Thailand Initiating Coverage

23 August 2016 Transport | Road & Rail Expressway & Metro Sell Target Price: THB7.00 PCL Price: THB7.95 Better Leave the Train At The Next Station Market Cap: USD3,507m Bloomberg Ticker: BEM TB

While the newsflow is positive for BEM, we initiate coverage on the stock Share Data with a SELL and a SOP-based TP of THB7.00 (12% downside) as we Avg Daily Turnover (THB/USD) 1,172m/33.8m believe the recent share price rally has priced in all the positives. We are 52-wk Price low/high (THB) 5.00 - 8.50 of view that investors have overvalued the benefits from Section 44 that should enable the company to get the MRT extension contract Free Float (%) 56 quicker than expected. Note that this new contract would require more Shares outstanding (m) 15,285 than three years before it can contribute revenue to the company. Estimated Return -12%

Section 44. At the end of June, the Thai Government used Section 44 of the Shareholders (%) interim constitution to speed up direct negotiations between the Mass Rapid CH. Karnchange PCL 28.2 Transit Authority of (MRTA) and Bangkok Expressway & Metro (BEM) Mass Rapit Transit Authority of Thailand 8.2 to run the Blue Line mass (MRT) extension. Under this clause, the Krung Thai Bank PCL 6.9 company may benefit in three ways: Share Performance (%) i. The negotiation process should be faster than what the consensus previously expected. Negotiations should be done in 75-90 days vs the YTD 1m 3m 6m 12m previous timeframe of 120-150 days; Absolute 16.1 28.2 54.4 ii. The concession – in a private-public partnership (PPP) net cost format – Relative 14.1 17.2 37.8 for the Blue Line extension may last 30 years, which is longer than Source: Bloomberg previous expectation of 25 years;

Bangkok Expressway & Metro PCL (BEM TB) iii. BEM may secure the Blue Line extension contract and renew the existing Price Close Relative to Stock Exchange of Thailand Index (RHS) Blue Line contract (of >19 more years) so that the two have the same 8.6 144 expiry date, ie 2048. This presented the biggest surprise from Section 44. 7.6 129 6.6 113 Overvalued on Section 44. The company’s share price has rallied more than 5.6 98 4.6 82 20% after Section 44 was brought into play. We are of view that the market has 1 overestimated the positive impact on the company and will wait for terms and 1 conditions of the contract from MRTA to be announced. This is so as it is not 1 1 yet confirmed that BEM will receive the second and third benefits mentioned above. Vol b We initiate coverage on BEM with a SOP-based TP of THB7.00 and a

SELL. Jul-16 Jan-16 Jun-16 Mar-16 Feb-16 May-16 SELL recommendation. While the company’s earnings growth outlook looks attractive (at a 37% average for the next three years), at the current share price, Source: Bloomberg the company is trading at the highest FY17F P/BV of 3.7x when compared to industry peer average of 1.8x. The stock is also trading at higher FY17F P/E Table Of Contents and EV/EBITDA multiples when compared to the industry peer average. Investment Thesis 3 Valuation And Recommendation 4 Key risks to our call: Risks And Company Background 5 i. Terms and conditions of the Blue Line extension contract benefiting the Expressway Business 6 Mass Transit Business 8 company more than we expected; Commercial Development Business 10 ii. A strong improvement in passenger traffic and ridership, which will boost Short-Term Growth Prospects 12 Long-Term Growth Prospects 12 its earnings growth beyond our forecast. Exclusive Ride On The 14 Negative Feedback From Passengers 16 Financial Performance 17

Outlook 18

Forecasts and Valuations Dec-14 Dec-15 Dec-16F Dec-17F Dec-18F Total turnover (THBm) 11,234 11,738 13,167 15,860 17,595 Reported net profit (THBm) 2,745 2,650 2,339 3,159 4,142 Recurring net profit (THBm) 2,315 1,625 2,339 3,159 4,142 Recurring net profit growth (%) 0.0 (29.8) 43.9 35.0 31.1 Recurring EPS (THB) 0.15 0.11 0.15 0.21 0.27 DPS (THB) 0.09 0.13 0.06 0.15 0.11 Recurring P/E (x) 52.5 74.8 52.0 38.5 29.3 P/B (x) 4.27 4.17 3.97 3.73 3.46 P/CF (x) 24.3 36.9 23.1 17.3 16.3 Dividend Yield (%) 1.1 1.6 0.8 1.9 1.4 EV/EBITDA (x) 20.3 21.2 19.2 15.8 13.5 Analyst Return on average equity (%) 0.0 9.2 7.8 10.0 12.2 Naruedom Mujjalinkool Net debt to equity (%) 109.8 119.8 118.4 94.1 70.8 +66 2862 9229 Our vs consensus EPS (adjusted) (%) (15.3) (15.1) (4.7) [email protected]

Source: Company data, RHB

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Bangkok Expressway & Metro PCL Thailand Initiating Coverage

23 August 2016 Transport | Road & Rail

Financial Exhibits

Financial model updated on: 2016-08-01.

Asia Financial summary Dec-14 Dec-15 Dec-16F Dec-17F Dec-18F Thailand Recurring EPS (THB) 0.15 0.11 0.15 0.21 0.27 Transport EPS (THB) 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.21 0.27 Bangkok Expressway & Metro PCL DPS (THB) 0.09 0.13 0.06 0.15 0.11 Bloomberg BEM TB BVPS (THB) 1.86 1.91 2.00 2.13 2.30 Sell Weighted avg adjusted shares (m) 15,285 15,285 15,285 15,285 15,285

Valuation basis Valuation metrics Dec-14 Dec-15 Dec-16F Dec-17F Dec-18F SOTP Recurring P/E (x) 52.5 74.8 52.0 38.5 29.3 P/E (x) 44.3 45.9 52.0 38.5 29.3 Key drivers P/B (x) 4.27 4.17 3.97 3.73 3.46 i. The operation in the new SOE expressway and FCF Yield (%) (1.2) (3.3) (0.4) 5.6 6.0 Purple line; Dividend Yield (%) 1.1 1.6 0.8 1.9 1.4 ii. More ridership from the new mass transit transferred to its core operations EV/EBITDA (x) 20.3 21.2 19.2 15.8 13.5 EV/EBIT (x) 37.5 41.3 37.1 29.6 23.2

Key risks i. Strong improvement in traffic and ridership; Income statement (THBm) Dec-14 Dec-15 Dec-16F Dec-17F Dec-18F ii. Being awarded a better than expected contract Total turnover 11,234 11,738 13,167 15,860 17,595 for the Blue Line extension. Gross profit 4,677 4,643 5,172 6,236 7,458 EBITDA 6,920 6,864 7,671 8,959 10,076 Company Profile Depreciation and amortisation (3,166) (3,336) (3,708) (4,171) (4,224) The Company is involved in the construction and Operating profit 3,754 3,528 3,963 4,788 5,851 operation of Expressway and Operation Management Net interest (1,394) (1,876) (1,595) (1,407) (1,252) of Mass Rapid Transit System Business, including related business. Income from associates & JVs 546 461 596 619 645 Pre-tax profit 3,513 3,422 2,977 4,017 5,262 Taxation (702) (721) (595) (803) (1,052)

Minority interests (66) (51) (43) (55) (67) Recurring net profit 2,315 1,625 2,339 3,159 4,142

Cash flow (THBm) Dec-14 Dec-15 Dec-16F Dec-17F Dec-18F Change in working capital (311) (71) (48) 1,162 64 Cash flow from operations 5,001 3,293 5,268 7,013 7,472 Capex (6,500) (7,254) (5,735) (235) (135) Cash flow from investing activities (7,128) (4,758) (5,735) (235) (135) Dividends paid (1,309) (1,925) (936) (1,263) (1,657) Cash flow from financing activities 1,471 3,571 3,858 (6,297) (5,764)

Balance sheet (THBm) Dec-14 Dec-15 Dec-16F Dec-17F Dec-18F Total cash and equivalents 4,725 4,981 8,372 8,853 10,426 Tangible fixed assets 10,896 19,780 25,320 24,900 24,369 Intangible assets 42,039 38,672 35,159 31,643 28,085 Total investments 9,714 10,870 10,870 10,870 10,870 Total other assets 2,352 2,929 2,283 2,412 2,556 Total assets 70,026 78,120 83,125 79,104 76,772 Short-term debt 5,041 22,529 12,305 8,083 9,732 Other liabilities 5,707 4,321 2,887 1,466 467 Total liabilities 43,817 48,990 52,506 46,480 41,529 Shareholders' equity 28,426 29,157 30,603 32,553 35,105 Minority interests 157 86 129 184 251 Total equity 26,209 29,130 30,619 32,624 35,244 Net debt 28,789 34,902 36,262 30,692 24,945 Total liabilities & equity 70,026 78,120 83,125 79,104 76,772

Key metrics Dec-14 Dec-15 Dec-16F Dec-17F Dec-18F Revenue growth (%) 0.0 4.5 12.2 20.5 10.9 Recurrent EPS growth (%) 0.0 (29.8) 43.9 35.0 31.1 Gross margin (%) 41.6 39.6 39.3 39.3 42.4 Operating EBITDA margin (%) 61.6 58.5 58.3 56.5 57.3 Net profit margin (%) 24.4 22.6 17.8 19.9 23.5 Dividend payout ratio (%) 47.7 72.6 40.0 72.6 40.0 Capex/sales (%) 57.9 61.8 43.6 1.5 0.8 Interest cover (x) 2.61 1.82 2.40 3.27 4.47

Source: Company data, RHB

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Bangkok Expressway & Metro PCL Thailand Initiating Coverage

23 August 2016 Transport | Road & Rail

Investment Thesis SELL, with a THB7.00 TP. We initiate coverage on BEM with a SOP-based TP of THB7.00 and a SELL recommendation. While the company’s earnings growth potential is attractive (37% average for the next three years), its current FY16-17F P/E valuation of 51.6x and 38.5x respectively is trading at a significant premium to industry peer average. We believe that BEM’s earnings growth will take time. We are of view that the company’s share price has already priced in the news of: i. The full operations of the Si Rat Outer Ring Road (SOE) and Purple Line in August; ii. Positive impact from Section 44 of the interim constitution with regards to the Blue Line. Bright outlook, but is it too expensive? While we agree that BEM is a company that has an attractive outlook both in the short and longer-term, we believe that the 20% share price rally has priced in all the good news. This is especially true for the expectation of a huge jump in revenue contributions from the SOE and Purple Line. The two are expected to start operations in August. These new revenue sources are still at the initial stages and should take about a year before it can start generating significant revenue for the company, in our view. Other potential upsides are still taking a long time. Apart from the SOP valuation of THB7.00 TP, we believe BEM still has more upside from the following catalysts: i. Winning the bids for new mass transit project such as the , and ; ii. Listing Bangkok Metro Networks Ltd (BMN) in the stock market in the near future; iii. Direct negotiations to become an operator for the extension of the Purple Line; iv. Compensation from the Expressway Authority of Thailand (EXAT) over toll rate disputes. However, the Orange Line, Yellow Line and Pink Line MRT networks are still under the term of reference (TOR) process. We may see the announcement of a winner at the end of this year, although this will take time. Other catalysts could also take a long time, ie more than one year, to materialise. Highest valuation in the region. Compared to its peers (Figure 1), BEM’s P/E, P/BV, and EV/EBITDA ratio are much higher than the industry average. Its FY16F P/BV of 4x is the highest amongst regional peers. Although its growth potential is high for the next two years, it also does not deserve to trade at such a rich P/E level. Compared to BTS Group Holdings (BTS Group) (BTS TB, BUY, THB10.40), we see that the latter has a higher P/E, but its financial position is much stronger than BEM’s. This is as its P/BV is only at 2.2x. BTS Group has a lot of cash, on top of owning valuable assets such as land and various properties.

Figure 1: Peers comparison Market Transport cap Ticker P/E P/BV EV/EBITDA Div. yield (%) ROE (%) EPS growth 16F 17F 16F 17F 16F 17F 16F 17F 16F 17F Company USDm 16F 17F Bangkok Expressway 3,471 BEM TB 51.6 38.5 4.0 3.7 19.1 15.7 0.8 1.9 7.8 10.0 44% 35% and Metro BTS Group Holdings 3,290 BTS TB 60.3 54.5 2.2 2.1 34.2 31.7 0.8 1.1 3.7 4.0 2% 11% MTR Crop 33,000 66 HK 27.0 24.9 1.5 1.6 15.8 14.6 7.3 7.4 5.6 6.3 -16% 13% Hopewell Highway 1,569 737 HK 18.4 17.1 1.7 1.7 6.2 5.7 5.1 5.6 8.2 9.7 13% 6% Infrastructure SMRT Crop 1,840 MRT SP 25.2 29.2 2.7 2.7 9.1 11.6 2.1 2.2 11.3 9.0 5% -12% Keio Crop 5,938 9008 JP 25.2 23.9 1.6 1.6 11.0 10.8 1.1 1.0 6.7 7.0 15% 6% East Japan Railway 35,742 9020 JP 13.5 12.7 1.4 1.3 7.9 7.9 1.5 1.5 10.9 10.7 27% 6% West Japan Railway 12,369 9021 JP 11.8 10.8 1.3 1.2 6.5 6.4 2.3 2.4 11.8 11.6 44% 10%

Average (Ex-BEM) 25.9 24.6 1.8 1.8 15.2 14.7 3.8 3.1 8.3 8.4 Source: Bloomberg, RHB

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Bangkok Expressway & Metro PCL Thailand Initiating Coverage

23 August 2016 Transport | Road & Rail

Valuation And Recommendation Expressway business. We expect BEM to garner extension contracts for all existing expressways under its network – ie First Stage Expressway (FES) and Sectors A, B, C, C+ and D – for 20 years each (Figure 2). However, the company may have to pay a higher revenue share to EXAT. We use DCF to value this business, with a 7.7% WACC and 0% terminal growth. Mass transit business. We believe Section 44 will help it win the 30-year contract for the Blue Line extension under the PPP net cost format. Whether the extended contract of the existing Blue Line will have the same expiry date as its extension is not yet known. As such, we have not imputed it into our valuation. For now, we assume that the existing Blue Line will get the operations & maintenance (O&M) revenue after its operation contract is ended in 2029. In Figure 2, after the contract expires, BEM should receive revenue from service fees. We use DCF to value this segment, with 8% WACC and 2% terminal growth. Media business. The company has a high chance of winning the contract for managing advertisements for the Purple Line and Blue Line extension, because it is a train operator. As such, we include the media business in our valuation, and assume a WACC of 10.1% WACC and 2% terminal growth for this segment.

Figure 2: BEM’s contract assumptions

Source: Company data, RHB

Figure 3: BEM’S SOP valuation THB/Share

Expressway business (7.7% WACC) 5.17 20-year contract extension in FES, Sector A,B,C,C+, and D

SOE

Mass transit business (8% WACC, 2% TG) 2.90 Existing Blue Line

Blue Line extension (Contract expire 2048)

Purple Line

Media business (10.1% WACC, 2% TG) 0.51 Existing Blue Line

Blue Line extension

Purple Line

Investment portfolio (CKP,TTW) 0.83 Cash-Debt -Minority interest (2.41) Total 7.00

Source: , RHB

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Bangkok Expressway & Metro PCL Thailand Initiating Coverage

23 August 2016 Transport | Road & Rail

Risks Terms and conditions of the Blue Line extension contract. Under Section 44, we did not include the expectation of a renewal the existing Blue Line contract (+19 more years) to have the same expiry date as the Blue Line extension, which is in 2048 on a net cost basis (ie the company receives the ticket fares). This enables BEM’s earnings to continue growing after 2029. This is because, at that time, its ridership should increase continuously and lead to significant earnings for the company. In our opinion, it might get the extension contract, although it would be under a gross cost contract, wherein it receives operating services fees. Strong improvement in traffic and ridership. Traffic and ridership are the most important factors for BEM because these two indicators are the key to its earnings. For our assumption, we expect only 50% of 100,000 riders per day on the Purple Line will transfer to its existing Blue Line. By contrast, BEM and MRTA expect riders of the Purple Line to number 120,000 and 200,000 per day respectively. As such, the company’s earnings have an upside risk if the Purple Line’s ridership is higher than our expectation.

Company Background Before becoming BEM. BEM was incorporated after Bangkok Expressway (BECL) and Bangkok Metro (BMCL) were merged on 30 Dec 2015. The company currently has three main businesses: i. Expressways; ii. Mass transit services; iii. Commercial development businesses. What happens after the merger? The combination of a cash cow (and a mature firm) like BECL and another entity that is anticipated to be a star (or in its growth stage) like BMCL should enable its amalgamation – BEM – to record solid recurring earnings growth for both the short and long term. BEM is already benefiting from the merger: i. Its financial position has improved as it received an “A” rating from TRIS Rating Co Ltd (TRIS Rating), which reflects its strong business profile, supported by stable and reliable operating cash flow; ii. It is benefiting from increased cost management efficiency; iii. The company has become a major transportation player in Thailand.

Figure 4: BEM’s major shareholders Figure 5: Revenue breakdown

Source: Company data Source: Company data

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Bangkok Expressway & Metro PCL Thailand Initiating Coverage

23 August 2016 Transport | Road & Rail

Expressway Business BEM has been granted concessions to construct and operate the following expressways: i. The second stage expressway for Sectors A, B, C, and D spanning 38.5 km (see the red and blue parts in Figure 6); ii. The Bang Pa-In-Pak Kret expressway (or Sector C+), which is 32km long; iii. The SOE, the newest expressway, which is expected to kick off operations in 3Q16. It spans 16.7 km (see the orange part in Figure 6). Si Rat Expressway, or Second Stage Expressway (SES). The company received a build-transfer-operate (BTO) project to construct and operate for EXAT. After finishing construction, it transferred the entire assets to authority to operate and received toll revenue – in negotiated proportions – from FES and SES. The project combines four sectors, ie Sectors A, B and C, and spans 38.5 km in total. The contract for operations started in 1990 and will last for 30 years. Moreover, BEM has been granted the rights to operate the SES and has another concession for Sector D (an extension of the SES). The 30-year contract to operate this expressway started in 1997. The Udon Ratthaya Expressway (Sector C+). This project was constructed and is operated by Northern Bangkok Expressway Co Ltd (NECL), in which BEM has a 99.99% investment. The expressway will connect to the SES at Chaeng Wattana Road and ends at Amphoe Bang Pa-In. It is approximately 32 km long. This project is also a BTO project that NECL will construct and operate first, and then transfer to EXAT. The toll revenue proportion is declared in the agreement, which started in 1996 with a 30-year contract.

Figure 6: Overview of BEM’s expressway operations Figure 7: Revenue breakdown of the expressway segment

NECL 14%

D 18% FES,A,B C 58% 10%

Source: Company data Source: Company data

In term of revenue contributions, BEM will receive 40% of total toll fare revenue from FES and SES (for Sectors A and B) that it shares with EXAT. Meanwhile, for Sectors C, C+, D and the SOE, the company will receive 100% of its toll fare revenues. The fare rates are adjusted every five years.

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Bangkok Expressway & Metro PCL Thailand Initiating Coverage

23 August 2016 Transport | Road & Rail

Figure 8: Revenue trend of BEM’s expressway business Figure 9: Daily traffic numbers on the expressway

THBm FES,A,B C D C+

1,133 1,208 982 1,050 802 1,452 1,563 1,393 1,233 1,339 900 928 798 849 867

5,113 4,478 4,540 4,730 5,002

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Source: Company data Source: Company data

Solid traffic growth. Nowadays, expressways have become an important option for private car owners in Thailand. This is because Bangkok has some the worst traffic jams in the world. As such, traffic volume numbers of those drivers using an expressway under BEM’s umbrella have the potential for solid growth. According to Figure 9, traffic has risen at a CAGR of 1.87% over the past nine years. High possibility of getting contract extensions. Although BEM still has only four years remaining for its revenue-sharing concessions in the FES and SES (Sectors A, B and C), which will expire in 2020, these concession agreements allow for two renewals every 10 years each. The company will also need to negotiate the benefit conditions with EXAT. In our assumptions, we expect BEM to get the contract extensions. However, while its revenue sharing in the FES, and Sectors A and B should remain the same at 40%, Sector C should see the start of revenue sharing with EXAT of at least 20%. On the other hand, its other concessions still have more than 10 years remaining (Figure 10). The disputes with EXAT. BEM and NECL have a total of 12 disputes with EXAT that have been referred to the arbitral tribunal. This is in accordance with the dispute settlement procedures under the agreements and in the administrative courts. These disputes are divided into: i. The ones that BEM and NECL refer to as dispute settlement proceedings under the agreements and demand for damages amounting to approximately THB28.2bn; ii. The ones that EXAT submitted claims for damages amounting to approximately THB9m. Disputes are still under the courts’ consideration. At present, most of these disputes are pending the court consideration process. It will take about 1-2 years to reach a conclusion. These are an additional upside for the company, primarily due to demand for damages, which amount to a huge sum, ie THB28.2bn.

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Bangkok Expressway & Metro PCL Thailand Initiating Coverage

23 August 2016 Transport | Road & Rail

Figure 10: Remaining concession period (in years)

Purple Line 2043

MRT Blue Line 2029

SOE 2042

Sector D 2027

Sector C+ 2026

Express way Express

FES & SES (Sector A-B-C) 2020

Source: Company data The new SOE. This expressway is an east-west corridor linking Bangkok and its surrounding areas. This project began construction in 2012 and has a total project cost of THB25.49bn. BEM is responsible for the expressway’s construction and will transfer ownership to EXAT under a 30-year BTO concession contract. In fact, the company will receive 100% of the SOEs toll fare revenue with the expectation of an 8.05% internal rate of return (IRR) with a 16-year payback period. This SOE is slated to start operations in August. BEM expects traffic volumes of around 88,000 trips per day.

Mass Transit Business BEM has been granted concessions for two MRT system projects from the MRTA (Figure 11) totalling 43km. The first one is the 20km Blue Line (Hua Lamphong-Bang Sue). The second one is the 23km Purple Line (Khlong Bang Phai Station-Tao Poon Station). BEM became the leading MRT operator in Thailand – in terms of longest rail length – when the Purple Line went operational on 6 Aug. Blue Line. This line is the first underground mass transit system in Thailand. The official commencement of operations was 3 Jul 2004. Hence, this line has been operating for more than 10 years now. BEM has the exclusive rights to collect revenue from ticket fares, as well as undertake activities and commercial development. This includes advertising, leasing spaces and telecommunications services at the metro stations and on the trains for a 25-year period. As per the concession agreement, the fare rates are adjusted every 24 months. These are based on actual changes on the Bangkok Non-food Consumer Price Index. Purple Line. BEM was able to execute a 30-year agreement for the Purple Line with the MRTA (Figure 10). This is an elevated metro line that runs throughout the route, with connection for the Blue Line extension at Tao Poon Station. This project is on a PPP gross cost basis, ie the public sector invests in all the civil work costs while BEM invests in the railway systems and rolling stock, which includes train O&M. In this regard, the Government is entitled to collect fares revenue from the use of all civil infrastructures, and the mechanical & electrical (M&E) systems, and will return the same to BEM in the form of service fees for train O&M and the M&E systems.

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Bangkok Expressway & Metro PCL Thailand Initiating Coverage

23 August 2016 Transport | Road & Rail

Figure 11: BEM’s mass transit routes Figure 12: Mass transit ridership

Source: Company data Source: Company data

Ridership growth potential. Although, ridership on the Blue Line is lower than what BEM expected – at only 260,000 trips per day (causing the company to operate at a loss since it started operations in 2004) – we have a positive view. We believe the Blue Line should start making profits after an increase in ridership via the feed-in from the Purple Line. According to the MRTA, it expects this line’s ridership to reach 200,000 trips per day in 2017 alone. However, BEM has more conservative view. The company forecasts a ridership of only 120,000 trips per day and expects about 50% of the Purple Line’s ridership transferring to the existing Blue Line. Therefore, with regards to BEM’s expectations, we expect the Blue Line’s ridership to grow significantly by 18% YoY to 330,000 trips per day (Figure 13), which will result in an improvement in terms of ticket fare revenue from 2017 onwards. The big step in 2019-2020. After we witness the full operations of the new mass transit network from the… i. Green Line extension (north-south); ii. Pink Line; iii. Yellow Line; iv. Orange Line; v. Blue Line extension; …we expect to see ridership of about 2m using the MRT system. For the Blue Line’s ridership, we expect to it record about 590,000 and 730,000 trips for 2019-2020 respectively. This is an about 150% growth from the numbers currently.

Figure 13: Existing Blue Line’s ridership forecast Figure 14: Thailand mass transit’s master plan

Source: Company data, RHB Source: BTS Holding Company

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Bangkok Expressway & Metro PCL Thailand Initiating Coverage

23 August 2016 Transport | Road & Rail

More room to grow. Currently, the number of riders who use the mass transit network locally – which includes BTS Group’s lines under the Bangkok Mass Transit System (BTS), BEM’s two lines and State Railway of Thailand’s (SRT) lines – stands at only 900,000 trips per day. This figure is much lower than in Thailand’s neighbouring countries. According to our research, when compared to other countries (Figure 15-18) Thailand has the lowest number of: i. Riders per day; ii. Distance length; iii. Average daily ridership per population. For example, Hong Kong has total population of about 7m people. Its ridership numbers stands at about 5m people per day, or 71% of its population. This is an extremely high figure. Thailand has a ridership per day of 900,000 currently vs Bangkok’s total population of around 11m, or equivalent to 8% of the people living there. Therefore, we opine that, when the mass transit network is finally fully operational, it will increase total ridership per day to more than 2m people per day (ie a 100% growth). Even then, this will represent only 18% of Bangkok’s population – a ridership figure that is still lower than what is being seen in other countries.

Figure 15: Ridership per km Figure 16: Average daily ridership

Source: RHB Source: RHB

Figure 17: Mass transit distance length Figure 18: Average daily ridership per population

Source: RHB Source: RHB

Commercial Development Business BEM also focuses on running the commercial development business for the Blue Line via BMN, a subsidiary. Its business involves: i. Managing the advertisements put up on the trains and stations; ii. Leasing the retail space in prime stations; iii. Providing and maintaining services related to the telecommunications system installed inside the metro stations.

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Bangkok Expressway & Metro PCL Thailand Initiating Coverage

23 August 2016 Transport | Road & Rail

Moreover, the company also now leases out space to private entities and individuals for commercial operations purposes. These entities can install intelligent traffic signs and various advertising boards, as well as retail spaces, around its toll plazas. BMN also cooperates with a well-known media company, Plan B Media (PLANB TB, NR), via an 8- year contract to share advertising space and revenue at Blue Line stations. Growing ridership to drive advertising revenue. In the record-breaking years of 2005- 2015, the number of riders on the Blue Line rose by 5.7% pa on average (Figure 12). This means advertising spenders who use BMN’s services were also able to garner more eyeballs for their advertising displays annually. The still growing ridership numbers should give the company more room to increase advertising rates with its customers. Currently, the Blue Line is a fast-growing mass transit network in terms of ridership numbers and services routes. In the near future, the Blue Line extension – which will act as a ring that connects inner Bangkok and the Purple Line extension – will be completed. This will also significantly boost the Blue Line’s ridership numbers and directly benefit advertisers. Modest transit media advertising expenditure (adex) growth. According to adex data from The Nielsen Company, transit adex has been amongst those charting outstanding growth. On average, it increased 13% over the past five years (Figure 19). Moreover, while we expect total adex for this year to decline due to the weak macroeconomic outlook, we believe that transit adex growth should remain strong as YTD, adex figures already grown 20% (Figure 20).

Figure 19: Transit media vs total adex Figure 20: YTD’s adex comparison (January-June) THBm YTD16 YTD15 Chg.% TV 26,023 29,238 (11.0%) Cable/ Satellite TV 2,440 2,954 (17.4%) Digital TV 9,570 10,520 (9.0%) Radio 2,643 2,628 0.6% Newspapers 4,930 5,971 (17.4%) Magazines 1,506 2,096 (28.1%) Cinema 2,721 2,243 21.3% Outdoor 2,464 2,090 17.9% Transit 2,477 2,061 20.2% In store 349 452 (22.8%) Internet 849 492 72.6% Total 55,972 60,746 (7.9%)

Source: The Nielsen Company Source: The Nielsen Company

Figure 21: Overview of BMN’s business

Source: Company

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Bangkok Expressway & Metro PCL Thailand Initiating Coverage

23 August 2016 Transport | Road & Rail

Short-Term Growth Prospects The SOE According to its 30-year contract (with the expectation of a 8.05% IRR and a 16-year payback period), BEM will receive 100% of toll fare revenue from the SOE, which will boost its revenue in two ways: i. Revenue recorded from people who use only this expressway. The company expects around 88,000 trips to be made per day, with fare prices averaging THB50.00 per trip; ii. Revenue from passengers transferring from the SOE to the SES. BEM expects about 20% of people who use the SOE will continue to use the SES.

Figure 22: Additional traffic from SOE to existing expressways

Source: Company data, RHB

Purple Line (Bang Yai-Bang Sue) According to the operation contract for the Purple Line, the operational fee is calculated by using a cost-plus pricing method at 10.5%. The company expects the cost of operations for the Purple Line project to be at THB1.31bn in 2017, and estimates this to increase about 4% every year. Therefore, it should receive about THB137m in net operational revenue per year. Moreover, the MRTA expects the Purple Line’s ridership to reach 200,000 trips per day in 2017. BEM has adopted a more conservative view, and forecasts only 120,000 trips per day. In the meantime, it expects about 50% of Purple Line riders to transfer to the existing Blue Line.

Long-Term Growth Prospects Blue Line extension (Bang Sue-Tha Phra and Hua Lamphong-Bang Khae) Blue Line extension will be the game changer. The extension of the Blue Line, which spans 26.9 km, will comprise 5.4km of subway tracks (four stations) and 21.5km of elevated structures (15 stations). It is separated into two parts: i. Bang Sue-Tha Phra; ii. Hua Lamphong-Bang Khae. After the Blue Line extension begins operating, the entire Blue Line will run as a circle (ie a loop) that passes through the centre and middle of Bangkok. This line will be the only mass transit line in Thailand with a route that is a loop. Moreover, according to the Bangkok Rail Mass Transit Master Plan (Figure 14), in the future, the Blue Line will be the key interchange connecting to other lines. It also has the most interchange stations. Currently, civil works on the Blue Line extension are about 79.03% complete.

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Many are waiting for this extension. The MRTA expects that, upon launching, the Blue Line extension will see riders taking 500,000 trips a day. However, we have a more conservative view, with 440,000 trips per day (about 10% below MRTA’s forecast). If BEM gets this contract, it will benefit from it in two ways: i. The Blue Line extension will be another source of revenue in 2019 going forward. We expect it to clock 440,000 riders a day with an average fare of THB27.00. Therefore the company will be able to book additional revenue about THB4bn per year; ii. We expect about 50% of passengers on the Blue Line extension will transfer to the existing Blue Line, which implies 220,000 additional riders per day. Hence, it stands to benefit from the significant increase in its ridership for its existing network. A missing link. Although the Purple Line already started operations on 6 Aug this year, the bad news is there is a 1km gap between the Blue Line’s Bang Sue station and the Purple Line’s Tao Poon station. Passengers who want to transfer trains from the Purple Line to Blue Line have to use a shuttle bus to travel between the stations – which takes about 5-10 minutes – or walk the distance. Therefore, passengers will find it inconvenient to travel to inner areas of Bangkok as there is no real interconnection between the two lines. The lack of a connection occurred because the construction of the Blue Line's Bang Sue-Tha Phra section (which covers the missing link between Bang Sue and Tao Poon) is still under way. In the future, the Purple and Blue Lines will be linked at Tao Poon Station.

Figure 23: Details of the missing link problem

Source: Bangkok Post

Blue Line extension now is under Section 44. In July, the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) invoked its powers under Section 44 of the interim charter to speed up direct negotiations between MRTA and the current operator of the Blue Line, BEM, for the running of two extended routes. According to the news reports during this period, “…the order will speed up the negotiation process with BEM. There is a specified time-frame for each step. It is believed the process will be faster. BEM will have confidence especially in planning the operation for the 1km missing link”. Therefore, under Section 44, we strongly believe that the negotiations should be done by October. This is faster than our previous expectation that the contract would be done in 4Q16. The benefits of Section 44 are also going through the existing Blue Line. BEM does not only get to benefit from the faster processing of the Blue Line extension contract, but it also gets the opportunity to: i. Sign the contract for the Blue Line’s extension for 30 years instead of 25 years; ii. Amend existing Blue Line operations contract to have the same expiry timeframe as the Blue Line extension – this is in order to ensure consistency in the management and operations of the rail service. This means that BEM will automatically get a renewed contract for the existing Blue Line from 2029 to 2048, ie 19 more years.

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Many new trains are waiting at the platforms. Apart from Purple Line, and Blue Line and Green Line extensions, the MRTA also expect to launch many more mass transit lines within this year. These include the Orange Line, Pink Line, Yellow Line and Purple Line extension. Orange Line. The Orange Line (Taling Chan-Min Buri) comprises 9km of elevated structures with seven stations and a 30.6km underground section with 23 stations. The total length is 39.6km. This line links Bangkok’s east and west sides, and passes through the centre of the city (Figure14). The project cost for O&M and M&E is about THB40bn. The bidding process should start next year. Pink Line and Yellow Line. The 34.5 km Pink Line (Khae Rai-Min Buri) and 30.4km Yellow Line (Lat Phrao-Samrong) are straddle monorail systems that ride on elevated structures. Note that the Pink Line and Yellow Line have indicative prices of THB53.5bn and THB51.8bn respectively. The Government will subsidise the project costs by about THB20bn each. The MRTA announced the invitation letter to tender of these two PPP- model projects last month. The timeline for these two projects as follows:

Figure 24: Pink Line and Yellow Line bidding timeline Date 6 Jul-5 Aug Interested parties to purchase TOR 7 Nov Tenderers to submit three envelopes to MRTA 17 Nov The announcement of the successful tenderers Source: MRTA

Which lines are on BEM’s radar? The company is prioritising the winning of the Orange Line, Yellow Line and Pink Line tenders. We expect it to win Orange Line because this line has many stations that are linked to its existing network. We are also of the belief that BEM should also win at least one line of either the Yellow Line – a higher chance as it is connected to the company’s Blue Line – or the Pink Line. This will help it boost its long-term future revenue. The expectation of getting a contract to manage a commercial area on the Purple Line via BMN. Normally, it is easier if commercial developer and service operator are from the same company. This is because it is easy to manage both commercial and train services together. Therefore, we have high expectations of BMN winning the bid for the commercial developer contract. This contract will allow the firm to manage a commercial area on the Purple Line. However, we expect the process of finding the media operator might take time. In a best case scenario, we may only find out the media operator for the Purple Line by year-end only. Hence, it will only be next year when BMN starts installing the media platforms in the station and begin full services, in such a case.

Exclusive Ride On The Purple Line On 15 Jul, we went for a site visit to a train depot and joined the trial run of the Purple Line at Khlong Bang Phai Station. Located to the east of this station is the Purple Line depot (Figure 25), which houses the main workshop, the operations control centre (Figure 26), and other railway systems’ O&M facilities. The first Japanese train in Thailand. Purple Line uses 21 cars with three carriages (this can be increased up to six if needed) of trains manufactured by Japan Transport Engineering Co (J-TREC). The Purple Line is the first heavy rail transit network in Thailand that use Japanese train. Each carriage can carry 307 passengers – around six passengers per sq m if you do the maths. The train has a maximum speed at 80km per hour with an average service speed of 30- 40km per hour. If we were using the train from terminal to terminal (ie 22km and 16 stations in total), it will take about 40 minutes, which is faster than using a car or any other forms of public transportation. Using ground vehicles may take more than an hour during the rush hour periods for the same distance. Fares start at THB14.00-42.00 and are calculated at a rate of THB2.00 per km.

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Figure 25: Purple Line train depot and train interior Figure 26: Control room

Source: RHB Source: RHB

Missing link problem. Once Thailand’s first platform-to-platform mass transit transfer system is completed, transferring between the Purple Line and Blue Line at the Tao Poon Interchange Station will just be a matter of going from one floor to another – a journey of around a minute only. Based on our on the ground experience, given that the missing link between the two stations is still under construction, we had to go out of Tao Poon Station (Purple Line) and take a shuttle bus to Bang Sue Station (Blue Line) – a journey that took more than 15 minutes. At that time (a weekday at 4.00 pm, ie not rush hour yet), we still spent eight minutes on the bus (not including the waiting time) thanks to some traffic along the way, and eventually walked for a total of seven minutes (ie walking from station to bus and from bus to station). Walking between stations of different lines can take 5-10 minutes on average. This problem has become a big issue now that the Purple Line has started operating. This is causing the line’s passengers a lot of inconvenience in terms of time wasted (see the following section). We hope that this missing link problem will be fixed as soon as possible.

Figure 27: Escalator to station Figure 28: Future link to the Blue Line

Source: RHB Source: RHB

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Negative Feedback From Passengers After two weeks of operations (the Purple Line began operating on 6 Aug), we have heard a lot of negative feedback from passengers on a variety of issues: i. Expensive ticket prices. For example, If we want to go to our work place by using Purple Line from Klong Bang Phai (the line’s terminal station) to Asoke Station on the Blue Line (a journey of 29 stations in total), we have to pay THB42.00 for the Purple Line ticket and THB39.00 for the Blue Line (a single journey ticket). This comes to THB81.00 per one way trip or THB162 for a round trip. This is quite expensive when you compare it with the cost of living in Thailand. Commuters also have a lot of other transportation options, eg a shuttle bus that costs not more than THB50.00 per trip; ii. No promotions and ticket packages. Normally, passenger who use mass transit networks on either the Green Line or Blue Line can purchase tickets as part of a package, eg THB1,400 for one month or THB1,250 for 50 trips. These promotions come up to be cheaper than a single journey ticket. As the Purple Line does not offer such packages, it finds difficult to attract mass transit passengers to use this line; iii. Time consuming. During the initial stages of operations, there were some problems that caused the Purple Line to run slower than expected. Normally, we expect to spend about 40 minutes in order to use the Purple Line from terminal to terminal. However, it is running by more than 50 minutes due to some technical issues. In fact, when using the Purple Line from Klong Bang Phai (the line’s terminal station) to Asoke Station on the Blue Line, we had to spend about an hour per trip, depending on the missing link, or one station gap issue. We use up the same amount of time as we would in taking the bus; iv. One station gap the biggest issue. As we mentioned earlier, the one station gap is the big issue when it comes to using this line during rush hour. In our view, the shuttle bus service provided by the MRTA can be overwhelmed during peak periods, resulting in a lot of time being spent either waiting for a bus or being caught in traffic. Sometimes, passengers have to spend more than 30 minute in order to transfer from the Blue Line to the Purple Line. As a result, according to the industry sources, the Purple Line has total ridership of only 20,000-50,000 trips per day. This is lower than the company and MRTA’s expectations of 120,000 and 200,000 trips per day respectively. This will directly impact BEM’s revenue, in our view.

Figure 29: The Purple Line’s park and ride Figure 30: The one station gap issue

Source: Various media sources Source: Various media sources

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Financial Performance Better financial position. The combination between a cash cow or mature company like BECL (which has a strong credit rating) and the company that is still in the developing stages (ie BMCL), helps to place BEM in a stronger financial position. The company just received an “A” rating from TRIS Rating, which reflects BEM’s strong business profile that is supported by a stable and reliable operating cash flow. This could help the company refinance its debt in order to have better interest rates than before. In the past, BMCL had poor interest rates due to a less-than-stellar past performances. Lower interest rate. BEM is authorised to issue bonds of up to THB48bn in order to invest for a new mass transit project. Currently, the company has already issued THB15bn in bonds with interest rates of around 2.9% pa. It uses this cash to repay its short-term loan. According to Figure 31, BEM will have cost of debt only 3.1% per year, which is lower than the previous rate. In terms of interest expenses, this could save the company almost THB400m pa.

Figure 31: BEM’s funding structure

Source: Company data

Manageable D/E. We expect BEM to have a 2016 D/E at 1.7x, mostly in long-term loans and debentures. In the future, if the company gets contracts for… i. Blue Line extension, which has about THB22.8bn in M&E project costs; ii. Either the Yellow Line or Pink Line contracts at THB30bn, around THB52.8bn in investment costs in total; …its long-term D/E should not be more than 2x, which is still at a manageable level. Investment in TTW (TTW TB, NR) and CK Power (CKP) (CKP TB, NR). Apart of its core business, BEM also has a 19% stake in CKP, which invests in companies generating and distributing electricity. It also holds 20% in TTW, which is involved in the production and sale of treated water. The investment in these two companies has a book value of about THB10bn.

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Outlook One-two boost in 2016-2017. For 2016, we expect BEM’s revenue to grow by 12% YoY, driven by four months of additional revenue contributions from the SOE and Purple Line. We expect the two to generate revenues of THB481m and THB520m respectively. Moreover, some of the passenger who is using these new toll expressway and MRT network should continue to transfer to BEM’s existing expressways and the Blue Line MRT network. Therefore, the company existing businesses should get more revenue from additional private car owners and passengers. In 2017, BEM’s revenue should surge by 20% YoY, driven by the full-year effect from the SOE and Purple Line. GPM decreasing slightly. Based on the initial stages of operations for both the SOE and Purple Line, we expect BEM to incur initial operations costs from these two projects. This should impact the company’s GPM, causing it to decrease slightly to 39.2% from 39.6% in 2016. However, it will gradually increase after it has more private cars and passengers using its expressways and the Blue Line. This is because most of BEM’s costs in the toll roads and MRT businesses are fixed. Thus, its GPM will increase in line with the rise in private cars and MRT passengers. Benefits from lower interest rate. In the past, BEM had interest expenses of about THB1.5-1.9bn pa. The financial restructuring helps the company to have lower interest rates of 3.1% from about 4%, which will reduce its interest expenses by more than THB400m pa. Moreover, we expect BEM to be able to reduce its interest rates further, after the company issues more bond with low interest rates. Strong core net profit growth in the next three years. As a result of the above, we expect the company’s net profit to surge by 44%/35% in 2016-2017 respectively. This will mostly come from additional revenues from both the new expressway and MRT businesses, as well as a decrease in interest expenses. For the long-term outlook, BEM’s future is still bright, given the expectation of a 35% growth on average for the three years. Moreover, if the company can start its Blue Line extension operations in 2019-2020, it will allow BEM to post continued significant earnings growth.

Figure 32: BEM’s revenue and net profit forecasts

THBm THBm 20,000 4,500 18,000 4,000 16,000 3,500 14,000 3,000 12,000 2,500 10,000 2,000 8,000 1,500 6,000 4,000 1,000 2,000 500 - - 2014 2015 2016F 2017F 2018F Commercial development Operation revenue (Purple Line) Mass transit Expressway Rerurring profit

Source: Company data, RHB

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SWOT Analysis

• Leader in Thailand’s expressway operator market • Regulatory risks relating to its • Strong relationship with shareholder Mass Rapid concession Transit Authority (MRTA) business • Risk of losing its benefits after the company extends a contract

• Participating in future mass transit expansion • Listing Bangkok Metro Networks Ltd (BMN) by 2017 • Population and urbanisation expansion

• Expiration of its current concession contract in the near future • The number of traffic and ridership is uncontrollable • High investment costs in its near future

Recommendation Chart

Date Recommendation Target Price Price Price Close 2016-08-22 8.8 Source: RHB, Bloomberg 8.3 7.8 7.3 6.8 6.3 5.8 5.3 4.8 Jan-16 Mar-16 May-16 Jul-16

Source: RHB, Bloomberg

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RHB Guide to Investment Ratings

Buy: Share price may exceed 10% over the next 12 months Trading Buy: Share price may exceed 15% over the next 3 months, however longer-term outlook remains uncertain Neutral: Share price may fall within the range of +/- 10% over the next 12 months Take Profit: Target price has been attained. Look to accumulate at lower levels Sell: Share price may fall by more than 10% over the next 12 months Not Rated: Stock is not within regular research coverage

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3. Affiliation between 2 companies whereby one or more member of the Board of Directors or the Commissioners are the same;

4. Affiliation between the Company and the parties, both directly or indirectly, controlling or being controlled by the Company;

5. Affiliation between 2 companies which are controlled, directly or indirectly, by the same party; or

6. Affiliation between the Company and the main Shareholders.

PT RHB Securities Indonesia is not an insider as defined in the Capital Market Law and the information contained in this report is not considered as insider information prohibited by law.

Insider means: a. a commissioner, director or employee of an Issuer or Public Company; b. a substantial shareholder of an Issuer or Public Company; c. an individual, who because of his position or profession, or because of a business relationship with an Issuer or Public Company, has access to inside information; and d. an individual who within the last six months was a Person defined in letters a, b or c, above.

Singapore RHB Research Institute Singapore Pte Ltd and/or its subsidiaries and/or associated companies do not make a market in any securities covered in this report, except for: (a) -

The staff of RHB Research Institute Singapore Pte Ltd and its subsidiaries and/or its associated companies do not serve on any board or trustee positions of any issuer whose securities are covered in this report, except for: (a) -

RHB Research Institute Singapore Pte Ltd and/or its subsidiaries and/or its associated companies do not have and have not within the last 12 months had any corporate finance advisory relationship with the issuer of the securities covered in this report or any other relationship (including a shareholding of 1% or more in the securities covered in this report) that may create a potential conflict of interest, except for: (a) -

Hong Kong RHBSHK or any of its group companies may have financial interests in in relation to an issuer or a new listing applicant (as the case may be) the securities in respect of which are reviewed in the report, and such interests aggregate to an amount equal to or more than (a) 1% of the subject company’s market capitalization (in the case of an issuer as defined under paragraph 16 of the Code of Conduct for Persons Licensed by or Registered with the Securities and Futures Commission (the “Code of Conduct”); and/or (b) an amount equal to or more than 1% of the subject company’s issued share capital, or issued units, as applicable (in the case of a new listing applicant as defined in the Code of Conduct). Further, the analysts named in this report or their associates may have financial interests in relation to an issuer or a new listing applicant (as the case may be) in the securities which are reviewed in the report.

23

Bangkok Expressway & Metro PCL Thailand Initiating Coverage

Transport | Road & Rail

RHBSHK or any of its group companies may make a market in the securities covered by this report. RHBSHK or any of its group companies may have analysts or their associates, individual(s) employed by or associated with RHBSHK or any of its group companies serving as an officer of the company or any of the companies covered by this report. RHBSHK or any of its group companies may have received compensation or a mandate for investment banking services to the company or any of the companies covered by this report within the past 12 months.

Note: The reference to “group companies” above refers to a group company of RHBSHK that carries on a business in Hong Kong in (a) investment banking; (b) proprietary trading or market making; or (c) agency broking, in relation to securities listed or traded on The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited.

Kuala Lumpur Hong Kong Singapore

RHB Research Institute Sdn Bhd RHB Securities Hong Kong Ltd. RHB Research Institute Singapore Level 11, Tower One, RHB Centre 12th Floor Pte Ltd. Jalan Tun Razak World-Wide House 10 Collyer Quay Kuala Lumpur 19 Des Voeux Road #09-08 Ocean Financial Centre Malaysia Central, Hong Kong Singapore 049315 Tel : +(60) 3 9280 2185 Tel : +(852) 2525 1118 Tel : +(65) 6533 1818 Fax : +(60) 3 9284 8693 Fax : +(852) 2810 0908 Fax : +(65) 6532 6211

Jakarta Shanghai Bangkok

PT RHB Securities Indonesia RHB (China) Investment Advisory Co. Ltd. RHB Securities (Thailand) PCL Wisma Mulia, 20th Floor Suite 4005, CITIC Square 10th Floor, Sathorn Square Office Tower Jl. Jenderal Gatot Subroto No. 42 1168 Nanjing West Road 98, North Sathorn Road, Silom 12710, Indonesia Shanghai 20041 Bangrak, Bangkok 10500 Tel : +(6221) 2783 0888 China Thailand Fax : +(6221) 2783 0777 Tel : +(8621) 6288 9611 Tel: +(66) 2 862 9999 Fax : +(8621) 6288 9633 Fax : +(66) 2 862 9799

24

Thai Institute of Directors Association (IOD) – Corporate Governance Report Rating 2015

Excellent ADVANC CPN GRAMMY KBANK MCOT PS RATCH SCB THCOM WACOAL BAFS DRT HANA KCE MINT PSL ROBINS SCC TISCO BCP DTAC HMPRO KKP MONO PTT SAMART SE-ED TKT BIGC DTC INTUCH KTB NKI PTTEP SAMTEL SIM TMB BTS EASTW IRPC LHBANK PHOL PTTGC SAT SNC TOP CK EGCO IVL LPN PPS QTC SC SPALI VGI

Very Good AAV BBL COL HEMRAJ MC PG SCG SST THIP TPC TWS ACAP BDMS CPF HOTPOT MEGA PJW SEAFCO STA THRE TPCORP UAC AGE BECL CPI HYDRO MFEC PM SFP STEC THREL TRC UT AHC BKI CSL ICC NBC PPP SIAM SVI TICON TRU UV AKP BLA DCC ICHI NCH PR SINGER SWC TIP TRUE VNT AMATA BMCL DELTA INET NINE PRANDA SIS SYMC TIPCO TSC WAVE ANAN BOL DEMCO IRC NSI PREB SITHAI SYNTEC TK TSTE WINNER AOT BROOK ECF KSL NTV PT SMK TASCO TKS TSTH YUASA APCS BWG EE KTC OCC PTG SMPC TBSP TMI TTA ZMICO ARIP CENTEL ERW LANNA OGC Q-CON SMT TCAP TMILL TTCL ASIMAR CFRESH GBX LH OISHI QH SNP TF TMT TTW ASK CHO GC LOXLEY OTO RS SPI TGCI TNDT TU ASP CIMBT GFPT LRH PAP S&J SSF THAI TNITY TVD BANPU CM GLOBAL MACO PDI SABINA SSI THANA TNL TVO BAY CNT GUNKUL MBK PE SAMCO SSSC THANI TOG TWFP* * On Oct 1,2015 TWFP TWFP merged with TWS resulting in a new company, TWPC

Good 2S AS CBG DNA GCAP ITD LHK MK PATO PTL SEAOIL STPI AEC ASIA CGD EARTH GENCO JSP LIT MODERN PB PYLON SIRI SUC AEONTS AUCT CHG EASON GL JTS LIVE MOONG PCA QLT SKR SUSCO AF AYUD CHOW ECL GLAND JUBILE LST MPG PCSGH RCL SMG SUTHA AH BA CI EFORL GLOW KASET M MSC PDG RICHY SOLAR SYNTEC AIRA BEAUTY CITY ESSO GOLD KBS MAJOR MTI PF RML SORKON TAE AIT BEC CKP FE GYT KCAR MAKRO MTLS PICO RPC SPA TAKUNI AJ BFIT CNS FIRE HTC KGI MATCH NC PL S SPC TCC AKR BH CPALL FOCUS HTECH KKC MATI NOK PLANB SALEE SPCG TCCC AMANAH BIG CPL FORTH IEC KTIS MBKET NUSA PLAT SAPPE SPPT TCJ AMARIN BJC CSC FPI IFEC KWC M-CHAI NWR PPM SAWAD SPVI TEAM AP BJCHI CSP FSMART IFS KYE MFC NYT PRG SCCC SRICHA TFD APCO BKD CSS FSS IHL L&E MILL OCEAN PRIN SCN SSC TFI AQUA BTNC CTW FVC IRCP LALIN MJD PACE PSTC SCP STANLY TIC TIW TPIPL UPF VPO TLUXE TRT UPOIC WHA TMC TSE UREKA WIN TMD TSR UWC XO TOPP UMI VIBHA TPCH UP VIH

IOD (IOD Disclaimer) การเปิดเผลผลการสํารวจของสมาคมส่งเสริมสถาบันกรรมการบริษัทไทย (IOD) ในเรื่องการกํากับดูแลกิจการ (Corporate Governance) นี ้เป็ นการ ดําเนินการตามนโยบายของสํานักงานคณะกรรมการกํากับหลักทรัพย์และตลาดหลักทรัพย์ โดยการสํารวจของ IOD เป็นการสํารวจและประเมินจากข้อมูลของบรษัทจด ทะเบียนในตลาดหลักทรัพย์แห่งประเทศไทยและตลาดหลักทรัพย์เอ็มเอไอ ที่มีการเปิดเผยต่อสาธารณะและเป็นข้อมูลที่ผู้ลงทุนทั่วไปสามารถเข้าถึงได้ ดังนั้นผลสํารวจ ดังกล่าวจึงเป็นการนําเสนอในมุมมองของบุคคลภายนอกโดยไม่ได้เป็นการประเมินการปฏิบัติและมิได้มีการใช้ข้อมูลภายในในการประเมิน อนึ่ง ผลการสํารวจดังกล่าว เป็นผลการสํารวจ ณ วันที่ปรากฎในรายงานการกํากับดูและกิจการบริษัทจดทะเบียนไทยเท่านั้น ดังนั้นผลการสํารวจจึงอาจ เปลี่ยนแปลงได้ภายหลังวันดังกล่าว ทั้งนี้บริษัทหลักทรัพย์ อาร์เอชบี จํากัด (มหาชน) มิได้ยืนยันหรือรับรองถึงความถูกต้องของผลการสํารวจดังกล่าวแต่อย่างใด

ขอมูล Anti-Corruption Progress Indicator ของบริษัทจดทะเบียน

ระดับ 1 ACD AEONTS AFC AIRA AJ ALUCON AMC AQUA ARIP AUCT BAT-3K BIG BJC BLISS BMCL BOL BRR BSBM CBG CCET CCN CGD CMR CPH CSC CSP CTW DCON DRACO DSGT DTCI E EMC ESSO FOCUS FSMART GIFT GLAND GRAND GUNKUL HFT HTECH IHL ILINK ITD JSP KDH KTIS KTP LEE LST MAJOR MATCH MAX M-CHAI MDX MIDA ML MPIC NC NEP NNCL NWR OHTL PICO PK PL PPM PRAKIT PRECHA PRIN PSTC PYLON RAM RICH RS SANKO SAUCE SAWAD SAWANG SCN SEAFCO SF SHANG SIRI SMART SMM SOLAR SPACK SPG SPPT SPVI STA STAR SVH SVOA SWC TAPAC TC TCCC TCJ TCOAT TH TKS TNH TNPC TPA TPAC TPOLY TRC TRUBB TSE TTA TTI TTL TTTM TWP TWZ U UMS UPA UPOIC UTP UVAN VARO VI VIBHA VIH VTE WG

ระดับ 2 2S ABICO AF AKP AMARIN AMATA AOT APCO AYUD BEAUTY BFIT BH BKD BLAND BTNC CCP CI CSR CSS EFORL EPCO FE FNS FVC GEL GLOBAL HEMRAJ IEC IFS INET JUTHA KASET KCAR KKC KSL L&E LALIN LTX M MALEE MBK MBKET MEGA MK MPG MTLS NCH NCL NPP OCC OCEAN PB PCA PRINC QH ROCK RPC S & J SGP SIAM SIS SKR SMG SMIT SORKON SUSCO TAKUNI TEAM TF TIC TIP TIPCO TMC TMI TPP TRT TRU TRUE TSC TSI TTW TVD TVO UKEM UNIQ UWC VNG WIIK WIN XO

ระดับ 3A ABC ACAP ADVANC AEC AGE AH AIE AMANAH ANAN AP APCS APURE AS ASIA ASIAN ASIMAR BIGC BROOK BTS BWG CEN CENTEL CFRESH CHARAN CHO CHOTI CM CNT COL CPALL CPF CPI CPL DELTA DEMCO DIMET DNA DTAC EA ECF EE EVER FPI GBX GC GFPT GLOW HMPRO HOTPOT ICC ICHI IFEC INOX INSURE IRC JAS JTS JUBILE KC KTC KYE LHK LPN LRH MAKRO MC MCOT MFC MFEC MINT MJD MONO MOONG NBC NDR NINE NMG NSI NTV OGC PACE PCSGH PDI PG PHOL PLAT PPS PR PRANDA PREB PS QLT RATCH RML ROBINS ROJNA RWI SAMCO SCCC SCG SEAOIL SE-ED SENA SINGER SITHAI SMK SMPC SPALI SPC SPCG SPI SRICHA SSI STANLY SUPER SVI SYMC SYNEX SYNTEC TASCO TCMC TFI THAI THRE THREL TICON TKT TLUXE TMILL TMT TNL TPCORP TSTE TSTH TTCL TU TVI UOBKH UREKA VGI VNT WACOAL WHA ZMICO

ระดับ 3B AAV AHC AI AIT AKR ARROW ASK BA BDMS BEC BECL BJCHI BUI CGH CHG CHOW CIG CITY CK CKP COLOR CWT EARTH EASON EPG F&D FANCY FIRE FMT FORTH GENCO GL GOLD GPSC GRAMMY HYDRO IRPC IT JCT KCM KWC LH LIT LOXLEY MACO MANRIN MATI MODERN MSC NOBLE NOK NPK NUSA OISHI OTO PAF PAP PATO PF PJW PLANB PLE POLAR PRG PTL Q-CON QTC RCI S11 SALEE SAM SAMART SAMTEL SAPPE SC SCP SFP SIM SLP SMT SPA SPORT SSC SST STEC STPI SUC SUTHA T TAE TBSP TCC TFD TGCI TGPRO THANA THIP TIW TK TMW TNDT TOPP TPC TPCH TPIPL TSR TT TYCN UAC UBIS UEC UMI UP UPF UT UV VPO WAVE WINNER YUASA

ระดับ 4 ASP BAFS BANPU BAY BBL BKI BLA CIMBT CNS CSL DCC DRT DTC EASTW ECL EGCO ERW FSS GCAP HANA HTC INTUCH IRPC IVL KBANK KCE KGI KKP KTB LANNA LHBANK MTI NKI PSL PTG PTTEP SABINA SCB SNC SNP SSF SSSC TCAP THCOM TISCO TMB TMD TNITY TOG

ระดับ 5 BCP CPN GYT PE PM PPP PT PTT PTTGC SAT SCC THANI TOP

ไมเปดเผยหรือไมมีนโยบาย A ACC AJD AQ BCH BGT BROCK BSM BTC CHUO

CPR CRANE EIC FER JMART JMT KAMART KBS KIAT LDC

MBAX MCS METCO NEW NEWS NYT PAE PDG PERM PMTA POST RCL RICHY ROH S SIMAT TCB TR TSF TVT WORK

หมายเหตุ ระดับ 1: มีนโยบาย ระดับ 2: ประกาศเจตนารมณ ระดับ 3: มีมาตรการปองกัน ซึ่งทั้ง 2 กรณี ถือเปนผลการประเมินในระดับเดียวกัน 3A: บริษัทมีการประกาศเจตนารมณเขารวมโครงการ CAC หรือภาค 3B: บริษัทมีคํามั่นและนโยบายของบริษัท แตมิไดประกาศเจตนารมณเขารวมโครงการ CAC หรือภาค ระดับ 4: ไดรับการรับรอง ระดับ 5: ขยายผลสูผูที่เกี่ยวของ