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Mbeki’s role at the Genoa G-8 summit AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT assisted the world’s political rulers, as 300,000 protesters gathered outside the AND GOVERNMENT: IS conference. After another name change, NEPAD was publicly launched in Abuja, NEPAD ALREADY PASSÉ? Nigeria, by several African heads of state on 23 October 2001. The document was later PATRICK BOND termed ‘philosophically spot-on’ by the Bush regime’s lead Africa official, Walter Kansteiner (Gopinath 2003), and warmly endorsed by the and IMF. Introduction NEPAD’s core elements include the deeper insertion of Africa into the world economy Three years after the launch of the New (in spite of the even more rapid decline in Partnership for Africa’s Development terms of trade since the late 1990s); more (NEPAD), it is fair to ponder whether the privatisation, especially of infrastructure programme is still worth taking seriously.1 (no matter its failure, especially in South The origins of NEPAD can be found in Africa); multi-party elections (typically, South African president Thabo Mbeki’s late though, between variants of neoliberal 1990s determination to establish an parties, as in the US, which serves as a veil ‘African Renaissance’. Poignant poetics for the lack of thorough-going participatory were gradually infused with content, democracy); grand visions of information initially in the secretive Millennium Africa and communications technology (hope- Recovery Plan, whose powerpoint skeleton lessly unrealistic considering the lack of was unveiled during 2000: to Bill Clinton simple reliable electricity across the in May, the Okinawa G-8 meeting in July, continent); and a self-mandate for peace- the United Nations Millennium Summit in keeping (which has sub- September, and a subsequent European sequently taken for its soldiers stationed in Union gathering in Portugal. The skeleton the Democratic Republic of the Congo and was fleshed out in November 2000 with the Burundi). assistance of several economists and was immediately ratified during a special South Criticisms from African intellectuals and African visit by World Bank president social movements have been sharp. The James Wolfensohn. By this stage, Mbeki Council for the Development of Social managed to sign on as partners two Science Research in Africa and Third World additional figures from the crucial North Network-Africa issued a statement and West of the continent: Abdelaziz following an April 2002 conference Bouteflika and Olusegun Obasanjo from summarising the problems. Nigeria. But these allies came under mass protests and oversaw various civil, The most fundamental flaws of NEPAD, military, religious and ethnic disturbances which reproduce the central elements of the at home, diminishing their utility as model World Bank’s Can Africa Claim the 21st African leaders. Century? and the ECA’s Compact for African Recovery, include: The July 2001 meeting of the African Union • The neoliberal economic policy in Lusaka gave Mbeki the opportunity for framework at the heart of the plan, which a continent-wide leadership endorsement, repeats the structural adjustment policy once his plan was merged with an packages of the preceding two decades infrastructure-project initiative - the and overlooks the disastrous effects of ‘Omega Plan’ - offered by Senegalese those policies; president, Abdoulaye Wade, to become the New African Initiative. Soon afterwards, • The fact that in spite of its proclaimed

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recognition of the central role of the the next African Union gathering, in African people to the plan, the African Durban, Thabo Mbeki complained that very people have not played any part in the few African heads of state were even conception, design and formulation of attending meetings. And in Maputo in July NEPAD; 2003, the generally pro-Mbeki Sunday Times wrote: • Notwithstanding its stated concerns for social and gender equity, it adopts the The George Dubya of Africa: Even as he social and economic measures that have relinquishes the reins of the African contributed to the marginalisation of Union, Thabo Mbeki is regarded with women; suspicion by other African leaders… In the • That in spite of claims of African origins, corridors they call him the George Bush its main targets are foreign donors, of Africa, leading the most powerful particularly in the G8; nation in the neighbourhood and using his financial and military muscle to further • Its vision of democracy is defined by the his own agenda (13 July 2003). needs of creating a functional market; What is that agenda? Nelson Mandela may • It under-emphasises the external have been diplomatic – or disturbingly frank conditions fundamental to Africa’s – when in mid-2003 he launched the Mandela developmental crisis, and thereby does Rhodes Foundation at Rhodes House in Cape not promote any meaningful measure to Town, the former De Beers corporate manage and restrict the effects of this headquarters. De Beers was, at the time, a environment on Africa development high-profile defendant in Jubilee South efforts. On the contrary, the engagement Africa and victim lawsuits to that it seeks with institutions and reclaim apartheid profits. Mandela not only processes like the World Bank, the IMF, condemned the suits (which in turn the WTO, the United States Africa contributed to their dismissal from the New Growth and Opportunity Act, the York courts in November 2004), but his Cotonou Agreement, will further lock speech also contained a positive reference to Africa’s economies disadvantageously the company founder’s sub-imperial role: ‘I into this environment; am sure that Cecil John Rhodes would have • The means for mobilisation of resources given his approval to this effort to make the will further the disintegration of African South African economy of the early 21st economies that we have witnessed at the century appropriate and fit for its time’3. hands of structural adjustment and WTO Today the most important ways that South 2 rules. African corporate investments in the region NEPAD’s credibility on governance has foster economic relations in the tradition of been thrown into question by the ongoing Rhodes are through retail trade, mining, Zimbabwe fiasco. According to Pretoria’s agricultural technology and the NEPAD then Trade Minister Alec Erwin, just as private infrastructure investment strategy. Robert Mugabe was stealing a presidential The terrain is terribly uneven, with NEPAD election in Zimbabwe in early 2002: ‘The in particular so far failing to attract the West should not hold the NEPAD hostage desired privatisation (‘public-private because of mistakes in Zimbabwe. If partnership’) resources. ‘In three years not NEPAD is not owned and implemented by a single company has invested in plan’s 20 Africa it will fail; we cannot be held hostage high-profile infrastructure development to the political whims of the G8 or any other projects’ [roads, energy, water, tele- groups’ (Taylor 2002). communications, ports], according to Business Day in mid-2004. In contrast, a But ownership and implementation looked 2002 World Economic Forum meeting in like low priorities to many Africans, for at Durban provided NEPAD with endorse-

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ments from 187 major companies, including Burundi, Mbeki, Foreign Minister Anglo American, BHP Billiton, Absa Bank Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma and Deputy and Microsoft. According to the President Jacob Zuma – facilitated two programme’s chief economist, Mohammed power-sharing peace deals in these Jahed, ‘NEPAD is reliant upon the success countries, but left the underlying of these infrastructure projects, so we need contradictions intact. to rethink how we will get the private sector involved, because clearly they have not The papering-over efforts did not halt the played the role we expected’ (Rose 2004). massacre of hundreds in the northeast of the DRC the day of the celebrated Sun City Thus while Johannesburg capital is indeed peace deal. Nor did it succeed in bringing moving rapidly into the region, just as in key Burundian rebel leaders to the table for Rhodes’ time, there seems to be a disconnect many months. Millions have died in the between longer-term, public-oriented DRC, and hundreds of thousands in investments within the NEPAD portfolio, Burundi. On the surface, Pretoria’s senior and the short-term self-interest of conflict mediation in central Africa during corporations. Actions taken by Pretoria 2003 appeared positive. However, closer to bureaucrats, including the Department of the ground, the agreements more closely Trade and Industry, do not correspond to resemble the style of elite deals which lock the integrative investment strategies in place ‘low-intensity democracy’ and proposed by the NEPAD secretariat. Hence neoliberal economic regimes. NEPAD’s function has not been, so far, to One can only hope that Pretoria’s peace boost profits for South African and allied deals will stick. Yet the interventions were businesses in the 20 major projects. Darlene characterised by top-down decisions from Miller concludes her nuanced analysis of the presidency, and apparently neglected NEPAD and Johannesburg capital’s consultation with the SA National Defence interests with crucial caveats: ‘different Force or Foreign Affairs, much less African appropriations of African identity are parliaments and societies. Trying to police possible within such a neoliberal the global capitalist periphery required Africanism’ in view of the business sector’s more common sense in relation to the root ‘modernisation notions of development causes of conflict, because without making that are a throwback to colonial times’. She provision for total debt cancellation in contrasts this approach with ‘African Burundi, for example, the massive drain on Renaissance ideology’ and its ‘pre-colonial that country’s resources is a recipe for and anti-colonial sentiment’. Still, conflict. In 1998, as strife became endemic, notwithstanding such divergences, there is Burundi spent nearly 40% of its export ‘ideological commonality’ (Miller 2004). earnings on debt repayment. Political NEPAD The Global Climate for NEPAD

At first blush, the most hopeful political The broader problem of a hostile intervention from the African Union and international context was, simultaneously, NEPAD was a set of peacekeeping efforts being addressed by other Mbeki initiatives. in West African hotspots and the Great Pretoria’s lead politicians were allowed, Lakes region. However, the particularly during the late 1990s, to preside over the difficult Burundi and DRC terrains of war UN Security Council, the board of were riven with deep-seated rivalries and governors of the IMF and World Bank, the socio-economic desperation, which Pretoria United Nations Conference on Trade and did not comprehend, much less resolve. In Development, the Commonwealth, the 2003, prominent South African officials – World Commission on Dams and many Mandela, who was chief mediator in other important global and continental

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bodies. Simultaneously taking Third World • Instead of exacerbating the World Summit leadership, Pretoria also headed the Non- on Sustainable Development’s orientation Aligned Movement, the Organisation of to commodification, not to mention African Unity and the Southern African repressing legitimate dissent, what if the Development Community. Then, during a ANC leaders had tried to harmonise and frenetic two-year period beginning in genuinely implement the agendas of September 2001, Mbeki and his colleagues poverty-eradication and environment? hosted, led, or were instrumental in a dozen • Instead of promoting water major international conferences or events. commercialisation and large dams, what However, virtually nothing was if South Africa had helped to establish accomplished through these opportunities. sound principles of decommodification Consider a few hypothetical questions in and respect for nature, both in water relation to Pretoria’s strategy and alignments: catchments at home and in international talk-shops? • Instead of selling $250 million worth of arms to the Iraq War aggressors – the Conclusion: Bottom-up, United States and the United Kingdom – Not Top-down and warmly welcoming George W. Bush a few weeks after his illegal occupation Mbeki’s agenda is not that of the majority of Baghdad, what if Mbeki had taken the of Africans or South Africans. If lead of Mandela (before his 2004 Johannesburg corporations profit from retraction) and explicitly punished Bush NEPAD’s legitimation of neoliberalism and with a snub, and strengthened anti-war lubrication of capital flows out of African resistance and even US/UK boycotts in countries, these flows mainly end up in venues like the Non-Aligned Movement London, where Anglo American Corp- and African Union? oration, De Beers, Old Mutual insurance, South African Breweries and others of • Instead of rejecting reparations struggles South Africa’s largest firms re-listed their to punish international financiers, financial headquarters during the late corporations and the Bretton Woods 1990s. And if Mbeki and his colleagues are institutions for supporting apartheid, themselves benefiting from the high profile what if Mbeki and his colleagues had provided by NEPAD and a variety of other nurtured the anti-racism cause, for the global-managerial functions, the real sake of both repairing apartheid’s racial winners are those in Washington and other and socio-economic damage and warning imperial centres that, increasingly, require big capital off future relations with a sub-imperial South African government odious regimes? for the ongoing superexploitation and • Instead of battling the global justice militarisation of Africa. movement and African trade officials from But NEPAD’s core content is opposed in a Seattle through Doha to Cancun, what if myriad of ways, and alternatives are being Trade Minister Erwin had tried uniting the sought in the course of social justice continent and its allies behind a counter- struggles. For example, in 2004, activists in hegemonic trade agenda so as to meet the Africa Trade Network soundly rejected popular needs, not those of global capital? the liberalisation agenda, especially • Instead of rejecting debt cancellation as a Economic Partnership Agreements between strategy, what if Manuel had joined the Africa-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) countries Jubilee movement, denounced bogus and the European Union. World Bank and IMF plans for crumbs of relief in the midst of amplified On financial matters, African resistance neoliberalism, and helped to organise a movements also regularly voice anger. One debtors’ cartel? striking example was the February 2004

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stayaway called by the Zambia Congress are also resisted by both civil society of Trade Unions, in which half a million groups and African governments. workers rejected a civil service wage freeze promoted by the IMF, demanding instead On a more local level, inspiring examples of a minimum wage and other budgetary what might be termed ‘decommodification’ concessions. are under way in Africa, especially South Africa. There, independent left movements More generally, a June 2004 Cape Town have struggled to turn basic needs into meeting of Jubilee Africa members worked : widespread access to anti- on a comprehensive Illegitimate Debt retroviral medicines to fight AIDS and other Audit. They ‘expressed deep concern with health services; free lifeline water (50 litres South Africa’s sub-imperialist role and its per person per day) and electricity (1 kilowatt use of NEPAD to promote the neoliberal hour per person per day); thorough-going paradigm to further dominate the rest of land reform; prohibitions on services the African continent politically, disconnections and evictions; free education; economically, culturally and militarily, and even a ‘Basic Income Grant,’ as serving the interests of transnational advocated by churches and trade unions. The corporations’. idea is that all such services should be provided to all as a human right, and to the Not only do the progressive, grassroots degree that it is feasible, financed through forces oppose NEPAD, they also openly call imposition of much higher prices for luxury for their finance ministers to default on the consumption. This agenda would include illegitimate foreign debt. They advocate not generous social policies stressing only ending the role of the World Bank and decommodification, and ultimately requires IMF in their countries, but also support capital controls and more inward-oriented international strategies for defunding and industrial strategies that would permit abolishing the Bretton Woods Institutions. democratic control of finance and ultimately US groups like Centre for Economic Justice of production itself. and Global Exchange work with Jubilee South Africa and Brazil’s Movement of the These sorts of reforms would strengthen Landless, among others, to promote the democratic movements and directly ‘World Bank Bonds Boycott’. empower the producers, especially women. But as the movements advocating social Other examples of Africans leading what change of this sort emerge, they will continue is being termed ‘deglobalisation’ include to find NEPAD’s authors standing in their the successful efforts to deny Trade- way. What remains to be seen is whether Related Intellectual Property Rights status NEPAD itself will become a barrier, or to AIDS medicines; to keep genetically whether its failure is already terminal. modified organisms out of several Southern African agricultural markets; and to terminate municipal contracts with PATRICK BOND is an academic with the French and British water privatisers. To University of the Witwatersrand in South these ends, the African Trade Network and Africa. He is the author of several academic the Gender and Trade Network in Africa titles, including Against Global Apartheid put intense pressure on the continent’s (2002), Cape Town: University of Cape delegates to reject the WTO’s Cancun Town Press; Fanon’s Warning: A Civil proposals, especially the General Society Reader on the New Partnership for Agreement on Trade in Services. And with Africa’s Development (2002), Trenton, the US and EU offering no concessions on Africa World Press; and Unsustainable matters of great importance to Africa, South Africa (2002), London: Merlin Press. upcoming bilateral or regional trade deals E-mail: [email protected]

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Endnotes Olukoshi, A. 2002, ‘Governing the African Political Space for Sustainable Development: 1 For more, see www.nepad.org A Reflection on NEPAD’, a paper for the 2 Council for the Development of Social Science African Forum for Envisioning Africa, Research in Africa and Third World Network – Nairobi, 26-29 April. Africa 2002, ‘Declaration on Africa’s Rose, R. 2004, ‘Companies Shirking their NEPAD Development Challenges,’ adopted at a joint Obligations’, Business Day, 24 May. conference on ‘Africa’s Development Challenges Taylor, I. 2002, ‘Obstacles to Change in Africa: in the Millennium’, Accra, 23-26 April. NEPAD, Zimbabwe, and Elites’, in ‘Foreign 3 South African Press Association 2003, ‘Mandela Policy in Focus Commentary’, available at Criticises Apartheid Lawsuits’, 25 August. www.fpif.org/outside/ commentary/2002/ 0204NEPAD.html. References Adedeji, A. 2002, ‘From the Lagos Plan of Action to the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, and from the Final Act of Lagos to the Constitutive Act: Whither Africa?’, a keynote address for the African Forum for Envisioning Africa, Nairobi, 26- 29 April. Adesina, J. 2002, ‘Development and the Challenge of Poverty: NEPAD, Post- Washington Consensus and Beyond’, a paper presented to the Codesria/TWN Conference on Africa and the Challenge of the 21st Century, Accra, 23-26 April. Anyang’ Nyong’o, P., Ghirmazion, A. & Lamba, D. eds. 2001, NEPAD: A New Path?, Nairobi: Heinrich Böll Foundation. Bond, P. 2002, Fanon’s Warning: A Civil Society Reader on the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, Africa World Press and Cape Town, AIDC; 2004, Talk Left, Walk Right: South Africa’s Frustrated Global Reforms, Pietermaritzburg, University of KwaZulu- Natal Press; 2004, ‘The ANC’s “Left Turn” and South African Sub-: Ideology, Geopolitics and ’, Review of African Political Economy:31. Gopinath, D. 2003, ‘Doubt of Africa,’ in Institutional Investor Magazine, May. Miller, D. 2004, ‘South African Multinational Corporations, NEPAD and Competing Spatial Claims on Post-Apartheid Southern Africa,’ Institute for Global Dialogue Occasional Paper 40, Johannesburg:25. Nabudere, D. 2002, ‘NEPAD: Historical Background and its Prospects,’ in Anyang’Nyong’o et al.

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