Notes

1 European Welfare States and Supranational Governance of Social Policy

1. The phrase 'welfare state' developed a pedigree; it goes back to the 1875 British legislation to ensure collective bargaining by trade unions and the right to strike, and to the first programme of compulsory social insurance introduced by Bismarck in Germany in the 1880s (Marshall 1975, pp. 21, 45). From its largely German beginnings, the concept of social insurance for the working population spread to Belgium, Denmark, France, Norway and Sweden. Other policy innovations followed, including the introduction of family allowance by Belgium in 1930 and France in 1932. These policies were emulated by other states, creating a 'movement of convergence ... as the example of the pioneers was generally followed' (Marshall 1975, p. 78). 2. Soziale Marktwirtschaft should be differentiated from Sozialstaat, the term used under Bismarck as 'a prescription against socialism and a means to win the new proletariat's loyalties for the autocracy' (Esping-Andersen 1990, p. 108). More generally, Sozialstaat refers specifically to the concept of state-provided social insurance, while Soziale Markwirtschaft locates the individual in a system of capitalist production and state provided social services intended to enable the individual to retain control over his or her entry into, and exit from, the labour market. 3. Defining worker training as one of the three categories of social policy (assis­ tance, insurance, regulation) is an especially tricky one - is it a benefit in the form of education, a form of social insurance to the unemployed, or a way of meeting a skills gap in the labour market? Here worker training is treated as a policy that seeks to remedy inefficiencies in the labour market; but, depend­ ing on the long-term histories of individuals receiving retraining, it could be viewed as one of the other components of social policy. 4. This statement follows Pierson: 'Understanding the contemporary politiCS of the welfare state requires examination of the distinctive problems and dynam­ ics which characterize particular sectors' (Pierson 2001a, p. 11). 5. Such a comparison between EU Member States of the south and east cannot be taken too far, and in further work the welfare states of the East merit individual analysis. For an extension of the welfare state regime analysis to central-eastern Europe see Ferge (2001). 6. The presentation and use of historical institutionalism also draws heavily upon Addison and Siebert (1997), Scharpf (1997), Armstrong and Bulmer (1998), Bulmer (1998), Pierson (1998), Aspinwall and Schneider (2001). 7. The term 'institution' is used in the work to refer to the EU level, namely the European Commission, Council, Parliament and ECl The complex of national social and labour market institutions and policies will be referred to as 'national welfare state regimes' in order to avoid confusing terms.

207 208 Notes

8. A limit on the power of the EC] is that national courts must refer cases to the EC], although the Commission, as guardian of the Treaties, may also take cases to the EC] in cases of non-implementation. 9. The votes in an enlarged EU under the Treaty of Nice are distributed as follows: France, Germany, Italy, UK have 29; Poland and Spain have 27; Netherlands 13; Belgium, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Portugal 12; Austria and Sweden 10; Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Lithuania, Slovakia 7; Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovenia 4. Under the pro­ posed Constitution, a successful vote by QMV would require support by at least 55 per cent of the members of the Council, at least 15 Member States, and Member States representing at least 65 per cent of the EU's pop­ ulation (EU 2000a; EU 2004). This reform of QMV in the EU-25 backs away from suggestions to move to a more simple system of a 'double majority' of Member State support and population, and from the draft European Convention where it was proposed votes passed by QMV would consist of the majority of Member States and that those Member States must repre­ sent at least three-fifths (60 per cent) of the population of the Union (EU 2003). 10. An example of Commission rhetoric is the following statement: '[Wle have to strike the right balance between economic and social considerations. We [the Commission] have firmly rejected the view that only economic consid­ erations should be taken into account and that social policy is a lUXury that can be afforded in good times but thrown out in bad times' (DG V official) (van Zonneveld 2000, p. 14). The Commission's use of rhetoric to create an 'image' of the policy problem at hand, and its ability to create 'venues' for policy cooperation, led one author using the term 'image-venue entrepre­ neur' to describe the Commission (Wendon 1998). 11. As a recent analysis of IGCs on the basis of historical institutionalist analy­ sis explained: '[S]cholars should not easily discard supranational actors from their research designs on treaty reform - although looking at more factors is demanding and supranational entrepreneurship is not always easily visible' (Falkner 2002, p. 113). In addition, 'there is a need to relate developments in the periods between IGCs to the treaty reform process' that can only happen if the analysis spans policy-making over time (Christiansen et al. 2002, p. 28). 12. Observations about the critical importance of policy entrepreneurs has given rise to well-deserved criticism that institutionalist theories subsume individual actors inside a more mechanistic view of political interaction. Some writers have attempted to 'put the individual back in' through actor­ centred approaches to institutionalist theory that marry rational choice with institutionalist paradigms (Scharpf 1997). 13. The phrase 'unanticipated consequences' is from Pierson (Pierson 1998). Other writers on historical institutionalism have used the phrase 'unin­ tended consequences'. Although the difference between these two phrases may be minimal, 'unanticipated consequences' is preferred. This is because the rationalist underpinnings of my work assume that Member States will attempt to anticipate the consequences of cooperation and yet, given the long time horizon in which policy-making will occur, will be unable to do so. Consequences of new bargains at the time of Treaty reform, or in Notes 209

instances of policy-making, are thus not so much unintended as they are unanticipated. 14. This comment is especially relevant, coming as it does from an academic and Amsterdam Treaty negotiator for Finland who was (in 2002) a member of Commission President Romano Prodi's cabinet. 15. Like the literature that emphasizes governance in the EU (Jachtenfuchs 2001), historical institutionalism is eclectic in its emphasis on both actors (Member States) and interests (such as unions and employers), and the ways in which supranational institutions constrain actor preferences and shape change (Marks and Hooghe 1996, p. 355). Indeed, many of the elements of historical institutionalism are folded into the multilevel governance literature, notably the constraint of principles by institutional rules and the role of unanticipated consequences (Marks and Hooghe 1996, pp.353-6). 16. While Pierson subsumes changes in government as part of 'shifts in COG [Chiefs of Government] policy preferences', here a change in government is treated as exogenous to the historical institutionalist model (Pierson 1998, pp.41-3). 17. The Secretariat of OKE, the Economic and Social Council of Greece, also trans­ lated a few Greek sources (mostly legal statutes) not available in English or French. For this they have my thanks. 18. The 30-year rule preventing researchers from accessing national, EU and ILO documents until three decades have passed is slowly dissolving in the wake of calls for greater transparency, notably at the EU level by Nordic Member States. At the European Council Archives I was given access to a range of files, some as late as 2001, and permission was granted for all of my requests to quote these documents. Documents released to me will also go on the web as part of the Council's work to promote access to documents for researchers who cannot travel to Brussels. At the ILO I was given access to docu­ ments from the Director-General's office up to 1992. Full transcripts of yearly International Labour Conference meetings are public. At the WTO, many official documents are available, as are summaries of various Council meet­ ings, although the record is, by its nature, less detailed when compared to summaries of European Council meetings that give the position of each Member State on the issue under discussion. 19. Fritz Scharpf's actor-centred institutionalism represents an integration of 'rational-choice and institutionalist' paradigms that is very similar to the research design presented here (Scharpf 1997, p. 36). As Scharpf reminds us, actor-centred institutionalism is 'a framework ... not a theory', but provides 'guidelines for the search for explanations' (Scharpf 1997, p. 37). His frame­ work 'emphasizes the influence of institutions on the perceptions, prefer­ ences, and capabilities of individual and corporate actors and on the modes of their interaction' (Scharpf 1997, p. 38). There is a danger in Scharpf's analYSiS, however, of overstating the extent to which preferences are shaped by institutions. Underlying preferences are best considered as expressing the outcome of national processes, while institutions may shape bargaining positiolJS and perceptions of possible bargaining strategies relative to possible outcomes. 210 Notes

2 Governance by Law: Health and Safety in the Workplace

1. The use of the term EU is especially problematic in a chapter concerning the SEA when the European Union was not yet in existence, but rather the European Economic Community (EEC) , EURATOM and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Collectively these institutions (EEC, EURATOM and ECSC) were referred to as the 'European Communities' or 'European Community' (EC). The term EU will be used in general discussion for the sake of consistency, but where necessary for accuracy the term EC will be used. 2. Although Sweden was not an EU Member State in 1985, a Swede - Pehr Gyllenhammer, CEO of Volvo - was the head of the influential European Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT) that pushed for R&D tax credits, a reduc­ tion of barriers to mergers and a host of other measures to ease trade and labour flows in Europe. The ERT became a key supporter of the Commission White Paper on the Internal Market (Cowles 1995), and advocated QMV to ease the passage of market-liberalizing legislation (Moravcsik 1998, p. 356). EFfA states including Sweden were then (1985) also members of the European standardization bodies (CEN, CENELEC and the ETSI) and, as EFfA members, aimed 'to influence the Commission to set the minimum standards [in health and safety] to correspond to the presumably higher requirements in the EFfA countries' (EFfA 1988). In addition, health and safety policy had been an area of cooperation between the Nordic Council of which Denmark was also a part. Despite being a non-member, Swedish preferences were fed into the decision­ making process via the ERT and Commission experts. 3. Article 100a (now art. 95) was added to the Treaty under the SEA to permit the approximation of laws for the purpose of completing the internal market. It, too, has been used to propose product and technical standards that have an effect on health and safety in the workplace. 4. See OJ EC 31 August 1962. 5. The European Parliament (appointed rather than elected until 1979) also resis­ ted setting high levels of worker protection (Vogel 1993, p. 68, fn. 15). In the 1990s the EP acted consistently in favour of higher levels of protection for workers. 6. Directives 77 /576/EEC (safety signs), 82/605EEC (lead), 83/1107/EEC (asbestos), 86/188/EEC (noise), Directive 80/1107/EEC (exposure to chemical, physical, and biological agents), also known as the 1980 Framework Directive, as well as Directive 78/610/EEC on exposure to vinyl chloride monomer. 7. Mutual recognition had previously been used in EFfA. 8. The Commission played an important entrepreneurial role in making concrete proposals for the completion of the SEM and helped to mobilize pro­ integrationist business interests in the form of the European Roundtable of Industrialists (Sandholtz and Zysman 1989; Cockfield 1994; Cowles 1995; Ross 1995a). Other explanations focus on the convergence of national eco­ nomic preferences held by governments of the right (Moravcsik 1991). It is clear that national preferences and Commission activism are both necessary explanatory variables to account for Treaty outcomes, including grand economic projects such as the SEM and EMU. Notes 211

9. This analysis is based on the predictions provided in (Moravcsik and NicolaYdis 1999) which argues that rich countries of the left should be the most in favour of approving social policy, while poor governments of the right should be the most resistant. This prediction is presaged in (Moravcsik 1998) where Moravcsik states: 'Much of Thatcher's opposition reflected scep­ ticism about EC social regulation from a relatively right-wing government in a (relatively) low-income country' (p. 346). Although definitions of 'poor' and 'rich' are not provided, it seems reasonable to assume that countries below the EU average should be considered relatively poor. Moravcsik and NicolaYdis do not state which variable (political party or relative wealth) is the more salient. The behaviour of poor countries with governments of the left and rich countries with governments of the right is thus not clearly predicted by their analysis. 10. For an account of the extraordinary use of majority voting to call the IGC, and more detail on the Milan Summit, see (Budden 1994). 11. The UK government was not, however, in full support of the SEM as proposed by Commissioner Lord Cockfield, although the SEM was clearly the main driving interest of the UK in engaging in the IGC. Thatcher herself described Cockfield as having gone native once in Brussels (Thatcher 1993, p. 547). For a detailed analysis of the UK position see Budden (1994), especially pp. 318-23 on the differences between Cockfield and the UK government. 12. Budden attributes the Danish proposal of QMV under art. 118 to the need to secure the agreement of the Social-Democratic opposition for the SEM proj­ ect (Budden 1994, p. 314). The consensual and coalition style governance that typifies the Danish and Swedish approach to relations with the EU is underappreciated in this analysis. 13. Under QMV rules from 1986-94 a formal blocking minority needed 23 votes. Voting weights were as follows: 10 votes each for France, Germany, Italy and the UK; 8 for Spain; 5 for Belgium, Greece, the Netherlands and Portugal; 3 for Denmark and Ireland; 2 for Luxembourg. For more on the evolution of QMV see Chapter 1. In practice, however, Directives have tended not to come under a strict QMV vote but rather have been guided by a desire for consensus or a kind of informal unanimity (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1996). 14. Papandreou's intransigence was all the more frustrating as Greek negotiators to the EC in the 1970s

repeatedly emphasized that Greece is not seeking enormous financial rewards from Community members, that its economy is strong enough to stand the strains of entry without added support and that its impact upon the balance of budgetary advantages within the Community will therefore be small. (Wallace 1979, p. 33)

The application of increasingly tough pre-accession criteria for new Member States, notably the countries of eastern Europe, is partially attributable to the difficulties experienced in enlargement to the South. 15. An adviser attached to the prime minister, Tzochatzopoulos, told the EP's delegation: Greece's reservations on the veto could be explained in psychological terms by its limited experience as a Member State and its particular 212 Notes

problems: once the issue of the IMPs [Integrated Mediterranean Programmes] was solved, the government's position might become more flexible. (Corbett 1998, p. 198)

16. Lord Cockfield stated in his memoirs:

And on social policy, the other main area in which demands for 'linkage' [with the Single Market Programme] were put forward, it took more than four years before the Social Charter saw the light of day. Had 'linkage' been accepted it would have resulted in intolerable delay being imposed on the Internal Market Programme.

Lord Cockfield also notes:

The agreement I made with my colleagues from the South was that in return for their support for my Internal Market Programme, I would sup­ port them in their demands that the Structural Funds should be doubled. But 'linkage' I would not accept at any price ... Ultimately the success of the line I had taken was sealed by the fact that at the second Brussels Summit in February 1988 when the success of the Internal Market Programme was clear, the Heads of Government agreed to doubling the Structural Funds. It is worth recalling that once again this was bitterly opposed by the United Kingdom. They wanted the Single Market but were not prepared to pay for it. (Cockfield 1994)

My reading of this statement is that linkage did, in fact, occur. However, given the vagueness of what constitutes linkage, and the differences between both explicit and implicit issue linkage and between immediate and forward linkages (in time), opinions on this subject vary. In addition, the notion of side-payments is vague. 17. Minimum health and safety requirements for the workplace (Directive 89/654), use of machines and equipment (Directive 89/655), personal protective equipment (Directive 89/656), handling heavy loads (Directive 90/269), visual display units (Directive 90/270), carcinogens (90/394), biological agents (Directive 90/394), exposure to asbestos (Directive 90/679). 18. UNICE proposed the following statement replace arts. 4 and 6: 'The employer shall be responsible for the safety and health of the workers in the under­ taking/establishment, regardless of the methods he uses.' 19. Because of the dynamic nature of technology, health and safety standards may often lag behind technological innovations and new working methods. As a result, standards may be outdated very soon after they are created. IntrodUCing a reference to the state of the art is meant to correct for this. Revising regulation on a regular basis is also important given technological change. In Germany, reference to privately developed standards is also used to keep standards updated (Eichener 1992, pp. 12-13). In the EU the 'state of the art' is defined by the European standardization bodies, and so the level of protection to be provided is decided not only by the formal Regulations approved in the Council but also by the technical committees of the European standardization bodies. 20. In other Member States such a consideration by the Courts is referred to as 'the principle of proportionality' (James 1993, p. 149). Notes 213

21. Mr Pangalos, under-secretary for foreign affairs responsible for European affairs of the PASOK government (1993), had this to say about politicization of staffing in Brussels: When the time comes for the implementation of agreed policies with regard to the personnel in the administration ... the Minister, any Minister, on personal or party considerations chooses the people to be sent to Brussels or that will become heads of the EU-relevant departments within these ministries. As a result there are people in charge with no knowledge of the subjects involved whatsoever or that cannot even speak a foreign language. (Quoted in Tsimisizelis 1996, p. 220) 22. Dual translation often occurs in specialist meetings owing to the unavailability and cost of securing translators that can work directly in all nine official Council working languages. A practical example would be that no translator would be present at a committee meeting that can translate directly from Greek to Danish, so a translator waits for the translation from, say, Greek to English, or Greek to French, and then translates from English or French to Danish. According to an official interviewed, Greek committee members who speak more than one Community language often 'listen in' on other channels while their colleagues are talking to see what the translators are say­ ing, and that the meaning is 'often lost' owing to poor translation. In this official's experience interventions are most effective if done in English, and Greek delegates who speak English 'often speak English when they feel they really need to make a point' (Interview 16). This last comment was con­ firmed in other interviews with Greek committee members (Interviews with 13, 14, 18). The danger of interventions in English, however, is that 'if you stop speaking Greek the number and quality of translators may suffer even further.' The difficulties of translation can only increase exponentially with EU enlargement to eastern Europe. 23. The following 'Resumes des Travaux du Groupe des Questions sociales' from the Council archives were analysed: 8 avril 1988 (5504/88 RESTREINT), 13 avril 1988 (5562/88 RESTREINT), 4 mai 1988 (5968/88 RESTREINT), 12 juillet 1988 (7411/88 RESTREINT), 16 septembre 1988 (8079/88 RESTREINT), 13 octobre 1988 (8607/RESTREINT), 14 novembre 1988 (8915/ 88 RESTREINT), 24 novembre 1988 (8916/88 RESTREINT), 28 novembre 1988 (9716/88 RESTREINT). As a result of the request to release these documents, they will soon be scanned and made available via the Council Archive web page. 24. The leadership of the Commission in drafting legislation at a high level of protection was also in evidence in the Machinery Directive (89/392/EC) and the Display Screen Equipment Directive (90/270/EC), supported by the Economic and Social Committee who advised on the Directives, and by the European Parliament that was also interested in a high level of protection for workers (Eichener 1992, pp. 58-52). The Commission has even drafted pro­ posals that met with criticism from both leader and large Member States, such as in the case of the Machinery Directive where the definition of machinery was opposed by Denmark, France, Germany and the UK (Eichener 1992, p. 57). 25. In one notable case in the creation of the Machinery Directive, however, it was not the Swedes or Danes who managed to convince the Commission of 214 Notes

the value of the broader concept of occupational health but rather a 'reformist member of the British Labour Inspection Service' who, in drafting the Machinery Directive 'brought his innovative ideas to the European Community' after 'he had no success [in reforming the health and safety phi­ losophy] in his own country' (Eichener 1992, pp. 36, 54). Notably, Germany was the only state to vote against Directive 89/392/EC on the Safety of Machinery, probably because this would mean that national patterns of decision-making involving very powerful bipartite bodies (such as the insur­ ance injury organization Beru(sdenossenschaften) would lose sole regulatory power (Eichener 1992, p. 39). 26. The diversity of tools used for implementation is apparent in the diversity of national legislation notified to the Commission by Member States in fulfill­ ing the transposition of Directive 80/391/EEC: Presidential decrees in Greece and new laws that drew heavily on the wording of the Directive [Presidential Decrees 1975 (no. 61), 1987-96 and Laws N.1837, 03/89, and No. 22224, 05/07/94], a new national statute in France that reproduced almost verbatim much of the Directive (The Prevention of Occupational Risks Act (91-1414) of 31 December 1991), a revision of several legal acts in Sweden (Arbetsiljog 1977: 1160, ArbetsmiljofOrordning 1977: 1166, Kungorelse om skyddsilt­ garder mot skada genom fall (1981), Kungorelse om arbetsstallningar och arbetsrorelser (1983), Kungorelse om takarbete (1983), Kungorelse med fOreskrifter om fOrst a hjalpen vid olycksfall och akut sjukdom (1984), Kungorelse med fOreskrifter om personalutrymmen (1992); (AFS 1983-92 and Arbetarskyddsstyrelens Forfattningssamiling 11/09/90, 14/09/81» and Germany (Unfallverhiitungsvorschrift (1974-93) (Bundesgesetzblatt 1957, 1975, 1986-96)), and a diversity of legislation that, collectively, is said to implement the Directive in the UK (Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, Industrial Relations Order 1976, Safety Representatives and Safety Committee Regulations 1977, The Health and Safety at Work (northern Ireland) Order 1978, Employment Protection (consolidation) act 1978, Safety Representatives and Safety Committees Regulations, 1979, The Health and Safety (First-Aid) Regulations 1981, The Reporting of Injuries, Health and Safety (First-Aid) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 1982, Fire Service Order 1984, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1985, The Relevant Statutory Provision for northern Ireland Reporting of Injuries, diseases and Dangerous occurrences Regulations, The Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1992, The Personal Protective Equipment at Work Regulations, 1992, Management of Health and Safety at Work RegulatiOns, 1992, Employment Rights Act 1993, Personal Protective Equipment at Work Regulations 1993, The Health and Safety (consultation with employees) Regulations 1996, Factories Ordinance, Factories (safety) Regulations 1996, Fire precautions (workplace) Regulations 1997 (Statutory Rules, Statutory Instruments, Statutory Rules of northern Ireland 1976-97)) (Commission 1998a, pp. 87-96). 27. Although not covered here, it may be worth noting that Directives concern­ ing chemical products and machinery standards have required more substan­ tive technical adjustments to Swedish legislation than Directives concerning minimum health and safety standards (Interview 19). Even high-standard countries thus have some adjustments to make as a result of EU legislation. Notes 215

28. ELINYAE's mandate includes fulfilling the services necessitated by national and EU legislation. In the 1988 and 1991 National General Collective Agreements, unions agreed to lower pay rises in exchange for the creation of LAEK (Account for Employment and Vocational Training). It is LAEK that manages ELINYAE, and not the Ministry of Labour. ELINYAE was thus founded not by statute but by the terms of the National Collective Agreements, making it a highly unusual organization in Greece. 29. In the words of one official, We are not happy with the downward trend because the downward trend may be significantly correlated to structural change. Up to 80 per cent of the improvement [in the declining number of industrial accidents] may be linked to structural change, and 20 per cent of the improvement from better legislation ... but we simply have no data to test this assertion (Interview 76). 30. A detailed examination of the Agency is outside the scope of this chapter. However, it is interesting to note that repeated attempts by the author to reach the national focal point in Greece (identified on the Agency website) via email while in Athens went answered, while emails to the UK and Swedish focal points resulted in responses within two working days. New EU Agencies cannot solve weak national administration.

3 Governance by Collective Bargaining: The Social Dialogue

1. Social Dialogue could be further subdivided into the Inter-sectoral Social Dialogue conducted by UNICE, CEEP and the ETUC and the sectoral social dialogues. The Inter-sectoral Social Dialogue is covered here. For more detail on the inter-sectoral social dialogues, see Commission (2000b), Weber (2001). 2. The earliest information on hourly wages in industry (manual and non­ manual workers) given for Germany is 26.12 ECU/EUR in 1995, and for France at 19.12 in 1992 (Eurostat 2002a, p. 16). 3. One expert on Spain noted the following about the effects of EU legislation: The Spanish government has emphasized its commitment to bringing Spanish legislation into line with Community legislation. It seems to have accepted that implementation of the ESC [European Social Charter] in Spain would increase production costs, relying on the modernization of the economy and the generosity of the European Structural Funds to provide the foundations for restoring competitiveness to the Spanish economy. (Argandona 1997, p. 207) 4. French business did not strongly support the ratification of Maastricht because of its social policy provisions, which 'business believed to be unnec­ essary and disadvantageous' in light of the British opt-out (Moravcsik 1998). 5. Liberal intergovernmentalism seems to equate employer interests with eco­ nomic interests (Moravcsik 1997, 1998). The role of unions is not considered, and it is far from clear how conflicting national union and employer group opinions on the Social Dialogue could be reconciled and presented as 'economic interests' of a Member State. 216 Notes

6. Dolvik and Visser, two of Europe's leading experts on national collective bar­ gaining and unions, note that the final mechanisms for EU Social Dialogue most closely resemble those of Belgium (Dolvik and Visser 2001, p. 30). The Commission has stated that 'the development of agreement-based law at European level is to a large extent inspired by the experience and practice of the Nordic countries, Belgium, and Italy', and these countries are those that have most often implemented Directives by means of collective agreement (Commission 2000b, pp. 28, 37). Although the EU Social Dialogue is described as 'unique in Europe' (Dolvik and Visser 2001, p. 30), it may be seen to 'fit' better with national traditions of bipartitie bargaining, followed by tripartite bargaining systems. 7. Such networks, while hard to document, demonstrate the overlap between national officials, trade unionists and the Commission. One early example of the interconnection of the ETUC and the European Commission was Carlo Savoini, a former Italian trade union official who became the secretary of the European Secretariat of ICFfU (which later became the ETUC) in 1964, an official in DG V in 1973, and head of the DG V unit on Social Dialogue in 1991. A later example was Patrick Venturini, a French trade unionist who was the key adviser on Social Dialogue in Jacques Delors's cabinet in the 1980s, and later head of ESC in 1998. Jaques Delors, who had encouraged bipartite bargaining in France in the 1970s in his role as adviser to French PM Jacques Chaban-Delmas, voted in favour of the Tripartite Employment Committee for the EU and was a key advocate of the Social Dialogue when he became Commission president in 1995. Later, Jacques Santer, an author of the Werner Plan, advocated social partner participation in all stages of EMU. Santer became the Luxembourg PM 1984-95, and succeeded Delors as president of the Commission. 8. The ETUC was preceded by the European trade union secretariat (SSE) and the European Confederation of Free Trade Unions (CESL). The European Association of Craft, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (UEAPME) has also pushed for participation in the Social Dialogue but, although consulted on issues, has not been invited to be a formal member of the process. A UEAPME-UNICE cooperation agreement may open up UEAPME participa­ tion in future negotiations (Branch and Greenwood 2001, p. 42). Other social partners have been recognized to negotiate voluntary sector-specific agree­ ments since January 1999. These social partners may be cross-industry or sec­ tor specific union and employer groups with recognized national affiliates in several Member States, and must have the capacity to effectively participate in the process. For a list of such sectoral social partners, see Commission (2000b, p. 16). This chapter concentrates on the larger Framework Directives that are signed by the ETUC, UNICE and CEEP. 9. Dolvik describes the ETUC as

extremely weak, without the experience of joint European action, deprived of financial and staff resources, lacking authority over or com­ mitment from its affiliates, with ill-defined and often contested relations between sectoral and trans-sectoral union activities and responsibilities, and utterly dependent upon its sponsors in the Commission, and in DG V. (Dolvik and Visser 2001, p. 16) Notes 217

10. It has been suggested that German agreement to enter EMU was linked to European, and most critically French, approval for reunification (Garrett 1993). Other authors have demonstrated, however, that German preferences favouring monetary union were in place before 1990 and were surprisingly unchanged despite the monetary havoc created by the economic conditions of reunification (Moravcsik 1998). 11. Falkner goes so far as to suggest, on the basis of several interviews, that the Commission may have colluded with the Belgian social ministry in devel­ oping these proposals, and allowed Belgium as a Member State government to make the initial proposal to the IGC (Falkner 1998, p. 92, 2002). 12. Luxembourg Presidency 'Draft Treaty on the Union' 18 June 1991: art. 118b 1. Should management and labour so desire, the dialogue between them at Community level may lead to relations based on agreement including agreement which shall be implemented in accordance with the procedures and practices peculiar to each Member State. 2. In the field referred to in art. 118, where management and labour so desire, the Commission may submit proposals to translate the agreement referred to in paragraph 1 into Community legislation. The Council shall act as laid down in art. 118. 13. A more detailed consideration of the composition of the Ad Hoc Group and the October 1991 negotiations can be found in Dolvik (1997). Dolvik empha­ sizes the division between national delegates appOinted by the ETUC to the Ad Hoc Group, and national affiliates. It seems that neither employers nor unions initially took the Ad Hoc group very seriously, and had not given it a clear bargaining mandate (Dolvik 1997, pp. 207-8). It should be noted that the ETUC and UNICE secretariats have an even stronger impetus to European-level agreement than national affiliates, as their specific purpose is representation at the EU level. The ETUC secretariat, and to a lesser but significant extent that of UNICE, had 'vested interests in defending the legitimacy of their institutionalized role' (Dolvik 1997, p. 215). The ETUC and UNICE secretariats thus each became an additional actor in the process of bargaining, and these organizations should be viewed as more than conglomerates of national interests. For a more detailed look at UNICE consultation of national members see Tyszkiewicz (2002a). Notably, the ETUC introduced QMV for internal decision-making in 1991, and UNICE in 1999. 14. Germany's proposal of a form of reinforced QMV (with a higher number of votes need for agreement under QMV) sits alongside Kohl's activism in the final negotiations. Germany's concerns about subsidiarity, competence, and the costs of deeper integration, combined with Kohl's highly pro-integrationist attitude, create this ambiguous position. 15. In an interview with John Major, he suggested that his three primary reasons for rejecting the Social Protocol were: (1) concerns about reversing supply­ side changes made to the British economy in the 1980s; (2) new burdens placed on employers; (3) losing competitiveness relative to the United States. In response to the question 'Is there a fourth reason [that you did not sign the Social Chapter] which is perhaps that you would not have gotten the eventual majority in Parliament that you did for approving Maastricht?', 218 Notes

Major replied:

No, it was not true, because I would have always had the support of the Labour Party and the Liberal Party if I had signed it. The arguments, because I know what you are referring to ... [pause] there were newspaper articles subsequently that I didn't sign the Social Chapter because one or two members of my Cabinet threatened to resign [if the Social Chapter was included]. If they did threaten to resign I didn't know it at the time I had negotiated it, because they had certainly not said that to me in Cabinet, or anywhere else. They may have whispered it behind their hands to newspapers who reported it subsequently, but not to me. So, in my mind, it [threats by Cabinet members to resign if the Social Chapter was signed] never was a factor, and neither do I believe that if I had so signed the Social Chapter that they [my Cabinet members] would have resigned .... suggestions to the contrary were always newspaper talk, and complete tittle-tattle. (Interview 6)

On 23 July 1993 a vote of confidence in the Major government as a result of debates concerning the Maastricht Treaty and the Social Protocol was won by 339 votes to 229. 16. EU legislation had also been previously transposed into national law via a collective bargaining agreement between management and labour at the national level. In Belgium, the Directives on collective redundancies (75/129) and on acquired rights in case of transfer of enterprises (77/187) 'have been (at least partially) transposed into Belgian law by way of (extended) [that is, national and binding on all employers and workers] collective bar­ gaining agreements' (Engles and Salas 1998, p. 84). The national systems of France, Germany and the Netherlands also permit implementation by col­ lective bargaining in certain instances. 17. Still, it is not totally clear how Delors could have forced Member States to agree to the old November draft on social policy had this not been agreeable to them. Paul Pierson called this early draft a 'bargaining chip in the expec­ tation that Britain would eventually accede to a contentless compromise' (Pierson 1998, p. 55). It is not explained how the social partners would have reacted to art. 118b being changed after their October agreement. I interpret Pierson's comments as meaning that the Dutch government had presented a watered-down text in the hopes of getting the UK to agree, and when it did not, Member States were not able to rely on the watered-down draft as it would have named them as reluctant cooperators in social policy. In any case the Dutch presidency tried to dilute the agreed compromise after Maastricht, according to Jon Erik Dolvik, an effort that ultimately failed (Dolvik 1997, p.217). 18. Papandreou's inconsistent view of the EU continued during his Parliamentary speech, where, despite having pledged his party's support for the ratification of the Treaty, he noted: '[The Treaty of Maastricht] is for us an invitation to a tough and unfair game .... Unfair because the Treaty of Maastricht reflects almost entirely the interests and views of the rich North' (Koliopoulos 1994, p. 117). Ultimately the Greek Parliament ratified the TEU by a vote of 286 to 6. Notes 219

19. Regulation agreed to under the Social Protocol would still be binding on UK firms operating elsewhere in the EU if they had a certain number of sub­ sidiaries and employees in the EU and the EEA (European Economic Area). EEA Members such as Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden were also bound to the Social Protocol. Other member firms of the CEl extended works coun­ cils voluntarily - such as United Biscuits and BP Oil (Falkner 1995, p. 11). 20. 'Everyone residing and moving legally within the EU is entitled to benefits and social advantages in accordance with Community law and national law and practices' (art. 34). 21. Two drafts of 1982 (OJ C 62/7 and OJ C 128/2) were amended in 1983 (OJ C 18/5) and 1984 (COM(84) 159 final). Three new drafts were proposed in 1990 (COM(90)228 final) and two were amended later that year (OJ C 305/8). Of the three proposed and amended Directives, only one was adopted (Directive 91/383/EC).

4 Governance by the Open Method of Coordination: The European Employment Strategy

1. In the period immediately following the Second World War there was no clear exchange rate between ECSC currencies and the European Payments Union was being formed. Accounts were thus registered in a 'unit of account'; the exact dollar, pound, franc or DM equivalent I have been unable to find. 2. For more detail on ESF, structural and cohesion funds, see Shackleton (1993), Hooghe (1996), Morata and Munoz (1996), NaneUi (1996) and Tsoukalis (1997). 3. A precursor to MISEP was SEDOC, a common European system for advertis­ ing vacancies, which was created in 1972 and superseded by EURES (the European Employment Service) in 1993 (Commission 1993b). 4. The Danish minister who served as the chairperson of the Employment Ministers' Informal Council was described as 'supportive' of Flynn's initia­ tive, in contrast to 'negative interference from the Council secretariat' (Interview 36). 5. 'There is no way that Delors would have allowed the Flynn-led Employment Initiative [The Community Wide Framework for Employment], with its spe­ cific 18-month timetable, to go forward if, at that time, he had other plans' (Interview 36). 6. The White Paper has been described as 'like the Bible - there's something in it for everyone, and there are contradictory bits, too' (Interview 36). 7. Allan Larsson had chaired a 1992 SAMAK (Nordic Social Democratic) report 'Sdtt Europa i arbete' (Make Europe Work) (Johansson 1999, p. 91). This report, which had brought him into contact with all Nordic Finance and Employment Ministers, was later adapted into a further report by the Party of European Socialists (PES) on a European Employment Initiative in 1994. Ant6nio Manuel de Oliveira Guterres chaired the PES initiative. Guterres was the prime minister of Portugal during the influential 2000 Portuguese Presidency of the EU. 8. It may also be argued that his presence in the Commission is an overlap of Swedish national interest - his place at DG V was targeted by the Swedes as a place to put a top official - and Commission entrepreneurship. 220 Notes

9. Moravcsik and Nicolai"dis do not state whether political affiliation of the government is more important than the relative wealth or poverty of the Member State, although political affiliation seems to be more important in their analysis. Further, they do not make it clear how they have defined poor and rich states (Moravcsik and Nicolai"dis 1999, p. 63). Here I have used GDP per capita at purchasing power parity for the year 1996 to determine rich (above the EU average) and poor (below the EU average) Member States. The Moravcsik and Nicolai"dis explanation (Moravcsik and Nicolai"dis 1999) is quite different from the explanation one might have expected from the liberal intergovernmental school for the Employment Title. Given the emphasis on economic interests in liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 1997), one might have expected a hypothesis that stresses the salience of economic interests - namely employers - in influencing the government's position. In this case, one would hypothesize that Germany would be in favour of the Employment Title in order to export costs, France and Sweden would sup­ port the Employment Title (for the same reasons as Germany) and Greece and the UK would oppose. This set of predictions is very close to the one sug­ gested by a welfare state explanation of preferences, although the welfare state explanation also considers unemployment rates and not only spending on labour market poliCies. 10. Other priority issues during negotiations to join the EU included trans­ parency (access to documents and the minutes of meetings of Councils of Ministers, for example), improving the democratic legitimacy of the EU, pre­ serving neutrality under CFSP, cooperation with the Baltic states and Russia, and the environment (Johnson 1998). These priorities were reflected in the '3 Es' of the 2001 Swedish presidency of the European Union (January­ June): Employment, Environment and Enlargement. The announcement of the '3E' presidency caused some critics to remark that there were two 'Es' missing - equality (of men and women) and EMU. Still others jokingly referred to the three 'Es' of the Swedish presidency as 'efficiency, efficiency, efficiency'. 11. The government also hoped that suggesting an EU employment policy would 'promote greater unity [in the SAP] by stressing a common theme for all Social Democrats. It was hoped that the anti-EU grass roots would be appeased. It was also argued that the unemployment issue would make the benefits of EU membership more real to a hostile Swedish public' (Miles 1997, p. 280). 12. Gunnar Lund, formerly state secretary in the Finance Ministry under then­ Minister Allan Larsson, was at the time (1995) state secretary in the Foreign Ministry and became the Swedish representative in the 1996 IGC. 13. As a French negotiator noted of the reflection group:

[E]ach foreign ministry appointed a representative who was supposed to be independent. In practice the Group consisted largely of those people who would ultimately negotiate the new Treaty, plus two representatives of the European Parliament. As a result, the Group's report cast its net wide: all of the opinions voiced by one or other of its members are included, with no way of ranking them in order of priority or ruling out the most improbable. (Petite 2001, p. 1) Notes 221

14. On employment the memorandum [on the IGC from the Governments of Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, 7 March 1996], while not denying the primary responsibility of Member States, proposes that the Treaty should contain explicit reference to the complementary role of the Union in promoting employment, with new provisions to this effect. In particular, it is proposed that employment policy coordination between Member States should take the form of annual Commission recommenda­ tions to be adopted by the Council. ... It is also considered that the Community should make a greater contribution to job-creating investment in the Member States, and that a committee for employment should be set up to examine the subject and make suitable proposals. (Belgium 1996) While considering that the main efforts will still have to be made at national level, the Danish government believes that the new Treaty should include a specific section on employment, intended to strengthen the objective of achieving a higher employment level and emphasizing that employment is a common responsibility requiring a coordinated approach. (Denmark 1996) It [the Greek government] therefore supports incorporating a special title on employment into the revised Treaty. (Greece 1996) [Spain] advocates inclusion in the TEU of specific provisions in employ­ ment policy. (Spain 1996)

(NB: This report was written by the Socialist government (PSOE) but also had the backing of the Popular Party that formed the government in May 1996 (Rodrigo 1996, p. 28).)

Italy believes that the revised Treaty must include a chapter on employ­ ment committing the Member States to undertake closer coordination of their employment policies on the basis of the strategic guidelines adopted at the Essen and Cannes European Councils. (Italy 1996)

15. The third stage of EMU was to begin on 1 January 1999 and fixed the con­ version rates of participating countries against the euro in anticipation of the full changeover to euro notes and coins in January 2002. 16. Germany's economic growth had slipped from 4.5 per cent to 2.2 per cent in 1994, financial transfers from former West to East Germany were, at their peak, 5 per cent of West German GDP, and a hard monetary policy followed by the Bundesbank had reduced growth, investment and tax revenue (Szukala and Wessels 1997, p. 80). 17. QMY, rather than unanimity, was the 'normal' Council voting procedure to suggest for the draft Title since 'it deals in general policy issues and co-operation [among Member States], rather than 'minimum social standards ... where there are precise competitive issues at stake' (Interview 36). 18. The complexity of the Treaty revisions is shown by the confusion, over arts. 102 and 103, between this text and the Swedish draft text. Arts. 102 and 103 of the Treaty on European Union are to be found in the consolidated Treaty Establishing the European Community in arts. 97, 98, 99 and 100. Art. 99 concerns the formulation of the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG). 222 Notes

19. The exact wording regarding Member State competence is: The Community shall contribute to a high level of employment by encouraging cooperation between Member States, supporting, and if necessary, complementing their action. In doing so, the competences of the Member States shall be respected. (art. 127(1» 20. Negotiations had no doubt already started on the Sunday night, 15 June. The Treaty negotiations concluded at 3:35 a.m. on Wednesday 18 June (McDonagh 1998, pp. 188, 194). 21. The Committee of the Regions, modelled on the Economic and Social Committee, was created in the Maastricht Treaty. 22. It should be noted that the German Presidency agenda was overwhelmed by the events in Kosovo, which took up valuable meeting time in the Council. 23. Second only to Denmark at 71.6 per cent (Commission 2001c). 24. One Greek official also noted that the Commission has a 'bad effect' of crowd­ ing out work that should be done by national governments and outbidding the government for capable staff. In the case of the NAPs, it may pay more (lit­ erally!) to be part of the national review teams of the European Commission than to take part in national working groups that create the NAPs in the first place. There have been cases of experts refusing work on creating NAPs only to show up writing the Commission critiques of the NAPs (Interview 16). 25. The attitude of the government, and of national officials and those participating in the labour market programmes, was described by one official as a 'take the money and run mentality' inspired by the instability of the previous decades (Interview 73). 26. Anyone familiar with Greek politics may question the use of the word 'depoliticize' in any context. It is employed here in a relative fashion to indi­ cate that however much politicians may bluster about policies, the guide­ lines to be followed in the NAPs are set in Brussels and cannot be changed. 27. The Socialist government promised to introduce legislation to reduce the working week on 10 October 1997 as voluntary implementation was too slow (Blanpain 1998, p. 6). 28. More recently, the German Federal Labour Offices (the national agency for job-seekers and unemployment benefits) were found to have been grossly exaggerating statistics on success rates for finding employment. A review of five offices found that success rates for job-seekers as a result of the interven­ tion of the Labour Offices was 18 per cent rather than the reported 51 per cent. Offices had claimed credit for jobs that individuals had found themselves. As there are 181 offices it is not known to what extent this problem may be endemic (FT 2002). The weakness of EU-level policies is highlighted by the dependence on national data which is not verified by Eurostat.

5 Global Governance of Social Policy: EU Member States at the International Labour Organization

1. Other regional mechanisms for the protection of social rights include the Inter-American Human Rights System under the Organization of American Notes 223

States (OAS), the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Permanent Arab Commission on Human Rights of the League of Arab States and the labour clauses of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 2. The United States, not a member of the League, joined the ILO in 1934 during the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Although the US left the ILO in 1977 during the Carter administration, it rejoined at the beginning of the Reagan administration in 1980. 3. Other international organizations in which the EU is also a member, rather than an observer, include the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the North West Atlantic Sea Fisheries Organization (NAFO) and international commodity agreements, such as the International Coffee Agreement and the Sugar Council. 4. The ILO formerly had a 'blacklist' of worst-performing Member States. This was eliminated in 1980 as it was not seen to represent an incentive for poorly performing Member States to improve (Betten 1993b, p. 403). 5. I am grateful to Christopher McCrudden, professor of International Labour Law at the University of Oxford, for this point. 6. Norway, a non-EU Member State that may provide a point of comparison, ratified the same number of Conventions as Finland and Sweden (10) in 1987-2001. Norway also voted on becoming an EU Member State, but the proposition was rejected by a nationwide referendum in 1994. Norway has a total of 109 ratifications as of 2001. 7. Le Conseil d'Administration du Bureau International du Travail invitera la Haute Autorite a se faire representer au titre d'observateur aux reunions de la Commission de I'industrie charbonniere et de la Commission du fer et de I'acier de l'Organisation Internationale du Travail. (para. 7) The Agreement was signed by Jean Monnet, president of the High Authority of the ECSC, and David A. Morse, director-general of the ILO. 8. The chairman of this report, Bertil Ohlin (former Swedish Minister of Commerce 1944-5 and former Leader of the Liberal Party), went on to develop the highly influential Heckscher - Ohlin model of international trade, for which he won a Nobel prize. The other members of the Group of Experts on Social Aspects of Problems of European Economic Integration were: Mr Maurice Bye (France), Mr T. U. Matthew (UK), Mr Helmut Meinhold (Germany), Mr Pasquale Saraceno (Italy) and Mr Petrus]. Verdoorn (Netherlands). Mr Bye (France) wrote a dissenting opinion at the end of the report questioning the assumptions of the report, notably the immobility of capital and labour. Bye described this as 'the most unrealistic of all [the pos­ sible scenarios]', and suggested that the relative immobility of persons (labour) and certain goods combined with perfect mobility of capital and imperfect competition would suggest different conclusions (ILO 1956, pp. 123-4, 134). Bye noted that the threat of a flight of capital which has already been held over earlier attempts at social progress would nUllify the efforts of the trade unions and governments. Under such circumstances it would be impossible to expect willing support for plans to integrate Europe ... In practice, the least 224 Notes

ambitious social legislation would tend to be taken as the standard. (ILO 1956, p. 129) 9. The invitation of the ILO to EU Committees has not been without con­ tention. The ILO was invited to participate as an observer in several highly specific technical committees in the late 1960s and early 1970s, such as the consultative committee on social problems in maritime fishing and the con­ sultative committee on social problems in internal transport. However, the formation of the Permanent Employment Committee in the 1970s caused a difference of opinion between the Commission, which wanted the ILO to be invited as an observer, and the Council of Ministers, which did not. A 1993 exchange of letters on ILO participation in Group of 24 meetings regarding eastern and central Europe, which are coordinated by the EU, between the ILO and Sir Leon Brittan (vice president of the Community and commis­ sioner for DG1 Trade) was 'far from satisfactory' in the director-general's (ILO) opinion (ILO 1993b). Sir Leon had noted that the 'ILO will hence be actively involved in the deliberations and efforts of the Group of 24 con­ cerning social aspects of reform programmes in the framework of country­ level coordination', but gave no indication as to how this might come about (ILO 1993b, Appendix: letter from Sir Leon Brittan dated 27 May 1993). The UK government representative to the Governing Body, as written in the min­ utes of the Governing Body session, noted that her government had approved ILO participation and that it was 'extremely irritating to receive a letter of this kind from the Commission' (ILO 1993a). 10. The 'key figure' identified was Mr Vinck, functionnaire at the Commission (ILO 1970a). In other notes, Mr Paul Finet of the High Authority is men­ tioned as a 'personality' who developed the cooperation between the ECSC and the ILO (ILO 1971b). Social Affairs Commissioner Coppe was described as more 'conservative' in his views of social policy (ILO 1971c). 11. It should be recalled that it is 'standing case law of the Court that EC Member States cannot undertake international commitments which would be in conflict with (or even affect) Community law' (Betten 1993a, p. 255). While art. 141 and judgements by the ECJ hold that a ban on night work for women in industry should no longer be permitted as part of rules on equal treatment, the 1958 ILO Convention No. 89 on Night Work (Women) (Revised) sets different guidelines for the work of women at night than those for men (Valticos 1993, p. xix). This ruling 'was later softened' in Case C-158/91 Levy (Betten 1993a). 12. It is interesting to note that Member States have also resisted expanding the competence of the Commission on new trade issues at the WTO, where oper­ ating as a bloc is far more established, on issues such as trade in services (Meunier and Nicolai"dis 1999). Exceptions to the Commission's leadership of trade policy at the WTO are negatively listed, however, and are very few in number compared with the lack of any areas of exclusive EU competence in the social field at the ILO. 13. I am grateful to Mr Don MacPhee at the Canadian Mission in Geneva, chair of IMEC (2002), for his detailed explanation of IMEC procedures. It is inter­ esting to note that another Canadian, John Mainwaring, then Director of International Relations at Labour Canada, was largely responsible for the conception and creation of IMEC. Notes 225

14. Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK. ILO Convention 115 was not ratified by Austria, Ireland and Luxembourg. 15. Directive 80/1107/EEC of November 1980 on the protection of workers from the risks related to exposure to chemical, physical and biological agents at work, amended by Directive 88/642/EEC, Directives 79/831/EEC and 88/379/ EEC on the labelling and packaging of dangerous substances, and the Framework Directive 89/391/EEC. 16. The 1984 complaint by the TUC to the ILO under Convention No. 87 (Freedom of Association) concerned Thatcher's decision that trade union membership at the British Government Communications Headquarters at Cheltenham (GCHQ) posed a threat to national security, making it a condi­ tion of employment that all personnel at GCHQ did not belong to a union or staff association other than the internal and approved staff association (Betten 1993, p. 74). The Thatcher government also

rescinded various 'fair-wage' resolutions (breaking the terms of ILO Convention No. 94, 1982) and (in 1986) modified minimum wage-fixing machinery, removing employees under 21 from cover and ending control over working conditions (entailing the deratification of ILO Convention No. 26). (Rhodes 2000, p. 46)

A case by the DGB (German Confederation of Trade Unions) was also brought to the ILO on restrictions to the right to strike by teachers and postal workers. This was appealed by the German government, but not brought before the ICJ as, in the opinion of the German government, the ICJ had not yet taken a position on the right to strike and ILO Conventions (ILO 1991). 17. Strangely, the ICITO continued to exist until the creation of the WTO in 1995 in order to entitle its members and the GATT Secretariat to certain ben­ efits accrued to the ICITO during its two years of existence, such as a con­ tractual personality and staff pension benefits under the UN system. 18. It should be noted that the 1996 Agreement on cooperation with the World Bank and IMF was hard-fought by the then WTO Director General Renato Ruggerio (Interview 46), and that cooperation between the World Bank and the WTO Secretariat, such as on Trade Policy Reviews of WTO Member States and on development issues related to the Doha Development Agenda, are not consistent. Inter-institutional relations at the global level are still highly complex, and by no means well sorted out. 19. From the ILO perspective, using trade sanctions to enforce core labour standards 'may not be the best way to promote standards' in the first instance, and in addition, 'the international community is not ready to grant sanctions to any institution' other than the WTO (Interview 43). The route to ratification and respect of core labour standards through trade-related measures will not happen in the foreseeable medium term via either the WTO or unilateral ILO action in trade-related areas; for example, ILO Officials were 'shot down in flames' by ILO members when the idea of ILO leadership on the labelling of products to indicate their compliance with production processes that respect core labour standards was suggested. In 226 Notes

short, the trade route to enforced labour standards is blocked and, in the view of many officials, is not the most desirable road anyway. 20. The 2000 Cotonou Agreement between the EU and the African­ Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) 77 also suggested that EU-ACP cooperation should aim at 'encouraging the promotion of participatory methods of social dialogue as well as respect of basic social rights' (Commission 2001a, p. 12 and Annex 6). 21. The initial request for consultations on the EU's requirements for GSP was submitted by Brazil in 2000 concerning drug law enforcement and special treatment for soluble coffee, but was later dropped (WTO 2000). The Thai and Indian request for consultations with the EU on labour and environ­ mental standards, and drug law enforcement requirements to qualify for GSP, was joined in 2001-2 by several Central American governments: Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua.

6 Conclusion

1. The first 'wave' of enlargement in May 2004 was to Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. The next wave of countries may include Bulgaria and Romania. Turkey is also a candidate country. The EU has negotiated Stabilization and Association Agreements with several Balkan states (Albania, Croatia, FYROM) and may do so for others (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro). The limits of the EU are set by the requirements of new Member States to possess market economies, democratic political systems, a respect for human rights, and the rule of law and their ability to absorb and implement the acquis communautaire. 2. Representatives to the Agency's Administrative Board are 'Member State representatives from each of the three key stakeholder groups - governments, employers and worker organizations, as well as three European Commission representatives' (Agency 2001, p. 6). In 2000 there was no Greek member of staff at the Agency, and 17 per cent of its staff were British. There was one Swede in the 35-member Agency. While no strong correlation can be made between Member State success in implementing legislation and members of staff at the Agency, it is still interesting to note that Greek officials continue to be underrepresented or absent from health and safety aspects of EU decision-making. 3. The research presented did not set out to test neo-functional assertions about spillover (Haas 1964; Wessels 1997; Jensen 2000). However, it is clear from the observations of Chapters 2 through 4 that spillover has been highly lim­ ited in the social policy field in the EU, and this may be of interest to researchers attempting to refine theories of the cases in which spillover occurs, and how this happens. Appendix: List of Interviews

I. National level (including national officials in Brussels)

(i) Politicians Greece 1. Ms Marietta Giannakou-Koutsikou, Member of the Greek Parliament, New Democracy Party, and former minister.

Sweden 2. Goran Lenmarker, Member of Parliament (Riksdagen) and spokesman on foreign affairs for the Moderate Party. 3. Martin Nilsson, Member of Parliament (Riksdagen) and member of the Labour Market Committee, Social Democratic Workers' Party. 4. Soren Lekbert, Member of Parliament (Riksdagen) and chairman of the Committee on EU Affairs, Social Democratic Workers' Party. 5. Susanne Eberstein, Member of Parliament (Riksdagen) and member of the Social affairs Committee, Social Democratic Workers' Party.

UK 6. John Major, British prime minister 1990-7. 7. Anthony Smith, Member of Parliament (Labour Party) and former liaison to the Party of European Socialists.

(ii) National bureaucrats, civil servants (a) Treaty negotiators Greece 8. Mr Constantin os Papadopoulos, adviser for European affairs, EFG Eurobank, Athens, and member of the Greek delegation to the Reflection Group and the 1996-7 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). 9. Dr Takis Ioakimidis, adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister's Office on the European Union, negotiator for the Greek govern­ ment at the Nice Treaty (2000) and president of the Hellenic Centre for European Studies (EKEM).

(b) Permanent representatives (Brussels) Sweden 10. Fredrik Sjogren, labour law and employment officer, Swedish Permanent Representation to the EU. 11. Johanna M611erberg, health and safety officer, Swedish Permanent Representation to the EU.

227 228 Appendix

Germany 12. Eckehart Hagen, labour and social affairs officer, German Permanent Representation to the EU.

(c) EU committee members Greece 13. Mr Dimitrios Politis, member of the board of directors of GSEE (Greek General Confederation of Labour) and vice-president of OKE (Economic and Social Council of Greece), and member of the Advisory Committee on Hygiene, Health and Safety. 14. Former member of the Economic Policy Committee (EPC) of the EU and the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the EU.

Sweden 15. Lennart Ahnstrom, chairman of the EU Council Working Group on Machinery under the Swedish Presidency of the EU and head of the Machinery Department at the Swedish Work Environment Authority.

(d) Other civil servants and government advisers Greece 16. Dr Platon Tinios, special adviser to the prime minister of Greece on social policy. 17. Professor Nikos Koutsiaras, adviser to the Ministry of Labour and Professor at the University of Athens. 18. An adviser to the Ministry of Labour and Social Security.

Sweden 19. A Swedish official. 20. Kerstin Wahlberg, Chemistry and Microbiology Division at the Swedish Work Environment Authority. 21. Bengt Johansson, principal administrative officer, Machinery and Personal Protective Equipment Division of the Swedish Work Environment Authority. 22. Ingela Ronn, press secretary, Swedish Work Environment Authority. 23. Anders Lindberg, political adviser for EU Affairs to the Social Democratic Party. UK 24. An official in the EU Division of Department for Education and Employment.

(iii) National representatives to international organizations UK 25. A UK official. 26. A UK official.

Other states 27. A German official. 28. An American official. List of Interviews 229

29. A Canadian official. 30. A Canadian official. 31. A Canadian official.

II. EU level: commissioners, EU civil servants

32. Allan Larsson, former Directorate-General of DG V (now DG Employment and Social Affairs), and former Swedish finance minister [via email]. 33. Patrick Venturini, secretary-general of the Economic and Social Committee and former European Commission adviser on Social Dialogue and Social Policy in Jacques Delors's cabinet. 34. A Commission official. 35. A Commission official. 36. A Commission official. 37. A Commission official. 38. A Commission official. 39. A Commission official. 40. A Commission official.

III. Global level: civil servants of international organizations

ILO 41. An ILO official. 42. An ILO official. 43. An ILO official. 44. An ILO official. 45. An ILO official.

WTO 46. A WTO official. 47. A WTO official.

IV. Interests: the social partners

(i) Business and employer groups Greece 48. Ms Anastasia Koutsivitou, head of Social Affairs Department, SEV (Federation of Greek Employers). 49. Mr Motsos, president of the Hellenic Confederation of Professionals, Craftsmen and Merchants [formerly the Greek Confederation of Small and Medium Sized Enterprises] (GSEVEE).

Sweden 50. Christian Bratt, director, international affairs, SAF (Swedish Employers Confederation, now the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise). 230 Appendix

51. Olof Allgardh, director, Brussels office, SAF (Swedish Employers Confederation, now the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise).

UK 52. Susan Anderson, head of social and labour market policy, Confederation of Business Industry (CBI), and member of the UNICE negotiating team for Social Dialogue on part-time work.

UNICE (Brussels) Contacted but could not arrange an interview time.

ILO Bureau for Employers' Activity (Geneva) 53. Deborah France, deputy-director, Bureau for Employers' Activity, International Labour Office.

(ii) Labour and employee groups Greece 54. Mr Dimitrios Politis, member of the board of directors of GSEE (Greek General Confederation of Labour) and vice-president of OKE (Economic and Social Council of Greece) [note, also listed as an EU Committee member, #13].

Sweden 55. Leif Hagg, International Department, LO (Swedish Trade Union Confederation). 56. Bo Ronngren, ombudsman, LO (Swedish Trade Union Confederation). 57. Anders Schaer strom, programme secretary, SACO (Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations). 58. Ake Zettermark, labour market policy, SACO (Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations). 59. Sven Erik]ansson, press officer, SACO (Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations). 60. Leif Dergel, labour market secretary, TCO (Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees). 61. Keth Zettervall-Thapper, international secretary, TCO (Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees).

UK 62. David Feickert, Trades Union Congress (TUC) (UK) representative to the ETUC, and member of the ETUC negotiating team for Social Dialogue on part-time work.

ETUC (Brussels) 63. David Foden, research officer, European Trade Union Institute (EUTI) , Brussels. 64. Amparo Serrano, research officer, European Trade Union Institute (ETUI), Brussels. List of Interviews 231

(iii) Other members of social partner organizations 65. Dr Gregory Papanikos, secretary-general, OKE (Economic and Social Council of Greece). 66. Mr Yannis Koyzis, scientific consultant to the Labour Institute of GSEE-ADEDY and professor of industrial relations. v. Academics

67. Dr Mats Benner, University of Lund. 68. Dr Lena Gonas, expert on gender equality in the workplace, Arbetslivsinstitutet (National Institute for Working Life). 69. Kerstin Ahlberg, researcher on the EU Employment Strategy, Arbetslivsinstitutet (National Institute for Working Life). 70. Dr Nicklaus Bruun, head of labour law research, Arbetslivsinstitutet (National Institute for Working Life). 71. Dr Panos Tskagloglou, professor, Athens School of Economics and Business (expert on Greek welfare policies, social exclusion, social assistance for the elderly). 72. Dr George Pagalotos, professor, Athens School of Economics and Business (expert on the history of the Greek welfare state). 73. Professor Manos Matsaganis, former special adviser to the prime minister on social policy and professor at the University of Crete. 74. Dr Calliope Spanou, professor, Athens School of Economics and Business (expert on Greek public administration). 75. Dr Dimitris Sotiropoulos, professor, University of Athens (expert on the history of the Greek welfare state). 76. Dr Christos Ioannou, director of research for the Hellenic Institute for Occupational Health and Safety, Athens. Bibliography

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ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) countries) 172 22, 197 active labour market policies (ALMPs) Community Method 17-18,63, 20, 99-100, 107, 128-38, 140, 121, 190 171, 198 see also governance by law Amsterdam Treaty 1, 39, 97, 108-23, competitive advantage 12,28,30-1, 129, 188, 191 33, 67, 143, 156, 203-4 Australia 164 Confederation of British Industry Austria 9, 16,30, 61-2, 67-8, 71, (CBI) 44, 69, 79, 81, 82-92, 170, 100-1,122,152-4,171 190, 193 Conference on Security and Balassa, Bela 141 Cooperation in Europe Belgium 9, 16, 30, 34, 36, 40, 47, 75, (CSCE) 146 100-1, 107, 122 conservative corporatist welfare state behaviour at the ILO 152-4, regime 7-9, 11, 52, 67-9, 163-4, 169, 171, 174-5, 180 98-103, 143, 151-4, 180, policy leader in EU 11, 47-8, 50, 194, 197 70,74,76-7,85,112-13, see also welfare state regime 129, 196 Corbett, Richard 112 Presidency of the EU 2001 163-4 Council (ECOFIN, General Affairs, role of unions in 61-2, 66-8, 78 Social Affairs) 24,32-4,36,37, bench marking see open method of 39,43,46, 50-1, 60, 61-6, 71-8, coordination 81-2, 85-8, 90, 95-6, 104-5, best practice see policy learning 107-8,111-12,117,120,124-6, Blair, Tony 102,114, 117, 122 133, 181 Bourgeois, Leon 4 Council of Europe 145-7 Bretton Woods 175 Cyprus 174 Broad Economic Policy Guidelines Czech Republic 159, 167, 174 (BEPGs) 116, 138, 192 Brok, Elamr 112 Degimbe, Jean 80 Delors, Jacques 28-9, 38, 41, 57, 63, Canada 154, 164, 176 72-3, 81-2, 85, 106-8, 129 capitalism, development of 6-7 Denmark 9, 16, 30, 34-6, 49, CEEP see European Centre of Public 67-8, 70, 75, 77, 79, 86-7, 92-3, Enterprises 100-1 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the behaviour at the ILO 151-4, 160, Worker (EU) see Social Charter 168, 184 child labour see International Labour national implementation of EU law Organization 52-3 Clinton, Bill 177, 179 policy leader in EU 11,35,37-40, Cohesion Fund 20, 38, 40-2, 50, 47-8, 50, 58, 85, 97, 104-6, 82-5, 188, 192 112-13,115,129,138-40,187, Colombia 163 196-8

260 Index 261

Denmark - continued European Convention on Human Presidency of the EU 1993 97, Rights 145-7 105-7 European Court of Human Rights role of unions in 35, 61-2 145-7 Directorate General Employment and European Court of Justice (ECJ) II, Social Affairs (formerly DG V) 15, 17-18,20,22,39,49,53-4, 18, 32, 72, 78, 89, 105-6, 108, 59, 85, 88-9, 94, 96, 130, 124, 127, 129, 158, 160-2, 172 145-7, 150-1, 155, 158-61, Durkheim, Emile 4 183, 189, 195 European Economic Area (EEA) Economic and Social Committee 67,71 (ESC) 17, 71, 118, 193 European Economic Community entrepreneurs see European (EEC) 29, 31-4, 103-4, 155-8 Commission European Employment Strategy Esping-Andersen, Gosta 7-8 (EES) 17,20,97-141,188,189, Estonia 167, 174 191, 203 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights Community-Wide Framework for 89, 145-7 Employment 106-7 EU Constitution (2004) 6, 16, 202 Essen criteria 107-8, 118, 124 EU Enlargement 15-17, 187,201-6 history of 103-29 1973 158 and interaction with ILO policies 1981 29,204, 161, 167, 170-2 1986 29, 34-7, 40-2, 58, 64, 204 National Action Plans under 2004 159, 163, 201, 204 125-6, 128-38 EU Presidency 161-5 pillars or themes of 124-5, 130, see also individual Member States 134-5 EU voting rules see qualified European Monetary Union 8, 18,35, majority voting; unanimity 82-4, 105, 107-8, 112, 122, 138, voting rules 188, 192, 197, 203 European Centre of Public Enterprises employment rates as possible (CEEP) 65, 71-6, 78-82, 90 convergence criteria for 105 European Coal and Steel Community European Parliament 37-8, 73, 91, (ECSC) 29,31-2, 103, 155-6, 105,111-12,118,162-3,191-2 European Commission European Social Fund (ESF) 20, as agenda setter 19 50, 57, 103-4, 130, 134, 188, oversight of national 192, 197 implementation 51-2 European social model 13, 73 as policy entrepreneur 17-19,29, European Trade Union Confederation 32-5, 37-8, 43-4, 49-50, 58-60, (ETUC) 43-4, 50, 62-3, 63, 65, 72, 77, 79-82, 85, 95-6, 65-7, 71-82, 85-90, 95-6, 97-8, 103-4, 123-8, 138-41, 170,193 178-81, 188-9, 191-2,205 see also regional governance as process manager 19 European Works Council 190 as promoter of EU cooperation 32 right to propose legislation 17, 32, Falkner, Gerda 64 42, 77, 96, 121 Finland 9, 16, 62, 67-8, 71, see also Delors, Jacques; Directorate 100-1, 112, 122, 151-4, 163, General Employment and 168-9, 171 Social Affairs Flynn, Padraig 89, 105-7, 129 262 Index

France 9, 15, 16,30-1, 34, 36-7, 64, relationship with regional 75, 87, 99-103, 109 governance 21, 186, 142-5, as inconsistent in reaction to EU 151-85, 189-96, 204 policy 13, 42, 69, 77, 82, see also ILO, supranational 98, 112-14, 118-23, 129, governance, WTO 139-40, 197 globalization 144-5, 178, 179 behaviour at the ILO 147, 152-4, governance by collective 160, 162, 165-71, 175, 180 bargaining harmonization of social relationship to other forms of EU policy 10 social policy 190-4 implementation of EU policy see also Social Dialogue 53-4, 58-9, 93-4, 136-7 governance by law 11-12,28-9, role of unions and collective 190-5, 200 bargaining in 62, 65, 67, 69, relationship to other forms of EU 79,88, 169 social policy 190-4 see also conservative corporatist governance by open method of welfare state regime coordination relationship to other forms of EU General Agreement on Tariffs and social policy 190-4 Trade (GATT) 175-7 see also open method of see also World Trade Organization coordination (OMC) Germany 9, 15, 16,30-1,49,59, 75, Greece 9, 16,29,30,36, 74-5, 77, 87,90,99-103 87-8,96, 99-103, 109, 112-13, as inconsistent in reaction to EU 121-3, 139-40 policy 13, 22, 34-7, 40, 48, administrative culture 45-6 52, 70, 77,81,89,98, 112-14, behaviour at the ILO 151-4, 160, 116-23, 127, 129, 139-40, 165-70, 175, 180 193, 197 and EU funding 20-1, 40-2 behaviour at the ILO 147, 151-4, and 1990-1 IGC 65 160,165-70,174-5,179 implementation of EU policy concerns about financial costs of 56-8, 92, 132-6 EU policy 21, 113-14, 119-20, modernization effect of EU 121, 188 policies on 67, 82-4, development of welfare state 5 132-6, 199 implementation of EU policy as passive towards EU social policy 53-4, 137-8 12-13,45-8, 70,82-5, 119-20, role of unions and employer 196-7 groups in 61-2, 67-8, Presidency of the EU in 1988 45 79-80, 87, 91 resistance to QMV 37,40-2,50 unification 76 role of unions and collective see also conservative corporatist bargaining in 62, 66-9, 79 welfare state regime; Kohl, transformation of national policy Helmut by supranational governance Global Employment Agenda see 82-4, 92, 168, 198-201 International Labour see also southern welfare state Organization, employment regime global governance 142-85 GSP Scheme (Generalized System of enforcement of 149-51, 195-6 Preferences) 167, 181-3 importance of funding to 202 Guigou Elisabeth 112 Index 263

Hallstein, Walter 156 1985 IGC 34-42, 104 Hansenne, Michael 178 1990-1IGC 62, 74-85 health and safety 28-60 1996IGC 106,111-19 art. 137 (ex 118a) 11, 15,32-42, intergovernmental theory 35, 46, 50, 58-60, 159, 188 70, 82, 95, 109, 121-3 and the European Agency for Safety International Labour Organization and Health at Work 58, 193-4 (ILO) 4,89, 106, 142-85,91 EU laws as new standard 49-52, child labour 163,167,174,181 56-8, 198, 205 Constitution 147-8 Framework Directive (89/391/EEC) core labour standards 161, 167, 29, 42-58, 189 172-5,178, 181-2, 184, 195, in ILO 166-9 201-2 in new member states Declaration on Fundamental Rights (of 2004) 205 146, 161, 165, 181 Machinery Directive 197 employment policies of 161, for temporary workers 89 170-2,201 see also governance by law enforcement mechanisms Helsinki Act 146 of 149-51, 183, 195-6, historical institutionalism 14-22, 200-2 25-7,123,200,206 evolution of governance 201-2 financial incentives and Global Employment Initiative 20 disincentives of 20-1,206 and health and safety 31-2, formal rules 15-17,50,85,204 166-9, 198-9,201 in explaining gaps in Member State history of 147-51 behaviour 13-15, 50, 85, Ohlin Report (1956) 155-7 129-30, 196 regional groups in 162-5, 184-5 in explaining new forms of relationship with EU 21, 144, governance 14, 16-18 151-85, 194-6 institutional learning 19-20, 188 relationship with WTO 167, process tracing 23-6, 98 175-83, 185,201-2 summary of impact on EU social Social Dialogue at 167, policy 186-90 169-70, 184 see also European Commission - as tripartite structure of 61, 148 policy entrepreneur; World Commission 179 unanticipated consequences International Monetary Fund Hungary 174 (IMF) 175 International Organization of ideology, role in social policy Employers (IOE) 170 cooperation 22-3, 35, 64, 70, International Trade Organization 97, 102, 118, 122, 187-9 (ITO) 175-7 India 177, 181-2 Ireland 9, 16, 30, 36, 59, 62, 65, 67, Industrial Market Economy Group 6~ 75, 79, 81, 87, 100-1, 105, (IMEC) 155, 162-5 109,112, 116-17, 122, 152-4, institutionalism see historical 171, 175, 197-8 institutionalism Italy 9, 12, 16,30,36,37,39-40, institutions 14-15, 19-22,206 46-8, 50, 62, 67-9, 74-5, 77-8, see also historical institutionalism 88, 100-1, 105, 112, 115, 147, Intergovernmental Conferences 151-4,162-3,165,168-9,171, (IGCs) 18, 24 180, 196 264 Index

Japan 33, 164-5 national experts joint decision trap 42-3 role in EU committees 17,43,46, Jospin, Lionel 102 49, 58 Junker, Jean-Claude 124 Netherlands, the 9, 16, 30, 36, 40, 46, 52, 62, 66-8, 70-1, 74-82,85, 'Keynesian compromise' 6 90,100-1,112,117,122,152-4, Kohl, Helmut 36, 75,81-2, 85, 95, 163, 169, 193 112, 120, 198 New Approach, the 33-4 New Zealand 164 labour market 6-7, 33, 39, 61, 57, Nice Treaty 1, 15-16, 127, 140, 191 87,105,200,202 informal 57 Ohlin Report (1956) 155-7 Lamy, Pascal 178 Open Method of Coordination (OMC) Laroque, Pierre 4 17,126-41,183,191 Larsson, Allan 19,108-9, 111, applications of 127 113-14,117,124,129,172 as example of institutional learning Latvia 167,174 19-20 League of Nations 147-8 benchmarking 201 liberal welfare state regime 8-9, enforcement of 189, 200 30-1, 52, 68-9, 98-103, 143, evolution of 97, 140,203-5 151-4, 180, 194 possible expansion of 203-5 see also welfare state regime see also governance by open Lisbon criteria 126-8, 201 method of coordination Lithuania 174 Organisation for Economic Lome Convention 172 Co-operation and Development Lund, Gunnar 111-12 (OECD) 106, 146, 171, 173 Luxembourg 9, 16, 30, 36, 67-8, 75, 77,91, 100-1, 112, 122, 139, Pakistan 177 151-4, 162, 169, 171 Papandreou, Andreas 36, 37, 40 Presidency of EU in 1985 36, 39 parental leave, Directive on Presidency of EU in 1997 124-6, (96!34!EC) 63, 87, 198,200 129, 189 part-time work 86-94 Luxembourg Compromise 32-3 see also Social Dialogue pay see wages Maastricht Treaty 1, 19,59, 61-2, Pierson, Paul 14 70, 74-85, 104, 188 Poland 174 Major, John 62, 81, 87, 102, 122, policy entrepreneurs see European 217-18 Commission Malaysia 177 policy failures 11, 28, 190 Malta 167,174 policy learning 34, 50, 64, 85, market economy, development 105, 121, 127, 129-30, 135-6, of 6 188, 194 Marshall, T.H. 3-4 see also open method of Milward, Alan 96 coordination Mitrany, David 142, 183 Portugal 12, 16, 34, 39, 42, 46, 48, Mitterrand, Fran<;ois 37,38,42, 58, 62, 66-7, 69-70, 74-5, 77, 79, 76,95 81-5,97, 100-1, 109, 112, 122, Moldova 182 151-4, 196-7, 201, 204 Myanmar 150, 163, 175, 177 Presidency of EU in 2000 126-8 Index 265 qualified majority voting (QMV) Social Action Programmes 18, 74 15-17,29,34-42,49, SO, 58-60, Social Charter 73,89, 145-7, 161, 63-4,76-8,80-6,116,119,129, 192, 204 187-8, 190-4, 204 social-democratic welfare state regime 7-9, 11,30-1, 52, 68-9, 98-103, regional (EU) governance 143,151-4,180,194,196 benefit levels (absence of see also welfare state regime harmonization in) 202-3 Social Dialogue 17,61-96,111, effect on enlargement on 201-6 188-9, 191 employers' participation in 17,24, European Works Councils 86-7 44-5, 61-96, 188-9, 192-4 Directive on Fixed Term Work enforcement and oversight (99/70/EC) mechanisms 14-15, 17,20, Directive on Parental Leave 22, 95-6, 189, 192, 200, 206 (96/34/EC) 63, 87, 89, evolution of 11-12,22, 189-94 198,200 (esp. 191),201-6 Directive on Part Time Work financing of SO, 85, 202, 205-6 (97/81/EC) 86-94, 198 implementation of 13, 20, 49-58, at ILO 167, 169-70, 184 90-4, 188-9, 205-6 see also governance by collective increasing flexibility of 190-4 bargaining informal cooperation in social dumping 8, 12 107-8,202 social justice 147 limits to 67, 86, 200-6 social partners, the 61, 70-1,94-6, policy leaders, resisters, passive lOS, 120, 163, 169-70, 188, states 10-14, SO, 85, 129, 192, 193 196-8,205 see also regional governance possible expansion of 201-6 social policy relationship to global governance child care 132, 203 21,142-5,151-85,186, definition of 3-7, 145-7 194-6, 204 enforcement mechanisms 14-15, role of EU committees 33,43, 17,20,22,189,192 49, 189 equality (equal treatment) 107, transformation of national policies 156, 159, 170, 173, 184, 198-200, 205 200,203 union participation in 17, 24, health 87, 203 44-5, 61-96, 188-9, 192-4 housing 203 regulatory space 2 inconsistent reaction to 13 Roundtable of European leaders in 7-8, 10-11,20, 193, Industrialists 73 196-8 passive in reaction to 12-13, 189, Santer, Jacques 108, 115 196-8 side payments 40-2,65,82-4, 102 pensions 193, 203 Single European Act (SEA) I, IS, 20, poverty 203 29, 32, 34-42, 59, 61, 63-4, 73-4, resisters of 8, 10-12,20, 189, 193, 95, 104-5, 188, 192 196-8 Single European Market (SEM) 18, right of association 172, 202 34-5, 73, 108, 191-2 right to strike 149-50, 156,202 Slovakia 159, 174 right to impose lock-outs 202 Slovenia 174 social assistance 4, 87, 203 266 Index social policy - continued Sweden 9, 16, 30, 46, 49, 59, 71, 87, social exclusion 193,203 96, 99-103 social insurance 4,87,203 behaviour at the ILO 151-4, social market economy (Soziale 165-71,175,179-80 Marktwirtschaft) 6 EU policy as requiring changes in social regulation I, 4, 6-7, 199-200 200, 202 implementation of EU policy social security (see also social 52-3, 92-3, 128-31 insurance above) 16, 67, policy leader in EU 11, 97, 156, 202 109-19, 129, 138-40, 187, values in 4-5, 147-8, 184, 194 196-8 see also health and safety, Social role of unions and collective Dialogue, and European bargaining in 61-2, 65-8, 79, Employment Strategy; global 109, 111 governance, regional see also social-democratic welfare governance; social dumping; state regime Welfare State Switzerland 154 Social Protocol 19, 64, 67, 71, 81-2, 85-6, 90, 104, 117, Thailand 182 120, 198 Thatcher, Margaret 23,37,41-2, social rights 145-7 59-60, 107, 169 soft law 127, 193 Trades Union Congress (TUC) 69, solidarity 4-5, 129 79,86-92 southern welfare state regime 8-9, Treaty of Amsterdam see Amsterdam 12-14, 30-1, 52, 68-9, 98-103, Treaty 143, 151-4, 180,201 Treaty of Nice see Nice Treaty and policy emulation 65, 67, Treaty of Paris (ECSC) 31 140, 188 Treaty of Rome 22,32, 103, 156, see also Greece; welfare state 158, 191, 193 regime Treaty on European Union (TEU) Spain 9, 12, 16, 34, 39, 42, 46, 48, 82, 117 58,62, 67, 69-70, 74-5, 77, 79, see also Maastricht Treaty 81-4,100-1,109,112,118-19, 122, 151-4, 159, 168-9, 175, unanticipated consequences 12, 14, 196-8,204 18, 21-2, 50, 58-60, 85, 86, 94, spillover 98, 200, 203 123-8, 130, 135 Stability and Growth Pact 8, United Kingdom 9, 15, 16, 30, 36, 189,203 67, 75, 77,99-103, 105 Structural Funds 119 as resister of EU social policy II, subsidiarity 64, 193 22, 34-42, 45-8, 50, 59-60, 62, supranational governance 1-3, 111, 70, 74,81,84,86-92,94-6, 186-206 97-8, 102-3, 114, 116, 129, effect on national policy 186, 139-40, 189, 190-3, 196, 198-201 198,204 emergence of 189-94 behaving against 'typecasting' 197 limits to 200-6 behaviour at the ILO 148, 151-4, spillover 200, 203 160,162,165-71,175,179 see also regional governance; global concerns about financial costs of governance EU policy 21 Index 267

United Kingdom - continued wages (pay) 67, 73, 155, 202-4 development of welfare state 5 decent reference wage 204 ideology towards social policy 23, fair wage, concept of 203 64, 188 welfare capitalism 6 implementation of EU policy welfare state 5-10 54-6,91-2, 131-2 and industrialization 6 opt-in to EU social policy 64, 70, and state building 6 90,117-18,122,198 resilience over time 200-1,204 opt-out of EU social policy 81-2, transformation by supranational 87,95, 190 governance 198-200 role of unions in 62, 69 see also welfare state regimes why it agrees to EU social welfare state regimes 7-14,25-7, policy 14 30-1, 65-70, 97-103, 121-3, 143, see also liberal welfare state regime; 151-4, 180, 186-9, 194, 196-201 Blair; Major; Thatcher Wilensky, Harold 6 UN Covenant of Fundamental women Economic, Social and Cultural in part time work 88-9 Rights 145-7 participation rates (in labour UN Millennium goals 172 market) 127 UNICE 40, 44, 50, 59-60, 62, 64-7, World Bank 175 71-91,95-6,170,193 World Trade Organization (WTO) see also regional governance 146,148,150,167,173,175-83, union density 62, 68-9 185, 201-2 United States of America 33, Article XX (e) on prison labour 147-8, 154, 164-5, 173, 146, 150, 176-7 175-8, 181 and challenge of GSP scheme of the EU 181-3 Val Duchesse tripartite discussions proposals for a Social Clause in 72-3, 79,85 180-1 Venturini, Patrick 109 Trade Policy Review Mechanism Versailles Peace Conference in 181 (1919) 147 see also General Agreement on Vredeling initiative 63 Tariffs and Trade