NATIONS I INTES x n\ E © i I V E POSTAL ADDRESS: United Nations S-2963A, New York NY 10017 USA TEL:(2 1 2) 963 8362 FAX:(2 12)' fil The Under-Secretary-General for General Assembly and Conference Managemer R 4UL15200S p EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

15 July 2005

To: The Deputy Secretary-General/

From: Nikhil Seth, Officer in charge, General Assembly and ECOSOC Affairs Branch

Subject: Summaries of the 111th and 112th Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly on agenda item 53 ("Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters: draft resolution (A/59/L.64)

Attached please find DPA's summary of the 111th and 112th '(jeireraj^sjem^ agenda item 53 ("Question of equitable representation on and ifi?3!gHS5;3n3hg3^^ to consider a draft resolution entitled "Security Council Reform" (A/59/L.64).

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;" :'i;rMRAL Summary of the 111th Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly on 11 July 2005 on the Agenda Item 53 entitled "Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters: draft resolution (A/59/L. 64)"

1. In the afternoon of 11 July 2005, the General Assembly held its 111th plenary meeting on the item entitled "Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters." It was convened to consider the draft resolution (A/59/L. 64, Attachment 1), originally proposed by the Group of Four (G-4) (Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan). 21 Member States (MS) (Brazil, Jordan, Japan, Algeria, , France, Iceland, Mauritius (speaking on behalf of the African Group), Fiji, China, Poland, , Colombia, Sweden, Finland, San Marino, Lithuania, Switzerland, Tuvalu, Latvia and Bhutan) made statements. The debate is scheduled to continue on 12 July 2005.

2. Summary: Varying opinions were heard on the draft resolution under review as well as other proposals on the issue regarding the Security Council reform, including the draft resolutions proposed by the Uniting for Consensus (UfC) Movement (Attachment 2) and by the (AU). Among the P5, while France joined co-sponsorship of the G-4 resolution, China voiced its objection to it.

3. Differing Opinion and Alternative Resolutions: (1) G-4 and Its Supporters: Introducing the draft resolution on behalf of co-sponsors, Brazil underscored that the text aimed to expand the Council's membership to reflect new realities, building on a proposal by the High-level Panel and reiterated by the Secretary- General's "In Larger Freedom" report. It was clear that the Council's future effectiveness was contingent on the permanent presence of major financial contributors and those that were most willing and able to contribute to the work of the UN. He added that restricting the expansion to the non-permanent category would not only mean the maintenance of the status quo, but also risk increasing the disparity in the composition of the Council.

A number of countries (Jordan, Japan, France, Iceland, Fiji, Finland, Lithuania, Tuvalu, Latvia, Bhutan) expressed support for or joined co-sponsorship of the G-4 resolution. In supporting the G-4 resolution, France, for instance, stressed the importance of expanding the Council in both non-permanent and permanent categories and maintained that the new Council should include, as permanent members, other Powers that could make major contributions to global peace and security.

While some MS, including Japan and Lithuania, held that the G-4 resolution was the "only viable proposal" capable of garnering the support of more than two-thirds of the MS, there were two other competing proposals on Council reform.

(2) Uniting for Consensus Movement: Among other countries that were critical of the G-4 resolution, members of the UfC Movement (Pakistan, Argentina, Colombia, San Marino) maintained that its alternative resolution (increasing non-permanent seats from 10 to 20, which could be re-elected immediately) was more flexible; provided for equitable accountability by re-elections and periodic elections; would enable small- and medium- size countries to be more represented; could accommodate the aspiration of the G-4 and of the AU; and could be realized sooner than the G-4 proposal. It was also emphasized that the G-4 draft resolution was contrary to the principle of the sovereign equality of States enshrined in the Charter; was unequal in that it would give permanent seats to 11 States while consigning 180 others to compete for 14 seats; would erode democracy and accountability in the Council by increasing the ratio of permanent to non-permanent members from 1:2 to close to 1:1; and used a complex three-phase approach that would lead to a "dead-end."

(3) The African Union: Algeria stated that all the proposals were equally unsatisfactory in not taking into account the positions of Africa. Therefore, African leaders had decided to submit their own view of Council reform, as expressed in the recent AU Summit in Sirte, Libya. This proposed vision included the establishment of a 26-member Security Council, where Africa was given two permanent seats with the veto right and five non- permanent seats. Mauritius (African Group) informed that the draft by the AU would be tabled shortly.

(4) The Position of China : Reiterating its position that it was firmly opposed to setting an artificial time frame for Council reform, China maintained that the decision and the process with regard to Council reform should be made by a vast majority of the membership, not by a few. In the circumstance in which no formula obtained widespread support yet, MS needed more time for dialogue and consultations in search of a compromise. In this context, he cautioned that forcing through an immature formula by a vote was "bound to split" MS and regional groups and thus weaken the authority and role of the UN.

4. Issues of the veto right, the review process and the working methods: (1) Veto: Diverse views on the veto right of permanent (new and current) members were shared: France supported the provision on the veto right in the G-4 resolution (operative para. 5), terming it as "appropriate" and "unambiguous." Algeria defended the AU's position that while the AU objected to the right of veto in principle, it considered that new permanent members should have the veto right as long as the current permanent members retained it. Although being sympathetic to the G-4 position, Sweden, Finland, Poland and Switzerland were not in favour of expanding the veto right to the new permanent members. In this regard, Argentina linked the question of Council expansion with the veto right and argued that creating more permanent members with the veto right would not make the Council more efficient.

(2) Review Process: As to the review process in the G-4 resolution, Sweden, supported by Switzerland, went a step further to propose a review process of the new permanent members, hi other words, it should include an explicit mechanism for other MS to review the performance of the new permanent members to assess if they fulfilled their obligations and, if not, to replace them.

(3) Working Methods: A number of MS (Jordan, Iceland, Finland, Sweden) underlined the importance of enhancing the working methods of the Council, which was as important as the issues of the composition and the size of the Council. In this connection, Switzerland, supported by Latvia, hoped that its non-paper on the working methods (Attachment 3), circulated to MS in May 2005, would be taken into consideration in improving the relevant provisions in the G-4 resolution (operative para. 8).

Relations with other UN Reform Issues: Throughout the debate, some countries (Algeria, Pakistan, China) objected that UN reform had been "overshadowed," "hijacked," or "diluted" by Council reform. On the other hand, Japan underlined that it attached great importance to other issues of UN reform and held that a decision on Council reform would create the further momentum needed to tackle other reform issues.

RK/SCPCRB/SCAD/DPA/12 July 2005 *** Summary of the 112th Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly on 12 July 2005 on the Agenda Item 53 entitled "Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters: draft resolution (A/59/L. 64)"

1. Summary: In the afternoon of 12 July 2005, the General Assembly resumed its debate in connection with the above agenda item. Statements were made by the following 27 Member States: , New Zealand, Uruguay, Belgium, Denmark, Russian Federation, Chile, Ukraine, Netherlands, United States, Republic of Korea, Germany, Czech Republic, , Greece, Norway, Haiti. Madagascar. Samoa, United Kingdom, Palau, Indonesia, , Costa Rica, Portugal, and India. In addition, Algeria exercised its right of reply. Fifteen members spoke in favour of the G-4 draft resolution. Four Member States supported the Uniting for Consensus proposal. Algeria again confirmed its support for the proposal of the AU-summit. The remaining eight speakers did not expressly support any of these proposals: Among those eight speakers, the United States expressed its clear opposition to the G-4 proposal. The Russian Federation stated it was ready to support "any reasonable option" which garnered broad support and did not dilute existing veto rights. The United Kingdom spoke in support of the G-4 proposal.

2. Views expressed in relation to the proposed enlargement of the Council:

(1) G-4 and Supporters:

The following fifteen Member States spoke hi favour of the G-4 proposal: Belgium, Chile, Denmark, Ukraine, Denmark. Germany, Czech Republic, Greece, Norway, Haiti, Samoa, United Kingdom, Palau, Portugal and India. Chile and the Netherlands did, however, express certain reservations.1 With the exception of five States, namely Chile, the Netherlands, Norway, Samoa and the United Kingdom, all of these fifteen States belong to the group of 27 States which had sponsored or co-sponsored the G-4 resolution.2

The representatives of the above States emphasized that the G-4 proposal represented the most concrete, balanced and broadly-based proposal. They noted that enough time had passed for Member States to consider this matter, and urged Member States to vote for the proposal before September, as had been recommended by the Secretary-General. They stressed that the Council reform was an integral part of the whole reform package and urged Member States not to shy away from this sensitive issue, as they now had a unique opportunity to affect change. Support for this proposal would also give an impetus to other reform issues. A failure to reach agreement, on the other hand, might compromise the summit. Speakers cautioned that not taking a decision on the draft would mean to perpetuate the status quo.

1 Chile stressed in particular that no veto rights should be granted to any new members, and that the exercise of veto rights should generally be restricted. Chile also felt that Latin American and Caribbean countries would be under- represented. The Netherlands felt that the draft resolution was not sufficiently clear on the question of the veto for new members. The Netherlands also believed that, with 25 seats, the size of the Council would be "stretched to the limit". In addition, the Netherlands would wish a periodic review clause to be included in the resolution. 2 As was noted in the summary note of the debate of 11 July 2005, the G4-proposal is also supported by Jordan, Fiji, Finland and Lithuania. Legitimacy / representation: The representatives of the above States stressed that the expansion of the Council should reflect the geo-political realities of today, and that an expansion in both the permanent and non-permanent categories represented the most balanced approach. Those Member States that contribute most to international peace and security should be permanent members of the Council.3 Restricting the expansion to the non-permanent category would increase the disparity in the composition of the Council. The proposed enlargement would also allow countries of the South, including two African countries, to become permanent members. Expanding the non-permanent category only, on the other hand, would mean to perpetuate the exclusion of developing countries from permanent membership. India stressed that only an increase in the permanent membership could diminish the continued dominance of the P5 and thus bring new legitimacy and authority to the Council. In relation to the identity of any potential new permanent members, the Netherlands and Portugal expressed support for the four known candidates. The Netherlands also expressed support for two African seats. Samoa and Palau expressed support for Japan, in light of its contribution to the international community. Chile expressed support for Brazil and Japan, but believed that Latin America and the Caribbean would be under-represented. Haiti, on the other hand, welcomed that Latin America and Africa would be better represented.

Effectiveness: Supporters of the G-4 proposal argued that the Council's future effectiveness was contingent on the permanent presence of major financial contributors and those that were most willing and able to contribute to the work of the UN. Bringing together major players would make the Council speak with a voice that could not be ignored. Permanency would allow members to fully assume their responsibilities. Germany noted that effectiveness was not just linked to size, but also to the Council's structure and working methods.4 This was echoed by India, which noted that effectiveness was essentially a question of good decisions, and that the quality of decisions would improve if developing countries were able to contribute as permanent members of the Council.

Flexibility: Several speakers stressed that the review clause included in the draft resolution would allow Member States to continue the dialogue and to reassess the appropriateness of the changes after a period of 15 years. The Netherlands, however, while generally supporting the G- 4 proposal, indicated its preference for a periodic review clause.

Chances of the G4-proposal to garner the required support: The supporters of the proposal argued that that there was no good alternative to the G4-proposal, and that other proposals were motivated by narrower interests or by the desire to maintain the status quo. The G-4 resolution was, therefore, the only proposal capable of garnering the required support. While broad agreement was of course desirable, the bar should not be raised above the required two thirds majority, bearing in mind that taking a vote was a generally accepted democratic procedure. With regard to opposition from some of the P5, Germany and India believed that if the membership could agree to the proposal, the P5 would most likely not want to be seen to resist world opinion. It was noted that the P5 had also initially blocked the proposed changes in 1963,

3 The Netherlands believed that the criteria for permanent membership should not only include contributions to international peace and security, but also to development. 4 Germany observed that some of those opposing the proposed larger size of the Council had not objected to the recent enlargement of the NATO-Council to 26 seats. but yielded in the end. India added that the fact that the proposal was not endorsed by all P5 should be an argument for, rather than against going ahead, as the purpose of the reform was to end the dominance of the P5.

(2) Uniting for Consensus (UfC) Movement:

The UfC-proposal was supported by Canada, the Republic of Korea, Mexico and Spain. The representatives of these States argued that their proposal would enhance democracy, fairness, accountability and flexibility, and in particular increase the chances of small- and medium-sized countries to be represented on the Council. They warned Member States not to rush to take a decision on the G-4 proposal, as this might lead to a fragmentation of the membership.

Representation of membership/ fairness: The supporters of the UfC-proposal stated that they could not agree with the addition of new permanent members, as principles of fairness did not allow for a two-tier membership, with .some members exercising a "monopoly" on international peace and security. The addition of permanent member would impact on the chances of other members to serve on the Council. Mexico believed that the G-4 proposal would privilege some States to the disadvantage of others and further concentrate power in the hands of a few.

Democratic principles /Accountability: The supporters of the UfC-proposal criticized that new permanent members would not be accountable to the membership. In contrast, non-permanent members would be regularly (re-)elected by the collective will of the international community. Canada and the Republic of Korea believed that Member States should be able to determine regularly which countries should have a seat on the Council. Democratic principles did not allow for life-time election. Without periodic elections, the international community would have no means of ensuring accountability.

Flexibility: Canada believed that a "rigid regime" was unsuited to today's dynamic world. This view was shared by the Republic of Korea, which cautioned that the mistakes made 60 years ago should not be repeated. Mexico also believed that the G-4 proposal was based on a static view of the world.

Representation of resigns: Supporters of the UfC-proposal argued that permanent members would not truly represent their regions. Seats should therefore be allocated permanently to regions, which should then decide for themselves on individual candidates.

Chances of the UfC-proposal to garner the required support: Canada and Mexico argued that the proposal would avoid a split in the membership, as it would not require States to choose between different worthy candidates. The Republic of Korea described the multi-stage voting process required.for the adoption of the G-4 proposal as a "mission impossible". In contrast, the UfC-proposal could build genuine consensus. (3) The African Union proposal:

In response to a question by the German representative as to Algeria's true position on the Council reform, Algeria, exercising its right of reply, emphasized that Algeria had had a major role in drafting the proposal at the recent AU Summit, that Algeria could not agree to any other draft, and that the G-4 proposal was "absolutely unacceptable". Accordingly, Algeria would vote against it and call on all Member States to do so also. No other statements in support of the AU proposal were made at the meeting.

(4) Other speakers:

The below remaining eight Member States did not express a clear preference for either of the above proposals, but expressed a variety of differing views:

The United States stated that it supported the expansion of the Council, that it also supported Japan's candidacy, and that it anticipated that others would also qualify. However, the United States would oppose any proposal that would make the Council less effective or not garner broad support. The timing and substance of the G4-proposal would not be helpful, as they were likely to divide world opinion. The Council should remain sufficiently small to be effective, and only include members which had demonstrated the capacity to contribute to international peace and security.5 The United States would vote against the G-4 proposal, as it was believed that this proposal would not strengthen the UN..

The Russian Federation stated that it was ready to support "any reasonable option", provided it was based on the broadest possible support, which should exceed the two thirds of Member States prescribed by the Charter. Those who wanted a speedy decision should consider carefully the potential consequences. The Russian Federation advocated the preservation of a compact size of the Council, which could comprise "20+" members. The Russian Federation would oppose any reform involving a dilution of the P5 or their veto rights.

New Zealand stated that it was open to all proposals, but indicated that it supported Japan in its candidacy, that it was against the expansion of veto rights, and in favour of a periodic review of permanent membership.

Uruguay emphasized that broad support for reform would be needed and that it would be wrong to rush into a decision. Uruguay also noted that it opposed the right of veto.

Indonesia warned that the G-4 proposal might lead to an over-representation of some regions and to an under-representation of and, more generally, the developing world. Indonesia cautioned that a hasty approach might distract from other issues and stated that a decision should be based on consensus and objective criteria.

5 Other criteria, according to the United States representative, should include the size of the economy and population of any candidates, their military capacity, their contributions to peacekeeping, their human rights record, their financial contributions and geographic balance. Turkey believed that it was "not absolutely necessary" to increase the number of permanent members, noting that such increase would not correspond with democratic principles.

Madagascar, while noting that it considered itself part of Africa, stated that it had an "open mind" in relation to the different reform proposals. Madagascar indicated, however, that it supported Japan's candidacy, in light of Japan's ongoing support of development in Africa.

Costa Rica noted that the G-4 and UfC-proposals had some "points of convergence", and believed that it would be important to have "time for reflection". With regard to the G-4 draft, Costa Rica believed that the addition of permanent members would not foster democracy and accountability. The proposal would also involve an overly complicated electoral process. Costa Rica suggested that it could present an alternative proposal if no consensus could be reached.

3. Issues relating to the veto right, the review process and the working methods:

(1) Veto: The Russian Federation indicated that it would oppose any "dilution" of veto rights. Mexico, which supports the UfC-proposal, criticized that the G-4 proposal lacked a clear "moratorium" on veto rights for the proposed new members. Chile and the Netherlands, while supporting the G-4 proposal, desired to see more clarity on the veto question. The United Kingdom also believed that expanding veto rights would not be in the interest of the UN. Norway similarly expressed its opposition to new veto rights, but, in light of recent statements by G-4 candidates, appeared satisfied with paragraph 5 (b) of the resolution, which envisages a postponement of the veto question to a review after fifteen years. Uruguay stated that it opposed the veto.

(2) Review clause: As noted above, the supporters of the UfC-proposal, without specifically commenting on the clause, generally criticized the addition of new permanent members proposed by the G-4 resolution as being too rigid. The Netherlands, while generally supporting the G-4 proposal, indicated that it would prefer a periodic review clause to the one-time review envisaged by the proposal. New Zealand also expressed itself in favour of a periodic review of permanent membership.

(3) Working Methods: A number of Member States, including the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Norway, underlined the importance of enhancing the working methods of the Council, which was as important as the issues of the composition and the size of the Council. In this connection, the Netherlands stated that non-members should be able to contribute more, especially in subsidiary bodies. The United Kingdom wished to see increased transparency in the Council's work. Norway expressed its content with the proposals for a reform of working methods contained in the G-4 draft resolution. 4. Relation with other reform issues and the broader UN agenda:

Throughout the debate, some countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Uruguay and Haiti, warned that the question of the Council reform should not distract from other reform issues, including the reform of the GA and ECOSOC, and the reform of management. Some countries, including Canada, Haiti, Mexico, Indonesia and Spain, cautioned that the Council reform should not overshadow other objectives of the Organization, such as the implementation of the MDG's, the advancement of security and human rights, and the protection of the environment. In Canada's view, such issues were in fact more urgent. Indonesia and the Republic of Korea warned that too strong a focus on the Council reform might derail the whole UN-reform.

Germany, India and other supporters of the G-4 proposal, on the other hand, emphasized that the Council reform was an integral part of the reform efforts generally, from which the membership should not shy away. Agreement on the Council reform, they added, could give a positive impetus to the summit.

TS/SCPCRB/SCAD/DPA/13 July 2005 *** United Nations A/59/L.64

General Assembly Distr.: Limited 6 July 2005

Original: English

Fifty-ninth session Agenda item 53 Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters

Afghanistan, Belgium, Bhutan, Brazil, Czech Republic, Denmark, Fiji, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Japan, Kiribati, Latvia, Maldives, Nauru, Palau, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Ukraine: draft resolution Security Council reform

The General Assembly, Recalling its resolutions 48/26 of 3 December 1993 and 53/30 of 1 December 1998, Recognizing the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security under the Charter of the United Nations, Recognizing also the functions and powers of the General Assembly on matters pertaining to the maintenance of international peace and security as contained in the Charter, Recalling Article 15 (1) of the Charter, and recognizing the need for closer cooperation between the Security Council and the General Assembly, Noting that the effectiveness, credibility and legitimacy of the work of the Security Council will be enhanced by its improved representative character, its better ability to discharge its primary responsibility and to carry out its duties on behalf of all members, Reasserting the purposes and principles of the Charter, and recalling that, under Article 2 (5) of the Charter, every Member State has pledged to "give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter", Stressing that the permanent members of the Security Council bear a special responsibility both to uphold the principles of the Charter and to give their full support to the Organization's actions to maintain international peace and security,

05-41080 (E) 070705 *O541OSO* A/S9/L.64

Recalling, in this regard, its resolutions 55/235 and 55/236 of 23 December 2000, as updated by resolution 58/256 of 23 December 2003, on the scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations peacekeeping operations, Acknowledging that there are many ways for Member States to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, and underlining that members of the Security Council should be elected with due regard to their record of various contributions to this end and also to equitable geographical distribution, as noted in Article 23 (1) of the Charter, as well as for their demonstrated commitment to and observance of international norms, Acknowledging also that security and development are intertwined and mutually reinforcing and that development is an indispensable foundation of collective security, Aiming at the expansion of the membership of the Security Council to better reflect contemporary world realities, thereby shaping a balance of forces capable of enhancing the Council's responsiveness to the views and needs of all Member States, in particular developing countries, and ensuring the adoption of improved working methods, Recognizing the ongoing efforts of the Security Council to improve its working methods, Noting with appreciation the efforts of the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council, which began its work in January 1994, Seeking in particular to enhance the transparency of the Security Council and the participation of non-members of the Council in its work, Bearing in mind the United Nations Millennium Declaration of 8 September 2000 adopted by Heads of State and Government,1 in which they resolved, in respect of reform of the Security Council, to intensify their efforts to achieve a comprehensive reform of the Security Council in all its aspects, Taking into account the relevant recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General entitled "In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all",2 in particular the recommendation to take a decision on Security Council reform before the summit of the General Assembly to be held in September 2005,

Size and composition 1. Decides: (a) That the membership of the Security Council shall be increased from fifteen to twenty-five by adding six permanent and four non-permanent members; (b) That the six new permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected according to the following pattern:

1 Resolution 55/2 of 8 September 2000. 2 A/59/2005. A/59/L.64

(i) Two from African States; (ii) Two from Asian States; (iii) One from Latin American and Caribbean States; (iv) One from Western European and Other States; (c) That the four new non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected according to the following pattern: (i) One from African States; (ii) One from Asian States; (iii) One from Eastern European States; (iv) One from Latin American and Caribbean States;

Election procedure for new permanent members 2. Invites interested States to inform the members of the General Assembly that they are prepared to assume the functions and responsibilities of permanent members of the Security Council and to submit their candidatures in writing to the President of the General Assembly within one week of the adoption of the present resolution; 3. Decides: (a) To proceed, as soon as possible but in any case no later than twelve weeks after the adoption of the present resolution, by a vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly through a secret ballot, to the designation of the States that will be elected to exercise the functions and responsibilities of permanent members of the Security Council, according to the pattern described in paragraph 1 (b) above, it being understood that if the number of States having obtained the required majority falls short of the number of seats allocated for permanent membership new rounds of balloting will be conducted for the remaining seats until six States obtain the required majority to occupy the six seats; (b) That only candidates registered in accordance with paragraph 2 above shall be eligible; (c) That the date for the election of the new permanent members according to subparagraph 3 (a) above shall be determined by the President of the General Assembly; 4. Decides, without prejudice to paragraph 3 above, to apply the rules of procedure of the General Assembly to the election of the new permanent members of the Security Council;

Veto 5. Decides: (a) That the new permanent members should have the same responsibilities and obligations as the current permanent members; (b) That the new permanent members shall not exercise the right of veto until the question of the extension of the right of veto to new permanent members A/59/L.64

has been decided upon in the framework of the review mandated under paragraph 7 below;

Amendment of the Charter of the United Nations and review 6. Decides: (a) That, no later than two weeks after the designation of States elected to serve as new permanent members of the Security Council, a resolution containing amendments to the Charter of the United Nations arising from the decisions taken in paragraphs 1 and 3 above will be submitted in order to be adopted at the earliest possible time, in accordance with Article 108 of the Charter; (b) That the resolution will include amendments to Articles 27 (2) and (3), 108, and 109 (1) and (2) of the Charter to require the affirmative vote of 14 of 25 members of the Security Council for a decision, and to reflect, consistent with paragraph 5 (b) above, the fact that the extension of the right of veto to the new permanent members has not been decided; 7. Decides also to review the situation created by the amendments referred to in paragraph 6 above fifteen years after their entry into force;

Working methods 8. Urges the Security Council to undertake the following measures to enhance the transparency, inclusiveness and legitimacy of its work to strengthen the support and understanding of its decisions by the membership of the Organization, thereby increasing the Council's effectiveness, namely, to: (a) As a general rule, meet in a public forum open to all Member States of the United Nations. Exceptionally, the Security Council may decide to meet in private; (b) Implement Articles 31 and 32 of the Charter by consulting with non- Security Council members on a regular basis, especially members with a special interest in the substantive matter under consideration by the Council; (c) Grant non-members access to subsidiary organs of the Council, including the right to participate, as appropriate; (d) Make available to non-members of the Council draft resolutions and presidential statements, as well as other draft documents that are tabled at informal consultations of the whole of the Council for action on its agenda items, as soon as such documents are tabled, or earlier, if so authorized by the author of the draft; (e) Hold frequent, timely and qualitative briefings for non-members on the matters discussed in the Security Council and its subsidiary organs, including briefings on its ad hoc missions, their terms of reference and the findings of such missions; (f) Hold regular and timely consultations with troop-contributing countries and countries that contribute financial resources, as well as other countries that are directly concerned or affected by a peacekeeping operation, as appropriate, before and during the decision-making process for the establishment, conduct, review and termination of peacekeeping operations, including the extension and change of mandates, as well as for specific operational issues; A/59/L.64

(g) Hold regular consultations with the Presidents of the General Assembly and Economic and Social Council; (h) Submit an annual report to the General Assembly providing a detailed substantive and comprehensive evaluation of the work of the Council pursuant to Articles 15 (1) and 24 (3) of the Charter; (i) Submit, when necessary, special reports to the General Assembly, in accordance with Article 24 (3) of the Charter, for the consideration of the Assembly in accordance with Article 15 (1) of the Charter. .2-

Ife (permanent (Representative of to the. VnitedNations ""Unitingfof Consensus'-focaf^oint ii

New York, July 8,2005

Excellency,,

I enclose, on behalf of "Uniting for Consensus, the text of a draft resolution on the Security Council Reform. This is based on the "Elements for a decision on the Security Council Reform", addressed to the membership with a letter on May 27,2005.

The "Uniting for Consensus" draft resolution aims at:

increasing the chances of all UN Member States to serve in the Security Council. Our model is fair, based on the principle of sovereign equality, and does not discriminate among the membership;

strengthening multilateralism through an approach that seeks to preserve the unity of the Membership;

creating a Security Council based on a democratic vision of the United Nations;

accommodating the interests of all Member States and the concern of all groups and political constituencies. The proposed model is flexible;

enhancing accountability. It contributes to restoring the central role and position of the General Assembly; and

reforming the Security Council in a simple, efficient and non-divisive way.

I hope that circulating this draft will contribute to an interactive, more focused and fruitful debate, due to take place next week in the General Assembly.

At this stage, "Uniting for Consensus" reaffirms the necessity of a constructive, inclusive and bottom-tip approach and invites all Member States to come forward with comments and improvements to the attached draft, in order to find a non-divisive solution based on the broadest possible agreement.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideratten.

All Permanent Representatives and Permanent Observers to the UN cc: H.E. Mr. Jean Ping President of the 59th UNGA H.E Mr. Kofi Annan Secretary General "iJmtingfor Consensus "

July 8,2005

DRAFT RESOLUTION OH SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 1991 A (XVIII), by which it decided to amend the Charter of the United Nations to increase the number of non-permanent members of the Security Council from six to ten, on the basis of the increase in membership since 1945;

Recalling the various reports of the "Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council," established by its resolution 48/26;

Stressing the urgent need to improve the working methods of the Security Council in accordance with the various issues discussed within the Open-Ended Working Group, in particular the question of transparency in decision making; accountability; fairer opportunities of participation of members States; better access to information by all member States and restrictions on the veto power with a view to its eventual elimination;

.Recalling the "Millenium Declaration" of 2000 and taking note of the Report of the Secretary-General, wln Larger Freedom"(A/59/2005) in particular its assessment of the interlocking nature of security, development and human rights;

Mindful of primary responsibility conferred by the Charter of the United Nations on the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security and that in carrying out its duties the Security Council acts on behalf of the members of the United Nations;

Mindful also . of the importance of strengthening the institutional balance and interrelationship among the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council within the scope of the comprehensive reform of the United Nations;

Considering that joint efforts by the General Assembly, Security Council and the Economic and social Council are needed in order to attain solutions to global problems and threats in an integrated and constructive manner; "l)nitm£for Consensus"

Considering that the present composition of the Security Council is inequitable and unbalanced;

Recognizing that contemporary world realities, in particular the substantial increase in membership of developing countries since 1963, requires an expansion of the Security Council, in the non-permanent category,- in order to ensure fairer opportunities of participation for all member States;

.Reaffirming that any expansion of the Security Council should make it more democratic, more equitably representative, more transparent, more effective and more accountable;

Convinced that periodic elections and reelections are the strongest means to promote real accountability, allow for frequent rotation and fair and equitable representation of its member States in the Security Council;

.Recalling its resolution 53/30;

Recognizing the importance of reaching the broadest possible agreement on all major issues, as decided in resolution 59/291.

Recalling article 108 of the Charter of the United Nations;

Amendments to Article 23

1. Decides that the Security Council shall consist, in addition to the five permanent Members as determined by Article 23(1) of the Charter, of twenty elected Members of the United Nations serving on the Security Council for a two—year term, according to the provisions of paragraphs 3 and 5 below.

2. Decides, in view of the above, to adopt the following amendments to the Charter and to submit them for ratification by the member States of the United Nations.

3. Decides that Article 23 (1) and (2) of the Charter of the United Nations will read as follows {amendments underlined) :

"1. The Security .Council shall consist of twenty-five members of the United Nations. France, the People's Republic of China the Russian Federation the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall be permanent members of the Security Council. The General Assembly shall elect twenty other members of the United Nations to be non-permanent members of the Security Council, due regard being specially paid, in the first instance to the contribution of members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international "Vnitingfor Consensus*

peace and security arid to the other purposes of the Organisation, and also to equitable geographical distribution.

2. The non permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected for a term of two years. In the first election of the non-permanent members, after the increase of the membership of the Security Council from fifteen to twenty-five, five of the retiring members shall continue for one more year. Non-permanent members may be eligible for immediate re-election, subject to the decision of their respective geographical groups.

Distribution of Seats

4. Decides that, in order to implement paragraph 3 above the twenty non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected according to the following pattern: six from African States; five from Asian States; four from Latin American and Caribbean States; three from Western and Other States; two from Eastern European States.

Limits to re-Qlection, and role 6f geographical, groups

5. Recommends that each of the five existing geographical groups, as identified in paragraph 4 above, shall decide on arrangements among its members for re-election or rotation of its members on the seats allotted to the Group. These arrangements shall also address, as appropriate, a fair sub- regional representation.

Majority required for Security Council decisions

6. Decides to amend also Article 27 (2) and (3) and Article 109 (1) of the Charter to require the affirmative vote of 15 of the 25 members of the Security Council.1

Working methods

7. Calls for improving the working methods of the Security Council in a transparent, inclusive and accountable manner, including in particular:

1 Regarding paragraph 3 of Article 27, the requirement of the concurring votes of the permanent members is not amended. "Vnitingfor Consensus"

- Restraint on the use of veto.

^ Procedures to guarantee transparency in decision making, accountability in performance and access to information including open briefings and interaction with all interested parties.

Consultation, cooperation and adequate exchange of information with the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council.

- Access and better participation of non—Member States of the Security Council in the work of the Security Council.

- Adoption and circulation of formal rules of procedure.

In addition, Underlines the need to elaborate further provisions through consultations among Member States.

B. Urges its "Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council," to promptly finalize its recommendations on working methods of the Security Council.

Ratification of Charter Amendments

9. Calls upon member States to ratify the above amendments, in accordance with their respective constitutional processes, by September, 2007.

10. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a report on the status of the process of entry into force.of these amendments to the Charter, at its Sixty-first regular session. Fro»:C-ch ; «-*dmn BVHM «t:OS-D5-77-2Oi« BocrBl?

TA« JVwwantf irf Representative of Switzerland Mw #»r,fc 27 Way .?0ft5 /e ;fr« Untied Natlota

Excellency.

For more than a. decode, the General Assembly has been cngagrd in an Intensive debate On possible reforms in the Composition and the working methods of the Security Council. While the issue of enlargement of the Security Council has attracted a lot oftutotticai. the matter of reforms of its -working methods was largely neglected hath itt ihelfigh-Lcvel-Panel-Repartandin the SecrelaryJjencral's Report "in Larger Freedom". J \vou!d therefore hope that the Outcome Document under preparation will devote some space to this important isiue.

During the informal coiveuliaiions on Cluster JY, Switzerland dccid&t! to distribute a Non-Paper with several rectunmendationc on how to improve the Security Council's working Methods. The recommendations were inspired by the work and documents of the Open-ended .Parking Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Inct-ea.tr. in the Membership of the Security Council. Furthermore. Switzerland had commissioned a paper on the topic from Professor Edward C. Luck from Columbia Univcrsit)'. who developed a systematic approach according to which meaningful reforms in the working methods have to meet at least one of four criteria. They have to make the Council' (i) more accountable; pi) more inclusive; (iii) more rcprcsenieitve or (ivf more transparent. In addition to mtxting One or more of these criteria, the proposed lurafuret have to past ua ultimate test: do they improve the Security Council's pcrfornuutae. nnd effectiveness in maintaining peace and security? The resulting Recommendations are based on the firm conviction thftt effectiveness and the other above criteria arc mutually reinforcing.

H.E. Mr Jain Phf President of the 50* Session of the Ul

PtrmOHta Million of Switzerland It She fnirsd AVtripw fijj IViirrf Avenue, I?*floor. /Vm> fort. K It. 10017 Tel. I U3/1M n 40txt. 1117, Ftx. / 112f2t615SS Tor Frum:l>cti | ft-admin fucGatewiv 8VMOO iTDfCtoA «L: O5-B5-Z7-20: «

of Switzerland and of the Principality of Liechtenstein then co- hosied :hrce panel discussion! in which mt/rc thin 5D delegations participated. Ttic. rr.r.ommcndation.1 were presented to interested Member State*, axking them far their opinions. Reactions were in general very positive find confirmed that many Member States - while acknowledging important progress in the pattt years - think that there: ij still room for further improvement.

Based on the panel discussions, we have refined and reformulated our recommendations which HV now respectfully submit to your consideration. I -would lite to point out thai the Non-Paper represents the view tifny Government and it not a negotiated document of those Member States having participated in the panel discussions, ft nould of course be appreciated if Member States look our recommendations as a point of reference when discussing the reform of the Security Council's working methods either in the content of the upcoming Summit or in further deliberations of the Open Ended Working Grovp.

Appreciative of your intcreffi. please accept. Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely yours,

Peter M Ambassador

Encl.

cc : Allfcnnane.nl Missions to the United Nations

Mr. Bob Orr. JLvtixtant Secretary-Genera} for Policy Coordination A. Strategic Planning EQSG-UNS-3233 Tnt Q-uSmin

WORKING METHODS OF THE SECUWTV COUNCIL

)'»pcr

Under the UN Charter the opportunity to serve on the Security Council - except for 1'crmaniail Members - will present itseVf relatively seldom. Whilst all Member Stales have lhe opportunity to be elected, the chance 16 become a Member ore rare and limited in time. Fc*r most Member State*, (hercfore. a serious reform of Security Council working methods would hove (he mod Immediate impact While acknowledging that some progress bus been made on working methods over the post years, many Member Stales contend thai it hat not gone fir enough. Yean of work within lite Open Ended Working Group on Security Council Reform h«vc resulted in an impressive wealth of ideas and proposals, many or which were included in docurociiis of the Genera] Assembly (e.g. Annex V to document A/57/47).

With the objective to narrow the multitude of reform proposals dcwn to a manageable number and to make them better suited to be included in 1he current reform debate, die following recommendations hsvc been elaborated, bearing four Criteria jn mind: legjliirmey, inclutivcncss, repreacniativhy and transparency. Hut the Tina! lest before inclusion into the list consisted in assessing thai the Security Council'K performance mid effectiveness in maintaining international peace and security would be enhanced as 3 result of the reform measures

Recommendation 1: The Security Council and its Metnbere should engage in HD informal and interactive discussion with the larger membership when the annual report of the Security Council it prevented to the General Assembly. A possible format of such udialo-gue could be the existing Regional Groups.

Recommendation 2: The Security Council should submit, when necessary, special repoits lo the General Assembly for its consideration, in accordance with Article 24.3 of the UN Charter.

Recornrogndatiort .1: The Security Council's report* on its missions top laces o f concern should be timely, comprehensive and analytical and should include budget and real cost indications.

Recommendation 4: The Security Council should tate steps to improve fhc quality and frequency of its •written and oral reports on the work of its subsidiary bodice. Summary records of subsidiary bodies' meetings should be made available, and afFectad Non-MemSers should be invited lo its meetings upon their request

ReonrmnETiriaiion S: The Security Council should explore vi-ays to assess (he exleut in which all Member Slates and other relevant ftctors have implemented its decisions. To Shis end. the Council should create lessons-learned groups that would: 1} assess the level of implementation of Security Council decisions, 2) analyze the reasons Tor non-implementation, and 3) suggest mechanisms or measures to improve compliance 1

;: The Security Councfl should empower any of its Members 10 caU Ibr a public indicative vote to clarify positions wn a proposed action Such a vote •would not have any Jegal effect The Permanent Member having vetoed a proposed Security Council Resolution should provide an explanation for its action to the General Assembly. No veto should be exercised by Permanent Members of the Security Council in »ho event of f.cnocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian tnw.

Rcconimendation 7: The President of the Security Council and fl\t Chairs of its subsidiary bodies should offer rafonnal opportunities «> interested Member States to provide substantive inpuv nn issues on the Council's agenda.

Recommendation 8; The Security Council should esnpagt in Bequenf and substantive exchanges of view* with the General Assembly and £COSOC us z Standard opermting procedure. The modalities govenrinfi this interaction should be disseminated to the larger Membership.

Recommendation Jj; The Security Council should enhance consultations with troop contributing countries (TCCs) and major stakeholders, including major financial contributors. Such consultations should take place before and during a troop deployment in order (o encompass both the defminoD of mandates and any reassessments undertaken over the course or a peace operation.

Recommendation 10: The Sec\aity Council should give Member Statei Affected by special economic problems caused by Council-imposed sanctions the opportunity to consah with the relevant sanctions committee on «timely and substantive basis, in accordance with Article 50 of the Charter.

Recommendation 1 \: Where sanctions involve lists of individuals and/or entities, cancliuni committees should csti>Hsh procedures for legal review thai oro optn to those claiming that their inclusion ur retention on such lias is unjustified. Affected individuals and/or coiitics should have the ri^il to file art eppe»i according to generally accepted standards of due process,

RecomtnendatioB 12: The Security Council should authorize, whew appropriate. Non-Mcmbere with strong interests and expertise to be associated with the deliberations md dccision-shsptae of one or several of its subsidiary bodice.

RccDrmnHTiMiasJl-- The Security Council Affaire Division should be tasked with WemifyingbestpractiecBemployedbyMembersofvhcCouncil toconsull wifh Non-Members, with » view 10 incorporate these practices toto Ihe Council s Provisional Rules of Procedure.

Raommendaiion 14: The Security Council should define under which urgent and exceptional circumstances h may discharge law-making functions. Ihtt w a matter of principle fall under the competence of the Genera) Assembly - and ensure the views of the larger Membership are (aken into nccooni in the - and dnJUng process when doing so. ; 05-C5-27-26.49

• Recommendation 15: The Security Council should show rcstraim in acting under Chapter VI! of the Charter and make piore frequent use of Chapters VI and VIII.

• RecommetHlauon 16; The Security Council AfDurs Division should prepare and disseminate H detailed briefing puckct on the procedure;, pntcticca and work of (he Security Council in order to facilitate the rapid integration of newly-elecled Members.

• Recommendation >1: The Security Council's Inforflial Working Croup on Implementation and Procedural Matters should regularly review the Council's working methods nnd inform the larger Membership on concrete siepc the Security Council has taken to enhance its transparency, incluEivcness nod rcprcsenUtjvity. The Presidency of (he Working Group should be ensured by the scne Member for a term of 12 monlhn, At the end of •which the outgoing President should brief the General Assembly on progress achieved during histaer tenure.