Open Budget Survey 2017 Partners

Afghanistan Germany Philippines Integrity Watch Afghanistan Open Knowledge Foundation Deutschland De La Salle University, Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance Albania Ghana Poland Albanian Socio-Economic Think-Tank – ASET Social Enterprise Development Foundation of West Africa Kraków University of Economics (SEND)-Ghana Algeria Portugal Association Nationale des Finances Publiques Guatemala Institute of Public Policy - Lisbon Asociación Centro Internacional para Investigaciones en Angola Derechos Humanos Qatar Acção para o Desenvolvimento Rural e Ambiente (ADRA) For inquiries, please contact the International Budget Partnership Honduras Argentina Foro Social de Deuda Externa y Desarrollo de Honduras (FOSDEH) Romania Asociación Civil por la Igualdad y la Justicia (ACIJ) Funky Citizens Hungary Australia Költségvetési Felelősségi Intézet Budapest (KFIB) Russia Tax and Transfer Policy Institute (TTPI), Crawford School of Public St.Petersburg Center “Strategy” Policy, Australian National University India Centre for Budget and Governance Accountability (CBGA) Rwanda Azerbaijan Institute of Policy Analysis and Research, IPAR-Rwanda Eurasia Extractive Industries Knowledge Hub Indonesia Forum Indonesia untuk Transparansi Anggaran (FITRA) São Tomé e Príncipe Bangladesh Webeto Centre on Budget and Policy, Department of Development Iraq Studies, University of Dhaka Iraq Institute for Economic Reform Saudi Arabia For inquiries, please contact the International Budget Partnership Benin Italy Social Watch Benin Lunaria/Sbilanciamoci! Senegal Groupe d’Etude, de Recherche et d’Action pour le Bolivia Japan Développement (GERAD) Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Laboral y Agrario (CEDLA) Access-info Clearinghouse Japan Serbia Bosnia and Herzegovina Jordan Transparency Serbia Fondacija “Centar za zastupanje građanskih interesa” (Public Partners - Jordan Interest Advocacy Center) Sierra Leone Kazakhstan Budget Advocacy Network (BAN) Botswana Sange Research Center Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis (BIDPA) Slovakia Kenya MESA10 Brazil Institute of Public Finance Kenya (IPF-Kenya) Instituto de Estudos Sócioeconômicos (INESC) Slovenia Kyrgyz Republic CPOEF Bulgaria Public Association Precedent Partner Group Industry Watch Group Somalia Lebanon Somali Disaster Resilience Institute (SDRI) Burkina Faso For inquiries, please contact the International Budget Partnership Centre pour la Gouvernance Démocratique (CGD) South Africa Lesotho Public Service Accountability Monitor Burundi Action Aid Lesotho For inquiries, please contact the International Budget Partnership South Korea Liberia Center on Good Budget Cambodia Actions for Genuine Democratic Alternatives (AGENDA) The NGO Forum on Cambodia South Sudan Macedonia For inquiries, please contact the International Budget Partnership Cameroon Center for Economic Analyses (CEA) Budget Information Center (BIC) Spain Madagascar Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria Canada Multi-Sector Information Service (MSIS-Tatao) Institute of Fiscal Studies and Democracy Sri Lanka Malawi Verite Research (Pvt) Ltd Chad Malawi Economic Justice Network (MEJN) Groupe de Recherches Alternatives et de Monirtoring du Projet Sudan Pétrole Tchad-Cameroun (GRAMPTC) Malaysia Nuha Mohamed, Consultant Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs (IDEAS) Chile Swaziland Fundación Ciudadano Inteligente Mali Coordinating Assembly of NGOs in Swaziland (CANGO) Groupe de recherche en économie appliqué et théorique China (GREAT) Sweden For inquiries, please contact the International Budget Partnership Melander Schnell Consultants Mexico Colombia FUNDAR Tajikistan Foro Nacional por Colombia Uktam Dzhumaev, Consultant Moldova Comoros Independent Think Tank ”Expert – Grup” Tanzania Comores Finance Consulting (Co-fin-co) HakiElimu Mongolia Costa Rica Open Society Forum Thailand Programa Estado de la Nación Ora-orn Poocharoen, Consultant Morocco Côte d’Ivoire Transparency Maroc Timor Leste Initiative pour la Justice Social, La Transparence et la Bonne La ‘o Hamutuk Gouvernance en Côte d’Ivoire (SOCIAL JUSTICE) Mozambique Centro de integridade publica (CIP) Trinidad and Tobago Croatia Sustainable Economic Development Unit (SEDU), Department of Institut za javne financije Myanmar Economics, The University of the West Indies Spectrum – Sustainable Development Knowledge Network Czech Republic Tunisia University of Economics, Prague Namibia Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT), Département des Institute for Public Policy Research Etudes Dominican Republic Fundación Solidaridad Nepal Turkey Freedom Forum Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) Democratic Republic of the Congo Reseau Gouvernance Economoque Et Democratie (REGED) New Zealand Uganda Jonathan Dunn, Consultant Uganda Debt Network Ecuador Fundación para el Avance de las Reformas y las Oportunidades- Nicaragua Ukraine Grupo FARO Instituto de Estudios Estratégicos y Políticas Públicas (IEEPP) Centre Eidos Egypt Niger United Kingdom The Egyptian Center For Public Policy Studies (ECPPS) Alternative Espaces Citoyens (AEC) London School of Economics and Political Science — Government Department El Salvador Nigeria Fundación Nacional para el Desarrollo (FUNDE) BudgIT Nigeria United States Robert Keith, Consultant Equatorial Guinea Norway Marcial Abaga Barril, Consultant Scanteam Venezuela Transparencia Venezuela Fiji Pakistan Citizens Constitutional Forum (CCF) Omar Asghar Kahn Development Foundation Vietnam Center for Development and Integration (CDI) France Papua New Guinea Association pour la Fondation Internationale de Finances Institute of National Affairs Yemen Social Research and Development Center (SRDC) Publiques (FONDAFIP) Paraguay Georgia Centro de Analisis y Difusion de la Economia Paraguaya (CADEP) Zambia Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection (JCTR) Transparency International Georgia Peru Ciudadanos al Día Zimbabwe National Association of Non-Governmental Organisations ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We at the International Budget Partnership (IBP) want to thank our colleagues at the 115 research institutions and civil society organizations around the world whose work is the foundation of the Open Budget Survey (OBS). Their dedication, perseverance, and expertise, as well as their patience with our numerous queries during the lengthy vetting and editorial process, are appreciated tremendously.

The Open Budget Survey is inspired by our partners and their work. We hope that the survey, in turn, contributes to the impact of their initiatives and advances budget transparency, participation, and oversight around the world.

This project is the result of the collective efforts of IBP’s Open Budget Survey team, led by Anjali Garg. She worked closely with IBP colleagues Nusrat Ahmad, Kenan Aslanli, Paolo de Renzio, Michaela Fleischer, Joel Friedman, Suad Hasan, Dan Hiller, Chao-Yuan Lee, Elena Mondo, María José Eva Parada, Vivek Ramkumar, David Robins, Babacar Sarr, and Sally Torbert, all of whom engaged with research partners and peer reviewers around the world to ensure the quality of the data. A special thanks to Emilie Gay and Jonathan Dunn, who also worked closely with the IBP team and research partners to collect and vet the data. We would also like to thank Elena Mondo for her leadership in designing the capacity building activities related to the Open Budget Survey and leading the team’s technology work, with assistance from David Robins and Dan Hiller.

The OBS 2017 report was a collective effort. The report was written by Jason Lakin. Isaac Shapiro drafted Chapter 3 and provided critical insights throughout. Joel Friedman helped to conceptualize the report and interpret the data and made vital contributions throughout the writing process. María José Eva Parada, Claire Schouten, and Sally Torbert authored the country case studies that appear in the report. A special thanks to Brian Wampler for researching and drafting the participation case studies that are also included in the report and Suad Hasan for her careful review and comments on these studies. We would also like to thank Dan Hiller for his skillful management of the database for the report.

IBP’s communication team under Delaine McCullough’s leadership played a critical role in getting this report ready for publication. Debby Friedman managed the editing and design of the report, with editorial and design assistance provided by Jay Colburn and Rebecca Warner. We also thank Marianne Klinker for developing the online presentation of the Open Budget Survey, and Claire Schouten for playing a key role in organizing and coordinating the multi-country release of the research.

Finally, we extend our sincere gratitude to the Ford Foundation, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Open Society Foundations, UNICEF, the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (UKAid), and the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, whose financial support made this effort possible.

Warren Krafchik Executive Director January 2018

i TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1: The Bridge: An Overview of the Open Budget Survey 2017 1 Introduction 1 Budgets as Bridges 2 Open Budget Survey 2017: Findings 3 Improving Citizen-State Relations 3 Summary 4

Chapter 2: The State of Budget Transparency 9 The Global State of Budget Documents 9 The Open Budget Index 2017 10 What’s Inside? How Information Availability Varies with Overall Scores 14 Summary 15

Chapter 3: The End of Progress? Increases in Transparency Halted in 2017 19 Developments between 2015 and 2017 19 Changes in the Publication of Documents and Information 20 Taking a Longer View: 2008-2017 20 Failure to Consolidate Gains from Previous Years 21 Case Studies of Changes in Transparency 22 Summary 26

Chapter 4: Assessing Oversight Institutions 29 Legislative Oversight 29 Supreme Audit Institutions 32 Independent Fiscal Institutions 32 Summary 33

Chapter 5: Participation Mechanisms Can Be More Inclusive and Better Structured 35 Participation and Democracy 35 Emerging Principles on Participation in Budgeting 36 Overall Participation Scores 36 Participation Mechanisms: How Common, and What Form Do They Take? 37 Putting It All Together: The Accountability System 40 Summary 42

ii Chapter 6: Concluding Remarks and Recommendations 45 What country executives should do 45 What country oversight institutions should do 46 What civil society should do 46 What donors should do 46

ANNEX A: Open Budget Survey 2017 Methodology 48 Implementing the Open Budget Survey 2017 and Calculating the Open Budget Index and other Scores 48 The Open Budget Questionnaire 48 The Research Process 48 The Open Budget Index 49 Measures for Oversight Institutions and Public Participation 49 Weighting the Relative Importance of Key Budget Documents and Implications on Scores 50 For More Information 50

ANNEX B: An Update to the Open Budget Index for 2017 51

ANNEX C: Open Budget Index Scores Over Time, 2006 to 2017 54

ANNEX D: Open Budget Survey 2017: Transparency, Public Participation, and Oversight Institutions 56

ANNEX E: Open Budget Survey 2017: The Public Availability of Budget Documents 58

Photo Credits 63

iii FIGURES, TABLES, AND BOXES

Between Chapters 1 and 2: Figure 1.0: The Open Budget Index 2017

Chapter 2: Table 2.1: Key budget documents and share of surveyed countries publishing each in OBS 2017 Table 2.2: Distribution of countries by number of key budget documents published in 2017 Figure 2.1: Distribution of countries based on Open Budget Index 2017 score Figure 2.2: A global picture of budget transparency in 2017 Box 2.1: Who’s new? Table 2.3.A: Characteristics of budget system by category of performance on the OBI 2017 Table 2.3.B: Social, political, and economic indicators by category of performance on the OBI 2017 Table 2.4: Average transparency score for six types of information found in Executive’s Budget Proposals, by OBI 2017 category Box 2.2: What do people really want to know about the budget...and what does the Open Budget Survey have to say about it? Box 2.2-Table 1: Countries publishing key information to answer “How much does my government spend on health?” Box 2.2-Table 2: Countries publishing key information to answer “Is my government implementing the budget as it was approved by the legislature?” Box 2.2-Table 3: Countries publishing key information to answer “What is the government trying to achieve with the money it collects and spends?”

Chapter 3: Table 3.1: Regional changes in OBI scores, 2015-2017 Table 3.2: Change in number of countries publishing particular documents between 2015 and 2017 Figure 3.1: Number of countries by category of transparency and year (countries surveyed since 2008) Table 3.3: Number of countries experiencing large changes in OBI score between survey rounds Table 3.4: Documents made available to the public between 2008 and 2015, but not in 2017 Table 3.5: Selected examples of repeated changes in budget document publication, 2008-2017 Box 3.1: Sub-Saharan Africa: Failure to institutionalize past gains

iv Chapter 4: Figure 4.1: Countries grouped by 2017 legislative oversight score Box 4.1: How often do legislatures amend budgets? Figure 4.2: Challenges to legislative oversight during budget approval and implementation Figure 4.3: Countries grouped by 2017 supreme audit institution oversight score

Chapter 5: Table 5.1: Opportunities for public participation in the budget process Box 5.1: How do the GIFT Principles of Public Participation link to the OBS participation questions? Table 5.2: Average country participation scores, by OBI transparency category Figure 5.1: How widespread are the seven mechanisms of participation assessed in OBS 2017? Box 5.2: Miles to go: Including the views of vulnerable groups Box 5.3: Philippines: Budget Partnership Agreements Box 5.4: Brazil: Public Policy Management Councils Box 5.5: South Korea: Website for reporting budget waste Box 5.6: Canada: Legislative hearings before budget approval in the House of Commons Figure 5.2: Performance across the budget accountability system in 2017 Table 5.3: Countries scoring 40 or lower on all three components of the accountability system Box 5.7: More robust participation measures in 2017 lead to lower scores

1 The Bridge: An Overview of the Open Budget Survey 2017

institutions. At the same time, survey data from recent years have revealed major misgivings about democracy across the “There is something strange going on world.3 with democracy. Everyone seems to want It would seem, therefore, that the bridge between citizens and it but no one believes in it any longer.” states is in need of repair. What is driving this broad disil- — David van Reybrouck, Against Elections: The Case for Democracy lusionment with government and democracy? In some cases, the problem is the expectation that the collapse of authoritarian regimes during the third wave would lead quickly to the Introduction establishment of robust democracies. Instead, many have become “competitive authoritarian” regimes or weak democra- What is the proper relationship between citizens and the cies at best.4 state? This question has been settled and reopened throughout human history. By the end of the 20th century, it seemed that A second and perhaps broader reason for disillusionment is the answer in an increasing number of countries was some that traditional political institutions and the structure of repre- version of representative democracy. From the 1970s through sentative democracy have not met the needs or expectations the beginning of this century, a “third wave” of democratiza- of modern citizens. Recent years have seen significant citizen tion saw democracies emerge at all income levels, across protests against corruption around the world, particularly in Europe as well as in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. middle-income countries. This unrest suggests that abuse of power and lack of accountability for the use of public resources Of course, this unprecedented rise of democracy was not are among the key drivers of discontent. without counter-currents. Between 1974 and 2014, just under a third of democracies in the world reverted to authoritari- Rising inequality in recent decades has also raised questions anism.1 Many countries, such as China and Singapore, have about whether governments are capable of responding to remained proudly undemocratic, and their models of govern- contemporary challenges. The possibility that they are not ment have been highly influential throughout this period. Since and that they are mainly serving the interests of the more the 1970s, concerns have also been raised about the health privileged has fueled some of the populist, anti-establishment of established democracies.2 Nevertheless, it would be fair to revolts of 2016-17. Rather than address these underlying chal- say that representative democracy seemed to be the preferred lenges, many governments have also tightened controls on civil answer of many citizens, states, and multilateral institutions society, further threatening their own legitimacy.5 to the question of the proper bridge between citizens and the state. Contemporary expectations of government go beyond reducing corruption and addressing people’s needs, however. Citizens in Beginning in 2016, however, growing discontent with govern- many countries want to know what governments are doing and ment, including democratic government, has culminated in the want to have a bigger say in the processes by which decisions rise of nationalist politicians with dubious democratic creden- are made and implemented. They are no longer content to sit tials and declining support for traditional political parties and back and watch their leaders make decisions without citizens’

1 Larry Diamond, “Facing Up to the Democratic Recession,” Journal of Democracy (January 2015): 141-55. 2 See for example, Michel Crozier, Samuel Huntington, and Joji Watanuki, The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission (New York: New York University Press, 1975). 3 For survey data from Western Europe and the United States, see Roberto Stefan Foa and Yascha Mounk, “The Democratic Disconnect,” Journal of Democracy 27, no. 3 (July 2016): 5-17. For survey data from Africa, see Robert Mattes and Michael Bratton, “Do Africans Still Want Democracy?” Policy Paper No. 36 (Afrobarometer, November 2016). For survey data that include some additional countries in Asia and Latin America, see edelman.com/global-results/. One surprise in these latter data is the high and increasing trust in government in India in recent years. Finally, data from Asian Barometer suggest declining trust in government in many East Asian countries over the last few iterations of the survey. See asianbarometer.org/survey/key-findings. 4 Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, “The Myth of Democratic Recession,” Journal of Democracy 26, no. 1 (January 2015): 45; and Mattes and Bratton, “Do Africans Still Want Democracy?” 5 For a review of what is happening to civic space globally in 2017, see CIVICUS, “CIVICUS State of Civil Society Report 2017: Year in Review, New Democratic Crisis and Civic Space,” (CIVICUS: Washington, D.C., 2017). 1 oversight or input. To the extent that governments have management by executives, and adequate oversight practices introduced new mechanisms to address these expectations, by legislature and auditors. Without transparency and public they have often proved unsatisfactory. According to this view, institutions that check one another’s powers, government is it is traditional forms of representative democracy (but not unlikely to be accountable or effective. democracy itself) that have reached their limits.6 The OBS 2017 broadens IBP’s approach to assessing oversight by In other words, the terms of the relationship between citizens including new questions about an increasingly prominent over- and the state are no longer a settled matter. Once again, the old sight institution, independent fiscal institutions (IFIs), for the question of how citizens and state should engage is being asked, first time. IFIs are government-financed technical agencies that and traditional forms of representative democracy are showing engage in independent, objective analysis of the economy and signs of strain. Citizens are not withdrawing from government, budget. Their role is to enhance the credibility of public finances but they are seeking new ways to participate effectively. The chal- either by ensuring that the government’s own forecasts and lenge of our historical moment is to create new bridges in an era analysis are rigorous or by providing an additional, independent that builds on the strengths of representative democracy, but at check on government numbers. The rise in IFIs in a modest the same time addresses its weaknesses. We must find innovative number of countries, like the changing nature of participation, and sustainable ways of encouraging and channeling citizen illustrates how some governments are seeking innovative ways to involvement into decision making that will ensure greater improve public confidence in institutions by moving beyond the representation and accountability from political leaders. traditional institutions of representative democracy.

Budgets as Bridges The OBS 2017 also goes further than assessing the core institutions of representative democracy by assessing novel At the core of the relationship between citizens and the state approaches to formal public participation in budgeting. This are decisions about how public resources are raised and spent. is the first survey to include a robust set of measures of public The budget is where the most important questions about the participation based on an international consensus about what role of government are asked and answered. This makes it the participation in the budget process should look like. While right place to look for an answer to how citizens and the state these measures will continue to evolve, they constitute an should engage. initial step toward improving citizen-state relationships to take us beyond the limitations of current democratic practice. The International Budget Partnership (IBP) has long argued for a different approach to citizen-state engagement around the The survey examines formal participation in the budget budget. Our initial focus was on the need for greater transpar- process at the national level, but we know that participation ency in government finances. This transparency was to lead is happening in other areas. For instance, recent years have to broader debate and greater public influence over budget seen scores of local governments introduce new participatory decision making in service of improved government and more mechanisms, such as participatory budgeting. And numerous pro-poor policy. Over time, we have increasingly emphasized governments are experimenting with participation outside the specific mechanisms by which the public participates of the budget process, using innovative mechanisms such as directly in such decision making. deliberative polling, citizens assemblies, and crowd-sourcing to drive electoral reform (e.g., Canada) or constitutional reform The Open Budget Survey (OBS) is the world’s only comparative (e.g., Iceland).7 and independent assessment of fiscal transparency, oversight, and participation at the national level. The survey is carried out Of course, this year’s emphasis on new forms of oversight and by independent researchers who respond to a set of factual ques- formal budget participation does not eliminate the need for tions in each of the 115 countries assessed. Each country’s results transparency. It is impossible to envision any new mechanism are then reviewed by an anonymous expert, and governments for citizen-state engagement that is not predicated on mean- are also given an opportunity to provide their comments. ingful transparency. IFIs, for instance, rely heavily on access to information to carry out their roles in the public finance The OBS is, first and foremost, an assessment of the core system. And citizens cannot use emerging mechanisms for institutions and practices that make representative democracy participation to deliberate meaningfully without budget function: public access to information, good public financial information either. Budget transparency therefore remains

6 This case is made in, among others, Filemon Peonidis, Democracy as Popular Sovereignty (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013); John Keane,Life and Death of Democracy (New York: Norton, 2009); and Helene Landemore, “Inclusive Constitution-Making: The Icelandic Experiment,” Journal of Political Philosophy 23, no. 2 (June 2015): 166-91. 7 Keane, Life and Death of Democracy; and Landemore, “Inclusive Constitution-Making.” 2 fundamental to the OBS and our hope for improved citizen- during implementation. Legislators could amend the budget state relations. in practice in more than half of the countries surveyed. But in just over half of countries, executives can shift funds between Open Budget Survey 2017: Findings units during the year without legislative approval. This means that some of the important work of legislators, and citizens, to The critical role of transparency in supporting the new mecha- influence budget priorities early in the budget process can be nisms we explore this year makes the survey results from 2017 undone during implementation without adequate oversight. particularly disappointing. The Open Budget Survey 2017 finds IFIs represent an area of public finance management with that, globally, progress toward greater transparency stalled, increasing potential, but only 18 countries have independent, declining modestly for the first time since we began measuring well-resourced agencies. it. An important driver of this year’s deceleration is the reversal of previous gains in Sub-Saharan Africa. Of the 27 countries Most countries have at least one formal mechanism for budget in Sub-Saharan Africa in both the 2015 and 2017 surveys, 22 participation. But overall participation scores are low: no saw their transparency scores fall in the OBS 2017. (This is country in our survey has adequate opportunities for citizen discussed further in Chapter 3.) With the exception of Asia, participation. In addition, the mechanisms that countries are other regions saw slower growth or modest declines in their using are not particularly inclusive or well-structured, and scores on the Open Budget Index (OBI) – the portion of the we found only eight cases where executives specifically reach OBS that assesses transparency – this round compared to last. out to vulnerable groups to encourage their participation. In just under half of countries, legislatures, which should be a While Sub-Saharan Africa showed the largest decline in principal route by which citizens influence the budget, do not transparency in this round, the region drove much of the provide formal opportunities for the public to offer their views improvement in transparency in the 2015 survey. This points on the budget before it is approved. to a broader and deeper concern that we highlighted in 2015: a lack of institutionalization of open government practices. As in Taking our assessments of transparency, participation, and previous rounds of the survey, the OBS 2017 once again showed oversight together, we can make some general observations that most countries are not sufficiently transparent to ensure about the accountability system. Countries with higher that budgets are allocated in accordance with public priorities transparency scores also tend to have higher oversight and or monitored adequately during implementation to deliver on participation scores. Nevertheless, no country has adequate government promises. It is particularly worrying, then, when practices in place in all three areas, largely because participa- governments seem to be regressing from already modest or low tion opportunities are limited and poorly structured. This transparency scores. year’s assessment suggests that formal participation in the budget process is the weakest link in the accountability system. But the picture this year is not all negative. The recent decline In addition, the budget accountability system as a whole is in transparency overall is significantly less than the gains extremely weak in 22 of the 115 countries assessed, as all found in previous rounds of the survey; that is, government three areas show significant shortcomings in these countries. budgets are still considerably more transparent today than This is discouraging: a budget process is only likely to be they were a decade ago. And, as always, the bigger picture fully accountable if all three building blocks – transparency, conceals critical variation. Chapter 3 of this report looks briefly participation, and oversight – are in place. at some of the best performers in the OBS 2017 and explores why their scores rose. A sizable share of the gains in 2017 were The final chapter of this report suggests ways in which govern- concentrated among low-transparency countries. Moreover, for ment actors, civil society, and donors can work to strengthen budget documents that were produced in both 2015 and 2017, these building blocks. This requires the strengthening of indi- the range of information provided increased marginally. vidual institutions and practices, but also coordinated efforts by various stakeholders committed to improved public finances. Our assessment of budget oversight is mixed. Auditors are more likely to have scores indicating adequate oversight Improving Citizen-State Relations practices than legislatures. Overall, legislatures engage in limited oversight practices but are able to provide somewhat The OBS 2017 finds that transparency around the world more extensive oversight during budget formulation than remains limited and that progress has faltered. We do not

3 purport to explain the overall decline in scores in the OBS 2017 Limited transparency in an era of rising polarization and the as a result of the crisis of trust in institutions or in represen- legitimate fear that data are becoming less compelling in an tative democracy. Indeed, there is no overall relationship era of “fake news” is exactly the wrong response. The best way between changes in democracy, as measured by widely used to short-circuit disastrous cycles of mistrust and polarization indices, and changes in OBI scores.8 is for governments to publish more and better budget information; present more, and more compelling, justifications for Instead, the modest decline in transparency observed in the their decisions; and offer citizens more and better opportuni- OBS 2017 is, along with shrinking civic and media space and ties to engage meaningfully in decision making. In short, we rising inequality, another symptom of the need to repair the must cure the weaknesses of democracy with more and better social contract between states and citizens. When citizens see information and opportunities for citizen participation. governments hiding their finances, ignoring citizen views, and failing to respect the separation of powers, their skepticism Summary of government grows. Improving the budget process must therefore be part of the solution to the decline in confidence in ■■ For the first time since we launched the survey, progress government and representative democracy. If the current chal- toward improved global transparency has stalled, with aver- lenges of inequality and political polarization around the globe age Open Budget Index scores declining modestly. Given are to be overcome, we need to reimagine how state and society that scores on the OBI remain low, it is particularly discour- engage in decision making with regard to public finances. aging to see countries regressing rather than institutionalizing budget transparency. The bridge to more effective and satisfying relationships ■■ Countries must also do more to strengthen oversight and between citizens and government is built through greater ensure that decisions made early in the budget process are sharing of ideas, information, and responsibility. As we report respected during budget implementation. Interest in IFIs is on the OBS 2017 findings, we also touch on specific types of encouraging, as these agencies can also help to restore faith information that we think are most relevant to citizens and in government. However, there are still relatively few of the release of which, we believe, can help increase confidence these institutions in operation worldwide. in government. In our expanded discussion of public partici- ■■ We believe that improving formal participation in budget- pation, we also offer concrete options for how citizens can ing must be part of the solution to declining confidence in meaningfully engage government. government and increasing skepticism about representative democracy in recent years. But countries will have to do In spite of the faltering progress we document in the OBS much more to encourage meaningful public participation 2017, our message remains optimistic. While 2017 has not in budgets going forward, as the survey finds that formal been an encouraging year for democracy or budget transpar- public participation in budgeting is weak around the globe. ency, governments around the world have the tools at hand to ■■ In the final chapter of this report, we offer specific recom- address the challenges we face, should they choose to use them. mendations for executives, oversight institutions, civil In the cases of transparency and participation, governments society, and donors aimed at improving transparency and already do some of what they need to do, and they can build participation. on these foundations to quickly enhance both. For example, all but four governments in our survey publish some budget documents online or have done so in the past. Yet two out of every three countries publish at least one document online but fail to put additional documents they already produce online in a timely fashion. What could be simpler than using existing websites that host other budget documents to expand access?

While budget participation scores are low overall, more than 80 percent of the countries surveyed have some form of participatory mechanism already. What these countries need to do is to enhance the inclusiveness of existing mechanisms and implement similar mechanisms in other stages of the budget process. These are not impossible leaps for any government.

8 We can only offer a basic assessment of this issue here, but our analysis shows almost no correlation between changes in democracy scores (using Freedom House or Economist Intelligence Unit data) between 2012 and 2015 or between 2015 and 2017 and changes in OBI scores between 2015 and 2017. Of course, some individual countries may have experienced declines (or increases) in both democracy and transpar- 4 ency. The Open Budget Index 2017 100 89 89 87 85 Extensive (81-100) Substantial (61-80) Limited (41-60) Minimal (21-40) Scant or None (0-20) 82 80 79 77 77 75 74 74 74 Low 73 73 Limited 72 Sufﬁcient 71 69 69 67 66 66 66 64 63 61 61 60 60 60 60 59 59 58 58 57 57 56 56 55 54 54 54 53 52 51 50 50 50 50 50 50 49 49 48 46 46 46 46 45 45 44 44 43 43 43 41 41 41 41 40 40 39 39 39 38 37 36 35 34 34 33 31 30 29 26 25 24 24 23 22 20 20 17 15 13 10 10 8 8 8 8 7 7 7 5 3 3 3 3 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Fiji Iraq Italy Mali Peru India Chile Chad Niger Qatar Brazil Egypt Spain Benin China Nepal Japan Kenya Sudan Ghana Serbia Bolivia Turkey Russia Yemen Poland France Liberia Angola Jordan Algeria Tunisia Nigeria Croatia Mexico Malawi Albania Zambia Canada Norway Uganda Ukraine Georgia Burundi Lesotho Senegal Sweden Somalia Rwanda Vietnam Ecuador Portugal Namibia Bulgaria Hungary Slovakia Moldova Slovenia Pakistan Thailand Lebanon Morocco Australia Romania Tanzania Malaysia Comoros Germany Mongolia Paraguay Colombia Tajikistan Sri Lanka Myanmar Honduras Argentina Indonesia Botswana Cambodia Venezuela Nicaragua Swaziland Cameroon Azerbaijan Zimbabwe Costa Rica Guatemala Philippines Macedonia El Salvador Kazakhstan Bangladesh Afghanistan Timor-Leste South Africa South Korea Madagascar Côte d'Ivoire Saudi Arabia Sierra Leone South Sudan Mozambique Burkina Faso New Zealand United States Czech Republic United Kingdom Kyrgyz Republic Equatorial Guinea Papua New Guinea Papua Dem. Rep. of Congo Rep. Dem. Dominican Republic Trinidad and Tobago Trinidad São Tomé e Príncipe Tomé São Bosnia and Herzegovina

2 The State of Budget Transparency

Whatever form the relationship between citizens and states About three-fourths of the 115 countries in our sample make takes in the 21st century, it must rest on a foundation of free both the Executive’s Budget Proposal and the Enacted Budget exchange of information. Both citizen agency and responsive publicly available, while fewer than half make either Pre- government require the free flow of data about government Budget Statements or Mid-Year Reviews available to the public. programs and the funds that are raised and spent on them. Half the countries in our sample now make Citizens Budgets Citizens cannot organize and make meaningful demands of available to the public. In-Year Reports, Year-End Reports, the state without such information. Government cannot main- and Audit Reports are made publicly available by a majority of tain its credibility or sustain the commitment of citizens to pay countries, but these are not as widely published as the Execu- taxes and provide feedback on policy preferences without the tive’s Budget Proposal. regular release of budget information. Of the 920 documents that the 115 countries surveyed in the This chapter offers a snapshot of the state of budget transpar- OBS 2017 should have published online in a timely manner, ency around the world as of the end of 2016. We look at trans- only 561 were published (see Table 2.2). Of the 359 documents parency from the perspective of the public availability of key (39 percent) that were not published, 156 are not produced at budget documents (“available” is defined as those documents all by country governments. The remaining 203 documents published online on an official government website in a timely are produced, but governments use them for internal purposes manner) and from the perspective of the comprehensiveness only and do not release them to the public; or limit their avail- of the information they contain. As always, our assessment is ability by releasing them in hard copy but not putting them based on international standards endorsed by various global online; or release them too late (undermining their relevance). institutions, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Of the 115 countries included in the 2017 survey, 98 publish (OECD), and the International Organization of Supreme Audit at least one, but not all, of the eight key documents. But these Institutions (INTOSAI), among others. countries also produce 172 documents that they do not publish. If these governments took the simple step of posting these The Global State of Budget Documents additional 172 documents online in a timely manner, it would increase the share of documents published out of the universe A well-functioning budget cycle has four stages: 1) formulation, of potential documents from 61 percent to 80 percent immedi- when the executive branch of the government drafts the budget ately, significantly improve the availability of budget informa- proposal; 2) approval, when the legislative branch debates, tion in these countries, and considerably raise their average amends, and approves the budget proposal; 3) execution, when overall transparency scores. the executive branch implements the policies outlined in the budget; and 4) oversight, when the supreme audit institution and The remaining 17 countries made either none of the eight legislature assess funds spent for compliance and performance. documents available, or all of them. The six countries that made no budget documents publicly available at all in our The Open Budget Survey is anchored on eight key budget 2017 assessment are: Equatorial Guinea, Lesotho, Niger, Qatar, documents that are well recognized internationally as neces- Venezuela, and Yemen. The 11 countries that publish all eight sary to inform each of these four stages. The OBS assesses the key documents are spectacularly diverse, representing all public availability and comprehensiveness of each of these majors regions of the world: Brazil, Bulgaria, Georgia, Indo- documents. For the 2017 survey, we assess only documents that nesia, Italy, Jordan, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, South Africa, should have been published prior to 31 December 2016. These and Sweden. There is clearly nothing regionally or culturally documents are described in Table 2.1, which also reports on determined about budget transparency. their overall availability.

9 Table 2.1: Key budget documents and share of surveyed countries publishing each in OBS 2017

Number of Countries (out of 115) Stage of Budget Cycle Key Budget Documents Percent of Countries Publishing Publishing in OBS 2017

Pre-Budget Statement: This document discloses the broad parameters of fiscal policies in advance of the Executive’s Budget Proposal; it outlines the 50 43% government’s economic forecast, as well as anticipated revenue, expenditures, and debt.

Formulation Executive’s Budget Proposal: This document or set of documents is submitted by the executive to the legislature for approval; it details the 88 77% sources of revenue, the allocations to ministries, proposed policy changes, and other information important for understanding a country’s fiscal situation.

Enacted Budget: This is the budget that Approval 100 87% has been approved by the legislature.

In-Year Reports: These documents include information on actual revenues collected, actual expenditures made, and 80 70% debt incurred; they may be issued on a quarterly or monthly basis.

Mid-Year Review: This document contains a comprehensive update on the implementation of the budget as of Execution 33 29% the middle of the fiscal year, including a review of economic assumptions and an updated forecast of budget outcomes.

Year-End Report: This document shows the government’s accounts at the end of the fiscal year and ideally includes an 76 66% evaluation of the progress made toward achieving the budget’s policy goals.

Audit Report: Issued by the country’s supreme audit institution, this Oversight document examines the soundness and 77 67% completeness of the government’s year- end accounts.

Citizens Budget: This is a simpler and less technical version of the government’s Executive’s Budget Proposal or All Stages Enacted Budget, designed to convey 57 50% key information to the public. Citizens versions of other documents are also desirable.

The Open Budget Index 2017 transparency remains limited, with most countries failing to publish key documents and key information. We measure transparency through the Open Budget Index (OBI). The OBI scores each country from 0 to 100, based on the Overall, as summarized in Figure 2.1, we find: average of the responses to the 109 questions in the question- ■■ 27 countries provide scant or no budget information, with naire that assess the public availability of budget information. A OBI scores of 20 or less; country’s OBI score reflects the timeliness and comprehensive- ■■ 20 countries provide minimal budget information, with ness of publicly available budget information in the eight key OBI scores between 21 and 40; budget documents. Additional survey questions assess oversight ■■ 42 countries provide limited budget information, with OBI and participation and are described later in this report, but these scores between 41 and 60; are not included in the calculation of the OBI score. ■■ 21 countries provide substantial budget information, with OBI scores between 61 and 80; and The average global OBI score for 2017 is 42 out of 100, while the ■■ 5 countries provide extensive budget information, with OBI median score is 45. This suggests that the global state of budget scores between 81 and 100.

10 Table 2.2: Distribution of countries by number of key budget documents published in 2017

Number of key budget Cumulative number of Cumulative number of Number of countries Percent of countries surveyed documents published countries documents published

8 11 10% 11 88

7 29 25% 40 291

6 15 13% 55 381

5 14 12% 69 451

4 14 12% 83 507

3 10 9% 93 537

2 8 7% 101 553

1 8 7% 109 561

0 6 5% 115 561

Total 115 100% ------

In the rest of the report, we typically combine these five groups eight key budget documents available to the public. There are of countries into three basic categories: only two cases where countries in this group maintain docu- ■■ those that provide a low level of budget information (score ments for internal use only. Among countries with sufficient of 0-40); transparency, just nine documents are published late, and none ■■ those that provide limited amounts of budget information are published only in hard copy. (score of 41-60); and ■■ those countries that provide sufficient budget information As in the past, we find that, on average, those countries (score of 61-100), where the public has at least the minimum releasing sufficient budget information are more likely to be information needed to engage in informed budget discus- democratic, have greater media freedom, are less dependent on sions. oil revenue, and have lower perceived corruption than those countries making less budget data available. These countries Only 26 countries have sufficient budget transparency in the also have more adequate legislative and audit oversight and are 2017 survey. more likely to have independent fiscal institutions. They tend to be wealthier and more highly developed than countries that Sufficiently Transparent Countries (Scores of 61 or higher). On make more limited budget information available, although average, the 26 countries in this category make seven of the some middle-income countries, such as Guatemala, Indonesia, and the Philippines, also feature here (see Tables 2.3 A and B.). Figure 2.1: Distribution of countries based on Open Budget Index 2017 score Limited Transparency Countries (Scores of 41 to 60). On average, 60 the 42 countries in this group publish six of the eight key budget documents. Forty-one documents from this group (12 percent) are produced but not published online in a timely manner.

40 Countries with limited transparency scores also fall in 20 between sufficient and low transparency countries on most other attributes. They are less likely to be democratic than top performers on budget transparency but more likely than the 5 Number of Countries lowest budget transparency countries. The same applies to their 20 42 levels of media freedom and perceived corruption. And they 27 21 are also in the middle of the range on the adequacy of oversight by legislatures, auditors, and independent fiscal institutions.

0 Low Limited Sufﬁcient The same medium range performance holds for human devel- Scant (0-20) Minimal (21-40) Limited (41-60) Substantial (61-80) Extensive (81-100) opment, but these countries are slightly less wealthy than low transparency countries. This is because oil-rich countries are

11 Figure 2.2: A global picture of budget transparency in 2017

Extensive (81-100) Sufﬁcient Substantial (61-80) Limited Limited (41-60) Minimal (21-40) Low Scant or None (0-20) Box 2.1: Who’s new? Table 2.3.A: Characteristics of budget system by category of performance on the OBI 2017 Between 2015 and 2017, we added 13 new countries to the Open Score on Open Budget Index Budget Survey. They represent a number of regions and a wide range 0-40 41-60 61-100 of levels of transparency. However, on average, countries entering the Open Budget Survey Indicators survey in 2017 have scores that are substantially lower than the overall average for the survey sample. Number of countries 47 42 26 Average number of eight key budget 3 6 7 Country OBI Score 2017 documents made publicly available online in a Australia 74 timely manner Burundi 7 Average score for publicly available Executive’s 38 57 77 Budget Proposals Canada 71 Percent of eight key budget documents that are: Comoros 8 Publicly available 35% 72% 91% Côte d’Ivoire 24 Not publicly available 65% 28% 9% Japan 60 Not produced 25% 16% 4% Lesotho 0 Produced, but used for internal 24% 6% 1% Madagascar 34 purposes only Moldova 58 Produced, but published too late 10% 5% 4% Paraguay 43 Produced, but published in hard 6% 1% 0% or soft copy only Somalia 8 Average score for: South Sudan 5 Participation 5 13 24 Swaziland 3 Oversight by legislature 37 48 69 Average score of 13 new countries 30 Oversight by supreme audit institution 49 68 81 Average score for all 115 countries 42 Countries with an independent 4% 24% 62% fiscal institution: overrepresented among those in the lowest budget transparency tier. When we remove the most oil-dependent countries, Table 2.4 below groups the types of information that we expect all of which have low transparency, GDP per capita of the to find in the Executive’s Budget Proposal into six categories.9 medium range is higher than that for the low transparency tier These include information about expenditures, revenues, and (Table 2.3.B). debt as well as the macroeconomic assumptions upon which the budget is based. In addition, budgets should include information Low Transparency Countries (Scores of 0-40). On average, the about government’s policy priorities and performance goals and 47 countries providing minimal, scant, or no information publish about three out of the eight key budget documents. A Table 2.3.B: Social, political, and economic indicators by category of remarkable 151 documents from this group (40 percent) are performance on the OBI 2017

produced but not published. This means that these countries Score on Open Budget Index could improve their transparency dramatically with only 0-40 41-60 61-100 modest additional effort. Other Indicators Percentage with full or flawed democracies 2% 26% 46% These countries include the most oil-dependent countries in Average score on Corruption Perceptions Index 31 39 56 our sample, but countries in this tier are also more likely to Average score on World Press Freedom Index 42 33 26 have experienced recent internal conflict. For example, Iraq, Average internal conflict score 2.1 1.8 1.2 Somalia, South Sudan, and Yemen are all in this category. Average score on Human Development Index 0.58 0.70 0.82 Gross Domestic Product Per Capita, PPP $14,800 $14,500 $29,600 Gross Domestic Product Per Capita, PPP $12,800 $14,500 $29,600 What’s Inside? How Information Availability (Excluding oil-dependent countries) Varies with Overall Scores Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (Democracy Index), Transparency International (Corruption Perceptions Index), Reporters Without Borders (World Press Freedom Index), Global Conflict Risk Index, United Nations Development Programme (Human Development Index), International Monetary Fund No one cares about budget documents or transparency scores (Gross Domestic Product). per se. What really matters is the budget information that Note: Data availability for some indicators causes the number of countries included in some averages to differ. A lower score indicates higher levels of media freedom, while a higher conflict score indicates governments make available to citizens for them to analyze, a higher risk of conflict, and a higher corruption score indicates lower perceived corruption. “Full democracy” and “flawed democracy” are the labels assigned to countries demonstrating higher degrees discuss, and use to advocate for change. (For examples, see Box of democratization on the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index relative to countries labeled as “authoritarian regime” or “hybrid regime.” Oil dependent countries are those for which oil rents 2.2 on pp. 16-17.) represent at least 20 percent of GDP.

9 The six categories are: “Expenditure,” which includes OBS questions 1-8 and 19-24; “Revenue,” which includes 9-12 and 25-30; “Debt,” which includes 13-14 and 31-32; “Macroeconomic,” which includes 15-16; “Policy & Performance,” which includes 17-18, 36, and 47-52; and “Fiscal Risk,” which includes 33-35 and 37-46. 14 Table 2.4: Average transparency score for six types of information found in Executive’s Budget Proposals, by OBI 2017 category

Policy & OBI Category Expenditure Revenue Debt Macroeconomic Fiscal Risk Performance Sufficient (61-100) 83 93 85 76 70 56 Limited (41-60) 69 81 68 33 41 35 Low (0-40) 49 54 42 25 26 20 All countries publishing an EBP 69 79 67 44 46 38

Note: Only the 88 countries that made an Executive’s Budget Proposal publicly available are included in these calculations. shed light on some of the fiscal risks the country may face in the future based on the commitments it has made. The comprehensiveness of information provided increases for each of these groups as we move from low- to high-scoring country tiers.

As an example of the specific kinds of information that more transparent countries make available, sufficient transparency countries (OBI scores above 60) are roughly three times as likely as low transparency countries (OBI scores of 40 and below) to provide information on tax expenditures. Generally, sufficient transparency countries publish more backward- and forward-looking information, such as multi-year projections for revenue and spending, as well as more details about debt, and assets and liabilities. But even these higher-scoring countries tend to provide insufficient information, on average, about their fiscal risks (such as contingent liabilities). Summary

■■ Budget transparency remains limited around the world, with many governments failing to publish key documents. Where such documents are published, they often lack essential information. Fewer than one in four surveyed countries provide sufficient budget information. ■■ The vast majority of countries in the survey could quickly improve transparency by making documents they already produce publicly available. Most countries that produce budget documents they do not publish online already publish other budget documents online and could easily do so for all documents. ■■ While the countries performing the best on the OBI tend to be wealthier, there are countries from all regions of the world and different income levels that release key budget documents and budget information. ■■ Even where documents are available, basic information that many citizens would likely wish to have on sector spending, budget implementation, and the goals and outcomes of spending are missing in most national budgets.

15 Box 2.2: What do people really want to know about the budget...and what does the Open Budget Survey have to say about it?

Here we focus on three examples of questions that people might ask about the budget, on the parts of the OBS that address those questions, and on what the survey tells us about how widely such information is available across the world.A

Question 1: How much does my government propose to spend on health care?

Citizens often want to know how much their government spends on a country would need to present its functional classification according to particular service and how that spending is changing over time. People international standards. (OBS Question 3) would also like to be able to compare what their country spends with what ■■ To assess health spending over time, you would need to have functional other countries are doing. Understanding how the government’s health spending from several years, both projections of future spending (OBS budget is changing is also one way of assessing whether it is making prog- Question 7) as well as historical data. (OBS Question 22) ress toward fulfilling national and international agreements, such as the ■■ If there are state corporations that support health services (such as Sustainable Development Goal on universal health coverage. We consider public insurers or suppliers), you will need information on spending that health care as an example here, but we could have asked the same question flows to these agencies. (OBS Question 37) of education or other services. ■■ Finally, if the health system is decentralized, funds to lower levels of government might not be captured under the central Ministry of Health Answering this question is not as simple as it sounds. People who try to budget or the functional classification of national spending. You would do so generally look only at the budget for the Ministry of Health. But this need quantitative and narrative information about such transfers. (OBS approach is likely incomplete, because not all health spending is necessarily Question 35) allocated to that ministry. To obtain a comprehensive picture of how much your government spends on health, you likely need at least the following The table below provides a summary of the level of availability of these information: types of information. While two-thirds of countries surveyed have a basic functional classification, less than half provide any of the other types of ■■ The budget needs a “functional classification” that organizes spend- information described above. So, certain simple questions, such as “how ing by functions or purposes, like health or education, and not just by much is the government spending on health this year compared to last ministries. This would ensure that health spending in different parts of year?”, cannot be answered easily in most countries (in 2017 only 31 coun- government is grouped together. (OBS Question 2) tries provide a functional classification from the previous year to compare ■■ To compare this to what other countries are spending on health, your with the current year allocations).

Table 1: Countries publishing key information to answer “How much does my government spend on health?”*

OBS Question OBS Question Percent of 115 Countries Surveyed Number

2 Functional classification? 67%

3 Functional classification using international standards? 44%

7 Functional classification for future years? 29%

22 Functional classification for past years? 27%

37 Transfers to state corporations? 32%

35 Transfers to other levels of government? 40%

* These figures are for countries with an “a” response (highest score). For Questions 7 and 22, which ask about the number (but not the type) of classifications in the budget, we confirmed the number that have functional classifications.

Question 2: Is my government implementing the budget as it was approved by the legislature?

We all know that government does not always spend the budget exactly ■■ The final approved – or enacted – budget (OBS Question EB-2) as planned. There are sometimes good reasons for this discrepancy. But if a ■■ Reports released throughout the year that show comparisons between country goes through a process of debating a budget and then agrees to it, the enacted budget and actual spending, as well as the reasons for its citizens should know whether the government is actually sticking to that these changes (OBS Questions 70 and 77) agreement. And if not, why not? ■■ A report at the end of the year that shows final spending against the original budget, with explanations for deviations (OBS Question 84) To assess government’s spending against the approved budget, you would ■■ For spending in a specific sector, like health, then the report at the end need the following information: of the year should also provide spending using the functional classification discussed above (OBS Question 85)

A. For a detailed survey of what civil society users are looking for in the budget, see Paolo de Renzio and Massimo Mastruzzi, “How Does Civil Society Use Budget Information? Mapping Fiscal Transparency Gaps and Needs in Developing Countries,” (Washington, D.C.: International Budget Partnership, December 2016) available at: https://www.internationalbudget.org/pblications/how-civil-society-uses-budget-information/ 16 Box 2.2: What do people really want to know about the budget...and what does the Open Budget Survey have to say about it?

The table below makes clear that enacted budgets are widely (though not budget available. Because less than half of countries use a functional clas- universally) available, but the other required information is not. Some 59 sification in their final reports, it is typically not possible to track the kind of percent of countries make data available on actual spending against budget spending by sector that many citizens are interested in. during implementation, but only 45 percent make final spending against

Table 2: Countries publishing key information to answer “Is my government implementing the budget as it was approved by the legislature?”*

OBS Question OBS Question Percent of 115 Countries Surveyed Number

EB-2 Approved (enacted) budget available? 87%

70 Comparisons between planned and actual spending during implementation? 59%

77 Updated budget by mid-year? 15%

84 Comparison of final spending to original budget? 45%

85 Actuals by functional classification? 46%

* These figures are for countries with an ”a” response (highest score) only in all cases. For Question 85, which asks about the number (but not the type) of classifications in the budget, we confirmed the number that have functional classifications.

Question 3: What is the government trying to achieve with the money it collects and spends?

Budgets are mainly descriptions of where money is going, rather than what ■■ Information about the purposes (and costs) of new policy proposals it will deliver. But many budgets now contain some information on the (OBS Question 17) intended uses and desired results of proposed spending. This information ■■ Information about the link between existing and new policies and the allows you to assess in more detail what the government is proposing to budget (OBS Question 47) do with your money. For example, a health department may use part of its ■■ Information about targets for the results government hopes to achieve budget to vaccinate children. The budget could indicate how many vaccines (OBS Question 51) it will purchase and how many children it hopes to vaccinate. These targets ■■ Information about performance against targets at the end of the year, could then be assessed against actual performance during the year. such as the number of vaccinations delivered against the original target To analyze these proposals, you would need the following information: (OBS Question 93)

Table 3: Countries publishing key information to answer “What is the government trying to achieve with the money it collects and spends?”*

OBS Question OBS Question Percent of 115 Countries Surveyed Number

17 Purposes and costs of new policy proposals? 27%

47 Link between existing and new policies and the budget? 33%

51 Targets for policy goals? 26%

93 Nonfinancial outputs versus targets? 12%

* These figures are for countries with an “a” response (highest score) on each question.

None of the indicators we consider above are available in more than a third of the countries surveyed in 2017. A third or less of the countries surveyed explain the costs or purposes of new policies or clarify how they link to the budget. Just over a quarter of the countries surveyed provide targets for the results they hope to achieve with the budget. Only 14 countries report back comprehensively at the end of the year on whether they achieved performance targets or not.

3 The End of Progress? Increases in Transparency Halted in 2017

The OBS 2017 uncovers an unfortunate development with have to be posted online in a timely manner to be considered regard to budget transparency. Our previous surveys all found publicly available. In previous surveys, budget documents that the overall OBI score increased from one round to the published only in hard copy (or in digital forms unavailable next, with the progress both steady and significant. But the online) were considered publicly available. This change was OBS 2017 indicates that budget transparency overall declined made to reflect the current ease of posting documents to the modestly over the past two years, with this regression primar- internet, as well as what constitutes good practice: online ily driven by countries in Sub-Saharan Africa providing less documents are far more accessible to the public than hard-copy budget information to the public than in 2015. documents, even where internet penetration is modest. We discuss this change further in Annex B.10 The modest decline in budget transparency from 2015 to 2017 was far from universal and has not erased the gains in There is an important regional dimension to this change in transparency achieved in previous survey rounds. In addition, transparency trends (see Table 3.1). The average OBI score for progress over the longer term has been most robust among the the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa fell from 2015 to 2017, group of countries that were least transparent to begin with. declining from 39 to 29 among the 27 countries for which data This progress, however, is of modest comfort considering that, from both surveys are available. In contrast, over the 2008 to as we saw in the previous chapter, a significant majority of 2015 period, budget transparency gains in Sub-Saharan Africa countries still fail to provide sufficient budget information. It substantially exceeded those in the rest of the world, as the remains to be seen if the recent negative trend will continue in region made positive gains in every survey. So, while Sub- future rounds or if the positive trends found prior to 2015 will Saharan Africa has still improved relative to 2008, it has gone reassert themselves. from the region in which the provision of budget information was growing most rapidly to the region in which the provision Previous rounds of the OBS were completed in 2006, 2008, of budget information declined the most. 2010, 2012, and 2015. After conducting the survey for more than a decade, IBP has amassed a wealth of data on how budget Meanwhile, the amount of budget information provided in other transparency has evolved over time and across countries. This countries rose modestly from 2015 to 2017. The average OBI chapter examines in detail the changes in budget transparency score inched up from 48 to 49 among the 75 countries outside of for the 102 countries surveyed in both 2015 and 2017, as well Sub-Saharan Africa for which there are comparable data. as the longer-term trend for the 77 countries surveyed consistently since 2008. We also consider some individual cases of There was, however, considerable variation among other countries that have made consistent progress over time, and regions. The countries within the South Asia region increased look in greater detail at what has happened in Sub-Saharan their budget transparency the most, although these gains only Africa in this round. made up for a portion of the significant drop in transparency they experienced from 2012 to 2015. The countries of East Asia Developments between 2015 and 2017 and the Pacific also increased the amount of budget information provided, while the Middle East and North Africa (from Among the 102 countries surveyed in both 2015 and 2017, an already low base) and Western Europe and the United States budget transparency has diminished in 2017. The average OBI (from a high base) showed modest declines in transparency. score in these countries fell from 45 in 2015 to 43 in 2017. Also of note, progress was particularly significant for the countries outside of Sub-Saharan Africa that were least transparent A portion of this decline reflects a change in how we measure in 2015 (those with OBI scores of 40 or less in 2015). Their public availability. In 2017, for the first time, budget documents scores increased by three points, on average.

10 For comparison of the OBS 2017 results with the results from previous rounds, we use questions and definitions associated with each survey round. In other words, documents available only in hard copy are considered available to the public in 2015 and previous years, but not available to the public in OBS 2017. 19 Table 3.1: Regional changes in OBI scores, 2015-2017 Table 3.2: Change in number of countries publishing particular documents

Regional Average OBI between 2015 and 2017 Region 2015 2017 Change* Key budget document 2015 2017 Change East Asia & Pacific 41 44 3 Pre-Budget Statement 55 47 -8 Eastern Europe & Central Asia 54 55 1 Executive’s Budget Proposal 86 81 -5 Latin America & Caribbean 50 50 1 Enacted Budget 97 89 -8 Middle East & North Africa 21 20 -1 Citizens Budget 54 54 0 South Asia 42 46 5 In-Year Reports 82 73 -9 Sub-Saharan Africa 39 29 -11 Mid-Year Review 35 31 -4 Western Europe & the United States 74 73 -1 Year-End Report 73 68 -5 All countries 45 43 -2 Audit Report 67 69 2

Compares the 102 countries that were evaluated in both the 2015 and 2017 Open Budget Surveys. Total 549 512 -37 *Changes in Table 3.1 may not tally due to rounding. Compares the 102 countries that were evaluated in both the 2015 and 2017 Open Budget Surveys.

Global and regional averages also mask variation among coun- The decline in document publication is the main driver of the tries. Nineteen countries improved their OBI scores by more decrease in the global average OBI score, as opposed to less than five points from 2015 to 2017, including a dozen countries information being provided in those documents that were (Albania, Cambodia, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Fiji, Georgia, published. The comprehensiveness of available budget docu- Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nepal, Thailand, and Turkey) ments published in both 2015 and 2017 increased slightly, from that had double-digit gains. On the other hand, OBI scores a weighted average of 61 in 2015 to 62 in 2017. fell by more than five points over this period in 28 countries, including 15 countries with double-digit declines (Algeria, With regard to specific types of information, information on Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, debt, revenue policies, and multi-year spending in Pre-Budget Democratic Republic of Congo, Malawi, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Statements was more likely to be available in 2017 than in 2015. Leone, Tanzania, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe). More information has also been made available in Executive’s Budget Proposals in 2017 in key categories such as transfers to Changes in the Publication of Documents state corporations and expenditures for the poor. On the other and Information hand, fewer countries in 2017 used an economic classification consistent with international standards in their budgets, and Among the 102 countries assessed in both 2015 and 2017, the fewer reported government finances on a consolidated basis, net number of budget documents published declined by 37 among other areas of declining transparency. (see Table 3.2). This is the first time since we began the survey that there has been a decrease in the number of documents Taking a Longer View: 2008-2017 published. This decrease was concentrated among the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. The net number of budget documents The discouraging trend in overall budget transparency from in this region declined by 27, making up a significant majority 2015 to 2017 has not offset the overall progress that occurred in of the net decline in budget documents throughout the world. prior years. As measured by the OBI, countries still provided more budget information in 2017 than they did in 2012. And Considering the documents individually, there was a net every other round of the survey prior to 2012 also found overall negative change globally in the publication status of six of growth in the amount of information provided. them; the two exceptions are Citizens Budgets, which showed no net change in the number published in 2015 and 2017, and We first surveyed countries in 2006, but the number of coun- Audit Reports, which showed a net gain of two. The number of tries initially covered was relatively small. Taking 2008 as a Pre-Budget Statements, Enacted Budgets, and In-Year Reports starting point, there are 77 countries for which we have scores declined by sizable numbers over the past two years, dropping for every survey between that year and the current survey. by between eight and nine documents. The number of Execu- Overall, the average OBI score for these 77 countries rose by tive’s Budget Proposals – arguably the most essential budget six points during that period, despite the modest decline in document – fell by five. transparency between 2015 and 2017.

20 As the long-term comparisons in previous reports have shown, Consistent with the trend toward increased budget information progress has been most pronounced by far among those prior to 2015, there was also a substantial increase in the number countries that were least transparent to begin with. Moreover, of key budget documents that were made available to the public the trend among countries in the middle of the transparency in a timely fashion in that period. On balance, the long-term spectrum has been more positive than among those that document trend remains positive: the gains in document publi- already provided sufficient information. The countries that had cation prior to 2015 exceed the losses experienced since then, OBI scores of 20 or less in 2008 increased their scores by an especially when it comes to the number of Citizens Budgets. average of 19 points by 2017, the only category of countries for which progress should be considered robust (though most of Failure to Consolidate Gains these countries that improved still fall well short of providing from Previous Years sufficient budget information). Among those with OBI scores between 41 and 60 in 2008, the average increase through 2017 One driver of the modest decline in overall transparency iden- was five points. For the other score ranges, average scores tified in the OBS 2017 is that in some countries, particularly decreased modestly. in Sub-Saharan Africa, scores that rose significantly in 2015 have fallen back in 2017. This is the first survey round since Another way to assess changes over time is by examining the 2008 that exhibits more countries with major losses (greater number of countries falling into each of the three categories of than five points) than major gains, with 28 countries declining transparency we use in this report: low, limited, or sufficient versus 19 gaining (see Table 3.3). For the 32 countries whose transparency (see Figure 3.1). We find that the number of low- scores increased by more than five points between 2012 and transparency countries has fallen over time and the number of 2015, average scores went down by seven points in 2017. countries providing limited or sufficient information has risen. Among the 77 countries for which comparisons over a decade Table 3.3: Number of countries experiencing large changes in OBI score are possible, 36 had OBI scores of 40 or less in 2008, dropping between survey rounds to 24 countries with scores this low in 2017. Meanwhile, the Number of countries 2008 2010 2012 2015 number of countries with scores of 41-60 rose from 23 in 2008 whose OBI score: to 2010 to 2012 to 2015 to 2017 to 31 in 2017, and the number providing sufficient information Increased by more than five points 18 26 32 19 (a score of 61 or more) rose by four. Declined by more than five points 3 15 23 28 Total number of countries in both 77 93 100 102 survey rounds

Figure 3.1: Number of countries by category of transparency and year (countries This type of reversal is new. This is the first survey round when surveyed since 2008) average scores for countries that have made major gains in a previous round of the survey (posting increases of more than five points) actually fell back. For example, if we look at the 18

18 18 19 countries that increased their scores by more than five points 22 22 between 2008 and 2010, their average scores continued to increase in each survey round until 2017, when they declined by seven points from 2015. Similarly, if we follow the 26 coun-

23 28 tries that increased scores by more than five points between 30 30 31 2010 and 2012, the average score increased again in 2015, but their scores then stagnated in 2017. Number of Countries Some countries that had consistently published key budget

36 documents in a timely manner also stopped doing so in 2017. 31 28 25 24 This list includes a diverse set of countries from all regions of the world (see Table 3.4).

2008 2010 2012 2015 2017 Regression among countries that have previously led reform Low Limited Sufﬁcient is worrying. Will this turn out to be a minor setback, or will this trend continue beyond 2017? Given that, across a number

21 Table 3.4: Documents made available to the public between 2008 and 2015, but Table 3.5: Selected examples of repeated changes in budget document not in 2017 publication, 2008-2017

Status in Open Document Status, by OBS Round Country Document Budget Survey 2017 Country Document 2008 2010 2012 2015 2017 Afghanistan In-Year Reports Published late Colombia Citizens Budget Bangladesh In-Year Reports Published late Pre-Budget Fiji Bolivia In-Year Reports Published late Statement Bosnia and Herzegovina In-Year Reports Published late Ghana In-Year Reports Croatia Pre-Budget Statement Published late Guatemala Citizens Budget Germany Mid-Year Review Not produced Pakistan Year-End Report Mongolia Pre-Budget Statement Published late Namibia Audit Report Not produced Philippines Mid-Year Review São Tomé e Papua New Guinea Pre-Budget Statement Published late In-Year Reports Príncipe Russia Pre-Budget Statement Published late Pre-Budget Produced for Slovenia Serbia Year-End Report Statement internal use only Thailand Audit Report Venezuela Enacted Budget Published late Executive’s Enacted Budget and Yemen Yemen Not produced Budget Proposal In-Year Reports

Available to the Public Not Produced • • • Published Late, or Not Published Online, or Produced for Internal Use Only of countries, documents are frequently published, then not published, then published again (see examples in Table 3.5), it of new budget documents: an extensive Mid-Year Review, and is hazardous to predict what 2019 will bring.11 six additional supporting documents to the Executive’s Budget Proposal, including a report on state debt. Case Studies of Changes in Transparency The United National Movement Party, which came into In this section, we consider in more detail specific cases of power as a result of protests against election manipulation, change over time in performance on the OBI. We look first at subsequently drafted the Strategic Vision for Public Financial cases where scores have been rising over successive rounds of Management. This vision guided a number of reforms, includ- the survey, such as Georgia, Jordan, Mexico, and Senegal. We ing program and performance budgeting starting in 2006, also consider Fiji, which performed well in 2017 but in which budget classification systems meeting international standards we find evidence of both increasing and decreasing transpar- in 2009, an E-Treasury system in 2010, and a central govern- ency and oversight. We then consider the Sub-Saharan Africa ment balance sheet in 2012.13 Key PFM legislation was passed region, which was an important driver of the overall decline in 2008-09, which consolidated central finance functions in scores in 2017. These case studies are based on conversa- within the Ministry of Finance.14 Reforms to the revenue tions between IBP, partners, country experts, and government administration system have also improved Georgia’s perfor- officials who have closely followed these developments. mance on the World Bank’s Doing Business report.15

Georgia: A flowering of transparency after Rose Revolution. Georgia received significant international support for PFM Georgia’s OBI score has risen from 34 in 2006 to 82 in 2017. reforms from the World Bank and the European Neighbour- These transparency improvements are linked to wider public hood and Partnership Instrument, among other donors. These financial management (PFM) reforms that have expanded reform programs included specific indicators on the timeliness and consolidated the availability of budget information. These and transparency of public finance information.16 Through reforms began with the Rose Revolution in 2003 – a peace- these programs, Georgia holds quarterly and annual review ful change of power supported by a coalition of opposition meetings to assess progress on its PFM strategy. parties, nongovernmental organizations, and media aligned with reform-minded politicians against corruption.12 For the Georgia had additional incentives to improve its public 2017 budget cycle, Georgia produced and published a number finances due to its goals of EU Association and participating in

11 For a more detailed assessment of these kinds of changes in budget document publication over time, see Paolo de Renzio, Daniel Hiller, and Suad Hasan, “Taking Stock of the Volatility of Budget Transparency,” Budget Brief (Washington, D.C.: International Budget Partnership, August 2017). 12 See Giorgi Kandelaki, “Georgia’s Rose Revolution: A Participant’s Perspective, Special Report” (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2006). 13 Georgia Public Expenditure Review: Building a Sustainable Future (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, June 2017). 14 Verena Fritz, Marijn Verhoeven, and Ambra Avenia, Political Economy of Public Financial Management Reforms: Experiences and Implications for Dialogue and Operational Engagement (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2017). 15 Doing Business 2018: Reforming to Create Jobs (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, October 2017). 22 16 “Georgia - Public Sector Financial Management Reform Support Project,” Implementation Completion and Results Report, no. ICR2445 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, November 2012). the Open Government Partnership (OGP) in 2011. Thus, even 10 most transparent countries in the survey. The improvement when Georgia underwent a political transition to the opposi- in Mexico’s OBI 2017 score is largely attributable to improved tion party, Georgian Dream, in 2012, PFM reforms continued comprehensiveness in its Mid-Year Review (considered as such and were consolidated. Open Government Partnership for the first time in this round) and in the Executive’s Budget commitments on PFM reforms and a more transparent budget Proposal. Information captured in the OBI 2017 that was not process were completed in 2015, resulting in a revised Citizens available before includes details on individual tax revenue Budget. New commitments on citizen participation in the audit sources and an economic classification consistent with interna- process were added in 2016.17 tional standards.

Georgia’s progress on transparency has been driven by capable The drivers of change in Mexico go back more than two civil servants within the Ministry of Finance, many of whom decades to the democratization of the party system, the joined after the political change in 2004 and remain committed development of a robust civil society engaged in budget issues, to modernizing government. These officials have overcome and a series of legal reforms starting in 2002. Among other internal obstacles to reforming their PFM systems, such as things, these reforms have increased access to information and potential tensions with line ministries on budgeting practices modernized the budget process. More recently, the Program and procedures, by engaging in frequent assessment and learn- for a Modern Government, Close to the People (Programa para ing processes. un Gobierno Cercano y Moderno) was also approved in 2013.20 The program includes a target of an OBI score of 81 by 2018.21 Jordan: Wider democratic reform and key partnerships. This has created incentives for different federal units to adjust Jordan has improved its OBI score significantly since 2006, their practices and standards to ensure the relevant budget when it scored 50. In the OBS 2017, this score increased to 63, information is available as required by international standards. mainly due to the release of a new Mid-Year Review and the enhanced comprehensiveness of its budget documents, includ- The role of the Performance Evaluation Unit within the Minis- ing the addition of macroeconomic forecasts in the Pre-Budget try of Finance has also been critical. The unit is in charge of Statement and expenditure data by functional classification in policy planning and is the primary reviewer of the OBS ques- the Executive’s Budget Proposal. tionnaire. As officials have become more familiar with the OBS over time, they have been better able to understand interna- Jordan’s Ministry of Finance has been pursuing wider public tional standards and the relevance of providing budget infor- financial management reforms with international support from mation in a certain format. The long tenure and professional the EU and USAID, whose support is partly conditional on norms of finance officials in Mexico has ensured commitment transparency improvements.18 These reforms are complemen- across presidential terms. The inclusion of a commitment to tary to broader democratic reforms that have taken place in an open and participatory budget in the Second Action Plan Jordan following the 2011 Arab Spring protests in the region, submitted to the Open Government Partnership may have also including changes to the electoral process and political party contributed to greater budget transparency in Mexico.22 laws and an anti-corruption strategy that includes transparency commitments.19 These steps suggest a government that is Finally, a deeper and ongoing technical dialogue between civil making a sustained commitment to improving fiscal transpar- society (Fundar, IBP) and the Performance Evaluation Unit has ency in the coming years. contributed to an improvement in the quality of information provided in budget documents. This was critical in relation to Mexico: Democratization, professionalization, and opening. the upgrading of the Criterios Generales de Política Económica, In 2009 the Mexican Secretary of Finance and Public Credit which is now considered a Mid-Year Review. began to work more consistently toward the publication of key budget information. This effort contributed to a steady increase Senegal: Regional and global partnerships support domestic in Mexico’s OBI score from 61 points in 2012, to 66 in 2015, reformers. The country increased its OBI score from 3 in 2008 and 79 in the current survey. Mexico now ranks among the top and 2010, to 43 in 2015, and to 51 in 2017. Between 2012 and

17 Lasha Gogidze,“Georgia: 2014-2016 End of Term Report” (Washington, D.C.: Open Government Partnership, 2016), available at https://www.opengovpartnership.org/sites/default/files/Georgia_EOTR_2014-2016_for-public-comment_ENG_0.pdf. 18 Support has also been provided by the World Bank, the IMF, and the aid agencies of Japan, Germany, France, and Korea. See John Wiggins, David Biggs, and Omar Al-Bokairat, “Jordan: PEFA Assessment 2016,” Project No. 2016/375005/1 (Spain: AECOM International Development Europe SL, February 2017). 19 “Jordan: Democracy, Rights & Governance,” USAID, last updated 5 September 2017, https://www.usaid.gov/jordan/democracy-human-rights-and-governance. See also Jordanian Embassy’s announcement on the National Integrity System, available at: http://www.jordanembassyus.org/sites/default/files/resources/national-integrity-system.pdf. 20 See “DECRETO que establece las medidas para el uso eficiente, transparente y eficaz de los recursos públicos, y las acciones de disciplina presupuestaria en el ejercicio del gasto público (Decreto de Austeri- dad), así como para la modernización de la Administración Pública Federal,” 10 December 2012, http://www.normateca.gob.mx/Archivos/92_D_3345_12-12-2012.pdf. 21 See “Programa para un Gobierno Cercano y Moderno 2013 – 2018, Sección III, Indicadores PGCM,” Diario Oficial de la Federación, 30 August 2013, http://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5312420&fecha=30/08/2013. 22 See “Alianza para el Gobierno Abierto, Segundo Plan de Acción 2013-2015, México,” http://pa2015.mx/. The most recent plan, 2016-2018, also includes commitments. 23 Box 3.1: Sub-Saharan Africa: Failure to institutionalize past gains

The modest decline in the global OBI score in 2017 is primarily attributable to Sub-Saharan Africa, where the score for the region fell by 11 points between 2015 and 2017. Of the 27 Sub-Saharan African countries surveyed in both years, 15 saw their OBI scores decrease by more than five points. Senegal was the only country in the region that increased its OBI score by more than five points. This is in sharp contrast to previous rounds of the survey, when Sub-Saha- ran African countries made strong gains. For instance, 12 out of the 26 Sub-Saharan African countries included in both the 2012 and 2015 rounds increased their scores by more than five points over the period, and only two countries saw their OBI scores decline by more than five points.

The decline in 2017 is largely due to Sub-Saharan countries publishing fewer documents. Fourteen countries published fewer documents in 2017 than in 2015, while only two published more. In total, there were 27 fewer documents published in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2017 than in 2015. Of the documents that were published in 2015 but not in 2017, six were Executive’s Budget Proposals. Because of the significant weight given to the Executive’s Budget Proposal in the overall OBI score, the failure to publish this key document has a large effect on the overall decline in a country’s score. Of the five Sub-Saharan African countries whose score declined by more than 30 points, four did not publish their Executive’s Budget Proposal online in a timely manner.

Are results for Sub-Saharan Africa driven by the change in how we measure public availability of budget documents? Part of the decline in the number of published documents was due to the change in how we measure public availability. Starting in 2017, we counted only documents published online as publicly available. In prior rounds, documents available only in hard copy were also accepted as publicly available (See Annex B). Had the measure of availability not changed, there would have been only 10 fewer documents in 2017, rather than 27.

There are a number of cases where this matters. There are six countries in Sub-Saharan Africa that produced the same eight documents in hard copy in both 2015 and in 2017, but we considered those documents publicly available only in 2015. In this case, the change in our way of measuring availability affected the country’s score because the country did not change its practice. There are also cases (five in Sub-Saharan Africa) where a country did not make a document publicly available previously, but did make it available in hard copy in 2017. These countries would have scored higher in 2017 if we had not changed the way we measure public availability.

Because the OBI does not assess documents that it does not consider to be publicly available, we do not have scores for the documents published in hard copy in 2017. Thus we cannot estimate precisely the impact of the change in how we measure public availability. We therefore undertook a number of analyses, using different assumptions, to approximate the impact of this change on 2017 scores. These tests are described in Annex B. The results, which depend on several broad assumptions, show that scores for Sub-Saharan Africa would have fallen by between three and six points in 2017 if we had not changed our definition of public availability.

So, while the decline in the scores for Sub-Saharan Africa was exacerbated by the change in how we measure public availability, a portion of that decline would have occurred even without this update to the OBI.

Are results for Sub-Saharan Africa driven by a small set of outliers? There are five countries whose scores fell by more than 30 points in 2017: Botswana, Cameroon, Malawi, Tanzania, and Zambia. When these countries are removed, the overall decline for the region drops from 11 points to five points. This is consistent with the fact that the scores of 10 other countries in the region declined by more than five points and that only one experienced an increase of more than five points. So removing the countries with the largest declines affects the magnitude of the overall change in scores for the region, but it remains negative.

Can we say anything about the countries that performed better or worse in the region in 2017? There does not appear to be any overall trend explaining these differences. While we have not conducted in-depth analyses of the factors driving these changes, a superficial look at simple correlations reveals that changes in OBI scores in Sub-Saharan Africa are not strongly correlated with changes in democracy indices, income, oil dependence, or human development. These preliminary findings require further investigation, however.

The OBS 2017 results suggest that whatever factors contributed to improvements in transparency in the region between 2012 and 2015 were not sufficient to maintain these gains in 2017. Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa that increased their OBI score by more than five points between 2012 and 2015 declined by more on average between 2015 and 2017 than the countries that were not substantial improvers between 2012 and 2015.

Our assessment indicates that the decline in budget transparency across Sub-Saharan Africa cannot be attributed to any single phenomenon nor to systematic efforts to withhold information. While the regression observed could be reversed in the next round of the OBS, the Sub-Saharan African case highlights the importance of institutionalizing gains over time. Other research by IBP suggests that transparency improvements may require countries to move beyond conventional responses, including public finance laws or capacity building, and that more consistent domestic demand for budget information may be a necessary complement to these more conventional approaches.A

A. See de Renzio, Hiller, and Hasan, “Taking Stock of the Volatility of Budget Transparency.”

24 2015, the government made the Executive’s Budget Proposal history of publishing key budget documents has been irregular. and Citizens Budget publicly available for the first time. The In 2016 Fiji published the Executive’s Budget Proposal for government also resumed publishing the Enacted Budget the first time. Publishing this key budget document largely after failing to publish it in 2012. Between 2015 and 2017, the explains the increase in Fiji’s score on the Open Budget Index government made the Year-End Report available to the public from 15 in 2015 to 41 in 2017. for the first time and resumed its earlier practice of publishing the Audit Report. The government has stated that publishing the Executive’s Budget Proposal is part of its commitment to transparency and In 2016 the government committed to strengthening the accessibility of budget information. It also publishes additional budget process by ensuring parliamentary oversight of the supporting documents to the Executive’s Budget Proposal on budget, and by enhancing the capacity of its supreme audit new and ongoing programs on the ministry’s website. The institution to comply with international standards. It promised ministry received support from the IMF’s Pacific Financial to adopt measures in line with the High-Level Principles on Technical Assistance Centre in producing these updated docu- Fiscal Transparency enacted by the Global Initiative for Fiscal ments. After the close of the data collection period for the most Transparency (GIFT) and endorsed by the United Nation’s recent round of the Open Budget Survey, the Fijian govern- General Assembly in 2012.23 The government also expressed ment also took the positive step of publishing its Audit Report interest in joining the OGP and stressed the importance of online, including three reports from previous years. disclosing budget information and enabling citizen engagement at a 2016 OGP meeting.24 With the improvements in However, the government’s approach to transparency and Senegal’s publication of documents, it has now become eligible sound public financial management appears to be inconsistent. to join OGP. While newly releasing the Executive’s Budget Proposal in 2016, during the same period Fiji failed to publish or even produce Several key factors contributed to the improvements in budget the Year-End Report and the Pre-Budget Statement, both of transparency in Senegal. The government has noted the role of which were produced and made available to the public previ- the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) ously. in driving reforms and the impressive gains in the region on the Open Budget Survey.25 Senegal has implemented WAEMU Gains in transparency have also been partially countered by directives on fiscal transparency that are in line with global reduced oversight from the legislature. Under Standing Order standards by adopting them into national legislation.26 51 in Parliament, which was adopted in December 2014, the legislature has presented, debated, and passed spending bills National and international civil society organizations, the on the same day, drastically reducing legislative review of the media, and development partners such as the European Union, budget. Debates on the annual budget proposal have also been the IMF, UNDP, the French government, USAID and the shortened – while parliament previously had two weeks to World Bank, have also played a role in budget transparency debate the draft budget, the timeline has now been reduced to reforms.27 The government has engaged in technical discus- one week. sions with Senegalese civil society, IBP, the Collaborative Africa Budget Reform Initiative (CABRI), and development While the recent publication of Fiji’s Audit Report was an partners to analyze budget transparency gaps and develop an important transparency advance, the opposition committee action plan. The government continues to work with various chair of the Public Accounts Committee who had pushed stakeholders to follow up on its promised reforms.28 for this change was voted out of his leadership role, and the government changed parliamentary rules to allow a member Fiji: Rising score but mixed signals on transparency. Fiji of the governing party to chair the committee. In addition, represents a complex case of changing transparency practices, the government has placed restrictions on civil society, such where an increased overall OBI score is in tension with declin- as prohibiting organizations that receive donor funding to ing transparency and oversight in specific areas. Since first organize meetings, or carry out awareness or public discussion starting to participate in the Open Budget Survey in 2008, Fiji on elections. This decision shows that even while Fiji’s trans- has made progress in its overall score on the OBI, although its parency score may have increased due to the publication of its

23 Senegal Country Statement, Anti-Corruption Summit – London 2016, accessed 12 May 2016, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/anti-corruption-summit-country-statements. 24 Mr. Mor Diouf, Executive Secretary of Senegal’s Project for the Coordination of Budgetary and Financial Reforms (PCRBF), panel discussion, Open Government Partnership Summit, Paris, France, December 2016. 25 Mr. Mor Diouf, OGP Summit. 26 The Senegalese government adopted the WAEMU Directive of 27 March 2009 on the Code of Transparency in Public Financial Management into its own legislation in December 2012. LOI n° 2012-22 du 27 décembre 2012, Journal Officiel, Republique du Senegal, www.jo.gouv.sn/spip.php?article9605. 27 Budget Transparency: An unprecedented workshop between the State of Senegal, the International Budget Partnership (IBP) and Civil Society,” ONG-3D, 10 June 2016, http://www.forum-srds.com/V1_3D/?p=972. 28 Moustapha Doukoure and Aarti Shah, “Reflections on budget transparency in Francophone Africa,” CABRI, 2 August 2016, http://www.cabri-sbo.org/en/blog/2016/reflections-on-budget-transparency-in-francophone-africa. 25 Executive’s Budget Proposal, the government’s commitment to enhancing transparency and accountability remains weak. Summary

■■ Budget transparency failed to improve between 2015 and 2017, declining modestly. The decline was most pronounced in Sub-Saharan Africa but also affected some other regions to a lesser degree. While part of this decline was caused by the change in how public availability is defined, there was also a genuine decline in the public availability of budget information. ■■ The decline in transparency was driven by the failure to release documents to the public. The overall range of information provided in those documents that were published actually increased marginally between 2015 and 2017. ■■ Overall, the decline in budget transparency in 2017 did not erase the gains from previous rounds of the survey, so more budget information is available to the public now than was the case a decade ago. This is particularly true for the countries that were least transparent in earlier rounds of the survey.

4 Assessing Oversight Institutions

This chapter examines the role of oversight institutions in the survey draw on principles from the IMF and the INTOSAI. the budget process. We focus on legislatures, supreme audit Our changes in the questions mean that the 2017 assessment of institutions (SAIs), and, for the first time, independent fiscal oversight is not directly comparable with the 2015 assessment. institutions (IFIs). Overall, we find that only 28 percent of legislatures have scores Oversight institutions are core to effective democratic indicating adequate oversight practices, while two-thirds government and public financial management. They provide of SAIs have adequate practices. Legislatures practice more “horizontal” accountability, which distinguishes them from adequate oversight during budget formulation and approval the “vertical” accountability relationship that exists between than they do during implementation. While there are now citizens and government, which is discussed in the next chap- IFIs in 28 countries, only 18 of these are both independent and ter. However, horizontal and vertical accountability should not sufficiently resourced to carry out their functions. While we do be viewed simply as parallel checks on the government, but not claim to offer a comprehensive assessment of all types of rather as interrelated mechanisms. oversight institutions, we do believe the survey results provide a reasonable sense of whether country budget systems include Without effective legislatures and auditors, citizen influence effective checks and balances that advance integrity and over budget policy and implementation is constrained. Even the accountability in the use of public resources. most active citizens cannot replace dedicated oversight bodies that have both the mandate and the resources to check the exec- Legislative Oversight utive branch. These institutions also ensure that the government releases information, and, in some cases, such as IFIs, they also Legislatures can play a role in all four stages of the budget help to analyze that information. Their efforts enable citizens to process. They can help set the main contours of the budget and play their own role effectively. At the same time, without active define priorities, and they can monitor budget implementation citizens, oversight institutions are weakened. Active citizens and review audit reports. share information with auditors and legislators about areas where government is not achieving its objectives, and these The OBS 2017 reveals that only 32 country legislatures (28 citizen inputs should help oversight bodies focus on those areas percent) out of 115 surveyed have adequate oversight practices. where they may have the most impact. A plurality of 47 countries (41 percent) have only limited legislative oversight, while 36 countries (31 percent) have weak For this round of the OBS, we reviewed the questions on legislative oversight. oversight institutions; we modified some of them and added others to focus on the key levers for effective monitoring. Our Formulation and approval. We asked one question about the revised measures emphasize the role of legislative committees legislature’s role in budget formulation in 2017. We wanted to in the budget process and the actual powers of both legislatures know whether legislatures debate budget policies before the and SAIs. We also added a section on IFIs — independent, tabling of the budget. Such a debate can help ensure that there nonpartisan institutions, normally attached to the executive is wider public scrutiny of the broad strategic choices in the or legislature, that make fiscal forecasts and estimate the cost budget, rather than lumping discussions of broad priorities of policies. This addition was made to recognize the recent together with the discussion of detailed matters of allocation in emergence of these important actors in the budget system and the budget’s approval stage. to investigate how they operate. The new questions on IFIs are based in part on the OECD principles adopted in February There are currently 29 countries in which the legislature (in 2014 and on work by the IMF.29 Other questions in this part of full or by committee) debates and approves key policy recom-

29 For a discussion of these principles and of IFIs more broadly in the OECD, see Lisa von Trapp, Ian Lienert, and Joachim Wehner, “Principles for Independent Fiscal Institutions and Case Studies,” OECD Journal on Budgeting 15, no. 2 (22 March 2016): 9-24. See also, “The Functions and Impact of Fiscal Councils,” Policy Paper (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 16 July 2013), https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/071613.pdf. 29 mendations prior to the tabling of the budget. This includes an review the budget. In 21 countries, the legislature has less than assortment of countries from different regions of the world, a month to review the budget or does not receive the budget in such as Brazil, Canada, Kenya, Nepal, Russia, South Africa, advance at all. and Spain. In other countries, the legislature either debates but does not approve any recommendations, or does not even Budgets should also be adopted far enough in advance of the debate such policies prior to the presentation of the budget. budget year so that agencies and citizens can prepare for their implementation. But of the 73 countries where the legislature does receive the budget more than two months in advance of the Figure 4.1: Countries grouped by 2017 legislative oversight score budget year, in only 30 of them does the legislature approve the 50 budget more than a month before the start of the budget year. There are 14 countries where the legislature receives the budget 47 more than a month before the start of the budget year but does

40 not approve it until after the beginning of the budget year.

36 When we look at budget approval, a critical question is whether legislatures have the legal power to amend the budget, and if 30 32 so, whether they use such power. Box 4.1 looks at this issue.

Implementation. It is imperative that legislatures provide over- 20

i sight of changes to the Enacted Budget that occur during budget implementation. While the executive is often granted some flex- ibility in implementing the Enacted Budget in order to manage

10 agencies effectively, major changes typically require legislative approval. In some countries, legislatures must authorize these changes to the Enacted Budget before they occur, while in

0 others, this authorization is given only after the changes are Weak Limited Adequate (0-40) (41-60) (61-100) Box 4.1: How often do legislatures amend budgets?

To assess budgets properly, legislatures must develop technical The power of the legislature to amend budgets before they are implemented can be an important check on executive power, ensuring that skills over time. Often these skills are vested in a budget or the approved budget reflects a broad consensus. In 2017 there were finance committee. While most countries have such a commit- only 12 countries where the legislature had no amendment powers. tee, in only 30 countries does this committee both have at least Most of these are low-transparency countries as well, but the list also a month to review the budget and produce a publicly available includes Canada and Georgia, which have high transparency scores, record of its recommendations. In 54 countries, a committee and Afghanistan and Fiji, which have moderate transparency scores. reviews the budget but there is no publicly available record of In most countries where legislatures can amend the budget, they still any recommendations the committee may have produced. face constraints on their powers: the legislature may not be able to change the fiscal balance or to amend the total resource envelope. While a specialized budget committee should examine the In Madagascar and Côte d’Ivoire, for example, the legislature can overall budget, it is also important for committees with sector propose amendments to the budget that would increase expenditure expertise to review budgets for their sector. Such sector reviews or reduce revenue only if those proposals are paired with equivalent occur in 72 countries, but in 44 of these, the committees do increases in revenue or reductions in expenditures. Some of these institutional differences reflect differences in political systems: parlia- not issue any publicly available recommendations prior to the mentary systems, for example, have traditionally offered legislatures budget’s adoption. less of a role in budget formulation than presidential systems.

International best practice suggests that legislatures should While 9 out of 10 surveyed countries grant the legislature some power have at least three months to review the budget proposal before in law to amend the budget, in only 6 out of 10 countries did legisla- the new budget year begins. This standard is met in just 40 tures use their amendment powers to modify the budget proposed by the executive. Roughly 4 out of 10 countries with at least some legal countries (little more than one-third of the total), while in 33 authority to amend the budget did not do so in the year surveyed. countries, the legislature has between two and three months to

30 Figure 4.2: Challenges to legislative oversight during budget approval and implementation (share of 115 surveyed countries)

65% 44% Budget approval

About two thirds of legislatures receive Nearly half of all legislatures did not successfully the budget less than three months before the amend the budget in the fiscal year covered by the budget year or not at all. OBS 2017, or had no legal authority to do so.

54% 61% 44% Budget implementation

The executive moves funds between The executive reduces spending in response The executive spends excess revenue administrative units without legislative approval to revenue shortfalls without legislative approval without approval from the legislature in in more than half of countries. in almost two-thirds of countries. nearly half of countries.

made. Where the legislature does not approve changes at all During the OBS research period, legislators in only 22 coun- or only approves them after the fact, the budget process can be tries produced reports on audit findings within six months. In weakened, particularly if it allows oversight provided earlier in 41 countries, the legislature did not examine the audit findings the process to be undermined during implementation. at all. In these cases, it is extremely unlikely that the audit findings will have an impact on government practices. The executive seeks legislative approval before shifting funds between different administrative units in less than half of the Comparing formulation/approval and implementation/ countries surveyed (53 of 115). In 18 countries, the law requires audit. The average overall score for legislatures for formulation legislative approval before such changes are made to the and approval is 53. For the questions related to implementa- budget, but in practice governments make these changes before tion and audit, the average score is 42. While neither score obtaining approval. is judged adequate by the OBS, legislatures exercise more oversight earlier in the budget process than they do during Another critical role played by the legislature is the review of implementation. This suggests that executives are somewhat Audit Reports. Audit findings should be presented to the legis- more constrained when seeking to pass the original budget, lature for review and follow up, and the legislature should then but they have somewhat more freedom during the year to make ensure that the executive does in fact implement any recom- changes to that budget with only limited legislative review. This mendations made. This must also be done in a timely fashion – can lead to spending that is not in line with the initial priori- ideally, within three months of receiving the Audit Report – in ties agreed to in the approved budget and generally opens the order to have an impact on ongoing budget implementation door to executive mismanagement of public funds. The fact and formulation of the next budget. that many legislatures delay reviewing Audit Reports, or do

31 not review them at all, further weakens oversight of executive In spite of this independence, however, SAIs may still fail to expenditure. play their proper role in the accountability system. In some countries, SAIs lack adequate budgets to carry out their work; Supreme Audit Institutions analysts raised this concern in 37 percent of the countries surveyed in 2017. In 38 countries, no Audit Reports are The fourth stage of the budget process is the audit stage. SAIs published; in 41 countries, as we saw above, the legislature does can assess whether funds are used in accordance with the law not review audit findings. and whether there were failures to comply with government financial procedures. Many auditors also carry out additional SAIs are generally less enabled in countries that are less transpar- financial and performance audits to gauge whether the govern- ent. The average transparency score for countries where the execu- ment achieved its goals and whether public spending was tive can remove the auditor is 25; in countries where this is not efficient. possible, the average score is 46. A lack of transparency combined with a lack of SAI independence and oversight can create particu- The basic conditions for SAIs to provide adequate oversight larly worrisome situations from an accountability perspective. are in place in most countries: 75 out of 115 in OBS 2017 (65 percent). SAIs remain weak in 24 countries, however, and are Independent Fiscal Institutions of limited scope in the remaining 16. As with legislatures, we do not measure the actual effectiveness of SAI oversight, but IFIs are a growing phenomenon in public finance. They have instead gauge the enabling conditions for oversight, such as existed in a small set of countries (such as Austria, Belgium, whether they are independent of government influence and and the United States) for decades, but many more countries have sufficient funding to execute their responsibilities. have established these bodies in the past decade. These agencies are generally considered part of the executive branch or the The OBS 2017 finds that the heads of 81 of the 115 SAIs legislature, but they are nonpartisan, and their independence surveyed were appointed in a way that ensured their inde- is ensured by law. One reason for the increasing number of pendence, and 92 cannot be removed solely by the executive such institutions is the need to restore credibility in govern- branch. Taken together, these findings suggest a fairly high ment finances and improve citizen confidence in government degree of independence for SAIs globally. numbers. As such, IFIs are another tool that can help build new bridges between citizens and the state.

Figure 4.3: Countries grouped by 2017 supreme audit institution oversight score In practice, IFIs generally take one of two forms: parliamentary

80 budget offices or fiscal councils. Examples on the legislative side include the Parliamentary Budget Office in Kenya, the 75 70 Center for Public Finance Studies in Mexico, the National Assembly Budget Office in South Korea, and the Congressional

60 Budget Office in the United States. On the executive side, examples include Peru’s Fiscal Council, the Swedish Fiscal

50 Policy Council, and the United Kingdom’s Office for Budget Responsibility. IFIs are principally responsible for informing

40 budget decision making by preparing economic forecasts – or assessing the forecasts prepared by the executive – and by

i 30 estimating the costs of policy proposals. Some also monitor compliance with fiscal rules, while others (such as those in

20 24 Kenya or the United States) provide direct budget analysis support to legislators. 16 10 Through 2016, 18 countries had independent and well-

0 resourced IFIs, while 87 countries had no IFI at all. The Weak Limited Adequate remaining 10 countries have IFIs that are either not legally (0-40) (41-60) (61-100) independent or not well resourced or both. IFIs are dispropor- tionately found in countries with high transparency, though

32 South Korea, Colombia, Serbia, and Slovakia, all of which are limited transparency countries, also have independent and well-resourced IFIs.

Eleven of these IFIs are involved in each of the main roles we assess: they publish their own macroeconomic forecasts and fiscal forecasts, and they estimate the costs of at least some policy proposals. The rest do some but not all of these things. Only in South Africa, South Korea, and the United States do they produce cost estimates of all new policy proposals, and all three of these IFIs are based in the legislature. There are 12 IFIs that do not estimate the costs of any proposals. Summary

■■ Legislatures are able to provide limited oversight in the budget process, with slightly more influence over the budget formulation and approval stages than during the budget implementation and audit stages. Legislatures do amend the budget in over half of the countries surveyed, but in a majority of countries, the executive is able to change the budget during implementation without legislative approval. ■■ The basic conditions for supreme audit institutions to provide oversight are in place in a majority of countries, but many SAIs still lack capacity and financing to deliver on their mandates, and in many countries the legislature does not review audit findings.

5 Participation Mechanisms Can Be More Inclusive and Better Structured

At the outset of this report we explained why declining confi- Our findings show that countries currently provide few oppor- dence in government, particularly democratic government, tunities for public participation in budget making. The average suggests that there is a need to revisit how government and overall score is just 12 out of 100, and not a single country citizens interact. How can we produce and implement policies provides participatory opportunities that are considered that are better aligned with citizen preferences than those that adequate (scores of 61 or above). Of the 115 countries that were emerge when we rely exclusively on the accountability mecha- included in the OBS 2017, 111 provide few or no opportunities nism of elections? We believe that establishing meaningful for the public to participate (less than 41), and the majority of public participation in the budget process is one way of build- these countries score in the single digits. This poor showing ing bridges between active citizens and their governments. reflects the fact that, while global commitment to participation in the abstract has become increasingly firm, government Where citizens do not have a way to use budget information practice has not caught up with this consensus. to participate in the decision-making process, the importance of transparency fades. Furthermore, transparency without Table 5.1: Opportunities for public participation in the budget process participation can lead to frustration: problems may be easier to identify, but solutions remain out of reach. And transparency Participation Assessment - OBS 2017 Number of Surveyed Countries without opportunities for people, particularly marginalized or Few or no opportunities (score: 0-40) 111 vulnerable groups, to participate may benefit elites rather than Limited opportunities (score: 41-60) 4 Adequate opportunities (score: 61-100) 0 address social inequalities.

With this in mind and reflecting an emerging international There are glimmers of hope, however. The vast majority of consensus on what constitutes appropriate participation, IBP countries have taken the first step toward bringing outside undertook a significant redesign of the participation indica- voices into budget deliberations. While many of the mecha- tors used in the previous rounds of the survey to ground them nisms used by the countries we assess are weak, there are cases in international standards. The OBS 2017 incorporates these of innovation. Most countries formally recognize the need for updated questions and is therefore the first international citizens to provide input into budgets. They can and should survey to use global standards to assess formal participation build on these foundations, learning from the experiences of in the budget process at national level. However, changes in their peers. the participation questions mean that the 2017 assessment of participation is not directly comparable to the 2015 assessment This chapter begins with a short discussion of how budget (see Box 5.7). participation is part of the global rethinking of representative democracy that was discussed in Chapter 1. It then turns to Our new approach emphasizes the importance of govern- how international institutions and IBP have tried to define ments providing opportunities for participation throughout what such participation entails. We proceed to discuss in detail the four stages of the budget cycle, of providing information the wide array of participation mechanisms found around the in advance, of ensuring comprehensive engagement between globe and reflect on the degree to which these are well struc- government and citizens, and of availing feedback to citizens tured and inclusive. on their contributions. We also look for efforts to be inclusive and incorporate vulnerable groups. The survey assesses formal Participation and Democracy opportunities to participate directly in the process by engaging with executive branch officials, legislators, and auditors. We do The lack of opportunities for citizen participation in the not assess informal participation through lobbying or media or budget process is part of the historical design of representative other less structured efforts to influence policymakers. democracy. The early architects of modern democracy, such as

35 18th-century revolutionaries in the United States and France, In December 2012 the United Nations General Assembly specifically intended that elections would yield a “natural endorsed a set of high-level principles on fiscal transparency, aristocracy,” a governing elite that was different from the participation, and accountability that were proposed by the electorate. These representatives would be socially superior and Global Initiative for Fiscal Transparency. GIFT is a global free to vote their consciences. network that facilitates dialogue between civil society, government, the private sector, and others to enhance fiscal transpar- These early proponents of representative democracy assumed ency. It is directed by seven lead stewards: representatives from that the “filtering” of elections would yield leadership that Brazil, Mexico, the Philippines, the World Bank, the IMF, IBP, could be trusted to make decisions on behalf of the polity. But and the International Federation of Accountants. The GIFT this left unresolved basic tensions about what representation principles on public participation in public finance, released and participation in governance mean in a modern democ- in 2016, became the foundation for the revisions made to the racy. For example, if the interests of elected officials deviate participation section of the Open Budget Survey 2017. As a from those of the voter and if these interests – rather than the result, the participation questions we use this year are now common interest – drive political behavior, will elite interests grounded in international standards, as has always been true of be allowed to triumph over the common good? What happens the transparency section of the survey (see Box 5.1). when the public wishes to give its views on specific policies rather than delegate judgment to representatives? Box 5.1: How do the GIFT Principles of Public Participation link to the OBS participation questions? Various 20th-century scholars have argued that electoral democracy and the imperatives of social mobilization within GIFT Principles of OBS 2017 Questions Public Participation democratic societies do inevitably lead to representatives in Fiscal Policy* with a different social status and distinct interests from those Inclusiveness 126, 129: Executives take concrete steps to include vulnerable or underrepresented 30 they represent. This is consistent with the contemporary groups. 125, 128, 135: Mechanisms at budget perception that many elected officials serve elite interests, a formulation and approval stages show feeling that may fuel anti-establishment movements that can evidence of inclusiveness. profoundly reshape politics, as mentioned in the introduction Timeliness 125: Mechanisms at formulation ensure early participation, before major decisions made. to this report. Openness 127, 130, 137: Ensuring a wide scope of discussion on all key budget issues, not just a few. Today, citizens are skeptical that elections yield leaders who 131: Purposes and scope of participation are will always pursue the public interest. Many citizens want clearly provided in advance. to weigh in on policy decisions frequently, not just at elec- Sustainability 132, 133, 138, 141: Executives, legislatures, and supreme audit institutions provide feedback on tion time. The kind of representative democracy envisioned inputs received from the public, encouraging further engagement. by earlier theorists is no longer seen as adequate to ensure * There are 10 principles of public participation agreed to by GIFT in 2016 and modified slightly that citizen views are respected. There is a need to bridge the in 2017. This box lists some of these principles and the OBS questions associated with each. For the full list of GIFT principles, please visit the GIFT website at gap between citizens and their representatives and to ensure http://www.fiscaltransparency.net/pp_principles/ that the voices of all citizens are included in ongoing policy decisions. Such a bridge would sustain democracy by opening and improving it, building on the strengths and correcting the Overall Participation Scores weaknesses of modern representative democracy. Global average scores on participation are low. The overall Emerging Principles on Participation in average score on our assessment of participation in 2017 is 12. Budgeting31 There are no countries that score above 60. Only four countries in our survey offer moderate opportunities for public partici- As the idea that the public should participate in government in pation, meaning a score between 41 and 60: Australia, New ways that go beyond voting has moved into the mainstream, Zealand, Philippines, and the United Kingdom. The remaining this prospect has generated debate over how to define what 111 countries score below 41. constitutes meaningful participation. In the past few years, significant progress has been made toward creating such a The countries that do best on participation are among the most definition, including when it comes to participation in the transparent countries in our survey. There are no low transpar- budget process. ency countries with moderate participation scores.

30 Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul (New York: Hearst’s International Library Co., 1915); Bernard Manin, The Principles of Representative Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 36 31 This chapter contains several case studies on participatory mechanisms in different countries originally drafted by Brian Wampler. Participation Mechanisms: How Common, Figure 5.1: How widespread are the seven mechanisms of participation assessed and What Form Do They Take? in OBS 2017?

50 The OBS 2017 is the first large, cross-national survey to apply iv i 11 the GIFT principles when assessing formal participation 25 iv i mechanisms across the stages of the budget process. We 7 considered seven types of participation mechanisms, starting 33 i iii i i with executive branch mechanisms that engage the public 6 61 during budget formulation and execution. We assessed legisla- i v 16 tive mechanisms that engage the public during budget approval 22 i i and oversight (when the Audit Report is considered). Finally, 4 we looked at participation in the audit process itself, including 42 i i both the determination of what to audit and the actual imple- 17 mentation of the audit. We examined both the existence of i vii these mechanisms and, in most cases, how inclusive they were. 0 115 i i i iii i iv i

Table 5.2: Average country participation scores, by OBI transparency category *The OBS 2017 assesses whether audit participation mechanisms exist, but not whether they are inclusive or well structured. OBI Transparency Category Average Participation Score (out of 100) Low (OBI score 0-40) 5 public around budget formulation, only 29 cover at least half Limited (OBI score 41-60) 13 of the key topics that such mechanisms should cover, such as Sufficient (OBI score 61-100) 24 revenue, social spending, and debt.

Figure 5.1 summarizes the number of countries with each type Box 5.2: Miles to go: Including the views of vulnerable groups of mechanism in place. More countries have opportunities for public participation through the executive branch during We attempted to measure inclusiveness in several of our questions, the formulation of the budget and with the legislature during principally for executive-led consultations. In Figure 5.1, we saw that its approval. While few countries have multiple participatory most mechanisms of participation are not well structured or inclusive. Here we look specifically at questions we asked about efforts to reach mechanisms, most countries (94 out of 115) have at least one vulnerable and under-represented populations. The table below indi- such mechanism. Countries can move forward by expanding cates that very few countries with executive participation mechanisms and deepening existing practices; most countries do not need make a special effort to reach vulnerable groups. to build their participatory mechanisms entirely from the Number of Countries Executive Number of Countries (out of 115) Making ground up. Participation (out of 115) with Efforts to Reach Mechanism Mechanism Vulnerable Groups Figure 5.1 gives an indication of how inclusive and well-struc- Formulation 50 7 tured the mechanisms used by the executive and legislature Implementation 25 1 are. (The OBS assesses whether audit participation mechanisms exist, but not whether they are inclusive or well structured.) In these cases, participation is open to all members of the public. In some parts of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, executive- These figures indicate that the mechanisms that do exist in led participation in budget formulation happens through many countries could be considerably more open and inclusive. public councils, where representatives of the government sit with representatives of various civil society organizations, Executive mechanisms. The kinds of participation mechanisms trade unions, and experts. Because these mechanisms are that countries use within each of these seven categories varies exclusively for those who belong to certain associations, they considerably. Two of the questions with the highest overall score lower on our metrics than cases in which participation scores in the participation section are those that assess whether is less restrictive. Budget Partnership Agreements, a related the executive has mechanisms for consulting the public during approach that is more centered on civil society organizations, budget formulation and consider the scope of the topics has been in place for several years in the Philippines, and is covered by such mechanisms. Of the 50 countries where the described in Box 5.3.32 executives have participatory mechanisms to consult with the

32 The Budget Partnership Agreements in the Philippines stand out for their innovative approach to incorporating the public into the national budget process, but recent events have demonstrated their fragility and point to the ongoing need to ensure that gains in public participation are sustained. 37 Box 5.3: Philippines: Budget Partnership Agreements is direct engagement between government and any member of the public who wishes to attend. In Malaysia the executive Budget Partnership Agreements (BPAs) were initiated in 2012 to gives citizens two weeks to submit suggestions for the budget directly include civil society organizations (CSOs) in budget decisions proposal online. In Canada the government is increasingly in a transparent manner. In 2016 involvement was increased to include using social media to expand the ambit of participation beyond 18 national government agencies, nine state corporations, and various sectoral councils and commissions.A traditional consultations. Brazil’s use of Public Policy Manage- ment Councils is another unique approach to participation The BPAs alter the budget process in several ways. Under the in the budget formulation (and implementation) process, as agreements, government agencies agree to provide more transpar- described in Box 5.4.33 ent information regarding spending. They also hold formal public hearings at the national and regional level to which they invite CSOs Countries score more poorly on executive engagement with the for consultations, and even CSOs that are not specifically invited may attend. While these hearings are not completely open, it is noteworthy public during implementation of the budget than on engage- that more than 80 percent of Filipinos are affiliated with CSOs.B Agen- ment during budget formulation. Only 25 countries have cies are then required to submit a report on the demands from CSOs mechanisms for public engagement during implementation. arising at these hearings to the Department of Budget and Manage- Nonetheless, there are innovative approaches in this area as ment (DBM) and to respond to the CSOs and to the DBM. well. For example, Japan provides an opportunity for citizens to comment on budget implementation related to specific Under the agreements, CSOs have formal authority to monitor programs as they are implemented and to engage in oversight and projects (more than 5,000 projects in 2017). These comments evaluation of completed projects. With a BPA in place, CSOs are able then inform the government’s own internal, expert-led evalu- to move beyond lobbying legislatures, executives, and bureaucra- ation of project execution. Meanwhile, South Korea maintains cies, and this decreases the likelihood of illegal or undemocratic an agency dedicated to receiving citizen reports of government exchanges. waste and inefficiency, described in more detail in Box 5.5.

One example of such a BPA is in the housing sector. The National Housing Authority (NHA, a government housing agency) entered into Unfortunately, the executive provides little feedback detail- a BPA with a CSO called the Partnership of Philippines Support Service ing the inputs it receives from the public or explaining which Agencies (PHILSSA). As per the BPA, PHILSSA held several consulta- inputs are incorporated into actions. Where there is some tions, submitted a summary assessment of past NHA programs, and participatory mechanism in place for budget formulation, 44 assisted with a budget proposal for the upcoming year. The proposal out of 50 countries provide no feedback at all on the inputs included a consolidated list of proposed projects including slum received from the public. When it comes to the implementation upgrading, relocation, and resettlement programs. The NHA had received only about half of its budget. The NHA then asked the DBM side, 21 of the 25 countries with such mechanisms provide no for a reconsideration based on the recommendations of the CSOs and feedback at all. was approved for an additional US$24.9 million in budget allocations for that year. For subsequent budget proposals, the NHA was able to Legislative mechanisms. Another area of relatively strong incorporate the CSO-recommended priority projects. According to a performance in our participation assessment is for legislative recent report assessing BPAs, the continuous engagement between hearings on the formulation of the budget prior to approval. NHA and a CSO has led to deeper trust and an understanding that they are allies working toward a common goal and advocating for Some kind of public hearing takes place in over half of the similar reforms.C surveyed countries (61), and the scope of these hearings is fairly extensive in nearly half of these countries (half or more of the A. “Citizens’ Participation in the Budget Process: How the Government Empowered the Citizens to Engage the Budget Process,” Department of Budget and Management, major topics that should be discussed in such hearings are Republic of the Philippines, 2014. B. See Civil Society Index: A Philippine Assessment Report (Quezon City, Philippines: CODE-NGO covered). Still, this means most countries fail to hold extensive and CIVICUS, August 2011). C. The Philippines example included in the BPA case study was pulled from a report called legislative hearings. In only 16 countries are all members of Assessment of the Budget Partnership Agreement (Executive Summary and Findings, Part I and II). The study was commissioned by Philippines Department of Budget and Manage- the public (as opposed to invited groups or individuals) able ment and completed by Affiliated Network for Social Accountability in East Asia and the Pacific Foundation, Inc in June 2013. to testify on budget formulation or to provide submissions through another mechanism.

In some cases where executives have established mechanisms In Liberia the public can attend legislative budget hearings and for open participation at the budget formulation stage, the submit suggestions to the legislature in writing during these hear- public is only asked to give written submissions or only certain ings. Benin also holds open public hearings in the legislature on members of the public may be invited to participate. In other the annual budget. The approach to legislative hearings taken by cases, such as Malawi, the sessions are truly open, and there Canada’s Standing Committee on Finance is described in Box 5.6.

33 The Public Policy Management Councils in Brazil stand out for their innovative approach to bringing the public into the national budget process, but recent events have threatened the sustainability of these programs and point to the ongoing need to ensure that gains in public participation are not reversed. 38 Box 5.4: Brazil: Public Policy Management Councils Box 5.5: South Korea: Website for reporting budget waste

Brazil is well known for its participatory budgeting model, but a less The South Korean government operates a Waste Reporting Center celebrated innovation, known as the Public Policy Management that has resulted in budget savings worth US$16 billion over the past Council (PPMC), is also noteworthy. PPMCs operate at national, state, 16 years. Any citizen can use the website, visit one of 300 reporting and municipal level and directly incorporate citizens, union repre- centers, or connect to a call center that allows them to register their sentatives, government officials, and service providers into a single allegation that government resources are being used inefficiently or policy-making body within a specific sector, such as education, health, illegally.A Following submission of the allegation, the government has and environment. Normally, half of PPMC seats are for elected officials, 30 days to respond. During the 30 days, public employees from the while one-fourth go to citizens elected in secret ballot elections. The Waste Reporting Center investigate the claim and issue a report to the remaining quarter of the seats are then divided between union repre- individual who filed it. sentatives, service providers, and policy experts (i.e., urban planners on a housing council). The website and the broader process are designed to distinguish between waste and corruption. Corruption refers specifically to the Council members must approve annual budgets in the sector they misuse of public authority for private gain by officials. These are work with and they also monitor budget implementation. If the criminal activities that fall outside the purview of the waste center. The budget is not approved by the PPMC, the federal government has the center investigates only cases of waste, which refers to the inefficient right to withhold financial transfers to the municipal, state, or federal or unfair use of public resources. For example, public resources should ministry. The formal authority of the councils on budgets occurs be employed in service of communities in need and not to benefit during the proposal phase; elected executives (mayors, governors, communities that are more privileged. or the president) must secure the approval of the council before the budget is sent to the legislature. The legislature has the formal right to When waste is uncovered, the individual filing the claim is eligible for change this budget allocation, but such action is not common. During a small cash award (200,000 Korean Won or about US$175 in 2017). the fiscal year, councils must approve changes to budget lines within The awards increase in value under two conditions: if the complaint is their policy area, and this is a budgetary authority that the councils selected as a best-practice case, the award is increased from US$175 to hold but that the legislature does not. While council members are not US$2,600; if the budget saving is particularly large, the award can go directly involved in budget implementation, they exercise oversight as high as US$50,000.B by approving quarterly and end-year reports. Participation is formally open to all residents, citizens as well as non- Council meetings are open to the public, so any interested citizens citizens alike. In practice, however, professional experts and people may attend and speak, though most attendees are council members with inside information on public programs make the most extensive or have a strong interest in the specific policy arena. Broader political use of the center website. Reports are filed at every level of govern- participation among ordinary citizens is more likely to occur in policy ment, from the national to the local. conferences, which operate parallel to the councils. Conferences are A. See “Budget Waste Reporting Center,” e-People, South Korea, typically held twice yearly, allowing citizens to attend a weekend-long http://www.epeople.go.kr/jsp/user/bw/front/UBwIntroduction.jsp. conference in which there is general deliberation around policy goals. B. “Budget Waste Reporting Center,” e-People. Participants develop policy proposals that are presented to government officials, but these are advisory rather than binding. Auditor mechanisms. Participation in the audit phase is particularly widespread in Latin America, where citizens can There is great variation among the councils in the quality of democrat- contribute to audit investigations. For example, in Costa Rica ic deliberation, partly related to differences among policy arenas. For example, health policy councils tend to be more robust because they the auditors sometimes survey citizens on their experience can count on participation from greater numbers of social movements with services as part of a performance audit; something similar and community-based organizations. In contrast, social assistance occurs periodically in Russia. In the United Kingdom citizens councils tend to be dominated by professional NGOs that are often can track audits in progress online and send in information involved in service delivery. they may have about those ongoing audits.

Does the legislature provide feedback to the public on the Overall, there are 42 countries that have mechanisms in place inputs it receives from them? Not very often. Among the for citizens to have input on the auditor’s audit program. In 61 countries where there is a public hearing, the legislature 17 countries, the SAI offers the public an opportunity to have provides some form of feedback to the public in only 11 cases. input into the investigations that form part of the audit. When it comes to feedback, the SAIs provide some form of feedback The survey also asks whether the legislature holds public to the public on the inputs they have received on what to audit hearings on audit reports. There is some form of hearing in just in 19 countries. 22 of 115 countries, and in most of these countries the wider public is not free to make submissions.

39 Box 5.6: Canada: Legislative hearings before budget approval in the Putting It All Together: House of Commons The Accountability System In the Canadian House of Commons, the Standing Committee on Finance (FINA) has undertaken annual pre-budget consultations since IBP and many other observers of the budget process strongly 1994. The process is designed to provide members of parliament with believe that effective public financial management is rooted in a broader understanding of changing social and economic conditions an accountability system that involves transparency, oversight, in Canada. and public participation. All three of these pillars of accountability need to be in place to establish a truly open and respon- The consultations consist of a two-stage process. First, Canadian sive budget system. citizens and organizations are requested to submit a written report of no more than 2,000 words. The FINA committee establishes specific questions or themes and seeks responses from interested citizens and Figure 5.2 shows that as transparency scores rise, so do scores organizations. In FINA’s pre-budget consultation for the 2017 budget, on oversight and participation. Public participation remains the framing questions were: the weakest link in this chain, however, as even high-transparency countries score only an average of 24 on our participation 1. What federal measures would help Canadians generally – and such questions. specific groups as the unemployed, Indigenous peoples, those with a disability, and seniors – maximize, in the manner of their choosing, their contributions to the country’s economic growth? Figure 5.2: Performance across the budget accountability system in 2017 2. What federal actions would assist Canada’s businesses to meet

their expansion, innovation, and prosperity goals, and thereby 100 contribute to economic growth in the country? 3. What federal measures would ensure that urban, rural, and remote communities throughout Canada enable residents to make their 80 desired contribution to the country’s economic growth and busi- 81 nesses to contribute to growth?A

68 69 60 Witnesses are chosen from among the submitted reports and invited to public hearings. This consultative process is open to all interested citizens but favors those with the professional skills to write persua- 49 48 sive reports. The vast majority of those submitting reports are from 40 professional NGOs, trade associations, and lobbies. Thus the Canadian 37 process allows for open participation, but the principal groups taking

advantage of the process are well-organized CSOs. Most public hear- v iii vi 20 24 ings are held in the national capital, but the FINA committee also holds

meetings throughout Canada to increase the likelihood that a broader 13 range of interested parties will attend. 0 5 040 4160 61100 There is no guarantee that the House of Commons or the executive iii vi i vi i iii will adopt any of the proposed measures. However, the House of Commons does issue a report with recommendations that include issues raised during these hearings.B In 2016, for example, 81 recommendations for the 2017 budget were contained in the report, There are no countries that score 61 or higher on all of the including recommendations for increased funding to reduce the components we measure, largely due to low scores on the budget country’s skills gap in information technology, with a focus on women, and a review and reform of the child welfare system for First Nations participation questions. But even if we allow for participation (indigenous people). But the executive does not indicate how or if scores of at least 41, the situation does not improve very much: these inputs are used in preparing the budget. only four countries have a participation score of at least 41 and a score of at least 61 on oversight and transparency: Australia, A. For more detail about these consultations, see Standing Committee on Finance, Parlia- ment of Canada, “Canadians Are Invited to Share Their Priorities for the 2017 Federal New Zealand, the Philippines, and the United Kingdom. Budget,” news release, 3 June 2016, http://bit.ly/2DejfOT . B. See Standing Committee on Finance, Parliament of Canada, “Creating the Conditions for Economic Growth: Tools for People, Businesses and Communities,” (December 2016), http://bit.ly/2DrS7Pw The budget process should be considered particularly deficient when no aspect of it is working properly. There are 22 countries that score 40 or lower on all three measures – transparency, participation, and oversight – assessed by the survey (see Table 5.3).

40 Table 5.3: Countries scoring 40 or lower on all three components of the accountability system

Algeria Comoros Mali Swaziland

Angola Côte d’Ivoire Niger Tunisia

Burkina Faso Equatorial Guinea Qatar Venezuela

Burundi Lebanon Saudi Arabia Yemen

Cameroon Lesotho Somalia

China Madagascar Sudan

Box 5.7: More robust participation measures in 2017 lead to lower scores

Between 2015 and 2017, we incorporated more elaborate questions about the mechanisms of participation used in different countries. This new set of questions is better aligned to international norms and represents a more robust approach to measuring genuine participation mechanisms.

These questions impose higher standards on governments than our previous assessment in several ways. First, the highest scores in 2017 are reserved for countries that facilitate engagement between government and citizens, as opposed to simply collecting citizen input. Second, the 2017 standards require governments to reach a wide public, instead of selecting specific groups or individuals from whom they wish to receive feedback. There is also special attention paid to mechanisms to include vulnerable groups. Third, the 2017 survey also captures more information about the scope of what is covered in these consultations, so that those countries that encourage citizens to discuss macroeconomic issues, revenue, debt, and other core public finance matters score higher than those where discussions are restricted to a more general policy level.

However, the more rigorous approach we took in this round does lead to lower scores across the board, and we believe this is appropriate: we are giving a more accurate portrayal of the true level of formal budget participation as judged by evolving international standards. Countries with certain forms of participatory mechanisms in place that do not specifically entail budget participation score poorly on our measures. This is in line with our objective of measuring only participation that is directly related to the budget.

While we believe we have improved our budget participation measures considerably and that the resulting scores provide genuine insight into what countries are doing to facilitate public participation in the budget process, they are not perfect and do not tell the whole story. In particular, the measures we use may overestimate the quality of formal participation processes and undervalue informal mechanisms of participation that are important in many countries. While formal mechanisms can play an essential role in ensuring that marginalized voices are brought into the budget process, informal struc- tures are also crucial, and citizens continue to participate effectively through actions ranging from street protests to phoning their legislators directly.

In addition, while the OBS does not assess either budget transparency or participation at the subnational level, we know that in some countries with limited national opportunities for participation, there is robust local budget participation. As has been the case in the past, we are also not able to assess whether participation mechanisms lead to high-quality participation or genuine changes in budget decisions. This is no different from the transparency part of our survey, which assesses the availability of information, but does not assess its quality.

To give some idea of the impact of these standards on scores, consider two examples of how countries fared under the 2015 participation questions and their treatment under the 2017 questions. While the two scores are not comparable because of the different underlying questions, understanding the reasons for these changes in specific cases can be instructive.

South Korea remains a leader on participation, but its score is lower under the 2017 measures than under the 2015 survey. The reason for this is that some of the innovative mechanisms it uses to elicit public views are not open to a wider public, but rather are limited to experts or professionals. Moreover, South Korea does not make any particular efforts to reach out to vulnerable populations.

The United States also scores lower under the 2017 measures. While the U.S. Congress offers opportunities for public engagement in the budget process, the new participation questions place more emphasis on interactions with executive branch officials, particularly formal engagements organized by a central agency (as opposed to more informal contacts exclusively with line departments). Similarly, the new measures stress the importance of all government institutions providing formal feedback to citizens on how their inputs were used, an area where the United States, like many countries, falls short.

41 Summary

■■ While new forms of participation in the budget process hold the potential to build stronger bridges between citizens and states, the current state of budget participation around the world is weak, scoring only 12 out of 100 points on our index. ■■ Many countries have at least one form of formal budget participation mechanism in place, but many of these are poorly structured and are not fully inclusive. In most cases, government officials and legislators fail to provide any feedback to citizens on their inputs, which can decrease interest in participating in the future and undermine confidence in institutions. ■■ Nevertheless, we document important innovations happening around the world across the four stages of the budget process, and countries can build on their current practices and learn from their peers to improve participation. ■■ Finally, when we consider the three pillars of the accountability system together – transparency, participation, and oversight – no country scores high on all three of these (above 60), and 22 countries score poorly (40 or lower) on all three.

6 Concluding Remarks and Recommendations

The Open Budget Survey 2017 finds representative government world. We offer guidance separately for country executives, challenged on two fronts. First, on its own terms, the basic oversight institutions, civil society, and donors, but we note conditions needed for representative democracy to function – that no single actor or set of actors can address these challenges the free flow of information and empowered oversight institu- alone. Systemic reform of the public finance system requires tions that can ensure adequate checks and balances and a stakeholders to work together to ensure that information is modicum of accountability – are not met in the budget sphere. available; that efficient, equitable, and responsive decisions are In most countries, transparency is below the minimum needed made; and that those decisions are effectively implemented. to sustain reasoned public discussion about or oversight of the budget. After more than a decade of tracking budget transpar- What country executives should do ency, we find a decline in global transparency for the first time in the 2017 round. This translates into global stagnation at ■■ Country executives should commit to achieving scores of levels of openness that are simply too low to allow for effective above 60 on the Open Budget Index, indicating the avail- democratic governance of budgets. ability of the minimum budget information necessary for public engagement. This means producing information and Many countries also lack the conditions for adequate legislative releasing it consistently. Too many documents are published oversight of budget formulation or implementation. While in one year, not published in a subsequent year, and then supreme audit institutions are better enabled than legislatures, sometimes published again. Governments should endeavor we know that their capacities are often limited, their findings to institutionalize transparency so that documents that are are not used sufficiently in many countries, and they cannot produced continue to be published consistently. Although compensate for the other weaknesses in the accountability not sufficient to ensure institutionalization, national legisla- system that should be at the heart of how representative tion requiring that documents be published may encourage democracy works. consistent publication.34 ■■ Executives should publish all documents that they But representative democracy, and indeed, many nondemo- produce on official government websites. Too many cratic governments as well, also face a second challenge in the documents are still produced but not published online in form of an increasing demand from citizens for greater partici- a timely fashion to facilitate citizen access. This is the case pation in decision making and oversight. The OBS 2017 shows for more than one-fifth of the key budget documents we that most countries have only inched forward in identifying assess. Of course, governments should also produce any formal mechanisms to meet these demands, and most of their documents that they fail to produce and put those online efforts are not sufficiently inclusive. With weak opportunities in a timely manner as well. Among the 115 countries we for public participation globally, most countries are far from surveyed in the OBS 2017, 17 percent of the key budget envisioning a path to more effective citizen-state relationships. documents that should be generated by governments were In the face of declining trust in institutions, and particularly still not produced. in democratic institutions, the time is now for governments ■■ Executives should focus their budget transparency efforts to double down on new approaches to public participation on information that is of particular interest to citizens, that can restore confidence in the capacity of people to engage such as that related to spending on particular sectors, collectively in the public sphere. tracking budget implementation throughout the year, and connecting budgets to policy goals and outcomes This final chapter brings together key points from the report that affect people’s lives. In our assessment of this kind and makes recommendations for improving transparency, of information in Chapter 2, we found that the majority of participation, and oversight in budget processes around the countries still fail to make available a majority of the infor-

34 Alta Folscher and Paolo de Renzio, “The Road to Budget Transparency: Lessons from Country Experience,” (Washington, D.C.: International Budget Partnership, November 2017)

45 mation needed to understand these issues. When citizens ing implementation challenges. Yet 54 national legislatures cannot find information in budgets that speaks to their offer no opportunities for the public to provide inputs to the concerns, they are likely to lose confidence in government budget before it is approved, and in 73 countries supreme and lose interest in participating in the budget process. audit institutions do not offer citizens an opportunity to ■■ Executives must expand the number and scope of existing contribute to decisions about which public programs or public participation opportunities and make existing entities to audit. Too often, when input is sought, no feed- opportunities more inclusive. Formal mechanisms of back is given to the public on their inputs. The good news participation are essential to ensure that vulnerable groups is that there are examples from across the world, some of are included in the budget process, but most governments which are highlighted in this report, that these institutions do little to incorporate such groups. We find only eight can adapt and expand upon in order to encourage greater cases where executives deliberately reach out to include participation in budgeting. vulnerable groups in the budget process, and most of these efforts are at the budget formulation stage. Clearly, addi- What civil society should do tional efforts must be made to ensure that, when participation happens, it does not benefit only the best organized ■■ Civil society organizations should continue to advocate and most well-resourced groups. for greater transparency and participation in budgeting, but they must also use available budget information What country oversight institutions and engage in budget debates to the maximum extent should do possible. Maintaining demand for budget information and seeking to exert influence in the budget process must be ■■ Legislatures, supreme audit institutions, and other continuous if governments are to consistently produce and oversight agencies must be strengthened to ensure that publish the most important budget information. decisions made early in the budget process are imple- ■■ We believe that civil society can also build a broader mented. Currently, in too many countries, legislative constituency for budget reform by working with a wide oversight is weakest during implementation. Legislatures range of actors, from social movements to government do amend the budget in a majority of countries surveyed. champions to private sector bodies, to forge stronger However, executives in a majority of countries are able to coalitions that can force more fundamental changes in make changes to the budget during the year without first government practices. Systemic reforms require pressure getting legislative approval, and recommendations from from many different quarters and will require activists to supreme audit institutions are not reviewed in a timely seek out new allies and new ways of framing old challenges. fashion or implemented. This failure of oversight under- ■■ Finally, civil society should advocate for greater inclusive- mines confidence in the budget process. It can also threaten ness of government participation mechanisms, so that the public participation if citizens believe that any influence most vulnerable voices are heard. Civil society organiza- they are able to exert at earlier stages of the process will be tions are uniquely well placed to propose new mechanisms, undone in subsequent stages. or ways of adapting existing mechanisms, to facilitate ■■ Legislatures and executives should consider strengthen- participation in the budget process by those with the great- ing or setting up independent fiscal institutions that est need. Civil society can also work with marginalized can help ensure high-quality, independent, and credible groups to encourage them to take advantage of existing macroeconomic forecasts and estimates of the cost of opportunities for participation and to push for the expan- policies are produced, and are taken into account in sion of these opportunities. decision making. Ensuring that budget decisions are well informed and based on sound, objective cost estimates is What donors should do also necessary if they are to be implemented. ■■ Legislatures and supreme audit institutions should ■■ Donors should reconsider how they use their leverage expand the number and improve the structure and to ensure that their funding contributes to greater inclusiveness of existing participatory mechanisms to budget transparency and public participation in the encourage more meaningful public participation in the budget process. The OBS 2017 demonstrates that budget budget process. Legislatures remain a critical locus for transparency levels remain too low to facilitate sound public participation in the budget process, while auditors public financial management. Even more alarming, overall have a special role to play in engaging the public in address- progress in expanding transparency has faltered for the first

46 time since the OBS was launched a decade ago. While there is no single approach that will work everywhere, closer coordination between donors and other stakeholders can help to ensure that donors maximize their leverage. ■■ Donors should enhance their support for transparency reforms, but also focus on the sustainability of these reforms and take prompt action when they see governments regress. This year’s findings show that some countries that had increased transparency dramatically in the 2015 survey round then became more opaque in the 2017 assessment. Findings from several rounds of the survey show significant changes in the publication status of key documents from year to year. Such findings suggest that transparency reforms cannot be treated as one-off events but require systemic change and continuous monitoring and engagement. Improving transparency should also be an explicit objective from the beginning when donors pursue broader reforms, such as those aimed at introducing medium-term budgetary frameworks or advanced information technology systems for public financial management. ■■ Donors should also expand support to domestic constitu- encies that can maintain consistent pressure for transparency over time. Donors cannot work alone on this agenda, and only prolonged, continuous demand from domestic non-state actors can ensure that transparency gains are achieved and maintained. ■■ Donors should also seek participation commitments along with transparency commitments from country governments. We know that transparency alone cannot yield the changes needed in country budgets, and we know that participation opportunities are weak and often exclu- sionary. Donors should confront both of these challenges together in their programs.

47 ANNEX A: Open Budget Survey 2017 Methodology

Implementing the Open Budget Survey The Open Budget Questionnaire 2017 and Calculating the Open Budget Index and other Scores The results for each country in the OBS 2017 are based on a questionnaire, comprising 145 scored questions, that is The Open Budget Survey (OBS) assesses the three components completed by researchers typically based in the surveyed of a budget accountability system: public availability of budget country.1 Almost all of the researchers responsible for complet- information; opportunities for the public to participate in the ing the questionnaire are from civil society organizations or budget process; and the role and effectiveness of formal over- academic institutions. Although the mandates and areas of sight institutions, including the legislature and the national interest of the research groups vary widely, all have a common audit office (referred to here as the “supreme audit institution”). interest in promoting transparent and responsive budgeting The majority of the survey questions assess what occurs in practices in their countries. Most of the researchers belong to practice, rather than what is required by law. organizations with a significant focus on budget issues.

The questions included in the OBS are based on generally Most of the survey questions require researchers to choose accepted good practice for public financial management. For from five responses. Responses “a” or “b” describe best or good example, the survey assesses the public availability of budget practice; with “a” indicating that the standard is fully met or information by considering the timely release and contents of exceeded, and “b” indicating the basic elements of the standard eight key budget documents that all countries should issue at have been met or largely met. Response “c” corresponds to mini- different points in the budget process. Many of these criteria mal efforts to attain the relevant standard, while “d” indicates are drawn from those developed by multilateral organizations, that the standard is not met at all. An “e” response indicates such as the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Code of Good that the standard is not applicable, for example, when an OECD Practices on Fiscal Transparency, the Public Expenditure and country is asked about the foreign aid it receives. Certain ques- Finance Accountability initiative (whose secretariat is hosted tions, however, have only three possible responses: “a” (standard by the World Bank), the Organisation for Economic Co-oper- met), “b” (standard not met), or “c” (not applicable). ation and Development’s (OECD) Best Practices for Fiscal Transparency, and the International Organization of Supreme Once completed, the questionnaire responses are quantified. Audit Institutions’ Lima Declaration of Guidelines on Auditing For the questions with five response options: an “a” receives Precepts. Similarly, the criteria used to assess opportunities for a numeric score of 100, a “b” receives 67, “c” receives 33, and the public to participate in the budget process are based on the “d” receives 0. Questions receiving an “e” are not included in Global Initiative for Fiscal Transparency’s Principles of Public the country’s aggregated scores. For the questions with three Participation in Fiscal Policy. The strength of such guidelines response options: “a” receives 100, “b” receives 0, and “c” lies in their universal applicability to different budget systems responses are not included in the aggregated score. around the world, including those of countries at different income levels. The Research Process

The OBS 2017 is the culmination of a collaborative research For the OBS 2017 researchers collected data on their country process in which the International Budget Partnership (IBP) between September 2016 and the end of December 2016. Thus worked with civil society partners in 115 countries – encom- the OBS 2017 assesses only those events, activities, or develop- passing all regions of the world and all income levels – over the ments that should have occurred up to 31 December 2016; any past 18 months. This is the sixth round of the OBS, which is actions occurring after this date are not accounted for in the typically conducted biennially. Earlier rounds were completed 2017 survey results. in 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, and 2015.

1 The 145 scored questions in the questionnaire include 109 questions that assess the public availability of budget information, 18 questions that assess opportunities for the public to participate in the budget process, and 18 questions that assess the role and effectiveness of the legislature and the supreme audit institution. The questionnaire also includes an additional 83 questions that are not used to calculate individual scores but help to complete the OBS research by collecting background information on key budget documents and exploring different characteristics of a country’s public finance management. 48 All responses to the OBS questions are supported by evidence. multiple occasions. Of the 112 governments that IBP contacted, This includes citations from budget documents; the country’s 76 commented on the OBS 2017 results for their country. These laws; or interviews with government officials, legislators, or comments can be seen in their entirety in the relevant ques- experts on the country’s budget process. Throughout the tionnaires at www.openbudgetsurvey.org. research process, IBP staff assisted the researchers in following the survey methodology, particularly the guidelines for IBP reviewed peer reviewer comments to ensure that they answering survey questions.2 were consistent with the study’s methodology. Any peer reviewer comments that were inconsistent were removed, and Upon completion, IBP staff analyzed and discussed each the remaining comments then were shared with researchers. questionnaire with the individual researchers over a three- to Researchers responded to comments from peer reviewers and six-month period. IBP sought to ensure that all questions were their government, if applicable, and IBP refereed any conflict- answered in a manner that was internally consistent within ing answers in order to ensure the consistency across countries each country, and consistent across all survey countries. The in selecting answers. answers were also cross-checked against published budget documents and reports on fiscal transparency issued by The Open Budget Index international institutions, such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the OECD. The Open Budget Index (OBI) assigns each country a score from 0 to 100 based on the simple average of the numerical Each questionnaire was then reviewed by an anonymous peer value of each of the responses to the 109 questions in the reviewer who has substantial working knowledge of the budget questionnaire that assess the public availability of budget infor- systems in the relevant country. The peer reviewers, who mation. A country’s OBI score measures the extent to which it were not associated with the government of the country they makes the eight key budget documents available to the public reviewed, were identified through professional contacts and on the relevant government website in a timely manner and the various other channels. comprehensiveness of publicly available budget information.

IBP also invited the governments of nearly all survey countries Measures for Oversight Institutions and to comment on the draft OBS results. The decision to invite a Public Participation government to comment on the draft results was made after consulting with the relevant research organization responsible Forty of the survey questions that are not used to calculate the for the survey. IBP made a major effort to encourage govern- OBI assess the opportunities for public engagement during the ments to comment on the draft results; many governments budget process and the oversight capacity of independent fiscal that did not initially respond to IBP letters were contacted on institutions, legislatures, and supreme audit institutions. To

Measuring the timely release of information to the public throughout the budget process

OBS 2017 Number of Questions per Budget Document Release Deadlines for “Publicly Available” Documents* Question Document in the OBI Must be released at least one month before the Executive’s Budget Proposal is submitted to Pre-Budget Statement 54-58, PBS-2 6 the legislature for consideration. Executive’s Budget Proposal and Must be publicly released while the legislature is still considering it and before it is approved. Supporting Documents for the In no case would a proposal released after the legislature has approved it be considered 1-53, EBP-2 54 Executive’s Budget Proposal “publicly available.” Enacted Budget Must be released no later than three months after the budget is approved by the legislature. 59-63, EB-2 6 Must be released within the same timeframe as the underlying Executive’s Budget Proposal or Enacted Budget. For example, a Citizens Budget for the Executive’s Budget Proposal must Citizens Budget 64-67 4 be released while the legislature is still considering the Executive’s Budget Proposal and before it is approved. In-Year Reports Must be released no later than three months after the reporting period ends. 68-75, IYR-2 9 Mid-Year Review Must be released no later than three months after the reporting period ends. 76-83, MYR-2 9 Must be released no later than 12 months after the end of the fiscal year (the reporting Year-End Report 84-96, YER-2 14 period). Must be released no later than 18 months after the end of the fiscal year (the reporting Audit Report 97-102, AR-2 7 period).

*The Open Budget Survey considers a document to be “publicly available” if it is published on the relevant government website within the given timeframe and is available free of charge.

2 See the Guide to the 2017 Open Budget Questionnaire at www.openbudgetsurvey.org.

49 measure the extent to which governments include the public the eight key budget documents assessed may have a different in budget decision making and monitoring, as well as the role number of questions related to it, the OBI score is a simple of the legislature and supreme audit institution in the budget average of the responses to all 109 questions. In calculating the process, the responses to the questions pertaining to each are OBI scores, no method of explicit weighting is used. averaged. Thus, each area is given a separate score. IBP also Though using a simple average is clear, it implicitly gives more collects information on the role of independent fiscal institu- weight to certain budget documents than others. In particular, tions (IFIs) – independent, nonpartisan institutions, normally 54 of the 109 OBI questions assess the public availability and attached to the executive or legislature that make fiscal comprehensiveness of the Executive’s Budget Proposal, and forecasts and estimate the cost of policies. However, IBP does thus are key determinants of a country’s overall OBI score. In not calculate a separate score for the role of IFIs. contrast, the Citizens Budget and the Enacted Budget are the focus of only four and six questions, respectively.

Evaluating oversight actors and practices This implicit weighting is justified. From a civil society OBS 2017 Number of perspective, the Executive’s Budget Proposal is the most impor- Indicator Measured Question Questions per Numbers Indicator tant budget document, as it lays out the government’s budget Public engagement in the budget 125-142 18 policy objectives and plans for the upcoming year. It typically process provides details on government fiscal policies not available in Role of independent fiscal institutions 103-106 4 any other document. Access to this information is critical for Role of the legislature 107-117 11 civil society to understand and influence the budget prior its Role of the supreme audit institution 118-124 7 approval, and to have as a resource throughout the year. Weighting the Relative Importance of Key For More Information Budget Documents and Implications on Scores This annex presents a basic description of the methodology used in producing the Open Budget Survey 2017. For further As mentioned above, each country’s OBI 2017 score is calcu- details on any aspect of the methodology, please contact IBP at lated from a subset of 109 survey questions. Though each of [email protected].

50 ANNEX B: An Update to the Open Budget Index for 2017

As announced in the OBS 2015 report (page 24, Box 2.2) and For the vast majority of countries included in the survey, this stated directly to those countries surveyed in 2017, we changed change has no effect on their 2017 scores or on the 2015-2017 the definition of “public availability” of documents between the comparisons. But some countries do continue the practice 2015 and 2017 Open Budget Survey: only those budget docu- of producing documents only in hard copy, and their scores ments that are posted on a relevant government website in a are affected, albeit modestly in most cases. In 2017, of the timely manner are now considered publicly available. In prior 920 possible documents in the 115 countries examined, 561 rounds, documents that were published in hard copy only (or documents were published online in a timely manner. Of the produced in electronic form but not posted on the internet) in 359 documents that were not judged to be publicly available, a timely manner were also considered available to the public. only 29 were produced in hard copy alone. Of this total, the 102 Consequently, any information in those hard-copy documents countries covered in both the 2015 and 2017 surveys produced contributed toward a country’s OBI score. In 2017, however, 20 documents in hard copy only in 2017. The failure to produce information provided in budget documents that exist only in documents at all or to make them available to the public in a hard copy does not count toward a country’s OBI score. timely manner remains a much more important driver of the global OBI score than our decision not to count hard-copy As a result, hard-copy only documents are now treated like documents as publicly available. other documents that the government produces but does not make available to the public in a timely fashion. This includes While we can count the number of documents that were documents that a government produces only for its internal affected by this change, the content of hard-copy documents use and does not make available to the public at all, as well as was not assessed in 2017. Therefore, it is impossible to know documents that it releases to the public, but too late in the year what the score associated with these documents would have to allow them to influence the budget process. been had the definition of public availability not been changed.

This survey update takes account of technological develop- Nevertheless, we conducted a variety of tests, making assump- ments over the past decade. Documents that are posted on the tions about scores for hard-copy documents, to estimate the internet are dramatically more accessible to the public than impact of the definition change on 2017 scores. One scenario hard-copy documents that few may be able to obtain. Internet assumes that those documents published in hard copy in 2015 penetration has expanded rapidly, and civil society organiza- would have received the same score in 2017 had we scored tions can easily print online documents to share with others them. Where a document score was not available for 2015, we who do not have internet access. Furthermore, any document used the regional average score for that document. Under these that is produced as a hard copy can now easily be posted to a assumptions, the global score in 2017 would have been about website at trivial cost. In fact, it is cheaper for governments to one point higher, but would still show a small decline relative post such documents online than to print and distribute large to 2015. At the regional level, this approach would have led budget books. South Asia to increase its score by an additional point since 2015, and Sub-Saharan Africa’s decline would have been less When the OBS was launched in 2006, internet posting was severe, dropping six points instead of 11. neither as common nor as inexpensive as it is today. The countries we have assessed consistently since the first OBS now We also tested a scenario that is far more generous to coun- make many fewer documents available in hard copy only than tries with hard-copy documents. In this approach, we made they did a decade ago. All but six of the 115 countries covered the most optimistic assumption possible: that any hard copy in the OBS 2017 published at least one document online, and document would receive a score of 100, the maximum possible two of those six countries had previously posted documents score and in several cases higher than the score of any docu- online. Governments around the globe clearly have the capac- ment produced by a country in the OBS 2017. For example, we ity to make documents available to the public online. calculated a hypothetical OBI score for Cameroon assuming its Year-End Report, which was only produced in hard copy

51 in 2017, had received a perfect score of 100 in 2017. That is, we gave Cameroon’s Year-End Report, which scored a 38 in 2015, a score of 100 in 2017, although no country produced a Year-End Report that scored 100 in 2017. This approach, when applied to all countries surveyed, would result in an additional two-point increase for South Asia over 2015, while Sub-Saharan Africa’s average score for the same period would still fall, but now by three points instead of 11. In total, the global score would have shown virtually no change between 2015 and 2017 under this approach, which indicates that the upward progress seen in previous rounds would have come to an end regardless of the change in the definition of public availability.

Both of these tests offer only rough approximations. For example, neither is able to fully adjust for the fact that some countries that published a document online also produced important supporting documentation in hard copy that was not taken into account under the new definition of public availability. But, based on our review of various scenarios, we conclude that the global OBI score would almost certainly have stagnated in this round, and likely would have fallen, regardless of the updated definition of public availability. In our discussion of Sub-Saharan Africa in Chapter 3, we looked at this issue in a bit more detail for the region.

52 Annex C: Open Budget Index Scores Over Time, 2006 to 2017

Country Open Budget Index 2006 Open Budget Index 2008 Open Budget Index 2010 Open Budget Index 2012 Open Budget Index 2015 Open Budget Index 2017

40 comparable countries 77 comparable countries 93 comparable countries 100 comparable countries 102 comparable countries 115 countries in OBS 2017 from 2006-2017 2008-2017 2010-2017 2012-2017 2015-2017 Afghanistan 8 21 59 42 49 Albania 25 37 33 47 38 50 Algeria 2 1 13 19 3 Angola 5 4 26 28 26 25 Argentina 40 56 56 50 59 50 Australia 74 Azerbaijan 30 37 43 42 51 34 Bangladesh 39 42 48 58 56 41 Benin 1 45 39 Bolivia 7 13 12 17 10 Bosnia and Herzegovina 44 44 50 43 35 Botswana 51 50 47 8 Brazil 74 74 71 73 77 77 Bulgaria 47 57 56 65 65 66 Burkina Faso 5 23 43 24 Burundi 7 Cambodia 11 15 15 8 20 Cameroon 5 2 10 44 7 Canada 71 Chad 0 3 4 2 Chile 72 66 58 57 China 14 13 11 14 13 Colombia 57 61 61 58 57 50 Comoros 8 Costa Rica 45 45 47 50 54 56 Côte d’Ivoire 24 Croatia 42 59 57 61 53 57 Czech Republic 61 62 62 75 69 61 Dem. Rep. of Congo 1 6 18 39 29 Dominican Republic 12 14 29 51 66 Ecuador 31 31 50 49 Egypt 19 43 49 13 16 41 El Salvador 28 37 37 43 53 45 Equatorial Guinea 0 0 0 4 0 Fiji 13 0 6 15 41 France 89 87 87 83 76 74 Georgia 34 53 55 55 66 82 Germany 64 68 71 71 69 Ghana 42 50 54 50 51 50 Guatemala 46 46 50 51 46 61 Honduras 12 11 53 43 54 Hungary 49 46 India 53 60 67 68 46 48 Indonesia 42 54 51 62 59 64 Iraq 0 4 3 3 Italy 58 60 73 73 Japan 60 Jordan 50 53 50 57 55 63 Kazakhstan 35 38 48 51 53 Kenya 49 49 48 46 Kyrgyz Republic 8 15 20 54 55 Lebanon 32 32 33 2 3 Lesotho 0 Liberia 3 40 43 38 36 Macedonia 54 49 35 35 37 Madagascar 34 Malawi 28 47 52 65 26 Malaysia 35 39 39 46 46

54 Country Open Budget Index 2006 Open Budget Index 2008 Open Budget Index 2010 Open Budget Index 2012 Open Budget Index 2015 Open Budget Index 2017

40 comparable countries 77 comparable countries 93 comparable countries 100 comparable countries 102 comparable countries 115 countries in OBS 2017 from 2006-2017 2008-2017 2010-2017 2012-2017 2015-2017 Mali 35 43 46 39 Mexico 50 55 52 61 66 79 Moldova 58 Mongolia 18 36 60 51 51 46 Morocco 19 28 28 38 38 45 Mozambique 28 47 38 41 Myanmar 0 2 7 Namibia 50 46 53 55 46 50 Nepal 36 43 45 44 24 52 New Zealand 86 86 90 93 88 89 Nicaragua 37 42 46 43 Niger 26 3 4 17 0 Nigeria 20 19 18 16 24 17 Norway 72 80 83 83 84 85 Pakistan 38 38 58 43 44 Papua New Guinea 52 61 57 56 55 50 Paraguay 43 Peru 67 65 57 75 73 Philippines 51 48 55 48 64 67 Poland 67 64 59 64 59 Portugal 58 62 64 66 Qatar 0 0 0 Romania 66 62 59 47 75 75 Russia 47 58 60 74 74 72 Rwanda 1 11 8 36 22 São Tomé e Príncipe 1 0 29 29 31 Saudi Arabia 1 1 1 0 1 Senegal 3 3 10 43 51 Serbia 46 54 39 47 43 Sierra Leone 39 52 38 Slovakia 57 67 57 59 Slovenia 74 70 74 68 69 Somalia 8 South Africa 86 87 92 90 86 89 South Korea 66 71 75 65 60 South Sudan 5 Spain 63 63 58 54 Sri Lanka 47 64 67 46 39 44 Sudan 10 2 Swaziland 3 Sweden 76 78 83 84 87 87 Tajikistan 17 25 30 Tanzania 36 45 47 46 10 Thailand 40 42 36 42 56 Timor-Leste 34 36 41 40 Trinidad and Tobago 33 33 38 34 33 Tunisia 11 42 39 Turkey 42 43 57 50 44 58 Uganda 32 51 55 65 62 60 Ukraine 55 62 54 46 54 United Kingdom 88 88 87 88 75 74 United States 81 82 82 79 81 77 Venezuela 35 34 37 8 0 Vietnam 3 10 14 19 18 15 Yemen 10 25 11 34 0 Zambia 36 4 39 8 Zimbabwe 20 35 23

55 Annex D: Open Budget Survey 2017: Transparency, Public Participation, and Oversight Institutions

Oversight Transparency Independent Fiscal Country Public Participation by Legislature and (Open Budget Index) by Supreme Audit Institution (Yes or No) Supreme Audit by Legislature Institution Institution Afghanistan 49 15 43 30 67 No Albania 50 2 69 67 72 No Algeria 3 0 31 42 11 No Angola 25 7 33 33 33 No Argentina 50 13 56 44 78 No Australia 74 41 70 56 100 Yes Azerbaijan 34 11 63 53 83 No Bangladesh 41 13 44 42 50 No Benin 39 9 61 61 61 No Bolivia 10 13 48 42 61 No Bosnia and Herzegovina 35 9 65 50 95 No Botswana 8 15 57 50 72 No Brazil 77 35 76 72 83 No Bulgaria 66 22 59 53 72 Yes Burkina Faso 24 0 37 47 17 No Burundi 7 0 22 17 33 No Cambodia 20 4 55 44 78 No Cameroon 7 7 22 22 22 No Canada 71 39 57 50 72 Yes Chad 2 0 44 31 72 No Chile 57 11 56 42 83 No China 13 6 28 14 56 No Colombia 50 15 68 61 83 Yes Comoros 8 0 33 25 50 No Costa Rica 56 7 70 61 89 No Côte d’Ivoire 24 0 31 31 33 No Croatia 57 26 59 45 89 Yes Czech Republic 61 9 82 81 83 No Dem. Rep. of Congo 29 9 46 44 50 No Dominican Republic 66 17 57 58 56 No Ecuador 49 6 47 33 80 No Egypt 41 11 39 39 39 No El Salvador 45 6 65 61 72 No Equatorial Guinea 0 0 22 33 0 No Fiji 41 15 15 8 28 No France 74 17 85 89 78 Yes Georgia 82 22 74 67 89 Yes Germany 69 17 89 86 95 Yes Ghana 50 22 43 39 50 No Guatemala 61 30 57 50 72 No Honduras 54 7 48 39 67 No Hungary 46 11 65 50 95 Yes India 48 15 48 42 61 No Indonesia 64 22 85 86 84 No Iraq 3 0 65 58 78 No Italy 73 7 78 78 78 Yes Japan 60 20 59 50 78 No Jordan 63 11 41 47 28 No Kazakhstan 53 13 63 69 50 No Kenya 46 15 50 42 67 Yes Kyrgyz Republic 55 31 74 72 78 No Lebanon 3 0 11 6 22 No Lesotho 0 0 31 30 33 No Liberia 36 11 54 47 67 Yes Macedonia 37 0 56 45 78 No Madagascar 34 9 28 36 11 No Malawi 26 15 55 61 44 No Malaysia 46 22 35 25 56 No

56 Oversight Transparency Independent Fiscal Country Public Participation by Legislature and (Open Budget Index) by Supreme Audit Institution (Yes or No) Supreme Audit by Legislature Institution Institution Mali 39 6 39 33 50 No Mexico 79 35 63 56 78 Yes Moldova 58 7 59 47 83 No Mongolia 46 7 76 69 89 No Morocco 45 0 31 36 22 No Mozambique 41 7 37 36 39 No Myanmar 7 0 48 56 33 No Namibia 50 0 48 33 78 No Nepal 52 24 44 28 78 No New Zealand 89 59 78 72 89 No Nicaragua 43 11 63 64 61 No Niger 0 0 39 36 45 No Nigeria 17 13 56 53 61 Yes Norway 85 17 91 92 89 No Pakistan 44 6 44 36 61 No Papua New Guinea 50 6 31 31 33 No Paraguay 43 11 48 42 61 No Peru 73 22 80 78 83 Yes Philippines 67 41 65 56 83 Yes Poland 59 24 82 75 95 No Portugal 66 15 72 72 72 Yes Qatar 0 2 2 0 6 No Romania 75 6 63 58 72 Yes Russia 72 13 78 75 83 No Rwanda 22 13 59 64 50 No São Tomé e Príncipe 31 0 46 36 67 No Saudi Arabia 1 0 11 0 33 No Senegal 51 2 39 42 33 No Serbia 43 2 63 53 83 Yes Sierra Leone 38 6 42 28 72 No Slovakia 59 9 56 47 72 Yes Slovenia 69 11 80 78 83 No Somalia 8 2 22 8 50 No South Africa 89 24 85 78 100 Yes South Korea 60 39 85 86 83 Yes South Sudan 5 2 54 44 72 No Spain 54 2 56 47 72 Yes Sri Lanka 44 11 50 42 67 No Sudan 2 0 31 22 50 No Swaziland 3 0 37 44 22 No Sweden 87 17 85 81 95 Yes Tajikistan 30 7 65 64 67 No Tanzania 10 15 41 42 39 No Thailand 56 7 52 44 67 Yes Timor-Leste 40 9 56 50 67 No Trinidad and Tobago 33 7 44 39 56 No Tunisia 39 2 35 42 22 No Turkey 58 0 59 50 78 No Uganda 60 28 63 53 83 Yes Ukraine 54 30 83 86 78 No United Kingdom 74 57 63 50 89 Yes United States 77 22 85 81 95 Yes Venezuela 0 7 30 11 67 No Vietnam 15 7 72 72 72 No Yemen 0 0 9 6 17 No Zambia 8 15 48 36 72 No Zimbabwe 23 9 44 42 50 No

57 Annex E: Open Budget Survey 2017: The Public Availability of Budget Documents

Pre-Budget Executive's Country Enacted Budget Citizens Budget In-Year Reports Mid-Year Review Year-End Report Audit Report Statement Budget Proposal Afghanistan Albania Algeria Angola Argentina Australia Azerbaijan Bangladesh Benin Bolivia Bosnia and Herzegovina Botswana Brazil Bulgaria Burkina Faso Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Canada Chad Chile China Colombia Comoros Costa Rica Côte d’Ivoire Croatia Czech Republic Dem. Rep. of Congo Dominican Republic Ecuador Egypt El Salvador Equatorial Guinea Fiji France Georgia Germany Ghana Guatemala Honduras Hungary India Indonesia Iraq Italy Japan Jordan Kazakhstan Kenya Kyrgyz Republic Lebanon Lesotho Liberia Macedonia Madagascar Malawi Malaysia

Available to the public Published Late or Not Published Online or Produced for Internal Use Only Not produced 58 Pre-Budget Executive's Country Enacted Budget Citizens Budget In-Year Reports Mid-Year Review Year-End Report Audit Report Statement Budget Proposal Mali Mexico Moldova Mongolia Morocco Mozambique Myanmar Namibia Nepal New Zealand Nicaragua Niger Nigeria Norway Pakistan Papua New Guinea Paraguay Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Qatar Romania Russia Rwanda São Tomé e Príncipe Saudi Arabia Senegal Serbia Sierra Leone Slovakia Slovenia Somalia South Africa South Korea South Sudan Spain Sri Lanka Sudan Swaziland Sweden Tajikistan Tanzania Thailand Timor-Leste Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia Turkey Uganda Ukraine United Kingdom United States Venezuela Vietnam Yemen Zambia Zimbabwe

Available to the public Published Late or Not Published Online or Produced for Internal Use Only Not produced 59 Photo Credits

Cover: Top photo: International Budget Partnership; Middle photo: Pippa Ranger for DFIF/Flickr; Bottom photo: Paula Bronstein/Getty Images Reportage

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