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A Case Study of BP International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research and Publications ISSN (Online): 2581-6187 Leadership Evaluation and Human Resource Management Analysis: A Case Study of BP Ling Han HUANG Coventry Business School, EDHEC Business School Email address: Huanglinghan0 @ gmail.com Abstract— This paper includes two parts: the first part is leadership problems, which is the challenge of providing more energy assessment and the second part is human resource management while generating fewer greenhouse gas emissions (Linkedin (HRM) analysis. Both parts are based on the case study of British 2020). Petroleum Group (BP) in the UK. This study is highly valuable for scholars and business students to have a comprehensive view of BP management issues. Keywords— Leadership, HRM, Leadership style, HSE, Diversity, Expatriate, Talent Management. I. PART 1: LEADERSHIP ANALYSIS 1. Introduction 1.1 BP BP is an energy multinational with businesses in Australasia, Europe, Africa, Asia, South and North America. From the ocean to the desert, from retail to wholesale, BP provides light, heat and mobility products and services across the world (BP 2020). BP prospects and produces oil and gas, markets, refines, and supplies petroleum products, delivers solar energy and markets chemicals. BP's chemicals comprise acrylonitrile, acetic acid, polyethylene and ethylene Figure 1. BP business model (BP 2020) (Bloomberg 2020). BP has downstream, upstream and renewable business, As BP‟s leader, especially after the report on deepwater which include well-developed trading systems, helping to horizon explosion in the Mexico Gulf on 20th April 2010 mitigate the influences of commodity pricing cycles. BP‟s published (The Guardian 2010), Bob Dudley tried to review geographic operating range provides them access to BP‟s vision and realized that the event arouses them to look sustainable markets, diversifying exposure, and continuous afresh at everything: not only safety but also how BP resources (BP 2020). BP operates businesses in 79 countries sustainably creates value. Bob, therefore, came up with a and has 70,100 employees and has 19,341 million barrels of series of directions and strategies, which are „Value over the crude equivalent of proved reserves (BP 2020). volume‟, „Lower for longer‟, „Advancing the energy The business model of BP is mainly based on exploring transition‟, and „Fit for the future‟. (BP 2020). This shows and delivering energy; manufacturing, refining and marketing; Bob‟s action correlates with the definition of leader carried out and supplying services and products (BP 2020). Figure 1 by Northouse (2019). shows the BP business model. As BP‟s CEO, for example, Bob Dudley newly formed a 1.2 BP leader and manager - Bob Dudley special organization managing all issues of BP‟s response to Northouse (2019) argues that management is commonly the deepwater horizon explosion and separate them into clean- producing orders including staffing and organizing, up teams, coordinating with the American government and controlling and problem solving, budgeting and planning. On local officials, and managing the $20bn fund specialized in the other hand, leadership focuses on conducting changes and this disaster (The Guardian 2010). This illustrates how Bob movements, which comprise aligning people, motivating and executes in a manager position. inspiring, and establishing direction. However, Kotter (1990) 1.3 Mission and Vision of BP supposes that although major activities of management and BP‟s mission (Comparably 2020) is, in their activities, leadership are performed differently, they are crucial to seeking to perform successive, fundamental qualities - dealing, success for an organization. honest, integrity, treating people with respect and dignity, Bob Dudley, who worked as an engineer and spent 40 striving for mutual advantage and contributing to human years career in the industry, was assigned to be the chief progress. executive officer (CEO) from 2010 to 2020. Under Bob‟s As BP‟s vision statement, BP tries to have the best leadership, BP was focused on one of the most pressing competitive operating, commercial and financial performance. 87 Ling Han HUANG, “Leadership Evaluation and Human Resource Management Analysis: A Case Study of BP,” International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research and Publications (IJMRAP), Volume 3, Issue 1, pp. 87-99, 2020. International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research and Publications ISSN (Online): 2581-6187 To improve, and to be diverse, inclusive and accessible Dudley is fully an adaptive leader. He is commissioned as (Comparably 2020). CEO to tackle the disaster and he adopted a series of adaptive 1.4 Report Structure actions to achieve that goal. BP‟s chairman, Helge Lund This report is going to apply the methodologies related to (Financial Times 2019) said: “Bob Dudley was appointed leadership on the analysis of BP and CEO Bob Dudley. The CEO at the most difficult time in BP‟s history. He has carried objective of this report is to critically analyze and explain how out the recovery from the deepwater horizon disaster, rebuilt the leader and manager executes and leads BP to deal with its BP as a stronger, safer organization and helped it re-earn its specific challenge: CSR challenge. position as one of the energy leaders.” This authoritative To achieve this goal, an analysis of the leadership style of appraisal provides evidence that Bob is an adaptive leader. Bob applying three classical leadership theories will be carried Overall, according to the three classical leadership analysis out firstly. In the second stage, BP‟s challenge - CSR demonstrated above, Bob Dudley‟s leadership can be challenge - and its corresponding consequences will be identified as extraversion, conceptual skills, and adaptive specified. The following step is the critical analysis of Bob‟s leader; figure 2 summarizes his leadership features. execution and leadership when facing the challenge. Finally, proposing recommendations and insights for Bob Dudley concerning the challenge. 2. BOB’S Leadership and the Challenge Of BP This section is going to analyze the leadership style of Bob Dudley by applying leadership theories. Moreover, a challenge will be specified for the sake of the illustration of Bob‟s leadership. 2.1 Leadership Analysis of Bob To identify Bob Dudley‟s leadership, the following paragraphs will analyze Bob Dudley‟s leadership style using several classic leadership theories including trait theory, skills approach, and adaptive leadership. 2.1.1 Trait Theory The leadership trait theory deems that individuality traits impact leader occurrence and effectiveness (Colbert et al. 2012). Determination, intelligence, self-confidence, sociability, and integrity are five major leadership traits. Bob Figure 2. Bob Dudley‟s leadership Dudley never breaks eye contact with the camera lens after 2.2 The Challenge of BP commissioned to be CEO. This indicates that he has a high Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is a combination of level of self-confidence. Furthermore, Bob announced that BP essential actions that a corporation has to take and it is aimed owes to the people of the gulf and that BP thinks of getting to to advance and protect society. The responsibility is mainly the bottom of this tragedy is BP‟s top priority. This claim made up of three areas: the organizational stakeholders, the could to some extent pacify the victims of the gulf; natural environment and general social welfare (Crane, Matten accordingly, he presented his sociability trait. and Spence 2019). BP faced considerable CSR challenges that Overall, according to the trait theory, Bob Dudley the reputation and long-term growth of BP would be damaged demonstrated possession of self-confidence and sociability. As if the challenge is not approached effectively and efficiently. a result, his leadership can be defined as Extraversion. Three issues in terms of CSR on BP will be analyzed in the 2.1.2 Skills Approach following sections. Mumford et al. (2000) suppose that leadership effects are a 2.2.1 The Organizational Stakeholders direct result of the leader‟s skilled competence in knowledge, BP has a serious stakeholder crisis since the oil spill crisis social judgment and problem solving-the skills include happened in April 2010. The main stakeholders related to the technical skill, human skill, and conceptual skill. This accident are the wildlife, the oil industry, fishermen, leadership analysis approach was applied to Bob; it is believed communities and tourist-driven businesses (Brennan 2013). that Bob has a high conceptual skill. For example, in the Figure 3 depicts the stakeholders‟ identification of the spill. speech of BP Energy Outlook 2035 conducted on 17 February 2.2.2 The Natural Environment 2015, Bob Dudley announced BP‟s strategic direction Energy-related emissions account for more than 70% of including shifting trade patterns and shifting response to the world‟s industrial CO2 pollution (Economist 2020). sustainability. These concepts have definitely illustrated his According to the statistical review of world energy (BP 2019), conceptual skill. carbon emissions rose by 2.0% in 2018, which is the fastest 2.1.3 Adaptive Leadership increase for the past seven years. BP has contributed to Heifetz, Ronald A. (2009) contend that adaptive leadership 34.02bn tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent since 1965 (The is the performance of mobilizing people to deal with tough Guardian 2019), ranking the 6th in the most global carbon challenges. Instructed by this
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