Tabletop Exercise at Bilibino NPP.Pdf (12.83Mb)

Nuclear Safety Institute Russian Academy of Sciences (IBRAE RAN)

Final Report for activities under ANNEX 2 to the Project Arrangement between the Department of Energy (DOE) of the United States of America and the Nuclear Safety Institute (IBRAE) of the Russian Federation for Coordination of Emergency Preparedness/Response Activities on preparation and organization of the tabletop exercise at the Bilibino NPP

Moscow October 2002

Content

Abbreviations list...... 4 Introduction...... 6 Objectives and Organization of the Exercise ...... 8 Exercise results...... 10 The exercise actors ...... 12 The Means of Conducting the Exercise...... 13 Organization of the Exercise ...... 18 Brief description of BiNPP and the region of the exercise...... 19 Technological scenario of the accident at Bilibino NPP ...... 37 Radiological scenario of the accident at Bilibino NPP ...... 39 Conducting of exercise at Bilibino NPP...... 55 Conducting of exercise at Crisis Center of “Rosenergoatom” ...... 64 Actions of Technical Crisis Center of IBRAE RAN (TCC IBRAE RAN)...... 65 The View of the Observers...... 83 Actions of Administration of Bilibino...... 91 Conclusions ...... 96 Annex ...... 98

3 Abbreviations list

ASKRO Automated System of Radiation Monitoring BCES Branch Commission on Emergency Situations BiNPP Bilibino Nuclear Power Plant CD Civil Defence CES Commission on Emergency Situations CESC Center of Emergency Situation Control CESF Commission on Emergency Situations of Facility DPINME Department of Protection of Information, Nuclear Materials and Enterprises, Minatom of Russia DSD Dispatcher Service on Duty DSES Department of Safety and Emergency Situations, Minatom of Russia EP Evacuation Post (Point) ES Emergency Situation ETC Novovoronezh Emergency Technical Center FA Fuel Assembly GAN Gosatomnadzor of Russia (State Nuclear and Radiation Protection Inspection) GNES Group of NPP Emergency Support IBRAE RAN Nuclear Safety Institute of Russian Academy of Sciences ICS Instrumentation and Control System IOB State Scientific Center "Institute of Biophysics" LEP Power Transmission Line LNS Local Notification System MCL Main Circulation Loop NPP Nuclear Power Plant OZ Observation Zone PEI State Scientific Center "Physical Energy Institute" PPCEAC Protected Post of Counter-Emergency Activity Control PPM Personnel Protection Means REA "Rosenergoatom" concern REA CC "Rosenergoatom" concern Crisis Centre SCC Situation Crisis Center, Minatom of Russia SPA Scientific Production Association SPC System of Protection Control SPZ Sanitary Protection Zone SS RS Shift Supervisor on Radiation Safety SSI State Sanitary Inspection, Ministry of Health of Russia SSP Shift Supervisor of Plant TSC Technical Support Centre

4 Abbreviations list for Chapter “Conducting of exercise at Bilibino NPP” AC Automated Controller CA Control Area CCR Central Control Room CD&ES Civil Defense & Emergency Situations CDE Chief on-Duty Electrician CEM Chief Engineer-Mechanic CEPP Chief Engineer of the Power Plant CPS Control and Protection System CTE Chief Turbine Engineer CWPSO Chief Water Purifying System Operator DD on-Duty Dosimetrist DE on-Duty Electrician DSS Drum-type Steam Separator ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System ED Engineer Dosimetrist EDM External Dose Monitoring service EFWP Emergency Feedwater Pump ES SS Electric Shop Shift Supervisor ESDC Electric Shop Deputy Head FA Fuel Assembly HAMS DPE Heat Automatics and Measurements Shop on-Duty Power Engineer HAMS SS Heat Automatics and Measurements Shop Shift Supervisor HAMSH Heat Automatics and Measurements Shop Head MCL Main Circulation Loop MCR Main Control Room MCRE Main Control Room Engineer MEP Make-up Electric Pump MSV Main Safety Valve MTH Machine and Turbine Hall NPP Nuclear Power Plant PEI Physical Energetics Institute PPSS Power Plant Shift Supervisor RSO Reactor Section operator RSSH Radiation Safety Section Head RTS DH Reactor and Turbine Shop Deputy Head RTS SS Reactor and Turbine Shop Shift Supervisor RTSH Reactor and Turbine Shop Head SPA Sanitary Protection Area TISH Technical Information Section Head UCCE Unit Control Chief Engineer WPSO Water Purifying System Operator

5 Introduction.

Tabletop exercise aimed at training of personnel actions in case of emergency situation took place at Bilbino NPP on August 21. US Department of Energy put forward the idea of the exercise. The exercise is held within the Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Unite States of America, "On cooperation in Research on Radiation effects for the purpose of minimizing the consequences of radioactive contamination on health and environment" issued on January 14, 1994 (Direction 3 "Information Technologies in Research on Radiation Effects and Decision-Making Support"). The idea was approved by the officials of Minatom of Russia, Rosenergoatom concern, and other organizations and departments. The order No. 351 of Minister of Nuclear Energy of Russia A. Yu. Rumyantsev was issued on 19.07.2002. In accordance with the order, the Deputy Minister M. I. Solonin was appointed as the director of the exercise. The director of the Safety and Emergency Situations Department A. M. Agapov and the technical director of "Rosenergoatom" concern B. V. Antonov were appointed as the director's deputies. Workgroup of Minatom of Russia, SCC of Minatom, IBRAE RAN, and SPA "Typhoon" (Rosgidromet) specialists was formed for coordination of preparing the exercise. IBRAE RAN prepared and organized the exercise in close contact with Minatom, "Rosenergoatom" concern and SPA "Typhoon" management and specialists. Specific tasks on organizing, preparing and conducting the exercise were discussed on several workgroup meetings. The meetings were aimed at preparing the program and plan of the exercise. These documents determine objectives, tasks, participants, as well as means of preparing, organizing and conducting of the exercise. Roles of all participants action at different stages of exercise preparing and conducting were determined. The scenario of the exercise was prepared by specialists of Nuclear Safety Institute of Russian Academy of Sciences (IBRAE RAN) and experts of “Rosenergoatom” concern Crisis Center. The technological and radiological scenarios of the exercise were developed. The scenarios determine detailed technical aspects of the accident development at the NPP and predict the dynamics of the radiological consequence development. In accordance with the plan of Bilibino tabletop exercise preparation, the following works were performed: 1. The works on organization of notification process of IAEA and countries of the Arctic Council. A working Meeting with Situation Crisis Center of Minatom was held. There were determined the specific forms, which will be used for notification. The similar forms were agreed with the Bilibino NPP authorities. A decision on transfer of 2 to 3 notification messages during the exercise was made. 2. Tests of the communication channels between Bilibino NPP and Crisis Center of Rosenergoatom were performed together with Bilibino NPP technical personnel. The data were transferred from automatic monitoring posts of radiation monitoring system. 12 sensors transferring the data were tested, including 5 sensors installed in Bilibino town. 3. Test videoconferences were held by specialists of Bilibino NPP, Crisis Center of Rosenergoatom and IBRAE, including videoconferences in a multidrop mode. The communication between Crisis Center of Rosenergoatom and Center of Technical Support of IBRAE was tested. The plan of the exercise organization (Annex 1) was elaborated. The timely referenced scenario of the exercise development was worked out. The actions of participants were defined. The actions of the NPP director, shift supervisor,

6 shift supervisor on radiation safety and members of local commission on emergency situations were coordinated. 4. Additional calculations of the trans-boundary transfer towards Alaska were performed (together with SPA "Typhoon"). 5. Negotiations with technical specialists of Bilibino NPP on technical provision of the exercise were conducted. The needs in hardware and office equipment were defined. 6. The handbook of participant and other documents on exercise were prepared. 7. The calculations of the radiological consequences of the accident on population and environment in the Bilibino NPP vicinity were performed. Doses on population were estimated as well as there were made assessments of contamination of soil, water objects and vegetation (berries).

7 Objectives and Organization of the Exercise

Objectives of the table-top exercise are the following:

Testing the procedures of notification and emergency information transfer to the crisis centres and technical support centres of «Rosenergoatom» concern, Minatom, EMERCOM, IAEA and neighboring countries;

Training Bilibino NPP experts in assessment of emergency situation and its possible consequences for population and environment, and also in decision- making on protective measures for personnel and population.

Training tasks of the exercise are as follows:

Improvement of:

Organization of "Rosenergoatom" concern and other organizations of appropriate ministries and departments interaction in case of an accident at Bilibino NPP;

Practical skills of Bilibino NPP operations staff and administration in determining and classifying of emergency situations, the declaration of the "Emergency condition" state and use of the "Plan of measures for protection of personnel in case of an accident at Bilibino NPP".

Testing of:

Preparedness of Bilibino NPP, REA CC, SCC and TSC (IBRAE RAN, SPA "Typhoon", IOB, PEI) for the mitigating and liquidation of the accident;

Preparedness of Bilibino NPP emergency centre;

Preparedness and reliability of the existing communications, including those used for data transfer and video conferencing;

Availability of adequate operating documentation: plans, schemes, maps etc.

Training in:

Notification of the NPP personnel;

Information transfer to REA CC, SCC and TSC;

Notification of IAEA, countries of the northern region (USA, Canada, Norway, Finland);

Interaction between Bilibino NPP administration and Rosenergoatom concern, administration of the Bilibino region and the town of Bilibino in case of an accident at Bilibino NPP;

Interaction between NPP emergency centre, REA CC, SCC and TSC;

Stable functioning of the local NPP warning system.

Research of potential directions:

Improvement of organization of interaction between Bilibino NPP administration and REA CC in case of an accident at Bilibino NPP;

Improvement of the "Plan of measures for protection of the personnel in case of an accident at Bilibino NPP";

Development of communications between Bilibino NPP and "Rosenergoatom" concern. 8 The participants concentrated on the following tasks: Notification. Initial notification covered notification of different national exercise participant stations and initiation of respective services actions. Notification of foreign countries, in accord with Vienna Convention of Early Warning, 1986, was carried out according to the accepted procedures. The following organizations were involved in notification procedures: From the Russian side: "Rosenergoatom" concern, SCC of Minatom, EMERCOM CESC, technical support centres; From the US side: Department of State, Department of Energy, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Environmental Protection Agency; International organizations: IAEA, Arctic Council (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden). Communication Testing. Data and information transfer between Bilibino NPP, "Rosenergoatom" CC and SCC of Minatom was performed using telephone and satellite communications (including videoconference) during communication testing. ASKRO system data also was transferred. Assessment and Prediction. The radiological consequences assessment was carried out by experts team on the basis of the radiation conditions assessment. The current situation was assessed and the short-term prediction of its development was provided. The exposure doses for the personnel and the population of Bilibino were estimated. The experts will use the conventional methods of assessing the radionuclide transfer in atmosphere and exposure doses for population. The recommendations on protective measures for personnel, population and environment were developed. Interaction. The interaction between REA CC, SCC of Minatom and technical support centers was tested via exchange of radiation condition assessments and prediction results. Videoconference for discussing the obtained results was used to raise the efficiency of the interaction.

9 Exercise results.

Basic tasks and objectives set by the organizers of the exercise at Bilibino NPP were realized during the exercise. Emergency response system of “Rosenergoatom” was tested in operation at local and federal levels. 1. Procedures of notification and transfer of information on emergency situation to crisis centers and technical support centers of “Rosenergoatom” concern, Minatom of Russia, EMERCOM of Russia, IAEA and foreign countries were tested. The existing communications, including data transfer channels and videoconference communications were tested in the test of notification procedures. The following channels were tested: BiNPP – REA CC, REA CC – SCC of Minatom, REA CC – IBRAE RAN TSC, SCC of Minatom - BiNPP. Also, multi-user videoconference was tested in operation for the first time. Also data transfer using mobile satellite communications was tested. Training notification of IAEA and several foreign countries was carried out in accord with established procedures. This procedure was carried out by the dispatcher service of SCC of Minatom on order of Branch Emergency Situation Commission (BESC) Head after receiving of corresponding information from REA CC. Notification of IAEA was performed in accord with EMERCON forms of N and R series. Procedures of notification of local and regional administration were tested. All procedures were carried out within the set time limits. Chukotka Administrative District administration, local and regional EMERCOM units, and the local administration were notified. Also population notification procedure was tested, including the translation of messages using the local radio and via loudspeakers.

2.BiNPP personnel and administration demonstrated high preparedness level for liquidation of emergency situation. After the message about the accident was received, the organizational measures were performed in accord with the plan of actions in emergency situations. Director of the power plant issued orders to leaders of all departments involved in the accident liquidation; measures on evacuation of personnel not involved in the counter-emergency actions were taken; workstations in the protected post were organized. In 20 minutes after the start of the accident, all participants of the accident liquidation were collected in the protected post, which was used for control of counter-emergency measures.

Survey was organized both on the territory of the NPP, and out of the NPP site. Dose control of the personnel was carried out. List of measures for accident liquidation was determined.

Software and hardware for assessment of radiation consequences of the accident were deployed in the protected post. Bilibino NPP experts carried out calculations for assessment of emergency situation and its radiation consequences for the population and the environment. They also made recommendations on protective measures according to existing criteria.

Practical skills of BiNPP operational personnel and administration in determining and classifying of emergency situation, announcement of “Emergency Preparedness” and “Emergency Situation” conditions, and engaging of “Plan of measures for personnel protection in case of an accident at Bilibino NPP|” were demonstrated.

3. Interaction of “Rosenergoatom” concern experts and other ministries and departments was organized during the exercise. Six communication sessions between NPP administration and NPP support team experts were held. During these sessions, NPP director transferred information about accident development and measures on its liquidation, recommendations on population protection.

10 Interaction with BESC, which was working in the central hall of SCC of Minatom, was organized.

TSC SPA “Typhoon” specialists made assessment of trans-boundary spreading of radionuclides taking into account the direction of high-altitude winds. VNIIAES experts were also involved in the exercise. They were predicting accident development and were developing recommendations on measures of its liquidation.

4. The complete sets of regulatory and technical documentation required for the liquidation of the accident was used by the plant personnel in the exercise. This included plan of measures for personnel protection in case of an emergency situation at the NPP, regulatory documents (radiation safety standards, sanitary rules), instructions of regulating bodies, and others.

5. Means and resources of liquidation of ES at the NPP preparedness was checked. In accordance with the plan of protective measures, the fire department, technical means of deactivation, and transport were put in the high preparedness mode. Evacuation points were prepared.

6.ES commission headed by Head of Bilibino administration was working in the town during the exercise. Commission provided notification of population, carried out radiation survey using civil defense resources, provided preparedness of evacuation points, prepared personal protection means and iodine prophylaxis preparations for town residents. Appeal to population of Bilibino was prepared. Stable telephone communication with emergency center of the NPP was held throughout the exercise. Commission received regular information on accident development. There were organized the consultations on the population protection measures with the NPP administration.

Local civil defense means and resources were activated, including fire department, police, technical means (tractors, excavators, bulldozers), medical personnel of regional hospital. Also technical resources and vehicles of local industrial facilities were in high preparedness level.

11 The exercise actors

The Exercise Participants The following staff took part in the exercise:

Bilibino NPP:

NPP administration (director, chief engineer)

Operations staff (shift supervisor of the power plant)

Emergency Situations HQ

NPP commission on ES

Radiation condition assessment team

Communications team

"Rosenergoatom" concern CC:

On-duty operational officer

Shift Engineer

Emergency Situations Department of the town of Bilibino

GAN Inspection at Bilibino NPP

SCC of Minatom of Russia:

Dispatcher Division

IBRAE RAN TSC:

On-duty operational officer

Experts team

SPA "Typhoon" TSC:

On-duty operational officer Observers Independent and competent assessment of the exercise by participating observers is of great importance for the organizers and participants of the exercise. The observers watched on the followings: 1.Participants’ actions assessment; 2.Assessment of communications, computer hardware and other equipment used in the exercise, together with recommendations on their modification; 3.Exercise organization and preparing assessment. The following aspects of participants actions are important for the various national exercise participants: Initial notification of the stations of different national exercise participants; Procedures of international organizations and foreign countries notification; Actions of the radiological consequences assessment team; Response of main national organizations and deployment of the technical support centres; Expert support of justification of decisions on protective measures; Coordination of the actions of respective organizations and responsibility areas. The following organizations participate in the exercise as observers:

12 From the Russian side: representatives of «Rosenergoatom» concern, DSES of Minatom, Novovoronezh ETC, IBRAE RAN, SPA "Typhoon"; From the US side: representatives of Department of Energy, Department of Environmental Protection of the state of Alaska, Division of Emergency Response of the Alaska administration, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratory, University of Alaska.

The Means of Conducting the Exercise

The exercise was conducted on the territory of Bilibino NPP (internal emergency centre), "Rosenergoatom" concern Crisis Centre, Situation Crisis Center of Minatom of Russia and in the technical support centres (IBRAE RAN, IOB, SPA "Typhoon"). The participants' actions were determined by the plan in accord with the "Programme of the table-top exercise at Bilibino NPP August 21, 2002", which was approved by First Deputy Minister of Nuclear Energy of RF M. I. Solonin. To provide the exercise conducting the following plan was prepared:

The start of the exercise is August 21, 2002. 11:00a.m. – T0 T0 – Start of the exercise – the scenario team sends the initial signal of the exercise start to the NPP personnel (conditional accident at Bilibino NPP).

1. Bilibino NPP Start Time End Time Event Executor

T0 Start of the accident.

T0+05 T0+15 Identification of the accident and radiation Shift Supervisor conditions at BiNPP. Report to the NPP director.

T0+15 T0+20 Decision making about the annunciation of the Director of "Emergency Situation" condition at the BiNPP and BiNPP the activation of the "Plan of measures for protection of personnel in case of an accident at BiNPP", order "Emergency Situation" issued to the shift supervisor to notify the personnel.

T0+15 T0+30 Notification of counter-emergency response Shift Supervisor participants and state organizations according to the "Emergency Situation" order.

T0+15 T0+30 Assessment of the site contamination, Radiation Safety recommendations to the Shift Supervisor Shift Supervisor concerning the protective measures for the NPP personnel.

T0+30 T0+45 Decision making and orders to the NPP personnel Shift Supervisor on using protective measures (via loudspeakers): Iodine prophylaxis, usage of the respiration protection, sealing of working areas and personnel sheltering, or gathering of the personnel in the "Personnel Collection Areas" on the plant territory.

T0+45 T0+165 Start of Local Crisis Center functioning in the Members of the PPCEAC on the BiNPP territory in the "emergency Emergency condition" mode: Situation 1. Implementation of the "Plan of measures for Commission of protection of personnel in case of an accident BiNPP, at BiNPP"; operations staff, Civil Defence 2. Monitoring of the unit conditions and the and Emergency current level of their safety; Situation HQ 3. Identification of the accident; 4. Analysis of possible accident development, the means of its progression, final conditions, possible measures of counter-emergency response; 5. Radiation condition monitoring on the NPP territory and in the Sanitary Protection and Control Areas; (Items 1-5 are performed by simulation) 6. Assessment (calculation) of the current and predicted radiological influence on the population and environment on the basis of the radiation survey and calculations of radioactive products distribution in current weather conditions performed by special programmes; 7. Preparation and justification of decisions on accident development prevention, re-gaining the control over the unit, localizing, mitigating and liquidation of the accident consequences; 8. Provision of the personnel safety and evacuation of the personnel from the NPP territory; (Items 7,8 are performed by simulation) 9. Communication and operational information interaction with Minatom of Russia, "Rosenergoatom" concern, SCC of Minatom, CC of REA concern; 10. Annunciation on the necessity of Iodine prophylaxis, protective measures and evacuation of the population living in the "plume" shadow; 11. Analysis of proposals and implementation of decisions of the industry administration, SCC of Minatom, "Rosenergoatom" concern CC.

T0+45 T0+65 Informing Minister of Nuclear Energy of RF, NPP "Rosenergoatom" concern president, the NPP administration support team leader, the mayor of Bilibino town, Emergency situations management of Bilibino town, SCC of Minatom, REA concern CC, GAN RF, State Sanitary Inspection (simulation) about the causes of "Emergency Situation" condition annunciation and the start of functioning of the "Plan of measures for the protection of the personnel in case of an accident at BiNPP".

T0+165 T0+240 Analysis and summary of the actions of the Bilibino Members of the NPP administration in localizing the accident, Emergency liquidation of its consequences and adequacy of the Situation implemented personnel and population protection Commission, measures (taking into consideration the operations staff, recommendations of the NPP support team and Civil Defence TSCs). and Emergency Situation HQ

T0+240 End of exercise.

2. "Rosenergoatom" concern CC Start Time End Time Event Executor

T0 Start of the accident.

T0 T0+05 Receiving of information about the conditional On-duty accident at BiNPP. Dispatcher of REA

T0+05 T0+45 Notification of REA administration, Minatom of On-duty Russia and the operating services of the appropriate Dispatcher of ministries and departments. Notification of on-duty REA engineer of REA CC and on-duty expert of ETC.

T0+15 Decision making on NPP support team collection. NPP support team leader

T0+15 T0+105 NPP support team collection. On-duty Notification of the operational engineer team of Dispatcher of REA CC, crisis experts team, and receiving the REA instruction for their collection. On-duty Deployment of REA Crisis Center zones. Technical Engineer of message to the REA CC leaders. Start of REA information preparation about the BiNPP accident. (The actions are performed by simulation)

T0+35 T0+45 Sending the initial information about the BiNPP On-duty accident to PEI (simulation), SPA "Typhoon", Engineer of IBRAE RAN, IOB. REA

T0+80 T0+110 REA CC Experts collection. Obtaining additional CC experts (more precise) information. Initial assessment of the scale of the accident. Sending the information to the NPP support team (simulation).

T0+110 T0+150 Operational diagnosis (prediction) of the BiNPP CC, TSC IBRAE condition. Determining the primary counter- RAN, SPA emergency measures and recommendations to the "Typhoon", IOB NPP and to control the NPP actions (jointly with experts TSCs).

T0+150 T0+200 Improvement of the diagnosis (prediction) jointly CC, TSC IBRAE with TSCs. Assessment of possible global radiation RAN, SPA consequences of the accident and improved "Typhoon", IOB evaluations of radiation consequences of the experts accident. Transfer of the assessments to the NPP support team. Videoconference with BiNPP, SCC of Minatom, TSC IBRAE RAN.

T0+200 T0+220 Discussion of the accident liquidation and personnel NPP support protection measures with BiNPP administration. team leader, CC experts

T0+240 End of exercise.

3. SCC of Minatom of Russia Start Time End Time Event Executor

T0 Start of the accident.

T0 T0+05 Receiving of the information about the conditional On-duty accident at BiNPP. Dispatcher

T0+05 T0+45 Notification of the leadership of Minatom of Russia On-duty and on-duty services of appropriate ministries and Dispatcher departments (after receiving the information from BiNPP).

T0+45 Decision-making on the notification of IAEA and Leader of foreign countries. Emergency Situation Commission

T0+45 T0+150 Preparing of initial information on BiNPP accident On-duty and notification of IAEA and countries of the arctic Dispatcher council.

T0+150 T0+210 Direction of additional information on the BiNPP On-duty accident (after receiving the appropriate data from Dispatcher BiNPP).

T0+240 End of exercise. Direction of messages about the On-duty end of the exercise. Dispatcher

4. TSCs Start Time End Time Event Executor

T0 Start of the accident.

T0+05 T0+45 Receiving and conformation of the signal about On-duty expert conditional accident at BiNPP. On-duty dispatcher

T0+05 T0+90 After receiving the message about the accident the On-duty expert TSC software and hardware is activated. Experts On-duty collection. dispatcher

T0+45 T0+150 Preparation of the initial data for the estimation of Expert teams radiation consequences of similar accidents and for the estimation of activity exceeding the barriers Weather conditions report preparation and detection of trans-boundary transfer conditions. Urgent situation prediction. Prediction of the radiation consequences; Development of measures for protection of personnel and population; Conclusion about trans-boundary transfer. Territory contamination and long-term effects assessment.

T0+150 T0+220 Improvement of the situation prediction. Expert teams Discussion of the situation prediction results with REA experts.

T0+240 End of the exercise.

Organization of the Exercise

Under the order of the exercise director, the first Deputy Minister M.I.Solonoin, workgroup for the preparation of the exercise was formed. Documentation development workgroup: No Name Post Tel. 1 Trofimov Nikolai Dmitrievitch DSES section leader 239-22-12 2 Kulikov Vladimir Konstantinovitch DSES section deputy leader 239-29-16 3 Krasnov Vladimir Evgenievitch DPINME section leader 239-26-77 4 Antonov Boris Vasilievitch Technical director of «Rosenergoatom» 220-63-16 concern 5 Gorelov Igor Ivanovitch Head of the REA CC 220-40-97 6 Pivnenko Boris Viktorovitch First Deputy Head of the REA CC 220-63-41 7 Kirichenko Anatoly Mihailovitch International Department of REA leader 239-25-96 8 Chudakov Mihail Valentinovitch BiNPP director (9217) 3-50 9 Ozerov Konstantin Ivanovitch BiNPP chief engineer (9217) 3-51 10 Moskalev Viktor Alexandrovitch Head of dispatcher service on duty of 239-23-11 SCC of Minatom 11 Panshin Anatoly Arcadievitch Head of department of SCC of Minatom 239-23-11 12 Linge Igor Innokentievitch IBRAE RAN Deputy Director 955-22-15 13 Ossipiants Igor Andreevitch IBRAE RAN section leader 955-22-77 14 Borodin Ruslan Valentinovitch SPA "Typhoon" 955-20-78

Organizational measures for the preparation of the exercise were performed by IBRAE RAN jointly with representatives of "Rosenergoatom" concern Crisis Centre, DSES of Minatom, BiNPP representation office in Moscow. Workgroup for exercise scenario preparing: No Name Organization 1 Linge Igor Innokentievich IBRAE RAN 2 Ossipyants Igor Andreevich IBRAE RAN 3 Pivnenko Boris Viktorovich REA CC 4 Borodin Ruslan Valentinovich SPA "Typhoon" 5 Semenov Vladimir Nikolaevich IBRAE RAN 6 Belikov Viktor Vasilievich IBRAE RAN 7 Shikin Alexandr Vasilievich IBRAE RAN 8 Bakin Ravil Ibragimovich IBRAE RAN

The following documents were developed while preparing the exercise:

Technological scenario of the accident for the exercise at BiNPP;

Radiological scenario of the accident at BiNPP;

Program of the tabletop exercise at BiNPP; Plan of the tabletop exercise at BiNPP.

Brief description of BiNPP and the region of the exercise

Brief Characteristics of Bilibino NPP Bilibino NPP is a combined source of electric and heat energy. It provides energy for settlements and industrial installations. During the design of the reactor hall of Bilibino NPP the permafrost and the isolation of the energy system were taken into account. The installed capacity of the NPP is 48 MW. Simultaneously the power plant gives heat energy at the rate of up to 67 GCal/hour. NPP is built according to the block principle: nuclear reactor – turbo unit, and consists of four similar units of 12 MW capacity. The four units of BiNPP were commissioned and activated one by one in 1974 – 1976.

NPP Unit No Reactor Type Capacity, MW Activated

Bilibino 1 EGP-6 12 12.01.74 2 EGP-6 12 30.12.74 3 EGP-6 12 22.12.75 4 EGP-6 12 27.12.76

Channel type water-graphite reactors with natural coolant circulation EGP-6 are used as steam- producing units. The steam is generated in a single-loop scheme. The water mode of main circulation loop is non-correction and neutral. Each unit includes: reactor unit (RU) EGP-6, main circulation loop, T-12/12-60/2.5 turbine, T-12-2 generator, TD-16000/110 transformer and auxiliary equipment of reactor and machine halls. Bilibino NPP is the Center of the Chaun-Bilibino energy system. It generates approximately 75% of the electricity of the energy system and nearly 100% of the Bilibino heat supply. Chaun-Bilibino energy system is stretched along the East Siberian Sea coast for a considerable distance. This includes: floating gas turbine power plant "Severnoe Siyanie" (Zelenyi Mis, Saha- Yakutia Republic, distance 270 km. is currently under conservation), Chaun power plant (Pevek town, Chukotka autonomous district, 420km) and high voltage distributive network. The total length of the power transmission line LEP–110 is 870 km. BiNPP regulates the frequency and capacity in the energy system. During the heating season (9 months per year) NPP provides heat for Bilibino town. The table shows basic parameters of the Chaun-Bilibino energy system power plants for 1994.

Basic unit characteristics

Rated heat power of RU 62 МW Rated power of the unit 12 МW Authorized heat power of RU 65 МW Authorized capacity of the unit 13,2 МW Rated steam production 95 т/h

19 Pressure in RU main circulation loop 6.37 МPa Number of FAs 273 Number of ICS channels 60 Fuel concentration 3.0 and 3.6 %

BiNPP personnel and the personnel of the attached organizations works in the buildings of main and auxiliary production on the NPP territory. Average number of personnel for 01.01.2001 is as follows:

Total number of Individuals Organization personnel Daytime Nighttime 1. Bilibino NPP 650 479 26 Other organizations

2. SU BAES 30 Work is not regular - 4. GAN, BOM, OVVO 24 17 3 5. Fire Department PCh-8 70 22 13 6. Army unit No.3537 103 44 14 Total 877 562 56 Brief description of the Bilibino town. Bilibino town is an administrative center of the Bilibino region, Chukotka Autonomous District. Population is 9090 people (on 01.01.2001), including 2075 children under the age of sixteen. The town is located 3.5 km to the west of the NPP, in the valley of B. Keperveyem river. It occupies the territory of 1.5x3.2 kilometers, with the area of 4,8 sq. km. Up to 88% of municipal housing are 3–5-storied stone buildings, with up to 7,9 thousand inhabitants. Up to 10% of the population live in wooden one/two-storied buildings, and 2% of the population lives in the private sector. Drinkable and industrial water is supplied from the NPP water reservoir through the town water- treatment plant via gravity conduits with the total length of 6.4 km. (dam–NPP–town) with a side pipeline 2.7 km long to the Arktika district (with a separate water-treatment plant in the greenhouse complex building). The length of water supply network is 14.2 km. Hot water and heat are supplied from the NPP through the town heat point and the heat point of the Arktika district. The town daily water consumption is 11500 m3 (rated value), although the actual value is up to 5000 m3/day (on 01.01.01 state). No auxiliary water supply is present. In an emergency situation, the “Neptune” sport Center swimming pool (500 m3) can be used as a water supply.

Following organizations are located in the town:

Public education and public health: Two high schools for 1100 pupils; Three nurseries for 380 children; One central regional hospital for 145 beds. Public catering and food supply:

20 Municipal public catering establishment; Four food stores (10 employees each); One food-manufacturing company. Sanitary services: Bathhouse with for 60 people; Laundry with a capacity of up to 250 kg/shift. There are five transportation companies in the town and a number of other organizations with following vehicles: 51 cars, 186 trucks, 36 buses, and 39 units of service vehicles. Bilibino Communal Services Department has 10 units of special vehicles. Bilibino town is connected with other settlements in a 30 km zone via dirt roads. These include a 32 km road to the Keperveem village and airport and a 40 km road to the Vstrechnyi settlement (liquidated by now). Road connections with other settlements are possible in winter (November – April) using “winter roads”. The basic transport in the district is small airplanes (AN-2) and helicopters (Mi-8). Keperveem runway allows the airport to operate such aircraft as AN-24, AN- 26, AN-12, AN-72, AN-74 and any type of helicopters. In winter it is possible to operate IL-18 aircraft. Weather forecasts can be received from the state meteorological stations of Bilibino, Keperveem, Ostrovnoe of Kolymsk Main Administration of the Hydro-meteorological Service. Communication of the town with NPP and settlements of the 30 km zone is via town telephone station. Communication with the rest of the settlements is via radio. Number of Bilibino NPP personnel, including members of their families, living in Bilibino is up to 1267 people in total, including 950 adults (650 of them working at BiNPP, with others working in other town companies and organizations), 90 children under seven years old, and 227 children of age 7 – 18. BiNPP personnel and their family members live in 5-storied stone and panel housing, including: 67% in Arktika district, 30% inVostochnyi district and town centre, and 3% in the suburbs. It is planned to shelter the personnel in the housing with average protection factor of 50. There are no anti-radiation shelters in the town. Town has a developed road network, including main and inter-block traffic routes. Seven evacuation points (EP) were organized for evacuation of personnel and members of their families. Transport is sent to each EP. It is planned to use partially metalled road Bilibino – Keperveem airport as an evacuation route. Two routes have been planned for the evacuation of personnel from the NPP site: 1. “BiNPP – Bilibino" road (5 km long); 2. Using temporary tractor by-pass road BiNPP – Pioneer camp and subsequently via the road Pioneer camp – Bilibino, which is connected with the Bilibino – Keperveem airport road. Total length – 25 km. To evacuate personnel and members of their families to the Keperveem airport 10 Laz-695 buses are required (travel time – 2 hours, four runs required, time of evacuation – 8-10 hours). Thirty five AN-24 flights are required for evacuation from the Keperveem airport. People to be evacuated: should collect from the NPP site to the town in accord with the BiNPP LNS notification; from the town to airport in accord with the 5-km BiNPP zone LNS notification, notification using the town radio network, and “workshop collection notifications” to EP 1-7, time for collection is 1 hour. Geography and Ecology of the territory NPP area is situated in the northeastern part of Asia and is located in the western spurs of the Illirney mountain ridge, in the zone of stony tundra and permafrost soils. NPP site is situated in the central part of the southern spurs of the North Annuyi upland - the extensive mountainous region of Chukotka, consisting of several mountains, small randomly oriented ridges and

21 separate groups. The average surface level of the upland varies from 700 to 1,000 m (the Baltic System). NPP site is within the Keperveyem chine, a constituent of the Annuyi upland. Relative watersheds excess over the bottom of the Valleys is 300 – 500 m. Genetically, the relief of the area is of erosion-tectonic category. The recent large – block tectonic motions in the late quaternary and contemporary periods have placed their mark on the appearance of the area. The Valley of B. Keperveem River is parallel to meridians direction. The valley is the largest in the NPP region with a width of 2.5 – 3.0 km. The NPP is sited in the trough-shaped Ponneurgen stream valley, of an equator-parallel direction with a width of 1 – 1.5km, and a slope of 0.01. Valley has lower and upper flood-plains and accumulative terraces of 2–3, 5–7, and 10 meter level. The NPP is sited on the right bank of B. Ponneurgen stream valley. The geological section of the site is as follows (from top to bottom):

turf-plant layer up to 0.2 m thick; sandy loam and thinner loams (0.1 – 0.6 m thick); crumbly-rubble soils (0.3 – 3.4 m thick); schist of various composition and sandstones eroded to the condition of crushed stone and grass (1.3 – 4.4 m); frequently interstratifying schist and sandstones from the depth of 1.7 – 4.4 m. Hydrogeological site conditions. Ground waters have been classified according to the conditions of deposit: seasonal waters; permanent ground waters – taliks appearing in the building melting bowl. Surface permafrost waters of seasonally melting layer are typical for the area and are bound to the waterproof soils of quaternary period and the fissured rocks of trias period. The upper boundary of permafrost rocks is the water-confining stratum for them. Melting of icy soils and precipitations provide feedwater for them. Characteristic feature of seasonal waters is a pressure-non-pressure mode. In below-zero temperatures they constantly freeze, acquiring local cryogenic pressure. Upon flowing to the surface, glazes are formed or they freeze at depth, forming icy mounds. Waters of talik layer. Talik layer is fixed under the buildings. Its depth in the boundaries of the main NPP building reaches 40 m. Temperature mode of the talik zone depends on the heat influence of the building. Water-containing rocks include interstratifying clay shale and sandstones. Talik zone waters of interstitial-vein type are non-pressure. Maliy Anuyi, flowing south of the region, is the main river, which receives surface water flow from the territory of Bilibino NPP region. Maliy Anuyi River is the second longest tributary of Kolyma River and the third by drainage area. One of the main tributaries of M. Anuyi is B.Keperveyem, flowing into the river 380 km from the mouth of Maliy Anuyi. B.Keperveyem crosses the central part of BiNPP region. NPP is situated on the territory of the drainage basin of B.Keperveyem River, at the right-bank flood-plain of Bolshoy Ponneurgen stream. The stream flows into the River Bolshoy Kepereveem on the 32nd km from its mouth. The total length of the stream is 26 km; the area of the drainage basin is 94.2 km2. Ponneurgen stream is the source of the industrial and drinking water supply for the plant and the town of Bilibino. The water is supplied from the reservoir (under construction), located 3.2 km upstream from the main NPP facility. The total reservoir capacity is 5.04 mln m3, conservation zone is 4.54 mln m3, and the average depth is 8 m. The reservoir is seasonally regulated. Bilibino NPP is situated in the northeastern part of Asia. This part of the continent has a complex landscape and is washed by the Arctic Ocean and the seas of the eastern coast of Asia. Climate in the region is greatly influenced by the Colyma Mountain ridge and the Cherski Mountains. The region of the NPP is situated approximately 150 km from the coast of the East Siberian Sea in

22 the border area between the maritime climate and the temperate continental climate. The seasonal change of the influence of the ocean (in summer) and the continent (in winter) is typical for this type of climate. The average annual temperature is below zero in all parts of the region and changes from -4 -5 C on the coast to -12 -14 C in the continental parts. The lowest temperature is recorded in January, the highest – in July.

Average, maximum and minimum temperature for each month and annual, °С

Month 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Year Average -29.5 -29.5 -22.8 -14.0 1.4 10.0 11.8 8.2 1.4 -11.4 -23.5 -28.2 -10.4

Maximum -25.1 -25.9 -19.2 -9.0 3.1 15.8 17.0 13.7 5.0 -8.6 -8.6 -23.5 -6.3

Minimum -33.0 -32.5 -27.9 -19.2 -6.2 5.8 5.8 3.0 -3.1 -15.5 -15.5 -31.0 -15.2

Absolute maximum 31.4, absolute minimum –52.1. In terms of wind conditions the region is close to continental type. Average windspeed is about 2–3 m/sec, and the maximum is rarely over 20 m/sec.

Seasonal and annual wind roses for 16 rhumbs, repeatability (R) of the rhumbs (%) and average windspeed (WS)

Rhumbs R WS

on W N NNE NE ENE E ESE SE SSE S SSW SW WSW W WNW NW NN Calm Seas

Win 32.4 22.7 63.4 93.0 293.8 26.1 14.8 01.6 12.8 12.7 53.1 83.2 152.9 62.2 72.2 31.9 67 Spr 53.4 32.6 52.6 82.5 353.0 52.7 32.6 21.9 21.8 21.9 42.5 52.6 123.1 42.8 62.6 22.4 52 Sum 42.9 32.6 73.3 62.9 283.1 53.4 53.2 23.1 42.4 22.4 63.0 53.1 103.3 43.7 53.1 23.1 27 Aut 42.5 32.8 83.0 93.4 363.1 32.9 22.8 12.0 11.5 11.9 42.6 83.3 123.3 42.7 52.6 22.2 58 Year 42.6 32.7 63.1 83.0 323.2 43.8 33.4 12.2 22.1 22.2 52.8 63.0 123.2 42.8 62.6 22.4 51

Average monthly and yearly windspeed, m/sec

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Year 1.0 1.0 0.7 1.5 2.0 2.5 2.2 2.2 1.7 1.2 0.9 1.2 1.6

Direction of eastern rhumbs is predominant. Such repeatability is kept at the surface and for the whole border layer of the atmosphere.

Calculated maximum possible windspeeds, including 1 case per 10000 years, m/sec Maximum windspeed possible per: 1 year 5 years 10 years 20 years 25 years 50 years 100 years 10000 years 10 27 31 35 36 39 43 65

Repeatability (%) of calms and mild winds (windspeed lower than 2 m/sec) for the whole year and for the cold period

23 Windspeed, m/sec Cold period Yearly Calm 36 58 0-1 37 65 2 7 13

Precipitations are determined by cyclones and relevant atmospheric fronts passing over the area. Precipitations in the NPP region are not large: about 250-275 mm per year. Precipitations are unevenly spread in the area because of the complex mountainous landscape. The precipitations have a clearly expressed annual character – maximum in summer months and minimum in spring months.

Annual precipitation distribution (mm) for years of 10, 50 and 90 percentage of supply

Supply I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII Year Calculated values using correction on wetting 10 11 3 0 18 26 33 98 72 46 17 12 14 350 50 9 7 3 7 11 13 67 59 38 25 10 16 265 90 13 15 17 15 10 22 17 3 12 17 18 8 167

Duration of winter is up to 7.5 months. The period with a permanent snow cover is up to 240 days per year, the blanket of snow is 45 cm high and can change in the range of 13 to 75cm. Standard snow load for the IV snow area, where the NPP is situated, is 150 kg/m2. Extreme load (possible 1/10000 years) is 176 kg/m2 for open field and 226 kg/m2 for the forest.

Supply of water in the snow cover Average Maximum Minimum 120 165 59

Date of stable snow cover formation 02.10 Date of stable snow cover destruction 26.05 Number of days with snow cover 236 Number of foggy days average annual 3 maximum 12 Number of blizzards average annual, 4 maximum 11 Average continuous blizzard duration (hours) 5.5

Dangerous Phenomena: Average intensity of heavy showers (reaching or exceeding 30 mm/h); Average precipitation exceeding 50 mm per 12 hours; Average precipitation exceeding 20 mm per 24 hours – all mentioned phenomena were never encountered. Average continuous blizzard duration, exceeding 12 hours at wind velocity of 10 m/sec and higher was 17.3 hours.

24 Ice-covered surface is formed annually in September – October, ice can hamper motor transport traffic and the use of aviation. The total duration of ice formations is less than 24 hours. Hail – maximum diameter is 0.5 mm. Thunderstorm resulting in damage were not encountered. Dust storms were not observed at the NPP site area. Tornadoes were not formed in the area of NPP. Average seasonal and average annual admixture concentration in the atmosphere. Dispersion of NPP admixtures in the atmosphere for the combination of “Cold” release in case of observed and most unfavorable meteorological conditions were analyzed. During the calculation of NPP admixtures specific concentration (SC) fields, it was determined, that the most unfavorable weather conditions appear in spring and autumn. Wind rose changes from one season to another, the position of SC maximum within different periods varies, but the tendency of shifting of the most unfavorable zone to the north from NPP remains. Three basic regions of increased admixture concentrations inside the 3-km zone were located: to the north, to the southeast and to the southwest. The most dangerous direction is to the north from NPP, since the specific concentrations beyond the 3- km zone will be the highest in that direction. Average annual SC reaches maximum at a distance of 400 m from the NPP. At the 3- km zone boundary concentrations are 10-15 times lower. Under severe weather conditions (in winter) the formation of the "meteorological accidents", caused by meteorological reasons, is possible. The probability of such "accidents" is evaluated 20 times during the year. In case of the "heated" admixture release, this type of accident does not appear. According to the given assessment, the joint action of the high repetition of calm layers and ground inversions, particularly in a winter period, as well as local orographical disturbances of the regulated vertical motions can lead to formation of thick intercepting layers and stagnation zones in the lower troposphere in the NPP vicinity.

Weather Category Repetition based on year seasons, %%

Weather Category Season А В С D Е F G Winter 0.00 1.06 3.90 8.20 4.09 5.40 4.70 Spring 2.30 7.50 23.1 19.2 4.20 6.70 3.60 Summer 2.50 7.50 20.8 15.6 4.70 3.20 1.76 Autumn 0.40 2.80 9.20 13.3 8.60 4.40 2.60

The NPP region is located between two large seismic belts: the Kurile-Kamchatka zone and the Chersky Belt. The region falls into the "white spot", where seismic events are scarcely observed. The nearest severe earthquake centres of East Chukotka are 700 – 800km from NPP. BiNPP site seismic risks assessment for lines I and II was performed on a basis of the series of geological and geophysical studies, including short-term seismic observations cycle. The detailed analysis of seismic activity was performed for separate districts. Assessment Results:

Analysis, performed for the design earthquake (DE) and a maximally calculated earthquake (MCE), with the possibility of 1/100 years and 1/10,000 years respectively. The earthquakes were evaluated at the value of 6 points for DE, and 7 points for MCE.

25 Paleo-seismogeological studies demonstrated that within the earthquake-hazardous zone of BiNPP, no traces of ancient earthquakes with the power greater than 6.0 were detected. Therefore, according to paleo-seismogeological data, the seismic potential of breakings and morphostructures in the region is determined by earthquakes with the power less than 6.0.

Regional (within 80 years) and temporary (within 10 months) network of seismic stations in BiNPP area have not registered a single earthquake. According to seismological data (in the absence of the historical information about the earthquakes) it is impossible to estimate the seismic potential of the region.

No strong evidence of late cenozoic and contemporary fractural zone tectonic activity in BiNPP region was found. Such activity can only be assumed.

The gradients of neotectonic motion speed in the region do not exceed the values 1.0E-09 cm/cm per year, which is typical for territories with seismic risks not exceeding 6–7 points.

The seismic risks of BiNPP sites from the nearest potentially active breakings were assessed at 7 points for MCE, and at 6 points for DE.

Bilibino NPP

View of Bilibino NPP and the town of Bilibino

Bilibino NPP

Town of Bilibino

Diagram of EGP-6 reactor

Production facilities of Bilibino NPP

Layout of Bilibino NPP

Map of Bilibino NPP surroundings

Bilibino NPP surroundings

Diagram of ASKRO sensors location

Diagram of ASKRO sensors location at Bilibino NPP site

th The 5 site Prophylactic home

Administrative building Check-point

Roof of the main building Sanitary inspection building

Examples of ASCRO sensors location

Technological scenario of the accident at Bilibino NPP

An accident with the maximum positive reactivity release caused by a failure of the reactor emergency protection system is considered as a "reference" accident in the"Plan of measures for the personnel protection in case of accident at Bilibino NPP". This accident leads to the most severe radiation consequences. The largest possible fuel damage is caused by an accident travel of 2 pairs of automatic controller (AC) rods up to their full extraction from the core and failure of the emergency protection system (the "reference" accident). The accident travel of AC rods leads to the introduction of positive reactivity of 0.5βeff with the rate defined by the maximum speed of the AC rods, 18 cm/sec. The movement of both pairs of AC rods out of the core proceeds in turns from their middle position up to the level of the end switches. This leads to an increase of neutron power up to the maximum value of 419% of rating value on the 36th second from the beginning of the AC rods movement upward. In this case, the rupture of one fuel element in 126 fuel assemblies (FA) occurs in the time interval 30 to 61 seconds from the beginning of the accident; and a partial burn-off of the fuel elements in 8 FA occurs on the 110th second. The rise of the fuel elements temperature, which is speeded up by reaching the critical value of heat transfer, also occurs at the moment of maximum capacity. This causes a capacity decrease. Though, it does not prevent the destruction of the fuel elements affected by the coolant pressure. The first "wet" fuel element accident is being accompanied by penetration of water-steam mixture into the stack (input of positive reactivity of approximately 0.1βeff). Drying of the main circulation loop and decrease of capacity because of the coolant loss and the fuel elements heating occurs on the 99th second. The maximum fuel element temperature after drying of the main circulation loop reaches 1400°C (on the 800th second). The reactor self-quenching takes place by the 1500th second. The relaxation of the reactor from the subcritical state caused by depoisoning and cooldown due to out-of-vessel heat dispersion starts in 15 hours after the reactor self-quenching. Special measures on inserting absorbents into the reactor should be taken during this period. According to the results of the damage investigation of the tubular fuel elements after the "wet" accidents at Beloyarskaya NPP, each "wet" accident leads to destruction of approximately 100- 200 mm of fuel element by coolant flow. In accordance with conventional estimations, obtained in the experimental studies for EGP-6 reactor fuel, the yield of fission products is the following: approx. 9% Kr and Xe approx. 0.5% I approx. 0.07% Cs of the content of these radionuclides in the destroyed part of the fuel element. The total destruction scale following 126 "wet" accidents is as follows: (126 fuel elements × 0.2 m)/(273 FA × 6 fuel elements × 3 m) = 5.1×10-3, which allows estimating the fission products yield in relation to the fission products accumulated in the reactor: approx. 0.046% Kr and Xe

37 approx. 2.5×10-3% I approx. 3.6×10-4% Cs In case of the accident, the yield caused by the heating of the fuel and burn-off of the fuel element cladding is equal to the following values in relation to their content in the reactor: approx. 24% Kr and Xe approx. 0.5% I approx. 0.2% Cs and fully defines the total yield of the fuel fission products in case of emergency.

Taking into account the retention of the fission products in the graphite stack of the reactor, the yield is the following: approx. 0.6% Kr and Xe approx. 0.0063% I approx. 0.0017% Cs

Nuclide composition of the fission products is given in table

Table. Nuclide composition of the fission products Nuclide Total activity of the fission Atmospheric release, products in the EGP-6 fuel, Bq Bq 85mKr 8.6*1015 5.5*1013 87Kr 1.8*1016 1.1*1014 88Kr 2.5*1016 1.5*1014 133Xe 9.1*1016 5.5*1014 135mXe 2.0*1016 1.2*1015 135Xe 1.9*1016 1.2*1015 131I 4.6*1016 2.9*1012 132I 6.6*1016 4.1*1012 133I 9.6*1016 5.8*1012 134I 9.9*1016 6.1*1012 135I 8.5*1016 5.4*1012 134Cs 8.9*1016 1.5*1011 137Cs 6.4*1015 1.1*1011

While analyzing the consequences of the accident and assessing the local radiation situation, it was assumed for the calculation that:

• the duration of the release – approx. 10 hours

• the altitude of the release – approx. 20 meters (into the aerodynamic shadow of the NPP building approx. 20 meters high)

• the temperature of the released gas - approx. 80°C

Radiological scenario of the accident at Bilibino NPP

Assessment of contaminated zones for a beyond design-basis ("reference") accident accompanied by gaseous and aerosol releases at Bilibino NPP

IBRAE RAN made an assessment of contaminated zones for a beyond design-basis ("reference") accident at Bilibino NPP. An accident with the maximum positive reactivity release caused by a failure of the reactor emergency protection system is considered as a "reference" accident. This accident leads to severest radiation consequences. The estimations of the radiation consequences were made using IBRAE information modeling system "Nostradamus". Given in table 1, is the nuclide composition of fission products in the atmospheric release that was used for calculations.

Table 1. Nuclide composition of the fission products in the atmospheric release

Nuclide Atmospheric release, Bq 85mKr 5.5*1013 87Kr 1.1*1014 88Kr 1.5*1014 133Xe 5.5*1014 135mXe 1.2*1015 135Xe 1.2*1015 131I 2.9*1012 132I 4.1*1012 133I 5.8*1012 134I 6.1*1012 135I 5.4*1012 134Cs 1.5*1011 137Cs 1.1*1011

The following parameters were used for calculations of the local radiation situation: • Duration of release – 10 hours; • Altitude of release – 20 meters (into the aerodynamic shadow of the NPP building approx. 20 meters high); • Weather conditions were assumed to be the most unfavorable, which are as follows: • Wind speed – 1 m/sec • Stable atmospheric conditions (category F according to Pascuille classification) • No precipitation • Roughness parameter z0=0.17 m (flat terrain, summer)

The calculations were carried out for two wind directions: east (90°) and northwest-west (292.5°). Option 1

39 In case of the east wind direction (in august, this wind direction is prevalent in the Bilibino NPP region), radioactive products generated during the accident would travel directly towards the town of Bilibino. The calculated values of the predicted dose of external exposure for 10 days, thyroid dose for children and adults, respectively, are given in figures 1 to 3. Points "bilibino2" (3 km from the source) and "bilibino3" (5 km from the source) have been chosen as referenced points along the plume axis.

Fig.1. Total effective dose of external exposure for 10 days

Fig.2. Total inhalation dose on thyroid gland for 10 days (children)

Table 2. Values of doses along the plume axis at different distances from Bilibino NPP Distance from the Dose from cloud, mSv Inhalation dose on External dose for 10 source, km thyroid gland days, mSv (children), mSv 1 0.6039 38.31 1.393 2 0.2748 11.77 0.5261 5 0.07224 1.921 0.1151 10 0.02612 0.3535 0.03465 20 0 0 0 50 0 0 0 100 0 0 0

Fig.3. Total inhalation dose on thyroid gland for 10 days (adults)

The dose values at different distances from the source along the plume axis are given in table 2. The calculated values of the predicted thyroid doses for children and adults at distances of 3 km (sanitary protection area) and 5 km (radiation control area of the NPP) are given in figures 4-7 for different time intervals.

Fig.4. Total inhalation dose (mSV) on thyroid gland for 10 days (children) at the distance of 3 km from Bilibino NPP ass a function of time (hours)

Fig.5. Total inhalation dose (mSV) on thyroid gland for 10 days (children) at the distance of 5 km from Bilibino NPP ass a function of time (hours)

Fig.6. Total inhalation dose (mSV) on thyroid gland for 10 days (adults) at the distance of 3 km from Bilibino NPP ass a function of time (hours)

Fig.7. Total inhalation dose (mSV) on thyroid gland for 10 days (adults) at the distance of 3 km from Bilibino NPP ass a function of time (hours)

The calculated values for the density of 131I and 137Cs fallout are given in figures 8 and 9.

Fig.8. Density of 131I fallout

Fig.9. Density of 137Cs fallout

44 Criteria for urgent decision-making at the initial stage of the accident in accordance with the "Radiation Safety Standards" (RSS-99) are given in table 3.

Table 3. Criteria for urgent decision-making at the initial stage of the accident Protection Prevented dose for the first 10 days, mGy measures Whole body Thyroid, lungs, skin Level A Level B Level A Level B Sheltering 5 50 50 500 Iodine Prophylaxis: adults - - 250* 2500* children - - 100* 1000* Evacuation 50 500 500 5000 *only for thyroid gland Analysis of the obtained data demonstrates that the calculated values are substantially lower than those given as limits in the " Radiation Safety Standards" (RSS-99). Thus, no special population protection measures are needed at the initial stage of the accident. Protection of respiratory organs and skin, sealing of apartments and working areas can be recommended as protection measures. Furthermore, it is reasonable to monitor contamination of mushrooms, berries and plants used for cattle feeding.

Option 2 In case of the northwest-west wind direction (winds in this direction are very unlikely in the Bilibino NPP region in august, and this direction was chosen for calculations in order to provide the contaminant transfer towards Alaska), radioactive products generated during the accident would spread over practically unpopulated area. The calculated values of the predicted doses of external exposure for 10 days, thyroid dose for children and adults, respectively, are given in figures 10-12.

Fig.10. Total effective dose of external exposure for 10 days

Fig.11. Total inhalation dose on thyroid gland for 10 days (children) 46

Fig.12. Total inhalation dose on thyroid gland for 10 days (adults)

As calculations for option 2 were performed using the same input data as for the option 1, except the wind direction, the other data are identical to the data obtained the first option and are not presented here. Analysis of the obtained data demonstrates that they are substantially lower than those given as limits in the "radiation safety standards" (RSS-99). Thus, no special population protection measures are needed at the initial stage of the accident. Monitoring of contamination of mushrooms, berries and plants used for cattle feeding can be recommended as protection measures. Along with the above calculations, special analysis was made for more favorable weather conditions (wind speed 1.5 m/sec and 2.2 m/sec, the D class atmosphere stability). In these cases, the calculated values of the required parameters are noticeably lower. Comparison of the data obtained using the information-analytical model "Nostradamus" with the values given in the "Plan of measures for the personnel protection in case of accident at Bilibino NPP", which were obtained by another model, show their good agreement.

BiNPP personnel Doses of beta and gamma-radiation and the internal inhalation dose for the central hall are as follows:

47 After 100 sec. since the accident beginning: Dγ = 10-3 Sv Dβ = 10-3 Sv Dinh = 10-2 Sv

After one hour: Dγ = 10 Sv Dβ = 50 Sv Dinh = 500 Sv

Doses in the machine hall (MH) and the main control room (MCR) are assessed as three orders lower than those in the central hall. Calculated maximum dose rates in the MCR reach 1R/hour, in the MH – 0.5 R/hour.

For the BiNPP personnel, the following measures are obligatory:

Iodine prophylaxis during the initial stages of the accident Protection of respiratory organs and skin Sheltering of the maintenance personnel not involved in technological operations in the civil defense NPP shelter.

Note: Calculation of radiation situation at Bilibino NPP facilities is given in the IPPE report "The improvement of safety and technical & economical parameters of the first line units of Bilibino NPP. Calculation of radiation situation in the Bilibino NPP facilities in case of design- basis and beyond design-basis accidents", IPPE inv. No.8533

48 Results of calculations for the trans-boundary transfer towards Alaska according to the scenario of tabletop exercise at Bilibino NPP on August 21, 2002

The regional model of atmospheric transport and dispersion "STADIUM", which used the Monte-Carlo method, was utilized to calculate possible consequences of trans-boundary radioactivity transfer. The model allows obtaining the time-spatial fields of contaminant concentrations in air and density of fallout on the underlying surface as a result of statistical processing of trajectories set for individual conditional particles. The conditional particles move in stochastic wind fields, represented by a sum of medial and turbulent components, which are determined by a particular time of averaging. As an average component, there are used the wind fields received as a result of numerical weather forecast or an objective data analysis transmitting from observational net. Such data are being processed using a preliminary special correction routine taking into account a real relief to satisfy the conservation law of mass balance. The model "STADIUM" is used in the Federal Informational and Analytical Center of Rosgidromet when it executes the functions of the Regional Specialized Meteorological Center of the World Meteorological organization for the Region II (Asia). There were used in calculations the real meteorological parameters, which were observed in the period June 21 through 25, 2002, in the area of conditional accident. Such meteorological situation ensures the atmospheric transport of contaminant towards Alaska. The figures illustrate the trajectories of air movement at different latitudes, which are typical for the trans-boundary transfer, fields of integrated over time concentration (for the third day after the accident) and integrated fallout of 137Cs radionuclide. The results of calculations show that there is no a significant trans-boundary transfer.

RSMC Obninsk, Russia Federal Environmental Emergency Response Centre Air mass trajectories

160°E 70°N

Bilibin o 2

140°W 3 N 50°N

Levels: (1) 500 m (2) 1500 m (3) 3000 m AGL Unconfirmed event - existence or strength is unknown Results based on initial default values

Date of release: 21 August 2002, 00:00 UTC Duration: 10 hrs

Source location: 166.5 E, 68.1 N

50 RSMC Obninsk, Russia Federal Environmental Emergency Response Centre Time integr. concentration (from 23 Aug 0 UTC to 24 Aug 0 UTC)

160°E 70°N

Bilibin * o

140°W N

50°N

Contours: (1) 1.0 e-1 (2) 1.0 e-2 (3) 1.0 e-3 (4) 1.0e-4 Maximum value: 1.1 Bq-s/m3 Unconfirmed event - existence or strength is unknown Results based on initial scenario values Date of release: 21 August 2002, 00:00 UTC Duration: 10 hrs Total release: 1.1e11 Bq of 137Cs Source location: 166.5 E, 68.1 N Vertical distribution: uniform 20-100 m Notes: Contours may change from map to map

51 RSMC Obninsk, Russia Federal Environmental Emergency Response Centre Total deposition in 96 hrs

160°E 70°N

Bilibin * o

140°W N

50°N

Contours: (1) 1.0 e+0 (2) 1.0 e-1 (3) 1.0 e-2 (4) 1.0e-3 Maximum value: 10 Bq/m2 Unconfirmed event - existence or strength is unknown Results based on initial scenario values Date of release: 21 August 2002, 00:00 UTC Duration: 10 hrs Total release: 1.1e11 Bq of 137Cs Source location: 166.5 E, 68.1 N Vertical distribution: uniform 20-100 m Notes: Contours may change from map to map

52 Computer simulation system

Computer modeling system simulating the operation of Bilibino NPP ASKRO system was developed at IBRAE. The system simulated the readings of each of the 12 sensors on the site of the power plant in a real-time mode.

The readings of the sensors changed according to the technological and radiological scenario of the accident. The examples of system output are given below.

The code was used in TSC during the exercise for obtaining data on dose rates.

Position of ASKRO system sensors in the vicinity of BilNPP

Simulation of dose rates dynamics

Indications of sensors

54 Conducting of exercise at Bilibino NPP

Background Program of the NPP counter-emergency exercise combined with the tabletop exercise for the personnel of shift No1

The objective of the exercise Training and testing of the NPP personnel interaction with medical personnel, fire-fighting units and civil defense unit members Exercise scenario Accident travel of AC - 1,2 and failure of AZ-1. ("Reference" beyond design-basis accident) Type of exercise NPP, combined with tabletop exercise Date and time of the exercise August 21, 2002 start at 11-00 Means of carrying out the Simulated actions of the personnel using functioning exercise equipment

Usage of the communications, means of preamble, simulated signals and messages transfer: all communications are used, all messages, reports, preambles are started with the word "Training". The exercise is started with announcement of the exercise leader via the loudspeakers: "Attention, the exercise has started".

Members of the exercise Controllers and their positioning Power Plant Shift Supervisor (PPSS) Chief Engineer of the Power Plant (CEPP) Ozerov K. I. Electric Shop Shift Supervisor (ES SS) Electric Shop Head Popov V. V. (acting) Chief on-Duty Electrician (CDE) Electric Shop Deputy Chief (ESDC) Malafeev A. V. on-Duty Electrician (DE) Electric Shop Deputy Chief Malafeev A. V. Reactor and Turbine Shop Shift Supervisor Reactor and Turbine Shop Head (RTSH) (RTS SS) Konstantinov A.N. Unit Control Chief Engineer (UCCE-1) RTSH Konstantinov A.N. UCCE -2 RTSH Konstantinov A.N. Chief Engineer-Mechanic (CEM) Reactor and Turbine Shop Deputy Head (RTS DH) Holopov K. G. Chief Turbine Engineer (CTE) RTS DH Holopov K. G. Reactor Section Operator (RSO) RTS DH Holopov K. G. Water Purifying System Operator (WPSO) Technical Information Section Head (TISH) Serkin I. A. Heat Automatics and Measurements Shop Shift Heat Automatics and Measurements Shop Supervisor (HAMS SS) Head (HAMSH) Ivanchenko V. V. Heat Automatics and Measurements Shop on- Heat Automatics and Measurements Shop Duty Power Engineer (HAMS DPE) Head (HAMSH) Ivanchenko V. V. Engineer-dosimetrist (ED) Radiation Safety Section Head (RSSH) Danilin I. V. (acting) On-duty dosimetrist (DD) Radiation Safety Section Head (RSSH) Danilin I. V. (acting)

55 Causes of failure in functioning, its development and consequences

As a result of an unauthorized influence on the control and protection system (CPS) units, signals for the movement of AC rods were generated in the control circuit. 1AC-1 has started movement from the position 145 cm with the speed of 18 cm/sec. After 1AC-1 finished moving, 1AC-2 has started movement "upward" from the position 135 cm with the speed of 18 cm/sec. Neutron flux change velocity blocks, density excess level protection, neutron flux change velocity protection did not work. This lead to introduction of positive reactivity of 0.55 βeff. As a result of the rise of neutron flux level up to ∼ 420% of rated Neutron flux, fuel element temperature, heat transfer critical state, the first "wet" accident takes place on the 30th second from the start of AC movement. According to PEI assessment, fuel elements of 126 FAs are destroyed by the 61st second of the accident, MCL is dried by the 99th second. Power decrease as a result of coolant loss and fuel element heating also takes place by the 99th second. Maximal fuel element temperature reached after the drying is 1400 °С (800th second). Self-damping of the reactor will occur by 1500th second. Contamination of the NPP rooms and territories is determined by the discharge of the accumulated fission products from the nonhermetic fuel elements and the corrosion products from the MCL. Radiation situation in the central hall, fuel failure detection room, main building ventilator room, pipeline corridor, special ventilation corridor deteriorates sharply. Alarm at the "D" panel of the main control room: "Concentration of gases and aerosols, excess of the gamma background limit and the limit of specific concentration of gas-aerosol mixture released through the stacks of the NPP". Light and sound alarm is activated in the corresponding rooms. Doses of gamma, beta exposures and internal exposure caused by inhalation of radionuclides for the central hall in an hour from the start of the accident are: - D gamma – 10 Sv - D beta – 50 Sv - D inhalation – 500 Sv Estimated doses for the MCR and machine hall are lower than those for the central hall by a factor of 1000. Rated maximal dose rates reach 1 R/hour for MCR, 0.5 R/hour for the machine hall, 30 mR/hour at the border of SPA and 10 mR/hour in the town of Bilibino. "Emergency situation" condition is announced at the power plant. Calculations reveal, that inhalation of radioactive iodine and intake of other aerosol particles bring the greatest contribution to the exposure dose at the early phase of the accident. The following measures are obligatory for the NPP personnel: - Iodine prophylaxis during the first stage of the accident; - Protection of respiratory organs and skin; - Sheltering of all the operating and maintaining personnel not involved in the technological operations in the civil defense shelter of the NPP. Steam spreading in the rooms of EPS panels and rooms of the instrumentation sensors of unit 1 (2.40) leads to breakdown of flowmeters (operational, launching) and differential pressure meters of the MCL. Water condenses on the panels of operational circuits of unit 1 and unit 2, in the MCR-1. In 10-15 minutes, the control circuits start to short circuit. Leaks of water and steam in the 0.4 kV panel room of unit 1 lead to short circuits in the sections 1 A and B (5 minutes from the start of the accident). Transformator substation 1 (TP-1) is shut down, bringing ODG-1 to inverted mode, disconnected from the machine and turbine hall (MTH) by protection systems. Lead-ins 1A and 1B are disconnected from the MTH. 1AS-2 is disconnected, DG-1 is started, in 10 seconds A.DG-1 is started and disconnected from the MTH. Transformator N1/1T is disconnected from the MTH. Sections 1A, 1B, operational buses II and I of units 1 and 2 are left without voltage.

56 Radiation Situation

Rated maximum dose rates can reach 10 Sv/hour in the central hall, 10 mSv/hour in the main control room (MCR) and 5 mSv/hour in the machine hall. The following measures are obligatory for BiNPP personnel: • Iodine prophylaxis during the early stage of the accident; • Protection of respiratory organs and skin; • Sheltering of all the operating and maintaining personnel not involved in the technological operations in the civil defense shelter of the NPP. NPP site • Spatial iodine-131 activity is about 4.3 Bq/l at the altitude of 1m above the surface; • Equivalent dose rate is about 0.4 mSv/hour; • Equivalent dose for the thyroid gland is about 2.2 mSv for an adult without accounting for protection measures. At the border of the Sanitary Protection Area (SPA) • Spatial iodine-131 activity is about 1.6 Bq/l at the altitude of 1m above the surface in 30 min from the initial release; • Equivalent dose rate is about 0.3 mSv/hour; • Equivalent dose for the thyroid gland is about 0.8 mSv for an adult without accounting for protection measures. Control Area (CA) • Spatial iodine-131 activity is about 0.58 Bq/l at the altitude of 1m above the surface in 30 min from the initial release; • Equivalent dose rate is about 0.3 mSv/hour; • Equivalent dose for the thyroid gland is about 0.8 mSv for an adult and 1.5 mSv for a child without accounting for protection measures. Exposure doses in case of the least favorable weather conditions Distance from the External exposure doses, mSv Dose for the thyroid source Over 10 days. Over a year. gland of a child, mSv 3000 (SPA) 1.9 3.4 4.9 5000 (CA) 1.2 2.2 2.9

These values are substantially lower than those set by NRB-99 standards as the lower limit for the necessity of decision-making on evacuation of population. Thus, evacuation or resettlement of population is not required at the early stage of the radiation accident development. The following measures are recommended for Bilibino town population at the early stage of the accident (10 days): • Protection of respiratory organs and skin; • Sealing of working areas and apartments; • Storing the water supply in sealed containers, packing food into plastic bags..

57 Operation of the Alarm and the Readings of the Instruments

MCR-1: siren, ring. Light and sound alarms activated, emergency information panels light up. In 30 seconds more emergency panels are activated, Generator 1 active power – 15MW, common activation of alarms. Deaerator level decreases, instruments show water disbalance in the loops. Steam is intensely released from the upper covering of the unit 1 reactor, and from the pipeline tunnel into machine hall. In 5 minutes more alarms on emergency shutdown of hardware are activated. Most alarms on position of unit devices are deactivated.

The Sequence of Failure Liquidation. Personnel actions

PPSS performed the following: 1. Obtained more detailed information on the condition of the emergency unit, and determined the type of the failure. Announced via the loudspeakers: "Attention all the personnel! Accident at unit 1! Everybody not involved in liquidation of the accident should leave the area of controlled access!"; turned on "emergency" tape recorder, reported the accident conditions and preliminary radiation situation assessment to director and chief engineer. Reported the causes of the unit's halt to on-duty dispatcher of "Rosenergoatom" concern, to the CD&ES HQ of the town of Bilibino and Chukotka Administrative District. 2. Issued instructions to ED on assessment of situation in the rooms and report on the necessity of iodine prophylaxis. 3. After acquiring data on radiation situation, issued instructions to shop shift supervisors to carry out iodine prophylaxis, provide personnel with personal protection means and urgent withdrawal of the personnel from the radiation-hazardous areas. 4. Issued instructions to ES SS: - to report to on-duty dispatcher of the energy system about emergency shutdown of units 1 and 2 and possible shutdown of units 3 and 4. Request on-duty dispatcher to establish power reserve in the energy system to provide aftercooling of the units. 5. Issued instructions to RTS SS on halt of the unit 2 and its maximally fast aftercooling. On receiving of the instructions from the director (or Chief Engineer of the Power Plant) about introduction of "Emergency situation" condition at the power plant and activation of the "Plan of measures for protection of the personnel in case of an accident": 6. Charged CDE to notify the head of Gosatomnadzor of Russia inspection at BiNPP, fire department No.8 (PCh-8), commander of the guard at army unit No.3537, medical and sanitary unit No.4, dispatcher of the regional hospital, on-Duty officer of regional police department (ROVD), administration and technicians of the power plant according to "Telephone number lists No.1 and No.2", Appendixes 3.1, 7.1, 7.2 of the Regulation on annunciation of the "Emergency Situation" condition inv. No. 11-85. 7. Activated the sirens of BiNPP and in town. 8. Notified the personnel of the power plant about the annunciation of the "Emergency Situation" condition. 9. Notified the population of the town about the annunciation of the "Emergency Situation" condition at BiNPP (the texts of the notifications are in the Regulation on annunciation of "Emergency Situation" condition inv. No. 11-85). 10. Organized account of the personnel at NPP and took urgent measures on withdrawal of personnel to the shelter. 11. Organized radiation and engineering survey using the combined efforts of the operational personnel.

58 12. Within the first hour after the start of the accident sent notification to the dispatcher division of "Rosenergoatom" concern. 13. Provided continuous monitoring of the discharge of radioactive substances into environment with gas-aerosol and liquid releases. 14. Organized implementation of technical measures specified in the "Plan of measures for personnel protection…" in accordance with instructions of the director and chief engineer of the power plant. 15. Transferred information about the development of situation and course of liquidation of the accident to on-duty dispatcher of "Rosenergoatom" concern in 2 hours after the start of the accident (report form is given in the Regulation on the annunciation of the "Emergency Situation" condition inv. No.11-85).

RTS SS:

Initial event Action performed Confirmation of action completeness Annunciation about the Arrival at MCR of unit 1 Personal confirmation of the accident via loudspeakers accident Constant control of UCCE Actions were performed actions correctly Notification of PPSS and RTS administration about the accident Issue of orders to UCCE of Reactor of unit 2 is damped unit 2 on halt and by button AZ-1, regular aftercooling aftercooling Issue of orders to personnel Reports from the personnel on examination of rooms and about the examination equipment through CEM Order of the PPSS on iodine Distribution of potassium CEM report on taking of prophylaxis iodide and PDA-3M (or IP- potassium iodide by 4) between UCCEs. Issue of personnel and usage of PDA- order "Put gas masks PDA- 3M (or IP-4) 3M or IP-4" via the loudspeakers Order of the PPSS on the Questioning of personnel Contact with every member personnel checking about state of health of RTS shift established. personally, using all State of health satisfactory available communications. Somebody is not responding Organization of search and CEM report on the results of to requests first aid through CEM the search Order of the PPSS on Issue of orders to CEM, RSO Report of CEM and RSO on blocking of the access to on blocking of the access to blocking of the access rooms in emergency central hall, to positions –7,2, condition. +11,56, +15,7 7

UCCE-1: Initial event Action performed Confirmation of action completeness Spontaneous extraction of Switching of AC-2 to AC-1 finished moving, AC-2 AC-1 and AC-2 out of the "manual", than AC-1 to extraction started core "manual", pressing of AZ-1

59 button Failure of AZ-1in the Switching reactor to unsuccessful presence of emergency subcritical state with AZ-1 signals button AZ and RS-AZ rods did not De-energizing of AZ rod unsuccessful move electromagnets with KAZ key AZ and RS-AZ rods did not Switching reactor to unsuccessful move subcritical state with AZ-1 button at central control room through PPSS AZ and RS-AZ rods did not Selection of all RR and RS- unsuccessful move AZ rods "down" and insertion of them into the core AZ and RS-AZ rods did not Issue of order to HAMS SS move on insertion of all EPS rods into the core by de-activating the 48 V DC voltage from the EP rod electromagnets, magnetic clutches of RS-AZ rods, RR rods manually MSV-A,B,V opened Control of decrease of Pressure in DSS continued pressure in DSS rising Increase of generator power Shutting turbo unit down Generator active power – 0 activity using the KOT Stop valve closed Annunciation about the Arrival of RTS SS at MCR accident via the loudspeakers Rising of pressure in reactor Control of operation of Regular protection algorithm stack protection algorithm operation Determination of FA destruction zone using fuel failure detection system Decrease of level in DSS Control of ECCS operation ECCS did not work lower than "-500 mm". protection algorithm ECCS operation Decrease of level in deaerator Opening of D-3 Red light at D-3 flashing Rising of reactor power over Shutting make-up electric Green light at D-3 flashing 100%, fuel element pump (MEP-A,B) down temperature over 400 °C. No Shutting Emergency level in DSS Feedwater Pump (EFWP) down , closing of D-3

UCCE-2 Switched reactor to subcritical state with AZ-1 button on receiving the order from RTS SS. Aftercooling was performed maximally fast.

CEM Initial event Action performed Confirmation of action completeness Annunciation about the Arrival at the emergency unit Report to RTS SS about unit accident via loudspeakers with portable radio station condition

60 Order of PPSS on Issue of order on Reports of personnel on examination of rooms and examination of halls to examination. equipment personnel, personal Report to RTS SS about examination examination results. PPSS (RTS SS) order on Taking of potassium iodide Personnel used potassium iodine prophylaxis and gas masks PDA-3M (IP- iodide and put on the gas 4) from the safe and masks distribution of those between the personnel Order of RTS SS on search Search for personnel in the Report to RTS SS about the of personnel places of possible location, results of the search provision of first aid, evacuation to safe places Order of RTS SS on blocking Locking the doors of Doors locked of the entrance to the rooms indicated rooms together with RSO

Other operational personnel of RTS (UCCE of non-emergency units, MCRE, CTE, MO, CWPSO, DS) act according to their duty and process regulations and orders of the administrative operational personnel. On receiving order from PPSS (RTS SS, CEM) personnel used potassium iodide and put on the gas masks.

CTE, 1. Provided halt of TA-1,2, controlled actions of protection systems and blocks, cut off water cooling the generator, cut off steam supply of unit 1 deaerator. RSO 1. put collector under pressure 2. acted according to the orders of RTS SS and CEM ES SS Initial event Action performed Confirmation of action completeness Annunciation about the Arrival at MCR, execution of Report to PPSS about the accident via loudspeakers regular switchings to internal switchings purposes 6kV and 0.4 kV at units 1,2. PPSS order on iodine Distribution potassium Personal, CDE and DE use of prophylaxis iodide and gas masks PDA- potassium iodide and the gas 3M (IP-4) between CDE and masks DE Order of the PPSS on Questioning of personnel Contact with every member revising of the personnel about state of health of ES shift established. State personally, using all of health satisfactory available communications. Somebody is not responding Organization of search and CEM (DE) report on the to requests first aid through CEM (DE) results of the search Order of the PPSS on Issue of order to DE on Report to PPSS about blocking of the access to blocking the access to the blocking of the access rooms in emergency room of 0.4 kV circuits after condition. checking for absence of people in the room

61 Made assessment of the situation taking into account the readings of the instruments, CCR alarm operation, on-duty operator reports. Provided personnel with personal protection means. Issued CDE an order to examine panel 10R in the CCR. Sent DE to examine the room of 0.4 kV circuits of unit 1, to ascertain the possibility of supplying the operational bus of unit 1, 2 and take measures on protection of the equipment to minimize the influence of coolant leaks. Jointly with DE disassembled circuits of units. CDE 1. On receiving the order of PPSS, notified administrative and technical personnel of the NPP about the start of the accident. Registered all switchings in chronological order, executed the orders of ES SS on liquidation of the accident. DE 1. Examined the room of 0.4 kV circuits of unit 1, reported the conditions of the equipment to ES SS, took measures on protection of electric equipment, executed the orders of ES SS on liquidation of the accident.

HAMS SS; Initial event Action preformed Confirmation of action completeness Annunciation about the Arrival at MCR of the Report to PPSS about the accident via loudspeakers emergency unit with portable condition of instrumentation radio station of the emergency unit Issue of order on switching launching instruments of units 1-4 on Personal verification of all Report to PPSS (RTS SS) EPS rods at lower position. about full insertion of all EPS Insertion those rods not at the rods to lower position lower position into the core using special gear. Arrival at MCR for providing of technical aid to UCCE Taking measures on saving the data recorded on diagram tapes PPSS order on iodine Handing of potassium iodide Personal use of potassium prophylaxis and gas masks PDA-3M (IP- iodide and the gas masks 4) Order of the PPSS on Questioning of personnel Contact with every member revising of the personnel about state of health of HAMS shift established. personally, using all State of health satisfactory available communications. Somebody is not responding Organization of search and CEM report on the results of to requests first aid through CEM the search Order of the PPSS on Issue of order to block access Report to PPSS about blocking of the access to to EPS actuator rooms, after blocking of the access rooms in emergency checking for absence of condition. people in the room

62 ED: 1. Assessed radiation situation at the NPP using stationary systems of the "D" panel and, if necessary, portable instruments. 2. Reported to PPSS about sharp deterioration of radiation situation at NPP. 3. Notified PPSS about the necessity of iodine prophylaxis. 4. Halted all work in the controlled access area and withdrew people. 5. Jointly with RTS SS determined the operational mode of the ventilation systems. 6. Registered wind direction and speed at the moment of the start of the accident in the operational log. Reported to EDM (external dose monitoring) service about the accident and issued required instructions. 7. Organized obligatory dose control of the personnel at the exit of controlled access area. 8. Executed constant monitoring of radiation situation at NPP, registered it in the operational log and reported to PPSS. 9. Provided operational personnel of the NPP with additional overalls, personal protection means and individual dose control instruments, determined the exposure doses. 10. Determined the releases to ventilation pipelines. EDM Service: 1. Determined the speed and direction of the wind (via the weather station). 2. Requested two mobile radio stations. 3. Carried out radiation survey of the routes: No2 round the NPP to the dam, No 3 – from the NPP to Keperveem, Arktika district, to the south-west border of the SPA. 4. Organized radiochemical analysis of the samples.

63 Conducting of exercise at Crisis Center of “Rosenergoatom”

Minutes of the Tabletop Exercise at Bilibino NPP, 21.08.02 (Moscow time) 2:08 Information about the accident at Bilibino NPP received at “Rosenergoatom” Concern Crisis Center. This information was transferred to the leader of Crisis Center NPP support team. Order on collection of “0” team in the Crisis Center was issued by NPP support team leader. 2:08-2:12 Information transferred to Situation Crisis Center (SCC) of Minatom, to interested ministries and departments, Technical Support Centers (TSC) 2:10-2:15 Crisis Center areas deployed to a full scale 2:10-2:20 CC communications deployed. Videoconference with Minatom CC, TSC IBRAE RAN, internal Bilibino NPP emergency center held 2:18 Information exchange between CC and IBRAE RAN using the videoconference 2:26 Videoconference connection between the CC and BiNPP established 2:27 Report of Bilibino NPP director about the accident at the NPP. “Emergency condition” mode is engaged at the NPP, the radiation survey has started, NPP personnel is sheltered, iodine prophylaxis of NPP personnel has been carried out 2:31 Written operational message about failure in NPP operation received from BiNPP 2:35 NPP support team deputy leader received permission from the leader on the preparation of special flight of NPP support team to Bilibino NPP. 2:41 NPP support team leader arrived at the Crisis Center, and received reports about the measures taken at the Crisis Center. 2:45 Report of Bilibino NPP director to NPP support team leader. Contaminated cloud is transferred in the direction of Bilibino. Radiation situation conditions do not require evacuation of personnel. All BiNPP personnel have carried out iodine prophylaxis. iodine prophylaxis was recommended for the population of Bilibino town. 2:50 Communication of CC with IBRAE RAN. NPP support team leader set IBRAE experts a task to prepare recommendations on protective measures 2:52 NPP support team leader set Physical Energetic Institute experts a task to prepare the recommendations on further actions on halting and aftercooling of the damaged reactor unit. Situation development prediction was also requested 2:56 Communication with Minatom CC. Crisis Centers informed each other about current situation and measures taken 2:59 NPP support team leader issues instructions to Crisis Center administration about preparation of the second flight with materials required for aiding the NPP 3:03 On-Duty Dispatcher of the Concern has prepared a request to Bryansk aviation unit on the flight of the second airplane to Bilibino NPP 3:11 IBRAE RAN reports the recommended protection measures 3:17 BiNPP reports detailed information on the situation, accounting for the data received from the survey services 3:20 NPP support team classifies the accident as corresponding to the 4th level of INES scale 3:30 During the exchange of information, issues on ASKRO organization are discussed 3:36 Communication of the Crisis Center with SCC on the issue of filling of INES form 4:00 Report of Bilibino NPP director to NPP support team leader on organization of deactivation 4:27 Communication of CC with SCC of Minatom, TSC IBRAE RAN, SPA “Typhoon”, short review by NPP support team leader 4:28 The objectives of the exercise are met, the exercise is finished. NPP support team leader issues tasks to corresponding organization leaders on fundamental analysis and summarizing the results of the exercise.

Actions of Technical Crisis Center of IBRAE RAN (TCC IBRAE RAN)

The exercise began in TCC IBRAE RAN as soon as fax message about tabletop exercise on Bilibino NPP was received from “Rosenergoatom” concern crisis center at 02:16. On-duty expert of TCC engaged the “Emergency Preparedness” mode. TCC administration, institute administration, experts team and technical team members were notified. The following measures were implemented between 02:16 and 02:30: • Experts team collection (8 members); • Activation of hardware and software; • Activation and check of operation of videoconferencing software; • Tasks were issued to the experts team

Internet site ay IBRAE RAN server was organized to provide access of interested people and organizations to information on organizing and conducting of the exercise.

Information on the was divided into three sections: 1. Documents, developed during the preparation of the exercise; 2. Information on conduction of the exercise; 3. Chronology of the exercise conduction;

The first section, containing general information on exercise objectives, exercise organizers, participants and observers, was prepared before the start of the exercise. This section also included exercise participant's handbook, which was distributed between the participants before the start of the exercise.

Information of the second section was added directly during the exercise on 21 of August. The section was updated by IBRAE RAN experts with messages sent from the TSC IBRAE RAN to "Rosenergoatom" Concern Crisis Center. The messages contained data of assessments and predictions of the radiation situation based on the information available at that moment. Special section described the trans-boundary transfer of radionuclides in the direction of Alaska.

The last section contained the chronology of the exercise. This document was prepared by observers at Bilibino NPP. The document contained the sequence of NPP personnel actions aimed at liquidation of the exercise.

References to web sites of the major exercise participants were also included on the site. Site had a full and limited access mode. Exercise organizers determined the access permissions of the users. The user in the limited access mode could only obtain general information on exercise objectives and participants. A password was required for the full access mode.

A few examples of web-presentation are shown below/

From the start of annunciation of emergency preparedness mode and lasting until 04:32 uninterrupted videoconference was held between the TCC and REA Crisis Centre (REA CC) During that time TCC specialists were able to communicate with administration and members of NPP support team, on-duty Situation Crisis Centre of Minatom (SCC) shift. Also it was possible to observe the actions of Bilibino NPP administration. During the videoconference sessions TCC experts listened to the report of Bilibino NPP director, received information from Bilibino NPP, consulted with NPP support team experts on issues concerning protective measures for the population of Bilibino town. The first message to REA CC was prepared and sent to the crisis center at 02:35 using e-mail and fax. The message was simultaneously displayed on the specialized IBRAE RAN server. Than TCC experts began assessing radiation situation in the region of Bilibino NPP location. The assessment results were used for the preparation of message No.2, which was sent to REA CC and IBRAE RAN server at 02:53. In the following 40 minutes, using acquired detailed information, more precise prediction of radiation situation at Bilibino NPP location was made and recommendations on protection of population were developed. Message No.3 was prepared and sent at 03:30.

Experts of TCC IBRAE during the exercise At 03:28-04:46 TCC experts performed further analysis of calculation data, made more precise prediction and confirmed the measures recommended for population protection earlier. This involved consultation with NPP support team experts, where decision about iodine prophylaxis of the population, taken by NPP administration, was considered excessive. An assessment of wild berries contamination was also made. Message No.4 was sent at 04:46. Telephone notification about the end of tabletop exercise at Bilibino NPP was received from on- Duty officer of “Rosenergoatom” Concern Crisis Centre at 4:52. Information about the exercise and messages sent from IBRAE RAN Technical Support Centre (TSC) to “Rosenergoatom” Concern Crisis Centre, were displayed in Internet throughout the exercise at: http://reac.ibrae.ac/ru/bilibino. Nine observers from Russia, USA, Finland and Iceland followed the development of the exercise (directly during the exercise) using the Internet site. Representatives of following organizations used the site for observing the development of the exercise: SCC of Minatom of Russia; “Rosenergoatom” Concern Crisis Centre; Institute of Marine Science of the School of Fisheries and Ocean Sciences, University of Alaska Fairbanks. Furthermore, USA representative John Mitchell (US Department of Energetic) followed the development of the exercise directly from TSC IBRAE RAN. Besides providing technical support of “Rosenergoatom” Concern Crisis Centre uring the tabletop exercise at Bilibino NPP, TSC IBRAE RAN sent institute representatives (Linge I.I, Osipyants I.A. and Shpinkova L.G) to the observer group which assessed the actions of tabletop exercise members and were deployed at the power plant. This mobile IBRAE RAN group used the satellite telephone for uninterrupted and stable communication with TSC IBRAE RAN throughout the tabletop exercise. The messages, which were sent to the CC are presented below

EXERCISE! EXERCISE! EXERCISE! EXERCISE! EXERCISE!

TSC IBRAE RAN: message No.1 p. 1 21.08.2002

Center of Technical Support for “Rosenergoatom” Concern Crisis Centre IBRAE RAN

Tel.: 958-00-98), 955-22-20 (reserve) Fax: 955 22-20, 958-00-80(reserve),e-mail: [email protected]

Message No.1

Notification about emergency situation at Bilibino NPP received at 02:16 on 21.08.02. Message contains information on the scenario of the accident, release source parameters, current and predicted weather conditions in the region of the power plant location. TSC IBRAE RAN is in emergency preparedness mode. Experts team is collected in TSC IBRAE RAN. Five experts are at their workstations. Hardware and software is activated, videoconference operation has been checked. Experts received their tasks.

On-duty Expert of TSC IBRAE RAN Experts S.V.PanchenkoV. N.Semenov R.I.Bakin V.F.Evseev A.V.Shikin

EXERCISE! EXERCISE! EXERCISE! EXERCISE! EXERCISE! TSC IBRAE RAN: message No.2 p. 105 21.08.2002

______

Centre of Technical Support for “Rosenergoatom” Concern Crisis Centre IBRAE RAN

Tel.: 958-00-98), 955-22-20 (reserve) Fax: 955 22-20, 958-00-80(reserve),e-mail: [email protected] Message No.2 TSC IBRAE RAN performed assessment of radiation situation in the region of Bilibino NPP location. Prediction is based on the data received from “Rosenrgoatom” concern at 02:16. Calcualtions were made using the info-modeling complex “Nostradamus”. Weather conditions in the region of the accident: Temperature - +100 С; Wind – eastern (90 degrees), V = 1m/sec; No precipitations (0 mm); Stable atmosphere condition (category F); Roughness parameter z0 = 0,17m (open field in summer). Radionuclide composition of fission products in the atmospheric release is given in table 1. Release duration – 10 hours Release altitude – 20 meters

Table 1. Nuclide composition of fission products in the atmospheric release.

Nuclide Release to Atmosphere, Bq 85mKr 5,5*1013 87Kr 1,1*1014 88Kr 1,5*1014 133Xe 5,5*1014 135mXe 1,2*1015 135Xe 1,2*1015 131I 2,9*1012 132I 4,1*1012 133I 5,8*1012 134I 6,1*1012 135I 5,4*1012 134Cs 1,5*1011 137Cs 1,1*1011

Figure 1-3 show calculated data on the predicted external exposure dose for 10 days, dose on child’s and adult’s thyroid gland correspondingly.

Fig.1 Total external effective dose over 10 days, mSv.

Fig.2 Total inhalation dose for child’s thyroiud gland, mSv.

Fig.3 Total inhalation dose for adult’s thyroid gland, mSv

On-duty Expert of TSC IBRAE RAN Experts S.V.Panchenko

V.N.SemenovR.I. Bakin V.F.Evseev A.V.Shikin

EXERCISE! EXERCISE! EXERCISE! EXERCISE! EXERCISE! TSC IBRAE RAN: message No.3 p. 3 21.08.2002

Centre of Technical Support for “Rosenergoatom” Concern Crisis Centre IBRAE RAN

Tel.: 958-00-98), 955-22-20 (reserve) Fax: 955 22-20, 958-00-80(reserve),e-mail: [email protected]

Message No.3. Analysis of calculated data was performed, more detailed prediction was made. Table 2 shows calculated exposure dose data along trace axis at various distances from Bilibino NPP. Table 2. Exposure doses along trace axis at various distances from Bilibino NPP

Distance from the Dose caused by the Inhalation dose for the External exposure source, km cloud, mSv thyroid gland of a dose over 10 days, child, mSv mSv 1 0.6039 38.31 1.393 2 0.2748 11.77 0.5261 5 0.07224 1.921 0.1151 10 0.02612 0.3535 0.03465 20 0 0 0 50 0 0 0 100 0 0 0

Figure 4-7 show calculated data of the dose for a thyroid gland of a child at distances 3 km (Sanitary protection area of the NPP) and 5 km (Control area of the NPP) depending on the time passed from the start of the accident.

75 Fig.4 Inhalation dose for the thyroid gland of a child at a distance of 5 km from Bilibino NPP depending on time

Fig.5 Inhalation dose for the thyroid gland of a child at a distance of 5 km from Bilibino NPP depending on time.

Fig.6 Inhalation dose for the thyroid gland of an adult at a distance of 3 km from Bilibino NPP depending on time.

Fig.7 Total inhalation dose for the thyroid gland of an adult at a distance of 5 km from Bilibino NPP depending on time.

Recommendations: Analysis of calculation data revealed that the obtained values are substantially lower than the limits set by “Radiation Safety Standards” (NRB-99). Thus no urgent population protection measures are required at the early stage of accident development. Still, taking into account uncertainties of the assessments, we can recommend: short-term protection of respiratory organs and skin, short-term sealing of working areas and apartments. Also it appears advisable to strengthen monitoring of contamination of berries and mushrooms and also plants used for feeding the animals.

On-duty Expert of TSC IBRAE RAN Experts S.V.Panchenko V.N.Semenov R.I.Bakin V.F.Evseev A.V.Shikin

EXERCISE! EXERCISE! EXERCISE! EXERCISE! EXERCISE! TSC IBRAE RAN: message No.4 p. 2 21.08.2002

Centre of Technical Support for “Rosenergoatom” Concern Crisis Centre IBRAE RAN

Tel.: 958-00-98), 955-22-20 (reserve) Fax: 955 22-20, 958-00-80(reserve),e-mail: [email protected]

Message No.4. Further analysis of the calculation data was performed, more precise prediction and recommendations for the population are being developed. Figures 8, 9 show calculation data on density of I-131 Cs-137 fallout.

Fig.8 I-131 fallout density.

Fig.9 Cs-137 fallout density. Assessments of radioactive substance content in surface waters show that the greatest concentrations can be encountered in Keperveem river in the location of Bilibino town during the passage of radioactive cloud over the site. The assessments were made on the basis of radionuclide fallout data. For 131I (the radionuclide of greatest biological significance), concentration in the mentioned period can reach 500 Bq/m3. Such contamination level is substantially lower than the levels of interference for drinking water recommended by radiation safety standards (NRB-99). After passing of the cloud radionuclide concentration in the water will drop to a value lower by a factor of 100. Blueberry and cloudberry are among those food products, the contamination of which is expected at the greatest level. The assessments performed show that within the area of 6-10 km from the NPP the maximum concentration of 131I (the radionuclide of greatest biological significance) can reach about 1 kBq/kg. Such concentration of 131I in berries does not require urgent measures on limiting the consumption of such products. Final conclusions concerning possible limiting of berries and mushrooms consumption in the future can be made after instrumentation monitoring Maximum concentrations of other nuclides will be 10 or more times lower and will not present serious threat.

On-duty Expert of TSC IBRAE RAN Experts S.V.Panchenko V.N.Semenov R.I.Bakin V.F.Evseev A.V.Shikin

Decisions on population protection were made based on the following criteria. Dose limits for the population in Russia are regulated by the NRB-99 standards, approved by the head sanitary inspector of Russia on July 2, 1999. The requirements for the population exposure limits in case of radiation accident are given in the standards.

In case of an accident, measures should be taken to regain control over radiation source and to minimize the exposure doses, the number of people affected, contamination of the environment, the social and economic losses caused by contamination.

In case of a radiation accident or detection of contamination, limiting the exposure is carried out using protective measures on the environment and the population. Such measures can disturb normal life of the population, and the social and economic functions of the region. This means that such measures lead not only to economic losses, but also to unfavorable influence on the population’s health, psychological influence combined with changes in the ecosystem condition. Thus, decision making about the required level of intervention (protective measures) should be made according to the following principles:

The benefit from the intervention for the society and, first of all, for the exposed population must be greater than the harm. The reduction of the harm as a result of exposure dose decrease should be sufficient to justify the harm and the cost, including the social cost, of the intervention (the principle of the intervention justification). The type, scale and duration of the intervention should be chosen in such a way that the pure benefit from the dose reduction (benefit from the reduction of the radiation damage minus the harm connected with the intervention) must be maximal (the principle of intervention optimization) f an expected exposure dose for a short period (2 days) reaches the levels at which clinically determined effects are possible (table ), urgent intervention (protective measures) is necessary. In this case, the harm from protective measures must be lower than the benefit for the affected population health.

Table . Predicted Exposure Levels of Required Urgent Intervention

Organ or Tissue Absorbed dose for the organ or tissue for 2 days, Gy Whole Body 1 Lungs 6 Skin 3 Thyroid 5 Lens 2 Gonads 3 Fetus 0.1

In case of a chronic exposure during the lifetime, the protective measures are obligatory, if the annual absorbed doses exceed the levels given in table. Exceeding the given doses leads to serious determined effects.

80 Table . Levels of Intervention in Case of Chronic Exposure

Organ or Tissue Annual absorbed Dose, Gy Gonads 0.2 Lens 0.1 Red Marrow 0.4

The levels of intervention for the resettlement of the population are established as follows: 30 mSv per month for the beginning of the resettlement, 10 mSv per month for the end of the resettlement. If it is considered that the accumulated dose would exceed the given parameters during a year, resettlement to permanent residence should be considered.

During decontamination meassures dose limits are not used. According to the given principles, branches of the State Sanitary Inspection determine the level of intervention (doses and dose rates, levels of contamination) for the protective measures being planned in case of a radiation accident. These levels are determined specially for each radiation object, the conditions of its location with the regard to possible accident types, scenarios and a current radiation situation.

In case of an accident resulting in the contamination of a large territory, area of radiation accident is determined according to monitoring and prediction of the radiation situation. In the area of radiation accident, monitoring of the radiation situation is carried out and measures for the reduction of population exposure are taken on the basis of the principles and approaches mentioned above.

Decision making about protective measures for the population in case of a major radiation accident with contamination of the territory is done on the basis of comparison of the predicted dose prevented by the protective measures and levels of contamination with levels A and B given in tables.

If the level of exposure prevented by the protective measure does not exceed level A, there is no need in taking measures disturbing the normal life and economic and social functions of the territory.

If the level of exposure prevented by the protective measure exceeds level A, but does not exceed level B, the decisions on taking protective measures are made in accordance with justification and optimization principles.

If the level of exposure prevented by the protective measure exceeds level B, the protective measures should be carried out even if they lead to disturbing normal life and social and economic functions of the territory.

At the later stages of a radiation accident accompanied by contamination of large territories by long-life nuclides, decision making on protective measures is done with a respect to the current radiation situation and specific social and economic conditions.

81 Table. Criteria for critical Decision Making at the Early Stage of Radiation Accident

Protective Prevented Dose for the first 10 days, mGy Measures Whole Body Thyroid Level A Level B Level A Level B Sheltering 5 50 50 500 Iodine Profilaxis: Adults - - 250 2500 Children - - 100 1000 Evacuation 50 500 500 5000

Table. Criteria for Decision Making on Resettlement and Restriction of the Use of Contaminated Food

Protective Measures Prevented effective Dose, mSv Level A Level B Restriction of the Use of the 5 for the first year 50 for the first year contaminated Food and Water 1 per year for the following 10 per year for the following years years Resettlement 50 for the first year 500 for the first year 1000 for resettlement duration

Table. Criteria for Decision Making on Restriction of Contaminated Food Use for the First Year Following the Accident

Radionuclides Specific activity of radionuclide in Food, kBq/kg Level A Level B 131I, 134Cs, 137Cs 1 10 90Sr 0.1 1.0 238Pu, 239Pu, 241Am 0.01

Criteria for decision making and the derived levels for limiting measures in case of accidents with dispersed uranium, plutonium, and other transuranium element are established by special norms.

The View of the Observers.

The following organizations participated in the exercise as observers: • From the Russian side: representatives of «Rosenergoatom» concern, DSES of Minatom, Novovoronezh ETC, VNIIAES, IBRAE RAS, SPA "Typhoon"; • From the US side: representatives of Department of Energy, Department of Environmental Protection of the state of Alaska, Division of Emergency Response of the Alaska administration, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, University of Alaska. The observers were able to be in all key rooms where the exercise was conducted. The observers followed the actions of NPP director and chief engineer of NPP. Observers were able to trace the procedure of notification of Minatom administration, “Rosenergoatom” concern administration, Chukotka Administrative District and town of Bilibino administration by NPP director. Than observers proceeded to the protected post of counter-emergency measures control. During the exercise the observers prepared a short chronology of the exercise, which is presented in figures below.

83 84 85 86 87 88 89

Actions of Administration of Bilibino

Actions of local Administration were based on Schedule of emergency situations commission of Chukotka Administrative District functioning in case of emergency situations threat and emergency situations. On stage of exercise preparation the following documents were produced: Resolution of municipal education administration – Bilibino region No.323 "On command and HQ exercise at Bilibino NPP", dated 08.08.2002. Resolution of municipal education administration – Bilibino region No.236-rg "On additions to resolution No.19-rg, dated 18.01.2002 "On members of emergency situations commission", dated 13.06.2002. Letter of Bilibino NPP director Chudakov M.V. to head of Bilibino region administration Shulgin V.N № 28/4005, dated 12.08.2002, including data for revision of "Plan of autotechnical provision of liquidation of consequences of possible emergency situations."

During the exercise the ES commission of Magadan District – Bilibino region has been urgently called.

Commission head Shulgin V.N. - Head of Magadan District – Bilibino region administration.

Deputy heads: Simonov A.F. - 1st administration Deputy Head; Smirnov N.N. - CD&ES HQ Commander

Commission secretary: Ivahnenko L. А. - Head of general and organization issues section of Magadan District – Bilibino region administration.

Commission members: Belchenko E.L. - director general of "SRT" corporation; Gorelikov P.K. - director of Chukotka forestry; Zamula S.G. - director of "Severnye electricheskie seti" ("Northern electrical networks") Karamyshev V.V. - commander of No.1 unit of EMERCOM in Chukotka administrative district; Korolenko T.N. - director of RUES; Milovanov A.V. - director of regional section of Federal safety service (RO UFSB); Miftahova V.I. - director of municipal services organization; Morlok Yu.P. - "Keperveem" airport director; Osipov E.V. - deputy head of Magadan District – Bilibino region administration; Rasskazov A.P. - head physician of regional sanitary substation (RC GSEP); Smirnov Yu.V. - commander of police department (ROVD); Sugatova N.N. - deputy head of Magadan District – Bilibino region administration; Syasin S.B. - Bilibino garrison commander; Chistalev L.P. - head physician of Bilibino branch of the central hospital - Bilibino central regional hospital (BCRB); Chudakov M.V. - director of Bilibino NPP.

91 Actions of the commission were done in the following chronological order

1102 – sound alert (Siren) is activated in the town. Radio translation of "Collection announced" notice via radio. Telephone notification of regional ES commission started. Collection announced. 1112 – Head of administration receives notice of NPP director about the accident and obtains detailed information on situation.

1115 – Head of administration reports to Deputy Governor of Chukotka Administrative District R.Dalakyan about the accident. Instructions for the population translated using the radio. ES commission members receive gas masks and respirators

1122 – all ES commission members have arrived. Head of administration reports the situation and issues tasks to commission members: Sanitary inspection – to determine the borders of contaminated area and radiation situation in the region; Police – to block access to the station with the exception of ES commission members; Engineering services – to retain town life support in case of voltage drop or NPP disconnection; Education – to determine the precise number of children and teachers in schools and nurseries and provide them with personal protection means; Hospital – to provide conditions necessary for receiving injured and to await instructions from sanitary inspection and NPP services; Transport – to be ready to assist NPP in evacuation, if required. At 1150 commission members must report to head of administration about preparedness.

1130 – phone call from EMERCOM Department of Chukotka Administrative District, requesting detailed information.

1140 operational HQ received information with detailed situation description from the head of CD&ES of NPP. CD&ES head of the region reports to head of administration.

1150 – commission collected for reporting. 1. CD&ES HQ head reports general situation: "awaiting notices from radiation survey from the power plant and sanitary inspection" 2. Fire-fighting services – personnel in the alert mode. Several crews advanced to NPP, other crews are in town. 3. Engineering services – 12MW of power lost, shortage will be compensated with heat power plant and floating power plant. No problems with electricity are expected. 4. Municipal services – collection of all the services is in process. 5. Communication – alert mode engaged, district capital informed, emergency plan engaged. 6. Director general of "Severnye Rudnye Tehnologii" (Northern Mining Technologies) - transport and specific engineering vehicles for CD&ES purposes provided. 7. Education – precise number of children and teachers in schools and nurseries received, all of them notified. 8. Police – 52 officers working, posts organized, full preparedness.

1158 –NPP director reports situation over telephone.

92 Head of administration orders to municipal services to send water distribution vehicle to water the roads approaching the power plant. 1 Deputy head of administration receives tasks to set for the town to check posts and services of the police.

1228 – army unit of the district reports on preparedness of specific engineering vehicles and manpower to assist town and power plant.

1232 – Sanitary inspection reports radiation situation in the town and power plant surroundings.

1235 – information from the power plant received: - no population evacuation required; - no iodine prophylaxis required; - it is recommended for the population to stay within the buildings.

1330 – end of the exercise.

1400 – final collection of commission for summarizing the exercise results.

Head of Bilibino regional administration Discussion of population protection controls the actions of Emergency measures. To the left – the leader of Situations Commission local service of EMERCOM (Chukotka Administrative District)

Members of Emergency Situation Commission of Bilibino region

The report of radiation survey group leader (acting) is presented on the figure above

21.08.02 11:10 a.m. – received signal for collection. 11:20 a.m. – arrived at CD&ES HQ of the region. 11:50 a.m. – signal for switching of regional RSSES unit from "Everyday" mode to "Alert" mode Received the preamble "Radiation accident at Bilibino NPP". 11:55 a.m. – issued orders for collection of radiation survey group using the central town sanitary inspection (CGSEN) notification plan. Time of collection and deployment – 30 minutes. Report on radiation situation on routes at 12:25 a.m. 12:15 a.m. – obtained more detailed weather conditions: wind direction 90 degrees (eastern), windspeed 1 m/sec, precipitations – 0 mm/hour, atmosphere stability class F. 12:30 a.m. – obtained more detailed situation at NPP – radiation background at NPP site – 5 mSv/hour. Radiation background in "Arktika" district – 0,2 mSv/hour; near BCRB – 0,5 mSv/hour. 12:35 a.m. – report to regional CD&ES commission head about situation and implementation of urgent measures. 12:40 a.m. – participation in elaboration of address to the citizens. 15:00 a.m.. – end of exercise. Analysis of performed measures.

Radiation Survey Group leader A.E. Nimgirov

Appeal to population of Bilibino was prepared.

Appeal to the population of Bilibino

21.08.2002 г. 12:40 a.m. Attention Bilibino citizens Exercise is being performed in the town today. The exercise is aimed at protection of population in case of radiation accident at Bilibino NPP. The situation is under control of regional administration and emergency situations commission. Training survey of radiation situation reveal fairly favorable conditions. Still, we recommend to close the windows and doors tightly, to make a water and food reserve, and shield them with plastic. Do not leave your houses for 8-10 hours, unless absolutely necessary, protect respiratory organs with respirator or cloth filters, inform your neighbors and acquaintances about it. Iodine prophylaxis is not necessary. Await notifications of emergency situations commission on town radio.

CD&ES HQ commander N.N.Smirnov

Conclusions

1. Exercise demonstrated that such measures present a highly effective means of checking of local system of emergency response, and notification and interaction procedure at federal and international levels. The exercise is also an effective means of testing the work of experts in Minatom and Rosenergoatom crisis centers and other organizations. Usage of various elements of emergency response at the NPP (local notification procedures, fire departments, transport, emergency technical resources) was an important moment of the exercise. 2. The exercise proved to be a good means of testing of experts work both in the NPP crisis center and in technical support centers. NPP experts demonstrated a high level of computer prediction and radiation assessment skills. 3. Regional administration, civil defense and emergency situations means and resources were widely involved in the exercise for the first time at BiNPP. NPP administration and local authorities interaction were tested in a real time mode. 4. The conduction of the exercise speeded up the process of equipping the NPP with data transfer means. 5. It should also be mentioned that more time is needed for the preparation of the exercise of such scale, because organization and technical issues consume a lot of time. 6. Computer simulation systems proved to be a highly effective means of exercise conduction. During this exercise such a system was used only in IBRAE crisis center.

Recommendations on improvement of separate elements of emergency response system were issued after the exercise.

Plan of elimination of the shortcomings revealed during the tabletop exercise at Bilibino NPP on the topic: “Training of personnel actions in case of an accident at Bilibino NPP.”

1. Revealed shortcoming: Internal and external emergency centers do not receive information on the condition of the emergency unit and radiation situation measures planned for elimination of the shortcoming: organization of information transfer system for the transfer of information on the condition of emergency unit and radiation situation at Bilibino NPP 2. Revealed shortcoming: insufficient equipment of BiNPP emergency centers with communication means and hardware measures planned for elimination of the shortcoming: supplying the emergency centers with the required communication means and hardware 3. Revealed shortcoming: organization of transport flight to BiNPP in case of emergency situation has no determined procedure measures planned for elimination of the shortcoming: development of operating procedure of organization of transport flight to BiNPP in case of emergency situation 4. Revealed shortcoming: technical safety parameters data of BiNPP units are not transferred to “Rosenergoatom” Concern Crisis Center measures planned for elimination of the shortcoming: 1. Provision of collection and transfer of technical safety parameters of BiNPP units to “Rosenergoatom” concern Crisis Center 2. Introduction of REA CC - Bilibino NPP satellite communication channel of “Materik- M” system 5. Revealed shortcoming: no data on the automated system of radiation monitoring (ASRM) of the NPP present at Crisis Center

96 measures planned for elimination of the shortcoming: development of program and technical complex for transfer of ASRM data from the NPP and their display in the Crisis Center

97 Annex

Start of the exercise. Office of BiNPP director M. Chudakov

Notification of the accident transferred via loudspeakers at the NPP

NPP director reports to REA concern and Minatom administration about the reference accident at the NPP

Observers from Minatom of Russia, REA concern, IBRAE RAN are following the development of the exercise

Protected post of Bilibino NPP became emergency center for the time of the exercise

Fire engines are ready for action

100

Preparation of the report to the NPP support team leader

Videoconference session with the NPP support team leader

101

Report of external dose control service about radiation situation in the sanitary protection area

The team of experts assesses the radiation situation 102

The Deputy Chief Engineer reports about the condition of the emergency unit

Discussion of the population protection measures with the leader of EMERCOM service in Chukotka Administrative District

103

Videoconference session with SCC of Minatom

Emergency center of BiNPP.The results of prognosis of the radiation situation is demonstrated on the screen

104

NPP director, Chief Engineer and IBRAE observer discuss recommendations on the population protection measures

105