Strengthening the Rule of Law Through the United Nations Security Council

Strengthening the rule of law through the United Nations Security Council

Workshop paper series

The United Nations Security Council, Force and the Rule of Law

Workshop held at the Australian National University on Thursday 21 June & Friday 22 June 2012 by the Australian Government’s Australian Civil-Military Centre and the ANU Centre for International Governance and Justice

(Project funded by ARC linkage grant LP110100708)

Protection of civilians and the rule of law: the need to build synergies between the two agendas

Working paper No. 5.7

Mr Peter Thomson

Protection of civilians and the rule of law: the need to build synergies between the two agendas

Peter Thomson1

Introduction

There are two agendas in the United Nations Security Council which are vital to the effective protection of civilians in conflict situations. The first is the Protection of Civilians in armed conflict (POC) and the second is the Rule of Law (ROL)2. These two agendas effectively operate in the Security Council as topics for discrete consideration and are supported by various institutions within the United Nations Secretariat. While this separation of the agendas is understandable, as both are wide-ranging, this Security Council practice poses challenges to the building of good synergistic policy in peacekeeping operations.

Over the last decade the POC agenda has come to the fore in the work and deliberations of the Security Council3. This agenda contains a collection of broadly related protection issues. One of these issues is the ‘protection of Civilians by United Nations (UN) peacekeeping and other missions’ (which I will refer to as ‘POC/PK’ to distinguish it from the Security Council broader POC agenda). POC/PK is that part of the POC agenda which relates to the reform of the mandated task of peacekeeping operations to ‘afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence’4. It is now broadly accepted within 5 the UN system that POC/PK is a core responsibility peacekeeping operations .

The ROL agenda6 is broad and ill-defined and involves numerous institutions requiring a dedicated UN coordination mechanism; the Rule of Law Coordination and Resource Group7. Like POC, the ROL agenda has assumed a much more significant place on the United Nations Security Council agenda over the last decade and the promotion of ROL is now said to be at the ‘heart’ of the UN’s mission8. Increasingly there is international recognition of the importance of equipping the UN with the necessary tools to effectively promote the rule of law and to respond to serious human rights violations in order to create the conditions necessary for peace building and economic revival.

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This paper focuses on some of the key links between these agendas in peacekeeping operations. These connections are most evident in the mandate given by the United Nations Security Council for the peacekeeping mission itself. They are also evident in the process for developing mission-wide comprehensive POC strategies which must be developed with regard to the Framework for Drafting Comprehensive Protection of Civilian Strategies in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (POC Framework)9. The aim of POC strategies broadly stated is to build greater cohesiveness within the mission on meeting the immediate protection needs of the civilian populations within the area of operation by drawing upon all components within the mission (including the ROL component)10.

In order to analyse the relationship between these agendas, I examine the key policy documents on POC and ROL. I also draw upon recent thinking on effective ROL programming and its delivery emerging from the ground-breaking World Bank’s World Development Report 2011, Conflict, Security, and Development (WDR11) 11. Against this historical and policy background, consideration is given to the way in which POC/PK and ROL agendas interact in the field and the need to build policy and institutional links between these agendas.

In this paper, I point to the benefits of comprehensive POC strategies. I also argue that more consideration needs to be given to the interaction between the two agendas and the potential impact of the POC/PK agenda on the ROL agenda. For example, there is some risk that comprehensive POC strategies may impact on the longer-term ROL tasking such as transitional justice programs by effectively lowering the priority afforded to such activities within the mission as a result of the higher priority afforded generally to POC/PK within the peacekeeping operations12.

Another issue, deserving of consideration, is the move within the ROL agenda towards a ‘thin’ (as opposed to ‘thick’) model for ROL in stabilisation operations. The value and utility of a more ambitious ‘thick’ programing has been increasingly questioned for conflict-afflicted countries with poor human resourcing. I suggest that in both POC/PK and ROL agendas there is a process for prioritisation: when deciding which ROL activities are to be included in the POC implementation matrix and when deciding which ROL activities are suitable to be included within a ‘thin’ ROL model. The conceptual links between these processes, between this new ROL thinking and the POC

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strategizing have not been sufficiently explored. I suggest that there are useful links which could be developed by building synergies between these agendas.

Any reform in these areas potentially faces challenges and building synergies and strengthening partnerships between the various participants in the field may prove difficult in part because different UN agencies have differing approaches to protection and many actors are driven predominantly by their strong commitment to their particular organisation’s mandate13.

The POC agenda

It is widely recognised that POC (including POC/PK) has its roots in the humanitarian protection of civilians and the law of armed conflict, especially the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols, which regulate how war is to be fought and affords certain status to civilian non-participants in armed conflict14. By regulating the conduct of armed conflict these laws have the effect of protecting those not taking part in the hostilities (for example civilians, health and aid workers)15.

One of the issues receiving consideration in POC field is the need to recognise the differing protection roles performed and differing understandings taken to protection amongst the various actors and entities. This reality is also reflected at the Security Council level where there are several processes and discrete resolutions16 addressing protection-related issues including the well-known resolutions on women peace and security17, children and armed conflict18 and conflict-related sexual violence19. One of the challenges in POC/PK is therefore to develop integrated approaches in the field while doing justice to the strategic aims of the differing agendas and to build synergies, where possible, in the utilisation of the limited resources of the mission and those of the humanitarians and others working in the field.

At the mission level, a degree of complexity is added particularly because of the range of activities which need to be managed in modern peace operations. As Alain Le Roy, former Under Secretary-General of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), stated:

[t]he complex and multidimensional nature of modern peacekeeping operations requires senior mission leaders capable of managing a vast array of tasks and challenges, ranging from human rights and reconciliation efforts and the establishment of the rule of law to complex disarmament processes 20 and the protection of civilians, among many others .

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The emergence of the POC/PK agenda is a reaction to the recognised failures by the UN to effectively protect civilians in countries in which peacekeepers were present21: In 1994 the Rwandan slaughter occurred despite the presence of a UN peacekeeping operation, UNAMIR, in the country. Again in 1995 in Srebrenica, a UN peacekeeping operation, UNPROFOR, failed to prevent ethnic cleansing.

In response to these crises, the United Nations Security Council in 1999 mandated the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMISIL) in language which was to become a standard for POC/PK22, ‘to take the necessary action…within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence’23.

In 1999, Brazil, as President of the Security Council, invited the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), then under the leadership of Sérgio Vieira de Mello, to brief the Council on its humanitarian activities. Later that year, the first open debate on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict was held – and the issue of POC was on the Security Council agenda.24

In 2002, an Aide Memoire25 was adopted by the UN Security Council as a tool 26 for the Council to manage and analyse protection issues . The Aide Memoire (which has been regularly updated) discusses the wider protection concerns pertaining to conflict-affected populations especially displacement, humanitarian access, the conduct of hostilities, accountability and the ROL27.

Even after these reports and reforms, problems remained in putting into effect the mandated task of protecting civilians28. In 2009, in its landmark Resolution 1894, the Security Council indicated that the protection of civilians ‘requires a coordinated response from all relevant mission components’ and reaffirmed its practice of ensuring that mandates of UN peacekeeping and other relevant missions include:

[W]here appropriate and on a case-by-case basis, provisions regarding the protection of civilians, [and] stresses that mandated protection activities must be given priority in decisions about the use of 29 available capacity and resources . [Emphasis added]

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The POC/PK agenda

Against this background of POC at the strategic level, over recent years we have seen impressive operational reforms being methodically introduced by the UN for the implementation of the POC/PK agenda within missions with protection of civilians mandates. Much of this recent work on the POC/PK agenda has been aimed at addressing the gaps in policy and preparedness described in the major independent study, Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations: Successes, Setbacks and Remaining Challenges30 (independent study) and other reports31. The authors of the independent study were remarkably frank about their concerns and observed that the ‘chain’ from early warning, to developing mandates by the UN Secretariat, to the mission level implementation of the mandates ‘was broken’ and that the Security Council’s intent was not understood. Importantly, the report identified both the need for guidance and the need for mission-wide strategies on POC to act as a lynchpin of the mission’s focus to implement the mandated task to protect civilians32.

In 2010, the United Nations Secretariat, through the C34 Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, achieved several significant advances in responding to these criticisms including the release of the DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (the Operational Concept)33. The Operational Concept recognised that what is needed ‘is a basic organizing framework for how these multiple lines of activity [within a peacekeeping mission] can support the protection of civilians, both directly and indirectly, and which helps to inform the development of mission- wide protection strategies.’ The Operational Concept proposed a three-tiered approach to protecting civilians and for the phasing of operations depending on the security context.

The first tier, entitled ‘protection through political processes’ recognises that in building peace there is always a need for a political solution and therefor includes the political and advocacy efforts that mission leadership and personnel should undertake in regard to POC. Tasks such as supporting the original peace agreement and transitional arrangements will fall within this tier. In addition some ROL activities such as rewriting a constitution and transitional justice mechanisms fall within this tier. It also includes measures to reform the security sector as well as measures necessary to transition to elections and building support for the establishment of parties, NGOs, and civil

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society. Of course, these tasks concern key aspects of the sovereignty of the host nation and it will often be very challenging for a mission to implement some of these activities given the need for the mission to maintain the host nation’s consent to its ongoing presence.

The second tier refers to ‘[p]roviding protection from physical violence’ and tasks may include the well-known examples of the UN peacekeepers escorting women to markets, working with local community protection systems and supporting internally displaced persons (IDPs) by providing camp support, such as stoves, lighting, toilets, and wood patrols, which can minimise the time spent outside the relative security of an IDP camp.

The third tier refers to ‘[e]stablishing a protective environment’ and this includes the longer term activities of promoting legal protection, and supporting effective national institutions. The Operational Concept specifies that this tier applies to ‘Security Sector Reform activities’, ROL actions aimed at the security sector and the ‘national police and other criminal justice actors involved in protection efforts.

Following the call from the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations in 2010 for comprehensive protection strategies to be incorporated in the overall mission implementation plans34, the POC Framework was released to provide guidance to mission leadership on developing comprehensive POC strategies.

There are three key features of POC strategies of particular interest in terms of their impact on ROL programs. The first is that a dedicated POC coordination mechanism must be established to determine priorities, risk and activities35 for the mission involving all components (including the ROL components) of the mission. The POC Framework notes that the Head of Mission (HOM), usually the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), is responsible for both the mandate and the development of the POC strategies36. The POC Framework also promotes the need for a Senior Management Group on POC37. It is this mechanism which creates the opportunity for more joined-up and joint ROL and POC activities.

The second key feature is the requirement for the mission to articulate actual and potential risks to civilians in the mission area and to identify activities to be undertaken by the mission directly, or in coordination with other protection actors, to address those risks. What is notable about this process is that it is

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context specific as it looks at the actual threats to the civilians within the mission’s area of operation and how those risks can be responded to, or treated. This ‘bottom up’ analysis, for reasons I will elaborate, provides a useful and practical tool for those designing ROL activities for the mission38.

The third feature is that the POC Framework requires the critical implementation matrix of the POC strategy be ‘action oriented’, focused and ‘concise’ (in a short timeframe of one year). These requirements are problematic for planning ROL programs, given the length of time that generally ROL projects need to be effective. It is this feature of the POC Framework that raises red flags about the ability to integrate ROL activities into a POC strategy - particularly for longer term ROL activities.

Rule of law agenda

As noted above, like POC, the ROL39 agenda has become more established both within the United Nations General Assembly40 and the United Nations Security Council41 where there has been an increasing recognition that the delivery of vital services such as justice and security is urgent and critical to peacebuilding and peacemaking. The delivery of justice and security, both crucial functions of an effective state, relies on effective rule of law42.

In 2000, the Brahimi Report43 called for a renewed focus on the re- establishment of the rule of law in post-conflict recovery. In 2003, the United Nations Security Council convened its first thematic debate on the ROL44. In 2005, the Secretary-General in his report, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All45 drew critical links between the enjoyment of human rights and rule of law with successful development and security outcomes.

The Guidance note of the Secretary-General on UN Approach to Rule of Law Assistance46 defines broadly what the ‘rule of law’ means47 for the United Nations and provides a ‘framework’ for UN ROL activities at the national level including in conflict, post conflict and development contexts. The framework is broad and ambitious particularly for use in the post conflict environments in which peacekeepers generally operate. The framework includes supporting a constitution, a legal framework, an electoral system, institutions of justice, governance, security and human rights, transitional justice processes, and supporting civil society48.

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For peacekeeping operations, the range of tasks to be performed by a mission will depend upon the specific mandate and component. As Simon Chesterman has observed,

The mandates for such missions tend to be broad, calling for the “re-establishment” or “restoration and maintenance” of the rule of law, without formally articulating what this might entail. In practice, the dominant activities have tended to be training of personnel, assisting institution-building, advising on law reform issues, and monitoring, with the emphasis on criminal law processes. Less attention has been paid, for example, to land law49.

Different United Nations components have various responsibilities in a mission for ROL activities50. The resources provided to these components often do not match the demand or their importance to the success of the mission51. The immediate emphasis or agenda of the ROL component in a UN multidimensional peacekeeping operation is said to be a focus on stabilisation and security and beginning the ‘basic progress … towards the development of rule of law structures and systems.52’ This is a ‘thin’ approach to the re- establishment of ROL. There is also recognition that peacekeeping operation are intended to be a short-term intervention, in a sense a first response, and that establishing criminal justice systems for example, will require longer term support. The Rule of Law component is therefore tasked with building relationships for a transition of longer term rule of law programs to other actors including Member States and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO).

The issue of strategic approaches is made more complex because there are several actors involved in delivering ROL activities with differing strategic objectives. For example, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), through its human rights components in peacekeeping missions, works closely with the ROL program and has a dual reporting line of accountability to the head of the peace mission and to the High Commissioner53. The human rights component provides human rights advice, technical assistance on ensuring that peace processes promote justice and equity and takes the lead on transitional justice mechanisms. However, there is little evidence of short term or first response thinking, for example when developing approaches to supporting transitional justice mechanisms associated with a society’s attempt to come to terms with a legacy of large- 54 scale past abuses . Rather OHCHR’s Management Plan indicates that this work is part of its strategy for a global effort to combat impunity and to strengthen accountability and the rule of law and democratic societies55.

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The potential impact of WDR11

How ROL programs are delivered in a conflict and development contexts has been the subject of intense professional consideration following the release of World Bank’s WDR11. That report is particularly important as it provides an authoritative source for empirical evidence supporting the contention that ROL and security are critical to supporting and maintaining an effective state. The WDR11 provides a new direction and new tools for appropriate international responses to conflict and its causes. As WDR11 notes,

The central message of the Report is that strengthening legitimate institutions and governance to 56 provide citizen security, justice, and jobs is crucial to break cycles of violence .

One key finding in the report was that countries with the weakest institutional legitimacy and governance are the most vulnerable to violence and instability. Violence and instability are key issues threatening the wellbeing of civilians in conflict zones. Supporting the re-establishment of the rule of law is essential to strengthening institutional legitimacy and governance and preventing instability which in turn strengthen human security and, I suggest, the protection of civilians.

The report contains some other key messages including that: institutional legitimacy is the key to stability; investing in citizen security, justice and jobs is essential to reducing violence; international agencies and partner countries must adapt procedures to respond with speed and bring a longer-term perspective; and, greater staying power by institutions working in this area is needed when working in these fragile states57.

One issue identified by the World Bank is the need to ensure that the solutions developed to support states are suitably adapted to their context. This was an issue that had also been identified in the Australian Civil-Military Centre of Excellence’s Rule of Law Roundtable: Towards best practice in post conflict situations. At that Roundtable, for example, it was pointed out that the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) illustrated the importance of planning assistance based on the local environment and context: The geography of the Solomon Islands meant that the police force in that country is essentially a maritime organisation and extra maritime capacity within this context was essential58. More generally, transferring western models may not take root in post-conflict environments and hence there is a 59 need to develop “best-fit” institutions .

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The intersections between the POC and ROL agendas

As mentioned in the introduction, there are two clear intersections between the POC and ROL agendas at the mission level. First the mandate itself usually refers to both agendas. The second is in the development of the POC strategy under the POC Framework which requires ROL input.

Each Security Council mandate contains a list of mandated tasks for the mission The number of tasks assigned to the peacekeeping operation often reads as something of a ‘shopping list’ and may be unrealistic for the mission to complete given the level of resourcing provided and the often challenging operational environment. Often little guidance is provided as to how the mandated tasks interact60. Something of an exception to this observation was MONUSCO’s 2010 mandate (extended in UNSCR 2053 (2012)) where the Security Council gave MONUSCO mandates on both POC/PK and ROL and provided that the mandated tasks would be prioritised. Paragraph a) (and therefore priority number one) was the standard reference to POC/PK. ROL tasking was paragraph p) and therefore presumably priority number sixteen61. This lowly priority for ROL is perhaps overstated because of the close links between ROL activities and the POC mandate as some ROL activities might be incorporated into the mission-wide POC strategy and therefore afforded a high priority. However, where ROL activities are not incorporated into the POC strategy, the activity may not gain priority for the use of mission resources.

The other key intersection, as noted above, is the mission-wide POC strategy which has the potential to deliver better-targeted ROL programming and better co-ordination between all components of the mission to address violence. This strategy should help address one of the concerns mentioned in the WDR11 which is that international assistance often fails to coordinate between the military, police and the justice system62. It is increasingly recognised that a multiagency and multidisciplinary approach is best practice in re-establishing ROL in post conflict situations and these approaches have particular relevance for the delivery of ROL activities in peace operations. Very like the Independent Panel in the Brahimi report ten years earlier63, the WDR11 report states:

A key lesson of successful violence prevention and recovery is that security, justice, and economic stresses are linked: approaches that try to solve them through military-only, justice-only, or 64 development-only solutions will falter .

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The Australian Civil-Military Centre’s Roundtable reached a similar conclusion65. Similarly a recent report on the UN’s ROL agenda also called for creative joint operational arrangements on the ground that:

…integrate rule-of-law expertise from these entities with political, security, and economic and financial expertise. Such initiatives exist… but they tend to arise despite, not because of, existing institutional arrangements or policy guidance.66

A very useful intersection point between POC/PK and ROL67 agendas will be the mission’s POC strategy risk analysis68. As noted above, each mission element (including the ROL, Security Sector Reform (SSR) and the human rights components) will be required to take part in the process69. Clearly ROL activities can play an important part in addressing the threats faced by civilians such as those posed by ill-disciplined local police, or armed criminal gangs70.

The POC risk analysis developed as part of the POC strategy for the mission will also potentially impact the development of the ROL programs and activities. This process should lead to a sharper focus by the mission on the actual needs of the civilian population and the prioritisation of the threats that they are facing. This process is likely to lead to some very useful ‘bottom up’ community-focused interventions71 by all the mission’s components. By supporting ‘bottom up’ approaches, while maintaining key strategic ‘top down’ approaches, ROL programs will be brought into line with the latest thinking on best practice for working in fragile states72. In addition, focussing on community and civilian risk should also assist in avoiding supply-driven reform programs- where organisations deliver the programs that they have the pre- existing capacity to deliver rather than develop more adapted and responsive interventions and should also encourage ‘best-fit’ approaches73.

More challenging is the issue of the prioritisation that should be ascribed to discrete traditional and important ROL activities such as transitional justice and constitution-making and other programs which are undoubtedly necessary in the longer term but which are not directed at responding to a direct threat to civilians. Programs to promote accountability, to reinforce respect for human rights, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting government officials may fall within this category and are essential to building longer term respect for the rule of law and justice.

In this context, it is interesting to note that there is a separate debate being undertaken within the ROL community on the need to focus on confidence-

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building measures for interventions in post conflict environments. Camino Kavanagh and Bruce Jones have argued:

In post-conflict settings, in cases where institutions are weak and resources are low, the UN should refrain from using the ‘thick’ version of the rule of law as an overarching framework for initial engagement, and ensure that support to specific rule-of-law functions is accompanied by confidence 74 building measures and in tune with the political economy realities on the ground.

While this thinking has some apparent conceptual links to the priority setting which occurs in developing a POC strategy, the concepts are far from identical. This is a critical area for a useful and constructive dialogue between those managing the two agendas as they apply in peacekeeping missions.

Building ‘legitimate institutions’ is now recognised as a long-term process and this will be challenging for the mission as peacekeeping operations are usually only provided with short mandates which need to be renewed - usually annually. The timelines for effective institutional reform on the other hand, based on the WDR11 report’s findings, require a much longer timeframe and possibly generational change75. This is an existing challenge for the UN, which will need to establish clear pathways to manage transitions of ROL programs from peacekeeping, to peacebuilding, to post conflict developmental phases. However, there is a risk that the POC strategizing might exacerbate this problem by leading to a prioritisation of shorter term activities and a delay in the commencement of longer term institutional reform efforts.

The need to build bridges between the two agendas

As we have seen there is a tension between the two agendas on POC and ROL and that even within each agenda there are competing interests and institutional agendas. For example, many actors play important roles in protection including military and police components in peacekeeping, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), humanitarians, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and Non-government Organisations. There are differing interests within each of these organisations in ‘formulating and advancing’ different aspects of POC. While all are well- motivated, it is almost inevitable that each will try to do so while ‘advancing organisational specific interests’76. It has been noted that the various UN departments apply differing definitions of ‘protection’ and agencies approaches are ‘coloured by their specific mandate and responsibilities’77. For example, UNHCR and UNHCHR are reported to see POC not so much as an overarching Peter Thomson – Protection of civilians and the rule of law Page 12

agenda but as a central dimension of more specific tasks. The UNHCHR is charged with the protection of human rights and UNHCR is primarily focussed on the protection of refugees. Furthermore, ‘humanitarian organisations have been keen to distinguish their protection action from that of peacekeeping missions in order to safeguard humanitarian principles’78.

Similar issues of competing institutional interests are raised in regard to the numerous entities within the UN that have ROL responsibilities, so much so, that efforts have been undertaken to strengthen coordination of rule of law work79. A recent report noted,

Nonetheless, with the three main Councils, all four General Assembly substantive committees, nine departments and agencies, and scores of smaller UN offices, task forces, emergency response teams, and other entities working on rule-of law policy and operational activities, competition and fragmentation has continued to undermine UN system coherence and the potential for an effective response.80

In 2009, DPKO and the Department of Field Support in A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping, United Nations (New Horizons)81, acknowledged that there is a relationship between POC/PK and ROL but that fully integrating the agendas is ‘as critical as it is challenging’82, 83 however, little analysis of the relationship was provided .

Since the release of the Operational Concept and the POC Framework little official consideration appears to have been given to the links between ROL activities of the peacekeeping operations and POC/PK84 and where consideration has been given, it does not show a deep level of consideration of the complexities involved. For example, POC/PK was not discussed in the Secretary-General’s Third report on strengthening and coordinating United Nations rule of law activities (save for comments annexed to the report by 85 Australia and Austria) . The report states that the UN sees coordination as ‘an ongoing and critical process for the Organization’, for example by developing joint program and joint justice units86 but did not consider the implications of the release of the Operational Concept87 on ROL activities.

The Aide Memoire, prepared by OCHA, touches on these issues. The report includes, as ‘issues for consideration’, the rapid deployment of well-trained civilian police, justice and corrections experts as a component of United Nations peacekeeping. The report also refers to the standard ROL wording calling for compliance by parties to armed conflict with applicable international standards and, the establishment of truth and reconciliation mechanisms.

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However, the Aide Memoire does not directly address the issues raised in this paper except for short references to the missions’ POC strategies and introducing best practices.88 What might be beneficial is an officially endorsed approach which considers the impact of prioritising POC/PK on the approaches and activities of the missions work on ROL and guidance on the extent to which ROL activities may be incorporated into the POC strategy as envisaged by the Operational Concept.

In September 2012 the United Nations Secretary General established a Global Focal Point for Police, Justice and Corrections Areas in the Rule of Law in Post- conflict and other Crisis Situations89. The Secretary-General has prioritized “delivery as one” by the United Nations in crisis and conflict settings. The Global Focal Point arrangement is aimed at strengthening the UN’s ability to fill critical civilian capacity gaps in the aftermath of conflict. These announcements are to be welcomed. The Focal Point will have a new function of supporting the UN system in delivering police, justice and corrections assistance to peacekeeping, and to assist United Nations country teams and United Nations missions to develop and implement common rule of law, justice and security strategies and programmes. It will be interesting to see how this new coordination point links in with the existing Rule of Law Coordination and Resource Group and whether this process can also address some of the issues raised in this paper.

Conclusion

In summary, there are many potential and important benefits in the better integration of ROL activities in the field into the mission-wide POC strategy. Specifically, the POC Framework and its resultant mission specific POC strategies will:

• encourage better targeting of some ROL activities and more ‘bottom-up’ activities to address the actual threats to the civilian population at local levels • lead to more multi-disciplinary and joined-up activities which are better equipped to respond to those threats (for example joint protection patrols), and • enhance the focus on ROL activities which address the actual threat to local communities.

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While the two agendas are largely synergistic, theoretically at least there may be challenges generated by the strategizing required under the POC Framework and in particular the potential for a lack of priority to be accorded to longer- term ROL activities such as institutional strengthening and transitional justice. A blend of longer and shorter term ROL approaches is desirable in post conflict states. However the POC Framework, with its focus on ‘action oriented’ activities and with a one year timeframe for the activities on the implementation matrix, is not likely to prioritise the longer-term ROL activities. For these activities, there appears to be a risk that either the activities will not be included as part of the mission’s POC strategy matrix of activities, or more likely, that they will be nevertheless pursued as a lower priority and in a non- integrated way under the rubric of differing mandate functions.

In developing the ROL agenda, consideration might be given to how the call for the UN to focus on ‘thin’ ROL programming in post conflict settings where institutions are weak and resources are low90, can work synergistically with the POC strategizing and the impact of the phasings which are also part of the POC Operational Concept. In addition, the call for more ‘joined-up’ ROL activities – may also be delivered under the POC strategy and supporting matrix. These issues and the way these goals can be achieved appear to have been inadequately considered in policy processes to date.

Given the priority tasking by the UN Security Council for POC/PK there is a risk that ROL activities pursued by the mission may be narrowed with longer-term activities not being supported91. Any delay in the commencement of the longer term ROL reforms to build legitimate institutions will effectively push out the timeline for the reform of these institutions and delay the strengthening of the human resourcing and skill-base that is essential to institutional reform. Such delay may also have the unintentional effect of delaying the ability of the peacekeepers to leave with their mission accomplished. Delaying transitional justice mechanisms until better security for civilians is established may or may not be appropriate (depending on the context) but it is a decision that should be conscientiously considered by the mission and at the strategic level92.

To what extent ROL activities will be affected may well depend on the country context and the Senior Mission Leadership (SML), but there would appear to be scope for some further clarification of expectations by the Security Council when drafting mission mandates by including further guidance on these issues. Specific consideration of the links between POC/PK and ROL agendas in peacekeeping operations would be a worthy topic for the Council’s Peter Thomson – Protection of civilians and the rule of law Page 15

deliberations so that at the strategic level, the links are made clearer, rather than leaving these difficult issues to be resolved at the operational level. Perhaps guidance to assist SML in weighing the benefits of longer-term protection activities against the more short-term priorities of responding to civilians needs for protection such as addressing threats to IDP camps would be beneficial. The Senior Management Groups on POC93 may be useful mechanisms for these discussions. The issue might also be explored in the Aide Memoire prepared by OCHA.

What is clear is that effective ROL programs are essential to effective POC/PK, the building of a sustainable peace and to responding to the challenges posed 94 by repeated cycles of conflict that are faced by many fragile states .

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1 The views expressed in the article are the author’s alone and not the views of the Australian Government.

2 See generally the online resource of the Security Council Report available at http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.1071693/k.24F/Security_Council_ReportBRMont hly_Forecast_August_2012.htm.

3 POC is currently the subject of a biannual open debate in the United Nations Security Council. See Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, S/2012/376, May 2012. POC issues were also raised in SC Res 1973 on Libya.

4 See Hugh Breakey ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflicts: Review and Analysis’, Institute for Ethics, Governance and Law, Griffith University, May, 2011. Breakey identifies this is ‘POC3’ which he defines as the ‘“protection of civilians” concept used by the UN Secretary General in his reports on the subject, and subsequently by the UN Security Council when considering action.’ See http://www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/333844/Responsibility-to-Protect-and-the- Protection-of-Civilians-in-Armed-Conflict-Review-and-Analysis.pdf.

5 In 2009, DPKO and DFS offered their vision of the agenda on peacekeeping in A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping report which noted that consensus on policy and requirements for civilian protection are ‘central to the success of current and future UN peacekeeping operations’. (United Nations, New York, July 2009, at v.)

6 An open debate on justice and the rule of law was held in January 2012. See Report of the Secretary-General on Strengthening and coordinating United Nations rule of law activities, A/66/133 August 2011.

7 The Rule of Law Coordination and Resource Group is chaired by the Deputy Secretary-General and supported by its secretariat, the Rule of Law Unit. See Alberto Cutillo, ‘Advancing the Rule of Law Agenda at the 67th General Assembly’, IPI Issue Brief, New York 2012 available at http://www.ipinst.org/publication/policy- papers/detail/372-advancing-the-rule-of-law-agenda-at-the-67th-general-assembly.html, accessed September 2012, 5. One of the key organisations for peacekeeping is the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) at the UN Headquarters which brings together the Police Division, the Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Service (CLJAS), the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Section (DDR) and the Security Sector Reform Unit.

8 See United Nations and the Rule of Law website, http://www.un.org/en/ruleoflaw/index.shtml.

9 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Department of Field Support, DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (2010). (Unpublished).

10 Released as a draft in 2010.

11 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank (Washington 2011).

12 In SC Res 1894, the UN Security Council stated that ‘where appropriate’ mandated protection activities must be given priority in decisions about the use of available capacity and resources. By 2011, the United Nations Security Council had authorised twelve UN peace operations with POC mandates, with eight active. UNOCI in Cote d’Ivoire; MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of Congo; MINUSTAH in Haiti; UNIFIL in Lebanon; UNMIL

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in Liberia; UNMISS in South Sudan; UNISFA in Abyei; and UNAMID in Darfur. The UN mission in Sudan (UNMIS) completed its operations in July 2011; its successor mission, the UN mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) also has a POC mandate.

13 Andreas Øien Stensland and Ole Jacob Sending ‘Unpacking the “culture of protection”; A political economy analysis of OCHA and the protection of civilians’, 2 Security in Practice ·(2011). Francesco Mancini, Managing Partnership, International Peacekeeping Vol. 18, No 5 November 2011, 627-633. Phoebe Wynn-Pope, Evolution of Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Australian Government and OXFAM, (2013). See Camino Kavanagh and Bruce Jones, Shaky Foundations; An assessment of the UN’s Rule of Law Support Agenda, (New York: New York University, 2011).

14 See Hugh Breakey, n4, 67-71.

15 See website of the International Committee of the Red Cross website at http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and- law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions/overview-geneva-conventions.htm.

16 See Liam Mahony and Roger Nash, A framework for a holistic approach to UNSC Resolutions on Protection of Civilians, Children and Armed Conflict, and Women, Peace and Security, (Fieldview Solutions, Prepared for the Swiss Mission to the United Nations) 12 November 2008. Available at http://www.aramis.admin.ch/Dokument.aspx?DocumentID=920.

17 Commencing with the landmark SC Res. 1325 (2000).

18 See SC Res. 1612 (2005) and SC Res. 1882 (2009).

19 See SC Res. 1820 which addresses sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict situations.

20 Alain Le Roy, Foreword, Considerations for Mission Leadership in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, (International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations and the Challenges Forum Partner Organizations, Sweden 2010) 7.

21 See Siobhán Wills, Protecting Civilians: The Obligations of Peacekeepers (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 2009.

22 SC Res. 1270. The finalised POC training modules refers to standard language as follows: ‘Decides that ...... is authorized to take the necessary action (sometimes “all necessary action”), in the areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, (…) and without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of ...... , to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence including all forms of sexual and gender-based violence.’ DPKO and DFS, ‘Module 2: International Legal Dimensions of the Protection of Civilians’, 24 (2012).

23 UNAMSIL in 1999, operative paragraph 14 of S/RES/1270 (1999).

24 Andreas Øien Stensland and Ole Jacob Sending ‘Unpacking the “culture of protection”; A political economy analysis of OCHA and the protection of civilians’, Vol 2 Security in Practice · (2011).

25 Aide Memoire; For the consideration of issues pertaining to the protection of civilians in armed conflict (4th edition) OCHA Vol 1 No 4, Policy and Studies Series (2011).

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26 The Aide Memoire is now in its fourth iteration. A particularly striking feature of the Aide Memoire is that it can operate as a template for the consideration of issues by the United Nations Security Council when considering the possible deployment of Peacekeeping operations. There are many practical benefits in standardizing such wording including strengthening the capacity of the UN Secretariat to respond in a timely manner to a new mandate.

27 Similarly, the Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict examined POC as part of a wider agenda on protection in armed conflicts: The Secretary General’s 5 core challenges on UNSC POC are similar in some respects to the topics covered in the Aide Memoire and include, enhancing compliance and particularly compliance by non-state armed groups, POC in peacekeeping operations, humanitarian access, and accountability. S/2012/376 (22 May 2012).

28 See also, Michael G. Smith, Jeni Whalan and Peter Thomson ‘The Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping Operations: Recent Developments’, Vol. 7, No. 4 Security Challenges (Summer 2011) 27-38.

29 UN SC Res. 1894, para. 19.

30 The independent study was jointly commissioned by United Nations. Victoria Holt and Glyn Taylor with Max Kelly (DPKO, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), United Nations, New York) 2009.

31 See New Horizons n81. See also Alison C. Giffen, ‘Enhancing the Protection of Civilians in Peace Operations from Policy to Practice, May 2011, available at http://acmc.gov.au/publications/summary-report-enhancing- the-protection-of-civilians-in-peace-operations/.

32 5.

33 N9. The DPKO/DFS Lessons Learned Note on the Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping Operations: Dilemmas, Emerging Practices and Lessons was also released at this time. The Operational Concept is now reported to be a UN system-wide concept. See Stian Kjeksrud, Jacob Aasland Ravndal, Andreas Øien Stensland, Cedric de Coning, Walter Lotze and Erin A. Weir, Protection of civilians in armed conflict – comparing organisation approaches, (Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) (Norway 2011)), 13.

34 Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations 2010 substantive session, A/64/19 (22 February-19 March 2010) para. 146. The report requested ‘that peacekeeping missions with protection of civilian mandates develop comprehensive protection strategies incorporated in the overall mission implementation plans and contingency plans, in consultation with the host Government, local authorities, troop- and police-contributing countries, and other relevant actors.’

35 While this mechanism might be either an established or a dedicated POC coordination mechanism, if an established mechanism is used, the strategy requires an explanation of how it will be used or adapted in this context. N9, para. 19.

36 The SRSG will delegate the implementation to the heads of the components through the DSRSGs.

37 N9, para.s 13-14. The coordination mechanism appropriately cascades down to the local level, with a local Head of Office coordinating with all relevant mission stakeholders and other non-mission stakeholders.

38 See WDR11 n11. The authors encourage ‘Programs that support bottom-up state society relations in insecure areas. These include community-based programs for violence prevention, employment, and associated service delivery, and access to local justice and dispute resolution.’ (Emphasis added) at 18. Peter Thomson – Protection of civilians and the rule of law Page 19

39 The United Nations defines the rule of law as a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency (see S/2004/616). See Delivering justice: programme of action to strengthen the rule of law at the national and international levels A/66/749 (16 March 2012).

40 The United Nations General Assembly has considered rule of law as an agenda item since 1992. (See UN doc.s A/RES/61/39, A/RES/62/70, A/RES/63/128). The General Assembly has held thematic debates on the rule of law with the latest being held on 11 April 2011 entitled ‘Promoting universal adherence to and implementation of the rule of law at the national and international levels’. On 24 September 2012, the General Assembly held a one day, High-level plenary Meeting on “the rule of law at the national and international levels”.

41 See Presidential statement UN doc. S/PRST/2010/11 (29 June 2010) addressed the issue of the rule of law in the maintenance of international peace and security. On 19 January 2012 an open debate on ‘the promotion and strengthening of the rule of law in the maintenance of international peace and security’ was held by the Security Council where the Secretary General’s report on the rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict situations UN doc. S/2011/634 (12 October 2011) was presented. A presidential statement was released following the debate: UN Doc. S/PRST/2012/1 (19 January 2012). Other Security Council resolutions have emphasised the links with other issues such as women, peace and security (SC Res 1325, SC Res. 1820, SC Res 1889, (children in armed conflict (e.g., SC res 1612), the protection of civilians in armed conflict (e.g., SC res 1674).

42 The Rule of Law Coordination and Resource Group has been focussing on better coordination and coherence with United Nations engagement in the area. See the Third Annual report on strengthening and coordinating United Nations rule of law activities: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/66/133 (8 August 2011).

43 UN Doc. A/55/305–S/2000/809 (21 August 2000). The Panel ‘recommends a doctrinal shift in the use of civilian police, other rule of law elements and human rights experts in complex peace operations to reflect an increased focus on strengthening rule of law institutions and improving respect for human rights in post- conflict environments.’ 8. See also Building on Brahimi: Peacekeeping in an era of Strategic Uncertainty; A Report by the NYU Center on International Cooperation Submitted to the UN Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support For the ‘New Horizons’ Project (April 2009). In September 2000, the Millennium Declaration adopted by World leaders called for strengthening respect for the rule of law in international affairs. See Jeremy Farrall, ‘Impossible expectations? The UN Security Council’s promotion of the rule of law after conflict’, The Role of International Law in Rebuilding Societies after Conflict- Great Expectations, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009) 141.

44 ‘Justice and the Rule of Law: the United Nations Role’, UN Doc. S/PV.4833 (24 September 2003).

45 UN Doc A/59/2005 2005 (21 March 2005). See Security Council Report, Cross-Cutting Report on the Rule of Law, October 2011.

46 UN Doc. A/55/305 S/2000/809 (21 August 2000).

47 UN Doc. Guidance note of the Secretary-General; UN Approach to Rule of Law Assistance (April 2008).

48 Op cit. 4-7.

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49 ‘An International Rule of Law?.’ Vol. 56 American Journal of Comparative Law (2008) 331-361; NYU Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 08-11 Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1081738

50 For the justice component the key tasks include working with the criminal justice system, reform legal education and training, reinforcing judicial independence, promoting judicial and prosecutorial professionalism, improving Court administration strengthening access to justice promoting gender justice and victim’s rights.

51 See Report of the Secretary-General Delivering justice: programme of action to strengthen the rule of law at the national and international levels, UN Doc. A/66/749, (16 March 2012), para 25.

52 Dmitry Titov, ‘Peacekeeping Promotes Rule of Law through Expertise and Partnerships’ Vol 2 Justice Update, (UN DPKO New York May 2011).

53 Human Rights Components of Peace Missions, OHCHR website, available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/Pages/PeaceMissionsIndex.aspx September 2012.

54 UN Doc. Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: United Nations Approach to Transitional Justice, (UN New York and Geneva 2010), 2.

55 OHCHR Management Plan 2012-2013: Working for results, Annex II, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/ohchrreport2011/web_version/ohchr_mp_2012_2013_web_en/index.html#/h ome (Accessed September 2012).

56 WDR112 n11.

57 WDR11 n11 270.

58 Report of the Rule of Law Roundtable: Towards best practice in post conflict situations, October 2010, Queanbeyan, http://civmilcoe.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Rule-of-Law-Roundtable.pdf.

59 As Professor Putzel has observed, ‘Externally determined prescriptions for reform are often implemented without adequate understanding of the political settlement underpinning the stability of a state. They are also often implemented over very short timeframes, giving little space for institutional consolidation and social adjustment’. Report of the Global and Regional Dimensions of conflict and Peace-building, Headline Seminar, (Addis Ababa, 10 and 12 October 2009).

60 See also Brahimi report, n43 , and 10-11.

61 The relevant parts of the mandate reads as follows: ‘Emphasizes that the protection of civilians must be given priority in decisions about the use of available capacity and resources and authorizes MONUSCO to use all necessary means, within the limits of its capacity and in the areas where its units are deployed;

Decides that MONUSCO shall have the following mandate in this order of priority:

Protection of civilians

(a) Ensure the effective protection of civilians, including humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders, under imminent threat of physical violence, in particular violence emanating from any of the parties engaged in the conflict; .....

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(p) Support, in close cooperation with other international partners, the efforts by the Congolese Government to consolidate State authority in the territory freed from armed groups through the deployment of trained PNC, and to develop rule of law institutions and territorial administration, with respect to the Government’s Stabilization and Reconstruction Plan (STAREC) and the International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSSS)...’

62 WDR11, n11 identifies multisectoral community programs that involve policing and justice as well as development activities, such as initiatives in Latin America that provide local dispute resolution and justice services, community policing, employment and training, safe public and trading spaces, and social and cultural programs that promote tolerance. 29.

63 N11, para. 40.

64 N11, 28.

65 Participants at the Australian Civil-Military Centre’s Roundtable emphasised that reform of the criminal justice system should be holistic and cover all aspects of the sector. For example, international police can arrest criminals, but if there are ineffective courts or penal institutions, this can create potential human rights issues for detainees. Report of the Rule of Law Roundtable: Towards best practice in post conflict situations, October 2010, Queanbeyan, http://civmilcoe.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Rule-of-Law- Roundtable.pdf 7.

66 See Camino Kavanagh and Bruce Jones, Shaky Foundations; An assessment of the UN’s Rule of Law Support Agenda, (New York: New York University, 2011), 10. The report did not directly consider the potential role for POC strategies for developing such integrated planning. See discussion on Integrated Mission Planning Processes (para.s 132-133).

67 In the report, ‘The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies’ reference is given to ‘progress towards greater coordination and coherence at the field level. Rule of law issues are systematically integrated into the strategic and inter-agency planning of peace operations. In humanitarian settings, rule of law activities are one of the five areas of responsibility under the protection cluster’. UN Doc. S/2011/634 (12 October 2011), para. 57.

68 POC Framework n9.

69 In determining what activities will be undertaken to address the identified POC risks, it is important to bear in mind that ROL activities can include measures across the three tiers.

70 This point is mentioned in the POC Framework (n9 para. 17) but no guidance is provided on managing the impact on the Human Rights Section, Child Protection or the Humanitarian Country Team.

71 See Camino Kavanagh and Bruce Jones n66. The authors describe efforts by UN rule of law support efforts in the field to respond to emerging challenges including by introducing bottom-up alternative dispute resolution and community-based policing. The authors observed that that these efforts lacked a coherent strategy that linked them to mid or longer term efforts. Such efforts are the type of activity that will address local needs and therefore are likely to be those prioritised in a POC strategy. At para 18.

72 OECD DAC’s Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, (3 April 2007), Principle 4.

73 WDR11, n11 8. Peter Thomson – Protection of civilians and the rule of law Page 22

74 Camino Kavanagh and Bruce Jones, n66 9.

75 WDR11, n11 37. See also UN Doc. A/61/636–S/2006/980 Uniting our strengths: Enhancing United Nations support for the rule of law Report of the Secretary-General, 14 December 2006, para.s 40-42.

76 Andreas Øien Stensland and Ole Jacob Sending ‘Unpacking the “culture of protection”; A political economy analysis of OCHA and the protection of civilians’, n13, 8.

77 Stian Kjeksrud, Jacob Aasland Ravndal, Andreas Øien Stensland, Cedric de Coning, Walter Lotze and Erin A. Weir, Protection of civilians in armed conflict – comparing organisation approaches, (Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) Norway 2011), 13.

78 Damian Lilly, ‘Peacekeeping and the protection of civilians: an issue for humanitarians?’ No.48 Humanitarian Exchange Magazine (2010).

79 The Rule of Law Coordination and Resource Group, chaired by the Deputy Secretary-General and supported by the Rule of Law Unit.

80 Camino Kavanagh and Bruce Jones, n66, 66

81 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Department of Field Support (DFS), New York, July 2009. See also The New Horizon Initiative: Progress Report No.2 (DPKO New York, 2011).

82 Op cit, 20.

83 In the report New Horizons it was noted that ‘For police, rule of law, human rights and humanitarian actors in missions, the protection of civilians is a familiar concept and each of these groups brings important contributions to mandate implementation. More effective policing and law enforcement techniques are essential in grappling with civilian protection tasks.’ n81, 20.

84 The Rule of Law Coordination and Resource Group seeks to develop ‘ensure coherence and minimize fragmentation across all thematic rule of law areas’ (downloaded 27 February 2013 ). See http://www.unrol.org/article.aspx?article_id=6

85 UN Doc. A/66/133, 8 August 2011.

86 The third report refers to the integration of staff of the DPKO, OHCHR and UNDP into a joint justice unit and their interventions into a single human rights and justice programme in Burundi. (para. 61)

87 See also the Report of the Workshop on Mission-Wide Protection, Strategies on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, 31 May–1 June 2010, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The report interestingly discussed the tensions caused by assigning lead responsibility for the drafting of a protection strategy. Cedric de Coning, Walter Lotze, Zinurine Alghali, and Lamii Kromah, Vol. 9 Security in Practice, (2010).

88 Aide Memoire, n27, 18-19, 54 and ff. The Aide Memoire does refer to system-wide protection and best practices and useful protection measures, such as the Joint Protection Teams, Community Liaison Interpreters, Joint Investigation Teams, Surveillance Centres and Women’s Protection Advisers.

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89 See http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/crisispreventionandrecovery/focus_areas/rule- of-law/global-focal-point-for-police--justice-and-corrections-/

90 See Camino Kavanagh and Bruce Jones, n66, 9.

91 See discussion of ‘thick’, ‘thin’ or ‘thinner’ conception of the rule of law discussion: Thom Ringer ‘Towards a thinner Conception of the Rule of Law for Development Theory and Practice’, Vol 10 Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal (2007) 178 and ff.

92 Interestingly, there are differing perceptions of what activities would fall within a ‘thin’ approach to ROL.

93 Where they exist.

94 WDR11, n11 Overview.

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