A REVIEW OF INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS FRAMEWORKS FOR EXPLORING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Peter Bradley1

1Department for Accounting, Economics and Finance, University of the West of England, Frenchay Campus, Coldharbour Lane, Bristol, UK, BS16 1QY. Email: [email protected]; Corresponding author: Peter Bradley

Economics Working Paper Series

10

(Jan 2021)

A REVIEW OF INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS FRAMEWORKS FOR EXPLORING SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT Abstract

A reorientation of institutions and governance to ensure sustainable development is called for by the WCED (1987) and later reports on sustainable development. Although policy actions are being taken by many governments around the world on sustainable development, the application of institutional economics to sustainable development is arguably still in its infancy. Institutional economics has great potential to inform and provide far reaching insights into understanding and progress institutional and governance challenges for sustainable development. In order to advance and contribute to the field, this paper conducts a systematic review of available frameworks from New Institutional Economics and Classical Institutional Economics that address sustainable development. As yet, there has not been such a review of frameworks. The papers contribution is to systematically collate and synthesise the literature, and from analysis draw out key characteristics, themes and clusters and subsequently identify key research gaps. 1. Introduction

New institutional economics and its forerunner (classical institutional economics) have made important contributions to sustainability research such as the conceptualisation of environmental problems as instances of interdependence and the acknowledgement of positive transaction costs as critical insights into the nature of environmental problems. Understandings of plurality of behavioural motivations and limited cognitive capacity are also identified as having important implications for analysis that can inform environmental decision making (Paavola and Adger 2005). Key early works on the institutional economics of the environment and sustainability include (but are not limited to) Kapp 1969 on the subject of social costs. Swaney 1987 who identifies the role of institutional economics in addressing environmental and sustainability challenges; Söderbaum (1990 and 1992) where an exploration of neoclassical approaches and institutional approaches to the environment are undertaken and Costanza et al 2001 on institutions, ecosystems, and sustainability. More recently, established authors such as Arild Vatn have provided fundamental insights in the field, publishing key works on the subject (Vatn 2005; 2010, 2012, 2015 a and 2015b) as well as Clive Spash and other less established authors. The aim of this paper is to conduct a review of available frameworks from New Institutional Economics and Classical Institutional Economics that address sustainable development (or aspects of it). As yet, there has not been such a review of frameworks. The current paper addresses this gap from a review of journal published articles.

The specific research questions of the paper are as follows:

1. What institutional economics frameworks exist in relation to sustainable development? 2. What are the range and nature of frameworks found? And; 3. What are some of the key gaps and opportunities for developing the area in relation to sustainable development?

2 Definitions and research approach

Authors define institutions in somewhat different ways in the literature, the current study applies a definition by Dequech (2002). Dequech (2002) identifies institutions as being partly seen as constraints, as cognitive models, or as normative structures. The Brundtland definition of sustainable development is currently the most widely accepted starting point for scholars and practitioners focused on environment and development dilemmas therefore we apply this definition: ‘‘development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’’ (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987). This is applied alongside the three main aims of sustainable development: 1. Economic aim: improved equity in resource distribution across and within societies; 2. Social aim: improving human well-being; and 3. Environmental aim: development that stays within environmental constraints and maintains ecological integrity over intergenerational timescales (Sneddon et al., 2006). The latter adjoining aims help maintain focus.

For this review, we followed a systematic review approach that Ostrom (2011) apply for reviewing in relation to institutional economics. We now lay out the approach. Firstly, a systematic review of peer- reviewed journal papers was conducted from searching scholarly databases such as Scopus, ScienceDirect, Business Source Complete, Wiley online, Emerald, Sage journals online, SpringerLink, Taylor & Francis amongst others. Searches were conducted on these database as of October 2019 to find literature documenting relevant institutional economics frameworks in any context or type of research. Search strings were guided by the search terms “Institutional economics sustainability,” “Institutional economics environmental”, “Ecological institutional economics”, “Institutional economics framework sustainability”, “Institutional ecological economics framework”, “Institutional economics frameworks environmental” and resulted in the following search results:

Table 1: Search results

Search term Total search results “Institutional economics sustainability" 103,506 results “Institutional economics environmental” 275,256 results “Ecological institutional economics” 76879 results “Institutional economics framework sustainability” 107,158 results “Institutional ecological economics framework” 76,658 results “Institutional economics frameworks environmental” 253,467 results

In general, for search results once the first one hundred articles were assessed, the author found that there were very few relevant papers, apart from the search on the terms “Ecological institutional economics” and Institutional Economics Frameworks sustainability” where the analyst checked articles up to 184 and 221, as quite a number of relevant articles were found after the first 100 results. This second short list was refined manually by reading titles and abstracts, and the full text if necessary, to check for applicability to the scope (i.e. little discussion of institutional economics and sustainability/environment focus). From this overall search and analysis one hundred and twenty articles were downloaded and saved in a folder to conduct the next stage of the review process.

Articles were then analysed to make sure that they were 1. Presenting or significantly extending a framework, with there being a reasonable degree of incorporation of institutional economics or new institutional economics into the paper. This resulted in twenty four frameworks being shortlisted for in depth systematic review. Each article was then read, and evaluated, based on the following criteria: 1. Author and date; 2. Primary focus of frameworks; 3. Main contributions of the framework; 4. Overview of characteristics of the framework; 5. Understanding of institutions; 6. Aspects of SD addressed (in line with the three aims outlined). And finally, 7. Applicability across sectors.

3.1 Frameworks found: focus, contribution and use as tools

This section starts by identifying the primary focus of various frameworks reviewed, this is summarised in Table 2.

Table 2: Summary table of studies, theoretical lens and focus

Cluster by broad theory Study Primary focus of framework Neoclassical Dzeraviaha 2018 Neoclassical framework to address natural resource and environmental problems Ostrom 2011 The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, focus on Common Pool resources Anderies et al 2004 Design principles and costs and benefits of formal institutions in SES Rudd 2004 Sustainable livelihoods apprach with IAD to address fisheries management. Gerber et al 2009 IRR, property rights and policy analysis to address natural resource use Feiock 2013 Government sector and public goods, policy and governance options to mitigate problems, risk and transaction costs. DeCaro et al 2017 Framework is primarily focused on formal institutions (aspects of law) and environmental governance. The focus is on adaptation and governance, not the study of institutions on their own. The institutional design principles set out. Clement 2010 Extending the IAD to consider power Ostrom 2009 SES Framework McGinnis and Ostrom 2014 Minor extensions of the SES Framework Léopold et al 2019 institutional interventions and their impact on fisheries Bettini et al 2015 Extend IAD to incorporate institutional work theory

NIE: Common pool and social ecological systems systems ecological social and pool Common NIE: Kolinjivadi et al 2014 Institutional aspects of payment for ecosystem services, water related Garrick et al 2013 Transaction and other relevant costs as an important evaluative criterion in institutional change NIE: Cost accounting Marshall 2013 Cost of institutional change to address environmental and natural resource systems McCann 2013 Physical and institutional determinants of transaction and abatement costs, primarily in mitigating pollution Kauko 2012 Property development, planning and sustainability - application of institutional approach. Classical institutional Dupuy et al 2015 Social environmental conflict and application of a commonsian framework economics frameworks Kim 2007 Decision making tools on energy-environmental problems including MCDA, institutional apprach Sociological and Ishiharaand Pascual 2009 Social capital, power and embeddedness impacts on collective action. psychology Grothmann et al 2013 Climate change and adaptive capacity frameworks O'Levänen and Hukkinen 2013 Feedback mechanisms between institutions and mental models in environmental governance Hodgson 2008 Darwinian theory applied to social systems and linked to addressing the environment. Darwinian theory and Ness et al 2010 Framework to look at higher level formal institutions and sustainability with a strong environmental and Political Geography spatial component.

Dzeraviaha (2018) produce a neoclassical framework to address natural resource and environmental problems. A number of the frameworks were designed to addressing common pool resource problems such as Ostrom 2011, Rudd (2004), DeCaro et al (2017), Clement (2010), Bettini et al 2015. All of the latter studies make use of the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework or an extension of it. A number of studies develop frameworks specifically focused on Social Ecological Systems, these are Anderies et al 2004, Ostrom 2009, McGinnis and Ostrom 2014, Leopold et al 2019. Feiock 2013 design a framework to address Institutional Collective Action problems (The Institutional Collective Action Framework) and Gerber et al 2009 a framework to enable the identification of the most relevant regulatory dimensions which can explain the (un)sustainable uses of resources (the Institutional Resource Regime framework). The frameworks of Garrick et al (2013), Marshall 2013 and McCann 2013 all focus on accounting for costs of institutional change. Garrick et al 2013 in relation to transaction costs, performance of water markets and allocation; Marshall 2013 in relation to managing complex social–ecological systems and McCann 2013 in relation to physical and institutional determinants of abatement and transaction costs of environmental policy design. All of the above approaches can be broadly defined as primarily New Institutional Economics approaches. Kolinjivadi et al 2014 develop an institutional Payment for Ecosystem Services framework to address water management. The approach has been included in the New Institutional Economics category, but it departs from more general approaches of New Institutional Economics (for example in applying a capabilities approach to look at outcomes as opposed to a cost benefit approach, and also dismissing a good number of neoclassical assumptions around payments for ecosystem services).

Kauko 2012 are said to apply both new and classical institutional economics approaches, but from reading the author seemed to lean more towards a classical institutional economics approach, the focus of the framework applied was analysis of planning and property development in an urban setting (including urban sustainability). Dupuy, develop a Commonsian approach and framework to address social environmental conflict. The focus of Kim 2007 is on evaluation approaches, they look at the cost benefit analysis framework (neoclassical) and multi-criteria decision analysis (classical institutional economics approach) to address energy-environmental problems.

Three frameworks were found to apply a strong social and psychological perspective. The focus of Ishihara and Pascual (2009) is on extending knowledge on the mechanism of how social capital works to enable or negate collective action, using strong (mainly sociology) related insights in crafting their framework. The framework underlies the importance of knowledge of social embeddedness and power in understanding institutional outcomes, which Williamson (2000) identifies is not a primary focus of the New Institutional Economics. It is clear from this paper and some others that for sustainable development, insights on social embeddedness are important to fully understanding relevant institutions and optimal institutional design and arrangements for sustainable development. The focus of the framework by Grothmann et al 2013 is on assessing institutional capacities to adapt to climate change via integrating psychological dimensions in the Adaptive Capacity Wheel. O'Levänen and Hukkinen 2013 focus on measuring mental models in environmental governance by key stakeholders and interaction with formal institutions.

In summary. The review highlighted some interesting frameworks from an array of different perspectives (neoclassical to sociological) and with different focuses (frameworks designed to predict outcomes from different institutional set ups to ones that identify mental modes, conflicts and resolution between participants). Most frameworks found could be classed as being from the field of New Institutional Economics (16 studies), only three frameworks were found that apply classical institutional economics. Three frameworks were found to predominantly use social/psychology related theory and two were from Darwinian theory and Political Geography disciplines. One of the frameworks was based on neoclassical economics. We have clustered the frameworks according to their themes when further analysing in this section. The main contributions of each study are identified in Table 3 below.

Table 3a: Key contributions of each study. Study Cluster by broad Key contributions theory

Dzeraviaha Neoclassical An integrated macro-model is proposed mainly applying neo-classical economics with some institutional 2018 considerations. They suggest that all environmental externalities can be accounted for in the existing production- consumption system. The main approach is to recognise environmental constraints and transform the existing pricing system alongside some institutional reforms to ensure sustainable development. Ostrom 2011 The paper provides an overview of the structure and evolution of the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework and discusses the relationship of the IAD to more complex frameworks for the analysis of social- ecological systems. Anderies et al The paper proposes a framework that helps identify potential vulnerabilities of social economic systems to 2004 disturbances. They look at the institutional configurations that affect the interactions among resources, resource users, public infrastructure providers, and public infrastructures. Rudd 2004 The paper modifies the IAD framework to transparently encompass both process-oriented pressure-state- response (PSR) and structurally oriented sustainable livelihood indicator frameworks to enable a platform for ecosystem-based fisheries management policy experiment design and monitoring. Gerber et al The article puts forward that a combination of approaches from the political sciences (in particular policy analysis) 2009 and institutional economics can enable identification of the most relevant regulatory dimensions which can explain the (un) sustainable uses of resources. From this they develop an innovative theoretical framework - the institutional resource regime (IRR). Feiock 2013 The paper describes the institutional collective action framework, outlining basic assumptions, empirical applications and drawing implications for governance. DeCaro et al Develops an overarching framework to conceptualise and analyse the current and potential role of law in creating 2017 favourable conditions for adaptation across multiple stakeholders and centres of governance activity. Clement 2010 The paper extends the IAD framework to integrate concepts from political ecology, decentralisation studies and discourse analysis. The reason given for doing this was to make it better suited for multi-level policy analysis. The objective of the paper is said to be to enrich the IAD framework with concepts and theories from a range of bodies of knowledge to make more suitable to the analysis of decentralised natural resource policies and multiple governance and government levels. Ostrom 2009 This paper presents an updated version of a multilevel, nested framework for analysing outcomes achieved on social ecological systems (Ostrom 2007). McGinnis and The paper extends the Social Ecological Systems framework of Ostrom (2007, 2009 and 2010). Ostrom 2014 Léopold et al The paper develops a multidimensional analytical framework of governance performance in fisheries 2019 management. A set of governance performance criteria is defined and the criteria are scored using data from an institutional diagnosis of the cases. Bettini et al Draws on the intellectual resources of new institutionalism to study empirical cases of urban water transitions.

2015 systems ecological social and pool Common NIE: The paper reviews transitions management making the case for understanding institutional dimensions that underly societal transitions. Then an analytical framework is brought together to describe the institutional context of potential transitions. They develop a mapping method to draw on tacit knowledge of experts to populate the analytical framework. Kolinjivadi et The paper addresses the following questions: 1. How do the economic characteristics (e.g. rivalry and al 2014 excludability) of ecosystem services inform the set of institutions required for effective and long term natural resource management? 2. In what ways is human well-being dependent on the resiliency of ecosystem services, particularly for achieving social equality in terms of human capabilities? 3. Under what institutional parameters can payment for ecosystem services (PES) policy promote flourishing socio-ecological watershed systems? In tackling these questions, the paper expands upon a nested institutional framework for social-ecological governance and situates parameters under which a range of policy tools, including PES, are best deployed within this framework. The paper substantially advances the nested institutional framework by reconceiving governance across geographic space according to economic characteristics of rivalry and excludability of ecosystem goods and services. Emphasis is also put on the hierarchical imperative of governing natural resources by aligning property rights regimes with the characteristics of the ecosystem service. By doing so, it is said that the framework advocates the enhancement of both individual and social well-being attributed from the effective management of ecosystem services. Garrick et al The paper develops a framework for analysis of water policy, building a multilevel typology of transaction costs 2013 and institutional change. They synthesise institutional theory primarily from Williamson, North and Ostrom schools, said to result in a unified approach to delineate static and institutional transaction costs as well as institutional lock in costs in the market-based water policy context, along with interactions of the costs over time. These are the costs associated with running and maintaining institutions over time. The approach explores the levels at which transaction costs occur, and the trade-offs and interactions between these in market based policy design and performance. This is particularly important due to water’s mixed good characteristics: private good, public good and character as a common pool resource. Marshall 2013 An institutional cost effectiveness framework is designed to provide comprehensive and logical structure for economic evaluation of institutional choices for complex social-ecological systems.

McCann 2013 A broad, pragmatic approach is taken in this paper to collate insights from neoclassical economics, new NIE: Cost accounting accounting Cost NIE: institutional economics and classical institutional economics to explore the factors affecting both abatement costs and transaction costs of environmental policy. Minimising/reducing the sum of these costs for a given level of environmental quality in both a static and dynamic sense is the criteria of evaluation used in the paper. From this synthesis of the literature a conceptual framework is developed from the analysis of physical and institutional issues and shows the physical and institutional effects on transaction costs and abatement costs.

Table 3b: Key contributions of each study.

Study Theory applied Key contribution Kauko 2012 Via being informed from institutional economics theory, they 1:) Describe the mechanisms of urban property development in particular institutional and geographic contexts; 2.) Discuss a range of innovative possibilities for governance intervention in urban property development projects; 3.) Evaluate the sustainable development of a country and city specific cases of property development. Dupuy et al The authors identify classical institutional economics frameworks as being relatively underdeveloped to address 2015 environmental issues. The authors build on Bruno Theret's interpretation of John R. Commons's transactional model and apply the framework to a case of socio-environmental conflict. Kim 2007 frameworks Neoclassical and institutional economics have different theories and methods for evaluating the environmental and social impacts associated with electricity generation (and other types of activity). The paper outlines the theory and methods of the two and approaches and applies, then identifying strengths and weaknesses of each

Classical institutional economics economics institutional Classical approach. Ishihara and The paper theoretically addresses the question of how social capital can help to foster collective action via making Pascual 2009 use of the concept of common knowledge as defined by Chwe (1999) and symbolic power, Sensu Bourdieu (1990). By bringing the concepts together they argue that the creation of collective action is not just the result of individuals rational calculation about how much to invest in collective action, but also the result of power relations and sosial structure. Grothmann et A number of studies show that social factors such as institutions, perceptions and social capital are important in al 2013 determining capacities to adapt to climate change. The authors identify the adaptive capacity wheel (ACW) (Gupta et al 2010) for assessing the adaptive capacity of institutions as the most comprehensive and operational framework for assessing social factors. They extend this approach to include adaptive motivation (actors motivation to realise, support and/or promote adaptation to climate) and adaptive belief (actors perceptions of realisability and effectiveness of adaptation measures). This said, the paper identifies no methods for systematically assessing social impacts. O'Levänen and The paper develops an analytical framework to describe what happens to stakeholders mental models when the

Hukkinen 2013 institutional setting changes and applying the framework illustrate how explicit knowledge of the changes in the Sociological and psychology frameworks psychology and Sociological stakeholders' mental models can increase their capabilities to respond to change in the operational environment.

Hodgson 2010 It is said that Darwinism can provide a highly abstract and general meta-theoretical framework to help understand natural and social evolution. The paper argues for application to social context and outlines the framework and suggests that the framework is useful as a common meta-narrative within which more detailed examinations of both institutional and ecological mechanisms may be placed. Ness et al 2010 The paper puts forward an approach to conceptualise issues of unsustainability by embedding the Drivers-Pressure- State-Impact-Response (DPSIR) scheme within a multi-level institutional framework represented by Hägerstrand's

system of nested domains. The proposed taxonomy aids in deciphering and understanding key causal chains and Political Geography Geography Political Darwinian theory and and theory Darwinian societal responses at different spatial scales for sustainability problem areas. In terms of the main use as tools it can be seen that there is quite a range of contributions, uses and functions across the different frameworks in Tables 3 and 4. The frameworks also varied in the extent to which they were top down or bottom up approaches, for example Ostrom 2009 and O'Levänen and Hukkinen 2013 are very much bottom up frameworks and approaches (particularly O'Levänen and Hukkinen 2013), whereas other studies such as Feiock 2013 and particularly Ness et al 2010 were very top down. This can be perceived properly when looking more in depth at the key characteristics and approach of each framework.

Table 4: Main use and functions of frameworks as tools.

Study Main use and functions of frameworks as tools Neoclassical Dzeraviaha 2018 Internalise environmental problems into market structures Ostrom 2011 Multi-tier conceptual map that has external variables and an internal structure (action situation, the unit of analysis). Predict likely behaviour of actors in a given institutional structure. One can also explore the internal structure or how the internal structure changes over time. Explore outcomes in different forms as listed when characterising.

Andreries et al 2004 Somewhat similar to the above, the framework is said to be mainly useful for analysing the internal dynamics within the components of a SES. Two forms of disturbance when assessing robustness, are biophysical disruptions and public infrastructure or socio-economic changes. Design principles are set put and useful. Rudd 2004 The framework is designed to explore investment decisions in different forms of capital and outcomes of these different forms of capital and societal goals (including wellbeing) and management objectives (extends IAD in these respects). Gerber et al 2009 The framework enables the identification of the most relevant institutional (formal) dimensions which explain sustainable/unsustainable use of resources. Has the capability to describe a range of possible institutional configurations or regimes both theoretically and empirically. Feiock 2013 Provides a conceptual system to explore and research a range of institutional collective action (ICA) dilemmas. Provides specific hypotheses about what mechanisms are chosen and effectiveness as solutions to complex ICA dilemmas. Key part of analysis is looking at transaction costs and risk. DeCaro et al 2017 The framework provides legal design principles of adaptive governance. They conceptualise how legal and institutional factors in particular social-ecological settings, influence environmental decision making and cooperative aspects of emergent self-organisation. Ostrom 2009 The framework aids one to identify the relevant variables for studying a single focal SES. Key variable categories are resource units; resource system; governance system; users. The various arrangements lead to interactions and outcomes.

NIE: Common pool and social ecological systems systems ecological social and pool Common NIE: McGinnis and Some extensions, but broadly similar to Ostrom 2009. Ostrom (2014) Léopold et al 2019 This framework provides a multi-criteria institutional diagnosis framework, showing causal relationships within the fishing system, to look at the impact of interventions on the sustainability of the fishery system (in various outcome forms). Bettini et al 2015 The most useful part of the framework with regards to the current study is the institutional mapping tool part of the framework. Kolinjivadi et al Helps with contextualising and operationalising integrated water resource management (a heuristic framework). 2014 Garrick et al 2013 The framework is designed to help analyse the types and interactions of transaction costs in market-based water allocation over a period of time. Helps identify these costs with respect to ongoing maintenance and development of institutions focus on economic efficiency outcomes.

NIE: Cost Cost NIE: Marshall 2013 Economic evaluation of institutional choices. accounting accounting McCann Outlines physical and institutional factors affecting transaction and abatement costs. Kauko 2012 Assesses sustainable development outcomes in property development.

Dupuy et al 2015 Captures relevant facets and dynamics of social-environmental conflicts (and understandings of power). Classical Classical

economics economics Kim Economic evaluation of value and social costs (including use and non use) from electricity generation.

frameworks institutional institutional

Ishihara and Pascual The framework presents theoretical routes for social capital to effect collective action which can explored in future studies. 2009 Grothmann et al The framework assesses institutional capacities to adapt to climate change. 2013

O'Levänen and The framework is able to capture a snapshot of a particular action situation from the point of view of a single stakeholder.

psychology psychology frameworks

Sociological and and Sociological Hukkinen 2013 The framework makes it possible to describe the mental models of different stakeholder groups obtained from interviews and then to facilitate comparisons of mental models across groups. Hodgson 2008 It is unclear what the framework can produce in terms of outputs, but the author argues in the paper that it is a theoretical framework that can be applied to explore social phenomenon. It can certainly lead to interesting research questions to explore and conceptualise key variables.

Political Ness et al (2010) A functional approach for structuring the cause-effect relationships in relation to environmental and natural resource

Darwinian Darwinian

theory and and theory Geography Geography management issues. The paper now looks at the key characteristics of each framework by each cluster and then characterises the institutional approaches by cluster (this is best done by cluster and after characterising the frameworks within each cluster). Then in section 3.3 and 3.4 we look at the extent to which aspects of SD are addressed and applicability of frameworks across sectors. 3.2 Key characteristics of the frameworks and institutional approaches in each cluster

3.2.1 Neoclassical (institutional) frameworks

Dzeraviaha (2018) Characteristics: In this paper an integrated macro model to internalise environmental problems into market structures is proposed to address the environmental crisis. This is done through recognising ecosystem services and internalising them into the market via institutional economic market-based instruments such as emissions trading and taxation. One of the main institutional perspectives made by the paper is the view that the main objective of environmental policy should be to focus on use of fiscal policy to influence consumption of end users. The paper also argues that the multi-dimensionality character of ecological economics approaches (including interdisciplinarity, value pluralism, multi -criteria approaches) causes uncertainty that impedes the creation of a commonly accepted methodology. One of the arguments for the neo-classical approach is that it is said ecological economics does not have, or have agreement on an overlying theory (like neo-classical economics does). The main argument and approach by the framework is that market based, tax based and financial incentives based approaches applying neoclassical framework can address the environmental and resource issues. In terms of addressing the environmental problem, a key focus is put on ecosystems valuation1. The focus is on taxing the end consumer and replacing taxes on labour and economic exchange value with taxes on resources. Such approaches can play an important role in if implemented in tandem with social and political considerations, such as considerations of inequality, but these are largely unexplored in the paper. The author picks up on the potentially regressive nature of taxes on the poor and potential disincentivising effects on economic growth, but the author goes on to justify the regressive nature of such taxes and largely in the name of addressing environmental problems (this ignores the interlinks between the progressing of the two). Much of the paper remains focused on the goal of economic growth (not differentiating between different types of growth). Overall from review, it was felt that the framework could benefit from a more inter-disciplinary, system-based approach and understanding, the approach and mindset seemed somewhat blinkered and siloed as an approach to institutions and the environment.

3.2.2 Approach to institutions

As seen above the paper takes a neoclassical mindset towards institutions and the approach is quite limited in terms of producing any depth on understanding the functioning of institutions. The paper focuses on specific forms of institutions (Market, taxes and pricing) with a neoclassical approach.

3.2.3 New Institutional: Common pool and social ecological systems frameworks

Ostrom (2011)

Characteristics: The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework is a multi-tier conceptual map (for common pool resources) that has external variables (biophysical conditions, attributes of the community, rules in use) and an internal structure (the unit of analysis): the action situation. The action situation is said to be the social space where individuals interact, exchange goods and services, solve problems and dominate one another, or fight (among other things that individuals do in action situations). The term action situation is said to be an analytical concept to enable analysts to isolate the immediate structure affecting a process of interest to an analyst, to enable explanation of regularities in human actions and results. The action situation can be used to describe, analyse, predict, and explain behaviour within institutional arrangements. It is said that an actor (individual, firm) within an action situation requires assumptions about four cluster variables: 1. The resource that an actor brings to a situation; 2. The valuation actors assign to states of the world and to actions; 3. The way actors acquire, process, retain, and use information and knowledge contingencies; 4. Processes that actors use for selection of particular courses of action.

1 There are some discussions about scale, allocation and distribution and the use of macroeconomic approaches to reduce key material flows though limited. The authors identify that much theoretical work stops at this level and takes variables specifying the situation and motivational and cognitive structure as givens and the analyst moves forward to predict likely behaviour of actors in such a structure. Two potential additional steps are identified: One can look at the structure of the situation (Kiser and Ostrom, 1982) secondly, one can explore how the action situation changes over time (based on earlier outcomes and effect on perceptions and strategies) Cox and Ostrom, 2010.

The structure of an action situation is said to include: 1. the set of actors 2. the specific positions to be filled by participants 3. a set of allowable actions and linkage to outcomes 4. the potential outcomes that are linked to individual sequences of actions 5. the extent of control participants have over choice; Available information for participants about the structure of the action situation, 6. the costs and benefits, that also act as incentives and deterrents, assigned to actions and outcomes. Numbers of plays of the game situation and knowledge of actors of this is also important. These act as givens of a particular action situation. The framework provides a set of questions relating to each of these variables.

Exploring actor outcomes: In terms of evaluating outcomes for actors the framework makes use of a set of evaluative criteria: economic efficiency - equity through fiscal equivalence - distributional equity - accountability - conformance to values of local actors - and sustainability.

Identifying working rules can be discovered by overtly examining how rules affect each of the variables of an action situation. The framework identifies seven types of working rules that can affect the structure of an action situation: Boundary rules - position rules - scope rules - choice rules - aggregation rules - information rules – and payoff rules. Assessment of outcomes is in terms of costs and benefits.

Anderies et al 2004

Characteristics: A Social Ecological System (SES) is said to be an ecological system intricately linked with and affected by one or more social systems. SESs are said to have designed and self-organising components and levels of uncertainty. They identify that it is important to recognize both the designed and self-organising components of a social ecological system and how they interact. The framework has a number of strengths in identifying important components and interactions in Social Ecological Systems (SES) and important design principles that lead to robust and sustainable SESs2. Robustness is the measure by which the framework assesses a SES. Robustness is said to emphasize the cost-benefit trade-offs associated with systems designed to cope with uncertainty3. The authors develop a conceptual model of a SES consisting of a resource, resource users, public infrastructure and public infrastructure providers. The innovation in the paper is said to be that the resource, its governance and the associated infrastructure are addressed. A list of entities involved in social-ecological systems are provided they include: the resource (e.g. water source/fishery); Resource users, Farmers using irrigation, fishers harvesting from an inshore fishery (etc. There is no mention of consumers however); Public infrastructure providers (e.g. council/government bureau); public infrastructure (Engineering works); Institutional rules; and external environment (Weather, economy, political system). Public infrastructures are said to combine two forms of human-made capital - physical and social (Costanza et al 2001). Physical capital is said to include any engineering works, such as irrigation canals etc. By social capital they refer to the rules actually used by those governing, managing, and using the system and those factors that reduce transaction costs associated with the monitoring and enforcing the rules (Ostrom and Ahn 2003). Links involved in social-ecological systems are identified, the framework shows a broad structure of interaction but little detail in relation to

2 It is said that for such a framework three issues need to be addressed: 1.) cooperation and potential for collective action should be maintained within the social system. 2.) ecological systems are dynamic, so too are the rules of the games that agents play amongst themselves and 3.) ecological systems can occupy multiple stable states and there can be rapid movement between them. 3 As such robustness is said by the authors to be a more appropriate concept when trying to understand how SESs can deal with disruptions. They do not however abandon the concept of resilience. external environment interaction. The framework is said mainly to be useful for analysing the internal dynamics within the components of SES. In assessing robustness, they assess two categories of disturbance: biophysical disruptions (floods earthquakes etc. impacting a resource) and the public infrastructure or socio-economic changes. It is said that a SES that rewards innovation can be robust to many external shocks, as long as it innovates quickly enough. They then go on to identify the design principles by which robust systems can be characterised, or at least incorporating a large number of these principles. The design principles are derived from studies of long-enduring institutions for governing sustainable resources (they seem to be substantially from Ostrom 1990). It is identified that institutions that have failed to sustain resources tend to be characterised by very few of these design principles, those characterised by a few are said to be fragile. Design principles originally developed to understand robust, but simple, common-pool resources are (it is said the authors) think a good starting point for designing principles for robust more complex SESs.

Rudd (2004)

Characteristics and of the framework: This paper substantially extends the IAD. Firstly, the IAD framework is extended to include five different types of capital assets. This extension firstly incorporates the sustainable livelihood’s framework which focuses on the role of capital assets (natural, produced or physical, human, social and financial) on sustainability and human welfare, the approach was developed by Ashley and Carney 1999, and Bebbington 2001. Justification of this extension is that they state the IAD research needs extending to include different types of assets. All types of capital share two fundamental distinguishing characteristics: each capital investment entails opportunity cost that they define as savings or consumption forgone (as opportunity cost is only seen through savings and consumption)4 and each can be used by people to help them increase their wellbeing. The five capital assets are: Natural capital; Manufactured capital; Human Capital; Social capital (three types of human capital defined and generally seen positively and primarily focused on economic activity); and Financial capital. The IAD framework is said to recognise three main situations in which institutions operate: operational, collective choice and constitutional. The framework identifies that pressures can occur on capital stocks from endogenous but also exogenous forces. These exogenous driving forces can be such things as demographic, environmental and technological change. Macroeconomic market forces are also identified as important due to speed of change of market prices, interest rates and other key variables change. These effect investment, input price and sold prices which influence day to day resource use decisions at the operational level. When capital assets and hence the productive capacity of society to meet objectives and fulfil aspirations are threatened, society can respond in a number of ways. The paper states that all responses however, can fundamentally be viewed as investment decisions by private (market), public or civil society organisations. These investments can take various forms: 1.) Investments in natural capital, manufactured capital, human capital, social capital-community capacity, social capital-state capacity, investment in institutions (operational, collective choice, constitutional situations). These spurred investments have effects on Natural capital; Manufactured capital; Human capital; Social capital; financial capital and impacts on non-market values. According to the framework, evaluation can then take place based on societal goals and management objectives that can then feed in to inform future investments in different forms of capital. The modified IAD framework is identified below in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Modified IAD Framework (Rudd 2004)

4 The current author wanders about non-consumption/savings activity that has opportunity cost (the definition could be broadened potentially).

Gerber et al 2009

Characteristics and of the framework:

The framework brings together a combination of approaches from political sciences (in particular policy analysis) and institutional economics (of property rights) and is said to enables the identification of the most relevant institutional dimensions which explain sustainable/unsustainable use of resources. The approach insists particularly on the need to analyse formal elements of institutional dimensions (e.g. policies and civil codes) as in political regimes that run by the rule of law, codified and accepted practices in environmental management. It is said that while the framework predominantly focuses on formal institutions, the framework also enables the indirect highlighting of informal ones, as the existence of powerful informal arrangements are often said to be the result of weak/incoherent formal regulations (according to the authors understanding at least, some would argue differently). The framework is based on three propositions: 1.) That resource users can obtain use rights in terms of access to benefit streams via the acquisition of property rights or via the advantages bestowed by specific policy implementation acts (policy outputs) that enable the use of certain goods/services of a resource at a given time (e.g. air pollution). 2. Rights can only be considered to exist if institutions exist that protect a holder against other users who are potentially interested in the same "benefit stream". 3.) In conjunction with other explanatory variables (values and social norms) the Institutional Resource Regime (IRR) has a direct influence on the condition of a resource in defining the range of authorized actions that the holder of rights can undertake in terms of use of goods/services that the resource provides. The framework proposes a causal relationship between the IRR and the resource system sustainability. Fig. 2 provides a schematic overview of the different elements of the IRR, highlighting the relationships that link them together, and demonstrating the possible ways in which uses can be regulated. Figure 2: “Regulation model highlighting the relationships between the Institutional Resource Regime (IRR), composed of a property-rights system (PR) and public policies (PP) (upper box), the actors who use the resource (middle box) and the condition of the resource (bottom box) as suggested by the IRR analytical framework. The thickness of the arrows representing the goods and services provided by the resource is proportional to the intensity of their use (or restoration in the case of the arrow pointing toward the good D). In a sustainable use situation, the capital (stock) of the resource (central circle) is not affected by the overall use. Actors are influenced in their action vis-à-vis the resource by the rules in force, irrespective of whether they originate from PP or the PR” (Gerber et al 2008, p.804).

The range of configurations possible from the IRR are described in what follows:

“The four main ways of regulating the uses of a resource can be identified as;

(1) Regulation through policies with no impact on the content of property rights. This involves the implementation of incentive-based instruments that do not have any impact on the content of the property and use rights of a resource's owners and/or users (e.g. information campaigns, subsidies or tax relief to prompt desired behaviour on the part of resource users).

(2) Regulation through policy with an impact on the value and content of property rights. This involves the implementation of policy instruments with impacts on the disposal and/or use rights of actors by means of the clarification of the content of these rights. Examples include restrictions on development, on the emission of atmospheric pollutants or liquids, on harvesting (wood, rare plants and game) and on rights of access (to lakeshores, forests and fragile biotopes).

(3) Regulation through the re-definition of the institution of property rights (mostly civil code). This involves different types of modifications to the substantial content of property rights that will have an impact on the scope and content of the disposal and use rights of all holders of such rights. In Switzerland, the most significant example of this type of regulation arose with the introduction of the Swiss Civil Code which created a unified definition of property rights at federal level and abolished the old use and disposal rights (e.g. common property regimes) in one fell swoop. A more recent example includes the introduction of the law of condominium ownership into the Civil Code (1965).

(4) Regulation through the re-definition of the structure of the distribution of property rights. This may consist of both an intervention as radical as privatization or nationalization (of land, water, forest etc.) for all kinds of reasons (greater economic efficiency, security of supply, efforts to counteract speculation etc.) and more punctual and limited intervention consisting of formal expropriation (e.g. for the implementation of infrastructure projects). We observe that use and disposal rights are more robust and stable when they are based on the PR system (3rd and 4th ways of regulation) because the civil code is politically more difficult to modify than other forms of legislation. Indeed, the civil code is very often considered to be a cornerstone of the political system.” (Gerber et al 2008, p.805)

One of the main contributions of the IRR framework is said to be its capability to describe a range of configurations of regimes both theoretically and empirically. The simple typology differentiates between four different types of regimes according to relative extent and (external) coherence (Figure 3). The four regimes are inexistent, simple, integrated and complex (these are defined in the paper). It is stated that: “Institutional Resource Regimes may be defined and categorized on the basis of the dimensions of “extent” and “coherence”. The absolute extent of an IRR refers to the total number of goods and services regulated by the regime at a given time. The related concept of relative extent describes the proportion of goods and services regulated in relation to which are actually in use: if this quotient is smaller than one, it means that not all of the goods and services used are regulated by the regime. The criterion of coherence depends on the content and connection of the different regulations established by the regime. Incoherence’s between these regulations will be more likely to emerge as their number increases (i.e. elevated absolute extent). They may be due to regulations originating in the property-rights system, the public policies or the connection between the two” (Gerber et al 2008 p.805)

A series of research hypothesise are set out and then the research procedure for the application of the IRR framework is described in six steps.

Feiock 2013

Characteristics and of the framework:

The framework is said to provide a conceptual system to explore and research a range of institutional collective action (ICA) dilemmas, said to integrate elements of collective action theories, transaction cost theories of organisations, the public economy framework, network theories of social embeddedness, and theories of policy design in political markets. This framework is said to provide better understanding and a unified approach to inform theory and practice by providing specific hypotheses about what mechanisms are chosen and effectiveness as solutions to complex ICA dilemmas.

ICA dilemmas are said to occur from the division of authority in which decisions by one government in one or more specific functional areas causes impact on other governments and other governmental functions. Aligning the scale and coerciveness of policy intervention to the specific scale and nature of the issue that is to be addressed is a well-established principle of policy design. In application the alignment is complicated by ICA dilemmas as fragmentation of policy responsibility generates diseconomies of scale, positive and negative externalities, and common property resource problems.

The ICA framework focuses explicitly on externalities of choice in fragmented systems. The ICA framework compares the impact of alternative approaches introduced to address collective action problems and how these evolve, are selected, or are imposed. ICA dilemmas are said to have horizontal, vertical, and functional manifestations. A horizontal collective action problem occurs if governments are too small (or large) to efficiently produce on their own a service each government wishes to provide, or if production of the service produces externalities that spill across jurisdiction boundaries. Vertical collective action problems occur between actors at different levels of government when organizations at more than one level of government pursue similar policy objectives simultaneously such as in economic development or environmental management (e.g. resulting in a more wasteful approach to addressing the problems than a more joined up approach). It is said that functional collective action problems reflect fragmentation by specific functions and policy areas.

ICA dilemmas are not confined to governmental policies and authorities, but the paper uses mainly government examples that illustrate the variety of mechanisms that could be applied and effectiveness in dealing with different types of ICA dilemmas. The last part of the paper extends the framework to focus on ICA problems encountered by nongovernment actors. The mechanisms for mitigating ICA dilemmas are classified according to their scope and enforcement. Actors incentives to engage with a mechanism are hypothesised to prefer mechanisms that provide the greatest gain at least cost, under differing conditions of collaboration risk, as determined by the nature of the underlying ICA problem, the compositions of affected jurisdictions, and institutional contexts. A number of useful tables and diagrams are produced as part of the framework. Underlying the framework is the presence of a rational choice logic. A key focus is on the mechanisms looked at and relationships with transaction costs and risk.

DeCaro et al 2017 - here

Characteristics of the framework:

The framework builds on existing work by combining theories of ecological resilience (e.g. Holling 2001), adaptive law (e.g. Craig 2010 and Ruhl 2011), self-governance (e.g. Ostrom 1990) and state re-enforced governance, that is said to be the concept of traditional government activity supporting self-governance of grassroots stakeholders (e.g. Sarker 2013). They also outline legal and institutional design principles for adaptive governance, said to be preliminary and non-exhaustive, but illustrating important ways that traditional centres of authority can ensure enabling conditions for adaptation, using a range of complementary legal, economic and democratic tools which authorise, fund and complement greater decision making and problem-solving capabilities of environmental stakeholders.

On the first page it is stated: “Adaptation typically emerges organically among multiple centres of agency and authority in society as a relatively self-organized or autonomous process marked by innovation, social learning, and political deliberation. This self-directed and emergent process is difficult to create in an exogenous, top-down fashion. However, traditional centres of authority may establish enabling conditions for adaptation using a suite of legal, economic, and democratic tools to legitimize and facilitate self- organization, coordination, and collaboration across scales. The principles outlined here provide preliminary legal and institutional foundations for adaptive environmental governance” (DeCaro et al 2017, p.1).

The Legal Design Principles of adaptive governance are set out as follows - Reflexive: Does not rely on static rules; Legal Sunsets: Planned periods of comprehensive evaluation, in which environmental policies and agreements can be periodically examined, renegotiated, and potentially modified; Legally binding authority: Authority to put in place decisions and implement chosen solutions is institutionalised in binding legislation, for multiple centres of governance activity in polycentric society, e.g. agencies, communities, regional government. Legally binding responsibility: Formal definition and assignment of responsibility to address, or contribute to resolution, of a social-ecological dilemma; Tangible support: Assistance from national, regional or local government, in the form of set and sufficient funds to address the issue, access to technology, information and training to meet legally binding responsibilities and implement authority on a situation. They also outline institutional design principles of Ostrom (1990) and (2010) as follows: well defined boundaries; participatory decision making; internal enforcement; internal conflict resolution. They develop a novel convention of "emergence frontiers" to conceptualise opportunities and constraints placed on emergence in the SESs by legal and institutional structures and processes. They identify that their 'emergence frontier' resembles the ' Action situation' of Ostrom. They adopt Ostrom’s concepts of 'self- governance' and 'action situations' and Sarker's (2013) concept of 'state re-enforced self-governance' to conceptualise how legal and institutional factors in particular social-ecological settings, influence environmental decision making and cooperative aspects of emergence or self-organisation. The advantage of this approach is that when applied it provides insight into broader social-political, co-operative and institutional aspects. The framework draws from a range of disciplinary traditions but particularly self- organising and adaptation theory. It is said that the tools and conventions of the framework help to conceptualise complex interactions among the law, institutions, and the environment from an adaptive governance standpoint.

Clement (2010)

Characteristics and of the framework: This paper extends the IAD to incorporate considerations of power. The paper lays out the rational as to why the analysis of the role of power, context and discourses in the birth and life of institutions is critical to both design and effective communication of policy recommendations. It is said that there may need to be changes in rules-in-use but also the prevailing discourses that legitimise the rules and the application of discourse analysis. They put forward that this can allow analysis of how problems have been framed in the policy making arena and to understand why current policies have emerged, as rational solutions to problems and relate policy change to discursive shifts.

To do this, the authors suggest the use of approaches such as narrative analysis. The discourse analysis applies critical realism. The incorporation of social context and discourse analysis is useful, as well as incorporation of thinking in relation to power. Also, the extended IAD framework is applied at different levels of analysis: central government; provincial level and local level. This can allow one to see how local context is shaped by the action areas occurring at larger scales. The study lacks detail in understanding exactly what is relevant to look at in relation to social, political and economic context at various levels.

It is said that the definition of power used in the work goes beyond the capacity of an agent to influence a target, power shapes context by just being, e.g. shaping of values, norms and preferences (relevant references are provided). In this sense, power can shape many of the informal institutions such as perceived norms as well as enable change to formal institutions, these important power effects on the creation and shaping of institutions are missed by many other frameworks in the field.

It is said that in order to analyse power mechanisms and practices, one needs to understand macro and micro political and economic structures that shape power distribution and in which institutions have emerged, sustained and collapsed. It is also said that collective action literature would benefit from a greater focus on social context. They state that the IAD on its own does not offer the adequate tools to explore how some variables have come into being, sustained and evolved over time, or adequately capture how power distribution at each governance level and between different levels affects rule crafting and transformation of rules into practice or how beliefs, norms and values emerge. Values are understood in this paper as the personal or societal standards of a person or society that define what it valuable in life. By dictating how social and physical phenomena should be conceptualised, it is said that discourses shape beliefs, norms and values.

All of the latter are important understandings missed by many other institutional frameworks reviewed thus far. Additionally, it is said that the extended framework allows one to examine whether actors might be willing or not to design new rules if new information is made available, and to determine the most appropriate times for policy change and which actors or groups of actors have interest to support arguments. It is said that the revisions to the framework help researchers move from "how-questions" to "why questions". The main aim however, is to ensure a strong analytical foundation to guide research seeking to make policy recommendations. Ostrom 2009

Characteristics of the framework:

This paper presents an updated version of a multilevel, nested framework for analysing outcomes achieved in social ecological systems (Ostrom 2007) and outlines the original framework clearly. The framework starts by providing an overview of the relationships among four first-level core subsystems of a SES, with each affecting each other. These first tier categories are: RU - Resource units (e.g. trees; or lobsters, wildlife); Resource system RS - (an identified protected park encompassing a specified territory containing forested areas, wildlife, and water systems etc); Governance system GS - (e.g., the government and other organizations that manage the park, the specific rules related to the use of the resource system, and how these rules are developed etc.); Users U - (e.g., individuals who make use of the park in diverse ways for recreation, sustenance, or commercial purposes); These lead to interactions (I) and outcomes (O). There are also linkages to wider social, economic, and political settings and related ecosystems (RE).

This framework aids one to identify the relevant variables for studying a single focal SES, such as the lobster fishery and the fishermen who rely on the fishery. Additionally, it puts in place a common set of variables for organizing studies of similar SESs such as a lake or lobster fishery system. This can aid comparative analysis and learning about the sustainability of different SES.

Each core subsystem is made up of multiple second-level variables (e.g., size of a resource system, mobility of a resource unit, level of governance, users’ knowledge of the resource system) etc which are all provided in a table and relate to the higher subsystems such as RU; RS; GS or U, and related ecosystems (RE). Each of these are further composed of deeper-level variables. Examples of why the variables are important to the sustainability of a SES are provided in the paper.

Resource unit variables are composed of: RU1 Resource unit mobility; RU2 Growth or replacement rate; RU3 Interaction among resource units, RU4 Economic value, RU5 Number of units, RU6 Distinctive markings, RU7 Spatial and temporal distribution;

Resource system variables are composed of: RS1 Sector (e.g., water, forests, pasture, fish), RS2 Clarity of system boundaries, RS3 Size of resource system, RS4 Human-constructed facilities, RS5 Productivity of system, RS6 Equilibrium properties, RS7 Predictability of system dynamics, RS8 Storage characteristics, RS9 Location.

Governance system variables are composed of: GS1 Government organizations; GS2 Nongovernment organizations; GS3 Network structure; GS4 Property-rights systems; GS5 Operational rules; GS6 Collective- choice rules; GS7 Constitutional rules; GS8 Monitoring and sanctioning processes.

Resource users’ variables are composed of: U1 Number of users; U2 Socioeconomic attributes of users; U3 History of use; U4 Location; U5 Leadership/entrepreneurship; U6 Norms/social capital; U7 Knowledge of SES/mental models; U8 Importance of resource; U9 Technology used.

Interactions (I) are composed of: I1 Harvesting levels of diverse users; I2 Information sharing among users; I3 Deliberation processes; I4 Conflicts among users; I5 Investment activities; I6 Lobbying activities; I7 Self- organizing activities; I8 Networking activities.

Outcomes (O) are composed of: O1 Social performance measures (e.g., efficiency, equity, accountability, sustainability); O2 Ecological performance measures (e.g., overharvested, resilience, bio-diversity, sustainability); O3 Externalities to other SESs.

Related ecosystems are composed of: (ECO): ECO1 Climate patterns; ECO2 Pollution patterns; ECO3 Flows into and out of focal SES. Social, Economic and political setting variables are: S1 Economic development; S2 Demographic trends; S3 Political stability; S4 Government resource policies; S5 Market incentives; S6 Media organization.

This is a very comprehensive framework, similar to the IAD in form and approach (in a number of ways) but covering a much wider range of variables and outcomes.

McGinnis and Ostrom (2014)

Characteristics and of the framework: The Ostrom (2009) framework is extended in the following ways: Labels for first-tier categories are changed; 2. Actors (A), replace resource users (RU), each RUx is changed to Ax for second tier attributes in that category; Action situations is added to the label of Interactions and Outcomes; Multiple instances of first-tier categories may be included in applications; Labelling is provided to describe the logical relations between first tier categories. Resource units are considered to be parts of (or drawn out of) broader resource systems, and governance systems define and set rules for actors; Monitoring activities are reformulated as particular instance of the action situation category, with rules determining monitoring continuing under governance systems; Evaluative activities are included as another action situation (and outcome criteria specified); Alterations in the relevant list of social, political or economic settings including the addition of technology as potential exogenous shocks, and generalisation of market incentives to any factors relating to markets and government resource policies to other potentially relevant governance systems; RU6 (distinctive characteristics) replaces RU6 (distinctive markings), expectation that Distinctive Markings would be moved to the next lower tier; and finally "Levels" is deleted from Harvesting level (ii) to keep focus on interactions rather than outcomes. The extensions are said to help enable the application of the SES framework to a wider range of applications of common pool and public good problems.

Léopold et al 2019

Characteristics of the framework: In order to identify the impacts of an experimental intervention on institutions for common-pool resource management and effectiveness a causal model of institutional change is identified, identifying key social-ecological processes in specific contexts (building on Stern et al 2002). A conceptual causal model for institutional change in common pool resources management is presented. The conceptual model has a governance sub-system component and a fisheries sub system component. The model shows causal relationships within the fishing system. Arrows go between the following interacting factor categories: intervention (an institutional innovation), mediators (instrumental factors: Enforcement capacity; institutional support, understanding of system linkages, capacity for action; and interactional factors: Actors' interests; social learning), contingencies (internal factors - user characteristics; resources' characteristics, resource-user interactions; external factors - global markets, large scale environmental drivers, political matters, cultural settings) and outcomes (catches, economic returns, actors behaviour, resource status). The authors then use a multivariate assessment approach to assess the impacts of interventions on institutional change and on sustainability of the fishing systems following Mitchell 2008.

The approach to evaluation of performance of the institutional setup involved identifying the range of factors that significantly affect the success or failure of co-management arrangements, via literature review. It is stated that contextual factors that were unchanged during the research or common to all cases were excluded from the analysis. From this, eleven criteria were developed and included for the assessment framework: Four outcome criteria - Actors behaviour; level and evolution of high value resource biomass density, and percentage of the maximum catches observed. Five instrumental criteria - Enforcement, government support, individual learning, capacity for action, and organisation), and two interactional criteria: actors' strategies and collective learning. Institutional performance was assessed based on the criteria. The research makes use action research in empirical work. This formed a key part of the Multi-criteria institutional diagnosis framework. The institutional approach has some similarities to the Ostrom 2009 and IAD approaches to institutional analysis, via the identification of variables, factors and outcomes approach.

Bettini et al 2015

Characteristics and of the framework: The IAD is applied in combination with Institutional Work Theory. The tool provides a systems analysis tool. It is said that the understanding of systems dynamics, rules and behaviour, provided by the framework enables scope as a tool for monitoring and evaluating as well as identifying a system’s readiness for a transition management intervention. For the research the IAD provides a structural understanding of the institutional context, sociological institutional theories recognize that these structures are altered through the interpretation and reinterpretation of the rules in use by a given set of institutional actors. It is said that via day to day interaction and practices of practitioners, cognitive and normative underpinnings of formal institutions are questioned and altered. Institutional work theory is said to be a branch of new institutionalism that addresses the intellectual need to identify the effect of these activities and interactions on structural change. Looking at the effects of practitioners activity on the way a system functions, the theory recognizes three types of institutional activity, or work that actors conduct: “Maintaining work: Activities that serve to maintain current institutions by enforcing or conforming to current rules. Creating work: Activities that create new rules and structures by questioning the assumptions and conventions behind current rules. Disrupting work: Activities that disrupt the order by explicitly challenging the current rules or undermining their legitimacy. Combining the IAD and institutional work theory, a framework for dynamically describing the institutional context of a system is developed as outline below in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Analytical framework for understanding institutional contexts (Bettini et al 2015).

A three-phase process was designed and applied to populate the framework developed in section 1.2 and analyse its content for each study. Using an iterative approach each phase (phase1) fed into phase 2 and then both to phase 3. Phase 1 was case context gathering using interviews and secondary data. Phase two were institutional workshops and phase 3 was the bringing together of all earlier work to produce detailed conceptual maps (primarily). In identifying the institutional setting, the study seeks to describe the institutional setting shaping each city’s drought response (focus of work). This involves identifying rules in use embedded in participants (practitioner) experiential knowledge. Workshops with some specific questions as well as discussions were used to collect such data on experiential knowledge and the study sets out a clear approach to data collection and analysis and reporting. This helps understand such things as conventions and norms, and assumptions underlying the logic of decision making. Some of the key questions used are as follows: what helps you do your job? What can hinder you achieving your job? Group activity was undertaken to map these influences, identifying what effect they have on water management practice, and any connections between them, this makes use of a mapping approach set out in the paper. The IAD framework provides a generic model of collective action to map the influences practitioners had identified against. Maps from different workshops were aggregated and organised using concept mapping techniques to describe key influences altering the practice of water management and the relationships between them. Maps were applied as a basis for discussion in interviews with key participants, as a member-checking validation measure. Based on results maps were adjusted. The result of this phase two was a concept map representing the institutional context. Phase three characterised the dynamics that had been identified in the previous phase to understand their structuration in a given institutional context. This was achieved by analysing the domains of change in greater depth, theoretically coding all the raw data according to the categories of institutional work described in the analysis framework. The result was a picture of the activities of actors and how these activities maintained or disrupted this context, and/or created new rules. Qualitative assessment was made as to whether the institutional dynamics were significant, limited or insignificant in their impact on the institutional setting. Significant ratings were given to those institutional work forms having notable effects on water management practices and formal rules and regulations. Finally, a narrative describing the dynamics within each domain was written with a conceptual map showing the relationships between the dynamics within and between domains, a visual account of institutional context. An example is provided in the paper.

Kolinjivadi et al 2014

Characteristics and of the framework: The authors adapt work by Yashiro et al (2013) to present a heuristic framework for watershed goods and services. On the y axis of the framework is rivalry (high or low), on the x axis is excludability (harder or easier) and on a second horizontal axis (complementing the x axis) is geographic scale (global to local). They look at four types of goods: Common-pool goods; public goods; private goods and toll or club goods. Much literature is built in developing this framework. The authors then set out multi-dimensional well-being within watershed management: A Capabilities approach building on Sen, 2010 and quite a number of other authors is developed. In deriving this approach the authors recognise that the achievements of enhanced capability sets from ecosystem services depends on: 1. the physical configuration of the biotic and abiotic landscape in a particular location; 2. the social rules and norms that influence how and the extent to which human societies can modify and manage that landscape to provide a bundle of ecosystem services or trade-off certain services for others, and 3. individual capacity in terms of knowledge, motivation or ability to utilize the ecological resources people have in order to enhance functioning from them (the latter building on Polishchuk and Rauschmayer, 2012). They state there is both an environmental (inherent) and human (dynamic) dimension to converting ecosystem services into benefits that improve capabilities and go on to state that these inherent and dynamic dimensions closely resemble the inherent rival and dynamic excludability characteristics of ecosystem goods and services looked at in the first part of their framework. Therefore, capability sets deriving from ecosystem services are intrinsically bounded by the rival nature of the particular service and associated institutional structures that govern the resource. It is stated that the relevance of interpretation of capabilities of PES lies in their role of negotiated exchange via mutual agreement, which may only occur successfully when such exchange is not constructed with the aims of living up to externally-imposed 'goals' or conceptualisation of success (building on Vignola et al., 2012). It is identified that this objective is in dramatic contrast to the established perspective of PES fixated on efficiency-oriented payments as the only 'means' by which socially optimal 'ends' can be met. The authors then emphasise that behavioural economics studies have illustrated that benefits deriving from public goods and services may result from highly contextualised configurations of ethics, cultural traditions or norms of behaviour regarding societal relations to nature (they provide citations). The advantages highlighted by the authors of the capabilities-focused approach to PES is that it enables and allows negotiation according to more diverse and culturally specific ways of human interaction, allowing technical and socially valid conceptualisations of land-use activity and ecological relations, and enabling the evaluative space for fair and legitimate outcomes. It is said that in this sense PES's can be a conduit in defining watershed development as being welfare-enhancing for both upstream and downstream entities. A key conclusion is then that in designing a wellbeing focused approach for achieving capabilities improvements, it would be necessary to start by understanding the social context, traditional knowledge, current livelihoods, distributional issues, and the needs and values of ecosystem service beneficiaries and providers. Latter it is however noted that PES either conceptualised as a market-based trade or as a deliberative social negotiation will be difficult to implement with the scale and number of beneficiaries and thus potential free-riders. Some key discussions regarding implementation are then addressed. A framework for contextualising and operationalising integrated water resource management is then presented. The authors state that in order to frame PES as a social contract based on perceived service improvements and built according to existing informal institutions, it is necessary to clarify a misconception with respect to transaction costs. They state that these refer to the information investments that lead to improved capacities to manage natural resources over time and with long-term benefits. If such costs of negotiation are viewed as barriers to efficient transactions (as some other frameworks presented earlier view), PES may fall short of being successful over the longer term. A second misconception is mentioned with regards to short and rigid project-oriented timelines/ecologically unrealistic conditionality requirements (Fisher, 2013). The paper concludes that PES should be envisioned as socially deliberated negotiations that harness incentives to actualise meaningful improvements in capabilities within cooperative governance arrangements and the paper is quite critical of the neoliberal conception of PES as a market-based arrangement, as it makes incorrect assumptions that regard that all ecosystem goods and services can be maximised as though they are highly rival and excludable.

The current author notes that the capabilities approach is also a step away from the mainstream welfarism approach in economics where one focuses on maximising consumer and producer surplus and with little focus on distribution. Building in of the capabilities approach, alongside institutional considerations to help bring about better governance of public good/common goods and services provision is an interesting and different avenue that differentiates this study from many of the other frameworks looked at so far.

3.2.4 Approach to intuitions

The table below provides an overview of the approaches to institutions taken in each paper.

Table 5: Analysis of approaches to institutions by new institutional economics: common pool and social ecological systems (10 studies) Summary of approach to institutions Ostrom 2011 Explore outcomes from varied institutional settings. Most applications assume individuals are utility maximising, boundedly rational and selfish. Profit or next costs and benefits maximisation (payoff) assumed a key goal. Institutions predominantly seen as rules (formal and informal) - informal institutions in the form of social norms. The authors identify that much much work with the framework takes variables specifying the situation and motivational and cognitive structure as givens and the analyst moves forward to predict likely behaviour of actors in such a structure, although it is clear that one does not necesaily need to assume motivation and cognitive structure. Anderies et al 2004 Similar to above but focused on SES. Focus on robustness and definition of success in terms of costs and benefits (outcomes). Economy, and political system are considered, but as external environment (therefore there is relatively little focus upon) that shock common pool resources. Rules focused, relating to the users (farmers and fishers etc) directly exploiting the common pool resource. Institutions are seen as rules. Similar assumptions regarding rationality etc seem to be predominant. Rudd 2004 The Sustainable livelihoods approach using capitals applied in combination with the IAD. In the IAD framework Institutions are defined as (rules-in-use) that influence actor incentives and behaviour and include formal and informal (seen as norms). Social context not explored beyond social capital. The paper advocates the use of neoclassical analysis and marginal cost, benefit analysis (outcomes).

Gerber et al 2009 The framework provides understanding primarily on institutions via property rights theory and policy analysis. The application of the IRR framework forces analysts and practitioners to look closely at the policy regulations and actual use rights at work. The framework is predominantly focused on formal institutions of policy, regulation and property rights. The framework assumes people are rational/boundedly ration and selfish. The framework is based on three propositions that are clearly set out and range of configurations possible from the IRR are described, this is said to be one of the key contributions. The approach also sets of a series of research hypothesise. Feiock 2013 The framework brings together different theory and a range of mechanisms for addressing institutional collective action problems and outlining risk and transaction cost characteristics from different institutional approaches. The framework provides specific hypotheses about what mechanisms are chosen and effectiveness as solutions to complex ICA dilemma. The framework is very focused on risk and economic efficiency. Transaction costs are seen as a barrier to addressing ICA problems. Institutions sees as higher-level rules (formal), political system structures, local institutions such a clubs etc. Social embeddedness theory is incorporated. Social insights mainly relate to creating social capital, and social embeddedness is seen as providing another basis for creating mechanisms to mitigate ICA dilemmas, through increased trust and legitimacy. The paper focuses heavily on different forms of organisation and structure and impacts on incentives and outcomes, rational choice and cost benefit approach informs the logic of framework. Actors incentives to engage with a mechanism are hypotesised to prefer mechanisms with the greatest gain at least cost. DeCaro et al 2017 The focus is on adaptation and governance, not the study of institutions on their own. The institutional principles set out are partly from Ostrom's work. Legal design principles are set out. Does not address aspects of Common Laws, or foundational aspects of property law or litigation that affect adaptation and self-organising. The advantage of this framework is said to be that when applied it provides insight into broader social-political, co-operative and institutional aspects. The framework is primarily focused on formal institutions (rules and laws focus), resilience and adaptive governance, most relevant to common pool goods. Actors are seen as self interested (and presumably rational although not stated) and the approach seems to broadly fit with new institutional economics appraches to institutional analysis in such ways.

Clement 2010 Extend the IAD to incorporate power and consider a a broader range on institutions than Ostrom. Applies a definition of institutions by Ostrom 2005, however the approach of incorporating discourse analysis to analyse the emergence of institutions and the focus on how values and attitudes are changed by the prevailing discourse (not just norms) is different from Ostrom 2005 and seems to incorporate a broader understanding of institutions. The authors seem to be partialy of the view like Ostrom that that actors are rational, as they cite that Institutions do not only emerge from rational individual decisions led by a set of incentives, but they also see the importance of power. The author identifies institutions as significantly shaped by power distribution at the collective-choice and at the constitutional levels (following Ribot 2006). Ostrom (2009) They provide a very comprehensive framework for understanding social ecological systems, the range of variables effecting, formal institutional arrangements and informal institutions (rules and norms) in place within the system and outcomes for such systems. Institutions are not defined but tend to relate to formal rules and informal social norms and rules within social systems (this said mental models are mentioned in the framework briefly). The framework is more in-depth and systems based and interdisciplinary than the IAD. The framework and understanding of institutions is predominantly focused on self-organising systems and takes the view that government regulation can often supress sustainability through inappropriate (or badly fitted) top down rules and regulation/governance. McGinnis and Ostrom 2014Provide some extensions for the same framework as above as set out when summarising the framework. Léopold et al 2019 Explores institutional interventions and their impact (on fisheries). It is stated that endogenous or constructed cooperative solutions to manage these resources in terms of institutions, can be defined as sets of rules, norms, beliefs, roles, laws and mechanisms that constrain and facilitate human organization and actions (Feeny et al., 1990; Ostrom, 1990). Both the framework and the approach to institutions is somewhat similar to Ostrom (2011), looking at a wide range of variables. The framework should allow comparative analysis of institutional interventions. The approach has multi-crietria in terms of outcomes. The framework seems be in line with assuming that actors are rational. Outcomes are looked at in terms of economic returns, actor behaviour and in this sense effiency, but also catches and resource status. Bettini et al 2015 For the research the IAD provides a structural understanding of the institutional context. It is said that via day to day interaction and practices of practitioners, cognitive and normative underpinnings of formal institutions are questioned and altered. Looking at the effects of practitioners activity on the way a system functions, the framework uses institutional work theory to explore three types of institutional activity, or work that actors conduct: “Maintaining work: Activities that serve to maintain current institutions by enforcing or conforming to current rules. Creating work: Activities that create new rules and structures by questioning the assumptions and conventions behind current rules. Disrupting work: Activities that disrupt the order by explicitly challenging the current rules or undermining their legitimacy. Institutions are defined by the authors (following structuration theory) as constituting "a range of formal and informal rules which not only shape the behaviour of a system, but provide actors with different forms of agency to change these rules" (in Bettini et al 2015, 67). Explorative social research methods such as interviews and workshops are used to understand the types of institutional work and the institutional context (formal and informal rules based) occuring within a system by different actors. The result is a visial diagram of institutional mapping and collective choice outcomes (the stucture of the diagrams is shaped by IAD categories explicitly). The approach is quite explorative and not too specific in terms of assumptions etc, but applying the IAD does intall a cost-benefit structure and rational within the institutional mapping analysis. Kolinjivadi et al 2014 The paper is said to illustrate the ineffectiveness/impossibility of sheer market-based trades for regulating, cultural and supporting ecosystem services due to non-rival characteristics. The paper identifies that payment for ecosystem services can play a useful role for achieving integrated and adaptive water resources, but only if attention is directed to nested governance arrangements which reflect horizontal coordination across space according to the economic characteristics of watershed goods and services, as well as the hierarchical legitimacy between higher and lower levels of governance. In the paper institutions are not defined, but the institutions are looked at quite broadly, addressing both formal and some kinds of informal institutions (values and norms). For the New Institutional: Common Pool and Social Ecological systems frameworks, The Ostrom 2011 framework allows one to explore characteristics and outcomes of Common Pool Resource regimes. Most applications of this framework assume individuals are utility maximising, boundedly rational and selfish. Profit or net costs and benefits maximisation (payoff) is the assumed goal in analysis using the IAD framework. Institutions are predominantly seen as rules (formal and informal). Therefore, in such approaches there seems to be quite a strong neoclassical tradition embodied within institutional analysis. Many other studies in this cluster also seem to have an embodied neoclassical tradition within, in their approach to institutional analysis, such as Anderies et al 2004 who focus on robustness and definition of success in terms of costs and benefits (outcomes), with institutions seen as rules (little focus on informal) and similar rationality approaches seem to be embedded. Rudd (2004) see institutions as rules (formal and informal) and the paper advocates the use of marginal cost benefit analysis in assessing outcomes (neoclassical). Gerber et al 2009, focus on institutions as rules (formal). The framework assumes people are rational/boundedly rational and selfish. For Feiock (2013) rational choice and economic efficiency/cost benefits informs the logic of the framework. Transaction costs are seen as a barrier to addressing ICA problems (as is the case for many NIE studies). The framework focuses on institutional structure and impacts on incentives and outcomes (cost/benefit) for ICA dilemmas. Institutions are seen as formal rules. Clement (2010), seem to be of the view like Ostrom 2005 that actors are rational, as they cite that institutions do not only emerge from rational individual decisions led by a set of incentives, but they also see importance of power. The author identifies institutions as significantly shaped by power distribution at the collective- choice and at constitutional levels (following Ribot 2006), the study extends the IAD to incorporate power considerations. Clement 2010, however seem to have a broader understanding of institutions as they look at aspects of power but also how values and attitudes are changed by the prevailing discourse (not just norms) so different to Ostrom 2005. Later studies such as Ostrom (2009) and Leopold et al 2019 seem to have a less embodied neoclassical mindset and look at a broader range of outputs (beyond costs and benefits). Ostrom (2009) still broadly see institutions as rules (formal and informal), Leopold et al 2019 also see institutions more broadly in terms of rules, norms, beliefs, roles, laws and mechanisms that constrain and facilitate organisation and actions. Likewise, in Kolinjivadi et al 2014, institutions are seen in a broader way addressing both formal and informal aspects such as norms and values. The latter paper is quite critical of many neoclassical approaches to payments for ecosystem services and presents an alternative capabilities approach. So as the paper moves through reviewing these frameworks, they seem to embody less strong assumptions (that are aligned with the neoclassical paradigm) and start to embrace wider definitions of institutions and wider perspectives. The majority still however seem to embody neoclassical undertones.

3.2.5 New Institutional: Cost accounting frameworks

Garrick et al (2013)

Characteristics and of the framework:

The paper develops a framework for analysis of water policy, building a multilevel typology of transaction costs and institutional change. The approach brings together a synthesis of three theoretical traditions of institutional analysis by Williamson, North, and Ostrom (often looked at independently); and a framework is developed to analyse the types and interactions of transaction costs in market-based water allocation over a period of time. The resulting framework is said to account for water's complexity as an economic good. This framework and the case studies lead to the identification of a number of policy implications such as the need for: a multiphase sequencing of reform, strategic investment in institutional transition costs, and institutional choices that maintain future flexibility to change water rights and diversion limits to manage social and environmental externalities. The strengths of the framework in exploring institutions is its focus and ability to identify transaction costs associated with the ongoing maintenance and development of institutions (focus being water related market- based institutions). These are identified as: Static transaction costs - for water these include inter alia, identification of buyers and sellers, administrative review, water-rights due diligence, monitoring and enforcement. Institutional transaction costs include: research, information, lobbying and policy enactment to put in place or strengthen market enabling legislation5. Institutional lock in transaction costs - costs imposed by current institutional choices on future efforts to reverse or alter water use patterns and infrastructure.

Static transaction costs and institutional transaction costs of market-based water allocation policy are both shaped and to an extent determined by past decisions that constrain current and future reform prospects (e.g. vested interests). Lock-in costs are also said to capture the institutional transition and static transition costs of future institutional change as learning improves. A broader set (of non-water focused) transaction costs relating to collective action and institutional change are identified in the paper.

The evaluation criterion used by the framework to conduct assessment is adaptive efficiency (Marshall, 2005; North 1990,2005)). The predominant focus of this work is primarily economic efficiency and cost minimisation to achieve water related goals (some of the goals that need to be achieved can be reducing social and environmental externalities, etc).

Marshall 2013

Characteristics and of the framework:

A cost effectiveness framework is developed to provide a comprehensive and logical structure for economic evaluation of institutional choices (path dependent) in relation to environmental and natural resource management. This framework is somewhat similar (though with differences) to the previous one that was specific to water. In the paper definitions of different types of costs are reviewed and a table defining six classes of costs (which are part of the cost effectiveness framework) are set out. These costs are: Static transaction costs, institutional transaction costs, institutional lock-in costs, static transformation costs, technological transaction costs and technological lock-in costs. Static and dynamic transaction costs are then discussed, looking at three different classifications and links to path dependency. Each cost is defined in Table 6.

Table 6: Definitions of the six classes of costs comprising the institutional cost effectiveness framework (Marshall 2013)

55 Institutional changes can include such things as the development of tradeable water rights, and cumulative diversion limits at multiple scales, said to including the river basin scale. These reforms include amendment to water-user associations, water rights systems, licensing systems, trading rules, and price-discovery mechanisms (such as auctions and tenders). They can also include modifications in water storage and distribution systems expressly designed to facilitate water trading activity.

Class of costs Definition Static transaction costs The transaction costs incurred in operating under an institutional option. Institutional transaction costs The transaction costs incurred in effecting change from existing institutional arrangements to a new institutional option. Institutional lock in costs The additional institutional transaction cost incurred by 'successor' institutional options (i.e. those eventually chosen as adaptations, transformations or replacements of the option under consideration) due to the impact on institutional path dependencies of the institutional option under consideration. Static transformation costs The transformation costs incurred operating under the technologies or practices that are adopted subject to the influence of the institutional option under consideration. Technological transition costs The transformation costs incurred in effecting change from existing technologies or practices to those adopted subject to the influence of the institutional option under consideration. Technological lock-in costs The additional technological transition costs incurred by 'successor' technologies or practices (i.e. those chosen under the influence of 'successor' institutional options) due to the impact on technological path dependencies of the institutional option under consideration.

The framework is then conceptualised in full. The framework states that transaction costs and transformation costs must be identified in assessing costs from institutional change. It is further stated that evaluating the cost effectiveness of institutional options in achieving a given adaptation target requires comparison of the total cost impacts (transaction and transformation costs) of options relative to do nothing scenarios (keeping existing institutions). Impacts include not only costs added but costs avoided (e.g. costs avoided from keeping existing institutions). The author cites his earlier work (of 2005) that presented a cost- effectiveness framework to fill this need via operationalising North's (1990) concept of adaptive efficiency.

Challen's (2000) identify that positive institutional lock-in costs represent a loss of quasi-option value and this is said also to apply to positive technological costs. Quasi-option value is said to be forfeited to the extent to which current institutional choice increases the institutional or technological transaction costs of future institutional options, thereby reducing subsequent possibilities for learning and experimentation required to inform ongoing institutional adaptation processes. The author notes that institutional choices can sometimes increase quasi option values and thus reduce institutional lock in costs. It is stated that accounting for these extra cost considerations in Challen's framework means that appropriate criteria for evaluating institutional cost effectiveness to reach an adaptation target involves finding and highlighting the option that minimises the sum of cost impacts (measured monetarily and discounted for time preferences) in respect of the six classes of costs they identify in Table 1 (from review) earlier in the paper.

A procedure for bounded rationality application of the framework is also developed and discussed building on Quiggin 2008. It is suggested to apply this if the use of conventional neoclassical economics is not possible (likely to be the case in many situations).

McCann 2013

Characteristics and of the framework: The paper synthesises empirical literature on transaction costs to identify a framework that makes design recommendations for environmental and natural resource policies. It is stated that physical and institutional determinants of transaction and abatement costs should be considered in policy design because there is interaction between them. The framework is useful as it identifies a very wide range of physical and institutional factors affecting transaction and abatements costs from synthesis of literature.

Towards the end of the paper a table is presented showing institutional factors affecting transaction costs. The author attempts to identify direction of change and factors least amenable to change and most amenable to change, culture is identified as least amenable to change, however recent evidence of quite substantial changes in culture in relation to vegetarianism/veganism would seem to contradict this. There are other instances where interpretations of the paper could be challenged, for example, efforts of activists/campaigners, may not be necessarily be perceived by them as a cost, as action may be closely aligned with their values. The paper takes a predominantly mainstream neoclassical approach and could be more inter-disciplinary, this seems to inhibit/preclude deeper understandings6.

In terms of decision making, Ervin and Graffy (1996) are identified as advocating to go for the options with lower total costs first (abatement and transaction costs). Which the paper seems to assert and recommend. The current author however notes that this approach does not ensure that the policy goal and more fundamental change (required to meet the environmental crisis) is addressed. Again, this wider understanding seems to inhibit analysis, as the costs of delaying fundamental change and meeting environmental goals to address climate change will far outweigh transaction or abatement costs of policies (see Stern 2006). This highlights the importance of an inter-disciplinary and holistic approach that that economic approaches and theory must incorporate in addressing urgent environmental challenges and sustainable development more broadly.

3.2.6: Approach to institutions

For the New Institutional: cost accounting frameworks all three are underpinned by a fairly strong rationality, cost benefit mindset and have an underlying neoclassical/new institutional tradition embodied within their approach to analysing institutions (although McCann states it covers aspects of classical institutional economics, it is largely new institutional in its tone and approach). Institutions are predominantly seen as rules (formal and informal), by the three frameworks and the focus is predominantly on costs from institutional change/institutional options, although each study is somewhat different as outlined earlier. A summary of the approach to institutions and institutional analysis by this cluster is provided below.

Table 7: Analysis of approach to institutions by cost accounting cluster

Summary of approach to institutions and institutional analysis Garrick et al (2013) This work shows transaction and other relevant costs as an important evaluative criterion in institutional change. Institutions seem to be seen as seen as formal rules and informal rules (norms). Most of the focus of the paper and analysis focuses on how one governs institutions to minimise transaction costs whilst still achieving goals (water related focus in the paper). The approach employs a neo- classically influenced approach in analysis (new institutional economics) and views associated environmental and social problems as externalities. The adaptive efficiency criteria is the one applied by Garrick et al 2013. Adaptive efficiency is defined: “a set of institutions that readily adapt to the shocks, disturbances, and ubiquitous uncertainty that characterize every society over time” (North 2005:78). This is said to build from his initial definition of adaptive efficiency as a condition that “provides the incentives to encourage the development of decentralised decision-making processes that allow societies to maximise the efforts required to explore alternative ways of solving the problem” (North, 1990: 81). Williamson focuses on the criterion of efficiency as defined as (minimisation of transaction costs). The evaluative criteria used by Ostrom et al (1990) are Robustness, Resilience, and sustainability in assessing institutions. It is identified that the traditions of the three approaches (Ostrom, Williamson and North) are bound by a focus on transactions as the unit of analysis. McCann 2013. The paper focuses on the physical and institutional determinants of transaction and abatement costs. Institutions are not defined, but broadly seem to be aligned with many new institutional economics definitions (formal rules and informal rules/norms). In assessing institutional change, the paper predominantly is focused on costs and cost reduction (economic) in environmental policy, this does not account for potential benefits beyond the immediate policy and does not consider the effectiveness of the policy in meeting the environmental objective. In terms of decision making, Ervin and Graffy (1996) are identified as advocating to go for the options with lower total costs first (abatement and transaction costs). The paper asserts and recommend this. The approach to institutions is fairly neoclassical in approach. Marshall 2013 The focus of the paper is on identifying costs associated with changes in formal institutions (primarily), as compared with not changing. The approach is somewhat different from the two other cost focused frameworks, through similar. They include not only costs added but costs avoided. The author cites his earlier work (of 2005) that presented a cost-effectiveness framework to fill this need via operationalising North's (1990) concept of adaptive efficiency. The paper is good and helpful in understanding how to identify costs from institutional change to address environmental and natural resource problems. A procedure for bounded rationality application of the framework is also developed and discussed building on Quiggin 2008. It is suggested to apply this if the use of conventional neoclassical economics is not possible (likely to be the case in many situations).

3.2.7 Classical institutional economics frameworks

6 Reference for Otto et al and Steinberger.. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41558-019-0402-3?proof=trueIn https://www.nature.com/articles/s41560-020-0579-8 Kauko 2012

Characteristics of the framework: The papers main contribution in terms of relevance to this paper is to identify the potential of classical and new institutional economics to be applied in tandem to address sustainable development. The case study empirical work is for property development. The theories are however set out in a way that clacks depth and clarity, which limits understanding of the full strengths and insights that such theory can bring. It is stated that while classic institutional economics and New Institutional Economics perspectives contain some general similarities, classical institutional economics basic deterministic power pertain to the institutional design including informal relations and NIE to the market determinism. This said, it is clear however from our review above that papers like Ostrom 2011 clearly focus on institutional design as well and are predominantly seen as NIE approaches. The article mainly takes primarily a classical institutional economics approach, although the exact approach could be set out more clearly. Classical institutional economics is said to advocate more intervention in economies, whereas NIE prioritizes the economy and often passive intervention and government. The author states the latter approach to urban development is shown to lead to urban sprawl and higher levels of unsustainable development. Empirical case study analysis is conducted. The position taken by the paper informed by urban sustainability research is that there is a need for intervention but also support of the private sector in tandem.

Dupuy et al (2015)

Characteristics and of the framework:

The authors present a Commonsian Transactional Framework, the framework is very different to other frameworks and was found less easy to follow. According to this framework, a key role is granted to conflict, said to be intrinsically dynamic and accounting for institutional evolution. Core concepts of commonsian economics that enable one to understand this dynamic are said to be transaction, going concern, and futurity. The elementary units of economic analysis applying this framework are said not to be individual (like most NIE work), but transactions and collective action. Transactions are said to occur between two "wills in action".

Transaction is defined as: “the least unit of economic theory – a unit of investigation by means of which reality may be understood” (Commons [1934] 1990, 59).

Going concern is defined as: “Transactions take place within “going concerns” (family, enterprise, nation, etc.), which are an organized, dynamic collective (Théret 2001) – i.e., an organized collective action of individuals sharing a common willingness and common goals.” (Dupuy et al 2015, p. 902)

With regards to futurity the following is very informative: “Every transaction implies a projection into the future, which necessarily entails some kind of uncertainty. Mind is not a passive sensation container, nor an infallible computer. Rather, mind is active and future-oriented, while still depending on (individual) habits and (collective) customs. If most transactions are routinely made (the human mind tends to acquire habits, or rules of conduct, adapted to “routine transactions”), some of them are strategic transactions: Projection into the future plays a key role and the effort made by the will is greater. For Commons, “futurity is the most important principle in economics” (Gislain 2002, 1), and it is at the heart of volitional psychology. Futurity is, first of all, the tendency of the human mind to search for secured anticipations in a context of limited cognitive skills and often radical uncertainties. Futurity is also at the root of what Jean-Jacques Gislain (2002) calls “institutional causality.” In such a pragmatist approach, causality is not simply mechanistic anymore and acting from the past to the future, as is traditionally the case in economics. The time of physics, with which the past and a cause, on one hand, and the future and a consequence, on the other, are associated, is not suited for economic inquiry. Actually, beyond the performative dimension of the economic discourse, which becomes difficult in light of the existence of perennial causal laws, the economic actor is eminently future-oriented. His/her choices and actions depend on hypotheses, beliefs in future world states, and not on well-informed rational calculus. Collective action (notably, collective action organized by firms, associations, nation-states, etc.), too, is only comprehensible through futurity, which grants it a meaning by projecting it into the future. Thus, the determination of goals/ends does not strictly exist prior to the search for means. Rather, there is a continuing ends/means interaction (Bromley 2008a). In a way, futurity meets the issue of sustainable development.” (Dupuy et al 2015, p. 902-903).

In this way, the Commonsian institutional economics is said to rely upon a theory of action that is different from the simplistic model of rational choice. Willingness is made up of five elements: futurity, custom, sovereignty, scarcity, and efficiency. In the paper it is said that if scarcity leads to bargaining transactions, efficiency implies management transactions. Sovereignty implies that actions and transactions are submitted to an authority (authorized transactions) that constrains individuals and groups via rules. It is said that custom, as sedimentation of past actions and transactions, unconsciously directs present actions.

In the framework, property is a fundamental institution as it functions to regulate scarcity related conflicts. Commons distinguishes between three types of transactions: bargaining, managerial and rationing transactions. These are defined as follows (p.902): “Bargaining transactions imply property rights exchanges between legally equal individuals. Such transactions, governed by the scarcity principle, engage individuals into economic activities. Managerial transactions, governed by the efficiency principle, take place in legally unequal relationships of command/authority. They organize the mobilization of property in production activities. Rationing transactions, likewise, have an asymmetric character between individuals and their legal representatives. The latter determine the social repartition of costs and benefits from economic activity. Transactions do not take place outside the social field, but they are regulated by “working rules,” and are thus “instituted.”” (Dupuy et al 2015, P.902)

The three different types of transactions outlined above are said to take place within "going concerns" (family, enterprise, nation etc), said to be organised by dynamic collective e.g. organised of collective action of individuals sharing common willingness and goals (Théret 2001).

Said to follow Peirce's epistemology, rejecting Cartesian dualism and the opposition between the hypothetic- deductive approach and experience (Mirowski 1887), a method is developed based on abduction7. The author states that abduction offers a more fruitful way than inductive and deductive methods. It is said that the Commonsian approach transcends both individualism and holism through a kind of relational economics. The economy is said to be integrated into an institutional scheme, institutions are seen as a collective action, the latter said to be "more than restraint and liberation of individual action - it is expansion of the will of the individual far beyond what he can do by his own puny acts" (Commons [1934], 1990, 73). Applying this theory, it is said that at the core of economic institutions lie transactions, the latter being said to be the least unit of economic theory, i.e. the unit of analysis according to Commons. Individuals are seen as socio- institutional beings, programmed to engage in transaction relationships, driven to them especially (but not only) as a result of scarcity.

Dupuy et al 2015 extended the Commonsian framework to account for natural resources and the environment. The framework is provided in detail in the paper. The framework could be clearer in parts, and at first it can be somewhat difficult to engage with as it is different from most of the other frameworks that mostly apply rational choice theory, although there is some commonality such as a focus on transactions (NIE also often has) as the unit of analysis. The framework enables it to be possible to capture relevant facets and dynamics of socio-environmental conflicts (and understandings of power). A benefit of the framework for looking at institutions and sustainability is that it is said to be multi-level and holistic in its approach. The main contribution of the framework is said to be as conceiving natural resources as necessarily instituted

7 “Abduction is the process of forming an explanatory hypothesis. It is the only logical operation which introduces any new idea; for induction does nothing but determine a value, and deduction merely evolves the necessary consequences of a pure hypothesis” (Peirce 1934, 106). objects at the centre of a complex nexus of transactions, that it is said researchers should strive to disentangle.

The paper identifies the Commons approach as hardly mobilised or put into practice in economics, this can limit cross study comparison and communication. The approach does however offer a very different lens from other frameworks, which can be useful to explore wicked problems. It does not separate into micro and macro, but takes a more integrated and holistic approach to look at different but inter related structural levels, has a different approach to understanding human action and institutions, looking at institutions in a broader, more holistic way that many of the other frameworks.

Kim 2007

Characteristics and of the framework: The institutional approach advocates that present environmental problems cannot be eliminated simply by integrating external costs into the market, and that it is not just market failure but institutional failure. Additionally, the ultimate goal is said to be not economically efficient allocation of resources, but achieving equity and fairness according to Teranisi, 2001. The institutional view of the social system is holistic and organic (the authors cite Swaney, 1987). It is said that wants are determined in a significant part within the economy, but more largely by culture, and that the structure of wants depends on the distribution of income and wealth that exists at a given time. Values, needs, and wants are separate from, and in addition to the mere aggregation of wants. It is also stated that individual and social values are hierarchical and cannot be reduced to a common yardstick (i.e. money). The economic system is recognised as open (Kapp, 1970), social and natural systems are mutually interdependent, co- evolving with feedbacks including circular causation. Institutionalists (classical) are said to use social cost valuation and multi-criteria frameworks as alternatives to external cost valuation. Social costs can include such things as damages to human health and the environment, property values etc. and impairment of less tangible values etc. The paper identifies Kapp (1969) as a pioneer and lays out why he dislikes the terms externalities and why such terminology and language is viewed negatively. Kim (2007) identifies the different approaches (neoclassical as well as the institutional approach). It is stated that although multicriteria decision analysis approaches of classical institutional economics provide quite a number of benefits, limitations are listed and relate to subjectivity and decisions that need to be made on weighting approaches; uncertainty problems e.g. with the use of mixed forms of data and information (this said the approach refutes that everything can be put into one unit such as money - recognising incommensurability); and the ordinal nature of the evaluation criteria (e.g. no attention is paid to the size of the difference between impact alternatives only the sign of the difference is taken into account). One of the main issues found with the neo-classical approach in the case study is that external costs seem to be estimated as particularly low compared to other costs when relying on humans and market related methods to value in monetary units. Overall the paper identifies the importance of the use of both qualitative and quantitative elements in assessment and identifies that actually for the case study applied, both approaches came to the same conclusion as to the two worst forms of electricity generation in terms of environmental impact.

3.2.8 Approach to institutions

With regards to approaches to institutions by the classical institutional economics frameworks, they recognise the importance of culture in determining institutions (particularly informal), largely missed by quite a number of new institutional frameworks. Kauko et al recognise institutions as being both formal and informal, and informal as being focused on norms and culturally supported practices. They do not recognise the cognitive models aspect recognised by Dequech (2002). The importance of path dependency is also recognised in determining institutions and outcomes. Dupuy et al (2015) bring to life the Commonsian approach to institutions which is an approach quite different to any other in terms of definition and understanding of institutions, institutions are seen as a collective action and a key benefit of the Commonsian approach is said to be in holding all levels and scales of analysis of conflict together. It is a holistic approach and this is one of the strengths of the classical institutional economics approaches to institutions. Both their ambition and scope to be holistic and inter-disciplinary is important, this is sometimes missing in some of the new institutional approaches as seen earlier. Such qualities are important in developing institutional economics frameworks for sustainable development, that said the approach by Dupuy et al (2015) is so different from other frameworks that it may be difficult to build knowledge across studies, it was also found to be a difficult framework to follow in terms of institutional analysis. The Commonsian institutional economics is said to rely upon a theory of action that is different from the simplistic model of rational choice, futurity plays a key role in determining behaviour. The framework by Kim, compares neoclassical CBA approaches to classical institutional economics evaluation approaches such as multi-criteria decision analysis. The paper essentially assesses the frameworks as value communicating institutions. When treating with classical institutional economics frameworks they highlight the importance of culture, values and norms, from review the classical institutional economics approach seems more geared up to both recognise and address informal intuitions of various kinds and these are often seen as, if not more important than formal institutions. The opposite is often the case with New Institutional economics frameworks, though there are clearly some NIE frameworks that attempt to address both formal and informal (though informal are often seen in a limited way e.g. norms regulating behaviour). A summary of the approach to institutions and institutional analysis by this cluster is provided below.

Table 8: Analysis of approach to institutions by classical institutional economics cluster

Summary of approach to institutions and institutional analysis Kauko 2012 The paper recognises the importance of path dependency and culture in urban development. The paper recognises formal and informal institutions as important, seeing informal as focused on norms and culturally supported practices, this is a more in-depth capturing of informal institutions than most other papers, but does not capture the cognitive models aspect recognised by Dequech (2002). From the paper's analysis they identify various types of institutions as being important, crucially rules, but also conventions and individual behaviour of key stakeholders matters. It is said that the importance of path dependency matters for the extent to which a given country or city is on a sustainable development path. The article mainly takes primarily a classical institutional economics approach. Dupuy et al (2015). Paper employs and develops a Commonsian apprach to institutions. In the paper it is stated (p.901): “Unlike new institutional economics, Commons did not reduce institutions to rules designed to regulate markets. The economy is integrated into an institutional scheme, therefore, it is “necessarily instituted” (Gislain 2010), and institutions are a collective action. “Collective [a]ction is more than restraint and liberation of individual action – it is expansion of the will of the individual far beyond what he can do by his own puny acts” (Commons [1934] 1990, 73).” The understandings of institutions are very different from understandings from many of the New Institutional Economics approaches. The elementary units of economic analysis applying this framework are said not to be individual (like most NIE work), but transactions and collective action. Futurity plays a key role in the framework rather than rational choice. In terms of philosophy and ontology and structure of the framework, it would be somewhat difficult to reconcile with NIE approaches. The compatibility of the institutional approach with other meso-scale economic approaches to environmental conflicts is said to remain to be analysed. The framework could potentially provide insights and analysis not provided or missed by New Institutional Economics approaches. The advantage of a Commonsian approach is said to be in holding all levels and scales of analysis of conflicts together. The paper identifies that it is the complex web of institutions that form a whole that makes society coherent. Kim 2007 The paper trials CBA (neoclassical) and institutional economics approaches to evaluation (in case study analysis). We focus on the institutional here as this is the focus of our analysis. The paper highlights the importance of culture, values and norms which the classical institutional approach is geared up to address. It is stated that individual and social values are hierarchical and cannot be reduced to a common yardstick (i.e. money). Classical institutional economics approaches recognise the economic system as open (Kapp, 1970), social and natural systems are mutually interdependent, co-evolving with feedbacks including circular causation. A benefit of classical institutional economics is that that it incorporates considerations of both and in a way that aligns with addressing needs and distributional aspects. In terms of the specifics in relation to the multi criteria decision analysis frameworks these are essentially value communicating appraches. Key to the institutional multi-criteria decision analysis approach is that it does not try to monetise impacts (the focus of CBA).

3.2.9 Sociological and psychology frameworks

Ishihara and Pascual (2009)

Characteristics and of the framework: The papers focus is to address the following question: “How social capital may help to foster collective action making use of the concepts of common knowledge as defined by Chwe (1999) and symbolic power, sensu Bourdieu (1990)” (Ishihara and Pascual 2009, p1550). The authors argue that power relations influence the way that preferences by individuals are shaped through the creation of so-called 'common knowledge' and collective action, an approach said to not be tackled by institutional analysis of common pool resource (CPR) management (Ray and Bijarnia 2007). The creation of common knowledge is said to be associated with the capacity to represent individuals' preferences as if they were the preference of the entire community through 'symbolic power'8.

It then follows on from this that the existence of collective action cannot be considered to result from pure rational calculation by individual community members. In the conceptual framework developed by the authors, they explore how common knowledge can be diffused among community members and how it may be challenged by some marginalised groups within the community leading to the inability (failure) to foster collective action (so in some ways it has some similarity with latter work of Bettini et al 2015, although a very different theoretical and conceptualisation approach). Within the framework the authors discuss two types of social capital, bonding and bridging social capital. Bridging social capital is identified as: Weak ties that bridge difference inside the community (Granovetter 1973) and Bonding social capital as: Strong ties that serve the interest of certain group of the community (Granovetter 1973).

They argue that bonding social capital can contribute to the creation of common knowledge, whereas bridging social capital may contribute to its sharing. They then conclude that different combinations of these two types of social capital in different contexts, where interpretation of common knowledge takes place results in different environmental outcomes. Overall this is a conceptual framework of the role of social capital in fostering collective action. Social embeddedness is said to have given rise to social capital and the paper discusses the way new institutional economists link CPR management with collective action and social capital. The authors depart from the NIE view of collective action being the result of individuals' rational calculation about their optimal amount of resource provision for the public good. In the paper it is said that Social capital is often defined as 'features of social organization such as networks, norms and trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit' (Putnam, 1993, pp. 35-36). The concept is said to be associated with incentive mechanisms or institutional arrangements to curb individuals' incentive for free- riding regarding the provision of public goods (Ostrom, 2000, Aoki, 2001). More generally it is also argued that the existence of networks among agents and the dense flow of information among them, lower the transaction costs of creating collective action (Putnam, 1993; Ostrom, 2000; Pretty and Ward, 2001; Collier, 2002; Paavola and Adger, 2005). There has however been criticism of these new institutional economics arguments due to their inability to explain why social capital has this intrinsic ability to curb such perverse incentives and lower transaction costs (Harris, 2001; Cleaver, 2003; Mosse, 2006). Critics argue that the NIE logic cannot explain why some communities succeed in creating collective action while others fail, despite the existence of networks and dense information flow. This is a key area and contribution that the paper addresses, this said only two routes and outcomes are presented and explained (one for success and one for failure), there is no middle route, which acknowledges challenges to common knowledge, but then compromise leading to reconciliation and success in collective action, the current author has witnessed from real life experience that such middle options exists and are important.

Ishihara and Pascual (2009) argue that the key concepts of 'common knowledge' and symbolic power' help to regain the explanatory power of social capital. They interestingly later discuss symbolic power and following Bourdieu (1990) identify it as a process where some dominant group has more power to impose its preference as common knowledge than other groups. With regards to the approach taken to rationality, the paper seems somewhat closer to classical institutionalists than new institutional economists9.

Grothmann et al (2013)

8 In the paper the authors define common knowledge as: Symbolic formula that represents the generalised preferences of the others in line with Chwe (1999,2001). Symbolic power as: Power that legitimise the certain 'symbolic formula' as common knowledge (following Bourdieu (1990)). 9 “institutional economists tend to use the Habermasian concept of communicative rationality, whereas anthropologists and sociologist tend to deny rationality itself by relying on the Foucauldian argument.” (p.1550) Characteristics and of the framework: Gupta et al 2010, define adaptive capacity relevant to the study as: "the inherent characteristics of institutions that empower social actors to respond to short- and long- term impacts either through planned measures or through allowing and encouraging creative responses from society both ex ante and ex post. It encompasses: - The characteristics of institutions (formal and informal; rules, norms and beliefs) that enable society (individuals, organisations and networks) to cope with climate change. - The degree to which such institutions allow and encourage actors to change these institutions to cope with climate change" (Gupta et al., 2010, p. 461).

The adaptive capacity wheel (ACW) is said to be the only highly operationalised method for assessing institutional capacities to adapt to climate change, claiming to be appropriate in a wide range of institutional settings. Other frameworks for assessing institutional adaptive capacities, focus on sector-specific institutional settings such as water. Based on Prutsch et al (2014) the paper identified six main challenges to adapting to climate change as follows: Uncertainty; lack of knowledge; adaptation mainstreaming; policy integration; equity and adaptation barriers. It is said that all of these challenges are explicitly, or implicitly addressed by the ACW, as well as being more operationalised, the framework is said to be more specific regarding the criteria for assessing institutional adaptive capacity. The framework differentiates twenty-two criteria to assess six dimensions: variety, learning capacity, room for autonomous change, leadership, availability of resources and fair governance. The criteria are as follows: Fair governance: Accountability; Responsiveness; Equity; Legitimacy; Resources: Financial; Human; Authority. Leadership: Visionary, Entrepreneurial; Collaborative; Room for autonomous change: Ability to improvise, Act according to a plan, Continuous access to information; Learning capacity: Trust; Single loop learning, Double loop learning; Discuss doubts; Institutional memory; Variety: Problem frame and solutions; Multi-actor, Level and sector; Diversity; Redundancy. Adaptation belief: Actors realisation of the realisability of adaptation; Adaptive motivation; Actors assessment of the relevance of adaptation.

The paper provides some questions/approaches to assess categories (in particular the new categories). The authors analysis of the dimensions and criteria of the ACW identified that the scientifically most interesting and practically most relevant results are found in qualitative analysis of criteria. Averaged quantitative assessments only provide a very rough overview of strengths and weaknesses in a particular sector and are less helpful in developing interventions and overcoming identified weaknesses. It was identified that the ACW does not address technology and infrastructure. Using the framework there are 6 dimensions or outcome criteria.

O'Levänen and Hukkinen 2013

Characteristics and of the framework: They adopt an analytical framework from activity theory, originally introduced by Leont'ev (1978), Luria (1976) and Vygotsky (1978, 1981) and said to be further developed by Engeström (1987, 1999, 2001,2010). In such theory, artefact-mediated and object-oriented activity is the unit of analysis. Conceptualisation occurs via an activity system model to characterise the activity and factors that affect it within a social context (Engeström, 2001). The activity system is said to consist of: a subject i.e. an individual or group whose perspective is assessed; mediating artefacts that help subject(s) to achieve the outcome of the activity (for example tools applied); a community, referring to people who share the objective with the subject; rules that regulate actions within the system (said to be implicit and explicit institutions within the community); and the division of labour that defines organisation tasks critical for the community to achieve its objectives (said to be implicit and explicit descriptions of the different roles of people within the community). It is said that the activity system framework is similar to Ostrom's IAD, the logic and correspondence is laid out as follows, Action situations (corresponding with division of labour in an activity system), and participants (subject in the activity system), influenced by biophysical/material conditions (mediating artefacts and object), attributes of community (community) and rules (rules). The activity system framework that the authors apply is however able to capture a snapshot of a particular action situation from the point of view of a single stakeholder. The authors state that they apply the activity system framework as it makes it possible to first describe the mental models of different stakeholder groups obtained from the interviews and secondly to facilitate comparison of mental models across groups. In their case, they use the activity system to describe the process by which institutional change in the industrial ecosystem triggers different models of action for different stakeholder groups. Each subject is a member of the community and they identified three different communities (industry, administrators and NGOs). In order to investigate the feedback between formal institutions and informal mental models of key stakeholders, the authors assume the mental model inferred from administrators from interviews represents the formal institution of waste management, i.e. the way administrators would implement the new waste management directive in the absence of feedback from stakeholders (they justify on empirical grounds). They state that the pressure from informal institutions to change formal institutions of waste management can be empirically observed via comparing the original mental model of the administrators to that from the mental models of industrial actors and NGOs during the research intervention (interviews-perspective of the three stakeholders), then via brainstorming (solutions developed by researchers) and final workshop (perspective of stakeholders to potential solutions)). In essence there is a three-step research approach here: 1.) interviews and identification of mental models; 2. identification of conflicting elements of models and hypothesising potential solutions; 3. workshop with stakeholders and researchers on potential solutions and collation of feedback from this. The framework provides a useful approach to help systematically understand stakeholder’s activity systems and then hypothesise how these could change to meet objectives (reconciling differences between stakeholders) and then gaining feedback with stakeholders on each's new positions in the new activity system and make recommendations.

3.2.10 Approach to institutions

For the Sociological and psychology frameworks there is quite a lot of variance in the approach to institutions. Ishihara and Pascual (2009) focus on collective action and social capital, but have an understanding of institutions similar to classical institutional economists. The framework brings in concepts of ‘common knowledge’ and symbolic power and look at how these influence collective action and the importance of embeddedness. New Institutional Economics most often ignores embeddedness according to Williamson (2000). This said, we note some frameworks such as Anderies et al 2004 and Rudd (2004) that build in social capital (all be it with a particular conception). Grothmann et al 2013 apply a definition of institutions that is quite broad: “systems of rules, decision-making procedures, and programs that give rise to social practices, assign roles to participants in these practices and guide interaction among occupants of the relevant roles” (IDGEC, 1999, p.14). This is a very social practices focused approach to institutions. The focus that formal institutions give rise to informal is different to classical institutional economics. Although quite sociologically focused, the framework also uses psychological categories, so more social psychological. The study focuses on outcomes in terms of adaptive capacity instead of costs and benefits, this is very different to most of the new institutional frameworks and quite possibly more appropriate when studying climate change adaptation. These outcomes are important to resilience, which are also important to more sustainable economies. This study and others in this category underlie the importance of qualitative analysis in the study of institutions (particularly to informal institutions). O'Levänen and Hukkinen 2013 focus on the feedback mechanisms between institutions and mental models, it is the only study to focus directly on this form of institution (mental models). Such considerations are key to understanding the emergence of informal institutions but largely neglected in the new institutional economics frameworks. A nice aspect about this framework is that it does not assume mind, it goes and collects empirical data. Interestingly, this type of framework could be nicely applied in tandem to complement and inform the IAD and similar frameworks. This said the conceptual and theoretical underpinning of informal institutions could be stronger at times. A summary of the approach to institutions and institutional analysis by this cluster is provided below.

Table 9: Analysis of approaches to institutions by social/psychology cluster Summary of approach to institutions and institutional analysis Ishihara and Pascual The focus is looking at how social capital may help to foster collective action making use of the concepts of common knowledge as (2009). defined by Chwe (1999) and symbolic power, sensu Bourdieu (1990). The authors seem to have an understanding of institutions more similar to classic institutional economists. The theory on how social capital can help to foster collective action via making use of the concept of common knowledge as defined by Chwe (1999) and symbolic power is important as such power influences are often missing in frameworks. The paper also critically identifies the role of embeddedness in shaping individual action (beyond just collective action, the focus of Isihara and Pascual's work) and preferences. It is important to note that the New Institutional Economics scholars generally ignore this level of analysis in institutional work (Williamson 2000). Grothmann et al (2013) The adaptive capacity wheel (ACW) is said to be the only highly operationalised method for assessing institutional capacities to adapt to climate change, claiming to be appropriate in a wide range of institutional settings. The study follows Gupta et al 2010 and defines institutions as: "systems of rules, decision-making procedures, and programs that give rise to social practices, assign roles to the participants in these practices, and guide interactions among the occupants of the relevant roles" (IDGEC, 1999,p.14). So the paper seems to take the perspective that formal institutions give rise to informal (different to classic institutional economics) and fairly focused on behaviour in terms of social practices, so quite a sociological viewpoint. This said, the study extends the framework with psychological categories. The framework could have deeper understanding and conceptualisations of institutions and social embeddedness. Grothmann et al 2013 leads the current author to make some observations, firstly that conventional New Institutional Economics analysis most often tends to measure outcomes in the forms of costs and benefits, rather than things such as adaptive capacity (although there are some exceptions), but these outcomes (adaptive capacity) are important to resilience of economies in the longer run and in this way sustainable production and consumption. Secondly the importance of qualitative analysis. The framework has six dimensions or outcomes that it looks at, iclusing such things as fairness, learning capacity and recources (amongst others). O'Levänen and Based on an activity theory approach. It is said that precious little is known about the feedback mechanisms between institutions and Hukkinen 2013. mental models in environmental governance. This is one of the few frameworks to really discuss the importance of peoples/actors mental models in a social ecological system. Mental models are key to the development and emergence of social norms, but also identify, values, attitudes and beliefs that are largely neglected by frameworks reviewed so far. Such considerations are key to understanding formal and informal institutions relevant to sustainable consumption and production. The approach does not link to classical institutional economics theory, which could provide rich conceptualisations of informal institutions. Like the IAD the approach is quite focused which is good, but there are gaps in terms of institutional frameworks that provide a rich and deep understandings of informal institutions. Informal institutions and their functioning as institutions if more clearly articulated could inform these useful action-oriented frameworks.

3.2.11 Darwinian theory and Political Geography Frameworks Hodgson 2008

Characteristics of the framework: Darwinism is said to offers a highly abstract and general meta- theoretical framework to help understand both natural and social evolution. This framework is of significance because it addresses the evolution and coevolution of biological systems and sets of human institutions. The paper presents the framework and sets out its historical origins since the time of Darwin.

Ontology and basic principles: A key step in generalising the core Darwinian principles is said to be in a general specification of the broad type of system to which the ideas apply. The assertion is that Darwinian principles apply to what may be described 'complex population systems’. These could be biological or social and involve population entities. Populations are defined by members of a type similar in important respects, this said within each type, there is a degree of variation, due to genesis or circumstances (Hodgson 2010). It is said that entities within the population have limited capacities to consume material and energy from the environment and have mechanisms to process information useful for survival. All entities are mortal and biodegradable and must consume energy and materials to survive or minimise degradation, however individuals due to access, face local and immediate scarcity as well as global resource constraints. A set of problems must be solved to minimise degradation and raise chances of their survival, and in the short run are said to be in a struggle for existence (Darwin, 1859, pp. 62-63). There is some assumed capacity to retain and pass on workable solutions to others for the problems faced. Creating an advantage for them and their future entities. This forms the foundation for trans-generational cumulative growth of problem solving 'knowledge'. This is said to be the basis of the Darwinian principle of inheritance, which refers to a broad class of mechanisms, including 'replication' and 'descent' (Mayr, 1991). The evolution of such population systems is said to involve three Darwinian principles of variation, inheritance and selection. It is said that the evolution must involve these three principles following this approach. It is identified that there must be explanation of how variety is generated and replenished in the population. Explanations are also needed on how useful information concerning solutions to particular adaptive systems is retained and passed on (inheritance). Finally, there must be explanations of how entities differ in their longevity and fecundity. In certain environments some entities are more adapted than others to survive and more successful in terms of progeny (the principle of selection). An important point made by Hodgson (2010) is that the criterion of consumer sovereignty based on existing preferences overlooks the dependence of individual goals on their cultural and institutional context. Hodgson (2010) defines institutions as "systems of established and prevalent social rules that structure social interactions." (p.701). So there seems to be a focus on rules. The paper also makes some important points in relation to scarcity, identifying it as a central concept in mainstream economics but (excluding Daly, 1974) it is said to be rarely dissected in detail. In his paper he defines scarcity as "resources that are not immediately available for an entity: their capture requires effort and costs. It does not necessarily imply that a resource is globally scarce, although that of course is the reality concerning many physical resources." (p.701). He importantly provides other useful points such as identifying that there are many suggestions of the way that the natural world may impact on human culture and institutions and their development, including climate and other factors (Diamond, 1997 and Acemoglu et al 2002 are cited). Hodgson 2010 states that the careful definitions of philosophers of key Darwinian concepts point to possible social interactions such as organisations, and possible social replicators such as habits and routines, but acknowledges that there are critics that claim a sharp replicator-interactor distinction is unviable and inappropriate in social evolution. It is stated that as in biology, detailed examination of the particular mechanisms is also required. Arguments for Darwinism approach are that it systemises the process of empirical enquiry and organises knowledge pertaining to a wide range of evolutionary processes. Additionally, it is stated that Darwinian ideas have important implications for social scientists concerning rationality and psyche of human agents (Richards, 1987). It is argued that assumptions about actors must be consistent with understanding of human evolution. Darwinian evolution is said to involve the development retention and selection of information concerning adaptive solutions to survive problems faced by organisms in their environment. It is stated that the paradigm constantly raises questions of causality and requires explanations of origin. This is said to apply in particular to dispositional programs behind human thought and behaviour. It is stated that contrary to mainstream economics, individuals and their preferences cannot simply be taken as given. Importantly it is also identified that Dawinism focuses attention on the possible mechanisms through which variety is preserved and created. It is stated that two of the most important mechanisms identified by Darwin (1859) retained in modern biology involve location considerations (migration to a different physical environment and use of creation of different niches) as mechanisms to explain speciation. In these cases, new environments and relative isolation of a group from the majority create new opportunities for variation, it is said that similar arguments apply to human institutions as well as biological organisms. It is stated that: "In line with the Darwinian emphasis on the role of variety in the processes of adaptation and selection, C. Dustin Becker and Elinor Ostrom (1995) emphasise the importance of institutional diversity in coping with complex developments in environmental systems. Similar themes are said to be prominent in a special issue of the Journal of Institutional Economics on institutions and ecosystems (Janssen, 2006)." (p.704). The view that the Darwinian approach can be applied to social phenomenon is clear but contested. Ness et al (2010)

Characteristics and of the framework: In the paper it is cited that the Drivers-Pressure-State-Impact- Response (DPSIR) framework is a functional approach for structuring the cause-effect relationships in relation to environmental and natural resource management issues, references are provided. The scheme is said to be a tool for integrating natural system, economic and social information into a framework to inform more detailed analysis. Driving forces are said to be independent, external causes (or forces) that underlie movement away from or towards intended targets. Pressures represent the consequence of the driving forces (positive or negative). These in turn influences the state of the environment. Resulting impacts are often stated in terms of measurable damages to human health and environment. Responses are decision-making measures on behalf of society to correct the problems to environment and human health. Although said to look at social and economic aspects, this is in a fairly particular way. The paper states that socio-economic system effects e.g. in relation to HIV/AIDS as an example have seldom been included in analysis. Ness et al (2010) also cite the problem of the schemes inability to encompass the multi-dimensional and multi-level relationships of problems. Their approach to addressing these issues is to merge Hägerstrand's (2001) system of nested domains. Hägerstrand and others (cited in the paper) argue that the management of the biosphere must be based on a more comprehensive and hierarchical understanding of how macro and micro aspects are connected. It is said that this approximately translates into how larger-scale decision making works/does not work, with individual actions occurring on the landscape (Kahn, 1966). In terms of meaning, by hierarchical Hägerstrand is said to imply the socio-spatial authority structure in human systems (Simon 1973). He looks into how actions on the landscape can be partitioned stated mosaics of spatial domains, and the paper here cites social institutions in terms of groups of actors at each level possessing their own set of rights, responsibilities and expertise, regularly limited to predetermined jurisdictions (so mainly a formal institutions focus is predominant in Hägerstrand's work). Domains are said to be held together by the domains acting above them (e.g. local government areas working under regional government and these working under national government etc.). It is said that higher order domains do not operate directly on the landscape but are responsible for rule making and control (called symbolic transactions) within their respective spatial boundaries. Such symbolic transactions are said to most often only have an indirect effect on the physical actions in the landscape through setting legal limits/incentives. It is said that Hägerstrand's conceptualisation enables one to visualise how symbolic transaction domains at each of the upper levels influence actors below, and how various regulations, policies, subsidies and information are ultimately translated on the ground. The result is said to be a multitude of small actions in the landscape (micro-level) guided by technological/legal freedoms and limits that are determined by domain levels above (said to be meso and macro-levels). It is said that the approach is also a way to illuminate divergence in goals between the upper symbolic transaction level and actions in the landscape. Hägerstrand asserts that it is where these small actions go unchecked that society receives the larger scale problems (e.g. in terms of dispersed pollution problems with no regulation of activities of many actors on the ground). This said, developing economies in countries such as the UK is a very bottom up, entrepreneurial process. Their viewpoint seems a quite top down view of both the problem and the solutions, in reality understanding the bottom up mindset is very important. The focus on actions in the landscape is quite tailored towards environmental management as opposed to sustainability management (environment is one aspect of sustainable development). The approach seems to have an emphasis that is strongly spatial, environmental and landscape oriented. The purpose of the framework is said to be to lead to a more effective detection and understanding of fundamental relationships of complex problems. The application of the combined framework in the paper is on an Agriculture case study. Ness et al (2010) cites Kates et al 2001 at the start of the paper, and identify that most unsustainability issues are characterised by very complex scale dynamics of space and time exacerbated by multiple anthropogenic and natural driving forces.

3.2.12 Approach to institutions

We now look at approaches to institutions by Darwinian and Political Geography cluster. The Darwinian framework approach by Hodgson 2008 can be useful particularly in studying specific institutions such as social norms. The framework was very helpful to the current author is raising important institutional questions in relation to sustainable production and consumption. There are varying views on whether the Darwinian approach can be applied to study social phenomena, but clearly it can give rise to a different approach and interesting questions and insights. Institutions are seen as rules (formal and informal) and clearly the approach rejects assumptions of neoclassical economies, for example it is stated that the criteria of consumer sovereignty based on existing preferences, overlooks the dependence of individual goals on their cultural and institutional context and that these cannot simply be taken as given as in mainstream economics. These are useful and important in relation to sustainable development as clearly existing consumption patterns in many nations given current technology are not in keeping with ensuring ecological and environmental sustainability and are having impacts on humans capabilities to flourish. The approach by Ness et al (2010) is on formal institutions, the paper has a very top down focus, very different from the Ostrom’s approaches. The definition and understandings of institutions in the paper are primarily on formal institutions, so somewhat similar to some of the NIE approaches in this sense. The paper largely misses informal institutions and their interaction with formal. A summary of the approach to institutions and institutional analysis by this cluster is provided below.

Table 10: Analysis of approach to institutions by Darwinian and Political Geography cluster

Summary of approach to institutions and institutional analysis Hodgson 2008. This framework provides fairly high-level theory. At times the theory is somewhat reductionist, this said reductionist approaches can be useful in understanding or capturing specific aspects of institutions such as a social norms or values. It would be useful to have conceptualisations of interaction to explore and test before empirical research is began so that relevant metrics can be determined, not just a specific institutions (social norm of value) in isolation as the paper seems to advocate. This said, the paper is informative in building understanding to address the institutional economics of sustainable production and consumption, in quite a number of ways. Firstly in economies, clearly variation is important in giving rise to new more sustainable lifestyles and forms of production and consumption, that are not wasteful economically, materially and environmentally, and that lead to increasing capabilities to flourish and better equality outcomes. Importantly, the paper highlights that variation is shaped by the physical environment, as well as the social and technological environment that exists at any given time. It is said that two of the most important mechanisms to explain speciation identified by Darwin (1859) and retained in modern biology involve location considerations (migration to a different physical environment and creation of different niches). This can inform important institutional questions such as: how does local and regional governance create and develop niches/selection environments that encourage sustainable production and consumption, and what institutions can help bring this forth? What regional and local policies within localities lead to variation and diversity in production and consumption? Inheritance and passing on of knowledge (and institutions) from one generation to the next about how to live, survive and produce, can help but also hinder (depending on the knowledge and advice) sustainable economy. Therefore, knowledge about inheritance and passing on of institutions in their different forms are important to understand in relation to sustainable production and consumption. Explanations are also needed on how information concerning solutions to particular adaptive systems is retained (or not) and passed on. The third aspect of selection is also key in the move towards a sustainable economy, what are the physical, social and economic contexts that lead to the selection of certain types of consumption and production forms? And how do we identify current social, economic and environmental selection environments that hinder sustainable development? The paper identifies that the criterion of consumer sovereignty from mainstream economics, based on existing preferences, overlooks the dependence of individual goals on their cultural and institutional context and that these cannot simply be taken as given. Ness et al 2010. The most detailed level of analysis in the paper is at the country and local levels and the focus is on government municipalities primarily and their regulation. In some ways it is an opposite approach from the Ostrom IAD approach which have a real focus of self- organising and a very bottom up perspective and low emphasis on the government in resolving environmental problems. The definition and understanding of institutions in the paper is mainly a formal institution understanding, so more similar to the New Institutional Economics approaches in this sense. The focus is on formal institutions which aligns with their government focus, but seems to miss informal institutions operating and their interaction. 3.3 Applicability across sectors

The neoclassical framework by Dzeraviaha 2018 is applicable across sectors of the economy. The NIE: Common pool and social ecological systems framework approaches are largely applicable to common pool resources and extractive sectors. In terms of the NIE: Cost accounting frameworks Garrick et al 2013 is applicable to the water sector, the other two are applicable across sectors. For the Classical Institutional Economics frameworks, Kauko 2012 is focused on property development but the other two are applicable across sectors. For the Sociological and Psychological framework approaches all seemed applicable across different sectors and parts of the economy, the same was true of the Darwinian and Political Geography framework. A summary of applicability across sectors for each study is provided below.

Table 11: Analysis of applicability across sectors Cluster Study Applicability across sectors Neoclassical Dzeraviaha 2018 The approach is economy wide and can be applied across sectors. Ostrom 2011 The framework is primarily designed to look at resource extraction from a resource system (extractive sectors or communities) e.g. common pool resources. Anderies et al 2004 The framework is most appropriate to extractive sectors predominantly e.g. fisheries and forestry, water and irrigation (common pool) etc. Design principles are interesting but are difficult to directly apply to many conventional every day private good (non-extractive) producer and consumer environments relevant to sustainable production and consumption. Rudd 2004 Fisheries management and potentially other common pool resource environments. Gerber et al 2009 The framework applicability tends to focus on extractive sectors predominantly e.g. fisheries and forestry etc. Feiock 2013 It seems to be primarily focused on the government sector and the governance of public goods and common pool resources, but can be applied to non government organisations. DeCaro et al 2017 The paper is focused on environmental governance and appears most appropriate to common pool resources and goods such as water resources. Clement 2010 The paper is primarily focused on extending the IAD so similarly is designed to look at resource extraction from a resource system (extractive sectors or communities) e.g. common pool resources, public good typical application scenario. Ostrom 2009 The framework seems to be predominantly applicable to extractive sectors/communities of common pool resources fisheries, forests, and water resources. The focus is on self-organising systems. McGinnis and The framework seems to be predominantly applicable to extractive sectors/communities of common pool resources Ostrom 2014 fisheries, forests, and water resources. The focus is on self-organising systems. Many social ecological systems also produce public goods and services (such as ecosystem services) that markets depend on. The authors note, just how broadly the SES framework can be usefully applied remains an open question. Léopold et al 2019 The applicability is to fisheries although it is identified that the framework may be applicable to other common pool NIE: Common pool and social ecological systems systems ecological social and pool Common NIE: resources of SES. A focus on the consumer is largely emitted with these common pool resource focused approaches, which inhibits application to sustainable consumption. Bertinni et al 2015 The paper is focused on urban water but making use of the IAD could potentially be applied to other common pool resource problems. Kolinjivadi et al The paper is focused on water related ecosystem goods and services. 2014 Garrick et al 2013 Applicable to the water to the water sector. NIE: Cost Marshall 2013 The framework seems applicable across sectors. accounting McCann 2013 The framework seems applicable across sectors. Classical Kauko 2012 Specific to property development. institutional Dupuy et al 2015 Applicable across sectors of the economy. economics Kim 2007 Applicable across sectors of the economy. Ishihara and It could be applied to understand social capital within any sector of the economy. Sociological Pascual 2009 and Grothmann et al Applicable across sectors of the economy. psychology 2013 frameworks O'Levänen and Applicable across sectors of the economy. Hukkinen 2013 Darwinian Hodgson 2008 Applicable across sectors of the economy. theory and Political Ness et al 2010 Applicable across sectors of the economy. Geography 3.4 Incorporation of sustainable development

In terms of focus on sustainable development we can summarise as follows: Not all frameworks were focused explicitly on sustainable development, many were focused on natural resources and the environment (relating to the third aim of sustainable development). Few frameworks address the 1st and 2nd aims of sustainable development. Ten studies primarily focus on ongoing natural resources harvesting/use and or the environment; Dzeraviaha 2018, Ostrom 2011, Anderies et al 2004, Gerber et al 2009, DeCaro et al 2017, Clement 2010, Léopold et al 2019, Dupuy et al 2015, O'Levänen and Hukkinen 2013, Hodgson 2008. A number of frameworks did not have an explicit focus on any of the aims of sustainable development, such as Feiock 2013, Garrick et al (2013), Marshall 2013, McCann 2013, Ishihara and Pascual (2009). Grothmann et al 2013 address climate change (3rd aim) and aspects of equity are addressed (1st aim) and Ostrom (2009) and McGinnis and Ostrom (2014) address equity, natural resources and environment (1st and 3rd aim). Rudd 2004, using the five capitals, sustainable livelihoods approach in conjunction with the IAD was found to address the second aim and third aim but not the first aim. Frameworks found to address all three aims were: Kolinjivadi et al 2014, Kauko 2012. The multi criteria decision analysis framework of Kim 2007 has the potential to address all three aims of sustainable development is applied appropriately. The analysis of aspects of sustainable development addressed by each study are provided below.

Table 12a: Analysis of aspects of sustainable development addressed. Cluster Study Aspects of sustainable development addressed Neoclassical Dzeraviaha 2018 The paper largely focuses on the environmental challenge (3rd aim of SD) and there is no definition of SD, social wellbeing aspects of SD are not focused on in the paper. Aspects of inequality (1st aim) are not addressed. Ethical aspects are also not discussed. Ostrom 2011 Sustainability is looked at in the same way as Anderies et al 2004. Ostrom concludes that many future institutional studies will continue to use the IAD by itself when the setting to be explained is not heavily affected by ecological variables, so from this it seems the approach is not designed to extensively address ecological and/or environmental aspects. The apprach does seem to look at inequality. Anderies et al 2004 Sustainability is seen in terms of on-going productive use of a resource. The approach to sustainability does not look at impacts on inequality, wellbeing and staying within key global environmental pressures (that relate to the 1st, 2nd and 3rd aims of sustainable development). Rudd 2004 The paper itself provides little detail on societal goals and objectives although these are said to be addressed. The paper usefully identifies that ideally indicator systems must communicate critical information simply and in a compact way, this may explain the latter. The paper identifies that often financial resources are scarce, yet a variety of investment options may be available to achieve sustainable development objectives. A benefit of applying the extended IAD approach put forward is said to be that all societal responses to pressures on capital assets can be viewed in terms of investments. Different segments of society can make those capital assets available directly or can use institutions to protect and enhance them, in this way one can assess the opportunity for alternative sustainability actions. The paper argues that this can inform the business case for different actions. Some issue with such cost benefit approaches is that it is very difficult to get values for many social and environmental benefits and sometimes values are incommensurable. Gerber et al 2009 The focus of sustainability is pollution and sustainable harvesting of a resource, first and second aims of sustainability such as addressing inequality and wellbeing are not addressed. The study's definition of sustainability is as follows: "The overall regulation of a resource leads to sustainability if the uses of individual goods or services are not carried out at the expense of other uses and if all uses considered in total do not deplete the stock of the resource (global quota)." (p.799). Additonally the paper concludes that: "In our view, the IRR approach presented in this article can be considered as a fairly robust conceptual framework for the analysis and explanation of key elements depicting the degree of sustainability of natural resources uses in Switzerland and Southern and Central European countries." (Gerber et al 2008,p .808) Feiock 2013 The paper does not explicitly address any of the three aspects of sustainable development. Positive and negative externalities and public good are mentioned which can relate to environmental and social impacts. DeCaro et al 2017 In terms of sustainable development, the framework is focused on environmental governance it does not address inequality (first aim) and wellbeing outcomes (second aim). Clement 2010 The paper is focused on natural resource governance and not sustainable development per say, so predominantly addresses aspects of the environmental (third aim) of sustainable development. Ostrom 2009 It is said that the framework can help understand the processes that lead to improvements in or deterioration of natural resources. The focus of sustainability in the paper is predominantly on the ability of a forest of water body to sustain on going fish/trees in future etc. Beyond this sustainability understanding, social performance measures are said to be (e.g., efficiency, equity, accountability) and for ecological performance measures are said to be (e.g., overharvesting, resilience, bio-diversity). However, the framework does also recognise externalities to other SESs, which is important. From this, the framework seems to address the first and third aims of sustainable development, but not the second (of measuring impact NIE: Common pool and social ecological systems systems ecological social and pool Common NIE: on wellbeing). McGinnis and Same as Ostrom (2009) Ostrom 2014 Léopold et al 2019 Multi criteria decision approaches show much promise in sustainability analysis. Benefits of such multi-criteria approaches is that outcomes are not assessed only in terms of exchange values, but physical and other criteria. Focus in terms of sustainability is primarily in terms of the fisheries ongoing potential to harvest fish biomass of high value and provide livelihoods. Pollution issues are not addressed (third objective of SD), or inequality (first aim of SD). The focus on the social is limited as it does not assess impacts on wellbeing (the second aim of SD) or capabilities to flourish (similar to Ostrom 2009 and McGinnis and Ostrom 2014). Bettini et al 2015 The tool is helpful in understanding and researching transitions management which is important in the move towards sustainable development, although not explicitly addressing or focusing on any one particular aim of sustainable development. Social, environmental and economic objectives are mentioned in a few places by interviewee participants of the paper. Kolinjivadi et al The capabilities approach could prove to be a very useful tool to incorporate into frameworks addressing sustainable 2014 production and consumption. A capabilities approach may also serve well in picking up on criticality related to certain types of consumptions. An important conclusion from the paper relevant to sustainable development is that in designing a wellbeing focused approach for achieving capabilities improvements, it would be necessary to start by understanding the social context, traditional knowledge, current livelihoods, distributional issues, and the needs and values of ecosystem service beneficiaries and providers. The capabilities approach helps address inequality and wellbeing (1st and 2nd aims of sustainable development). Both the capabilities approach and understandings in realtion to ecosystem services can inform the appraches to sustainable production and consumption (not just water, the focus of the study). Garrick et al 2013 Not focused on sustainable development per say, but water management, the paper does however consider associated environmental and social externalities. Citing Colby (1990) the paper identifies that the politics of water allocation involve trade-offs between economic efficiency and other policy goals, such as equity and robustness (Colby, 1990). Marshall 2013 The paper adreses the costs of institutional change to address an environmental or natural resource issue. The first, second and third aims of sustainable development are not a focus of the paper. McCann 2013 Economic cost aspects in relation to institutional change and environmental policy for environmental and natural resource issues are the focus. The paper identifies that the framework highlights the importance of property rights since transaction costs will be incurred to obtain or retain property rights and since the rights assignment may affect both the magnitudes

NIE: Cost accounting accounting Cost NIE: and distribution of costs. The latter understanding is important in attempting to understand potential distributional impacts on inequality from policies but otherwise aspects or inequality (1st aim of sustainable development) are not substantially addressed. Wellbeing (2nd aim) not a focus of the paper.

Table 12b: Analysis of aspects of sustainable development addressed.

Cluster Study Aspects of sustainable development addressed Kauko 2012 The paper defines economic sustainability; externalities: green; sustainable development and urban sustainability. The definition of sustainability applies the Brundtland definition, but could be tied down more clearly. In general they do mention environmental, economic and social dimensions, the urban sustainability definition is a little more specific. The paper could employ a more systematic approaching to assessing sustainability as approach to assessment was somewhat unclear. The paper identifies and argues that sustainability has a distinct spatial dimension, and so they argue that the appropriate level to set policy; regulation and incentives is the local and possibly regional level (as opposed to national or even higher levels of governance). The current author however, notes that if only focusing on the regional level, global effects from policies that may inhibit global sustainability may be ignored. All three aims of sustainable dvelopment seem to be covered at points in the paper, although perhaps not in as comprehensive mannor as ideally would be undertaken. Dupuy et al 2015 The paper identifies that political ecology, the analysis of common pool resources, and ecological economics, among others, have provided praiseworthy insights into socio-environmental issues. Institutional approaches to these phenomena are identified as still scarce. The paper takes the Commonsian model and attempts to incorporate consideration of the environment (third aim of sustainable development). The paper is focused on natural resource and environmental issues and less focused on sustainable development per say. Sustainable development and relevant metrics to look at etc are not defined as the focus is predominantly natural resources and environment. Elements of power and inequality (first aim of sustainable development) are however recognised and the framework does bring in important social elements of study that need to be addressed. It is said that focussing narrowly in the style of New Institutional Economics on property rights and transaction costs is not sufficient for understanding the complexity of the interplay between rules, norms and their evolution through socio-environmental conflict. The framework provided is said to not be a theory or model but a heuristic framework that can offer a more robust scaffolding for the use of Common’s method, framework and insights to socio- environmental issues. Additionally, in relation to sustainable development, the following is informative: Socio- environmental conflicts are said to directly link to place-specific, livelihood-related issues. Such aspects are said to make the local scale pertinent and a key driver of intuitional change. They demonstrate this though their application of the framework to a case study. This said, sustainable development is also a global concept with global considerations such as climate change and others need global action, protocol and international norms and rules. On this point, the framework by Dupuy et al 2015 is also useful, as they state that the defining characteristic of their proposed framework is its global approach that does not dissociate scales and levels of rules and thus it is said escapes the micro-macro opposition. Classical institutional economics frameworks economics institutional Classical Kim 2007 Valuation of social costs and benefits in relation to sustainability analysis is a real challenge in sustainable development and key to making good decisions for sustainable development as opposed to just economic growth with no consideration of social and environmental impacts. The institutional approaches such as multicriteria decision analyses and other methods mentioned in the paper can play a key role in factoring in non-market costs and benefits (although not perfect) and can be developed to assess things such as criticality in terms of certain types of consumptions and productions and associated costs and benefits which would not come through strongly or reliably enough in cost benefit analysis. Such institutional frameworks have good potential to contribute towards sustainable production and consumption decisions on the ground and as alternative or additional evaluation tool to cost benefit analysis. Such approaches can help the analyst to look at both social and environmental aspects and outcomes in development, but do also have some of their own weaknesses in sustainability appraisal as outlined in the paper. Dimensions of equity and fairness are discussed in the paper and the classical institutional economics approach can help address these aspects that are relevant to the first aim of sustainable development. The multi-criteria apprach may also be usefull for picking up on positive and negative impacts of wellbeing (2nd aim of SD), but also has some limitations as discussed in the paper. The study does address the environment (3rd aim of SD). Ishihara and The paper is not specifically about sustainable development. The paper has a focus on environmental governance so Pascual (2009) addresses the third aim of sustainable development primarily, but there are some discussion on distributional aspects and inequality (first aim of sustainable development). The framework is highly usefull in understanding social context in realtion to the development of social capital (that can have a positive or negative effect on governance and co-ordination). Grothmann et al The focus is in relation to climate change adaptation, which limits applicability to exploring sustainable production and 2013 consumption more widely than beyond this one issue. The study does not define sustainable development, but it is not

frameworks specifically about sustainable development, so you would not expect it too, some environmental (third aim of sustainable development) and equity (first aim of sustainable development) dimensions are considered.

O'Levänen and The paper is primarily focused on sustainable use of natural resources and waste management (relating to the third aim of Sociological and psychology psychology and Sociological Hukkinen 2013 sustainable development). This said the approach seems applicable to exploring social aspects of sustainable development. Hodgson 2008 The paper does not discuss that much in relation to sustainable development, but what there is relates to ecological sustainability (the third aim of sustainable development), but this is limited. Ness et al 2010 The paper acknowledges that sustainability science needs approaches that allow for the integration of knowledge across disciplines and scales. Social, economic and environmental components of sustainability are addressed in the paper. Although said to look at social and economic aspects, using their approach, this is in a fairly particular way. This said the

paper is clearly set out to address sustainability science and challenges. This said, the paper does not explicitly seem to Political Geography Geography Political Darwinian theory and and theory Darwinian look at inequality or wellbeing (1st and 2nd aims of sustainable development).

4. Discussion and conclusions

This paper now attempts to answer the original research questions and identify the contributions of the study. Firstly, we start by addressing the question: What institutional economics frameworks exist in relation to sustainable development?

From review 24 frameworks were found. Most frameworks found could be classed as being from the field of New Institutional Economics (15 studies), only three frameworks were found that apply classical institutional economics. One of the frameworks was based on neoclassical economics. Five frameworks were found to predominantly use social/psychology related theory and two were from Darwinian theory and Political Geography disciplines. Frameworks fell into one of five different clusters: Neoclassical; New Institutional: Common Pool and Social Ecological systems; New Institutional: Cost Accounting; Classical Institutional Economics; Sociological and Psychology related; Darwinian theory and Political Geography. Framework varied in terms of their use as tools and these were outlined for each study and clearly there is substantial variance in terms of uses and contributions of different frameworks.

Secondly, what are the range and nature of frameworks found? And third, what are some of the key gaps and opportunities for developing the area in relation to sustainable development?

The range and nature of the frameworks vary substantially. The majority of frameworks found in relation to the most prominent category New Institutional Economics, are frameworks designed to look at institutional aspects relating to common pool resources or social ecological systems. The predominant focus of these frameworks seems to be on common pool and or extractive sectors e.g. fisheries, forestry, agriculture etc and often there is a strong focus on the user of the resource. Some of these frameworks are very good at scoping out the range of variables in undertaking institutional analysis of such resource systems, such as Ostrom 2011. In terms of gaps, most of these frameworks lack a focus on the end consumers that may not be involved with the actual direct use and extraction activities of the system (i.e. those far away) or supplies further upstream that may be processing and producing products purchased from the extractive activity actors. This was somewhat surprising given the importance of these types of consumers and producers in western societies and for sustainable development, often with complex supply chains where much of the value of supply chains (as well as often pollution) occur downstream of the extractive activity (via processing, packaging, distribution and use phase of final products). There is an opportunity to develop institutional frameworks with a consumer or supply chain focus, and this is likely to be key to progressing frameworks for institutional analysis of sustainable development. In terms of addressing the different dimensions of sustainable development (social, environmental, economic etc) none of these frameworks apart from Kolinjivadi et al 2014, address all three aims of sustainable development, the majority focus on the third aim, and Rudd 2004 address the 2nd aim. It is also worth noting that the majority of these frameworks see institutions as rules and often have a particularly strong focus on formal rules, in terms of informal rules, most of the new institutional studies see these in terms of social norms. Few see informal institutions as cognitive models or values and attitudes. This is another key gap as these types of informal institutions are often particularly important in relation to sustainable development. Many of these frameworks had an embedded neoclassical influence and logic underlying (rationality, selfishness, maximising net benefits) but some diverge somewhat such as Leoplod et al 2019 and Kolinjivadi et al 2014.

The classical institutional economics framework in general tended to have a stronger and broader focus on informal institutions and be quite interdisciplinary and two of the three seemed capable of addressing all three aims of sustainable development. All three frameworks were quite different in how they addressed and conducted institutional analysis, particularly Dupuy et al 2015. This said, the clarity and rigour of two of these three frameworks could be improved and be stronger, some of the NIE frameworks were good in these respects, so there are opportunity for future work to improve here in the classical sphere. In terms of applicability across sectors, Kauko 2012 was focused on property development, the other two frameworks seemed to be applicable to a wider range of sectors. These frameworks tend to reject many neoclassical economics assumptions about rationality etc. Dupuy et al 2015 apply a theory of action that is very different from the simplistic model of rational choice and bring in and focus heavily on concepts such as futurity and relatedness. There is a focus on transactions as the key unit of analysis similar to many NIE approaches.

The sociological and psychology frameworks, provided some useful and interesting contributions. For the Sociological and psychology frameworks there is quite a lot of variance in the approach to institutions. Ishihara and Pascual (2009) focus on collective action and social capital, but understand institutions similar to classical institutional economists. The focus is on the level of embeddedness and power (few other studies address). The framework brings in concepts of ‘common knowledge’ and symbolic power and look at how these influence collective action and the importance of embeddedness in shaping outcomes. Grothmann et al 2013 also apply a definition of institutions that is quite broad. Grothmann et al however, have a very social practices focused approach to institutions. The logic that formal institutions give rise to informal institutions, is however different to classical institutional economics (and may sociological approaches to institutions). Although quite sociologically focused, the framework also uses psychological categories, so it is more social psychological. O'Levänen and Hukkinen 2013 focus on the feedback mechanisms between institutions and mental models, it is the only study to focus directly on actors’ mental models. All of the above frameworks are useful in studying informal institutions and all seemed applicable across different sectors and parts of the economy. The frameworks are primarily addressing the third aim of sustainable development.

The Darwinian framework approach by Hodgson 2008 can be useful particularly in studying specific institutions such as social norms. The framework was very helpful to the current author is raising important institutional questions in relation to sustainable development. The definition of institutions is in terms of rules is less broad than some frameworks. Similar to the classical institutional frameworks they reject many of the mainstream assumptions of neoclassical economics. There seems to be conflicting views on whether the framework is suitable to understanding social phenomenon, this requires further research. The approach by Ness et al (2010) is on formal institutions, the paper has a very top down focus, very different from the Ostrom or O'Levänen and Hukkinen’s approaches. The definition and understandings of institutions in the paper are primarily on formal institutions, so somewhat similar to some of the NIE approaches. The frameworks appear to be applicable across different sectors and primarily address the third aim of sustainable development (but Ness 2010 look as some social aspects of sustainable development also). The approach to researching institutions is very top down.

Overall it would seem that many of the New Institutional Economics approaches have been largely developed to explore institutions in terms of rules (primarily formal, but also some informal such as norms), where as the classical institutional economics and sociological and psychological frameworks have often been developed to address informal institutions (in various forms not just norms) as much if not more than formal. Therefore, it would seem worth exploring the extent to which such frameworks can be used in tandem such as using O'Levänen and Hukkinen 2013 and the IAD in tandem. This seems to be an important area of study and a gap that sustainability focused studies should look to address. It is likely that some of the different frameworks will be incompatible due to very different assumptions or conceptualisations, but there may be some areas where compatibility exists. Another key gap that falls out from the analysis of the review is that more frameworks need to be developed to focus on industrialised supply chains and consumption, beyond common pool, resource extractive sectors and there is need for a particular focus on consumers. The vast majority of NIE approaches are focused on common pool resources or social ecological systems but with a foreground focus on extractive sectors and direct resource users, it would be interesting to see the foreground focus shift and explore the extent to which such frameworks or alternative frameworks can be developed to explore manufacturing sectors and industrial production consumption systems for example. This is an important area to develop the frameworks from the field.

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