Limits to Supporting Security Sector Interventions in the DRC

ISS PAPER 257 | JULY 2014

Limits to supporting security sector interventions in the DRC

Evert Kets and Hugo de Vries

Summary Since 2003, the international community has invested considerable resources in keeping the peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Many interventions were focused on supporting security sector reform (SSR) and on the stabilisation of the volatile ‘militia belt’ in the eastern DRC, but these only achieved limited impact and the security context remains volatile. To explain why international efforts did not bring about the expected changes, the authors examine issues such as the peculiar relationship between the armed forces and local communities, and the neo- patrimonial incentives of the Congolese elite. A largely technical approach that ignored the bigger political picture underscores the failure to fundamentally change the DRC’s security context. The defeat of the M23 rebellion in 2013 was a rare success, but it now threatens to take away the necessary pressure for meaningful reform.

OVER THE YEARS, THE Democratic Province, over the hilly Kivu provinces to or I4S) was rolled out in the eastern Republic of Congo (DRC) has acquired the southern province of Katanga. provinces to support the GoDRC in its the reputation of being a ‘hopeless efforts to build and maintain its presence An important factor contributing to the case’ among diplomats and aid workers in areas from where armed groups had continuing insecurity in the eastern been cleared. So far, however, neither because of the vicious cycle of armed provinces is the inability of the security SSR nor the ISSSS has had a far- conﬂ ict, regional meddling, corruption forces, particularly the Forces Armées de reaching impact on the situation, and the and poverty that holds back the country’s la République Démocratique du Congo FARDC and the GoDRC are struggling development. Since the Congolese (FARDC), to effectively control terrain to stop armed groups from controlling wars formally ended in 2003 with the against armed groups.1 In response eastern parts of the country. signing in Pretoria of the Accord Global to this shortcoming, the international et Inclusif (Global and All-Inclusive community has dedicated signiﬁ cant It was a low point in recent Congolese Agreement), violence has still remained resources to security sector reform (SSR) history when Goma, the capital of North rife for many Congolese, especially in in support of the Congolese government Kivu Province, fell to the March 23 (M23) the densely populated so-called militia (GoDRC) in the past few years. At the rebel movement in November 2012. belt in the east, which stretches from same time, an international security and Although the FARDC did regain the the Ituri district, in the northern Orientale stabilisation support strategy (ISSSS, upper hand during 2013, and the military PAPER

wing of the rebel movement has formally are not merely suffering from a lack of actors are, the easier they can be disbanded at the time of writing,2 the capacity and communities are not merely controlled by private political, economic long-term political consequences of this apathetic victims either. or military networks. recent episode are not yet clear. To better understand the prevailing This neo-patrimonial system is This paper looks at the ways in which insecurity in the eastern DRC, it is particularly prevalent in the FARDC, the armed forces and local communities important to take the neo-patrimonial which is itself a product of years of interact, and the neo-patrimonial nature of the Congolese state and co-option and power-sharing with incentives that guide the Congolese society into account.5 In neo-patrimonial armed groups. Peace agreements elites’ decision making on matters of systems, each member of society, from have commonly included provisions security. It also examines the largely high to low, belongs to mutually obliging to integrate former opponents into the technical efforts that the international social networks, which are usually army. Unlike other peace processes in community has undertaken to support formed around ethnic, geographical, the region, which usually give armed the GoDRC in its attempt to re-establish professional or socio-economic lines. groups only one chance to integrate, its authority in the eastern provinces. These networks are essential for people the DRC’s integration process has been Finally, the paper sets out a number to make a living because they need open-ended. Ironically, the lure of army of political considerations that would connections to access jobs, capital and positions or reintegration packages has actually led many armed groups lend further support to security and other economic opportunities in both to mobilise. stabilisation in the DRC. the formal and informal sectors. Those As a result of continuing rounds To better understand the prevailing insecurity in the of integration, the current FARDC eastern DRC, it is important to take the neo-patrimonial comprises a hotchpotch of former Zairean and Congolese government nature of the Congolese state and society into account forces; remnants of several political- The army and the people who reach infl uential positions within this military armed movements from the eastern provinces (RCD, RCD-K-ML, The reason for insecurity in the eastern system by attracting a large group of RCD-N, MLC, PARECO and CNDP); and DRC is often presented as the state and followers or clients need to ‘feed’ their local Mayi-Mayi militia groups. its armed forces, the FARDC, lacking networks to maintain their positions. capacity to control territory, thereby Perhaps the most convenient way for a It has often been the case that the armed leaving vacuums, which are then fi lled by person to gain infl uence and work their groups have integrated on condition armed groups in search of power and way up is via state apparatus, such as that they could keep their command illegal sources of income.3 The people are an elected political position, the civil structures intact and remain in the same then caught between the armed groups service or, particularly as they wield the areas where they used to be active. and the FARDC, and suffer from human- instruments of force, the FARDC and This has given them the opportunity to rights violations infl icted by both sides. the police service, the Police Nationale continue controlling their old territories – The simplistic assumption is that if Congolaise (PNC).6 Positions in such only this time in a formal FARDC uniform. the state had the support to expand state services are valued resources As a result, the current FARDC is still into these vacuums and the armed because people have a chance to make subject to different command-and- forces were trained and paid, then the an income for themselves and feed control structures and rivalries among the GoDRC would be able to control these their networks. various commands.7 pockets of resistance and the armed groups would be forced to negotiate This has important consequences for This situation has hampered the combat and lay down their arms. This sort of the way in which the state functions. abilities of the FARDC soldiers, who do assessment has been referred to as a The system has fragmented the not always trust their commanders, and ‘technocratic interpretation of violence as state apparatus and, in some cases, led to units receiving confl icting orders. In a law-and-order problem linked to weak privatised it. It may be in the interest of addition, there is sometimes little loyalty state institutions’.4 In reality, however, many of the elites to keep this system or esprit de corps among the various the local dynamics are considerably the way it is: the weaker the state battalions – a key ingredient for an more complicated: formal authorities administration and judiciary and security effective fi ghting force.8

2 LIMITS TO SUPPORTING SECURITY SECTOR INTERVENTIONS IN THE DRC The division of the FARDC also makes supposed to serve.10 Second, even if for SSR, however, tends to stem from it easier for local or national elites to communities consider the FARDC to a misunderstanding of the GoDRC’s infl uence it. Some of these power brokers be a more legitimate fi gure of authority complex restraints that prevent it from work together with the commanders than the armed groups, people will make fully engaging with such a process. The to control politically or economically pragmatic decisions about which side historical trajectory of army formation in important areas, collect illegal taxes to collaborate with. As noted by Kalyvas the DRC and the neo-patrimonial nature or protect certain ethnic groups. On (in reference to communities in wartime of the FARDC and the Congolese state occasion, FARDC units have also made in general) and Verweijen (the DRC apparatus have set certain limits to the deals with opposing armed groups, in particular), people interact with the reform agenda. such as the Rwandan Hutu Forces controlling power in the interests of their To begin with, the central government Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda own survival, needs and convenience.11 doesn’t actually have enough infl uence (FDLR) rebel movement. Over the years, the armed forces have become more Because the FARDC is organised around various geared towards revenue generation than competing political-military networks, the central operational effectiveness. government’s leeway is quite limited This is not to say that there are no FARDC commanders and soldiers who There is no simple ideological dividing line over the army to fundamentally are professional and motivated to protect between people’s loyalties – pro-state or reconfi gure it. Because the FARDC is their people. The neo-patrimonial system pro-rebel, people are usually consistently organised around various competing does not determine everything that loyal only to their own interests, which political-military networks, the happens in the FARDC, and command depend on which side is in control, which central government’s leeway is quite and control does matter to a certain side offers more opportunities and which limited. Taking this into account, four extent. Many offi cers do the best they side is more likely to retaliate against considerations seem to have been can, but their room to manoeuvre is the community should things turn sour. important to the Congolese political limited by the context in which they On occasion, communities have used and military decision-making elites, who are deployed, their position within the locally deployed armed factions for their defi ned the security agenda.13 patronage network and the composition own ends. They have also engaged First, the confl ict with armed groups, of the unit they command.9 in protection schemes with FARDC such as the Congrès National pour In the meantime, to say that citizens commanders to benefi t their businesses la Défense du Peuple (CNDP), /M23 are caught between the armed groups or eliminate competition, in exchange for (which had its origins in CNDP), Allied and the FARDC as apathetic bystanders a part of the profi ts. Democratic Forces (ADF) and FDLR, is and victims is to oversimplify the issue. All things considered, people are not defi ned as much as possible in military People’s connections to armed actors merely silent voices for peace but have terms. To a certain extent, the GoDRC are more ambiguous than that. First, learnt to adapt to the fact that power pitches the confl ict as one between and in marked contrast to the offi cial often comes from the barrel of a gun.12 a legitimate government and foreign- discourse of the model of ‘rebels fi lling Many eastern Congolese have learnt to backed armed groups who are hungry state vacuums’, the armed groups are instrumentalise violence and see it as a for power and natural resources, and not always considered to be interlopers. legitimate tool to resolve confl ict. feed off a non-political defenceless Many of them have their roots in local population. Rwandan-backed armed communities and may justify violence Ten years of ‘Army Reform’ groups supposedly have a more sinister by claiming it is used in defence of local (2003–2013) agenda: to ‘carve up’ the eastern prerogatives. Western states recognise that the provinces (the so-called Balkanisation They are sometimes more familiar to the composition and capacity constraints conspiracy14) and turn them into a communities where they operate than of the FARDC are a problem for the Rwandan-controlled zone of infl uence. the locally deployed FARDC. People stabilisation of the eastern provinces, and The rhetoric about the confl ict is phrased have often regarded the FARDC as have, over the past decade, repeatedly in black-and-white, absolute terms, thieves who abuse their formal authority, urged the GoDRC to move ahead with thereby justifying a fi rm military response. and this has caused some soldiers SSR. The often-heard lament that there The political root causes of the confl ict to resent the communities they are is no political will from the government – related to community grievances, a

ISS PAPER 257 • JULY 2014 3 PAPER

predatory state and confl icts over land, following professional guidelines and identity and citizenship – are more or less controlled by internal disciplinary papered over, because addressing these measures. would require political trade-offs that the Should this happen, it would make it elites are hesitant to make. Moreover, more diffi cult to play factions against one keeping the focus on a military solution another by giving certain commanders requires substantial investments in the promotions or control over profi table armed forces, which creates a source territories.16 Some politicians may fear a of income and patronage for infl uential coup d’état if the army were to function commanders. as a unifi ed, professional organisation. Second, the FARDC should have enough This is one of the reasons why the combat capacity to keep armed groups presidency micromanages part of the from threatening the DRC’s territorial, or FARDC and relies on a better-paid and rather governmental, integrity. well-equipped Republican Guard, which

Although the FARDC should be more combat-capable, the neo-patrimonial system dictates that it remains divided in its loyalties and controlled by political-military networks

Although it is debatable whether even consists mainly of Katangans and others politically motivated armed groups who are loyal to the head of state.17 such as the CNDP and later M23 ever The ﬁ nal consideration is that the FARDC intended (or had the capacity) to carve should remain on standby for the up the country geographically, increased integration of former militia members, local autonomy for certain ethnic and function as a short-term solution communities, supported by the force of to security problems. This approach arms and outside of the control of the seems to have lost some of its appeal state, is a threat to Kinshasa’s political because of pressure from Western powerbrokers. If these communities donors and the realisation that the old turn to sources of patronage outside way of integrating armed factions into of the state – for example, by looking the FARDC’s operations created more to regional powers through their armed problems than it solved. Nonetheless, proxies – then Kinshasa would lose a the idea of integrating armed groups 15 key source of inﬂ uence over them. To and redeploying them to different zones subdue or counter this dynamic, the across the country may still resurface FARDC needs to be strong enough to as a solution of sorts, should the keep the main population centres under circumstances call for it. After all, it is control and the armed groups out. unlikely that the FARDC will be able Third, although the FARDC should to suppress all the armed groups on be more combat-capable, the neo- its territory anytime soon. Therefore, patrimonial system dictates that it integrating them is actually a way of preventing the problem from spinning out remains divided in its loyalties and SOME POLITICIANS MAY FEAR A of control and becoming worse. controlled by political-military networks. COUP D’ÉTAT IF THE ARMY WERE It is in the interests of political and Although there is a common discourse TO FUNCTION AS A UNIFIED, military powerbrokers that the FARDC in the international community that there PROFESSIONAL ORGANISATION does not become an organisation led is ‘no political will’ for SSR and that this along a single chain of command, means the government doesn’t care and

4 LIMITS TO SUPPORTING SECURITY SECTOR INTERVENTIONS IN THE DRC has an attitude of ‘If SSR doesn’t work, The M23 rebellion in 2012 made the too bad’ and that they ‘won’t lose any pendulum swing back the other way, sleep over it,’ this isn’t true, because all and the GoDRC became outwardly this is not, in fact, an ideal position and more compliant with the international in reality the situation is far from ideal for community’s desire to return to a the GoDRC. more political SSR process. Since then, President Kabila has taken every Stalled army reform and the prominent opportunity to emphasise the importance roles of ex-CNDP members in the FARDC of army reform to the stability of the DRC, have seriously damaged President despite the fact that his government has Kabila’s electoral base in the eastern slowed down the process repeatedly provinces.18 However, the GoDRC’s since 2003.19 choices are limited. As a result of the above deliberations, the government has In the meantime, and despite continuing taken, so far, a rather particular approach pressure from Western donors, there to supporting the security sector. is still no realistic long-term plan for In the years between the peace deal in 2003 and the elections in 2006, integrating armed groups into the FARDC was made a priority

Over the years, the GoDRC’s interest in the reform of the FARDC. Ideally, the SSR has waxed and waned, depending composition of a country’s armed on political expediency. In the years forces is informed by detailed threat and between the peace deal in 2003 and capacity assessments, but the DRC has the elections in 2006, integrating armed never undertaken such assessments. groups into the FARDC was made a The desired size and structure of priority to neutralise potential ‘spoiler the armed forces remain open to capacity’ and backlash from rebel interpretation, so the government is not leaders-turned-politicians, who felt they pinned down to a plan with future visions had lost out in the peace agreement. This and benchmarks. As a result, the current position changed after President Kabila’s defence-reform plan is little more than a electoral victory and consolidation of PowerPoint slideshow and reads like a power in 2006. The government then long shopping list to the value of $686 made it clear that it wanted to deal million, mainly for military equipment. with SSR donors in a bilateral fashion, The plan does not address internal and largely side-lined the UN as the control mechanisms, military justice, coordinator of international support for parliamentary oversight, procurement the process. When the government checks, command structures or 20 needed external support to integrate or disciplinary measures. 23 MARCH demobilise the many armed groups that MONUSCO (the UN’s stabilisation signed the Goma agreements of 2008, mission in the DRC) and the main the rhetoric changed brieﬂ y to become Western donors were approached by more inclusive and open to a coordinated the GoDRC to support the armed forces SSR effort. This didn’t last long, however, in two main ways. First, MONUSCO 2009 THE GOVERNMENT SIGNS as the government continued to conduct (formerly known as MONUC) was AGREEMENTS WITH THE CNDP business in a bilateral way and, again, asked to provide operational support AND RWANDA, AGAIN SIDE-LINING side-lined the UN when it signed to the FARDC’s military operations. THE UN agreements with Rwanda and the CNDP MONUSCO has gradually become more on 23 March 2009. assertive and taken a directly combative

ISS PAPER 257 • JULY 2014 5 PAPER

role with the deployment of the Force provided the government with two Intervention Brigade (FIB, explained in specifi c types of security-sector support. more detail below). This suits certain The intention was for these to work in elite interests well, because if the FIB tandem with the operational military and MONUSCO brigades do part of support that MONUSCO provided. the fi ghting for the FARDC, or at least The fi rst type was top-down, country- continue to provide it with logistical wide technical support to the FARDC. support, there is less pressure on the FARDC to reform. Second, international Elements of SSR were already included partners were asked to provide training in the 2003 peace agreement, although and equipment to the FARDC, mainly SSR was only formally adopted by the in a bilateral fashion. The government UN General Assembly as a UN policy stated that it had sovereign concerns in 2008, through the UN secretary about the international support given to general’s report, Securing Peace and the coordination (which the UN would Development. The Accord Global normally undertake) of such a sensitive et Inclusif called for the transitional issue. In this way, political discussions government to engage in army, police could largely be avoided. and justice reform to provide human SSR is defi ned as a countrywide political process to improve human security by employing more effective security actors and laying out a foundation for sustainable development

By adopting this approach, elites security and establish the rule of law within the GoDRC and the armed through effective and accountable forces have hoped to build the army’s security and justice institutions. capacity without actually threatening However, the SSR process soon the foundations of the neo-patrimonial became one-sided, with the GoDRC system. Simultaneously, they have pushing its partners to focus on short- allocated certain projects to the term technical interventions, such as international community and therefore, training, equipment and infrastructure, can claim that progress is being made on rather than on longer-term political SSR. This has led to a ‘train-and-equip’ issues like better governance and approach, but this is only a limited part oversight. Considerable support was of what SSR should be. In essence, given by a wide range of partners, SSR is deﬁ ned as a countrywide such as Angola, Belgium, China, political process undertaken to improve the European Union, France, the human security by employing more Netherlands, South Africa, the United accountable and effective security Kingdom and the United States. This led to the training of FARDC battalions, actors and laying out a foundation for construction of barracks and provision of sustainable development.21 support to root out the many so-called International responses: ‘ghost soldiers’ from the army’s payroll. SSR and the ISSSS However, serious difﬁ culties arose in 2010 (2008 – 2013) coordinating donors and the government THE DRC’S 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF In response to the demands of the took few steps to address command and INDEPENDENCE GoDRC and members of the UN Security deployment issues, disciplinary matters Council, the international community or payment of its soldiers.22 The outcome

6 LIMITS TO SUPPORTING SECURITY SECTOR INTERVENTIONS IN THE DRC was, predictably, disappointing and The international tide turned again resulted in an undisciplined army that in favour of a comprehensive SSR was either unable to resist armed groups approach after the controversial elections or even worked with them in some areas of November 2011 and the mutiny of to divide the spoils of war.23 Despite army units in the east in April 2012. these shortcomings, training continued, This mutiny shattered the already while ‘political’ SSR descended into little unconvincing illusion that the eastern more than handing out code-of-conduct DRC was moving towards stability and booklets to soldiers and supporting shone a spotlight on the fragmentation projects to improve military justice, of the FARDC. Noteworthy, and perhaps which were accepted with lukewarm even instrumental at that time, was enthusiasm by the FARDC.24 the successful advocacy campaign The occupation of Goma by the M23 in November INITIALLY, THE ISSSS HAD 2012 created a watershed in political opinion about CONSIDERABLE TECHNICAL the DRC SUCCESS:

Although these technical efforts of the Congolese civil society’s SSR continued, the UN’s appetite to network. With the support of international 2008 – 2012 push for political SSR with a hesitant NGOs, the network published a widely government abated over the years. In distributed report that called for urgent 2009 the MONUC mandate explicitly army reform. stated that support for security-sector Network members toured North reform, which included the coordination America and Europe with their report, 69 of international efforts in partnership which exploded the international belief PROJECTS WERE with the GoDRC, was a key mission that ‘the Congolese just don’t want IMPLEMENTED, RESULTING IN objective. The mandate also linked the SSR’.28 Controversy surrounding the new ISSSS strategy for the east to the elections, renewed rebellion and civil- 25 broader SSR approach. This seemed society advocacy put SSR back on to hit a nerve with the GoDRC and in the the agenda, and the 2012 UN Security jingoistic atmosphere of the DRC’s 50th Council resolution called on the 1 700 anniversary of independence in 2010, GoDRC to establish ‘a new strategic KM OF ROADS REHABILITATED it decided to defl ect these attempts at partnership with MONUSCO in the area outside coordination. of SSR’, once again linking SSR to the There was strong political pressure on consolidation of state authority in the 29 the mission to do two things: fi rst, to east. By this time, however, the M23 change its mandate to MONUSCO, with rebellion was in full swing and culminated the addition of the ‘S’ (‘stabilisation’) in the occupation of Goma in November 90 indicating that the DRC had entered 2012. Despite these setbacks – or STATE BUILDINGS a transitory phase, where the worst perhaps because of them – SSR was CONSTRUCTED problems had supposedly been solved fi rmly kept on the international agenda as and the country had started moving part of the ‘post-Goma’ peacebuilding process. The regional Framework towards a ‘normal’ state of affairs;26 Agreement, signed in February 2013, and, second, to deprioritise SSR in the clearly mentions it as an obligation for mission mandate altogether. Resolution the GoDRC. 1925 (2010) only mentions army, police 900 CIVIL SERVANTS AND and justice reform as separate technical The second type of support provided POLICEMEN TRAINED processes, which rendered political SSR by the international community to the dead in the water in 2010 and 2011.27 government’s attempts to retake the

ISS PAPER 257 • JULY 2014 7 PAPER

eastern provinces was the roll-out of the an effective and accountable FARDC and ISSSS stabilisation programme in the two PNC in the long term, and the ISSSS Kivus, Ituri and Maniema, after the Goma would work provincially to calm tensions agreements of 2008 and the agreements and help both local state authorities and of 23 March 2009.30 The Goma the communities until the newly trained agreements (where a host of armed troops and policemen could take over groups came together to integrate into security tasks from MONUSCO. If the the army) and the 23 March agreements two processes worked out as planned, (in which the CNDP decided to integrate MONUSCO would have a suitable exit into the FARDC) were indicative of a strategy as well. phase of international optimism about the DRC. The government made all Initially, the ISSSS had considerable the right noises about reform, and the technical success: between 2008 and UN, sensing a window of opportunity, 2012, 69 projects were implemented, to rapidly set up a stabilisation strategy the value of $367 million. This resulted that would support the government in, among other things, the rehabilitation in ‘clearing, holding and building’ in of a network of roads extending over areas affected by confl ict in the east, 1 700 kilometres, the construction more or less along the lines of classical of 90 state buildings and the training counterinsurgency theory.31 of 900 civil servants and policemen. The ISSSS had fi ve pillars: security, political processes, restoration of state authority, return, reintegration and socio-economic recovery, and the fi ght against sexual violence

The ISSSS had fi ve pillars: security; Almost half a million people benefi ted political processes; restoration of state from programmes for agriculture, health authority; return, reintegration and socio- and sanitation.33 However, much like economic recovery; and the fi ght against the SSR process, the ISSSS ran into a sexual violence.32 The strategy would number of serious political problems. kick-in after certain priority axes had First, the peace processes fell apart, been cleared of armed groups. Along and tensions in the army increased these axes, MONUSCO, UN agencies between the integrated CNDP and the and international NGOs would support resurgent FDLR and Mayi-Mayi groups. dialogue between the state and potential The GoDRC was hesitant to invest the political spoilers; build roads to open necessary political capital and address up the hinterland for the authorities; the grievances of local communities, both support administration, police and of which were required if the accords justice in key strategic zones; roll out were to hold. Together with the lack of 24 FEBRUARY socio-economic programmes to provide progress on SSR, this created ongoing economic alternatives to potential insecurity. In this context, stabilisation combatants; set up activities to counter programming could only have a limited sexual violence; and, particularly relevant impact. Second, the ISSSS had a rather 2013 to this paper, support the FARDC by technocratic approach to restoring state THE PEACE, SECURITY AND building barracks and upholding military authority. It provided infrastructure, and COOPERATION FRAMEWORK justice. In principle, the ISSSS would standardised training for civil servants IS SIGNED complement the work done under SSR. and policemen with no consideration The SSR would work nationally to create for where they would be deployed

8 LIMITS TO SUPPORTING SECURITY SECTOR INTERVENTIONS IN THE DRC afterwards, and with little input from the The international community had too leverage the mission now has with the local communities. With little follow-up or many international crises on its hands GoDRC – created by the deployment disciplinary measures, and a state that and seemed to tire of the ongoing of the FIB – to raise the thorny issue of was either incapable of or unwilling to confl ict, so it joined the regional SSR again. Kobler has formally made pay salaries, civil servants and policemen governments to debate the political SSR a top priority for the mission’s often subjected the communities to new problems that formed the basis of the civilian, police and military components, types of corruption. crisis. Consequently, the Peace, Security in line with the PSCF agreement and and Cooperation Framework (PSCF) was UN Security Council Resolution 2098. The international approaches to both signed on 24 February 2013.35 Under this He has managed to rally a number of SSR and the ISSSS were technical framework, regional states supported SSR donors to support a leading role for responses to inherently political problems the boosting of MONUSCO’s capacity MONUSCO in the coordination of SSR. and, as such, struggled to change the to undertake unilateral offensive military The mission also asked the GoDRC situation on the ground. These medium- operations against the M23 and other to provide a clear defence-reform plan to-long-term processes stalled, and armed groups by setting up the Force to match the FARDC’s needs to what operational support by MONUSCO Intervention Brigade. The FIB consists of donors could provide. MONUSCO’s peacekeepers to the FARDC could only South African, Tanzanian and Malawian renewed drive to support SSR may have a temporary impact. The FARDC peacekeepers under the command of an have come just in time to fi ll the gap remained divided and unmotivated, and assertive force commander. created by EUSEC and EUPOL (Europe’s the international community seemed to army reform and police reform support Although the FIB is active, an FARDC slip into a sense of defeatism regarding missions), which are drawing down rapid-reaction force would be trained to SSR and stabilisation. Few international because of the European Union’s budget take over from the international brigade partners were willing to take the political cuts on international support operations. in due course. Of equal importance was struggle to the top in Kinshasa and the fact that the international and regional Second, and predating the M23 events, address the ongoing cycles of violence. partners re-emphasised the need for in 2012 and 2013 the ISSSS was revised Serious ‘Congo fatigue’ was setting in. political reforms in the DRC. Under the to address the shortcomings of its fi rst PSCF, a national oversight mechanism phase. The revised stabilisation strategy Revising the international was set up, through which Kinshasa has dropped its top-down approach and approach (2012–2013) committed itself to moving forward on now takes as its starting point the fact However, the years 2012 and 2013 a number of reforms, including SSR that the root causes of the crisis in the turned out to be eventful. In 2012 the and decentralisation – both critical east are often community-based and tensions within the FARDC and between to stabilising the eastern provinces. differ fundamentally for each location – communities fi nally came to a head. MONUSCO’s resolve seems to have depending on struggles among the local The initial success of the Rwandan- been boosted by the PSCF and its fi rst communities, and between communities supported M23 rebellion in beating back results. The FIB took a while to become and the state over land, citizenship, the FARDC destroyed any remaining operational, but as of the summer of access to natural resources and provision international faith in the progress of army 2013, it has been supporting the FARDC of security.36 reform and revealed the government’s in fi ghting the M23 and the ADF-NALU According to the revised ISSSS, unwillingness to engage with political group with considerable success. communities and state authorities issues.34 The occupation of Goma by By the end of 2013, the M23 was should be brought together to discuss the M23 in November 2012 created a defeated and the communities in their differences and analyse the root watershed in political opinion about the North Kivu seem to have gained some causes of confl ict. It is hoped that this DRC. The badly undersupplied FARDC confi dence in their armed forces. will bring communities closer together fl ed in the face of the M23 offensive, and provide a more realistic basis for As a result, MONUSCO has also taken a and MONUSCO’s peacekeepers stood confl ict-sensitive programming than stronger line on SSR and stabilisation in aside as the rebels entered the town. the generalised programmes that were the eastern provinces. MONUSCO limited itself to protecting its put in place during the ISSSS’s fi rst assets and patrolling the streets, pointing First, the new special representative of phase. Programmes for socio-economic out that its mandate was to support the the secretary general of the mission, recovery and restoration of state authority FARDC, not fi ght in its stead. Martin Kobler, seems to have used the will be based on these types of dialogues

ISS PAPER 257 • JULY 2014 9 PAPER

and, therefore, should be locally relevant On the positive side, the FARDC has and resolve conﬂ ict. defeated the military wing of the M23, The international community must have a frank discussion about the limits within which the Congolese government can, and is willing to, move on reforms

The ISSSS’s security pillar will focus with the support of MONUSCO’s FIB. more directly on damage control at This seems to prove, if anything, that the the local level. In areas held by the armed forces do have a few battalions FARDC after operations, the ISSSS has capable of doing their job in diffi cult proposed to work with locally deployed circumstances if the situation requires FARDC units and the surrounding it. However, this should not be seen communities to set up dialogue merely as a success story of the train- platforms in which communities can and-equip approach. A recent analysis express their security needs to the shows that the FARDC was effective this FARDC and PNC. Training on protection time for three reasons. First, the troops issues will be set up in situ, and the were paid and well equipped; second, the troops were led by specially selected FARDC’s Service d’Éducation Civique, commanders and many of the eastern et d’Action Sociale will be supported to brigades’ senior offi cers were recalled improve civil–military relations. Socio- to Kinshasa, perhaps to prevent them economic programmes will target military from pillaging operational supplies and and civilian families together to increase bickering among one another; and, fi nally social cohesion, and the management and most importantly, Rwanda did not of small arms and light weapons may intervene and support the M23 this time, help reduce armed violence. The revised which fundamentally weakened the rebel ISSSS will also play a leading role in movement’s military strength.37 the new Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration process that was This points to another positive change, launched in early 2014. The strategy also namely the increased political pressure on Rwanda to stay out of the eastern has a new monitoring and evaluation DRC.38 With the defeat of the M23’s framework that brings the various military wing, this is the fi rst time in implementing partners together around decades that there is no substantial a set of qualitative and quantitative Rwandan-supported armed group in benchmarks, which should enable the eastern provinces. This may have an them to measure the broader progress important impact on confl ict dynamics on stabilisation beyond the project- because local armed groups will no output level. longer have their usual ‘bogeyman’ to What next? Caution and agitate against. opportunities At the same time, however, many So what does this new dynamic mean questions remain. IF THERE EVER WAS A WINDOW for the possibility of the DRC effectively The fi rst and foremost question is, will the OF OPPORTUNITY TO PUSH FOR changing track in the coming years? incentive structure of the neo-patrimonial CHANGE, THIS MAY NO LONGER BE Despite the renewed international political system have changed to such AVAILABLE FOLLOWING THE MILITARY enthusiasm, it is simply too early to say. an extent that Congolese political and DEFEAT OF THE M23 For the time being, it may be best to be military elites will actually push to have cautious about the new developments. a unifi ed and competent FARDC? This

10 LIMITS TO SUPPORTING SECURITY SECTOR INTERVENTIONS IN THE DRC is rather doubtful. It may be that, in the not put much pressure on the GoDRC the military defeat of the M23. This may coming year or so, extra attention will be to comply with the national reforms, be a cynical view, but the events of the given to SSR, or at least to training and possibly because they consider this a last decade have instilled precious little equipping certain battalions to better matter of national sovereignty, which faith in those working on security and secure the eastern provinces. With a tends to be a sensitive issue for these stabilisation in the DRC. Nonetheless, parliamentary opposition that is larger governments as well.40 the new situation does present a chance than ever and increased international scrutiny, the government may have no While the M23 was an active threat, Kinshasa other choice than to keep the pressure needed the support of the regional states and the on for the time being. However, what FIB, which forced it to make certain concessions on happens in the long run is anybody’s guess. The GoDRC’s main concern national reforms was the M23 because it perceived this Finally, the government is still unclear for the international community to take movement as a direct threat to its control about the future composition of the stock and decide on the kind of security of the eastern DRC and a proxy force armed forces. The defence reform support to give the GoDRC in the for foreign encroachment. Now that the plan mentioned earlier in this paper is coming years. armed wing of the M23 has disbanded, in effect and has been presented by At the political level, two matters however, it is questionable whether the the military and political leadership to are important. First, the international government will remain as vigorous in the donors for them to more or less community must have a frank discussion fi ghting either the FDLR, with which it ‘pick and choose’ from.41 There is about the limits within which the has repeatedly negotiated in the past, still no clarity about the link between Congolese government can, and is or the various Mayi-Mayi groups, which the Disarmament, Demoblisation and willing to, move on reforms. The neo- it can bribe with reintegration packages. Reintegration process, and SSR. Even patrimonial system that dominates It would also be more diffi cult for the though the government has stated that the DRC cannot be changed from FARDC and FIB to fi ght the FDLR and the FARDC will no longer accept the the outside overnight, but ‘political Mayi-Mayi because – unlike the M23 wholesale integration of ex-combatants, willingness’ is not an absolute – it – these opponents do not hold onto the back door has been kept open varies according to the subject and set positions, but use guerrilla tactics because former fi ghters can join the the powerbroker. International partners and move around the DRC’s immense FARDC through the regular application forests. This makes them a diffi cult procedure, provided they have no could try to outline where small changes enemy to get a grip on. damaging human-rights record.42 maybe made and determine incentives to support these changes. This will be a While the M23 was an active threat, Training continues on a bilateral basis, diffi cult exercise, however, because the Kinshasa needed the support of the and whether or not MONUSCO will be paths of power in Kinshasa are highly regional states and the FIB, which able to reclaim its role as the coordinator opaque. It is important to include the forced it to make certain concessions of the international effort, despite the provincial and local governments and on national reforms. Once the pressure rhetoric, is still up for debate. Since communities in the discussion because is off, though, it is not certain that this the events of 2012, the government this would open up the traditionally momentum will be maintained. And seems to be less outspoken about the Kinshasa-focused discussion and allow the historical precedent is not very wish to work in a bilateral manner with partners, but considering the political voices from the provinces to have their promising. This situation is not improved sensitivities involved, this may still be their say. The ISSSS’s dialogue activities at by the fact that there is still no detailed preferred option. the community level may be a starting long-term technical framework to point to integrate local realities and accompany the required reforms. The In other words, although there have concerns into the discussions at the benchmarks mentioned in the national been a few signifi cant changes in the national level. oversight mechanism of the PSCF are balance of power in the eastern Congo, rather technical and mostly focus on the margins for reform are still narrow Second, MONUSCO should map out numbers of state personnel deployed and if there ever was a window of the agendas of the DRC’s various to the east.39 So far, the neighbouring opportunity to push for change, this international partners, because it is states of the Great Lakes region have may no longer be available following clear that they do not all share the

ISS PAPER 257 • JULY 2014 11 PAPER

same considerations. At the moment, for a joint-donor agenda to be discussed. in charge of what, and to tighten high- there seem to be three main camps. This platform should receive high-level level coordination so that the mission, First, there are the ‘multilaterals’, support and feed into discussions in the agencies and donors do not stray from such as the United Kingdom, Sweden UN Security Council. the chosen strategy.44 and the Netherlands, which work in In terms of programmes, the UN and Finally, it is important to be realistic about a coordinated manner through UN the international community could unite what may be achieved. Because it will frameworks like the ISSSS and have the various existing frameworks into be virtually impossible to fundamentally funds, but relatively little political leverage. a single response to the crisis in the change the incentive structure of Second, there are the ‘bilaterals’, such as eastern DRC. At the regional political Congolese political and military the United States, the European Union, level, there is the PSCF; for national powerbrokers anytime soon, or to get the France and Belgium, which give technical reforms, there is the national monitoring international partners to follow the same support directly to the government and framework; for SSR, there is the new agenda, the most that may be achieved may have more political clout than the impetus from the MONUSCO leadership; over the coming years is a certain degree ‘multilaterals’, but seem to have little and, fi nally, there is the revised ISSSS to of damage control at the local level. Small interest in discussing sensitive political address local confl ict dynamics. These changes may be made through smart, matters, or claim to do so in a bilateral, strategies could be consolidated into a community-based programming that behind-the-scenes sort of way. Finally, single approach with – and this is crucial addresses local needs and by working there are other countries like China – a strong monitoring and evaluation directly with Congolese partners that or Russia, which may have economic framework with political benchmarks to have an interest in improving things. Such interests in the DRC but usually assess progress. These benchmarks changes are worthwhile on their own, abstain from participating in the peace- should not merely be government but they would also afford communities building discussion, perhaps because statements or project outputs, which some security and provide opportunities they consider this an intrusion of the mean little on their own, but instead for them to develop themselves, which, DRC’s sovereignty. should be issues such as the changing in turn, creates the potential to increase It will be diffi cult to move the government perceptions of communities in the east.43 bottom-up pressure on the authorities if the international partners do not fi nd The revised ISSSS has developed a to develop a more inclusive system. some common ground between their framework that includes a number of This may take decades, however, and positions. MONUSCO has recently re- such issues, which could be used as a it remains to be seen if the international launched the Groupe de Coordination base to build on. Going forward, it will community’s patience with the DRC will des Partenaires, which creates a forum be necessary to be clear about who is last that long.

12 LIMITS TO SUPPORTING SECURITY SECTOR INTERVENTIONS IN THE DRC Notes 1 This paper does not discuss in detail the of state survival, Cambridge: Cambridge too opaque for outsiders to have a full view of complex root causes of the confl ict in the Studies in International Relations, 1996.) Neo- what happens. The points are also presented DRC, but instead will focus specifi cally on the patrimonialism varies widely in scope and in a way that suggests more of a rationalised role of the security sector. For more extensive form across countries. or deterministic decision-making process than studies on the wider confl ict in the DRC, see, 6 See, for example,Maria Eriksson Baaz and may exist in reality, and it is also implied that for example, Sévérine Autessere, The trouble Ola Ollson, Feeding the horse: Unoffi cial there is a Congolese government ‘bloc’ of with the Congo: Local violence and the failure economic activities in the police force in decision makers, which may not be the case. of international peacebuilding, New York: the DR Congo,African Security, 4 (2011), 14 The Balkanisation conspiracy theory has Cambridge University Press, 2010; Jason 223–241; Koen Vlassenroot and Hans been cultivated by Congolese intellectuals Stearns, Dancing in the glory of monsters: Romkema, Local governance and leadership and politicians since the country’s fi rst prime The collapse of the Congo and the great war in DRC, Oxfam-Novib, May 2007;and Jennifer minister, Patrice Lumumba, mentioned of Africa, New York: Public Affairs, 2011; Smith, Democratisation and good governance it in the early 1960s. This thesis has International Alert, Sortir de l’impasse: Vers in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A case proved to be remarkably persistent over une nouvelle vision de la paix à l’est de la study of South Kivu province, International the years, and is used by some political RDC, September 2012; and the International Alert, March 2009. powerbrokers not only to protest against the Security and Stabilization Support Strategy 7 For more on the problematic integration formal decentralisation of state functions, (ISSSS) 2013–2017, MONUSCO, 2013. process, see Maria Eriksson Baaz and Judith as foreseen in the Constitution, but also 2 February 2014. Verweijen, The volatility of a half-cooked to mobilise eastern communities against 3 See, for example, the special report of the bouillabaisse: Rebel-military integration and supposed ‘Rwandophone interlopers’, like the secretary general (United Nations Security confl ict dynamics in the eastern DRC, African Banyamulenge community in South Kivu. Council, Report of the Secretary General Affairs, 112(449)(2013), 563–582. 15 Stearns, Verweijen and Eriksson Baaz, inThe on the United Nations Organization Mission 8 The limited fi ghting ability of the FARDC was national army and armed groups in the in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, evident during the various military operations eastern Congo, show that this process has S/2013/96, 15 February 2013) on the held between 2008 and 2012, such as been ongoing for a long time, with regional mandate of MONUSCO states that peace- Umoja Wetu, Kimia I and II, and Amani Leo. powers taking over important local sources of consolidation challenges stem from ‘a serious These operations mainly involved moving patronage from national parties. shortfall in terms of the capacity and the lack FARDC units around the countryside after 16 Infl uential or effective army (and police) of accountability of state institutions’, that the armed groups had already moved out of commanders can be moved by their ‘impunity …is itself a symptom of weak state areas beforehand (having received advance hierarchy to ‘profi table’ areas where there authority’ (para. 9) and that armed groups warning). The armed groups would then are more opportunities to impose taxes or are ‘taking advantage of power and security retake the terrain once the FARDC was collect an income. If they don’t perform well vacuums’ (para. 5, 47). forced to retreat due to the lack of resources or do not pay off their superiors as they 4 Jason Stearns, Judith Verweijen and Maria needed to sustain its presence. Human-rights should, commanders can be moved to Eriksson Baaz, The national army and armed violations were common and many people ‘dry’ areas where there are fewer economic groups in the eastern Congo: Untangling the were displaced. opportunities. See Verweijen, Military business Gordian knot of insecurity, Rift Valley Institute, 9 Stearns, Verweijen and Eriksson Baaz,The and the business of the military,and Eriksson Usalama Project, 2013. national army and armed groups in the Baaz and Ollson, Feeding the horse. 5 Booth (2012) notes that ‘patrimonialism… eastern Congo. 17 Stearns, Verweijen and Eriksson Baaz,The refers to the blurring or absence of a 10 Maria Eriksson Baaz and Maria Stern, The national army and armed groups in the distinction between public [state] wealth and complexity of violence: A critical analysis eastern Congo, 39. the private wealth of the ruler. The prefi x neo of sexual violence in the Democratic 18 During the 2011 elections, the president was indicates a system that combines patrimonial Republic of Congo (DRC), SIDA working repeatedly attacked by his political opponents and legal-rational or modern bureaucratic paper on gender-based violence, Nordiska for ‘letting the Rwandans in’. His decision to features.’ (David Booth, Development as Afrikainstitutet, 2010. dismantle the CNDP-led Amani Leocommand a Collective Action Problem; addressing 11 Stathis N Kalyvas,The logic of violence in civil structure was a result of mounting political the real challenges of African governance. war, New York: Cambridge University Press, resistance to the composition of the FARDC. Synthesis report of the African Power and 2006; and Judith Verweijen, Military business Politics Programme. Overseas Development 19 President Kabila called SSR a national and the business of the military, Review of Institute, October 2012.) In more explicit priority on 23 October 2013 in his speech African Political Economy 40(135) (March terms, Clapham defi nes neo-patrimonialism to Parliament at the occasion of the closure 2013), 67–82. as a ‘peculiarly consumption-oriented form of the national dialogue, which had been of political management, which depends on 12 Helene Morvan and Jean-Louis Kambala intended to address the issue of national the diversion of consumption opportunities Nzweve, La paix à petits pas: Inventaire et cohesion in the light of the M23 rebellion to those groups which offer most help, or analyse des pratiques locales de paix a l’est and the controversial 2011 elections. He pose most danger, to people in power’. de la République Démocratique du Congo – had already mentioned the need for army Clapham continues: ‘The state was needed, Cas de Nord et Sud Kivu, International Alert, and police reform in his inaugural speech on if at all, as a kind of license which facilitated November 2010; Verweijen, Military business 17 January 2001, when he succeeded his access to certain kinds of resources; it was and the business of the military. assassinated father as president of the DRC. not needed, and could indeed even be 13 It should be noted that the points made in this 20 FARDC presentation, June 2013. The budget threatening, as a governing institution in its chapter are partly deductive. In addition to the for civil–military cooperation activities, which own right … personal networks rather than discussions of the literature mentioned in this is supposed to help the FARDC regain the effective institutions provided the best road paper, the authors continually noticed these trust of the local communities, is $2,7 million, to survival.’ (Christopher Clapham, Africa tendencies during their work in the DRC. or0,39 per cent of the total budget. By and the international system: The politics GoDRC decision-making procedures are far contrast, the plan asks for $241 million for the

ISS PAPER 257 • JULY 2014 13 PAPER

air force and $211 million for the navy. Most Republic of the Congo, HPG working paper, military support to the M23’s invasion, and, civil–military cooperation and related ‘soft’ Overseas Development Institute, July 2011; consequently, Rwanda’s main strategic activities depend on funding from international Oxfam, No will, no way; Emily Paddon and donors, particularly the United States, seem organisations such as the UN Development Guillaume Lacaille, Stabilising the Congo, to have put pressure on President Kagame’s Programme, UN Women, EUSEC and forced migration policy briefi ng 8, Refugee government to take a back seat during international NGOs like Search for Common Studies Centre, Oxford University, December operations against the M23. The United Ground. 2011; International Alert, Sortir de l’impasse. States cancelled support to a Rwandan-army 21 See, for example,OECD/DAC, Supporting 31 On overall counterinsurgency practice, see training programme and thereby provided security and justice. Handbook on security US Army Field Manual FM-3-24,2006. a clear signal that Washington recognised Kigali’s culpability. system reform, 2007;United Nations 32 Rather confusingly, SSR was one of the fi ve Secretary General report, Securing peace and components of the sexual violence pillar 39 See GoDRC, Mécanisme National de development: The role of the United Nations of the ISSSS, the others being the fi ght Suivi.Critères et indicateurs de progrès in supporting security sector reform,2008; against impunity, prevention and protection, de Septembre 2013 a Septembre 2014: United Nations Secretary General report, multisectoral assistance and data mapping. engagements pris au niveau national aux Securing states and societies: Strengthening This led some people to believe that SSR was termes de l’accord-cadre pour la paix, la the United Nations comprehensive support to merely a matter of preventing acts of sexual sécurité et la coopération en République security sector reform, 2013. and gender-based violence by the FARDC Démocratique du Congo et dans la région, 22 Henri Boshoff, Dylan Hendrickson, Sylvie and the PNC. Government of the DRC, September 2013. More et al, Supporting SSR in the DRC: 33 ISSSS revised strategy for 2012–2017. 40 The PSCF repeatedly states that support Between a rock and a hard place, Clingendael 34 For an extensive history of the M23 rebellion, to the regional and national oversight Confl ict Research Unit, April 2010; Oxfam,No see Stearns, Dancing in the glory of mechanism will be given ‘in full respect of will, no way: US-funded security sector monsters. One of the direct causes of the the national sovereignty’ of the DRC and the reform in the Democratic Republic of the rebellion was President Kabila’s decision to participating states. Congo, 2011. dismantle the Amani Leocommand structure 41 The minister of defence and his general staff 23 Oxfam,No will, no way; Verweijen, Military within the FARDC, in which many CNDP presented the plan to the ambassadors of the business and the business of the military. offi cers held lucrative positions. This was a main donor states for funding in June 2013. 24 Evaluation by the UN’s Peacebuilding Support direct threat to their independence and led to 42 The national oversight mechanism actually Offi ce of the Prosecution Support Cells, 2013. a clash of arms. mentions that the FARDC intends to recruit 25 UNSC (United Nations Security Council), 35 Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework 16650 new soldiers per year. for the Democratic Republic of the Congo Resolution S/Ref/1906 (2009). 43 For example, at the time of writing, the and the Region,2013. 26 UNSC, Resolution 1925 (2010) states that the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative has just country is ‘now entering a new phase of its 36 See International Security and Stabilization fi nished collecting inputs for a broad transition towards peace consolidation’. Support Strategy, 2013–2017, MONUSCO, baseline study of people’s perceptions of 2013. The revised ISSSS defi nes stabilisation security and access to justice in the two 27 UNSC, Resolution 1925 (2010). as an ‘integrated, holistic but targeted Kivus and Ituri. This baseline will be used for 28 The Democratic Republic of Congo: Taking process of enabling state and society to build quarterly assessments to measure changing a stand on security sector reform was mutual accountability and capacity to address perceptions. The Harvard Humanitarian published in English and French by 13 civil- and mitigate existing or emerging drivers Initiative’s work will provide critical inputs for society groups, including the Congolese of violent confl ict, creating the conditions the monitoring of the revised ISSSS. Réseau pour la Réforme du Secteur de for improved governance and longer-term 44 At present, there is a bewildering array of Securité et de Justice. See www.rrssj-rdc.org. development’. frameworks for support to the DRC, offi cially for further information. 37 See Darren Olivier, Pincer movements, all complementary to one another, but in 29 UNSC, Resolution 2053 (2012). choppers and teamwork: How the M23 was reality they often overlap and all use different 30 On the ISSSS and its effects, see the ISSSS rolled back,Think Africa Press, 30 October benchmarks and indicators. This allows Integrated Programme Framework, 2009; 2013. donors and implementing agents to ‘pick Sarah Bailey, Humanitarian action, early 38 Strong evidence has been provided in and choose’, and link their work to whichever recovery and stabilisation in the Democratic various UN reports that Rwanda gave framework provides the best fi t.

14 LIMITS TO SUPPORTING SECURITY SECTOR INTERVENTIONS IN THE DRC SUBSCRIPTIONS TO ISS PUBLICATIONS

If you would like to subscribe to ISS publications, complete the form below and return it to the ISS with a cheque, or a postal/money order for the correct amount, made payable to the Institute for Security Studies (marked not transferable). You may also deposit your payment into the following bank account, quoting the reference: PUBSPAY + your surname. If you would like to subscribe to the SA Crime Quarterly only, please quote the reference SACQ + your surname.

ISS bank details: FNB, Brooklyn, Branch Code: 251345 Account number: 62447764201 Swift code: FIRNZAJJXXX

Kindly fax, email or mail the subscription form and proof of payment to: ISS Publication Subscriptions, PO Box 1787, Brooklyn Square, 0075, Pretoria, South Africa ISS contact details: (Tel) +27 12 346 9500, (Fax) +27 12 460 0998, Email: [email protected]

Website: www.issafrica.org

PERSONAL DETAILS

Title Surname Initials Organisation Position Postal Address Postal Code Country Tel Fax Email

Please note that the African Security Review (ASR) is now published by Taylor & Francis. Kindly refer to the Taylor & Francis website www.informaworld.com/rasr, subscription inquiries can be forwarded to Helen White ([email protected]). For orders in sub-Saharan Africa, contact Unisa Press, PO Box 392, Unisa, 0003, South Africa. (Tel) +27 12 429 3449; Email: [email protected]

SOUTH AFRICAN PUBLICATIONS AFRICA COUNTRIES* INTERNATIONAL

ISS Monographs (Approx. 4 per year) R130 US$ 40 US$ 50

ISS Papers (Approx. 10 per year) R150 US$ 45 US$ 55

SA Crime Quarterly (4 issues per year) R115 US$ 30 US$ 40

Comprehensive subscription R550 US$ 130 US$ 150 (Monographs, Papers and SA Crime Quarterly)

SUBSCRIPTIONS INDICATE COST The ISS is an African organisation that aims to ISS Monographs only enhance human security ISS Papers only by providing independent SA Crime Quarterly only and authoritative research, Comprehensive subscription expert policy analysis, training

TOTAL and technical assistance.

* Angola; Botswana; Burundi; Congo-Brazzaville; Democratic Republic of the Congo; Gabon, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar; Malawi, Mauritius; Mozambique; Namibia; Reunion; Rwanda; Seychelles; Swaziland; Tanzania; Uganda; Zambia; Zimbabwe (formerly African Postal Union countries). PAPER

About the authors ISS Pretoria Evert Kets worked in the DRC from 2010 to 2013 with MONUSCO’s SSR Block C, Brooklyn Court, unit in Kinshasa and with Protection International in Bukavu. He is currently 361 Veale Street New Muckleneuk, working for MINUSMA’s SSR section in Bamako, Mali. Evert is a historian Pretoria, South Africa from Leuven University and worked previously as a journalist for TV Brussel, Tel: +27 12 346 9500 as a political analyst for the Belgian Defence and as a research fellow Fax: +27 12 460 0998 for Clingendael. [email protected] Hugo de Vries worked in the DRC between 2010 and 2013 with ISS Addis Ababa MONUSCO’s Stabilisation Support Unit (SSU) in Goma and Bukavu. He 5th Floor, Get House is currently a consultant with the World Bank. Hugo has an MA in conﬂ ict Building, Africa Avenue, studies from Utrecht University and worked previously for the Dutch Addis Ababa, Ethiopia Defence Staff, as a DDR and SALW Policy Ofﬁ cer in the Dutch Ministry Tel: +251 11 515 6320 of Foreign Affairs and as a research fellow for the Clingendael Institute in Fax: +251 11 515 6449 [email protected] The Hague. ISS Dakar 4th Floor, Immeuble Atryum Route de Ouakam, About the ISS Dakar, Senegal The Institute for Security Studies is an African organisation that aims Tel: +221 33 860 3304/42 to enhance human security on the continent. It does independent and Fax: +221 33 860 3343 authoritative research, provides expert policy analysis and advice, and [email protected] delivers practical training and technical assistance. ISS Nairobi Braeside Gardens, off Muthangari Road Acknowledgements Lavington, Nairobi, Kenya Tel: +254 20 266 7208 The ISS is grateful for support from the following members of the ISS Fax: +254 20 266 7198 Partnership Forum: the governments of Australia, Canada, Denmark, [email protected] Finland, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the USA.

www.issafrica.org

© 2014, Institute for Security Studies Copyright in the volume as a whole is vested in the Institute for Security Studies, and no part may be ISS Paper No 257 reproduced in whole or in part without the express permission, in writing, of both the authors and the publishers. The opinions expressed do not necessarily reﬂ ect those of the ISS, its trustees, members of the Advisory Council or donors. Authors contribute to ISS publications in their personal capacity. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not represent those of the institutions the authors were, or are, associated with.