PB 80–94–4 October 1994 Vol. 7, No. 4

PB 80Ð94Ð4 October 1994 Vol. 7, No. 4 From the Commandant Special Warfare

On Aug. 4, 1994, a colorful ceremony was conducted at Fort Bragg’s JFK Plaza — the change of command of the JFK Special Warfare Center from myself to Maj. Gen. William F. Garrison. The ceremony was all about change, the only permanent thing in life. As the assumption-of-command letter was read and the organizational colors were passed, the JFK Center and School came under new management. Maj. Gen. Sidney Maj. Gen. William F. For the outgoing commander this is a Shachnow Garrison bittersweet occasion — he is sad to leave, but he enjoys all the compliments the tions Command and deputy commander speakers and the guests tend to shower of the U.S. Army Intelligence Security on him. Still, I could not help being Agency of the U.S. Army Intelligence and reminded of the lines by an unknown Security Command. poet concerning the fact that no one is General Garrison has extensive experi- indispensable: ence in combat arms. As a junior officer he was a battalion senior adviser with Sometime when you feel that the U.S. Military Assistance Command- your going, Vietnam and company commander of Would leave an unfillable hole, both A Company, 1st Battalion and B Just follow this simple instruction, Company, 2nd Battalion in the 509th And see how it humbles your soul. Infantry, 8th Infantry Division in West Take a bucket and fill it with water, Germany. He was a provincial-reconnais- Put your hand in it, up to the wrist, sance-unit team leader with the U.S. Mil- Pull it out, and the hole that’s itary Assistance Command-Vietnam and remaining, commander of the 1st Battalion, 505th Is a measure of how you’ll be missed. Infantry of the 82nd Airborne Division. Unwritten protocol dictates that the Bill Garrison is extremely well-suited new commander’s remarks be short and for his new command, and I wish him the positive, and Bill Garrison lived up to very best as he carries his responsibilities that standard — his acceptance remarks to new heights of achievement. totaled two sentences. Those of us who know Bill Garrison know him as a calm, extremely intelli- gent, visionary, experienced general officer. His military credentials are impres- Retired Maj. Gen. Sidney Shachnow sive, and his frame of reference is experience, not theory. He has held a variety of command positions, most recently as commander of the Joint Special Opera- tions Command. His other assignments include service as deputy commanding general of the U.S. Army Special Opera- PB 80Ð94Ð4 Contents October 1994 Special Warfare Vol. 7, No. 4

Commander & Commandant Maj. Gen. William F. Garrison Editor Features Jerry D. Steelman 2 PSYOP in Somalia: The Voice of Hope Associate Editor by Lt. Col. Charles P. Borchini and Mari Borstelmann Sylvia McCarley Graphics & Design 10 Unconventional Operations Forces of Special Operations Bruce S. Barfield by Col. Mark D. Boyatt 18 Civil Affairs in the Gulf War: Administration of an Occupied Town by Maj. Douglas E. Nash 28 SOF Planning for Coalition Operations by Lt. Col. Robert D. Lewis

VE AS R I RT T A E S LI B 34 Tanks and Helicopters: Factors Influencing the Rate E T of Innovation Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of by Guy M. Hicks and George E. Pickett Jr. the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its mission is to promote the professional development of 42 MQS Evolves into Officer Foundation Standards special-operations forces by providing a forum for the by Lt. Col. Thomas G. Sterner and Carol M. Bushong examination of both established doctrine and new ideas. Views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official Army position. This 46 Interview: H. Allen Holmes, Assistant Secretary of Defense publication does not supersede any information presented for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict in other official Army publications. Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited, and should be addressed to: Editor, Special Warfare, USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000. Telephone: DSN 239-5703 or commercial (910) 432-5703. Special Warfare reserves the right to edit all material. Published works may be reprinted, except where copyrighted, provided credit is given to Special Warfare and the author. Official distribution is limited to active and reserve special-operations units. Individuals desiring a private Departments subscription should forward their requests to: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 49 Officer Career Notes Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 50 Enlisted Career Notes By Order of the Secretary of the Army: 52 Foreign SOF Gordon R. Sullivan General, United States Army 54 Update Chief of Staff 56 Book Reviews Official:

Milton H. Hamilton Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army 07138 Headquarters, Department of the Army PSYOP in Somalia: The Voice of Hope

by Lt. Col. Charles P. Borchini and Mari Borstelmann

sychological operations saved tens of tions in Somalia, or UNOSOM II, the thousands of lives during the Gulf main focus of psychological operations was PWar, and during Operation Restore to facilitate the flow of information Hope in Somalia, PSYOP proved to have between Somalis and the organizations remarkable adaptability to peacetime responsible for implementing the humani- operations as well. tarian mission of Operation Restore Hope. Operation Restore Hope began in early To ensure that PSYOP would be consis- December 1992, when President George tently applied and that PSYOP assets could Bush announced respond to a broad spectrum of operational that the U.S. would requirements, UNITAF formed a joint lead a “coalition of PSYOP task force, which worked directly the willing” in com- for the UNITAF commander, Lt. Gen. mitting a significant Robert Johnston. The JPOTF’s mission was military force to to provide advice, to analyze PSYOP-rele- help ensure the vant intelligence and produce all printed delivery of much- products (leaflets, handbills, posters), needed humanitari- including a Somali-language newspaper, an assistance to the and to transmit radio broadcasts via AM, people of Somalia. FM and shortwave programming. From the outset, According to Johnston, “Having under- Photo courtesy 4th PSYOP Group PSYOP was inte- stood the potential impact of PSYOP, I A U.S. soldier oversees grated into all plans and operations. was extremely interested in having the delivery of supplies in Almost immediately after the president’s PSYOP up front for this operation, Somalia. announcement, PSYOP staff planners because I thought the most useful part of from the 4th PSYOP Group at Fort Bragg, PSYOP would be that it would prevent N.C., were dispatched to the U.S. Central armed conflict.” Command at MacDill Air Force Base, Fla. Composed of 125 soldiers and civilians Their mission was to integrate PSYOP from the U.S. Army’s 4th PSYOP Group, into the plans of both the U.S.-led Unified one U.S. Navy sailor and a dozen Somali Task Force, or UNITAF, and its compo- linguists, the JPOTF worked with coali- nents from 22 countries. tion forces, senior U.S. and U.N. civilians, During the five-month period prior to and nongovernmental and private volun- the May 4, 1993, change of command from teer organizations. Throughout the course UNITAF to the United Nations Opera- of Restore Hope, the JPOTF designed, produced and disseminated large numbers of

2 Special Warfare more than a dozen different handbills and their support and noninterference. Heli- posters; issued 116 editions of a Somali- borne PSYOP personnel thanked the language newspaper; transmitted radio crowds as Marines cleared the area and broadcasts twice daily; produced and dis- dropped leaflets informing the people of seminated more than seven million Mogadishu that the objective of the opera- leaflets; deployed tactical PSYOP teams tion was to improve security in the city. with the coalition forces; and provided Maj. Gen. Charles E. Wilhelm, com- advice to the U.S. special envoy, Ambas- mander of U.S. Marine Forces in Somalia, sador Robert Oakley and his staff. described the tactical PSYOP teams as “a combat subtractor ... they reduced the Tactical operations amount of unnecessary bloodshed by con- The first PSYOP soldiers deployed from vincing Somali gunmen to surrender Fort Bragg to Mombasa, Kenya, where rather than fight.” they joined the U.S. 15th Marine Expedi- Acting as the “scout platoon” of the tionary Unit aboard the USS Tripoli. They JPOTF, tactical PSYOP teams used face- accompanied the initial Marine landing at to-face communication to assess the secu- Mogadishu on Dec. 9. Over the next sever- rity environment and to collect PSYOP- al weeks, eight tactical PSYOP teams relevant information. This was also the accompanied UNITAF ground forces as most effective means for PSYOP soldiers they deployed throughout central and southern Somalia to secure relief convoys A tactical PSYOP team in- and to promote stability. forms Somali citizens of an upcoming military operation. From the initial landing on the beach at Mogadishu to the May 1993 transition to UNOSOM II, the eight tactical PSYOP teams participating in Operation Restore Hope faced many challenges. Using their loudspeakers, teams broadcast numerous messages to the Somalis, including surrender appeals, procedures to follow during weapons sweeps and at roadblocks, and announcements to organize crowds at feeding sites. Tactical PSYOP teams also distributed the UNITAF newspaper Rajo in many of the major towns and villages in each humanitarian-relief sector. In Mogadishu, Marine maneuver commanders integrated tactical PSYOP teams into complex security operations that targeted the local arms markets. In mid-Jan- uary 1993, for example, a Marine operation directed against an area of the city known as the Argentine Arms Market used tactical PSYOP teams to inform local residents of the operation and to request Photo courtesy 4th PSYOP Group

October 1994 3 a daily newspaper and broadcasting a daily radio program — both called “Rajo,” which is Somali for “hope.” Rajo, the Somali-language newspaper, of which more than 27,000 copies were published daily, was eventually distributed to every town and village where UNITAF forces were deployed. At the beginning of operations, the Rajo publishing and editorial staff included 4th PSYOP Group soldiers and civilian specialists as well as Somali linguists from the U.S. Rajo articles cov- ered a number of relevant issues but generally focused on military operations to secure Mogadishu and each of the major towns, humanitarian relief provid- Photo courtesy 4th PSYOP Group ed to the famine areas, redevelopment U.S. soldiers distribute cop- to assist the humanitarian-relief-sector efforts, hope for the future and analyses ies of the Rajo newspaper maneuver commanders in understanding of the reconciliation and national-unity to Somali children. the perceptions, attitudes and concerns of process. the Somali people. Tactical PSYOP teams Regular features included interviews met directly with village elders and reli- with relief-agency staff, public-health gious leaders to reinforce UNITAF mes- information on treating common childhood sages presented in the Rajo newspaper diseases, the status of security in each and in radio broadcasts. humanitarian-relief sector, reports on In addition to using traditional PSYOP rebuilding the educational system and methods of communicating with the local judicial institutions, and forming local population, tactical PSYOP teams found police forces and security councils. unique ways of using their interpersonal As a complement to the newspaper, the skills. While waiting for officers to return JPOTF established Radio Rajo, a 45- from a community meeting, one team minute, Somali-language program trans- attracted a crowd of several hundred curi- mitted twice daily on AM/medium wave, ous children. After many attempts to dis- FM and shortwave. The program included perse the children, one soldier thought readings from the Koran, Rajo newspaper that they might be distracted by playing a articles, selections of Somali poetry and game. Once he explained the rules and short stories, news about Africa, signifi- started the game, the children joined in cant events throughout the world and enthusiastically, and the remaining sol- Somali music. The programs broadcast diers were able to return to their mission. over shortwave eventually reached every city and town in Somalia where UNITAF Rajo newspaper forces were located. On Dec. 20, four days after the arrival of Guided by a broadcast journalist from the main contingent of forces in the 4th PSYOP Group, a team of Somali Mogadishu, the JPOTF began publishing staff members, PSYOP specialists and

4 Special Warfare civilian analysts worked together to devel- • Disarmament progress in each humani- op articles that incorporated a number of tarian-assistance sector. themes encouraging Somali clans to put The process of collecting information aside their differences and rebuild their required routine research efforts beyond country. Themes included the following: Mogadishu. In January 1993, for example, • Fairness of UNITAF rules of JPOTF staff members traveled to the town engagement. of Marka, where they interviewed Presi- • Impartiality of UNITAF. dent Aadan ‘Abdullah’ Usmaan, Somalia’s • The need for Somalis to resolve Soma- first head of state and an important sym- lia’s problems. bol of national unity. Excerpts from this • Inability of UNITAF and relief agencies interview were published in the newspa- to do more than assist in the resolution per and broadcast over Radio Rajo as well. process. One of the most popular features of the • Roles and capabilities of the 22 nations newspaper was a cartoon devoted to the participating in UNITAF. comments and the observations of a Soma- • Redevelopment and re-establishment of li man named Celmi (after the U.S. Navy Somalia’s infrastructure. sailor who was born in Somalia and served • Agreements made by faction leaders as a linguist for the JPOTF) and his wise and the consequences of violating those friend, the camel Mandeeq. The dialogue agreements. between these two characters reinforced

Photo courtesy 4th PSYOP Group (Above) A soldier from the joint PSYOP task force produces material for broadcast over Radio Rajo.

(Left) A U.S. Marine hands out copies of the Rajo newspaper to waiting Somalis.

Photo by Terry Mitchell

October 1994 5 various PSYOP themes and described spe- population and to correct distortions. ... cific aspects of the UNITAF mission. The faction leaders, I know, read it very, A consistent propaganda theme broad- very carefully. Every once in a while cast by one of the local warlords over Aideed or Ali Mahdi ... draws my attention his radio station and published in his to something that appeared in the news- faction’s newspaper was that UNITAF — paper. So they’re very, very sensitive to it U.S. forces in particular — was exploit- and they know its power.” ing Somalia’s precious natural resources. PSYOP countered this propaganda Leaflet operations by broadcasting and publishing stories The initial landing of U.S. forces in in the Rajo describing the true nature Mogadishu on Dec. 9 was preceded by a of engineering activities throughout drop of approximately 220,000 leaflets Somalia. from a U.S. Marine CH-53 Sea Stallion In an effort to encourage national unity helicopter. This operation used two kinds and to revitalize Somali traditional cul- of leaflets to announce the arrival of U.S. ture, Rajo sponsored a poetry contest and forces and to alert inhabitants of the need published the six winning entries in a spe- for convoy-security missions. The “hand- cial edition of the paper. Commenting on shake” leaflet communicated the basic the importance of Rajo to the success of message that the intent of the mission was the operation, Ambassador Robert Oakley to assist, not harm Somalis; the convoy- said, “We are using Rajo to get the correct security leaflet stressed that coalition information into the hands of the Somali

U.S. Marines control crowds of Somalis waiting to receive medical treatment. PSYOP leaflets stressed that U.S. forces came to help, not harm, the Somalis.

Photo by Terry Mitchell

6 Special Warfare troops would use force to protect the relief U.S. forces deploy leaflet shipments. These three-by-six-inch bundles over Somalia. leaflets had been printed at Fort Bragg by the 4th PSYOP Group. Throughout the operation, PSYOP teams, using U.S. C-130s, U.S. Marine CH-53s, U.S. Army UH-60s and UH-1s, and a Canadian C-130, continued to drop the two leaflets along major supply routes. The handshake leaflets were dropped two or three days prior to the arrival of UNITAF forces in each town; the convoy leaflets were dropped two or three days afterward. During one operation, PSYOP teams used U.S. Navy S-3 Viking fixed- wing aircraft to jettison 60 canisters, each carrying 2,500 leaflets, over the target area. With the gradual redeployment of U.S. C-130s, leaflet missions were also conducted from New Zealand Andovers, a small version of the DC-3. The handshake and convoy-security leaflets were only two of 37 different leaflets eventually produced during Restore Hope. Even after the establishment of the newspaper and the radio pro- Photo by Mark Dwyer gram, UNITAF continued to use leaflets, target areas. Announcements published in designed and printed by the JPOTF in the Rajo reinforced leaflet messages. Somalia, to support military operations. Leaflets, handbills and posters support- Leaflets announced rules prohibiting speed several engineering projects as well. In cific categories of weapons and behavior December and again in March, engineers and informed local communities that coali- cleared Mogadishu’s streets of abandoned tion troops were authorized to use force if and destroyed vehicles, downed telephone they were threatened. While the rules for poles, sand, debris and other objects that each major town were roughly the same, blocked the flow of traffic along major they reflected local conditions and were roads and near market areas. Later in the modified as the security environment operation, Army engineers and Navy changed. Tactical PSYOP teams attached Seabees repaired or constructed more to Army and Marine forces in each human- than 1,200 miles of roads, drilled 14 wells, itarian-relief sector requested leaflets with and erected a Bailey bridge across the themes based on the specific situation con- Juba River near the town of Jilib. Leaflets, fronting each maneuver commander. handbills and posters complemented each Leaflet concepts were coordinated with the effort by informing the Somali people of UNITAF director of operations and then the upcoming operation and asking them designed, printed and dropped over the to cooperate by staying clear of hazardous engineering equipment. These products

October 1994 7 mines. During Operation Restore Hope, mine explosions killed or injured several UNITAF personnel as well as many Soma- lis. PSYOP specialists produced several different posters and published articles in the Rajo newspaper advising Somalis to be aware of mine hazards. Toward the end of the operation, PSYOP also produced coloring books detailing the first-aid requirements for victims of mine-related accidents; handbills explaining how to exit a mine field safely; and posters illustrating the most common mines found in Somalia. The underlying message was the same: “Report, don’t touch, mines.” Copies of the products were also distributed to other Photo courtesy 4th PSYOP Group members of the UNITAF coalition. A civilian relief worker also requested that Somalis report mine helps distribute supplies to locations. Contingency operations Somali citizens during PSYOP also supported several humani- At the end of February 1993, on the first Operation Restore Hope. tarian-relief operations conducted by non- day of Ramadan, violent demonstrations governmental organizations. A major took place in the area of Mogadishu con- problem facing Somalia is the large num- trolled by Mohamed Farah Aideed, leader ber of displaced persons and refugees who of the Somali National Alliance. Following were forced to leave their homes during the demonstrations, children began carry- the civil war. With no reliable source of ing toy handguns, which they pointed at food or medical care, these groups have UNITAF forces. By the end of Ramadan, become totally dependent on relief provid- toy guns were prevalent throughout the ed by the NGOs. city, and there were several incidents in The “pastoral scene” leaflet supported which UNITAF forces came close to shoot- programs encouraging displaced persons ing children, thinking the guns were real. and refugees to return to their homes The JPOTF initiated a campaign to when it was safe to do so, in order to har- address the problem in the Rajo newspa- vest their crops and to begin planting for per, over the radio and in leaflets. The the next growing season. The goal of this Rajo radio program included an interview leaflet, and of articles written for Rajo with a prominent representative of a describing specific NGO resettlement pro- Somali women’s group who spoke in very grams, was to help break the cycle of strong terms about the dangers of the chil- dependency and to encourage self- dren’s behavior. Fortunately, there were sufficiency. no accidents, and the number of incidents eventually decreased. Mine-awareness PSYOP also responded quickly to the Like many nations around the world, repeated crises in Kismayo. After Hersi Somalia has a serious problem with Morgan took Kismayo in late February,

8 Special Warfare Johnston and Ambassador Oakley issued He is a 1994 graduate of the U.S. Army an ultimatum for him to withdraw his War College. forces to a town on the Kenya border. The JPOTF produced and dropped leaflets Mari Borstelmann is a informing Morgan’s supporters, as well as civilian analyst and a Horn the people of Kismayo and other major of Africa area specialist towns in the lower Juba valley, of the assigned to the 4th PSYOP situation. Group. She deployed with PSYOP was a key battlefield operating U.S. PSYOP forces to Soma- system and contributed significantly to lia as the civilian analyst. the success of Operation Restore Hope. As She holds bachelor’s and master’s degrees Johnston later said, “PSYOP really from Boston University and has completed worked well to convince (Somalis) that we dissertation research for a Ph.D. in were there with the military capability to African history. take care of the factions, and that we were going to provide support and safety. I think that was the (unique) dimension of PSYOP.” Operation Restore Hope focused international attention on the challenges that military forces face as they apply their combat talents and training in support of difficult humanitarian objectives. The soldiers of the 4th PSYOP Group who served in the JPOTF readily adapted to the challenge. Having witnessed PSYOP’s direct contribution to Somalia’s first steps toward peace and reconstruction, these soldiers are now even better prepared to participate in future peacekeeping operations.

Lt. Col. Charles P. Borchi- ni is currently assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Drug Enforce- ment Policy and Support in Washington, D.C. During his military career he has served in a variety of command and staff assignments as a Military Police officer. A former commander of the 8th PSYOP Battalion of the 4th PSYOP Group, Lt. Col. Borchini served as commander of the joint PSYOP task force during Operation Restore Hope.

October 1994 9 Unconventional Operations Forces of Special Operations

by Col. Mark D. Boyatt

he term “special-operations forces” examples are foreign-internal-defense is used to describe a broad array of operations, humanitarian-assistance Tdiverse forces and organizations. operations, nation-building operations, The essence of SOF, the elements that counterdrug assistance and security- contribute most significantly over the long assistance programs. During conflict or term to the U.S. national security strategy war, UO are primarily unconventional- in terms of the numbers of active missions warfare operations. Examples are guerril- and their effect on national security objec- la warfare, evasion and escape, subver- tives, is its unconventional-operations sion, sabotage and other operations of a forces. But current doctrine does not iden- low-visibility, covert or clandestine tify specific unconventional-operations nature.1 The above-mentioned peacetime forces, nor is there a definition of uncon- operations may also continue during conventional operations in Joint Pub 1-02, flict as economy-of-force efforts, either Department of Defense Dictionary of Mili- within the operational and strategic areas tary and Associated Terms. of operation or in other areas. An example Unconventional operations, or UO, are of this synergistic effect was demonstrat- low-visibility, economy-of-force and econo- ed during the Gulf War: While some U.S. my-of-resource operations. They are Army Special Forces contributed to the unique in that relatively small operational effectiveness of coalition warfare in the elements work in a combined environment area of operations, other Special Forces by, through or with indigenous counter- elements conducted missions in Turkey, parts. The UO environment is usually Africa, South and Central America, the politically sensitive, frequently requiring Pacific and Asia. close cooperation with the Department of Unconventional operations provide a State and other non-DoD agencies in low-risk political option with a high poten- remote locations and across the opera- tial for political return. Conducted without tional continuum. fanfare, UO usually attract little, if any, During peacetime, UO consist primarily media coverage. of operations with nations important to the U.S. national-security strategy. Some UO forces Unconventional-operations forces are Views expressed in this article are those those U.S. special-operations forces who of the author and do not necessarily reflect have unique capabilities to conduct a policies of the Department of the Army or wide range of UO, as opposed to those the Department of Defense.

10 Special Warfare SOF elements whose missions are more - Foreign internal defense specialized. - Security assistance Unconventional-operations forces con- - Humanitarian assistance centrate primarily on teaching, training, - Counternarcotics and organizing military, paramilitary or • Direct action2 other indigenous forces in the conduct of - Counterterrorism FID operations, unconventional warfare, - Personnel recovery humanitarian assistance, nation building • Special reconnaissance and counterdrug assistance. Best defined as forces principally organized and trained Collateral activities to accomplish their missions with, through • Special activities or by counterpart relationships with • Antiterrorism and other security indigenous personnel, UO forces are activities unique. The only SOF specifically organized, trained and equipped to conduct The proposed changes would categorize missions in this manner are the numbered UW and FID as the primary elements of Army Special Forces groups. UO. Security assistance, humanitarian Roles and missions According to Joint Test Pub 3-05, Doc- trine for Joint Special Operations, SOF have five principal missions and six collateral special-operations activities.

Principal missions • Unconventional warfare • Direct action • Special reconnaissance • Foreign internal defense • Counterterrorism

Collateral activities • Security assistance • Humanitarian assistance • Antiterrorism and other security activities U.S. Army photo A Special Forces NCO in- • Counternarcotics assistance and counternarcotics would become subsets of FID. Counterterrorism structs Salvadoran soldiers • Personnel recovery in small-unit tactics. • Special activities and personnel recovery would become subsets of DA. Such a realignment of mission Several of these missions are, in reality, categories would simplify the training subsets of others. By introducing the con- focus for units. cept of unconventional operations, we can The chart on page 12 shows the SOF combine several of these missions, shrink- elements and their primary missions ing the principal ones to three, with sever- under current doctrine.3 al subsets. These proposed changes better By doctrine, Special Forces have five organize and clarify SOF missions into primary missions — unconventional war- functional areas. fare, foreign internal defense, special reconnaissance, direct action and coun- Principal missions terterrorism. Much of the attention SF • Unconventional operations receives focuses on only three missions: - Unconventional warfare counterterrorism, direct action and special-reconnaissance operations.

October 1994 11 Five missions are too many and result ty, but as a subset of direct action. Since in a dilution of effort and resources, espe- other elements focus on counterterrorist cially when considering direct-action, spe- missions, Special Forces groups should not cial-reconnaissance and counterterrorism be so tasked.6 missions. Units usually approach these as Unilateral direct action and special stand-alone missions and train to execute reconnaissance are high-visibility opera- them in a unilateral manner. Each mis- tions and have always received dispro- sion then receives repetitive training time, portionate attention as SF missions. Spe- consuming significant resources. Addition- cial Forces groups can and do conduct ally, other SOF or general-purpose forces these operations, but only by sacrificing include direct action, special reconnais- expertise and competence in unconven- sance and counterterrorism among their tional operations. The capability to con- missions. Some of these units are actually duct a mission does not equate with com- better-trained, better-organized and bet- petence. As with CT, other units and ter-resourced for those missions than are some general-purpose-force elements the Special Forces groups. This is duplica- receive specific resourcing to train, equip tion we can ill afford in these times of and organize for DA and SR.7 SF soldiers shrinking budgets.4 are better able to conduct these missions The probability that counterterrorism through coalition operations with indige- forces will be needed may have increased nous assets. For unilateral DA and SR, with the uncertainty facing the changing Special Forces assets should be consid- world.5 Counterterrorism must keep its ered only when other SOF units or gen- high priority because of political sensitivi- eral-purpose forces are inappropriate or

SOF Primary Missions

Army

Special Forces UW, DA, SR, FID, CT Rangers DA, CT SO Aviation DA, SR, support for all operations

Navy*

SEALs UW**, DA, SR, FID, CT Special Boat Units Support for all operations SEAL Delivery Vehicle Teams Support for all operations

Air Force

Fixed-wing Support for all operations Rotary-wing Support for all operations SO Weather Support for all operations SO CCT/PJ Support for all operations

Special-Mission Units

UW, DA, SR, FID, CT

* The USMC Marine Expeditionary Unit (special-operations capable) is not listed because it is not a core SOF element. ** Although the SEALs have unconventional warfare as a mission, their definition of UW is more like the definition of direct action. They see UW as strikes and raids behind enemy lines, unlike Army Special Forces. Army SF practice UW in the traditional sense of working with indigenous elements in a denied area.

12 Special Warfare unavailable. understanding of the host nation’s culture. The second chart shows SOF elements Intercultural communication, which and their proposed primary missions. The includes language training and regional introduction of unconventional operations studies, is a basic element of the training as a mission category, along with direct of a Special Forces group. Unfortunately, action and special reconnaissance, focuses when Special Forces units focus on a non- the missions functionally. UO mission in response to a tasking, the The ability of Army Special Forces to cultural aspects are the first to suffer. conduct the broad range of unconventional Achieving adequate proficiency in cultural operations is unique in the U.S. military. aspects requires regional focus and inten- Certainly, other SOF elements and, on sive training. Conducting unconventional- occasion, elements of the general-purpose warfare or foreign-internal-defense mis- forces execute portions of unconventional sions requires an integrated proficiency in operations. However, only the Special direct action and special reconnaissance, Forces groups, by virtue of their organiza- but with a different training focus. In UO, tion, training, equipment and orientation, these missions will be executed in a com- are capable of covering the complete UO bined environment by, through or with for- spectrum. eign counterparts. Unconventional operations have unique Why focus the SF mission on UO? Why cultural aspects that are important not leave the missions as now assigned: whether we are teaching or conducting UW, DA, SR, FID and CT? The reason is military operations. Conducting effective resources, with the primary resource UO requires a detailed knowledge and being time. Currently, many SF units

Proposed SOF Primary Missions

Army

Special Forces UO Rangers DA SO Aviation DA, SR, support for all operations

Navy*

SEALs DA, SR Special Boat Units Support for all operations SEAL Delivery Vehicle Teams Support for all operations

Air Force*

Fixed-wing Support for all operations Rotary-wing Support for all operations SO Weather Support for all operations SO CCT/PJ Support for all operations

Special-Mission Units*

DA, SR

* Elements of these SOF organizations, on occasion, conduct FID, a portion of UO.

October 1994 13 choice. Unfortunately, we seem fixated on CT, DA and SR missions. As a result, these highly visible missions receive most of the attention and resourcing — unconventional-operations missions don’t receive equal attention. It is these routine and not-so- glamorous unconventional operations, however, which contribute most to U.S. national-security strategy in terms of the numbers of missions conducted and their effect on national-security objectives.9 Recommendations First, we need to codify in doctrine the terms “unconventional operations” and “unconventional-operations forces.” We U. S. Navy photo need to recognize UO forces as a distinct U.S. Navy SEALs deploy focus strictly on DA, SR or CT.8 According- element of SOF and as key players in from a combat rubber raid- ly, most of their training time is spent per- implementing national-security strategy. ing craft. These Navy fecting their unilateral capabilities in Secondly, unconventional operations forces are well-suited for these areas, degrading their ability to be DA and SR missions. must be the primary mission for active- truly effective in the more complex activi- component Army Special Forces groups. ties of unconventional operations. They Eliminate DA, SR and CT missions or cannot make the transition without signif- clearly state that they are duplicative sub- icant effort and time. Likewise, units ordinate missions of SF. Clearly indicate effectively trained in UO will not be able that other SOF or general-purpose-force to make a rapid transition to effective uni- elements are more appropriately tasked to lateral DA, SR or CT missions. These, too, undertake these missions. Unconventional are complicated missions requiring inten- operations require intense focus. Diver- sive training. sion of training time and resources to mis- With regard to the capability of the sions that can be performed by other ele- overall force, critics can point out a short- ments is an unjustifiable duplication. fall resulting from the proposal to delete Finally, and most important, Special special reconnaissance as a unilateral SF Forces units must become actively mission. This shortfall is in human intelli- involved outside the United States to gain gence, or HUMINT, forward of the corps more insight into the various regions and fire-coordination line. Many commanders to assist with regional stability. This expect Special Forces to fill this role, and involvement would require some change to if there are no other options, Special the current structure, funding and Forces may have to. But we should not employment of SF battalions. The assume that Special Forces will act unilat- strength of Special Forces is in their cul- erally. If UO forces are permitted to con- tural focus, and we must capitalize upon duct peacetime, preconflict missions in this strength. their assigned regions, a secondary benefit To accomplish these goals, we must sig- may be the availability of indigenous nificantly increase funding and priority for assets. An effective and efficient way of unconventional operations. Ensure region- collecting HUMINT is through indigenous al orientation and funding for the UO assets trained by UO forces. Indigenous forces to operate as much as possible in assets might conduct missions unilateral- their respective regions. Give the 15 active ly, or they might be organized, trained, Special Forces battalions clear areas or equipped and led by UO forces. Unilateral regions of responsibility that will remain collection by SF is the method of last

14 Special Warfare fixed. It takes a long time, sometimes would provide a ready source of first- years, to cultivate an area and to inculcate hand regional expertise. regional expertise in a unit. A UO force cannot change its regional and language Conclusion orientation every few years and be expect- President George Bush stated in the ed to develop a significant degree of exper- January 1993 National Security Strategy tise or cultural understanding. of the United States, “Through a strategy Carefully select these areas of responsi- of engagement and leadership, we seek bility based on world dynamics, not on global and regional stability which encour- current force structure. We need to identi- ages peaceful change and progress. To this fy the regions and allocate the SF battal- end, we have four mutually supportive ions; then determine the headquarters goals that guide our overall national secu- structure at SF group level. This may rity efforts. These are protecting the Unit- mean that one theater has seven battal- ed States and its citizens from attack; hon- ions oriented on subregional areas and oring, strengthening, and extending our ethnic groups, while another may require historic, treaty and collective defense five battalions, and a third may require arrangements; ensuring that no hostile only three battalions. At the same time, power is able to dominate or control a make the SF battalions more organiza- region critical to our interests; and work- tionally independent, even at the expense ing to avoid conflict by reducing sources of of the SF group support structure. regional instability and violence, limiting The current structure of the SF group the proliferation of advanced military headquarters will require modification. technology and weapons of mass destruc- Most of the structure should be moved to tion, and strengthening civil-military the battalions. Another consideration is to institutions while reducing the economic move the group headquarters into the the- burdens of military spending.”10 aters and designate them as the Army- Unconventional-operations forces have component headquarters for the regional a significant, if not leading, role to play commander in chief’s special-operations in implementing these national security commands. The focus of UO-force activity efforts. Indications are that the world of will be the SF battalion, not the group. the 1990s, and likely beyond, will be By emphasizing the unconventional more unstable than the world of the U.S. Air Force SOF, such as operations role of Special Forces, the 1980s. The control and the relatively this combat control team, United States gains regional experts enforced stability of the bipolar world of are capable of supporting all with on-the-ground experience. Addition- the 1970s and 1980s have given way to a types of SOF operations. ally, mutual trust and understanding, cultivated through personal and sus- tained contact with regional personalities, may be the most important outcome of the long-term regional orientation. In most developing nations, personal relationships are key to trust and understanding. Who you are personally is more important than what you represent. UO forces can develop these relationships and facilitate the critical inter- face between coalition forces in a conflict, as they did in Desert Storm. If sufficiently resourced, UO forces can maintain a forward presence that could reassure nervous nations and increase regional stability. Furthermore, in the event of an incident or conflict, these elements U. S. Air Force photo

October 1994 15 growing concern by numerous nations ments include serving as a detachment about their national security.11 The role commander and group operations and that the U.S. is to play in this unstable training officer in the 5th SF Group, as an environment is unclear. One means that action officer in the Army Special Opera- is available, though in need of attention, tions Agency, as commander of the 1st Bat- is unconventional operations. UO, pru- talion, 1st SF Group, and as chief of staff dently and judiciously executed, can pro- for the JFK Special Warfare Center and vide regional stability through a low-level School. A graduate of the Armed Forces U.S. presence that acts as a brake on Staff College and the Army War College, regional ambitions. he holds a bachelor’s degree from the Uni- Nations that see or benefit from these versity of Tennessee at Knoxville. unconventional operations may become more convinced and assured of U.S. inter- Notes: est and concern for a given region. The 1 Unconventional warfare (DoD) [Joint Pub 1-02]: A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary opera- presence of UO forces can foster diploma- tions conducted in enemy-held, enemy-controlled or cy, whereas their absence may foster con- politically sensitive territory. Unconventional war- flict. Nations or regions that perceive fare includes, but is not limited to, the interrelated themselves as outside the sphere of con- fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, sub- cern of the world’s only superpower may version, sabotage, and other operations of a low-visibility, covert or clandestine nature. These interrelat- feel compelled to pursue their own indeed aspects of unconventional warfare may be prose- pendent means of national security. This cuted singly or collectively by predominantly indige- can lead to regional arms races, possible nous personnel, usually supported and directed in proliferation of weapons of mass destruc- varying degrees by an external source(s) during all tion and regional instability. conditions of war or peace. 2 Direct-action missions may be conducted as part U.S. foreign policy is in transition. It is of unconventional operations, such as unconventional unclear what vision will emerge, and it is warfare and counternarcotics, but the desire is that difficult to anticipate world and regional these missions be combined operations if possible. events. Samuel Huntington describes it 3 Joint Test Pub 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special thus: “All in all, the emerging world is Operations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 90). likely to lack the clarity and stability of 4 The Rangers are an excellent direct-action unit. the Cold War and to be a more jungle- They prefer not to be employed in less than battal- like world of multiple dangers, hidden ion-size elements, although in some cases they will traps, unpleasant surprises and moral execute company-size operations. The Navy SEAL teams are excellent at small direct-action and recon- ambiguities.”12 naissance operations but are limited to coastal and Unconventional operations can provide riverine areas. Special-mission units are specifically a window through which this “jungle-like trained to conduct all missions: CT, DA, SR and lim- world” can be viewed with greater clarity. ited FID and UW. The general-purpose force has This is the arena, the regionally focused reconnaissance units that conduct tactical reconnais- arena, within which unconventional oper- sance missions. 5 Walter Laqueur, first in his monumental works ations forces thrive and, if properly and Guerrilla, 1976, and Terrorism, 1977, and in The Age timely employed, can provide a unique of Terrorism, 1987, makes the point that terrorism is option in executing the U.S. national secu- a tactic to effect political change and has been used rity strategy. over the centuries by disaffected and politically impo- tent segments of society. Terrorism is a tactic closely associated with insurgencies and guerrilla warfare. As political phenomena, they are not mutually exclu- Col. Mark D. Boyatt is sive of each other. The future, reflected in the post- currently commander of the Cold War realities, suggests that insurgency and ter- 3rd Special Forces Group. rorism will occur with increasing regularity. Commissioned in Infantry, 6 CT proficiency requires intense effort to become truly surgical. However, the CT mission given to SF he has served as an Infantry is an in-extremis mission. If honestly approached in platoon leader, company this manner, and not as a de facto duplication of the executive officer and compa- principal CT forces, then this is only a DA mission. ny commander. His Special Forces assign- Obviously, the degree of risk increases.

16 Special Warfare 7 Some examples are the special-mission units, the special-support units, the Rangers, divisional and corps reconnaissance units, and the SEALs. None of these units focus on UO. 8 The 7th SF Group is probably an exception to this generality. Of all the Special Forces groups, the 7th is most oriented to UO. 9 Special Forces elements have been training with their counterparts in nations around the globe for many years. Through their presence in these countries, relationships and contacts have been established that have had far-reaching effects. In many of these countries, the military counterparts with whom Special Forces have worked have eventually risen to various positions of power — in some cases even heads of state. These relationships have led to regional stability in some cases and to access to critical facilities in others. In almost all cases, SF are viewed in these countries as informal ambassadors of the U.S. and as positive examples of democracy. The leverage gained in negotiations with foreign govern- ments over our national security goals and objectives often staggers the imagination of the casual observ- er. For example, if one accepts that one of our goals in Liberia was to gain and maintain the trust and the confidence of its leader, President Doe, then the efforts of a single Special Forces sergeant met and exceeded expectations. There are other operations, usually classified, in which the accomplishments of Special Forces soldiers far exceeded anything thought possible in terms of the long-term positive impact on U.S./allied relations. 10 The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern- ment Printing Office, January, 1993), p. 3. 11 During the Cold War, these countries enjoyed relative national security because of the competition between the USSR and the U.S. Neither superpower would permit tangible threats to its respective satel- lites, surrogates or friends. Without superpower influence, these nations may now pursue regional ambitions or threats from their now-unconstrained neighbors. 12 Samuel Huntington is an Eaton professor of the Science of Government and is the director of the John M. Olin Institute of Strategic Studies at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University.

October 1994 17 Civil Affairs in the Gulf War: Administration of an Occupied Town

by Maj. Douglas E. Nash

uring the Gulf War, U.S. Army is the administration of an occupied town Civil Affairs units performed a or city in enemy territory. The Army Dvariety of tasks, including liaison gained considerable experience in this duties with the host-nation government, task during World War II and the Korean humanitarian-relief activities, planning War, but it has had little opportunity to for noncombatant evacuation operations engage in it since. During Operation and educating U.S. units about Saudi Ara- Desert Storm, Company B of the 96th bian culture. These are missions for which Civil Affairs Battalion had the mission of all CA units train regularly. administering the town of As Salman after A task that is rarely practiced, however, its seizure by the French 6th Light Armored Division. A Civil Affairs officer evalu- ates a desert well in Saudi Employment Arabia for suitability of use by American forces. Company B’s mission during Operation Desert Shield/Storm was to support the XVIII Airborne Corps and its subordinate units with Civil Affairs teams. From the beginning of Desert Shield in August 1990 until reserve-component CA units were activated and deployed in December 1990, Co. B was the only CA unit supporting the entire corps. Its first teams arrived in Saudi Arabia with the lead elements of the 82nd Airborne and 24th Infantry divisions. During this five-month period, Co.B located water wells and negotiated con- tracts for their use, assessed and evaluated potential sources of labor, produced bilingual instruction cards for guard personnel, established liaison with local officials to minimize the impact of incidents between U.S. forces and the Saudi populace, and provided assistance to the corps staff judge advocate and Saudi officials on Photo courtesy Douglas Nash

18 Special Warfare claims against the U.S. government. The company also developed and coordinated plans for the evacuation of civilians in the eastern province, and developed and coordinated a noncombatant-evacuation-operation plan for U.S. and third-country nationals. Authorized 36 personnel, Co. B had only 22 personnel present for duty when Desert Shield began. Soldiers from other companies of the 96th CA Battalion were attached to the company, giving it a peak strength of 34 personnel in November 1990. Attached to the XVIII Airborne Corps, the company assigned teams to each of the corps’ major subordinate commands — the 1st Cavalry, the 24th Mechanized Photo courtesy Douglas Nash Infantry, the 82nd Airborne and 101st Air- venirs sought out members of the compa- A Civil Affairs officer meets mobile divisions, the XVIII Airborne Corps ny. Other French soldiers were more curi- with a Saudi emir to dis- Artillery, the 1st Corps Support Com- ous about what a Civil Affairs unit could cuss matters affecting the mand, the 16th MP Brigade, and the 3rd do for them. deployment of American forces. Armored Cavalry Regiment. Teams varied The XVIII Airborne Corps had request- in size from two to four personnel. Their ed that the company be attached to the equipment was limited to trucks, radio 6th LAD because the division would have sets and individual weapons, and they the task of seizing and administering the were completely dependent upon the units only sizable Iraqi town in the area — As to which they were attached for support. Salman. Although other Civil Affairs units were available, they had only recently Support to French forces deployed into the theater. Company B had Early in January 1991, the company the most experienced and best-trained CA was notified by the XVIII Airborne Corps assets, and a number of its officers and G-5 that it would be attached to the NCOs spoke French. French 6th Light Armored Division for the Before the ground-attack phase of liberation of Kuwait. Co. B began move- Desert Storm began, Co. B became ment on Jan. 17 to the 6th LAD’s tactical acquainted with its new division and the assembly area north of the village of area around Rafha. The company conduct- Rafha. En route, some of the company’s ed area surveys and assessments and teams also supported the convoy move- established working relationships with the ment of the corps. By Jan. 29, these teams emir of Rafha and other local authorities. had rejoined the company, which was then These relationships proved invaluable to busily engaged in supporting the French the 6th LAD and the XVIII Airborne forces in the Rafha area, providing much Corps in dealing with the inevitable fric- the same operational and planning sup- tion involved in massing thousands of sol- port as it had for the XVIII Airborne diers and vehicles in a civilian community. Corps units. Company B was somewhat of an oddity Mission to the French, who had no Civil Affairs While the air war continued, the compa- capability in their force structure. After an ny received an updated mission statement initial adjustment period, curious French from the French division commander, soldiers who wanted to meet “les Améri- General Michel Roquejeoffre. The mission cains” and trade for highly prized sou- directed that Co. B conduct civil-military

October 1994 19 operations to reduce civilian interference itself, the company would concentrate on with military operations, identify and population control to minimize civilian acquire local resources, fulfill legal obliga- interference with military operations. tions and moral considerations in accord- Unit personnel would also conduct early ance with international law and agree- assessments of the attitudes and basic ments, and terminate hostilities with con- needs of Iraqi civilians. ditions favorable to the long-term national Once As Salman was seized, tasks interest of the allied coalition. Implicit in would be prioritized as follows: this mission was that the company would • Coordinate and execute a civil-infor- assume responsibility for the administra- mation program to create a favorable tion of the town of As Salman. As condi- image with the Iraqi civilian population. tions permitted, it would receive adminis- • Locate local resources and assist in trative and logistics support from the their acquisition for use by allied forces French to carry out its mission. and the civilian population. Since the 6th LAD had no staff position • Conduct displaced-civilian operations. equivalent to a G-5, the Co. B commander • Alleviate human suffering among wrote the Civil Affairs annex to the 6th civilians in accordance with Article 56 of LAD operations plan. The company’s two the Geneva Convention. French linguists translated the document, • Assist French commanders in fulfill- and it was published as part of the divi- ing their obligations under international sion’s plan. The concept of operations for law. Co. B was that during preparation for the • Conduct civil administration of occu- ground campaign, the unit would update pied areas, including the re-establishment area studies, refine CA plans, identify of essential services. stockpiles of humanitarian-relief supplies • Plan for the transfer of civil-military- and pre-position them as far forward as operations functions to follow-on elements possible. During the ground campaign of the 360th CA Brigade.

Task Organization for Administrative Mission

B96CA

DIV MAIN CP

CIVIL PUBLIC PUBLIC PUBLIC LAW & ADMIN/ INFOR- HEALTH & WORKS SERVICES ORDER LOG MATION HOUSING

20 Special Warfare To accomplish these tasks, the unit developed an approach best described as “civil affairs triage.” Similar to categoriz- Typical Team Organization ing wounded personnel, the process enabled the company’s teams to decide what could be fixed quickly and placed back into operation, what could be fixed in the long-term, and what could not be B96CA fixed. To carry out its mission, the company reorganized along functional lines and PERSONNEL: established five teams. The public-works team would locate and assess Iraqi gov- 1 Ð TEAM LEADER - O-3/CPT ernment facilities; the public-services 1 Ð TEAM NCOIC - E-7/SFC team would assess the civilian popula- 1 Ð OPNS SPECIALIST - E-4/SPC tion’s requirements for survival; the law- 1 Ð TRANSLATOR - KUWAITI and-order team would handle population EQUIPMENT: control and enforcement of directives targeted at the Iraqi populace; the civil-infor- 1 Ð M-1009 3/4 -TON TRUCK mation team would coordinate psychologi- 1 Ð AN/VRC-46 cal operations targeted toward the Iraqi 1 Ð BULLHORN populace; and the public-health-and-housing team would determine health and many of whom were nomadic Bedouins medical requirements and the condition of who lived there only during the winter. civilian housing. Located about 70 miles north of the Saudi Each team consisted of an officer, an Arabian-Iraqi border, the town had NCO, an operations specialist (usually a served as a watering hole for caravans military policeman), and a volunteer along the “Darb’ al Hadj,” the historic pil- Kuwaiti translator. The volunteers, mili- grimage route from Baghdad to Mecca. tiamen from a training camp north of This route, recently paved, had been Dhahran, added a much-needed Arabic- renamed major supply route “Texas” by language capability. the XVIII Airborne Corps. It became one of the major avenues of approach to the Objective: As Salman Euphrates valley. One of the most difficult tasks the unit With the coming of the Iraqi Ba’ath had before the ground war started was to regime, As Salman became a major gov- acquire reliable information about As ernmental “corporate” town. In addition to Salman. Unit members made acquaint- housing a border police battalion in a ances with local merchants, police, fortress two miles east of the town, As Bedouins and administrators and, through Salman also housed a military garrison, a these sources, gathered enough informa- military school and a local Ba’ath party tion to generate a detailed picture of As headquarters. It boasted a modern health Salman and the entire French sector. clinic, running water, several schools, a Using its area study and the application weather station and many other amenities of 14 political-military analytical factors not common to Iraqi towns in the region. taught in the Regional Studies Course at Once the air war began, large numbers Fort Bragg’s John F. Kennedy Special of the town’s residents fled north to avoid Warfare Center and School, the company the bombing. An Iraqi reserve division, developed a plan to administer As Salman the 45th (composed mostly of Kurds), was once it had been seized by the French. moved to As Salman and ordered to Founded approximately 1,800 years defend the Iraqi far right flank while it ago, As Salman was home to 4,500 people, continued to incorporate large numbers of reservists into its force structure.

October 1994 21 Soldiers from Co. B would not enter As preters, each civilian was escorted back to Salman until it had been secured by the his home by a CA team and told not to French division’s 3rd Colonial Marine leave the dwelling. Infantry Regiment, the 3rd RIMA. On the morning of Feb. 26, the company com- Civil affairs triage mander was told to link up immediately Once As Salman had been searched and with the 3rd RIMA for the attack on As secured, Co. B quickly moved its command Salman. Fortunately, the unit had post and displaced-civilian collection point planned for this contingency, and its to the center of town. A quick survey of teams were prepared. After a hasty confer- the town disclosed that damage was mini- ence, one CA team was attached to each of mal. The 3rd RIMA commander estab- the four French infantry companies to lished his command post in the muhk- deal with civilians and EPWs encountered tarate, the Iraqi mayor’s office, since it during the attack. One remaining team was centrally located and was the most would move with the French battalion modern building with enough room for trains to receive displaced civilians and communications equipment. Company B EPWs from the forward teams and hold established its command post in a nearby them at a collection point for interrogation boys’ school. by French military-intelligence personnel. On Feb. 27, the company’s teams fanned When the armored vehicles of the 3rd out across the town to assess infrastruc- RIMA reached the edge of As Salman, the ture damage, the availability of food sup- troops dismounted and began clearing the plies and the condition of the medical clin- town house by house. The Iraqis did not ic. As Salman had been designated by the defend As Salman, and all that allied Iraqis as both a divisional headquarters troops had to show for their efforts were site and a mobilization point. Tons of 17 Iraqi prisoners and 13 civilians. The abandoned equipment, weapons, and vehi- EPWs were shipped to Rafha, but the cles were scattered throughout the town. civilians were allowed to remain. After Teams also located large amounts of food, interrogation by the unit’s Kuwaiti inter-

U.S. Civil Affairs soldiers issue food rations to Iraqi villagers in As Salman.

Photo courtesy Douglas Nash

22 Special Warfare medicine, bottled water and ammunition. While sappers of the French Foreign Legion removed and destroyed arms and ammunition, the public-service team moved hundreds of bags of flour, rice and beans, as well as stores of cooking oil and salt, to a food-issue point at the boys’ school. The public-health-and-housing team evaluated the clinic that Iraqi troops had used as a field hospital. Despite its recent use, the clinic was well-stocked and equipped. Although badly in need of clean- ing, it could soon be placed back into operation for the returning civilian population. The public-works team assessed the condition of the town’s utilities, communications and roads. The town telephone exchange had been removed by the Iraqis. Photo courtesy Douglas Nash The power plant, though capable of being The company commander decided that Civil Affairs soldiers and restored, lacked a trained engineer to the allies should formally recognize the Kuwaiti volunteers assist operate it. Allied bombing had destroyed muhktar as the sole legitimate civilian the muhktar of As Salman the waterworks on the northern edge of leader of As Salman, and the French gar- (center, with glasses) at the food-issue point. the town, and the only reliable sources of rison commander concurred. The civil- water were private wells. If the town’s information team was given the mission of inhabitants did return, the several hun- enhancing the muhktar’s legitimacy and dred bottles of water discovered by Co. B using him to channel information about would not last long. the town’s new “administrators” to its The law-and-order team searched the inhabitants. town police station, which had been hit by Since the muhktarate was being used by a 500-pound bomb. Despite the damage, the French, Co. B’s commander set up the team members were able to retrieve the muhktar’s new office in an unused room in town’s police files, which would help iden- the boys’ school, near the company com- tify potentially disruptive elements once mand post. The civil-information team the townspeople began returning. The also arranged daily town-council meetings team also made identity cards for each of with the muhktar and various tribal and the town’s inhabitants and was prepared family heads, in which details of the to issue them should the villagers return. administration of the town were worked The team leader met daily with his French out. The muhktar was also briefed on military-police counterpart to coordinate directives issued by the French area com- local security tasks and exchange informa- mander that would affect the town’s popu- tion. All local security, except for Co. B’s lation. Important information, such as the compound, was the responsibility of the need to boil drinking water and the dan- French. gers posed by unexploded munitions, was The civil-information team was also regularly disseminated during the meet- fully occupied during the first several days ings. The meetings were also a forum for after the town was seized. After question- grievances. The fact that there were no ing all of the Iraqi civilians in the town, instances of rebellion or outbreaks of hos- the team discovered that the secular tility during the town’s administration is mayor, who held an Iraqi civil-service indicative of the success of the meetings. position, had fled, as had all members of Every evening, team leaders met with the Ba’ath party political structure. How- the company commander to share infor- ever, the traditional tribal leader of the mation and to update the As Salman area town, the muhktar, had remained. assessment. To keep both the 6th LAD

October 1994 23 and the Corps G-5 informed of its activi- townspeople returned. ties, the company submitted daily situa- An estimated 500 townspeople were tion reports that detailed its activities and camping in the desert. Although they were provided estimates of supplies required for notified by the muhktar that it was safe to the town’s population. return to their homes, they did not trust The French, for their part, did not the Americans at first — Iraqi propaganda intrude into this process. They remained had painted the allies as barbarians. The satisfied with the company’s performance villagers sent representatives to As as long as the town did not demand too Salman to see for themselves. If the Amer- much in terms of security or logistics sup- icans were telling the truth, the villagers port and did not interfere with military would return. Word was also passed along operations. However, the French com- by Bedouins to those townspeople who had mander stipulated that only prewar resi- fled north that it was safe to return home. dents of As Salman would be allowed to These groups also sent representatives to return. All others were to be turned away. see what the Americans and the French were up to. Population returns By Mar. 9, the trickle of returnees had By Mar. 5, 1991, the teams had complet- become a flood. To establish control of the ed their inventories. All foodstuffs had returning townspeople, the law-and-order been moved to a storage site in the compa- team set up a checkpoint at the northern ny’s compound. Military equipment had entrance to the town. All other routes into been removed from most of the residential the town were sealed off by the French. At areas of the town. Tons of gear, ammuni- the checkpoint, all returning traffic was tion and weapons had been collected by stopped and vehicles and personnel were French Foreign Legion sappers and searched for weapons and other contra- destroyed north of the town. band. Because of Islamic customs regard- Several wells had been placed back ing the treatment of women, the unit’s into operation, and the town clinic had sole female soldier was joined by three been cleaned in preparation for the daily other female soldiers from the Corps G-5 sick call that would begin when the and the CA Brigade to assist with search- population returned. Company B’s es of women. mechanic had repaired a garbage truck The law-and-order team quickly discov- Villagers of As Salman re- and two water trucks, making them ered that most Iraqis had no identity doc- ceive bulk issues of rations operational. All these services would be uments. Many had had their identity at the food-issue point. badly needed when the estimated 2,500 cards confiscated by the Iraqi secret police; others had thrown them away to hide their identity. The lack of identity cards made screening the legitimate inhabitants of the town difficult, but the Kuwaiti translators were adept at ferret- ing out the required information. For example, they could tell by an Iraqi’s dialect whether he was a local Bedouin or a resident of Baghdad. Questionable cases were checked against the captured police files. Iraqis who were not returnees were turned away. Many were found to be Iraqi Army deserters, and when their numbers began to pose a threat to security at the checkpoint, they were taken to the EPW cage in Rafha. Returnees who had been

Photo courtesy Douglas Nash screened were in-processed and issued an

24 Special Warfare French and American soldiers talk with villagers of As Salman.

Photo courtesy Douglas Nash American-made identity card and four For example, the civil-service team had days’ rations. All returnees were briefed initially staffed the food distribution point by the muhktar on the allied administra- and had managed the issuing of rations. tion and its rules. They were also told that The muhktar was directed to pick a staff they would have to go through the muhk- to run the food-issue point. One of the tar with questions or complaints — they company’s operations specialists would were not allowed to deal directly with the supervise the operation. allies. This helped establish the muhktar Soldiers from Co. B had initially driv- as the legitimate Iraqi leader in the town. en the water trucks and the garbage truck, but an Egyptian national later Challenge of ‘military government’ volunteered to perform this duty. He By Mar. 24, the company had processed “hired” several local assistants, who were 2,768 returnees, most of whom chose to usually paid with extra rations of food. return to their homes. Others, mostly By the end of Co. B’s stay, water distri- Bedouins, returned to their pastures in bution and trash hauling were civilian the surrounding area. Most of the unit’s responsibilities. personnel were heavily involved in the As food stocks were exhausted, the day-to-day duties required to administer a French Army provided military rations for town of more than 2,000 inhabitants; only issue to the townspeople. Although the the law-and-order team remained at the allies could have flooded the town with checkpoint north of town, where it contin- food, the company commander believed ued to screen and in-process the few that it would not be in the Iraqis’ best remaining returnees. interests to raise their standard of living Realizing that the unit was not large higher than it had been before the war. enough to adequately administer the They received what was adequate to sus- town, the company commander decided to tain their day-to-day needs, and local mer- transfer as many duties as possible to the chants slowly began to fill in the gaps. muhktar once he was able to handle them. The public-health team administered

October 1994 25 sick call at the town clinic. Since all Iraqi As Salman, ensuring that the company public-health personnel had fled north, was flexible enough to adapt to changing the French Army medical personnel per- circumstances. Area assessments were formed this vital service, often seeing important because they were used as tools more than 100 patients each day. Care to teach company members about the vil- provided at the clinic played a major role lage they would soon be administering. in developing favorable attitudes toward Soldiers knew each street, each building, the allies in general and the Americans and the ethnic makeup of the town before in particular. As a result, the Iraqis coop- they ever saw it. erated with their American administra- Experience was another crucial factor. tors, even going so far as to compel their Although all the members of Co. B had neighbors to follow the allies’ rules and received some formal Civil Affairs training, regulations. six months in the theater — working with By Mar. 20, the town was virtually self- the inhabitants and dealing with real prob- sustaining except for food and medical lems — gave the unit experience in locating supplies. On Mar. 23, the company moved local resources, dealing with local officials from the boy’s school to an abandoned bor- and operating in a desert environment. der-police fortress on the northern edge of The unit’s success could not have been town. This move was necessary because achieved without administrative and logis- the town council had decided to reopen the tics support from the XVIII Airborne schools, probably the most conclusive evi- Corps G-5 and the 6th LAD. The company dence that normalcy had returned to As learned to live without support from Salman and that the unit’s mission had ARCENT or CENTCOM: these organiza- been successful. That same day, the com- tions were too remote. Although As pany commander met with the com- Salman was administered in an austere mander of the 354th CA Command from logistical environment, the town’s needs VII Corps to discuss the hand-off of were largely met by energizing the consid- responsibility for As Salman. The follow- erable assets of the corps. Fortunately, the ing day, the company was relieved by VII rapid cessation of hostilities enabled the Corps units and began its redeployment to 6th LAD to divert a larger amount of CONUS. resources for the Iraqi populace than it ordinarily would have. Conclusion Company B trained throughout the air During Operation Desert Storm, Co. B campaign to conduct its mission. Team was able to execute a classic Civil Affairs members were fully aware of their individ- mission — the administration of an occu- ual roles and of the general concept of the pied town in enemy territory. With little operation. Teams conducted rehearsals of prior experience in performing such a their assigned missions, and when the task, a small unit was able to complete its ground war began, each soldier was ready. mission with a minimum diversion of The importance of collective and individ- allied resources. A combination of factors ual initiative was also reinforced. All contributed to the unit’s success: planning, things do not come to those who wait. Unit experience, service support, training, ini- members must often aggressively seek tiative, PSYOP, and cultural and language information and gather resources without training. waiting for help. This is especially impor- Planning was crucial to the success of tant on the modern battlefield, where Civil the mission. Not only was a solid opera- Affairs units compete with other services tions plan important, but also constant for the same limited assets. rehearsals, updated area studies, and Another lesson learned was the need for coordination with supported and support- Civil Affairs and PSYOP to work closely ing units. The operations plan was adjust- together. Each must have a working ed constantly during the administration of knowledge of the other’s job. Because both specialties are in short supply on the bat-

26 Special Warfare tlefield, CA and PSYOP soldiers may have analytical tools for Civil Affairs and to fill in for each other. This was the case PSYOP units. in As Salman. Because PSYOP support • Infantry skills are necessary in was unavailable, Co. B improvised loud- preparing for combat operations. CA units speakers, leaflets and other media. All may have to accompany the ground- indications showed that these attempts, assault force. although crude, were successful, in part • Flexibility and ingenuity are crucial — because several of the unit’s members had don’t wait for detailed guidance or try to attended formal blocks of instruction on fit the doctrinal template to real-world PSYOP or had worked closely enough with situations. PSYOP units to gain an understanding of • METT-T applies to the planning proc- the fundamentals. ess for CA and PSYOP units too. Finally, cultural and language expertise • JRTC must continue to emphasize the proved to be the company’s most crucial administration of occupied population cen- advantage. The knowledge of Arabic cul- ters during its exercise play. ture gained after six months of dealing • CA units should view an administra- with indigenous peoples on a daily basis tive mission as a temporary one. If they enabled the unit to approach its mission become indispensable, they may remain with the required degree of sensitivity. indispensable. Reactivate the indigenous The Americans showed respect for Islamic leadership as soon as possible. culture and gained the trust of the local • Use local resources as much as possi- leadership, and the people of As Salman ble — don’t be a distractor for the maneu- were receptive to American administra- ver commander. tion. Cultural sensitivity is the most diffi- • All members of CA units are workers — cult skill to learn and the most perishable, the only way to get an administration but it is one of the crucial factors that mission moving is to practice hands-on make SOF an effective combat multiplier. leadership. As the Army and other services prepare for a future characterized by operations other than war, episodes such as the Maj. Douglas E. Nash is administration of As Salman may become currently attending the Army commonplace. Commanders may find Command and General Staff themselves responsible for the safety and College, Fort Leavenworth, well-being of thousands of enemy citizens Kan. His most recent assign- within their area of operations. While in ment was commander of the many respects As Salman was an ideal lab- Regional Studies Detach- oratory for revalidating CA concepts and ment, 3rd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare principles, all units can benefit from the Training Group, Fort Bragg, N.C. His lessons learned from Co. B’s operations. other assignments include service as commander of Company B, 96th Civil Affairs Lessons learned Battalion, where he served during Opera- • PSYOP should be incorporated into tion Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Opera- all aspects of planning for humanitarian tion Provide Comfort and Operation Guan- missions. tanamo. A graduate of the Civil Affairs • Language and intercultural skills are Course and the Regional Studies Course, crucial to success. he holds a bachelor’s degree from the U.S. • CA units cannot provide security for Military Academy and a master’s degree towns — that is an MP mission. from Troy State University. • U.S. forces should be prepared to work with allied and international forces. • Political-military factors taught in the Regional Studies Course are excellent

October 1994 27 SOF Planning for Coalition Operations

by Lt. Col. Robert D. Lewis

uring Operation Desert Storm, tions to serve as stopgaps for conventional special-operations forces from the shortfalls. DU.S., Great Britain, France and Finally, the national military strategy the Arab coalition partners cooperated in makes it clear that the United States will executing a variety of SOF missions. fight future wars as part of a coalition. Their combined efforts provided a proto- The current administration has embraced type of coalition special warfare. the concept of multilateralism, and SOF Future military operations are likely to will be employed to maximize these coali- see an increasing use of coalition special tion efforts. operations, and SOF planners must learn to integrate available elements into a true Dilemma coalition force. Today, active-component Special Forces, Three dynamics are at work to make Civil Affairs and PSYOP units find them- coalition special warfare a norm in the selves heavily employed, conducting oper- future. First, former Secretary of Defense ations in foreign internal defense, coun- Les Aspin’s “Bottom-Up Review” defines terterrorism, counternarcotics and other multiple tasks for America’s armed forces, activities. These missions are important to including operations other than war such the United States and to the stability of as peacekeeping, peacemaking and the regions in which they take place. Calls humanitarian assistance. The U.S. com- by the current administration for mitment to these tasks will require the increased international activism could use of all available force multipliers, result in increased SOF deployments, including indigenous and coalition forces. especially with the reduction of forward- The second dynamic is the drawdown of based U.S. conventional forces. The result- American forces. Cuts in the conventional ing dilemma is, “Will sufficient SOF be forces of all the services make it more like- available to respond to the requirements ly that those constrained resources will be of a regional crisis short of war?” husbanded to respond to major regional If not, the national command authority contingencies. Military requirements such may not choose to redeploy an already- as operations other than war may rely on engaged SOF unit to fulfill a requirement the capabilities of regionally aligned SOF, in another theater. The solution might be indigenous forces and coalition contribu- to employ allied SOF in consonance with

28 Special Warfare apportioned U.S. SOF to fulfill the theater Northern Europe, the author had the commander’s requirement. opportunity to work in a combined, joint headquarters that conducted planning for Allied SOF contributions SOF from several nations. Planners had to Using allied SOF would offer three dis- allow for the employment of SOF from as tinct advantages: many as six different countries, and they • Unique cultural attributes: SOF from evaluated each of the forces against seven nations within or bordering the theater’s criteria. Discussion of the evaluation will area of responsibility, or AOR, will likely assume that allied forces have been allo- include soldiers who share a common language, ethnic and cultural traits and religious beliefs with military personnel and SOF Analysis civilians in the AOR. These soldiers will be more easily assimilated and hidden 1 What purpose does the force serve? within the area of operations. 2 What type of force is it? • No stigma of American intervention: The U.S. government or its allies may 3 What is the force structure? develop a requirement for SOF in an AOR, but political considerations might preclude 4 What are the capabilities/limitations of the force? the employment of U.S. SOF. Under such 5 Can allied capabilities eliminate limitations? conditions, SOF from a nonthreatening ally might better meet the requirement. 6 What are the likely mission profiles? • Operational experience in the AOR: 7 Can combined SOF operations be undertaken? Allied SOF from within the crisis region have previously developed the operational techniques, personnel and equipment cated to the SOC, which serves as a coali- issues for successful employment. As a tion headquarters. result, these forces may be more easily What purpose does the force serve? — A employed than U.S. forces who have not nation creates and maintains SOF for worked in the area. three primary purposes. In many Third Each nation’s SOF has its own capabili- World nations, SOF is designed as an ties and its own limitations. Considera- agency of state security or “palace guard.” tions such as command and control, intel- In such cases, the purpose of the force is ligence, infiltration and exfiltration, and not war fighting, but internal security for communications are common across the the government against the indigenous spectrum of mission profiles, but no other population. Under such circumstances, the nation has structured its forces with the force provides no tangible advantages and myriad capabilities of U.S. SOF. Allied two important liabilities. First, the central forces may need the U.S. to provide some government is very unlikely to release this kind of support. force for war fighting. Second, this force is probably unpopular with the native popu- SOF analysis lation, so its usefulness in FID or in U.S. regional special-operations com- unconventional warfare is poor. mands, or SOCs, can be tasked to assume Other nations design their SOF as a operational control of allied SOF, or a SOC function of their intelligence services. may be integrated into an allied com- These are primarily stay-behind military mand. From either position, U.S. SOF forces, or SBMF, designed to operate for planners could be expected to project the extended periods in enemy rear areas. The most effective employment of special three doctrinal missions performed by forces from different nations, using some SBMF are strategic reconnaissance, direct kind of evaluation process. During assign- action and unconventional warfare. Their ment to the headquarters of Allied Forces strengths lie in the extensive systems of contacts and caches established in likely

October 1994 29 crete principle is that a nation will always retain command of its forces. This command may be exercised in a simple one- time approval of tasking authority to an American SOC, or it may require that every action directed by the American SOC be approved by national authorities. Normally, communications and sustainment will remain national responsibilities. However, certain countries will seek substantial logistics support as a prerequisite to participation in a coalition. What is the particular unit’s force structure? — Few nations organize their forces to perform the multitude of tasks conducted by American SOF. Generally, allied forces are structured to execute one or two doctrinal Photo by Thomas Witham tasks, such as special reconnaissance and A U.S. Navy SEAL trains a areas of conflict. SBMF also have two lia- direct action, because they lack the person- Saudi Special Forces sol- bilities. First, their intelligence services nel and equipment to conduct other tasks. dier on the use of diving desire information of national strategic Structure must be examined in terms of the equipment during Operation value, not operational value. As a result, teams/patrols, command and control, intelli- Desert Storm. regional SOCs should not expect these gence, communications and sustainment. forces to be released to them. Second, the The SOF planner must be careful to employ nature of stay-behind means that these a force only within its capabilities. elements will remain dormant as the What are the force’s capabilities and lim- fighting occurs around them. They will itations? — To determine the specific activate only when the forward edge of the capabilities and limitations that will affect battle area is well past them. a force’s employment, the planner must Many other allied SOF are organized to evaluate each force in the following areas: perform special reconnaissance and direct operational time frame, means of infiltra- action. Their roles are similar to those of tion and exfiltration, communications, American Special Forces or Rangers. technological level and caches. These forces may be employed by the SOC • Operational time frame: This is the if released. length of time a force can be employed. What type of force is it? — Two issues Short operational time frames limit a SOF are relevant to this question — terms of element to specific missions such as direct service and command relationships. action. Forces capable of longer employ- Throughout the world, countries raise ment times can undertake deeper and more both professional and conscripted forces. complex missions. By defining the opera- Obviously, long-service professional spe- tional time frame, the planner can cial forces receive additional training to sequence the infiltration and exfiltration of perfect their doctrine, structure and tech- U.S. and coalition SOF teams at appropri- nology, which enables them to undertake ate points throughout the operation. Fur- complex SOF missions. These forces are ther, the time frames will define the tasks also retained as cohesive formations for that each national SOF can undertake. long periods. Conscript forces do not have • Means of infiltration and exfiltration: these luxuries. They have less time to Each nation trains its SOF units in differ- train and are constantly retraining on the ent methods of infil and exfil. Techniques same tasks because of personnel vary from intentional stay-behind opera- turnovers. tions, to overland marches, to airborne, Command relationships concerning airland or seaborne infiltrations. Planners allied forces can also be confusing. A con- should attempt to employ each nation’s

30 Special Warfare SOF element using the methods its sol- nations have acquired the capability to pro- diers know best. Initially, infil and exfil vide terminal guidance (laser target desig- planning for allied SOF should be limited nation and transponders). to the employment of national means. • Caches: Many allies have alleviated • Communications: The planner exam- shortfalls in robustness and technology by ines communications with regard to range, establishing well-developed cache systems sustainability, speed and security. This is throughout their nations. The caches are done from two aspects — the capabilities inspected and updated on a routine basis. of the SOF element to relay reports from This form of sustainment is especially pop- the team/patrol to its base station, and the ular among nations that rely on large-scale, capabilities of each ally to process these stay-behind warfare. Of concern to regional reports into a usable product and to com- SOCs are three issues. First, what is in the municate the data into the coalition com- caches and are these resources compatible mand structure. Of particular importance with American or other allied SOF? If pos- are the liaison requirements for each sible, planners should pursue standardiza- nation within the coalition headquarters tion of ammunition, communications and or the SOC. batteries. Second, can SOF other than the • Technological level: The planner must host nation’s gain access to these caches? examine the technologies that an allied Finally, will the host nation allow U.S. ele- force can employ in its missions. Two pri- ments or other forces to build their own mary areas to consider are special recon- caches in-country? naissance and direct action. Technology will define the parameters of the special recon- Operational planning naissance mission and should be evaluated Using their analyses, SOC planners can in terms of observation ranges, night-vision overlay the available U.S. and allied forces capabilities and all-weather capabilities. on the battlefield. In addition to the con- Direct-action technology will define the type sideration of each force’s capabilities and and complexity of the target system that the limitations, three additional factors must SOF element can undertake. Very few

U.S. SOF deploy with a rubber boat from a helicopter. Few allies will have the infiltration and exfiltration capabilities of U.S. forces.

U.S. Air Force photo

October 1994 31 be considered. best be accomplished by an allied SOF First, areas of operation must be team. restricted to a single nation. Egyptian Finally, certain missions could be commandos, for example, should not share assigned to SOF teams composed of indian AO with the British SAS. This precau- viduals and elements from two nations. tion reduces the chance of allied SOF ele- Combined teams should be employed only ments compromising one another. A tech- if each contributing force brings a specific nique that can be employed is the use of capability required by the mission; for operational bands, with each band provid- example, the combination of allied and ing the AO for a nation’s SOF. The defin- U.S. forces to conduct laser-target-desig- ing principle of these bands is primarily nation operations. Extensive contact with the infil and exfil capabilities of each the local population would favor the use of nation. An example of this technique is a national team, but the target might be shown in the chart below. sufficiently complex to require a laser- Second, planners should determine marking capability that the allies might whether assets can be shared by more not have. A national patrol with an than one nation’s forces; for example, attached U.S. two-man lasing team would whether American aircraft could be used be the solution. to infiltrate and exfiltrate forces of other nations. The U.S. Air Force’s special-oper- Operations ations wings bring the most developed In the arena of coalition SOF opera- capability, but there may be small num- tions, the author’s experience has shown bers of U.S. aircraft available. The SOC that the allied command’s activities will should also be prepared to request assis- fall into three areas: liaison between tance from allies as the situation national SOF and the command, coordina- demands. Conditions requiring extensive tion of SOF and conventional operations contact with the local population or use of and response to operational emergencies. a conveniently located cache, for example, As an allied headquarters, the SOC will may determine that a specific mission can receive liaison cells from each SOF ele-

SOF Areas of Operation

XXXXX

ITALIAN FRENCH

EGYPTIAN BRITISH UNITED STATES

XXXXX

32 Special Warfare ment it employs. These liaison cells have linkups will require personnel from the three functions: SOC and the national SOF liaison cell to • Provide the SOC with expertise con- join the advancing unit to effect linkup. cerning tactics, doctrine and employment Linkup should be planned prior to infiltra- of national SOF elements. tion; however, battlefield uncertainties • Process and coordinate commands and may cause linkup to be performed ad hoc. information between the SOC and their national teams. Conclusion • Coordinate and deconflict missions In the future, American armed forces and mission changes between the SOC are less likely to “go it alone.” They may and the national command. operate as part of a multinational coali- The SOC must provide resources to the tion, and the shrinking U.S. force struc- liaison cells. They will require a secure ture may also lead to a greater U.S. place to work and access to sufficient com- dependence on the contributions of allied munication nodes to conduct their coordi- forces. The existing command, control, nation. The SOC will be required to inte- communications and intelligence structure grate the liaison cells’ national communi- of the U.S. regional SOCs is capable of cations gear into its array. employing coalition assets, but SOF plan- One of the primary purposes of the SOC ners must be prepared to plan the employ- is to coordinate the activities of SOF with ment and integration of allied units. An conventional operations. These operations analysis such as the one presented here may involve ground forces from one nation will allow planners to evaluate allied and SOF from another; the SOC, with its forces’ capabilities and limitations in order liaison cells, must ensure a coordinated to employ each force to its best effort. Coordination is especially impor- advantage. tant in the synchronization of direct-action targets, in the deconfliction of operations and in the linkup with conventional forces. Lt. Col. Robert D. Lewis is Targets selected for direct action are currently assigned to the 4th designed to provide a large payoff for Special Operations Support future operations. An example would be a Command, Fort Shafter, series of simultaneous SOF attacks on air- Hawaii. A Special Forces defense systems to generate a blind spot officer, he has served in com- through which deep-attack aircraft could mand and staff positions in fly undetected. both Field Artillery and Special Forces The SOC will also deconflict SOF with and was formerly assigned to the Direc- conventional operations. Infils and exfils torate of Operations, Readiness and Mobi- using each nation’s SOF aircraft, sub- lization in the Office of the Army Deputy marines and other means must be coordi- Chief of Staff for Operations. A distin- nated with friendly air-defense arrays, guished military graduate of California fire-support systems and front-line units. State University, Chico, he is also a gradu- Routes of ingress and egress will have to ate of the Army Command and General be shared with conventional force plan- Staff College and the Naval Command ners. Further, conventional deep attacks and Staff College. (air, missile and artillery) must be decon- flicted with the movements of employed SOF teams. SOC personnel will be required to attend most of the conventional maneuver and interdiction planning meetings. Linkup operations between advancing conventional forces and employed SOF are challenging in the coalition world. Such

October 1994 33 Tanks and Helicopters: Factors Influencing the Rate of Innovation

by Guy M. Hicks and George E. Pickett Jr.

nnovation has always been an essen- periods of austerity such as the one DoD is tial, indeed critical, element of effec- now entering. Budgets influence, but do Itive military forces and peacetime not dictate, the rates of innovation. And deterrence. The Soviet Union was defeated despite the enthusiasm of technologists, in part by U.S. innovations in technology, history suggests that it is not the inven- weapons, doctrine, etc., which raised question of new science or devices that consti- tions in the minds of Soviet leaders as to tutes innovation. Invention provides new whether they could wage war or compete systems, but systems have little utility in peacetime effectively. Crises such as until the accompanying doctrine is devel- Desert Storm have been resolved in the oped, the operational practices are United States’ favor, with less loss of life, ingrained into soldiers and their leaders, in part because of our innovations in tech- the accompanying strategy is developed nology and operations (e.g., long-range and the invention is deployed so that polit- tank fires and day/night operations). ical and military leaders alike become con- Innovation will continue to be impor- vinced it will work. tant. New technologies, e.g., information; If innovation involves more than the old technologies used in new ways, e.g., mere appearance of an invention, then ballistic missiles; and new operational attempts to foment or accelerate the rates concepts, e.g., precision strike, provide of innovation require more than just fund- opportunities for the U.S. and other states ing science. Moreover, understanding to change the way combat occurs. With the what causes innovation should suggest global spread of technology and knowl- actions that military organizations and edge, the U.S. can no longer remain confi- people of all ranks could use to effect dent that it will be the only power to adopt change. In an attempt to understand what these. Meanwhile the understandable these factors might be, the authors have decline in the defense budget requires examined the steps and missteps taken in more innovative use of remaining acquiring and incorporating into the Army resources to enable the U.S. to respond to two major weapons of this century: the the variety of situations that may develop. tank and the helicopter. How innovation occurs in the military and in large organizations in general is Main battle tanks not thoroughly understood. The military From World War I through the Korean innovations of the 1920s and 1930s show War — a span of almost 40 years — the that great advances are possible, even in U.S. Army struggled not only with the

34 Special Warfare development of the tank but also with its ers went about experimenting with tanks integration into the Army force structure. at Camp Meade in 1919 and 1920. Over In contrast, by World War II several other the course of a year, Eisenhower and Pat- nations had embraced the tank as a major ton, both tank company commanders, con- innovation and an important battlefield ducted daily field experiments in tactics, weapon. What are some of the reasons for followed by evening discussions of the the- this difference between the U.S. and other ories of armor deployment. Their findings, nations? which were based on their field trials, U.S. tank experience on the battlefield, were accepted for publication in several in exercises, in training, and through military journals. The reaction was swift. experimentation was limited during the Eisenhower was called before the Chief of first several decades of the tank’s existence. Infantry and was told that his ideas were In early 1918, the U.S. Tank Corps was not only wrong but dangerous, and that established in France as part of the Amer- henceforth he would keep them to himself. ican Expeditionary Force, but it saw limit- Particularly, he was not to publish any- ed combat in the closing days of the war. thing incompatible with solid infantry doc- By contrast, the British and the French trine. If he did, he would be hauled before armies had used tanks for several years. a court-martial.2 This lack of experience with the tank not only limited direct observation and experimentation under combat conditions Eisenhower was called before the Chief of but also led to an absence of a persuasive Infantry and was told that his ideas were not body of knowledge from which to launch an aggressive research-and-development only wrong but dangerous, and that henceforth effort and tactical evolution after the war. A major postwar evaluation of artillery he would keep them to himself. Particularly, he resulted in 50 pages of detailed guidelines was not to publish anything incompatible with for changes to artillery pieces and munitions. Guidelines for postwar tank devel- solid infantry doctrine. If he did, he would be opment consisted of two pages of general statements.1 hauled before a court-martial. During the years following the war, few opportunities existed for developing addi- Various study boards unanimously rec- tional experience using the tank. Experi- ommended that “tanks should be recog- ments by George Patton and Dwight nized as infantry-supporting and infantry- Eisenhower in 1919 and 1920 were clan- accompanying weapons and be organized destinely conducted and terminated. An for association with, and for combat as experimental unit formed in 1928 was part of, an infantry command.”3 Congress disbanded after three months; another then abolished the Tank Corps through one formed in 1930 was disbanded after the National Defense Act of 1920 and for- seven months. In 1935 a test unit finally mally assigned tanks to the infantry. achieved permanence. Between 1919 and Conflict between the infantry and the 1939, no tank was approved as a stand- cavalry continued throughout the 1920s. ardized weapon, and until 1931, no Both branches vied for control of the sys- experimental model could be used in tem, insisting that the tank’s primary maneuvers. responsibility was to support their respec- Bureaucratic infighting among Army tive views of mechanized warfare. The branches delayed the formation of an cavalry was interested in making the tank armor organization. Competition for the light and swift and adapting it to standard tank and over its role emerged quickly horse cavalry tactics. The infantry was after World War I. Dwight Eisenhower interested in designing a tank that would described in his memoirs the covert man- support infantrymen on foot. It would ner in which he, George Patton, and oth- have to be slow-moving and equipped with

October 1994 35 heavy armor.4 by the new chief of staff, Gen. Douglas Senior leadership in the Army did not MacArthur, because of decreasing funding provide consistent support for the develop- for Army weapons and President Hoover’s ment of armor. At the close of World War intention to propose a ban on all offensive I, Secretary of War Newton Baker and weapons. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Peyton March Budget constraints caused by demobi- sought independent status for a tank lization and shrinking defense funds ham- corps. John J. Pershing, commanding gen- pered the tank’s development. Congress eral of the American Expeditionary Force, abolished the Tank Corps in 1920 partly vigorously opposed this move and argued on the basis of cost. During hearings on that tanks should become an adjunct to the measure, several congressmen voiced the infantry. To bolster his position, Per- strong opposition to the creation of anoth- shing organized a number of review er branch because of the large fixed costs boards to evaluate the lessons of the war and the overhead associated with any and to make specific recommendations organization. Throughout the interwar that the tank be assigned to the infantry. period, from 1920 to 1940, budget priority In 1927 Dwight Davis, secretary of war, was given to maintaining the numbers of observed field maneuvers conducted by personnel in the force. Research and the British Experimental Mechanized development typically received less than Force. Impressed with the demonstration two percent of the total Army budget. The ordnance budget, from which the In contrast to 40 years of tank evolution, the tank was funded during the period, was subdivided into 21 separate categories. Army’s use of helicopters progressed in about The amount spent on artillery was 10 times greater than that allocated to tanks; 15 years from a small effort involving a few even small arms received more funds than highly specialized units to an essential weapon armor. R&D levels fell consistently through the 1930s, affecting all weapons system incorporated into all major combat units. systems, especially tanks. From 1925 to 1939, the average annual budget for tank of mobility and firepower, Davis brought development was $60,000, barely enough about the creation of a small but similar to purchase and test one tank prototype a force in 1928 to conduct tests. To encour- year.5 age experimentation, he ordered the com- Research and development seem to have mander of the newly formed tank unit to been hampered less by technology than by ignore all regulations prescribing organi- other factors. Technology-related chal- zation, armament and equipment. The lenges obstructed tank design from 1920 unit, however, was disbanded after a to 1940. User-established requirements three-month test. conflicted with the state of technology — Davis then appointed a planning board objectives for armor thickness and calibers to review long-range mechanization of guns could not be met within the estab- options. In late 1928, the board released lished weight limit, for example. Specific its report, which called for an invigorated performance requirements for subsystems, mechanization program and the establish- e.g., suspension, power plants and track ment of a separate tank corps. The report design, also required significant technical brought immediate resistance from the advances. Army chief of staff, who argued that estab- In developing new tanks, the Army’s lishing a tank corps would retard develop- design organization — the Ordnance ment of the tank for its intended mission Corps — complied with requirements stat- as “an auxiliary to the infantryman.” ed by the infantry and (during World War Another experimental mechanized force II) by Army ground and armor forces. was established in November 1930. But Attempts to diverge from stated require- after only seven months, it was disbanded ments and to pursue more innovative

36 Special Warfare designs were limited and unsuccessful. approach to conventional war during the For example, in the early 1920s the official 40 years following World War II. It added stated requirement for a light (five-ton) a third physical dimension to the battle- and a medium (15-ton) tank led the Ord- field, changed the notion of time and dis- nance Corps to terminate its development tance for unit commanders, affected most, of a heavier tank. if not all, of the Army’s branches and Even during World War II, as the U.S. affected the allocation of funds within the faced losses from better-armed and better- Army by adding a new category of sys- protected German tanks, the introduction tems. These changes took place not only in of more powerful tanks was delayed by the face of potentially divisive internal Army policies. At that time, the Army was disagreements, but also in the face of sub- committed to standardizing the M-4 Sher- stantial resistance from the Air Force. man tank, even though that tank lacked How was this accomplished? the caliber of gun and the thickness of Opportunities occurred for the heli- armor to combat newer German tanks. copter’s utility to be unambiguously This commitment was based upon strong observed. The value of helicopters was sentiments that a standard tank was more seen clearly during the Korean War. Small important because of the intercontinental helicopters for use in liaison and medical distances separating the European battle- evacuation arrived in December 1950. The field from maintenance facilities in the Marines were the first to use the heli- U.S. and because of Army acquisition poli- copter to transport combat troops into an cies that new designs not be provided to attack, and they demonstrated its utility combat units until after they had been rig- in resupplying units under fire.7 orously evaluated and standardized. Impressed by the Marines’ use, Gen. Heavier tanks, which were ready to be Matthew Ridgway requested in November sent to overseas Army units in 1942, were 1951 that the Army provide four heli- held back. Not until early 1945 did combat copter transport battalions, each with 28 units begin receiving the stronger M-26 helicopters. He also recommended that six Pershing.6 more battalions be added later. The technical challenges do not appear The Army was committed to airmobility to have hampered the Army’s adoption of even before a proven troop-carrying heli- armor warfare as much as Army acquisi- copter was in production. The helicopter’s tion policies, mercurial top-level support advantage in medical evacuation, aerial and conflicts between branches. observation, general transportation, and command and control also supported the Helicopters principal roles of the various Army In contrast to 40 years of tank evolu- branches. In Korea, helicopters airlifted tion, the Army’s use of helicopters pro- more than 15,000 of the 23,000 medevac gressed in about 15 years from a small casualties.8 effort involving a few highly specialized Technical problems that could have units to an essential weapon system slowed the adoption of helicopters were incorporated into all major combat units. solved. The helicopter was used briefly In 1950, the Army had only several hun- near the end of World War II, but techni- dred aircraft of all types (helicopters and cal limitations constrained its utility. In fixed-wing aircraft). By 1960, it had sev- the 1950s, as new uses for the helicopter eral thousand helicopters and had begun were being identified, technology was reorganizing its combat units to incorpo- delivering the performance increases rate them. By 1964, it had begun to build needed for evolving missions. Moreover, the 1st Air Cavalry Division entirely technological improvements were easing around airmobility. the challenge of training pilots and were This transition was one of the most rev- improving safety records. olutionary changes in the Army’s For example, the turbine engine provided increased power-to-weight ratios and

October 1994 37 eliminated the need for a heavy clutch, colonels and colonels were arranged in thereby improving payloads, rates of 1955-1956. Officers Armywide were climb, and service ceilings. Complex encouraged to apply for the 24 slots. A mechanical systems were replaced by major percentage of those who graduated sophisticated power and servo-control sys- advanced to the rank of general. In the tems that eased the pilot’s load and made late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, the helicopter safer to fly. Advances in additional promising colonels and generals rotor head design and rotor RPM controls were sent to pilot training. increasingly lifted the pilot’s burden of To ensure that the aviation program did having to delicately maintain constant not founder because of the absence of good rotor speed through different flight young officers, Army policies were altered regimes. Finally, early helicopters had to encourage their participation. In the rotor blades that were specifically early 1950s, personnel policies prevented matched as a pair to each helicopter; if one West Pointers and ROTC graduates from was damaged, both had to be replaced. applying for flight school until after they Design and manufacturing standards had completed several years of unit eventually made blades interchangeable.9 assignments. Often, these officers were Top-level support was given to the then too old to attend flight school. Army’s adoption of helicopters. In 1950- Because of resistance from the Army’s chief of personnel, helicopter advocates Resistance tends to be closely related to the went directly to the vice chief of staff for the creation of a regulation enabling degree to which a new idea ‘threatens’ the young officers to select flight school upon graduation from college. basic, historical orientation of a suborganiza- Aggressive and bureaucratically skill- tion or poses new tasks that are difficult to ful advocates overcame organizational obstacles. As new doctrinal and opera- accommodate within a branch’s structure. tional concepts for helicopters were being developed, enthusiastic officers attempt- 1951, the secretary and the undersecre- ed to ensure that each major branch in tary of the Army saw the potential in the Army received a part of the action. In helicopter aviation. The Army staff the late 1950s, helicopters were assigned formed a small special-staff component to to combat units belonging to many oversee helicopter development. The branches. In a division, artillery received principal activists on this staff worked aircraft to conduct fire adjustment; directly for general officers who believed armor received a cavalry unit of attack in air mobility and could influence others. helicopters; infantry received troop heli- The activists worked throughout most of copters; and all commanders received the 1950s to strengthen helicopter avia- helicopters to use in command and con- tion. In 1962 they were instrumental in trol. In selecting officers for flight school, forming the Howze Board, which provid- the Army made efforts to ensure that key ed the basis for a major expansion in branches were represented in order to Army aviation. achieve support for Army aviation Selection and training of junior and throughout the service. senior officers was far-sighted. During the Opportunities were exploited. General early 1950s, senior officers realized that a officers and key lower-ranking officers successful Army aviation program would used opportunities to improve support for require general-officer support in the Army aviation. During the 1940s and immediate future and both junior- and 1950s, for example, bitter disagreements general-officer support in the long term. erupted between the Army and the newly To place top officers with aviation experi- formed Air Force over their respective ence into the senior ranks, two special aviation roles. Their positions bordered flight-training classes for lieutenant on the extreme. One event that crystal-

38 Special Warfare lized the dispute occurred in a peacetime which a new idea “threatens” the basic, training incident in the early 1960s. An historical orientation of a suborganiza- Army helicopter landed and loaded the tion (e.g., the cavalry’s focus on horses) or casualty; then an Air Force helicopter poses new tasks that are difficult to landed, and its pilot ordered the casualty accommodate within a branch’s structure transferred to the Air Force helicopter. (e.g., ordnance at one time did not ade- Within a week this story had reached quately support helicopter maintenance Robert McNamara, who then convened a because it had no appropriate organiza- meeting between the chiefs and the secre- tion to which to assign the function). taries of both services. After three hours • An aggressive set of advocates — they emerged with notes on general “change agents” — must perform effective- agreements, which Army and Air Force ly. Advocates provide the energy for action officers pressed into final form developing new operational concepts, for over a week’s time. locating resources, for overcoming bureaucratic resistance and for providing Analysis the long-term health of the innovation. The innovations of tanks and heli- They fight the day-to-day struggle for an copters are very different events, occur- innovation, which top-level leaders usual- ring at different times in the 20th century. ly cannot do, and may even have to act in The Army that adopted the helicopter dur- conflict with rules and regulations. ing the 1950s was a larger, more experi- • An adequate number of capable per- enced, and probably broader, intellectual sonnel must be provided for the near and institution than it was in the 1920s and the long term. In the near term, the top 1930s. Hardware and technology were ranks must be “inoculated” in order to much more a part of its portfolio, and its protect and enhance the innovation. potential opponents and conflict arenas Lower-ranking personnel must be trained were more distinguishable. The helicopter to execute the changes needed, to ensure benefited from this and from its inherent that the innovation performs well in its lack of threat to the core competencies of first appearances and to provide the core the combat branches. for future senior leaders. On the other hand, the histories of • The rate of innovation will be directly these two systems appear to share com- affected by the speed with which the new mon threads in the roles of leaders, fol- system, concept or idea is placed with oper- lowers, organizations, resources and tech- ating personnel and units. Early experi- nology. These similarities, in turn, sug- mentation on an innovation placed with gest some notions about the actions that operational units provides several critical influence the rate at which an innovation inputs to the advancement of that innova- is implemented. Although these conclu- tion. First, it engenders new concepts for sions are listed below in an Army context, employment. Second, it provides practical they appear to have a broad application feedback that can be used to affect system to other organizations. design. Third, it foments thinking and • Top-level support is important to the enthusiasm among people who will later rate of progress. Indeed, depending upon be in positions to influence the pace and the degree of resistance, top-level support the nature of the innovation. may have to be quite active to ensure • The rate of progress in technology has that an innovation is not slowed or halted to be sufficient to keep pace with the evo- by opposition, benign neglect or strict lution of conceptual thinking and organi- adherence to old bureaucratic procedures. zation, but it will not necessarily cause • The support of internal organizations, the innovation to move faster. Technology such as the different branches of the can act as a catalyst in the development Army, must be gained. Resistance tends of a major innovation. If technology pro- to be closely related to the degree to vides answers to technical problems faster than the organization, the people,

October 1994 39 and the doctrine are prepared to absorb, contend that the critical constraint in then the pace of innovation will not be innovation is neither money nor technolo- accelerated. However, if technology fails gy. It is time — as expressed in reducing to advance rapidly enough to keep pace barriers internally, waiting for or creat- with these other factors, it can slow ing opportunities and providing the right progress. people to apply the innovation. • The creation or the use of opportuni- The examples of the tank and the heli- ties is important in testing innovations, copter demonstrate that a major risk to developing support for them and overcom- successful innovation lies in simple views ing obstacles. Crises, combat missions about what is essential to success. Tech- and exercises provide opportunities to nology is a necessary but not sufficient gather data, to develop ideas, and to test condition. Limited budgets will not neces- concepts and systems. In some circum- sarily terminate an effort. Although top- stances, a crisis is essential in providing level leadership is critical, its presence unambiguous data high enough in the does not guarantee success. The key issue organization to overcome existing and is not the presence or the absence of each substantial bureaucratic resistance. of the above nine items, but rather their When opportunities do not occur, advo- mix and context. Organizations that cates may try to create them. Recognizing employ more of the above factors will the importance of opportunities and probably move more rapidly in adopting exploiting them when they occur may be changes than those which do not. a key difference between slower and faster adoption of innovations. • Establishment of operational units Guy M. Hicks is the man- and high-level staff organizations is ager for business develop- important in preserving an innovation. ment and planning in the Staffs provide a place for advocates who International Business can use their charter as the basis for Group, Simulation Division skillfully maneuvering an organization of Evans and Sutherland, a into accepting an innovation. Operational computer and simulation units — even if experimental — provide company located in Salt Lake City, Utah. the means by which to test and develop Prior to his current position, he was a the innovation, to create opportunities for senior analyst in the Northrop Grumman demonstrating the change, and to build a Corporation Analysis Center in Washing- cadre of enthusiasts. Moreover, units ton, D.C. from 1986 to 1993. He has held require bases, logistics support, person- several government positions with both the nel assignments, special regulations and executive and legislative branches. From training. Many of these functions are cen- 1981 to 1982, he was an intelligence ana- trally controlled within the Army, and lyst in the Defense Intelligence Agency. having to respond to the needs of an From 1982 to 1986, he served as a staff experimental unit may bring about member of the Foreign Operations Sub- implicit support for its existence. committee of the U.S. House of Representa- • Budgets, like improvements in the tives Appropriations Committee. Commis- underlying technology, are a necessary sioned as an Infantry officer in 1978, he but not sufficient condition for successful served 10 years in the Army Reserve and innovation. The presence of funds cannot held various company and battalion posi- necessarily overcome technical obstacles tions, including executive officer, training that only time-consuming and diverse officer and platoon leader. His last assign- actions of research and development will ment while in the Army Reserve was as a alleviate. Nor can funds overcome team leader in A Co., 2nd Battalion, 11th bureaucratic barriers that have not been SF Group. He received a bachelor’s degree overcome by advocates, practical expo- from the University of Utah and a master’s sure and other factors. Indeed, one might degree from the University of Michigan.

40 Special Warfare George E. Pickett Jr. is currently director of the Northrop Grumman Corpo- ration Analysis Center in Arlington, Va. A graduate of Yale University and the Har- vard Business School, he served in the U.S. Army for 12 years in various command and intelligence positions. He was assigned to the National Security Council and the Office of the Sec- retary of Defense in the Net Assessment Office in the early 1970s and has published several articles on net assessment, competitive strategies and long-term defense policy. In the mid-1970s he was the senior staff member of the Senate Intelli- gence Committee responsible for the budgets of tactical and certain national-intelligence programs. For the past 14 years he has held various positions in private industry as a systems engineer and systems planner. At the Northrop Grumman Corporation, his principal responsibilities are in threat analysis, defense planning and industry strategy.

Notes: 1C.L. Green, H. Thomson and P. Roots, The Ord- nance Department: Planning Munitions for War (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1955), pp. 169-70, 189-92. 2Dwight D. Eisenhower, At Ease (New York: Dou- bleday and Company, 1967), p. 173. 3G.F. Hofmann, “The Demise of the U.S. Tank Corps and Medium Tank Development Program,” Military Affairs (February 1973):20. 4Arthur J. Alexander, Armor Development in the Soviet Union and the United States (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, at the request of the Director of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1976), p. 67. 5Green, p. 195; and R.A. Miller, “The United States Army During the 1930s” (Ph.D. dissertation: Princeton University, 1973), p. 10, as quoted in Alexander. 6Green, pp. 278-87. 7Bill Siuru, The Huey and Huey Cobra (Pennsylva- nia: Tab Books, 1987), pp. 5-8. 8Michael J. Taylor, History of Helicopters (New York: Hamlyn Publishers, 1984), p. 111. 9Siuru, pp. 9-16.

October 1994 41 MQS Evolves Into Officer Foundation Standards

by Lt. Col. Thomas G. Sterner and Carol M. Bushong

rmy leadership doctrine is defined doing is right, we must improve the in FM 100-5, Operations: “The most methods and the techniques by which we Aessential dynamic of combat power do it. is competent and confident officer and noncommissioned officer leadership. ... No MQS history peacetime duty is more important for lead- MQS resulted from a 1978 study, the ers than studying their profession, under- Review of Education and Training for Offi- standing the human dimension of leader- cers, which determined that officers ship, becoming tactically and technically required a standard set of military skills, proficient and preparing for war.” knowledge and education in order to be This doctrine is the foundation upon successful in the military. The study also which the Army’s leader-development outlined three MQS levels: MQS I for pre- effort was established. For the past 15 commissioning, MQS II for lieutenants years, the Army has used its Military and MQS III for captains. Qualification Standards program to cap- During the next six years, the Army ture the essence of what is critical to an Training and Doctrine Command devel- officer’s career development and to inte- oped and fielded MQS I for commissioning grate it into the officer corps. The MQS candidates. Two more years were required concept recognized the value of preserv- for TRADOC to develop common-core sub- ing the wisdom and the experience of the jects for officer basic and advanced cours- current generation, presenting it to es. Both OBC and OAC common cores emerging leaders early in their develop- served as foundations upon which the ment, and providing junior officers with MQS II Common Manual was developed. the essentials for career progression. The OAC common core also served as the Now MQS is changing to Officer Foun- foundation of the MQS III Common Manu- dation Standards. More a redesign than a al for captains. revision, the change is the first step In 1987, the deputy commandant of the toward eventual improvement. We have Army Command and General Staff College challenged our assumptions and have conducted the Leader Development Study, discovered that although what we are the results of which became the Army’s Leader Development Action Plan. Under Based on Col. Sterner’s MQS article that this plan, MQS was further defined as a originally appeared in the Summer 1994 system to qualify officers for branch- issue of Army Trainer.

42 Special Warfare required duties at particular grades and to knowledge areas required of majors and integrate the training and educational lieutenant colonels, based on the curricula efforts of officers, unit commanders and of courses at the Army Command and the Army’s education system. It also modi- General Staff College and the Army War fied the MQS levels, combining lieu- College. tenants and captains into MQS II and rec- But even as the MQS III manual was ommending that MQS III include majors being edited for publication, the Army’s and lieutenant colonels. senior leadership expressed concerns that Under the plan, MQS had two compo- unlike ARTEP mission-training plans, the nents, the military-task-and-knowledge Soldier’s Manual of Common Tasks, and component to identify battle-focused tasks, the family of how-to-fight manuals, MQS and the professional-military-education did not seem to be making a difference to component to set standards for profession- individual officers and unit commanders. al development. The military-task-and- They directed a thorough study to deter- knowledge component for MQS II includes mine whether the Army should continue common manuals for company-grade offi- MQS. cer critical tasks and branch manuals for branch qualification. Two branch manu- MQS study als, Special Forces and Civil Affairs, are Once the study was directed in June relevant to Army SOF. 1993, the Center for Army Leadership The SF branch manual describes both began an internal evaluation of the MQS SF and Infantry tasks critical in planning and developed an action plan to carry out and executing SF missions. It comple- and complete the study. ments the training in officer advanced During the relook, 3,171 officers, from courses and in the SF Qualification lieutenants to lieutenant colonels, partici- Course. Originally distributed in 1991, the pated in an MQS survey. The survey SF branch manual will begin its revision examined their understanding of MQS; process in May 1995. Revision will be com- their perceptions of its usefulness; and pleted in September 1996. their opinions about the quality of MQS The Civil Affairs branch manual products, the importance of MQS and MQS describes those tasks critical for CA cap- tasks, and the availability of manuals. tains and complements the CA Officer The last element of the study was a Advanced Course. Because CA units sup- conference to examine what worked and port general-purpose forces across the what didn’t work about MQS and to operational continuum, CA captains must make recommendations to the Army chief know SOF tasks and retain the conven- of staff. Attending the conference were tional skills of their accession branch. The representatives from 19 service schools, CA branch manual is scheduled for com- the four commissioning sources, DA, pletion in May 1995 and distribution in TRADOC, the Army Training Support June 1995. Center, CAL, the Warrant Officer Career By 1990, MQS responsibilities had shift- Center and the U.S. Army Sergeants ed from the Combined Arms Command Major Academy. Training Activity to the Center for Army The group recommended that the Army Leadership. TRADOC Regulation 351-12, update MQS I and revise MQS II. It also Military Qualifications Standards System advised keeping the MQS II branch prod- Products, Policy, and Procedures (August ucts, but allowing each branch comman- 1991) designated the Center for Army dant to determine their content and when Leadership as the executive agent for they should be revised. MQS III was too MQS. new to evaluate. Next, the group recom- In August 1993, the MQS III manual for mended that MQS verification testing be majors and lieutenant colonels was pub- eliminated and that a new purpose state- lished. Unlike MQS I and II, MQS III does ment describe MQS as “A system that not contain tasks; it describes broad

October 1994 43 standardizes officer common institutional the addition of new topics such as Army training and provides a tool for use in family-team building and equal opportu- operational assignments and self-develop- nity/sexual harassment, the number of ment. It supports officer training and required subjects for training had leader development.” increased, yet there was no single list of The group also recommended a funda- required subjects or a means of manag- mental shift of MQS’s equal emphasis on ing them. the three pillars of leader development — With these concerns in mind, TRADOC institutional, operational and self-develop- decided to use the MQS/OFS revision and ment — to the institutional pillar alone. redesign effort as an opportunity to reor- The group determined that MQS could be ganize under one system all of the com- useful in assisting the other two pillars. mon military training. CAL added two additional proposals to The TRADOC OFS plan calls for devel- the recommendations on MQS: that the oping a single common-core list within Army use an electronic medium, such as the officer education system and desig- CD ROM, to publish the next MQS prod- nating the CGSC as executive agent. The uct, and that the Army change the name Warrant Officer Career Center and the “military qualification standards” to “offi- Army Sergeants Major Academy will cer foundation standards.” The first rec- serve as executive agents for their educa- ommendation would offer reduced cost and tional systems. electronic linkage with other training TRADOC Regulation 351-10, Institu- products; the second recommendation tional Leader Education and Training, would more clearly identify the officer will define each executive agent’s respon- audience and better describe the pro- sibilities. Until this regulation is pub- gram’s intention to provide “foundation” lished, scheduled for fiscal year 1995, the studies. executive agents will be required to accomplish the following: OFS • Conduct a task-site selection board to OFS will be more than simply made- review and validate the TRADOC-pro- over MQS. Besides focusing on institution- posed common-core task list. al leader development, OFS will manage • Identify subjects on the list that are all common training within the officer not being trained. education system, combining the former • Recommend common-core changes. MQS common-core and the military com- • Assess the quality of training-support mon training into a consolidated common products developed by TRADOC-appoint- core. ed proponents and provide approval rec- Programs of instruction for all officer ommendations to TRADOC headquarters. basic and advanced courses comprise sev- The JFK Special Warfare Center and eral major subject groups, including com- School has waited for an opportune time mon-core tasks and professional-knowl- to integrate Army special-operations edge areas described in the MQS II Com- forces into conventional Army schools. mon Manual; branch subjects defined by This is being accomplished by making each branch commandant; subjects com- ARSOF integration part of common-core mon to two or more service schools (shared training for all officer advanced courses in tasks); and other subjects which do not fall TRADOC schools. A training support into any of these categories. These sub- package is being developed to explain SOF jects are collectively known as common missions, concepts of operation, and com- military training. mand-and-control relationships, both in During the March 1993 TRADOC Com- war and in operations other than war. manders Conference, service schools This training-support package, along with expressed concern about the manage- a videotape, will be sent to all officer ment of common military training. With advanced courses for inclusion into their common-core curriculum. Active and

44 Special Warfare National Guard ARSOF components will or commercial (804) 878-4881. receive an information copy of the video. OFS will provide TRADOC school com- mandants with a central manager for all Challenges common-core tasks in the officer education The challenges awaiting OFS are con- system. This should eliminate confusion siderable, but not unmanageable. The first concerning what to teach without interfer- task is to foster Armywide understanding ing with a commandant’s prerogative to of the change from MQS to OFS. The mes- determine how to teach. Subject-matter sage should be continuously circulated experts will provide economical, standard through many sources, beginning with the training material to the schools. Army’s senior leadership. By publishing OFS products in an elec- Changing any system is tough, but the tronic format, TRADOC can distribute and MQS-to-OFS transformation will be even revise them at a fraction of the current tougher in a downsized TDA Army. While cost in time and money. Finally, as the the TOE Army was methodically down- Army enters the information age, its sized with a goal of not creating hollow training products will be readily available units, the TDA Army of TRADOC is still both to units and to individual officers. basically organized as it was when bud- For additional information, contact Lt. gets and staffing matched authorization Col. Thomas Sterner at DSN 552- documents. Yet many organizations are 2127/2164 or commercial (913) 684- more than 50 percent smaller than they 2127/2164. were when most existing training products were developed. Another concern is that DA civilian Lt. Col. Thomas G. Stern- training developers have been virtually er is chief of the Leader Edu- eliminated from many service schools. The cation and Training Develop- training-development mission, along with ment Division at the Center the mission of writing doctrine, is now the for Army Leadership, Fort responsibility of military subject-matter- Leavenworth, Kan. His previ- expert instructors. These circumstances ous assignments include ser- have forced TRADOC to take advantage of vice as an instructor at the Army Com- every standardization and economy mea- mand and General Staff College, as a sure available in developing and manag- brigade operations officer, as the G-3 and ing training. After all, it requires as much executive officer in the Berlin Brigade, as work to develop a training product to an Infantry company commander with the teach 500,000 soldiers as it does to teach 3rd U.S. Infantry (The Old Guard) and as 785,000. a platoon leader with the 25th Infantry As tasks are derived from subjects and Division. A graduate of the Army Com- as task lists are developed and approved, mand and General Staff College, he holds a the resulting training products must be bachelor’s degree from Old Dominion Uni- relevant, useful and high-quality. versity and a master’s degree from Spring- OFS products must be developed for field College, Springfield, Mass. compatibility with, and for use by, the Automated Systems Approach to Training. Carol M. Bushong is an This electronic, relational data base allows education specialist with the training products to be accessed by a vari- Directorate of Training and ety of users. More importantly, ASAT Doctrine at the JFK Special takes advantage of information-age tech- Warfare Center and School. nology and moves our Army’s training methods into the 21st century. For information on ASAT, contact the project manager, Maria R. Santillan, at DSN 927-4881

October 1994 45 Interview:

H. Allen Holmes, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict

H. Allen Holmes was sworn in sity and did graduate work at the throughout our foreign-policy com- on Nov. 18, 1993, as the Assistant Institut d’Études Politiques of the munity now understand that in this Secretary of Defense for Special University of Paris. He served as new global environment, special- Operations and Low Intensity Con- an infantry officer in the Marine operations forces are not only force flict. He had previously served as Corps from 1954 to 1957. multipliers in the military sense, the Ambassador at Large for Bur- but are also diplomacy multipliers. densharing, responsible to the SW: What are your top priorities It is important that we make the president for a more balanced for the office of the ASD-SO/LIC? community well-understood as a sharing of security responsibilities Holmes: I think the number-one national resource for modern, for- and costs by NATO members, priority from the standpoint of my ward-looking diplomacy and that Japan, the Republic of Korea and office is to ensure that this extreme- we ensure SOF are properly other countries allied to the United ly valuable resource for our country, employed. We must also make peo- States. He also served as Assistant the SOF community, is properly ple understand the limitations of Secretary of State for Politico-Mili- used in the pursuit of our national special-operations forces. Secondly, tary Affairs from June 1985 to foreign-policy and security-policy it’s extremely important that the August 1989. His foreign assign- objectives in the new global envi- special-operations community have ments include service as a political ronment. From the point of view of the resources to maintain the high officer in Rome from 1963 to 1967, someone who has spent most of his state of readiness and the talents as counselor for political affairs in career in the Foreign Service, but that it now brings to the national- Paris from 1972 to 1974, as deputy working with the State Department security arena. SOF must have suf- chief of mission in Rome from 1977 and the Defense Department, I can ficient resources to modernize their to 1979 and as the U.S. ambas- say that the talents and potential platforms, their equipment, their sador to Portugal from 1982 to contributions of the SOF communi- weapons and the training for their 1985. Born in Bucharest of Ameri- ty have not been well-understood in warrior-diplomat missions. Here, I can parents, he received a bache- the past. That’s beginning to would place a strong emphasis on lor’s degree from Princeton Univer- change. I think that people cultural-area training and language

46 Special Warfare training. Language training is very civil warfare to a more stable kind they would probably need some expensive, but given the require- of society — and I’m thinking of explosive-ordnance-disposal people ment for Special Forces, Psychologi- places like Cambodia, Eritrea, from our regular armed forces to cal Operations forces and Civil Ethiopia and Mozambique. These assist in that training. Affairs forces to operate in foreign countries have been engaged in environments, I don’t think you can civil warfare for well over a genera- SW: What do you see as our great- overemphasize the importance of tion, and they are now groping to est challenge in conducting opera- language training. establish a national identity and tions other than war? goals of economic development and Holmes: Certainly one of the major SW: Do you think we need more education for their people. But challenges to this administration is language and cultural training? they’re finding it difficult to accom- peacekeeping operations. With the Holmes: I would like to see more. plish this, with so much of their end of the Cold War and the growth I realize that in an era of shrink- arable land littered with dangerous of regional conflicts based on reli- ing resources, we don’t have much antipersonnel land mines. It’s esti- gious and ethnic differences and slack. But to the extent possible, I mated that as many as 100 million territorial disputes, the world is would like to see a shift in land mines are scattered across the witnessing an increase in civil-mili- resources to increase the trend we earth’s surface; they kill or maim tary conflict. The United States is have already started and to give an estimated 1,200 people per the remaining superpower, but a special operators increased train- month, mostly civilians. This is one superpower with finite resources ing in language and area studies. of the most fundamental humani- cannot be the court of last resort for tarian missions that the United every problem that comes before SW: Do you have other priorities? States can be involved in, and spe- the world community. We must Holmes: I think another priority, cial-operations forces are already work with the United Nations and in terms of the policy responsibili- showing that they have a role to other regional organizations, both ties of our office, is to fully inte- play. Psychological Operations to try to cope with the outbursts of grate the two new mission areas forces, with policy direction and regional strife and to allow the for which we have proponency. oversight from my office, are con- United States to be selective in The first area is counterdrug poli- ducting mine-awareness programs those conflicts that we intervene in, cy and operations, which is basi- in several countries, and I think either on our own or in combination cally the Defense Department’s this is an area where a handful of with other countries and the Unit- contribution to the president’s very dedicated and skilled SOF ed Nations. We are already seeing national counterdrug strategy. people can have a multiplier effect. the results of regional conflict in The second is humanitarian and They can train trainers in these places such as Somalia and Bosnia, refugee affairs. We now have countries who can then fan out to and there will be many, many responsibility for humanitarian the villages and schools and the opportunities for the United States and civic assistance, refugees, dis- countryside to teach their people to intervene. We have to be very aster relief and law-of-war issues. how to clear those fields and trans- selective in how we intervene, and Once the new mission areas have form them from killing fields into we’ve got to be smart about work- been fully integrated, we must planting fields. ing with the United Nations and ensure that SOF missions conduct- other regional organizations to ed in those areas are fully congru- SW: Our troops would not actually share the burden of trying to estab- ent with the policy. perform the demining operations? lish regional stability. Holmes: No, our people would not SW: Do you think that in the future be involved in the demining opera- SW: Do you see a possibility for we’ll see any variations in the way tions. They would be there to train increased use of combined SOF SOF are used in humanitarian- in two phases: First, they would and conventional forces during assistance missions? train local trainers to conduct operations other than war? Holmes: Yes, there’s one critically mine-awareness programs. Then Holmes: Absolutely. A primary important humanitarian mission they would train these trainers to strategic function of SOF is to that already has a high profile, and conduct demining programs. I expand the range of options avail- that’s mine awareness and demin- think the demining phase is an able to decision-makers con- ing operations. Various countries example of how SOF would com- fronting crises and conflicts below are moving from a period of intense bine with conventional forces — the threshold of war. SOF can sel-

October 1994 47 dom perform these missions with- accomplish the missions that cial-operations forces since you out close cooperation with conven- we’re assigned. The third require- came to the office of the ASD- tional forces. In fact, larger opera- ment is the investment strategy SO/LIC? tions short of war, such as the for the future. Unless we main- Holmes: Well, I’ve learned a lot humanitarian and peace opera- tain a technological edge in the more about them. I already knew tions that have dominated head- equipment our forces use, we will about the commando side of the lines of late, are primarily handled not be in a position in future special-operations forces and the by conventional forces supported years to maintain the readiness superb training, dedication and by SOF. I think the indispensable we have today. It’s a balance that attitude of the special operators. SOF role in these operations is has to be constructed between But what I’ve been most better appreciated now than ever readiness, force structure and impressed by, what I’ve learned before. The succinct comment by a modernization, and it is some- most about, is the maturity of the senior Marine commander about Special Forces, PSYOP and Civil the value of PSYOP in Somalia is Affairs people. They represent a a good example. “Don’t leave home most impressive array of field without them,” he said. experience and training that Not only are SOF operations makes them very valuable to the increasingly “joint,” they are also nation. As I said earlier, they are increasingly “interagency.” Opera- what I call diplomacy multipliers. tions other than war require a uni- It’s because of the talent, the expe- fied national effort to ensure suc- rience and the maturity of these cess; they must be intimately and individuals that I think they will carefully coordinated with a vari- be called upon more and more to ety of U.S. government agencies. help in the conduct of our foreign So in addition to an increasing relations. appreciation for the necessity of close cooperation between SOF SW: Is there a message or a par- and conventional forces in opera- ticular point you’d like to commu- tions other than war, I see an nicate to the people of the SOF increasing requirement for SOF to community? be especially attuned to and adept Holmes: I wouldn’t be so arrogant at interagency coordination and as to advise them. I would just cooperation. “Unless we maintain a comment on how fortunate we are technological edge in the as a nation to have the people of SW: You mentioned that one prior- equipment our forces the SOF community and to be able ity is to make sure we have the to call on their skills and their right resources for equipment and use, we will not be in a dedication. I’m constantly training. Do you think SOF will position in future years to impressed by the spirit of team- face significant budget issues over maintain the readiness work and the camaraderie that the next few years? we have today.” motivates this community and by Holmes: Yes, I think we will. So the selflessness and the dedication far, the special-operations forces times difficult to effect the right of its people. They represent a have done relatively well in terms balance. But we have to struggle model, I believe, of behavior and of maintaining the budgetary with it and come up with the cor- attitude toward each other and resources needed, but increasing- rect balance, so that we are fully toward their country that is really ly, as domestic claims on our equipped for the future and so exemplary. national budget increase, we will that our forces have the skills have to be very careful in the way that are required and the protec- we use our resources. The num- tion they need to accomplish their ber-one requirement, of course, is missions. to maintain readiness. It’s also important to maintain the force SW: Have you changed your per- structure that we need in order to ception or your evaluation of spe-

48 Special Warfare Officer Career Notes Special Warfare

Acquisition Corps offers Each year a small number of Special Forces captains can be accessed into education, advancement the Army Acquisition Corps, which conducts activities associated with the acquisition of new weapons systems and related items. SF Branch nomi- nees are reviewed by an Army selection board. Those selected receive fully funded civil schooling in fields such as business administration, computer science and engineering. AAC members are assigned one of three functional areas — research, development and acquisition; automation; or contract- ing. Following advanced civil schooling, they serve in repetitive acquisition assignments. The AAC career path includes opportunities for selection as product manager (battalion-command equivalent) and project manager (brigade-command equivalent). AAC officers can expect favorable promotion and command-selection rates. The AAC goal is for its SF branch officers to work on SOF-support projects such as the acquisition of new SF equipment. Officers selected will not return to operational SOF assignments. The payoff of being selected into the AAC is advanced civil schooling, excellent promotion and command opportunities and a challenging career vital to national defense and the SOF community. Interested officers should contact Capt. Ernie Benner, SF Branch, at DSN 239-3175/8.

Warrant officer MOS, Special Forces warrant officers should check their next officer evaluation duty titles separate report to ensure that their principal duty title is correct. Principal duty titles are “assistant detachment commander,” “company operations warrant officer,” “battalion operations warrant officer,” “group intelligence warrant officer” and “group operations warrant officer.” The correct MOS title is “Special Forces Warrant Officer.” The word “technician” is no longer used because of its confusing connotations in foreign and joint environments. MOS 180A is also the only warrant MOS in the Army that is a direct ground-combat role. This role is not traditional for a “technician.”

SF warrant officers needed A recent Army functional review showed a lack of growth in MOS 180A in in National Guard National Guard SF groups. The SF proponent encourages commanders in these units to select and recommend NCOs with the potential, experience and leadership ability for this challenging field. Prerequisites include the SF Operations and Intelligence Course and a minimum of three years’ A- detachment experience. Applicants must not be older than 42 (36 after November 1995). The SWCS Special Operations Proponency Office is developing policies for National Guard recruitment, growth and sustainment of MOS 180A. It will assist warrant-officer aspirants and their commanders in their efforts to build a strong MOS inventory in the Guard. The point of contact in SOPO is the MOS 180A manager, CWO 3 Shaun Driscoll, phone DSN 239-2415/9002 or commercial (910) 432-2415/9002. For National Guard warrant-officer recruiting information, call 1-800-638-7600, ext. 40.

October 1994 49 Enlisted Career Notes Special Warfare

Target interdiction ASI Additional skill identifier W3, special-operations target-interdiction oper- approved; tactical air ations, has been approved, effective Oct. 1, 1994. To be awarded the W3 ASI pending ASI, soldiers must be graduates of the Special Operations Target Inter- diction Course and hold an 18B3 or 18C3 slot on an SF A-detachment or one of several coded instructor positions in the SWCS. Local personnel and administration centers can award the ASI with an approved DA Form 4187 and a copy of the soldier’s course diploma. Soldiers with MOSs other than 18B and 18C may still attend the SOTIC course. Approval for ASI Q8, tactical air operations, is currently pending at the U.S. Total Army Personnel Command. To be awarded the ASI Q8 if it is approved, soldiers must be graduates of the Joint Firepower Control Course conducted at Hurlburt Field, Fla., and be slotted in an 18B or 18E position at the A-detachment level. An exception to policy has already been approved by PERSCOM to permit CMF 18 soldiers to attend the course; the Army Special Operations Command currently has several school allocations for fiscal year 1995.

Civil Affairs SQI approved The Total Army Personnel Command has approved a change to Army for RC soldiers Regulation 611-201, which authorizes the award of skill-qualification identifier “D,” Civil Affairs, to soldiers in the reserve components. The SQI requires completion of the Civil Affairs Operations Course and is restricted to soldiers assigned to Civil Affairs units in positions coded with MOSs other than 38000, Civil Affairs specialist. The change will be published in the October 1994 edition of Military Occupational Classifica- tion and Structure, Update 12-5. The next publication of unit authorization documents will reflect positions requiring SQI “D” training. For more information contact Maj. Ron Fiegle, Special Operations Proponency Office, at DSN 239-6406 or commercial (910) 432-6406.

SF enlisted chief explains The chief of the SF Enlisted Branch, Capt. Adrian A. Erckenbrack, is con- promotion outlook cerned that SF enlisted soldiers understand the need to be increasingly competitive for promotion. “Since the Special Forces Branch was established in 1984, it has experienced rapid growth and taken on many responsibilities worldwide,” he said. “Its growth was governed by the branch personnel manning and authorization document, or PMAD, that established limits on the number of SF soldiers allowed in the Army. Since 1984, soldiers in Special Forces Career Management Field 18 have enjoyed more rapid promotions because CMF 18 has had an operating strength less than that authorized under the PMAD. In short, there were more positions authorized than there were qualified 18-series soldiers to fill them.” Because of this situation, the DA-select objective (the number of CMF 18-series soldiers to be promoted by rank and MOS) for promo-

50 Special Warfare tions into most grades has been faster than for most of the other series in the Army. CMF 18 usually far exceeded the Army’s promotion average in ranks E-6 through E-9 during its growth years. Master-sergeant promotion-board results released in April 1994 show how soldiers in CMF 18 compared to those in CMF 11 (Infantry): CMF 11 CMF 18 Education (Avg) 12.8 years 13.3 years Time in service (Avg)16.6 years 14.2 years Time in grade (Avg) 5.0 years 4.5 years Age (Avg) 36.1 years 33.8 years “From these results,” Erckenbrack said, “we can conclude that the CMF 18 soldier selected for master sergeant is better educated, has less time in service and grade and is younger than his CMF 11 counterpart. That same trend was established in most 18-series MOSs throughout the SF growth period.” Now that growth period has ended. In most cases, SF strength matches authorizations, and there are more soldiers in each MOS and grade competing for promotion. “This will make future promotion selection rates more in line with the Army average, and selection for career-enhancing jobs such as the Joint Readiness Training Center, JFK Special Warfare Center and School, and staff assignments more competitive,” he said. “The bottom line is that the Special Forces branch is full of the best soldiers that the Army has to offer, and to compete for promotions, soldiers must do their best every day. Quality time on an ODA and other competitive assignments all add up to a well-rounded soldier in front of the promotion board.”

Army updating DA Pamphlet 600-25, Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development DA Pamphlet 600-25 Guide, is being staffed by the Combined Arms Command for minor revi- sions to maintain uniformity with both officer and warrant-officer professional-development guides. Chapters 13, 14 and 15 of the pamphlet specifically discuss Special Forces, Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs, respectively. The pamphlet is scheduled to be fielded by the end of calendar year 1994.

October 1994 51 Foreign SOF Special Warfare

Indian security challenged Indian Prime Minister Narashimha Rao, concerned that instabilities cre- by narcoterrorists ated by ethnic, religious and criminal violence were threatening India’s economic reform programs, has called for the establishment of modern- ized state police forces that are less dependent on the central security forces for support. While cautioning in his July 1994 remarks that security forces had to respect human rights and avoid excessive measures, he stressed that the national integrity of India was threatened by a variety of subversive forces. In particular, he noted the need to break the linkage between “narcoterrorism and the mafia,” which has contributed substan- tially to the country’s instability. Prime Minister Rao was probably refer- ring to the penchant of a number of separatist and terrorist groups in India and around the periphery to use funds generated by drug trafficking to support their various agendas and infrastructure. India continues to be a challenge for internal-security approaches and practices because of its location near heavily productive and active drug-trafficking centers in southwest and southeast Asia; the diverse mix of ethno-national-religious groups in the region; a host of separatist aspirations; and the internal Indian drug cultivation, processing and trafficking activities.

Mexico forms Reports from Mexico indicate that the forming Grupo Antiterrorista, or new counterterrorist group GAT, numbers about 300 personnel and draws its members from the Fed- eral Judicial Police, the so-called Zorros (foxes) counterterrorist unit, the Mexican Army and other agencies. The new unit (reported in a Spanish- language periodical to be trained by U.S., Spanish and Argentine specialists) is intended to perform a range of missions dealing with hostage-taking, terrorist and guerrilla violence and associated problems. Given the rash of bomb detonations around the country, GAT is emphasizing training in explosives. GAT members are also trained to infiltrate subversive or guerrilla groups such as the Revolutionary Workers Party and the Zap- atista Liberation Army. Elements of the force may deploy and operate in teams. In a recent operation, elements of GAT were thought to be deployed to the Mexican states of Guerrero, Michoacan, Oaxaca, Jalisco and Chiapis.

Drug trafficking may fund While North Korea’s economic problems and isolation grow, long-standing North Korean regime charges of official drug trafficking continue to receive attention. In this regard, the North Korean expansion of opium-poppy cultivation reported in late summer of 1993 was believed to be linked to the intensified efforts of the late Kim Il-sung and his son, current North Korean President Kim Chong-il, to acquire hard currency. Some reporting has charged that the establishment of a North Korean opium-processing plant was intended to produce heroin and morphine for sale and distribution by North Korean citizens living abroad, particularly in Japan. Under this scheme, the reports charge, drugs would be transported abroad by North Korean diplomats, official delegations, ship crews, etc., and sold though North

52 Special Warfare Korean residents of the targeted countries. Other countries thought to be on the receiving end of North Korean drug trafficking include China, France, Indonesia and Sweden. More recently, in June 1994, some North Korean citizens were arrested in the Russian far east while attempting to smuggle eight kilograms of heroin. They were identified as part of a Rus- sian-North Korean “joint venture,” which was conducted without official Russian authorization (as a number of North Korean business ventures of this sort have been in the past). The incident suggests that through criminal enterprises, Russia remains a “privatized” source of revenue and support for the North Korean regime.

Belarus forms border troops Even before the final disintegration of the USSR, legislation in the fall of to combat smuggling 1991 established a border-troop force in the emerging state of Belarus. Since then, the growing but still critically undermanned force has recruited substantial numbers of “professional” troops (vs. conscripts) and has attempted to arm and equip them with high-quality material. Among the principal border problems identified by Lt. Gen. Yawgen Bacharow, the border-troop commander, are drug and arms trafficking. The quantities of drugs, weapons, hard currency, metals, and other contraband seized are increasing rapidly. The border-troop chief expressed the view that Belarus seemed to be changing from a transit area for drugs being moving elsewhere to a drug market itself. He also identified illegal immigra- tion as a particularly important problem. “People smuggling” and other forms of illegal population movements have become a serious concern for a number of former Soviet states.

Armenian operation An announcement during the summer indicated that counternarcotics targets drug trade operation Poppy 94 had begun in the proclaimed “Republic of Mountain- ous Karabakh,” or RMK, formerly the USSR’s Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Republic. Bearing the same name as similar operations in central Asia, Russia and elsewhere, Poppy 94 was said to involve both RMK Internal Ministry and “army” elements. The objective of the operation was to arrest cultivators, processors and sellers of opium products and cannabis. Given the extremely limited resources of the new republic, it is certain that RMK’s version of Poppy 94 is quite modest. The republic has been a center of Armenian-Azeri conflict for some years, and it was reported that when Armenian forces pushed Azeri units out of the area, Armenian criminals were quick to restore deserted poppy fields in an effort to re-establish what had been a brisk, lucrative drugs-for-arms trade. Given that opium and other drug sales may constitute a source of revenue and support for some RMK individuals or organizations, the vigor with which the operation was pursued is unclear.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. of the Foreign Military Studies Office, Combined Arms Command, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

October 1994 53 Update Special Warfare

Garrison new commander in moving costs. “We will save of SWCS more than $2.5 million (a year) in PCS (permanent change of station) Maj. Gen. William F. Garrison costs,” said Col. Richard Sutton, took command of the Special War- SOMTC’s commander and dean. fare Center and School during a The 73,738-square-foot facility ceremony at Fort Bragg’s JFK will contain 10 classrooms with a Memorial Plaza on Aug. 4. 20- to 200-student capacity each, a His predecessor, Maj. Gen. Sid- medical library, 10 operating ney Shachnow, who commanded rooms and a 136-room barracks SWCS for two years, retired from complex. — SSgt. Keith Butler, the Army after 39 years of service. USASOC PAO “Maj. Gen. Shachnow had demonstrated leadership and vision SOF reserve units to a degree seldom found,” said Lt. inactivated Gen. J.T. Scott, commanding general of the Army Special Operations Several special-operations units Command. “All over the world, the in the Army Reserve have recently soldiers trained to his standard, been inactivated as part of the downsizing of U.S. military forces. and sharing his vision, are training File photo and helping allied and friendly Two units of the Army Special The Special Operations Medical Training Center nations and people.” Forces Command were affected — the 11th SF Group was inactivated Garrison formerly commanded of 1996. The complex will be locat- the Joint Special Operations Com- Aug. 28, and the 12th SF Group ed on Kedenburg Street in the was inactivated Sept. 11. mand at Fort Bragg. “Maj. Gen. Smoke Bomb Hill area. Bill Garrison has major challenges The Army Civil Affairs and Psy- The SOMTC will provide resi- chological Operations Command ahead as we continue shaping dent medical instruction for all Army special operations and move had five units inactivated effective special-operations forces. Current- Sept. 15 — the Headquarters and into the 21st century,” Scott said. ly Army Special Forces medical “He has demonstrated the ability to Headquarters Company, 5th Psy- sergeants are trained at Fort chological Operations Group; the think beyond the here-and-now and Bragg and at Fort Sam Houston, to move an organization into its 16th PSYOP Company; the 244th Texas. Medics from Navy and Air PSYOP Company; the 351st future, ensuring its relevance in Force special-operations units fast-changing and turbulent times.” PSYOP Company; and the 360th attend their own courses. PSYOP Company. Ground broken for SOF “Resources used for separate (medical) programs can be used for Medical Training Center USASOC names NCO, other projects and training. This is soldier of the year Leaders of special-operations a cornerstone of special-operations forces broke ground at Fort Bragg joint thinking,” said Gen. Wayne A. The U.S. Army Special Opera- July 7 at the site of what will Downing, commander in chief of tions Command recently announced become the Special Operations the U.S. Special Operations Com- the winners in its NCO and Soldier Medical Training Center. mand, MacDill Air Force Base, Fla. of the Year competitions. Construction of the $17 million Since the 55-week Special The NCO of the Year is SSgt. Special Operations Medical Train- Forces Medical Sergeant Course Jaime E. Vazquez of the U.S. ing Center, or SOMTC, is sched- will no longer be split between two Army Special Forces Command, a uled for completion in the summer installations, money will be saved communications and medical

54 Special Warfare sergeant on an A-detachment in outdated, Cahill said. School of Law and Diplomacy; the 5th SF Group at Fort Camp- To justify a rewrite and to International Security Studies bell, Ky. The Soldier of the Year is ensure that changes incorporate a Program; Medford, MA 02155; Spec. Tiffany A. Mapp, an automa- wide variety of operational experi- phone (617) 628-7010, extension tion logistician in Co. B, Support ence, the SWCS Doctrine Manage- 2736; fax (617) 627-3933. Battalion, 1st Special Warfare ment Branch is requesting input Training Group, JFK Special War- from field CA units, Cahill said. Review under way for Civil fare Center and School. Input should be submitted on DA Affairs MTPs Runners-up were Sgt. Robert B. Form 2028, Recommended The Special Warfare Center and Rossow, 6th PSYOP Battalion, 4th Changes to Publications and School has begun the review proc- PSYOP Group, U.S. Army Civil Blank Forms. ess necessary to produce a new Affairs and Psychological Opera- For more information, contact series of ARTEP Mission Training tions Command; and Spec. Virna Capt. Dennis Cahill at DSN 239- Plans for Army Civil Affairs units. L. Reynoso, PSYOP Dissemination 6035 or commercial (910) 432-6035. The new series will be revised to Battalion, also from the 4th 3rd SF Group receives better meet the needs of CA units, PSYOP Group, USACAPOC. according to Capt. Tamara Mus- Other competitors were Sgt. new commander grave-Cotcher of the ARTEP Richard C. Ayala and Spec. James Col. Mark D. Boyatt took com- Branch of the SWCS Unit Train- J. Hamlett of the 160th Special mand of the 3rd Special Forces ing Division. Operations Aviation Regiment; Group July 22nd, replacing Col. One major change will be the SSgt. Robert A. Trivino and Spec. Philip R. Kensinger. consolidation of similar units into William M. Walker of the 75th Maj. Gen. Harley C. Davis, com- shared manuals; for example, the Ranger Regiment; SSgt. Joseph A. mander of the Army Special subordinate detachments of the Clark, USAJFKSWCS; and Spec. Forces Command, told Boyatt, pre- CA FID/UW battalion could be Joseph J. Gutierrez, USASFC. viously the chief of staff for the combined into one manual, Mus- SWCS seeks comments JFK Special Warfare Center and grave-Cotcher said. This will School, “You are taking command reduce the redundancy of tasks on CA manual of a magnificent organization. ... common to all units and will allow The Special Warfare Center and There are no time-outs here. You each unit to better understand School is looking for comments have to hit the ground running.” how its mission fits into the CA from the field regarding necessary Davis praised the outgoing organizational structure. changes to FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Kensinger as a warrior and a Another change will be the Operations. scholar. “He forged a reputation as inclusion of the CA general-sup- According to an upcoming a tireless planner,” Davis said. port battalion in the series of man- change to TRADOC Regulation 25- uals, either combined with the 30, Preparation, Production and Conference to examine FID/UW battalion or in a separate Processing of Armywide Doctrinal roles of SOF manual. A third change will be the and Training Literature, Army The Fletcher School of Law and scaling back of the survivability doctrinal publications will be Diplomacy of Tufts University will tasks available in the Common reviewed and revised as needed, sponsor a conference Nov. 15 and Collective Tasks manual. according to Capt. Dennis Cahill of 16 on the roles and missions of Revision is expected to take the Doctrine Division of the SWCS special-operations forces in the approximately three years, with Directorate of Training and Doc- aftermath of the Cold War. the first manual scheduled for com- trine. The rewrite of a manual is The conference, co-sponsored by pletion in late 1996. In revising the justified only if a certain percent- the U.S. Special Operations Com- manuals, UTD will solicit com- age of it can be documented as mand and the Institute for Foreign ments from CA field units and incorrect or outdated. Policy Analysis, will be held in other interested users, to refine the Since FM 41-10 was published Cambridge, Mass. Topics will MTPs to meet the evolving Civil in January 1993, the regional include sources of instability and Affairs missions and environments, alignment of CA units, the concept conflict, U.S. regional security pol- Musgrave-Cotcher said. of military operations other than icy and emerging SOF roles and war, and lessons learned from missions. operations and exercises have For information on registration, made some portions of the manual contact Freda Kilgallen; Fletcher

October 1994 55 Book Reviews Special Warfare

Eastern Approaches. By Fitzroy Eastern Approaches contains Maclean. London: Penguin Books, much information of value today 1991. ISBN: 0-14-013271-6 for soldiers, particularly those in (paper). 543 pages. $13. Military Intelligence and special operations. This reprint of the classic 1949 memoir by British foreign-service Maj. (P) Neil R. Porter Jr. officer and Special Air Service gen- U.S. Army Special Operations eral Fitzroy Maclean is probably Command more relevant today than at the Fort Bragg, N.C. time of its original publication. The book depicts the author’s Point Man: Inside the Tough- experiences as a diplomat in the est and Most Deadly Unit in USSR of the late 1930s, as an SAS Vietnam. By Chief James Watson officer in North Africa and as and Kevin Dockery. New York: Churchill’s personal representa- William Morrow and Co., 1993. tive in Yugoslavia. ISBN: 0-688-12212-4. 336 pages. Assigned to the Moscow $22. embassy in early 1937, Maclean repeatedly penetrated the off-lim- Point Man, by retired Chief its Central Asian republics. Often Petty Officer James Watson and in disguise or shadowed by agents recruited by David Stirling into Kevin Dockery, is the personal of the NKVD (the embryonic the then-platoon-sized SAS. He account of a young man’s Navy KGB), Maclean survived capture provides an excellent account of career and his role in the early and imprisonment through a com- desert warfare and operations history of the Navy’s Sea, Air, bination of guile and audacity. His behind enemy lines, with some Land special-operations force. encounters with these Soviet interesting insights on the effects Decisively influenced by the agents are often amusing and of sleep deprivation. World War II service of a favored always instructive. The last third of the book details uncle in the U.S. Army Rangers, Maclean’s observations on the Maclean’s experiences as a liaison as well as the teamwork and relationship between the central officer in Yugoslavia and as a mili- esprit de corps portrayed in the government and the various peo- tary adviser to Tito. Chapter 8 film “The Frogmen,” young James ple among whom he traveled do contains a particularly enlighten- Watson leaves New Jersey in much to explain the subsequent ing thumbnail history of the 1955 to enlist in the Navy. Deter- breakup of the USSR and provide Balkans, which is highly profitable mined to become a member of the an excellent context for the eth- reading for those interested in famous underwater demolition nic strife we see today. It is inter- understanding present conditions teams, the UDT, Watson persists esting to reflect on the potential there. Maclean also gives an insid- until he, too, is a frogman. dividends an enlightened civil er’s account of Tito as a guerrilla Watson’s earliest naval service affairs policy would have paid the leader, political organizer and is as a young sailor in the fleet, his Germans following Operation statesman. recognized talent as a bugle player Barbarossa. Maclean’s keen analysis is com- influencing his assignments. Leaving the foreign service in bined with an astute eye for Never losing sight of his goal, how- 1939 to join his father’s regiment, detail and a flair for description. ever, Watson persistently pursues Maclean was commissioned and The book is filled with amusing, attendance to Underwater Demoli- posted to Egypt where he was sometimes hilarious, anecdotes. tion Team Replacement training

56 Special Warfare until he was accepted in the win- tially everyone else. As could be with a background or interest in ter of 1959. In 1960, he completes expected, this did little to win the SEALs. Although it does not UDTR as one of 18 graduates (out friends or to positively influence contribute significantly to existing of an original class of 126) and people. Unfortunately, Watson literature of how the SEALs becomes a member of UDT 21. misses a chance to send a signal to fought in Vietnam, it nonetheless The book melds its autobio- future SEALs on the change in provides another primary perspec- graphical and historical tones at today’s professional climate. tive on what it was like to be and the event of the creation of a force More than half of Point Man to fight as a SEAL in the riverine of maritime commandos, the deals with Watson’s Vietnam environment. In this vein, Point SEALs. Watson is selected to join experience in Vietnam as part of Man dovetails well with other SEAL Team Two as an original Team Two, which included three existing books on the SEAL/river- member, along with other well- tours of duty there beginning in ine war in Vietnam. known SEAL personalities such as 1967. During the course of these While Lt. Cdr. Cutler’s Brown Master Chief Rudy Boesch. From tours, Watson participated in most Water, Black Berets provides a that point on, the identity and per- of, if not all of, the various types of strong macro view of the riverine sona of James Watson, as cap- operations that SEALs conducted war, it only touches on associated tured in Point Man, becomes during the Vietnam War. His SEAL operations. Lt. Cdr. Bosilije- essentially synonymous with that vac’s SEALS; UDT/SEAL Opera- of the SEALs. Who he is becomes tions in Vietnam narrows the focus what he is, a SEAL operator. We by detailing those operations. Wat- learn almost anecdotally that his son’s tale, in turn, joins existing first marriage ends in divorce and works such as Darryl Young’s The that later, in the twilight of his Element of Surprise: Navy SEALS career, he remarries. Apart from in Vietnam, which provide those that, we learn very little about the firsthand details, feelings and kind of man James Watson really immediate consequences felt by is. Accurately or otherwise, the the SEAL operators and their result is a one-dimensional picture brown-water Navy counterparts. of the author. Watson is justifiably proud of For several chapters, Watson his membership and association recounts the challenges and diffi- with the SEALs, and of his culties that SEAL Team Two faced undoubtedly well-earned reputa- in standing up a new unit and tion as a “hunter,” a warrior eager preparing it for war. Experimenta- to seek out the enemy and to tion with weapon types, training accomplish the mission regardless with atomic demolitions and clan- of personal cost. Point Man is destine intelligence-gathering worth reading by any soldier, against friendly nations are some sailor or airman for an insight into of the experiences Watson high- experiences ranged from being a that kind of dedication to duty. lights from those earlier days. member of a SEAL squad conduct- The reader also begins to get a ing riverine special operations, to Maj. John F. Mulholland feel for the “attitude” and leader- being an adviser to the South Viet- Fort Bragg, N.C. ship styles of these early SEALs, namese SEAL counterparts, to at least as remembered by Wat- being a participant with the son. Consistent throughout the provincial reconnaissance units in book, this attitude reflects a self- the war against the communist assured cockiness, consequences- infrastructure. At what would be-damned assertiveness that was have been the end of his second undoubtedly born of confidence in tour, Watson was severely wound- one’s skills and capabilities. ed by the detonation of a recovered The “good old days” for Chief Viet Cong water mine. He recov- Watson mixed admirable loyalty to ered and returned for his third one’s primary social/tactical group- tour. ing with an unabashedly con- An easy read, Point Man will frontational attitude toward essen- probably appeal foremost to those

October 1994 57 Special Warfare

This publication is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited ■ Headquarters, Department of the Army

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