UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY (JGi'iTCTTEE CM THE COJGO
MEETINGS
Nos. 1-8
Aug-Oct. I960
EIIGLISH
CONFIDENTIAL
VOT,, 1
UNITI'D NATIONS CONFIDENTIAL Meeting No. 1 2k Aufnist 1960 ENGLISH
UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE CONGO
Meeting at United Nations Headquarters,, ou Wednesday, 2k August 1960, at 5 p.m.
60-20599 The SSCP5TARY-GENERAL; Distinguished delegates, there is still the representative of Ghana missing, but I gue«e that ve can start, aopocially as it will take some time until ve come to questions of substance. First of all, I wish you most heartily welcome to this meeting and to this Committee. Some of you have taken part in the work of advisory committees here before; some of you have not. Under those circumstances, I think that it is right for me to describe to you very briefly how the practice has been developed in other advisory committees0 This is, in fact, the third or the fourth one. As you remember, in the Security Council I said that procedures and other matters relevant to the work of the Committee would be copied from the Advisory Committee established by the- General Assembly on the UNSF operation in Gaze, and that is the background against which I would lika to give you a few indications of how we work. It being an advisory committee to the Secretary-General, the SecretP.ry-General — for purely practical reasons, not as a matter of prestige — is in the Chair. The meetings are not listed in the Journal, and the records are not circulated outside the group of members here present, but you will have yourself verbatim records. The records are, of course, official records in the sense that they can be quoted, if need be* They are part of the documentation. But as this is a closed meeting, there is no publication. We maintain very strict rules as regards publicity. Nothing is said to the Press or to the outside unless that has been agreed. The most important point, however, is the proceedings as to decisions and debate. The rule established, first of all in the Gaza Committee but later followed in, for example, the very important Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, is that we never vote. The debate is an open dabate. At the end of the debate a summary is given by the Chair of his conclusions —• mind you, his conclusions --on the debate, it being agreed that any member who disagrees with the summary or wants to have another view expressed goes on record with that view. That is to say, instead of submitting such and such a decision to a vote, there is a simple, informal summing up which is registered in our record, end anybody who disagrees with that summary goes on record, I can tell you, not as a warning nor even as a desideratum, that so far, neither in the Gaza Committee nor in the Atomic Energy Committee, has any member ever gone on record as dissenting from the Secretary-General. It does not mean that I have run a kind of crazy dictatorship; it means Just simply that we have always managed to thrash out our differences in such a way that it has been quite easy for the Secretary-General to sum up the sense of the meeting. I hopa we will te able to work in the same spirit here. Of course, I do not want to impose on you any procedure. If you want to follow another line, I think that might very well be considered. In that respect, I am in your hands. All I can say is that in these other two committees, which dealt with subjects that are at least as sensitive as the subject which is before this Committee, this other method has proved to be an excellent way to come to a common conclusion* Of course, we are not entitled by either the General Assembly or the Security Council to take formal decisions, and for that reason the procedure to which I referred is also constitutionally the rational one. That is to say, even if I am in complete agreement with the fifteen of you on the line which I have to follow as Secretary-General under the Security Council mandate, it does not unburden me from the formal constitutional responsibility. That is, of course, the rationale of this extraordinary procedure. It is a rationale which I fully accept. It has nothing to do with the fact that, of course, I feel very much guided by the views expressed here. Again, I want to make it quite clear to you that this is not any kind of method of railroading anybody to any opinion. It is a good method to keep you informed and a good method for us in the Secretariat to be in close touch with the views of those delegates who are most closely interested. Before proceeding to the substance of this meeting, I would like to ask if there is anybody who has either suggestions to make or questions to ask on this short report on what has been the practice in previous coranittees of a similar kind. Since that is not the case, I then turn to the questions of substance* I vant to inform you, first of all, about one move, which you have already seen because the papers have been distributed. I sent already, on Monday, to Vice Prime Minister Gizenga a letter which brought up two points. The first one was this Coimaittee, Regarding that one, I felt that it was my duty to point out to him the desirability of having liaison with the Government. According to the pattern established -f and Ambassador Loutfi knows that very well -- a country.which Is, shall we say, the most interested one is not a party to the Committee. The reason is a simple one. Naturally they should retain thsir complete freedom of action and reaction. For that reason, our friends from the United Arab Republic have never been in on the Committee. On the other hand, I have had the advantage of being very closely in touch with Ambassador Loutfi, Foreign Minister Fawzi and other representatives of the country. Again in following the past pattern, I felt that this was the model to adhere to, as it has shown itself to be wise. That is to say, they cannot and - should not, according to what I said in the Security Council, be members of the Coranittee, but it was most desirable to be able to continue the contact, I would say, even on a daily basis during the more critical periods, and for that reason I felt that I should draw the attention of the Congo Government to the desirability of such an arrangement. The letter you have before you is in fact only the notification to the delegation here. As a matter of good form and protocol, I addressed the formal suggestion to the Foreign Minister for transmittal to the Government. I have had no reaction at all to my letter to Mr. Gizenga, nor any visit from him, nor an acknowledgement of receipt. I have heard nothing from Leopoldville on the same point, but I guess that they wanted to take their time to think it over. The other point I raised in this letter to Mr. Gizenga — which also, as you will see from the papers, was raised directly through the normal channels with the Foreign Minister of the Government — is the point of referring to the bases. It perhaps does not belong directly to the immediate concern of this Committee, but I can just as well take this opportunity to make a few comments on the point. I think the text is self-explanatory but I can, all the same, add Just one word. It is quite obvious that, if over a week we have to ask the Belgians for whom these people have been working to leave, there will be immediately a major employment problem. That employment problem is spelled out in budget terms for the Members of the Organization. I have assumed that the Members of the Organization are willing for a while to pay the cost of what in fact is a dole, but I do not believe that the Members of the United Nations would like to keep this going on a purely artificial basis. For that reason, there is a need for an immediate study of what should be done and how it should be done. It is a study that cannot be permitted to delay action but it is a study which should not wait until every legal question is solved* I can say here and now that, after having looked into the matter and having seen the Kamina base — not the Kitona one — it is perfectly obvious that there will be no possibility, nor any sense even, in the Congo Government trying to run the Kamina base as it now stands. We thus have an intermediary period of adjustment, development and so on, which obviously should take place in close consultation with the Government. But, of course, before either the Government or we can enter upon such consultations, we must know what we are- talking about, and I know for certain that I know only 10 per cent of what I need to know, and I think that certainly the central Government in Leopoldville does not know more. Under such circumstances it was natural to advise the Government of the need to instigate this study — it is a very quick one, as you see, a fortnight and to ask the Government to arrange for the proper contacts within the Government for preparatory talks with this group that should work with the problem. The natural man — the man who has the key responsibility in a case like this — is obviously the Minister for Planning and Economic Co-ordination. So naturally I mentioned him. But naturally, if the Government should find that there are other members of the Government or other experts with whom we should deal, we would be quite as happy to deal with them* Anyway, I would not like to do this for very long, because any delay does not mean a delay in the retreat of the Belgian troops but it means an increased cost for all Member nations, and that, from my point of view, is a consideration which also has to be taken most seriously. 8-0.0
If you vlll permit me in one series of presentations to touch upon two other things which I think should be mentioned, I want to read to you the main parts of a letter which has been received today from the Belgian representative, I shall read it in French, and over the eazphones you will then have it in English: "Mr. Secretary-General, I have the honour to refer to my letter of 20 August in which I informed you that the withdrawal of Belgian troops from ths Congo would be carried out within eight days at most* In reply to the request addressed to me yesterday by your collaborator, Mr* Wieschhoff, I am able to confirm to you, in the name of my Government, that the Belgian troops will in fact have left the Congo before 29 August at midnight. I may add that the small number of Belgian troops still in Albcrtville will be evacuated during the course of today. To carry out the total withdrawal of the troops, the assistance of American planes, which was offered to Belgium by your intermediary, will be necessary. For transportation in the interior of the Congo, the Belgian Government requests your support in order that the Sabena planes now in the Congo may be used.
P.S. As I sign this letter, I leam that the Belgian troops have left Albertville." I read this letter to you for two reasons* First of all,' it spells out, in time of days and hours, the eight-day limit to which I -refertrfed in the Security Council. It thus is 29 August, at the.twenty-fourth hour. The other reason why I read this letter-to you is becauee I think that statement made concerning Albertville is enough to make it clear that we need not make any further commento about the stories we have read regarding Albertville and the introduction yesterday of some Belgian military units. To the extent that such an introduction took place it has already been liquidated, as you will gather from this letter received this morning. I would, however, feel that I am in duty bound, in view of the presence here of our friend, the representative of the Federation of Mali, to say that we have no confirmation whatsoever of newspaper rumours to'the effect that there have been any irregularities in the Mali contingent. We have sent the Burmese Deputy Chief of Staff, a Colonel, to Albertville to make a full report on what really happened yesterday; as. soon as we have'the report it is, of course, something which we will inform you about. For the moment, I can only.say that I put a very big question mark indeed against the newspaper dispatches coming from sources about which I have my views. The last point before we turn to the substantive information which I would like to give you and which is, so to say, an introduction to the whole work of this Committee, is also covered by the paper you have before you. You are, of course, fully aware of what tl:s proceedings in the Security Council on Sunday meant. I said that short of getting guidance from the Security Council, it is a question, of course, of following my own conviction. This refers to two questions: the interpretation in law of the previous decisions of the Security Council; and the interpretation of the situation as to the facts in the field. From the paper before you you will recall that the interpretation of the resolutions was not challenged by anybody in their speech, much less in the draft resolution. The line followed when a question mark was put on the stand I had taken was based on another consideration, and that was that my understanding of the factual situation was not correct, that this was not an internal conflict 15-15 because the insurrection had active support from the outside. However, you know as well as I what happened* It was said, but was never followed up. In these circumstances, summing up the conclusions which I have drawn from the debate, the legal office — this is not my paper — has made the study which is now before you. This study corresponds to my own view. I hope it corresponds to the views of the members round the table., but I would like to recall what I said before. If it doos not accord with your views, I would consider it natural, desirable, and even necessary, that you pub your - views on record. Mind you, this is not a question of approving or not approving my stand. This is a question of approving or not approving the conclusions I have drawn from the resolution. In order to be quite clear about the procedural situation, I want again to recall that the finding of the Secretary-General cannot be unburdened on to anybody else, and cannot and should not be submitted to a vote. On the other hand, of course, dissenting views are something which are of importance to any member of this Committee, They are important to me, and for that reason I would be happy to hear such dissenting >iews as to my .conclusions which I have drawn from the debate, and we would certainly all be happy to receive them. Before concluding, I would say that there are two things we would like to do at this meeting, both of which are essential; I think, to provide a background for the further work ahead of us. One is to give you a picture — and General Rilchye of India, who is here with us, will do that --of the deployment of the United Nations force and related problems, such as communication, logistics, the situation which we are facing, and similar things like that* The second thing which I think would be useful, and this will be the task of Mr. Wieschboff, is to give you a picture of, let me coll it> the .ethnic and tribal situation in the Congo which faces the United Nations with the peculiar problem which we have never had to tackle before. Before asking General Rikhye to give us his, description — or through his collaborators to give us his description — pf the Congo and related problems, I would, of course, invite you all to make. Jwhatever obssrvatiens you would like to make on the various points I myself have raised in. my introduction, which from your point of view may have "been on the long eide but which I felt was necessary in order to clarify, what our background is» Could we not do it thic way, perhaps. You may wish to think matters over. This is not a very formal procedure.. We could ask General Rikhye to give us his description, and if you have this or that observation you would like to make, this or that view which you would like to bring out, this or that question which you would like to ask, vs could come back to it. This is not a meeting with an agenda, as you see; for that reason I think that i we are all .happy. I do-not think it would lead us away from good procedure if any observations or suggestions you would like to make you are free to make after the meeting is over. If that is agreeable to you, my suggestion would be that General Rikhye tell us his, story.
Mr* GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): Before the General begins, I have a few questions to askf It has not been possible up to the moment for everyone to read all the documents. Is it possible to modify the procedure somehow to allow us to submit observations which may seem to us necessary, at other meetings?
The SECRETARY-GENERAL: May I tell you that this is an informal meeting in the true sense of the word. I would not impose any kind of .procedure. Any time anyone can give us any information or advice, we are happy to get it. For that reason there are no closed doors; there is nothing that is definitive, where it can be said, "This is everything. We have nothing more to say about it." You have, in the first place working documents, and, in the second place, you will have the complete report of what I have been saying. We shall be meeting here again in two or three days and you can be thinking the matter over, after having contacted your Governments. Under these circumstances I think that you are fully safeguarded, both you and all of your colleagues. 17-20
General RIKHYE: I would like first to introduce the geographical map vhich is in the middle. To begin with, I shall indicate the main features of the Congo. As you see, the western part of the Congo is only about twenty miles wide, and lies upon the Atlantic Ocean. On the north is the other Republic of Congo, with Brazzaville as its capital; then there is French Equatorial Africa and, to the northeast, there is Uganda and Ruanda-Urundi, with Tanganyika and Rhodesia to the east and, to the south, Angola. The main geographical features of the Congo are as follows. It has an equatorial plain -- you can see that, all in green, the main basin of the River Congo. To the south is the province of Kasai, and to its west, the Province of Leopoldville, both of which are a semi-mountainous, undulating plateau-type of country running almost all the way to the soa. To the east is the Province of Kivu, which is fairly high; and to the south is the Province of Katanga, which is not as high as ICLvu but which is semi-mountainous. The main communications of the Congo run as follows. The ocean liners come up the River Congo and go as far as the port of Motadi, which has been opened by our United Nations operation under General Wheeler. From Matadi there is a road running through to Leopoldville. The river is not navigable because of the cataracts below Leopoldville. The river starts to be navigable again by riverboats from Leopoldville right up to Stanleyville. From Stanleyville, the means of communication are by train, which goes as far as Ponthierville, immediately south of Stanleyville; and from there, by the river again as far as Kindu; and from Kindu, we join the railway line which runs all the way down to Elisabethville. There are also communications right across the country. Starting again at Leopoldville, one goes up the river and then turns east to Port-Francqui, and at Port-Francqui trans-shipments are made on to the railway, through Luluabourg, up to the present border of Katanga Province. Trains are not running beyond the Kasai province at present, but the railway line does exist through Kamina to Elisabethville. 21
There is a third major link from tlie Atlantic coast. Starting at Lebito through the Portuguese territory of Angola a railway line goes all the way to ELisabethville. And, of course, there ic yet another way to reach Flicabethville from the Indian Ocean from the port of Car es Salaam, along the railway line which runs through that area up to just north of Lake Tanganyika, then across the lake and to Albertville "by the river steamers, or lake steamers as they are in this case, to join up with the railway system. Although rcadc exist and have "been indicated on the map on the left, outside the cities they are only of natural surface and will not be able to stand up to the United Nations military traffic once we get all our vehicle complement. Good airports exist at all the provincial capitals, and there are numerous DC-3 strips all over the country. I have already covered the provinces, "but I chould just like to go over them once again* Starting from the north there is the Equateur Province and to the north-east the Oricntale Province, then the Kivu Province, the Province of ir:itp.i\;.-i, the Province of Kaeai end Lcopoldvillo — a total of six* I i.'ioul'l like to touch "briefly on the climatic conditions sinca they hc.vc quite a bearing on military operations* The average temperature is 77 degress Falir-Qflticit* Towards the equator it goes up to 100 degrees. Humidity is very strong- It varies from 65 per cent to 91 per cent, and Is heaviest at night. The mornings, as a rule, are always very cloudy, Ac you see, the seasons vary north of the equator and south of the equator. In the north it rains in the months of April and June and then in September and October, and it is just the reverse in the couth. Now a few words on the economic'..wealth of the Congo which has a bearing on the logistical acpects of the Force, -The.following aro available in abundance: forest products, normal tropical crops, a certain amount of animal stock in. Kivu end Katanga, email industries, minerals such as uranium, cobalt, copper, coal and industrial diamond. The next point I want to touch on-is the order of battle of the Force. The Force ici at.present composed of eleven battalions and two more battalions are due in, which will make a total of thirteen, plus an independent company.from Malaya* 22
I see that the order of battle is being distributed to you, and you will note the combat units and the administrative units which comprise the military force in the Congo. You may not be familiar with these symbols, so I will go over this quickly. The first one, the troops, is chart No. 2. Ethiopia has two brigade headquarters and four battalions; C&ana has a brigade headquarters, three infantry battalions and two MP companies; Guinea already has a battalion and a second one is expected shortly; Indonesia has one battalion expected there in September; Ireland has a brigade headquarters and two battalions; Liberia has the equivalent of a double company; Malaya has one company due in at the same time as the Indonesian battalions; Mali has one battalion; Morocco has a brigade headquarters and three battalions; the Sudan has one battalion minus; Sweden has one battalion; Tunisia has one brigade headquarters, two battalions and two company groups; the United Arab Republic has a battalion. Those are the teeth of the Force. Please refer now to chart No. 1, which is the headquarters of ONUC. This operation is strange in many ways. It is certainly among the strangest in military history* It is usual that a headquarters is raised first to plan fan operation and to arrange its logistical support, transport and so on. In this case we put the troops in the Congo first and raise the headquarters afterwards, and we are in the process of raising the administrative units. However, strange as it may sound, it certainly works. We will take the headquarters. This organization has now been finalized and requests for staff officers have already gone out, and you will be glad to know that the hard core had started to arrive about a fortnight ago. I think the chart is fairly clear. The organization is based on the American and continental pattern --a supreme commander with his deputy-chief and a chief of staff. It has a personnel side, a logistical side and an operations side, and then the various specialists such as air staff, medical staff, legal staff, provost marshal and a camp commandant to look after the house. We wonft go into the details of the rest of it, but if you have the time to spare I am sure that you will find it of some interest. I request you now to refer to chart No. 3« Logistics form a vital link in the smooth running of any military force, and so in the Force we have organized different administrative units -- and demands have gone out to the countries as indicated. We want to have a main supply depot where all the supplies are received from outside sources and then sent out to small supply depots in the provinces where they are further distributed to the troops in forward areas. Similary, an ordnance organization is required to go through an identical procedure. Then transport is required, primarily to assist these basic depots, and of course transport Is also required within the units to enable the unit commanders and brigade commanders to carry out their daily operational tasks and routine ad ministratlon. 26
For the movement of all supplies and commodities, the air movement and the movement along the rivers, a movement control organization ia necessary, which we are also in the process of raising. For taking care of the disciplinary aspects of the Force, traffic discipline and other discipline in the in-bound areas, it is necessary to have the Provost Marshal organization. On the medical side, -we already have a couple of hospitals and we are raising hygiene teams, since prevention of disease is a very important aspect of our medical operations in the Congo. For workshops and so on we are primarily basing our operations on existing garage resources, which are fairly adequate. We have asked for a control and supervisory team, which will ensure that the repairs are carried out to our specifications and that the spare parts issued by us will be kept under control and properly and suitably used. We also have an engineer unit, whose task is to plan the accommodation as well as the ancillary services, such as toilets, baths and so on. We are mostly using existing accommodation wherever they are available. This happens to be the time when all the schools are closed and we have been able to use schools practically all over the country, but we will soon have to abandon them when the schools reopen, and go into other accommodations. Whenever we cannot hire them, the accommodations will have to be constructed, and this task will be carried out by this engineer unit, which will use local contractors for construction. A word again on food. We are using the resources which are available in the country in the main, and we are only importing into the Congo what is not available or the type of food that is not available. The food given to all your contingents la to national taste. It is to the basic ration as laid down by the country and plus. It is a better ration than they get in their own countries. Fresh food is available in abundance within the Congo as well as imported by us and sent out by the UN general services from here. To see that they cook their food properly a catering service has been included which will provide them with necessary guidance in , improving their cooking standards. • ; A word on the postal service. Post, of course, is very important for the . morale of the troops. Unfortunately, the system is not working at the moment because of circumstances which are beyond our control, namely the conditions in •27
Leopoldville, vfaich is our base post off ice at the moment* The mail is all1 locked up there but we hope to get it out arid then distribute it smoothly to the 'men. I am sure that you will feel sorry for the trpops because they have not received any mail since they have been in the Congo, but ve have people working on this problem at the moment. . . We have a signal unit which provides us with the necessary means of signal ,. communications all over the country. : Until the present signal unit arrived from Canada we were relying mostly on. existing resources, which were not adequate'. Now this unit is being deployed all over the Congo establishing radio communications • within the provincial capitals to Leopoldville,and producing the main exchange in Leopoldville itself for communications within the city and within our .headquarters. They will assist any brigades that have come without adequate signal communications. This unit has also been geared to provide communications between the ground and aircraft if the existing air control organization fails anywhere in the Congo. We have had to organize a large air transport unit to carry out operational moves of our personnel within the Congo as well as for logistical support. This < air unit consists of ten Dakotas, five C-119s, eight helicopters, some .0mall • • aircraft like Austers, Beavers, Otters and Piper Cubs for purposes of - reconnaissance. This air unit is at the moment located in Leopoldville but is • - being moved to Stanleyville, which is a more-centra}, location and will enable the air maintenance to be carried out easier, . , . I should like to give you some of my impressions of the 12,000 mile tour that I completed of the Congo. During the course of my. tour J visited all the, ,. .contingents and the key places from the military strategy point of view in regard to pur operations in the Congo. . . . . • . ./ Smarting with the province of Equateur, I first visited the Quinea contingent, which was,in.Jbhe Baimingville-Inongo area. They had made a-ylarge contribution " toward creating, peaceful conditions. They arranged the withdrawal ;pf the Belgian troops froijL those areas and there is now tremendous confidence in the local > population.in-the handling of the various situations with, which-they are presented by the UN troops there. To add to their difficulties, six tribes about.forty.miles from Banningyille have started.inter-tribal warfare, but up:.to .time-time that 1 visitecLit, which was about ten days ago, the young Guinea company commander, a lieutenant in Banningvilie, had the the situation fairly well under control. Then I *tf*%3d *ii» Liberian contingent in the north at Libenga. The area 10 /try peaceful and tt has generally not been affected by the serious disturbance* elsewhere. The Liberian troop* were fairly well housed comfortably and the population vat very happy to have them there. Then we cone to the province Orientale, with Stanleyville as its capital. In this area the Ethiopian brigade is deployed* Shey are wall spread «mt as they are fairly strong in numbers and have covered practically the whole of that province. In addition they are assisting our units in the Equateur province, which were rather thin on the ground to begin with. As you know, the UAR battalion has gone to Coqullbatville and is assisting in our operations there. Later they will have to move up to Llbenge to relieve the Liberians as and when aircraft are avilable in the Congo. In the Kivu province at Kindu, the Irish troops were the first to arrive and they were relieved by the Mali battalion within a few days. The Irish all proceeded to Qona and Bukavu. 31
The conditions there were difficult and the Mall battalion there handled the situation extremely well. In fact, there are the largest copper mines outside Katanga eighty miles from Kindu. The population was peaceful and the interests of everyone were being taken care of. With regard to Katanga, you have heard about the setting up of a sub-command at Elisabethville, which Joins the province of Katanga and Kivu. Ifeis was done for very obvious reasons, as Leopoldville is at a great distance, and it takes the Supreme Commander ten hours of flying time to visit Elisabethville and return to Leopoldville. He has set up a sub-command Joining these two provinces. Sbese two provinces have further been divided into four sectors. The north sector being Goma, Bukavu and Kivu. The second sector is Albertville and the west. The third sector is Kamina and the northwest. The fourth sector is at Elisabethville and extends all the way along the railway going to Dilolo on the Angola border. The troops in Katanga and Kivu to begin with. The Irish at Goma and Bokavu are very well settled in very good and comfortable accommodation. The climate is very salubrious and the territory is about 5*000 feet high. They have been able to establish peace and quiet in that area. There are a lot of small industries in Goma, and they were all functioning normally. I did not visit Bukavu. Later I visited Elisabethville, Jadotvllle, Kblwezi and Kamina, and I think you are all fairly familiar with, the situation there. We now have about 4,000 troops there. They are deployed all over the place. Aa a matter of fact, we have 1,500 more troops in Katanga than the Belgians have. We have all the strategic and important places fairly well protected, as well as the railway line, which is very important in that area. Now we come to Kasal, where the Tunisian brigade is located* I visited them at Luluabourg, and it was immediately after the first unfortunate brash they had with the tribe, in which three of their men were injured, one of whom eventually died of his wounds. The Tunisian brigade probably has the toughest assignment, particularly as the tribal war is very close to them. In fact, they are living right in the middle of it. dere, on top of everything else, they have to deploy many of their troops for the protection of the railway lines from Port Francque to Luluabourg, as well as to provide escorts for the refugees. They are usually minority groups of one tribe being taken back to where their main area is. This 32 is quite a tricky operation and very hazardous. They are doing an excellent Job and their morale is very high. In the province of Leopoldville, the military locations are ia two parts. One part is the town of Leopoldville itself and the Nidjili airport, which is about twenty miles from Leopoldville and is the main international airport of the Congo. The second part is the interior of the province. In Leopoldville the Ghana brigade is deployed. They were the first to get there and they are fully committed in guarding various vulnerable points in the city, as well as protecting ONUC headquarters. At Nidjili airport the Sudanese battalion is taking care of the airport together with their colleagues from Ghana. Doulo which is an airport four miles outside the town, was to begin with, the nja.^.n United Nations air base, btib BOW that air base is being shifted to Stanleyville. However, we are using Juali airport for light aircraft and Langali airport for heavy aircraft, such a« the C-119 and any of the hired aircraft that we are using from different commercial companies. With regard to the Moroccan troops, their brigade headquarters is located in Leopoldville and they have a battalion at Thysville, which is deployed all over that area. The second battalion is divided into two parts. One is in the western part of Matadi and right along the coast and the second battalion in the eastern part of the Kikwit area. My main impressions of this tour were that there was no civil administration in existence anywhere and the various military commanders at all levels, from platoon to brigade, were being faced with enormous problems, because people came to them for guidance and assistance. In spite of the fact that these men were neither trained nor briefed for the job, I found them doing it exceedingly well, tackling the different situations in the best possible manner. The morale of the troops is very high all over the place, in spite of the fact that they are working under most trying conditions.
The SECRETARY-GENERAL; Are there any questions at this point or any further information that you would like to get from the General while he is at this table? 33-35
,v. Mr., SLIM (Tunisia) (interpretation.from French): , I should like - to thank you, Mr. Secretary-General, and General Rikhye for all the ., •. information you have given us. There is one point on which I should like, . ; to obtain.some clarification if possible and that relates to the deployment of troops* .It I understand correctly, the Command is divided into ^sectors which sometimes correspond to the provinces and sometimes, corresponds to parts of provinces. Is that correct? I am thinking of, Kivu and Katanga-
The SECRKTAR Y^GEMBRALi .That is correct, and as regards Kivu and Katanga you can certainly see the point of Joining /these two provinces in order to gat .over any kin4 of ambiguity, when, for technical^ practical and . geographical.reasons it was necessary to have a sub-command. -,-There is no sub-command in Katanga* .It is in Kataoga and Kivu. That,in turn, because of the enormous extent,of the area, was -cy-t up into four divisions. There.are .
only practical reasons for this, and there has not; and there cannot be any political overtones to it. . 36
Mr. CABA (Guinea) (interpretation from French): I should like to ask a question concerning the deployment of troops in Katanga. I do not know whether I understood the General quite correctly on the question of the nationality of the troops. I understood that there were only Irish troops there. Are there any others and what is their nationality in Katanga now?
The SECRETARY-GENERAL (interpretation from French): mil, Moroccan, Ethiopian, Irish and Swedish troops, and the great majority are African troops. Taking the Moroccans, the Ethiopians and the Mali forces together, what is the number, General?
General RIKHYE; There are about 2,000 troops in the African contingents.
Mr. LOUTFI (United Arab Republic) (interpretation from French): We were told that there is virtually no civil administration at all in the country. Did I understand correctly?
General RIKHYE; That is right.
Mr. L017TFI (United Arab Republic) (interpretation from French): None at all? - ,
General RIKHYE; No, it just does not exist.
Mr. SLIM (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): I should like to ask some questions about Kamina, where I understand there are some Belgian technicians whose evacuation involves some problems for the normal civilian life of the Congolese population who work there. I would like to know whether there are any workshops or installations which could be turned into plants or factories of a civilian nature which could be permanently productive and valuable for the Congo and in respect of which technicians, non-Belgians of course, but reasonably neutral ones, could be furnished so as to continue the life of the place in some other form and in a manner which could be useful so that the base would no longer be a military one but a productive one and useful in the general economy of the Congo. 37
vouW give a Dumber of Congolese some gainful employment. Can you talk aoout that, or must we await the report?
. 3fre SECREIARY-GENERAL:. My impression is that there are some possibilities in that direction but they have to be fully explored and for, that reason I would not dare to evaluate them before having the report of the experts. However, I would like to refer the question to General Rikhye, who has.a>much more solid and thorough impression of the base. . , , . • , ,
General RIKHYE: I have very briefly described to you vhat the base conaists of. It was constructed primarily for the defence of the uranium mines, and then, in 195^.when uraniujn was found elsewhere there was co longer,any need for the base. However, the Belgian Government made use of it primarily to turn it into the largest air training centre for their country, for tho very.obvious reasons that flying„conditions are excellent all year round, and there is plenty of air space vacant so that it is very suited for the training of new young pilot* without any air hazards. They have also built a very large maintenance base,for the army which they had in the Congo, and it has all sorts of things which go with a military base. For instance it l^as heavy workshops capable of making repairs,to all the types of equipment with which the Belgian army is equipped. It has very excellent workshops for carrying out all types of repairs on the several different kinds of aircraft with which the Belgian army is equipped. The base,also provided training for paratroopers who came from Belgium, agein because it provided excellent climatic conditions for their training. In.the main., _the base,is an administrative headquarters and it has an air component and an army "component. The air component, as I said, had its air maintenance units, it has had a flying school and, what is very interesting, it had a technical school for the Congolese. Young Congolese yere taken into this school for a period of four years.training and thereafter became mechanics. Tfcese were employed in the air school as well as on the military side in the different military workshops, so,that has excellent potentialities to which you were referring. 3B
On the army side, there is a railway track coming right into it, storage space and an excellent tailoring shop which can produce clothing in enormous quantities. There are coal and petrol stores and so on. Besides the Belgian technical population, numbering about one thousand or, together with their families about 4,000, the Congolese number about 4,000 workers and together with their families either 11,000 or 14,000 — both figures have been given to u§. The Congolese live in two main villages, for which elementary schools have been established. Between the two villages there is a school at which boys can study up to the age of twelve years when they are normally sent to one of the technical schools. The base is about 30 kilometres away from the town of Kamina and therefore it is a township by itself. The Belgian army hat) all the civic facilities and has to organize all that kind of thing, for instance the construction of roads, buildings and accommodations. They have a hydroelectric plant about 80 miles away which provides electric power. Besides these schools they have an excellently equipped hospital for the Congolese as well; it is the same hospital and very good treatment is given to them. It is a sort of ideal township providing very good facilities to their own people as Well as to the Congolese population.
The SECRETARY-GENERAL; May I ask one question. You said there are 4,000 workers; to what extent would you say that there is natural work for them once the special military needs are taken away?
General RIKEYE; It would be very hard to find natural work for them once the military aspects of the base are disrupted.
The SECRETARY-GENERAL: We have equipment, we have workmen, but we have to work for nothing. It has to be converted to reasonable uses and that is exactly why the study has been made dfurgence.
Mr. BOLAND (Ireland): I would like to thank the General very much for the account he has given us. I have one point to raise. It has no political 59
•Ignlficance whatever but It tes to.dpjdLth the point which, as the General himself said, is of some importance, namely the morale of the troops •,.. I refer to the postal services. I understood the General to say that the reaoon wby^t&e, postal services have bsen so disappointing up to date is that it has teen impossible to get nail which .is at present concentrated at Leopoldville out to.: the provinces. Am I right in thinking that thess difficulties in Leopoldville are likely to be soon removed and, if they, are, whether tho air and other .jcanmunicafeioas availalde to the Force are sufficient to esnole nail deliveries to.be reasonably regular . thereafter? . . . -„.. . ., . . . -. . ...>-..., •._..,.-.•. • -., -.-;•• ..-..
General BIKST/B;.- I am glad to. inform you that alternative arrangements • have already been made and by the time-.. I. left, about three... days .ago, mail deliveries should be back to nozm.lr :
Mr», CAM. (Guinsa) (interpretation from French): A while ago we were told tha.t iCasai constituted a crucial an . General RIKHYJSt Right now, the other critical areas from the military point of view — I would say Leopoldvillo is at the top, v& ^really have, a,, very . delicate situation there, and I would say that number two is Katanga. The S3CBETARY"GEKERAL-i Leopoldville, Kasa.i and. Katanga s, . • 'r • ! Mr > ^OUTfl . (United Arab Republic) (interpretetioa f r General RIKIHS: The description I gave of the base at Kamina does not quite, apply j the base at Kitona is about one fourth the size and itd problems of course are iu proportion. The Congolese population at Kitona is about ^,000. There la one point I may add nov on the subject of welfare* I should really have given more details* We have already arranged for Radio Leopoldville to give us time on the radio and this service has already been introduced* We have half an hour in the morning, half an hour in the evening and fifteen minutes in the afternoon; nevs in French and English is being put out as veil as music* The SECRETARY-GENERAL; Arc there any further giestions at . . this staget Mr, JHA (India): Mr. Secretary-General, the General talked about deployment of troops In various areas and pockets. He also said that there Is a civil administration. I would like to know if there is any representative of the Government in these areas with whom the United Nations local commander can "be llaisoned. I mean, to whom does he turn if he has any difficulties vhich might need the assistance of the local administration or the Government? General RIKHYE; The administrative heads do exist but they have no control over the administration of any kind. In many cases they have asked the military commander to provide them vith technical advice. For example, the Kindu Deputy Commissioner is one that was appointed by Leopoldville — that is, by the Central Government — and another one has been appointed by the provisional government of Bukavu,, and the military commander had quite a time as to 'whom he should contact. The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I should add, perhaps, that it has been arranged with the Command that civilian officers will be attached to It and they will serve as liaison vith the civilian authorities. Mr. SLTM (Tunisia)(interpretation from French): Mr. Secretary-General, so far we have discussed and touched upon problems, •which mainly deal vith security and the role of the United Nations Forces. Before going any further, I would like to ask this question: Does the job of this Committee also extend to purely civilian operations and technical assistance requested by the Congolese Government and in respect of vhich the Secretary-General has already begun to clear the vay? The SECRETARY-GENERAL: My own viev has been the vhole time that this is one unified operation — only we have not said United Nations Forces in the Conga, ve have said "Organisation dee Nations Unles au Conga". Under such circumstances, I will have to devote a later meeting as to where ve are exactly in a civilian operation. I would not be on my part happy to have this limited to the military aspect* On the other hand, it would be natural to start with the military aspect which., of course, vould be most important* Mr« SUM (Tunisia)(interpretation from French): In these circumstances, I will not push my question any further. It is an important one, but I think we will touch upon it later, The SECRETARY~GENERAL; We can discuss the civilian side of the question during that meeting and that will also be the meeting vhere you •will go back to whatever observations you have* This is a kind, of general Introductory meeting, and that will certainly lead to questions* Let us have an introductory meeting on the civilian operation where ve will reserve time for all questions, either to points I raise or the points emerging from the General1s report* Mr* BITCHIE (Canada): General, I am Just trying to. understand what the conditions must be for the troops in these provinces* If there are no Congolese authorities, who actually preserves, or does anybody attempt to preserve, ordinary law and order, to deal with sort of thefts and minor crimes? Is there anyone in authority at all from that point of view? If not, to what extent are the United Nations Forces involved in this kind of duty? The gECREIJARY^GENERAL! May I give part of the reply, General, and you will follow it up with your broader knowledge from other areas. It has been pointed out to us by the Central Government -«- in fact, by the Prime Minister himself when he was in New York — that there is nothing which in the ordinary sense can be called a magistrature* There are no police courts, no courts functioning and no regular police functioning. It la ,a miracle that a society kecpo 0oin$ -without* -ttwb* ; ho^o that nobody will draw the conclusion that we all can live without them* But, of course, the gap must be filled* From the Central Government rather urgent requests have been made for assistance just In that field* It Is an enormous undertaking, because, as you know, there are no Congolese who have received any legal training; and, of course, it is desirable that .those who man those courts are Congolese and have reasonable legal training or legal, experience* It is very typical and lends itself to some reflections. A couple of days ago a kind of lawsuit was started against the local director of SABENA. The court established for the purpose was an ad hoc court, with three . Belgians* Have you anything to add? . . . . ,: General RIKHYE; The only thing I can add, sir, to that is that there, is very little crime and, generally, there has always, been very little crime. The Congolese, basically, are not Inclined that way. There is very little theft; and really, the fact which generally has, contributed, to peace and order is the presence of United Nations troops* - Mr* ADEEL (The Sudan): Just one minor question* If I understood General Rikhye, he said that he expects the total .strength of the .Force to be thirteen battalions plus the Malayan company. Is that your total requirements or do you foresee a need for. an increase in the Force--that •;.•••: is, Judging by the present circumstances? . .,...; • y.. " General RIKHYE: We consider this Force to be adequate for the .. task we have. I think I gave you a comparison in Katanga. In fact,, all over the Congo we have a far bigger force than the Belgians ever had* This really makes up for the lack of functioning of the local forc.es, poltce; .and : * so on* That is why we have more troops than the Belgians had* We really are deployed at this time nearly everywhere we should be* We are in the process of organizing our road transport, and once that is . . done, then we will really be all over the country* We will tie able tp . -t, organize mobile patrols and show our presence, in fact, all over .the country — i «•''••• even in such places where administration possibly in the olden days never even shoved itself* Iflf Mr. ADEEL (The Sudan): My second question relates to the liaison "between the local commanders and the civilian authorities. I wondered if the tribal chiefs figured at all in this respect. I know the country myself, and I know they can be very useful. General RIKBYE: Yes. Take Kasai as an example. Before I left, the instructions had gpne out from the Supreme Commander that the tribal chiefs should b.e contacted with a view to get them together and prevent this tribal war. As I gave you the example of the Guinea company commander at Bougainville, he had personally contacted the tribesmen and had made them stop fighting each other. Mr. HASAN (Pakistan): Mr. Secretary-General, the impression one gets from the newspapers is that there is some semblance of law and order and administration of Justice in Katanga and that a more normal economic life is running there than in the rest of the Congo. Is that correct? The SECKSTAITir»-GENERAL; I do not know. (to General Rikhye) Perhaps you are better informed. General RIKHYE; From my impressions, yes, in Katanga it is running better than it is running in other places. Generally, the economic life in the Congo has only been affec.ted to the extent where it was being run and executed by Belgian nationals. So wherever Belgian nationals were prominent in the other parts of the Congo and have now left — and they have left in most places — that is affected. The SECHET&RY.-GENERAL: I understood your question somewhat differently, concerning civilian administration, and so on and so forth, and that is the point on which I cannot reply* On the other point, of course, the General is correct. Where the Belgians stayed, the enterprises have continued to run. Where they have left them, nothing has come in their place. It was lucky — and, of course, it wae one of our alma in what I call the Katanga breakthrough — that ve managed to do that without any disturbance of the big industry in EliBabethville. If. it had happened there, it would have meant 20,000 unemployed overnight. Mr. BARNES (Liberia): Mr* Secretary-General, assuming that the Secretary-General is informed of the Conference of Independent African States about to convene in Leopoldville, I am wondering whether any arrangement is being made for an observer for the Secretary-General to be present at that conference, and to what extent does the Secretary-General expect to be guided by the findings or the views of that conference? yhe SECRETARY-GENERAL: We are not officially informed about the conference. We have not been invited to send any observer* As to guidance^ I take very much guidance, as you know, from the African Member States, and, to the extent that the African Member States will reflect the views arrived at at the conference, I cm sure they will guide me. The conference as such is an operation outside the United Nations, and it is through the Member Nations that their views will be reflected in the United Nations* Mr. GEBRE^EGZY (Ethiopia): Sir, from the exchange of questions and answers, first, I gathered that at least in one province there is law. and order, or there is the normal administration of life in the community* In the second place, I get the Impression that in the other areas apparently there is no such ordinary and normal administration of the communities* Thirdly, I get the impression that when the Belgians left the territory, or in the course of their administration of the territory, there has not really been a proper development of civilian administration. At least, that is the impression I get from indications such as that there are no trained administrators of the law. Now, are these impressions correct? Then is it correct to say that the administration of ordinary normal life is not always done in a streamlined manner in Western style? Are there indications that community life as exists in many other parts of Africa has also broken down completely, or are we referring to some sort of well organized civil administration in the sense that it is understood in the Western world? Th.e SECREIARY~GENERAL; I can apeak with some knowledge only about Leopoldville. There/ vlth the exodus of the Europeans, there Is nothing that can be called a regular municipal administration in the European sense, but, as through a miracle, the .community life functions all the same* The city is alive; the city goes on. How that happens I do not know* It must be a very happy temper in the people which makes it possible* In Katanga, or in Elisabethville, the situation in the administrative field — to the extent that I dare speak about it at all — I have already said that I do not know about it, but to the extent that I dare speak about it at all — • it reflects very much the same situation as we have in economic life in an industry, to the extent that all the of ficials "have remained on the spot, Of course, there is at least the structure of an organized municipal 'life* To the extent that they have deserted — -there are Congolese in 'some functions, but there is 'this underlying fundamental weakness/ that no one has legal training and few have legal experience* • ' .'•'•< . • . Mr* HASAN (Pakistan): Is the spread of Ilterac^ the same in ' parts of the Congo or is it more advanced in some parts? SECRETARY-GENERAL; I will refer that question to ' Dr, Wieschhoff. Mr, WIESCEHOFF ; Mr, Secretary-General," of course, as in many other parts of Africa, life is' fairly highly developed in the municipal centres such as Leopoltfville, Stanleyville, Elisabethvilie and others. As one moves into the countryside, of course, it is closer to the traditional.• . lin. e '•''•'' • .••«.!.•. probably than in many other parts of Africa.' Mr. CABA (Guinea) (interpretation from French): I apologize for taking the floor again, but toe question asked a moment ago by the representative of Pakistan obliges me to ask a question of my own. We are told that economic life In Katanga seem* to be better than what is encountered in other provinces and that the administration seems to be in better shape. Some weeks ago Belgium told us that order prevailed there. A while ago the General, in his very precise speech, however, presented Katanga as being one of the critical areas. I vonder how the situation has so speedily deteriorated and how, taking into account this new situation, the United Nations troops can operate at all. The SECRETARY-GENERAL; First of all, thare is one position, that is, the one given in what I said. If one talks about the economic life running, if it is simply, as I said, the fact that for such and such reasons there has not been an abandonment of poets of the type we saw in the Leopoldville area, and for that reason production is going on, we have employment going on* In the question of a region neVralgique, the attention lies on a somewhat different level, and I would like to ask the General himself to clarify why he thinks the situation in Katanga is one which is from our point of view a problem. General RIKHYE; This is what I saw myself, and in fact on that visit Dr. Wieschhoff and I went together to the town df_»Jadotville. This was the day after the Secretary-General arrived in Elisabethville with two companies of Swedish troops. He received a call to send assistance to troops in Jadotville immediately, and he sent Dr. Wieschhoff and myself. The SECRETARY-GENERAL; Just as good as any troops. General RIKHYE; What we learned there we find is being repeated in other places. There is a definite opposition to the present administration or Government in Katanga, and that creates conflict. That is exactly what happened at Albertville yesterday. It happened at Kolwezi, and it is likely to happen at other places. 51 The SECRETARY-u&ridHAL; Aleo, so to say, built*In tensions. Mr. CABA (Guinea) (interpretation from French): Now may I come to the second part of my question. How do United Nations forces operate to tackle this situation? This situation in Katanga seems to be rather confusing* Are we facing Belgian troops there, or does an organized army confront our forces! That is the sort of clarification I would like from the General. The SECRETARY-GENERAL; Subject to what the General may say, I would say that the situation is as follows. We have no Belgian troops opposing our Force. As you know, all of them will be out on the 29 August at midnight, and for that reason they are fully engaged in retreat. The other side of the natter IE that there are the remnants of the old Force Publique which to a large extent are, or are said to be, loyal to the Provincial Government. They are concentrated in the Elisabethville area. They are the troops which have also been augmented by recruitment and which presented what I called the organized armed resistance at the airport. They are sufficiently numerous to be used for such a purpose; they are not a military force in any other sense. However, as our line of entry is the airport, it was enough of a nuisance to create the difficulty which we referred to before the meeting of the 9th. ; The problem which the General indicates is of a different nature. It is unrelated to the Belgians and unrelated to the existence of this group, or Force Publique, which is loyal to the Provincial Government. However, it is the fact that there are groups which, for this or that reason, are loyal to the Provincial Government. There are also groups which are loyal, for this or that reason, to the Central Government; that is to say, there is, as I called it, a built-in tension in the population. ' The United Nations Force is responsible for law and order. That does not mean that we intervene, so to say, merely upon my authority, but it does mean, of course, that we are also a kind of anti-rioting police and carry out the usual functions of a police force, protecting civilian rights. I think perhaps that answers the question. 52 Mr* JHA (India): I do not want to detain the meeting any longer, tut there are Just one or two points about which I wish to seek clarification and which are related to the description of conditions in the Congo. I was referring to the convening of this Advisory Committee. I might «ay, Mr. Secretary-General, that we are very grateful to you for having invited us to participate, and although your communication arrived only yesterday and I have not had a chance to inform my Government and get their reaction, I am sure my Government will welcome the formation of this Committee. Perhaps all of us after this meeting, which you have very rightly called the preliminary meeting, might like to send a report to our Governments on this important subject, because very great public concern about this question is felt in my country. I would like to be able to tell them with as much precision as possible what this Committee is about. You have said that this Committee is patterned on the UKEF Committee, and certain precedents were established then which, I suppose, will be applicable now. For example, you have today given us some very valuable information, the summary of which we would like to impart to our Governments and they will be pleased to learn of this situation. But what is the scope of this Committee? Does it cover the entire field of operations? The policy-making side of the question must be formulated, of course, by the Security Council and executed by you; but even there there might be some subsidiary matter of policy, and it might be possible for us to offer some advice there or you may like to ask for our advice. Then there is the question of the meetings. Today we have received two or three documents which are very important and which will require some study. Ity suggestion to you for consideration would be that perhaps we might fix a day in the week for the meeting of the Advisory Committee, and of course you can always call us earlier if asy need arises, if you think any urgent advice is necessary, or if you wish to tell us something urgently. But this will give us the opportunity of reading the papers and forming our opinions, and I feel in that way we might be able to advise you better. This is, of course, a matter of procedure entirely, but my main concern is that I think Governments would like to know with a little more precision what this Committee is going to advise you about, and in what manner they come into the picture. 53 Of course, I entirely agree, if I nay say so, that we are an advisory committee and that we cannot unburden you, as you nave put it, of your responsibility. The responsibility is yours and you receive your mandate from the Security Council. But nevertheless ve are representatives of Governments and our Governments are interested in this question, .and I would be grateful to receive some clarification. Just one final point. You mentioned the representative of the Republic of the Congo, about whom you have written to the Government of the Congo, and you stated your opinion that he should not be a member of this Committee? I fully appreciate your reasons, but I was Just wondering whether it would look well. After all, in.one month's time the Congo will be a Member of the United Nations> and how would it look if they are excluded from this Committee? In certain circumstances it might be an advantage to have them associated with us. I am not stating my definitive opinion, but this struck me as a possible line of thought for consideration* The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I will try to deal with the ground you have covered, and I will start with your last point* I would say that in this regard I feel bound by the precedent and by what I said to the Security Council. The General Assembly itself took a stand on the UNEF Advisory Committee and they did not make the United Arab Republic a member. That is the only precedent which I can follow. I think there are good reasons why a country who is, so to day, a party to an issue should not be in an advisory capacity tied to the United Nations executive, because there are here two parties. Cfc the other hand, for my part I would feel that it would be very natural if the Advisory Comnittee were to feel that we should invite a representative of the Congo and have his views. It does not mean that the representative is a member of the Committee, but that he has been invited by the Committee. I think that takes care of the substantive issue without putting us in any kind of conflict with the precedent which has been established by the General Assembly. For my part, I would be quite happy to see this take place, and if I aa correctly informed, early in September we are likely to have a permanent delegate on the spot, whatever their reaction may be to my approach now. 5^-55 With regard to procedure, again I fall back on the formulae which have been elaborated In the other Advisory Committees; there have In fact been three. The procedure has been, as I say, geared to the constitutional situation. Member Governments have not been willing, and it has not been the intention of the General Assembly that they should be willing, so to say to share in executive responsibility. That is to say, they have to act in an advisory capacity. On the other hand, I have always followed, so to say, the sense of the meeting. In cases where this has been expressed I have regarded it as valuable guidance, not, so to say, removing the responsibility from those who give the advice and taking the responsibility myself, but being guided by the views expressed. And those views are on record, and when you come to a conclusion or a summing up of the discussion, they are formalized on the record. But any Government can dissociate themselves from the line I have followed. That has been considered to provide sufficient protection in all directions for members of other Committees. They can always dissociate themselves from the matter. They have never positively assumed any responsibility for the decisions taken. In this case I would say, in principle, that the only thing that is excluded from the expression of views of the Committee Is to discuss the decisions of the Security Council, because in that regard, we are obviously all bound by the decisions as they stand. " > 56 However, the executive, the Secretary-General, IB charged with the Implementation, and, as I said the other day in the Security Council, that means that I am necessarily also charged vith the Interpretation, because how can I implement, so to say, unless I draw conclusions as to what has been the intention of the authors of the resolution. The interpretation, therefore, must be made by me* We are not going to vote, because then, in fact, this Committee. would, as It were, supersede the Security Council. . . . But the paper you have before you is very typical. I have informed the Advisory Conmittee about the conclusions which I have drawn from the discussion In the Security Council. You can challenge it. You can say, "We feel that you go too far" or "We do not feel that this is right", and so forth. That Is valuable advice and can very well appear on the record. Whether you agree or do not agree, we have our record. But it is valuable advice and it leaves untouched toe authority of the Security Council. That is to say, we have the authority of the Security Council deciding on the policy lines; we have the authority of the Security Council mandate to the Secretary •General as executive* But in hit day-to-day development of policy under the Security Council mandate the Secretary •General relies on the advice of this group. He relies on that advice in the form which I Indicated, without any transfer of responsibility but leaving the possibility, openly and directly, for you to disassociate yourselves from his line if you feel that that is indicated. That has, as I said, worked in the other Committees and I believe that you will find it to be a very reasonable formula in this case. As regards the scope, I would reply that, from my point of view, none of the executive functions in this case is excluded from advice. I would say the natural development would be that we keep you informed as broadly as possible about all major developments or developments on which we feel that there may be different views. It is a somewhat cumbersome procedure for you and for us, but the value of the whole operation 10 that you ore kept fully aware — not ae much ae 57 we, but at least on all essential points. It is good for you because you are all parties in one way or another to this operation and you should know what the total picture is* That is to say, from my angle, there is first of all general information, and second, drawing your attention to points on which I feel advice is of special need* On the other hand, you on your side, in the light of general information or whatever you hear or read in the papers, can bring up any questions for clarification, for amplification or for whatever kind of reply we can give to your thoughts or suggestions. That ia to say, there is. a very free initiative on the side of the members. You will have the general background which we give you; you will have before you certain suggestions put forward indicating how we look at it but also asking for your advice. With this background you should be free to ask any questions relating to the operation which you feel you' should ask, whether they emanate from these discussions or from information you have in other forms. I think that gives you the whole width of this approach as I see it* Mr. JHA (India): Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary-General* I think "™~^*"~>™1*™™" . •/.! .' this is-precisely what I wanted, because that, then, really gives us a certain; . . .T ' .-..'• idea of where we actually stand in this Committee. What you have said is completely satisfactory from our point of view. , Mr* SALL (Federation of Mili) (interpretation from French): Thank you, Mr. Secretary-General, I shall be quite brief. When I came here I had received < . some news, principally from the Press, of rather alarming nature concerning the Mali troops, and I was very happy when you offered information which caused my anxiety to vanish. I wish to personally thank you. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: As soon as the report from the Burmese Colonel is received, we shall make it available to you. Mr. HASAN (Pakistan): Can we inform our Governments tha.t it is not your intention to call these meetings anywhere but in New York? 53 The SECRgTABY-QENERAL: I will not give you any promise on that point* A situation may develop where there nay be good reason for you to take a first-hand look at It. If BO, I suppose ire shall have to charter a plane. But for the moment I shall have to be here/ for other reasons, as you know. But under those circumstances, I will be very happy if you will give me advice; then I will not disappear to Leopoldvllle. Mr* WIRJOPRANOTO (Indonesia): I would like to wait for a while before making any observations, for two reasons: first, of course I would like to contact my Government; and second, I think it is also important that up to the present we do not know the official reaction of the Government of the Republic of the Congo following the last Security Council meeting. So, with all this material, we need to have some idea in which direction we have to form our minds in order to give our best contribution The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I fully appreciate that, Mr. Ambassador; but, Just as we in the Secretariat are in the unhappy position of having to implement without having the advantage of very clear interpretations — just as today we have to make our own interpretations — so we have, in the best interests of the Congo and of the Central Government, to go ahead even when we do not receive from the Government the clarification which we would like* And in view of those various difficulties, such reactions are sometimes a bit slow in- coming out. On the other hand, we unfortunately cannot wait, because if we did wait everything would break down and they would be the first to suffer. When, for example, it has been said that in this or that respect there has not been proper consultation, I think it could best be summed up in this way, that we have been eager to consult but we have not been able to wait for the reaction, if we were 'not to let the whole operation break down. In the same sense I warn you here that again and again I may have to take a stand not because I like to take a stand without guidance, especially from the Central Government, but • simply because the course of events is such that I am forced to act. Then, of course, the guiding principle is that we act with the best possible analysis and evaluation of what is in the interest of the Central Government and of the Republic. May we now ask Dr. Wleschhoff to give us a little information, which is badly needed and necessary, on the tribcOLand ethnic situation. 59-60 Mr, WnsCHHDFF; Mr. Secretary-General, I believe that it would be very tempting to give an analysis of the over-all ethnic situation in the Congo, but I will Just leave it at a few general observations as far as they appear to be relevant to the United Nations operation in the Congo. Speaking about tribal groups and tribalism in Africa, one of course enters upon a sphere of discussion which quite likely is regarded with some contempt, particularly in African circles, because the word "tribalism" has only too often been used recently in order to degrade, If I may say so, African society. Obviously., we are not approaching this problem in this way. Nevertheless, for an understanding of the over-all operation, it has to be kept in mind that there is no section of Africa which is as tribalized as the Congo. 61 First of all — and I have in mind that there are many representatives here particularly from the vest and north African regions — the situation In the Congo, by virtue of Its whole geography to which General Rifchye referred, has a setting which ie different, shall wa say, from that of Ghana or of Guinea In so far as the splinteriz-vfcion of tribal groups has been, In this particular geographic situation, much more natural than elsewhere, and, so to speak, centrifugal forces have been very great* But on top of that It must be said that, the Congo being a large area and having beou directed politically over the last thirty or forty years In such a way that political forces have not come to the fore, it quite clearly does not have anyvhore near the political or national direction that we find elsewhere In Africa. That is a fact which goes back to the history of the Congo ovi»r the last fifty or sixty years* Bo, whatever the motivation, the factor of triballzatlon and spllnterization in the Congo is a concrete factor which of course, as has already been indicated by General Rikhye, has a very wholesome feature in so far as in the general breakdown — if that is the right word --of civil administration traditional forces, it has, so to speak, filled the gap, and is primarily responsible for the maintenance of such order as in fact exists* Another factor in this whole situation is that the urbanization, which in other parts of Africa has led to what is commonly called a detrlballeation, particularly in the large centres such as Leopoldvllle pr Luluabourg, has not been effective in the Congo for the mere reason that close links were consciously retained between the village of origin and the metropolitan centres, both by the administration and by the strong tribal society which existed, to such a degree that, for Instance, the African settlements around Leopoldvllle are almost divided by particular tribal groups* So the detrlballzatlon in Africa has hardly affected even the metropolitan centres* I must point out another factor, and that is that in those areas of the Congo where industrialization occurred — as, for instance, in the Katanga, in the area of Kasal, particularly in the Leopoldville province and even In the Equateur region around Banningville -- the Industries have for the most part depended on the import of labour from other tribal groups. And this import of labour from other tribal regions has brought about in these particular areas a disequilibrium. This is particularly noticeable in the Luluabourg area, where we have heard recently so 62 much about tribal disputes in which, as General RUcbye has indicated, the Uhlted - - - Nations forces have been directly involved* Luluabourg and the area arpund it is traditionally inhabited by a group of people known by the name of Lulua. Into this area have moved very very strong forces of Balube, coining from the northern parts of Katanga, particularly in the area of Albertville and, indeed, all over. They have just moved towards the west. These Baluba, during the Belgian period, were, shall we say, there under the Belgian authority. But the Lulua themselves, having retained rights to their territory under traditional land tenure, did regard and do regard the Baluba as foreign elements who are interfering with their own traditional life, and of course in the laet ten or fifteen years a good many rivalries have been built up as the result of the fact that those who worked in the mines were, comparatively speaking, financially better off, and thus Jealousies arose in the minds of the Lulua. One could, of course, pursue this further, but I believe that I have given an idea of the situation* Here we have a conflict which now is confronting the United Nations Force, and which will be confronting those who are going into the area to re-establish normal civilian administration. The same conflict exists, of course, in other areas, and we can already see the first signs thereof in the recent somewhat over-exaggerated events in Albertville; the Baluba inhabiting the northern parts of Katanga are quite clearly in conflict with the so-called Lingda group -- there are many tribal names given to it -- inhabiting the area around Ellzabethville. I believe that one could not go far wrong in saying that gradually this conflict might very well develop into a more complicated affair where political and tribal problems were mixing in such a way that they would be exceedingly difficult to disentangle. Without citing too many other examples of the sort mentioned by General Rikhye in connexion with the Banningville area, may I perhaps point out that this underlying tribalism is, of course, fully reflected in the political life of the Congo as it emerged as the result of the elections prior to independence. The parties presenting themselves for election were almost all, with a few exceptions, tribal parties. There were in the field fifty parties competing for the 1JO seats in the Legislative Assembly, and most of them were relating themselves to one very specific locality. There are only two parties that have made an attempt to go beyond the tribal lines. One, of course, is the Mouvement National Cpngolais. 63-65 which again Is, unfortunately, somewhat split on tribal lines, and the other la the so-called HJNA party, vhloh has made an attempt to go across the nation but; with very little success, In so far as It succeeded In getting only seven votes. Consequently, the whole structure In the Congo -- and I should like to say this particularl..»'.' y to the African representatives here --is more splinterized, more triballzed, than anywhere else in the African continent for reasons which I have tried to explain. Of course, one would have to go much deeper Into It In order to have a complete and full understanding. 66 jhe SH3RET/Ufr-&!WM^ ; OJiis la only a sidelight on the problem with which we have to deal as a fact and which, of course, for our Force requires very great tact and very great understanding In order really to maintain the kind of neutrality which Is that of the Force, serving, as I put it in the Security Council, as an umbrella under which the national life can take a natural course toward constructive events. This is what we had on our agenda. I think we have Hept you for over two hours, which is a good solid meeting even by UN standards. Since we are continuing on the same subjects plus the civilian activities next time, it may be that you feel you had enough for this afternoon* Otherwise you are quite welcome to raise whatever points you like. Mr. CABA (Guinea) (interpretation from French): Mr. Secretary- General, this meeting has been so interesting that we would like to remain even much longer to hear the information that you have to provide and perhaps, for our part, to present some suggestions. I should like to know whether there is, as has been stated In the Press, Katangese coinage or currency in Katanga. I understand there is an issuing Institute, a Katangese Central Bank and a Katangese currency or coinage. SECRETAIg-Gl&'EHAL; I am Informed that they use Congolese money. General RIKHYE; We have been paying all our bills with Congolese money. The SECRETARY-GENERAL! You know that they have made a. law on the Central Bank. I do not know, however, that it has proceeded in practice. I know that the Belgians have dissociated themselves from that law. I propose that we meet again Friday afternoon, if that is all right with you. I would suggest that we meet at the same time because it allows for a full day at the office and then we can meet for a couple of hours. The meeting rose at 7«15 P*m. Meeting lid. 2 26 August I960 UJGUSH UNITED HA3TQNS ADVISORY - \ ON THE CONGO Meeting Held at United Nations Headquarters on Friday, 26 August 1960, at 5 p.m. 60-20725 2. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I believe we can start, and my suggestion would be, if it is convenient for you, that we begin by following up the review of the factual situation as to the United Nations operation, and to return after that to discussion, to questions and to such observations as you may wish to make on what we put before you at the last meeting. If that is convenient to you, before we go on, in order to have a full picture, tf I will therefore invite Sir Alexander MacFarquhar to review what we have done and where we stand in the civilian field. Sir Alexander MACFARQUHAR: Members of the Advisory Committee will have seen the Secretary-General's paper on the organization of the civilian operation. That civilian operation has not begun in any formal sense in the way of a considered response to requests from the Government of the Congo. So far we have been in a period in which we have been meeting essential requirements in health services, telecommunications, airport operations, port and river clearance and emergency food supplies. That in itself has involved quite a lot of people. Pbr example, in the health field, there are about 150 people in the form of Red Cross teams helping to keep a number of hospitals going. The initial difficulty of there being no public security and a lack of courts is still with us. With the appointment of General Kettani, who is also the Deputy-Commander of the Force, to be the United Nations adviser to the Prime Minister, who has requested it, for the Force Publique, now the Arm^e Nationale, we hope that there will be an improvement in public security. We hope also to present a name very quickly to the Government on the judiciary and to get the courts reopened. In this connexion, it may very well happen that there will be a number of requests, possibly for groups of magistrates or groups of police, from countries. However, even in this emergency period, a pattern has begun to build up within the basic principles of technical assistance, which, as you know, require a request from the Government and the offering of assistance in the form in which IAO Government wants it. The Government decides on the acceptability of the experts and decides on the objectives of the exercise. 3-5 The "bulk of our operation in the Congo will have this character, but the potential size of the operation in some fields involves a need for a general oversight -which will be given by senior experts attached as a consultative group to the chief of the United Nations civilian operation. Despite the necessity of meeting day to day emergencies as a priority, we have established a considerable and useful collaboration with the Government, which has nominated the Minister of the Plan and Economic Co-ordination as its point of contact with us. One example of this collaboration has been that .!•'"'.. • '•.'?;• - • early in August, at the request of the Government, the mixed economic commission visited four provincial capitals to determine what the situation in respect of the public services was, their minimum requirements, what was needed to revive the economy and matters of that kind. Naturally their conclusions could only be, at this stage, in the most general terms, but it will interest the Committee, I think, to know that that mixed commission included two central ministers, five of their senior civil servants and four United Nations representatives. They found that some decentralization of banking facilities was very urgently necessary, that rural credit had broken down and that public works, even those which had already been budgeted for, were not moving forward, as a result of the lack of credit. As'a result of that exercise, the Government has asked the United Nations to station a representative, a civil affairs officer, .'.(.- ' . . / ' ..'•''.' \ • • • • at the headquarters of each province. In public works, apart from the works already budgeted for tn the ordinary processes of government, it has been foreseen that there may be a necessity for additional works to deal with unusual unemployment arising from the general character of the situation. In this connexion, we have heard only today that thirteen of our engineers have been making a tour of the country to select the most urgent works for execution, to develop specifications for them and to suggest administrative machinery. They are due to return to Leopoldville tomorrow, and whatever plans they have to suggest will then go before the Cabinet for consideration as to the execution of public works. In the field of public administration, we have not got beyond undertaking a survey of the Central Ministries and bureaus, which is in hand at the moment. This has been done in agreement with the Ministers of the Plan and of the Public Service. Another field in which there has been some activity is the transport system. The immediate necessity, of course, was to clear the river and get the ports working. There was, about ten days ago, a press release indicating that we now have twenty-nine feet of water in the river, that pilots are available and that ships can come up normally. Since then a survey has been made of what is required for the further future. The general result that has come out is that everywhere the equipment and the workshops are good and adequate \ and that there is a great deal of good skilled and unskilled labour which will train very readily. What is lacking, of course, is supervisory personnel, and we have with the Government at the moment a proposal for meeting some of the more emergent needs. For example, to keep the railway diesel locomotives running, we need maintenance crews, and for the workshops for both the railway and the port, the Government will need some additional skilled personnel. The assistance of the United Nations has been given also in the field of public finance, in the form of good offices, and you will have seen the press releases about the United Nations placing $5 million at the disposal of the Congo Government to finance their normal imports and in accordance with normal exchange controls. There have been difficulties — very natural difficulties — in meeting the fortnightly payments to labour. These have been overcome by a series of improvisations, and this money should help to stabilize the situation. The earnings from this money, in the form of Congolese francs, will go into a special account which the Government will be able to use for meeting current budgetary requirements. The.other matter in vhich the good offices of the United Nations have been very much appreciated -• there has been an expression by both parties, the Congolese and the Belgians, that the operation has been very successful -- has been in preparing an agreement for the liquidation of the Central Bank of the Congo and of Ruanda-Urundi, which is located in Brussels. There will how be a separate national bank, a Central Bank, for the Congo. The delegations have expressed a hope that this kind of operation can be repeated, and it" is very likely,that such services would be required in connexion with the formation of a currency board and of new exchange controls inside the Congo. I mentioned rather earlier that a number of senior experts have been accredited to the Chief of the United Rations civilian operation to exercise control over experts in fields where there is likely to be a large programme. When the Prime Minister of the Congo was. in New York he asked the Secretary- General for provision of advisory services at the highest levels of government, and, it is the intention that these consultants should also be available from time to time for that purpose as may be required by the Government. At this stage there are too many indeterminate factors to make any reasonable estimate of the cost of the United, Nations civilian operation possible. But it might be useful to indicate some of the principles which are likely to guide us. The Government has already established a point of collaboration with us, and we would hope that that point could become a single point for the determination of their needs and for the reception of offers of assistance, and that they would look to the objective advisory services of the United Nations in these functions. From the instances I have already quoted, I think that that has already begun to happen* The United Nations will not expect to finance all the requests which may, In this way, be channelled through it. Already in a number of cases our most useful services nave been our good offices, which are valuable but inexpensive. Again, it is very likely that in the case of State monopolies and public utilities there will be a need for external technicians and supervisory personnel, but •6 there our expectation would be that as these enterprises have operated in the past on a commercial basis they will be able to continue to do so and to pay for any services that are provided. However, there are very considerable tasks ahead in training alone. There will, for instance, be no Congolese doctor for another two years, and only eighteen at the end of five years, so that this involves a very large programme of training for doctors, teachers, civil servants, engineers and so on. Here a possibility is and in some other fields as well, such as industry, it may well be that after the country has decided on vhat it wants to do, possibly on the basis of United Nations advice or possibly on other advice, the costly element of the actual implementation of the operation could become a matter for one of the many bilateral programmes. This is a pattern of technical assistance which has been established between the United Nations and the bilateral programmes in other countries, and irfeeed so far as the Congo is concerned we have already had offers by some countries to channel assistance through the United Nations. The SECRETARY-GENERAL; As you see, we are still at a very early stage; we have in fact covered only the points of extreme urgency. This has in all cases been done in very close co-operation if not with the Council of Ministers, with the Minister of Plan and Economic Co-ordination, who has been charged with this special case of co-ordination. We also see 'that in some cases there are quite a lot of people involved which makes it a somewhat cumbersome administrative operation because of numbers. It is natural that in such circumstances it is necessary to have a central administration for the various branches of the United Nations activities, and I stress United Nations activities, not administrative activities under the Congolese Flag» If you have these health teams spread over the country, you must have somebody in Leopoldville who is responsible for their co-ordination, their work, their welfare and their integration. This has led to the creation of consultant posts attached to the chief of the civilian operation in Leopoldville which has given rise to some discussion. I think the examples, however, show clearly what it is all about. As Sir Alexander mentioned, Prime Minister Lumumba when he was here asked for top-level advisers. I was not willing to go the full length for several reasons, which I think are very understandable, because I took for granted that top-level advisers in this as in other cases, although requested and desired by the Government, would very soon be the targets of this and that kind of criticism because of suspicions and the natural difficulties that may develop when senior people of very great experience have to fit into a foreign framework. For that reason, I met the Prime Minister's demand only half way by saying that people who would be responsible for our own administrative activities in the various fields would be so recruited that they would be qualified also to give advice, on an ad hoc basis and that at the direct request of the Government. That has given these consultants their second role, the first one being as I said to be responsible for the adminictration of United Nations technical assistance in the various fields, ttte second one being to serve as advisers at the call of the Government in specific cases on an ad hoc basis. So far from superimposing on the Congo Administration any kind of outside administration under the UN Flag, we have again in fact -only, gone hillf way in meeting their requests. I think, however, that the system we have is a sound one, is better • constitutionally and politically, and also in many ways it is a cheaper one, because if we were to have top-level advisers in the Congolese Administration, that would not do away with our need to have people responsible for our own administration activities and we should in fact have to have two instead of one. I would like to add as an aside that the recruitment of this kind of people is not quite easy, because nothing short of the best should be used. In all cases, as you have gathered from the report, addendum 5> where we, so to say, collide with a specialized agency, it is the local representative of the specialized agency who is made consultant. In order to enable us to play that way — to combine the local representative of the specialized agency with our man, we have agreed with the specialized agencies to consult before they appoint their local representative. The result of this is that, for example in the field of finance, the man who will finally take up this post on the spot will be jointly approved by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the United Nations* The advantage of this arrangement to the Congo Government is obvious; it means that they get, so to say, a third function, where the man is also the qualified liaison officer for them in 10 their negotiations with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The same holds true in the case of WHO, FAO and so on. In this special case we have had the advantage at an early stage of using — and I can use this as an example — such a highly qualified man as El Emery, a governor of the National Bank of Egypt, as the man carrying the confidence of the Fund, the Bank and the United Nations. He is now taking part in negotiations in Geneva and is likely to continue with some of his activities in Europe on the same lines, I do not think there is anything more to it, "because the only really novel element is this group of consultants; the rest is regular technical assistance although on an unusually broad scale and with an unusual accent, because it is not a long-term constructive work of the type we have in other countries, it is simply the bare necessity to meet the absolutely imperative immediate needs. We hope to have very good co-operation with the Minister of the Plan and Economic Co-ordination, as is apparent also from what Sir Alexander said about this Joint committee which has been going round the country and has presented what I myself find an exceedingly interesting and provocative report. There we had an example of how this can and should be operated and following the recommendations of this committee to the extent we can, we shall also work hand in hand with the Minister of the Plan. Sir Alexander talked about what It will cost* I have no idea how far this will take us moneywlse. It will depend, first of all, on the requests of the Government, as they set the limit, but also,. naturally, on the acute needs* You may have observed that the Government has requested rather extensive provincial representation in the civilian field, of the United Nations. Again, for-: reasons of economy and natural prudence, we have been leaning over backwards and have, in fact, only met the request, I would say, to one third of the extent requested. Naturally, at a later stage, when things are more balanced, we may be able to go further than we have gone so far. . I should perhaps add one accent. All of this does require as an absolute condition that there is a reasonable degree of order and security maintained. You can very well understand that it is impossible to have this and that kind of activity if people are in constant danger. And for that reason, Just as on the one Bide these civilian activities requested by the Government are necessary to create conditions where we can phase out the force, on the other hand the force is necessary to protect these civilian activities at the present stage where things are still a little bit on the troubled side. Any questions? Any further information on this point that you would like to have? . ' * ' ' ' • *' V Mr. HASAN (Pakistan): I have one small question. Sir Alexander MacFarquhar referred to bilateral agreements for technical assistance being offered to the Congo by various countries. Now, would these agreements be directly between the Congo and the Government concerned or would they be channelled through the United Nations? The SECRB?TAKY-GEHSBAL; There is, of course, no legal obligation for any Government, neither the Congo Government nor any other Government, to channel everything through the United Nations. And for that reason we are faced with the possibility of having United Nations agreements which may cover also bilateral essictance under the United Nations flag — a little bit of the type w« have in the Mskong project In South-East Asia. We may, however, aside from that also have purely bilateral agreements. However, there is one point which, so to say, tends to press in the direction of agreements with some kind of United Nations stamp* Some of those who approach the authorities bilaterally run into the same difficulty 12 we have met, and that Is that it is exceedingly difficult to find out what the real needs are. To dump "X" number of experts on the country without knowing where they can be ueed or whether they can be used does not make much ecnse. I have met examples --no names --of parties with very considerable possibilities to investigate the situation, saying, "We will be quite happy to help. Tb2 Congo Government has addressed us, Ohey have not been able to spell out what they need, and we must come to you to try and find out what they really need, where we should put in the assistance." Even in such a case what would emerge would be bilateral agreement. It is quite obvious that this is bilateral agreement guided by information which has emerged from consultations between our people and the Government; that is to say, it would represent a curious kind of "half-way house", assistance given on a bilateral basis but within the framework suggested by us and established by us in consultation with the Government, Mr, E*i3AN (Pakistan): dat is true, sir, because you would probably know the needs as well as any individual country could, The SECRETARY-GENERAL i So far we have known them, Mr« HASAN (Pakistan): I think it will continue to be so at the present ~"; * time, Mr, ADEEL (Sudan): Mr, Secretary-General, I was wondering whether any investigations are being made about the Congo's financial and economic position, past, present and future, for one has always heard that the Congo is a very rich area. We have been brought up, at least, in that knowledge in our country, and now we discover, or ona gets the feeling that, it is totally bankrupt, I wonder what has happened to this wealth which we have heard so much about, The SECRETARY-GENERAL: Well, it is certainly potentially a very rich, country; but when civilian life breaks down, of course, you may run out of cash. But I wonder, Sir Alexander, if you could give some more data. We have had quite a lot of studies made on it. 13 Sir Alexander MACFARQUHAR; The Congo has been In the middle or rather very nsar the end of a ten -year plan, running from 1950^1959 > a great deal of which has actually been executed. At the beginning of that period they were keeping their budgetary receipts ahead of their budgetary expenditure, but they did suffer a recession In 1957-1958, and there was; some relaxation of -expenditure control . apparently around that time. So for the last two years there has been a deficit on the budget. There has also been a certain amount of flight of capital, not surprising in all the circumstances; but basically the Congo continues to be a rich country and should be able to recover Its financial situation* SECRETARY -GEW3I&L! Caere is, in that context, one question, I think, Sir Alexander, we might go a little bit further into, and that is the unemployment situation. I would suggest, in that context, you go back to the recommendations of the Committee, the final conclusions* It is a very interesting illustration of the civilian problem. Apparently we do not have the papers here, but we will send for them and get back to it later. It was a series of recommendations from this Mixed Economic Commission, with two cabinet ministers, several senior cabinet advisers and four of our people, on how to tackle the unenployinent problem which, of course, lies very close to what you. say. We have at present major unemployment in the Leopoldville area and also ir> acme other industrial centres* Mr^ AEOUD (Morocco): Since you have Just mentioned that the urgent needs aia not well known, io there any methodical survey being conducted? If not, is tbore acy intention to do so? Besides this, I have another question as to the field of priority, according . to the critical situation which faces the United Nations in this field of priority. The SECP.E1AHY-GEHERAL ! On the first point, there have been earlier rorveys made, but I think most of the results, quite frankly, are to be found In "*UDsels, not in the Congo. For that reason we have felt that there would be a need -- and it was discussed with the Prime Minister when he was here — for a new i.4-15 survey of natural resources and related matters* We have not so far got It started. Ihe situation does not invite that kind of work just now; but it is definitely in our plans if it meets with the wishes of the Government; and that would then, of course, be put at the disposal of the Government, because they would hove to take decisions as to what should be done on the basis of the findings, Mr. ABOUD (Morocco): What are the problems of priority which face the United Nations in respect of the most critical areas concerned? The SECRETAHY-GEHER.U; They were really mentioned by Sir Alexander here as we have experienced them so far0 The first priority was health, because there we are really running, into a very serious situation* The second was, in a broad sense, communications. First of all, the port of Matadi and the river traffic. I think that covers the two first priorities, in fact. Sir Alexander MACFARQUHAR; The next would be education. The SECFxETAHY-GE?iERAL; Yes, the next one, but that is a little more long term. -- education. But the first two things, as you see, had to be done overnight. For example, in Leopoldville there was a very serious and dangerous health situation — no water control, no spraying, no doctors, no hospitals. We were risking, as you also remember from previous discussions a few weeks ago, famine in the Leopoldville area. Both things are now gone. Both things are in hand. 16 Mr. HAS AM (Pakistan): : There are two small questions, Mr. Secretary- General, One arises from what Sir Alexander said Just now. He said that in the first eight years of planned development — of the ten-year plan, from 1950 to 1959 — receipts were ahead of expenditure. That would be a most extraordinary situation, in a country which is developing, to have receipts exceeding the expenditure. Sir Alexander MACFARQEJHAR: I am sorry, perhaps I misled you there. In the ordinary "budget, expenditure and revenue, they were keeping ahead on the revenue side. But financing of development involved .additions to the : public debt. . Mr. HASATT (Pakistan): The other small question was this. The representative from Morocco mentioned priorities. Why would priorities be indicated in that part of the plan which is still unimplemented? Would it . not be wise to follow those priorities In the ten-year plan? The SITRETARY-GENERAL; It is quite certain, Mr. Ambassador, that we can seek guidance from the old plan, but the old plan was the Belgian plan and was geared to their concept of the economic development of the country, V 7. am not at all sure that the Congolese people and its leaders will exactly follow the same pattern. If I remember correctly — I have not looked at it now for some time — there was fairly heavy emphasis on industrial development, for example, but the Prime Minister when he was here put a very strong emphasis on agriculture. He wanted, so to say, to speed the development of an agricultural Corporation and the organization of markets for agricultural produce, and so on and so forth. I guess, as an economist looking at the Congo, that it is a typical case where the basic production must be and remain agricultural, and for that reason this emphasis on the side of the Government is quite sound. Then Industry becomes a kind of superimposed thing which, of course, could develop to the extent that major investments have been made. But whether there could bo at present a consistent industrialization programme or not is something I would not like to Judge. I think that that is a policy decision which must be basically that of the Government* 17 Mr. LOUTFI (United Arab Republic): I am not sure if I understood the explanation. General Kettani has been appointed adviser to the Prime Minister for the Congolese Force Publique. IB that with the agreement of the Prime Minister? The SECRETARY-GENERAL; It is more than that. He requested it, and we gave our consent with the sole condition that he should retain.his post as deputy to the Supreme Commander, and that was not contested but accepted. That means that automatically he will be on our side, with two hats — Deputy Supreme Commander and member of the group of consultants which is, so to say, the panel from which these various advisers are drawn. As I say, we were happy to welcome it. Mr. LOUCT1 (United Arab Republic): How large is the budget of the Con®>? The SECIgfllACT-GENERAL; The regular budget, that is. Mr. LOUTFI (United Arab Republic): Yes. \ Sir Alexander HkCflAPQEJHAR; The ordinary revenue was running at $222 million a year, and expenditure at about $272 million. That was in 1958« Then there was extraordinary expenditure of $13^ million, Mr. ABOUP (Morocco): Are those francs? Sir Alexander MACFARQUHAR: No, in francs it is 11.1 billion, 13.6 billion and 6.7 billion. Mr. LOUTFI (United Arab Republic): Would you repeat that please? 18 Sir Alexander MACFARQPHAR: The budget results for 1958 were, an ordinary revenue of 11.1 billion francs equivalent to $222 million, an . ordinary, expenditure of 13.6 billion ($272 million) and an extraordinary expenditure of 6.7 billion francs ($13^ million). Mrr IOUTPT (United Arab Republic): What happened at Matadi to. make it necessary to clear the river again? Was there some trouble there? The 3ECBETAITf«GI'mRAL: Silting and lack of pilots. But, if I may use this somewhat informal term, Mr. Loutfi, our old friend Specs Wheeler cleared it up quickly and veil. Then we got it going quickly. Mr«_JHA. (India): I feel that we have heard a very important statement from Sir Alexander MacFarquhar, Mr. Secretary-General. This certainly represents the most creative side, if I may say so, of the activities that have been entrusted to you by the Security Council, and we were very interested to read the paper that you circulated some time ago and also to hear the statement. If I make a few comments it is not really as a specialist or someone knowing very much about the activities, but I would like to share our general thoughts on this question* If I may say so, I think that your general approach1 of caution as regards the inducting of too many personnel too soon is a very wise one for obvious reasons. Katurally there has to be a full survey of requirements and of the possibilities of finding personnel, but your idea about the consultative committee fteems to have been very appropriate — I suppose the precise name is "group of consultants". In general I think that these operations have made a gpod beginning as you have already provided emergency personnel. It is also very satisfactory to learn that everything is being done with the consent and full co-operation of the Minister for Economic Co-ordination and, I presume, the whole of the Congolese Government. Now it seems to us that, there being no civil administration, or practically none, and there being very few specialist personnel in the country, your activities in this field will cover really the whole range of administration, and perhaps it may be useful to make some distinction between what might be called the general administrative services and the higher specialized services. 19-20 It seems to me that so far as concerns the Induction of personnel this, naturally, will have to be personnel from outside and will have to be sent for various purposes — finance, economics, trade or whatever it may be — and will have to be provided pretty soon. But we also feel that in regard to the general administrative services — which migit comprise, say, the magistracy, the running of the courts, essential medical services, essential public health services, essential public works, and that kind of thing — we should try to be very cautious about inducting outside personnel. And I do not mean to say that the personnel for this is available in the country now. But here the rule should be just the opposite: that is to say, we should try to get as few people from outside as possible. Let this be the main responsibility of the Congo Government. I realize that at present they have not very many educated persons who could really take charge of general administration, at least in all its branches, and this is the idea I want to put to you «»«- that it seems to be very appropriate if the United Nations could offer to the Con@D the immediate starting of some institutes for the training of administrators in the middle and lower ranks. 21 If a good scheme Is put out, and I am sure It could "be with all the resources at your disposal and all the co-operation that you have from the specialized agencies and that I am sure you will get from many Governments, it might be possible to turn out several hundreds of these people within a period of perhaps a few months, six months or whatever it might be, and these could be put into positions in the general civil administration. Of course, the higher personnel will probably have to.be found for the time being outside. I feel that it would be desirable to have thQ leaut number of such personnel in the general administrative services — I am not referring to the higher specialist branches of the administration — from outside. I think we could maka a very constructive contribution by starting one or two institutes at such places as you might consider suitable to train and make available to the Government a large number of people in the middle and lower ranks of administration. ;• • ..-) • As regards the cost, you hava referred to various requests from the Government of the Congo and at their request you have provided various services. It seems to me necessary that at .the very initial stage there should also be an agreement as to cost, otherwise wa are ^ikely to get into very serious difficulties later on. Speaking as one who is unfamiliar with all the facto, very tentatively I should say that the cost of .providing personnel for general administration or even for the training institute --or most of the cost — should be borne by the Government of the country. As a matter of fact, there should be a very clear-cut agreement about costs. Of course it is a different matter if the Government does not have the money; it may havjs to take a loan from some source. But in principle we should have a very clear-cut agreement as to the sharing of costs. Mr. Secretary-General, I am sorry. I have been rather long, but these are the few remarks that I wanted to make for your consideration, The SECRETARY-GE!gHEAL: If I may clarify the situation, I would say first of all that our guiding principle has been exactly the one that you mentioned: as few people as possible from outside. It is not a good idea to 22 introduce elements which In fact nay tend to slow dovn the growth of the national administration or create tensions within it. As regards training, I feel that is something which is bound to come, because a crash programme of instruction in administrative jobs is badly needed due to the lack of such education from the Belgian time* We have not been able to organize anything of the kind yet. The consolation I have tried to feel is that already by having good technical advisers, they may see it as their task to train their Congolese colleagues as much as they can, thereby getting at least a nucleus of training centred inside the administration, and BO forth. That will not give them over-all training, but it may give them specialized training, and it will help at least in the beginning. I should like to mention one point. I do not know exactly how it has worked out, but in the beginning we suggested to the Government that the Luvanium students who had vacations, as veil as those from the other state university, should work at various administrative jobs and in that way they could get extra training. Even if they switched from branches in -which they vere previously engaged, it may be that their more important future is in the new line with which they become acquainted during this vacation Job in the Government service. As regards costs, I agree with you that we should not in the UN budget or in the Technical Assistance budget take over the nomteV administrative costs of the Government. Their budgetary situation in the long run is definitely such that they should be able to carry their own administration. I think it would be a very bad thing and that it would lead in the wrong direction if ue switched the burden and in that way took over part of the national budget. There are different categories which we must keep in view here, . First of all, as a matter of course, these so-called consultants are in fact secretariat officials, and ve do not charge the Congo Government for anything, even if we lend them to them for advice. That advice, of course, is for nothing. It is just an added responsibility and an added job for these people, whom we would have engaged in any case. Secondly, as you know there is a firm pattern for technical assistance people, and that pattern will be followed in this case. Then we have an intermediate category 23 •which has not been used at all so far In the Congo, and that Is the so-called QPEX one, where the Government pays the regular salaries,, and if there Is a need to fill a gap up to the salary the man would take in the international market, we fill that gap. All the rest are employed directly by the government on contracts from the Government. They have hired quite a few non-Congolese for various administrative Jobs, including Belgians, who are of course on contracts, and people employed on contracts should be paid by the Government. That is to say, we have a small nucleus of people on our budget who render a service to them, and that I tliink is quite natural. We have technical assistance, which runs exactly in accordance with the same rules which apply to any country. We have OPEX, if and when we come to it, ^hich will run in accordance with the same rules which aPP^y to other cases. Finally, we have people whom \» may recruit for them whom they hire on contracts and they pay them in the same manner as any officials employed in their administration. I think this does meet your wishes and it shows that we are on lines which in fact are quite conventional. . May I go back to what I mentioned before; we could not thoroughly explain It because we did not have the paper with us. I now have the paper which sets out the results of this mission vtoich has been going around under the leadership of two cabinet ministers. I said that it would be of* interest to the Committee to know the recommendations regarding unemployment, I shall translate this from th3 French: "The Mission wishes to recommend to the experts the following procedure. nl. An inventory of big and medium-sized enterprises, whether industrial commercial, agricultural or others, which are still functioning. A study to be made of their problems so as to forestall any stopping of their activities and to forestall any addition to the number of unemployed from those industries and enterprises. "2. An inventory of big and medium-sized enterprises of various kinds Vhich have stopped their activities. An immediate study of their problems and recommendations as to steps to be taken in order to reopen the activity. 2^-25 "3. An inventory of public works the execution of which has been suspended because of recent events. Again recommendations expected for steps to be taken in order to resume those public works. nk. An organization of public works specifically chosen in order to provide for the employment of contract workers or day workers who still would be unemployed after execution of measures proposed under the previous points. "5. Direct assistance in case of remaining unemployment." Well, it is nothing too different from all the countries which have experienced unemployment, but I must say that what is good and striking is an approach which starts out quite realistIcally by measures to stop any further suspension of activities; it goes on to reopen all the enterprises and factories which may exist; it goes on from there first to the reopening of activities in public works, and only as a fourth point it discusses public works especially for unemployment purposes; the fifth and last point is a system of dole. This seems to me to be a very well balanced approach from the Government side, and as a matter of course our psople will meet these requests to the extent we can. Here we have a report from our ovn people vhlch says that these proposals have been endorsed by the Council of Ministers" and ^that each Minister concerned has got instructions for immediate execution on thsir side of the recommendations. We will of course, respond in the same vay. Unemployment is a little difficult to analyse at present. There are figures which emanate from the International Labour Office and which are higher than the figures I will quote here, but these are the figures which our own experts consider as valid. I think they are probably on the conservative side. They are more encouraging now than thay were only a few weeks ago. This would show at present a total of real unemployment of 23,500; in Equateur Province, 1,500; in Orientale Province, U,000; in Kivu, 3,000; in Kasai, 3,000; and in Leopoldville, 12,000. Mr. CAM (Guinea) (interpretation from French): Mr. Secretary-General, I listened with a good deal of satisfaction to the statement you made on the civilian operations of the United Nations in the Congo. We wish to pay a sincere tribute to those responsible on the international level for bringing to fruition the United Nations mission in the Congo. I am confident that these States will continue to assist the Congolese Government to circumnavigate this difficult cape. My question has two sides. Which are the Member .States of our Organization that participate in the technical action of the United Nations, nnd which are the other States that are assisting the Congo now on the basis merely of bilateral agreements? I think this is a notion which ought to be more clearly delineated. It is of great interest. This is my first question, and in order to save time I should like to link it with the second. We remember that the Congolese Government appealed to some Belgian technicians and officials to remain in the Congo and continue on the job. Was this appeal heeded? Are there any Belgian technicians that are continuing to serve? 27 The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I can reply to the last question. There are quite a number — although highly insufficient, all the same — of Belgians who continue in their Jobs. There has not been any considerable reflux of Belgians to the Congo, to my knowledge. There have been discussions between the Central Government and certain professional groups, for example, doctors, for the return under Government contracts to the Congo of Belgian doctors. The last I heard about those talks was that they had not led to positive results so far, but, you see, things are in motion, so to say. I should like Sir Alexander to fill out the pattern as regards the national distribution of these various operations — the people participating in these various operations. Sj.r Alexander MACFARQUEAR; This is a pattern which is changing from day to day, but as at the moment we have about lO^ doing various types of technical assistance. More than half of these — 53 — are in communications 29 from Africa, lU from Europe and 10 from North America. Then we have in the health field 23 people, most of whom are officials of WHO who have been transferred to help over the emergency period. There are also people in finance, education and, of course, on the consultative group and on agriculture* The SECRETARY-GENERAL: And the regional distribution of those? Sir Alexander MACFARQUHAR: The regional distribution is: $k people from Africa, ho from Europe, k from the Middle East, 11 from Latin America, lU from North America, and 1 from Australasia. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I should add one thing. As you will understand, in the early stages we just had to draw on our resources. Searching for experts from other areas is a time-consuming process. So we had to draw on our own people to the extent that we could afford them. Sir Alexander MACFARQUHAR; In addition there are 1^7 people on medical teams trying to keep hospitals open on a minimum basis. Most of thuee are Red Cross medical teams which have come in either in answer to an appeal from WHO or on their own initiative* There are also Government teams from Ghana and Israel. The SECRETARY-GEKERAL: Bilaterally? Sir Alexander MACFARQUHAR: Yes. The SECRETARY~GENKRAL: There is a very wide-spread geographical distribution on the medical teams. I do not know what we have regarding bilateral arrangements in the technical field. I can mention one thing, and I do not think it is an impermissible discrimination* The country I had in mind when I talked to you of the wish to get specifications of practical needs was the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union asked me if I could give specifications as to the types of technicians needed, with a real breakdown. That indicates not necessarily that they wish to go the United Nations way, but it is a sort of half-way house, integrating themselves with the United Nations plans, and I indicated that this was a sensible and reasonable suggestion. Mr. CAB A (Guinea) (interpretation from French): Perhaps my question opened the door to a great deal of specific information — more perhaps than I expected. What I wanted to know actually was which countries in Africa, for example, are participating in the United Nations technical assistance in the Congo and which other countries, for example, the United States and Latin American countries, are participating. The SECRETARY-GENERAL; There are 3k Africans: 7 from Ethiopia, 1 from Ghana, h from Morocco, 19 from Tunisia, 3 from the United Arab Republic. That is the temporary pattern but, as Sir Alexander said, it shifts practically from day to day. 29-50 One thing I should certainly add is that at this stage we have, for obvious reasons, worked on the basis of short-term contracts because it is ao difficult to Judge about the future. The figures for Europe may interest you: Denmark 1, France 5> Greece 1, Italy 3, Netherlands 2, Norway 2, Sweden 2, Switzerland 19 and the United Kingdom 5. Mr. JOHNSON (Liberia): Mr. Secretary-General, I think we all fully appreciate the efforts that are being made in the Congo at the present time. We realize that it is an up-hill fight, and I think no one is in a position at the present moment to predict correctly the outcome of things- 31 Notwithstanding, and especially, as you have hinted, along the idea of eliminating as much as possible suspicions on the part of the Congolese, I would, with your permission, ask this question: I should like to ask whether any time- limit has "been set for the United Nations operation despite the fact that ve are all conscious of the multitude of problems that exist there. Joined to that quastion is the question vJiet her the men who are being sent either as technicians or as specialists are going there with the full consciousness that they are to be there for a certain duration of time and that their primary mission will be the preparation of the Congolese to assume the responsibility of managing their own affairs after a certain lapse of time; and attached to that, whether it will not be to the advantage of the United Nations to give some serious consideration, or renewed consideration, to the distinction that exists in the contemplation of a great many men just now, that the Congolese are on the one side .and that the .United Nations is on. another side in trying to solve administrative problems. - _- SECTga!ARY--GEMBRAL; .May I try to reply, sir, to your questions starting from the end. I think that if Mr. Caba Sory will permit me to quote President Sdkou Toure* on the last point. The very same point was discussed when President S^kou Tour£ was here, and he said, very rightly, "How can thare "ho two sides, with the United Nations on one side and" — in that case — - "on the otiier side, Guinea?" He said, "It would seem as if, as somebody said, •foe body is negotiating with its own leg." • For that reason, I must say that we on the United Nations side cannot and vlll not accept the theory that there are two sides. It is a joint operation and it must be a joint operation. I am very sorry to see t;nat this view is not always shared by all spokesmen of the Congo; but I think you will make the discovery, which was so eloquently expressed by Mr. Se*kou Toure*, that the body is really not negotiating with the leg. They co-exist peacefully and happily. As regards the spirit In which the experts go there, I think that you need not worry. They go there to serve, they do not go there in order to stay. They are taken from other Jobs. They are not out looking for Jobs, trying to get a foothold there; they want to get back to their families and to their own Jobs. In any case, the general philosophy strictly applied by us, is, of course, that they are there to make themselves unnecessary, that the United Nations is there in order to make itself unnecessary. An entirely different matter is that in very many cases, as you know, technical assistance is going on in many countries for quite a period of time, but it is on a scale which is successively reduced and which is delicately geared to meet the immediate needs. In this specific case we work vita much shorter contracts than we do in other cases. It is a matter of contracts for a couple of months in fact or a half year perhaps. We show so much concern about time not only because we are concerned about getting stuck with something that is not effective, but also concerned about limiting it as much as possible. Ordinarily our technical assistance contracts have to be somewhat longer — a couple of years or so — because certain technical assistance activities cannot be usefully carried through in so short a time. If it is, however, a question of a "crash" programme, you can work with shorter intervals. Finally, as regards the time extension of the United Nations activities in the Congo, I think we should make a sharp distinction 'between the civilian side and the military side. On the civilian side, I have already replied, because, of course, we should make ourselves unnecessary as quickly as we possibly can. Nobody can Judge what time that will take and to what extent it will be possible within a very short interval. I think we will have pockets of continued technical assistance which might be of fairly long duration. Let us take the case of another African country which was, so to say, born in this Organization *.Libya, where we had a programme in the beginning much more modest than anything we are doing here but of somewhat similar character. We still, after all these years, have technical assistance teams of some significance which work in perfect co-operation with the Government, which we would be very happy to withdraw but vhlch the Government would not permit us to withdraw at present. That does not '33 mean a Blowing-down of the development of Libya; on the contrary, it is a good development as you know, an extremely encouraging one. It-Just means that certain gaps in their own situation cannot "be sufficiently well filled out of their own resources. That may happen here too. On the military side, the problem is, of course, an entirely different one. You may remember that the first resolution said that the United Nations Force would be there until, by normal means, the situation was in hand. I do not think it is a good idea to beat around the bush in this matter and to encourage the illusion that the Congolese national army is in any shape to take hold of the responsibility for order and security in the Territory. It was, as you know, disorganized and demoralized during the mutiny. It lost all its old officers and officer cadres, and what we have at present is something that has to be reorganized. The Government itself is the first one to recognize this fact, as its invitation to General Kettani clearly shows. You have to reshape groups, you have to reshape discipline and you have to give the new Congolese officers who have been appointed and promoted from the ranks — certainly very good people — a chance to learn their profession (because it is, after all, a profession) and to establish their authority in such a way that it is again an organized force. The Congo cen in no way be blamed for the fact that they have not enough cadres; but of course, on the other hand we shall be blamed and I shall be blamed, and rightly^ if we repeat the experiment of leaving matters in the air. For that reason, there is a time limit 'built into the situation, and that is determined by how much time it will take to reshape the Force Publlque or Arm^e Nationale sufficiently to make it strong enough to keep this vast area — I would not call it "under control", "but in such a condition that law and order are generally maintained. I cannot ,judge. I think that it should be done as quickly as possible, and we will certainly do what we can, within the framework provided by the Government, at their request, to speed up the reorganization and reshaping of the Force Publique. It will take some time. And I wish to be quite serious on this point: A withdrawal before that has happened would, in my view, re-create a vacuum; and if we re-create a vacuum, with what follows from a vacuum, we would re-create the threat of the introduction of foreign forces and we would then have again a threat to peace and security. That is to say, from my point of view, a premature withdrawal of the United Nations Force would "be a threat to peace and security, and the time limit will have to be determined by the development of the Force Publique into an organized, disciplined unit, a good arm end hand for the Government in maintaining order over the territory. •36 You will remember last time that General Rifchye, In reply to a question, said, that'he felt that the Force we now haye will amount to something like 16,000, or 18,000 men — I do not know the figure exactly, I think it is • 16,000* That, according to our best estimate, is what is needed now* But do remember that this is a Force composed of well trained, highly disciplined units from — in the vast majority -- African States, under the guidance of experienced officers and with good co-ordination and controls, with quite a heavy logistic and signals support. If that Is what is needed now, you can easily sej£;1fchat it . will ..take time before that kind of framework can be filled by the Force Publlque. %• own feeling, and'this is what I have explained to the members of the Cabinet, is that one should not, BO to say, have a black and white situation —we should not wait until the Force Publlque, or the National Arny, J.B re-established to full efficiency and Is fully capable of tackling this Job. One should work step by-step to the extent that when good solid units of the Force Publlque are re-established and organized and functioning in a satisfactory way, that should'. • ••-•'. i alleviate the "burden on the United Nations and the United Nations should, to a ,- . corresponding extent, phase out. It should be a gradual "development; with vtHe.'" grovth In strength of the National Army, the United Nations units should phase out so-that at no time will there be a vacuum but eventually. In aer1 short a time as possible, the vacuvan will be filled solely by the Congolese. That is asVT • see the question and you will appreciate that it'is difficult to guess what this means in terms of time. I have only one other observation" to make; for-reasons cf the difficulty of the operation and the budget burden on all members, and • for reasbris of the burdan on those countries which contribute contingents, I can ' fa-3sure you 'that the pressure on us to make the time as short as possible is very strong indeed. tfr. JOHNSON (Liberia): I am very grateful for the explanations you have given and I am Inclined to agree with you in toto. Of course you realize that all the men who will be going to the Congo are not of the 37 temperament of the Secretary-General, and although you may think that what I am suggesting may be facetious, I think it is worth looking into, since we all agree that It will be some time before any withdrawal of United Nations forces is made. Tbe SECREGARY-GEKERAL: Is advisable* Mr. JOHMSON (Liberia): Well, yes. I would suggest, then, that perhaps either through this Committee or any other group that the Secretary-General may devise, you might look into the situation and the possibility of perhaps fitting the Congolese administrators into the UN Force somehow, so as to obviate all possibilities of suspicion, doubt, charges of trusteesh5.p and the like. Perhaps at the moment this is trite, but as time goes on you will find elements which will begin to say that the United Nations has come hare to do this and to do that so that If a way could be found whereby you could gradually work them in so that It would give an appearance of a single unit working — I have not studied this carefully, so I am not saying It with any academic precision. The SSCREIARY-GENERAL; I think there is very much In what you say, and In fact this is a matter which has been discussed and which I would like to mention here. First of all, although we cannot have joint operations as you know, because they are against the rules of the game, and I think it is good that It is so, we can very well have co-ordinated operations and one of the things which I regret is that so far it has not been possible to have agreements which spell out, so to say, divisions of responsibility. That does not mean co-operation in joint operations, it just means working- for the same aim under a set of rules which are agreed. On our side, we wish to have such agreements as soon as possible and covering the field as broadly as possible. That is point one. Point two — and my impression on that is that again I thlnx General Rlkhye would be a better witness — is that professionals always or mostly get along very well together and I feel for that reason that our staff and the staff of the National Army, on a professional basis, will increasingly 38 . see eye to eye on how things should "be run. Then you come to the rank and file, and there a proposal has been made to me to the effect that" we should, at an appropriate stage and if we can find a proper form for it — it is not very easy — have duty hours arranged fbr such man-to-man contacts as would create a feeling of solidarity and break down those feelings of "those being the others" which, as you can readily see, easily develop as time passes. We should not forget that this is, so far, a story — as to the United Nations presence — of less than six weeks, and in less than six weeks you do not work miracles in the psychological field. We have tried our best in the physical field, but much still remains to be done in the psychological field. I think this indicates to you an awareness of this problem both on the Congp side and on our side, and I think the three methods I mentioned, co-operation arrangements, staff contact and rank and file friendship together will help us along. Mr, BEN^ABOUD (Morocco): We were asking last time about your possible participation as an observer or as a participant in the Ministers Conference which is being held today in Leopoldville, and in view of the exchange of views between you and the representative of Liberia, are you in contact with that Ministers Conference and, if not, would .it not be desirable for the Secretariat to take advantage of that Conference ,to prepare the atmosphere for what you have in your intentions? The SECPE-TAEY«»G5NERAL; The initiative for that lies with the host of the Conference and with the Conference itself; I would not like, for my part, to take any initiative of my own. I am now thinking that since General Kettani is an adviser on the Force Publique, which has a key position in the whole thing, it would from my point of view be most welcome if General Kettani were invited to report on his philosophy of it. I need not brief him, because I know we see eye to eye. That might be in a certain sense less politically interesting than an invitation to the United Nations, but it would have I am sure the same substantive value. Mr. BEN ABOUD (Morocco): Just a question of clarification. What is the recent date on which you evaluated the figures you have just mentioned of the contribution of the various States — African States and European States? The SECRETARY-GENERAL: The 24th — two days a@D. Mr« WIRJOPRANOTO (Indonesia): Allow me to make some general observations similar to those made by the representative of Liberia. As a member of the Advisory Committee, the Indonesian delegation desires to contribute in every possible manner to the efficient and successful execution of the United Nations operation in the Congo. In my opinion, it is of primary importance that an atmosphere of co-operation and understanding be maintained between the Government of the Republic of the Congo and the United Nations Force. This is essential to fulfil the purpose of the United Nations activities in the Congp. As the United Nations Force is in the Congo on a purely temporary basis, the withdrawal of Belgian troops being almost completed, I feel that a plan is essential for the gradual reversion of all military power in the Congo from the United Nations to the Central Government. However, since I have not heard of the existence of any such plan, I would be grateful if the Secretary-General could inform this Committee whether such a plan is in existence or in the process of formulation. la It may perhaps be unnecessary to add that, of course, no action taken • ••-••• • . •' \ • . . by the United Nations Is Intended to constitute, nor may be Interpreted as constituting, any form or degree of recognition of any Government from the Territory of the Congo other than the Government of the Republic of the Congo. I will be very grateful if the Secretary-General could enlighten me on the points I have put forward, so that I may report more fully to my Government, which in the meantime has already been informed of the preliminary proceedings of this Advisory Committee. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: Well, on "the first point, Mr. Ambassador, I have already replied all I can possibly say. There cannot be a plan for withdrawal unless we have a plan for the building up of the national army, and we still, on that point, are at scratch — I use that word. It does not exist. It exists as mass, but it does not exist in form. On the other point, we touch on a subject which was discussed, as you remember, at length in the Security Council, and I think I replied on one point and I can only repeat it: the United Nations deals only with Governments, sovereign Governments -- nothing but -- and that applies in this territory as well as in other territories. On the other hand, it is unavoidable that if there is- a situation de facto we sinrply must deal with the party which we have to push back. For example, when sometimes surprise has been expressed because of the fact that we were dealing with the Belgians, it seems that one forgets that the Belgians are supposed to withdraw. Perhaps it would be useful if you, General Rikhye, would say something on this point. General RIKBYE; The point raised earlier was that we should have close liaison with the Congolese National Army I would like to inform you gentlemen that we have the closest liaison and collaboration with the Congolese Army. " At Lebpoldvilie, which is the^headquarters of the ANC, General Lundula, their Commander, and Colonel Mobuto, who is the Chief of staff of the Congolese Army, are in continuous and close collaboration with the United Nations Supreme Commander and his military staff. There are meetings almost every day, and nearly every aspect of the United Nations military operation IP fe carried out with the closest possible co-operation of the high command of the Congolese National Army. We also have Brigadier Otu of Ghana and Colonel Millenschwier of Sweden, who are permanently attached to the Congolese military high command as the liaison officers of the Supreme Commander with the Congolese National Army, and report to them minute-to-minute developments of the deployment of United Nations military forces as veil as any other problems that may arise. The Secretary-General has also approved that we invite a senior officer of the Congolese National Army to be attached to the staff of the Supreme Commander, General Von Horn. Furthermore, the liaison between the troops is excellent. There is hardly any need for any orders to be issued to the United Nations forces, because I have seen it with my own eyes during my long and extensive tour that our men are already playing games with the Congolese Army, and they freely spend their spare time with the men of the Congolese Army, as is natural, because it is, as the Secretary-General said, easy for professional men to get along, and it is certainly very easy for soldiers to get along with each other. The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I think that completes the picture in a way which should be encouraging. Mr. CABA (Guinea) (interpretation from French): I believe that the Committee would be very happy to get a complete picture or at least an accurate idea of the present stage of the evolution of the situation in the Congo, in general. We do not have sufficient news from the Press. There seems to be a bit of silence, either from Leopoldville or Stanleyville* My colleagues would be very happy to get a brief but precise picture of the situation. The SECRETARY-GENERAL; General Rikhye could give you that picture probably off the cuff. However, there are two points I would like to mention which may be of special interest to you. First of all, I am very pleased to confirm — and you have seen a press release to the effect — that there was absolutely 'nothing In back of the widely publicized complaints against the Mali battalion. On the contrary, they were praised by our Command as having done their best in a difficult situation. The second point, which refers to the same situation, is that you saw that in a flurry that took place in Albertville I think roughly a hundred or some little bit more than a hundred Belgian troops were introduced in the city. We protested, and I guess that protest vas not very essential, because at all events they vere withdrawn the very next day. That was one of those, let us cal\ it, minor irregularities which can happen in this kind of an operation; but the important thing is that within twenty-four hours they were withdrawn. The other thing I would like to mention, because you may have seen it — and it is a kind of warning against believing too much in newspaper reports -- was a dispatch in both Reuters and UP I, I think, yesterday, that there had been Belgian reconnaissance planes in Kasai. I can categorically deny it. There have been no such planes up in the air. As to the rest, General, if you could give us a kind of general picture, I think it would be welcome. General RIKHYE; Actually, there is very little change from the situation as it was reported by me when -we met last. The main event has "been the arrival of the United Arab Republic battalion at Coquilhatville, and the relief of the Liberian battalion in the area north — that is, Libenge and Gemena, The United Arab Republic battalion is going to cover a much wider area, and that was one of the reasons why this battalion was asked to go there because it is a much bigger unit in size than the Liberian unit, which was a little hard pushed — in fact, it was not really possible for it to deploy into the wider area as the United Nations Command desired. The United Arab Republic battalion is also relieving elements of the Ethiopian battalion or brigade which were in the Equatorial Province. Thereby, in the northern part of the Equatorial Province the United Arab Republic battalion is talcing over completely. This produces a very satisfactory situation. It will be possible for United Nations troops to carry out the necessary security tasks with which they have been entrusted in that area. The Liberian battalion is being air-lifted to Luluabourg, and in fact that operation has also been completed. They are going to be placed under the command of the brigade in Luluabourg — that is, the Tunisian brigade — thereby giving it added infantry which it very badly needs in that area* As I stated the other day, they have quite a heavy commitment of providing -escorts, and the tribal war has not diminished any. And on top of that some Congolese national army personnel have been moved in, which is not going to help the situation, In fact, it has created increased tension. As regards Katanga, the Ethiopian battalion, which had arrived in Kamina, has been able to get the transport required — or a satisfactory amount of transport •- and has begun to deploy in the area towards the borders of the Katanga Province, towards Luluabourg, and to spread out in the country, which again is a very satisfactory situation. The SECRETARY-GENERAL; There is, perhaps, one little point of information. I think it is unnecessary, but I could give it, I have seen in various papers a statement to the effect that the transport of certain units — not very big, but certain units — of the Arme'e Nationals to Kasai was done by United Nations planes. It was by planes ovned by Sabena and: requisitioned by the Government. We we rev : naturally, outside that in accordance with the rules .we follow generally. Mr. JHA (India): Could we get an indication of the financial- implications of the Congo operation in terms of the extra amount in .supplementary budget for 0:960 — that is to say, up to December? I am not asking for expejiditure. in 1961. ••..-.- -..-.. V The SECBETARY-GENERAL; I am looking for Mr. Cdrdier, who has wisely disappeared. - ' . :• . Mr. JIIA (India):- A figure, of §1*0 million has been mentioned som3-Jhere, - The a^CRETARYXSENSR/lL; I wou34 not like to mention any figure at present, Mr. Ambassador. We are making calculations on it. We have people, so to say, working on ity and the Advisory Committee will come In next week and then we will have estimates ready. Today I would not venture a figure. I can assure you of one thing, and that Is that a certain correspondent of a big newspaper Just took a figure out of the slcy. /* v • Mr. CABA (Guinea) ( interpretation from French) : . I am surprised by the extreme speed with which the General has gained such perfect knowledge of: the. Congo. There is one question which, perhaps, ought to be dealt with by our, Committee. The information, of course, comes from the Press, and in certain reports whi«h d6 not originate from very official quarters we. have been told that Belgian troops that are 'leaving, or are, said to have left the Congo, have actually been concentrated In border or adjacent areas, such as Ruanda -UruniU,, which may cause the risk of compromising or jeopardizing the work of tfce United Nations. The General, who knows the country so well, might perhaps tell, us . < whether the Belgian troops have tended to concentrate in Ruanda-Urundi, and whether also there is a certain concentration of Belgian troops in the south on the Angola frontier. This is extremely dangerous, and perhaps just when we thought that the fire In the Congo was extinguished other fires on the frontiers may break out. General RIKHYJ3; The first point I would like to make clear Is that, as you gentlemen -were Informed by the Secretary-General the other day, all combat Belgian troops will withdraw by the twenty-ninth. All steps have been taken by the United Nations Command in the Congo to ensure that that is so. There was some problem of a lift of the troops from the Kamina Base, and the Belgian authorities have been provided with the necessary amount of extra transport required to ensure that all troops do leave by the twenty.ninth. So, on the thirtieth all you will have so far as the Belgian troops are concerned will "be the technicians in the Kamina Base, who are about 1,000 in number, and about $00 technicians in the base at Kitona. In our deployment sketch that we showed you the other day we told you about both those bases and said that we already had troops stationed at thenu Therefore, it is impossible for anyone to try to get away without our knowing about it. In fact, it would be extremely difficult for anyone to go out of those bases — and certainly for technicians — when we have combat soldiers posted in considerable strength. As regards Ruanda-Urundi, the movement is all out of Kamina direct to Belgium, and this story that these troops are going towards Ruanda-Urundi is really a wild story. Certainly no movement in that direction has been observed by our troops, and we know for a fact that most of the troops have gone back home to Belgium. The rest who are still there are baling collected at Kamina and Kitona, and are on their way out. Certainly no Belgian troops have gone towards Portuguese Angola. That would be almost an invasion of Angola. So I think we can safely say that the few troops which are left are in Kamina and Kitona and will leave by the twenty-ninth. The SECRETARY-GENERAL; There is one point I would add to that. It Is that we have no information on what the military potential may be in Ruanda- Urundl. I agree with you that if there were a case of military build-up it would Indicate the existence of another problem, but so far that is not a fence we have had to Jump. 51 - - Mr. JHA (India); ; I know- It Is very late and I do not vant to detain the meeting but, arising /roto bur discussions and exchanges of views the other day at our first meeting-, I would like to go on record with two points under the instructions of my Government. This is, of course, an advisory committee, and we have to place them before*l >you for your consideration. The first point — you~ will remember that I asked you whether it might be possible to have fe representative of the Congo Government on the Advisory Committee, and you replied that because of the UNEF pattern you did not think that it would be possible and that perhaps also you had your limitations with' regard to the ; - Security Council, which you had informed of your intention to establish a committee on the UNEP pattern. -.'..• •'•'.- We feel that because of the very great importance of utilizing every possible means of establishing a» proper rapport and understanding with the Government, of the Congo it would be,advantageous and it might facilitate the-creation of an . outlook a* regards the acceptability of UN actions and policies if a representative of the Government^b£ the Congo sat on this Committee. Apart from what he might'~ • ' be able »tb contribute, there- would be this ^aspect: from the very beginning of the .-; consideration of any proposals, he might feel that tha Government of the Congo had been taken into confidence. , ;••..;•, -„•-.,. The second point — you circulated a paper containing certain conclusions in which you analysed- the- proceedings of-:the Security Council. In this connexion I would'1 like-to say that so far as the-mandate-of-the Security Council is concerned^ it is for you to interpret it in the light of the discussions and ; . •••,. ..-. resolutions- of the Security Council, and that interpretation is really a matter -, between yoxirand the Security Council. So far as .we are concerned, this is an •.-... . Advisory Committee! and we do not think it is necessary for us to approve or disapprove it. : Of -course, if there is any specific .question on which our advice 10 sought or on which toe- are called upon to give advice, we should examine that question in1 the light of the relevant .situation.and the Security Council ; resolutions. That is to say, on any specific questions we would certainly express our opinion and give you such advice as we think, appropriate. . 52 Tbe SECRETARY-GENERAL; With regard to the first point, you will remember the situation. I have indicated to the Government of the Congo the desirability of their placing oomebody in Kew York as liaison. It is a bit difficult to run it without having that kind of access to the Government. You will also remember that in reply to your own request I said that while I see some difficulties in formally having him as a member of the Committee, on the other hand, I for my part would welcome an invitation by the Committee for them to be present and to take part in the discussion in whatever way seemed appropriate. In other words, I tried to get over the precedent by choosing a somewhat different formula for their participation. As this is an advisory committee, this difference of status really does not mean anything in the sense that it would have meaning in a voting committee * I think that your point, Mr. Ambassador, and that of your Government can be fully met the very moment we have the advantage of having a Congo representative here. However, if that rhymes with the views of the members of the Advisory Committee, I could very well add to my letter to the Foreign Minister the observation that if and when they appoint a representative, he would be invited to the Committee, thus making it evident to them that liaison is really liaison and not just a letter-box relation. As to the other point, I do not think that there is any difference in principle in our approach. As a matter of course, the interpretation of the mandate is a matter between the Security Council and the Secretary-General. That is unavoidable. On the other hand, since the interpretation in this case leads to certain practical conclusions, among others the one that we do not, for example, transport A and C troops, it was something about which I felt I should inform this Committee. This was a paper, as I said, prepared by the Legal Department here, and I myself feel that their conclusion is not open very much to discussion, because how would it be possible to draw the opposite conclusion from a debate which had this development and this end. But anyway, it was not submitted for any approval and it was not intended in any way to commit the members of this Committee. On the other hand, if the members of this Committee wanted to express a view on this conclusion from the debate, of course they were free to do so for the record* If they do not want to do so, all right; that does not mean approval, it does not mean disapproval — it Just means taking note of it without committing yourself in any way. 53 We have already met for two hours , but I am willing to continue if you have any further questions. . . . , Mr. LOUTFI (United Arab Republic): Just one more point. Can you give us any information concerning the political situation? She SECRETARY-GENSHAL; What do you mean by the political situation, what is said or1 what toe the facts? . " Mr» LOUTFI (United Arab Republic)*. I prefer the facts. ... ,. The SE(yjSTARY-G^NE?AL; I:do not know the fact, but I know what is said. I think that this is a matter which, with a growing understanding of our philosophy, will come into shape after some further exchanges which will indicate the possibilities of misunderstandings at this early stage. Mr. CABA (Guinea) (interpretation from French): I should merely like to say that my delegation would certainly find no objection to seeing a representative of the Congo meeting with us as a witness to our meetings. We could take note of his suggestions, should he make them* On this point, I support the suggestion of the representative of India, and I wish to thank the Secretary-General for having favourably received that suggestion. The SECRS[EARY-GSTOEPAL; If I do not hear any objections I take it that this is the generally shared opinion, and then I would be quite happy to add it to the previous communication to Mr. Bomboko. That is all right. I would suggest that we meet next one week from today, unless something happens, of course. We could perhaps stick to the Friday pattern as a reasonable one, if that is a good day for you «-Friday afternoons, unless you have luxurious weekend habits. Mr. CABA (Guinea) (interpretation from French): I think that in view of the evolution of the situation, we cannot really set a fixed time for our meetings. For example, if tomorrow morning unforeseen circumstances make it imperative for the Secretary-General suddenly to consult with the Committee, we shall have to meet. The SECRETARY-GENERAL; It is a matter of course that if there is a need for it, we shall ask you to come. What I meant was that even If there was no need, we should meet regularly so as to be able to cover the ground and give you an up-to-date picture. My suggestion for Friday meetings doec not exclude meetings as needed. We shall meet a week from today. Thank you very much, The meeting rose at 7 P«m. OC cU. '«-££<. ^^ CORFIDEMTIAI. Meeting No. 3 27 August I960 ENGUSH UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE CONGO Meeting at United Nations Headquarters, on Saturday, 27 August I960* at 1 p<,m. 60-20714 The SBCHBTARY-QKWERAL: I am sorry to have to call this unexpected meeting at such short notice and at such a very awkward time. However, the incident which occurred this morning in Stanleyville is of a nature which, I feel, calls for an opportunity to exchange views as to the best way to treat it from here. ,...., You have before you the texts of various messages which we have received this ~ •'.'.'•.• '''."• morning .and which give you as full a picture as we have ourselves of what really happened in Stanleyville. I have, however, two pieces of Information which I think I should add. One is that, according to the information we have, the Prime Minister left Leopoldvllle for Stanleyville at 9.30 the same morning, so that after flying fpr four hours in the plane bringing him to Leopoldvllle, he would have arrived shortly after the events which are described here. The other point which I mention is that as late as yesterday we were informed about an agreement reached in Stanleyville regarding the airport. According to this Stanleyville agreement, not more than six soldiers from the Arme'e Nationale Congolalee should be at,the.airport. :••':.< .-'.». •."• . • '•' V,':'''- '-!'••'•? '<> :''.-- ; . •:•:'•' ;.' v % . ' ' • •••. • <•• . .Tbere are other things which might deserve being mentioned, but X leave them aside because I think it. Just as...well to limit ourselves to the incidents you haye before you on the.table. It would be my intention, in, view of these developments which far exceed ,-.':' ' .".••> ;?•*-,»;•:,;•' i- •,-,..•••,•• .'•.,.. -. • . . anything we have experienced so far ;by way of harrassment and irresponsible and undisciplined action, to approach the Heads of State of the African Governments calling for their co-operation under Article lj-9 of the Charter; for these actions are not directed against Canadians or Americans or Swedes, but against the United nations, as basing its action on the full co-operation of the African States. In thi9 specific case it so happened that it was the Ethiopian Brigade which had to take the blow. They obviously did all they could, but that was not sufficient. And we have, so far, no information, even to the minimum effect, that people unlawfully and illegally arrested have been returned. However, this is a situation which is a typical one for consideration by this group, and I would be very happy indeed to have your reactions end your advice. Just this minute we received some information which has come through the United States Embassy in Leopoldville — it has not reached us direct — that United Nations troops have freed three Canadians and one American, who are now in our hands. That is obviously something that has been done by the Ethiopian troops. I take it for granted that you will all wish to report and report fully. This is not a code cable, the one you have before you; you can use that text as it stands. Mr. JHA, (India): Mr. Secretary-General, as you have rightly said, the incidents contained in this paper are extremely grave. We regret very deeply the sort of conduct of the Congolese troops which has caused injuries and assault to fellow African troops; and more than that, it is really a defiance of the United Nations. All of the issues raised by this incident are very grave and they must naturally receive youir very earnest attention in the consultations you have with African States and any others with which you may choose to consult. I can speak only provisionally, but I think I can speak with a fair amount of confidence and say that our Government will take a very grave view of this situation and will wish to give you the fullest support in meeting it. It is obvious that the personnel in the United llations Force, to which many countries have contributed at their sacrifice, are under the protection of the United Nations, and it would be a bitter fate for them if conditions were not created which would ensure their operating normally and in safety, and ensure the possibility of their maintaining themselves in conditions of human dignity. I think it is a very serious situation and it has to be brought home to the Congolese Government that this sort of thing cannot go on and that they cannot have it both ways. The United Nations, having gone there after mature consideration and at their request, has certainly the right to be there, and will not tolerate any molestation or interference; and exactly how Ifaited Nations Forces are deployed and what action is taken are matters for the Security Council. I feel that, once the United Nations, after mature consideration, has become Involved, tb* discretion as to the exercise of certain functions or the time to cease exercising certain functions or certain missions given to them to perform with the United Nations. 'The .view of the Government is of course a matter fgr important consideration; but this matter is being treated as a sport,. AS: a joke, and I think the time has come when perhaps the Heads xtf African7 States, or if you wish, some special mission from, perhaps, this Advisory Committee or from the Security Council -- I am not very clear as to how it should be done -- shoj^L4; also go there and have quite a plain talk with Mr. Lumumba; and they should be supported by the .Security Council, and if it is necessary to pro'tect the - ; personnel who are already there, if more troops are necessary, they should go. •;•-••''•' This is something that affects the very integrity of the United Nations and, therefore^ the possibility of taking any action. As I said, these ideas are very-provisional, my first reactions; but I feel that the time has come when ve . have to:.take a very.firm s$and. This puts everything.in a very difficult . . .. position^and it puts you.in.a very difficult positipn, and it ie our duty t you.pur fullest support -r.and we.,will dp tjaat.; . .,., .The SgCRETARY^GENBRAL;: :.-3C may remind you p£ the stand taken by ' , ,:,„ President.Kkrumah last week when he endorsed thd stand of General Alexander. We can leave aside General Alexander, because that has nothing to do with the United-Nations operation atvall. What i8 important is;the stand taken by President Nkrumah, who felt tl>at at that stage; we had .already about reached the . end;of tiie line as regards the conflict with the Arrn^e Nationale. •• • / • , .However, I want to add what I, said yesterday, that this 1s in contradiction., to the, fact that on the top level there is good co-operation; and it demonstrates ;; one fact -- the complete lack of command and discipline. That is to say, I want :, to make a distinction in talking about the Anne> Nationale; We have no quarrel with the Command. We have good co-operation with the Command* This is something outside their control just as it is outside our control. t . Mr«-GEBKE-BGZY (Ethiopia): Sir, thank you very much for the information. We have to be very cautious, to continue speaking very cautiously, until we get a clearer picture, not only from pur own point of view but from yours as well; ire are, of course, a party to .your desire. Also, we will see to it that whatever can be done individually will be recommended to our Government -- that is, speaking for myself* I will do that, ... . . , ; But I would like to knov a little bit more concerning In uhat direction you wish to move regarding approaching the Heads of State on this point. I ask the question because the Foreign Ministers are now meeting in Leopoldville and — I do not know how it could be done, but if a call could be made to them also. — The SECRETARY-GENERAL; Dr. Bunche is instructed to give flat, factual information to the delegates at the Pan-African Conference in Leopoldville. Simply viewed from our side, they are all parties and they are entitled to have the Baste information that ve have. The other side of the matter is viiat I mentioned; that is to say, not only your reporting to your capitals, but also any messages from me to, in the first place, the African Heads of State — has this background. Through agreements with these various Heads of State we have received military assistance, contingents for vhich we then, naturally, assume responsibility. I feel that responsibility very strongly, and I feel that contact should be maintained bet-ween us, as responsible for the contingents generously put at the disposal of the United Nations, and the Joint African States and the Chiefs of State who are at the other end of the line. That is to say,. I do not expect them to take any other action than they feel they should take in relation, .first of all, to their own representatives in Leopold ville. The matter thus naturally, of course, has one aspect of responsibility on my side, -while on the other band I naturally leave it entirely to the Heads of State to decide for themselves what kind of initiative they might wish to take in relation to their own Foreign Ministers or Ambassadors in Leopoldville, or in any other form. I think that gives you a picture of why I in this situation approach the Chiefs of State, as I have from the very beginning, Mr, JOHNSON (Liberia): Mr. Secretary-General, I thank you for this Information, and while I have not in any way communicated this to my Government, I feel that anything the Secretary-General of the United Nations may do in the circumstances to restore normal conditions and redeem the situation will be whole-heartedly approved by my Government. We have reached here a point \toere we can no longer play with words and just talk while, perhaps, things get out of hand in the Congo. I think this situation requires expedition, that matters have to be e^peditiously if the situation out there is to be brought under control. Since you have, suggested getting In touch with the Heads of State, I think that-; /.-•, should , come about immediately, and that at the same time the meeting of the Foreign*. Ministers of the independent African States could be apprised of the .position that has already been taken by /the Secretary-General with reference to the Heads of : ? . State, and I thin£ they should be in a position to tell you exactly what to do ,- . . : .: under the circumstances and could directly advise their Foreign Ministers, wherevar theyja^gfrt, be. ; . . •,.-.:•.. .you see, this is a very serious thing. We have soldiers out there, and I: v -\, do not.:>*ant to see our men standing still while they are being assaulted or •.•••>:-^: butchered ^because of lack of action on the part of the United Nations.* A« I satd>u; if we talk aad talk and talk and nothing is done, I fear it may Jeopardize their :••'. ::••• As I: have stated, Mr. Secretary.-General^ this 4s a serious matter, and I dp: r. ',- not think any State will oppose ,ac;ti on. $£ t^e .part pf.^jaeU^ted Nations. . Of. : .; v.. course,,.,! have already suggested thls:.tOfjny Go.veipnwe^ that this ..;. »,/,.;! would be forthcoming in a radiogram two days ago, and I have been expepting it . ;.•:,; and if it bad not happened I would have been very much surprised -- I would have been veryvmuch surprised*, ,..L ;•:,/.;-. ^ . .;,-? '...-...•.-•.:... ~^:.j,rr-:.-:i'~ . Y.:: :;. • - :•''•' So -I; think that you are on , the. right track- and I: /think it should be done . . immediately; and if it becomes necessary,, as the Ambassador- of India has suggested,,' that you send a group from the Advisory Committee to the Congo to tell Mr* Lumumbe, .- and at- the same time to talk with the Foreign Ministers meeting there, so .that rv.;.: >; they can know exactly how you feel about the matter and what the position will be, I think that also will be in order. You see, the United Nations has reached a point where we have to. revise what we were talking about yesterday — your idea of non-interference in the domestic affairs pf the Congo. Here is. where you have ^o examine your . interpretation again, to see whether "domestic affairs"- in this instance is the same as in other more normal situations before* Therefore, I think that you should try to do something so that Mr. Lu«9Amba and others in the Congolese Government nay know that we have not supported any action that is untpward in this instance. . I will stpp here for the ti^ being, at least until something else arises. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: Thank you for your comments. I am afraid that any group from this Advisory Committee, or from elsewhere here, would not help at all. I think it would be interpreted in a way entirely opposite to the one you have in mind; it would be interpreted as a kind of surrender to force. And the basic misunderstanding — again I must speak plainly — the basic misunderstanding is that the United Nations is a tool for the ambitions of anybody. As regards the other side — action, in other vords — you know the Charter as well as I do. Military action in open defiance of the United Nations has been foreseen in the Charter. You foresaw this development, and the drafters of the Charter foresaw not this situation but the possibility of such a situation. I refer you to Article 42. You may remember that Article k2 overrides Article 2.7; that is to say, the problem ceases to be a problem of non-interference. But so far I have stayed out of that. We are a peace organization. We are there to serve the Government, we are there to help their representatives. I stick to that line as long as it is practically, politically and humanly possible. And that is enough* Mr. JHA (India): Mr. Secretary-General, I might say that I was really talking in a very off-hand manner when I said that some1group from here or from the Security Council might go. I really did not wish to make a proposal and it need not be taken in that sense. But I did feel that it was time that some people in authority should go. If it is Heads of State, it is much better; but I think that Heads of State would find it difficult to go into the Congo. The SECRETARY-GENERAL; They have the Foreign Ministers there now. Mr. JHA (India): The Foreign Ministers are there now. But you don't know — here they are in Brazzaville — you see, it is not really where Mr. Lumumba is. But my thinking was that if some people in authority went and talked to them and said, "We are your friends. We are trying to help you but you are making it very difficult for us and we would not be able to support your actions. We would support you, of course, if you come to some reasonable arrangement with the United Nations regarding a reasonable manner in which the United Nations should function. That, of course, is possible. But this kind of unilateral defiance will not take us very far." However, as I have said, I'am not making a proposal, and please do not take it as a proposal. The SECRETARY-GENERAL; Mr. Ambassador, I believe that there are two sides to the approach which I mentioned. On the one hand, we do not want any solutions at all, we just pass the Information on to those at Leopoldville at the specific Conference, leaving it entirely to them to act; and on the otlw* han4 as I mentioned earlier, an expression of worry, made directly to those to whom I am responsible, that is to say, the Chiefs of State. That is direct action, peaceful action in line with the whole philosophy. We will also send a formal protest to the Government, through Mr. Bomboko, We have not received the text of that yet, but I am sure it is properly drafted with all the seriousness, and at the same time all the restraint, which is indicated for this Organization. ?••,-. •..,....-.. - . • Mr. GBBRfi-BGZY (Ethiopia); We are, of course, very much concerned about 'the possibility that this thing may get out of hand. It occurs to me that perhaps if there is sufficient strength in the area where these incidents have "•. •' .•'•£ ..-'....'•••.•...' taken place, the area of Stanleyville/ maybe the dtihgolesfe Army will think twice before they precipitate a situation where "they oblige the tfnited Nations Force, in final desperation, to fire; I mean, this might avoid a situation where the United Nations Force would be forced to do exactly what you have been trying to avert, which is also our sincere desire. This is to say, we would do almost anything to avoid such an eventuality. The SECRETARY-GENERAL; You have touched exactly upon the line which we are following. We have always felt that, since the loose bands from the old Force Publique are unorganized -- and for that reason, of course, basically very, very weak -- the simple fact of our being there in sufficient strength should have the proper restraining Influence. That has worked in some oases« In this case it has obviously not worked. But it is exactly the kind of line we have to follow: If you are strong enough, people do not attack you; If you are weak, people will attack you and you have to defend yourself -- and than we have the incidents. 8-15 But I would like to ask General Rikhye to tell us about Stanleyville. In Stanleyville at present we have a concentration of Ethiopian troops, and I am happy to say that all I have heard about them indicates only their high qualities. General RIKHYE; I would ask Major Bowitz, my collaborator, to point out Stanleyville on the map. Thank you. The brigade headquarters of the Ethiopian Brigade is located at Stanleyville. Most of one of their battalions is in the town of Stanleyville. The city and the airport are separated by a distance of about two miles. A few days ago, when this agreement was reached with the Congolese Army, we reinforced the airfield so that we could provide it with adequate security. This reinforcement was carried out also as there had been a number of incidents at Stanleyville involving United Nations personnel and Congolese Army personnel. The strength in Stanleyville is adequate for the task, but, as indicated in the report from the Commander of the Ethiopian Brigade, it is natural that, in keeping with the policy of the United Nations of minimum forces and the natural lack of desire on the part of all United Nations personnel to open fire at the Congolese Army, the exigencies of the situation do lead to our first being hurt before any repressive steps can be \taken. I think that I cannot explain it in any greater detail than that. I would like to give you some idea of the Congolese Army. To our best knowledge, the total strength of the Congolese Army at the time of the independence of the Republic of the Congo was 25,000 men. There was not a single Congolese national in the officer ranks. General Lundula held the rank of Sergeant-Major. Colonel Mobutu, Chief of Staff, was a Sergeant. There was no officer cadre of any kind. These officers have, unfortunately, had no opportunities to be trained as commanders and leaders of this force. Out of the 25,000 — I am not sAire of the figures, but I believe about 5,000 were in the Province of Katanga. 16 ~ ;»v •- :•.•:' :• -' „ . . . . ' '. ..'.;• I;..;...' .•••:.- . .. . - . .'"• The developments there brought an Indication to the Belgian Array to return after 1 July, and with their assistance all'the Congolese Army was disbanded and a force called the Gendarmerie has been, raised in that part. So therefore we will leave that part alone. As they are strictly under control — they have a large proportion of Belgian officers — therefore the situation there has not changed very much from what it was before 1 July in regard to leadership and command. With regard to the balance which is in the other provinces of the Congo, I believe that some of them have disappeared back into the bush, but the majority of them are still in their camps, for want of anythiipg else, end they . usually run into the problem of food and pay. For instance, in the area of Leopoldvilie province, they were paid by General Kettani, who was in command of the Moroccan troops. The money ran out. Actually towards the end there was no money left, for one man, and General Kettani, paid it out of his own pocket. He was, of course, reimbursed by the United Nations. There is a big camp at Inonu, which is southwest of Coquilhatville. ^iVr---.:...:' .• .-."' .' •;. -L-i.;.:.-". .',..- T;\;;'.':-:», r :' :../;. :':.". . ; ,' ' • ' . . > • There are about 1500 to 2000 Congolese men there v , and the last report we had was that they were going to run out of rations. So we had arranged with the United Nations troops to send food and other assistance up the river to take care of them, because their own Government did not seem to be interested in what they were doing. The indiscipline is increasing. The Congolese men who arrested,the two security guards who carried Dr. Blanche's letter to the Prime Minister -^ most of them were under the influence of hashish and drink. The man who actually wanted to shoot the Brazilian security guards was completely under the effects of hashish, which is freely permitted to be used by these sbldiers. The company commander in charge of the military j>olice of the garrison at Leopoldvilie, whom I went to see to get the pistols of these security guards ,of ours away — he was also under the influence of these drugs when I met him. 17 To give another example of the indiscipline: when Mr. Lumumba ordered his army to take over control at the Ndjili airport, he went there himself with his high command — General Lundula, Colonel Mobutu and company* General Lundula was personally supervising the search of all international aircraft which were passing through — not only those which were landing at the Ndjili airport but even those which were proceeding to points beyond Ndjili and were only stopping there for refreshments and refueling* I was there myself to see some of it, and General Lundula, under the orders of his Prime Minister, had been carrying out searches himself* I suppose he gpt a bit tired of doing it himself, and so he turned around to a group of soldiers and, addressing one of them, said: "You 30 and search the next aircraft." This soldier turned around to his General and said: "It's your turn now, General. I have done my Job for today." I have given you these examples just to give you an idea that, through. no fault of theirs, the Congolese army is without leaders, or those leaders they have are totally and absolutely inadequately trained. The men everywhere are extremely cooperative* In fact, in a number of places the United Nations troops are living side-by-side with the Congolese forces* We are sharing barracks with them, and our relations are excellent. It is only those who appear to be acting under orders of their Government — specific orders — which have led to these incidents. * ,v The SECRETAIff-GENERAL; I think you could say "under specific orders of the Government" — not necessarily of the high command. General RIKHYE; Yes, Sir. Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): Sir, would it be correct, from the description the General has just given us, that we may rest assured as regards a spreading of shooting in the country? That is to say, if someone starts shooting, that it may spread in the country? In other words, if the Congolese Army is partly so indisciplined, and therefore there is no danger of facing them in such a way that they could fight the United Nations forces? Thosa men are. all armed.. We only tool: away the arms of the Concqlese Array in Leopold yille,. which they, -surrendered1 : ; A voluntarily. There were Eome others who gave up their arms in the Thysville area, and they have , taken their weapons back. There are no instructions that we have to disarm .the Congolese Army* YOU have them all armed. They have their ammunition. They are completely undisciplined. They have nobody to guide them,,. and under misdirection they: could cause considerable trouble. . v- ;.• '•:•.-. .<:.• :v..' ..'-..-V-a'. •:- .••;.r-:.-i:v ^ :. ;.;••:• ;.-.-...•» ,'••.!.••.-,:• -• ; • ; / - ;-: 19 Mr. LOUTFI (United Arab Republic) (interpretation from French): The incidents which have occurred in the Congo are very regrettable and my delegation shares the opinion already expressed here by previous speakers. I believe, Mr. Secretary-General, that you have had an excellent idea in Instructing Mr, Bunche to get in touch with the Foreign Ministers of African countries vho are now in Leopoldville, The other idea of bringing these events to the notice of the Heads of African States and asking them to do all they can to prevent a recurrence is also an excellent one* I am confident that the United Nations troops will use their weapons only when they are obliged to do so, because we must be patient and I am \ in entire agreement with you on that point, Mr. Secretary-General. Mr. ACHKAR-MAROF (Guinea) (interpretation from French): We realize quite well the gravity of the situation in the Congo and my delegation wishes first of all to express regret about what is now happening in that country. We are a little worried when we are told that the most complete collaboration exists on a high level, while on a lower level It appears to be very difficult. We wonder what can be done with a view to creating a certain co-ordination and co-operation on the lower level, which now seems to us now to be lacking in discipline, as General Rikhye has Just stated. That is why I wish to ask a question. I wish to ask whether, in the communication you Intend to make to the Heads of African States, you envisage making any kind of recommendation which may seem desirable to you with a view to establishing co-operation and co-ordination of effort on the lower level* 20 ,,,: The SEPRETARY-GEWBRAL; No, ,1 did not intend to be that precise. I think that is,f so to say, going beyond what is my right in relation to the , .:.-. Chiefs .of State. This would be a question of concrete recommendations, which.-., I think should be treated on a wore technical level. .It..is, as I said before, a question of bringing to their attention a situation which concerns them closely, and i;t is also a .question of bringing to their attention the deep worry_;we, feel about it. We wish, as I said before, and as was stressed most recently by Ambassador Loutfi, to retain our line, that is to say, one of a . very peaceful and restrained approach indeed. It is in support of that line that I would, like to address the Chiefs of State ^because they are the first to see that alternatives to that line are in various ways disastrous, either in open, conflict, which should, be .avoided, or el,se very drastic measures of ;the kind recommended by President. Nkrumah in relation to the Force Publique. What he had in mind was obviously the disarming of the Force Publique, which was a step within the range ,of, thepretical an4 political possibilities but which I have not touched so far myself. ,....,.-• . Mr* QEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): I. think £ did ,not. clarify my previous question sufficiently to ge-t a precise idea of .what I want. This is what I had.:in mind.. .We have been $old that the Congolese Army,., or the Force Publique, is nst,.disarmed. Secondly, we have been told that the., discipline by and large is not good. That, being the case, 4.S there any danger that this sort of ... inqident may lead to a greater one, .or is it the reverse? In other .words, as long.as they are organized and well disciplined they can be contained, or the incidents can be contained wherever they may arise. .; . I ask this question because, as I said earlier, my Government is horrified, however extreme and remote it may be, that our people may have to shoot. As I said, earlier, we want to avoid that very much, and I think that is also the policy,of the United Nations Force- So I would like to get a clear picture about this, because it seems to me that, if the army was well disciplined, or at least disciplined,-if incidents such as. those occurred, then the chance of spreading, on the one side, la not there and, on the other, if it does spread a little bit, then there,would be this clash. , . . . . 21 The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I would like to refer the question to the General, but my own immediate reaction is this. I have not the slightest doubt that we can — and can easily — bring the Congolese Army under control, but it would change entirely the role of the United Nations in the Congo. General RIKHYE; I can only add to what I have already said that the Congolese Army lacks leadership from the top to the lowest possible ranks that you can think of. They have promoted some officers, but, as I have explained to you, you could hardly expect a sergeant-major, even the best one in the army, to be the commander-in-chief of an army. At the same time, there is a request on the part of the Congolese Army to train them, for the very obvious reason that the Government also realizes the need to train the army. Without being trained, this army without adequate leadership is being committed to tasks which are completely beyond its ability and power. Certainly, if left to such devices, they are indeed a very dangerous element. Mr. JOHNSON (Liberia): Mr. Secretary-General, .in view of what has been made clear to us, I think the question of fusion of the two forces in the Congo comes more prominently into view. I touched a little on this yesterday. It is like getting one group of people to think about the souls of individuals and another group to think about their secular affairs. This is always bringing conflict. Where you have two forces, with a certain amount of misunderstanding existing between them, working in compartments in a single area, there is bound to be friction. So for this reason I am suggesting perhaps, Mr. Secretary-General, without any idea as to whether it is a correct suggestion, that in your recommendation or suggestion or discussions with the Heads of States notice may be taken of the desirability of some fusion of the Congolese Army into the United Nations Force, or at least efforts to be made to bring them all under a single command, because here you have the Prime Minister working on the secular aspects of the Congo and the Waited Nations trying to establish order from a military point of view. The Prime Minister, is left with control over his own military forces and naturally he does not seem to see eye to eye with the United Nations Forces in all particulars. So there you see there is bound to be friction at some time, whether now or in the future. V . .. 22 So I think that, if some way could be found whereby you could try to bring the group*'together under one head, either through suggestions from the Heads of State! or in some other vay — that would be one of the ways to the solution of the problem that exists now. I am just throwing this out for you to think about it; I do not think you can have the two forces working in compartments- and *aq?ect hojpes on-the situation to exist* -••'••"••"•'••-- The SECR£TARY^CENEKAL! I feel very doubtful about the possibility you indicate, because the difference is not one of detail; the difference is one- where undoubtedly it is a basic clash in the sense that some at present regard, or- choose to regard, the United Nations Force as a hostile element* As long as that is the case, as long as that kind of word is passed along, nothing will -help. You do not ask for assistance in order to get a scapegoat and someone to hit. The best change must come from there. We cannot fuse and have a sjpllit coznnand, black and white — in the spiritual sense of course. We cannot have it. . . :,- I may mention one thing which will give you a sidelight on the type of problem we are' really facing, : I«have a report before me regarding Ndjili airfield. Ndjili airfield is the point on1 which we must base our contract with the outside world. -It is' the lifeline 'fdr all the contingents of the various nations here represented^. It i;s also the necessary basis for all . .j logistic operations in relation to the-troops within 'the Congo, for rotation of troops and what not. That is to say, that airfield simply must be safeguarded and so protected as to provide a safe operation* If a safe operation is not safeguarded, then I do not see how I could take the responsibility for your respective Governments for the troops you have in the Congo. However, there has been a repeated demand from the Prime Minister that the airfield should be controlled — and entirely controlled — by the Arm^e Rationale Conaolaise. You have heard a description of the units which under such circumstances might rove around on the airfield with machine-guns * 25-27 I simply cannot assume the responsibility for this operation if the airfield is in such hands. , We, of course, have not the siigitest wish to interfere with any of the normal operations of the airfield in the civilian sense and in such respects as are essential for the operation of the Government. But to leave the United Nations operations, from the control-tower down to the runways and the planes, to the whims of whatever ideas may turn up in the mind of somebody that is impossible. That is to say, ve simply must maintain our right to be in control of United Nations operations, and that starts with the control-tower. Yesterday the Prime Minister paid a visit to the airfield. It is said that the immediate plan is to put in Congolese to understudy the control-tower officials, with the intention that they would take over the control-tover operations within one week. I think all of you have some experience of what control-tower activities mean by way of technical expertise, great knowledge of technicalities, good nerves, long tested experience and so on and so forth, in order to provide even for a minimum of security for civilian operations* I leave the rest without any comments* Mr. JOHNSON (Liberia): I am not trying to dispute this with you. What I am trying to emphasize is exactly what you are saying, but in another direction. If you cannot leave the control-tower and these other areas of importance in the hands of the Congolese forces, and the United Nations must operate there, and the Prime Minister feels that he could control it> then I say this* 28, .>; Priae Minister feels that ha should control it. What I am trying to •ay is*thai It way should be found to bring all these forcea under the United Nations activities for a while until we have things veil established, and of course they.... can work in conjunction, they can work as understudies under the United Nations, , bui as to the relinquishing of activities by the United Nations, that should be within "the province of the United Nations to decide at the present time. Thii is my point, . .:.-»'•'• S . •• .'-'.'.*•• ' ' '• ..••'••. foe SECRETARY-GENERAL; While I agree in general with your philosophy, .„ we are^ discussing it on somewhat different planes, because my objections were on the level of practicability. Can we achieve it? Mr, LAMINE BALL (Federation of Mali) (interpretation from French): I have taken note of the information you have communicated to this Advisory Committee and ifvmuBt say that it was with a sentiment of horror that I learned of the regrettabl..-,..;-. e eventt s' vhic' h : hav-..-i >•'-e: ••••,;•«'•;.'!.:•.';happene: d' < ':i.n X l^.'^.^.-the Congol ••'•• '•'"•. "•'•'Thes' '•*e' ' entirel• • y Justified '' this 'urgent meeting of the Advisory Committee. I must say that it is a very .-•:.,.. • • • • . •••.:'•. ..::-, .-.'. ••»•.:•••,.-•• •:»..:•.•. ••'• '' • ••./*• serldus situation, because the troops which were sent to the Congo vent there with the I'dea'of bringing help, with the'idea of collaborating and co-operating with the Council of Ministers to solve the problem of security. It would be very regrettable if, as a result of this mission, the United Nations troops became the, target of certain troubles and were made the victims of these events« I think,the Secretary-General has expressed ideas which are very useful, above all concerning contact with the Chiefs of African Governments, which will permit us to see an immediate reaction and also gain knowledge of the latest developments in the Congo. Your idea of making contacts indirectly with the conference nov being held in Leopoldville is an idea vhich is also very important, because I find that on the spot" in Leopoldville there will be African elements which may be able to help the United Nations to find a rapid solution. , •-..•• .15 • - ,.' '. • ' ' . ;' ' ' ' I wish simply to add that as regards the indiscipline of the troops I consider this to be a very important element; it is a threat which has hung over the United Nations mission from the very beginning, because the United Nations went to the Congo as a result of a mutiny of the troops* I was very happy to learn from General Rikhye that a demand had been mada to the Congolese Government to have . certain'clamant§ of its Congolese troops trained with the United Nations so that 29 they could become element• of the cadres. One could perhaps try that to take advantage of this idea, inasmuch as high officers of the United Nations, such as General Kettani, are already collaborating with the Council of Ministers with the consent of the United Nations, In this framework, I think it would be interesting to see how it would be possible to create a kind of military organism in which Congolese elements could be trained to become officers or leaders imbued with the spirit of discipline and a sentiment of respect for human dignity and for other people* These would be a small minority who could be dispersed at the sensitive spots, but they would nevertheless introduce a new spirit which would help in the execution Of the delicate task the United Nations must accomplish in the Congo* I only just express this Idea and leave it for you to evaluate, because I wish to repeat that these events are very grave and exceedingly regrettable. Mr. ACHKAB-MABOF (Guinea) (interpretation from French): Just now the General told us that among the gendarmerie in Katanga discipline was maintained thanks to the presence of Belgian officers* That made me think that we are at present concerned with a situation which arose in Stanleyville, but it is possible that an identical situation may arise in other regions of the Congo* I am thinking of the departure, which I suppose is imminent, of Belgian officers from the V Congolese army in Katanga and I wanted to ask whether in view of this possibility, the United Nations has thought of taking measures to prevent a recurrence of the regrettable events which are now happening. The SECBBTARY-QENERAL: At a very early stage, in fact at the time of the Prime Minister's visit here, this question of the officers cadres was discussed. It seemed at that stage that there was a certain tendency in his mind to think in terms of officers from other regions, from other parts of the world, other parts of Africa, to serve temporarily in order, so to say, to build up the force and reorganize it. As you said, it started out with a mutiny and it may be well to remember that the mutiny of the force publique was against the present Government. However, again I was leaning over backwards; I did not feel that his proposal was a good one as it stood, because I feared that if non-Congolese officers were in direct command of Congolese troops the result might well be a kind of transposing of the anti-Belgian-officer feelings to the officers from other countries. X said 3o therefore, tfcat it seamed to me th$t: it would be much better if they would build up Congolese,, off icervQa4res but forpad. them in groups and that t^iey,had as adviser* to* each group experienced officers from other countries. Those officers would thus .,_,.. be able, so to say, to.hold their hands Curing the formative period and give them . guidance as to organization, discipline .and similar matters without getting directly in touch yith the troops, always having the Congolese themselves to deal immediately with the troops. 31 I still believe that the most constructive idea — and I can only regret to aay that that idea seems to have disappeared in the last few weeks, I have not seen anything developed in that direction apart from the most welcome offer to ask assistance from General Kettani; he and I see eye to eye on the desirability of bolstering the Congolese officers in the Army with experienced officers from other parts while avoiding direct contact between foreign officers and the troops. However, it is again a question of the spirit, it is again a question of how this is explained to the soldiers and to the people. That leaves very much to be desired. As regards the situation in Katanga, I am not wholly in the picture, but I guess that the formal situation corresponds very much with what it was before the mutiny in the rest of the country. That is to say, those Belgian officers are not in Belgian servicej they are, and they were in Leopoldville and in the rest of the country if I understand the situation correctly, at the time of the mutiny on contract with the Government itself. That is to say, the status of those officers is ultimately determined by the local authorities as a contracting party. It may be that you, General Rikhye, have more exact information but I think that is the legal situation. General RIKHYE; That information is quite ..correct. The officers with the Katanga forces are Belgian officers and contracted by the Katanga authorities, and are directly under the command, in every respect, of the Katanga authorities. The SBCRETARY^ENERAL: They are not seconded from the Belgian Government and I think, to a large extent, they have been recruited among Belgians who have been born in Katanga. That is to say, they are not really an import. However, what is important for us in reply to your question is their exact legal status, and this is the best we know about it. Mr. JHA (India): I would like to ask for some information on this point: to what extent are the activities and the attacks by the Congolese armed forces against the United Nations a manifestation of local lack of discipline or to what extent are they the result of any central design or direction? V,^ •' •'• • ' • • ' '• ••'*• •.«.'•'.•'• \ ••..>• s ••'•:- ' .• . • i . • . . i • ''"'.' (foe SECteTARYMJENERAl; I have no idea* I cannot reply to the question at all. I think basically one should regard It as a situation of lack of discipline 'with extremely excitable minds, especially to the extent that drugs enter the picture. It requires very little to cause a flare up. There are always, in troubled 'situations like this, people who like to use or rather to abuse this kind of attitude, 'but where they are to be found I do not know at all* The only responsibility I would lead backwards up to the centre is not one that goes back to the high command of the national army; I have already expressed my confidence in 'them. It is one that goes back to the political atmosphere and th« excitement maintained. I can tell you here that when I was in Leopoldville the first time I counted with the possibility of a very quick turn, via the radio, of opinion against the United Nations, not specifically this or that movement but a turn which, so to say, broke down the dams against xenophobia, excitement and hysteria. Mr» LOUTFI (United Arab Republic): I should like to know who is now ,V.;- J • . .'- ."•: •"• . • , '• -: :•• .- ;•;-•,- ;•.••-•-• .-. .-•( .; ".' *" '.'•' : '• in control of the airfields? ' " • " . . . . .... _ . . . -...... SECRETAHY-»GENERAL: The International Civil Aviation Organization experts whom we seconded. Mr« CUHRIE (Canada): We have been assuming all along that these Incidents we are talking about today have not been the result of conscious and direct orders from the Government of the Congo, and we are prepared to continue to gp on that assumption* Of course, if that assumption Is not true this whole situation changes and the whole situation of the UN relationship to the Congo obviously changes* But on that assumption, may I make a few remarks* These recent incidents, which followed very closely statements by Prime Minister Lumumba that earlier difficulties were due to misunderstandings and did not represent Congolese policy — • these new Incidents must therefore be considered by the Canadian Government in the way that others have stated here, other Governments participating in the United Nations operations, namely as raising the nost serious issues as regards the future of the United Nations Force itself and even the question of the relations between the United Nations and the Congolese State* 33 It seems to us that It would be difficult if not impossible for Canadian civilian experts and Canadian service personnel performing non-combat duties to remain in the Congo unless their personal security can be ensured by United Nations forces, even if necessary against the Congolese security forces. We have been discussing this morning possible ways of taking steps, which would include adequate arrangements at the airports and steps by the United Nations military commanders to ensure the security of tfoited Nations personnel generally within the Congo. If it should turn out that the United Nations forces cannot be allowed to operate by the Congolese authorities in such a way that minimum security is provided for UN personnel, the whole problem of the continued operation in the Congo will have to be considered in a different light by the Security Council. One of course can expect that incidents will continue to take place in the difficult circumstances which now obtain in the Congo, but further United Nations assistance would be difficult to provide where Congolese authorities appeared to be unwilling or unable to allow the UN to check attacks by Congolese forces against UN personnel. The jSECREJARYoGENERALi I can assure you that the present instruction is that the necessary control positions at the airports, necessary in the sense that they are essential for the security of UN troops and civilian personnel, will be maintained. They will not be given up and they cannot be given up. Were we to be forced out of them, I would have to bring the matter to the Security Council and I would be the first to say that if we are not, under a mandate and clear instructions from the Security Council, entitled to maintain these control positions, I would recommend the cessation of military operations and, as an obvious consequence, of civilian operations. I cannot but think that the withdrawal of the UN forces would recreate again a power vacuum, as I said yesterday. This means that I would object against a withdrawal as it would re-create -• and in a more serious form — a threat to peace and security. I think we have exhausted the subject; you shall of course be kept currently informed and I hope that as in so many previous incidents not only words said in the Congo will go with the wind but also that actions will be quickly forgotten* There is one other thing I should like to point out; we gave you the text of this cable; as I said, it is not in code and you can use it, but may I ask you to leave out all names of persons for the simple reason that we would not like the information to leak to their families. The meeting rose at 2.15 p.m. BO. * 2 September I960 UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE CONGO Meeting at United Nations Headquarters, on Friday, 2 September I960, at 5 p.m. 60-21108 The SECRETARY-GENERAL; The meeting is called to order. I am sure that I speak for all of us if I first of all address nyself to two men who have not been with us at the previous meetings. One is Dr. Bunche, who has just returned from Leopoldville, and he will later during the meeting give us a fev of his impressions. The other one is Ambassador Dayal, a well-known old hand in United Nations affairs vho now, bowever, rejoinc us in a new capacity as the Special Representative of the United Nations in the Congo and as head of the United Nations operations in tha Congo. Ambassador Dayal will leave tomorrow. We h&ve had an occasion — he and Dr. Bunche and myself and the other collaborators --to nan over the ground so as to ensure that the take-over will be one in vhieh we can have complete continuity. We may then turn to today's meeting. I should like to give you first of all a brief outline of what for the first time may perhaps even be considered an agenda, because there are various questions that I should like to take up. In the first place I should like to make some comments on the third report to the Security Council. These comments will cover three points: the present status of withdrawal; the United Nations legal position as to the bases; and, in the third place, our plans for the phasing out of Belgian technicians. '-v The second item would be the question of protection of civilians. Under that item, I will first of all ask Dr, Wieschhoff to give a short report on the Bakwanga massacre — I use purposely the word "massacre" — secondly, we will take up the approach to the central Government of the Republic of the Congo which I feel this massacre calls for. Thirdly, we shall take up the question of the changing, or rather elaborating, instructions to the forces in view of such events as this one, which, to say the least, is also an infringement of human rights as considered and conceived in this Organization* The third item would be the report on the initiatives I have taken, over the last ten days and more, for consultations with the central Government, so far without any replies. Fourth, I should like Dr, Bunche, as I said before, to give you some of his impressions on the conditions under which we are working and under which the task has to be fulfilled. 3-5 Finally, I should like to ask Ambassador Labouisse to give us the latest data on the deployment and development of the United Nations force. If I may, then, turn to the first Item, which Is the third report, as you will remember, the first sub-Item la the present status of the withdrawal. You will have noted from the Third report that at the time when it was Issued, twenty-four hours after tha deadline in the withdrawal of Belgian troops there were- still some Belgian troops left at the Kamina baae. They all left the base yesterday by train, not by air -- or, rather, -that Is a little exaggerated, and I will be more precise -- of those forces''inentioned in the tThird report, the parachutists left yesterday by train, for Albertville, from where they will go by boat to Usuribura in Ruanda Urundi. We have insisted that the flying school and the 120 guards who are ofcill In Kaznina be evacuated too, and I have every reason to believe that that will be done today or tomorrow. Thereafter there would be no military personnel, in the combatant sense of:the word, left in Kamlna* I will revert later to the question of technicians. I need not add anything to what I said in the note verbale to the Belgian Government. This delay Is regrettable; It is, of course, without major political significance, but facts are facts, and promises are promises. As regards the base at KLtona, we are in a somewhat bewildering situation. There are reasons to believe that there is nobody left but technicians, but we have not been able to ascertain that that is a fact, which has naturally caused from our side a demarche to the Belgian Government in order to get the situation straightened out. At the very most it is a question of a hundred men. We can thus regard the question of the Belgian withdrawal as settled as of today. What remain are, so to say, minor spots on the map which have no significance; politically or militarily. We may regret the lack of co-operation but we cannot possibly be permitted to give it any political significance. - As regards the legal position of the bases, it has been defined in the Third report in a way which, as you know, has caused some raised eyebrows, even in the Press* The situation, however, la a very simple one. The United Nations bad to step In the very moment military personnel withdrew. But the Security Council has never asked for anything but withdrawal of the military forces. The Security Council has most definitely not asked for a confiscation of property or the handing over of private property to somebody vho is not the owner. Any idea to that effect represents a misreading of the Security Council decision. Anyway, for the Secretary-General, in the interpretation of his mandate, the situation is simple and clear. The Secretary-General cannot, in a controversial legal situation, step in and establish himself, on behalf of the Security Council, as the judge,, Baying who is right, who is wrong, whose rights are involved, or what property belongs to such and such a pnrty. That is to eay, the United Nations can, of course, never, as an executive organ, step in, changing any legal relations or legal rights as established under generally recognized principles of law, civilian or international. Under such circumstances, we have had no other way to take over, under "speedy modalities", than this one, to step in and keep everything in suspense. If there is somebody who £§§lfl tUatc-W- aboiild.Jiot keep it in suspense, let him —...... «+~*••*-*"" ••"*—"--- tell us what the law is. Under such circumstances, of course, the rights,, whatever they are, of the Belgians, as owners of the'base, will have to be asserted in proper forums at the proper time, and the rights of the sovereign government will have to be asserted at the proper tims in the proper forum* And if there are any other parties, they will have to do the same. It has been said that the Security Council decision did not entitle the Secretary-General to keep the matter in suspense. That may be so. They did not do that explicitly and formally. But what is the situation if, on the other hand, the Security Council, as I said before, did most definitely not rule on the legal issue, much less entitle the Secretary-General to rule on it? . I come then to the thi,rd. pblnt in the Third report, and that is the question of the phasing out of technicians. ,Qn that point, what I have stated to the Belgian Government, largely influenced by experiences and recent developments, is as follows. (Spoke in French)j Such a substitution is strictly in conformity with the spirit and the letter of the Security Council resolutions. I could Justify a temporary exception only for practical reasons, against which other views must be confronted and which have become definitive! As yo\i know, such a substitution was clearly stated by myself in the statements I made in the Security Council at its 887th and 866th meetings. In those statements I considered a progressive substitution, taking into account all the practical considerations that must come into play. In the present situation, I find it no longer possible to Justify any more than a transitional period. That must depend on our possibilities of replacing the other technicians by our own, with qualifications being taken into account that will allow us to maintain the basas and to employ the population depending on those baoefl. (Continued in English); I think that this represents the maximum as to speedy modalities which makes sense, which it is possible to Justify and for which I personally would take the responsibility; that is to say, the substitution will take place as quickly as possible, 'not forgetting tha need to maintain employment *—gf the population or the Maintenance of the base. When it is said that tnT~evacuatioir^>f technicians should take place more quickly than that, I must challenge those who say it to tell me how we can then assume our responsibility for the rights of others and, first of all, the right to employment of the population. These are my comments on the third report* They are comments which do not go beyond what you find already in the report. They have, however, naturally, a more personal accent than is permissible in United Nations print, which is, as you know, characterized by a literary style of some chill and impersonality. 8-10 I repeat the main points: Tb& withdrawal can today be considered as concluded. The legal position is one of maintaining the situation in suspense as we have no right to decide on the 3.egal issues involved, — certainly not the"Secretary-General, and in my view the Security Council *find" *M^»l«i»i«»i»is itsel» —•«•*»f " i•"n • the saiae' position "ante1 '"Ha ^•••ji^M*""^*^^*^*''"***''***'**™**'*'*^^*^''"s not claimed to have" an' '"*"'"""""y othe" Pl r""^ poslTJ16n7~~ Finally, as to the phasing out, it will take place as quickly -*-—^as practica. l conditions and circumstances permit, without harming interests which we are in duty bound to protect. If there aro questions or comnsnto, I would of course, as always, be happy to discuss them. 11 Mr* JHA (India): May I ask a question In relation to the.position regarding the baaes — that la, the Kanina base •- ,..._ ( •' ' ' < ' The SECREOLARY-GENERAL; And Kitona. T ; • . ••...... Mr* JHA (,India): Yea, and Kitona — a situation In wiiich the United Nations forces have been substituted for Belgian troops* You said that there had been some, raised eyebrows. I should like to know whether there have been any auch raised eyebrows on the part of the Government of the Congo. As far as J vas able to gather, you were probably referring to some doubts or some queetiona In certain quarters in the United Nations* But I was not quite clear whether there-had been any kind of adverse reaction frcm the Government of the Congo. .-: The SECRETARY-GENERAL: There have been raised eyebrows from two quarters* One is publicly known, and for that reason it is no indiscretion to. mention it: it is the Government of the USSR, 1fce other quarter is Mr* Tahombe and the provincial authorities of Katanga. ,.i .•- Mr, GSBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): Wfcat la finally to become of this.private, property?-:.. What do you envisage? .•"Are you going 1;o go on, maintaining the situation,dn suspense? How do you intend to; go about aettling the matter?. .- If someone does not challenge it,- apparently the situation is going.to continue.. What will happen,if .no one challenges it? • , .; .; : . . v The 6ECRETARY*QENERAL ; It is my view .that as soon.es possible- th Lecide hov to dispose of the property. We have the same interest as any caretaker: since this costs some money acdf does not give us anything in return, we want to see to it that this matter is settled as quickly as possible* In such a settlement, though, if the United Nations Force is still in the Congo, I would like to see the United Nations as an added party, because for us it is a good logistic base for the vfaole qf_;Hafi,.r"*ne- But that is something which we do not claim for ourselves; that is something we should like to have as a negotiated right with those who may have rights to the property. For the moment, we have to assume it because it flows, so to ssy, from our caretaker position, but it is not an established right short of its being accepted by those vho may consider themselves as having claims end rights to the property. Mr> LOUTFI (United Arab Republic) (interpretation from French): Do you have a plan for the evacuation of technicians from the bases? The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I hope to have it very soon. But the first step in that process will probably be to address to your country, and probably to two or three other countries, very urgent demands with specifications as to the kind of technicians we need* To be very practical, we have Galo Plaza, who is also an old United Nations hand, and General Rlkhye, whom you know, and a couple of others to make an inventory to see exactly what is needed by way of technicians. We must know the qualifications, the numbers, the degree of experience, and so forth. Once we have those lists, we will go out shopping and try to find them primarily, I would say, from African countries* There is one interesting aspect, and that is that we do not at all exclude the possibility of finding, among the labour force at the base, people who are capable and who would deserve promotion to posts of greater responsibility. Of course, that is the ideal solution. I do not believe that it is possible to do it all over the field at once, but that is what we should aim at. The. operation should be run by the Congolese to whatever extent they are able to do so. But the first point is to get the Plaza report — and then we will go out shopping, as I call it. Mr. EASAfl (Pakistan): I wafit to be clear about one thing. When the legal points are settled, where " does the property vest *- the property which is recognized as Belgian property, as in these buses? In -whom would it vest?' Who would be responsible for its safety? The United Nations? ' • The SEraffEAftY-GENERAL; We are reoponaible for its safety, as caretakers. 3he common- law term, I think, is really French: geption des affaires d*autrui» We work under that formula, because that is a clearly defined formula as to our rights and duties* It is, of course, a curiov-a situation* We do not yet know exactly the character of the landholding. We know that all the investments are investments made by the Belgians and, for that reason, Belgian property. We know, of course, that it is under the sovereignty of the Central Governmant. But we know, further, — in order to make a full map of it — that, w3ien we took over, certain police and administrative functions were exercised by Congolese officials who had pledged allegiance to the authorities in Elisabethville. I say that only in order to make the map complete -- nothing more. By the way, I should add that we have requested -- and it has probably been executed by now -- that they leave the base, because we will clean it up and make it purely a United Nations operation without anybody mixing in for the moment. Mr. JHA (India); Mr. Secretary-General, your exposition of the situation of the United Nations with regard to the former Belgian military bases seems to ma, if I may say so, quite sound. That is to say, the United Nations has stepped into the shoes of the Belgian force there, and they cannot adjudicate the legal rights of either party. They are more or less in the position of a trustee, not only for the interests of the private property of Belgium but also for the interests of the Government concerned — SECRETARY-GENERAL; Just as much. Mr. JHA (India): That position seems to us perfectly sound* I know that you are seized pf all aspects of this question, but it strikes me that in this matter ve should perhaps not overemphasize the caretaker aspect of the United Nations proepee in these bases or the question of the legal ownership of the various kinds of property that are in the bases, or soy "Well, it isfo?\ the parties to have their claims legally adjudicated by the International Court of Justice or by some tribunal or by agreement", because that might put the United Nations in the position of becoming indefinite occupiers of these bases. I Just throw out that idea because I feel that the United Nations occupation of these bases must always be juotified and based on larger coneiderations, which are present before the Security Council. ^The^fifor^^ T y™1"1* *yrtL overemphasize — in fact, I would keep it in the_background •.» the question of logal oTmerdiip and the legality of the claiml s> of either party. "^~" ^-J^»ai»'"'""" *""" ^"»*ni».-Tlra,L_u_,,, TII iini'iin" n The 8BCRETARY»GEKBRAL:. I agree with you. Et Is,, go'toapeak, be cflufle of a play of circumstances that I have had to emphasize it. It is not, of course, the basic approach. The basic approach Is the Security Council mandate* The SecurityJJaunctl mandate is the mandate for the Force in general. There was a i i - j | •****" " **" »•'.-»*«* '*^»*-wr|^ ijmtima'--* -n v%iJt-..-*T*,i:. itjtjfcjifa~*v "wmi i tr«trj»*rrTr"TT wmn v^.\ v-yiTWuft*-"Omjjua -^uJriL,——WJ^AjjiiiJL ^au4Hi^i»ip««^»^ special clause; "epe^o(^modalities". This question of speedy modalltlos meant that when we insisted on withdrawal of the Belgians from Kamina it was-/ so to eay, not .suddenly abandoned by the civil administration, but by everything' that was really maintaining it. The speedy modality was, therefore, simply that we • • stepped in. Then we had to define our statue, and the status was one in whidh we could not adjudicate, as -you say. That wan real?.y the basis. Wow, to explain why we could not adjudicate, I have had to mention that there •were several interests, theoretical or possibly individual, of which we. wea?a .not the masters. But the ^verri^njg^^neideration is necessarily that we arevthere under the. Sedurity Council mandate ;. i From my point-of view, when the~man^ale ^ ;T" eacpiresour right to sit. there as caretakers expires too and^ in that situation, . we would be forced to force'the parties to take care of it one way or the other. That Is to say, this is* "cna. o.WrTlfllft8. bfiHjIld^ratlo'ii". " I' was anxious "?fco show , , vtiy the caretaklng functions have -this .character"-of putting things In suspense* J4r..:JHA- (India): 1 am .grateful.for your elaboration. • I knew that that idea would: certainly be .con&idje.red by; you, but.:I thought that J should share our thoughts with-.you on thett .point.-. •,.,. 1 . The SECRETARY-tGBNEBAL?: Can I go on now to tyte next. subi«ct, which Is Mr. CABA. (Guinea)(interpretation from French): We entirely agree on the -three points, which you have stressed in your third repprt. That is why we hav^-noted with satisfaction your protest to the Belgian government .regarding the1 delay in the evacuation of the Belgian troops* It i» true that; certain-..;. troofcs a're still there* and, as you said-earlier, those .which remain-ar« of no •ignificant polltical--6r military' Importance. This, means-that you wlU , . .... continue ail your1 efforts to accelerate the complete evacuation of th* troops. 17 Yes, it la a mopping-up operation* The SECRETARY-GEKERALt I do not think that, on the aecond point, there is any difference because, as is obvious from what I said to the representative of Ethiopia, we will, of course, remain in contact with the parties and, for our part, the sooner this is tidied up, the better. I think that the way in which we have proceeded also shows you that we do not permit any lack of clarity or elaboration in the resolutions to stop vie from going on. We have to find 18-20 aoBetlmea normal legal fonm^aa in order to get over a hump, -- that la exactly what baa happened here. We will maintain .the same pace and tha ,03108 philosophy in the future. Mr. CgjEg-BjCgY (Ethiopia): I have two questions. What would he. the exact situation if someone from the base or from the military side went over and was employed provincially and took part — as I think I have seen in the movies — in some sort of troop organization? I have seen on television something from which I gathered — I may be wrong — that there were some who had gone over from the Belgian troops to the provincial authorities. Can they do this? Is that a proper thing? The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I do not know any case of that type, but I f • • <**^**mf**^*^*»*»*u^m*^****i*»^^^f*^am . ^ • . ^ . ^ ... want to be precise as regards the situation as I understand it. . There may have been members of the Belgian combat troops who have,.so to say, cancelled their relations, to the Belgian Army and the Belgian QQvernment. and have been hired, by the local authorities* About that I.do nc/b Imow anything, but, of courae, anybody can Jump out of his old boat and board a new one. That does present us with a problem wfcich is not limited to, the Belgians.. because tftere are also other casea vhere nationals, irrespective of their nationalities,.have taken service with this or that military unit in. the Congo, £ do not now spea^ about the United Rations . Force because that is an entirely different problemf . .\ . : If•• ..'• .thi: .• .,s. is of any significance militarily — and it may be; I do not exclude it — we have to go into the matter under the general rules of international law and within the interpretation Of the spirit of the resolutions. I promise you that will be done if we note .anything of significance in that respect. That is the first point. 23. The force publlgue had all over the Congo,when the mutiny broke out and the crisis started, Belgian officers. They left in the five provinces; they did not leave in Katanga. They are still hired by the provincial authorities as part of the gendarmerie. They do represent a problem -which we have not yet been able to tackle. They are under contracts with the local authorities. They are for that reason not under Belgian authority; they are under local authority. I am not ready here and now to say exactly how that problem should be tackled. The third point is the question of the non-combat personnel for the moment left in Kamina. As I said in the Security Council, it is absolutely necessary that these do not engage In propaganda -- they should not engage in any activity which has anything to do with the local situation in the Congo* If they do, now they are under our command and they will be out. Further, they are non-combatants and, in vny view, for that reason they shculd also be non-armed. That is as much as I can say for the moment, In this caw^ as in other cases, there are questions involved which have to be followed very closely and which would call for immediate reaction if they seemed to run counter to what is the obvious target of the United Nations. Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): I have one further question. Would it be correct to say that the United Nations, in maintaining the Kamina base, does not say that the property belongs to either the Congolese Government or the Belgian Government? It simply stays there, The SECRETARY-GENERAL; You are entirely right. We do not rule in any sense on any right. What we note is only that there may be various rights involved and that in that situation when we step in in an emergency as caretakers we have only one duty and that is not to prejudge any possible right as it may be found in legal forms or through negotiations. We have not ruled on any right. 22 Mr; JOHNSONi (Liberia) i . I wish tQ thank you for the" escposition on the question*as you have given it to us. I think, of course, the position of >my delegation is well known and perhaps it is sometimes' a little too strong for the United Nations bold action in the Congo situation. But in order that I may be able to think correctly on this legal aspect of the bases, I would like to pose this question. I have .been told or I hava read that these bacas'came'into consideration a day before independence was attained and that on that date th«y entered into a treaty with the Belgian Government. We understand that the treaty was not at any time ratified by the Assembly or any official body of the Congo*, If that ia the case, I think it establishes a very dubious situation in this - question of bases. I would like to know whether that is correct, namely that • it was not ratified. .The SECREMRY^EMEPALt: That is quite correct. The so-called treaty of friendship was never ratified. What is said in the treaty of friendship regarding the bases is quite simple/ It. is said that .la reprise des bases, the turning over of the bases or ths . taking; back of < the bases, by the Congo Government will be negotiated between.the two parties* • If .we- look at that as a declaration of intentions, and of course it may stand as a declaration of intentions, even if it is not. a legally valid --agreement', it tnoaris.; two things. On the one side it means that the Belgian Goa-ermcent had5*-given up-the bases and considered, that they should pass over to the Congo authorities. > On-the other hand, it also means that on the Congo side it was recognized, as we recognize it now, : that there were various legal problems involved which should be properly studied Jointly as. a basis for .a decision on the modalities for this passing .pyer of the bases to the Congo authorities. Our stepping in in an emergency and filling the gap, which .deve.lo.ped when, the troops left is uninfluenced by the treaty of friendship and is in no way based on it. The most that can be said — and I would refer to Dr. Schachter who is here if I am wrong <•«• legally is that we can refer to it as an indication of the fact that there are;various legal interests involved and that for that reason we should take a neutral position of not prejudging those interests-nor passing on any of the rights as matters now stand. That is to say, I regard the 'treaty of friendship as in no way relevant to our step, but as an indication of the fact that there are various interests involved because the two parties both recognized 23- that there was a need for some kind of negotiation. It may also be said that it is of interest that the Belgian Government in its declaration of intentions made it clear that they considered that the final owner of the bases should be the Congo Government, Mr. CABA (Guinea) (interpretation from French): I should like to add that my country considers that with regard to these bases we shall have strategic and political problems more than merely legal problems. I previously *':,ated that these bases vere technically developed and that we shall meet vith aiany difficulties on the part of the Belgian Government with respect to their evacuation. The SECRETARY-OSIjggAL: Nobody dsnie.i the existence of the other interests, but what I have to maintain, in a somewhat feeble voice, is that the United Nations is a very law-abiding organization. For the.t reason we never cut into rights if they exist. That does not mean that we forget the existence of strategic and political interests which may be overriding, but we just must see to it that we are not those who assume rights which are not ours. Mr» ADEEL (Sudan): I wonder whether I am correct in understanding that these technicians for whom you intend to start shopping soon to replace the cians would be re the maintenance of these bases until their ultimate future is decided and not for their operation. The SECRETARY-GENERAL; My understanding of it is that you are right. They ajre required only for the maintenance, because to the extent there will be any operations at all,they will be operations for the United Nations Force and thus will be taken care of by the United Nations Force itself. Mr. ADEEL (Sudan): I was also wondering whether the Congolese Government has at all pronounced itself on the future of these bases vis-a-vis the Congolese Government. Do they want to keep them in the future? '•if; The 3ECB£TARY-GENERAL; - ^h«»e fcave-"been various ideas expressed abdut It by various members of the Government from President Kasavubu downwards.' Hone of them knows more than we know about the potentialities of the-bases and- the possibilities of their future use* In fact, I believe that the discussion, of-the future use by the Congolese can usefully start the moment we have the Gala Plaza report, baeaus^ that will be -the first time 'that we have ian -inventory and will know what has been going on end what the equipment really is. To •discuss' it in the abstract is, of course, not very useful. . ;..... •V-'I would? likfc -to add one observation that I mads on a previous' occasions I think, in somewhat frivolous language, from the point of view of the Congo' it will prove to be a white elephant. That is a personal impression and it stands for what it.is. wprt*i, V /: '• • : i I was about to suggest that since we*are attempting -ta gghleve harmonious relationships in the Congo, would it not advantageous to our side as well en to the side of the Congolese if we rule out all di«cu9«ip^,on.tiie- legal aspect of these base's and confine ourselves solely to the idea that these bttsofc'- will be he3A In trust by .the United; NatJWlw Force whi3.e in the Congo , and when te" e United, Jjfotions ^ are terminated thife baiies -will-be turiied over to • the * appropriate authoritieet • 26 The SECRETARY -GENERAL; That is one vay of expressing the line of what trying to say. There is only one small reserwU Mr. HASAN (Pakistan): As you said, in the Treaty, which was not ratified, the intention was expressed that eventually these bases would belong to the Congo Government. The SECRETARY ..GENERAL: They used the phrase "reprise des baoea". Mr« HASAN (Pakistan): Was there any question of payment for these bases The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I think they used the phrase "les modalltfo de la reprise des basesn, which would include all the conditions. Mr. HASAN (Pakistan): There was no mention of coopeniation? \ The SECRETARY-GENERAL; No, the word "conjpenatvfcion" was not mentioned, the word "modaliteV1 was mentioned. There is quite a considerable real estate value; after all, there are two cities, and the housing and the workshops alone are very valuable and certainly should be put to the best possible use. They represent a value not only in investment money but also in uce. In the same way, as a matter of course, to the extent that we use the stocks that are found at the base, or uee the services in a way which means wear and tear, we are in duty bound to pay our way. That is just a question of a common, accepted legal principle. However, 1 should add one thing which may be interesting and which is essential. It is that as long as the Belgian technicians assist us as technicians, they are paid by the Belgian Government, not l?y us. We do not pay any compensation for that technical assistance. 27 Mr. HASAN (Pakistan): I am interested In rthe maintenance of -the bases. The SECRETARY-GENERAL; W^ stepped in, at a burden to .ourselves, 'and •we should not have too much of a burden so long as this transitional stage lasts. Mr.. JHA (India): Following upon what you have said, are they regarded at present as part, even temporarily, of UN personnel — do they carry UN arm bands? The SECRETARY•aEI'PSRAL; -No. Mr. JHA (India): It seems to me that whatever it is they should be placed under another authority. The SSCRETARY-OEICSR^L: The construction is another one, as you have seen in the report, although it is a fragment of a sentence. They are under United Nations, orders in that we have administrative responsibility at the bases. They are not in United Nations service.) that ;is a service rendered to us by the -Belgian Government as a.gift, *s I Mr. LAMINE SALL (Mali]x(lnterpretation from French): I believe that the position of the OrganJ^tf^ion ..regarding possession of the property or non- posses sioajo£-±h«-iJfoperty of the bases is one that. I go along with, but 1 should like some information regarding the utilization of the bases, especially that of / Kamina. Can these bases be placed at the disposal of planes transporting troops f for example from the Congolese Government or any other Government or authority? The SECRETARY-GENERAL: Puring this period when we are in exclusive control of,it it may be ,used only by the United Nations^- only. That is to say, the Belgians cannot use it, the Congo Government cannot use it, and, as I said before, whatever, civilian personnel of an administrative nature there may have been from the Katanga authorities have been* I would not say expelled, but evacuated. 28 Mr* JOHNSON (Liberia): When you said just now that the Belgian tehchnicians will be paid by the Belgian Government, I vender, Mr, Secretary-General, whether it would not be more conducive to harmonious relationships and to the elimination of all possible suspicion and doubt if you could work out — since we are here in an advisory capacity, I am trying to say this — if you could work out a scheme whereby the United Nations could become wholly responsible for the administration of the base in all its aspects? The SECRETARY-GENERAL; That is exactly what we are working for as quickly as we possibly can. Mr. JOHNSON (Liberia): Does that include ths payment of these technicians by tile United Nations? The SECRETARY-GSNEPALr I think that Member Governments should be quite grateful not to have these expenses added to the very heavy bill I have to present. After all, at this very moment they are under our exclusive authority and it is a temporary phase, because we just cannot do it any other way now* After all, it only took us from one Monday to a Tuesday to take it over. Mr. WIEoCHHOFF; The Secretary-General has b$en informed through i«lr. Cordier by a Red Cross representative who returned yesterday from Bakwanga in Kasai Province, and also subsequently by a UNOC representative in Luluabourg> concerning serious fighting which has continued in the Bakwanga area in the course of the last few days, as of course has been reported in the daily Press. It ippears from these reports that the primary dispute eentres around forces of the VrmeV nationale congolaise and the Jeunesse Baluba, The former apparently represents forces of the Central Government and the latter seems to be composed of followers of Mr. Kalonjl, who leads the secessionist movement in the Kasai area. Jhile the Jeunesse Baluba appears to be ill-equipped militarily, the ANC group, originating from Thysville is armed with mortars, heavy and light machine guns, ,ub-machiae guns and grenades. It is reported by the Red Cross representative :hat the ANC groups formed parties which are operating on their ovo and do not take orders from Mr. NJoka, the ANC commanded in Luluabourg. It may be added that 29-30 the ANC commander In Luluabourg, as well as the Central Government Security Administrator there, are only too eager to regulate the situation, but they have no control. It appears further that in the fighting between the ANC and the Jeunesse Baluba some 150 persons have been killed and that an unspecified number of executions for political reasons have been taking place recently involving some of the ministers of the so-called Kalonji Government who were captured at Bakwanga. It may be added that other reports received from the area placed the figure slightly higher. But in addition to these tragic events involving the armed forces of political opponents, there occurred in the afternoon of 31 August an event which can only be described as a massacre. On that occasion, ABC soldiers/ apparently finding themselves threatened by sporadic fire from a nearby village, massacred some seventy men, women and children who had sought refuge in mission schools. This massacre is all the more brutal as it was not undertaken with firearms but with machetes* In this connexion it may be noted that the dead were only buried when the people had been frightened by a doctor in the UN service that a threat of epidemic existed* The SECRETARY-GENERAL; You can very well see that this gives rise to a serious problem. We have here, in this Eakvanga massacre, something far beyond tribal warfare. We have gone far beyond what can reasonably be called political fights of a civil war type. If jinned meja^jaafa^beying the orders of their commander use machetes and kill a great number of women and children, it cannot oe described genocide For that reason, the question arises: what are really the duties and what ia the competence of the United Nations Force? It is stated that it * - • ' ' '. ' » should maintain law and order. It has the right of self-defence --a fairly extensive right of.self-defence --because it is entitled to hold positions which it holds under orders, but it is also supposed not in any way to interfere in internal conflicts. In a situation like this one where, so to say, the borders between internal conflict, tribal warfare and simple butchery are floating, the instructions must be clarified. Personally I have not the slightest hesitation in saying that in a clear, . cold case beyond the limits of internal conflict and even beyond the limits of what, mi git be called organized, tribal warfare -- if there is anything of the kind — our force has obligations. Simply,imagine where the United Nations, I would stand as an Organization if, with a strong military potential in an a£fa* ! because of principles which are in themselves soundj>ut interpreted }n this casein too legalistic a/way/it were to stajpd as a. silent and |>assive( witness .a' s to. make clear tha' t the principle of non-interference, while being firmly maintained, and the principle of self-defence, while being firmly maintained, " '' ' do not mean passivity in a case of the slaughtering of the civilian population t :a ^m*^^*M^*l,t^.,*,.*~.^~^-«i-^-*<'"*''~'' <**'*r*'»»*m>it***t*m «, ,\^-M^M^*^&^:^*.-*~.-*+*fa-yi***^?X*"*^ *^ J^rjai.y^il£eajp^a^j^ I have a draft of a letter to the Foreign Minister on the matter. It is a draft, and for that reason I would not say that it is the last word, but this is what is said. We are all members of the Advisory Committee, and for that reason I think it is quite legitimate to use drafts and to profit from your reactions and your advice. I will read it in French: (Continued in French) "Sir: You must be aware of the recent events in the Bakwanga region which caused the death of many civilians in that region* To the extent to vhlch a conflict in that region is due to a conflict between the forces of the Congolese National Army and the supporters of Mr* Kalonji, it must be considered as an Internal conflict and one in which the United Nations •hould not intervene, in conformity with the principles so far established. "Nevertheless, information has come from a reliable source that arbitrary acts were updertalten, by units which were not directly . subordinated to the Congolese Government, ag&inet civilians.who were not directly concerned in the conflict* CTAe Secretary-General of the United Nations, I must condemn such actg. I am convinced that your Government will willingly give its support -to such a condemnation and-that it will take, all measures, to prevent a repetition of BUvsh acts; . ; WI am convinced that you and your Goveamment .will fully recognize, -- '- i - | --in _ ..— , , --• „, jiu.._.n -v. ~T - .- --r-r- T-n - —irm as I do, that instructions must be given to the^Unjltefl Nations Force to interpose itself, by force if necesoary> to. prevent sa&ittJsjta^ United Nations,/and the interdiction: against interference by the , United Nations in domestic-affairs should not be applied to mao sac res .- or to tribal warfare. , In 'the-, interests of maintaining public order and in the spirit of the Universal Declaration, of Human Rights, I am convinced : that your Government will unreservedly give,, its support to the United, .- Nations, so as to protect .innocent human livesw •,.'..- •.-:•. .; \--- "The appropriate instructions will be issued to the High Commander of the United Nations-Force in the ••"Congo*1, unless your,Government has any other positive suggestions to formulate. I do not think.it necessary to stress the urgency of this oju&stion." < •" ^ •- (Continued in English) The necessary instructions which would correspond to this letter and which would be issued if the discussion with the Government does not, so to say, the doors to some-other solution would be as follows: •••.-'.•-. ; ^ . ' "In view of the ^problems illustrated by the Bata/anga massacre, the United Nations Force* must be instructed to interpose themselves; foree_if necessary, '^o prevent the slaughter of glvilians, including ^^^^^^^^^^^*^^****"'**|'WW'**W*'*l*'***'l"***''**1*^ . the local as well as the European populatiofilaB tneprohiDltion against ^p ^^a>*BH^^^*aw "Legal basis for action is simple obligation to maintain lav and order, inspired also by principles of Declaration of Human Rights* The Organization cannot stand aside in the case of incipient genocide. Application in particular circumstances will necessarily depend upon Judgement of local United Nations Commanders, on the basis of manpower available in the actual situation, but they should have standing instructions on the above lines. They should also be informed that the interposition of troops to maintain order in these cases would not involve initiative in use of arms but that United Nations troops are entitled to respond with force to any attack, including any attempts to make them withdraw or to interfere with their duties in maintaining order." That is the problem and an attempted line of approach. We have not been able to see any other way, or a clearer way, and, as a matter of course, I hope that the Government will see eye to eye with us in the very interests of law and order and future good relations within the country. The difficulty arises because of the fact that in borderline cases it may be difficult to see what is what, but we have so definitely gone beyond the border that an instruction must be given which clarifies the duties and rights of the Force. Mr. LOUTFI (United Arab Republic) (interpretation from French): I should merely like to ask a question. Of what nationality are the United Nations troops that are in the region where the trouble occurred? The^gBjRCTXRY-^NEBA.L; They are Tunisian troops. I am informed that the Tunisians suffered another casualty today. They have had bad luck. So far their part in this situation, apart from protecting the population where they could protect it « I mean, passively protect it — has been especially to protect refugees. There have been some migrations from the area. Mr. CABA. (Guinea) (interpretation from French): Before taking up a quick analysis of the document you have read to us, Mr» Secretary-General, I should like to ask a question. Is it true that certain United Nations forces were obliged today to defend themselves in a specific case? I heard this on the radio, and I do not know whether I am correctly informed. The SECBETARY-GENEPAL; Yes, it is right. The Moroccans were attacked; the civilian population tried to take their arms. They first fired warning shots and, when that did not work, they had to shoot, and there was one casualty. It is a clear case of self-defence on their side, They were attacked. 36. Mr, GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): Would it be correct .to understand that the instructions to the United Nations Force will go- out only after you receive i^i^^^^a**********"•**t***mp**fttl*'* ie Congolese Government! The SECRETARY-GENERAL; 'They will not be sent un-'c-il we have the reaction. But as you remember, my demand to the Government was. to present an «*IWt^jW.j (.•?.•.*•* .v.'-w-l-Kt. .Mnnnifr alternative* Back of that is, of course, the feeling on our side that we /* Just cannot stand back when it comes to this kind of point. We are quite willing to discuss alternatives and the ideal would be, of course, if the Government itself re-established order in such cases and lifted off our shoulders this responsibility, which is not the one we envisaged when the troops were sent there. Mr. HASAN (Pakistan): If the difficulty comes from this representation you made to the Governments, it is most likely that they will take measures to prevent such things. Would you be satisfied with that or would you still give orders to the United Nations High Command that, if they consider it proper and necessary to intervene in such cases, they should go ahead? The SECRETARY-GENERAL; My reply, which IB hypothetical, is that the Government should, of course, have the benefit of the doubt. But if they do not manage to take effective measures, I do not see how we^can take on v ourselves the responsibility for things just going on. There is the other possibility, and that is that the Government itself asks us to assist them in this kind of task, and that is, of course, quite different. But I would not a priori consider myself in any way entitled to say that the Government measures will be insufficient. They would have the benefit of the doubt. retation from French): Mr. Secretary-General, I fllnrp-^^^uf^XJjJiy^L-^^" Vh4fffT^TTini1 •*•-*, *»*- wants to assist in finding an efficient ground on which to work, we have to be frank and open in expressing our views* I believe that the new instructions which we *H \ 1;3 giv< e to thfiimlln. ^^,+t ....,.., . - .- . , „.«„ ,J'—.,»«-«««—"-'-»^" *'' ^^ Nations Force will hardly be palatable to the central Government, because these are very dangerous instructions* On the one hand, tne"central Government, in its own mind, says: In order to safeguard the integrity of the territory, in order to give greater power to the central Government, we must by all means end the danger of secession in Kaeai and Katanga. On the other hand, we have the stand taken by the United Nations: The United Nations told us that they feel that the United Nations cannot intervene in domestic affairs. But it is these two juxtaposed and defined positions that lead us to regrettable situations that we have just heard about, this massacre, this dreadful situation that leads Congolese, children of the same country, to kill one another. This, of course, makes our task doubly difficult. But this is the dilemma that we have to confront at the moment, a dilemma which may perhaps complicate even further our task in the Congo, because the central Government is determined, as we see through the press, to use force in order to end secession in Kasai and Katanga. Now how will those instructions be taken in Leopoldville? That is where I have to express certain reservations. That is where my delegation is somewhat disturbed, I believe that the principle of non-intervention must be very rapidly and very carefully analysed, because t>hq central Government considers that these acts of Tshombe or Kblonji, of secession, are not inoVparabie from the main problem that disturbs us, which is the presence of Belgian troops. I think that the Committee must be extremely wise and ^- _, , i m n •""" i persevering and must very carefully and deeply analyse the instructions that are to be sent to Leopoldville in order to avoid our being confronted by a second crisis. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: That may be true. It is always wise to think. But I think that you recognize that there are also international"Taw"s for warfare. And if, even with the most cleaViy'st^ thispart of an internal civil war or internal conflict, those laws are Qk a 8 infringed upnfljyjfr Vr ffittiuAifciiilrf|ljj]"g^. , serious as in a war between nations. That is to say, in a case like this one, for the United Nations to '"accept the resort to forms of warfare whicharecoridemgd as barbaric anywhere, that is t l ***** •*..'*****.**+„,.+>*t^.^rr.^**'>™>****~ * *~~^~**~^*'**"*-'' "™*~ -^xi**™**™***"*****^ impossible. That is the other side of the umbrella. • .i***" •THH^T 11 • M up IDIIHHI ii inn i i in» ^ ii 'Inning i i "' ~ i i» i i If you imagine world opinion facing the fact that there we are, with the possibility to stop the killing of women and children and that wV do no*^-->««w«*--««^^.^~W.t do it, for a principlv.vw,j»»^e^ which in itself i''e " sound'• - , I.••-. do .no t think .tha ,^4.^.,t , world opinion would follow us or that the Organization would escape being tUMUfc^M^^^te«UM^^M4A^_ ' ' -tm nmi fc-w+.-»*.n», •*».-Mfc*w-•*-• i- *-'-•• * •••;'. • " '•'•....-! condemned. And that is a very serious matter too. The approach to the Government is a legitimate one. We point out that this is something which we feel enters the field of our responsibilities already because of the principles upheld by the Organization. I believe that the Government itself is the first one to want to maintain civilized forms of conflict in warfare and, for that reason, that they would rather welcome this being something which we concern ourselves with too. If we take a hypothetical and, I hope, completely unrealistic case, ^ ' •* J .___ m^^_^_*&u*imtumt^*^**umiijmm^iiji»*MMa*<*i<*r-rtmTrrJtrriniumav9'>*11*' • " ' —~~" ' * that the Government does not see eye to eye with us, I would put that on ... \. • _ . . (India): MpV Secretary-General, this is a very difficult problem\that has^ciaetr.'*'^! appreciate your anxiety and the way you wish to handle this problem. In the first place, your approach to the Government seeme to be entirely proper, of course, at this stage. But I feel -• and I agree, there with the representative of Guinea --that we have to give it *a7gre"atllealTmpre thought, I think that even in your letter, if I may make in mil \at*i*+H*mil*mHmmm*n n»i "•|i"*'«n»i»a.4(.*yV»*. . . - . a suggestion, we should not take the legal point so much, the point about **t«9*»WW«**l«TO^ ...... -*'-*"-'V*--' maintaining order. That certainly is important and the Security Council . resolutions do give the mandate to the United Nations Force for maintaining internal, security. And you are certainly right in saying that if the Congolese troops try to massacre innocent people, that certainly goes to the foundation of maintenance of law and order. The troops would be committing an illegal act, an act which is calculated to disturb public law and order, and therefore the United Nations troops would be justified in intervening. But once that argument is used, I think the Government can use the argument that a mass rebellio,,,. n — „Kolonji' - s followerstiwAa^MV^, or^ whoever may be — jrjM) (• 4VMMO**" Xcn^.^..^ ---- ,_ _ - .-,.- . , . . - ••"•MiffflMiwuimni i,, , ...... mi i pin . .„.------~ —,***.«, „ .rt^,. ,,„,»,..,,,,,,<«*?;«<>>* «»tvv, r »*•*«• ".-r •*•••< ""• .•*->»?». -o.-A.rtwu*** against the Government is something which essentially affects law and l'«»»1'^^ order and therefore they are entitled to the assistance of the United Nations Force. V.iMatfc.S**'' While I say this, I fully realize the gravity of the situation. J[ would place this matter on humanitarian considerations. That is the most important aspect, the aspect that any slaughter of the kind that you have referred to, about which you have received reports, goes fundamentally against the purposes and principles of the Charter and really amounts to genocide. It is on the highest humanitarian grounds that we should take our stand, because if we stray into the region of the requirement of the maintenance of law and order, then it seems to me that the Government may very well say: "Well, in the other circumstance, you should intervene to help us to suppress thsse rebellions". The other point that I wish to make has to do with the concluding part of your draft instructions. , I agree that instructions will have to be issued to the United Nations Force; it 1§ not fair to leave them in the air. But you said at the end, if, I remember rightly, that they will not fire first even in a situation like that, that it is only when they are attacked that they will do so. Now, I do not:know- whether it is necessary to spell it out in so much detail, but there may be a situation in which slaughter is going on and the United Nations troops are not.being fire4 upon,.but rather,some other innocent persons are being fired upon or ..slaughtered. According to these instructions, the United Nations troops • -'-*-• .-.>iii*^Jr*~rM-r-.> ,. mini,J a-IW t ,-,,„-„ • n TnnnmiicMii •..,.,. ' ' __1_ . x cannot do anything in such a situation becaus• "" ^^*^^"'- e""* "the " •""• ••"•'T«Wr*Wy ar7.!••* ' . . . r .. LQUTFT (Vfc&s. Arab Republic) (interpretation faxam French): OMs is ,^ * ' " ^'fif*"""' ° • ,.• •'.'.-:', really a very Delicate question. The first step you took, to contact the central Government of the' Congo, was a very wise step. But I fehould like to propose something. Would it not be possible to give instructions to Mr. Cordier to «- "'" "* ••'•"**--•» --r —- — •'-"' -Ti I i- Hif-"*'""1"1*'**""'-*"— ^—r- I approach the Government in your behalf without sending 1die letter right away" — The: SECRETARY-GENERAL (interpretation from French) : Certainly, there can be a draft letter, which would be discussed with Mr. Bomboko. Mr, LOUTET: (United Arab Republic) (interpretation from French): It would be necessary to try to convince them that it is a humanitarian question, and that what Is happening could do much harm to the Government of the Congo. ' The SJSCRETARY^GENERAL (interpretation from French): Certainly, that le a very good idea. Mr. AFOUD (Morocco) (interpretation from French): I believe that today's meeting shows convincingly that things are deteriorating and that general considerations are no longer the centre of our problem, that we are considering details which may change the very face of the problem. We know -ttxst the central Government has shown much impatience in regard to the question of the complete and final evacuation of the Belgian forces. The second question close to the heart of the Government is that of territorial unity. Thsse are legitimate concerns. We find such preoccupations in practically every country. An atmosphere of bitterness has come into being, and we now see that the population is sporadically opposing even the forces of the United Nations. The United Nations, pursuing a humanitarian aim, is endeavouring to protect innocent human lives. The very first danger that the United Nations might face would be to become involved in domestic confusions, even against t£is will of this Organization. In situations of a domestic nature, troops are troops and police forces are merely police forces„ When it comes to protecting law and order in the interior of the country, it is usually the police forces that are in charge of such tasks, and any activity should be carried out as a police activity in that field. Secondly, the painful and sometimes inhuman events, such as those registered today, are at first a detail and then a consequence of a complex. The impatience shown by the central Government in the face of the two cardinal problems of territorial integrity and evacuation of troops is an aspect which we certainly did not consider lightly, and we have placed all our trust and confidence in the Secretary-General to handle this complex situation. What we apprehend now if such instructions are issued, is that, while we are endeavouring to keep out of domestic involvements, we may become involved in domestic affairs against the will of the United Nations. Why? First, there is the delay which the central Government has not looked upon favourably but which we have considered with much more patience in view of the confidence which we have placed in the ability of the Secretary-General. Nevertheless this delay has generated confusing and even very dangerous situations, such as the situation we are facing today. The second point is that operations which should normally have been undertaken by police forces will now perhaps be undertaken by military units, and this will create a very tense atmosphere, because the United Nations will actually become a party to an internal conflict. 1*6 Thirdly, instead of constantly bearing ia mind, the overriding importance of, preserving territorial unity — which includes opposition to secession — we are . risking distortion of the very problem itself,, This poin£ s^ovjld be considered very carefully by this Conmittee and we should try, , in the first place, to avoid . Delays and, secondly, to act to protect innoc.ent human lives — at the same time acting within the framework of such organs as are normally entrusted with the maintenance of peace and security,, such as police forces, in co-operation with the Central Government. This would oblige the Central Government to face its , ; responsibilities so that there would be no coafusion in the attitude of the United Nations Force, which could, without intending it, become a party. to an internal. conflict. In the third place, we should consider vsry carefully the question of delays. Perhaps a good offices coaadttec or oth^r similar organ ehould be set uj> in order to eradicate the root of the evil. The secessionist intrigues . v are well known to everybody, and yet, we are not using "** fran"* •• •»!•*• *.iPI****!-**--"* k * . M****,)**,*,^and^ , ^to'J ,.,,..-_ ope. n languag+ e 'In " the "facer of - thesir evetftsT" It must be said" th$t ' tJotfi" the Central Government and the population live in a tense atmosphere, because of the delays which I have mentioned and because of the • secessionist , movements, which are supported by , colonialist influence. Let, us -pall these things by their names as we take into account the seriousness of the situation. : • ''•••• ""• " ' • - - -...... v ' • - • .. therefore, we . should try once more ; to give all our attention to the original problem the solution, of which was entrusted to" -fchfarCJommittee* *--~.-^^*. „, |, i ,' ,„, ii '«™'mmt»a<>T*'mii*»*^****;-«a^.»MMf,i.^^...,.. ., _____ ,...., .....„.. . . \. .. ,.M^. . ------...... Thus, there are. three points:, -first, the tense atmosphere which fcas been ^ caused by the delays; seco.ndly, the particular type of action; to be taken to protect human lives; and thirdly, we should not fprget the main .features of the , problem while concentrating on details, and^ we should envisage rapid action to stop the secessionist movement and to prevent any delay, in the evacuation ToT" foreign < .-^li^^^^., ._,T- - r-|i',i.i| |L,'_,^n n ._y.i. -ir-l* — T------...... '...-—..--....,---••--»-.'-..'.-..,-..,.;,..,, ...-,,. ' ' tropps^ ,The atmosphere in the Congo, is very tense and such tension has been f created through the existence of these factors* ;,._ v <, The .S^REIARY^GEIiERA^: Part of the difficulty is,, as Mr* Caba:6aid, the 4il?mma, .wl*ich .means .that we might slip into a false position. I can illustrate that in a very simple way. Some irregular band attacks a house or a village • It has nothing to do with anything* Nobody contests for a moment the fact that we can have a cordon to screen it off to protect the human beings in it. It is perfectly clear; it is the maintenance of lav and order. The band is composed of people from the Association nationale congolaise. In the second place, these men of the AMC have ceased to take orders from their officers and they go from village to village killing people. I would tend to rank that case clearly with the first one. But they are people in the armed ranks and those people are killed. The women happen to be married to Balubas, who are secessionists. Where are we? I adduce it only as an illustration. As to the other point, I have no reason to feel that, on the United Nations side, as regarcte withdrawal of foreign troops, there has been any slowness a We are up against another phenomenon about which I spoke at one time in the Security Council. We are up against completely unrealistic impatience; so we should not be rushed into stupid action because of impatience. We should act as quickly as we can responsibly; and I think we have done it, and with considerable effect, because, after all, the speedy withdrawal has been completed much more quickly — as Mr. Loutfi will remember — than another famous withdrawal in 1956-195? — I think in about half the tjbne. The other point which you had in mind referred to secessionist intrigues and the slowness in that regard. Well, to speed that up, if I may put it that way, it seems to be a question for the Central Government; it is certainly not our question. I agree that the difficulty in coming to grips with the situation has created an electrified atmosphere, as you said, but in that respect I would put us outside the problem, and I would say also — and I think you will agree with me — that if impatience on that front — the inner conflict front — is turned against the United, nations, it is seeking a completely irrational outlet in making us scapegoats in something in which we have no part. Mr. ABOUD (Morocco) (interpretation from French): What I meant — and I have even made some notes — was that the United Nations, always acting towards establishing peace in the Congo, is engaged in a very difficult problem to which North Africa is no stranger, because there, too, considerable confusion attended the struggle for independence. These matters are well known. They are familiar in the history of the countries which recently became independent. What has been 48-50 described as Irregulars,, or bands, or outlaws, is actually quite a natural. . iii _' _if ___ n i •—*••**"»*-•'•—-.-'-»»••-.>-•>»— -^ l.-~ ..... — -S-H-IH __mmii Of course the events which have Just been described are extremely painful* They should be made completely Impossible to recur with the co-operation of the central Government in order to prevent the accusation of closiring to create a state within a state, especially with regard to foreigners. We must avoid a situation which might be described as a "rotten" one. We must see that these are the details and the consequences which result from the natural development of things. Mr. CAM (Guinea) (Interpretation from French): We are here, Mr. Secretary-General, to assist you in your delicate task which you have undertaken in application of the resolutions of the Security Council. It is our duty to tell you quite frankly what our fo^Angfl are so that ve may best help you in the most effective manner to achieve the aims vhich you are pursuing. If we failed to tell you what ve really think, we would to a certain extent be responsible for the deterioration of the situation. That is why I yielded the floor to Ambassador Loutfi, who presented a very wise suggestion, namely to use the services of your present representative in the Congo so as to discuss the contents of this document with the central Government in order to determine the reaction of responsible Congolese. Within twenty-four or forty-eight hours you would have uuffIcieni; knowing© of thalr attitude before the instructions were finalized. You know that African psychology is sometimes quite difficult to understand. It is necessary to have a deep knowledge of every aspect of Africa to understand and to feel what the reactions of Africans might be. We are not at all stubborn and it is precisely because we must take into account so manjTp'olitical, ethnic and even tribal factors that we are accustomed to say exactly what we }-„. ..><•• -••• —^»-««..*«,»««wli4UJWM-fcAr.«t .,..,•-,'-.— -...... „, „„ ....--. .-.••.,,;...„, >-..-, . .•:•-- ••-»v <. ..«»*«*<• <>~. .,..„..,....., .„. ...,..,„ .„.,,.,., At_. think. If these instructions should go tonight to the central Government, the attitude of that Government would be the following: a few days ago we asked the United Nations to help us to suppress, the Katanga movement, to place at our.* disposal the necessary means to help us to preserve the integrity of our country, to place at our disposal the United Nations Force in order to re-establish order in Katanga and in Kasai and to eradicate all acts of secession; they have replied to us that the terms of reference of the Force do 53 not provide for such action -- I ain continuing the*'analysis of the reaction of the central Government to these instructions -- now that we have taken some action, thanks to the means at our disposal, to put an end to this rebellion, we are told that we are preparing the ground for geiaocide* This is the situation as it will be analysed by the central Government. We who envisage the action of the United Nations in all its aspects and especially in it3 juridical aspect, may say that these arc acts of genocide and that we must intervene in order to prevent such acts which are condemned by the international community. But the central Government, faced aa they are by their own Congolese crisis, will say: if the United Nations imposes itseK between us and the secessionists, that i3 a stand which actively fe.vours secession. This is the analysis which will take place if these instructions are issued, and this might lead to a crisis* Those vho are confronted by acute problems do not understand all the intricacies involved and they may say that there is still no clear interpretation of the mandate of the Security Council. Therefore, I think it would be most wise to undertake action through your representatives and to have them contact the central Government. The Committee would then be in a pooition to assist you in drafting instructions to the United Nations Force, The Congolese Government might say, "Now that we are inarching against Kalonji and Tshombe*, we are branded as engaging in massacre and as being 'inhuman". That is what will ba said. Now I can cay that Kalonji, who is actually one of the men most responsible for such massacres, certainly knew, in my view, that such massacres would take place. I do not think that I am committing any act of indiscretion in saying that when Kalonji was here in the United States about two months ago I had a long discussion with him. His principal concern was to ask me whether it 'would not be possible for my Government to supply him with arms for Kasai, I told him, "Well, that is a problem which exceeds my terras of reference, You are on the eve of'elections and you should organize your country and now you are looking for arms, What do you foresee?" Kalonji replied, MI foresee a very serious situation in two or three months and I shall organize a state; therefore it will be'necessary to have arms." ' 55 Tlila shows that the crisis Is of long standing and had been foreseen two or three months ago. If the United Nations Forces should nov interpose themselves between the troops of the central Government and those of Jeuneeces Baluba or of any other group connected with Kalonji or Tshombe*, it will certainly lead to a catastrophe* The SECRETARY -GENERAL: I think you are quite realistic and you have given a very eloquent description of the difficulties we have to face, I repeat what I said before: The suggestion made by Ambassador Loutfi is fully accepted. I think it is a very wise one. I shall proceed in that way and I think that will taks care of this situation which you fear and which may be, as I said, quite realistic. I only want to make one small correction,, We will not interpose ourselves between the A1.JC and the Jsunespqs Baluba. That is not our task. There we would go beyond what we harce to do. But that is another kind of thing. I illustrated the problem in the comparison which I made to Ambassador Bon Aboud — the difference between a disorganized band - •——•—- -. —* —*—.——. ****** attacking private persons, where everybody is agreed that we should intervene. \ ^*^ ••WT*^^**HIIIP**il*'*|l'*1'*™^^^-~irni • ma ii in !• i r n^-^"r- j_.niirt ._. ^ timn&u'mt-*' .iJT-t . JliMM"* "*">l mvf + '>* ' ' * ' \ and the case where units have broken out from their command and indulged in, l I coul•"»!'d •no' t cal-- l" — i^>t— •*•,•»—privat— TT'-nw-.^.v,e warfar. ,_„. , _e ___ ..-„-,,becauBeTt, -,r., n.-. ,.,,.,„ _T_ is. no...Ift 1 warfar-- >-~-.-..e. .-»*~****»<'-*~~—'- when the-y attack woncn and children, but that is still far removed from the situation which you ...h..^..-..,. •. ... .^,v«-,.- • • - . . ... :-..-(, -: •• -.. - •• . •,.,.„„. //;, ,: v . Mr. ABOUD (Morocco) (interpretation from French): I regret that ; I have .to speak for the third time* Generally I am not so loquacious, but what I vented to say — and Ambassador Caba-Sory has expressed the saws idea in . different terms and from a different point of view — was that for us the question.is as followa: Here is a country in.which civil war is threatening. In iAternal warfare the movement of troops ic not dictated, by any laws and we .; • cannot expect the international laws formulated at Geneva to be applied. We have witnessed examples of such internal conflicts in Europe, in Asia and elsewhere, an4/.w* know that i,n such oircumst^nccs events talqe place,which are completely , * contrary tp moral law and even to the rights^of man. Consequently the problem before,.;us is the-following; We are faced by a country in which civil war.: . is threatening, with aOl tha dangers and violations, of moral, lays .and.other ; are involved, , .,;' ::.- -, - - •:• -. :••.--. ••>- •-. .,-."• -.. •• -•., -.- • •• In that country UN troops are present. Those troops Intend to intervene to protect men or Innocent raaon and children, but we are also dealing with a population which after eighty years of a given regime has produced only sixteen college graduates. Therefore, a very specific situation obtains there. We are discussing here these questions with reference to laws and regulations which are altogether incomprehensible to these people. Wa are trying to treat these occurrences in the Congo on such a lofty level* Perhaps in thic way we are guilty of an optical error, intellectually speaking, and instead of seaking the root of the evil, as a physician would do, and trying to apply a suitable remedy, we are trying to apply symptomatic remedies which will make us shift continually from one detail to another and will mak^ us givo up the neutral attitude which the United Nations troops should observe vls-^-vls the population. Nov we have examples; Canadian troops have been attacked, United States soldiers have been attacked, the Tunisians and the Moroccans have had casualties; the situation is deteriorating and we intend to interpose ourselves in all good-will to ensure the rule of law and independence. Yet the atmosphere deteriorates to such an extent that we already apprehend that'the situation should be internationally branded as a condition of complete disintegration. This is a situation which calls for the very solution which has been suggested by Ambassador touc.?l. The consideration of the whole of the problem, if not in the Security Council in this Committee at least, seems to us to be an urgent necessity in order to find out what the attitude of the United Nations should be in this civil strife — should it be defined as a passive attitude which would not seek the root of the evil or try to find a radical remedy, or should it be a positive one as a result of the reconsideration of the whole of the problem? The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I would not think that the time is right to go to the Security Council, because I tbinfc it Is now more fruitful, OB experience has shown, to discuss it in this group rather than to throw it open to the winds o+ publicity and policy statements. Thus a discussion in the Security Council, while having a high political value, cannot be an exchange of views such as we have had here. I feel that we might reserve for our forthcoming meeting, sometime early next week, an attempt to outline policies in a general sense. It is an entirely 57 new situation; we have never been in force in a country with civil war elements before. The only precedent, as you know, is Lebanon and we w2re not there in a military sense, we were observers and notMug else. For all bhess reasons we have to map out new ground. So far, we have fionc 5.t pragmatically, and it may ' be true'that we have now reached a stage where -je must take stock of the total problem. I for one would be happy on our side, in the Secretariat, to prepare' the ground for such a discussion sometime next weelE^" oulTliis ~3T of AnB>a8sa9of Loutfi is yetenu and in these circumstances I suggest'we'Veoerve these widflr'^iuestions for consideration next we3k. r"we"may*^ll 'gfve~'tl^nr some thougE"t'*1ffi'advance. We have some more things to do, and i't ie close to seve^ o'clock, BO with your permission I will pass on. •The next question is a simple"and pleasant one, it is the question of consultations with the Government. You will remember that last time I mentioned to' you that in a letter of 22 August Iliad proposed to the' Government of the Congo ' that they send somebody, in' advance of 'admission, to be a liaison officer with the Secretariat and with this Committee. A5 the same* meeting you suggested, and' I think it wad Ambassador Jha who underscored it, that ve should inform them in ' ' ' Leopoidville that such a representative or liaison officer," if"stationed here^ ' " would be welcome to come to tne meetings of ibis ComiEitte^. r wrote the very same" day to the Foreign Minister informing him aHout this attitude and suggestion. The very same day I wrote to him' also about another suggestion -which covers co-operation in the military field. You remember from the meeting last week '— I think 'it'waflT General Rikhye who mentioned it — that quite apart from the fact that there is* very close daily contact in fact between the High Command of the Avme'e Nationale and our High Command there should also be two officers from our Force -attached as liaison officers to the Annexe Nationale Congo lalse* "TChe proposal I made, whi these cases should be mutually Investigated, We have established on our side a small group with a very qualified chief in order, so to say, to co-operate with whatever representatives the Minister of the Interior — I suppose it would be he ••- might appoint for the same purpose. As soon as any such story comes up, ve will Jointly investigate the origin and the truth of it, and of course if it proves to be true action will be taken, if it proves to be untrue the rumour will be killed. I mention this third case as a further indication of how we develop the machinery for continued consultation which I think will take care of quite a few of the difficulties which we have experienced. Mostly, in similar cases, we have not had similar formal and procedural a.rrangements, but the very ecope and character of the problems in the Congo I think Justify this decree of formalization of contacts and consultations on different levels and for different kinds of questions. In none of these cases have we had any reply to our suggestions, but the Foreign Minister has announced that on Monday, I think it ia, Mr. Kanza will leave Leopoldville for New York, obviously with the intention of serving in the capacity which we have mentioned and of course also in other capacities, I do not think this gives rise to any comment.'* at all. The proposals made, and the suggestions which are before the Government, are I think sound and I hope they will be accepted. I am sure that would help us a lot. Having given this piece of information, I suggest that we ask Dr. Bunche to give us some of his impressions. After all, he has just returned and he has fresher, if not views at least conclusions, concerning our problems than anyone else. Mr. BUNCHB; The United Nations Organization in the Congo hac accomplished very much in both the military and the civilian fields, and it has done this under most unusual difficulties» That it has been able to do it is due in very great measure to the co-operation of your Governments, the Governments you represent here, in making troops available. One of the greatest difficulties 59-60 boa beet the unprecedented need in tlmt situation* r'I do not suppose there ever been a situation in which the need was as great or wad so pressing and . ' ' BO pctrvaeive in acqpe. Among the difficulties we encountered out there in our operations> in addition to this great need, were the attitudes of suspicion, fear' and misunderstanding — non-couipr^heneion of the United Nations and its ways, a complete of attitudes and feelings which in a very real sense, I do not doubt,are - part of 'the heritage of the recent colonial regime. • ••'•'• — / 61 One of these main difficulties Is the lack of effective government at either the local or the national level. That is something I might say Just a few vords about in order to give it special emphasis. I Bay, "the lack of effective government at either the national or the local level". 15ie difficulty is in carrying on an operation of our kind, in regard to civilian activities, the deployment of troops, the provisioning of troops and the assignment of experts, vhen it is extremely difficult to get authoritative decisions, from governmental authorities, from appropriate ministers, when in the government there is not •what we would be familiar with as regular of£i3e routlrie, when, indeed, there is often a lack of familiarity with that routine^ Just last week, one of the ministers -- and these men are very anxious to get do-wr- to work arid get things done — came in to see Mr. Linner, the chief of the civilian brench, and asked him if he could just sit in his office for several days in order to acquaint himself with how Mr. Linner was conducting the affairs of the office, preparing memoranda, meeting people, conducting interviews and the like, because he had had no experience, he had had no opportunity for experience, in this sort of thing. There is not tinat we would ordinarily recognize as organized ministries with a responsible corps of officials, because in this territory — unlike any one that I have had familiarity with — there is a lack of trained personnel in order to start the ministries, in order to provide the corps of responsible officials. There is an appalling lack of trained people at every level in the society. There is a very great need, now that two months have elapsed since independence, for the Government to settle down to the work of governing the country. It is most unusual to be in a country where there are no courts functioning, where literally no taxes are being collected, or where at the major airports, such as Leopoldville, there is no customs or immigration regime and there are no customs duties levied. Our own people were able to get a customs regime reinstituted at Matadi, the main port, but there is no personnel for this, because all this had been done previously by the Belgians. They pulled out and they left no people trained for this purpose. The post office and other public services deteriorate because there are no trained personnel to carry them on since the Belgians left. Therefore it is necessary to look to the United Nations to find trained technicians, and to recruit them from outside, in order to keep these essential services going. '• "-62 One of -the vital factors of this nhoLs situation Is the Annie . natlooale. the former Force publique. nhich la- a force of considerable size .*- of 6om« 25,000 men, most of whom are still armed, • aad eome A, 300 of ufacam are lrt the oanpTat Leopoldville— over vhich there is no effective control; It is an -" ', undisciplined force, a force lacking iff an officer cadre, a force in idiich Just. ..*.- a month ago there was not a single African, above the rank of adjutant end -which has nov lost all of its officers, all of whom were Belgian. Obviously, there has not been tine to develop* through training, an effective officer corps which can - command the respect of the troops* ....;• When ve talk of situations such as you h&ve been talking about just new-.- the situation in Bakwanga and the massacre- -one of the factors that may well figure in that — and it has not been mentioned in the discussion — is that, for example, the massacre of these seventy women and children in the mission was not a premeditated act at all but the act of irresponsible troops rfts, under the emotion of the moment, cut loose, in this instance with machetes and not guns. I could cite many examples of situations which sometimes certainly run along the borderline of anarchy. Some of them have involved representatives of your own Oovernttents. Just last week, foriaetance, Dr. Mokaddem, Mr, Slim and Mr. Queison-Sackey were coming to the African Conference at Leopoldville, The ferry from Brazzaville to Leopoldville had been closed — it was not clear by whose order* There was apparently no government order to do so, particularly since the Government wanted the delegates to come to the Conference. But Congolese soldiers closed the ferry* Ihen Ambassador Bourguiba went to the Prime Ministers office to get a note from the Prime Minister in order that he might cross on the ferry to meet his representatives. He was given a note. I saw the note. It was signed by Mr. Lumumba* It had the seal of the Government on it. When Ambassador Bourguiba vent to the ferry and presented this note signed by the Prime Minister to the Congolese soldiers, it was not honoured at all* In fact. they threatened to tear it up* They shooed Ambassador Bourguiba away, at gunpoint, and he was unable, to go over to welcome the members of his Government* That night at eleven p.m., I was called by the Foreign Minister, who asked if ue could send a United nations aircraft over to Brazzaville early the next morning, in artier to bring over to Leopoldville Dr. Mokaddem and Mr. Slim and also Mr. Quaiaoa-Sackey, who had been stranded in Brazzaville for twenty-four hours, unable to cross* 63-65 vat aleo the situation In the incidents at HdJiU airport and *t Stojlayville last Saturday. With regard to the trouble at Ndjill airport, the difficulty that the Canadians and the Moroccans and Indians had that morning and "before that was not that there was governmental control jst the airport but that there was a lack of governmental control at the airport. There were Congolese soldiers all over the airport,and they had been riding about there in jeeps with mounted machine-guns, and with the cartridge belts in the machine-guns, stopping pasa^Tjgers, pulling thpn out of tfce B^anos, arresting toe crews, going into the control tower and so on. 66. warning before the incident VIth the Cane&tans, a bigfr officer In the Congolese army bad tried to: stop hit men from going- oft a plane. ' ^OJhia was tha"**-" plane:wbich was bringing eifi^f Norwegian, officers, and these eight were arrested by the: Congolese soldiers* This officer tried to keep his men from going on p33tte>.;but.some.of the men put guns in his ribs and~led'bim icto the plf\ne : : his win* .. f- . • -: v • .. -..'.. •: •-:•;:--. :;.•• • •'••'•''" - •' As regards the. night we almost lost two UN guards, this was a case of--t&eV::'" Congplese soldiers refusing to recognize identity cards which had been honoured ~ by their Government and ordered recognieed by the Minister of Interior.- "But they stilj.; arrested our guards* The .next night; in order td deliver ahb-fcher letter to the Prime Minister!s house,.v Thc hour is late and I will not ,go on with this . But I dc want to say that despite all these difficulties, the UN has done very much out t.hei'3 and It can do vastly more and will do vastly more as suspicion lesseno and as political interference decreases and as more understanding and co-operation develop on the part of the central Government. All of these things, I am sure, will happen. I think there is a slow improvement in the situation,, There ie a slow development toward understanding. I recognize fully that it is not ever easy to achieve understanding in a situation where a force such as th*o is dropped down in the midst of a society which has teen, by training, experience and contact With the outside world, not at all well prepared to understand why it is there, what it is all about, and Just how it, should be used. Those aro occupational hazards in an operation of this Idnd. I would not want to close without saying y;a SECRBffARY-GgNERAL! Thank you. Are there any questions of Br. Bunche? Mr* JOHNSON (Liberia): Mr. Secretary-General, I think we should all thank Dr. Bunche for his exposition of the situation as it exists at the present time in the Congo* Prom reading the newspapers, we observe that the Foreign Ministers closed the Conference of Independent African States with a number of resolutions, the most important of which seemed to be the question of territorial integrity. Now the next one is the co-operation of the Congolese Government with the United Nations. In view of all that has been expressed here, and since you have suggested that we should be thinking about ways and means of resolving the problem out there, I think that we have before us three questions. One is the question of territorial integrity. Then there is the unification of all segnents of the Congo. Third -- and this I think is perhaps very important »- there is the 68-70 strengthening of the position,of the, centra). Government. All of these wJJA, I so cure, converge pn.tfye fourth question, namely a, reconstruction of.the position p£ the United Nations towar It is not something that has come about s»s ; a result of United Nations actions • .; :.•• •*;;! *•';:,;»,. V^^f-3. ^.:.- ".--. •'>'^ -:, *':«'•' * .Si-VrV;.;^.;.,-- :;•.•.•/ . .i. . • - : . .- '•• ' there or as a result of the "withdrawal .of the Belgians. We iiaye hsard of this tribal conflict before and it is 'dsep-seated. Of course, as you have pointed out, trouble may come from some unknown source and it may Jeopardize the lives of the whole population. Now to do that, you need, as has been suggested by the. learned Ambassador of Morocco, a police forca, and that police force, as I see it at the present moment, must come through the aegis of the United Nations. 71 To repeat, I think that we have to strengthen the position of the central Governmentt with Mr. Lumumba taken into our confidence and being given sufficient grounds to believe in us, and then we can really go to work to establish throughout the Congo the necessary police force that will make for lasting peace. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: At a previous mating — I think it wag the, first meeting — I pointed out that there is a strict limit set to the debates and studies of this Committee, and that is that it cannot assume the responsibilities or question the decisions of the Security Council. A change in the character of the United Nations operation of the kind which you have in mind would be possible only through the Security Council. For that reason, although various views can be held on it and discussion of it is perfectly legitimate, I feel that it does not properly belong here. The Security Council has taken its stand, it has interpreted its stand, and we must take that as a fact upon which we have to base our considerations and our actions. I might perhaps add one observation: There is more than one point that would have to be taken into consideration if the Security Council were to embark on the line which you suggest. One point is the legitimate interest of various parties in this or that political development in and around the Congo. Another point is that before the United Nations makes itself a party to what is a domestic fight, whatever form it takes or whatever name it is given — before the Security Council takes such a stand — consideration should be given to what that may mean in other territories and in other cases. It is contrary to the explicit letter of the Charter unless w-a use Chapter VII, and the more imperative paragraphs of Chapter VII: it can be done only if it is a condition for international peace and security because, on any other basis, the Security Council is not entitled to act under the Charter contrary to Article 2 (7). For that reason, we are here in an interesting and important field, but a field which is outside the competence of this Committee, as I see it, and, what is perhaps more important, ..only partly within the competence of the Security Council, 72' . Mr, JHA (India)t Dr. Bunchyfs statement confirmed what we bad learned earlier: that what has happened in the Congo is that 25,000 troops have been let loose without any leader and without any discipline. It is not surprising that many incidents have taken place; what is surprising is that nothing much worse has taken place. That has sometimes bean'really incomprehensible. I wonder whether Dr. Bunche can enlighten us, first, on whether there has been, b/ and largo, any improvement in .discipline, in : * •':'•• ... ' '• - "; ' • "• ' ' 'J holding together these 25,000 troops since the beginning of the crisis. Secondly, has the Government' taken any steps to see taat this really becomes a well knit and disciplined force? Thirdly, what can the United Nations do? I believe that General Kitani, of iforocco, has been taken perhaps on loan -- I do not know what the arrangement is — for this purpose. But that does not eeein t'6 bs enough. I think the United Nations might be a^ble to give much more substantial help and perhaps produce a detailed scheme to help the Congo Government* It seems to me that perhaps one of the important tasks of Mr, Dayal, when he goes' there, might'"be" to persuade the Government that that is one direction ih which we raigh-t help'them. It is certainly a dangerous situation for • Mr. BUNCHES; There has been an improvement since the period of 7 July to 9 July, when that army was completely mutinous and in fact had the country at its mercy. Several African officers have been appointed since then — a commanding officer and other high officers. They have not had an opportunity to weld that force into a .disciplined whole in this time. The situation varies in localities according to the quality of the local officer. In most localities, the amount of discipline is not very great. One step has been taken, which you have mentioned: At the request of the Prime Minister, the United Nations has made available the services of General Kitani, of Morocco, on a part-time basis. He stays with the United Nations as Deputy Commander of the United Nations Force, but he serves as a military adviser to the Congolese Government on the question of reorganization and 75-75 training of the national army. General Kitani is working up a programme for that purpose. I had not seen it at the time I left the Congo on Tuesday* But it will certainly require an intensive programme of training; it will require bringing into that force experienced and able officers until the force can train its own officers. As you probably know, part of the mutiny was motivated by a demand on the part of the troops — an understandable demand — for Africanization. They saw the country getting its independence and, as they put it -- some of them spoke to me about it -- "The Prime Minister is African, Members of Parliament are African, but tlie army stays just the same, with no African officers". And so they demanded a change. While I am speaking, I might say just a word in response to the question raised by the representative of Liberia. I have been out there in the midst of this for two months. We deal only with the central Government, we recognize only the central Government, in accordance with the Security Council resolutions. But we are out there as a peace force^ as a friendly force. We can be effective only so long as we have the good will of the population. We avoid being a police force in the sense of an army of occupation. The last thing I would want.to see that force get involved in is killing Africans, for however good a political purpose* That, it seems to me, is far beyond the conception of a force of this kind. . And so, while we recognize the national Government, it is the national Government's responsibility to weld the Congo into a national unity, but it ±s not the Job of an international peace force to take offensive initiative, with arms, to accomplish that purpose for the Government. Mr* CABA (Gulnfta)( interpretation from French); ' f should like to fcsk two questions resulting from the somewhat dark picture drawn by your representative in the Congo, who spoke, of the Inefficiency of the 'present'G o vernment, the ' incompetence of the cadres, the: presence of irresponsible l>3op^ and so on. Naturally, this is a situation which does not eurpri&e us , ' in view of what has occurred; we can scarcely expect anything better. But what ; disturbs us is the ' question of the lack- .of discipline in an army of 25,000.' I thiijik that, .In the course of our last-. meeting, we touched upon this serious prob lea cif discipline. We stressed the need.fortfte speedy establishment of cadre^^ and of assistance to the Congolese in this respect in order that such a regrettable situation should be avoided in the -future. . - - ' - ; I should like .to know whether the United Nations is aware thaV the United Kingdom migjit .agree to set up.ciadres^ in the Congo and to :tra?.h them. 'I do not have the document in this connexion before :zne, but the press carried a report to the effect tl?at tjie .Central Government of the Congo had asked the United Kingdom to establish certain cadres . X tbiiik^ that the United Nations should take note of this initiative on the part of the Government. Ify second, ^juestion. is the- fallowing. •"- A gteat' deal having bieen said here about the massacres; hasr the United Katio'ris a> do'esier doncerriing the massacre at Balouba and also the one at, Katanga? --' d?ehombe mentioned the'ae massacres and said that he was prepared to withstand any offensive by the Central Government. . :The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I would remind you that at the previous meeting I said that, this question 'of the creation of cadres for a force-pnblique was discussed with 'the Prime Minister in- great detail when he was hare. -We even mad* certain .suggestions which, as- 1 said, did not gd as far' as he wanted at that time because ivcLLd not. feel that we should, at that moment at least, provide officers to conpand the Congolese troops; :that th£ 'better formula was to train Congolese offiQers...aDd<.Xet them deal :with the soldiers . You will1 fitid -it in one of the addenda to the report because the formal reply to his request is reported there in a memorandum which he took with him. The disturbed conditions in the country later on have delayed constructive action. We have, so to say, reserved certain men who could be used for the purpose. We recruited, at the request of the 77 Ooverttnent, first, one man who vould take the responsibility of being chief adviser back of these other officers vhom we could give them at their request. Bach individual had to be approved of. It did not work out well, so he went back, and later on this requeet for General Kettani came from the Government. The initiative rests with the Government, but I can assure you that we, on our side, remain more than willing to help in the recruitment and in the organizing of it, as shown by the fact that we accepted with very great satisfaction this request of General Kettani who, I think, is highly qualified for that post. If the Government goes ahead on its own, that IB its business. On the other hand, if it wants our help, it can have it. On the other question, I do not know whether anybody here is in a position to say what reports there are of these Incidents in various places in the country. It is a very lively country now, as you know. We have nothing which can be » regarded as a report; there are bits and pieces. We do not rely only on the newspapers, but our people have not been more than part witnesses, and for that reason we could not establish a dossier, as you say. Mr. CABA (Guinea)(interpretation from French): With regard to the possible assistance which the United Kingdom Government could give to the Congolese Army, do you have any specific information? Mr. BUMCHS; On that question I am told that the Congolese Minister approached the British Ambassador in Leopoldville on the possibility of the United Kingdom offering technical assistance in the way of training a substantial number of Congolese military people in England. I think that the figure mentioned for this purpose was 60. He was told by the British Ambassador that this request would be considered sympathetically by the United Kingdom but that it should come in the form of United Nations technical assistance; that'the approach to this should be made through the United Nations, and that, if it were made in this way, his Government would give sympathetic consideration to the request. The SECRBTARY-GSflERAL! I think thai there have been one or two exactly similar caaet regarding the possibility of training In other countries, but we vish, on the'tide of the Government concerned, to put it under the same "hat" «o as to integrate and co-ordinate our efforts* Mr. GEBRS-EGZY (Ethiopia): I should like to have some clarification of an answer given to me by th& Secretary-General when 1 asked him a question at our last meeting, meeting No. J. My question appears on pa'ge 20. I think that the Secretary-General must have misunderstood my question "because he replied as follows: "I would like to refer the question to the General, but my own immediate reaction is this. I have not the slightest doubt that we can «— and can easily — bring the Congolese Army under control, but it would change entirely the role of the United Nations in the Congo." In my question I was simply trying to find out to what extent the national army was disciplined. I was not proposing the action which the Secretary-General understood me to mean. The SBCRBTARY*GENERAL; I am sorry to have misunderstood your question and I am grateful for this correction. I think that one or two words should be said regarding the development of the Force, and I would invite Mr. Labouisse to give a brief report. Mr. LABOUI33E; I shall Just mention the changes which, I think, have taken place since the last meeting. The main changes have been the arrival of the UAR battalion and the arrival of a Tunisian company. The UAR battalion Is in the area of Ubenge in the northern sector. The Tunisian company went to Luluabourg with the rest of the Tunisian troops. The total number of troops actually in the Congo at the present time is about 15,500 — that is, troops ae distinguished from support units, which are in addition. In addition to these troops that are there, the Indonesian Government 79-So has offered a battalion of almost 1,100 men, and the Government of Malaya a battalion of ^50 men. We are now trying to work out the logistics to move both of these units to the Congo. The total, when they arrive, will be roughly 16,800 troops. Within the Congo there has been some redeployment. We have not got very up-to-date Information, but we do know that, for exacrplo, at Kamina there is now an Ethiopian contingent, an Irish contingent and-a Swedish contingent. We do not know whether the Liberian contingent has been Lioved from the Libenge area. It vas proposed at one time that they should go to Luluabourg. 81 In addition to the troops, there are support units of great importance from other countries. I think it is interesting to note that the troops themselves actually come from eleven countries and with the Indonesians and Malayans, the number comes to thirteen countries supplying troops. In addition to those, the c-dministrative units, such as ordnance companies, supply platoons and so forth, bring in six more countries — a total of nlnsteen countries supplying units of a substantial size. The Indian Government has recently agrsod to mc,ke available a four-hundred bed hospital fully equipped. We expect a one -hundred bed hospital from Italy. We vere asked by the High Command to get a five -hundred bed hospital, two one -hundred beds in one place and three hops5.tal units of a hundred each, I think ve he.ve been able to do that. We are r.lso getting an additional cupply platoon from India. The staff is gradually being built up and $s in much better shape than it was about a week or so ago. The SECRETARY -GENERAL; Well, I guess that may give us all a good conscience. It is now 7*^0 p.m. and I thank you for your attention. We shall prepare for the next meeting, as we s&icU There may be specific questions that may come up and there is always the possibility that something may happen which would require an extra meeting. But if that does not occur, I would suggest that we meet one week from now. Mr . JHA (India): May I suggest that we meet a bit earlier, if it is not inconvenient to you. If we have to send a telegram, as we usually do, and keep our staff waiting until the late hours, all kinds of difficulties arise , The SECRETARY -GENERAL; We may meet at four o'clock. I have a reason why we have the meeting in the afternoon. We have so much to get out of our hands every day and the time differential over there is such that we should get it out so that it does not arrive at an awkward hour. We must also avoid what is even worse, and that is if it should come in too late for action the next morning. We shall meet next week at four o'clock. The meeting rose at 7*^2 p«m. / COm'IDEKTIAL Meeting No, 5 1 October I960 iSNGLISH UNHBD NATIONS ADVISORY COMJ1ITTEE ON THE CONGO Meeting at United Nations Headquarters on Saturday^ 1 October I'^O, at k p^n* The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I think that we can begin although I regret that some of our friends are still engaged elsewhere. I believe, however, that it is possible for us to arrange this disucsoion in such a way that we will reach the main points only at a somewhat later stage. If so we will have, I hope, the advantage of the presence of India, the Sudan, Tunisia and Mali — those who are not here. In any event, you all have your engagements end for that reason I think it is wise to begin after this classical quarter of an hour — which is at least classical in the committees even if the General Assembly has started to indulge in a more liberal practice,, Before turning to our informal agenda of today, I should like to express, I am sure, the welcome of up all to the two new members of the Committee. We have not with us personally yet the representative of Mali, but we have with us the representative of Senegal, and I wish to extend to him our most hearty welcome. I will later on say personally and directly to the representative of Mali how satisfied we are. You will find thio group to be a very informal one which is, I think, at the same time a very useful group — at least it is from the point of view of the Bcaretaj&atr ••>* in which we have managed to establish close, human relations in the best interests of the Congo operation. I think that in the future it will be possible to develop this even further in the direction of close and full co-operation. I have for so long regarded Malaya as part of the team that I forgot to mention it directly and openly, but that just reflects the fact that it has been under long discussion while it is such a recent event with Mali and Senegal that I happened to mention them first. However, we have been without meetings of this group for some time, so that it is Just in this overlapping of human contact and direct contact outside the Committee, and the formal contact here that I wish now at the same time to' extend to you our warmest welcome in this formal gathering. If I then turn to our agenda, it is as usual an informal one. I felt that you would like to be informed about the present status of the Force, the deployment of the Force, the present status all over the country and in the various provinces and in other respects and the situation in Leopoldville; that is to say, not a kind of progress report but a status report covering the ground so that you are brought up to date after the1, some threa weeka which have passed since we last cjet. After that I should like, end that is the main item, to turn to the resolution . of 21 September and to the special obligations created "by that resolution for the Advisory Committee. I think that that is the only matter which requires active consideration* The other parts are more in the nature of information although it is useful information...... On that po^nt I should like to say that personally I have frankly "been a little worried by the* fact.that it has been impossible to get this group together f or euca- a long time* But you knew juat na well 0.0 I do what we he.ve been doing, all of us, and for such reecons .you re.ali&e Jutit as well ao I that there was not much of a ctiance to'get a useful and quiet meeting together. Even now^ I felt that the-only Chance to meet was on a Saturday afternoon, which was a sad indication indeed of the state of affairs in the United Nations or, if you please,? a good indibatioa of how dilig.ea*- acd hsrd working we all are. , ... . Anyway, may I, with your permission, first of all ask for a review of the status of the Force -- the contingents, where they are, how they have been deployed and what movements may be in sight — so that you may be clear on how the present situation presents itself to us? Mr. FjryCHS; Gentlemen, I should first mention that we have Jiijfc received a cable informing us -- and we regret it — of the death of a member of the Pakistani unit, Sepoy Mohamed Shaffi, of Pakistan, who died yesterday evening, 30 September, at the military hospital in Leopoldville from injuries to head, chest and leg as the result of a motor accident while he was on routine duty. With regard to the strength of the contingents, I think that th&ra is nothing that needs to be said beyond what has been reported in Mr. Dayal's first progress report, appearing in document S/H-55lj w'iich was circulated on 21 September. There has been little change in the strength cc? «&£» of the contingents since that date, ajad such changes as there have been are so small as not to merit mention. With regard to the deployment of the forces, as of today in Leopoldville we have the headquarters of the Force, a Canadian signal squadron, an Indian supply platoon, a Pakistani ordnance company, a Ghanaian brigade of three battalions and two MP companies, a Sudanese battalion, a Tunisian company, a United Arab Republic company and a Moroccan brigade headquarters. In Leopoldville Province, south of the Congo-Kasai River, are the two Moroccan battalions. North of the Kasai River is the Guinean battalion, and this battalion has been deployed more widely, appearing in new localities such as Dima, Bolobo, Kiri and Kutu. In the Equator Province, in the Coquilhatville area, there is one Moroccan company. In the northern sector of the Equator Province there is the United Arab Republic battalion, less the one company which is stationed in Leopoldville. In Oriental Province there is the Ethiopian brigade headquarters and four Ethiopian battalions, less one company which is in Kamina. The Ethiopian units, since the last meeting of this Committee, have been withdrawn from a number of localities in orpLer to consolidate their positions and protect their lines. 7*10 la Kasai Province there is the Tunisian brigade headquarters, two Tunisian battalions, one Tunisian company and a Liberian company* The Tunisian battalion has been further deployed over the Province to new places — .seven or eight localities which need not be mentioned. The Liberian company was transferred from the northern sector of Equator Province and now occupies the localities_of Kalu, Kele, Musonga Banza, Qtd Lvjputa in Kasai Province. . • . Oho two Irish battalions, less the two companies in Kamina, remain in Kivu Province, and in Katanga Province, in Elisabethville, there is the headquarters sub-command for tho eastern "province of the Force, the Mali battalion in Nosth Katanga, in the Kabalo area, the Swedish "battalion, less one company in the Elisabethville area, two Moroccan companies in Jadotville, Kblwezi and the Dilolo area/ and a Swedish coLipe'cy, two Iriah companies and one Ethiopian company in the Kamiaa area. -.-....- 11 In the entire province of Katanga the force has been deployed quite widely now appearing in some twelve to fifteen new localities. As regards movements now under way or in imminent prospect I misht mention that the battalion from Indonesia with a strength of 1,1^3 officers and men which is being shipped on the United States Ship Bsxasr.* which left Jakarta on 9 September arrived at the mouth of the Congo River today and is now moving up the river to Matadi where the equipment will be disembarked today, and the personnel tomorrow. The Malayan contingent consisting of headquarters, two to three infantry companies and an armoured reconnaissance squadron totalling 6l3 officers and men, with 91 vehicles, is due to leave Maleya on k October, with estimated arrival in Matadi of 1 November* Reinforcements from Tunisia to the Tunisian brigade, of thirty men and five tons of equipment, are to be airlifted today. An advance party of the Nigerian • battalion, consisting of seven officers, is being lifted next week. The battalion from Nigeria is expected to arrive about 15 October. A small reinforcement from Ghana to the Ghana brigade, consisting of twenty-four men, with land Rovers, scout cars, and twenty-four tons of equipment is to be lifted just as quickly as transportation can be made available. The men and the equipment are ready. As regards internal movements, the general principle which will be followed is to shift contingents from one area to another fairly regularly so that no contingent will remain overly long in any one sector. There have been movements already, as you know, such as the Liberiansj the Ghana, and Tunisian brigades are to be interchanged later this month. The United Nations Air Maintenance Baee ie being moved also from Stanleyville to Kamina, As regards the situation generally in the provinces -- The SECRETARY-GENERAL; We should make a couple of points because they are of interest and should be mentioned here. There have been formal requests frow President Kasavubu for withdrawal of the Ghana and Guinea 12-15 contingents^ and £or. not accepting t\ie Indonesian contingent. Our reply has been the. obvious one, that this is 3, matte^ which is prejudged by the very fact that these contingents are included in the JTcrce.. There is no question of any one-sided cancellation of that arrangement, and the United Nations doee not entertain these proposals; that is to say, a polite but firm refusal to consider those.suggestions. I tiling that we can leave it at that. I need not tell you that from our point of view there is nothing to discuss in the matter, • ' - • ' ' : . ' ' . ' V I • • 1 • •/ and ve have replied, accordingly., •The other ,pp^nt.>-ni.ch I shall mention is, I do not think there is any reason to elaborate,, of course, that the newly arranged and happy solution of the problems of our frisnds from Mali and Senegal, has made necessary a certain .regrouping frori the Federation of Mali. I have been in personal contaot'" with the two Governments concerned. They have rspreeentatives in the area which ;ar,e.,.discussing it with the staff. We are looking forward to the regrouping, and will, of course, be extremely happy, on the conditions which the'two Governments may wish to establish regarding the regrouped units, t6 see them - continue with us as the Mali "unit and as the Senegal unit. But tnat^is1 first;'' of all a question for the Governments concerned and we trust that in close ' ' collaboration ve will find a mutually satisfactory solution. " "• ••'••'••- 16 We would, on the United Nations side, naturally be extremely sorry if we were to lose these fine troops. I do not think there is any reason to count on such a risk. It is Just a question of finding the proper formula with each one of the two Governments independently. Mr. RTJMCEE: The military situation in the Congo has undergone a slight Improvement since the last meeting of this Committee, although the situation is still tsnse and numerous incidents have occurred -- the two most regrettable "being the quite "bad affairo in Kasai and at Manono in northern Katanga involving the Katanga Gendarmerie, where there were virtual massacres. Through United Nations efforts .a cease-fire has been achieved and is being maintained along the Katanga-Kasai border. On the 10th of this month two United Nations observer groups Were set up for the purpose of supervising this cease-fire. According to the latest situation reports from Mr. Dsyel and General Von Horn, the situation in the provinces of Equateur and Orientale is fairly calm. In Equateur, most of the plantations are still in production, but there is a danger, we are told, of the collapse of those plantations and of the local econoray, due to tJie insecurity of the transport of goods, payrolls, and so on, which may force the remaining Europeans to leave. In this area the discipline of the Congolese Army and the Gendarmerie is not at all good. In Orientale Province, the Congolese soldiers revolted against their own officers at Stanleyville on 27 September. Their main grievance was the non- receipt of pay and the disparity between officers' and soldiers' pay. The Commander of the force at Stanleyville, Colonel Rakosa, was arrested by his own soldiers, and the Chief of Staff, Major Kabongo, sought refuge from those soldiers at United Nations headquarters. On 30 September the provincial Government of Province Orientale was arrested by the civilian police but released after United Nations intervention and a promise to pay the police. In Kivu Province tension is reported between the provincial Government and the Congolese Army. There has also been a report of a large number of refugees from Ruanda-Urundi. How many of these are veritable refugees and how many just unemployed is not quite clear yet. la Kasai Province the' situatibn- Is Very tense;-but there has-been''no further fighting in recent days between-the'various tribes and between1the Congolese Army and the followers of Kalonji, which is an improvement. • The Kalocji headquarters are now in BaVcwanga, and some-local leaders there have had to be taken under"United Nations protection. . • , ' . The provincial Government in Kasai Province has requested United Nations'' assistance to avert massacres. Numerous refugees are'.still reported- in this1 area. The Liberian company has been able to distribute some food, but it is available only io meagre quaotit&ee, &&-TFG are tr/iog'to arrauga to baTe the Red Cross teams move in to tfrevdait ftKirbher'deterioratioh 6d? food and health '• conditions-. .,•-•' • .. •••••'•- •-•''•''•' • ' ••'• .•••. .-'•-;•;•.• . v . ._. • / • . ;.. . .. •.;..• -., . 21 The situation in Katanga is generally quiet, thanks largely to very extensive and continuing patrolling by United Nations troops* On 23 September an Ethiopian patrol vas fired upon in error at Kabunda Dianda by the Katanga gendarmerie. The Ethiopians returned fire by firing overhead. There vere no casualties on either side, and later the gendarmerie apologized for the mistake* The situation at Kamina base is quiet. United Nations forces have now arrived to take over the operation of that large base. In Leopoldville Province the military situation continues relatively calm. Since 23 September United Nations guards at the residences of Mr. Kasavubu and Mr. Lumumba, respectively, have consisted of soldiers from five contingents — namely, Ghana, Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia and the United Arab Republic. The relations between the troops of the United Nations and the Congolese troops in the Leopoldville area are reported to be satisfactory. I believe that that covers the military situation. The SEOiSTABY-GMERAL; After that summary of the military situation, I shall ask Mr. Wieschfcoff to give some indications — to the extent that it is possible to do so — of the political situation in Leopoldville. Before doing so, however, I should like to raise a couple of short points* Some arrangements had been made for the training in the United Kingdom of Congolese cadets from the ANC, the Arme'e Nationale Congolaiae. We protested because I think that in the present circumstances the training of cadets must be regarded as military assistance and, under the resolution of 21 September, it is therefore something which should not take place; it would be outside the framework of the United Nations. Our stand on this provoked a very temperamental reaction from Colonel Mobutu, who regards it as a flagrant example of interference in domestic affairs. I need not tell this Committee that this is now the accusation which is the most common one in my life from all sides. We are meeting this kind of reaction even in a case like that of the training of the cadets, where I think that our stand is a direct translation of a principle of the General Assembly resolution, a translation which cannot be discussed in terms of internal conflict at all. I find, in human terms, that the reaction is extremely natural, and I need not tell the Committee that we are in no way shaken by it. 22-25 The second point which I should like to mention ifi the folloving. Quite some time ago I raised, and I am pursuing, the extremely delicate and difficult issue gf volunteers of European nationality in Katanga or in Kasai. This is an extremely difficult issue because, to a large extent at least, obviously individual initiatives are involved, international law is anything but clear on the point, and there is the added complication that we are not on negotiating terms with either Mr. Tshombe or Mr, Kalonji. I merely want to place on record the fact that we are actively engaged in trying to arrive at some decent solution of the problem, but that we are running into difficulties and complications of the type to which I have referred and which I feel are self-explanatory. Those difficulties will in no way keep me from continuing the efforts, because it is my personal conviction that, although this does not represent a major political risk; it is an 'irregularity in the situation which is like a source o£ infection in the body politic and which, for that reason, must be tidied up. I shall of course keep the Committee currently informed about any progress we may make on the matter. I would only ask the Committee for the kind of patience I myself have bad to develop when we run into this type of complication. i Having made those two small additions to Mr. Bunchefs resume, I should now like to call on Mr. Wieschhoff. 26 Hr. VIESCBHOyFt Members of the Committee, it is practically impossible to describe tije confused political situation which now exists in the Leopoldville area -. without in any way entering into the constitutional aspects of the problems within the capital of the Congo. It might.perhaps be said that there exists presently three different groups claiming to.be either the legal, or the de facto Governments; first, the Government of Mr. Lumumba; secondly, the Cabinet formed by Mr. Ileo, almost exclusively existing on paper; and thirdly, the group of Commissioners which was • • • ' ' • , - - • • .' • • : • . . j • instituted by Colonel Mobutu. The latter appears to be the presence of a government having some kind of de facto existence, if that is the proper way to describe it. Its establishment was announced by Colonel Mobutu on 20 September and, as members of this Committee no doubt, know from the daily prese, were sworn in by Mr. Kaeavubu on 29 September; but this swearing in was later disavowed by Colonel Mobutu. . It is difficult to. describe actually the degree to which this latter group is functioning,, except in stating that it has occupied many of the governmental , offices in Leopoldville* Efforts are presently being made to convene, a round-table conference of political leaders for the purpose pf establishing a new constitution and a new Government for the Republic of the Congo. • • . • It appears that the concept of a round-table discussion was accepted on 28 September both by Mr. Kasavubu and Mr, Lumumba. However, some differences seem to exist as to the composition of the round-table between Mr. Kasavubu and Colonel Mobutu on the one side, and Mr. Lumumba on the other. While the former are advocating a round-table discussion of sixty political leaders, Mr. Lumumba is advocating a larger group including, aside from political leaders, representatives of the Senate, the House and the various provincial legislators. In any case, Colonel Mobutu has despatched some twenty-six AMCJ officers to the various provinces in order to round up delegates for the Conference. In this connexion, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General has been informed by Mr. Kasavubu that the AMS — the Arme'e Nationale Congolaise — will guarantee the security of all the political leaders while staying in Leopoldville; but he has also asked the United Nations to provide for the security not only of these political leaders, but for all the Deputies and Senators presently in Leopoldville. It may be noted, perhaps, in this connexion that the political instability of Leopoldville and in the Leopoldville area is strongly reflected in the provinces, as Dr. Bunche indicated, and in many of these provinces the political and economic deterioration appears to be very far advanced. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I think ve should add that at our own request President Kasavubu, Premier Lumumba and Colonel Mobutu, each of them separately having United Nations protection as individuals and each of them sitting under this umbrella is in come kind of negotiation contact with the two others. I think this note characterizes very much the subtlety of the situation, because this combination of triangular contacts and, on the other hand individual protection for each one of the three parties to the triangle, creates of course problems which have to be handled with all the tact which, I am very happy to register,Ambassador Dayal is a master of. 31-35 However, "before turning to what I call the only thing that requires active consideration and decision, I would, after these notes on the situation, invite you all to put your questions so that we can fill out the gans which you would like to have filled in order to feel that you are brought up to date. Mr.' QUAISQN--SACKEY (Ghana): Mr, Secretary-General; there is a small point'which I thought I must mention here, because it is causing some concern among the Ghanaian population. That is about the deployment of troops. Naturally, OTO: has the right to deploy the troops in the Congo in the \raiy it sees fit, but in view of the repeated requests from Colonel Mobutu and .:••-.: '; • ••• - "...•"'.• •'•••• -.'••','-.'•••• i ••.!'.'.• : . • • • .-• ' • **: - Kasavubu that Ghanaian troops be withdrawn from the Congo, the feeling is that if they are moved from Leppoldville and sent to Kasai, it would give the -?:•'•••• • v ••:'/,'• •:'••.'.-.. ,: -. *>•..-• ' • ,. • :•.: • • . . • • : • . . • appearance of OMJC giving in to these two men who want to see Ghanaian troops out of the way. I am making this point because it has caused concern already, and you, air, have been apprised of the point. Since there are three Ghanaian battalions and a platoon of police, I am wondering whether it would be advisable at this particular moment of time, when there is pressure being brought to bear upon OSPJC to get Ghanaian troops out of Leopoldville, whether it would not be politic to hold on a bit before the interchange takes place. I am making this point because it has a political significance to it, and while there should be no attempt whatsoever to interfere in the situation as it exists today, we feel very strongly that we should not act in a way which might give the semblance of OKUC giving in to these pressures from Kasavubu and Mobutu. This is a point which I thought I must bring up for consideration. The SECRETARY-GENERAL; We are keenly aware of it, as you know, and the last impression I would like to give at all is the one you fear, that we sway or adjust or compromise. I don't think that this is a case for compromise, because that would be a misunderstood compromise. On the other hand, it would be interpreted as a sign of weakness and the possibility, so to say, of introducing completely foreign elements of thought and consideration into the United Nations operations. Ibe other thing, as you know, is that the move, as such, is one of long planning, tied up with a very heavy burden, which has "been resting on the Tunisians, and tied up, also, with the fact that the Ghana authorities themselves have felt that the tying down of the Ghanaian troops in Leopoldville was open to objections of another sort. However, I think the best I could do would ' be to ask Mr. Bunche to tell you exactly where we are today, because following your line, I have underscored to the authorities in Leopoldville that such considerations come heavily into play in the further development of their plans, I would just like to have Mr. Bunche say exactly where we are, repeating, before doing so, my assurance that the last thing in the world I would like to do is to give a false impression to the people in Leopoldville and thus indirectly to the Governments, Mr, BUNCHE; First of all, the pressure which has been mentioned is not for the removal of the Ghanaian and Guinean troops from Leopoldville but from the Congo — The SECRETARY-GENERAL: Withdrawal, Mr. BUNCHE; (continuing) — the withdrawal of the units which, as the Secretary-General has said, we do not even acknowledge. Secondly, the actual interchange of the Ghanaians and the Tunisians would be a phased operation which, except for a possible small advance party of Ghanians to look over the territory in which they would be deployed in Kaoal, would not commence until around the middle of this month. It would be a phased operation; that is it would not be all at once. Thirdly, as Ambassador Quaicon-Sackey knows, this IsJ not a new story at all from the standpoint of the United Nations internal operation. This idea began actually late in July. The first initiative was taken by the Ghe.saifln representative himself, who raised the question of the Ghanaian troops being concentrated in the Leopoldville area where there was just nominal guard duty to perform. In a discussion which I held at the time with two representatives of the Government of Ghana during the African conference at LeopoldTllle in late August, it was agreed that it would be desirable to transfer the Ghana contingent to Kasai, 37-^0 where the greatest need and the most important work for the United Nations Force were being experienced, in fact, because the Kasai province was the one that was presenting the greatest difficulty. The Tunisian contingent had been there from the beginning, had given excellent- service, was fatigued and is even more fatigued today* In the earlier period, before their-function was well understood, they suffered several casualties and they were in need of a change. The change was a natural one, as between the Tunisians and the Ghanaians, because they were ' relatively the same in size, Me had,'earlier, because of the situation-in Kas&i and the inadequate numbers of the Tunsians, moved the Liberian contingent there as reinforcements/And it will remain there — that is, for the time being. But the idea is to change all of the contingents over a period, 'so that each one would have some experience with the more difficult areas. So this is not, as we all know, in any sense in response to any pressure, because it was conceived and planned long before there was any difficulty on the part of the Lumumba~Ka6G*Vuau Government and before there was any question of the Ghanaian contingent or the Guinean contingent was being raised. The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I would like to go one step beyond it. It is' Unfortunate that these Kaea*Vtibu«*MoUutu pressures developed at a time when the old plan matured. Now, I hope they will blow over when we have made It perfectly clear that we do not acknowledge them, entertain them or even take them up. Otherwise, I would have been forced to circulate these letters signed by "•"; the Chief.of State. But I cannot treat them in that way. This is out of order. However, when I say that I want to go one step further it is in this sense that were these pressures to be maintained, it Would introduce a new element9 and I would most definitely like to look at the time-table again because I would not like the whole plan to be fulfilled in a situation, or met in a situation where it could be misinterpreted. But for the moment, I hope that we have killed these ideas; and then there will be a couple of weeks before it all starts, and in such circumstances there is a fair chance that it will develop in a natural way. VJere that not to be the case -- and that I repeat -- then we would have to look at the matter again in order to avoid any false impression because/ as Mr, Bunche says, no idea is more foreign to us. But it is not good enough to have it that way. No possible misunderstanding should be permitted to arise either. I think that will give you a feeling of safety and, as a matter of course, we shall keep in touch with you. Mr. LOUTFI (United Arab Republic): Mr. Bunche has just told us that the Kamina base has been taken over by the United Nations forces. I should like to know whether you have more information about that* What is happening? Are the Belgians still there, or have they all withdrawn? The SECRETARY-GENERAL: We have overwhelmingly rich information — if I may make a little personal confession— oo much that I get very, very'tired the moment I see a cable about it. But I think that Sir Alexander MacFarquhar may give more exact information on the present Kamina and Kitona facts. I would add to the somewhat frivolous expression that I used, the fact that these have, developed — especially Kamina -- into very major operations in their own right, Sir Alexander MacFARQUHAR; The situation on Kamina and Katona is this, that the Special Bases Committee has been down there and has reported and made certain recommendations about both these bases* Those recommendations h.ava already :been 'considered by the Secretary-General and he has made certain: proposals for the consideration of the Government. In the meantime, Kamina, in so far as it is required, will be use'd largely as an air maintenance base for . . UNOC and'for repair units of the air force.- '.-.-• The secondary consideration at Kamina is the maintenance of employment for a population which, with dependents, is about 15,000. That is being taken care of on a temporary basis by continuing existing contracts, even where they are not entirely necessary for United Nations use, pending the Government's decision as to what the .ultimate use of that base will be, •.-.'• ,.- The SECRETARY-GENERAL; Could you say anything about the phasing of the Belgian withdrawal, which is systematically being carried out? Sir Alexander MacFARQUftflR •* The" latest figure for Belgian technicians at Kamiiia • is',;" I' think; in; the neighbourhood Of — we have two figures in fact'; one is a figure -Of 'about 7^0, from one source,1 and we have a'figure of 1,100 from .another. The truth, I suppose, is somewhere between. ' We already kn'ow -bhat although there' • was no Congolese above the rank of foreman, many Congolese are sufficiently skilled to be foremen and better, and we have, therefore, asked our public administration people, along with some training people already in Leopoldville', •... to go down and make an immediate examination of the possibilities of replacement. x of the Belgians immediately in the foreman class, and later in higher classes, . • •: by Congolese -on the base. In addition, we expect to weed out•• a considerable number of Belgians quickly through the fact that the base was too richly endowed with European technicians. For those two operations we have set 15 October to get rid of .the Belgians who are not required, and 15 November for the replacement of those who are required for the time being. The. SECRETARY-GENERAL! And by that time it will be reduced to a negligible number. So it is a question of another six, seven or eight weeks for the tidying of the situation in Xitona. 1*6 Sir Alexander MACFARQUHAR; Kitona is quite a different proposition. It is much smaller in area and it does not have the same chance of alternative employment in that .area. The general thinking is that it might be useful at some stage as a military base for the Congo Government itself. In the meantime, it has certain advantages as a possible training base for the ANC; but we have to await the orders of Government on that, The SECRETARY-GENERAL; There is also the question of the reduction in the number of Belgian technicians much more quickly. There are still three hundred Belgian technicians, and I thiflte the need probably is for a hundred. But in both cases, as Sir Alexander mentioned, we have a curious complication in the difficulties which we meet everywhere Administratively and on the governmental side. As Sir Alexander said, the recommendations which seem to flow from the studies made on the spot have been submitted through the delegation, through our people in Leopoldville, through the authorities. The reason why they are submitted in this way, of course, together with the full report, is obvious: it is a question of good order, it is a question of maintaining the close co-operation which we should have with them. But there is also another reason, and that is that even short-term, emergency measures prejudge the future use. If we stop certain investments, certain building activities, if we do this or that, all of it prejudges to a certain extent what should be done in the future. That is not a question of consultation; it is something much more substantial. The decision on the, future use of Kamina and Kitona rests entirely, of course, with the authorities of the Congo; that is to say, we need to have a decision from Government on the future use we want for the bases. Once that decision is taken, quite a few things flow more or less automatically* Technically our people are good enough to see what follows from such decisions and to implement it. That is to say, once we have the basis of a decision for the future use, the consultation can be very much simplified and will be more a matter of routine. But you can very well guess that whatever the legal, constitutional or political situation in Leopoldville may be, it is not one in which it is very easy to get deeialons of this nature. For that reason we are a little bit stymied. That does not in any way mean a slowing-down of the replacement, in the phaslngrout of the remaining Belgian technicians and the replacement, especially, by the Congolese; but it does mean that we find it difficult to decide on such relatively practical issues as to whether a certain contract which is running should be maintained or dropped, and .things of that type, • Do you have anything more, Mr. Lowtfi? ; . Mr. L017JFI (United Arab Republic); Only a small comment. I Just heard now from Mr. Wieschhoff that the round-table conference is scheduled to meet on 28 September, . . , . Mr* WIESCHFOFF; There is no date, yet. . Mr » LOJPPI (United Arab Republio); Tfcere is no date yet? .. X also understood thai; we are having some difficulties about this conference, so I hope, ,1 am confident, that your representative in the Congo, Mr. Dayal, will do fcia best to get these people together* .because,! think that ie the only . solutioa./ • : ••- • :. - . , •.,•'.. , .- ;•;. .»; . .-. .,, • • .. • • . • . . ..'• .•'.. The SECBBIARY-QENBRAL! I will- coipe to my final and finest point, which is paragraph 3 ;in the resolution of 21 :Beptember. We may perhaps revert to the question of the round-table conference and Mr. Dayal 's possible responsibilities in that conference when we come to the resolution. May -I give the f loor .to you, Ambassadcir? . ; :. Mr. BARNES (Liberia) ; Dr. Bunche,- in speaking of the military in theiCdngo, said, I believe, that the . Liberian unit, which is. now transferred . • to Kasal Province, was experiencing some difficulty in the distribution of food* ,• : I would like to be enlightened, if I may, on the reason for that difficulty. . : Mr. BUNCHE; The difficulty arose from two direct cause's: the first was the meagre food supplies available an& the second was the difficulty of transport. That'is why further efforts'are being made to try to relieve the situation. Mr. BARNES (Liberia): Could that be attributed in any way to tfce Liberian unit there? Mr. BUNCHE; Not in the least. They have no responsibility for " providing food. The food supplies were meagre and it is hoped to be able to improve on that through other channels, through Red Cross teams and so on. It is not in the least to the discredit of the Liberian unit. The SECRETARY-GENERAL; The Liberian unit has worked admirably under' very, very complicated circumstances, having to distribute food tfhich does not arrive. So I should like to use" this occasion to say that it is an extremely encouraging thing generally that all over the land there is nothing but praise for the contingents. It is a very, very nice record indeed, Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): I have two questions. One refers" to' the point the Secretary-General raised in his statement earlier about volunteers. 1 should like to get a little more information on that. The second question refers to a question I had asked in one" of our previbus meetings. On that occasion I had asked what would be the statue'of a Belgiari> either civilian or a member of the former troops, so to speak, changing his allegiance perhaps from his Government to one of the provincial authorities. The Secretary-General had promised to look into the matter. I wonder if he has some clarification on this point. In that connexion I should also like to ask this question. Paragraph 6 of the resolution adopted by the emergency session states "military personnel and other assistance". I was wondering whether such questions as volunteers and my previous question would also be covered by this, ! can Btart vith y°ur last question. I have considered it as covering volunteers. I have not circulated it yet because the matter in still under cliaaiuajcn, but on the basis of this very paragraph in the resolution of the emergency special cession, I addressed a note to the Felgians ashing the 1-eT.gian Government to take all r.ar, That is really where ve are at present. I do not at all consider the situation satisfactory, and I do not at all limit myself to formal protests, even if we do not exactly start shooting at them... There is one thing I should add, however, which I think is important. I have been informed that on two different occasions the Belgian Government has intervened and stopped people leaving Belgium — or leaving Holland via Belgium to go to Katanga tts volunteers. There have been two attempts to do so — somebody hiding people -« end that has been broken. On Belgian territory, of course, it ca:.i be broken because it is Just a question of police intervention.. It has been broken in two specified cases, M.?. C/HA. (Guinea) (interpretation from French): Before asking two ; or three questions, my delegation would like to express its regrets ,to the people and Government of Pakistan and its 4eejpest sympathy because we have been • . very moved to learn of the loss of. this .Pakistani soldier, who was fighting in. the Congo for the establishment o£ peace .and:: security. .-•,.;. .. , .•.-,;' * My.first question refers to the -deployment of troopa. I do not wish to .. . press >this: point top much, because my colleague and brother -from Ghana has asked - his questions, an4 our apprehensions have been allayed for the moment. .1 . • , 61 In our opinion it would be highly dangerous to give any credence whatsoever to requests coming either from Mobutu or. Kasavubu, vijo as we have pointed cut time and time again are not carrying out the policy desired by the Congolese people. We thank the Secretary-General for having completely refused to give satisfaction to this request. My second question refers to volunteers. You will recall, Mr» Secretary- General, that my delegation had underlined the danger in accepting volunteers in Kasai and Katanga; and you, yourself, have underlined it today that their presence represents difficulties which we must overcome as quickly as possible, in the opinion of my delegation, a time has come for the Committee to raise protests with Belgium and that the protests be brought to the attention of the General Assembly which is now meeting, because if Belgium tells us that no link "binds it with the volunteers, vho could deny that Belgium could do this tomorrow and recognize them as nationals and thereby establish links after these volunteers have played their roles, which is complicating our job in the Congo? I believe that the Secretary-General, by continuing to protest and to denounce Belgium's role>is performing a very useful service for our Committee. My third point. I am afraid I did not understand the full import of the sad situation of the Ethiopian troops in Katanga. I remember that on 23 August the patrol went through a very difficult situation; it came across a group of gendarmes. I should like some additional explanation. I should like to know what w as the reaction of the Ethiopian troops which is an element in the United Nations Force in Katanga. I should like to come back to the political situation. Mr. Wieschhoff is perfectly correct when he pointed out a short while ago that there was an unstable situation* Now, according to information which we have just received, I believe that the idea of a round-table Conference is not making any headway. An agreement must be reached between now and Monday between Lumumba and Mobutu; and the Parliament would be called together on Monday to contemplate the setting up of a reshuffled Government. I believe that this element should be borne in mind by the Committee when we tackle the examination of item 2 of our agenda» 62-65 Lastly, with respect to the JOaraina and the Kitona bases,, I believe that the time has come to take a very clear stand. As we have always said within this Committee, the presence of 780 or 1,100 Belgians, which has Just been pointed out to us,represents a danger. It would be desirable for these technicians, regardless of their skill or competence, to evacuate at present these bases in order that the United Nations Force may occupy them effectively. It is true that we will have, a highly difficult situation from an economic point of view in order to ensure the security and even the welfare of tjie population. But we must get rid of these Belgian troops first pf aj-l...... I was somewhat disturbed when, aU the beginning, the Secretary-General pointed out 7- speaking of volunteers — that there were some European volunteers. I believe that.there were other volunteers from other nationalities. I should like more specific information. In other words, are. these only Belgians or are these volunteers haying other nationalities? Tbefle are my questions for the moment. Perhaps I shall.have some concrete . questions to make afterwards...... 66 The 3ECRETABY-GENERAL i On the last point, as you well understand, we cannot have first-hand information, as we are not in first-hand contact with the Kalonji group, or Kalonji forces. We can only have what may be regarded as intelligence information, not by spying but by the testimonies we have ourselves been able to collect. From these testimonies it appears likely that those officers who are to be found in the Kalonji group are Belgians, but the evidence is not conclusive, because other things have been said, such as: "Fait semblant d'gtre volontaires britanniques", and things like that. But that is too loose for me to say that there are British or that there are any other nationalities. The assumption is clearly that there are Belgians. That is the reason why I have had a basis for addressing the Belgian Government but no basis for addressing any other Government, because we have no evidence which I in all honesty can regard as evidence. As you have raised the question again, I would like to read to you the final paragraph in the note verbale to the Belgians. ThiB was on 31 September, BO that it ie already fairly old. The reason why I have not circulated it is that I wanted to have the full exchange to present at the same time for the General Assembly, The final paragraph is as follows: (continued in French) "In view of the specific demand* of the General Assembly expressed at the beginning of the note verbale, and in the light of the information received by the Secretary-General, as well as the very serious reaction against Belgium on the part of the Congolese population, a reaction which is the result of interference by volunteers, the Secretary-General is clearly obliged to ask the Belgian Government to take without delay all useful measures within its power to put an end to this military assistance, the so-called voluntary nature of which does not diminish the great danger." That is very clear language, as you hear. As regards Kamina and Kitona, all I would like to say is that I hope there is no misunderstanding. There is not the slightest ambiguity as to the stand or as to the principles applied. There is only this purely practical consideration which has led to the establishment of a time-table for the weeding out of all necessary, with a final date of 15 October, and the replacement of the necessary by Congolese to the greatest possible extent by 15 November, 67-70 That IB an adjustment which hfie been based on a .very, careful study of ..the . operation by the group we have there, .which, as you know, comprise. , Mr. Galo Plaza of Ecuador, Mr. Rikiiye of India, and JTwokedi. of ...... Nigeria. To epeod it up beyond that, I would be very happy to do . r something,. and. we will certainly try to <^p it as fast as we can, but you know, Mr. Ambassador,., it. is. frankly a rather heavy operation,, and I do. not want to make a mess, pf it. . ,..,"• '"''". With that tjflckground,, I would repeat what t said-at the beginning.. I hope there is no. misunderstanding at all as to. the stand. The stand is absolutely . clear-cut, and firmly pn record, both with the parties on the spot and with the Belgian Government...... With regard to ypur^ first question, perhaps Mr,* Bunche can .answer it. '•'••'• • • • ''',." ^. ' . ' . .. ' ..' V '..-"'. V, ..•.'. •'••''••...- ..." ' . ' ' '" . ' . .'.'....' i.'."'., ,. Mr. BUNCHE: , Mr. Ambassador, I gave all the information we have on . that incident at Kabunga, Dianda on 23 September, pur people out there seemed... to be quite satisfied that the frying on the Ethiopian patrol was an accident,, and; as I have said; the Ethiopian patrol returned the fire but deliberately . fired overhead*. There were no casualties, and the Katanga Gendarmerie, later,, apologized.-for the error in firing on the Ethiopian patrol. • x . . • . ....,'.. The SECRETARY-GENERAL! There was a fourth point, which you did not raise as a question but on which I would like to give a clarification. You mentioned the meeting of Parliament as a possibility. That reminds me of this message which was handed over by Okito and some other parliamentarians and which has been circulated, herein one of the points was a request that the . United Nations troops ehould, as he called it, libe'rer the Parliament. I would like to read to you Mr. Dayal's comments on that specific point: n "Second demand ia that UNOC troops liberate* Parliament building and Government offices. Facts are that last week Arme'e Nationale Congolaise had withdrawn guards from administrative "buildings, but after two commissars were assaulted by MNC youth on the 26th in their offices"— the MNC is, as you know, the party of Lumumba — "ANC guards were reinstated. Parliament building has been guarded by ANC following Chief of Staff's first broadcast on Ik September. Hie demand of the delegation would involve use of UNOC troops for forcible ejection of ANC with danger of armed clash and consequent bloodshed. This would not only constitute interference but also violation of the peaceful character of UNOC' s mandate". Those are Mr. Dayal's comments. I merely wish to give you the exact information on the status of the Parliament building. Mr. JHA (India): I should like to raise a few points as a result of the expositions by Mr* Bunche and Mr. Wieschhoff. My first point relates to the round-table conference. I am not sure whether this conference, which Kasavubu, Mobutu and Lumumba are trying to call -• although they have differences as to who should attend -- is intended merely to patch up their differences in regard to the composition of the Government or is intended to be a Constitution-making body. I believe that Mr. Wieschhoff said that it would be a Constitution-making body, something like a constituent assembly. Now, of course, if these three gentlemen want to call an assembly or a conference, it is not for the United Nations to prevent that or to do anything at all in the matter. But it seems to me that a body of this type cannot really perform the function of Constitution-making. If it tries to do so, there will be no finality about the results; there will be trouble and disputes; other interests will come in subsequently and repudiate that Constitution* That will perhaps be the surest way of creating a very strong disruptive element. 72-75 I vender if the United Nations, in the advisory capacity which it undoubtedly has through ito rpooial representative in the Congo, chould not advice these gontlcmcn not to call the: round- U.ble ccni'erence as a Constitution- rr.nkinG tody; I VOL tier if we cho ild not tell them that thio function should be per.formed by the Parlirnent. After all, in a.l 1 countriec the Parliaments either, constitute theme-elves into constituent assemblies or add seine other elements or set un now bodies for the pu.'Tirjc, Tlio point that I vli:h to r.3l;e is thio: Han not the time come for the United Nations rorreDentativcG In the Cr;nn;o, for yoa, Ire. Secretary-General, to (rive thene C'^nr..l.r;acn Gtror.^ alvicc en thio poii^b? I think that they probably r.ucd ravice; thoy do not undcrscmid these mattrrc. There in no doubt that if ihcy try to have this kind oC boJy write a Cni^3 titution, the. Constitution io not .i '.,"'' • . ' ' pcing to last* Of course, if thoy'merely want to meet together in order to try to ce-ttle their differ cue on, to arrive at a ccmponitc Government, that is all to the c'^od end should be encouraged, .!..'• • ' . . ' • • ' • • Tho/oforo, I thin)-, thnt it would be proper and within the functions of Ihe Urltcd i;at,ionc in the Ccn^o to Glvi;:e these conLleiacn not to eo hablir.b._ any Ccjntit'ibioii-n^i.lng body otlv:r fiian through the Parll.c:rncnt. Tiiey nhould be . advice: I -- or, indirectly, any i:i^a.3iu-c:.; which ore possible micht be taken -- to stimulate or reactivate the Parlioiucnt, to ^et it ftoing. For that is one thing that seems to be still alive. 16 It Is a parliament duly elected by the people, and that parliament should function in the normal way, should frame laws and should exercise all the controls and authority that parliament is entitled to under the Constitution. The second point relates to volunteers. This is really a very serious matter, because volunteers perhaps exist already in considerable numbers in Katanga and Kasai, and more might be coming in. If this flow is not stopped, the secessionist movement will be gathering strength, and it really poses a question which goes to the very basis of the United Nations resolutions in the Security Council and the General Assembly* If I may say so, you are perfectly right in putting in a strong representation to the Belgian Government; but it is not the Belgian Government alone* Perhaps there are other Governments who clandestinely are sending, or wishing to send volunteers. So it is really a much more general question. Apart from that, I wonder if the United Nations cannot, through the power of regulation of airports -- and that includes, I suppose, arrivals at airports — stop the coming in of volunteers, because as far as I can see, in the Congo it is difficult for volunteers to come in except by air. Maybe a very small number might infiltrate across the borders between the Congo and other territories; but most of them, perhaps, might come in the guise of civilians, innocent merchants, or whatever it is. That is a question which, as Ambassador Caba Sory has pointed out, is really very important, and we have to take it up perhaps in a somewhat larger context. The third point was raised by the Ambassador from Ghana, and I am sure he is returning to that point. But it seemed to me that, while it is perfectly legitimate to have a system of rotation of troops between Leopoldville and other areas, and naturally Ghana troops who have been there for some time will have to go out, it is important to see that there is no wrong inference drawn from the movement which 1 believe is scheduled for some time in the middle of this month* I wonder if it would be wise, even if the principle of rotation is perfectly all right/ to move these troops, or any considerable portion of them, at this time, because this is the sort of thing which gets the United Nations into quite unjustified criticism, because the people there and the people elsewhere start thinking that perhaps it is because of the pressure of these two gentlemen, who after all are not the Government of the Congo«> They can by no stretch of the 77-80 imagination be called the Governmentrof. the Congo* Kasavubu is the President, but Mobutu certain!/ cannot be cabled the Government of the Congo. That is another point that I thought I should bring to notice. . The fourth point ia this. I wquld lil$e to kn.ow,what the United Kingdom's . reaction is. to the point that you have .made; that ia to say, paragraph 6 of the resolution of the; emergency special session, which,comprehends a recommendation against the training of the Congolese Army except, through the United Nations. If I may say so, it seems to me that ypur interpretation is correct, Yqu have said that Mobutu,; of course-, completely repudiated any such interpretation and said, he was. completely free.tto do ^Lt.. -But what did the United Kingdom say? After all,,,that resolution has been also before the. United Kingdom, and ,as far as. we know they voted f.pr that resolution and for- that paragraph.. . . . These are the. points that I wish to raise for your consideration. £ know that perhaps I cannot really ask for an. answer, but these,points have to be..kept in mind* . , r • .. ...The SECRBTARY^GENERALt Mr. Ambassador, on the last point, although ... I haye..nQt the last.word, I think that I can assure you that the United Kingdom will follow my. line, on .the cadets. If we object, they will drop the whole matter; I am sure of tyiat...... 61 I haven't got it, so to say, in writing, but there is every indication in their whole approach to the matter and also to the specific problem which we have mentioned to them. As for the rotation problem, I have already made very clear that I share your view, that it is not only that we shouldnTt be influenced, it is also that we shouldn't give the impression of being influenced and thus weaken our moral position. That will apply generally not only to Ghana, but it will apply just as much in the case of Guinea or whoever it is. As to volunteers, I feel like you, that if we do not get, and fairly quickly, a result with the means I tried in the first instance, that is to say, to go straight to the Government which is responsible to a certain extent, after all, for its nationals, and for what they do, another approach ie necessary. What other means arc available is a bit difficult to say. I think that the main thing would then be to see what direct pressure we can exercise on those responsible in the country, that is to say, Kalonji and Tshombe, whatever means we can find to an effective approach which, of course, must involve an element of real pressure, as I don't think we will get anywhere without it. But on one specific point 1 think I can give you some assurance. The main danger is, as you say, the possibility of feeding this group, and such a feeding must take place, in the first place, by air. I can, for that reason, permit a little indiscretion as to the way in which the Belgian Government stopped the two occasions where they got, so to say, knowledge of something of that kind going en* the notbod used in that case was to prohibit Sabeua to transport any such, and I think did it in general terms so that they have cut off the main airline which may go into Elisabethville. However, there are other airlines going into Elisabethville, and for that reason, the matter may have to be broadened. I think that if it is so, as I think, that Sabena has been told that it cannot permit themselves to be parties to this kind of traffic, it is very reasonable that in a proper forum the attention is also drawn of other airlines which may go into Elisabethville. It is a matter of sheer decency even as among the competing air companies. I regard it as a secondary line, a supporting line, because I would first of all try to get whatever results we can get politically and diplomatically. 82-85 At. «. certain stage, of course, publicity, also comes in as a pressure element to the extent that ye all have news which is a little more solid than what you see in the papers. We, after all, are duty bound not to publish anything for which we cannot'stand. '-But all these things are very much in view, in my perspective, and there is First of all, so far we have not felt that we were entitled as the United Nations to give advice beyond one single point, which is, BO to say, on public record, and that is the one that a solution to their conflicts, which as you know are personal, as well as political,as well as tribal — it is all mixed up — should be sought by peaceful means; that is to say, negotiations should always precede shooting. That is, I think, not interference but a simple restatement of United Batione principles and United Nations stands in obvious terms. However, it is all right to take such an aloof attitude: no advice beyond this one, peaceful means — by all means. Then you come to the question, what then should practically be done and, if we were to express views on it, what should those views be? There, I entirely agree with you. I, for fi7 part, would be more than skeptical — in fact, very critical — regarding the value of any improvised assemblies even if Kasavubu and Lumumba and the rest were in agreement. Such improvieations are dangerous. They are very dangerous because they may lead to a new, very fragile, unstable situation, which would throw us into new difficulties. For that reason, my own conclusion is that Parliament should be kept in its proper place with regard to its decisive role in this matter. And in view of this, the United Nations should try to work in the direction of creating conditions under which Parliament again can function properly. The last time Parliament met in session there was obviously some confusion as to the numbers; and with all reservationa that there may be mistakes about the counting, I would all the same quote the numbers because they are indicative of an underlying problem. When the meeting started it seems that there were some 120 plus present. When the meeting ended there were, according to various counts, 93 present. Well, you can leave aside the question of quorum or no quorum;but the total nxanber of the House of Representatives and the Senate should be something like 226 — 220, anyway. That is to say, it was at best a very meagre quorum * Well, that means, of course, that Parliament, as a representative body able to tackle .such extremely important problems, as it would if it were functioning as a kind of constituent assembly, is undermined by practical .circumstances. 87-90 It is, of course, desirable to get them all together again,, get a live , Parliament.which is truly representative in the sense that a majority is present. It is.not for us to tell people to go there; it is not for us to take them there; .. but it is. definitely for us to .create conditions under which they will turn up, because; that is> again, a question of law and order. And I would consider it for that reason, as I said,' an absolutely legitimate aim for the United Nations to further re/turn to normal parliamentary conditions, by creating such .a situation of security and quiet as would lead to a fully functioning Parliament again. What, then, are the reasons for this bad attendance? Well, the reasons are partly physical. We live in an atmosphere there of fear, very wide-spread fear. There are elements of intimidation from.this side or that, side, which do not make it easier; but over and above that, we see in this situation reflected, also, the separatist or secessionist tendencies >- Deputies a.nd Senators not coming fron this and that province'because they, do not want to come .even if they, felt absolutely secure. For that reason, sti^l thinking aloud, I have the feeling,fcfoa ti f we are to create.conditions in which Parliament wouia function again ae-the natural reconciling centre of the political activities of the country, we must also try to overcome this reluctance of people to turn up. . , . Now/ again, we run into one of .those curious.elements of present-day life in the Congo. You may not have observed it, but some time ago Senators and deputies — I think it was from. Katanga -* who did not go back to Katanga but who stayed In Leopoldville••*- and for that reason probably were, so to say, "Central Government Katanganese", if I may put it in that way.—: wished to go.for what they called "vacations" to Katanga. They went. And I must confess that I b;Lt my lip a little bit. Of course, they were perfectly entitled to go. Of course, , it was entirely in line with our philosophy that they should go. , -But ve were not sure what would happen. Nothing happened. Everything developed as it should, which shows that in spite of all the big noises an They will, of course, be influenced by the attitudes of political leaders, wherever they are, be it Bolikango or Kalonji or Tshombe, and therefore in the last resort, this ideally functioning parliament taking its responsibilities fully again and being, in fact, the centre round which reconciliation of the various elements can be brought about, brings us to the problem of the separatist politicians. My own feeling would be that using the appeal in the emergency special session resolution, using also whatever means we have of a peaceful nature and in line with our general approach, we should, without regarding that as any kind of intervention in domestic affairs, exert all the pressure, all the moral pressure we can in the direction of getting these various politicians to bow to the authority of Parliament, to recognize BariUaaieat and, so to say, to let their representatives in Parliament take part in parliamentary activities. So you see, in regard to what you say, I think there is a very wide parallelism of thought between us — no improvisations, because really they will not give Lasting results. Parliament is the natural centre, based as it is on elections around which reconciliation efforts and unification of the country should revovle. That will require security, which we should be able to provide* It should also lead naturally to our giving all the facilities we can for people to come to Parliament as parliamentarians; and finally, in the last resort it should entitle us, without' being accused of interference, to exert whatever pressure we can for people to bow to the authority of parliament and to play ball within the framework of Parliament. I believe this to be perfectly in keeping with the philosophy of the Security Council, and I believe it to be definitely in the interest of the country because, for a reconciliation-by peaceful means, it must have its instruments•—• and what other instrument have you got? Mr« JHA. (India): I am very happy to hear your exposition and, if I may say so, I think that it is the right line of approach. And I am happy to see that you are. fully aware of the importance of the Parliament functioning again in the manner in which it ought to. 92-95 But I should like to clarify what perhaps I did not make clear in the beginning. Certain United Nations1 functions/— ,and that is what the United Nations Force is trying to do, to create conditions which enable people and government authorities and members of parliament to=function in the normal way, to be able to move -from one place to another, to, attend meetings in the parliament hall without molestation or fear of life, etc. and that part is certainly being done by the United Nations and ought to be continued vigorously. The reason why parliament -- or one ,of the reasons — is not meeting perhaps is that the President of the Republic —who, presumably, under the constitution has the right to call the Farllajnejort -- is not calling it. Theve, the United Nations cannot really do anything;,it cannot append its signature in place of the President^ signature. That is where I think the advisory function of the United Nations comes in« , It is .true that advice, if given in certain forms, might be taken to be interference, but, on the other hand, if diplomatically tendered -- and tnat, -fortunately, can be done — it may not T?e regarded as interference. It is really a question of how it is done. But 1 do feel that the time has come when the UN will gain in prestige and acceptability and will increase its constructive role if, without fear, you or your representative were to tell them: this is what we think is the right course; of course, you are the masters, the Government is yours, but nevertheless we think that is the right course to follow; we think that a round-table conference or a constituentassembly called invthis manner is not the right course; that is not what is done in other countries, and we should like to give you this advice. It may not strictly follow' from the words of the Security Council resolutions, but it is certainly something which, in a friendly way, the The SECRETARY-GENERAL; If I may Just add, before I come back to Mr. Quaison-Sackey, there is no difference of view at all, I said generally, as you see,that even if it may be regarded as intervention in the internal affairs, I think it is perfectly proper for the United Nations to exercise moral pressure in this direction on the leaders, and I mention specifically those who are, so to say "free-wheelers11, but among the leaders there is, of course, also the speakers of the two Houses and the President himself. I do not make any exceptions because once we take the line that Parliament should function, once i?e take the line that we are entitled to give advice in diplomatic form, although with moral pressure back of it, that of course is addressed to everybody without exception who has any responsibility in the field. Of course, I feel that we will have greater difficulties with some gentlemen than with others. But that does not in any way make a difference in our approach. So I am quite agreed also as regards the President. However, there is one small detail; the Parliament is called by the speaker Of the House, not by the President. !Ehat does not change the picture because I include everybody without exception — those who have major personal responsibilities to carry in the story. But I feel that, if I understand you correctly — I am sure that I do — there is 100 per cent paralellism in the philosophy of the matter. Mr. QUAISON-SACKEy (Ghana): Mr, Secretary-General, I was going to ask whether there is any information about the unemployment situation in the Congo. I believe that this is the time of a very grave situation. I wonder whether any studies have been initiated and attempts been made to combat this growing menace. My second question is about the administration of the country. I do not know what has happened now, but anyone who was in the Congo in August could see very clearly that there is a complete absence of any semblance of administration or government organization, I wonder whether our operation in the Congo depends upon law and order being established, whether there is peace, whether there is a normal functioning of the governmental machinery. All this brings me to the point that possibly, if there is any action on the part of the United Nations, 97-100 the United Ifatlons should enter the field of administration and organize the various, departments which are not functioning properly and. which are likely,t , therefore, to bring about disorder and difficulties. For example, I am thinking about the establishment and recruitment and training of personnel, immigration. The point has.been raised that if there :Ls a proper organization of immigration then you can easily combat the incursions, of people from the outside/ whether they are Belgians or Russians or English; a proper immigration department should be established. Has anything been done, about a customs department, income taxes? What about the department of agriculture? Is it functioning properly? What about the police, what about the welfare services, what about the department of- justice, the legal department? I think that these are various points which m\ist be taken up:. If there is no report;on all these various structures which I think go to make up the Congo, I would be very grateful if at our next meeting a full report is given us in this.Advisory,Committee about the situation. 101 The SECRETARY"GENERALi You can have a very full report, for example, on the Congo situation because we have fairly full data. But I think that Sir Alexander already now could fill us in on where we are. We are, so to cay, on our toes to get all these things done. We are painfully aware of them, but we have got a little bit stuck. I think Sir Alexander can tell us the story. Sir Alexander MACFARQUHAR: On this epecific question of unemployment there was a joint commissionn which went around early in August to the various provincial headquarters and looked at the economic situation. In that commission there were two Central Ministers, five Secretaries of State, I think, and four United Nations people. One of the things that obviously required doing was the setting-up of worko to mop up unemployment. The Chief of the Civilian Operation was able to get thirteen engineers detailed to go around the provinces eeeing the projects that had some priority and that were worth taking up. When he had come to his own conclusions he made recommendations as to what would be a suitable programme to mop up the extraordinary unemployment over the next three months. And there at the moment it rests* We are unable to get a request from anybody to take these projects further. The idea was that the Government, after examining these recommendations — which vere, of course, technical recommendations — if it found them sound and approved of them, wo would then proceed to help them in negotiating the contracts , which would be their contracts, and also in supervising the work, the execution of the work. So at that stage we are halted. The SECRSTARY-»GENERAL; I have Just added, to Sir Alexander, that as to the finances, this Would be a proper budgetary expenditure and it would therefore be proper for us to allocate it to the United Nations Fund for the Congo, We would pay for then!, Sir Alexander MACFAKQUHAR; As to the general administrative picture, the support to the structure of the administration, that ifl to say advisers in various points close to the Ministries, it has been rather a matter of chance as to whether or not a Ministry got its request in while there was still a Minister and while there vas still a Government. For example, frouvthe Ministry of Agriculture 102-105" we have, a request for, I think,, twenty-one people Including four professorial poets. We have authorized recruitment on those posts, Prcm the Ministry of . Education, on the .other hand, while we do know wfcat w^ think is necessary and - have prepared, ourselves for it,we.dp not have a request, as it came in all the later — our. preparation of our summary of the situation was rather later, and we do not have a request. Again, on the important Finance Ministry, the early advisers who went in on an emergency basis are new feeling the strain- of a complete lack of customs personnel, treasury personnel and eo op, and they have forecast for us a requirement;of something like eighty or eighty-one people for the treasury, the customs,and sp on , in the financial field, • We have taken preliminary steps to< check on recruitment sources and find out where we can get, them; but again, we have no formal request from the Goveripent, ,and thia is vhere we are held \jp, , - • , - ; - 106 So far as the courts are concerned, we hare been able to get a member for Mr. Linker's consultative group, who is now looking at that situation and getting proposals ready for the re-opening of the courts and for the recruitment of magistrates* The collection of taxes is at a standstill as the result of the lack of administrative personnel. Mr. WIRJOPRANOTO (Indonesia): Mr. Secretary-General, the United Nations Force is already in the Congo, and I think that we would all be very glad if, tomorrow or the day after tomorrow, the United Nations Force could be out of the Congo. Meanwhile, I understand the difficulties because the situation is getting more complicated. I am thankful for the information about the political situation in the Congo, but I am missing something. There is one point which I mentioned in my speech in the Security Council and which later on, I repeated in the emergency special session of the General Assembly on the Congo situation, and that is that if we desire to leave the Congo as soon as possible the United Nations Force should contact, should approach and should deal with a strong central government. I know that for two months there was a strong central Government, but later on that Government was practically crippled and it may be that today there is no government at all. For this reason I am rather afraid that if there is no government'at all, or if there is no strong government but this weak government, the United Nations Force, although it will be there, will find that its position may be more complicated. * Therefore, to my way of thinking, we should approach and even promote the reconstruction of a strong central government. I feel that if the United Nations Force is moving in that direction nobody will be angry or feel that we should be condemned. This is according to the whole history in the Security Council, There we have passed already three or four resolutions which mention that there should be a government, and that there should be a strong government, but what I would like to stress now is the position in fact, in practice. There is not what I would call close contact --no close co-operation. This is missing between the United Nations^Force and the Central Government. 107-110 Acknowledging the difficulties/ in Leopoldville there is a rift between LuBisnba and Kasavubu. There are even clashes between many groups, between tribes even, and I should like to mention one thing. In spite of all these difficulties, in spite of all these clashes, there has been no murder among the leaders. Neither Kasavubu nor Lumumba, ,nor anybody else among the outstanding leaders, has been killed. Ill This fact Is very important. What does it mean? It means that the leaders in Leopoldville have enough common sense. But they are not able to find each other. For the moment they are taking the wrong road, instead of being united. Why? Beaause there was influence — not from the United Nations -• I should like to be frank, of course, from the Belgian side -- we are in an informal committee. And where are the headquarters of this Belgian influence? It is in Katanga, in Kasai? No, our Secretary-General has done the utmost for the withdrawal of the Belgian troops. It is not complete, but practically 90 per cent, 95 per cent, 99 per cent, but anyhow the United Nations Force la already in Katanga and in Kasai. Now, we have to make an investigation. What is the influence, the psychological influence, the political influence, and the physical influence of the presence of the United Nations Force in.Katanga and in Kasai: the headquarters of the Belgian troops? According to my calculations and my feelingo, the leaders in Katanga And in Kasai, Tshombe and Kalonji, are now reconsidering. They are thinking in another way because the masters, the protectors, the defenders, have all gone away. And who has come in? The United Nations, this neutral. So these leaders, using common sense, are thinking another way. What shall we do? Shall we go along with Belgium -- many thousands of miles from the Congo -- or shall we go along with the United Nations? Maybe they have their rancour against Lumumba, but that is another matter. Therefore, the United Nations Force in Katanga and in Kasai can do a great deal by just putting the leaders in their right way, at least the way of thinking in the right way. Because it is clear that in all the resolutions there will be no two Congos. As soon as Tshombe and Kalonji know this and are convinced about this, they will take another attitude. First, as soon as the leaders in Leopoldville -- because this is inter- related -- know about this, that there is some change in Katanga and Kasai 112-115 the intention to reconcile -- the attitude "between Lumumba and Kasavubu to reconcile — they will be more clear. : And this also is an indication to 'the • United Nations Force to' promote the reconciliation. ; . . .••:.. As I told you in the beginning, the United Nations Force may need a strong central government. Now, how can we make strong this central government? ' ' Of course, we cannot make it strong as long as they are not strong by themselves. It is not our task. But we can do something by promoting indirectly; for - ' instance,' Lumumba and Kasavubu are considered by the parliament as still the leaders of the Congo, according to my feelings. Thete Is still a very great chance for reconciliation. • ' - ; . I mean, the rift is not deep; it is more or less artificial. But, to promote a reconciliation and to make the central Government strong, we need the other body, that is, the Parliament. The representative of India has already mentioned the role and the function of the Parliament. I agree, because, after all, to answer the question, "is the central Government strong, yes or no?n, not only is the existence and the stability of that Government decisive but also the support and assistance of the people through the Parliament. Of course, I understand that everything is not easy. We cannot ask the people or the leaders for the maximum, but if we can be satisfied for the time being, Juat for the start, that will be something we will have already. With something already going, with something already accepted, I think the. United Nations can go along in this way. Of course, Mr. Secretary- General, this is a suggestion, and it is up to you to implement it, I am not pessimistic about this matter in the Congo. I am still optimistic. But the approach, according to me, should in the first place be the political approach, and I think we must do everything to promote the reconciliation of the leaders* Perhaps after a few months, not even one year or two years, the United Nations will leave the Congo, and the people will be very glad, not because the United Nations Force leaves the Congo but because the United Nations Force has made peace in the Congo. Th« SECRETARY-GENERAL: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. May I say, Sir, that your statement, combined with the statement of Ambassador Jha> has encouraged me very much, because, taken together, in the essence of what you said and the essence of what Ambassador Jha says, you have come very close to the guiding philosophy which I have had the whole time. I would be very happy if this kind of approach to the Congo problem could be reflected also at less formal gatherings, because I thinte it really covers the truth of the matter. May I sum up a few points very briefly. For the rest, I would like to give the floor to Mr. Bunche, who was there, as you know, from the end of June and followed all the various stages of the disintegration, which one must understand in order to be able to see how we can get it together again. 117-120 ', I will flay a few words myselfonly dn justification of what I said, that I feel your statement and-that of Ambassador Jha combined brought put what I regard as my philosophy in the whole operation. It started out. .with, so to say, an imjoeoA political system which had not. grown organically. We know that. For that "reason, 'the 'painful process pf compromise^:.reconciliation, getting over : : personal animosities and so--on and so forth .had not:taken place-before it ...... started an independent political life. YaU1 could-express it. also in this way. In fact, 'when the -Congo started,-all Borta ;pf. tensions -were: bv< in to the , ,., political system, the most impdrtattt tensions being 'represented by the four names K&savubu, Lumufflba, Bdlikangb and Ts-hombe.. The ,most important of those .... built-in conflicts Vas obviously the one betweeri Kasavubu and 'Lumumba, between • Abako'and'-Orientale ProVinee, with the.top..men;; so to 6.ay; tied ...together, but without any prior-solution rof^ their rela'tlonBhipri. Sopner or. later there had, to be a choice in their political life.''-' Should the.centrifugal forces of an ..... individual natee take'the upper hand or shfculd patriotism lead to a centripetal ; mouldixis'together'6f these various gentlemen/ all of whom had.a claim to authority because'they all had ';thfeir' kind of support soinewhere> somehow? • ...-.••.•-.. . ..-..\. 121 As you know, the centrifugal forces took the upper hand at a very early stage -- and I think that that was very natural* I am the last one who would exculpate the Belgians in any sense* Whatever way one may write history, it is quite obvious that the Belgians abused all the centrifugal forces and made things worse; instead of, as it were, working in the moulding direction, they worked in the other direction. That, from the very beginning, very clearly indicated our role: We should not intervene but we should in the first place construct an umbrella under which they could find their way without being overburdened either with technical problems or with problems of law and order* We should, so to speak, lift off of their shoulders some things which might be called roadblocks in the moulding together of a political system. We tried to do that. But then I come to the specific question of Katanga, , which has been discussed so much. My own very simple political thinking on this question has been on the lines that you, Ambassador Wirjopranoto, have indicated. I said to myself that the first thing that was absolutely necessary was to get the Belgians out. As long as the Belgians were there, we would have separatism, because Tshombe would then be negotiating, so to speak, from a position of strength. To get the Belgians out it was absolutely necessary for us to get in. For that reason, we had a break-through and, as you know, a break-through which was unconditional and, in fact, was characterized by Tshorabe himself as an occupation. That was the first break in the armour. From then on Tshombe had to rely for whatever security there could be in Katanga, not on the Belgians, but on us. We were, so to speak, the. lock on the door to grave disorder. There still remain those Belgian . elements to which reference has been made, representing a certain measure of artificial strength. They, too, have to get out — less because they represent any kind of war risk than because they vitiate the balance in the situation; they are a kind of interference in the natural processes of political development. That is why we have to work for that. 122-125 This much I have understood of Mr. Tshombe's arguments: He is not basically anti-unity. . His motives have been a blend of various elements — personal grievances, distrust,, political differences with some of the leaders in Leopoldville, and this element of special strength behind him. I think, Ambassador Wirjopranoto, that you are absolutely right -- and I' have always aimed at this -- that by breaking down the 'artificial strengths and by showing .the patience necessary to smooth out, generally speaking, the controversies between individual leaders, a situation would be created in which Tahqmbe. vould be fQfced to retreat frosj bitf 0toa3j since it is not one of principle. For thAt reason, I was, I ara and 1 shall remain optimistic about a peaceful .-solution of the unity problem. I should not have said whai; I said in the fourth report, urging the leaders to accept a peaceful solution, had I not believe^., in th£ possibility of a peaceful solution. I believe firmly-in such'a possibility. But it requires these various elements: First, the Belgian troops must get..out, which, will create a kind of dependence on us'for essential functions. Second, the last vestiges and elements of this kind of artificial'support must be eliminated* Third, there must be a growth of political balance and maturity in the rest of the.country --and here Ambassador Jha's point comes in: they must : really be.forced, ,so to say, to get together, forced by'the simple means Of persuasion,an• ••••.'.d' the eliminatio. • n of wha•.'.••/.-t I, have called artificial elements. . That is also the reason why I felt that it' was so essential to keep all 1 ' ' ' • •* • "'. *' - • large-Power,, backstage support out of the picture. If anyone felt that he crould play from a positiqr) of strength because, if something went wrong, someone would in some way pome in and help him, we 'should never settle anything. 126 The sum total of all this is, as you see, that by combining an analysis of the initial stage, why did it go wrong (the centrifugal forces were built in; they were abused; we must deal with them). ^By eliminating the artificial elements, and by working through the constitutional machinery in a way indicated by Ambassador Jha, and meanwhile protecting the whole system from new interference and from breakdown, we have outlined what strikes me as not only great commonsense but also a very promising line which cannot be accused of playing into anybody's hand, be it any outside Power or any persons or any parties. When I talked about built-in conflict, the built-in centrifugal iorces, I meant, of course, that at the very beginning there were tides of opposition running as undercurrents of the system which we should not permit to be recreated if we now.get a strong government based on-normal procedures, reunification; reconciliation. We should not have such built-in tensions. It is much better that they should settle their quarrels befpre it is put together .again. And that will take some time; but it need not take too much time. We might at least get the beginning of a centralized administration, a central government, which in the beginning may not be very strong, but which by the very force of circumstances will develop strength. But with this background, which are general observations -- I have permitted myself again to think aloud; but you were rather provocative to that in this direction -- I would like to give the floor to Mr. Bunche, who has had the day-to- day experience of how it all happened. Mr. BUNCHE; I need not add much to what has been said by the Secretary- General. The key sentence in your statement, Ambassador, was the reference to a strong central government. I can assure you that had we had a functioning central government, not even a strong one, we would be having a much different type of discussion in this Committee, if indeed this Committee would need to be meeting now. There were three basic factors in that situation -- and I go back now to the very beginning. I arrived there on 25 June, which was five days before independence. From 50 June onwards, once independence was achieved, the three basic factors were, first of all, divisions. The country had not been welded 127-13Q into a unified whole, into a nation, at the time of independence. There were strong inter-tribal divisions; there were regional divisions, such as we have seen flare up since independence in Katanga and Kasai, and threatened in other regions also in addition to those. Also there were the divisions amongst the leaders, not only as between Kasavubu and Lumumba. The built-in division that the Secretary-General has referred to was built in, in fact, by the Belgians at the time the Government was set up, ev6n before independence, and the people were speculating>' on independence day,'as to how long this could hold together; whether it would be one month/ or six months — no one gave it longer than six months --for this division to break the Government apart; because it was generally accepted that the rivalry between these two men was so strong that they,could not long be held together in a cohesive gpve'rnmcnt. There were divisions — as we ; know also — amongst leaders such as Tshombe, Kalonji, Bolikangp and others. The second factor — and it is one, I -think, which is too often passed over, or even ignored— was, from almost the very 'beginning, the proof :of unreliability, of the national Army, which mutinied,fitfte rall > within a week of independence — 6n 7 July, in fact — arid which has been a facto-r-of1 instability, insecurity and ' unreliability ever since, because it Is an army which has no effective command, which has no trained officers and which has no fixed allegiance* It is an army of considerable size, an army of 25,OCX)'men who are relatively heavily armed." 131-135 This has been a fundamental factor in that situation, and continues to be so. She third is the factor of a lack of an effective government from' the very beginning, and this has been the greatest problem which the United Nations has had to face in trying to work. This was even before the resolutions of the United Nations, of the Security Council, in response to the appeal from the Government of the Republic of the Congo, even before then. In the talkswe were carrying on to try to get the normal technical assistance programme underway, after talking with Mr. Lumumba, and his telling us, well, we have the green light, to find responsible ministers to talk with, with whom to begin to work out programmes in various fields -- agriculture, education and so on'— to find out how to get agreements on measures was, from the very beginning, an extremely difficult thing to do, and it became more difficult as the problems of the society increased. That same situation prevailed two months later, before the actual break between Mr. Lumumba and Mr. Kasavubu. Two months after independence, this lack of effective governmental authority was very glaring. It was this to which Ambassador Quaison-Sackey referred when he raised the question about administrative activities, about the lack of it, which was so apparent at the time of the African Conference held, I believe, about 25 August, when two members of this committee were present, Ambassador Quaison-S&ckey and Ambassador Slim, and saw at first hand how ineffective, how completely ineffective, the governmental operation was. This, I emphasize, was before any break between the two principal leaders in the society, Mr, Lumumba and Mr* Kaeavubu, In other words, the problem there now is exactly what it has been since 30 June, and that is, how to achieve a government — and I do not say a strong central government, but how to achieve an operating government with which to do business, because we do not ask necessarily for a strong central government, because we think that if there could be a central government set up which had the resolve to try to get down to the business of governing, the United Nations could backstop it, so to speak, give it expert administrative support, support of all kinds, end help it gradually to build the strength necessary to develop the country and eventually to make it possible, as you suggest, for the United Nations Forces to withdraw and a civilian programme of assistance to carry on. This is the key to that whole situation and has been from the beginning. 156 Mr. WIRJOPRANOTO (Indonesia): I. accept the statement of Dr. Bunche as a clarification. I have only one comment. Because of this background, we shall go ahead with our efforts. ' . -. '' •.' •. The SECRETARY-GENERAL; May I introduce one little note, which comes in very handy in relation to what we discussed before. I have just received a report which is relevant to the question of officer volunteers. 1 said, if we can establish the proper contact with Kalonji and , Tshombe. Now here is a report from General Rikfcye.. Kalonji is at present in Leopoldville. General Rikhye got in touch vith him and then insisted that . . Kalonji withdraw, .the. European officers without de,lay. I need not read .the , rest of the cable. That is to say, it is not only the protests and the negotiations — whatever you call it— with the Belgians; it is, to the extent we can ge.t the proper contacts, also very afreet insistence on the spot. In this case, General Rikhye, who Is, very effective in such .a negotiation, exercised direct personal pressure on Kalonji ;to get them out* , . . I think, Mr* Shahi, you had as,ked for the, floor. ., .... : ..Mr. SHAHI.-XPakisten); Yes, Sir. I think,the Ambassador,of Morocco . wou!4 like to. speak first; so I yield the floor to.him...... Mr, BENABOUD (Morocco): Well, Sir, I am satisfied with the.;discussion, I do not have anything to add, except that I would like to address to Mr. Shahi and the Government of Pakistan my expression of sympathy and sorrow for the loss of that soldier who lost his life in.service. , The SECRETARY"GENERAL; Thank you. I am sure we all,would like to repeat what you said and what Mr. Caba Sory said. I am very sorry, indeed, Mr_• SHAHI (Pakistan): My delegation has learned with deep regret of the death of Mohamed Shatti, a member of our contingent in the Congo, We feel that he has died in a very worthy cause and that he has fallen in the service of the United Nations. 137-lto At this point, may I express my gratitude to the distinguished Ambassadors of Guinea and Morocco for their kind expressions of sympathy. I will not fail to convey what they have said to my Government and to the army command in Pakistan and, through them, to the family of Mohamed Shatti. I wanted to ask one question, Mr. Secretary-General. I think in one of your reports, if I remember correctly, you had seated that the high level representatives of the specialized agencies in the Congo, who were to give advice to the Chief of Civilian Operations and, through him, to the Congo Government, if requested to do so, were undertaking a study of the needs of the Congo for technical and other assistance in the various departments of government. My delegation would be glad to know if they have been able to study and report on the over-all requirements of the Congo and what should be the priorities for giving technical assistance. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: Before referring this question to Sir Alexander, may I say that I am sure that I make myself spokesman for the whole Committee when I say that when you communicate to your Government please express the deep sympathy of the whole Committee and of all its members. Sir Alexander MACFAR&UHAR; The question of the requirements of technical assistance, as I said earlier, has been a matter of investigation of the central ministries and has gotten to various stages. In particular, in the matter of the personnel requirements of the Government, we have had a public administration expert at work, and he hopes to work out within the next fortnight what the central ministries will require in the way of personnel, both as to the total and then in terms of how many Congolese will be able to fit into that. Then there will be the residual balance of the requirements from external sources. The SECRETARY-GENERAL; That is to say, there is so far no over-all report which we can showj but when there is one, we certainly.will want to put it before yout Mr, QUAISON SACKEY (Ghana): Forgive me;for intervening so often, Mr. Secretary-General. I think it is heartening that-the Congolese leaders find it very easy to come together,land I wonder whether paragraph 3 of the resolution of 20 September could not be put into motion, I'am very sure that this will be a basis for positive development of the situation, and I wonder whether some steps should be taken now in trying to get it implemented. The SECRETARY-GENERAL; My own main'motive in asking you to come tonight was really Just this paragraph 2, because I felt that as soon as we could sit down after the emergency special session to 166k'at this matter, we should. We should, however, of course, look at it with all the tact necessary because I think we can make, a UF> eful. contribution and fit-it into the situation as it is there; and if consultation is a must for all. our tJp^ratibns^ it is more a must-in this case than in any other. We cannot, so to say, dump on them the group unless the group is welcome,,Vut at any rate, it should be studied and, as the'paragraph is written, ^il; is. in a way, I.think, very appropriate to Itfce situation;; , "Appeals to all Congolege within the. Republic ot ,the Congo to keek a ' speedy solution "by peaceful means of all° their internal conflicts for the unity and integrity of the Congo, with the assistance, as appropriate, of Asian and African representatives appointed toy the Advisory Committee, on the Congo, in consultation with the Secretary^General, for the -purpose of ; ' conciliation;" .. : = -. • '• I had, of course, to give you a chance and-invite you to put forward your ideas1 and work out what you felt should be done, being available myself for whatever advice ' I could give>on the .way'In which you forge your plans. Now I must say that this discussion today has taken 'a turn which,! I think, ' is eactremely 'useful but which has given a lot of food for thought; so even' if " I had this or that idea myself — which I would have waited to put out until I had heard you -- when I came, I am less sure about those ideas on this specific point in the light of this discussion, which highlighted the issue on the line of deeper political philosophy. My own-feeling, therefore, would be on this issue that wo should regard ourselves as most actively seized with this paragraph, but that we should all take a couple of days to think over how this might best be fitted into the situation. And then my suggestion would be that the first thing that should be done would be, preferably through Dayal, but through Dayal together with some of the envoys in Leopoldville,. to nwike a very informal and very intimate and, so to say, friendly contact with those who are the main responsible ones on the stage, so as to know in that way what their views are. I thlnk; however, one should be able to give both Dayal and those with whom he is likely to co-operate — those ambassadors there on the spot — the benefit of a little bit of &rticu3st6 thinking from our side; and that is, in the light of this discussion, why I myself would like to fit in early next week — I say early next week because time is running out --a meeting at which we would jump all this catching up with developments and go straight for this question — but regarding ourselves as under obligation to formulate some kind of line of action when we meet again. That would be my personal reaction to your question, Mr, Ambassador, but this is at least as much, and more, your business as mine on this special point. Mr, CAM (Guinea) (interpretation from French): That is precisely what I was about to propose. The exchange of views this afternoon has been very fruitful and I believe, in the light of this discussion, that a study of the points which concern us in the resolution adopted by the special emergency session can be prepared. A little while ago I said I would reserve my right to speak again in order to put two or three questions and to make my line of thinking clearer. We have heard two interesting statements regarding the political and military situation in the Congo, and when my colleagues from Indonesia and India stressed the importance of the Congolese parliament, a question came to my mind immediately. We have heard of the administrative organization, but in consultation with which Congolese Government, since all the Security Council resolutions state that the United Nations action must be carried out in consultation with the Congolese Government? I am under the impression that the United Nations action continues without consulting any Government, That is a very embarrassing situation. The United Nations continues to act without consulting Mobutu, without consulting Wsisavubu or Lumumba'. I should like to know then how United Nations' action is being continued on the basis of the spirit"of the' Security 'Council resolution. Secondly, 1 believe that at the last meeting,' on the proposal of the Indian representative, at least on his suggestion, the Xfommittee accepted the principle that a representative of the Congo should be a member of this Committees I believe that the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Bomboko, sent a letter to the Secretary-General designating Kanza as a member of this Committee. He is now - present in New York: he is still in touch with Leopoldvilie. I believe that it would be desirable for him to participate at our next meeting in our discussions" in order to clarify the political situation. There is a final question. We have documents which reached us from Leopoldville and I am very grateful to the Secretary-General for saying that tie does not have clear information regarding the composition of the volunteers in Kasal and Katanga. However, we have received information to the effect that'there are not only Belgians in these two provinces. There is flagrant complicity between the United Kingdom, Belgium and their NATO allies in general, and events will Some day prove us to be right, when the necessary information reaches the supreme United Nations Command at Leopoldvilie. * * These were the three questions left in my mind and which I wished to place before the Secretary-General. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: As to the consultations, I would say'this:' As has appeared from what Sir Alexander said and what I have said in part too, we can proceed with studies and plans, as was done in the case of Kamina. But we cannot proceed with action which in any way ties our hands or the hands of the Government because we have no possibility of carrying out a consultation which at that stage is necessary. I think you would agree that studies and planning are a preliminary stage to consultation.; and for that reason that can continue, as long as we do not, ao to say, fix positions in a way which would commit either Government or us. For that reason we have so far been able to use our time usefully without running into the troubles which would otherwise be unavoidable. But as I mentioned, for t •''.--. . ' ; ' ' ' example, in the case of Kamina, we are stuck there because there are many things which we need to decide, which would have to be decided in the light of the major decisions which have to be taken by the responsible authorities. We do not g2t such decisions for two reasons. First of all, because it is somewhat difficult to see with this disintegration of the Council of Ministers who exactly can talk authoritatively for the whole Cabinet. Secondly, they do not seem t> be, and I understand it, very much in the mood to take any decision, to talk more about any matters. As to Mr« Kanza, it is for the group to decide. There is only one position. He would be invited to take part; he would not be a formal member. I think the fact that he is invited to take part may make it easier, but I am sure, on the other hand, that the Committee itself would like to take a stand on this in view of the stand taken in the General Assembly -- especially in the General Assembly. However, I leave that decision entirely to the Committee. I will not, for my part, take any stand on it. I should like to hope that Mr. Kanza himself will not feel in any way embarrassed by it, but in this present confused situation my African friends here are the first ones to find how he would look at it. Finally, on the question of volunteers, I can only add one thing to what I have said: We keep our eyes open, we keep our ears open and when we ru:i ia'io (something we feel goes against paragraph 6 of the resolution, with the very wide interpretation I give to it, we hit back. I hope that you do not look at it too darkly* I think that they may not be so numerous as you fear, but anyway whenever we find things of this type we tike the strongest counter^aetioa *><> and we will continue to do so. 151 Mr*"™"*^y taL017TF™"™*m^mf*I^ (Unite- d '*-•'.-Arab Republic. ••.' ) .'.--(interpretatio, I- • .n • ' from •French) ,,: We• ,.,•• have had a very useful discussion, Mr, Secretary-General, 'and very important points have been raised by members of this group. Since it is now becoming late, I think it would be more useful for us to use some time in thinking this matter over* Therefore would it be possible to adjourn our meeting? It is now 6.45 ofclock. The SECRETARY-GENERAL; The matter is in your hands',' If there is anybody who will say a parting word, that might.be — . Mr, CABA (Guinea) (interpretation from French); I should like to make the same, jprqposal as the one made by the representative of the United Arab Republic» But ..I have a suggestion to make to the Committee* Would it be possible for the Secretary-General, when convening the Committee, to .inform us unofficially, .informally of the agenda of our .next meeting, to entrust us with this agenda 1 This would give us a chance to think matters over more fully . v • ;" ' ' •< '. •'. • ' - ..•••';••" ••' s.;:. v :•..'• •?<"' ,.'.'. •'••••' :• ••'• •„••<•• ••*••. •;••••. •.••,... _ ' . -•;. and to present suggestions to the Committee which would'be more satisfactory* r ••••."•••••': '••• ' •.';- ••.•-' i. ,w ••'•;.: .. ' • ••• •'• • ..•-. ••••••• ...-• .-.:.;• The SECRETARY-GENERAL (interpretation from French): We shall try our best, but it may.not fce good enough. It is very difficult, as you realize, but we shall try our best. . > ': •":;••' •••• ..•••' - • f ". ,'• .' 'r' '. •'•:[•• *>••:•'•:'• . ,•.'".'.•."• ^v...' > v .. ,\'- . ' -.'. ' Mr, JHA (India): I will just take one minute. I think the point t'hat has been raised "by Mr, Quaiiaon-Sackey is important. This "is the resolution now, . •'..'.; -' and certainly some attention has to be given to it. I believe that in the general debate and maybe in the statements that may come later there is going to be considerable support for that kind of idea. But I agree that we have really to think a little bit more about it, and therefore we should, perhaps, at your convenience have another date on which this matter, will be discussed. We have to be clear as to the mechanics of the whole thing. The resolution says "appointed by the Advisory Committee in consultation with the Secretary-General". I think that the few days before the next meeting we could utilize in consultations among ourselves, and then in consultation with you, informally, before the Committee as well. 152-155 There is one other suggestion I would make for your consideration. I think you referred to this matter of taking the Congolese leaders into confidence. I think that is very rightt because no commission or committee from here can Just drop into the Congo without their knowledge or without their "being mentally prepared for it, I suggest that you might ask Mr. Dayal, your Special Representative, to make some very discreet, friendly soundings and to let you have a confidential report as to what sort of ground there might be -- because we do not want to send a committee for which there is no ground prepared and which might not succeed, and all that. We have to be very careful in this matter, Mr, SLIM (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): Thank you, Mr. Secretary-General, for having convened this meeting. I am very glad that we have Jiad these conversations, I wish to add something to what has just been said by Mr. Jha, This is a subject which is an old subject and a very delicate one. In requesting Mr. Dayal to make the necessary inquiries regarding this committee of conciliation, I should like to see sufficient precautions taken, because otherwise international complications might arise. We should have sufficient time to consult among ourselves before we propose the members of such a committee, if we should so decide. 156 The SECRETARY -GENERAL; Can we not' compromise but Just combine the1 thoughts in a way which I think would be useful -- and we are not in such a terrible Jiurry? That will be that I would send a summary of, sb to say/ the ' tendencies and conclusions of this io Dayal, ask him for his best thought on it, caution him, of course, that there is nothing he should talk about in such a way that there might be leaks or some complication of the situation, but, on the other hand, saying that to the extent he can support his opinion in a way which : does not involve us in such risks it would be helpful for the Committee. That ie not an instruction. It is just that we get his best thinking, and be will certainly see to what extent 'he can or might usefully check his own opinion with others, without involving the Committee or himself in any kind of trouble. So I think we can conclude on that note. He will be informed, and I would also like to inform him about the trend of thinking which has emerged from the * statements of the Ambassadors of India and Indonesia, also without any commitment at all, because ve have only been thinking aloud. But it may be veryv£ood to 1 '•*''••• ' • '«'.. • • .• • -. . •• • • ..•• ••• ••- ;.••• • •-. • *•••• •..,.• • ., - - ...... -, ,... have the benefit of his own thinking on such matters. " • Mzv GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): I should Just like to 'ask whether consultations or the approach which will be made will be based on paragraph 5 of the emergency session resolution. Is that understanding correct? The SECRETARY -GENERAL i Yes, it is. And that, as has been rightly pointed out here, puts the ball squarely in your hands. You have to play it, in the first instance, but we will of course do everything we can to help you, not only in a practical sense to arrive at your conclusions, but also by way of consultation and obtaining information which may be useful to the Committee. Mr. LOUTFI (United Arab Republic) (interpretation from French): I should like to add one word. We do not know whether this round-table conference will be held, or whether there will be a meeting of the Parliament. I think we should wait and see whether the Congolese cannot solve the problem themselves. I would prefer that, 157 The SECRETARY-GENERAL;(inte rpretat ion from French): We are all of that opinion. Mr* CABA (Guinea) (interpretation from French): I wish to support the proposal made by our friend, Ambassador Loutfi, because we learn from rumours that Mr, Tshombe is on his way to New York, so that the idea of a round-table conference•.. I see that you are making a gesture of disapproval, Mr, Secretary-General. No doubt you have more information than I have, and I should like to know what it is. The SECRETARY-GENERAL (interpretation from French): I know absolutely nothing about it* And rumours are abundant, as you know. The meeting ended at 6.55 P»ni. CONFIDENTIAL , Meeting No. 6 13 October 1960 ENGLISH UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE CONGO Meeting at United Nations Headquarters on Thursday, 13 October I960, at 8.30 P»m. 2-3 . .'• 'I :••.•- - .••• ; •'-..-,» v •. '"" ' ' The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I vould, first of all, like to turn to the representative of Nigeria, whom we see among us for the first time, representing a most welcome added contingent to the United Nations Force. We are happy to see you here with us, and I hope you will like our manners, which are a little bit different from those you find in the General Assembly. We have "before us Just one major question, which was raised last time, by me, formally, by reference to the resolution of the emergency special session of the General Assembly. It is the point which the General Assembly proposed be considered by the Advisory Committee, namely that the Committee, in consultation with the Secretary-General, might wish to. decide- on a kind of mission ^ I do not know exactly how to call it; perhaps one should say a good offices mission — which might go to the Congo, first of all to Leopoldville, in order to see what contribution might be made to an ironing-out of those difficulties which have developed. It was agreed on that occasion that I should contact Ambassador Dayal, who is in Leopoldville, as you know, and try to get his views on the situation and on the possibilities of making a useful contribution in the way indicated. It was felt that it was too early to sound out opinion in the City — of course, first of all, with leading political dignitaries; but that, on the other hand, if I understood your view correctly, Ambassador Dayal, with his very sane and stable Judgement, might try to find out a little bit as to where people stood. With this background, I informed Ambassador Dayal about the trend of the discussion here, and since then we have had not a few communications from him covering various stages not only of the development in Leopoldville but also of his own thinking regarding that development and its possibilities. We may get back to it at a later stage. There is nothing very revolutionary in it at all. I would Just like, in a short summing-up, to say that he has a lot of faith in the kind of approach which we looked at and turned around and considered for a while at our last meeting on the Initiative of Ambassador Jha, supported by his neighbour to the right, our friend the Ambassador from Indonesia. I-tMnfcthe best vay to introduce this discussion — which is really your >•,'.!'.;••• ,-• , • . , • - • < . . discussion, in consultation vith DB, and not the other way around — would be r.-' ' • ,•;••.:• - if I asked Dr. Wieschhoff to give you, as well as he can/ a picture of where we are at present in this bewildering situation in Leopoldville regarding the '•'•'. •' ' .1 , '. \ • • ; r • • position of various personalities^ the thinking on constitutional issues and the trends of thought, generally speaking. l£ tnat meets with your approval, I would therefore like to invite Dr. Wieschhoff'to give a short summary of the situation . as it stands today, '.''/.' - ••. .1 »"••:' '.I '••.• .»••.-... - . '....• Mr. WIESCHHOFJF; A political analysis of the present amorphous political situation in the Republic of the Congo must, of course, first of all register the i fact that Parliament has remained inactive for more than six weeks now as a ~ result of a good many different circumstanceB. The other fact to be registered is that perhaps any political solution of the existing dilwama in the Congo would have to take into account several contending groups and parties. There is first of all Mr. Kasavubu, the President of the Republic, the only constitutionally established authority which still remains nominally functioning. There is secondly Mr. Lumumba, whose status as Prime Minister, as is well known, is disputed, not only by the President but by many others. There is also the "Government11 — if I may say, in quotations — of Mr. Ileo which, as was stated here the last time, only exists on paper. There is, furthermore, Colonel Mobutu, who now is very strongly supported, it appears, by Mr. Bomboko, the former Foreign Minister of the Lumumba Government, associated with the members of the College of Commissioners, of which he is the Commissioner General, and a group which has assumed authority, however without any osn&titutlcraal endorsement. There is still within the picture of the Congo as a whole the so-called Maoris* authority in Katanga — of course, also extra-sonetitutioneJL. Finally, there are in the various provinces many different regimes exhibiting different separatist tendencies, the constitutional status of most of which is, at least, somewhat beclouded. These are the major factors in the present political situation in the territory. 5 . Although primary attention Is presently being given to the political disputes Involving the Lumumba group on the one hand and the Mobutu-Bomboko group on the other, it Is to be realized that the political struggle between them • Is almost exclusively limited to the Leopoldville area and that, as a corollary, In any attempt that ie made to assess the political climate in the territory as a whole, it must Invariably be taXen into account that there are existing, or there are operating, other political regimes and other political tendencies in the various provinces. Attempts to solve the political crisis in the Congo by a round-table discussion, or a round-table conference -- as was reported here the last time — a conference to be called by permanent leaders of the various political parties --as was originally envisaged by Colonel Mobutu -- have failed and further attempts in that direction seem to have been abandonee!. One of the chief reasons for the collapse of these attempts has been ., the inability of the various pa.rtiea to reaqlx agreement, not only as to the composition of the rouncUtable conferance^bu^ als9 aa to its objectives. In this connexion, it may be noted that Mr* Tehombe in Katanga was not even willing to receive envoys Colcnel Mobutu had despatched to Katanga for the purpose of persuading him to participate in such a conference. At present it may be noted that strong efforts are being made by Colonel Mobutu, apparently strongly directed by Mr. Bomboko,to enforce on the Congo a government based on the College of Commissioners, and it appears that means are now being explored as to how to operate in order to secure for this body the endorsement of Parliament. It appears that pressure tactics are being used not dissimilar to those which had been used in the past. On the other hand, there seems to emerge a tendency which believes that the only solution to the present political stalemate can be found in the parliamentary approach. This approach, as was discussed here the last time, has been strongly favoured by the Secretary-General and his Special Representative in the city of Leopoldville, and it appears to have now the support of some disinterested personalities in the Congo. I may add that it is apparently Mr. Dayal's opinion that any aeatftnbling of Parliament would, however, not be sufficient to overcome the present crisis. It would be necessary for both chambers of Parliament to meet with as full an attendance as can reasonably be expected. It would further appear to be necessary for the parliamentarians to be given discreet objective guidance along constructive lines, with indications of possible solutions so that as complete as possible adherence to parliamentary and democratic procedures could be secured. It is realized that one difficulty in getting Parliament assembled on a broad basis is the fear of many leaders of political parties that a meeting of Parliament may not be convened in good faith. Therefore, ways and means would have to be found to give assurance beforehand to all leaders of political parties that Parliament will be free to act not only in regard to the establishment of a broadly based Central Government, but also as a constitutional assembly. Assurance would have to be given that whatever Central Government would emerge, the question of the future Constitution of the Congo would be kept open for subsequent discussion. In order to guarantee to iceptical political leaders the necessary assurance which alone can bring a full Parliament into existence, the assi stance of some United Nations agent would oe necessary. It would appear essential that whatever group would be constituted for this purpose would have to be acceptable to all of the contending parties. Any decision to superimpose A committee.upon 'them which would not be likely to lead to the desired results would be undesirable; In this connexion, some . , . thought might perhaps be given to whether representatives of African and Asian ...,. . States now represented in Leopoldville could not render the most useful service*,. In view of the many Sensitivities which have understandably developed the =•;:, selection of such a group would be most delicate. Also, the question of when and how it would function' would need careful thought. '• - . , .-..- '•'''*. ' ' • The SECRETARY-GENERAL; Well, ladies and gentlemen/as you,see from this,.. which Is really an extract from observations made by, first of all, ..:••: _-, Ambassador Dayal, while there is a growing interest in the parliamentary approach, • parliament representing the only uncontested constitutional authority, there are ;-> also thoughts indicating that the road is really full of difficulties. These _'.-..,. difficulties are not new to us, because I think we mentioned them last time --the need to have full attendance, the need to have a feeling of safety, and so on and 80 forth* But what is new and important IB that in the last week or couple of weeks, to Judge from Ambassador Dayal's reports -- and he is in close contact with many personalities and also with the Afro-Asian diplomatic representatives — there is a growing, so to say, soberness which leads to a line-up somewhat in the direction mentioned last time here and now repeated by Dr. Wieschhoff. It is in that setting that one has to envisage an initiative from here, and my own feeling is -- and I know that in this respect I reflect Ambassador Dayal's views -- that two criteria have to be met. The main contenders, the main protagonists on the Leopoldville and Congo scene, must all of them at least acquiesce in the activities of such a group If it is not to act as a further dissolving and disintegrating influence. That is to say, in good American lingo, that one would say that the idea has to be sold to those gentlemen. The second thing is that we should, of course, not build into such a group conflicts which already exist in the Congo in such a way that in fact the group and its work in the Congo would only mean the widening of the area of debate* The group should represent a common line of approach, with variations, with margins as a matter of course, and with flexibility, but with a common line of approach to tne extent necessary iu order to have it serve ao a kind of rallying point in a country already torn by individual viewpoints. Before ending this little introductory survey I may draw your attention to papers you have received which, with the sense of irony we all can have, with the sense of humour we all can afford even in situations which basically are tragic, must have amused you. Not very many days ago some words were said about our partisanship against Mr. Lumumba. Nowadays, as you know, we run hourly an interesting debate regarding our partisanship in favour of Mr. Lumumba. I do not know if the mail has brought you the latest document in this interesting series of exchanges of messages: a cable of today, addressed to the President of the General Assembly and to me from Mr. Kasavubu and Mr. Bomboko, which in no uncertain terms takes us to task as regards the consequences of our rather consistent line of policy to protect all the main political personalities against acts of violence, whatever their formal excuse may be. If you have seen the last one, we have there reached a highly interesting point where it is thought that our protection for what is called "one man in the Congo" is the price I am paying for maintaining Just one Secretary-General post here. 10 So, a* we see, we are still in a world of vivid and rich imagination* I would not find this interesting at all if it/were not a reminder of the delicacy and complications of the situation with which we have to deal and the risk we have to take into account that even the ;most sober and well-intentioned moves may be twisted into something entirely foreign to the minds of the • • •-..- originators or initiators. It leads me back to "what I said initially; I feel. ... that whatever line this Committee may wish to take in accordance with the . f..._, • *; invitation of the General Assembly it must oe a line -which is, so to say, at, .-...•.-.- least understood and acquiesced in by the main parties to the conflict if we . .v are not merely to start a new round in this seemingly endless turnaround and .-...-. discussion of political alternatives which is going on "vhile the city is falling1*. Please excuse me for this introduction of some length, but it is to be .-.., .., regarded'as some kind of a report in reply to your invitation last time to .:.-...-. find out what we should say, not fofr your, guidance but.. as a background for.your / own consideration. • -.•-- .. ,, ,: , Mr* JHA. (India): I think this is a very important meeting, from the very issue which you have brought to our notice and also because of what has happened in the General Assembly during the last eight or ten days. We are an Advisory Committee, and it is our duty to advise you as to what we consider the best course in a certain set of circumstances. Our own approach, as members of this Advisory Committee, is to assist you and to make your task and the task of the General Assembly in the forthcoming discussions on the Congo situation, a question which has now been included in the agenda, easier and clearer. There are several points which I wish to raise tonight. I would not like to raise all of them at once because that would take up too much time, so I will first take the question of this consultative group, or good offices group, which is contemplated in paragraph 3 of the resolution of the Emergency Special Session. Now, to my delegation and to my Government it appears that the one solid thing we have is the resolution that was adopted by the Emergency Special Session/ and the more we read it, the more we think it is the right resolution and that it points the way to the right course of action. 11 Paragraph 3 of that resolution definitely envisages the appointment of a group of representatives of Asian-African countries appointed by the Advisory Committee in consultation with you, and it is the view of my Government that we should not lose time in creating this Committee* We have heard with interest what you said in the way of a report from your Special Representative in Leopoldville, and we appreciate that there are many contending parties, each with its own ideas, each wanting to seize power* It seems that almost anybody who can gather a few men around him acquires a great deal of ambition in the Congo these days, but anyhow, even taking that view into consideration, we feel that paragraph 3 of the resolution should be given effect to. It is not a question of superimposing on any of the parties any committee* in fact, the committee is not meant to be superimposed on any party or on the Government; it is only a good offices committee which, as appropriate, might assist the Congolese parties in terms of paragraph 3 of the resolution to reach an amicable settlement. 12 ' 'It ii poaaible we may not lie able to achieve much at flrat. it is possible they nay have to come back an^pethafca enter into further die CUB alone/but it la the View of my Government that it would be a good thing if auch a group vent In . .r •.••:••.• . . . ^ . , ...... a preliminary way, even for a week or ten days, In the fir at inatanfce* We f rerllee that perhaps nothing could be done at first, but they could come back and hold further consultations with the members of the Advisory Committee and other Membera of the Assembly and with you, and perhaps make further visits later/ If ' end when necessary. But we do think — and I am Instructed by my Government to •fey"''this1-- that it would be useful from every poin-b of view to send auch a group as envisaged in the resolution 6f the emergency special session to the Congo, We feel that no time should be loot in Getting up such a group but, as you pointed dut very riigh-bly, it'Is not up to you to take the initiative In the matter, it is for the Advisory Conciivbee itself, and I think we ought to get doi/n to the task. The otker matter w!,\icli I wleh to raise la ciore in the nature of a question. We have gathered from newspaper reports — I do not know whether they are true — that the United Nations, authority has disbursed money to Colonel Mobutu for payment to the soldiers who are under hie control. We do not know if that Information is correct, but it seems to UG that whatever may be the position of Mr* Lumumba and hie colleagues, or of Mr, Ileo and his colleagues, one thing la certain, and that is that Colonel Mobutu, by no stretch of Imagination, can be, said to have any legal foundation for the authority that he claims to exercise. We are not quite clear why the United Nations should deal with Colonel Mobutu at all. If it had been a question of accession to authority by a revolutionary Government, one could understand, but all our understanding and information is to the effect that Colonel Mobutu has not effected that quantum of coup d!e*tQt or anything like that which might force us to deal with him, and it seems to us that whatever may be the legal position of the Lumumba Government or of any other Government aet up, the United Nations would not be wise in dealing with Colonel Mobutu as any kind of de facto authority. That is the first thing from which we chould start. The United Nations, of course, la quite right In not taking part In the internal conflicts of the various authorities, but, at the same time, if the United Nations, by maintaining an attitude which la amenable to dealing with any authority vhlch springs up in the Congo, and certainly they are springing up by the dozen, what happens la that, with the beat motives in the world, they tend to veaken the lawful Government and also In some ways to whet the appetite and ambitions of distant groups. In making these remarks, I vant to make it clear that I em not attributing any motives, but I do feel very strongly, and these are the instructions of my Government, that ve can see no Justification for the United Notions disbursing money to Colonel Mobutu or to have dealings vlth him as if he were the Government, because he, of all persons, has no lawful foundation of any character at all. I ehould like to know -what the real situation is, because to us it is very disconcerting to learn that United Nations funds are going to someone who cannot really be called the lawful authority of the Congo. I have one or two other questions with regard to the reconvening of Parliament end the facilities for its reconvening, but at present, in order to be brief, I will confine myself to thcae reaarks. The SECRETARY GENERAL; Mr. AmbassadorI think that the last questions you mentioned'are very closely related to'the question of the good offices mission, because, of course, the parliamentary approach and whatever is being done from here must be seen in the same context, and for that' reason ' I think it would be extremely useful, if I may speak for your colleagues in the ; Committee — and speaking also, of course, for myself -- if you would clarify your ideas on those points as a background for discussion; of course, at ' the moment which seems to be the right one for you. On this question of Colonel Mobutu, I think I can give you satisfaction, first of all, by saying that I share, and our representatives share, 100 per ceiit, your view as to the legal authority of Colonel Mobutu. He has no constitutional authority at all. That is the first point. The second point is that I am sorry to have noticed over the days and weeks the extent to which newspaper reports have given food for worry — may I put it that way — "because they are not authoritative sources in any way. I understood you to put a question regarding the accuracy of this information. We have exact information on the matter .... ••;/;,.• . _' • • - • • '*•/•> . ' • from Ambassador Dayal. We have sen t : for the cables and will give you his exact reply. I can anticipate the reply by saying that no money has been put at the disposal of Colonel Mobutu at all. The other question — the extent to which, in' order to ward off the worst — and I really say "the worst", that is to say, armed mutiny, on this or that point — not through Colonel Mobutu, but under the United Nations flag, through General Kettani and General lyassou, certain salary payments have had to be made to ANC people, is, I think you will agree, a matter of an entirely different character, lifted entirely outside the power fight among various authorities and belonging wholly to the sphere of what in an emergency makes sense as an operation, with basically humanitarian justification and ultimately with some consequences of rather great importance as regards the maintenance of a minimum of law and order -- and I say "a minimum of latf and order" because, as you know, this ie a situation where the ANC is one of the most disturbing factors in the whole situation. »v v- •/ . . Fending the arrival of tbla cable, I think you can leave the data of the Mobutu story aside, with the two explanations I have given. There is no recognition — there could not he any, as it is against our whole view — of Colonel Mobutu, in the first place. In the second place, no money has been put at the disposal of Colonel Mobutu, May I, then, perhaps, if you do not want to pursue your line Just now, Ambassador Jha — Mr. JHA (India): May I Just interrupt you a little? We saw a newspaper report — this was in one of the Indian newspapers, but I believe it has appeared also in some newspapers here — from Leopoldville, g8 September: "The United Nations administration here today formally accused Colonel Mobutu of not accounting for a million francs handed to him by the United Nations for payment of salaries to Congolese soldiers, it is authoritatively learned. The United Nations has been progressively making payments of arrears of salaries to the Congolese troops as part of its pacification programme. Colonel Mobutu was today asked to produce the signatures of soldiers if the arrears had been paid to them.*1 This is the sort of report that I had in mind. The SECRETARY-GENERAL; The problem is news to me, Ambassador Jha, even in the specific form you read out. Mr. JHA (India): I am very glad to hear that, but you can well appreciate that news like that is very difficult indeed to understand. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: Yes, I can. It has been one of our major headaches all through, this kind of news. Mr. JHA (India): Thank you very much. The SECRETARY-GENERA!* But anyway, as soon as we get a cable down, we will give you the exact replies of Ambassador Dayal to these various atotied, 16-17 But may I generalize again. I have seen quite a lot; you know it happens here In' New York too, that when we read the morning newspapers we are .very surprised that that is what wa did or said the day before. So it is not surprising that thie applies also to Leopoldville. But it has'been and remains^ a major disturbance because thers is no question about it that journalists, : in gt'bd faith or bad faith,1 are a little slanted. They want to see news • developing in a certain direction, and for that reason news is often tendentious. This, of course, leads ue:-to' a much wider problem which has no special application to the Congo, but I think one of the best uses of the Advisory Committee is -that we have this chance to straighten the news out, and I am very happy that you raised this point. -In fact, the lap-t detail that you mentioned is news to me, even as a; ntniour. . • " •••' Mr. JEA. (India).*'Thank you. '..'; . 18 Mr* LOUTFI (United Arab Republic) (interpretation from French): I should like first to refer to the question of Parliament. I was very pleased to hear that Ambassador Dayal, the Secretary-General's Representative in the Congo, feels that Parliament should meet. I am also pleased to note that the intention is to have a meeting of the Parliament and that an attempt will be made to have all Members present. I am happy to know, too., that the United Nations could assist in arranging this meeting and that even Members who are not in Leopoldville could attend. I also feel that this meeting of the Parliament could deal with the Constitution of the Congo. I believe that that is very important. This would enable us to remain on a legal basis and to work on that basis. The second point of interest to my delegation relates to the question of the protection which the United Nations has given to Mr. Lumumba. I believe that the Secretary-General acted very wisely in protecting Mr. Lumumba and preventing his arrest. In ray opinion, from the legal point of view Mr. Lumumba cannot be arrested without authorization from Parliament. This is a law that exists in all countries of the world. Mr. Lumumba is a Member of Parliament, even if he is not a Minister, and a Member of Parliament cannot be arrested, as I have said, without the authorization of the Parliament. That is why I fully approve the position taken by the Secretary-General on this matter. Ify third point is in connexion with one raised by Mr* Jha. I refer to the question of a good offices committee. I believe that we could start to discuss the ways of establishing such a committee and the question of when it could go to the Congo. I think that this would be very useful. That is all I wish to say for the moment. I shall perhaps speak later, if I feel it advisable. Mr. QEJAISON-SACKEY (Ghana): I would refer first to the last point raised by Ambassador Jha, relating to the disbursement of funds to Colonel Mobutu. I am glad to hear from the Secretary-General that nothing of the sort is in fact happening and that the Secretary-General will ask for confirmation of this from Leopoldville. We ourselves have raised the question with Brigadier Otu, and we have been assured that no such payments have been made. 19-20 There are two main points which I should like to raise. •. . - '. • ..•'.' The first refers to the possibility of convening Parliament.' The second refers to the question of sending a good offices committee to the Congo. It- • would appear that the two points are related. - .''V • • '•*' - . • It is our view that it might be a Oof* ifleal solution to send this grcrro to the Congo, convene a meeting of all the various leaders in the Congo and give them all the assurances which Ambassador Dayal in Leopoldville thinks must be given them, before Parliament meets. I say this because I wonder how Parliament can meet if such assurances are hot given in the first instance. It Would have to be decided whether these assurances should be given quietly or whether there should be an announcement that Parliament should meet. That is why we feel that if a mission could be sent immediately -- and when I say "immediately" I am thinking in terms of weeks and not months — it could do the preliminary work within, say, a week, get the various leaders together and impress upon them the necessity of convening Parliament. " L '•'••••' If that cannot be done, I should like to have some clarification on this point. For example, how can Parliament meett I suppose, eta the Secretary-General himself said at the last meeting, that Parliament can 'meet if the President of the Senate calls for a meeting; or I suppose it ''&je, nwet if the President of the State calls for a meeting. We have seen some correspondence indicating that the President of the Senate, Mr. Akito, has sent a letter to Mr. Kasa/vubu asking him to convene Parliament, but so far nothing has happened. Would it be in'order,--Mr; Secretary-General, if I read out the letter which Mr. Joseph Akito sent t6 Mr. Kasavubu? The SECRETARY-GENERAL: Please do so. '•'•'f ''••'• 21 Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana): This la a message addressed to Mr* Kasavubu, President of the Congo Republic, from the President of the Congolese Senate. It reads as follows: "On behalf of the Congolese nation we denounce your silence regarding the unlawful actions being committed with the participation of the Belgian troops all over the country and especially in Katanga and Kasai. It has been proved that Belgian military personnel are working among Tsho^be end Kalonji's army under false capacities, auch as technical advisers. Brazzaville radio announced on October the seventh that three of such officers were killed by the national liberation forces in the Baloba villages in Katanga. We believe that both Tshombe and Kalonji are working in agreement with you since Kalonji is staying with you at the present time. Sometimes he stays also with Abbs' 1'oulou, the President of the Republic of Congo, (Brazzaville). "Do you still remember while you are encouraging Tehombe by facilitating the secession of Katanga the oath you undertook in accordance with Article 30 of the Basic I^aw which provided that you would uphold the Congolese l^.ws as well as Congolese independence and territorial integrity? lfl denand your reply on my lettsr dated September 29th regarding the question of Katanga. "I ask you also to order Tshombe to cease fire immediately. "Being silent while the chaos is prevailing over the country makes you share the responsibility. Colonel Mobutu is arresting the Parliament Members and the Ministers with no Justification. You are the Chief of State according to the Basic Law issued on May 19th, 1960, which you do not respect. We draw your attention to Articles ^0, 65, 55 concerning the arrest of Members of the Parliament. Article 65 states that Members of the Parliament shall be immune to pursuit, search, arrest, jail and trial if such actions were taken for whatever opinion they declare or vote they cast while exercising their duties. Article 66 stipulates that the arrest of any deputy member or Senator cannot be undertaken without the approval of the Council to which he belongs unless there is an obvious violation of the lav in which case an authorisation of the Bureau of the Council is required. Although you are aware of those articles, yet you permit 22 Colonel Mobutu to arrest the Parliament Members, a. fact that provokes the people* You are'actually tearing the Democratic Parliamentary system Into pieces by your failure to bear the responsibilities of the Chief of State* Thus you Issue decrees without obtaining the signature of tie competent Minister or Mr. Lunrjaba's Government. You know perfectly well that Article 20 stipulates that any procedure taken by the:Chief of State does not have any effect unless it carries the .signature of the Minister in charge. You have created a new machinery in the Government, nenely the General Constiissaries1 Committee and you cannot ignore that only the Parliament has the authority .in euch matters. Thus you have breached Article 21 of the Basic Law which states that the Chief.;Qf State has no other powers than those accorded to him by that law. You issued a decree of law for the establishment of the National Bank. You know that according to Article 37 the Government may only in urgent questions ask the Parliament to grant its authorisation,to -'the Chief of State to exercise this right in specific cas^s," "The decrees of such lave should be studied in Cabinet sessions* Consequently the Parliament and the Congolese people refuse to accept the General Commissaries Committee and consider its actions as void and contrary to any parliamentary system which requires a parliamentary majority for any proposed law. Thus, as you may notice, the activities of the General Commissaries Committee is not subject to the supervision of the people's representatives. Its actions, therefore are not binding on anybody except yourself and Colonel Mobutue "On behalf of the Congolese people we invite you to re-examine this dangerous situation which could lead tfce country to its destruction and hold you responsible for it, nln conclusion, we reassert that the Parliament is the only authority which represent the nation^ interests. We therefore demand that you reopen the Parliament in accordance with Article 70 of the basic law.11 That is signed by Okito Joseph, President of the Congolese Senate, 21* I do not know hov much credence can be given to this document; but, without disclosing the source, it was given to me by the Ambassador. I merely read this to indicate that there is definitely still some soreness among the leaders in the Congo, and I am wondering whether preparatory work could not be done, either by this good offices committee or by some other contacts. That is why I have raised the question. If I can be given some clarification as to how Parliament can be convened without using force, for example -- because at the moment the principals of Parliament are being guarded by the Force Publique —I shall be in a position to offer other suggestions. The SECRETARY-GENERAL; If you will permit me to try and give a tentative reply to Ambassador Quaison-Sackey's question, it may be helpful. It would be as follows: Undoubtedly there are still very wide divergencies among all the leading political personalities in Leopoldville. There are Okito, Kasavubu, Lumumba, Bolikongo, Ileo — you can include several. I think, however, reading from the reports we have got, that African Ambassadors both as a group and as individuals have devoted much painstaking work to efforts toward finding and building bridges among the various political personalities, guided I think very much by the same ideas which have guided us, to return to constitutionality, which requires of course some taming of two individualistic wills to power. I have a feeling that this work has not received the appreciation and respect it deserves outside Leopoldville, as well as in Leopoldville, I have a feeling also that this is work which should continue and really merits great encouragement. I know that very frequently •- I think practically even daily — this group and Ambassador Dayal have been in intimate contact, an intimate contact inspired, I believe, by a gravitation towards a common philosophy. We always run into the same difficulties. They have run into them, and we run into them; and those difficulties include the one I have already mentioned. As long as the various personalities, so to say, do not bend to the recognition of the need for co-operation in order to establish a democratic State, it is very difficult te get anywhere, beoause practically any single one of than can break up our attempts* All have, as I think you fcnov, their followers* I think AabasBador Jha characterized it very veil when he sold that anybody who could get a handful of men to establish some kind of personal power, grabs it and runs it*A It requires, so to say, self-discipline, which can certainly come With time and under the useful influence of those gentlemen to whom I have referred* The main problem in that respect is, of course --finally --Mr. Tshombe, May I venture into a somewhat dangerous field by going a little bit further on the Tshombe issue and the Katanga issue than I think I did last time, if I remember it correctly,, and outline how the Katanga issue has looked to me the whole time and looks now, : I think it is essential., especially in the light of some of the things being said in tha General Assembly. First of all, let me put on record, so there can be no misunderstanding, that from the very first day until..now, for me the full integration"of Katanga in tha Republic of the Congo has been a political "must", a legal nmust11 and an economic "must". There is ho discussion about it. The problem which first presented itself was the de facto situation which we were facing and which you were facing, all the African States, when the United Nations came to the Congo, and that was of course that they had broken loose and they could within certain limits assert their independence by military means. That being so, we were facing a choice: either we broke the Katanga resistance and brought them back into the integrated Congo by military means or we did it by political, diplomatic, that is to say, peaceful means. You know that there are adherents to the theory that it should have been done by military means, but, on the other hand, excuse me if I personally find that it is exceedingly difficult for the UN to be party to an operation which has to resort to the use of force before using non-military, non-armed means. If the Charter csbiblisScs the principle that mediation, reconciliation, always in international conflicts precedes the resort to armed force, should not the United Nations uphold the same principle regarding the national issue? I think the reply is obvious and for that reason it seems to me, in the light of the general philosophy of the United Nations, to be ruled out. Negotiation, mediation, diplomatic and political means must have precedence* Then came the second point, and that is that the United Nations got the contributions to its force on assumptions which were made clear in the very first meeting of the Security Council and later again in the second meeting and in the report of the second meeting. It got the contributions in men on the assumption that this was not a fighting force. That also indicated clearly that it could not be used in order to fight down the resistance of Katanga. The third point which has been one most highlighted, but which in my view is the least significant in the practical situation, is that the UN force was not supposed to be the arm of any one party in this kind of conflict. But as it was proved later on, not in the Security Council but later on, to be a controversial issue, leave it aside and look at the two first considerations. Should not a peaceful solution precede any attempt to solve the Katanga problem by military means and should we not stick to our commitment to the contributing countries in the sense that the Force should be a police force and not a fighting force with the right of military initiative? My reply was obvious; my reply remains the same. That, however, throws the burden over on the civilian line, the non-military line, and I would really have been very much 26-27 amis* in the whole approach to the Congo problem it, all the time looking at It in this way, I had not had in mind ways and means by which the result could be achieved by peaceful means. . .'••-.,• My own thinking on this natter was simple. It was that if we had, on the ona side, a reasonably speedy development toward political stability in !>r»x>ld\ille and if, on the other hand, by introducing UN .forces in ICatanga we got the. Belgian military elements out, would we not. then.create a situation in which Mr. T^hombe and his people simply would have to reconsider the whole fli-cuation of Katanga in relation to the Congo! ••..,, Iherc was a rallying of forces, hypothetic ally, In Leopoldville and on the other hand the element on which a separatist movement could be maintained would be eliminated by the departure, the withdrawal of Belgian forces. Well, the . calculation vas I think a politically sound one, but it turned out to be unsatisfactory for two reasons. . The first reason was that the development in Leopoldville was much more slow, and much more in the direction of disintegration, than was anticipated. The dthsr element was that although the Belgian military forces had left, there remained a kind of mentality in Katanga which obviously was characterized by a tendency to count on final support in a separatiot policy from outside, -from • •• Belgium, if not by military means at least in other forms. That is to say, ' the basic assumptions for the reunification of Katanga by peaceful means with the rest of the Congo turned out to be over-optimistic, • Now as to those basic assumptions there are further developments* On thr- one side, what are we talking about if not the possibility of getting a. situation in Leopoldville which would create Just the background I was hoping for In the final solution of the Katanga -problem^' Were-we to get Parliament back as the supreme constitutional authority, with the constitutional co-operation of the Chief of State and the Government, I think we should have taken a long step in the direction which is necessary if we are to solve the Katanga problem. On the other side, without going here and now into details, I can tell you that I have been continuously turning the screw in regard to the links,now mainly psychological, between Katanga and Belgium. It is perhaps more a psychological than a physical process at the present stage; I can only say that these very last days I think I am turning the screw to the bottom. I do not know exactly how they will react; we may have new disappointments, but I think it should at least drive home the point that Katanga will not be able to fall back on anything but the United Nations, and, the United Nations being formally committed to the integration of the whole territory of the Congo, it means that it will have to acquiesce in it as a hard political fact. If we combine this continued and intensified effort, completely in line with the general approach from the beginning, with our hope — at least — for a stabilization of conditions in Katanga, I think that we may count with the possibility that the Katanga people, or rather the Elisabethville people, because Elisabethville is really it -• it is not Katanga in its entirety — will reconsider their position, which will be that of facing a choice between a life within and together with the rest of the Congo or a life in a vacuum. I do not think that any responsible politician will hesitate too long in such a situation. If we get this development in Leopoldville, if partly thanks to that and partly thanks to the continued and increasingly applied pressures on Katanga we break the resistance there, you can certainly see why and how I can see a way towards a satisfactory solution of the parliamentary question. I think that Parliament is the key to it in this respect, because I do not believe that we should have Just a rallying of a few personalities which would command sufficient respect and trust to break the resistance from Elisabethville. There remain a couple of rather thorny questionsf but fortunately much easier because they are of a nature that we should be able to handle. One is, so to say, the personal safety or perhaps safe conduct of the members of Parliament when they come, and one is the fact that Parliament should not meet under duress — that is to say it should not meet at gunpoint -- from anybody. 30 Another is that. Kasavubu at least must exsrcioe sufficient Influence on Mobuto to withdraw hie guards from the House of Parliament* As ve cannot shoot them away, we must negotiate them away, and the man who holds the key, I thinkj must be Kasavubu. One which is .much more touchy, and regarding which we have no direct influence, is, of course, rumoured efforts to influence .in an illegitimate we. or that member of the House of Deputies or the Senate.. We do not know anything. about it, more than rumours which you certainly have heard, all of you. We canno'b cut it, bub I do not think that we should exaggerate the importance of it. If the other points are taken care of I think that this IB one which ie rather likely to fall into place. Of cource, corruption if any -- and I have no evidence --is something which thrives on abnormal conditions. To the extent that conditions are normalized I think that people would act with, BO to say, normal decency, and ^iiafc for that reason this is something tthat may be of Bignificanoe but should be of diminishing significance. Anyway, it is - • extremely difficult for uo to have access to:,that, and to exercise any influence On'it* .- .- • • s..-. , • • ••• • ; •'. • •• ; ••;•• . ;'; ;.-; ., -, . • However, summing it all up, I hope Mr. Quaison-Sackey . that you can see how this shapes Itself into a pattern. While I do not believe that there is any difference of aims around this table I have taken this much of your time because I felt that it might be about time to outline the .lines which have been, so to say, guiding me in my thinking on this whole issue, and we are at present closer to crystallizing something that can be put into a simple black and white pattern on a paper than we have ever been. There was a stage where, you understand, it was exceedingly difficult to talk about it, because certain. pressures and negotiations are not exactly of the kind which is furthered by .. . a lot of discussion. , I would say,regarding consistency, the same on the point raised by Ambassador Loutfi. If we have refused to yield to pressures and threats in the case of the arrest of Mr. Lumumba it is on the basis of exactly the same principleB which guided ur in some other cases where the balance was the opposite one. It is always BO, of course, that one and the same principle, in this turmoil, one day works in favour of one, and is then highly applauded by that side, and another day works in favour of another one, and then is Just as much 31-32 criticized by the first party. It ia part of daily life now, and we are not impressed. We will stick to our guns, and if you approve of the principle in this case, I think you approved of it in the past and you will approve of it in the future, although we get, because of this, a rather strange correspondence. May I now for a second revert to Ambassador Jhafs question, because I have the cables here and it may be useful if I read out the full text of Dayal's two statements which refer to it. One is as follows: "The only UN funds which are in any way to be administered in part through Congolese authorities are the five million dollar fund contributed by the US through the UN" -- it is a much earlier statement: it is not the present one -- "in connection with exchange regulations and Import licensing programmes that had been negotiated with the assistance of our civilian operations office." That is a fairly early story* before the main conflict, and it refers to a situation where, due to complete lack of foreign exchange, foreign trade had come to a complete standstill. That was lethally dangerous, and for that reason we managed, but this is neither the government nor any other -- these are civilian authorities which are in control of the foreign trade and which co-operate with ours. "The operations of this fund are Just being started with counterpart Congolese francs supplied by import" -- this is garbled -- "become available to Congolese authorities for such purposes as overdue civil service salary payments." That is to say it is a question of counterpart funds in the foreign trade which are then in the Central Bank. As counterpart funds, of course, they are uaed in this context for civil service salary payments, among other things* This Is about the deficit question. These arrangements are being made with ministries at the technical level, that is to Bay, administrators in the various ministries which were appointed and have been appointed and still function under the authority of the Central Government. It is not with the Central Government itself, but with the administration set up by the Central Government. No United Nations fund whatsoever is administered by Rasavubu or Mobutu. That is clear language. The other question which I should mention in this context in order to be complete is the question of such salary payments which have taken place in concrete cases to the AflC. It is in three cases. On 11 September, in Leopoldville, this took the form of a refund of money from funds left by the Belgians and paid to the troops. I can give you the background. The draft from the Belgian funds was made,to_ our knowledge,, at the orders of Lumumba, but the Belgian funds were obviously not their funds, so they really borrowed from funds outside their control. After a discussion between Kettani and Lumumba, if I remember correctly, this refund was made to the Belgian funds from which they had borrowed. That is to say, it does not raise the question of anybody illegitimately disposing of funds. The purpose of the payment was to enable training to be undertaken within the ftBC and to avoid! conditions and dangers of violence arising out of the failure by the Government to provide necessary funde. That is, of course, the reason why the matter was raised by Mr. Lumumba at that stage. The second case was on 27 September to 2 October in Stanleyville. A highly dangerous situation had arisen in Stanleyville. Many of the non-commissioned officers had been imprisoned and members of the Provincial Government were being threatened. The only immediate solution for the crisis recommended by General lyassoa, as you know, of Ethiopia, who flew to the spot, vas to provide the pay which the Government had neglected to do. In addition, it was used as an encouragement for the troops to cease hostilities and return to Leopoldville. That is to say, it was not with Colonel Mobuto, it was at the recommendation of General lyassoa when he faced the situation at Stanleyville, which was getting completely out of hand. The third case is that of 29 September, in Luluabourg. The purpose was to prevent disorder. Wall, that is really lt« As you see, there cannot possibly be any basis for the story about Colonel Mobuto not giving receipts or vouchers, and, anyway, this is all the information we have in reply to a direct request for specification of what has been done. Mr. JHA. (India): May I ask just one question in the same connexion! How is it that these troops are paid? How do they support themselves? They are an army of 20,000 to 25,000. How do they get their salaries and allowances? The SECRETARY-GENERAL; To a very large extent, I do not think they get anything at all, and if you will permit me to be a little frivolous for a second, it is one of the mysteries of life. Here there is on the whole order in the country, without any police, without any courts or anything. Here people live without receiving any salaries. I do not understand anything. To some extent, they have been paid. After all, these are only three particular payments for very clearly specified reasons and under very clearly specified conditions. When they have been paid in other cases, I have not the faintest idea from whom, by whom, and how. Of course, the country is short of cash, as you know, to the extreme point. Dr. Bunche points out that the troops have solved their probems in part by looting, but I do not regard that as a legal form of payment. I am sorry for this long statement. 35 , Mr, CABA (Guinea) (interpretation from French); Mr, Secretary-General, I think that two fundamental ideas are it) our minds tonight: firstly/ parliamentary action which we should like to encourage in the Congo and, secondly, the idea of forming a good offices committee to take into account the requirements of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its emergency session* Before clarifying my delegation1s viewpoint, I think it might be useful to clarify certain points. The members of the Committee will recall that at the time vhen Kasavubu took the decision to depose Prime Minister Lumumba ve Immediately witnessed a reply from the latter saying that the Head of State had no right to depose the Prime Minister, but immediately thereafter there was a reaction from the Chamber of Deputies of the Congolese Parliament, and Its President, Xasongo, sent a fairly specific and clear document to the United Nations saying that the Chamber did not approve of the position taken by the two responsible statesmen, Mr* Kasavubu and Mr* Lumumba* A little time after that, the Senate took a position to the effect that the decisions of the two leaders were not valid. At the same time, the two Chambers met in a combined sitting and confirmed the decisions taken separately by the two houses. How, what did the Congolese Parliament say? "We are anxious to ensure that both Mr. Kasavubu and Mr* Lumumba remain In power and we propose to work in the Interests of our country along these lines." The validity of the decisions taken by these two bodies has been contested. Yet these decisions were clear. At that time we emphasized the fundamental error of minimizing decisions taken by democratically installed bodies after elections had been held. At the time there was no talk about a coup d!e*tat, about an impasse or about inexplicable situations incapable of resolution* At that time it was a question of considering the authority and the decisions of this Chamber in order to come closer to a solution* My delegation believes that this was a great opportunity that was lost. That is ufay I em surprised to see that now, in order to get out of this impasse, emphasis is laid on the need to convene the Parliament In the Congo. The idea is emphasized that an appeal should be made for parliamentary action, action which at the proper time was minimized, What is even better, we are told that the members of Parliament, so that they may come and sit and pronounce themselves on the constitutional future of the country, must be guaranteed their, freedom and security. Thle is a situation which my delegation cannot understand. 36 At the outaet, the two Chambers met In complete freedom and took their dec!sione in complete freedom and sent documents, which were rejected* If today certain members of Parliament require guarantees and assurances, it is because effectively the Chamber and the Senate have been divested of men who are hostile to the policies of Mobutu and Kasavubu. That is the real truth. 37 Those who would like to come and change the spirit of the Central Government,who have asked the United Nations for assistance, have been set aside. Those who would say, "We do not know Lumumba. We do not know the old Central Government. We rather know Mobutu, and we should deal with Kasavubu," are the ones who have been asking for guarantees to be given them before they come to speak out. To promote their coming would be even more serious than the thing they want to try to avoid -- omaely, non-interference in the domestic affairs of the Congo. That is the clear and specific point of view of my Government. Those who wish specifically to promote a meeting of the Parliament in these troubled times want to ignore the existence of the Government which today justifies the presence of this Committee. That is why we for our part feel that we should display a great deal of patience and tact and should not regard the convening of Parliament as an action which could promote the activities of the United Nations. This is a trap that has been set for us. Those who want to come together are trying to accelerate the fall of the Central Government that we have recognized. That is why we shall follow very closely the conditions laid down for the convening of this Parliament, and that is why we shall avail ourselves of this occasion specifically to support the document just read out by my brother from Ghana. Many Members of Parliament have been arrested precisely because they once again confirmed the power of Kasavubu and Mobutu. That is what the do^uoeut that was read out states. These Members of Parliament are no longer there, and no doubt others have to be brought together. That is the trap, and this Committee must take the situation into account. I was put at ease when Dr.Wieechhoff emphasized a few minutes ago that Mobutu has absolutely no constitutional authority. Since he has no constitutional authority, since his activities every day in the Congo are disturbing international peace and security and preventing us from applying the Security Council resolutions and the resolution of 21 September 1960, I believe that this Committee should specifically reduce these activities that are complicating our work. An army exists which is sowing dissension and disorder. It is imprisoning people. Although there is a document to the effect that it is not financed by the United Itetioas, we should not give a great deal of credence to information that deceives us every day, !Ihe very existence of this army is a disturbing factor, it should not be completely free to take action which complicates the Congolese problem. Of course, we shall be told that trying to arrest Mobutu and disarm his troops would be interference in the domestic affairs of the - Congo, But that is not at all interference/ and on that point our position has been clear. If my mentory serves me correctly, at the second or third - meeting which the Afro-Asian group had with the Secretary-General I emphasized the danger of peaceful negotiations in Katanga and said that, in my delegation's view, the only solution, the imperative solution at th£ time, was to put an end to the revolt in order to safeguard the unity and Integrity of the ' territory, , . And today the problem'of Katanga -is acute because, as a matter of fact/ negotiations have not been fruitful. I believe that the Mobutu problem is one that ve should resolve on the strength'of all of the resolutions of the, Security Council and those of the emergency special session of the General Assembly, Accordingly, as regards the Parliament, our position was clarified. This is a trap, a trap which we must sidestep* Let no one tell us that some politicians are in favour of the convening of the Parliament, They are not all in agreement, and those who should be there have certainly not called for this-meeting and have no longer the right to speak; the Army has put an end to their activities. That is whyT am very much surprised to see that importance is attached to this meeting of the Parliament — a Parliament which has been trampled under foot* To summarize my views on this, let no one tell us that these Members of Parliament need a guarantee of who is going to sit there. Is the United Nations going to protect them? The forces of Mobutu? That is the question. This is an exceedingly delicate problem. The letter that has Just been introduced to us, signed by Mr. Kasavubu, is clear and precise. All of our diplomatic missions have received this letter and have followed very closely the way in which Members of Parliament hostile to the former Central-Government have been sequestered. I come how to the idea of the setting<-u£ of a good offices committee. ' ; I hope that you will allow me, Mr. Secretary-General, to come back at this point somewhat to the work done at our first meeting, when it was said that this •. was an advisory body and its members should offer suggestions which would be examined judiciously by the Secretary-General and the Secretariat,- who would take into account all view points. It was also said that the system of voting would not be applied in- the Committee. But if I correctly read the paragraph-dealing with , the appointment of the members of this small good offices group, the paragraph states that the representatives of Africa and Asia will be appointed by the Committee. So first of all, we shall have to clarify our criteria for appointment. Would it be by a vote? Would it be by unanimous accord? Would it be by a majority of the members of this Committee? This is a problem which should be defined, and I think that in seeking a solution to this we shall be led to clarify the powers of the Advisory Committee on the Congo. Secondly, the Secretary-General said that this committee vlll consist of representatives of Asia and Africa, Now, we are sitting here on behalf of our Governments, which have agreed to make troops available to the United Nations. But this committee no matter what one says, is primarily, first and foremost a political committee which carries on political activities] and if we say "representatives of Africa and Asia51, it is because this problem affects us directly; it io a question of the independence of the Congo and other countries that is threatened, and all those of us who have known the pact history of colonialism have the over-riding duty to mobilize all our energies to resolve this problem. I would specifically suggest that the members of this Committee who are memfeTars of the Afro-Asian group should be given time to consult with that group, who perhaps might offer some suggestions. We have colleagues on that group vho are not here and who have, perhaps, considered the application of paragraph 3 of the resolution, and could perhaps offer some very u&eful suggestions. The representatives of this Connaittee could, through thsir Governments, order their diplomatic missions in the Congo to strengthen further their contacts with the representatives of the Secretary-General, and in particular Ambassador Dayal, so that a more complete study could be sent to us. Thus, by studying the views of our diplomatic missions, together with the views of the United Nations representatives in the Congo and those of the AfroWLsian group at the United Nations, I think we could accomplish something more useful. This, therefore, leads ne to the point, saying that the formation of this good offices committee requires surely a great deal of tact, for this will not be a body to engage in paternalistic acts, but it will have to play a political role. The choice of members, therefore, should be made very, very cautiously. This Is my delegation's viewpoint on the idea of convening Parliament and on the idea of the formation of the Good Offices Committee. I should like to say one word about the resolution that we have before us, because we are beginning the study of paragraph 3. Paragraph 3 cannot be dissociated from the last paragraph of the preamble of the document, which says that we should continue to render assistance to the central Government of the Congo. This paragraph is intimately linked with paragraph 2 of the resolution, which dwells on the necessity for maintaining order in the Congo, but always within the spirit or in a desire to assist the central Government of the Congo. Are we going to form this body without taking into account the suggestions of the central Government? There is a third difficulty. This, moreover, is what has led certain African delegations to submit a resolution in the General Assembly which is sitting now. I am talking about the countries of Morocco, Ghana, Guinea, and by Monday other African and Asian countries will Join us in sponsoring this resolution, BO that the resolution will acquire a more unified character, a majority view. Therefore, before taking up this resolution we must take into account this central factor, which is the central Government. If the Parliament comes together, who is going to make the first report to it? Who will say, "Here is the position on the crisis. Take a decision; speak out." I suppose Kasavubu will go; but we do not know who else will go there. Mobutu would go; but then the people would say, "Constitutionally you are not recognized." Ileo might go, and he would hear exactly what Dr. Wieschhoff has Just said, "But you are, after all, only a figurehead." Parliament, therefore, would be convened to achieve something negative. If we are really to continue our work and to attain speedy results, let us take a step backward. This step backward would be to apply this resolution. Let us concede that there is a Government. Let us deal with this Government, whatever be the criticisms of that Government. For us it is clear; if you want a homogeneous Parliament and say, "We prefer Ileo," let us say, "That is the man we will support.11 Then Parliament may say, "We prefer Mobutu," and then we would have to support Mobutu. parliament may say, "We do not want anything to do with Lumumba. We prefer so-and-so." We would have to come to the point of defending him to the utmost. Let us not deal with the problem from the viewpoint of individuals. Let ue place it rather on the level of the central Government that we would recognize, in relation to the assistance of those Governments that have provided aid to the United Nations. The special session of the General Assembly has already recognized us as a very special and Important "body, because we have to appoint the people to work on the Good Offices Committee. Therefore, the General Assembly should and can still take into account our views on the idea of having represented here the members of this Government so that we could deal with them direct. For the time being, Mr. Secretary-General, these are my delegation's views on the various points put to us. kk The SECRETARY-GENERAL? Before calling on the representative of Literis, I suppose members would like me to give a couple of pieces of information which I think ore relevant* I have before me the report of today made by Ambassador Dayal. He has the good habit of making a kind of summing up report every evening vhich is exceedingly useful for bur attempts to follow the situation "African envoys called" — that is the whole group — "expressing unqualified approval of parliamentary approach and need bring in Katanga". Fhat is one sentence* "Regarding good offices team from Advisory Committee African views were divided, that is to say, the Charge dfAffaires of Ghana opposed but concensus was that if it represented common line of approach with full authority of UN and with clear terms of reference, it could help in process of leading the politicians; including Tshorabe, along more realistic lines, but advance preparation here would be essential and some measure of prior approval of leading personalities necessary." his group Is a very parallel group to this one on the spot and for that reason ertainly their views are something you would wish to know about» I may adjl as a happy note* ^Mr* Lumumba issued statement yesterday expressing full faith in UN and its impartiality, and it is hoped that it will help Congolese out of the present anarchy. He also said it was time to forget the past sterile quarrel and devote ourselves to economic and social development of our Republic." Regarding the parliamentary issue, there is perhaps one clarification acessary. You talked, Mr. Ambassador, about those sequestrated. As a matter Z course when we talk about a full Parliament, those named as part of the Miditions for a session of Parliament must be freed, BO it would not be a selective 'ouping, Ify whole line for my part has been that Parliament is no good if it selective in any direction, but still the sole interest of the people is pressed in Parliament, and if the Chief of State and the Government are in conflict think every constitutional system tries to solve that conflict by parliamentary ans. You may remember, and that characterizes the problem, that the decision Which we referred, according to the published accounting, started out a Joint session, if I remember correctly, with 125 or 126 members present. * total number IB 220 plus. That is to say, it started out with only 50 per cent as, and, according to various accounts, when it ended up there were 93 persons present, that IB to Bay, lass than half* That does indicate that the parliamentary approach is one to which one realty must add the observations provided that it is not salected, provided it is representative. That has been the assumption the whole time, and I think it IB an assumption one should keep in mind if this approach is to be of any sense* Mr> JOHNSON (Liberia): I have listened attentively to all thq ^speakers that have preceded me, and I art inclined to sympathize with some of the views that have been expressed. ,....-.... However, I want to make this observation: that recent trends }Ln the Congo and the United Nations pronouncements on the legality of certain officials of .. . the Congo Government has impelled my delegation to ask this pertinent question* Has the United Nations abandoned'its principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of the Congot The good offices committee which has been referred to and which has been provided for by the United Nations resolution should I think \ • • be implemented with a view to the guidance of the Congolese leaders towards unity and a stable form of government. Some of us are of the opinion that so long as we endeavour to solve the problems of the Congo on the personalities involved rather than on the best interests of the population as a whole, so long shall we continue the confusion that now obtains in the Congo. I say this advisedly. When we look over the incidents of the past few weeks, when this Committee was first organized I think I made clear the position of the Liberian Government, that we are not interested in doing anything that will cause Africans to shoot one another. Nevertheless I tried to project the view that the United Nations cannot stand aloof while the situation in the Congo deteriorates, in other words, I thought that the United Nations should take some definite step in resolving the problem there. But unfortunately I received no support because at that time certain individuals were in power. Now, after several weeks, we have been told that the United Nations should, willy-nilly, do everything possible to bring back the status quo in the Congo. This has heightened my confusion of thought and I would like very much to have a clarification on this. I have been trying to be academic in an effort not to Justify or condemn Mr. Kasavubu, Mr. Mobutu, Mr. Bomboko and others of the College of Commissioners, but I have been powerless in the absence of an authentic copy of the loi fondamentale of the Congo. I want to say that we have talked about legality at length, we have discussed it in all its ramifications here, but no one has been able to put at our disposal this Constitution so that we could read for ourselves and see what is really involved in it. Until we have this we cannot argue very much on the legality of the situation as it exists now in the Congo. 51 As far as we know, Mr. Secretary-General, the principles of de facto and de Jure recognition of States, in political science and international relations, must be examined in this Congo situation in their historical perspectives. According to the principals in the Congo drama, some semblance of recognition has, I think,been accorded, which in my opinion is correct. Revolutions take place, governments come in and governments are overthrown, but States do not remain aloof because they are brought in by personalities that we do not like and to whom we do not offer recognition. Unless the action of the United Nations in the Congo has been, perhaps, with the birds in the fields or with some animals rather than with some form of authority, I am inclined to say, Mr. Secretary-General, that we have accorded a de facto recognition to some authority in the Congo, because if we have been dealing with Kasavubu, as head of the Government, in the absence of the Constitution which is to tell us whether we are correct in our action or wrong I do not see how we can look for something else somewhere. I think, therefore, Mr. Secretary-General, that this de facto recognition is in order, because we wish the problem in the Congo to be settled and it has to be settled without reference to personalities or personal interest. I heard the representative of Cameroun make his speech today, I was very much impressed, and I felt that if what he was saying from the standpoint of constitutional authority in the Congo was valid then that constitution should be placed at the disposal of members of this Committee for study. Without it I do not see how we can go on talking about the legality or illegality of Kasavubu or anybody else, or even saying that Parliament this or Parliament that should be brought into existence, because then we should be acting ultra vires. I am saying that when Mr. Dayal refused to obey the orders of this Government that is in authority and that is functioning now he was acting ultra vires. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I would say to those members who have not the loi fondamentale that we shall be happy to provide them with copies of it. I can tell you in advance that it is really not very helpful in the present situation. If you have that I think you should also have the various interpretations given. There is one interpretation signed "Lumumba". There is one interpretation signed "Bomboko", who was still then Foreign Minister, and so on and so forth. But the loi fondamentale should, of course, be in the hands of all who want to have it. The situation you raise is perhaps less complicated although more frustrating in practice than appears from what you say, because we have stuck very firmly to non-interference, and quite frankly that is part of the trouble, because anybody claiming authority would, of course, like us to take more or less his Bide. I might however — as you have raised the question again, and in the hope of "being helpful — repeat roughly what Dr.Wieschhoff said with one or two additions. Mr. Knsavubu is, from our point of view,.undoubtedly President of the Republic. He is so also because Parliament itself annulled the decision which could put that in question — that is to eay, the decision of Mr, Lumumba. We must therefore regard him as having the.authority of Chief of State within the Constitution. Within the Constitution he has very limited authority, but he has some defined authority. Mr. Lumumba, whose status as Prime Minister is.disputed by the President and others, was, on the other hand, likewise confinned by Parliament as Parliament annulled the decision of the Chief of State regarding him. But his Cabinet, the Council of Ministers, is not de facto functioning. What is functioning is an administration -- that is to say officials, fonctionnaires, who have been appointed by that Government to a certain extent, but alas, in later times, partly self-appointed, because they have, so to say, not had any Government to which to go. Then they seemed to have been running it very much the way I saw, for example, during the war in countries under occupation where there was no cabinet and, for that reason, the administration had to be self- promoting as it were in order to keep things going. 53' That IB, of course, not a constitutional authority, but for daily use, so to Bay, it is sometimes a useful instrument in our efforts to get something done which is not committing any higher authority. Colonel Mobuto, as Mr. Wieschhoff said, has no constitutional authority or endorsement at all, although in part he seems to have been supported by President Kasavubu. What, from our point of view, has given him a certain kind of de facto position is the fact he has been in negotiation and contact with both the President and the Prime Minister, and, of course, if those two were negotiating with him, it is a little difficult not to receive him if he comes to us. Finally, the Tshombe authority in Katanga is nothing but de facto and extra- constitutional . That is the broad outline of the situation, leaving aside the situation in the provinces, which would only add confusion without helping. In the situation, we cannot make any of the agreements which we need. We have to live on a day to day basis with working arrangements, all of them conditional and depending for their survival or continuance on proper constitutional approval in order to be implemented. But, as you understand, life is going on and certain things, moreover, had to be done, and they had to be done, first of all, in contact with the administration and, secondly, within the strict limits imposed by the emergency rights which may be considered to exist, and always on the clear understanding that they are conditional and dependent on final constitutional approval in proper form. That this cut down both the pace and the scope of our activities to what I call a frustrating degree is obvious, but we preferred that to other ways of proceeding which would have involved us by implication in recognition of authority beyond what is clear and undisputed in the preaent situation. Mr* JHA (India): I mentioned in my earlier intervention that I would like to raise one or two points later. You very rightly eoid,Mr. Secretary-General, in one of your previous interventions that Parliament is the key to the situation. I believe that all of us agree with that. There is no difference of opinion here. This is a point which I raised in the Advisory Committee about ten days ago. This was mentioned by my Prime Minister in hie statement before the General Assembly 5^-55 and by several other leaders. I am very happy to see you agree with that, and that being a point of unanimity, I think that should be the starting point of our future thinking. Therefore, all efforts should be made to have the Parliament reconvened. How can it be donet Naturally, the United Nations Special Representative or the Secretary-General cannot convene a Parliament. It has to be convened either by the Chief of State or perhaps by the Speaker of the House of Representatives or the Speaker of the Senate. But it seems to me that it is our duty, it is the duty of the United Nations at all stages and at all times to hammer the idea of reconvening this Parliament. This has first to be done diplomatically, and the Special Representative is already doing that, and we are very glad to learn that and also to learn that he is having some success in hie effort. Probably there is some re-thinking on those lines among Congolese leaders, but he must go on doing that at all times. I think the fcext step may be, if this does not succeed, perhaps some kind of a declaration by the Secretary-General on the authority of the Assembly. The Assembly, I am sure, will agree with this point of view that Parliament must be reconvened. That would be the other process if they are recalcitrant. I also believe that the good offices committee, of which we have been thinking, should it be formed, could proceed to the Congo and also help in the Congo by talking, with the leaders. I suggest we follow this triple line of approach, and the most important thing in the Congo, something without which no further solution for the difficulties can be attained, is that the Parliament should be reactivated. 56 The Parliament should be convened. All members should be able to attend without let or hindrance, and the United Nations should throw its full weight of protection behind these leaders. There are some who, I believe, are arrested and are in prison. They must be released. It is a mockery of the parliamentary system if its members are put in jail. Actually they have immunity. If they are put in jail, they are unable to represent their electorates. So all these things should be done, and I hope you will give thought to this and will proceed as expeditiously and methodically along these lines as possible. The reconvening of the Parliament will also, we believe, help in a move towards the solution of the Katanga problem. The Katanga people are represented in the Parliament. It should be the aim to get them to attend the Parliament and take part in it. One very unfortunate by-product of the happenings in Leopoldville has been that somehow Katanga has inadvertently been neglected, and the result is that the secessionist movement there tends to become harder. That is our appreciation. I think that, if the Parliament is convened, that may be the first breakthrough towards the solution of the Katanga problem, which, as you have very rightly pointed out, is something that weighs heavily on the United Nations and on yourself, and which must be solved if the integrity of the Congo is to be maintained. I have just one or two other points. One is relating to the legal position. I entirely agree with our colleague from Liberia that the sooner we get a copy of the loi fondamentale, whatever it is worth, the better. I have, through the kind courtesy of the Secretariat, managed to secure a copy here, and I have been trying to understand what the constitution is. I am not a legal expert but I think there is considerable force in what Ambassador Johnson said, that we cannot completely ignore the legality of the situation. We cannot afford not to direct our attention to the legal position. This is a very peculiar law. There is one section, article 22, which says: "The Chief of State will nominate and revoke the Prime Minister and the other ministers." On the other hand, article 21 says: "The Chief of State will not exercise his powers, and notably those under articles 16, 22 and 32" — and article 22, if you please, is about the revocation — "except under conditions laid down in articles 17, 19 and 20." Article 20 says that no act of the 57-58 Chief of State will have effect if it is not countersigned by one Minister, who for that purpose is responsible. This is a very extraordinary state of affairs. That is, the Prime Minister must himself sign his death warrant. The SECRETARY-GENERAL; Any Minister. Mr. JHA (India): Yes, any Minister, but we had more in mind Mr. Lumumba. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: Bomboko in this case did it, you know. Mr. JHA (India): "But that is not all. This article says that he can nominate or revoke the authority: of the Prime Minister. This is nothing new. This is in all constitutions. The mandate of the Prime Minister and the Ministers arises from a decree by the President or the sovereign, whoever may be the Head of the State. But the law -,- 'I am sorry to be legalistic here but I think it is a very important point — is a very curious law. The law says that, after nominating, a certain formality has to be gone through• That is to say, the Ministers have to go to Parliament and get their acceptance and all that kind of thing. But it says nothing as to what has to be done after revocation. 59 Therefore, If It were the intention that, after the installation of a Minister, the President should at any hour of the day or night revoke the mandate, that would be the worst form of absolute autocracy that the world has ever seen. The idea is quite clear. The idea is that revocation can take place in only two conditions: the first, if the period of the mandate is over; and the second, if a vote of no confidence in the Ministers has been taken. A detailed procedure has been established for votes of no confidence. If there has been a two-thirds-majority vote of no confidence, the Ministers have to submit their resignations. This matter might require some legal interpretation by an authoritative source, but it seems to me that article 22, read with other articles, makes it quite clear that, Just as the nomination is subject to a certain process thereafter, the revocation must be preceded by a certain process. It cannot be otherwise because the whole structure of this law is the structure of a democratic, constitutional government, where Parliament is elected by universal suffrage, where the Ministers have to secure the confidence of Parliament, and where the Ministers can be voted out by a vote of no confidence. In any case, if the interpretation as to when the President can revoke is not accepted, it is quite clear that the revocation — or the new Ministry, if a new Ministry is formed — must have the confidence of Parliament. Furthermore, article 4U provides that, until the formation of a new Government the current affairs must be dealt with by the previous Government. Thus, there are all those factors. And this brings us back to the question of Parliament all the time. We think that at some stage — I do not say it should be right away; perhaps more thought should be given to the matter, and certainly we should have the discussions on the Congo question in the General Assembly — the United Nations must say that unless a Government has received the confidence of the Parliament the United Nations will not recognize that Government as the Central Government of the Congo and will not deal with it. If the United Nations does that, all these paper governments which arise will collapse like a house of cards. For, after all, the United Nations is a tremendous force. It has great moral authority. I do not say that we should interfere in the affairs of the Congo, but, as the Secretary-General has rightly 6o said, by extreme non-interference we have created difficulties for ourselves. It is a perfectly good principle, but we do feel that Parliament's authority must be sustained. I think that at the appropriate time we must, with courage and without any fear of criticism) insist on any Government's having the confidence of the Parliament. We may even ask Mr. Lumumba to go in front of Parliament and get a vote of confidence, if we have any doubt about it. That vas the point I wished to make concerning the Parliament. My next point concerns the arrest of Mr. Lumumba. We are very .happy that the Secretary-General's Special Representative has resisted the demand. It was a demand that was quite fantastic. For the United Nations to arrest the Prime Minister at whose invitation it went there is quite absurd. The ground that has been used is that there is no valid warrant of arrest. I think that we could go even further. I think that we could say that this gentleman claims, at any rate, to be the Prime Minister. And there is no doubt that at some stage or other he has had the support of the Parliament. I believe that until recently he also had a vote of confidence -- although there is scone dispute as to whether there was a quorum in the Parliament. I think we should be quite Justified in saying that we do not accept anything like that; this is not the function of the United Nations; and, warrant or no warrant, we shall not allow Mr. Lumumba to be flayed alive by his opponents. I think that that would be a correct attitude to take. 6l The law itself here is quite clear, as Ambassador Loutfl pointed out. There is parliamentary immunity for certain persons and it is only in cases of serious offences and provided that there is an authorization by the Chain Bearer that these things can be done, but the United Nations really cannot convert itself into a court of extradition. Its sole defence, its sole justification for not handing over Mr. Lumumba is that although many people there do not regard him as Prime Minister he was at one time the Prime Minister, still claims to be Prime Minister, and we have no right to interfere in that kind of thing. There can be no question of handing him over. We should be quite firm. Mr. Mobutu's communication on that subject should not be accepted, because he has no lawful authority in the Congo, he is a pretender and I think that we should set our faces very strongly against Colonel Mobutu. It is entirely in order for the United Nations to deal with the Departments of the Government, because sometimes the Departments go on without Minietere. It would be quite in order to deal with the Department of the Interior, or the Ministry of Defence if they have one in respect of the Arme'e nationale congolaise but we should not deal with Mobutu, we should not entertain him. The Special Representative would be completely justified in telling Mr. Mobutu to take back his communication, in not even accepting it, Mr* Mobutu has no legal authority of any kind, nor has "che university Government, which seems to have sprung up as a kind of freak in this situation. The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I think I must clarify two points with regard to the warrant of arrest. The legal situation is this. Like Mr. Kasavubu, like others, Mr. Lumumba at a certain stage asked for United Nations protection. We have acceded to this request as we did to the other requests, and in doing that, in relation to whomsoever it was, we said that this is protection but it cannot involve interference with due process of law. I think that is a principle you fully recognize. That is the background for Mr. Dayal's statement which, by the way, is a joint statement, in the sense that I was consulted and took the responsibility for the decision. If we give protection to X, Y or Z, whether he is Prime Minister or whatever he is, and we are facing a situation where that would mean interference with due process of lav , then the protection cannot be considered as valid, then it would be an interference in internal affairs 62 In a very qualified sense, because of course to interfere with Jurisdiction or something like that is very difficult or even impermissible. In certain circumstances, of course, we run into this question of the validity of the warrant of arrest. It is Mr. Kasavubu, the Chief of State, who is back of the demand and back of the protest; it is not Mr. Mobutu, that is to say it is somebody who claims a certain authority to speak for the country. The first request was'made by Mr. Mobutu, and the later operations have been two communications to me from Mr. Kasavubu regarding the matter. To him, .for that reason, we have had to reply exactly what I said, and he for his part has already considered that the fact that we looked at the legality of the warrant of.arrest was itself an interference in internal affairs, because how could we pass any Judgement on the warrant of arrest? In this case, there was no reason for any legal subtlety, for -parliamentary -immunity is an established principle and for that a. I reason the warrant of arrest was involved priina facie. I cannot consider that in any vay as an interference in their affairs. I have said this in order to make clear that 1- personally find it exceedingly difficult to see that protection granted to somebody at his request can be extended to the point: where we can resist legal action against him. For example, if it was a case of crime under common law, there we should have no right at all to go into the matter. But I think that parliamentary immunity is limited to political acts, and for that reason you can see that we move in a field of a certain subtlety. 63 However, in tills specific case the situation was quite clear. The warrant of arrest was not valid; it was directed to actions which are political in nature,and parliamentary immunity, from my point of view, wao a matter of course. I hope we will not face the other situation, and for that reason your worry, Mr. Ambassador, will prove to be theoretical. Mr. ADEEL (Sudan): Ac my colleagues around this table appreciate, we seldom intervene in these debates, not because we are not concerned, like our other colleagues. It is exactly the contrary because, if I may say so, with all respect, our country is most directly affected by what happens in the Congo, at least because we have a very long border with them. We have ethnological ties with them and we have always clung to the policy that the independence and stability of the Congo is a necessary assurance of our own independence* Our policy toward the Congo has always been very simple; that we support the independence of the Congo, its territorial integrity and its unity. We are always against outside interference, and I think we are all agreed on this. What is happening now? I may say this -- I hope it is not impertinence in this Committee -• that we are not helping the Congo. We are making academic points that do not further the cause we are after. V/e are going into the past, where somebody was wrong or how it should have been done; that is not helpful today. To us the Congo question has ceased to be a political question. It is a human tragedy and we have to look at it like that. It is a human problem toxiay and we have it on our hands. If you can only start from that understanding and begin to find ways and means of solving it, not accounts of persons, as the representative of Liberia said, or accounts of self-interest of whoever is concerned, whether they are imperialists or whatever they may call them; we are interested in the Congo people themselves. In all the debates today I heard only one constructive suggestion made in this gloomy situation: that one way is Just to try to reconvene the Parliament. Let us start from that point and see how it works. If we start going back ad to who was there and who was arrested and who was this and who was that, we will get nowhere; we could go on forever that way. Let us start from a constructive point of view and pursue it because we believe uncompromisingly that this question has become a human question more than anything else. I am sorry that I feel emotional on this but it is because of our particular relation to the The SECRETARY-GENERAL: To hear you speak, Ambassador Adeel, is to hear our people in Leopoldville, This is what they are preaching every time. The trouble is that we get involved in these somewhat sterile discussions, because we have to steer a clear line. But the problem you mentioned is the, problem, I agree with you. Mr, SALL (Senegal) (interpretation from French): I should like to make a rather brief statement because I know it is getting rather late. I feel it my duty to s^eak because the situation in the Congo has assumed a rather particular importance by the very fact of the information the Secretary-General has supplied to us. 65 I must atate that my Government, by associating itself with the situation in the Congo, has always accepted certain principles* First of all, the principle of non-interference and non-meddling in the affairs of the Congo, Today the Congo has become a sovereign Gtate and a Member State of the United Nations, and no one can go to the Congo and say, "We ore a big people; you are a small people. We shall advise you and we shall tell you what you are going to do." That is why we feel that the principle of non-interference should be a very clearly established principle in our minds. Therefore, it will not be a matter of solving the Congo problem on the basis of preference with respect to any political personality as opposed to some other political personality. Moreover, in order to attain this end, we must remember that we are all living under the very same, confusion. Two and a half months ago the very first Congolese Government was set up. We are told that Kasavubu is still a legal authority. We are told that Lumumba is still a legal authority,, because Lumumba was displaced but afterwords he was recognized by Parliament* Moreover, we see a military mr.n who has risen, like Mobutu, who at present seems to be holding the effective reins of power in the Congo. Therefore, any attempt to impose a political personality would not solve the Congolese problem. The Congolese problem con only be solved by taking into consideration the interests of the people of the Congo and, above all, trying to see and understand the sincere and profound aspirations of the Congolese people. This is the first principle, which is very important to our Government. Moreover, there is another principle which is equally important. It is the importance of the principle of the sovereignty of the Congo State. We believe that the people of the Congo should have a rather particular responsibility in the solution which is to be found to the current situation in that country. Under such conditions, we. believe that Parliament, which is an outgrowth of the people, must be consulted. Parliament must be convened, and I believe this was a highly constructive suggestion that was made, and I should like to support it wholeheartedly. I feel that in so far as a parliamentary meeting is concerned, the Unitad Nations should help in seeing that the greatest num-ber Of parliamentarians attend when a decision is to be taken. Also, if we consider that a man like Lumumba carmot be arrested because he is protected by parliamentary immunity, I 66 also believe that we should show the some spirit of justice with regard to all members of the Parliament of the Congo, regardless of their political parties. By convening a Parliament which will have a quorum laid down by law, the decision will have that much more moral authority. Thus, this is the firsjb idea which we support, namely, the convening of Parliament as soon as possible. The second idea, which is dear to our hearts, and which has been expressed here, refers to the establishment of a Good Offices Committee. We believe that this Good Offices Committee is a useful thing, because the differences and divergencies which exist at present between the various political leaders and groups in the Congo is the chief ccuse cf the troubles which we note at present in the Congo. I feel that this Good Offices Conanittee could get in touch with the political leaders of the Congo and endeavour to see IB, the present situation whether there are any possible solutions, and it likewise would have any information or data on the situation, which could guide us* But I should like to state that I have always felt that the constitution of the Congo is of the first importance in order to find a solution to the Congolese problem, because this constitution is interpreted in different ways, depending upon the interests involved of any given political personality, as opposed to those of any other political personality. Moreover, after having read this constitution, I realize that there was something strange and bizarre, things which may have reflected a compromise between divergent interests when this roundtable meeting was called in Brussels; so much so that the basic law in its present form did not contemplate any of the problems which have arisen today. Therefore, this constitution is not capable of helping us to find a correct solution to the problem which exists today in the Congo. After having expressed all these thoughts, I believe that in the minds of my delegation, it would be necessary to make use of both these ideas, which are useful ones. First of all, the holding of a parliamentary meeting as soon as possible and under such conditions that the Parliament is the true outgrowth, the emanation, of the Congolese people; onji that Parliament should truly reflect the aspirations of the Congolese people. Furthermore, I believe that the idea of a Good Offices Committee is a very useful one which will help us to make further headway towards a solution of this problem and to utilize to the maximum the human element involved, which was stressed so well by my colleage from the Sudan. This is a vital element in this problem of the Congo. 67-70 Mr. SLIM (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): Mr. Secretary-General, I should like to say how satisfied I am with the decision taken by Ambassador Dayal and approved by you, of opposition to the removal of protection granted by the United Nations to all the important personalities in Leopoldvillet and in particular I should like to refer to Mr. Lumumba. But I do not wish to go into legal or other considerations. I should like to come to two important matters which I think can be of use to us in trying to shed some light on the situation in the Congo and in finding a satisfactory solution and one"which might stabilize the situation. 71 First of Gil, I en referring to a convening of Parliament. I believe that thi.o io a highly interesting ma uccful idc,:» I bolleva that, in the c..o::onco of a (pverr^cnt with which wo r.re confronted to^ny, a covernncnt hrv/ing the power io c.ct, vhclher legally or rot 3p££Lly, Pnrl!.Gin::-nii could help uc vcvy r^v?h and H3G1GG the United lotions in clcnrlr.g up tho cl tint ton and in re-eatfobll^Ulng the lr*al, constitutional ottuation vhich would ir^kc it possible for uo lo work uoufiil!y0 But the convening of Parlicment, ITr. Secretory-General, raises one problem: l.lio vill Jo the cohvfnin;;? Krder ilia ronntlfculica, I "believe it la the President of il:a Republic v"io inutit do 1hio convening, or the President of tlic Cenntc, or iiiG Prcaiucnta of both houcec, Kov;, rc^ardlcGB of tho oituation, An-ibncsj-^dor Dayal r.r.ot ciu:c-.:cd in conviiicirg the enihority vh!<.:.h holdo the power c/f convening r'urlitv.'-nt, that rarl:Ur*.:nt clionld be ronvcn-v.l. T,: ,.o,,vPjy, ornc ti c; ;v:;oc".!.l.ou of r.^-11:; .;r>b harj boon decided upon, T:^ chnuld "1.:. j '* .,- i. .,.: a !r;v;r,inic,j or rc:;:,,!< ;"cr ,i'.v, i;.i rrr'Llr/:ilrr vlt'i ic-nrd t:» i'io iroot 1 r T i\' . .--. ..„ ..'•••.:. icv.i of i;,- L .•*.-:•? .'.::;. y f;;::r f,-.i c, i ^ C;;4:.-.-.-.l J\t,:;:; -/. L . ' : \ ; 1 I•>!.;• lo _:c il'-3 Icir rcj.i:cci.cu; la ctli-M" \ror;K;; ^i.tli rc;' ^?:d to Hie ccc'Lr ; *.i J'arVU .icnt, to ensure lue neutrality of tho entire zone iu whicli both Loasca ore lo cat0,1. Now, Mr, Pciyal mny "bo in opposition to the Array or the police forcon, or any t^/pc of force. I hcllcvo ti\r:t we cliOuld n^k il/. Dayal — we, throi\;ii your intervention; Mr, ficcrctary-Gcijornl — to act in cnch a way aa to have tae entire uouo ovo.cualc.d by nil typoa CL tuithority, rc'.^r.rdlc-aa oC their nature, and to onjuro for crao time befovG lae Licetl;^ of Poi-J.:i.r--:nt a true neutrality of this ;. •.::.:;: ny Dotting i'p a cvjrficii .itly cec^ro ccn.kva DO a:3 to bloc): off cny t^pe of i,.,C'J>-l in.^ or intcrfereiiuc or ti:o uco of any l;.Liid oC1 force around the zone wjalcli, in the provlciojiUl co^orii atioa, ia indicutr 1 ao a noutral zone. Thirdly, lir. JBccro•Uay-G./neri-'l, we ch-vu Ld like to nok you, end we would ask the Uivllcd Ifatiuia Force, to cij^urc tho pOi!J.i}in:ni;::;ry intimity of all M:-r.bcr3 c;f i arlitii. .AO, c.ii-1, in o/ucr to cltala tlilo, to ai:o in r.uch a Mc.y -- dip] ntlcally, ilvuL of till cr by ilio ULJC ot Gr-.ir; oovt of ]jrc:i^ur;.: — co to free all ll--! Fourth, we would ask you to use only the transportation which the United Nations has, to transport all Members of Parliament who are away. I believe also that this guarantee of parliamentary Immunity for all Members of Parliament should cover the entire period during which Parliament Is to meet In order to find a solution to this conflict between the Government or members of the Government and any personalities In Leopoldville, and afterwards to prepare as rapidly as possible a constitution and to help in taking up all these secessionist movements, in particular the one which has occurred in Katanga, I believe most members of our Committee could agree to this — unless I bear any other suggestions* ., Now> Mr. Secretary-General, I should like to come to the membership of the good offices committee* My delegation would be very pleased if we could set up this committee as quickly as possible, because this vas a recommendation made by the emergency session of the General Assembly* I believe that; regardless pf our present preoccupations, regardless cf any concerns we may have about the current session of the General Assembly, we should ask you to help us, Mir* Secretary- General. We must act in such a way that this committee will be set up as. aoon as possible, because later on we in this Advisory Committee might be reproached for having held up the creation of some means which could have facilitated the solution of the problem. With respect to this, and defining its 'goals, I think first of all it should act ^essentially on the personalities who composed or still compose — or who were opposed or still are opposed --in Leopoldville. Let us forget about Katanga for the moment. As its first goal this committee should endeavour to find a solution to the problem of the central Government of the Congo, regardless of the importance which we attach to the question of Katanga. I believe that this question can find a solution only once a definition has been found in Leopoldville with -regard to this problem. The longer this problem drags on in Leopoldville the more difficult it will be to find a solution to the Katanga problem and the easier it will be for any secessionist movement to become stronger and stronger or to strengthen itself in any region. Therefore, since the purpose ie to bring about a conciliation or a reconciliation between the various political personalities in the Central Government, and since this is a good offices committee, it would be useful for us to set it up in such a way as to ensure that it can work usefully on all the personalities involved. On what basis could this be set up? How should it be set up? The basis is that laid down by the resolution itself. It must include Asian and African representatives from among the Members of this Committee. That does not prevent other members of the Committee who are not Asian or African from helping us by their suggestions or opinions concerning the membership of the committee. I feel that it should be constituted on a basis which would facilitate its work of effecting a reconciliation of all the important personalities of the former Central Government or of a new Central Government -- I do not wish to go into these fine legal points. Is the old Government still legal? That is not my prpblem, and I do not believe that it is a problem confronting our Committee. But I think that the good offices committee should act in such a way as to reconcile all the important persons now in Leopoldville who are affected by the central system, in other words the central governmental machinery. Those are the conments which I wished to make concerning the present situation- 75 Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): This evening many important Btatements have teen made, and I hope that you will not mind if I esk to have those statements as early as possible tomorrow because some of them contain very definite views and very definite principles. I should very much like to be able to get them some time tomorrow morning. Secondly, I should like to obtain the loi fondementale, the Constitution of the country, so that at least I shall have more understanding of it. I do not pretend that I have never seen it; I have seen it, but I will be fratik enough to say that I on quite confused. Then I would like to ask a question here. Would you say that the last resolution of the emergency session -- document A/1^7VRev,l --is now in complete effect? That is to say, from the point of view of outside interference, because we still attach a great deal of importance to it. Do you have anything in the way of new information to give us on whether there is direct interference or indirect interference, whatever the source may bet For example, has the question of volunteers which was raised last time, been settled completely to your satisfaction, or are you and are we still preoccupied with it? With regard to the question of Parliament, we would be most happy if Parliament were to meet and if the Congolese --as paragraph 3 of the resolution itself says -- resolved their problems. We would be only too happy to see that come about. 76, So we completely agree that Parliament should••meet and attempt to find a. _, solution to it. In that regard; I should like to support the principles which Ambassador Slim has been good enough to put before us and to emphasize that were ve to accept such a solution as Parliament is to bring about, then I think we have to have our minds at ease, that is to say, there would have been ho interference whatsoever from any quarter, that the Congolese themselves would say, this is the. vay ws are going to resolve it, and that I think all of us here and, indeed, the world at large would be prepared to accept. Regarding paragraph 3> what I would like to say ie this. If the measures suggested in paragraph 3 are to be useful, then I think it is a very delicate matter and it should call for careful consultation among various groups of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General so that when it is constituted it will be such a body that tlie Congolese, all of them, will accept it and respect it. la that connexion, I think we have to be frank enough to say that we should not be in a hurry, if the Congolese leaders are not willing to accept it, it is no use saying there is a resolution. If the Congolese leaders, and I do not mention names because that is not my purpose, do net want it or do not accept it, then I do not see why we should rush it. Further, we should see to it that conditions are created that they will accept it and take it in the way it is offered here, and that is, that it will help them in a very disinterested and completely objective manner to resolve their problems. The SECRETARY-GENERAL; In reply to your question, I would like to give you the status report regarding "Foreign Intervention". I would first of all like to say that I found it, especially the final paragraph regarding foreign intervention, extremely useful. It has definitely strengthened our hands in respects which are important. You will have noticed, for example, the case where, on that basis, we refused training of officers abroad. This is the status report as of today from Ambassador Dayal. There are no Belgian troops as such in the Congo with the exception of the two bases. It does not fill out the picture on the bases, but I can do that myself. There are small groups of non-combatant members of the Belgian armed forces which 77 are being phased out and entirely under our control* They cannot be considered as an intervention, and they are being phased out speedily. In Katanga, some Belgian officers are employed by the Katangese gendarmerie as technical officers. The matter has been raised with them, but it has been delayed for technical reasons only, and one of these days there will be on the table both in Brussels and Elieabethville a request for their immediate withdrawal. Otherwise, in the rest of the Congo we understand there are four Belgian officers and one warrant officer still serving with the ANC in Leopoldville and Thysvllle, Those men were in service before 1 July and were retained by the Congolese Government as experts in telecommimfoerisdons, finance and accountins. Then he replies, concerning the rumour, that it is not true that Belgian troops are rearming the Force Publique throughout the Congo. But, as you see, the whole problem, according to this stat/us report/ le; reduced to the Belgian officers still employed by the Katangose gendarmerie. / However, that problem is in hand, and I hope will be settled successfully. For the rest, I canuot regard it as a case of intervention, because the four or five officers mentioned ao being in Leopoldville and Thyeville are there at the invitation of the Central Government, and the few non-combatant troops which remain in the two bases are entirely under our control. Mr. CABA. (Guinea) (interpretation from French): I think, that to some of my colleagues my first statement may have seemed much more pessimistic ' than optimistic in tone. That is why I should'like very briefly to clarify my position further, •••,. If we said that it would be extremely-dangerous to convene Parliament in this political atmosphere that had been created, it was because, as a matter of fact, preparations had been made to ensure that Parliament would speak out in favour of one man, who would not represent and would not act in favour of the Congolese peeple. That is why I referred to the fact that a month ago decisions of the Parliament had been trampled under foot, and I asked why the Parliament should be convened in these troubled times* That is a point that meets the eye immediately* Emphasis is laid on the necessity of convening the Parliament. We agree. But nobody wanted to hear about this Parliament a month ago. I think that we should honestly understand that conditions have been created to dictate law*' and decisions to men who psychologically and politically have been prepared for this. The Congo question is inscribed on the Assembly's agenda. At- the proper time we shall be able to give facts to support vhat we have said. Members of Parliament have been bought financially and politically. People who have resisted this, who are not open to corruption, are now in prison. There are Members of Parliament who no longer reflect the aspirations of their electorate and who, tomorrow or the day after, will follow dictation. That is what we wanted to denounce, and we remain firm about this point. We think that it is illogical to emphasize the need to convene a Parliament that we did not want to hear before. That is the point we wanted to bring out. If the idea is to create conditions of justice so that the Parliament which was democratically elected when the Congo acceded to independence can exercise its powers democratically, we agree. But we shall never agree to convening en embryo of a Parliament. I have one further point. Who concocted this loi fondamentale to which reference is made? In what circumstances was it drafted? Were the representatives of the Congolese people consulted? No, it was concocted on purpose by the Belgiano who now take credit for having given independence to the Congo. It was concocted at Brussels. They said,"We have to deal with children. We are going to gran4* them independence, but we shall tie their feet before we leave*„ And that is wtat has been done, and that is why we find this law contradictory. 8o . We know what provisions ere included about the head of State, what powers he ie given, but other articles deprive him of those very same powers in order to create contradiction* Therefore the basic law has been applied with aH its contradictions, and no one can really base himself upon it. Rather we should face our responsibilities and see the problems clearly as they emerge, and resolve them accordingly. It is in these conditions that we intend to speak out against the too hasty convening of a parliament which I would be quite willing to call a prefabricated parliament« When a few moments ago I said that such an intervention in Congolese affaire should be fully understood, I wanted to add that all the resolutions on the Congo say that we must uphold peace and order and only ae tbcee two conditions are not met can the United Nations act. If we had assumed our responsibilities in Katcnga and Kasai in time to stop the onward march of Mobutu, I think that sooner or later Kasavubu and Lumumba, who were democratically elected, would have come together to resolve the crisis. We have seen in what circumstances the transitional government was set up; no majority could hold power, no political party could get a government together and therefore you needed a unit of the two majority parties. Hie appointments made broke up that unit and put an end to the homogeneous unit we had seen emerge. Accordingly, non-interference should be interpreted rightly; negotiations, no matter how peaceful, cannot cause us to lose sight of the positive contents of the Security Council's resolutions and the last resolution by the General Assembly. This is our clarification on the point of non- intervention. As regards the good offices committee, we did not say we were against it. In fact, a few moments ago the representative of Tunisia said that the representatives of Asian and African countries should be appointed from this Committee* But the resolution says specifically that those Asian and African representatives should be appointed by the Advisory Committee, but whether from within this Committee or from outside it remains to be clarified. I do not know. In accordance with the terms of the resolution, I do not know whether we, the representatives of the Governments which have contributed troops to the United Nations,should be included or whether the appointments should be made from the whole of the General Assembly. 81, Afghanistan is not represented here, but we could say that Afghanistan would be a useful member and could be appointed* After all, we could say that the Philippines is a member of the Afro-Asian group and we could appoint them, These are details on which clarification must be given firat. Furthermore, our colleague from Ethiopia said that we must take into account the wishes of the Congolese people* How can we take those wishes into account? 'By a referendum in the Congo? Shall we ask them what they Understand by the good offices committee, what they understand about its powers? There is a constitutional body which can answer on behalf of the Congolese people and express the wishes of the people; that can only be the Government, only the Government can come before Parliament, only the Government can say to the Parliament what it intends to do and can ask the Parliament to have confidence in its 'powers and in its " policy both within the country and abroad. IS that confidence to be found or is it nott Only if the Parliament passes a motion of nb ccftfidence in the Government does the time come for ue to support any new Government that may emerge* ' ' ..-....••'..,- ,. , .. -....-...... \- .. •.-...> , .-•-... These are the points of detail that we put before the•Committee* It is not possible to say that we should-forget about the past, that we should wipe out the picture and deal with the future, I think'the 'past affects the present - as the present affects the future and if today we want the Parliament, let us be honest and say that we were wrong in not recognizing the decisions of the Parliament a few days ago* 82 That Is what we wanted to put clearly before this Committee, To conclude, we wanted to emphasize that the Assembly resolution should now be studied as a whole, Biis resolution should be taken in toto. It is all right to say that the Congo is goi,ng through a crisis and people expect humanitarian assistance from us, but this aid should be provided through somebody, and until we resolve this problem we will not make any progress. Shis is as clear as crystal. You can send a committee out tomorrow morning. % Government would be prepared to make its full contribution, if you determine the criteria underlying its appointment, taking into account efficiency, susceptibilities and political attributes that the committee will have* Then we are ready. The committee would set out for Leopoldville, and then it would find itself in a difficult position. With whom would it get in contact forthwith? With isolated individuals? But if we have the courage to come to grips with this problem — we have been acting for several months on the basis of requests of a Government, whatever criticisms we may have received — let us deal with these representatives with whom the committee cquld play a role. The committee might have the bad luck, say, to start out with Mobutu, and then it may be criticized by Lumumba supporters• The committee might start itp activity in the Lumumba camp, and it might find criticisms from the other side. Therefore, let us consider all the political and psychological conditions favourable for the activities of this committee, keeping in mind that we cannot act unless we have a constitutional organ through which to act, and then I am sure we could advance. Until we have settled the problem as to whom we shall apply to, as regards this plan we have been discussing for so many hours, we will not be. able to find any concrete solutions. Every day. the situation will deteriorate. Bay by day we will find ourselves in an impasse* These are the points of clarification that my delegation thought it would be useful to put before the Committee. Mr. HASAN (Pakistan): Mr* Secretary-General, I want to ask a very anti-climactic question, and it is a pity that I bring the Committee back from the discussion of sublime questions of politics and humanity to one of mundane finance* 83-81* It appears from the discussion here and from the conditions that prevail in the Congo that it will he Borne time before there is a government which can look after itself financially, and therefore the United Nations vill have to continue to incur very large expenditures* I was wondering whether you had considered at all the question of whether all this expenditure should he considered eventually and ultimately as grants to the Congo or whether It is possible for you to discuss the matter with the leaders, every one of whom, despite their differences in politics and so on, wants the United Nations to be in the Congo »* to discuss with them the possibility of treating this expenditure as a loan --a long-term loan. In that case there would be a greater sense of responsibility in incurring expenditure and incurring liabilities and so on. I was* wondering whether you had considered that possibility. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: We have considered the problem very much, of . course, because the financial aspects are most worrying. For the moment, it is extremely difficult to get any signatures which are valid for the future* This may lead me to the observation/which I an sure IB fully appreciated by my friend, Ambassador Cab* Sory, that the request for United Nations assistance was signed by Kaeavubu, with the counter-signature of Lumumba. That is to say, if you start from the beginning, of course, Ve are tied to A and B, and the crux of the problem now is really A or fc. ' •-.?•.•• The same is true when you come to questions of national assistance* I would say that, as soon as we can get anybody who has the authority to engage the people financially and is functioning and -- for a third point --is willing to do so/ we should ask for at least some kind of endorsement of our expenditure : for whatever settlement may be negotiated at the earliest possible date. Our trouble today, as I said, is that the conflict in the country cuts straight through the constitutional authority on which we should really basically rely for euch commitments. 65*06 Mr. OUSMftN EA (Mali) (interpretation from French): If I speak at such a late hour, It Is not to detain the members of the Committee but because It Is good for each of us to make his contribution to the discussion* If I am making a statement It Is because on this point my Government holds a point of view which does not seem to be shared by the majority. In Mali we had to deal very quickly after our Independence with problems like the Congo because from the very outset we were asked to send troops* From this point of view, with the departure of a great number of our army to the Congo, we received some Information which has enabled us to form some Judgement*. MDreover, we almost found ourselves in a situation similar to the Congo experience, and we know how it is possible to eliminate or to re-establish democratic legality. 3& order to bring about some concrete solutions, I should like to bring up some points without any pretension whatsoever. We feel that there were definitely some mistakes made in the Congo. We do feel that any Member of the United Nations who would be confronted vith such a complicated problem would certainly make some mistakes at least. In principle it is only the people who do nothing who make no mistakes. Having said this, we feel that the basic problem in the Congo to be solved is the problem of settling all matters by finding and re-establishing democratic legality. We all agree with this principle. Some people advocate an attempt to reconstitute Parliament to bring this about. On the contrary, we feel that there is another way of trying to bring about legality* fci other words, reconstituting the Central Government. I believe that in order to bring about true legality and if we do not wish to trample things any further, it is advisable for us to find some sort of guiding principle. We were told that this principle must be based on non-interference in internal affairs in the Congo. We all agree with this, and we agree whole-heartedly and we should try to replace the united Nations by the Congolese leaders and people. However, we also believe that even strict respect for this principle should not lead us iato scute sort of paralysis and to half-way measures which, in our opinion, are responsible for the current situation. The United Nations was asked to come into the Congo, and it is the Central Government which called upon the United Nations to come into the Congo. We must deal with those who called us, and we must not be concerned with any ideological problems concerning questions of choice of preference. 87 It is this Central Government that we must deal with, because if the United Nations is In tfee Congo it Is there for a purpose, to re-establish legality. In other words, we. believe that when a fire breaks out we must try not merely to surround; and confine It, but rather to put out the fire. We must try not merely to prevent any <3amage; we must try to wipe out the cause or causes of any. damage. . • . , . . We ^shall nst go Into all these legal points. Moreover, I agree with what Mr. Kasayubu has written, that It is not up to us to take the place of the Congolese in order to Interp-xst thair laws, their Basic Law which is a rather confusing and complex one, v.Mch does contain errors and mis-bakes and which, of course, is not the law uaoc. by each of us. Nevertheless, we all have sufficient p:rec We believe that theae are three steps which will make it possible to tackle with some chance of success and effectiveness the heart of the problem, which is the problem of re-establishing democratic legality. We feel that when these three conditions have been met we should re-establish the Central Government in its prerogatives and in its rights -- in other words, see to it that it is a true executive body. Mention has been made of Parliament and opposition, but we feel that it is easier in practice to have a government operate, even though it may be a rather plethoric government. They speak of forty or forty-five members. I think that it is easier to have forty members brought together than to have a whole parliament meet in the current Congolese situation, where the members of Parliament are spread among the numerous factions with which we are all familiar and where there would be a very very slight chance of success in having that Parliaaent actually cut through all these questions of tribal dissension and all the problems which are raised by the other factions. The ideal thing would have been to have Parliament convened. I grant that quite willingly, but I believe, on the contrary and without really separating ourselves from the legal approach, we could very well act as valid intermediaries, and this could be challenged by none, I also believe that if we should try to bring together the Central Government that would or could put an end to the Kasavubu-Lumumba dissensions, because those are the two who are responsible for the Government. To the extent that there exists a will to reconstitute the Central Government, which until further orders is the legal executive organ which grew out of Parliament when it operated normally, I believe that this could enable us to have something which could act as an executive organ and thereby prevent the United Nations looking like something which would replace the executive organ. I believe that just now someone asked here, "Who is going to convene Parliament?1* I believe that the United Nations is not empowered to convene the Parliament of the Congo, but it can create the conditions which will make it possible to have Parliament meet, and I feel that if the Central Government can be put together again it can operate for a short while and then the situation may become clearer domestically. 90 At that time, when, through the action and aoo4stance of the United Nations, we have reconstituted the Central Government, which can then despatch current • - affairs and prepare the conditions1 for the convening of Parliament itself, there will be a better atmosphere than the one prevailing at present,-an atmosphere which will make it possible to convene a parliament* It is a parliament which is a rather burdsnsorae body and rather sizeable, a body which will give rise to practical problems because we are called upon to ensure the security, safety and immunity of each member of parliament/ But it is better to ensure the . security and immunity of each member of the Government> and to have a truly effective executive organ that cculd deal with the United Nations and base its activities on the United Nations. • : We believe that these are steps which could be taken with a greater degree of energy and with less concern for not committing any interference. We agree that no interference should be committed in'the domestic affairs of the Congo.; • I stressed that at the beginning, but this desire not to meddle in the domestic affairs of tho Congo ehoitld not bring Ud to a state of paraljrsis. 91 The United Nations are there on the spot and they must do something* If we cannot settle the matter or at least prepare the conditions which would clear up the situation, I believe that our role would no longer be Justified. In our opinion, here are the paths to be followed in so far as the means are concerned* We believe that the good offices Committee should go there quickly, but this Committee must go with specific proposals which we will clearly define so that it should truly be an effective one, Ihese are the specific proposals which my Government would like to make, without any pretensions whatsoever, because we believe, in the light of the information we have received from several of our representatives who are constantly shuttling to and fro, it would be a contribution to the clarification of a problem which is a very complicated one, Mr. LOUTFI (United Arab Republic) (interpretation from French): We have taken up a great deal of your time tonight, and it is almost midnight. I think we could have another meeting next week, because we have to consider this question of the good offices Committee and another question as well, that raised by the representative of Mali, the question of the Congolese Army, because we would like to have some exchanges of view on this, so perhaps we could meet next week, The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I do not think we can have the records of a three-hour meeting ending at midnight, in the morning* We will have them later on Friday, but as early as possible. We will be able, I hope, to give you very soon and before our next meeting a memorandum setting out on which lines the ANC problem is being tackled, because it is being studied very intensely. For practical reasons, we have not been able to have the services of General Kettani for the last couple of weeks. He is, as you know, charged by the central Government to make plans for the handling of the ai-my. He is co-operating with the authorities, on the one side, and with our General Staff, on the other side, and they are very much aware of the problem Just mentioned by the representative of Mali, that this Is one of the keys to the whole situation, I think that their thinking is going along the line of what you call "consignment", but for reorganization and education and training purposes, that is to say, a constructive contribution which I hope will get under way as soon as possible. 92-95 With this background it may be that it is your wish to follow the vise advice of Ambassador Loutfi that we think it over and meet again. I will be at your disposal as early as you wish, but my suggestion would be, however, that you consult among yourselves on these matters, because we are too big a group to settle anything here unless it is prepared by talks among yourselves, in whatever form you find convenient. This is, as you know, a fairly formless gathering ; and I think that the creation of such voluntary groups is perfectly in line.with the whole approach we have* . • • . ;: • . Mr. WIRJOPRAMOTO (Indonesia): I should like to stress again that our approach to finding some solution should .not be merely a legal approach, but more a political approach, and I think this is also in line with the resolution. I understand at this stage that we are going to appoint an Asian and an African, representative for the purpose of conciliation. What kind,of conciliation and in which direction? , , , 96-97 I understand that the conciliation should be between the two leaders, Mr. Kasavubu and Mr. Lumumba. There is no other person. We should therefore do everything possible to have this conciliation between the two leaders. Politically speaking, that is the right way. There may be any kind of Government; the United Nations may send any kind of assistance — military, financial, material; but without a strong Central Government we can do nothing. Hence, in my delegations opinion, there can be created, or recreated, or rebuilt, a strong Central Government only if the first Government of Kasavubu and Lumumba is reconstructed. After all, it was Lumumba who sent the letter to the United Nations asking for assistance. In my delegation's opinion, it will be difficult for the United Nations to carry out its task without the assistance of these two leaders. I have glanced at what is called the loi fondamentale. I have seen that on one side the articles are given in French and on the other side in Dutch — actually it is Flemish, the Belgian official language, but that is merely Dutch. When I look at this I remember everything that I have studied about the Dutch Constitution; there are some similarities. To make the matter more interesting, perhaps, I would say the following. So far there has been no mention --in the newspapers, in these meetings, in the Security Council, or in the emergency session of the Assembly — of the second paragraph of article 20, The first paragraph of article 20 says that the Head of State cannot act unless one of the Ministers countersigns the decision. That is all right.But the second paragraph is very important. It reads: (continued in French) "In no case can an oral or written instruction of the Head of State remove a Minister from power". (The representative tben read out the above text in Flemish.) What does this mean? It means that the Head of State can do everything with the countersignature of a Minister except dismiss a Minister, including the Prime Minister. For this reason, only to make the matter more interesting, we have been of the opinion from tlis "beginning that Prime Minister-Lumumba is etill the Prime Minister in the Government, of the Congo. His function IB still valid; the question now is how to put him "back in the chair* That is the position, I think it VLB nade clear at the last meeting that we should not hecitate, not even for one rcinute, to put back Mr. Lucrjuiba as-the Prime Minister and give him all the facilities and privileges, because without the combination, or coalition as you may like to call it, between Lumumba end Kasavubu ve can do nothing* I wish to state and restate this. This is the opinion of my Government and I arn entitled, even instructed, to st&te it in this meeting. Mr,.CABA (Guinea) (interpretation from French): I will not speak on the oubotsnce of the question, but I should lll-.e to propose a small amendment to tiie proposal mads by my friend Ambassador L'j>.Vu:?i to the effect that we should ad.jotirn now in view of iiis Ir.teneeo of the hour. As I said last time, I believe that our Committee is too passive. We u&ke suggestions, we exchange views, and I still have uot even seen any specific decision emerge from the debates in this Committee. Most sincerely I em not in favour of coming together here at 8.JO after a very heavy day at the United Nations, but if we are to break up without having achieved any concrete results I think our Committee will continue in a very passive manner* I will be most grateful to the Secretary-General if the Committee could proceed to move from a passive to an active approach, and if at the end of each meeting we could be told we have added something more to the work of the United Nations in the Congo. If we confine ourselves to exchanging views, if we do not take our responsibilities in hand, grasp them and give this Committee full powers, even if we have to establish precedents in the United Nations, at each meeting, we must come up with solutions that can be applied in the Congo. These are the comments I wish to make on the proposal of Ambassador Loutfi. Mr* SfrSftg (Pakistan): I would like to put a question about Mr, Mobutu, who does not seem to have cleaned up the administration as most of these military people who assume power do* It has happened in many countries; the whole thing was cleaned up, but what sort of a thing did he do — is he a complete hoax, has be any power in the country, and If not what happened? 99 The SECRETARY-GENERAL; It is scmewhst difficult to describe, but I vlll attempt to clarify the situation* According to his own words he wanted, for a certain period — up to the end of the year — to neutralise all political agencies and personalities. Die word he used was "neutralize11 -- it was, so to say, & kind of variation on the theme of the U Win regime in Burma which substituted itself, for a limited period, for a regular constitutional system. 100 Ihat Is the best that I have been able to understand* I do not know if this is really his thinking, but it is a kind of rationalization of i,t... . ,, Mr, BENABOUD (Morocco) (interpretation from French): This is a follow-up of a comment made by Ambassador Caba. I think that an adjournment means simply - that at the next meeting we will continue the work of this meeting — that is how, I understood it — with the preparation among us all of all these useful points* The SECRETARY-GENERAL: If I may add my word to what Ambassador Benaboud has said: I had a feeling that after ell, in these extremely delicate matters it has fceen most useful to have a continued exploration and clarification of the problem. I think we have done a most useful job. Even if it is not possible to crystallize it in concrete decisions at this stage, we have certainly advanced . towards the possibility and towards the stage where such decisions are possible* But I ventured to rake my little amendment to Ambassador Loutfi's proposal, and that was that you consult among yourselves so as to prepare the ground for a solid step forward at the next meeting* I am willing to have that meeting any time to suit you; but I, think that with this in mind it may be vise to wait until some time next week** We have no rules pf procedure, and for that reason'! cannot put a motion for adjournment to a vote. ..'•:.. Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana): I thought it would be a good idea if we were helped on this matter a little. It may be that we require more of an indication of how urgently you, knowing the situation in the Congo at the moment, think Parliament should be convened, and when a commission should be sent. I thought that If we knew this it would help a great deal in our informal consultations, and so on, before we have another meeting. Pie SECRETARY-GENERAL: Perhaps I may put that question to Ambassador Dayal, who is in touch with your opposite numbers, your own Ambassadors in Leopoldville, Ify own judgement would"be'—^ but tnis is very tentative, because I am Just as far from the place as you are -- that things are in fact moving 101 every day, and moving in the whole direction of some kind of cohesion. That is the predominant impression that I have. Under these circumstances, we have no reason to rush in and perhaps disturb the development. On the other hand, I think one should time it so that you are prepared to act the moment your own people and our people Jointly say, "It would now be very useful to have a possibility of crystallizing the situation with such a commission". That is the way I read what has come out so far. But I would like to submit this to our own people; they are in a much better position to formulate a considered reply. Mr> JHA (India): I would like to say, Sir, what I have been instructed by my Government to put before you and before this group, that of course it is very desirable that there should be as good an atmosphere as possible in the Congo. But nevertheless my Government feels that at.the earliest possible date a conciliation group, such as contemplated in the resolution, should go. They may not be able to. achieve very much in the first visit. It is going to be a long process. But the very fact that we go there, and come back with first- hand information, first-hand contacts and experience which will be available to this group and to the Members of the United Nations, will be extremely useful. I just wanted to put this point, because I was specifically instructed to mention this, that it would be a very good thing, in my Government's view, if some move could be made in that direction. The.SECRETARY-GENERAL: That may perhaps end our discussion of today and quite apart from the decision to call this group early some time next week, of course any one of you may. take the initiative, if you feel there is a need for it at an earlier date than we propose. The meeting rose at 12.10 a.m. §/ V^- ff COHFIDElfriAL '•' Beting No. T 21 October 1960 ENGLISH UNITED MOTIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE CONGO Meeting at United Nations Headquarters on Friday, 21 October 1960, at 8.30 p.m. The SECRfflARY-GENERAL* ladies and gentlemen, I think ve can excuse ourselves for beginning even if not everyone is here. To begin with, I should like to draw your attention to the paper which has been circulated and which includes the text of a cable from Mr. Kasavubu regarding new legislation, vhich is certainly of interest whatever importance ve may attach to this special measure* Before turning to what is the main subject of your discussion today — that is to say, the implementation of paragraph 3 of the General Assembly resolution of 20 September— I should like to give you one piece of information, The information can be,more complete in the next fev days, but what can be said now I should like to say now. This afternoon the Reuters Agency sent a cable from Brussels vhich I should like to read to you: "Belgium has rejected a demand by UN Secretary-General that all direct Belgian aid to the Congo should be discontinued and about 1,800 Belgian civilian technicians still working there be recalled, a Government source said here today. The source said the Belgian reply already had been sent to Hammarskjold but that its contents would not be published in Brussels. Hammarskjold's demand was contained in a letter sent to the Belgian Government last Saturday. The Secretary-General insisted that all technical assistance to the Congo should come through the UN, vhich also vould select the technicians to be sent there. "After a Cabinet meeting today the Foreign Minister, Pierre Wigny, read a communique to reporters containing vhat some observers interpreted as threatening a UN walkout. The communique said Hammarskjold's letter provoked the most painful surprise, both by its content and by certain of its expressions. It said that in the letter Belgium vas not treated11 — this is a quote -- "vith the respect vhich a sovereign State, a loyal founding Member of the United Nations, could expect," -. . "I.-"t . concludes- k ..-:...: X •.-..•. -.'.- ...• ... .' ;:• ' .. •."••• .' 'The Belgian Government considers that membership of the United Nations : can only be possible and useful inasmuch as their Member States and•*' ,•. ' in particular, Belgium, who has recently led the Congo towards independence, of her own will, are decently treated.1" Well, I have not received a reply. I have not been informed about the contents of this communique. I have no observations on the diplomatic procedure used. However, the note to which this communique refers reads as follows: (Continued in French) "The Secretary-General of the United Nations Organization presents his compliments to the Permanent Representative of Belgium before the United Nations and has the honour to declare that, with regard to the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 20 September 19^0 > and after a close examination of conditions existing at the present time in the Congo, he is more than ever convinced that it is absolutely essential that no technical or financial assistance should be supplied to any of the Congo authorities except through the United Nations. He therefore concludes that the unilateral assistance which the Belgian Government is continuing to supply to authorities both in Katanga and in South Kasai is not in accordance with the request of the General Assembly, particularly in paragraph 5 (a) of the resolution, and that in fact this asssstance impedes the restoration of a normal political situation in the Republic of the Congo. "Proceeding from this conclusion, the Secretary-General wishes to request the Belgian Government to withdraw all military, para-military or civilian personnel made available to authorities in the Congo and, henceforth, to follow the examples set by many other States, by having all assistance to the Congo or to Congolese authorities channelled through the United Nations. The Secretary-General is convinced that only the accession to this request will make it possible to avert the development of events in the Congo which might bring that country into a situation fraught with possible consequences of a world conflagration. "The Secretary-General wishes to inform the Belgian Government that it has addressed a coxonunication to Mr. Tshombe, which is appended to this declaration." I do not think there "is any need for 'any further concents froto nie/ except perhaps to say that thd interpretation of the resolution of 20 iseptetribe^ha!^' : ' never seemed to me to be in doubt, I should perhaps add, however, that there0' is a follow-up on this note verbale which ope 11s out in detail the character and extent of 'the various forms of continued assistance on a bilateral basis given *•»''•/ r\ • • '•''•;' f .',,':.'• -:-.-•• . • .' . - . -, ....-., , . . . • i . "'•.., »' ;' • . . i ; by Belgium to Katanga* I "have nothing against bilateral aid in itself/ but if f bilateral aid comes into the picture in a way which certainly increases the'' " " '' difficulties on our road to normalization, 1 feel that it is proper to draw tfo 'it the attention of thV Government concerned, ''" •>'?"t' After this piece of Information, I would like to turn to paragraph 3 of* the5 " same resolution on which this exchange has been built; concerning an advisory or rather I would* say a good ''off ices miss 1'bn to be established by this Advisor*;.'>y ; Committe"•, •.'.-.•'' "v e vfro ' ;>"••''m amon' ^3 :•••••••g it• s Africa•.••;''.:•'•'•'••'•n membe. r •' nation. • v s-i i-n. •consultatio • • ' ••...':• n • wit. .-n^ ."-•• '{••• the Secretary-General. We Have naturally iieeh in continued contact with ' ""'*'"'' Leopoldville, tnat is to say with Ambassador Ciiyal and 'his friends, the African3 '•'*' Ambassadors." 'The atest^ ^ °ccramuriication s three or f oii* di^ys old and Just repeats what 'I Have i already feld Vou ai>out ^evibW1 &efetn1gB,l'refer:ring''W'^a%' '"* he calls"1 I the rather unenthusias tic attitude" which is found with one single' x exception, and he adcts that aihcia i' tfaien/' since his earlier r'eport' "--'"'the ' ofae $6 which I referred last week -- views have developed in a negative direction. I have no reason to go into any detail; I think what I have said is enough to keep you au courant in your discussions with your opposite numbers in Leopoldville • At the last meeting I think there was general agreement that you would singly and jointly give some thought to this problem in order to see how we might proceed constructively, and, the matter being one where the initiative rests with the Committee, I would, without taking any more of your time, wish to invite you to present your views, your suggestions and perhaps your questions, Mr, HASAN (Pakistan) : Before we pass on the question now raised, may X ask one or two questions about your communication to the Belgian Government and their reply. You are objecting to their giving bilateral technical and financial assistance. As far as the technical assistance was concerned, it was quite open, you could observe it, and there it was. Did you have any information about financial assistance being given also, or was it only an assumption that it was being givent The SECRETARY-GENERAL: Half way between the two. From where do certain funds come! There was evidence which after all led to certain poesible conclusions. Mr, HASAN (Pakistan): The second question was this. I know that we have all said that no military assistance should be given bilaterally and that it ehoula pass only through the United Nations, but I cannot recall any resolution or any decision of ours forbidding any country from giving technical assistance bilaterally. Possibly there was some such decision, but I Just cannot remember that we have taken a decision on that* The SECEETARY-GE3MAL; The military aspect was covered in paragraph 6 of the resolution, but paragraph £ (a)talks about steps taken by governments which render more difficult a normalization of the situation. I do not want to go into any further criticism beyond what I have said, what I wanted to say to the Belgian Government in the note which I read, but if the seceding province is receiving financial and technical assistance bilaterally, I feel it is perfectly proper to raise it as an issue, as rendering a unification of the country more difficult* So the decision was in paragraph 5 a. 8 •-...., . - ...... ••. . ..• . „•..< ....,-. ••• . . .- ..- . ..- „.;.. • • .r. Mr i HASAN (P^ifltan): I Just wanted to know what the situation was. The SECRETARY-GENERAL; Generally, it is not cutting into technical assistance, although,I,do want to point put that in other cases, regarding the main part of the Congo, some of the major Powers have been so prudent as to channel everything thrpugh the United Nations. I can mention as an example the. , United, Spates,.which has refused to.go outside United Nations channels so as^tp avoid any political complication.... There is no law involved. The.matter has to be Judged in the light of .the effect. , In my view, the point of Judgement is that; the ^ilaterai, approach, in the specific forms which it took in the situation of a divided country, was harmful,to the efforts to normalize conditions. Mr. HASAN (Pakistan): In that case, would not the moral >e to take _ an unequivocal decision that technical assistance, also, should not be given bilaterally? ..... The SECRETARY-GENERAL; Youj-un ,into a very curious problem when you raise that as a matter of principle in a General Assembly decision.-- that is^ the question of the sovereignty of the Government concerned; that is the headache. . J -IV:-:'.". .,.,.".;. ,- .. - ' ', ^.' ..--.' . \.v .! .''...- . .'..' • f-i . _/,"'. ;. ".-,' .:' ' "....-.< "• \ • ' •'• .' '." T'. "» '.'-".I'..": :: . ,:, ' • .'.'.*."• .; Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): ^ Would I be cprrect in cpncluding from your . letter that any assistance, including technical assistance, apart from military assistance would have to be given to the Central Government? I got the Impression that the emphasis of your objection was on the point that the assistance was to Katanga. The SECRETARY-GENERAL; My reply would be this; We deal with Governments. Our technical assistance arrangements are with Governments. Any province in a country has to subordinate itself to the formulas, methods and procedures of the United Nations. Therefore I think that your conclusion is correct. To ask the provincial authorities to take assistance through the United Nations means in fact to force them to take technical assistance under the flag of the Central Government. That is the conclusion. The United Nations in this case means automatically the authorities in the country with which the United Nations deals. That is to say, it would force the Katanga authorities to deal with the United Nations through the centre. Then, of course, we have the other problem -- which should be a passing one, and is an abnormal one: I do not want to go into legal subtleties, but for the moment there is definitely nothing that functions with proper authority as a Government in Leopoldville in relation to Katanga; the bridges are cut. The main sense of this matter is; in the first instance, that it would cut the dependence of the Katanga authorities on Belgium. To bring it down to the simplest denominator, I would say that this is the first step in the direction of getting things, so to speak, in hand. I have already explained to this Committee the whole philosophy on Katanga. If we cannot achieve a certain result which has been established by the Security Council through military means at the disposal of the United Nations, then of course we have to choose political and diplomatic means. Among political and diplomatic means, of course, there is legitimately included, as I see it, the tidying up of a situation which will, as it were, avoid this curious kind of, let us say, competition between a specific extra-African Power and the United Nations — using the United Nations authority to say that it seems to us that if we are to get anywhere you have to deal with us; you simply have to deal with us. That would establish a basis on which we could more easily, perhaps, discuss what should be the next step towards real normalization. j .. 0.0 . • • '' ••"'.•''.''-. . • ; • i '. • ,•• — ,- In other words, you. are. rigfct, in your conclusion;, thi* would ultimately .-.. -:. under normal circumstances, mean that technical assistance would have to .go*. through tfce Central Government of the ^country. It does, in that acute., situation, mean that there, cannot l?e two policies as regards Katanga. , Mr. QEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia); I em glad to confirn my own opinion . :v on the matter, and that ie, whatever interpretation. may be placed ..-..- .: ;, on technical assistance, that is not military assistance. Whatever interpretation may bev placed on the emergency resolution^ I think we have to be quite clear that no one should ever attempt, to give any assistance whatsoever to any of the provinces, and that whatever assistance is given militarily to the ;Congo should ,v be- given -through the. United Nations . . , , .1 say specifically that there may be doubt on what the exact interpretation is regarding technical assistance, but not military. . But as regards military . assistance *> and I think that is what I gathered from, .your letter -» it is quite clear that it ,vould be illegal and against the seventy or more votes that have . . gone to adopt the resolution to give; any assletajnce to- -any: ^ other regions of ,the .Mr. JHA (India): I just want a little clarification. Is the Belgian; Government giving any kind of financial or other assistance bilaterally to the L; Central Government of the Congo or to any of the parties which allege that they are the Central Government? I would like to have an answer to that, and then I would like to make some comments . The SECRETARY -GENERAL: We have no evidence. We Just simply do not know. But my reply to Ambassador Hasan stands, that people in Leopoldville definitely have access to funds of vhich we do not know the origin. Mr. JHA (India); Then I think your communication to the Belgian Government concerning financial and other assistance — and, of course, military and paramilitary assistance which comes, as you have said, clearly under paragraph 6 — seems to have been very appropriate, because there is no instance 11 in the world in vhich a Government givee any kind of financial or economic assistance which aiust necessarily involve some agreement with a provincial authority; it is really unconstitutional. If I may say so, you are perfectly right in pointing out that the practice by Belgium of giving assistance to Katanga and Southern Kaeal is against paragraph 5 (a) of the resolution, because it certainly undermines the unity and territorial integrity of the Congo — it is only in that way that these parties which have started a secessionist movement and wish to leave the Congo can be sustained. I think that kind of assistance is not only prohibited by paragraph 5 (a), but it prohibited under all terms of international law and international relations. I should say that, instead of Belgium being painfully surprised, it is we who should be painfully surprised at their behaviour. I also feel sure that on this point you will get very strong support from the Assembly, and when the question of the Congo comes up — I am speaking very provisionally — it would be a wise thing to have a resolution which seeks to insulate Katanga or Kasai, or any other secessionist area from any other assistance of any kind from any Member of the United Nations. That is the only way in which the movement can be weakened, by which these States will come to realize that their only hope is to cast their lot with the Central Government of the Congo and with the whole of the Congo as the unit making for territorial unity and integrity of the Congo. /:Mr. BBMASOUD {Morocco?) (interpretation from French):, I should, lite .*ta. express my thanks to you,; sir, -for having read to .us the letter sent to- the. :.". Belgian. Government. As far as my delegation is 'concerned, this letter has a-. • -, double \signtficance. In the first place, it takes one of the two great -points; of the present orisis> ,tbe second being, "toe secessionist movement. , , .". The first cause is the intervention of a foreign Power in an independent nation, perhaps over the head of the Central Government, "but in any case, over the head of the United Nations. The second significance of the letter is that it proves the concern of the Members of the United Nations about the irrefutable existence of the intervention of a foreign Power --in this case, Belgium -- the continuance of which continues to poison the atmosphere, and to follow this is to make us forget the cause and to divert us from the thought of an internal crisis. For these two reasons the letter which you have read is very significant; indeed, it does confirm the favourable impression which we have had of your policy in the course of our first two meetings in which, with your enlightened assistance, you have permitted the African States to exchange their views with you when the Central Government first requested technical assistance and then military assistance, under the signatures of the President of the Republic and the Head of the Government. Thus, as far as we are concerned, the existence of such a letter is not only a lucid and courageous action, but is an element which Justifies the confidence which we have in you. This is the reason why, at our last meeting, I asked you whether the meeting to be held today was to be understood --as you later confirmed -- as a follow-up of the discussion which we had at the last meeting. My delegation wished to know the conclusions which we might draw from the previous meetings and from today's meeting in order that we might work quickly. As I have said before, before the last meeting of the Security Council we were afraid that the United Nations would be attacked from the outeide because of having allowed, through a diplomatic and passive attitude, the situation to reach a really dangerous stage; and indeed, Mr. Secretary-General, no one can take this global and intuitive view of the Congolese crisis. There vaa a state of independence which, through the machinations of Belgium, could only be a pseudo independence, and the Congolese did not wish to be the object of mockery. They revolted, and after the revolt there was intervention by armed forces, followed by the secessionist movement. The financial situation, of which little was said, was disastrous and is still disastrous. Therefore, we may ask ourselves whether there was ever any currency at all in the Congo. Then ve saw that an internal crisis had taken place, and^ tola internal crisis was so present in our minds that ve forgot the central problem,- the. problem--of • the illegal Belgian Intervention and the existence 'of these secessionist / . U movements in Katanga, Kasai and so on. A little later ve saw that .the : •.•••:: .;.:. Government split in two, with the isolation of the Head of the Government as . • 'a-result.- Tohcabe, in the unanimous opinion of those who are for Kasavubit; or LtimuoibB or against them as the case may be, is a person who does not inspire • confidence.: He has freedom of movement, and" hie words are taken very fieri cue ly, so that we see, with'-tnis-'bird-'s eye view,, that ve might indeed forget the ; ..« • importance of the matters of details . ; . • . • , . : v,;:;!: We vere anxious to come here today, and your letter was indeed a very good beginning for this meeting, and ve should like to express our congratulations to you. It is in this epirit and in this way that we hope we can get out of the rut in which the Security Council, the United Nations and this Committee find themselves. Thus we consider your action, Mr. Secretary-General, as the beginning and a happy triggering-off of developments towards a denouement of the crisis, because the two problems which form the heart of this matter are the Intervention of a foreiga Power and the secessionist movements encouraged by this foreign Power. Thus, the problem before us today is paragraph 3 of the resolution. I believe that we may, with your permission, Sir, perhaps Immediately begin discussion of the outlines of this problem and express our opinions. Before doing so, I should like to have your opinion on the subject and, if my colleagues wish, to start a discussion on this, and according to your answer I should like to take the floor again. The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I have nothing to say In reply to your specific question at the present stage* I had hoped and I hope that the views will develop in the group and that I may perhaps give whatever advice I can give in reaction to your views rather than take any lead on this matter which is so very much a question for you* If I may permit myself to say one word, it is by way of clarification* You will remember what I said last time regarding the line we in the Secretariat and I personally have been pursuing regarding Katanga all through, aiming at unity, aiming at overcoming the special problem, but having to choose, for reasons which are well known, diplomatic and political means* ,16 Having'to choose such means, of course; is & question of finding the fi^rt * '"'•'"• means, and, even more, of finding the right timing. '- : " ; '^ *.,••>"• • "'• 'This letter to which you refer, and which I read, is, sb to say, entirely iir tine with the policy which has been pursued the whole time. In fact, I ' •-: referred to It in our last meeting, I could do co because the letter is, in ,fact^ 'irom my point of view, a fortnight old. It could "be transmitted to v" "' Mri'tshombe only last Saturday because I felt that there was a* need to transmit ' the corresponding letter to him by personal messenger, and this personal messenger was not available and could not go until last Saturday* * ' This much about the calendar. But, Mr. Benabcud, Ambassador Loutfi ?.sked : for the floor, and'before going back to you, perhaps we might permit your' ' ' colleague* ^o say what he has to say. • Mr» LOUTFt (United Arab Republic) (interpretation from Pre'nch): Mr. 'Secretary-General, according''t6 the steps you undertook vis^a-^riB the Belgian Government, regarding financial arid technical" assistance I think i&iat the Committee cannot but give you its unanimous support* I think we can debate the matter later, when an official reply from the Belgian Government has been received. Now, before proceeding to the question of the good offices committtee or the conciliation committee, I think that if you could provide some information on what took place regarding the whole, matter of the convocation of the parliament, this would be most helpful, The SECRETARY-GENERAL\ As is everything in the CDnga, sir, information is a bit confused, so I. would say that in this case I find it difficult to give any precise information. The total picture is one •- in fact, all this week — on the whole of continued interest, and a standstill as regards any practical action on the constitutional issue.. But I might perhaps at this stage, with your permission, Mr. Loutfi, ask Mr. Wiaechoff, if Le is prepared to io so, to £&y where we are on the political situation generally. 17-20 Mr» WIU3CHCOF: Members of the Committee, as the Secretary-General ha* said, there Is very little to report beyond what was said here last week in regard to the over-all constitutional titUfttlOBu Regarding the specific question which was addressed *,o the Secretary-General "by Ambassador Loutfi, I, of course, would have to refer to this decree, or this so-called decree, which was distributed to the Members Just before the meeting, in which Article 2 states that the Chamber*, the Legislative Chambers, have been adjourned. I may perhaps in this connexion draw attention to the fact that this whole decree does, in fact, make no pretense at constitutionality under the Loi Fondamentale, At the same time, as I Just said, in Article 2 it does refer to the fact that until the mission of the Council of Commissioners is completed whenever that may be — the Legislative Chambers are adjourned*. Of course, I presume everyone now has the Loi Fondamentalet Article 7° of 'fcne Loi Fondamentale, as it is pointed out, very definitely limits the authority of the Chief of State to adjourn the Chambers for one month during the period of one session, and this very same Article states that such adjournment cannot be renewed during the same session without the consent of the Chambers» 521 Sa if, in fact, the Loi yondamentale were to be Invoked there would'be a, certain difficulty with fegard to1 this decree. • .. . ^ .. With- regard to some other aspects of the political' situation in the Congo b it may be reported, as perhaps is quite clear to most members from dispatches in the newspapers, that there has been a general deterioration of law and order in the area of Leopoldville, resulting, as Mr. Dayal states, ; "from the complete indiscipline of the ANC, which has been carrying out ; ' arbitrary arrests, illegal deportations, imprisonment under harsh conditions,1 arbitrary preventions of the movement of political and other figures, • looting and robbery and rape". • In addition, he reports that various youth organizations are carrying on their lawless actlviHties against each other. . It may be noted in this connexion that Mr. Dayal, as well as some of his associates, have in the-course of the last few days held several conversations with those somewhat responsible who are involved in the deterioration, and that now, in- co-operation -with some of the1 local Leopoldvllle authorities, a system has beeii devised whereby join^-gatrbls of Congolese strid United Nations soldiers : ' have extended their patrols throughout the city,- and It "Is hoped that thereby the-general deterioration; may be stopped* - - • ••-'•' • j It has been -cUstomaiy here to refer at least' briefiy-t:o t^e situation in1-the Provinces. A general review would seem'to indicate that there is ho improvement in the conditions of the various provinces, as has been reported here in the pact* Perhaps,-in this connexion, it might be noted, however, that some negotiations have taken place with regard to establishing in the northern Katanga area a truce* This appears to be in effect. There have been some recent reports in the Press that Mr, Tshombe has violently complained about the ineiffective.nesfi of the truce or has accused United Nations forces of having assisted in violating this truce. We thus far have no information of any sort which would justify the correctness of Mr. Tshombe^ public pronouncements. With regard to the parliamentary situation, there does not seem to be any new movement. I refer to the fact that, of course, this new decree of Mr. Kasavubu seems to indicate that some of those now in a position of authority would seem 22 to oppose a parliamentary meeting, and while, here and there, discussions are being held in order to get a parliament going, the prospects, so it appears from the information which we are getting> for an early meeting of parliament are certainly not bright — not to put it at the lowest denominator. The SECRETARY-GENERAL; Parliament, that is of course, under the conditions which we mentioned last time -- full parliament under conditions of security. This was an interlude in your intervention, Ambassador Loutfi. Have you anything more to add? Mr. LOUTFI (United Arab Republic) : No, this is very important. The SECRETARY -GENERAL i I am glad you provoked it. Mr* LOUIFI (United Arab Republic) (interpretation from French): I am sorry, because I hoped last time that we would be able to have a meeting which was most important, because we must assist the legal authority of this nation to function. That is really the problem, but I do not know what we can do« I have not read the Loi Fondamentale, but I have grave doubts whether this new decree is countersigned because there are no Ministers. The SECRETARY-GEKERAL; I think that it could be held that it is anti-constitutional» Mr. LOUPFI (United Arab Republic): Yes. The HECREIARY«CENERAJS.t 'Mr. Benaboud, you wanted to continue, and you threw a question to me to which I did'not reply* '• r ' •" ' ' Mr. BENABOUD (Morocco) (interpretation from French); Thank you, Mr. Secretary-General, I wbuld like to proceed. ' - . ''•' : I think what is at issue now is to find some remedy to the situation." Before going into the substance of the matter, I would like to voice a reservatiori, for which I must crave your indulgence, • It should be clearly understood that our actions are aimed at achieving the following objective. In Africa and elsewhere,no evil precedent, such as that' of the Congo, should recur, because a foreign Power, desiring to mock the newly found independence of the Congo, wishes to see that its manoeuvres bear fruit* This is our goal, generally. It is inspired by Justice and nothing else. It is in this sense and in this spirit that we want to speak in a very disinterested and dispassionate way and remain quiiie aloof from the personalities and the existing circumstances." Dhat is why you 'noted our own spontaneous reaction, l4r^ Secretary-General, to the letter which you have Just1 read oxrt. It is only-' one"part of the mosaic; it is only one part of the whole"picture involving foreign intervention. ••'.•-•- • • ..-,-,. .- ... ., • •• ... ._•... ,.- . ... ,;.; I think that this is the point at which foreign"intervention will be halted^ It will not halt intervention entirely, but it is a beginning. I think, therefore, that we should, in approaching the matter, remain detached from personalities and special circumstances. Interventionist action took place, governed by an evil design, making a mockery of the independence of a newly independent State, What is necessary, therefore, is to normalize the situation. In the event that you cannot take the vigorous steps which my delegation requested at the last meeting of the Security Council, when we asked that a vigorous stand be taken -- as vigorous as the stand of the United Nations taken in the Suez Canal crisis -- we have already declared that we always have confidence in diplomatic and political methods, provided they are carried out speedily — and if the letter which you read out had been despatched earlier, and if this vigorous stand had been taken earlier, I think that the situation 2^-25 vould be a little less confused than it is today. In any case, ve would still count ourselves as being satisfied* We must make efforts to conciliate. But this does not mean that we simply must patch up matters. To conciliate means to return to a normal constitutional and legal situation. What we must not do is patch up the situation; we must normalize it* A normal situation would be characterized by the existence of fundamental law, a constitution, a government and a parliament — the concept or idea of territorial unity and the self-determination of the Congolese people. As we see it, these are the facets of a normal situation. In order to normalize the situation, we should agree to the idea of a conciliation commission, as requested in paragraph 3; provided, however, that some directives are adopted here so that we will not once again have a very vague and shaky starting point. The conciliation committee, once established with a given membership, should know exactly where it is heading. We must return to normalcy. There was a Government, That Government must reappear on the scene, Conciliation must take place between those members who have been the .protagonists in a criois which ban almost led uo to forget the diaeeae. The symptom must disappear — that is, the lack of a government, illegality, unconstitutionality, as you yourself have just pointed out. 26 There must be a return to normalcy* All those who suggest as a first point that there should be a reconciliation between Kasavubu, Lumumba etc. -- X, Y, 2 as we might term them -- will get the support of my delegation. But before we • proceed to tackle the problem of a parliament9 certain members^ of which are in prison, other members of which are being, subject to pressures and others still are in hiding, there is another very normal step which would be far better, and that is to take up the question of the Government. There have always been complaints that in the Congo there was no executive. All the more reason, then, to return to an executive which will properly understand its duties, not an executive made up of militants who are never to be found in their offices. That is point number one. For my second point, I would support the suggestion of Mr, Loutfi, that the parliament should be convened. That would be the second step, but in the third step we should grapple with the second aspect of the crisis. The first element of the crisis is foreign intervention wherever it comes from, and the second element in the crisis is territorial unity. Even if the parliament and the government are allowed to lie fallow for a certain time, if vigorous action is taken for a return to territorial unity and the withdrawal of all foreign intervention, then I think that the atmosphere would be normalized and individuals will no longer have an opportunity to attack one another. We should be scientific about the causes and their ensuing effects; we should not be obsessed with effects and forget the underlying causes. Then, in the fourth place, we must allow the Congolese people self-determination. Either there must be new elections or there must be a strengthening of the existing situation which arose following upon some conciliation. But if, as I say, we are to become obsessed with the effects and forget the causes, if we are simply to patch things up and take partial measures, then we shall be operating in a vacuum, running around in circles, and the confusion will deepen and the crisis, which today has been circumscribed from the international point of view, may well spread with all the dangers implicit therein. 27 In my statement earlier today I referred to the financial aspect of the situation, which is truly disastrous. The Belgians have left the country in a state of intellectual and financial destitution, and the Belgians are responsible for this. Now intellectual destitution can be remedied far more easily than complete chaos and disorder in the financial sphere. To euip;up, the Belgian Government acted with premeditation* Its action must npt >e allowed to be crowned with success. No precedent must be set for . further events.; of this type in the Congo or eloewbere in,.Africa or in the - world. The; responsibility assumed by the .United Nations mus,t be implemented .; very promptly to normalize the situation, to return to conditions based on - .; solid foundations rather than on shaky ones, so that/those conditions may; last* Mr* JAJA WACHUKU (Nigeria): I should like to say a few words about this all-important matter. First, I should like to state my delegation1* attitude towards the question. As is already well known to members of this Committee and to Members of the United Nations, the attitude of the Federation of Nigeria is that under no conditions can we recognize any secessionist government in the Congo. The Congo was given independence as a unit. We can recognize no government except the Central Government of the Congo. The Constitution provides for provincial legislatures, but not for any government other than the Central Government. The provisions of the Constitution, or the loi fondamentale, must be respected. Therefore, in our view, the United Nations is quite right in standing firm on its position that it will recognise no other government than the Central Government of the Congo, even though it is not quite clear what it is or where it is now. Having made that clear, I should now like to touch on the question of technical and financial assistance. We support the stand that no assistance of any kind, whether direct or indirect — and I shall explain in a moment what I mean by "direct or indirect" — should be given by any Member State bilaterally to either the Central Government or a provincial government. All assiotance — technical, financial, military or any other — should come through the United Nations. That is the only way we can stifle certain forces that would like to encourage trouble in the Congo. If no resolution has as yet been adopted to that effect, I think that either the Security Council or the General Assembly should be made to adopt such a resolution so that every State Member of the United Nations will assume the obligation not to give any assistance of any kind, direct or indirect, except through the United Nations. 29 I shall now explain what I mean by the words "direct or indirect". A nation nay say, "Oh, yes, we agree not to give assistance", but then transfer funds to its businessmen there, who will indirectly pass them to others* That is indirect assistance and will make the whole thing futile. Let us Just look at the borders of the Congo* We see Uganda, the Sudan, Tanganyika, Angola and Ruanda-Urundi, which is a Trust Territory. The United Nations must also take steps to make sure that nothing comes through those sources bordering on the Congo« 30 I knov that would be a great task; but if a thing ia worth doing, it is worth doing well.; If we adopt that attitude, then nobody will go to the Congo and say, "We are trying to give technical assistance", when in fact they are* giving military assistance;or nobody vould say,ttWe want to assist them financially" and then give them something else. • . With regard to intervention, I think intervention in the Congo is not a matter purely from the great Powers; it includes the smaller Powers and the African nations also, not only non-African nations. All African States must give an undertaking that they will not, directly or indirectly, give any assistance to the Congo except through the United Nations. I think that is very important. It has been said that the Congo is an African problem and it requires Africans to solve the problem, I think it would be necessary that every African State should give that undertaking. If we do not give that undertaking, then there is something very wrong. I can say here, in no equivocal manner, that my ovn country is prepared not to do anything or give any assistance of any kind to the Congo except through the United Nations. That being the case, in my opinion it is necessary that the United Nations should use the resources it has now in the Congo, even the force it has there, to make sure that the army is not used for the purpose of intervening in order to put one person or one party into power. But the army there can serve as a police force, to make sure that if this policy is accepted, it is not only a matter of theory but also fact. Only by doing that can we arrive at a solution in the Congo. I think the army that has been put there by the various nations should be utilized to make sure that what is agreed upon is carried out by all concerned. That brings us to the question of conciliation. As the Prime Minister of my country said when he came here to address the United Nations, we are keen and anxious that we should Know the truth about what is happening in the Congo; we cannot find a solution or remedy unless we know the facts and the truth of the position. Therefore, whether some people are antagonistic about it now, or not, I think it is imperative that if things are not going to be allowed to become completely chaotic the United Nations should send out a body of persons directly to the Congo to investigate and find out the position, and try to bring all who are concerned in this great tragedy to see reason, to 0ee that it is necessary for then to get together and help the United Nations, in order to help themselves* In that particular respect, again, ve should not allow whatever law exists there now to break down completely. Whether we accept the loi fondamentale or not, I regard it as a provisional constitution and not the final constitution of the Congo. 32 There ore two institution* that are still, I think, valid at least: the office of the Head of State and the existence of Parliament. The United Nations cannot abolish the Parliament that has already been elected. It is there; whether it is in hiding or in prison^ it is there. We cannot tell the Congolese people ' to get rid of their Parliament. That being the case, I think it is very necessary that the United Nations should use its good offices to make sure that all elected Members of Parliament, whether they are Senators or Members of the Assembly, should be made to assemble, because they are the only legitimate representatives of the people of the Congo whom we know now. We cannot impose anything on anybody from outside, -but they themselves can speak for their people, and if' there are some of them who have been seized and imprisoned, the weight of world opinion through the United Nations should be brought to bear to have all of them released. Every one must be released, and the army which you have there should be used to make sure that nobody is intimidated. Surely if it is possible for them to meet and to take a decision, free from any intimidation or fear of anybody, 'this body should be able to recognize whatever decision they take as the decision of the elected representatives of the people of the Congo. We are not interested in any person; iny own delegation is not interested in any person. All we know is that there la chaos in the Congo, and we will not support putting forth through this United Nations any individual for acceptance at this stage, because I do not think that any particular person would be accepted by anyone without friction one way or the other. But if all concerned really think of the Congo and not of themselves, and if it is the desire -- service politics are not power politics, in our opinion — to help the Congo, then the assembly, when it meets, should be allowed to take a decision. Whoever is called upon to form the Government of the Congo, should be recognized as head of the Government. it would be simply preposterous to suggest to this Committee that what has been going on in the Congo all this time has meant no change in the present position. Our attitude is to recognize facts and try to find a solution based on the facts as we know them now. And, therefore, as I said, we should have as our starting point the Head of the State who, I think, still has power to summon the assembly under the provisional constitution; and then vben the aaeasily is summoned, the United Nations should use its good offices to make sure that it is not a question of summoning a section. Everybody must be summoned to attend this one because it is a very fundamental act on the part of all elected people. The United Nations cannot go to the Congo and pick people for the good of the Congo; they have already picked their men, except the dead ones; whether they are crippled, in hospital, in sick beds, they should be brought out to express their views, and once they have expressed their views we should use them. Whatever government is set up should be the government for the purpose of whatever assistance the United Nations wants to give to the people of the Congo. I think that the independent African States, of all the Member nations, should think of the people of the Congo and the people of the Congo alone, not the individuals concerned in this game. And the future of that State should be of more primary concern to us than any particular individual. As an eminent British politician said, we politicians are butterflies. We are short-lived, but the Congo nation will survive after everybody is dead and gone. Power seeking should not be the basis of our action here, but service to the people of the Congo, and service to Africa, and to the world. We want to have world peace* We should not encourage anything that is likely to set off a war in the Congo. There are m?.ny contradictions in thifl provisional constitution, as is quite obvious. One section gives power to do a certain thing, and another section gives power not to do it. Another section gives power but says it must be supported by another. In other words, the constitution lias been drawn up in a hurry. Once the body is set up, it is necessary that arrangements be made, so that, with the assistance of the United Nations end men of good-will, they may be helped to draw up a better constitution than taey have now. Once whatever body is set up appreciates that it is there to form a kind of bridgehead and it is not the final authority, they could then assist them to draw up a better constitution than they have at the moment, without necessarily any interference, with whatever advice they may get through the United Nations, to frame a constitution in the light of other peoples1 experience, e, constitution that will make for stability and give scope to the diverse opinions that they have in the Congo, I think I am right -- and if I am wrong I should be corrected -- and I understand that when the election took place no single power had an over-all majority. It was because no single power had an over-all majority that it was not possible for one political party to form a government, and so they had to form a coalition government. Once you "nave such, it is quite clear that there must be diverse opinions, and it should be in the interests of the peace and prosperity of the Congo that those diverse opinions should be given the opportunity to express themselves, so that they may be canalized and form something that will be acceptable to the people of the Congo. That is the way our minds are working in this particular instance.- I believe that, if we adopt a measure along this line, I do not say we will find the solution but I think we will be contributing to something. Then, instead of allowing the position to deteriorate as it is doing now, we may be able to arrest the chaotic position that is developing. I would like whatever step that is decided upon to be taken as quickly as possible. Therefore, the sooner this conciliatory body is set up the better. The United Nations should not depend purely on paper correspondence and telegraphic communications. I think it is necessary that human beings should go to this place, delegated to see the position as it is, with sufficient authority to take action on the spot, to try to get the people together in order to see that this Job is done quickly. The Congo, is. a huge territory -- it ie bigger than my own country in'- ' size -- and, if a chain reaction is allowed to set in there, I am afraid it will not stop in the Congo. I think it will go beyond the boundaries of the Congo* I am not a Sudanese, but I think Sudan is very clone to the danger point there. It will not be in the interests of other people to allow that to happen. So I honestly and sincerely hope that the Members of this Committee will agree, in spite of whatever reticence there may be, whatever the ambassadors may think, whether they are keen on the question of a conciliatory body or not. I personally feel that, while we have the ambassadors of various States, we need ambassadors of the United Nations to go to the Congo in order to bring whatever assistance they may bring and a succour to the people of Congo. These are my views, and this is how I and my delegation •WjAct of this problem at the moment. Mr. LOUTFI (United Arab Republic) (interpretation from French)? I em sorry I have to take the floor a second time, but since we are here today, and since the news concerning the convening of a parliament is not good, we must ponder over the question of implementing paragraph 3 of the resolution of 21 September I960, As you note, paragraph 3 "Appeals to all Congolese within the Republic of the Congo to seek a speedy solution by peaceful means of all their internal conflicts for the unity and integrity of the Congo, with the assistance, as appropriate, of Asian and African representatives appointed by the Advisory Committee on the Congo, in consultation with the Secretary-General, for the purpose of conciliation;0. (A/RES/l*^ (ES-IV), p.2) I should like to make a simple suggestion concerning the implementation of this paragraph. It seems to me that we may entrust this task to the representatives of the States Members in this Committee; that is, those that are in Leopoldville through their diplomatic missions. Other States Members of this Committee which axe not diplomatically represented in Leopoldville, who should like to Join this conciliation committee, might also be able to do this. I think that the States who wish to be represented on this conciliation committee might inform the Secretary-General in the course of the week. No one is forced to do this. All those who have diplomatic representatives there may inform the Secretary-General that they wish to be port of this Ccnmittee. States which have no diplomatic representatives may also Inform the Secretary-General that they wish to be represented thereon. As far as I am concerned, the primary • task .of .the committee would tje to.., t. • work 8,0 as to obtain the convening of the Parliament of the. Congolese Republic• It is a simple suggestion, tut I would like to know opinions on the.. matter, .- • -. • .• . • • -•/'..-...... -..-. Mr, OBEID (Sudan): The Minister.; of Nigeria has mentioned that the United.Nations should try to stop any kind of aid,-whether technical or financial, coning through the borders through agents* Mentioned among the countries wh£cfct. he singled out of those who have common boundaries with the Congo was my country,. I wish to assure the Minister from Nigeria that my country, which has, all through this business, from the outset of the funnelling of assistance, whether technical, military or otherwise) been doing so through the United. Nations., will, not fail to see that such assistance as will definitely impede, our work will.,,. . not go through its borders. I wouldr like very much if the Minister,of Nigeria .... has any information of that kind, that he..pass .it pn ;to me,, as my Government < -.- would be delighted to h,aye tha^ information, so t^iat it may do something to stop it. Kiat la my first point. . . „ ... ,,.-.,...• .. ... , The second point, to which .Ambassador I^Dutfi made,mention, I am. afraid that , ::.-/':« ••.'.•'-. - •<-.'. •'• " •' . '••'. .:••.? fv-' <('••'•','''-.'•' '•*-• ••• '•' . • '• '•••'•' .'••'••> :•••' my Government's opinion in that may be a^bit different. The cpnciiUatlpn , committee, in the opinion of my Government^l( should., not be from ambassadors who are there, because that means the ambassadors who reason or anotherl , fallen : into things which.migh s t put them in the eyes of the. ,1 , , ]t-'^ *'. •_ ; ••• .i .,••;•'•,. • .-•; ' ..'; •,<.'.". V^ , : ,' >.'.' ' I -' ^v ' '• • ' '".':. • - .• - 'Ji -.'. -t. conflicting parties in the Congp, as undesirables. Qfoe other point whiph my Government gives consideration,is /that the ., . .fi. , concilation committee which is to be appointed should, be.agreeable to the : v-.':;.!.••'. .-..-•,.:.•.' . • • •.'.•.•'. .>••••: •-..-;.•• -j-.v- •:..••',.•..• ..:-. r »-<..,•.-..•.... :-.-.. «•% •• •:<'+: :•.-. conflicting parties in the Congo...... ;-. •'.'.•..:•/•(. -.-.,.• .•.•'.:;.-:•'• : • ••.:•,-. •. ..'-. .. .';•... -A'--1. ...'...-' ; »,.•-.•...:.-••• ,-' Shese er,e the views of my.Government.in this respe^t^ .an4 .I.wpul^i ^ike-very much ^hat the Committee take them, into consideration.. lt _., ... .,„,*.,,:, f...- *,. , , ... . Mr. JAJA WACHUKU (Nigeria): I should like to make Just one point in reply* I wish to make it clear that I have no facts and that I was not forgone moment suggesting that the Sudanese people or its Government were guilty .of .. , anything. All that I did was to take cognizance of the geographical-situation , of the various. State boundaries that do exist there and the possibilities that may flow from such boundaries. , ...-.-.. Mr> CABA. (Guinea) (interpretation from French): I should like.to ... speak on the proposal made by Mr. Jaja Wachuku and to .tell him that it would be a vaete of time. . Wa have "boen confronted by a crisis in the Congo for a long time and we do not at this moment know by which rapid means we may bring about the convening of Parliament. A clarification is necessary. Who is to convene this Parliament? If we refer to the Loi fondamentale it is stated, in article £0,. that it is the head of the State who has the .right to convene the Chambers in extraordinary emergency sessions. The expos^ of Mr. Wieschhoff stated that the head of State, does not wish to convene the Parliament. T'ais explains his attitude in the document distributed today in article 2 of the constitutional decree law,of 11 October. But vhat does happen if the head of State does not wish to convene Parliament? Who must act in his place? It is stated in article 33 that if the head of State finds it impossible to assume his functions the Prime Minister, after consultation with the Council of Ministers, shall convene the .Chambers ,.. as rapidly as. possible, and at least within., thirty days. It-is, hqwever, the representative character of this Prime Minister and his Ministers which ^.is. challenged/ and at the last meeting it was stated that the presence of^Mpbuto ... was illegal and had no constitutional basis. The same applies, to the Ileo ... ,. Government, which exists on paper. . ; , . . - Will the United Nations assume the responsibility of convening the Parliament? I do not think so. But if we study this law closely article 4U states that if there is a motion which challenges the Government and the Government abandons power, the Prime Minister then resigns and the question arises which constitutional body assumes power* The current charge of affairs is taken by whom? Article U2 states that until a new Government is ettabltthed matters on hand are dealt with by the Government which has resigned. We can valldly rely upon Article Mf to call upon the Government, which we are told has resigned, so that we, together, might convene the Parliament* This will be possible only if we have a conciliation committee at work. In the opinion of my Government, it would be desirable that this committee be chosen here, within the present Committee, and not outside of it. The conciliation committee should be composed of African and Asian States, which is referred to in paragrpah 3 of the resolution, in order to avoid offending anyone. So as to ensure that our consultative Advisory Committee will remain homogeneous and cohesive, it would be desirable that all the countries of Asia and Africa which have sent troops into the Congo and which have extended assistance through the United Nations to the Congo be part of this conciliation committee. This will result in a speedy solution of the situation. We will thereby have a committee which will go to the Congo in order to make contact with those persons who are now involved in disputes. We can determine, by referring to Article Mf, whether it is possible to convene the Parliament. But we should not reduce the conciliation committee, because it will offend someone* This might result in compromise, thereby undermining our future work. There are fifteen Afro-Asian countries who have troops in the Congo* It would be unfortunate if one of those countries was excluded, a country which desires to restore law and order there* Once this conciliation committee has been appointed by this Committee, it must immediately go to the Congo. This would be, indeed, a most resounding event; and I am certain that those statesmen who are opposed to this, will take into account the presence of the committee and will favour its work, Therefore, a speedy solution will be found. This is the only solution upon which we may rely and which may get us out of this impasse. This is a proposal, and it is the only one which is wise in the opinion of my delegation. Mr. BENABOUD (Morocco) (interpretation from French): Mr, Secretary- General, I had not anticipated that the delegate of Guinea would speak when I asked for the floor* What I said was that there should be an executive, so that the normal development of political activity in the Congo might be carried out in as orderly a fashion as possible. One could easily make a thorough-going analysis, demonstrating that if what is sought is a return to normalcy, it is essential to have, first of all, an executive which can more easily be led because it is not as cumbersome as an assembly consisting of over 100 members — for, after all, an executive should work speedily. It is therefore essential that there should be such an executive, for otherwise I do not see how we can undertake any official action as soon as possible. The United Nations cannot try to fill the gap left by the Central Government. An example has been given by you, sir, that the United Nations should not intervene in the domestic affairs of the country. However, failing the suggestion I have made we shall simply have to take stop-gap measures to try to patch up the situation as best we can. The conciliation committee represents the wishes of the United Nations; it is disinterested because of its very nature, its membership must bs homogeneous and complete. The country in question has a very extensive territory; the task of the committee will be very burdensome and the members of the committee, as human beings, may after all be subject to disease, fatigue, or may even be recalled by their Governments. Therefore, this committee must not be too small. On the other hand, it must not go to the opposite extreme and be too large. The Advisory Committee has heard various suggestions which are rather veil taken. They are all somewhat similar, even if they appear to be different. First we are agreed that States should select their representatives either from among their representatives in this Committee, or from their representatives in the capitals, or from among their officials who are acquainted with matters in the territory in question and who, through their tact and skill, have succeeded in winning the sympathy of most of the Congolese responsible for the conduct of affairs. What we are appointing, therefore, is rather nations and states and not individuals. The representative of the United Arab Republic and the representative of Guinea actually have views which are quite close to one another. From our point of view; the States mentioned in paragraph 3 of the resolution should clearly be represented. Their nucber is not excessive; any smaller number might lead to some paralysis of the work of the body in question. There is another point on which I think unanimity migfrt be secured forthwith, and that is that the countries which wish to render service and which feel that they are able to do so can come to the fore right now and volunteer for membership of this conciliation body. Those of us who are represented there have already started some conciliatory activities and have acquired some experience which can certainly be productive whatever present differences of opinion may be* Opinions change. It Is therefor* essential that there should be such an executive, for otherwise I do not see how we can undertake any official action as soon as i , .••••' possible. The United Nations cannot try to fill the gap left by the Central Government. An example has been given by you, sir, that the United Nations should not intervene in the domestic affairs of the country. However, failing the suggestion I have made we shall simply have to take stop-gap measures to try to patch up the situation as best we can. The conciliation committee represents the wishes of the United Nations; it is disinterested because of its very nature, its membership must be homogeneous and complete. The country in question has a very extensive territory; the task of the committee will be very burdensome and the members of the ccoanittee, as human beings, may after »?T be subject to disease, fatigue, or may even be recalled by their Governments. Therefore, this committee must not be too small. On the other hand, it must not go to the opposite extreme and be too large. The Advisory Committee has heard various suggestions which are rather veil taken. They are all somewhat similar, even if they appear to be different. First we are agreed that States should select their representatives either from among their representatives in this Committee, or from their representatives in the capitals, or from among their officials who are acquainted with matters in the territory in question and who, through their tact and skill, have succeeded in winning the sympathy of most of the Congolese responsible for the conduct of affairs. What we are appointing, therefore, is rather nations and states and not individuals. The representative of the United Arab Republic and the representative of Guinea actually have views which are quite close to one another. From our point of view; the States mentioned in paragraph 3 of the resolution should clearly be represented. Their number is not excessive; any smaller number might lead to some paralysis of the work of the body in question. There is another point on which I think unanimity might be secured forthwith, and that is that the countries which wish to render service and which feel that they are able to do so can come to the fore right now and volunteer for membership of this conciliation body. Those of us who are represented there have already started some conciliatory activities and have acquired some experience which can certainly be productive whatever present differences of opinion may be. Opinions change* The body in question should be acceptable to the Congolese. The Congolese population, 'after ell, is varied; some elements of the population are at times in conflict with others. We must remember that the committee should enlist the sympathy of the responsible authorities in the Congo without going so far as to paralyse the activity of the conciliation committee. If you try to please those to your right and those to your left, you vill ' . i . .(. have to be a genius. We should not set up a committee of such a nature that its very activity will be paralyzed. To sum up, I would say that the membership of the committee should be an average membership. States should appoint their representatives and those States should themselves be appointed to membership of the committee. All States which have contributed contingents to the United Nations forces are entitled to be represented on the committee, if they wish to be represented. We can only be thankful to them for the service they wish to render to this cause. Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): Once again I should like to thank you very much, Mr. Secretary-General, for the letter you sent to the Government of Belgium. I repeat this because we really do attach a great deal of importance to this question. No matter what happens, one thing about which we feel very strongly is the unity of the Congo. On that there must be absolutely no compromise, and for a number of reasons. This is a country in the centre of Africa, and it is essential that it should be strong. I think that basically strength comes from the richness of its diverse regions. Thus, on that point we have very strong views. Now, we have hesitated a great deal about giving our definite views on what should be done about this question, because we are rather reluctant to become involved in any way in the internal politics of the Congo. Ideally we should be happy to support any solution arrived at by the Congolese themselves. I think that that attitude stems from the fact that no matter what has happened internally in Ethiopia we have always been one whenever it has been a question of facing the outsj.de world. I can assure members of this Committee that they will find instances in our history when, fifty, sixty, seventy or eighty years ago, we said, 'Veil, we shall postpone our fight for a while and shall face the outside world together"• We should have been most happy if the Congolese themselves had arrived at their own solution and told us, "This is what we want". We should have accepted and respected such a solution. That is why we have been reluctant to say what we think should be done in the Congo. 1*8 Now, however, as we see it, things are getting worse and worse every day. No matter how reluctant we may be, I think we shall have to bear our responsibility as Members of the United Nations. We have gone to the Congo for only one purpose: not to take sides in internal politics, but to give whatever help we can, however humble it may be, in maintaining the unity of the country. Therefore, at this stage, we feel very strongly that a conciliation committee should be established and that it should be strong enough so that the leaders will accept it. Whatever suggestion, whatever move, is made to bring the leaders together, the committee should be so strong that they will say, "We shall accept your point of view and submerge our differences". We would not even mind if they resumed their fight later on; that is their own business* But for the moment; for the sake of the country, they must submerge their differences and be one. Therefore, I urge very strongly that the committee of conciliation should be formed. We do not place so much importance oh the number< It should be big enough, and we should have the courage to say that if member countries wish to be part of it, they should not be excluded* The committee, in our view, should work along the lines that have been very carefully outlined by the representative of Nigeria. We should put as our first and fundamental aim the bringing together of the leaders* Then we should make it possible for them to work out their own differences and get along. I do not think we should go further than leaking it possible for them to come together* That IB what I have to say at this stage, Mr. JHA (India): We have heard many valuable suggestions, and some very important points have emerged from the discussions. Like other members of this committee, we were hoping that there would be improved prospects very soon for the reactivation of the parliament and that parliament wouli meet at the earliest possible date* When we met last, it appeared from the report that we received from you, Sir, and your associate that the reactivation and reconvening of the parliament was finding some favour among the leaders. But today, with the receipt of this communication from Mr. Kosavubu — reading paragraph 2 thereof — and also the latest reports that you have from Ambassador Dayel, it appears that there is very little chance of the parliament meeting in the near future. What is the United nations to do? Naturally, the Congo operations will go on. They are pursued in accordance with the directives that you have from the Security Council and the General Assembly. But it seems to us that something more hac to be done on the part of the General Assembly in respect of the resolution that was passed on 20 September* Leaving the situation exactly as it is, and not taking any further steps, would in our opinion not be desirable. The position is that the parliament cannot be convened. We were hoping that if the parliament met, poscibly the parliament itself might become a forum for conciliation and it might devise means of bringing the parties together, and that kind of thing* That not being the case, it seems to us that conciliation must now precede the convening of the parliament* That at once brings us to the question of, the conciliation committee, paragraph 3 of the resolution of 20 September. The suggestion has been made by . Aufcaasador Loutfi that the Ambassadors of countries who ere there should be constituted into such a committee, I have no objection to the representatives of countries which are on the Advisory Committee, and others, pursuing their efforts to bring abour conciliation; but I am not very sure if that would really be the implementation of paragraph 3 of the resolution of 20 September, 51 That resolution asks us, the members of the Advisory Committee, to constitute a conciliation committee, not by nr-jne, not by designation, but by countries. It is not that we shall become members of the committee. Actually, it is open to Governments to send one of us or to nominate one of their Ambassadors in Leopoldville , but ve have to designate the countries which should form the membership of this conciliation group ~.nd, Q« I said * little while ^.go, we believe that it has become even more necessary that some such group should visit the Congo after the very discouraging reports which we have of the possible reconvening of the Parliament by the President or by the Speaker. I think that the efforts through the Ambassadors should go on, but we might think also of nominating countries -- Asian and African countries --in accordance with paragraph 5 of the resolution. Speaking for myself, I would certainly prefer a small committee rather than a large one. A small committee has a lot of advantages; they can direct their energies in a more co-ordinated way; there is less discussion in tae committee itself and a greater possibility of rapport among the members and also with the various leaders and others whom they should contact. But I believe -- and I think that there is a point in what some of the members have said •- that it is not easy to select just a few out of so many Asian and African countries. Naturally, the Congo situation is a matter of great concern to everybody. Most countries -- especially the Asian and African countries — wish to play a role and contribute to the settlement of the difficulties there and, as I said, although I would prefer a smaller group, if that is the wish of the members of the Committee, I would not be opposed to the fifteen Asian and African countries which form the Advisory Committee here being requested to nominate representatives to form tho membership of this conciliation committee. It io possible that ti.is larger group, when it goes to the Congo, may appoint some sub-groups to study the different aspects, to ma.e different contacts, and then perhaps get together and discuss the wnole situation. It would not be unworkable, although a smaller group has many advantages which a larger group does not have. As for the terms of reference of the conciliation committee, I think that they are adequately described in paragraph 3 of the resolution and we need not go ruiy further into that. But what is very important — and my Government.has repeatedly given expression to it — is that there should be a group going, to. the Congo, We cannot be sure that they will have success, but their very arrival, the very fact that the United Nations is so seriously interested in bringing about a reconciliation, will have a very great effect. .Also, this, group will be able to report to this Committee and to the,Secretary-General — the Secretary-Qeneral, of course, has his own channel of information, but the group will perhaps,have a slightly larger range. It can also.report to the Gener.al Assembly and give other Members of the Assembly an .account of the situation in the Congo and an appraisal of the developments that are talcing '•"' place there and the possible developments in the future. That will be the great advantage, . . ; ,. To sum up: I would say that to leave the whole thing static --,1 do,not« mean the situation because the situation is never static but always moving -r. in the context of the resolution of 20 September would not .be right and we , i must make a move. There is no question of that, and. if it, means that we ,oa;n : avoid differences araong^ourselves, as to composition and. so on, let.us by all mep.ns have a committee of fifteen. We have no objection, but, as I saidy. we . would have preferred a smaller committee. . I forgot to mention one thing. This document that you have received — I do not know what your intention is, whether you would send any reply to this or anything like that. The . SECRETARY -GENERAL t So far I have given no thought.. £o it; it;.:.-... arrived late this afternoon. . •.-.-• 53 Mr* JHA (India): If I may express Just a thought for your consideration, I think that this is a very mischievous document. It is really an attempt to change the whole constitution. Three people whose names are mentioned there have decided that the constitution of the Congo, which is the Loi fondamentale, should be changed, and they have in very formal terms notified the United Nations. You might consider whether you should not send a reply that you cannot accept the validity of this document in view of the provisions of the Loi fondamentale. That is for your consideration. Naturally, you would have to think about it. But I believe that, if you were disposed to send a reply like this, that might itself help in the reconvening of the Parliament because that would be a great discouragement to the people who are trying to bypass the Parliament, to suspend it, contrary to the constitution, and to arrogate to themselves the power of changing the constitution and making a new constitution, which really does not belong to them. That power, under the Loi fondamentale itself, belongs to the Parliament, which is supposed to frame a future constitution of the country according to the constitutional processes indicated there* So I just submit that to you for your consideration,because this is an extraordinary document which the United Nations certainly cannot take any cognizance of* One wonders whether the United Nations should not even go so far as to say that this document is a mere scrap of paper as far as it is concerned. Mr. BARNES (Liberia): The discussions tonight in regard to implementing paragraph 3 of the resolution of the General Assembly of 20 September have been most illuminating to me. What I should like to say is that this matter of the creation of a conciliation commission to go to the Congo for the purpose of endeavouring to reconcile the differences existing between the various political factions there is not new to the thinking of my Government. I say that because, prior to independence in the Congo, the Liberian Government had consulted with some of the African States on the desirability of a good offices commission going to the Congo to see what could be done in bringing about a settlement of the differences that existed then, because perhaps the situation in the Congo that exists today was foreseen. This idea was considered as acceptable, but from some quarters it was felt that action should be delayed until after independence, vhen it would be possible to discuss this question perhaps with an existing Government. I *thlnk"fa ire all agreed that the situation in the Congo continues to deteriorate and it is imperative that action be taken as early as it is' possibly ..... «v .i". \ convenient to create this conciliation committee for the ...purpos i - e of afiiiotin*. •• g the Congolese people to come to some understanding so that peace and order will be restored--in the-Congo. • All .of us in this assembly tonight have a stake in the peace of the Congo. We have a stake because our troops are in the Congo. These troops have their families back.in their various countries and they want to return1to' their "' families.. : - :. • -\ - ' 55 As long as order and peace IB not restored to the Congo, they will be pinned down there. I think Ambassador Benaboud has expressed my own view on the manner of the creation of this conciliation commission. It seems to me that members of the African and Asian group here should volunteer for membership on the conciliation commission, and that it should be left to our Governments to designate the representatives who should serve on this commission. It seems to me, further, that the question of a conciliation commission should precede any consideration of the convening of the Parliament, because that is entirely impossible, as far as I see it, The Parliament is composed of various warring political factions In the Congo, and except if conciliation is undertaken between those warring political factions, it would be unrealistic to pursue any endeavours to convene Parliament. These are my views on this matter of the creation of the conciliation consul a si on and its composition. Mr. SUM (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): I should like to speak only on the application of the resolution taken by the General Assembly. We are here on the Advisory Committee, together with the Secretary-General, to implement the decisions of the Security Council and of the General Assembly. Of course, I feel that it is necessary, as quickly as possible, to set up this committee as suggested by paragraph 3 of the resolution. But since we deal with Its purpose, it is necessary to stress its conciliatory character. Ibis is a conciliation comnlttee to reconcile various parties which have split in the Congo and which continue to add to the chaos. Therefore, as a conciliation committee, we must avoid imposing one solution or another, imposing what would favour one faction over the other. We must reconcile points of view so that a common agreement is reached, a conciliation between various parties* Therefore, this committee will not have the right to hold discussions with one side or the other, to say that such-and-such a decision taken by any party Is in conformity with Lpl Fondaaientele or not. The interpretation of the 56-60 constitutional lav Is strictly within the competence of the Congolese* We must convince .both sides that they must settle according to paragraph 3 of the resolution, that they must settle among themselves their Internal conflicts* We must not impose any solution -upon them basing ourselves on the • constitutionality or lack thereof of any decision. Of course, I find that the remark of the representative of Sudan is quite Judicious. Any committee, any good office committee, or any action whose aim is to reach agreement between parties must be made up of persons who are acceptable to both parties. If this were not the cass, we would have the :* opposition of one of the parties, founded or unfounded. However, 'Ve are here* trying to implement this resolution. It seems to me that it would be wiser to decide that this coomlttee must be made up of members of this Committee' of the Asian and African States Members. It would be wiser, rather than to appoint all members, in it, to have a more limited number, a number below fifteen. We see now that, Vlth eighteen here, with you, Mr. Secretary-General^ when we begin a discussion of an important item, we loce a great deal of time before we reach any solution or any decision. ; - '61 I should like to make a suggestion. What would happen when fifteen members faced one party or the other and tried to decide who should speak? That would be very complicated, and I therefore agree with the remarks of Ambassador Jha in that I find that it would be useful to have the body made up of a limited number of members. I should like to have the committee set up on a voluntary basis. I would like to have it comprise those countries of Asia and Africa who would like to be members, and to have each representative, after he had received instructions from his Government, tell the Secretary-General that his country wished to be a member of the committee. If we had fifteen positive answers then there would be fifteen members. If we had fewer positive answers then there would be fewer members, and that would be even simpler. Another point I should like to stress in that connexion is that we are faced with a decision upon which the point of view of my delegation is that we are dealing with an unconstitutional matter. Although we must not interfere, we are, however, confronted by a difficulty in trying to convoke the Parliament. But I feel that the conciliation committee will try to convince the parties of the necessity to convene the Parliament by giving them and the Parliament itself all satisfaction so far as concerns liberty of action and security. And here I refer to all the parties. Mr. OUSMAN BA (Mali)(interpretation from French): At our last meeting I put forward certain concrete proposals, but I think that they were not taken into much account. I feel that if we had wanted once again to weigh those proposals — which did not represent just a mental exercise — we would have taken a step already towards a solution of the Congo drama. I take note of the fact, however, that some of our positions are winning wide-spread acceptance in that we felt that at the present stage of the situation in the Congo the Parliament could not very well be convened. It seems to me that at present this idea of convening the Parliament is being left more and more by the wayside. I should like to return to the proposals which I made at our last meeting on behalf of my delegation. I do not change those proposals. It seems to me that the last suggestions of the Secretary-General and the steps which he took mark clear progress towards a settlement of the Congolese problem, and that other 62 practical measures — bold measures — will assist us in the near future in clarifying the situation. .-:•..- •••.-•; I pointed out at our last meeting that before we tackled the substantive • problem, the restoration of democratic legality in the Congo, it was important - to take a few.urgent and practical steps which would clarify the situation before we addressed ourselves to the crux of the matter. . , What measures did we propose? I pointed out — and X think this was dwelt upon by all speakers at our last meeting — that it was essential to bring Mobutu!s activities to a halt. We no longer need to demonstrate here that Mobutu illegally carried out his activities, that he was self-appointed, and that in abuse of his powers he brought a conglomeration of troops around him so as to have some semblance of power. I think that checking Mobutu!s activities would make it possible to substantially clarify the situation in the Congo. I think that the Secretary-General, with the agreement of the Committee, could take steps to that effect in the days to come. Secondly, I pointed out that it was Important to dispose of another illegal situation, and that was the illegal and unconstitutional existence of the Council of Commissioners-General, which was arbitrarily set up to replace the Council of Ministers which, until further information is received, must be considered to be in existence, for it has not been actually dissolved. We must seek to restore law and order in the Congo, and we must not be swayed by the personalities involved. I suggest that we disband the Council of Comnissioners-General, 1 have a paper before me which is signed by Kasavubu and the President of the Council of Ccmmissioners-General. I think that this paper makes it clear that, if we want to avoid a deterioration of the situation, the Council of Commissioners-General must be dissolved. This Council is not provided for in any of the clauses of the Congolese Constitution. A third point to which I alluded is a very practical one. I referred to the problem of the Congolese troops. The Secretary-General had told us that this was a difficult problem and that he had studied it. But we feel that it is possible, by means of our troops and our representatives and the representatives of the Secretary- General in the Congo, if not to disband these troops — for that would be illegal and would represent interference on our part in the affairs of the Congo -- to at least see to it that no factions can, with impunity, enlist the support of these troops and make use of them. The most flagrant proof of the need for such action is that Colonel Mobutu is at the present time using these armed forces against the legally constituted authorities of the Congo. These are all concrete steps which can be taken. A fourth step which could also "be taken — and which would seem all the more necessary in light of the information given to us tonight— is to have a complete withdrawal of any Belgians remaining in the Congo. We find that it is particularly scandalous, after this situation was created because of the Belgian position -- although the Belgians deny this -- that Belgians should still "be found in the Congo -- so-called technicians. We wondered to what extent these technicians are not disguised as colonels or generals. 65 This Is a scandalous aspect of the situation and I feel that it is urgent for the United Nations to put an end to it at once by requesting all Belgians who are there at present in the Congo to leave the Congo so that the matter can be settled once and for all. I do not think it is necessary to spell out thA effect that the presence of even a very small minority of Belgian technicians in the Congo Will certainly not serve to lessen tension. It is evidently very easy to repatriate 800 Belgian technicians from the Congo if the restoration of peace is at stake, and that is certainly what we all seek* The Secretary-General has taken steps which I support, and I now come to my fifth point, which is that assistance wherever it may come from should be channelled through the United Nations, whether it is unilateral, bilateral or multilateral assistance. If anarchy is to be checked we must prevent assistance from being given, to this or that group, for such assistance will only strengthen one or the other party involved in the conflict. I sincerely feel that if these concrete measures can be undertaken in the next few days — and I think this is quite feasible -- then we shall be able to tackle the real issue, which is the restoration of legality. Regarding this substantive problem, I pointed out the other day — at which time my view was a minority view -- that the convocation of parliament was no doubt desirable, that it represented the ideal, but we felt that it was a delusion to think that it could be done. This was because the last time the parliament was convened, if my information from our representatives in the Congo is accurate, the conditions were such that each deputy had to have a bodyguard around him. I think we have better uses for our troops tten ensuring the personal safety of those deptties. The situation in the Congo is a tragic comedy, but I do not think we should have this kind of spectacle, in which the deputies being convened have to be surrounded by soldiers armed with revolvers and sub-machine guns. We do not want this kind of farce, we want a serious convocation of parliament. If this seems too difficult, it might be better to concentrate on summoning the Council of Ministers of the Central Government, This is the root of the problem. The problem exists at the present time to some extent because the various factions of the Central Government are torn by dissension. Attempts at 66 conciliation will be easier if they are aimed at reconciling Mr. Kasavubu and Mr.' Luniumba, around whom the situation has crystallized, than if'they are aimed at reconciling the countless factions involved in a parliament. The least pessimistic maintain that there are at least fifteen factions in the parliament, each one claiming that it is right and each trying to demonstrate by messages such as this that its point is well-founded. They all seek ihe support of the Secretary-General. I think it would be difficult to consider that each of those fifteen factions is right. It is easier to reconcile two, three or four persons, it is easier to reconcile Mr, Kasavubu, Mr. Lumumba and Mr. Bomboko than to effect' conciliation in a hundred-deputy parliament, particularly since the deputies are scattered over the Territory, sdme have fled, others seem to have vanished from'the scene and others still are in prison. Even titanic efforts would'still fail, it seems to me/to convoke parliament within the next few months. 67 I think that, although we should not concentrate too much on personalities, it is entirely possible to demand the convening of the central Parliament. If this is done the United Nations cannot be accused of anything. The United Nations can always say that the Government was set up by the Parliament. We feel that if that Government is reconstituted, much of the dissensions which are rife in the Congo today will vanish. I think that this is feasible. I turn now to the question of the conciliation committee. We stated earlier that we felt that such a body was desirable. But I think that we must not put the cart before the horse. The conciliation committee is a good thing. Its membership should be clearly defined. But we feel that this body can operate effectively only if it has a clear mission emanating from us and acts on clear facts. The fifteen-member, or smaller, committee cannot go the Congo and find a makeshift solution there. We should appoint this committee, establish a concrete basis for its work and spell out its main objectives. Certain terms of reference must be given to the committee. We all have views on the Congo problem, and we should not have this committee,once on the spot, divided regarding the Parliament, Kasavubu, Lumumba, and so forth. However urgent it is to set up the committee, it is no less important that ve should give it clear tasks so that, once on the spot, it will not have to improvise and take makeshift steps which may not prove to be the most useful. Before sending this committee we should define its general objectives. As regards the membership of the committee, I can be quite brief. It seems to us that every member of this Advisory Committee can and should ask to be a member of the conciliation committee. I do not think that such a body would be more numerous than other bodies which have had to tackle much more serious issues. All the States which have troops in the Congo are directly concerned and have a right to be members of the conciliation committee. Other members from Afro-Asian States might prove useful advisers. But I do not agree that the conciliation committee should include any States not represented in this Committee. We must be wary not only lest our dissensions here be transferred to the Congo but also lest the conflict! of the cold war be transferred there. I could not have any confidence, for instance, 68 in any conciliation measures recommended by persons who have had to settle colonial problems elsewhere and have carried out a colonial policy. The members of the Afro-Asian group have all been colonized. They are not colonizers*. Therefore they are the countries most likely to be dispassionate and .objective and most indicated for membership of the conciliation committee. I think we should stick to the membership of this Committee, unless of course certain members waive their right to go, in which case the Committee would be small in number; but otherwise I think all members of this Committee should be selected. I would ask the Secretary-General to tell us whether the practical measures which I have Just outlined — which I consider to be quite practicable — can actually be adopted. I think this would be a step forward in clarifying the Congolese problem, bearing in mind, of course, that the substantive issue, that of the reconstitution of the Central Government, can be studied on the spot, practically,by the Conciliation Committee -- because on the spot the problem of conciliation is the main one, I ask this, with the understanding that in the Congo the Secretary-General and his representatives have already resolved the various points I mentioned earlier. The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I will answer these practical questions. I will reserve until later whatever comments I may have by way of advice to the Good Offices Committee, and I will limit myself to a few observations on the practical questions raised by the representative of Mali. I think we must remember the very limited authority which the United Nations has. When we talk about non-intervention in internal affairs, it is not only a question of not taking sides, which we have avoided to an extent which now seems to be a source of special complaint by some parties, along the lines so wieely indicated by the representative of Mali, Anybody who is hoping for support, and does not get it, regards us as his enemy. But there is another question, and a more important one. We must not in any way substitute ourselves for the authorities of the Congo. When we come to the practical questions which were raised, this becomes quite important. In regard to Parliament, we cannot convene it. We cannot even press this or that authority to convene it, even if we respond with advice should they wish to hear our views about it. We can do nothing more than try and maintain such conditions as would give the members of Parliament a sufficient feeling of safety, so that they can get together and we can facilitate their coming, and similar things. But that is all we have the right to do regarding Parliament. I have never had the idea that we would give a kind of personal bodyguard to all the 70 members of" Parliament. I think we can simply establish some kind of guard in the neutralist area, or Parliament, which is in fact a neutralist area, and see to it that nobody interferes with the proper procedures o£ Parliament or exerts pressure on members, as has been the case in the past. As regards technical assistance, we can of course insist on channeling it through the United Nations, provided we can give a reason for it, and a reason which is based on the resolution of the General Assembly. That is the case with the letter to the Belgian Government to which I referred. I have no right, and we the Committee havs no right to demand in absolute terms that all technical assistance should go through the United Nations, unless we can point out that technical assistance given in other forms or in other ways is harmful to the aims of peace and security, law and order, integrity and independence of the Congo, indicated as such aims by the General Assembly. That was the case with technical assistance to a special province which has : •'."•''• i -..'•''' seceded. It may be the case also with the Central Government in a situation where such bilateral aid has political implications or provokes counter action in a way which runs counter to the aims of the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. 71 But beyond that we cannot go. And to that extent I have, in the implementation of the General Assembly resolution, gone. That is to say, we have done what I think can be done, even stretching a little bit perhaps on the resolution. As regards the withdrawal of the Belgians, we have, of course, no right to ban civilians from the territory of the Congo, especially not civilians who have been invited to come, even by the Central Government. We can express a view on the desirability of avoiding such, so to say, intrusions or such people working there, and I have done so, again with the aim of the General Assembly and the Security Council in mind. On this point I would say that I consider, myself, that we have stretched the powers of the United Nations, or at least of the Secretary-General, under the resolution to the utmost point, and I do not see how any further steps can be permissible than this, not demand but appeal, to them to withdraw all technical assistance or civilian para-military or military. You have seen the reaction. When we come to the Arme'e Nationale Congolaise we run for the first time directly into the question of the extent to which we can act without, so to speak, substituting ourselves for Congolese authorities. The man who, according to loi fondamentale, is Supreme Commander is the President. I guess that one could defend taking the steps indicated here if requested to do so by the President, but you will remember that the President is under constitutional rule, which requires counter-signature by a member of the Cabinet in order to render the decision which he has taken legal. It so happens, as you certainly know, that, for what it is worth, in the view of various people, Mr. Lumumba is Minister of Defence; so in this question of the authority under which we can act in order to come to grips with the Arme'e Nationale Congolaise problem, we run into the conflict between the two leading personalities. Short of having some kind of constitutionally valid decision, I feel that we would really usurp the authority of the national institutions if we were to force the ANC into this and that kind of special position, this kind of -- I do not know what to call it -- sequestration or what not. It is not a matter of arrangements of that type being arrived at betvecn us and the Arme'e Nationale Congolaise itself. The Arme'e Nationale Congolaise not being at present under any recognized authority, I think that, from their of point of viev, no recognized authority can take this and that kind of action which they are asked to take. But we move on very thin ice indeed. 72 My main observation in reply to the question is that we have, aa an : organization, in the present situation certainly no right to order the ANC around for whatever good purpose it might be. In the same way we may have thid or that view regarding the constitutionality of these commissaires •- the Oonseil de Coramissaire -- but for us to act is something for which I cannot find any "basis in International law, in the Charter, or in any of the decisions, whatever we thinfc about it. Finally we come to Colonel Mobutu and we are in much the same position here. What can we do with him? Can we tell him he is no longer in the self-appointed psoition he holds? How do you do that? How do you lift him out of it?: And izhat do you do to the man? We have no right to arrest him, no right to push him around. That is an interference with the individuals in the country which, I think, goes beyond our rights, unless he personally, so to say, engages in acts contrary to concrete law and order. We do not consider non*constitutional acts to be acts of that nature. The police in a regular country do not interpret constitutional law and implement it as a kind of executor. The sum total of all this is that I would beg the members of the Committee, in considering these practical things the desirability of which I do not for a moment dispute, to keep in mind the peculiar circumstances under which we work and the legal basis which we must recognize. I repeat what I said, that I feel that it is perfectly clear what we can and what we cannot do regarding Parliament. I feel we have gone as far as we are legally entitled to go regarding technical assistance. I feel we have even stretched ourselves a bit as regards the Belgians --of course, I am thinking especially now of civilians. I am facing fie oerious problem aa regards the Arraee nationale congolaise, as regards the Commissaires and as regards Mr* Mobutu. There may be suggestions, there may t>e formulae found which may open the door to further action. For the moment I am, as I said, a little worried about the situation in those respects. I may, as I said, perhaps later on return to the question of the good offices committee for advice, if I have anything to say, and with your permission I will now revert to the list of speakers and give the floor to tlie Ambassador of Pakistan* Mr» HASAN (Pakistan): Mr. Secretary-General, at this late hour I do not really have anything very profound to say. It is a very small thing to remember, but I recall that at the very first meeting of this Committee I asked if you could give an assurance that we would not be asked to go to the Congo. You did not give us an assurance but you said that it was very unlikely that we would be asked to go there. However, eircumstraces have changed now. I agree, Mr. Secretary-General, that the problem of the Congo is essentially for the Africans to settle. I have consistently held that view. I have said that at the emergency session and I have said it at other group meetings and ., n^L^- *Jk>*>~~ ^Le^fi^f^-0-^ elsewhere. One does not like this emphasis on originality, on this original consideration of problems, but, as a fact of life with which we have to live, and remembering that fact of life, it appears reasonable that the committo^ -chat we are seeking to set up should comprise African members of this Committee. There would be some philosophy behind that proposal that it should be only Africans. But as an alternative it has been suggested that this committet should also have the Asian members of this Advisory Committee • I do not see any philosophy beljind that, because,1 do not see whyt for the fortuitous reason that my country has been in the for.tunate position of giving some assistance, to-you, Mr. Secretary-General, by being utilized in the Congo, I should be better > entitled to be represented on t^.is mediation group than a country such as, say, Iraq or Jordan or Iran or Turkey,.which geographically are prpbably,closer to Africa and probably would be better mediators. At the same time,, if-the iAsian - members, are to be included merely because they are in the fortunate position of giving some- assistance,. I see no reason why other members who have also given '• euch aBsistence should not be eligible for similar membership* Howevei1, as I • said^ there is a yepy good reason for this ccjcanittee being only an African •••' '•''•••• committee, ^v. .- .-••;.-•• _ -...- ..-.;•. .-•_.. •• . •' •- ''••..' •'••• ''-'-•'•''''• It was suggested that, besides the,. African.members, if somebody else ' volunteer? to join,this,-mediation group, he ..sliould be allowed to join. • Personally, I do not thi«kjanybody would volunteer, ,In; such cases it very rarely'happens that somebody puts himself forward, and says, M,Wel3L^ take me along too* I am a very, good mediator alsp;." : , -^ , . '.;•• •;.•:••.-'•.•... . Therefpre, to make this .long stor.y;short>.iyir.,>?cretary-General, my--., ,: ..- suggestion would be, that my delegation and my country and the Government.•!.-.om . "., representing here would agree that probably the^most desirable opurse to follow would be to.have a.committee of the .African members of the Advisory.Committee . only, unless somebody else wants to .be included, in which .case certainly no .one should have any objection* . .1. tnJLnk,.the African oamb^re would,.probably be in a position to play a.real part, a more important part and a more effective, part than other people* . , • : .;••••'•* .— . T> ",*.•-.•»..«•• < £ % , ...... ,*.*:.- 4'"' *'* NATION;:; AD?I::O:IY wmjjwm (n HIE co^ao Correctiono to ha made on the English copies of tlva verbatim raport of mooting No0 7 Tenth line of Hr0 Hasan''s etat It also looks better that the problem should be entrusted only to the Africans to settle, because if you say Afro-Asians, then why not others also? That is all I had to say. Mr* CABA (Guinea) (interpretation from French): I should like, before I deal with the formation of the Committee, to revert back to the principle of non-interference by the United Nations* This is not the first time that my delegation states that it cannot accept the interpretation given to this principle of non-interference. If the situation is complicated in Katanga now and B.lgium and its allies continue to reinforce the secessionists, it is precisely because we have not agreed on the principle of non-interference. If Mobutu continues to arrest free citizens in the Congo and threatens them with execution, I do not think that the United Nations can remain indifferent, faced with this situation. A month or two ago, the United Nations did accept the closing of the radio station and the airfields, and this was indeed an act of interference in the affairs of the Congo. If an individual who is illegally in the Congo is responsible for disorder there, we must take the responsibility, I share entirely the opinion of the representative of Mali, namely, that the United Nations, by remaining indifferent in face of the actions of individuals who are recognized neither by the Congolese people nor by the Congolese Government — nor by us, as we have said on many occasions — complicates its own task* My delegation cannot accept this interpretation. Secondly, as far as the formation of the committee is concerned, there are three distinct opinions, none of which is mutually exclusive. Some proposed that there be volunteers: Pakistan will say, for instance, that it should like to take part in the conciliation in the Congo; Indonesia will say that it should like to go; Guinea will say that it should like to go — and then we will be up to fifteen* This is certain; we have all accepted it. We have sent soldiers who are suffering there, who are suffering from the seasons; but to send our brothers who are oppressed only because imperialism wishes to set them one against the other will cause a new State of Africa or Asia to hesitate to make sacrifices to work in this noble task* Therefore, we cannot accept the idea of a snail group, of a limited group, which is only palliative* Fifteen members of the Afro-Asian group is not a large committee. The country is great* ?6-80 There .are many tendencies among the fifteen nations in;the Congo which might make three teams of five which could meet every day to compare their notes/, , and some day it might be stated that fifteen is actually not jenougfr, Thus> if we take the first idea, that each country volunteer, I am. certain that iny -. country, which is now struggling in the Congo for the restoration of peace, will accept to go* , , . .Then my second proposal, that all fifteen go: this- is the most .rapid and the most constructive solution. , As.far as the third idea, that only the African States should-serve, we will go against the terms of the resolution itself. The resolution states Africa and Asia, and if we only say Africa, I, as a representative of an. , African. State> would oppose this, and I would not go, and I would recommen.4 my Government not tp send anyone there* ...... Therefore, very concretely, if we wish to get out of this impasse, let us have a committee of fifteen Africftno and Asians, and this committee might ' begin its work right away. It would be up- to our Governments to give crede to ambasnadors here to go to the Congo and to give, credentials to other men who might go to the Congo. 81 Of course, this committee would not go to the Congo with empty hands. It is to be appointed by the Advisory Committee, union is to establish its terms of reference. I said that last time, and it is in the verbatim record so that I need not repeat myself* When it is said that it is necessary to go to the Congo not to favour one group or another, I agree perfectly, but I must say clearly that this conciliation committee will have a special role in the Congo. I would have hoped and preferred that the committee might be first appointed and the membership determined, and that in the course of another meeting we might draw up its mandate. The Secretary-General could assist with this resolution, and then we might all have discussed the resolution. We would all make suggestions, and I am certain that we would then have something that would be concrete which the committee might implement right away in the Congo, Let us, therefore, be Mr. AUOUNE (Senegal) (interpretation from French): This is the first time that we have taken part in the debate in this Committee on the Congo* My Government wishes to express gratification at the resolution adopted by the General Assembly and designed to maintain the unity of the Congo and also to establish a committee of good offices to restore peace in that country. May I say that this Congolese question is of concern to the people of the Congo alone. All of us here represent countries. No one of us would like to have another Power dictate laws to govern domestic affairs in his country. We would be opposed, therefore, to any measure which might envenom the situation, rekindle the conflict and revive the various problems which have already arisen in this part of the Congo by encouraging fratricidal warfare* We feel that in viev of the complex situation it may not be the wisest course at all times to invoke the constitution wad to denounce this or that position. What the 82 United Nations* could do to avoid interfering in domestic affairs is to apply paragraph 3 of the General Assembly resolution vhich provides that a good offices committee shall be set up. We feel, however, that this body should be one which would take wise and appropriate measures to bring together those who disagree. 8? If we try to impose our views in the Congo and invoke legal texts while we, are clearly not members of the Congolese population, then we will prevent a rapprochement, which is just what we seek to. establish in the interests of peace and unity in Africa. I continue to believe that this Committee should not try to foist its will upon the people of the Congo. As regards the membership of the committee, I would support the suggestion of the representative of Tunisia, that the Advisory Committee, as a whole, should be consulted and that all those who are requested to do so should send a representative to establish conditions favourable to the maintenance of peace and unity in the Congo. Mr, BENABOUD (Morocco)(interpretation from French): In view of the lateness of the hour,if there are no other statements I will relinquish my right to speak. Some representatives have left; others are anxious to follow that good example. Otherwise, if there are other speakers, I might make some very brief comments• The SECRETARY-GENERAL (interpretation from French): If you like. Mr. BENABOUD (Morocco)(interpretation from French): As far as the telegram is concerned, I should like to join in agreement with the comments that have been made. As far as we are concerned, this is a very serious act. It is serious because this situation tends to make the crisis a chronic crisis because of illegal, unilateral actions by some persons in a nation as vast as the Congo, under very difficult conditions. The position of the representative of India is forceful, the force of which is parallel to the seriousness of a similar unilateral act and which tramples the constitutionality and legality of the Congolese Constitution. As far as your answer to the representative of Mali is concerned, I see the difficulties of the Secretariat. We know the problem is complicated, and we express our sympathy to the Secretariat. However• • ., . these difficultie»• • . • Ts • • must• -hot'lea • . • d, us to sum Up paradoxically'that, , because of lav, we do not have the right to do good, that law does' indeed prevent us from doing good. This would be a contradiction and a very paradoxical situation. Precisely because of this'paradoxical situation, we have seen here that we must appoint' a'conciliation committee, and this must be done as rapidly as possible. We must hot prolong debate as to membership. We must act according to the adage^ which says: "The better is the enemy of the good." : I do' not think that everyone will respond positively. Because of this" paradoxical situation, where law prevents us from doing good, we are now faced with a situation in the Congo where there are two armies, a United Nations Army — which is paralysed because of legal considerations — and'a Congolese Army -- which, everybody complains, from the head of the United nations right up t6 the : newcomers, has no experience at all. 85 The presence of these two armies shows the contradiction that prevents us from doing good. The position in which Mr. Mobutu has placed himself is paradoxical in that it is against the very law which we are afraid will paralyse us. He, Mr. Mobutu, has himself violated constitutional order; are we then to ask the United Nations to do nothing when faced with a situation in which Mr. Mobutu himsalf shows no respect for law? The beginning of this whole matter was against legality and constitutionality, as a result of the Belgian intervention and the secessionist movements; if these two matters are the very root of the question, and we have no remedy for them, we shall go on again from confusion to confusion and from contradiction to contradiction. It must be stated quite clearly, so that the conciliation committee may be unanimous in taking a radical decision to secure once more, and quickly, the departure of the Belgians and the unity of the territory through maasures which may be Implemented only through the action of the Security Council. The last time we were not good prophets, because we asked for a meeting of the Council and it did not meet until a week later. Today we are faced with a situation which is becoming more and more rotten so that we may be obliged, one of these days, to go back to the Security Council. It would perhaps therefore be better if such a meeting were to be asked for immediately so that the Secretary-General could take the necessary strong measures against the Belgian intervention and the secessionist movement. With regard to the Government, we are again faced with a contradiction in which the law prevents us from doing good. We shall lose far too much time, since we have already had the experience and we do not want to renew it, if we hesitate on the question whether or not we should speak to those who -- and here I do not think we ought to be afraid of words — imperialism has divided. Here I would like to recall the unanimous testimony of all those who have been to the Congo, and we have some of them with us. They have told us what kind of vermin is to be found there; the Belgian advisers of Lumumba, the Belgian advisers of Kasavubu, both wish to ruin both Lumumba and Kasavubu at the same time. We must therefore recognize the sad reality. The Belgians are there for reasons of vengeance. Their presence, in spite of all the technical qualifications of the Belgians who are there, is much more dangerous than useful. The ill that they do is much more evident than the good that one may expect from the presence of these Belgian technicians. Such is the testimony which has been given to us in the frankest possible manner and which must be repeated whenever it IB necessary to do so. 86 If ye really consider this paradoxical and inexplicable situation, this contradiction as a result of which the lav prevents us from doing good, ve shall automatically wind up at the logical conclusion, paralysis, deterioration even more pronounced than at present, and a revolt against the United Nations, a revolt which we have already seen growing even in the Security Council in the voices of those who spoke there although not members of the Council, as well as in the General Assembly. 87 Those arc the comments which I wished most respectfully to make. I wished to make them because of the difficult situation in which you find youselft Mr. Secretary-General. We must act as a physician. We must not try to treat a little headache when the disease is really cancer. We must operate to remove the cancer. Mr. ADEEL (Sudan): It is not without a sense of deep regret that we intervene again in this debate. Our position is the same as that which I tried to explain at the last meeting. I should like to repeat it. We consider that the Congo problem today is a human problem* We are flattered to note that you agree with us, Mr. Secretary-General. We deeply regret that we have not progressed one inch since last week. We are still speaking here about personalities, about Mobutu, about Lumumba, about Kasavubu, about who was right and who was wrong. We believe that that kind of thing is wrong in the present conditions in the Congo. One constructive suggestion was made at the last meeting. That was the idea of trying "to convene the Parliament, if possible, to pronounce itself on this burning question of legality about which so many representatives have spoken today* At the end of the last meeting, the idea of convening the Parliament was impeached, if I remember correctly, by the representative of Guinea, who said that it would be a prefabricated Parliament, that the Members would have been bought by the time the Parliament met, that there would be all kinds of pressures, and so forth. Of course, that representative was entitled to hold that view. But there was an alternative suggestion relating to the despatch of the conciliation committee. If I remember correctly, the representative of India said that his Government was strongly of the opinion that that committee should go to the Congo as soon as possible. Those were two constructive ideas which were put forward at the last meeting. And now, at this meeting, we are again discussing personalities, who was right and who was wrong. I shall not speak now about the question of convening the Parliament. The idea did not commend itself to certain representatives here. We must now fall back on the alternative, the conciliation committee. I think that the question now is what the membership of the committee 88 should be. Should the committee be made up of all the members of the Advisory . Committee, or should its membership be restricted to the Asian and African members of this Committee? Of course, the resolution provides for the Asian and African members, Here there are Questions of practicability and acceptability* .1 stress 4. s • .- the word "acceptability" because, as I have stated before, the aim of my country's policy towards the Congo is the independence, the territorial integrity and the unity of .the Congo* If a conciliation committee is to come to life and have any prospects of success, its aim must be the unity of the Congo, That is why the conciliation committee must be acceptable to all the leaders of the Congo* •89 It Is not a question of choosing between certain parties; Kasavubu, Lumumba, or others, because we know — it is no secret — that when Katanga defected Kasavubu and Lumumba were there. If this committee has as its terms of reference the reconciliation of these persons and leaves other issues alone, it would not be a committee working for the unity of the Congo* If you have to send a conciliation committee out of this Advisory Committee, it should be a committee that will be acceptable to all the factions in the Congo/ I think those are the points I wanted to bring before the Committee, but I must repeat ray sense of regret that we are not advancing at all. The SECREIARY"GEI\[ERAL: As an interlude, may I eay, Mr. Ambassador, that you may have seen in my last intervention in the General Assembly that I followed exactly the line you have indicated here. Mr. ousMAN BA (Mali) (interpretation from French): I am sorry I have to speak at this late hour, but I feel the situation in the Congo is of such importance that we may sacrifice a few hours sleep on it. I thank the representative of Morocco for his having indicated that we had examined the Congolese problem as a physician would. Being a physician, I have dissected this problem medically, because when a patient has to be healed there are two ways of doing it. There is the way of healing a patient properly, seeking the source of his disease and doing away with the cause. Then there is the other way, which certain physicians might use — I do not know if there are many of them — which is not to look for the cause of the harm, but to give certain palliatives,while understanding that death will follow. Our objective is to heal the Congo end to eradicate the disease. This is why we have proposed solutions, although they are difficult. We indeed think the problem is difficult, because after many months of this problem we are still trying to seek premises for solutions, solutions which might lead us to a true solution in turn. I am really surprised that we are running in one spot, because this is what I think we are doing. Concrete proposals are made. I have submitted proposals, In all humility. I do not claim to be able to find solutions that are better than others can find; but I do not think that before every resolution arguments should be advanced, for instance, that to do away with Mobutu is an interference in 90 internal affaire* We are told that we cannot die solve the Coneeil des Commiflsairet- Ge*neraux and we are not able to replace authorities* When we deal with the question of the Parliament, we are told that we cannot interfere in the internal affairs of 'the Congo, 'We have done something in regard to technical assistance, but to go beyond this is to interfere in technical assistance. 4?o eliminate the Belgians we cannot do more than we have done, because 'this is to go beyond our mandate. The same thing applies to the Arme'e Nati'onale. Therefore, if we wish to follow this way of thinking through, we are faced with a situation where there is no solution to the Congolese problem, ' Hut "I believe that we are here to find the solution, and we must offer constructive solutions which might allow us to get out of the impasse. As far as I am concerned, I stated last time that the United Nations were not "in the Congo to be a framework for the internal anarchy that reigno there. That is to say, the fire being in the middle, to surround the fire and not allow it to propagate, but to maintain a fire within, I do not think this is the role of the United Nations* 91 However, if ve allow ourselves to be paralyzed by this sword of Damocles — which is to say each time we may not interfere in internal affairs --we shall then maintain the chronic anarchy which exists in the Congo. I do not think that this is a solution. Therefore, I propose that at the next meeting the Secretariat might tell us, in the light of our present and past debates, about some suggestions so that we should not be paralyzed or take only half measures which will only lead to deterioration of the internal situation; this document is witness of the fact that the situation is being aggravated because of Mobutu, Lumumba and all those others who wish to be dictators and to assume power. It is not our role to say that there is nothing to do or that we must not interpret the Congolese laws. It is one thing to interpret the law in the Congo for the Congolese, and quite another to maintain this legitimacy. This legitimacy has been defined at least once under normal conditions when Parliament was functioning normally. It instituted certain authorities, who are still there, and we must not allow any substitutions for the legally constituted authorities, who were constituted by the Parliament when it was functioning. We must not permit substitutions by any person who may assume power and claim that he is the legal head of the Congo. This legitimate situation has been defined once, and on its basis we can advance in the Congolese problem and reach the only solution which allows us to go further with conciliation of those who were responsible for the Government. This, I feel, is not beyond our means. Therefore, I think that it would be well to have a meeting soon and to have proposals before us. To say that something is impossible is not concrete, and I feel that the committee which we are to send must not go there only with the desire to reconcile. We must, as an Advisory Committee, say what the basis of conciliation should be, rather than have each representative go there on the basis of hie own position or that of his Government. This would not lead to a solution, and we are trying to find a positive answer. Mr. SLIM (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): It is true that it is very late, but my delegation, having participated in all the debates of the Security Council on the Congo question, and having assumed certain responsibilities in these debates, as well as in the special emergency session, feels that it should endeavour to clarify the mission of this Committee. . 92-93 If I nay take the liberty of encroaching somewhat upon your prerogatives— ; for which I apologize -- this Committee was instituted by the Secretary-General after the approval given in statements of all the members of the Security Council, following.-upon a statement by the Secretary-General in which he suggested that an Advisory Committee should be set up to assist him in carrying out the resolutions of the Security,Council and the General Assembly. No other decisions can be taken by this Committee unless special statements to that effect are made either by. the Security Council or by the General Assembly. , My delegation considers that the Security Council decisions do not entitle the Unitei d Nation•'••••• s to intervene <. in the domestic 'affair s of th. e Congo. I believe that it was the second resolution adopted by the Security Council — the resolution of 22 July.--. which declared in one of its paragraphs that this action must in no way constitute interference In the constitutional or other affairs of the Congo, and I recall,the use of the word nconstitutional". I recall that, during the .debates preceding the adoption of this decision, there was some question about adopting a word or tvo relating to the maintenance of law and order, but these words were not adopted; they did not become part of the resolution* Even at that time, when the question of the maintenance of law and, order was involved, the Security Council chose not to intervene.* Later it was made clear that this Committee should assist the Secretary- General in carrying out the decisions of the Security Council and that we must assist the central Government in maintaining public order, but this does not involve any maintenance of constitutional or anti-constitutional order* Perhaps some elucidation should be sought. Perhaps we should go a little further into the chaotic'situation in the Congo, but it does not behoove the Secret cry-General to do so, nor does it behoove this Committee to decide this. The decision must be taken either by the Security Council or by the General Assembly, because we will debate this matter in the Assembly inasmuch as the Congo question is an item on the agenda. This Committee will have to decide two thingsf and this is mentioned in the last General Assembly resolution, which states in paragraph '-j that the Committee vi11 appoint this good offices committee. This is a decision which we shall have to take. We shall also have to define its terms of reference. Paragraph 3/1 think, makes this clear and defines these terms of reference. I would recall that this resolution was put before the special session of the General Assembly by a group of States that appear among the members of the Advisory Committee and that come from Africa and Asia. In paragraph 3 we read: "Appeals to all Congolese within the Republic of the Congo to seek a speedy solution by peaceful means" -- that is, not by me&na imposed by force -- "of all their internal conflicts for the unity and integrity of the Congo, with the assistance, as appropriate," -- it is assistance which we can give, and I am glad that the Advisory Committee agrees on this — "of Asian and African representatives" -- and here I agree with the representative of Guinea that we should not have an exclusively African body -- "appointed by the Advisory Committee on the Congo, in consultation with the Secretary-General, for the purpose of conciliation" -- and therefore clearly not for the purpose of imposing this or that view, of imposing this or that party. We must reconcile the parties in conflict. We must urge them to agree for the maintenance of the unity and territorial integrity of the Congo, so that peace and security within the Congo may be preserved. That is tiie role of the Advisory Committee, If I am mistaken, I beg to be corrected. That Is the rolewhich should be played by the Advisory Committee /and I would be very happy if we could reach an agreement, I never said thatxwe should have a five- or ten-member committee, nor did Mr. Loutfi,'nor did Mr. Jha. I think we all said that we would prefer to have a smaller committee. 'But if this body feels that a fifteen-member committee should be appointed9 it can very well be a fifteen-member committee. I think that we could move forward and begin to appoint this committee today. I'would agree with my colleague from Guinea, that at our next meeting we could then more clearly go into the meaning of paragraph J and define the exact mission and the limits of action of this conciliation committee. Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): I really want to intervene Just for one purpose. I do not like to take the floor very much. What we have to do today, as I understand it, is to try to compose"the committee. Let us do that and at leaat let us show, after weeks of inaction — which on my part stems ftrom a reluctance to meddle in the affairs of the Congo — that we are able to compose V .•-•••..;:•.-.• '-.:.- , •• • ' .••-•*> ••;•• -,.v.:..-. ••.•^'••: .,';;:•• . • ••• ,:'".••. .•;/;-.• , • .-••••. • —.*.••••;•. the committee. Today we are compelled to face our responsibility. Let iis compose the committee'and then meet next time to work out'the terms of reference if what is already worked out in the emergency resolution is not satisfactory. Mr. ADEEL (Sudan): I am sorry but there are no points of order In "" this 3onanmlttee, because, as I read the resolution of the General Assembly, the matter of appointing the committee should be done by the Advisory Committee in consultation with the Secretary-General. As I understand this, the committee should be appointed by the Advisory Committee, but in consultation with the members of the Advisory Committee. -' •• . '.'.U'-.. :.-• • •;••.•• .<•-.•:. •• . '; . • ."..'• • . •; .'••••''. '•-.-.• I do not like to be faced with any proposals as to how this conciliation committee is going to be composed now, before I am consulted about it. So I am sorry '— The SECRETARY-OENEltAL; Let us settle this point of order, Mr. Ambassador. It is designated "in consultation with..."; Let us say that 1 interpret that it would be that you form your opinion — this is why I have been Inactive today -• and then you take into account whatever advice I give, or you do not take it into account. 97-100 Mr. APEEL (Sudan): There will be no proposal now as to how it should be composed. Mr. JHA (India): I have a suggestion to make, I was coming exactly to the same point that the representative of Sudan has raised. We have to appoint the committee in consultation with you, Mr. Secretary-General, and I suggest that we wind up our meeting today first by ascertaining your views, if you would care to give us any, on the composition of the committee or on anything else connected with that matter and, secondly — Mr. ADEEL (Sudan): I am sorry to intervene again. That should not be done now. Mr. JHA (India): May I finish? Then, of course, you can comment on that. Second, I think we should meet a few days later so that we are better prepared, because, after all, specific ideas have emerged --a fifteen-nation committee or maybe a smaller committee, we do not know. Meanwhile, we will have the chance to consult our own Governments. So a few days later we could meet and then finalize our work so far as it relates to the implementation of paragraph 3 of the resolution. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I put myself last on the list of speakers, of whatever length it was, because, as I said before, views should be developed without any kind of interference on my part on this practical issue. But I will promise both of you to express my views, and then it is for the Committee to decide whether you put that proposal on the table or several proposals on the table and to decide how you want to handle those proposals. I promise you that I will get back to the matter when your colleagues have expressed their views on this issue. I think, by the way, since we are past midnight, that we have been rather diligent in our work today. 101 . Mr« BARNES (Uberia)* In the light of. paragraph 3 of this , resolution I should like to inquire; Mr. Secretary-General,.whether your representative in the Congo has sought .to consult with any of the leaders there on the desirability of the conciliation commission's going to the Congo for the purposes stated in the resolution. Or, if he has not done so, is it not desirable that this should be done prior to the constitution of the commission? The SECRETARY-GENERAL: You come to a point which I intended to raise myself. There has been no such consultation because, as I understood the stand of the committee when the question of contact with Leopoldville, or our . representatives in Leopoldville, was discussed,it was that it was premature , to enter into^consultations with the Congolese authorities or Congolese .. personalities. That is to say, the views which I have referred to as coming .,-;. from Leojjoldville .have been found onesidecp^r in our representation or among the' African envoys in Leopoldville. No man on the .Congolese side has been consulted about the advisability,of the good offices committee. . ,. May I perfcapa at this stage then, if we loolt at, the^clock, say a few ,.--. •„.-•-.* words. You may remember that on tfte. last occasion I read, parts .of a cable,.., referring just to these talks which ha As a matter of course a conciliation committee, as has been said here around this table, has not much of a chance if it is rejected by any one of those vho are supposedly to be reconciled. It may be rejection of the committee, as such, or it may be something rather unpleasant and delicate — rejection of a certain composition. We have, I think, to keep in mind that a onesided decision which imposes a good offices committee with a composition which may be open to objection from any one of the parties may be good for information purposes but certainly will not achieve its end. Now this consultation with the authorities or with leading personalities is rather a delicate matter. First of all, it is a question of who should be approached. On one point I think it is obvious that President Kasavubu is a must in the picture. On another point I think it is also rather obvious that Mr. Lumumba must figure in the picture. On a third point, I guess that different views may be expressed around the table. That is as regards Mr. Tshombe. But we must not forget that an essential aim is the integrity of the territory, and whatever views are held about Tshombe^ position he is in effective control of Katanga, That is a de facto situation which I think should be taken into account. Anyway, I think this Committee must express some view on who shall be consulted. It is not for me or my Ambassador, Dayal, to decide an issue which has serious political overtones. 103.- ...Further, it must be decided about what those personalities should "be consulted.. We can say on the good offices committee, under paragraph-3; they tare bound to ask for more.. They are bound to ask about composition.-* They.:,are bound to ask about terms of reference* And I-doubt whether this ' Committee: is ready to give such clear indications tonight that it is possible for vine to ; ask Ambassador Dayal to enter upon those consultations. I can leave ; aside, having said what I said, the question of composition, apart from saying ' that;it is purely a practical consideration. '• . . I an very .much afraid that a group of fifteen, which is not an excessively - big committee,, is GQ extremely difficult organ to handle when it is a question of .discussing these very delicate matteis with people who hold violently ^ differen-t views and STQ .only too ;likely to create quite difficult situations •'•'' in the debate, where the greater .the number, the greater the possiMliiies--*- ; ^ I \rould not say of divei-geneies.-*- but of a discussion;/which leads into'wide l: fields »•-"becomes sor.ie\/hat confused. • -.-• - • '. . ' ••• • ••''.'•<' • that reason, all thta is entirely in the hands of this Conoaittee. myself > it TOM wfced for «y advice^ :Bay,- try"»to get- at something' vHich ' is, at tdte maximum, five -persons.- Frankly, I pereonally d6 not believe in the : ' possibility of operating with a "bigger group. But I repeat/••A.o'Jf• • doui»se> • it' * ' '- IB solely for this Conmittee to decide. I felt that the views expressed here, that Governments, once one has decided on the composition, should be free to choose whatever man they want, was correct. It may be their representative here. It may be their representative at Leopoldvllle. It may be third persons. I do not think that we, this Advisory Committee, can dictate to any Government who shall represent it, and I do not think this Advisory Committee would be correct in, so to say, making a selection of persons instead of a selection of countries. Governments are involved in a way in which we cannot disregard* The final end third point is the ijueetion of terms of reference* It is quite clear that paragraph 3 in the resolution gives terms of reference in a general sense. But I believe that terms of reference in this case must mean something more* It means, in fact, some kind of Instruction from this Committee* 104 I noted -- and I must say I noted as expressing very much my view — what vas said here about the danger of forming an opinion once the group Is In Leopoldville. Of course, there should be flexibility. Of course, there should be a possibility of adjustment to what one learns on the spot, what one gathers in talks with these various personalities) but this flexibility cannot be such that the Committee suddenly breaks up because it does not have a clear line of its own. A ccaei^Urftaa committee which, In fact, itself may get divided, I think, is a somewhat dangerous thing, because then it may, in fact, function in a way which adds increased intensity to the conflicts among themetoho ait& 9 supposed to reconcile. One party counting on support from such and such countries, one party counting on support from other members of the group, will cause the group, as such, to disappear and become fragmentized into parties. For that reason, I think that terms of reference must involve, also, a kind of instruction as to some general line regarding which the committee should remain united, even in the light of such experience as may develop. If I put together this question of consultation and one common line — and perhaps, also, the question of the size of the committee — I do not feel myself that you are ready -- and there I meet Ambassador Adeel — to take any kind of formal decision tonight. 105 I think that we can help you by trying to formulate not one decision but .'' ' ' : ' •-- •' : • -'•• -' • ' '.." .'.-.••••;• • '• • . ,.••'-. •..;•,- •••: -v;T alternative possible lines of approach which may crystallize the discussi9n which I would like to take place very soon indeed, not waiting a whole week. My conclusion, therefore, la that I thought that you on your side must think of the problems which do arise in case of consultation, that you should give due thought to the question of the number of persons to be included, that you should give some thought also to the'question of what should be the instructions, beyond the purely formal terms of reference. We on our side will do what we can to help you crystallize that, but it must be with alternatives, necessarily with alternatives, because I think it would be preposterous if we were to put one line before you. I personally have not drawn the conclusion from this discussion that it has been so clearcut that i could say this or that represents a kind of general consensus' around which unanimity is likely to emerge next time. " If it would be agreeable to you, therefore, we on our side would try to do this Jo>> as well as ue can "but I would, all the same, visit to repeat my appeal to'you to give it further thought, singly or together, so "the,t""we can make more progress next time. May I say just one vord about a couple of other matters which have come up. One is regarding more""effective measures.' vln: tact, Ambassador "Slim has already replied to this in a ve^ry clear way. This Committee is bound by the same rules as the Secretariat. Those rules are established hot only by the ' ' • - Charter but also by the "Security Council and by the "'General Assembly, and if i may' use medical language, I would say that we find ourselves in' the situation of'a doctor who may realize that a" surgical operation is necessary but who has not beeri provided with any knives. ' ~ The other question is the question of non-interference. I think there are only a couple of points there that I would like to make clear. As regards Katanga, we must fall back on what has happened in the Security Council. Members may like it or not like it, I may like it or not like it; but there it is -- that is the legislative body in this case and its word stands. In this special case it did emerge that there was no support in the Security Council, as a body, for the use of the United Nations Force for the suppression of the secession in Katanga, and that is the main thing. That means, as I said last time, that we were pushed over in the direction of diplomatic effort. I could not disregard the fact that the Force was not set up with such a military mandate; it has no right to take military initiatives. 106 The other point I want to make clear is that/ as regards arrests/ in all the cases in which our people have been able to intervene against acts of violence under the cover of law, in the form of arbitrary arrests, we have intervened; we have stopped it. We cannot, so to say, be everywhere where things have happened - we have been the first to acknowledge --it is a thing which we deplore. There have been arbitrary arrests/ there have been, as you know/ arbitrary beatings and there has been much more that has been highly objectionable. We do what we can as a police force which cannot go beyond certain limits for physical reasons/ but it is not a case of non-interference. As regards non-interference in relation to arrests/ there is only one limit which is self-imposed/ and I think it is obvious — we cannot interfere with due process of law. We can interfere in all other cases/ but I do not think anyone would want us to interfere with due process of law. I would not like to go now into the question of the airports/ which has been very much discussed; I still absolutely refuse to regard that as an interference In internal affairs. It was in order to forestall what really would have been a disaster. We leave that aside; it has been discussed so much before* I Just want to point out this essential point/ that of the two real cases of problems around the question of non-interference/ that of Katanga is clear in the light of the record of the Security Council, and as to arrests there is only one self-imposed rule which follows from the principle of non-interference/ and that is T&hat we do not interfere with due process of law. In the other cases/ we do what we c&n to stop these various arbitrary acts. 107 That was an excursion, however, and I excuse myself for having made it. I thought it was necessary for the sake of clarity. The main point is the practical one. It may be that some members would still feel that we should try to reach some kind of decision tonight. Personally «- this follows from what I have said -- I feel that it would be wiser if we all had some time to crystallize the matter, especially in the light of the need for consultation and the need to have something which is recognized by this whole group as an instruction to the good offices committee, when it goes to the Congo. Mr: LOUTFI (United Arab Republic)(interpretation from French); I thinH that this meeting might now be adjourned and that we should meet early next week or the middle of next week. This will give us time to think over the question of the committee'B terms of reference, the instructions we should give the committee, and its membership. It will give us time to reflect on whether we can follow a course different from that suggested today. , The SECRETARY-GENERAL (interpretation from French): May I suggest that the next meeting should be on Tuesday, so that we shall not lose too much time?' " •-.•••..-:.-•..• •..--.". • Mr. HASSAN (Morocco)(interpretation from French): There is apparently only one meeting of the First Committee on Tuesday. Most of the members of this Advisory Committee attend the First Committee. Would it not be possible for us to meet on Tuesday in the morning or in the afternoon? The SECRETARY-GENERAL (interpretation from French): I think that we. should all prefer an afternoon meeting, if possible, because these night meetings are somewhat tiring. . ••:•'•.'•*,'• ;U •;„,>.,,;.• (continued in English) ;'""' I am informed that the General Committee will meet at 2.30 on Tuesday afternoon to consider the Cuban issue. 108 Mr. IXXTTFI (United Arab Republic): Could we not meet at 9 o'clock in the morning? The SECRETARY -GENERAL: Yes, certainly, but there will be a self-imposed restraint, because you will have to rush off to the meeting of the First Committee. Mr. ADEEL (Sudan): I humbly submit, Mr'. Secretary-General, that the two questions — that of the terms of reference and that of the composition of the committee — may not be so easy to settle at one meeting. Governments are concerned in this question, and at the highest level. I think that the terms of reference of the Committee will have to be defined first. It is only in the light of the terms of reference that the Governments chosen will take their stand on whether or not they will be prepared to serve on the committee. This involves another question: At what level will the Governments participate? Will it be a personal appointment, or will countries be appointed? At what level should the countries participate? Should it be Heads of State or Prime Ministers or permanent representatives? These questions have to be considered, too. I therefore respectfully submit that the first thing we should do at our next meeting is agree on the terms of reference. The SECRETARY-GENERAL; Let us try from the Secretariat side to get to you on Monday afternoon whatever alternative suggestions we may manage to piece together. I do not think that that is an unreasonable proposition, because we must have some time ourselves. After all, we are all in touch and can arrange a meeting at short notice, I should like the next meeting to take place before the middle of the week has passed, because time is running out. Mr. CABA (Guinea)(interpretation from French): I believe that many ideas and thoughts have been expressed today. I think that it would be too soon for us to meet again on Tuesday. I suggest that we meet on Wednesday. We must consult our Governments and get instructions on the various proposals that have been made* I therefore propose that we meet again on Wednesday. 109 The SECRETARY- The meeting rose at 12.25 a.m. COHFIDBNTIAL Meeting No. 6 29 October I960 ,v ,* v •!::>•* , v. .-UNITED NATIONS ADVISORY COMMTTOE ON THE CONGO Meeting at United Nations Headquarters on Saturday, 29 October I960, at 11.a.in. ro .V.L •.-:,,:•) . \ 60-27071 The SECRETARY-GENERAL; First of all, I owe you a sincere apology for being late. I bad a quite serious talk with one of the chief delegates and could not get away before. Before turning to the subject for today's discussion, I wish to draw your attention to the communication circulated to you. It is a communication from President Kasavubu which you received on the 28th. Here, of course, we have no reason to be too formalistic about these matters, and for that reason I do not go into any scrutiny of the constitutional or legal problems involved. For your information, with this background, I wish to read to you a letter which I received today. It is from a representative from Congo (Leopoldville) here present. I shall read it in French, (interpretation from French): "We have just been informed of the creation of the so-called Conciliation Commission within the Advisory Committee on the Congo. This Commission which is to go to the Congo will study on-the-spot measures to solve the Congolese problem. We warmly appreciate this initiative, which once again show the interest of the United Nations in the Congolese problem. However, for the purposes of collaboration, my delegation, consisting of Mr. Adoula and two others * would like to be heard by this Commission before it leaves, if possible when it meets on the 29th. We hope that you will study this carefully and will bear this fully in mind." (Signed) Cyrille Adoula Head of the Delegation (continued in English): I read this only as information. If we then turn to our agenda, I think that it has only one item, and that is paragraph 3 of the resolution of 21 September. I invite you to present your views and your suggestions. Mr. Krishna MEHOff (India): My Government/ as you might have understood from the Prime Minister's observations in the General Assembly, is a little bit worried about the content of this word "conciliation". Of course, it is a Charter principle and the Secretary-General is the personification of 3-5 conciliation, /but this has to be done in acme fortf whereby* it dees not appear-^1 that this is treating all facts as free and equal; that is/ various authorities' ^r and various parties in the Congo in some form get a recognition and combat • '-••'• weaker parties and are strengthened by the fact thatthey arfc adopted* -I vas;:!: going to;ask Mr. Hammarskjold under which of two basis do we proceed? One "; ; is the resolution, about which we have done nothing bfc'that paragraph; for '•'• '• five or six weeks, so it may be dead, or invcold storage, -whatever the case may be. ..: L ;•.••..:•; ,.••... 'x1.-;-: JVK.V'': /•! Secondly, as ourselves advising you, or whatever it may be, even if this resolution was not here, the proposal could be brought forward for doing this or that or the other* Now, if this Committee, which I understand you have decided to send, if it is only Just going to go without talking about conciliation, probably does it not mean that there may be greater arguments about problems of interfering in the Internal affairs and also giving some sort of greater attention -- I won't call it recognition — to various other people, and complicating matters? I would like to know your views on this. The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I have read "conciliation" only as indicating a general aim, and as a general aim I think it is acceptable to everybody; but not as an indication of any kind of procedure. That will reply, I think, to the worries expressed by Mr. Nehru and now by you; that is to say, the resolution spells out a rather obvious thing: that this General Assembly and the United Nations hope that we will find a unified country with a functioning central or governmental authority. But that is all* Mr» KRISHNA. MENON: In other words, conciliation is to be interpreted as some sort of conciliation in the Congo, and not conciliation between the parties; it is a pacification in the sense of greater quietude. The SECRETARY-GENERAL; That is my reading of the text, Mr. KRISHNA MENON; I would like that to be gone into or something on that character. What I am saying is this, that conciliation should be interpreted in this matter as people who go there to bring about greater quietness in the Congo rather than reconciliation between parties. I mean, that may be part of their'work when they go there, to talk to them. The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I see your difficulty. Does not the matter come up when the Advisory Committee wishes to formulate the task of this committee? Let us try to be precise in this way: It is aiming at a certain aim; it IB not a ccranittee the task of which should be read as one of mediation between various personalities* Mr. KRISHNA MENON; I understand that. But in the process of doing so, for example, supposing you vent there and you spoke to somebody who was a spurious representative, as ve regard him, the very fact that he is spoken to should be so limited as it does not raise his status. That is the position I am talking about. Ihe SECRETARY-GENERAL; Exactly. We have run into Just that problem, and we have been meticulously careful in spelling out that the fact that we have, so to say, approached somebody because de facto he exercises certain functions does not imply any recognition of any kind of status. It is a flat recognition of the de facto, without any further consequences* The commission could act in the same way. Mr. KRISHNA MENON: In the same way as in a labour dispute or civil trouble you have to talk to a lawbreaker. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: Exactly. That has been the trouble the whole time, and we have been forced to work that way, and that has often been misunderstood. To talk to a lawbreaker, to use your formulation, is not the same as to say that he has a right, Mr. KRISHNA MENON; It is only a recognition that he has broken the law by appropriating something for himself. The SECRETARY-GENERAL; To get a thief out of the house, you may have to do something with him. Mr. KRISHNA MENON; To talk to him, yes. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: Dr. Bunche has handed me the text of the resolution. He points out, rightly, that the text reads as follows: "Appeals to all Congolese within the Republic of the Congo to seek a speedy solution by peaceful means of all their internal conflicts..." (A/BES/lfrfr (ES-IV). p.2) '8 -10 And then later on: ,..,-...... "...for the purpose of conciliation;*1. (Ibid*) " . I do not ti\ink this changes anything in what has been said, Mr. Menon, between you and me, "but it Just means that you could perhaps spell out conciliation . as being of assistance in the efforts of the various people in the Congo to solve by peaceful means all their internal conflicts. • • ••-•••- ; • •••-•,- -•'•••••• .-*; ..'.v:- ,-.v. 11 Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana): I think that in the course of our dlecuagion we ghall have to decide finally on the composition of this mission which will be . sent to the Congo. It would appear that there are certain doubts as to what name should be given to this mission which will be sent. Are you going to call it a visiting mission; are you going to call it a committee of inquiry; or are you going to call it a commission of conciliation? I think that the point which was raised by the Minister of Defence of India is very germane to the issue. Our own view is that there is much more to it than conciliation in the Congo at the moment. Any work that can be done by the mission which will be gent there will entail much more than merely bringing together the various warring factions. Therefore, I was wondering whether a general term, for instance, a"United Nations mission of reconciliation to the Congo", might not embrace the various ideas which we have In mind. In other words, without prejudging the discussion of the terms of reference which this mission should have, I, and my Government, feel that there axe certain facts which must be known, there are certain inquiries which will have to be undertaken by this mission, there will be a necessity for meeting a number of personalities and there will be a number of subjects which this mission will have to undertake. Therefore, a general term, na mission of reconciliation", to my mind, would meet the situation, but I throw this forward for discussion. The SECRETARY-GENERAL; Thank you. May I draw your attention to one thing? I do believe that we should be quite clear on one thing. The General Assembly, as I read the resolution, has not considered it to be some kind of observer group making a report or some kind of inquiry. I for my part would have nothing against it, but we have to stick to the terms of the resolution. This is, after all, a political mission with an aim which is spelled out in these words: "for the purpose of conciliation", and that is it* What is necessary for that purpose, I think It can do, without, as Mr. Menon rightly pointed out, by Implication thereby creating new legal factors in the situation, which would be very bad. However, if you feel worried about this question of terminology, I wonder whether we could not solve the problem very simply by calling it, for formal purposes, a United Nations mission under resolution such and such, because then there are the terms of the resolution. 12 r • -.-.-. Mr., Krishna MEHON (India);. The only point'1* that that makes .it more precise.. Why- cannot ve Just say "UN mission" and that is the end, of it? It is,:., an unfortunate word. Of course, this was drafted six weeks ago in conditions.,, . which .were put to us as a grave,emergency, and to a certain extent one is trying ; to retrace, for a possible implication of this word, . Jf it were going today, ; I would agree with my friend from Ghana to call it a visiting mission, or a .study mission or a fact-finding missiop or something like that. .Also-, nothing should come out in this to suggest that it is an .inquiry into; United Nations; v^o administration. - ...... ,.,.. , ...... ,.:• . .The SgCRBTARY-GENBRAL; -Or into their activities, Just as much. •Mr. Krishna MSNON (India):; . No, it should not be like that, because ,, then it weakens the activity of somebody who is trying to do something. Therefore, I have, great sympathy with what was said :by: the representative of Giana- Either you give-it no;,nane\or -wj:. .;>.-....: ..;•. :.... ._••_.-. -••• •_•-... ^ .... ^- ..,;-.-,, .-.L .•>•,. . .; .. *. . «,,, ;•.,.;,. , The BEGRE!EARY,->GENE^AL; : .Jf J may add^to the confusion,, I have always, , w 11 in pcivate talks called Itiv.a ; ^Qpd of f tees mission ;. , , ...... .Mr. Krishna MBNQN (India): • Yes. ; Even »ome wording that corresponds,tp ^ "parliamentary delegation". In difficulties of this kind, when members of Parliament-have been .sent anywhere, they have lpe,en simply called a parliamentary delegation.-;- -.. • •-.... •• .•:•'•:••:••.; ,-•,-.••.•• ..-•••.• . , ; , The • SBCRETARY-GENERAL ; If it is withdrawn it would a<|d to the^confusipn. Mt. SLIM (Tunisia). ( interpretation ; from. French.): . I wanted to first.abQUtjjbhe possible compos itina. of -such a, mission, a..sub,3ec1t wl?iQh has been of concern* at. our previous meeting, when we discussed how to se.t up ^uch,a mission, 'aaod then I wanted to speak of the mission prpper and the task pf such a body. . ,.., , . . >...... 13-15 With regard to the possible number of persons who might constitute that body, I think that the preliminary conversations that have been held between a certain number of delegations that make up this Advisory Committee seem to imply that the membership of such a body should be made up of the whole of the fifteen African and Asian members of this Advisory Committee. 16 But/ 'sinde we have already gone into: the -. question of the task it^eif.^ Q£ body, I tfcifctt I ought first ta mention that .our Committee is,. not a committee/ 1»o decisions; " As I said -at bur; last nieeting/ it, is -an adviaory, -opmmitte.e -tp ..-.apg^r v decisions taken by the Security Council or by the General .-Assembly;: . .A the task of this commission, to be set-up, should be .interpreted only •within framework of paragraph 3 of the resolution. It is a body which should aid the Congolese in the broadest sense of the term — to find a speedy solution by peaceful means and not by means of discord, to all their internal conflicts with a view to preserving the territorial integrity of the Congo. It seems to me that this commission in its work, in its concern to help the parties find a peaceful solution within the framework of the unity and integrity of the Congo would certainly be led to discuss with both sides or all the parties, and in the course of discussion to find that some arguments raised by one side or the other are either false or Just, depending on the consltutional system of the country, in the light of the supreme purpose of the unity and the integrity of the Congo, of the task of building a stable situation in the Congo. But in addition, this commission itself is not supposed to find a solution itself; it is supposed to help the Congolese to find their own solution. These are the provisions of this paragraph. I would recall to the Secretary-General that already this question of the Congo has given rise to considerable discussion both in the Security Council and in the General Assembly — and in the general debates, and on whatever occasion one chooses to cite — and on all occasions criticism has been made of the United Nations activity, criticism emanating from Members of the United Nations, and criticism by the Congolese themselves, depending upon the time and the moment. And repeatedly we have heard criticism of the United Nations action that exceeded the task that had been entrusted, to it. I am afraid that if we define this paragraph 5 in any other way, and if we assign to this Mission a task other than that defined by the General Assembly, by a vote of ?0 votes in favour with no negative votes, I am afraid that we ar« going to be pushing the work of the United Nations along a path other than that defined in the resolution. And then when the matter comes before the General Assembly this question of tl?e Congo, at that time we, too, will be subject to criticism together with you, Mr. Secretary -General, for having exceeded the task assigned to us in this resolution. 17-20 Accordingly, it seems to me that the problem for this Mission is only to aid the Congolese in finding a peaceful solution within the framework of the unity and integrity of the Congo. If we want some other task to be assigned to it, it seems to me that we should wait until the debate on the Congo comes up again in the General Assembly and then we could propose that another task should be assigned either to the same commission or to some other body to be set up, and then that body would have to work within that new framework, or, if we feel that the situation is sufficiently Serious, we could convene a further meeting of the Security Council to set up a specific body for pacific purposes. 21' But I think that this, body that w,e have.been talking about now for the past two or three meetings is merely a, Conciliation commission, and I think It would be t • ' '•• • • • • • '• '' '': -•••• - . .' .' . '.',;'•'••' '%,..: useful if we could first define its member shipt and then we, would be able clearly to define its task. Now, if I may be permitted, I should like to turn to the cablegram that has come tip us from .Mr. Kasavubu, Here is a further argument in favour of what I have b$en.saying. It seems ttyat Mr. Kasavubu was badly informed; that, as regards this commission, it was not a question of revoking or examining the legality or illegality of the act of revocation of the powers of Mr. Lumumba. This is not the task of the Committee or of the conciliation commission that is to be set up; neither is it the role of the United Nations. This is one further example of the error into which Mr. Kasavubu seems to have been led, and from the very first moment this seems to have evoked a negative reaction or opposition or an attitude of distrust of this commission. It seems to me that if this comnission can remain a conciliating body, and if at the very outset all of the parties in the Congo can be made to realize that this is a conciliation conmission, we will have less resistance from one side or the other with respect to this new body, and accordingly we will be more effective, as far as the achievement of the task of the commission is concerned, than we would otherwise have been. Mr. WIRJOPRANOTO (Indonesia): My delegation has only one interest in the Congo: to safeguard the independence of the Congo. From the very beginning, our only aim has been to support the true Congo national movement • Our sole objective has been to defend the freedom of the Congo, which found expression, on 30 June last, in the inauguration of the Government of President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba, These are our three guiding principles: preservation of Congolese independence, support of the true Congo national movement, and a return to national unity. We believe that this should also be the starting point for the conciliation conmission in the Congo. This commission should seek, in the first place, conciliation between President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba. Secondly, we hope that these efforts to restore national unity will encourage Tshombe and others of hie Kind to adopt the right course in line with the true Congo national movement. 22-25 The task of the conciliation commission should indeed be clear. It must, through the process of conciliation, assist in the preservation and strengthening of Congolese independence on the basis of political and legal realities leading toward national unity. To discharge this task, we shduld like to see the membership of the conciliation commission ket>t as small as possible. For practical reasons, we would prefer a membership^ o'f three. In our opinion, it is essential that a common view exist among the members of the conciliation commission. This is even a prerequisite for''any chance of success. It would be worse than folly to send a large commission*'to th'e Congo, composed of members with varying points of view. There is 'eOLready enough dissension in the Congo. Indeed, the conciliation commission can only-rep re sent one point of view; it must be of one mind. 26 Moreover, we believe that the fullest understanding and co-operation must exist between the Conciliation Committee and the Secretary-General. We should have the assurance,before the Conciliation Committee even goes to the Congo, that its members are of one mind, that there is a close understanding and co-operation between the Committee and the Secretary-General and that the Conciliation Committee will enjoy all assistance of the representative of the Secretary-General in the Congo, Tto v-as* oJ the Conciliation Committee is a delicate one; it requires patience and perseverance« It must be carried out by persuasion, not imposition^ But at the same time it must be made clear to all parties that this approach reflects a strong and firm determination to implement the Assembly's resolution of September last in all its conssquences and as soon as possible. Therefore, the Committee must have the wherewithal to discharge its task purposefully and with no further hesitation* The United Nations must act nov, It cannot afford to lose any more ground in the Congo, It cannot afford to hesitate any more in completing the unfinished business of securing the total withdrawal of Belgian forces from the Congo. This remains tto the unfinished business, notwithstanding the endeavours of the Secretary-General to secure the withdrawal of the Belgian forces from the Congo, We certainly appreciate the past efforts of the Secretary-General in this direction. We appreciate greatly what he is doing now. But there is a need to push on these efforts of the Secretary-General so that the perfidious deeigns of Belgium in the Congo may be eliminated once and for all. The United Nations Command in the Congo must take a clear stand. It is about time that the United Nations Command abandons its so-called neutrality in the Congo, In the struggle against the reimposition of a new-style Belgian colonialism upon a free, independent and sovereign country, the Republic of the Congo, the United Nations cannot be neutral. It must atand with freedom and, independence and against colonialism in all its manifestations. Let me add here t&it this is not a question of interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of the Congo. Most of us are newly-independent countries. We hold our independence dear. We are even sometimes considered overly sensitive on tnis point, we know very well, therefore, as do all the 27-30 other Members of the United Nations, what constitutes interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of the Congo. But let us also be r.s clear on what does not constitute interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of the Congo. Firstt to assist the parties concerned -- the parties which themselves have requested the assistance of the United Nations — to assist these parties, through the process of conciliation,does not constitute interference in the internal affairs of the Congo. Secondly, to support the elected Government of the Republic of the Congo la its struggle against the reimposition of Belgian colonial rule, hiding behind a Congolese facade, does not constitute interference in the internal affairs of the Congo. The choice is clearly one between the elected Government of the Republic of the Congo or Belgium colonial rule. For the United Nations there can only be one choice: to support actively the elected Government of the Republic of the'Congo in accordance with the principles and purposes of the Charter. •"•• "•'•'*' In fact, Belgium has lost no time in taking full advantage of the so*fcalled neutrality of the United Nations. It has used this so-called neutrality to undermine the very authority and prestige'of the Organization in the;Congo. And if we hesitate much longer, we may well find that the situation in the Congo has become far worse --far worse than it even was in the first few days after 20 June. • '" '"''• • • •' • • .••.,.••,:; ,. . ! Belgium is already coming back everywhere into the Congo.' Belgian material' and personnel ere pouring everywhere into the Congo. And this is not the sort of material and personnel that ordinarily would be channeled through the United Nations for the economic development and reconstruction of the Congo. What Belgium is sending back into the Congo are military and para-military equipment and personnel, as well as high colonial administrative officials. What a strange and paradoxical situation exists in the Congo. No one seems to be safe in Leopoldvil.\e and in Katanga except the Belgians. The Congolese people, the United Nations personnel, are being harassed, but not a single Belgian is troubled. Who has the upper hand in the Congo? It io indeed amazing how openly the Belgians are exercising their influence in the Congo. They are quite brazen about it. One can read practically every day, in the most authoritative newspapers, of the increasingly important role that Belgian experts are again playing in the Congo's central administration. One reads that the former Belgian civil servants are drifting back to top-echelon posts in Leopoldville. An article in yesterday's New York Times noted that the United Nations Command had reasons to believe that a recruitment centre in Brussels is channeling officials of the former colonial administration and other Belgian personnel into key posts in the Congo, where they "become, in effect, superiors of the United Nations advisers. Really, how long can the United Nations' maintain its position of so-called neutrality? How long can the United Nations stand by while Belgium reimposes colonialism in the Congo? We know something about attempts to reimpose 22-35 colonialism upon a free and sovereign country. We have some experience w5.th this sort of thing. But I do not think I could describe it any better than is dons in the 3! October issue of Time Magazine, certainly one of the foremost conservative magazines in the United States. An article in that magazine states: "... Belgian advisors and experts on Tshombe's payroll virtually run the Katanga government departments and provide leadership for the Army. Every government minister has a Belgian chef de cabinet to advise him on every move; more often than not, the Belgian summons the minister when he wants him, sits while he stands." It is high time that the United Nations corrects this state of affairs. It can do so by taking a clear stand in the Congo. We. recognize that mistakes have been made in the past. But if the United Nations takes a clear stand now, we are convinced that a completely new atmosphere will be created in the Congo. Then the leaders and the people of the Congo — perhaps even Mr. Tehombe -- will place their confidence in the United Nations. This is, after all, what everybody is waiting for. The first task, however, is to rid the Congo of the nefarious activities of Belgium* This is the greatest obstacle to conciliation. Once that is removed, once the United Nations adopts a clear position in the Congo, we are convinced that the elected leaders of the Congo will be able to recover their national unity and move ahead with the task of national reconstruction in a climate of peace.. ., In conclusion, the Indonesian delegation is rather reluctant at present to take a decision on sending a conciliation committee to the Congo composed of the entire Asian-African membership of the Advisory Committee. However, we would be happy if this meeting could reach agreement on the terms of reference of the conciliation committee, on its most practical composition and on all the other preparatory measures I have mentioned as the prerequisite for the successful carrying out of its task. If possible, we do not want to adopt a definite decision now. The SECRECY-GENERAL; I am sure that we have all listened with very great interest to that intervention, but I may perhaps add that we have here before us an immediate practical task,to which the representative of Indonesia addressed himself. I think it is an urgent one, and although the matters he discussed and the points he raised are very important, I take the liberty of suggesting that we try to aim directly at the practical task before us. I can add that there will be, I am quite sure, plenty of opportunity to discuss these other substantive matters fully fairly soon, because I have requested Ambassador Dayal to present by Tuesday of next week a report on the present situation. In that report I shall also publish the exchange of letters with Belgium which has taken place recently. I think that exchange of letters — which, through some kind of leak, was referred to also in the New York Times article -- vi.".'. prove that, in the sanse you fear MTV Ambassador^ there is no neutrality at all on the United Nations side, and there is no hesitation at all in the definition of the line because, as you may know, on the basis of the resolution, paragraph 5(a)> I requested full withdrawal of all assistance, military or non-military, provided by the Belgian Government, and also requested that any further assistance which might be forthcoming should be channeled through and approved by the United Nations, which seems to be the clear basis. However, with this st=md taken and with this forthcoming report, I feel that it is practical and natural if we on this occasion limit ourselves to the question of the commission, but I thank you for your speech. Mr. LOUTFI (United Arab Republic)t (interpretation from French): I agree with you entirely, Mr. Secretary-General, on the manner in which we should act here. We should begin by appointing the members of the commission and then study the question of its competence and its terms of reference. Those are two very important points which we should determine. The representative of Tunisia has already told us that in the consultations which took place before this meeting the general opinion was that we should have a commission consisting of all the members of the Advisory Committee who wish to participate in this visit to the Congo. Concerning the suggestion made by the representative of Indonesia, certainly it has considerable weight. He is, perhaps, right, but froia a realistic and practical standpoint we cannot defer this-matter further because for more than a month now we have not been able to appoint the members of this commission, and I think personally that it would be very difficult to do other than include aH fifteen members of the Advisory Committee, on condition that they all wish to participate. 41 Mr. BARNES (Liberia): Before proceeding to discuss the subject of our meeting this morning, I think it would be appropriate for me to express, on behalf of my delegation, to the representative of Ireland our deepest oymjat-hy at the loos that his Government has sustained in the death of Colonel MacCarthy in the Congo as the result of an accident. I am sure that the other members of the Advisory Committee would want to associate themselves in this expression of sympathy to the representative of Ireland. At the last meeting of the Advisory Committee I raised the question of consultations with the leaders in the Congo prior to the constitution of a conciliation committee. I inquired whether the Representative of the Secretary- General had sought to consult any of the leaders in the Congo about the desirability of sending such a commission to the Congo and, if that had not been done, whether it would not be preferable for consultations of that kind to be held before the conciliation commission was established. In reply to my question the Secretary-General quoted parts of a cablegram from Ambassador Dayal. I should like to read out portions of that cablegram, as recorded in the verbatim record of our meeting: "The concensus was that if ^/the good offices team/represented a common line of approach with full authority of the United Nations and with clear terms of reference it would help in the process of leading the politicians, including Tshombe, along more realistic lines. But advance preparations here would be essential and some measure of prior approval of leading personalities necessary". I would emphasize those last words: "some measure of prior approval of leading personalities necessary". In his further statement I think that the Secretary-General said that we must take into consideration which personalities should be consulted. He mentioned President Kasavubu. He felt that Mr. Lumumba would also come into the picture. As regards Mr. Tshombe, his opinion was that for the integrity of the territory of the Congo it must be taken into consideration that Mr. Tshombe is in effective control of Katanga. I cm in full agreement that there ia1 'great urgency about the constitution of the conciliation commission. * I -'believe ttofirt? 'this commission must .go to the'Congo aa soon as possible for the purpose of conciliation•. But I h&vs my doubts about the utility 6f such a:commission's going to the Congo -unleca some effort h&s been made to consult wiih the leaders in the Congo on the desirability of sending a'conciliation commission there. . The commission in question will not be a commission of inquiry; it will be a conciliation commission. Under the resolution- the purpose of the commission is to assist the Congolese people in'reconciling their differences, for the purpose of the integrity and.ianity of the Congo. It seems to me that some effort should be made to consult those persons with whom the commission-will have to deal when-it goes to the Congo. We have a cablegram tere from President Kasavubu in which he points out that it Is h'is understanding that the purpose of .-the -commission is .to inquire into the revocation act which he recently pronounced regarding the dismiscal of Lumumba/ the creation of the group of commissioners and the suspension of 'Parliament. That ia a complete miss tat eraent of the purpose of the commission. The reason for the misstatement is that there has been no consultation with Mr. 'Kaeavubu about the purpose of the commission. Everything hc,s been left 'open to conjecture and speculation. I again ask, Mr. Secretary-General, whether it wo>ild be desirable for us to'proceed to constitute this commission prior to any efforts being made to consult the leaders in the Congo about the desirability of such a commission going to the Congo for the purpose of conciliation. 46- Mr. THIAM (Senegal) (interpretation from French): I think it would be a good idea to try to make the debate brief, and the problem we have before us should be conaidered exactly, otherwise we risk too long a discuosion on a matter which I think could be solved quite rapidly. In my opinion, after having studied the text of the resolution, only todf\y, I am afraid — I apologize; I was not a member of the United Nations when the resolution was voted on — the firet question which arises is the desirability of sendingthie commission to the Congo. In the first discuosion in the African group, I understood that th« sending of this commission should be undertaken now. After studying tiie resolution, I eee that it says this ccjaniBQlon could be sent to the Congo when necessary. This is exactly what it says in the resolution, This means that we night send it, or we might not send it, bearing in mind the circumstances,.end after seriously studying the desirability of sending euch a commission. From this point of view I should like to say that if we visa to send a comoiscion to the Congo, we must in the first place be sure that it will be likely to succeed, and this presupposes preparation and especially the preparation of a climate which would allow for its success. After having studied t£ie telegram sent to us by Mr* Kasavubu, and after also having studied eone reactions of other leaders in the Congo, I feel that there is certainly sone reticence in the Congo, because the United Nations is accused of having objectives which in fact it is not aiming at. We are told here, for instance, that Mr*. Kasavubu believes ve are intervening in the Congo in tiasir iaiwssaal affairs, and especially the study of the legality of internal acts. If we lee.ve on one side the position of Mr. Kasavubu, and study the position of other leaders who are in conflict with him, we also see that they have some misgivings, because they are not sufficiently aware of the general intentions of the United Nations. Therefore, I wonder if it is desirable to send a conciliation commission immediately to the Congo before we have had some preparation and before these parties have been told exactly what the purpose of this commission is. I think this is very important. My colleague from Liberia has just referred to this, and I insist very strongly on it, because without prior preparation there cannot be any conciliation, if there is not a minimum of confidence from the parties. This is a question which I believe we should study seriously, ftiis 10 the first question I em raising: Is it desirable that we should decide now to send a conciliation commission, if we do not make an effort to gain the confidence of 1*7-50 those vhoo we intend to conciliate? We could discuss this* But supposing ve agree that it is desirable to immediately send a commission? I think it would then be a goo• d ide'a to ••defin• •••• '•••..-e . very precisel; » ' y the purpose of the. ccaamicsibri.'.-. . I have just heRrd names which could be given to this commission. Some rup have spoken of en inquiry commission. I think that if we vleh to avoid any criticism, we should abide strictly by the terms of the resolution, 'which is very clear on this point: it speaks of a commission, in conirultation with the Secretary-General, for the purpose of conciliation. : v :.-:• : ,' . ".:" '.'."> I think we should tell the Commission which nay go to the Congo what its role should be, and I think that it would even be a good idea — this is only a suggestion which may not be accepted, but it is my opinion — if the Commission had written instructions stating as clearly as possible the terms of reference of its mission. This is the second point which I wish to raise. My third and final point is that of the composition of the Commission. We have already discussed this and we have the following difficulty. On the one hand, some people think that the Commission should be as restricted as possible for reasons of efficiency, while others think it should be as large as possible because all African countries should participate in it. I believe that we shall have to study this ao well, and I think that if we really wish to have efficiency, we should not have too large a Commission. It has been stressed that the Conanisffion should be as large as possible BO as to represent all trends. I do not think that we should establish a Conciliation Commission on the basis of trends or tendencies. When anyone goes to a country for reconciliation purposes, the trends should be reconciled. The Commission should abide strictly by the reason for which it is set up and there should not be any trends within it. These are the three questions which I think we should study: the desirability of sending a Commission to the Congo, the precise definition of the purposes of the Commission, and its composition. I think that we could have a useful discussion on these three points and, by restricting ourselves to that, avoid losing time. Mr, Krishna MEKON (India): I should like your assistance and guidance with regard to certain matters. I came here this morning to assist my colleague in the matter that is already proceeding and also to inform the Advisory Committee and yourself about certain items on which the Government of India is exercised or wishes to seek information and possible action. Therefore, ve are only continuing the processes that have been operating in the United Nations. I do not know whether you would like me to deal with these two matters separately. You are now on the question of the Commission, the inquiry and the rest. 52-55 The 8SCREItARY->QBNKRAli;' 1 think that it vould be practical If you concentrated on the Commission. Your colleagues, of course, vould also be Interested to hear your views on other matters. / Mr» Krishna MENON (iniia): In the first place/ I shall have to revise my tkinking on this after hearing the representative of Liberia. The Secretary-General, to get out of the difficulty of naming the Commission, referred to paragraph 3. I confess that, although I have read it so many times, each time I read it something more turns up. If you read the paragraph carefully, it is not a paragraph appointing a Commission, or even asking for one. All it Bays is; n.«.with the assistance as appropriate of Asian and African representatives to assist the Congolese people to a speedy solution, etc.n This really means that the paragraph does not tie us to a Commission of Conciliation, One could sand a Commission to distribute food in the circumstances, or anything else, but with all the private and public talk that is going on, people seem to think that this is a kind of dead hand on us and these are marching orders. I would draw your attention first of all to the fact that we may not send It under the'. resolution without making it clear and, secondly, to the earlier point which I mentioned about the general orientation of this Commission on the lines which I spoke* about before. Therefore, there is nothing inconsistent with this resolution. If we send the Commission, we are generally charged with the purposes of this paragraph, and not as though it is created under it in express terms, . . . And; now we' have the two .statements made by the representatives of Liberia and.Senegal,, With regard to these, I preface my observations by saying that the Government of India's position is that there is an item on the Congo on the agenda. We have been, although we have made no fuss about it, rather worried about the fact that an emergency session of the General Assembly was called three or four days before the regular session because of the critical situation. 56 We have been here five or six weeks, and speaking for myself, I have a Parliament opening up in a few days vbere the eaae degree of limitation on debats cannot "be exercised and I could not say this is a matter concerning the security of India r.nd, therefore, I cannot give information. All these problems arise in our constitutional procedures. As a result, in consultation with our colleagrvaa, and for their advice, we have stayed our hand in pushing the discussion of this item in the General Assembly, That relates to what I am going to say later on, Now, Mr. Secretary-General, the Liberian representative evidently is rather worried. The idea is that — to use this word without any misunderstanding — the arm of the United Nations, the projection of the United Nations into the Congo, is to be with the consent of all the gentlemen who claim authority in that area. The Government of India is put in an extremely difficult position. There are officers and men of the President's army in the Congo, and we find ourselves in a difficult position with regard to that, and, therefore, we would have to resist quite emphatically any suggestion that the operations of the United Nations — which I shall come to later on — the operations of the United Nations are Taovad by these factors. The matter came up in the Security Council under chapter 6 — which I have just checked up with Br. Bunche -- and, as frequently happena in these questions, the reference Is made under chapter 6 because we do not want to heat things up., And under chapter 6 are bread matters which lead up to chapter 7- Anyway, the reference is under chapter 6« For obvious reasons I do not want to mention parallel matterso You licvf. difficulties with chapters 6 and 7 getting mixed up in the past. It is under chapter 6, modified by the "uniting for pec/jeful solutions", which is brought about before the General Assembly. So the general competence of the General Assembly under chapter 6 or its content remains, and there can be no question of psking anybody's permission to go there. Now, that takes us to the position of our Government. No one knows better than you, Mr« Secretary-General, that the Government of India has always said that any assistance, intervention, or whatever you like to call it, any participation, must always be usta? utv cprcovci proviso, ae in. regarde. f or example, that th~ Government 01 area agrees, and at that tijne, since, under chapter 6f the reference was made on the request of the Government of the Congo, we had no difficulties. That is still our position. Therefore, we cannot accept the position that someone else has to be consulted. 57-60 Then I ask you to look at this resolution again. It says in the preamble:: "... protecting and advancing the welfare of its people, and to safeguarding international peace, it is essential for the United Nations to continue to assist the Central Government of the Congo,", (A/RES/iklk (ES-IV) Presumably, that is the mandate of the Secretary-General* You may remember, Sir, that I said in the general debate that the Security Council, when passing resolutions, must take some responsibility for their consequences. Then it goes on to say, in the operative paragraph: ; "... to assist the Central Government of th<=» Congo in the restoration and maintenance of law and order" — it defines it in terms -- "throughout the territory of the Republic of the Congo, and to safeguard .-..".. (ibid,) So that this matter raised by Liberia would come in the way of not only this committee, but of other operations, because it might well be told at some time that if Indian personnel, under the authority I mentioned Just now, were to come under the query of Individuals or groups of parties who may de facto ba recognized for any purpose, but not otherwise, we would have an extremely difficult situation. Therefore, Mr. Secretary-General, who has now the sole authority in this matter will not count against this position. At least the Government of India could certainly not agree to this 6.1 Number two is that we have no special views about the numbers or who should go and this, that and the other. All that we would say is that it would have to be the representatives of a country and not of this Committee. That i=3, the Governments must be free to send competent people in that way. That, I understand, is already the position, and we are not only willing but we are quite ready to abide by any general private understandings reached in this matter. I would also like to say that, so far as the Government of India is concerned, ths confining of this group to Asian and African representatives is not of its volition but what is in the resolution. That is a principle we have to follow. That is all I would like to say about this particular matter. At an appropriate time, if you will let me speak about the others, I will do so. The r.?.CP.E1?CP.Y-QENERAX: I will not. raise ths question about which chapter of the Charter is applicable. It is a little obscure, but it has an important baaring on the whole question raised by you, and for tbat reason I may say Just one word. I can point out, for exaaple, that in this resolution the General Assembly has referred to Article ^9, Art ids ^9 is an article in Chapter VTI, and there are also other indications that the Security Council considered itself as acting under Article Uo. I h&ve in fact considered that quite essential because, as the representative knows, wo have in the Secretariat and in the Comand several times run into a case where tlis Ch:v';f of State or some other authorised authority, like the central Government when it was still functioning, has expressed views, and strong views, on the participation of such and such a man or such and such a nstion. I have then based myself on the half-mandatory nature which derives from Article ^0. There is a general interest involved, and I havo carried through that stand consistently in the sense that I have refused them to intervene in what must be considered internal United Nations affairs. In that way, I feel, I have protected those who participate in the operation, and I feel in duty bound to do so. Whether that is exceeding Chapter VI or within Chapter VT, with the general rights which the United Nations has assumed in assisting the country, I do not want to say. I have, however, counted myself on the legal basis in Article 1*0, which, as I said, is a stand that can be justified in the light of tho history. ,62-65 Anyway, the conclusion ia the one, I think, that the representative, would like to Bee us draw: that, while we must take, seriously into account the views expressed by the authorities, to the extent that it is a question of an internal United Nations operation or a United Nations responsibility the United Nations is solely, in control of it.. , ' . There is,a point here that I would like .to submit to the meabers of the Committee. We heard that. Mr. Krishna Menon has to go to another meeting and has views which he would like to express on other issues. I have six inscribed -on the list of speakers but I guess that, all the same, the members would wish to hear hia views on the other issues too, so as not to detain him unnecessarily here. Mr.- Krishna MENQN (India): I will not take more than five or six minutes,. Sir. 1 only want to enunciate these matters for, you to considerr First of all, as I said, our general orientation has been for this item to come before the Assembly as quickly as possible, and you will rcaember that my Prime Minister referred particularly to the calling of Parliament. My Government would like sone indication, up to date, as to what are the prospects of this meeting, either given to this Committee or to be given to us afterwards in the nomal way. That is one point. The eecond is to acquaint you of the fact that, unless we proceed towards that in sonie fora, the situation would further deteriorate and it may lead to acrimonious debate in the Assembly itself. This, of course, is another matter. The particular point to which I was asked to refer was whether the Secretary-General through his own machinery here, would arrange for authorized English translations of the constitution of the Congo and also give us the legal opinion — we have our own advice on this matter in great detail -- the legal opinion in regard to various pivotal procedures that have taken place. I do not want to debate on this. The second is a suggestion, and this is made merely as a suggestion or thinking aloud-: that is, in any action that is taken, the individual — and I am now talking about Congolese individuals— a Congolese individual, in whatever way, without further interference and confusion, should be reminded of the fact that when the time comes under Congolese law he will be responsible. What I am trying to point out is this: supposing one of those people who take the who.le power give orders to a person to loot the treasury or to kill somebody or to do this or that or the other. He cannot plead that order in bar of future punishment. I mean, it is more like the Nuremburg procedure. They must know that Just saying that "My commander asked me to do this", that would not do in the circumstances. In our opinion, even if no action was immediately taken, the spread of that idea would prevent more pretenders arising and also perhaps restrain their hands. It may be for the Secretary-General to consider how he should inform his representative in that way. As you know, we have no access to him. We have been quarantined in the United Nations and we have no intention of making any direct contacts. Let us take the fact — supposing for example one of Colonel Mobutu!s officers apta in a w?y that is not in consonance with the Congolese law — either looting the treanury of killing off soir.sbody or taking away whatever he wants. Now, he must know that when the time comes --it may be a month hence or a year hence — he will be persoraliy made accountable for it, because the responsibility, especially in a Municipal society, before the law cannot be esceped. So if they feel that they c&nnot Bay that the head constable told me so -- then that may get somewhere« It may not be practical, but that is that. But v.hs more practical matter that has to be rair.ed is not a theoretical argument — whether Belgian technicians or civilians can go there or not. First of all, the resolution gives the Secretary-General complete authority in this matter -- according to the reso3.ution — with regard to the taking of all steps, essential for the United Nations to safeguard international peace — and also with regard to law and order. The view of my Government is that every Belgian there, except those who are eng^sed in councils of ministry of aiding the sick and the wounded and so on, they are a provocation fcr the breach of international peace. And I think the Belgian Government talks with its tongue in its cheek when yesterday it spoke about the fact that the United Nations may not come in the way of giving the technics! aid to this poor part of Africa which is so sorely needed -- having forgotten that for one hundred years that has not been forthcoming. 67-70 You see, I think it is time that ve took with the Belgian Government in the Assembly, within the context of the United Nationst the same ctrcng attitude we took with regard to the British, the French and the Israelis in the occupation of Egypt. I am not suggesting for a moment that there has been any support or anything of that character; and my Government cannot make any distinction in this matter whatever may be the legal theory, with regard to the Belgian personnel or Belgian volunteers or anything of that kind. They are not vanted there. They have been sent away. They are an irritant. And what is more, there is no doubt that their purpose is like Colonel Westerling is in Indonesia — Just a great danger in this place. Now, the Secretary-General nay say, nThatTs all very well, but what do I do about them?* We want to inquire from you, presumably Belgians or other nationals, including our own, require,come papers to go into the Congo. It should not be difficult for the Administration to promulgate measures with regard to the presence of non-Congolese people there. After all, that is what in our country, in the municipalities, we would call security areas — people do net wander about in these places — since my understanding is that the ports, all the points of,ingress and egress, except through smuggling processes, except tfcrcugh il31oit entry, are under United Nations de facto control. I would l^-.e to know; who permits these people to go in? What papers do they shov?? And regulations have to coma in, in that vay. Supposing, for example, these operations ultimately affect the safety of United.Nations personnel. You eay, at your request, we have sent in personnel with twelve cartridges « not with sufficient weapons for their own defence. Now, in an instance where this goes on in this way, that matter would become very serious. 71 Therefore, we would like consideration to "be given to the taking of very serious measures, and it should be made clearly known that these steps would be taken. Whatever form of Congolese authority is available for this purpose could be so used that no new arrivals are possible in this area, and from a given date -- three days, five days or ten days, or whatever it is — all non-Congolese personnel who are not there for United Nations purposes would have to register, or something of that character. That is what is done everywhere else. These are aliens, and they should not be wandering about in order to make trouble. They have made enough trouble for one hundred years, and they ought to go out. Secondly, I would say that, where paragraph 6 of the resolution deals with "provision of arms or other materials of war, military personnel or other assistance'1, that has to include money. It is quite obvious that any proper legitimate transmission of money can easily be stopped through the same channels I mentioned, in the same way that we stop money going in and out of certain territories But there is no possibility of stopping through diplomatic cover and things of that character. But therefore we should be mindful of the previous part of the resolution, which says "Calls upon all States, without prejudice to the sovereign rights of the Republic of the Congo, to refrain from the direct and indirect ...n. Therefore, unless there is a direct request from the legal authority in the Republic, or the United Nations, any provision of this character would be contrary to the resolution and the purposes of the Charter. These, then, are the matters we wanted to raise: Firot, we would like a translation of the Constitution. We have our own, but that is not sufficient. Secondly, we would like to know the view of the Legal Department of the United Nations with regard to the legality or illegality of certain authorities or personnel. I do not wish to air our own views at the moment. Next, we should like to have consideration by your advisers, Mr, Secretary- General -- not this Committee, "but your advisers — as to whether it is possible, In a sense, to strike a certain degree of concern or apprehension in the minds of the people that "You cannot get away with it; if you commit murderous actions now, you will be accountable afterward in your persons". We should like to have some consideration of the question of hov far that can go. 72-75 Then there is the question of how to stop the new arrivals of non-United Nations and non-Congolese personnel in this area, and whether any arrangement can be made with the Central Government, in co-operation with the United Nations, to issue permits to get in. Then, at least, we would know who is coming and who is not, and we would "be able to give a better answer. Then there is the question of the supplying of all this money. People have been asking us who pays Mobutu's army. I asked one of my friends the other day, and he said: "You know, the Congolese have plenty of money". I thought they had not. That is why we have all this trouble in the Fifth Committee. If the Congolese have plenty of money, let us send Mr. Loutfi or somebody else to collect it. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: I can give a very quick reply. You will be provided with an official translation of the Loi Fondamentale. As to legal comments, we do not want to interfere in their affairs, but if we can make such comments -- Mr. KRISHNA MENON (India): As a Member of the United Nations, my delegation has a right to ask for it. The SECRETARY-GENERAL: If we can make such comments an internal document of this Advisory Committee, I think that is roughly what would be defensible. I would not like to make it a General Assembly document at the present stage. As to the responsibility of individuals, I will draw the attention of our representatives to the viewpoint expressed. We keep a very good record of what people do, and they are aware of that, because at regular intervals it is presented to them orally — with considerable emphasis, I understand, from the Command and from Mr. Dayal. Ae to the Belgian civilians or military, I have already stated that I have taken what I think is the most far-reaching line I can take on the basis of the resolution --so far without any other effect than, as you have seen, considerable noiee. But I would be happy to have support for my stand. I know it is a stand supported.by the vast majority of the General Assembly and of the Security Council. Anyway, there is the record, and you will have it next week in the report. On this same point, the airport arrangement is such that we are in complete control, to the extent that we can get to know about it-j of anything military in character « military personnel or arms — but, on the other hand, we have from the very beginning, on the basis of arrangements with the then functioning ,.-(, Government, left immigration control and customs to Congolese civilian groups. That is, of course, a matter that may have to be reconsidered. I just want to; give you the facts. Finally, as regards money, I think the paradox to which you point may be explained away by saying that some Congolese may have money but the State of the Republic of the Congo has not. • ' ' v • • . -..*-..• Mr. Krishna MENON (India): Who pays MobutoU army? The SECRETARY "GENERAL; I do not know; partly, they are not paid at all. But anyway there is a mystery in the situation because there are funds available. Obviously we do not know, in legal terms, the source of it. It does give rise to a problem wnether it can be under paragraph 5 or 6 of the •••••' . » ' " • ' • • '' : ', ....•' ' . ' . resolution; I think that we might have to look at. it. It is not very easy to check such movements because, as you know, without an effective foreign exchange control system, even in very well organized countries, it is one of these commodities which leap over borders very easily, in both directions. Anyway, there is a problem and it is recognized; we will not forget about it. Mr. Krishna MENON (India): With great respect to the Secretary-General, so far as our Government is concerned, we would fully support any attempts, any steps taken in this direction and would regard that to be within the competence of the functions we have assumed and which are authorized by the resolutions. We think this is more or less an operational area. ¥ou have so many UN personnel there — I do not know how many, I know how many we have there — and we must see to their security and safety and see that there is no affront to their dignity — all these things must be considered. Therefore, as far as my Government is concerned, we would fully support any action that is taken. 77-80 Now that you have made this comment,, it is time to consider, since a great part of the administration is within your competence in many ways, wbstLer this question of immigration and customs cannot be looked at by seme aort of ' working arrangement so that we will have knowledge of that sort of thiug* Secondly, may I also say, without being misunderstood, the impression should not be gathered by the world — certainly not in this assembly — that there is scrutiny, unofficial or official, regular or irregular, in regard to certain countries and certain peoples, but not of others. That general impression is quite wrong, I an sure, but it may be believed. I em very grateful to the Secretary-General for his offer to let us have thise Anyway, I will send the Secretary-General a note on what we mean by individual responsibility. The S.50HETARY"G]SNERA.L; I can add just one thing concerning customs and immigration. It has been natural, first of all, to use diplomatic means; that is to say., to get the Belgian Government in line by the'usual means. That is, of course, the necessary first step. If that does not work and tills other question does arise, ?".:':. will be,' £»c ^o &*?, iin eni^rcr-'.iant mcv.surs from our side* We nay very well be at this point or come to it, but I have still not given up ths hope that the Belgian Government will see its way to fvill co-opere.btcu. - • . ..,. . . , .- . . •».- ••••-•.-• • - • I think psycho logically the situation is explained by the 'fact that Belgians, for reasons which you fcnov, consider themselves to haVe' a'very r special position in the Congo, somewhat aside "but not outside the 'J.iw". • '.. ./ . •• . .- .: • .-• ..••.- •'•' •' . •••• * •• .., • ,...... ••. Mr. KRISHNA MENON (India): I do not understand that. 'What is the special position of getting out quickly? ' - • ••'.'. :'; 'I. :• ?-. .•;...... -. • • - . • . ..,. .,.,..* . The SECRETARY-GENERAL; Psychologically '— no, that I say this does not mean that I take that view. s Mr. KRISHNA MENON (India): The British did not take that view in' ' India. This is my whole point, because the Belgian Goverument has made some declaration two or three days ago, if the Press reports are to be '"believed) ' talking about its activities, about helping a poor country which must be assisted* Forget, as I said, the days of King Albert.'''But they also h&d a ' hundred years in which to do this, and suddenly they remind ih&ne'eives ot ' '•"•'• •'•' • • -• "• ••.-.'" ' '.' •".:'. •' • • .'• .- ;' . ': • «... -v . .... v • their responsibilities. " •• The SECRETAHY-^ECTJRAL; ' Anyway, I think there is agreement B,rouhd; this table about the point. It is not an agreement with Belgium, but4 we ' have to iry to convert them. .' .'"•':••' ••< -• •'•'•.,• • . .. ,•„..'..• Mr. JAJA WACHUKU (Nigeria): 1 want to say that my delegation is r very much, concerned'with the resolution which was passed on ^0' Sbptember1196o> asking, that this committee be pet up. September has gone and October is--oh • the verge of going and this committee has not been seVUp.' To my'mitfd, 'an impression is given that we are not really serious ab6ut impiementing paragraph 3 off the resolution, which says: ..-•,* "Appeals to all Congolese within the Republic of the Congo:1io seek a speedy solution by peaceful means of'all their internal1conflicts foi4 • the unity and integrity of the Congo, 'with'the assistance; as appropriate, of Asian and African representatives appointed by the Advisory Committee ' on the.Ctyngp, in consultation with the Secretary-General, for the purpose ''' ' 82-85 In this particular case, I take it that "conciliation" is not being used in the technical, legal sense, but means the ordinary word "reconciliation". That is my interpretation. Therefore, I would not like to go into the legalistic concept of "conciliation". That being the case, I want to say that the composition of the committee has created a lot of trouble as to what the number should be. The representative of Senegal suggested that we agree on the desire to form the committee. I do not know whether he has been here before, but I think that we have all agreed that a committee should be set up, We do not have two minds in that regard; so it is decided that we should have a committee. Our problem now is what will be the composition of this committee, and, if constituted, what will be the terms of reference. According to the Secretary-General's circular, which was sent to us the other day, paragraph 4 (A) of the letter of 2^ October asks the Advisory Committee to indicate which of the Congolese authorities or personalities the committee would consult. I took it that members considered •'v-ij'.s s;\d were prepared to make concrete proposals today and not spend time going over grounds which we have covered previously. I do not think that we can talk here when the Congolese are dying or alloT 'i£.fc Congolese State to go to coioplete liquidation. To my way of thinking, I think the Congo situation is a vary serious challenge, firstly, to the African States, and, secondly, to the Ltt'iiuM who work in collaboration with them as a group. If we fail in the Congo, then we have no justification to claim a right to independence. Therefore, I would like my colleagues to take this matter very seriously. The other nations in their own zone and in their own regions do not have this type of situation, and, therefore, it is no longer a question of what I like or do not like, whether I like A!s face or B's face or whether I like his deportment or not, but it is what is best for the Congolese people -- that is what should guide this committee. That being the case, from discussions which have taken place outside this committee it is quite clear that you cannot get a committee which will not include all the African and Asian members* That is my reading of the trend as we have been debating this thing behind the scenes. And the resolution itself expressly mentions this, by stating "vith the assistance, as appropriate, of Asian and African representatives appointed by the Advisory Committee on the Congo", 96 I would suggest, in order not to waste any further time, that all the representatives of Asian and African States should be included in this commission. Let us agree on that and not argue about it any more/becffUde otherwise we &h6ll- debate the issue over and over again and will never arriv'e at a conciusidn. '" If we cannot agree on a matter like this here how are we going to bring about reconciliation when we go to the Congo? It is impossible/J Let us agyee'on this, and that will be the beginning of reconciliation because if we are able to reconcile ourselves here we prepare the basis ifor re'cohfcillat'ion in the Congo. If we cannot agree here we might as well throw away the paper1 arid not come •''•' here discussing and discussing and arriving at nothing. i ' ' - ' I am^ not suggesting that members are not conscious of their responsibility to the Congolese people. I suppose it is due to their desire to serve them that ,they are going iLio very great detail, The number of the Asian and African- Members is,fifteen. I hope I am correct, Therefore, what' I am: suggesting is that the commission should be composed of thoee fifteen''Member s:. ' ; If we agree on that it is then necessary for* us to indicate -—as tLe * r .'•/. V^.:;li-,i .•..':•.'"..••::•' . ' . ' - - . . - •• • • . . , , ...... r Secretary-Gencrel wants us to do — -which of the Congolese euthcri'vies"cr 1 personalitie: s tho ccmission shoaVt consult In order to bring about reconciliation '' ' '••" - '- -r-:-:-.. ...;.•:. '.-.. •.?•-.•:•: ...•• • •.;•.••••.•.•-..: -.- •• ..- --:. -., .-- . :i; v/r-'A.. .••-:-^ .••.';- in internal conflicts and to safeguard the unity of the Republic. .And ia . . peragraph. 3 of this resolution, too, it is .clear that the appeal is to Reek e speedy solution b^r peaceful means of all internal conflicts* We do not expect that the commission would go into .every detail of all the internal matters. , . It would confine itself to the essential internal conflicts. Looking through the constitution, with my rusty French and with such assistance as I could obtain, I notice the suggestion we have here in paragraph ta. I em going to make a suggestion, and my suggestion is based on articles 6, 7, 8 and 160 to 170 of the constitutional provisions. I think that if we do not recognize that those provisions are there then we are not beginning at all. The constitution is in being. There are certain institutions it has set up and we have to face that fact. Under article 6 it is stated that there is only one indivisible State of the Congo, and then article 7 tells us that there shall be six provinces in the Congo, while under article 8 it is suggested that there should be a central government, a provincial government, a central institution, a provincial institution and local institutions. There are only two, however, that are well 8t-90 defined under the constitution, and the third one comes into existence in accordance with a lav which was in existence at the time the State come into being. It defines the central institutions as a Chief of State, a government headed by a prime minister, the House of Representatives and the Senste. And then, for the provincial institutions, we have a provincial government headed by a president and a provincial assembly. The other instruments of government that the constitution recognizes are the Economic Council and what I suppose, in our parlance,constitutes the Judiciary. Therefore, seriously speaking, if we want really to bring about peace and understanding we cannot go beyond the central legislature, the Head of State, the central Parliament, the provincial legislature and, if'there has been a judiciary established, the Chief Justice of that, and, if there is one, perhaps the President of the Economic Council. We cannot go beyond that. Local government is no concern of curs. I em saying, as my own suggestion on that question, that if this conmission is set up as I have proposed then, as to personalities, it would have to deal With the Head of State and all the elected members of the House of Representatives, which will include the Prime Minister ~ some people say the legal Prime Minister, while others say the illegal Prime Minister, as the case may be - and all the members of the legislature, so long as they are elscted members, together with thr OH the provincial .level it should be only the Presidents of the Assemblies, because they are the persons recognized by the Constitution. I think that all the trouble, the problems of secession, and so forth, arose from the fact that some presidents decided that they should pull out'of'the Congo vith their ovn provincial legislatures. I say this in the light of my own country's experience. If there is a conflict between the leaders of the Central Government and the leaders of the provincial governments and a commission whose purpose it is to settle the matter ignores the provincial Presidents when It goes to the country, it will be impossible to settle the matter. Hence, as regards the personalities to be consulted, I humbly suggest '-- irrespective of what I may feel about any particular individual — that we must take into account the Head of State, the members of the central lelgislature, that is the Parliament, the members of the House of Representatives and the Senate, and the Presidents of the six Provinces; I do not think we have to consult all the members of the provincial legislatures, but only the Presidents because they are the persons recognized in the Constitution, The Lix Provinces, the six provincial legislatures and the central legislature make up the Government of the Congo, To ignore this fact is simply to ignore reality. If there is a Chief Justice — who ruust have been selected for his wisdom and his ability in the law and the interpretation of the Constitution — I think that he should be brought into the picture. As for the head of the Economic Council, that is a different matter. Therefore, that is my suggestion concerning the personalities to be consulted. I have made the suggestion in the light of our own experience. I am not talking in mere theoretical terms. From 19^7 to the present day I have witnessed the political upheavals that have led to my own country's independence, I therefore know what I am talking about. We have had political troubles. VJe had threats of secession. In 1953 one of the foremost leaders of our own political party was at the head of such a movement. I know what method we adopted to stop him. If we ignore the personalities to whom I have referred it will be impossible to settle the question. I would not like any member of this Committee to think in terms of who will be the head of this or who will be the head of that* What should concern us is what will be best for the Congo. On that basis what we must do is get these people 92-95 together and agree with them that their legislatures should be cummoned. After all, we are told that these people have been freely elected by the people of the Congo. Their House has not been uioaolved; it has only been cus^enclc-:,".. r.^»> only thing to do is to encourage them to reassemble, without intimidation. If they decide on any leader to be head of their Central Government, the commiesion should by all means recommend to the United Nations to recognize him as the legitimate head of the legitimate Government, In oy own opinion to do anything contrary to this -would be merely to skim the surface and not to get to the root of the problem. I have taken these two points as being what I consider the moet vital aspect of the discussion,. and I would like now to go into other problems affecting the Congo* I said before, as for the presence of the Belgians there, directly or .indirectly, that was not authorized by anybody and this Committee must strengthen the hand of the representative of the Secretary-General "there to see to it that the; get out,, unless we consider that it is with the approval of the leaders, that they have agreed to them being there to assist them in> certain! fields•.•' But this kind of direct or indirect technical assistance, *!iich turns out to be something else, must be completely wiped out in. the Congo, so as to allow the accredited representatives of the -Congolese popple to do their work for their people. We.in .Nigeria feel that any disintegration of the Congo virtually affects us very fundamentally, and we would like tc see a strong Congolese Government, 'because if the Congolese Government is strong it means that one objective which.we nave set ourselves In the tot&l liberation of Africa is achieved. •Th&t being the case, I sincerely hope that this Committee will not continue to debate this mattei\.at random, and will let us decide on this question of the number, the people to be consulted, and then once we agree on that I think paragraph 3 itself of this resolution has supplied the answer to whatever name may b» given to it — a commission to the Congo, and the details contained there, to assist ths leaders of the Congo to settle their internal differences in order to give the United Nations a legitimate government with which it can deal. Mr. ADEEL (Sudan): Like the representative of Nigeria, I have always pleaded that we should not waste time on the composition of this conciliation committee; and, like the representative of Nigeria, I should like to say that it IE obviouo by now that we cannot have a committee composed of less than the fifteen Asian-African members of this group. In fact, I meant to intervene just to support the point of view raised by the representative of Liberia regarding prior consultation uith the leaders of the Congo before dispatching this committee, because we cannot impose a committee on the leaders if they do not want it. But, sir, reading your note of 2k August, where you refer to a concept of appointing an agent or agency, I was under the impression that what you had in mine for the purpose of that agent or agency was the aame thing which the representative of Liberia has in mind also; that la, prior soundings of the Congolese leaders befc the committee is dispatched. 97-100 I hope I am right in that interpretation, Mr. Secretary-General* If that is your view, I think we agree on that essential point, and I would like you, if you will, to elaborate on what your idea was regarding this concept of agent or agency. The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I can do that very briefly P-safer??^ back to point 3, it is said, "Appeals to all Congolese", etc. That is to s&y, it is an appeal directed, addressed to the leaders of the Congo. Then it says, "with the assistance". This word "assistance" obviously means that we are subordinated to the leaders; we are not taking over from them or guiding *£i«i; we are aseisting them. Then, "as appropriate", which obviously also involve a certain recognition of the right of the leaders to have views on this matter. How can we alone say what is appropriate? Then it says, "for the purpose of reconciliation". If the purpose is conciliation, there must be a chance to conciliate; that is to say, the instrument used must be one that serves that aim. It should also be an instrument which is, so to speak, subordinated to the leaders and so shaped, so developed as to be appropriate also in their views. 101 I think tliat these varioue words indicate recognition of the sovereignty of the Congo. For the Commission to go out straight under such circumstances strikes me as somewhat adventurous and somewhat high-handed. On the other hand, I do not feel that it is right and proper to use the United Nations Secretariat representatives — in the first place, Ambassador Dayal, because his is an entirely different function. He should not negotiate such a matter. Under such circumstances I felt that the necessary personal contact with the leaders — necessary under the terms of paragraph 3 — "would be something that could best be handled by somebody that could be chosen and assigned by this Comnittse for the purpose of informing the leaders about the intention of the Committee and inform the Committee about the reactions of those leaders* I think, that for that reason, it would be a good idea to have, so to speak, a tentative agreement here on what the Committee would like to see done and then that somebody talk that over, of course, with a view to trying to get it accepted, but, on the other hand, to be in a position to report back to the extent that this meets objections which the Committee here may wish to take into account. That is what I call an agent's activity or an agency activity. I think thio may be sufficient aa an explanation, Mr._ Q.y.l'30fl-SACXEY (Ghana): If I had intervened earlier, what I was going to suggest was that your paper of 24 October, Sir, had some observations concerning the establishment of a conciliation commission by the United Nations Advisory Committee and that this should be the basis of our discussion. I was not at the last meeting, but it was very clear from reading the minutes that there was only one subject which was a bone of contention in this Committee, namely, the formation of a good offices commission or conciliation commission and, therefore, I feel that we should direct our attention to that particular matter and have it settled and then go on to other matters. That is why I feel that your paper of 2k October is very germane to this discussion this morning. As has been said by speakers who have preceded me, particularly the representatives of Nigeria and the Sudan, it is very clear that the Asian and African members of this Committee are all of the opinion that only the fifteen members of this Committee should go -- or representatives of these fifteen should go to the Congo* Of course, this is our view, but then, you, Sir, have certain obligations under paragraph 3 of the resolution of 20 September; that ia, that the 102-105 Advisory Committee should consult you on this. And, if I may put a concrete point, we have decided that fifteen'should go. Now we ar'e-consulting you on this. If,: in your opinion, you-cannot have"fifteen representatives ;ih the Congo, then I think1 you- f»re at liberty'to tell us so ih«it!'further consultations^ can take place among our • - !f Governments; but, definitely, t'lie'' number of fifteen' na&.lDeen decided. ••'...:•;••• Secondly, there is a scope of activity of this -Commission-, i'f it is appointed',-; in the Congo.' In our view, itr would be a good idea to*'have a very broad basis -6f activity when the CommissionT'gbe'e." It is our opiriibti'that some of the matters whictt can be taken up a'r^ concilia^lbn> or a meeting betweeh'^bhe Conciliation Commissionyr; on the "one hand, and the Various personalities, on th«f-other — the personalities,"•*• of course, concerned can be decided by the Advisory Committe'e* :-...' r In ^fc'he second place, another matter is that Parliisuiierit should- reopen and, ; therefore, "the boneiliatilon Commission might concern itself with that:.' 106 Thirdly, every effort should be made by the conciliation committee to emphasize the Security Council's resolution regarding the sovereignty and the integrity of the entire Congolese territory. If, sir, I may suggest, from the point of view of my delegation, these three matters can form a very broad basis upon which the Commission would act. Then thirdly, in your paper, you made a very good point, sir, that it is very vital that some groundwork should be done by an agent in the Congo, and I think that would be the point which has been raised by the representative of Liberia. Of course, I do not agree with him, that one should take very seriously the telegram from President JCasavubu, because I think he has been misinformed. If indeed this commission is going to interfere in the internal affairs of the Congo, we are opposed to it. We do not think it is the right of any commission or committee of the United Nations to go and pronounce itself on the legality or illegality of any act* I do not think that should be the duty of the commission, and therefore that IB out of the question. In other words, it is very vital to pursue the three points which I have revised: first of all, to give us your view about our idea that all fifteen should go; secondly, the terms of reference which are enunciated — in my opinion, they should be as broad as possible -- thirdly, the agency. If I may give you my view about the agency, or the agent, I would say that a personality irrespective of a nation or nationality, of any group of people here, might be the answer to our question. I feel that if you can appoint a man like Ambassador Padilla Nervo — I am sorry that I keep mentioning him in my speeches, but to me he is a very fine personality, indeed, and is a man who can fire the imagination of people, and, in fact, can bring about the reconciliation of the type we are thinking of — and therefore, my suggestion would be to appoint a man like him, who would be outside this group; someone who himself has a country which has undergone the various difficulties which Africa is undergoing now. I think, sir, that once that is done, once we have appointed the commission, with no doubt of the terms of reference, and the agency has done the background work, or the spadework, then, of course, we can proceed accordingly. These are my views. 10? The SECRETARY-GENERALr On one point I think-you expect me to reply - right'away, regarding the fifteen, because it was a concrete question*' i i-.-n.j expressed already, the last time ^ my grave doubts concerning the possibility -to=j - . operate in a conciliation context with as many as fifteen, and I really do - '•'••' '-"• feel that very strongly. On the other hand, I;do hot'interpret "in consultation1* in the strictly legal sense, that there must be consensus with the Secretary -General, I would- not feel'entitled to quasi-vetoing something; I would bow to the decision, But I may explain why I feel that fifteen is dangerous "for the purpose of conciliation", as the resolution said. Xf you are fifteen, or if there are " - : fifteen, their contacts with the various personalities would obviously take the following form: they must, more or less, call them int because a troop ,of fifteen, plus some secretaries, cannot walk around and come to the offices of ; these people, their homes, and so on and so forthjit';ifl-hot done«; You will' necessarily run inio rather formal prdtedttre, ; Vf"v ' '^ ^ r;:,ii; ; '""'''"Sow", 'we all knov ^hs/fc in'an^'goodroffices committee/' any reconciliation mission, 'it is a subtle" round of personal bontacts/ perhaps 'a quick " <••'•' • succession of contacts,without 'the"publicity and'nbise, that''really4does the trtcki1 - For that rea&on, I think1 thiect', quite apartfrom' other cbnsi&era-bions, a group of this size will find itself to be oh the very heavy side Iri the practical - -' operations. The ideal would be something as small as three, as has been said here; Five°ls betted than fifteen, but worse than three. But I can very well see that — it is felt that a certain width of representation is necessary. However,*I - agree very strongly with what has been said here, that there is no need to have representation of different tendencies, because there should be, in fact, only r one tendency, and that is to assist these men in finding their way to get ; . together. " • : In a certain sense, I think that the group should be Just a cotalyst for '.-'. tendencies within the Congo itself, which I have a kind of'hunch are beginning to crystallize, and we may speed up that in a very useful way; but certainly not by introducing "certain tendenciesn] if I;inay usV'¥tiat; term again. That is my reply to your question. I repeat it:; i tow to the deciBion of the Committee, but, on the other hand, I have the doubts I have expressed and for the reasons I have expressed to you. in Mr. QUAISON-SACKEY (Ghana) :Sir, if I may with humility, I should like to ask you to request the Committee to decide on this matter before any other extraneous matters are brought in, because it is very vital before we leave this place that we should have formed an idea whether the composition is agreed upon or not. The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I have still six speakers on my list, and I vender whether it is not proper to close the list, to take the vote you want to have after the six speakers have had a chance to express their views, and after that wee where we are. Then I may have one or two practical suggestions as to • procedure which I may want to bring out at that stage. Mr. GEERB-EGZY (Ethiopia): I will be very brief. I will take these points one by 6ne. In the first place, regarding the composition of the committee, whatever the name may be, there has been a very important and very extended, consultation not only among the members of the Advisory Committee but also vtthin a group .that feels very much concerned on the matter. The consensus, and in fact the unanimous, decision, was to have the number stated here, fifteen, with the understanding that it is left completely to each individual country that,if any one wished, it would not be obliged to serve. Therefore, so far as my delegation is concerned, that is the understanding at which I have arrived within my own group. I must respect that and I would not accept any change contrary to 1he understanding into : which I have entered within my group. Here let me say that this understanding was arrived at after a very careful analysis of almost all the points raised here, and therefore I frankly feel that I could not go into this question any more. That is the first point. The second point is that, regarding the terms of reference, we feel that paragraph 3 of the emergency session resolution is adequate. Of course, here I think there was a consensus among all of us here that Parliament should meet, and we have agreed to that and we support that. If, in addition to that, it is desired to spell out some broad principles, of course, I would have no objection, but I fear that the discussion will go on while the country ia really facing more and more dlffIcultie0. 112-115 lii connexion with this, r sn'ouli perhaps say a'word or two about the-Question ; of the agency. While it is good- to have someone to dek'in general terms — it ie.t not whether someone is acceptable or not, but in general terms •'•*•* I doubt whether--.n this will not-really take more "time. I should have thought :-- although I will;'.- ; >^; not object — I should have thought that the consultation which has .been ' -;r '-.'., carried out already, however'general it may be, was enough. There may be ' r.: difficulty in the sense of giving some sort of veto €0 some people in the ..= : Ju. country. However, here again, if the majority wished something else, I would, vl^:^-: of course, have no 'choice but to agree to it. But here I must say that, as a practical illustration of what1 we wish to do, I think we should proceed step i -J r . by step and settle one point at a time. Otherwise this thing may go on. I : . . ,, ' . would suggest, in agreement with the representative of Ghana, that we should first>, decide one point, 'sd 4&at at least when we leatre here'people will know that we.•:• -0 i.-.-; have done something/ and'then proceed to something else. I would'-suggest, Sir, that^you-at the a^pprojfi'ia'te1 tine-da*ai/ the c^Jticiuftioti thaiy it i.i^theU^will of the. Adviedry Committee 'i(S6i Sdmpbeif - -tlie oom^ttee-of 66nci34,ationj; as baflt.been described already1 \>ypreceding spoafeirs, including myself., IDhafc ^id,;what I wish; to 's-aV' at the moment;' ••-•"•'••-• :.•-••.. ••<••• .:--'->- ,-: .•:..-'•:. • •' .;..••.-. ,•.;••••-.••,:•.•.--. .•-.'.-. - -.- .>;:;_ 116 Mr. DIALLO (Mall) (interpretation from French): I want to thank the representatives of Nigeria and of Ghana who have in a practical and concrete way brought us back to the issues which seem to constitute the subject matter of our meeting today. Obviously we did not come together this morning to discuss the advisability of despatching a Mission to the Congo. Various reasons have already been advanced on this point, and in order to save time I should like forthwith to give my delegation's view on the two items which are before us, namely, the composition of this Mission and its terms of reference. Before doing this, however, I would like to point out that at the beginning of this discussion, Ambassador Slim reminded us that previous contacts had been, established, that there had been discussion on this point -- and .this was Just recalled again by the representative of Ethiopia. I think this is very important to bear in mind because it will facilitate the work of the Secretary-General to the extent that we do not go back all over again over the pros and cons of this matter that had already been discussed and which led us to accept unanimously the figure of fifteen. And having said that, I do not need to revert to this matter. But my delegation would like to say about this figure of fifteen that if we thought that some criterion had to be found which could avoid hurting the feelings of the Afro-Asian nations that are already participating in a practical way in the solution of the Congo problem, within the framework of the United Nations activities, our idea is that we should not throw oil on the fire. We should try to set aside certain issues as being unrealistic because we do not have any objective grounds for saying that for example my friend, Benaboud, has the same position as I have on this problem. These are suggestive issues that we cannot control and I think it is completely impossible for us to find who would follow a particular trend and who would follow another. Accordingly, this is a matter of conscience and I am convinced for my own part that the fifteen representatives to be sent to the Congo will be deeply aware of the fact that they are not representing their respective Governments or personal positions, but rather that they are representing an international organization of undeniable prestige, namely the United Nations, and that it is solely within the framework of this principle that they will carry out their activities, and that is the reason they are being sent there. 117-120 Now, whether they are fifteen or three does not really matter so long as they are aware that they represent the United Nations; -and that will therefore remove this other objection* I am sure this will be .borne in mind by the fifteen who go to the Congo, and as. soon as contact has been established by a bureau, as we suggested last time, after the.comments made by the representative of Guinea — we would have a Chairman and a Rapporteur who would get into contact with certain Congolese personalitiesj then it would be well for personalities of the Congo to come before as large a group as possible in order to enter into discussion and exchange views; and the larger the group, the more likelihood that the discussion will be fruitful and wise and the more likelihood they will get an absolute majority. That is why, since I feel this is rather important, I have dwelt in some detail on this. Now, as the Secretary-General said a few minutes, conciliation is an objective, and in order to attain this there is a whole range of practical action which could perfectly well be.comprised within the terms •'o f referencei -'...•' * And what is important is to ensure that contents, the necessary rapport have some useful purpo'se. We have to go to the spot-and have maximum information. 121 Therefore, our research Work should be confined to a specific field, end yt* feel we can deal only vith the Central Qovernaent. ' . . - . ,;. Conciliation must be carried out at the summit. If there is a national problem, we hare to' deal at the summit with the national personalities, and at/that level. ;• deal vith provincial issues, vhich would have to be inserted within a much wider- r : framework* ' '' ' '••''• •'•• - •• "• .•'..-.".••• . • .. -.....,-, :.: Accordingly, the question is not whether the commission should go to a \. . ; particular province, to determine whether a particular provincial leader represents one thing or another. Our task should be to work at a higher level, 'and contacts Should be limited to the Central Government. :: I think this Issue is also important, and that is why we are in favour of ,. ; terms of reference, in writing, which would establish a flexible but specific ;. : framework for this commission that is to be sent to the Congo. My last comment relates to the presence of Belgians and any possible action that might retard a solution of the problem of the Congo. I thank Mri Krishna Menon for raising this problem, folloving the 'representative of Indonesia. •;;•.••, It is perfectly possible that ve will not find major difficulties in dealing • with the Congolese leaders* I do not believe we will. I have had the honour to be in the Congo twice, and many delegations here must understand that the difficulties do not arise so much from the United Nations or the commission and its membership; the primary difficulty resides in the fact that our brothers in the Congo have fairly confused issues that have to be dealt with and that it remains for us to deal with. But these difficulties, it seems to me, are aggravated by the presence of Belgiaas. If the Belgians think that they have some special position there — what I myself would call a consciousness of acquired rights that they believe they have in the Congo — I think it would be very well if this commission were to bring back as much information as possible on this point* Considerable work has already been done on this matter by Ambassador Dayal, but a body specifically instructed to deal with conciliation should address itself to this problem as well. If it considers that the major difficulty in the solution of the problems of .the Congo derives from the presence of the Belgians, that would be reflected in the report to the Secretary-General and to us. They could say! "Well, this is the scope of the difficulties — but the primary problem is the presence of the Belgians". Perhaps this is an issue that will arise. 122-125 We therefore think that as regards membership, since there is uaandtaity on we woul• d • as• • k the Secretary-Genera}• • . i ;, . •• ,'y. ..'..- to tak• e into accoun' ' '. ,.. t. the comments we have Just made and we would propose that .the membership of fifteen "be maintained, • -• : * -. .••*•• •.'••• . • . : _, '. t : ' .Is) . Secondly, the terms of . reference should lay down, clearly, that the commission should deal with Congolese problems at the national .level, and not at the .... provincial level* _.;... :••;., ..,.,,. ., : ,. ,,,..., Mr*. %ATftlB3 (Liberia),;, ,%; delegation has supported the proposition that the conciliation commission should be composed o£, fifteen members, and we ero conjmitted to tha1# point, of vie'Ar«. / ; I think that the first act of the commission after it Is constituted should- be to establish contacts vith the Readers with whom ve will deal, so as to. .^ convey tUe true intentions and pi^rppses of the commission and to obtain their - reactions. , . . . / .; .-•-.'• • •-••,. : • -. • ...... •' .U'-i.'-j I should like to refer to an issue on which my, .delegation has e.^preBsed itBKv, views, ,and that is the matter of prior consultation, !Those views were referred -v. to by the representative pf?::$ndi% JC, believe, I only fwantt to say that in my f- opinion, if we ha^-pro9^te^.>))y.,a..^rpc^a.pf.;])r.j.pr .co^ultations, ..cwe certainly would not have been confronted with a telegram which reflects misinformation as , to the true purposes of the commission, and I would not doubt that otter leaders, in the Congo might be Junker ^similar mis apprehensions as to the true purposes . and intentions of this conciliation commission. , 126 Mr. CABA (Guinea) (interpretation from French): I shall be very brief, 15jniting myself to the precise point we are studying this morning, that is, the composition of the Committee* I sincerely believe that, after the Intervention: of my colleague from Tunisia, the Committee must reach a rapid decision* We have considered the problem here, a problem which will not be solved this ' morning, but at least we can clearly see the difficult situation in the Congo* I think that at our last meeting .two. opposing arguments were advanceds - whether to have a small group1 or a large group. We asked &na S^eretery-Genaral to give his suggestions, ftnd he has told us in his note of 2^ October that the delicate task of the Committee meant that it would be desirable not -to have ' . too numerous a group* That was the first argument* The second argument vaa defended by my delegation and by the delegations , of Mali and India, It asked that the Coiffiaittee should have fifteen members«• Finally, we decided to continue our consultations and the Ambassador of : . Tunisia has spofcen on- behalf of those who have been consulting for three days.. -• Our proposal, therefore, is as follows? that all the Afro-Asian States that are membere of -this Cocniittee should be appointed members of the v : Cencilistion Committee. I think'f4,3 C^ V-'spr-jflontB^.WB o.''. ">'ih$.o#ila 8*3.8, we have reached this decision almost unanimously, And so paragraph 3 of the •'•• study of the Se^retary^Qeneral "is not appropriate, that is, that an agency or person is best capable of submitting a report to the people in question, so as to study with them the composition of the Conciliation Committee. We are now ready to take a decision, and we shall eay that the Committee will have the composition either of fifteen members or three members* I think, therefore, that this agency has no further part to play with people who have no right of vetoj that is, they cannot oppose the decision of the General Assembly which asks us to name this Committee in consultation with the Secretary-General* The study of the Secretary-General asks in paragraph 5 whether Member States will be members of this Committee or whether individuals should be appointed to the Committee* I think that only Member States should be members of the Conciliation Committee. It remains to be seen whether the members of this Committee will be chosen from among the members of this Advisory group or whether our respective 127-130 QoYernaent* will be the only ones with the power to appoint representatives to this Coomittee. I think we could solve this question very quickly/ barring in mind the suggestions which have been made* Aa to defining the terms of reference, I think ve should study this matter at a future meeting because ve would have a lot to say about the terms of reference and how ve are to define them* Therefore, sumarizing my statement, ve could agree on the composition of this Committee, and this would be the most rapid meaae of eotablisbing order in the Congo* 131 Mr. HASAN (Pakistan): Mr. Secretary-General, I shall not add to the diversity of views about the size, composition and complexion of this conciliation group. It seems that the fifteen of us, who are said to be needed in the conciliation group, have almost as many views among them on this subject. You yourself, Mr. Secretary-General,came very close to expressing my own opinion, and that is that under paragraph 3 of the resolution which has.been under consideration the assistance has to be sought by the Congo itself, and that is their privilege, whether the consideration of the appropriateness of the resistance is the privilege and the prerogative of this advisory group. That meane that this group can only be sent if it is asked for as a measure of assistance. However, I shall not insist on that interpretation. I ask your permission to speak in order to clarify two points. While you were telling us about the views of your special representative in the Congo — and you read out a communication from him — you said that in one of the paragraphs he said that this group, whichever group might go to the Congo, should hive the full authority of the United Nations. Now, one can understand a group having the authority of the United Nations if it has to take a very important decision, but I do not think full authority is needed for the purpose of conciliation* So I vould like to know what sort of full authority is visualized by your special representative in the Congo, As to the second point, it was mentioned during today's discussion that every individual official, whether he is a constable or a police inspector, should be made to realize that a day of reckoning will come and that he will bear personal responsibility for his actions. In my opinion, Mr. Secretary-General, you agreed very readily and with great alacrity to communicate this view to the people concerned in the Congo. I am very much concerned with this, because we have personnel in the Ctongo, and jon k&ocr the rules of discipline: that a man must carry out the orders of his superiors. But if every constable knows that a day of reckoning will come and that he might be hanged for what he has done, there will be no discipline and no obedience, l^y view is, Mr. Secretary-General, that perhaps the readiness to communicate this view came forth too readily. Therefore, I would appreciate some clarification on these two points. 158-135 Mr. SgCRpTARY»GENERAL: J jbayr to interpret myself what Ambassador Dayal meant by tfee. ".full authority1' of the United Nations. He was, in fact, speaking not only for. himself', but for, .the group. of, Afr;Lcai3.envoys. I do not believe that he meant anything formalv I think he. meant carrying the full. moral weifiht;or authority of the JUbited Nations; that is to say, they should stay within such limits £8 are indicated by the fact that they should be able to speak vith the voice; of t)*e United Nations. They should not bring out factional views within the .United Nations but be able to speak for the Organization. I think this is the sensible interpretation, and the one I gave to it. As> concerns the other points, I wonder if there is not a, misunderstanding. I did not believe that it was the intention that we should tell everybody in the United Nations forces something /which is a matter of course. They are under military laws and military rules. We do not have to,wait for a new state of affairs in the Congo to mete out: whatever punishment^-there may be for what they do wrong. - On the contrary, the^r own Governments act on disciplinary matters when disciplinary matters arise,: Tfcat is to say, I,do not believe that the suggestion from Mr. Krishna Menon was applicable to our troops because there the problem does not arisev ••.• •. •- ;r,; ":.:•:•,; , •.-. ,. _ ...... •. v...... r As regards!-•.•Congolese nationals •«** and I think we could all see what Mr. Kriehnd'Menon had in mind—- I think the matter is also a matter of course, and I felt that the first pert of my reply was the adequate one* There is a record kept of what is happening?-and, after all, we are objective observers. That is one point* "the other point is .that, as a matter of course, there was no kind of general amnesty built'into the situation from the beginning. In my reply I had no intention to communicate this a* something which should be, so to> say, preached all around. It was a point to which I had to draw the attention of Mr. Dayal in the first instance,'and, of course, ,it was something which,, in these various discussions of infringements of law which take place, he usefully might bring to the attention of the parties concerned. That is my way of interpreting Mr* Krishna Menon; and, if so, I do not think I replied with any levity or alacrity; I rather followed what eeemed to me to be the common-sense line with this interpretation vAnyway, it will be coonunlcated to Mr. Dayal. It will be nis good Judgement to «ay what he should say, how he should say it, and when he could say it. It is not my instruction that he should threaten with a day of reckoning. 136 Mr, JHA> (India); I think I nay My, Mr. Secretary-General, that the vay you have Interpreted Mr. Krishna Menon's remarks in that connexion is the right one. He referred only to the Congolese and not to United Nations personnel, in respect of whoa he said that they vere there under the full authority of the United Nations, and his idea was that there are all these different groups arising which collects some soldiers or assert their authority and begin taking action which properly belongs only to the legal Government of the Congo. It was not his idea that United Nations should, very formally or in a decree, bring this matter to the notice of those concerned. I think that the way in which this should be brought home to the people is to say that if they purport to exercise governmental authority, in the realm of law and order or in arresting people, and BO on, without having the legal sanction of the Government, then a day of reckoning may come. He felt that that might have a salutary effect on many sections which are trying to assert their authority, confusing the situation regarding law and order and bringing United Nations into a lot of difficulties. There have been, for example, reports of looting and rape and molestation of women, etc. But how it be done is a matter which requires consideration, and that no doubt you cdnsider. I come nov to the main question before UB, and I shall try to be very brief. ?irst, about 'the composition of the commission. We ourselves hold the vieir that a smaller sousaiss^on would be much more appropriate,but we attach great weight to the views of our African colleagues here. The smaller commission, from the point of view of efficiency, in certainly better, but on the other hand we cannot altogether ignore the psychological aspect. If we have a fifteen nation commission it will comprise mostly African States — the number of Asians is rather small — and they might feel a certain amount of satisfaction, and in their approach to the mission there might be a bettar psychological attitude* And as I said the other day, and aa the Chairman of our delegation mentioned today, if that is the wish of the large majority of this Committee we would agree, even though we would agree with your view that a smaller commission would have been better perhaps. That is with regard to the composition of the committee. Then the question arioes what should we do next? The next thing to do is to be clear in our minds about the terms of reference. I do not know if we have the time tocjay to direct our .attention to ;it, but it is .a very important point. Then the third thing would be > after we had settled tfce terms of reference, to Inform the lawful authorities -- and President Kasavubu is President of the Republic and has all the centres of communication. Perhaps we could combine an: . answer, through the Secretary-General and his officia^a:there of course, to : this telegram removing the misapprehension which are.,inherent in it. And I • might say here that the misapprehensions are without reason. Mr.-Kasavubu must have seen the resolution of 21 September, and there is northing in its paragraph 5 which .indicates that the commission would be pro-Lumumba or ,-..-• anti-Lumumba, or pro-anybody or anti-anybody. However, there seems; to be some misapprehension and..-a ,lot of wrong reports are probably going from here. . ,. • Therefore, after, we have agreed on the terms of. reference we should communicate this to President Kasavubu and to any others, and perhaps a^.-aounce it by means; of a publ.ic communiq.u As you, Mra Secretary-General, and others have rightly pointed out, the commission will really be a catalyst. The main work of conciliation and the settlement of differences must be done by the Congolese people and the parties themselves. We shall only be a catalyst. Perhpas we shall succeed; perhaps we shall not succeed. This is only an attempt by the United Nations to helpthe forces of unification and settleaeat of disputes which> as you yourself, Mr. Secretary- General, said a short while ago, seem fortunately to be coining up there» The next question is: What is to be the agency? On this point, if I may differ slightly, I would say that I do not think it is feasible for this body to appoint another body or another individual, of whatever eminence, to become our agent. I do not conceive of the commission as a negotiating body0 Therefore, the question of an agency does not arise. There will certainly have to be some communication even while the commission, after its formation, is in New York -- and that will of course be the case after the members of the commission reach the Congo. Now, while the members of the commission are still in New York, the only agency, it seems to me, through which they could communicate would be the United Nations agency. That would be a legitimate function of the United Nations agency. Naturally, the United Nations agency will not negotiate on our behalf because it should not be identified on the substantive side with the fifteen-nation commission. But I do not see any objection to the United Nations agency being the channel of communication, of. preliminary communication, which must take place before the commission goes to the Congo* After it reaches the Congo, it may'not be entirely necessary to use the good offices of the United Nations agency/ It might be ' possible to establish some kind of rapport through a-liaison officer appointed by the Government or through liaison personnel appointed'by 'the commission itself. That is how we imagine the commission would function. ' I should .-now like to sum up* We must agree on the composition of the commission It seems that; there is no possibility of finding a number acceptable to everyone other than the number fifteen; that is, a commission consisting of the Asian and African members of this Advisory Committee. As I haVa said, we Would agree to that/ although: with perhaps some reservations. For the sake of solidarity and unity, we do agree to a fifteen-nation commission. ,, Secondlyy:,the terms of reference should be considered and decided upon* I ao not making any proposal* This is a matter which will have to be considered very carefully. But to give us some food for thought, as it were, I would read out the following suggestion: • • ; "In accordance with General Assembly resolution Ikfk (T2S-IV) and in < . ccsmiltation with: the Secretary-General, the Advisory Committee on the Congo appoints the representatives of the following countries to assist in carrying out the purposes of paragraph 5 of the General Assembly resolution: ... „, _•'. :. .- "The aforesaid representatives should study the situation, such a study to cover the entire territory of the Congo, and should direct their efforts towards the attainment by the Congolese of solutions of their present difficulties which will be conducive to the maintenance and strengthening of the unity, territorial integrity &nd political independence of the Republic of the Congo, within the fraaeworfc of the constitutional and legal structure o£ the Republic of the Congo and bearing iQ mind the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the resolution of the General Assembly". I might add here, in parenthesis, that this enumeration is really maant to emphasize that the Committee will in no way interfere in the infcernt-.l affairs of the Congolese Republic, because that is part of the essence of the resolutions of the Security Council which have been reaffirmed by the resolution of the General Assembly of 21 September. Some sort of enumeration such as this also seems necessary to remove the fear that this body might go to the Congo and start negotiating for all sorts of extra-legal and illegal groups and bodies* That is why it has to be within the framework of the constitution and legal structure of the Republic of the Congo. I shall proceed with this very rough idea: "In particular, the representatives will endeavour to assist in decisions being reached with a view to the speedy restoration of parliamentary institutions ?.n the Republic of the Congo* Representatives are requested to proceed to the Congo as early as possible asd to submit a report to the Advisory Cooalttee on the Congo by" — whatever date we might thi.:.ih suitable. As I said, this is not a proposal; this is Just sharing our thoughts with the members of this Committee, We feel that something on these lines will perhaps enable the Committee to proceed in the right manner and will also remove posaible apprehensions in certain quarters. Mr0 2AKAJRIA (Federation of Malaya); Before we take a decision ou this matter I would like to put forward the view of my Government, and on this question I would address myself particularly to the question of the composition of the Committee. My Government is of tlie view that for practical purposes, the smaller the committee, the better it would be, and therefore it -would agree with the observations made by you, Mr. Secretary-General, and also l>y the representative of Indonesia. However, I realize that extensive discussions have been going on in this assembly for the J.e.st few days, and it seems clear that no committee smaller than fifteen is possible, Therefore, for the purpose of unity,and also bowing to the wishes of our African colleagues, we would accept this committee of fifteen. 1^7-150 On the question of the Status of representatives of this committee, I sm impressed by the views put forward by the representative of Mali, if 1 understand him correctly, that the members df the committee should regard themselves mo)/e •a's' representatives of the United Nations, rather than of their own respective Governments. In this connexion I will go further-by saying that the members appointed to the conciliation-committee should be appointed in a personal capacity, although of course appointment" will,be made by their respective Governments>;so that the possibility of allegations«of national interference or national :' embarrassment arising,therefrom would be minimized.- -.' The .SECRETARY^GEHERAIr; We may, then, .perhaps wind up with whatever •' decisions may be considered possible.at the present stage. I take it that there . are no differing views as to the desirability of .constituting;and establishing av committee in compliance with the resolution. .- - - .• . ' .As regards the. composition, my understanding.;£ar that although there are--*•••'-' those who would like'-to\-abstatn:on'thA..'qud8tiooy^th€er^'i&''-a-'-Bajority^£n the -group, which holds that the composition should be one of fifteen members^ and I think we ' can register the decision itf that -form,; : "'I think 'that, for the" time: beihg, we could rest 'satisfied with a ;':/ i decision along these lines which has brought us a few s'teps further. I shall communicate it directly and at once to Ambassador Dayal. I would, however, suggest, if it is agreeable to you/ that you form a small drafting committee for the terms of reference — riot how at this table,' but without further delay. If we can serve in this case as a "catalyst" to 'get the group together and established we would be happy to do so. We' may even start this afternoon to call round and see how you feel about it* Thus 1 would end this meeting by saying that, as to the line of action/ " ; '."... '• "•. .' ", ;?.':':,';."' .'' •."•' ' '"•..' • •',-' . a . '' "• ,•'•'. ' •""' '. •'*,'*.'; •' " '. as to the composition, as to information, I believe that we are on common ground and can regard it as a result of this meeting so far* As to the terms of reference, we shall be 'in touch with you for the formation of a small committee. Mr. ADEEL (Sudan): Just a small point about the question of an agent or agency. I consider that this is an urgent matter --in fact, it should have preceded the decision on the formation of the commission because there'is a lot of groundwork to be done, the Cdmmittee may feel that it may entrust"you, Mr. Secretary-General, to make this appointment, and in that context I would commend to you the suggestion made by 'the representative-of Ghana about Ambassador £adi'lla Nervo. I would go further and "suggest an alterhative in case Mr. 'Padilla Nervo is not available. I have in, mind Ambassador Correa : of Ecuador, who is well acquainted with this situatidn. ! He handled it in the Security Council and has also had experience in the Trusteeship Council, I would also'suggest that;'whoever is' selected finally, should be assisted by an African, "who^migh't^^ help himi atleast'with'the African outlook. r • 156 The 8ECRETARY»GENERAL; Thank you. We have then before us a proposal from your side to this effect. I do not believe that the Committee is ready to take a decision on it now, and I Mr» LQUTFI (United Arab Republic) (interpretation from Fvsncti): Just one word, eir. At our next meeting, we will take up the terms oJ? reference and the situation in the Congo? Is that the case, Mr. Secretary-General? The SSCRETARY»GEMERAL (interpretation from French): You will have a report fran Ambassador Daysl, which should be received by Tuesday, so we ought to be able to circulate it Wednesday, and that will give you an opportunity to think over the de facto situation,, Mr. CABA (Guinea) (interpretation from French): I am asking for the floor the second time to raise two questions, Mr, Secretary-General. I believe that rfe took a decision; in other words, we decided that the conciliation committee would consist of fifteen members, that is, fifteen representatives of African end Asian States that are contributing to the United Nations activities in the Congo. I think we should spell out two aspects of this decision. In paragraph 6 of your document of 2k October, the question is put to us whether it should be made up of Member States or persons to be appointed by the Committee. Therefore, I think the solution to this question has been found; it will consist solely of representatives of Member States, and not of individuals. 157-160 Secondly, for the Information of our 'respective Governments, it would "be well to ascertain whether the members of this commission, this conciliation conmiesion, will be made up of members of th,is Advisory Committee or whether our Goverauente are empowered to.. appoint: ;:rep*»erafr-v&ir*e of their, chpice. I think thab this is a clarification we , ought tp-be: able to have before we leave this room. . The SECRETARY-GENERAL: My feeling is that we must abide by the decisions of the Governments, In that, sense, it is the nomination of the Afro- Asian Governments represented around this table* I do not think. we can impose conditions on the Governments* a$ to whom they may wish to choose. That has been my understanding of the previous discussion* If there is anybody, who holds a differec view, it would certainly be useful to hear it» Hence . I would ,s&y that this, is the line we should follow. •.••• ..I -want tq: underline one thing,: The fact thai we appeal to Governments for members of this committee does not mean that the members of the group going out represent their Governments; they represent, .fir. a collectivity, the United Nations. This is also vLat I would like to call carrying the weight of ^hs" United Nations, sp (interpretation, from, French): My second point: I think, .we ackers to the principle of working in a .}.im.ited group "oh vorking out the terms of reference, of thio conciliation commission* , It would be particularly desirable., then.,, £ pr this small working group Jco start this very week to work out the broad lines ; of . the terms of reference, and it would also.be highly desirable before adjourning, this, meeting, for us to be, able very quickly to set up this small working party so that it. could start to draw, as I have said, the broad general line? of; the terms of reference, of this conciliation commission. • .,- : Mr. SLIM (Tunisia) (interpretation from French) : Mr. Secretary-General, I believe that it would be useful on this point to, leave the initiative to '''.-•'• • •-•••• •••••.••-•. •' . .•.'.. , •; ... •; , ( , . •_. . Ambassador Jha, as he has just read out a tepct to us. Let him choose any person iie likes, with the assistance o£ the members of the Secretariat, and try to prepare a draft for us for our next meeting. I think that would be the easiest way. I think It docs not matter which one he chooses, bearing in mind the various positions here. Let him prepare a draft of the terms of reference in collaboration with any number of persons that he thinks would be desirable in doing this work. Mr. JHA (India): I am very grateful to Ambassador Slim for his confidence in me, but I would prefer-if he himself made a proposal, .perhaps/ Mr. Secretary-General, you may nominate three or four or five of us, and we shall bo very happy if yon would do that,, . The SECRECY-GENERAL; I had- another proposal, and that was that informally this afternoon we consult and see what is, so to say, the general trend. Mr. CABA (Guinea) (interpretation from French): I will refrain from making any proposal now. Mr. SI.3M (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): I should like merely to add one thing, about the information to be given to the Leopoldville Government with regard to the appointment and purposes of this conciliation commissionv Iftis body will act not only in the name of the United Nations but, above all, it will act in accordance with the provisions of the resolution as members of the Advisory Committee, and not because it is participating in the United Nations action there but because this is an issue which may wound the feelings of some other Members of the United Nations, particularly of a country of Asia or Africa that does not feel that, because we have been working with the United Nations actively in its activities in the Congo, this entitles us to be members of the group, but rather because we are primarily African or Asian countrie This would remove some of the objections which may be felt to be implied in Mr. Kasavubu's telegram. We were appointed in accordance with the provisions of the resolution and because we are members of this Advisory Committee. The SECRETARY-GENERAL (interpretation from French): It is the resolution which guides us, and this has certainly been a useful clarification. I hardly think that there could be any objection to this clarification. 162 Mr. JHA (India): I have only one suggestion to make. There was a telegram from President Kasavubu to you, which you have circulated to us here. Obviously it is based on some incorrect information or some misapprehension. I would suggest that you might reply to him that his telegram was placed before the Advisory Committee and that you are authorized to say that the committee yhich is to be constituted -- though we are perhaps not making a communique today -- is in accordance with paragraph 3 and will not be concerned with doing wiiat he has said in his first sentence --we can use the same words -- and also that this will not be a coiumittee of only African members but, in the terms of the resolution, it will be a committee of Asian and African representatives appointed by the Advisory Committee. We can also add perhaps that as scon as the composition of. the committee and its terms of reference are decided upon "the Advisory Committee wishes to communicate with you" or something lika that. I think that would be courteous. The SECRETARY -GENERAL; I thought that the matter would be taken care of by, so to say, an additional instruction to Mr, BavauL. He has to see Mr. Kasavubu anyway, and then he can explain it, and that is a little more elegant than meraly putting it in black and white. Mr. GEBRE-EGZY (Ethiopia): May I just add one thing. In the telegram vo fsJ.l to find that the conciliation committee, or whatever may be its name, is going to be some sort of judge on constitutional issues. 'The SECRETARY-GENERAL; No. Mr. GEBRE-EGZ.Y (Ethiopia): I think that has to be very clear. That is my first point. ~ My second point is that my delegation is not willing to go back again over the ground we have covered, and therefore I would beg you, Sir, to indicate precisely the exact decision of the Committee, so that we will not be forced to spend weeks and weeks on it, The SECRETARY-GENERAL; I think you will have it very clearly in the verbatim record. The meeting rose at 2.03 p_.m.