Palgrave Studies in Economic History

Series editor Kent Deng London School of Economics London, United Kingdom Palgrave Studies in Economic History is designed to illuminate and enrich our understanding of economies and economic phenomena of the past. The series covers a vast range of topics including financial history, labour history, development economics, commercialisation, urban- isation, industrialisation, modernisation, globalisation, and changes in world economic orders.

More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14632 M.d.Mar Rubio-Varas • Joseba De la Torre Editors The Economic History of Nuclear Energy in Spain Governance, Business and Finance Editors M.d.Mar Rubio-Varas Joseba De la Torre Department of Economics Department of Economics Universidad Pública de Navarra Universidad Pública de Navarra Pamplona, Spain Pamplona, Spain

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This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland The original version of the book back matter was revised. The name of the nuclear plant has been corrected to Trillo in the second note to the table in the appendix. Preface

While writing this book some countries have announced the launch of a nuclear power plant construction program and others are prepar- ing to do so in the coming years. According to data from the Nuclear News Agency NUCNET, at the beginning of 2017, 59 new reactors are being built in the world and another 143 are planned for the next three decades. In terms of electricity production, these new reactors would add 211,000 MWe of installed nuclear capacity, equivalent to 54% of all the power currently installed in the 448 nuclear power plants operating on our planet. Each nuclear project continues to pose technological, economic and security challenges of enormous dimensions, with environmental, social and political effects that prompt action from international organizations, governments, companies and society. The promoters of the atom argue that, assuring safety, nuclear development is necessary as a base-load energy to combat climate change, the volatility of oil prices and a guarantee for electricity supply. However, recalling the accidents at Chernobyl (1986) and Fukushima (2011), the debate over the extension of the licenses to continue the operation nuclear power plants beyond the 40 years originally granted, and finding permanent storage solutions for spent fuel and irradiated materials pro- voke the distrust sections of the population (with large variation across countries in scale and scope). One of the many paradoxes of this sce- nario is that, within the European Union, while Germany plans to phase vii viii Preface nuclear power by 2022, the UK, France, Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria have decided to develop new atomic plants. Far from being a contro- versial subject of the past, nuclear power is still on the front page in the present and will remain so in the future. The arguments of current energy officials in countries as diverse as Turkey, Egypt, Iran, Bangladesh, Sudan and Ghana are reminiscent of those used by pioneers of nuclear power in the 1960s and 1970s. Governments, agencies and companies back then proclaimed that nuclear programs would provide safe and cheap electricity, boost industrializa- tion and reduce energy dependency. There is hardly any information on how and who will pay for such projects in Africa and Asia, or whether the technological, business and financial capacities have been considered. The International Atomic Energy Agency oversee these projects and the implied governments have negotiated with China and Russia, who seem willing to provide the know-how and the massive financial support that building a nuclear power plant requires. In this sense, the nuclear history of Spain that we present in this volume can be paradigmatic to under- stand the present, the expectations and the foreseeable successes and mis- takes that these emerging economies may face in the coming years. Most of the history of nuclear energy written to this day has focused on the study of the industrial countries that pioneered all relevant aspects this source of electricity. The US first, immediately followed by the Soviet Union, the UK, Canada, France and West Germany were innovators of this new technological challenge, diffusers of their industrial, health and alimentary applications, which promised eternal prosperity for humanity, but also posed known and unknown risks. In that first phase of nuclear history, there were other countries with economic potentials a priori insufficient to sustain a project of the scale required to deploy this expensive and complex technology. Spain was one of them but its history has gone quite unnoticed. In the middle of the twentieth century Spain decided to promote a program of nuclear power plants that, at the time of its maximum splendor, sought to install reactors in forecasted amounts that surpassed those planned by economic powers such as West Germany or Japan. Other developing countries that pursued nuclear power at the time, such as India, Pakistan, Argentina and Brazil, did so with proposals more modest than the Spanish one. Preface ix

Perhaps South Korea and Taiwan are examples of greater similarity to Spain. The three countries shared strategic economic objectives and authoritarian political regimes. In fact, Spain was the only country of the Western Bloc that successfully propelled an atomic program, while at the same time abominating liberal democracy. From a modest start, and with the full support of part of the regime leaders, private utilities and foreign aid, Spain emerged as an early adopter and champion importer of commercial nuclear equipment. In fact, by the mid-1970s, Spain became the largest customer of the US—the world’s largest provider of nuclear technology. At its maximum, the utilities formally applied to install reactors with a combined capacity of nearly 35,000 MWe. The government pre- authorized the installation of over 15,000 MWe. Yet, a combination of economic, political and social factors led the curtailment of the Spanish nuclear program to just ten reactors connected to the grid by 1988, just over 7,500 MWe. The seven reactors in operation in 2017 provide about 20% of electric power. This book aims at solving some of the paradoxes that arise from this story, which chronology runs from 1950 to 1985. We seek to explain how Spain, one of the least developed economies of the southern European periphery, with a scant initial technological and industrial level, with companies barely subject to international competition and, moreover, governed by a dictatorship, could successfully insert itself among the pioneers of the world’s nuclear energy. The economic and industrial take-off of Spain between 1960 and 1975 served to leave behind the autarkic economic policy and to deploy the atomic project. However, the nuclear excitement failed to reach all its objectives. It was possible to build power plants with foreign technology (mostly North American but also French and German), and gradually increase the local technological content, innovating and competing internationally. But at the end, just a frac- tion of the forecasted plants achieved operation, and the manufacture of a Spanish reactor fueled by domestically enriched uranium never happened. The nuclear industry narrative justifies this partially frustrated success by holding the Socialist government accountable for paralyzing the nuclear program decreeing a nuclear moratorium in 1984. On the contrary, the antinuclear movements allege they forced the moratorium with their protests. As historians, we intertwine a mass of qualitative and x Preface quantitative evidence for explaining how a young democracy assimilated the dictatorship’s nuclear legacy within a context of a crude economic and financial recession, the raise of social demands and the threats to democratic consolidation. Each of the eight chapters of this volume analyze and solve some specific elements of the institutional, economic, financial, business, technological and social architecture that configure the essence of that history. The book presents a case study, that of the economic history of nuclear power in Spain, yet it does so in permanent contact with an international context nourished from multiple historiographical sources. The subtitle Governance, Business and Finance seeks to identify the processes of interaction and decision-making among the actors involved in the atomic project. Those interactions lead to the creation and management of new laws, rules and institutions, administered by an authoritarian political regime. What the Spanish example shows is that the relations between the state and the market under a dictatorship facilitated the collaboration between government and companies to undertake this megaproject, in the absence of checks and balances to supervise the decisions made. Chapter 1 offers a global overview synthetizing the macro-economic and political developments on which the nuclear programs rooted around the world, from the golden age and until after the two oil crises. This approach serves to contextualize the Spanish case within these worldwide dynamics, offering the key elements to build a comparative history, and some initial indications about the true dimensions of the Spanish nuclear program. In the next step, in Chap. 2, we identify and dissect the main actors involved in the Spanish atomic project. Experts, scientist, military, policymakers, promoters, engineers, consultants and energy consumers articulated a project forced to evolve with the changes in the political economy of the dictatorship and in the technological model finally followed. After 40 years, the transition to democracy changed many things in Spain, but in our context two issues stand out. First, voicing criti- cal arguments from antinuclear movements became legally possible and socially noticeable. Second, the new institutional framework replaced most of the actors involved, except a crucial stakeholder: the directors of the electric companies, who would have to negotiate the atomic halt of 1984. Preface xi

Chapter 3 explains the origins and the behavior of the electro-nuclear lobby during the decisive decision-making phase about who would own the nuclear business in Spain, the state or the market. Or rather how the costs and benefits of an energy that everyone understood as strategic for the country’s development and economic well-being would be shared. The developmentalist economic policy and the influence of the promoters tilt the balance in favor of the lobby. Thus, the private companies led the development of nuclear power in Spain. However, as Spain could not develop a nuclear program on its own, the collaboration of the technological leaders came about. In fact, the Spanish scientific and industrial system had been establishing contacts with French and German experts and entrepreneurs since the 1950s, which came to fruition years later. As shown in Chap. 4, the contacts of JEN—the Spanish nuclear agency— physicists with German, French and American laboratories led to a swift supply of the highly specialized human capital required for the development of a thermonuclear civil program. The private sector could afford to take bold nuclear investment decisions because it counted on the state backup. Chapter 5 reveals it. In a very short time Spain became the “billion-dollar client” of the Exim Bank due to the purchases of US nuclear equipment and enriched fuel. The breakdown of dollar borrowing by company—until now unknown in its magnitude—confirms the level of indebtedness that the electric sector incurred to build thermonuclear plants. The debasement of the exchange rate and increase of the price of money, between the end of the Carter administration and the arrival of Reagan to the White House, trapped the promoters in a spiral of negative cash flows. This explains why the state came to the rescue of companies and that, in return, they accept the nationalization of the electricity grid. In the meantime, the export of the North American technological model to a selective club of the nuclear countries played an essential role in maximizing the huge invest- ments made in the US since the 1950s. The American multinationals had been supported by US economic diplomacy and the abundant financing from their public and private banking. It was very difficult for third parties to compete and win international nuclear contracts under these conditions. Only the industry of France and West Germany managed to xii Preface obtain contracts in the very active Spanish nuclear market, as discussed in Chaps. 6 and 7. The capture of contracts to launch the Vandellós and Trillo nuclear power plants with the industry of France and the German Federal Republic, in which business networks entwined with the political inter- ests of the governments involved, constituted pyrrhic victories against the North American nuclear commercial hegemony. Both examples offer similarities and differences of interest. On the one hand, the French nuclear route activated very soon after 1945. It sought to guarantee national independence in the bipolar world of the Cold War. It used its own technological development, that of the reactors that used natural uranium created in alliance between the public and private sectors, and a permanent connection with the military uses of plutonium. West Germany, on the other hand, saw its strategy tied up by the Allies’ mis- trust during the postwar period, although it tried to revive a network of atomic research laboratories that would eventually connect with private industry. Chapter 8, as an epilogue, establishes a balance between the objectives of the Spanish nuclear program, the promises made in the years of atomic optimism, and their results. We examine the compliance of the objectives in the energy field by looking at the impact of nuclear energy on energy issues such as the actual changes in energy matrix, the external energy dependency and the security of supply. Our review of historical evidence provides some rebuttals to the principal promises that pushed the Spanish nuclear program since its inception. But it also finds some accomplish- ments about how nuclear power helped to modernize the country. Being the first economic history of the sector we have given priority to establishing a state-of-the-art that has left out some pieces that will require further study. Thus, the avid reader would surely miss the history of the antinuclear movements, the local impacts at sitting places or a more comprehensive description of the vicissitudes of the configuration of the fuel cycle from uranium mining to waste management. Except for a few of the balances established in the last chapter, this is a story that ends in 1985. It remains pending the analysis of what has happened since then to our days, both in the Spanish dimension and the international dimension. One of the merits of this book is an effort of Preface xiii analysis and conceptualization that incorporates, from a dual macro- and microeconomic perspective, the study of the decision-making and the configuration of a business ecosystem with international ramifications. And this case study shows that the economic history of nuclear energy must necessarily be studied within a global context that integrates the economic, political and social dimensions. Chronology of the Spanish Nuclear Program

1948 A secret nuclear energy program (EPALE) started by Franco dictatorship. 1951 Nuclear Energy Board (JEN) created for nuclear research. 1956 Two consortia founded by private electricity utilities to build nuclear plants: NUCLENOR and CENUSA. 1957 TECNATOM founded by Banco Urquijo to develop nuclear activities. 1957 The Ministry of Industry creates the Directorate General of Nuclear Energy. 1958 The first experimental swimming pool reactor built in Madrid (Moncloa facilities) by JEN and General Electric. 1959 The government opens a factory to process natural uranium from the Southern areas of the Iberian Peninsula. 1961 ARGOS experimental reactor at the School of Industrial Engineering of Barcelona. 1962 ARBI experimental reactor at the School of Industrial Engineering of Bilbao. 1962 The nuclear industry creates the lobby Spanish Atomic Forum. 1964 First nuclear Law: planning of nuclear energy policy, safety, risks and insurances. 1964 First Eximbank credit authorization for the export of a turnkey nuclear project to Zorita NPP. 1964 First Development Plan establishes a high degree of Spanish participation in nuclear projects which set it at a minimum of 40%. 1966 Palomares accident: four hydrogen bombs drop from a US bomber landing near the small fishing village of Palomares (Almería). One of the earliest civil contaminations by plutonium in the world. 1967 First administrative complaint filed against Irta NPP by a local group defending tourism activities.

xv xvi Chronology of the Spanish Nuclear Program

1968 Zorita NPP by Westinghouse becomes the first to supply commercial electricity to the grid. 1968 The Spanish Government refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 1969 National Electricity Plan revised the local participation in nuclear projects until it got to 50% in 1972, 60% in 1975, and 75% in 1978. 1971 Garoña NPP by GE connected to a regional grid. 1971 Accidental Discharge of radioactive water from the JEN facilities into the river Manzanares in Madrid. 1972 National Energy Plan foresees the installation of new nuclear 22.7 GW by 1985 (requiring at least two new nuclear stations per year). 1972 A new Decree on Nuclear and Radioactive Regulations introduced the process to authorize a NPP: siting, construction and operation. 1973 Government plans for new National companies for supply nuclear equipment (ENSA) and fuel cycle (ENUSA). 1976 Emergent local environmental antinuclear groups around the country go into the public eye. 1977 Moncloa Pacts included the agreement on energy policy and nuclear matters. 1978 ETA, first terrorist attacks against Lemóniz NPP. 1979 First Nuclear debate in a new democratic Parliament. 1979 The Civil Guard killed an antinuclear militant in an antinuclear protest in Tudela (Navarra). 1980 Law creating the CSN (Nuclear Safety Board) as the only competent body for nuclear safety and radiation protection, as an independent organism. 1981 ETA kills the engineering Director of Lemóniz NP. A year later his substitute too. 1984 The Socialist Party’s Government establishes a nuclear moratorium and the electric utilities financial rescue. 1984 Spanish Parliament creates ENRESA as a public, non-profit organization responsible for the management of radioactive waste. 1988 The last of 10 nuclear reactors become operational. Nuclear provides almost half of the electricity in mainland Spain. 1989 Vandellós I accident: a fire in one of the turbines-generator (classified 3 in INES). Closure of the reactor. Decommission ordered. 1994 As a consequence of the restructuring of the electricity sector, large shares of previously NPP private property ends up on the hands of ENDESA the public electricity company. 2006 Zorita NNP, closes down after 38 years of operation initiating its decommission by 2009–10. 2015 Spanish consumers finish paying the cost of the nuclear moratorium. Acknowledgments

This book is the result of research work that explores unpublished sources of archives, parts of which have been submitted for discussion in different seminars and congresses over the years. That is why our list of thanks to the colleagues with whom we have discussed topics and exchanged ideas is extensive. We have also accumulated a better and qualified knowledge of the sector thanks to oral history by some of the protagonists. The three workshops on Economy and Nuclear Energy in Spain, c. 1950–2010 held at the Public Universities of Navarra, Pompeu Fabra and Autónoma de Madrid have given us the testimony of Jorge Fabra (one of the cre- ators of Red Eléctrica Española), Martín Gallego (Secretary of State for Energy in 1983), Gonzalo Madrid (first director of Ciemat) and Alberto Lafuente (Director General of Energy in the early 1990s and member of the Governing Board of the International Atomic Energy Organization), whose premature death we regret. The two sessions that we organized in theXVIIth World Economic History Congress (Kyoto, Japan, August 2015), and in the First Congress on Business History/20th Congress of The European Business History Association (University of Bergen, Norway, August 2016), and the participation of any of the authors in the International Meeting Electric Worlds/Mondes électriques (Paris, December 2014), The Energy Economics Iberian Conference EEIC (Lisbon, 2016), and The International Conference on Energy Research and Social Science (Sitges, xvii xviii Acknowledgments

2017) have served as a meeting point to present results and to discuss with Martin Chick, Duncan P. Connors, Marly Kamioji, Chris Pokarier, Mauro Elli, Elisabetta Bini, Michael Camp, Niall MacKenzie, Pierre Lanthier and Takeo Kikkawa, among others. The colleagues from the Basque Country University and the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid invited us to present some sections of the project, just as we did in the XI Congreso Internacional de la Asociación Española de Historia Económica (CUNEF, Madrid, 2014) and in the two International Congress on Historical Links between Spain and North America (Franklin Institute, Alcalá de Henares, 2014 and CUNY, New York, 2015). We want to mention Santiago López, Paloma Fernández, Jesús Mª Valdaliso, Emiliano Fernández de Pinedo, Rafael Uriarte, Patricio Saiz, Rafael Castro, Pablo Díaz Morlán, Adoración Álvaro, Carlos Aguasaco, Elena Martínez-Ruiz, Isabel Bartolomé, Bernardo Batiz-Lazo, Ernesto López, Emilio Huerta, Julio Tascón, Misael López Zapico, María Jesús Santesmases, Raquel Lázaro, José Ramón Rodríguez Lago, Ana Romero de Pablo, Fernando Guirao, Xavier Tafunell, Michael Aaron Rockland and Clemens Zimmermann. In 2015 three of us joined the consortium formed to research the History of Nuclear Energy and Society (HoNESt) a project financed by the EU under the Horizon2020 program. We have learned a great deal of the interaction with the colleagues of across Europe and beyond. The list of names of a consortium of 23 institutions would exceed the patience of our readers, but we would like to mention at least those that directly con- tributed to this volume by sharing materials, bibliography and knowledge: Stuart Buttler and Nalalia Melnikova. Also to those that organized and attended the two sessions within the panel entitled “History of Nuclear Energy and Society” at the European Social Sciences History Conference (ESSHC 2016): Christian Forstner, Jan-Henrik Meyer, Arne Kaijser, Wilfried Konrad, Karl-Erik Michelsen, Ioan Parry, John Whitton and Josep Lluís Espluga. The research objectives of HoNESt brought us to meet the stakeholders of Spanish industry. Even when they may not share our views, we feel obliged with CEIDEN (the R&D platform of the Spanish nuclear industry), ENSA, ENUSA, Tecnatom and Foro Nuclear, who received us and answered our questions, which directly and indi- rectly inform parts of this volume. Acknowledgments xix

We also must also offer thanks for the support received by the archi- vists and technicians of a score of libraries and archives scattered among Spain, the United States, Germany, France and the United Kingdom. All the authors of this book belong to two intersecting research projects. We are indebted with the generosity of the whole research team when sharing their materials to the benefit of this volume: Albert Presas facilitating us the access to the British sources fetched by him and to the complete digitalized collection of the magazine Energía Nuclear; Josean Garrues providing the documentation he obtained at the archives from Nuclenor; Esther Sanchez sharing relevant sources and documents obtained in her field trips to France and Vandellós. Sharing resources made possible cross examining information and filling the gaps. We want to express our gratitude to our research assistants at Public University of Navarra: Elena Aramendia for her help gathering and digi- talizing sources and with the editing process; Cristina Greño and Diego Sesma for their data-mining work. In any case, our institutional and per- sonal debts are numerous. Finally, none of this would have been possible without the public funding achieved in competitive calls and provided the resources for the authors to complete fieldwork, attend conferences and pay for many of the services required for bringing research to the public. Among the funding bodies, we must thank the Spanish Ministry of Economics and Competitiveness (projects: The Deployment of Nuclear Energy in Spain from an International Perspective: Economics, Business and Finance, c. 1950–1985 [HAR 2014/53825 R]; The Livelihood of Man [HAR2013–40760-R]; Industrial Crisis and Productive Recovery in Spanish History, 1686–2018 [HAR2015–64769-P); the Spanish Ministry of Defence (El factor internacional y la transformación de las Fuerzas Armadas (1953–1982): diplomacia de defensa y transferencia de tecnología, [ref. 2014–09]); the Bank of Spain (The External Financing of Spanish Industrial Development through the IEME (1950–1982)), and, last but not least, the European Commission/Euratom research and training program 2014–2018 (History of Nuclear Energy and Society (HoNESt), grant agreement No. 662268). Contents

1 Seeking the Perennial Fountain of the World’s Prosperity 1 M.d.Mar Rubio-Varas and Joseba De la Torre

2 Who was Who in the Making of Spanish Nuclear Programme, c.1950–1985 33 Joseba De la Torre

3 The Nuclear Business and the Spanish Electric-Banking Oligopoly: The First Steps 67 Josean Garrués-Irurzun and Juan A. Rubio-Mondéjar

4 Human Capital and Physics Research for the Spanish Nuclear Program 97 Albert Presas i Puig

5 How did Spain Become the Major US Nuclear Client? 119 M.d.Mar Rubio-Varas and Joseba De la Torre

xxi xxii Contents

6 An Alternative Route? France’s Position in the Spanish Nuclear Program, c. 1950s–1980s 155 Esther M. Sánchez-Sánchez

7 The Long Road to the Trillo Nuclear Power Plant: West Germany in the Spanish Nuclear Race 187 Gloria Sanz Lafuente

8 Energy Planning, Nuclear Promises and Realities 217 Beatriz Muñoz-Delgado and M.d.Mar Rubio-Varas

Appendix A. List of Nuclear Projects in Spain since 1959 to Present 249

Appendix B. Spanish Nuclear Industry (2011) 255

Bibliography 259

Index 279 Abbreviations

BOE Boletin Oficial del Estado (Official State Bulletin, the place for publishing laws) BWR Boiling Water Reactor CENUSA Centrales Nucleares SA (a private joint venture for nuclear power in the South of the country) CERN Center of the European Organization for Nuclear Research CIEMAT Centro de Investigaciones Energéticas Medioambientales y Tecnológicas (Public Research Agency for Energy, Environment and Technologies) CSN Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear (Nuclear Safety Board) CSNI Consejo de Seguridad de Instalaciones Nucleares (Nuclear Plants Safety Board) EDF Electricite de France ENDESA Empresa Nacional de Electricidad SA (National Company for Electricity) ENEA European Nuclear Energy Agency ENRESA Empresa Nacional de Residuos Radioactivos SA (National Company for Nuclear Waste) ENSA Equipos Nucleares SA (National Company for Nuclear Equipment)

xxiii xxiv Abbreviations

ENUSA Empresa Nacional de Uranio SA (National Company for Uranium cycle) EPALE Estudios y Patentes de Aleaciones Especiales (the first Spanish nuclear research public body) FECSA Fuerzas Eléctricas de Cataluña (a private electricity utility) FORO Forum Atómico Español (today known as Foro Nuclear) (Nuclear Industry lobby) GE General Electric GIFT The Inter-University Group on Theoretical Physics HECSA Hidroeléctrica de Cataluña (a private electricity utility) HIDROLA Hidroeléctrica Española (a private electricity utility) HIFRENSA Hispano-francesa de Energía Nuclear (French and Spanish joint venture for Vandellós I) IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency IBERDUERO A private electricity utility IEN Instituto de Energía Nuclear (Nuclear Energy Institute) INI Instituto Nacional de Industria (National Industry Institute) INPO Institute of Nuclear Power Operations JEN Junta Energía Nuclear (Nuclear Energy Board) KWU Kraftwerk Uninion (AG plus Siemens branch for nuclear development) NUCLENOR Centrales Nucleares del Norte (Nuclear Power Plants of the North) PEN Plan Energético Nacional (Energy National Planning) PWR Pressurized Water Reactor TECNATOM Técnicas Atómicas SA (engineering company providing services for nuclear plants) UEM Union Electrica Madrileña (the pioneer utility on nuclear power in Spain) UNESA Unidad Eléctrica SA (Electrical management Association) Abbreviations xxv

WANO World Association of Nuclear Operators WH Westinghouse Corporation WNA World Nuclear Association List of Figures

Fig. 1.1 World’s nuclear reactors by construction start date and capacity, 1950–2011 11 Fig. 1.2 Map of nuclear power plants planned and installed in Spain 1960s–1980s 20 Fig. 3.1 Corporate network of the largest Spanish banking firms, and electricity and auxiliary industries (1960). Sphere: Electricity companies; banks and auxiliary industries; Square: UNESA. The thickness of the links depends on the number of directorships 79 Fig. 3.2 Egonets of Bank of Vizcaya, Bank of Bilbao, Iberduero and Hidroeléctrica Española (Hidrola) in 1960. The relations of the Banco de Vizcaya (also known as “Electric Bank”) with other banks, utilities and auxiliary companies have marked in black 82 Fig. 5.1 Global Nuclear Export Orders (no. of reactors) and share of the US in the Western nuclear market 1955–80 122 Fig. 5.2 Global import orders for nuclear reactors (1955–80) 123 Fig. 5.3 Cumulative applications, pre-authorizations and nuclear capacity connected Spain (1959–88). Distribution of nuclear applications and pre-authorizations by geographical areas 134

xxvii xxviii List of Figures

Fig. 5.4 Nuclear capacity planned by Spanish utilities 1959–1975 135 Fig. 5.5 Scheduled repayment instalments by Spanish electricity utilities on their Eximbank credits (1968–90) 141 Fig. 5.6 Accumulated costs of the Spanish nuclear project supplied by US 142 Fig. 5.7 Declining US share on Spanish nuclear project costs, 1964–77 (and Exim Finance share on US costs of Spanish projects) 143 Fig. 8.1 Forecast for electricity consumption and nuclear needs by MacVeigh (1957) vs. historical data of electricity consumption and nuclear capacity Spain 1950–2000 220 Fig. 8.2 Map of Spanish provincial industrial electricity consumption in 1960 222 Fig. 8.3 Electric intensity of Spanish GDP, 1950–2000 (MWh per million $ Gheary-Khamis of 1990) 226 Fig. 8.4 Spanish dependence on energy imports, 1950–2008 (%) 228 Fig. 8.5 Primary energy consumption in Spain by source, 1950–2008 (PJ) 229 Fig. 8.6 Electricity generation in Spain by source, 1980–2014 (TWh) 235 Fig. 8.7 Energy Mix Concentration Index (EMCI) in Spain with and without nuclear power, 1959–2009 237 Fig. 8.8 Spain and EU-15 vs. France electricity prices comparison for industrial and domestic consumers in Euros/kWh (excluding taxes and levies), 1985S1–2007S2 238 Fig. 8.9 Spanish net trade of nuclear equipment and fuel elements 1965–2010 (million real US dollars) 241 List of Tables

Table 1.1 Production of electricity, contribution of nuclear power in non-communist countries by 1973 19 Table 5.1 Eximbank financing support of nuclear power exports through December 31, 1969 127 Table 5.2 The Spanish nuclear market for nuclear reactors (successful tenders, under construction and operative) 137 Table 5.3 Stakeholders and interest in the Spanish electricity sector by 1978 139 Table 6.1 French and Spanish financing for Vandellós 1 nuclear plant 168 Table 8.1 Successive historical forecasts for nuclear installed capacity in Spain 225 Table 8.2 Spanish nuclear cluster by Sectors (2011) 241

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