THE PRINCETON JOURNAL OF EAST ASIAN STUDIES

VOLUME I

FALL 2011

PRINCETON JOURNAL OF EAST ASIAN STUDIES

EDITORS-IN-CHIEF Yunsuk Chung ’12 Natalie Kim ’12

COPY EDITORS Charles Fortin ’15 Heidi Yi ’15

LAYOUT EDITOR Jiweon Kim ’15

FINANCE MANAGER Eric Wang ’12

IT TEAM IT MANAGER Eeh Pyoung Rhee ’13 STAFF Thomas Truongchau ’14

PUBLICITY TEAM PUBLICITY MANAGER OPERATIONS MANAGERS Alex Kim ’12 Tanny Kang ’14 Jenna Song ’14

CHINA EDITORIAL TEAM JAPAN EDITORIAL TEAM KOREA EDITORIAL TEAM ASSOCIATE EDITOR ASSOCIATE EDITOR ASSOCIATE EDITOR Eddie Skolnick ’12 Rafael Abrahams ’13 Anji Shin ’13 EDITORS EDITORS EDITORS Gavin Cook ’15 Tzu-Yung Huang ’15 Jennifer Cho ’15 Charles Fortin ’15 Shiro Kuriwaki ’14 Jisoo Han ’14 Adrienne Fung ’14 Ryohei Ozaki ’14 Lydia Lim ’15 Rebecca Haynes ’15 Tzu-Yung Huang ’15 !

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TABLE OF CONTENTS ! ! 1. THE RIVER SUSPENDED IN TIME AND SPACE: THE PRESENCE OF THE MILKY WAY IN LI BAI’S POETIC CONSCIOUSNESS | BECKY KEUNG YOON BAE 1

2. ADVANCING “VIRTUAL CIVIL SOCIETY” IN CHINA: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS | EDDIE SKOLNICK 7

3. THE “RISK-AVERSE” JAPANESE-JAPANESE ENTREPRENEURSHIP | PRINCETON KWONG 19

4. NORTH KOREA’S GROWING ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE ON CHINA | HYUN SUN SUH 37

5. MAPPING SOUTH KOREAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES | JULIE HAN 52

6. SON PREFERENCE YESTERDAY AND TODAY: THE CAUSES AND IMPLICATIONS OF SON PREFERENCE IN CONTEMPORARY | KRISTEN KIM 62

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THE RIVER SUSPENDED IN TIME AND SPACE: The Presence of the Milky Way in Li Bai’s Poetic Consciousness Becky Keung Yoon Bae ’11

Seventh Night Song From Tr. Becky Keung Yoon Bae The distant Cowherd Star The glistening Milky Way Girl (i.e. the seamstress star) Such delicate, delicate little hands Pushing the loom to clatter and chatter But all day long she cannot complete one pattern And teardrops sprinkle down like rain The Milky Way is clear and shallow But how wide is it across, the distance between (the lovers)? Separated by a full stretch of water For ages they cannot exchange a word.

Gazing Upon The Lu Mountain Falls Tr. Becky Keung Yoon Bae ，In the rising sun, purple mist arises from the Xiang Lu (‘Incense Burner’) Peak Beholding from afar the waterfall; a long river hanging ，The flying current drops down three thousand feet 。It could be the Milky Way, fallen from the heavens

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Drinking Alone Under the Moonlight

Tr. Ezra Pound

Amongst the flowers is a pot of wine

I pour alone but with no friend at hand

So I lift the cup to invite the shining moon,

Along with my shadow we become party of three

Though the moon understands none of drinking, and

The shadow just follows my body vainly

Still I make the moon and the shadow my company

To enjoy the springtime before too late

The moon lingers while I am singing

The shadow scatters while I am dancing

We cheer in delight when being awake

We separate apart after getting drunk

Forever will we keep this unfettered friendship

Till we meet again far in the Milky Way

Princeton Kwong1

EAS 331 Chinese Poetry

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 1 Princeton Kwong is a senior majoring in the East Asian Studies Department.

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The legend of the lovers in the Therefore, over the course of this paper, I Milky Way () is a significant one will attempt to engage these two poems in in Asian cultural consciousness, a story a discourse with the folktale and with the perhaps akin to ‘Romeo and Juliet’ in the first poem. West in that it tells of two star struck The first poem, which is a much young lovers separated by forces beyond older one from the Han Dynasty their power. In the story, the Heavenly collection ‘ (Nineteen Emperor marries his talented seamstress Ancient Poems),’ does well to introduce daughter to a young, handsome cowherd, certain ideas or sensibilities that are but when the young couple begin to attached to the traditional tale. The first neglect their duties in favor of spending characters ‘’ immediately establish time with each other, the Emperor grows the central problem, which is ‘distance’; angry and decides to separate them for all from the distant, faraway Cowherd Star, eternity. He places them at the opposite the poem’s focus pulls back to center ends of the sky, with the Milky Way upon the seamstress, who finds herself between them, and the lovers can only melancholy, listless and unable to weave at meet once a year on the seventh day of her loom. The poem appears to be told the seventh month ( ) when the more from the point of view of the heavens are forded by a bridge of ‘,’ directly meaning ‘The Milky blackbirds and magpies. The tale is one of Way Girl’ and referring to the seamstress sadness, eternal love, and yearning, the princess. Milky Way becoming a symbol of an Both the seamstress’ name and impossible distance, like a wide river, her distress introduce another integral part between the cowherd and the seamstress. of the Milky Way metaphor: water. The Only the first of the three poems Milky Way has long been characterized as that I have selected deals directly with this a long, wide river that stretches across the mythological love story, and shows how sky, as can be seen in its various names: the perception of the Milky Way in ‘,’ (Milky Way River) ‘,’ Chinese poetry has been influenced by it. (Silver River) etc. The water imagery is In the other two poems, both of which further reinforced by the princess’s are composed by the great poet Li Bai, ‘teardrops [sprinkling] down like rain,’ and there is only a brief of the Milky also the observation that ‘the Milky Way is Way toward the final lines: clear and shallow’ – a clear, definitive ‘ It could be the Milky description of the Milky Way as a form of Way, fallen from the heavens’ (Gazing water. There is a very fluid, rhythmic Upon the Lu Mountain Falls) and quality to the entire poem that is brought ‘ Till we meet again far in the about not only through this imagery, but Milky Way’ (Drinking Alone Under the also by the constant repetitive rhyme Moonlight). In reading the two celebrated scheme of repeating two syllables at the poems, however, I felt that the tale still beginning of each line (‘/ lurked below the surface, on the other ’), and also the imagery of side of his consciousness, in the way that the clattering, chattering loom moving the concept was utilized, and that the under the seamstress’s hands. poems themselves could be seen in a new Interestingly, despite its light with the legend, and the Milky Way ‘uncrossability,’ the Milky Way never as defined by this legend, in mind.

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 3! appears to pose a direct threat; that is, it is contradictory, yet completely not characterized as a dangerous space. ‘The understandable, description is supported Milky Way is clear and shallow,’ describes by the following phrase ‘ (The the poet, before emphasizing that it is flying current drops down),’ a line that really the distance and width of the river perfectly captures the momentary that presents itself as a the real obstacle suspension of time and motion as the separating the two lovers. ‘ water current falls over the precipice, both (For ages they cannot exchange a word)’, flying yet descending. says the poet, a line that highlights both It is no wonder, then, that the the suffering of the two lovers in their utter beauty and grandeur of the spectacle division and also the impossible distance leaves Li Bai pondering – suspecting (‘’) between them, not only in space but also – that the waterfall is not of any human in time. For all its fluidity, the Milky Way realm, but rather the Milky Way River does not flow from one lover to descended from the heavens. It certainly another, but parallel to both their shores. befits the qualities defined in ‘,’ of Thus, the Milky Way is defined as an width and immutability and suspension, immutable, ineffable, eternal river flowing and the connection of the river to the suspended in the heavens. heavens is further reinforced by Li Bai’s This characterization, then, leads us quite conveniently to the next poem, rhyming of ‘’ (which descends) at the end which is Li Bai’s ‘ (Gazing of the second line with ‘’ (which ascends) Upon the Lu Mountain Falls),’ where it is at the end of the fourth. The juxtaposition obvious that the idea of the Milky Way as of the two contrasting motions within the a river was also very much ingrained in poem, one up toward the sky and one Li’s sensibilities of it, even though the down from the sky, both appear to reflect poem itself does not reference the folktale an unconscious desire on the part of the in any direct way. In this poem, Li Bai poet to grow closer to the heavens presents his impression of the wondrous himself, perhaps in a never-ending effort landscape of both the Xiang Lu peak and to attain a level of immortality or eternity the Lu Mountain cascade, in a – as all artists, it seems, strive to do. The juxtaposition of two very different smoke rising above like incense, the movements: rising up, and falling down. torrential river descending mightily from The first, quite masterful line, Li Bai deftly up high – both seem to signify a kind of inadvertent yearning and reaching out that uses the mountain peak’s name is reflected in the movement of what Li (‘Incense Burner’) to create an upward- Bai sees. If one superimposes the moving image; the sun rising slowly above Cowherd and the Seamstress’s tale on this the peak, signifying light and flame, dynamic, it is not difficult to see Li Bai creates an ethereal tableau as the morning and the Heavens separated by the Lu mist ascends like incense smoke. Mountain cascade. This slow, upward motion is This desire appears to come to a sharply in contrast with the rest of the poem, which turns its eye toward the full head in the last poem, ‘ mountain’s torrential waterfall descending Drinking Alone Under the Moonlight.’ I down below. Here, also, there is a curious have used Ezra Pound’s translation here, coexistence of descent and suspension, rather than my own, as I feel that he struck just the right balance between where the phrase ‘ ’presents us poetic artistry and accurate translation, with a ‘long river hanging.’ This

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 4! thereby elegantly conveying the whimsical, cold utilitarian nature in the way he amusing, but at the same time bittersweet defines his friendship in the poem, and somewhat desolate experience of referring to it in the second-to-last line as ‘ drinking alone. Pound, it seems, ’: unfettered. There is no understands best the gently ironic, sentimentality, no desperate emotions or sarcastic tone that Li Bai adopts here. clinging here, only the enjoyment of Outwardly, Li appears to be having a oneself in shallow, straightforward light-hearted, fanciful conversation with companionship and drunkenness. his drinking companions the moon and It is ironic, then, that Li his shadow, dancing and conversing with simultaneously makes such a grand them, but constantly lurking in each line is declaration in the final line of the poem: ‘ a complete consciousness of how absurd (Till we meet again far in these companions are, and in truth how the Milky Way).’ Knowing all too well very alone he is in this experience. from ‘Lu Mountain Cascade’ that the The first line ‘ (I Milky Way as an eternal, celestial river is pour alone but with no friend at hand)’ ingrained deeply in Li Bai’s mind, it is quite decisively defines Li Bais situation, curious to see that he casts his new and serves as a backdrop as to why he is ‘friendship’ with the moon and the acting the way he is in the poem. The fifth shadow to the sky, to a place immutable and sixth lines are most indicative of his and endless. Indeed, Li’s relationship with amused, and somewhat self-pitying, mode his drinking companions can be seen as of thought: ‘/ the absolute antithesis of the sentiments (Though the moon understands none of and ideas expressed in ‘’ drinking, and/The shadow just follows and ‘,’; there is nothing eternal, my body vainly).’ Li is drinking and mystical, or emotionally resonant in Li’s dancing with companions who know frolicking with his friends, only a sad, nothing of either drinking or dancing, but ironic, bittersweet whimsicality that at this moment when there are ‘no friends attempts to mask Li’s loneliness. In at hand’ the moon and the shadow must promising to meet his companions in this suffice – and, it seems, with enough ‘unfettered’ friendship in a mythological liquor, Li can fool himself at least for the space that is defined by eternity, yearning, moment into thinking that he is not so and sentimentality, Li Bai, in a final, alone. crowning gesture of irony, is This fleeting quality of this self- acknowledging the futility of his efforts to illusion is also acknowledged in the lines ‘ attain immortality. By invoking something / (We cheer in so great, so profoundly high above, so delight when being awake/We separate unfathomable, at the end of a poem that apart after getting drunk).’ The poet has mostly dealt with a sense of individual enjoys himself as much as he can with his amusement and whimsicality, Li Bai new-found friends in the waking moments appears to be admitting and also poking of his drinking, and when he has drunk fun at the relative smallness of his own enough, when he is sufficiently tipsy, he existence in the context of the world, of ‘ departs, no longer needing those drinking .’ companions. This attitude is underlined in What Li Bai is referring to in ‘ the corresponding rhyme of ‘ ,’ then, is not only a sense of the (welcoming, delight)’and ‘ (separation, Milky Way as an eternal river, but the very dissemination).’ There is a simple, almost

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 5! attainment of immortality, the state of mythologization. The age-old legend of the Cowherd and the Seamstress and the immovable, everlasting constellations in the sky are both facets of the eternal heavenly river, facets that Li Bai understands so well but – in his opinion – cannot reach himself. In a kind of cruel, poetic irony, the very river that stands as a symbol of the immortality he so yearns can also be imposed upon the circumstances as the metaphorical barrier that separates him from his desire, much as the Milky Way separated the Cowherd and the Seamstress. Moreover, though li Bai himself may not know, the very poem where he lamented the futility of aspiring toward eternity also granted it to him, in that ‘’ is one of his most-loved, celebrated, and translated poems today. Like this, the Milky Way as defined by the folktale of the Cowherd and the Seamstress claims a distinct presence in cultural consciousness. It encapsulates perfectly several contradictory, conflicting qualities: movement (change) and eternity, love and separation, breathtaking beauty and extended suffering. Yet the one sentiment it seems to signify the most is the sense of wistful yearning, not only of two lovers toward each other as we saw in ‘ ’, but also that of an artist, and his never-ending struggle toward an ideal. The Milky Way in Chinese poetry is both the struggle and the ideal, the heavenly paradise that poets reach toward and also the immutable space that stands between them and their goal.

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ADVANCING “VIRTUAL CIVIL SOCIETY” IN CHINA: Problems and Prospects Eddie Skolnick ’12

ABSTRACT early 2011 and of how more debilitating crackdowns on virtual civil society can be This policy paper provides a avoided. Next, the paper identifies where preliminary field study regarding the there is need for improvement in the advancement of civil society in China via development of China’s virtual civil the internet. The paper begins by society, and suggests what the realistic evaluating how and to what extent the prospects are for further advancing civil internet has become a forum for “virtual society online. civil society” in China, and then goes on The final section deals with the to hypothesize how the internet might question of outside advocacy and how also develop as a force for advancing civil outside entities, either governmental or society in China more generally. Particular civil society-based, can best approach attention is given to the rise of China in a constructive way in order to “” in China, and the direct facilitate the domestic advancement of impacts of this phenomenon on Chinese civil society. The paper concludes with a society, as well as the implications for the series of recommendations for the ways in future of China’s governance. which United States actors should push The first section of the paper is a for both an ideal and a pragmatic agenda preliminary description of the current vis-à-vis these problems in China. state of the . It attempts to paint a picture of to what extent civil INTRODUCTION society is flourishing on the Internet, and what the developments have been in this In March 2008, a Chinese store- regard in recent years from a domestic owner Peng Gaofeng ( 彭高峰) Chinese perspective. The primary experienced the greatest horror imaginable question here is why certain online for any parent – his only son, Wenle (文 movements, such as the 2005 petitioning ), who at the time was three years old, campaign, have been successful, while was abducted by a man right outside of others have not. The central case study for his house in the southern metropolis of this paper is that of the “Child Beggar Shenzhen.1 For the next several months, Campaign” of 2010, in which websites Peng traveled back-and-forth across post photographs of missing children in China, desperately searching for his lost an attempt to help parents reconnect with son. Despite suggestions by the police that them. Through this and other examples, Wenle would not be found, he relentlessly this analysis uncovers what have been the persisted in his search, even going so far challenges, successes, failures, and as to join in a protest at the Olympic frustrations of civil society groups Green in . He questioned how the operating on the internet in China. There Chinese government was able to host the is also a discussion of the official backlash 2008 Olympics, yet the authorities were against the Child Beggar Campaign in still unable to find his son.

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After nearly three years of conscience.”5 The microblogs are searching for Wenle to no avail, a designed so that any “netizens” (slang for promising potential lead as to Wenle’s internet users) can upload photographs whereabouts finally arose on a Chinese that they have taken of children begging microblogging website.2 Deng Fei (), on the streets in blog posts that also a journalist from Phoenix Weekly, had include the date and location. Parents of been helping Peng for some time in his abducted children can then go onto these search for his son by posting Wenle’s websites and attempt to identify their lost picture on his weibo account, the Chinese children. The success of the so-called equivalent of .3 With over 100,000 “Child Beggar Campaign” has resonated followers, Deng hoped that his microblog throughout China, with dozens of success could function as a sort of “virtual milk stories inspiring constantly increasing carton,” and that someone would be able participation and innovation in to recognize Wenle by his distinctive facial microblogs.6 features. In February 2011, during the From the point of view of an beginning of the Chinese New Year outsider looking in, the story of Peng holiday, when many urban Chinese return Gaofeng and the ensuing Child Beggar to their hometowns to celebrate with their Campaign provide a case in point for the families, one user recognized Wenle in development of civil society in China Pizhou, a city in northern Jiansu province, today. The implications of this and other over one thousand miles north of such movements for the future of China’s Shenzhen. The user contacted Peng, who governance are complex and manifold, immediately traveled to Pizhou along with and it is becoming increasingly clear that the local police from Shenzhen. The now the internet and microblogs in particular six-year-old Wenle recognized his father at are central to the future of China’s first glance, and after DNA tests burgeoning civil society. Today’s China is confirmed the boy’s identity, the father undergoing nothing short of a tectonic and son were finally reunited. shift in terms of the treatment of human The highly emotional and tearful rights, such as freedom of speech, by the reunion was broadcast live via the Communist regime, so the question of internet, and Peng asserted that he how China’s leaders are responding to unequivocally believed this miracle was these developments is as relevant as it is due to the power of the internet: “If there timely. Bearing this in mind, this paper was no Internet, I would never have seeks to assess the problems and found my son.”4 The story of Peng and prospects of advancing “virtual civil Wenle received wide media attention both society” in China today. in China and abroad, and has since sparked a full-fledged movement, MICROBLOGGING AS A TOOL FOR consisting of various microblogging CIVIL SOCIETY accounts all aimed at reuniting lost and abducted children with their families. The Since the vast majority of media sensational popularity of such websites, outlets in China are state-run or state- which have already accumulated hundreds controlled, there is very limited of thousands of followers throughout opportunity for the free flow of China, has been cited as the onset of a information, and there are sharp new era for citizen activism online and a restrictions placed on individuals seeking revolution of China’s “digital to voice their opinions.7 The impressive feat of monitoring and repressing the

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 8! opinions expressed online by hundreds of such as “jasmine” and “revolution.”12 millions of internet users is made possible These are both examples of how by China’s highly advanced mechanism of microblogs are providing an alternative internet supervision, which has been means of information exchange. described by many internet experts as the Furthermore, since weibo are one of the “most sophisticated system in only media sources that are not entirely the world.”8 In light of the government’s sponsored by the Communist Party, they unrelenting suppression of conventional are also of particular appeal to those internet content, many Chinese internet citizens who seek to read about news and users have increasingly resorted to using a engage in the public debate in a way that different online mechanism for the is fundamentally independent of the promulgation of news and the expression Party.13 of different perspectives and points-of- Indeed, many microbloggers on view: microblogs. China’s weibo websites are engaging in a Referred to in Chinese as weibo ( debate over some of the most sensitive 微波), these microblogging websites are and controversial political topics in China different from most other sites in that the today, such as the recent wave of content posted by users is usually of a demonstrations and protest in the Middle relatively small file size, and thus allows East and North Africa, discussions of for the exchange of small amounts of political reform among China’s leaders, information, such as a few short including Premier Wen Jiabao’s recent call sentences, an image, or a link to a video.9 for greater openness, and even the Often compared in format to the presumably “off-limits” discussion of American website Twitter, these weibo Tibet and the Dalai Lama.14 In this sense, have recently become immensely popular weibo are home to a form of political in China, with at least twelve major discussion and debate the likes of which microblogging sites servicing over 120 can scarcely be found elsewhere in China, million users who produce upwards of a albeit, in a virtual world that is made million posts an hour.10 Furthermore, this possible only through the power of the recent explosion of microblogs seems to internet. be outpacing the capabilities of China’s However, there is a definite limit infamously capable censors, providing an on the range of topics that are tolerated by alternative avenue for free speech and the Chinese authorities. Despite the expression under China’s repressive apparent allowance of discussion of the information regime.11 above-mentioned politically-sensitive In an atmosphere in which the subjects on China’s weibo websites, government has blocked several other content related to , the Nobel popular forms of social media, such as Peace Prize-winning human rights activist and YouTube, the immense and political dissident, and Falun Gong, appeal of microblogs for Chinese citizens the outlawed spiritual movement, is is clear. The rising popularity of nevertheless subject to restrictions and microblogs in China has also been fueled monitoring by the government’s internet by the government’s continued blocking police.15 Posts on microblogs pertaining of foreign news sources, such as CNN to such “ultra-sensitive” issues are liable and BBC, and by the recent monitoring to be blocked from re-posting on other and censorship of text messages sent via blogs or simply to be deleted outright. cell phone that contain sensitive words Despite this limited censorship, however, the surging popularity of

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 9! microblogging in China is beginning to appetite for microblogging. It was not exhibit some of the classic features of civil until 2010, however, that microblogs in society, albeit in a virtual world. Weibo China really began to take off, spawning have essentially come to provide a virtual several independent websites, such as the public forum in which Chinese people can microblog described in the introduction. engage in discussions and debates about The heart-wrenching story of Peng matters of public concern, which Gaofeng being reunited with his son in otherwise would be too taboo or February 2011, nearly three years after his dangerous to discuss openly.16 Weibo are abduction, provided a vivid illustration of also increasingly providing an outlet for the power of microblogging. But this Chinese citizens to formulate their own anecdote can be viewed more broadly as opinions and furthermore to express them evidence of the promise of the internet as in a public way.17 In this sense, a potential tool for civil society in China. microblogs in China can be seen as filling Peng’s story further inspired the void left by the lack of a public forum multiple individuals and groups in Chinese society, and creating the throughout China to explore using foundations for what could be regarded as microblogs to help track down more a “virtual civil society.” children, including Peking University The sky-rocketing popularity of sociology professor Yu Jianrong (于建 such microblogging sites in China can ), who founded a microblog with the thus be explained, at least in part, by the express purpose of “taking snapshots to fact that unlike in democratic countries rescue child beggars” (随手拍照解救乞 where there are a wealth of avenues for 儿童 suishou paizhao jiejiu qitao people to exercise their freedom of ertong).21 In less than one month’s time, speech, Chinese people are limited to a Yu’s account had accrued over 200,000 few options, chief among them being followers, and the broader implications of microblogging, where free expression of the movement were beginning to become opinions is a luxury not to be taken for clear. Despite the immense popularity of granted.18 Since China does not have a Yu’s and other similar sites, public free media, an established rule of law, responses to the Child Beggar Campaign general elections for political office, or a were mixed, with its critics insisting that well- functioning system for petitioning this mechanism is flawed in that it might the government for reform or to redress incite retaliation by human traffickers grievances, microblogs have quickly toward the children whose pictures are become one of the most prominent posted on the microblogs.22 Concerns channels for civil society to operate in were also raised about the possibility for China.19 the campaign to create stigmas around

child beggars, who are already an CASE STUDY: THE CHILD BEGGAR extremely vulnerable segment of the CAMPAIGN population.23

The official response to the Child Since Twitter was blocked in Beggar Campaign by the Chinese China in March 2009, along with several government has also been mixed. Initially, other social networking and social media the websites seemed to be embraced by sites, several “knockoffs” of the popular the authorities, who expressed a American microblog were subsequently commitment to confirm and pursue all created by Chinese companies in order to viable leads that were found through the take advantage of the Chinese people’s

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 10! sites.24 However, this initial receptiveness regard.28 It would probably still be seen to the microblogs by police was as beneficial to have ordinary citizens supplanted in late February 2011 by helping out the police through official government backlash against the microblogs. In China, however, the websites.25 Although falling short of an reaction is opposite. Any sort of all-out crackdown on the microblogs, the independent initiatives with regard to law press releases by the official government- enforcement are regarded as a threat to sponsored news agencies sought to the Communist regime; albeit, not enough undermine the credibility of the of a threat to warrant a full-scale crack microblogging sites, and to label the down, such as that of Falun Gong. movement as antithetical to the party Nevertheless, any phenomenon such as line.26 the Child Beggar Campaign is not going At first it may seem perplexing to receive the same kind of praise by the that the government would openly Chinese government that such a social criticize a movement that was providing movement would most likely receive in such an undeniable social good; however, the US. The Communist leadership when taken in light of the unique context cannot simply shut down these weibo, of the Chinese state, this type of reaction under the assertion that they have the is revealed to be an inevitability. Given child beggar problem “under control,” China’s authoritarian regime, where any because the Chinese people are already type of alternative association among observing a noticeable difference in the citizens is perceived as a threat to China’s efficacy of the authorities and civil society “harmonious society,” it is clear why organizations in combating this societal microblogs as popular as these might problem. As these weibo become more make the government nervous.27 With and more popular, China’s blogosphere is followers in the hundreds of thousands, beginning to take on attributes that these weibo sites have seemingly sprung resemble a civil society, the most up in the blink of an eye to provide threatening of which is an avenue for another avenue for connecting people and alternative association that goes beyond actualizing social justice, completely government control. independent of the Communist Party. Since the beginning of the Child Furthermore, the Child Beggar Campaign Beggar Campaign last year, microblogs sites in particular are serving to have quickly expanded to perform other complement law enforcement by functions that are highly characteristic of providing leads and operational support civil society. Some have served to buttress for the police. At the same time, these law enforcement by helping the police to weibo can be embarrassing for the solve cases, while others have even authorities to some degree, since they also exposed corruption among local party serve as a reminder of the Communist officials. Other weibo sites have even Party’s inability to sufficiently address the succeeded in raising money for social problem of child abductions in philanthropic endeavors to benefit the China. poor all across China.29 While many of Were such an initiative to take these microblogs are still in their early hold in the United States, it is likely that it stages of development, the potential of would be met with the response that the such websites to contribute to the authorities are clearly trying very hard to advancement of a virtual civil society in combat child abductions, and that they China is undeniable. have the confidence of the citizenry in this The Implications of Virtual Civil Society

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 11!

The striking ability of microblogs evidence that microblogs are effectively to fill this niche in the development of transforming the way that public opinion China’s civil society has been recognized is formulated in China, since weibo are by many among China’s elite, who have becoming increasingly critical to observed first-hand the empowering determining the content and format of nature of weibo for China’s masses. The public discourse. In this sense, microblogs capacity to mobilize phenomenally large are essentially usurping a key power that numbers of people across geographical has historically been monopolized by the regions is encapsulated in the growth of elite and the state-run media—the power microblogs that boast followers in the to decide “hot topics” and to promulgate millions, such as that of prominent an agenda for public discourse.34 Rather businessman Xu Xiaoping (徐小平).30 than a China in which the masses Xu emphasizes that weibo in China are concerned themselves precisely with developing in a way unlike any other whatever they were told to, weibo are institution in China today, and he introducing a new structure where the succinctly asserts: “Weibo give people people themselves define the origins of power.”31 public opinion. The apparent power of weibo However, when evaluating the manifests itself in a number of forms, accomplishments of microblogging in most notably in terms of influencing terms of advancing civil society in China, China’s tightly controlled public opinion it is important not to mistake this trend as and as a mechanism for the organization evidence of growing leniency among of social movements online. The government authorities regarding free blogosphere in China is increasingly being speech or free expression on the understood as more than just a forum for internet.35 Rather, the failure of censors the free expression of ideas, but as a place to “keep up” and maintain their rigid where people can come together in an content restrictions on weibo sites is more organized way to advance a common likely a result of a combination of other cause – an idea which resonates with factors, including the booming numbers Westerners as the most recognizable aim of microbloggers, the high speed at which of civil society.32 short microblog posts are made, and the In addition to this more abstract unfamiliarity of the new technology.36 conceptualization of virtual civil society in Microblogging in China occurs at such a China, the entrenchment of weibo within fast pace and at such a high volume, that Chinese society has also begun to be government censors are left with no quantified, as is shown by a recent study choice but to adjust their standards for by Xie Gengyun (), a professor at what content is acceptable and what is not.37 This inevitably leads to certain Shanghai Jiaotong University ( politically sensitive topics getting through, Shanghai Jiaotong Daxue). Xie’s while only the most divisive and report shows that for Chinese citizens, polarizing posts end up being blocked. weibo are now regarded as the most The explosion of microblogging in reliable and trustworthy sources for China has forced government leaders to information and news, surpassing in look for new and innovative ways to popularity more conventional media like combat the rise of civil society via the newspapers, and even other internet- internet. One such method is to have based sources, such as online forums and lower level party officials create weibo blogs.33 Xie interprets these findings as accounts of their own. This practice has

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 12! spread among local Communist Party strengthen their mechanisms for bosses, into the ranks of propaganda “guiding” public opinion. department, municipal police This speech by President Hu is departments, and even the provincial particularly noteworthy because it took party chief in Xinjiang province.38 This place so soon after the Egyptian President strategy has been encouraged by Hosni Mubarak resigned as leader and individuals such as Chen Tong (), the relinquished power under pressure from executive vice president and editor in weeks-long protests in Cairo’s Tahrir chief of Sina.com, which is the largest Square and elsewhere throughout . website in China and also host to the This event in turn also prompted an country’s most popular weibo. Thanks to emergency meeting of the Chinese his advocating for party officials to Politburo to address the surging wave of embrace this trend, he reportedly similar uprisings throughout the Middle convinced one hundred members of East, and to discuss what ramifications China’s parliament to launch their own this might hold for China.43 Coming weibo accounts during their most recent from the absolute highest level of the annual meeting in March, indicating that Chinese Communist hierarchy, Hu’s this strategy is gradually making its way speech demonstrated a profound into higher levels of the Communist understanding of the potentially Party.39 Despite these increased efforts by revolutionary power of the Chinese the Party to infiltrate the weibo, internet, and expressed a surprisingly government officials’ prominence in the frank admittance that the internet was well so-called “blogosphere” pales in on its way to developing an alternative comparison to that of other public figures, avenue for Chinese people to associate such as athletes, singers, and other with each other besides the Communist- entertainers.40 These highly popular sanctioned channels. accounts have been known to accumulate as many as ten million followers each.41 OUTSIDE ADVOCACY However, whether or not such immensely popular blogs can serve as a boon for civil Since 2010, microblogging has society is much more uncertain. exploded on the Chinese internet as one China’s Communist leaders seem of the most popular forms of alternative to be well aware of the rise of virtual civil association among Chinese people, society in China, and of the potential naturally making the Chinese government threat that this might pose to their regime. extremely nervous and increasingly aware Their understanding of the internet and its of the threat posed by the growth of a rising influence in China was exemplified virtual civil society in China. The rise of in a speech on February 19, 2011 by microblogging does not comport with the Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡涛), in story of triumphant Chinese nationalism which he instructed a rovincial-level Party under the Communist Party, and has cadre that the Communist Party as a revealed a number of underlying social whole must do a better job controlling the problems that are indicative of the void growth of the internet and the xuni shehui left by the absence of a full-fledged civil society in China. The internet as a whole, (虚社会), or “virtual society,” that it is and microblogs in particular, provides the creating.42 In the same vein, he went on best means for spreading awareness of to say that China’s leaders must work to these kinds of social issues, since it is the

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 13! effectively the only form of social media instituting more systemic protections in in China that is not fully censored. the future, ideally leading to complete Furthermore, there has been an internet freedom. increased frequency and rate of success As of today, weibo such as those among independent initiatives by Chinese contributing to the Child Beggar citizens to strengthen civil society online, Campaign are being criticized by the often drawing on the models of other Communist Party, but that is not websites. This is evidence of the fact that necessarily reason to worry just yet. In such initiatives are not isolated cases, but recent years, other internet groups have rather are indicative of a larger been shut down entirely by government phenomenon. The success of certain censors, and yet these microblogs websites in addressing important social continue to grow and thrive.45 This gives issues, such as child abductions and such groups all the more reason to adopt human trafficking, have been shown to be strategies to preempt a government able to complement law enforcement, but crackdown, by evading ultra-sensitive this is also potentially very embarrassing political issues, and instead focusing all of for the authorities. The sky-rocking their energies and efforts on popularity of microblogs has also made it accomplishing their social missions. In much clearer where the government this vein, the question for internet-based censors draw the line in terms of what is NGOs in China becomes not so much and is not acceptable as “free speech” on about quelling government criticism, but the internet. rather about what should be done to The challenge posed by the prevent a crackdown in this area. internet to the authority of the ruling There is also some promise in that has been the rise of virtual civil society has further increasingly magnified in recent months in exposed the fact that the Chinese light of the revolutionary wave of government is not a monolith, particularly demonstrations and protests in the Middle with regard to issues pertaining to the East and North Africa and the crucial role internet. For outside actors, it is important that websites such as Facebook and to recognize that China’s internet is in Twitter have played in these many ways further along than many other movements.44 Furthermore, the recent parts of the world in terms of developing crackdown by the Chinese government on civil society online, and this should be political dissidents has elevated the thoughtfully acknowledged in discourses importance of virtual civil society and with Chinese counterparts. It would not highlighted the vulnerability of online be very prudent for the United States to movements to government restrictions. sing the praises of China’s weibo as The ideal goal for Chinese civil running counter to the aims of the society organizations should be to insulate Communist Party, but rather, the US themselves and websites associated with should commend such websites on their them from government criticism and successes in combating social ills as a backlash in order to prevent a more severe distinctively “Chinese solution” to a crackdown by the government on such universal problem. websites. In doing so, they will allow Additionally, although it might virtual civil society to continue to grow in seem natural for the US government to China. Internet-based NGOs can adopt want to provide funding to these internet- tactics to help protect themselves from based NGOs, either through the Bureau government criticism, as a step towards of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 14!

(DRL) or the US Agency for International exchange, such as holding a conference on Development (USAID), such efforts to microblogging and the implications it has provide financial support for China’s for governance, would be an ideal way for virtual civil society may actually end up both countries to share and learn from backfiring, since they would then run the each other, while also strengthening the risk of being associated with unsolicited legitimacy of such websites. If such American involvement in domestic endeavors are organized through Chinese affairs. Finally, the US academia, they are much less likely to be government should shy away from direct perceived as threatening by the Chinese tactical advice to the Chinese leaders government. These track II exchanges are themselves. Rather, China’s leaders must also beneficial in that they emphasize the come to realize on their own the potential fact that the question of using the internet benefits of a vibrant virtual civil society to address social problems is not at all for China’s future. unique to China, but is also highly relevant to the United States. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 3. Avoid compromising what has already What follows is a short list of been achieved general policy recommendations for both The United States government US civil society organizations and the US should do its best to prevent undermining government for how to best support the what has already begun to take shape as advancement of virtual civil society in China’s virtual civil society. For those China: websites that are not yet under attack, we should aim to safeguard them as best as 1. Learn from Chinese successes possible, by not bringing excessive American-based civil society international attention to them or organizations should make efforts to learn providing direct funding, which might from the successes of Chinese-based cause them to be labeled as “American groups in using the internet to further tools.” This will allow more space for civil their causes. China’s internet is far beyond society to develop on its own in China. that of most other counties in terms of The United States should also shy away the political relevance of online discourse from direct, tactical advice to the Chinese and the widespread nature of internet leadership itself regarding how to address phenomena. American non-governmental the development of civil society on the organizations can seek ways to emulate internet. Given enough time to grow, this their Chinese counterparts in terms of online movement has the potential to how they make use of the internet, and propose profound systemic reforms in various models that have proven to be China, but only if we do not compromise widely effective and popular in China can the progress that has already been made. be adapted for use in the United States. CONCLUSION 2. Pursue “track II” diplomacy Actors within the United States The political impact of connectivity made should put emphasis on “track II” possible by weibo is undeniable. These dialogue with their Chinese counterparts online tools serve to strengthen the in order to buttress the growth of virtual Chinese people’s sense of selves, sense of civil society in China. Non-threatening community, and sense of the political and mutually-beneficial avenues of process.46 The blogosphere is unlike any

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 15! other form of association in China today 1 Interview with Rebecca MacKinnon, New America Fo undation. See also Ziyue Tai, The Internet in China: Cyb in that it decisively cuts across geographic erspace and Civil Society, (New York: Routledge, 2006), lines and class lines. The internet takes pp. 3-24. people out of the physical confines of 1 Guobin Yang, The Power of the Internet in China: Citi zen Activism Online, (New York: Columbia University P their natural communities, and places ress, 2009), pp. 126-8. them in a broader, de-territorialized space. 1 Keith B. Richburg, “In China, microblogging sites bec It is thanks to this dynamism that the ome free- speech platform,” The Washington Post, livepage.apple. internet holds such vast potential in terms comhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/world/in-china- of creating a virtual civil society in China. microblogging-sites-become-free-speech- Judging from the developments over the platform/2011/03/22/AFcsxlkB_story.html. 1 Interview with Cathy Yan, The Wall Street Journal. See past year, microblogs hold great promise also Xiaoling Zhang and Yongnian Zheng, China’s Infor as an invaluable tool for civil society mation and Communications Technology Revolution: S organizations. However, despite the fact ocial changes and state responses, (New York: Routledge , 2009), pp. 4-7. that many of these websites are not yet 1 Michael Kan, “China blocks microblogs for Jasmine Re under attack from the Communist regime, volution,” IDG, http://news.idg.no/cw/art.cfm?id=A1 there are signs that China’s leaders are B048E7-1A64-6A71-CE3AF5E4803C886E. 1 Richard McGregor, The Party: The Secret World of C becoming increasingly aware of the threat hina's Communist Rulers, (New York: Harper Collins Pu posed by this phenomenon. It is in this blishers, 2010) pp. 46-51. context and with a full appreciation of the 1 Jon Russell, “Microblogging in China: Politics, censors hip & 120 million users,” asiancorrespondent.com, livep nuances of Chinese society that outsiders age.apple.comhttp://asiancorrespondent.com/51332/m must approach the internet in China. Only icroblogging-in-china-politics-censorship- 120-million- then can we hope to be able to safeguard users/. 1 Austin Ramzy, “China‘s Crackdown on Dissidents Con China’s nascent virtual society, and tinues,” Time, http://www.time.com/time/world/article perhaps give it more room to grow. /0,8599,1963609,00.html. 1 Interview with Hu Yong, Associate Professor of Journ alism at Peking University. See also Qiusha Ma, Non- Governmental Organizations in Contemporary China: P 1 “ aving the Way to Civil Society? (New York: Routledge, 2 (Little Wenle returned home yesterday, father turns self 006), p. 15. into volunteer),” 1 Reza Hasmath and Jennifer Hsu, China in an Era of Tr (Xianzai News), http://news.cnxianzai.com/2011/02/3 ansition: Understanding Contemporary State and Society 14665.html. Actors, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 19- 1 “Weibo reunites father with kidnapped son after three l 29. ong years,” shanghaiist, http://shanghaiist.com/2011/0 1 “News Media Tool Floods China,” The Asia Business, 2/09/weibo_reunites_father_kidnapped_son.php. http://eng.ajnews.co.kr/view.jsp?newsId=20110329000 1 Link to Deng Fei’s microblog account: http://t.qq.com 181. /dengfei/. 1 Interview with Jing Chen, Princeton University. See als 1 Louisa Lim, “In China, Dad Uses Social Media To Fin o Neil J. Diamant, Stanley B. Lubman, and Kevin J. O‘Br d Missing Boy,” NPR, http://www.npr.org/2011/02/10 ien, Engaging the Law in China: State, Society, and Possi /133644822/Chinas-Social-Media-Help-To-Rescue- bilities for Justice, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2 Abducted-Boy. 005) pp. 114- 1 C. Custer, “Child Beggars and a Revolution of Digital 121 and Jonathan Schwartz and Shawn Shieh, State and Conscience,” ChinaGeeks, http://chinageeks.org/2011/ Society Responses to Social Welfare Needs in China: Ser 02/child-beggars-and-a-revolution-of-digital- ving the People, (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 28. conscience/. 1 Stan Schroeder, “China Blocks Twitter (And Almost E 1 (Cai Shenglong) and (He Jianhui), “ verything Else),” Mashable, http://mashable.com/2009 900 /06/02/china-blocks-twitter-and-almost-everything- else/. (Child beggar campaign attracts attention, netizens post 1 Link to Yu Jianrong‘s account: http://t.sin over 900 pictures),” a.com.cn/jiejiuqier. (Tencent News), http://news.qq.com/a/20110207/000 1 Qiu Ming, “Stop Running and Think For A Moment,” 095.htm. XXZB, http://www.zonaeuropa.com/201102a.brief.htm 1 Yongnian Zheng and Joseph Fewsmith, China’s Openi #016. ng Society: The Non- 1 He Caitou, “Who Is Being Abducted And Sold Off?” State Sector and Governance, (New York: Routledge, 20 http://www.zonaeuropa.com/201102a.brief.htm#015. 08), p. 88. 1 “Family holiday strengthens campaign to rescue stolen

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 16! children,” Xinhua, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2 cnt.aspx?id=20110222000067&cid=1101. 010/indepth/2011-02/07/c_13721776.htm. 1 Perry Link, “How China Fears the Middle East Revolut 1 Evan Kornbluh, “Official Backlash Against the Child ions,” The New York Review of Books, http://www.ny Beggar Campaign,” West of Middle, http://westofmiddl books.com/articles/archives/2011/mar/24/how-china- e.wordpress.com/2011/02/22/official-backlash-against- fears-middle-east-revolutions/. the-child-beggar-campaign/. 1 Michael Sainsbury, “China hits Gmail in censorship cra 1 “Downsides unseen of child- ckdown,” The Australian, livepage.apple.comhttp://ww abduction blug, online rogues,” Global Times, http://op w.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/china-hits-gmail-in- inion.globaltimes.cn/editorial/2011-02/622091.html. censorship-crackdown/story-e6frg6so- 1226025648501. 1 Ma, pp. 45-6. 1 Thank you to Evan Osnos for this important point. 1 Thank you to Martin Flaherty for this observation. 1 Some microblogs have even been taken on more entre REFERENCES preneurial forms, as exemplified by a campaign initiated by bloggers in the days leading up to Valentine‘s Day, w Balme, Stephanie, and Michael W Dowdle. ho in reference to Yu‘s inspirational model named their Building Constitutionalism in China. New York: weibo: “taking snapshots to rescue singles” ( Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. , Suishou paizhao jiejiu danshen) http://t.gztv.com/in Brook, Timothy, and B. Michael Frolic. Civil dex.php?m=ta&name=. Society in China. New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1997. 1 Link to Xu‘s Sina Weibo account: http://blog.sina.com .cn/xuxiaoping. Cai, Yongshun. State and Laid-Off Workers in 1 Yang Yang, “Information flow draws more people to w Reform China: The Silence and Collective Action of the eibo,” China Daily Europe, http://europe.chinadaily.co Retrenched. New York: Routledge, 2005. m.cn/epaper/2011-04/22/content_12376555.htm. 1 Baogang He, The Democratic Implications of Civil So Chan, Chris King-Chi. The Challenge of Labour in ciety in China, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997), p China: Strikes and the Changing Labour Regime in p. 13-18. Global Factories. London: Routledge, 2010. 1 Pang Qi, “Micro- blogging increasing rapidly in China,” Global Times, htt p://china.globaltimes.cn/society/2011-04/606969.html. Daniere, Amrita, and Mike Douglass. The Politics of Civic Space in Asia: Building urban communities. 1 “ New York: Routledge, 2009. (Microblogs have become a platform for free- speech for China‘s masses),” Davis, Deborah, and Feng Wang. Creating Wealth (The Epoch Times), http://www.epochtimes.com/gb/ and Poverty in Postsocialist China. Stanford: Stanford 11/4/6/n3219992p.htm. University Press, 2008. 1 Thank you to Elizabeth Wickeri for this important obs ervation. 1 Simon Shen and Shaun Breslin, Online Chinese Nation Deng, Zhenglai . Country and Society: alism and China’s Bilateral Relations, (New York: Lexing China Civil Society Research, : ton Books, 2010), p. 75. (Guojia yu shehui: Zhongguo shimin shehui 1 David Barboza, “Despite Restrictions, Microblogs Catc yanjiu). Chengdu : Sichuan People's Publishing h on in China,” The New York Times, http://www.nyti House, 1997. mes.com/2011/05/16/business/global/16blogs.html. 1 Zheng jinran, “Xinjiang Party chief opens micro blog,” Diamant, Neil J, Stanley B Lubman, and Kevin J China Daily, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011 O'Brien. Engaging the Law in China: State, Society, and npc/2011-03/03/content_12110976.htm. Possibilities for Justice. Stanford: Stanford University 1 “China‘s leaders embrace social media,” China Media P Press, 2005. roject, http://cmp.hku.hk/2011/03/02/10346/. 1 Xiang Zhou, “The political blogosphere in China: A co ntent analysis of the blogs regarding the dismissal of Sh Dittmer, Lowell, and Guoli Liu. China's Deep anghai leader Chen Liangyu,” New Media & Society, Sha Reform: Domestic Politics in Transition. Lanham, ntou University, http://nms.sagepub.com/content/11/6 Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006. /1003.full.pdf. 1 “Chinese microblogs growing faster than Twitter,” Wa Friedmann, John. China's Urban Transition. nt ChinaTimes, http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news- Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005. subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20110520000007&cid=1503. 1 Xuni shehui can also be translated as “imaginary societ Hao, Yufan, and Lin Su. China's Foreign Policy y” or “fictitious society.” http://news.qq.com/a/201102 Making: Societal Force And Chinese American Policy. 20/000168.htm Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005. 1 Ju Li- chyun, “Politburo Plans Ahead to Stile Discussion of U nrest,” Want China Times, http://www.wantchinatimes.c om/news-subclass-

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Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 18!

THE “RISK-AVERSE” JAPANESE-JAPANESE ENTREPRENEURSHIP Princeton Kwong ’12

INTRODUCTION that fuel Japan’s economy were all originally the ideas of American In the last decade, Japan has been entrepreneurs. The first general, all- relatively stagnant in its entrepreneurial purpose computer, ENIAC, was activities. As opposed to American conceived in 1946 in the U.S. Ford corporations, where avant-garde revolutionized automobile production in innovation is a key criterion to modern 1908 in the U.S. Although Japan prides success, a bulk of Japanese business and maintains itself as one of the world’s wealth today is accumulated through foremost retailers in the automobile and “dynasty” corporations; that is, companies technology industries, these coveted that have been in the industry for several productions alone have not been enough decades. These already-established to raise Japan out of its recession. companies utilize their veteran status in History clearly shows that “that their respective industries to take pre- the business likely to drive economies 25 existing concepts that have been years from now will NOT come from developed elsewhere and improve upon today’s large established companies, but them. When one thinks of the major, from the efforts of entrepreneurs starting money-earning industries in Japan, the companies yesterday, today, or first thoughts that come to mind are tomorrow.” iNoriyuki Takahashi, a automobiles and electronic technology: professor of economics from Musashi Japanese world corporations. One may University in Tokyo, Japan states, "Unless view a 3-D television set from Sony as new firms are created, the Japanese “innovative” technology, however, this is economy won't easily be revitalized, but not an entrepreneurial idea nor is it a start- that recognition has yet to emerge."ii up to a new enterprise. The product is Statistics from the Global still merely a TV with improved Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) have modifications. Additionally, the new car clearly shown that the rate of new firm models released every few years from emergence in Japan remains shockingly Japanese automotive industries such as low compared to that of its neighbors’. Toyota and Honda may be seen as According to the Total “innovative” with their refurbished Entrepreneurial Activity (TEA) consisting designs, GPS systems, and plethora of of the top 65 countries, data from GEM modern, integrated technology. shows that Japan has consistently Nevertheless, these are again simply oscillated from last place to 64th place, improvements made from the original next to Puerto Rico, within the last entrepreneurial corporate designs that decade.iii Note that the TEA percentage is were established in Japan following the obtained by measuring each country’s advent of the automobile in the early entrepreneurial activity as a percentage of 1900s. It is important to note that the that country’s GDP. Seeing that Japan’s automobiles and electronics industries GDP is second only to the United States,

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 19! one would assume that similarly to the sociology theoretical approach to provide U.S., Japan’s entrepreneurial activity general frameworks to better understand would rank high as well. Puerto Rico has the prosperity of entrepreneurship in one of the lowest GDPs in the world at a America and the adversity to it in Japan. I -5.80% growth rateiv, which signifies that will then differentiate my research into Japan’s entrepreneurial activity stands three subcategories. Firstly, I will analyze appallingly low, on par with the business structures in Japanese underdeveloped countries despite having companies and their internal hierarchal the status of an economically superior properties. Next, I will evaluate cultural country. I found it quite disturbing to and societal backings specific to Japan in discover that Japan is so behind this order to ascertain a pattern between stratum. Thus, I decided to research the Japanese cultural tendencies and the fear reasons behind the stagnant properties of of entrepreneurship. And thirdly, I will Japanese entrepreneurship. utilize the Geert Hofstede framework, Why has Japan lagged in its which provides a comprehensive study of movement away from entrepreneurship how values in the workplace are and novel platforms for its companies? influenced by culture, and I will use those Popular preconceptions and stereotypes findings to link back to my prior two of Japanese would offer the convenient research results on Japanese business and answer: “The Japanese are opportunists cultural explanations. Finally, after laying and are afraid to take risks.” The world down the overall structure of the has looked upon Japan’s new Prime shortcomings that are inhibiting Minister, Naoto Kan, as a risk-averse entrepreneurship in Japan, I will conclude opportunist.v “Rather than a crusading with a generally positive direction for visionary, Kan looks more like a Japanese entrepreneurship in the future. stereotypical Japanese salary man: a bland, opportunistic, risk-averse leader who KEY CHARACTERISTICS OF A prefers to go with the flow.” Throughout SUCCESSFUL ENTREPRENEUR his term, contrary to the insistence of his cabinet members, Kan opted to not Before we delve into the analysis, challenge any of Japan’s status quos. however, it is important to first define the However, despite these publicized words, key characteristics of a successful it would be baseless and fallacious to use entrepreneur in order to understand the Japanese clichés and stigmatic images as areas in which Japan is lacking. Successful the sole explanation for the lack of entrepreneurship can be summed up entrepreneurial activity in Japan. In order overall into five categories: risk, drive, to find more substantive and concrete experience, organization, and leadership.vi evidence to answer this question, I The ability to take on risks is decided to investigate deeper not only arguably the most crucial element in Japanese societal influences but the starting a company. Risk plays an Japanese business structure as well. increasingly large role in entrepreneurship Through my research, I have as public needs becomes more difficult to found that there are several factors that predict and interpret. Thus, a good contribute to the dormant nature of the entrepreneur must know and understand entrepreneurial drive. In this paper, I the risks at hand and must be brave and want to show that the lack of daring enough to take on both the entrepreneurial activity is something expected and unforeseen challenges. inherently Japanese. Initially, I will use a Even amidst product failure, successful

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 20! entrepreneur has the ability to rebound Having established what is needed and try again; unfazed by past failures. for a generally successful entrepreneur, let Drive refers to recognition of us now interpret the general layouts opportunity, vision, and persistence. In among business styles, which is critical for order to succeed, goals must be focused understanding what creates or bridles this upon to ensure that demands are met and generation’s entrepreneurial drive. In that a solid directive is maintained. Vision sociological organizational theory, there allows for novelty, innovation, and are three main systems that model the administration of the current and future developmental paths of companies. movement of the company. Passion and These three organizational perspectives, persistence are needed, as the or systems, are Rational Systems, Natural entrepreneur must be completely Systems, and Open Systems. For this committed to building his company even paper, I will focus on the initial two: in rough times, which undoubtedly Rational and Natural Systems. accompany any startup. Rational Systems can be thought Experience is what allows an of as formalized bureaucracy. This system entrepreneur to draw upon previous closely models pre-established and technical knowledge and background in relatively large firms. Overall, the most order to manage the technical aspects of important characteristic of an organization the company. A lack of experience leads in this system is accomplishing specific, to the inadequacy of handling future solid goals and adhering to the formal, unforeseen problems. written roles that help lead to the overall Organization is key to maintaining goal of the organization. Boundaries the firm as a singular unit. within the company are highly formalized Communication must be fluid amongst and activities in the company are defined the members of the company, as the initial by roles and role relationships. There is a count is sparse. All must be devoted to clear hierarchy of authority, almost the goal of the company, and priorities bureaucratic in form. Since the division must be properly delegated to ensure of labor is so extreme, there is a high maximum efficiency amongst the fledgling degree of de-skilling of the worker and company. dehumanization of the workplace. Finally, leadership is a necessity Managers direct their workers through for any aspiring entrepreneur. Looking at strict administration, and in turn, worker this past decade’s thriving American moral and productivity is optimized startups such as Google and Facebook, it through material incentives. The system is evident that Lawrence Page, Sergey runs on task relationships, rules, and Brin, and Mark Zuckerberg, the respective rewards. This models the very traditional CEOs of these two companies, all share form of Japanese “dynasty” companies. these commanding qualities. When Recently, however, entrepreneurs of the looking at Japanese startups, experience, world have been shifting away from this organization, and leadership may be particular organizational perspective and visible, but it appears that there is a severe have begun a movement toward a more lack of risk taking and opportunity conducive system of starting new exploitation. companies. Natural Systems is a framework of JAPANESE VS. U.S. an organization that holds a different ORGANIZATIONAL MODELS mindset toward goals, boundaries, and activities and is widely connected with

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 21! entrepreneurial companies and smaller itself. Employees are encouraged to enjoy firms. This system generally relies heavily their freedom to pursue their desires. upon the human resource and relation This mentality has been preserved sectors of the company. The goals are not throughout Google’s startup process, and purely instrumental to the company, but the straying from strict hierarchal rather are a conglomerate of the boundaries has been an essential aspirations of the employees of the trademark of most up-and-coming company. Behavior of the participants is entrepreneurial firms. The freedom and not guided strictly by formal and written united direction within these companies rules set by the organization. However, has allowed for an unhindered mind in the organization does function as a sort of pushing into novel boundaries and social system for its participants. Here the markets. Natural System-style participants feel as though perpetuation of organizations model the ideal conception the company as a whole is an essential of an entrepreneurial company. part of pursuing their own desires and Japanese large firms, on the other goals. The employees work for the hand, are represented by a Rational company not for monetary incentives but System-like company structure; one of because of their love for their work and bureaucratic nature. Thus far, I have their drive to prolong the company. gained an understanding of Japanese Natural System closely fits U.S. smaller company mindset and attitudes and have companies in their fledgling state, where examined how the many aspects of strict cooperation and unified drive is critical in bureaucracy in Japanese companies have launching a productive company. These led to a lack of entrepreneurial growth. two systems provide the basic frameworks My research has revealed that business that I will use to classify and delineate structures and social construction and general Japanese company operations organization provide explanations for from that of U.S. company operations. Japan’s lack of entrepreneurial growth. The new wave of U.S. industries has closely adopted the Natural System I. JAPANESE COMPANY setup for companies. The highlights of STRUCTURE: INTERNAL Google for example, using the Natural HIERARCHY AND ATTITUDES Systems approach, are quite clear. Google portrays itself to the public as a hub and a As noted above, the Japanese generator of unique and brilliant ideas, economy is maintained heavily by mainly stemming from the spontaneous “dynasty” companies. In order to attain a minds of its employees. It prides itself on better notion of this term “dynasty,” it is being “not a conventional company” and important to understand where Japanese on the fact that it “does not intend to companies initially attained their power. become one.”vii Management takes on a Today’s well known companies such as very organic nature in the sense that Mitsubishi and Nissan are remnants of the communication remains fluid and free- zaibatsu, early 1900s vertical-chain-of- flowing between manager and employee, command firms. These companies were and that the manager is integrated with ruled by family name and employed their the teamwork. In other words, Google is immense financial and monopoly power. consciously trying to stray from the path Everything from manufacturing and of bureaucracy. The workers are retailing to banking shared the name of passionate about their work and self-goals the company. After World War II, the as much as they are about the company zaibatsu dissolved and reformed into the

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 22! keiretsu, companies with horizontal firms. I draw from these observations to integration and interlocking business reveal their subsequent detrimental effects relationships.viii Although pure on stimulating entrepreneurship. monopolies no longer exist, many argue that remnants of zaibatsu mentality still i. The Controlling of Employee exist amongst the keiretsu.ix Taking note Opportunism of Japan’s automobile industry, for example, it would be nearly impossible for As noted in the key criteria for an a new automobile company to be founded entrepreneur, a drive for seeking since current organizations such as Toyota opportunism is an important characteristic and Honda maintain such a substantial shared amongst successful entrepreneurs. amount of power. Toyota is widely viewed However, in Japan it appears that the idea as one of the obvious zaibatsu vertically- of opportunism in a worker is discouraged integrated companies still existing today through strict bureaucracy. Dr. Aoki under the publically accepted keiretsu Masahiko, the current President and Chief façade.x There would be no point in Research Officer (CRO) of the Research investing money in a company that could Institute of Economy, Trade, and Industry not compete in a keiretsu-linked (REITI) in Japan, provides insight into the monopoly. Although this mentality is managerial logic behind Japanese perfectly reasonable with respect to executives. Masahiko postulates that the entering an automobile industry, it ‘autonomy’ of workshop groups regarding appears as if this notion and opposition to work duties “gives rise to opportunistic entering markets has cascaded into basic behavior on the part of the workers.”xi entrepreneurial disposition. A look into The underlying theory that Japanese the hierarchy of Japanese bureaucracy managers share is that the onset of the reveals why Japan is perpetually stuck in “individual within the group” further the Rational System organizational weakens the strong relationship between perspective and sees little movement the group and the company.xii The toward the entrepreneur-friendly Natural working force of the company abides by System. the authority of the managerial staff with very little room for individual input. THE JAPANESE BUSINESS SYSTEM Hierarchy in Japanese companies instills a somewhat aimless nature in the Japanese As a corporation grows, it is workman. I use the term “aimless” not in logical to say that more bureaucracy is the sense of “no direction” but more needed to maintain order and direction towards the meaning of “no need for amidst thousands of employees. This is a direction.” Because working for a large characteristic of large companies in company in Japan ensures job stability and general. Japan’s interlinking of large firms some form of social status, there is a great through the keiretsu system thus explains feeling of normality, attendance, and the necessary implementation of complacency. In Japan, the job wage is hierarchal structure, a key component of based on a “seniority-based wage system.” bureaucracy. Two major aspects common That is, elder status and term of work with among Japanese firms that I have focused the company directly correlate to how on are management’s controlling of much one is paid in Japan. With hierarchy employee opportunism and the set in place, Japanese workers thus seek to contrasting role of Japanese venture stay in one company for as long as capitalist firms compared to American possible in order to increase their

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 23! earnings. There simply is no consequently brought before the Japanese encouragement to start a new company, courts, a rare sign of the rise of the not only due to the risk and low pay, but worker’s voice against the company. also because should a start-up fail, time Although these cases were would reset on the seniority counter, brought before a judge, company assuming the entrepreneur returned to a hierarchy interestingly remained prevalent new firm to work. One may counter with even in the court room, under Japanese the argument, “Have workers ever voiced law. In court, “judges rarely order their discontent with their treatment companies to present assessment results within the company?” The answer to this as evidence to substantiate their claims. is surely yes, yet the means by which They usually permit companies to arrange Japanese firms have controlled this have the testimony of many bosses, and ratified the attitude of the Japanese employees to make the employees, who go with the flow of counterargument.”xiv It is not uncommon bureaucracy rather than going against it. for cases regarding assessment discrimination in Japan to take more than CONTROLLED WORKER ten years to resolve. “Moreover the costs ASSESSMENT AND INDIVIDUALITY for going to trial are exorbitant.”xv Seeing DETERRENTS this as an ongoing trend with employees who have tried to speak up against their In Japan, the workplace is like a company, and faced unfair court controlled environment that strives to procedure, long and drawn out case times, ensure no form of individualism. and expensive court fees, it would seem Whatever chance of autonomy a worker unwise for an employee to engage in may have is lost amidst the strict opportunistic behavior, as the opportunity moderation by Japanese higher-up costs of the resulting aftermath all point managers. There does exist a rigid to sunk costs. Thus, once situated within concept of worker assessment where the Rational System of Japanese employees are systematically gauged based corporations, “herd mentality” sets in, and on their work performance and are employees serve to follow the direction subsequently rewarded or demoted. This that the company has administered for appears to lend a sort of freedom to the them. As a result, there are very few cases hierarchal structure of the Japanese today where workers stand up for company as the employee is given power themselves because the Japanese court over his positioning through these system has been proven to be assessments. In reality, however, the disadvantageous for employees. Japanese worker assessment system It is precisely because companies achieves nothing and works against the apply their domineering hand over their notion of an autonomous worker. employees that opportunism is not “Interviews are conducted, but employees rampant among Japanese workers. The are not notified of their assessment idea of working outside of a large results,”xiii nor do they have the right to company in Japan is almost unthinkable as access their appraisals. There have been the large corporations maintain their past cases where employees who had been zaibatsu behavior toward their employees; working for a long period of time in a that is, a monopoly over the direction of company were not given proper treatment one’s work. Harnessing of opportunities or deserved promotions. These various is the stimulator of the growth of claims of employee discrimination were entrepreneurship. Even if the vision

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 24! exists, however, the startup will never start risk capital investments. if the opportunity is not taken. Many For American venture capital Japanese are well aware of this notion as it companies, financing can be split into has been brought up on Japanese internet roughly six different categories: seed, web blogs. As translated from one start-up, other early-stage, expansion, Japanese blog, one person writes, “If you leveraged buyout, and acquisition.xvii The have all the ideas but you don’t take first three are often categorized as start-up action, then you cannot be called a real funds and typically account for more than entrepreneur.”xvi In addition to this sort 40% of all venture capital investment of engineered complacency of employees expenditure in America. The latter three within Japanese companies, there is yet represent 60% of capital dedicated to later another factor that has proven to be quite state company investments.xviii Based on unfavorable for entrepreneurial this data, it is evident that there is a development in Japan. Let us say that an significant amount of “risky” investment individual does indeed have the innovative that is put into fledgling companies. idea as well as the bravery to individually These funds are what allow the greatly- push for an opportunity to start a new needed start to more quickly stimulate the company. Without sufficient funds, the company toward actuality. Generous idea will not be carried through. American venture capital organizations Regardless of the type of startup are largely responsible for the ranking of company, money is always the limiting entrepreneurial growth in comparison factor that is needed to see a new firm with the rest of the world on the world into succession. In business, there are classification scale.xix Looking at these companies that specialize in granting same numerical data values for Japan, private risk capital to entrepreneurs. however, we see that the venture capital These are called venture capital firms. We firms in Japan are taking a strikingly now come across the second problem for opposite and more conservative pattern Japanese entrepreneurs: the attitude of the with their private risk capital investments. Japanese venture capital firms toward In Japan, statistics show that entrepreneurial companies. venture capital companies remain relatively unwilling to provide significant ii. Japanese Venture Capital Risk investments to early-stage entrepreneur Aversion companies. According to the studies conducted by Masaaki Kawagoe, an Although it is dangerous and economics graduate from Tokyo boundless to label the entire Japanese University and currently an economics population with the stereotype of being researcher at Oxford University, results risk-adverse, through a comparison show that, indeed, “the fundamental between American and Japanese venture problem is that private risk capital in capital firms, it is evident that through the Japan is risk-adverse.”xx Figures taken in years of investment patterns, risk aversion the late 1990s on venture capital behavior may very well be a decisive impetus for show that about 20% of new venture the lacking of entrepreneurial activity in capital investment went to companies that Japan. Data from the National Science were between ten and 19 years old, and Foundation (NSF) and the Oxford nearly 40% went to those that were 20 Review of Economic Policy have given years or older. Investment in companies conclusive results on the differences aged give years or less, by contrast, had between American and Japanese private negligible investments.xxi Clearly, there is

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 25! risk when investing capital in start-ups, whose success in the market is not In addition to the business noticeable in the early stages. Judging by structures in Japan, there are several the behavior of Japanese venture factors of Japanese culture and society capitalists, these companies are dodging that provide possible explanations for the risks and are not willing to invest in limited entrepreneurship. Culturally, early-stage firms. Veteran companies that failure is very closely linked to dishonor, have been established for over a decade and Japanese history has created a and that have already produced viable discouraging mindset toward the resultant products are the ones who receive a bulk ramifications should one fail at a venture. of the investment funds. Additionally, incentives too colloquial in It is evident that business Japan, social conditions dictate more of a structure, behavior, and attitude are key convergence toward staying with large, elements that delineate American prominent companies. Recent Japanese entrepreneurial activity from Japanese age demographics and aspects that govern entrepreneurial activity. In America, social worth have proven to be obstacles employees are not as corralled and to establishing new entrepreneurs. restricted, and individual ideas are i. Failure and Dishonor Stigmas encouraged by the company, as seen with A common process with any organizations such as Google. In Japan, entrepreneurship is the possibility or however, individualism in an employee is contingency of failure. However, seen as a stigma and is rejected. Workers particularly with Japanese culture, failure have very little voice of their own and has been linked with serious negative very limited rights within the company. repercussions and thus disparages start- Thus there is very little incentive and ups. Stemming all the way back to the opportunism in Japan for the pursuit of 12th century, we see the early signs of entrepreneurship. Moreover, in America, reactions to failure in the bushido, the initial funding to start new companies is Japanese code of conduct and a way of more available than it is in Japan. samurai life. Under the bushido ideal, if a Japanese venture capitalists remain samurai failed to maintain and uphold his apathetic toward substantial investments honor, the only way he could regain it was in start-up companies. Thus far, I have to perform a ritual suicide known as analyzed the Japanese business structures seppuku.xxii Although this may seem like a and attitudes and their relationship with much exaggerated effect, in modern day the dormancy of entrepreneurship in Japanese society, this idea of suicide from Japan. To properly address the stereotype failure has been for some unfortunate of “Japanese risk-aversion,” my research businessmen whose ventures were unable does not stop at the scrutiny of Japanese to launch. Because of the heavy stigma businesses but expands into the evaluation that accompanies failure, founders of of cultural and societal backings specific failed businesses become social outcasts as to Japan. The goal is to ascertain a no one is willing to re-hire them or fund pattern between Japanese cultural and them again. Japanese banks set extremely social tendencies and the lack of tough conditions for loans, forcing entrepreneurship. borrowers to use relatives and friends as guarantors who become liable for the II. CULTURAL AND SOCIAL defaulted loans, producing extreme guilt FACTORS IN RELATION TO RISK- and despair in the borrower.xxiii Vaguely AVERSION similar to the seppuku mentality, in many

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 26! cases, the only feasible way to regain America are exponentially more generous “honor” without putting the burden on with their investments, failure at a start-up the guarantors is by “taking responsibility in America often is not accompanied with for their unpaid loans and outstanding the massive financial debts as seen in debts through life insurance payouts;”xxiv Japan. in other words, suicide. ii. Social Factors One such case occurred in the Contrary to popular belief, summer of 2003 when three Osaka according to the global entrepreneurship residents, a husband, a wife, and her monitor, there is a negative correlation brother, leapt in front of an oncoming between start-up rate and the share of a train on the Japan Railway Kansai Lane. young population. One would think that According to the reports and suicide letter more entrepreneurs would be of youthful found, the husband of the family “had ages, where energy and daringness borrowed 20,000 yen from various prescribe the ability to take on the sources; the amount to be repaid now demands of a start-up company. totaled 150,000 yen.”xxv Debt collectors However, “the oldest age group (ages pressed for returns, but when the couple fifty-five to sixty-four) experienced the could not come up with the sum of largest increase in entrepreneurial activity money, the wife concluded, “We have from 2007 to 2008 (0.31 percent to 0.36 decided to apologize with our lives.”xxvi percent), making it the age group with the Looking at the couple’s debt, it was highest entrepreneurial activity rate.”xxvii roughly $1,500 U.S. dollars, yet suicide Thus it turns out that over the past decade was the unfortunate route they chose. or so, the highest rate of entrepreneurial Cases such as this are quite activity has belonged to the 55 – 64 age frequent in Japan. With such a negative group. The 20 – 34 age bracket, and rather depressing connotation related meanwhile, which one would usually to failure involving money loss, and identify with the “swashbuckling and risk because entrepreneurship involves a high taking youth” of Facebook and Google, rate of risk and deficiency, it is not has the lowest rate.xxviii However, judging surprising that many are hesitant to by the age demographics of Japan, proceed with entering a start-up. statistics further conflict with this general In contrast to Japanese culture, age group trend of entrepreneurs. failure carries no stigma in the Silicon Statistically speaking, the aging of Valley, America’s hub for new high-tech Japan outweighs all other nations; it has entrepreneurs. From my personal the highest proportion of elderly citizens, experiences, tech entrepreneurs from with 21% over the age of 60.xxix It is places such as Palo Alto or Berkeley roughly estimated that if the age trend typically begin a conversation by talking continues, the percentage is expected to about their current startup. Then the increase to 40% by 2055. Japan holds the conversation transitions, and they soon highest concentration of elderly in the start to boast about all their previous world for several reasons. failed start-up ventures. As seen here, Firstly, the World Health failure at entrepreneurship does not Organization in 2000 reported that “Japan demonstrate inadequacy within the provides one of the best healthcare individual, but rather, shows that to have systems in the world among 191 member failed means to have gained experience countries.”xxx Premiums on healthcare are and to have learned. And as previously affordable because they are based on stated, since venture capitalist firms in income and ability to pay. “The poorest

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 27! can be supported by the national health explanation as to why very few workers insurance program offered by the are available to invest their time into government.”xxxi Another reason for the starting a new company. With most longevity is the Japanese diet. According workers achieving their highest status in to the Food and Agricultural Organization the company in their later years of service, of the United Nations in 2001, Japan had this system works directly against the one of the lowest consumption rates of trend of older individuals being more saturated fat among developed countries. likely to start a business. Additionally, since the late 1970s, the average number of children born to a THE IMPORTANCE OF A BUSINESS woman over her lifetime has been CARD estimated to be fewer than two due to In Japanese society, one’s social legal abortions, birth control, and late worth is often dictated during first-time marriage, which results from an increase introductions with others. Generally, in in participation of women in the working meetings, one is greeted by the initial force.xxxii For these reasons, Japan holds a contact upon arrival and is taken to a higher concentration of older people. meeting room. Here teams meet and Thus a valid question arises. If Japan has there is a polite exchanging of business the highest concentration of elderly cards. “One of the reasons why Japanese individuals who are at an optimal age for so ritually proffer and accept business entrepreneurs, why is it then that Japan is cards at meetings is the sense of pride in an anomaly with regards to entrepreneur belonging to the company of a Japanese aging patterns? This can be explained in salary man.”xxxiv To a great extent, a two reasons that revolve around defining Japanese man and his family are “socially one’s social worth in society. ranked by the reputation of the company he works for and the position and SENIORITY-BASED WAGE SYSTEM prospects he has there.”xxxv Because the low rate of entrepreneurial activity in In Japan, there exists a system Japan, being an entrepreneur holds the called the seniority-wage system, or nenko stigma of being slightly eccentric or a joretsu. In this particular form of misfit in society. A business card that is Japanese employment system, workers are not affiliated with a kabushiki kaisha, or promoted with higher salary in relation to large, well-known Japanese corporation, their proximity to retirement. Employees does not initially promote the social status begin with a standard, basic wage and of the holder. This being said, it is receive an increase in pay for each year of understandable that in addition to the service. “The seniority-based wage system older generation aiming to increase their keeps workers from changing jobs since status within the company, the younger after a few years of employment they generation aims to enter a company that enjoy a wage level that could not be would grant an immediate incipient status matched if they moved to another as opposed to the unknown prestige of an company.”xxxiii There is very little incentive entrepreneur. for a worker to retire early from a Thus far I have analyzed the company thus contributing to the idea of business hierarchy aspects of Japanese lifetime employment. A typical young companies and the social stigmas and man will enter a company at age 22 effects relating to entrepreneurship in already anticipating his retirement in the Japan. To sum up my findings and same company at age 65. This gives an conclusions, I will utilize the Geert

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 28!

Hofstede framework, which provides a According to the statistics comprehensive study of how values in the gathered on Japan by Hofstede, Japan workplace are influenced by culture, and holds a PDI of 50, an IDV of 41, an MAS use those findings to link back to my prior of 90, a UAI of 90, and an LTO of 78. two research results on Japanese business On the contrary, the U.S. holds a PDI of and cultural explanations. 38, an IDV of 89, an MAS of 60, a UAI of 41, and a LTO of 25. The following III. GEERT HOFSTEDE graphs give a more tangible visual FRAMEWORK representation of the contrasting dimensions between Japan and the United “Dr. Geert Hofstede conducted States. perhaps the most comprehensive study of how values in the workplace are influenced by culture. From 1967 to 1973, while working at IBM as a psychologist, he collected and analyzed data from over 100,000 individuals from forty countries. From those results, and later additions, Hofstede developed a model that identifies five primary dimensions to differentiate cultures.”xxxvi The first of five elements is the Power Distance Index (PDI), which measures the equality or inequality between people in the society of the country. The second dimension is Individualism (IDV), which monitors individual or collective achievement and interpersonal relationships. Next is Masculinity (MAS), which is the degree in which society reinforces traditional masculine work role, achievement, and power; gender differentiation. The fourth element is the Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI), which focuses on the level of tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity within the society; risk aversion. And the final dimension of the Geert Hofstede ! model is Long Term Orientation (LTO), These results confirm my which primarily concentrates on the reasoning about Japan’s low degree that society embraces, or does not entrepreneurship activity. One of the embrace, long-term devotion to traditional obvious differences between Japan and values or contemporary, forward-thinking the U.S. is the ranking of the values. These five aspects of a country are Individualism index. The United States ranked though various collected data holds the highest level of individualism source inputs and are used to classify amongst all of the countries classified countries and show relativity patterns using the Geert Hofstede framework. across the dimensions.

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Australia and the rank strong adherence to company bureaucracy second and third, respectively, in terms of and strict hierarchy. This organizational IDV levels.xxxvii Japan, on the other hand, perspective of the Rational System does falls below the world average IDV level. not allow for much freedom or The fact that high IDV levels in the U.S. individuality of the company employee, come coupled with high entrepreneurship but rather, it institutes a herd mentality rates and that low IDV levels in Japan are within corporations, which inhibits the coupled with low entrepreneurship rates is entrepreneurial drive. Furthermore, the not just a coincidence. My initial lack of venture capitalists’ willingness to reasoning and arguments in the previous invest in seed-state, fledgling companies sections serve to confirm this overall extinguishes the incentives to form a encompassing framework. Additionally, startup since failure without venture MAS and UAI levels in Japan tower over capital backing would likely mean debt. those of the U.S. The higher level of And in a society rampant with debt- masculinity amongst the Japanese related suicides, it is highly discouraging to population relates to the importance of be an entrepreneur. Although world the salary man and the relevance of job entrepreneur activity shows a higher position to power. This reverts back to density of older individuals pursuing the notion of entering and staying with a entrepreneurship, Japan, the country with kabushiki kaisha rather than pursuing a the most elderly, remains averse to startup in order to achieve company and startups due to the seniority-based wage social status with more guarantees. The system and job security within the high UAI levels suggest and coincide with kabushiki kaisha. Risk aversion points to stereotypes of Japan that Japanese are staying with the corporation. The Geert risk-adverse. And finally, the U.S.’s LTO Hofstede framework reaffirms my dimension is dwarfed by Japan’s strong findings about the reasons behind preservation and devotion to tradition. Japanese entrepreneur dormancy with its This does not serve well for Japan on the pattern classifications of Japan being anti- field of entrepreneurship, as business individualistic, highly risk averse, and traditions and social cultures have proven resistant to change. detrimental to entrepreneurial activity in Although Japanese Japan. entrepreneurship is lacking, there are I do not use the Geert Hofstede paths that Japanese firms can take that framework as my source of factual may be able to jumpstart activity. Most representation and proof of Japan’s importantly, an increase in private risk defunct entrepreneurial activity. I utilize it capital for entry-level companies will as an interesting study that neatly subsequently decrease risk aversion, at compliments and affirms the results and least for the entrepreneur. As for the findings from my analysis of the business venture capitalist firm, if an increased structures, cultural rationale, and societal frequency of investments in early-stage norms in Japan. ! companies can yield at least one profitable ! company such as the American firms CONCLUSION! Google or Facebook, then overall, the ! venture capital firm will profit from its The stereotype that Japan is “risk more risky investment behavior. Judging averse” is baseless without proper from the Geert Hofstede comparison deduction. In Japan, there remains a between Japan and the U.S., another underlying factor that can be changed is

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 30! the high level of Long Term Orientation ! in Japan. Entrepreneurship is in itself an ! aspect not entirely aligned with the ! conservative, risk averse nature of ! Japanese corporations, yet if a solid ! community of entrepreneurs can at least ! be established in Japan, then the ! traditional herd mentality of Japanese may ! eventually lead to the advocacy of ! entrepreneurship. ! ! Success stories do exist in Japan. ! Kentaro Lemeto founded his own ! company, Clara Online, in 1997 with just ! US$9,000. Today Clara is now one of the ! leading server hosting companies in Japan ! and Korea, listed on the stock ! exchange with a market capitalization of ! xxxviii US$3 million. Another successful ! entrepreneur is Noriko Teremoto, “who ! broke through Japan’s notoriously thick ! glass ceiling and became a successful ! female entrepreneur after she was barred ! from returning to work by her company ! when she took leave to have a child.”xxxix ! Her company, Digimom Inc., a webpage ! design firm, has acquired much successful ! reputation from not only being a ! profitable company but also consisting of ! mainly female employees. While ! admirable, Digimoms’ success also serves ! as an indicator of how Japanese often ! ! need to be persuaded that ! entrepreneurship is another possible path ! to success, and not just a path that entails xl ! risk and shame. Success is possible, and ! there are still avenues of opportunity for ! Japan to rid itself of its stereotypical ! stigma of risk aversion. ! ! ! ! ! ! !

!

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Total Entrepreneurial Activity

Ranked by Country

World Average = 10.6% - Africa Only (15.6%) - Asia Only (11.2%) - Europe Only (6.4%) - North America Only (13.4%) - South America Only (19.2%) - Mid Eastern Only (11.8%) U.S. State by State

Note: TEA by Country Measures Entrepreneurial Activity as a Percent of GDP.

2009 TE 2008 TE 2007 TE 2002 TE Country! AVERAGE! 2006 TEA! 2005 TEA! 2004 TEA! 2003 TEA! 2001 TEA! A! A! A! A!

Peru 30.6% 20.9% 25.6% 25.9% 40.20% 40.30% Uganda 31.5% 33.6% 31.60% 29.30% Bolivia 29.8% 29.8% Venezuela 22.8% 18.7% 20.2% 25.00% 27.30% Angola 22.7% 22.7% Philippines 20.4% 20.40% Thailand 20.1% 26.9% 15.20% 20.70% 18.90% 18.9% Colombia 20.4% 22.4% 13.8% 22.7% 22.50% Indonesia 19.3% 19.30% Dominican Rep. 18.2% 17.5% 20.4% 16.8% Jordan 14.3% 10.2% 18.30% Ecuador 17.2% 15.8% 8.7% 27.20% Jamaica 18.9% 22.7% 15.6% 20.30% 17.00% New Zealand 15.7% 17.60% 14.70% 13.80% 14.0% 18.2% Macedonia 14.5% 14.5% China 14.9% 18.8% 16.4% 16.20% 13.70% 12.00% 12.3% South Korea 12.2% 7.0 10.0% 14.50% 14.5% 14.8% Chile 13.5% 14.9% 14.1% 13.4% 9.20% 11.10% 16.30% 15.7% Argentina 13.3% 14.7% 16.5% 14.4% 10.20% 9.50% 12.80% 17.00% 14.2% 10.5% Brazil 13.0% 15.3% 12.0% 12.7% 11.70% 11.30% 13.50% 13.20% 13.5% 14.2% Uruguay 12.2% 12.2% 11.9% 12.2% 12.60% India 12.1% 6.9% 8.5% 10.40% 17.90% 17.9% 11.2% 11.9% 12.00% 10.90% 13.40% 9.90% 8.7% 16.2% Iceland 11.5% 11.4% 10.1% 11.30% 13.60% 11.30% 11.3% Mexico 11.3% 13.1% 5.30% 5.90% 12.40% 12.4% 18.7% Malaysia 7.75% 4.4% 11.10% United States 10.6% 8.0% 10.8% 9.6% 10.00% 12.40% 11.30% 11.30% 10.5% 11.6% Kazakhstan 9.4% 9.4%

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Canada 8.9% 7.10% 9.30% 8.90% 8.50% 8.8% 10.9% Ireland 8.7% 7.6% 8.2% 7.40% 7.70% 8.60% 9.1% 12.1% Norway 8.3% 8.5% 8.7% 6.5% 9.10% 9.20% 7.00% 8.10% 8.7% 8.7% Serbia 7.0% 4.9% 7.6% 8.6% Czech 7.9% 7.90% Republic Egypt 7.9% 7.9% Greece 7.6% 8.8% 9.9% 7.90% 6.50% 5.80% 6.80% Poland 6.9% 8.80% 4.40% 4.4% 9.9% Switzerland 6.9% 7.7% 6.3% 6.10% 7.30% 7.1% Portugal 6.6% 8.8% 4.00% 7.0% South Africa 6.4% 5.9% 7.8% 5.30% 5.10% 5.40% 5.70% 6.5% 9.3% Spain 6.3% 5.1% 7.0% 7.6% 7.30% 5.70% 5.20% 6.30% 4.6% 7.7% Israel 6.3% 6.1% 6.4% 5.4% 6.60% 7.10% 7.1% 5.9% Bosnia & Herz. 5.4% 4.4% 6.4% Hungary 6.6% 9.1% 6.6% 6.9% 6.00% 1.90% 4.30% 6.60% 6.6% 11.4% United 6.0% 5.7% 5.9% 5.5% 5.80% 6.20% 6.30% 6.00% 5.4% 7.6% Kingdom Latvia 7.0% 10.5% 6.5% 4.5% 6.60% 6.60% UAE 8.5% 13.3% 8.4% 3.70% Finland 5.9% 5.2% 7.3% 6.9% 5.00% 5.00% 4.40% 5.70% 4.6% 9.3% Iran 9.0% 12.0% 5.9% Turkey 5.9% 6.0% 5.6% 6.10% Denmark 5.5% 3.6% 4.4% 5.4% 5.30% 4.80% 5.30% 6.20% 6.5% 8.0% Croatia 5.7% 5.6% 7.6% 7.3% 8.60% 6.10% 3.70% 3.10% 3.6% Singapore 5.72 4.90% 7.20% 5.70% 5.40% 5.9% 5.1% Italy 5.4% 3.7% 4.6% 5.0% 3.50% 4.30% 4.60% 5.9% 10.1% Germany 4.9% 4.1% 3.8% 4.20% 5.40% 4.50% 5.20% 5.2% 7.0% 5.3% 7.2% 5.2% 5.2% 5.40% 4.40% 5.10% 4.10% 4.6% 6.3% Hong Kong 4.7% 3.6% 10.0% 3.00% 3.30% 3.4% France 4.6% 4.3% 5.6% 3.2% 4.40% 5.40% 6.00% 2.40% 3.2% 7.2% Slovenia 4.6% 5.4% 6.4% 4.8% 4.60% 4.40% 2.60% 4.30% 4.6% Sweden 4.3% 4.2% 3.50% 4.00% 3.70% 4.10% 4.0% 6.6% Taiwan 4.3% 4.30% 4.3% Romania 4.3% 5.0% 4.0% 4.0% Austria 3.9% 2.4% 5.30% Russia 3.8% 3.9% 3.5% 2.7% 4.90% 2.50% 2.5% 6.9% Belgium 3.4% 3.5 2.9% 3.2% 2.70% 3.90% 3.50% 3.40% 3.0% 4.5% Japan 3.2% 3.3 5.4% 4.3% 2.90% 2.20% 1.50% 2.20% 1.8% 5.0% Puerto Rico 3.1% 3.1%

World Average! 10.6%! 10.7%! 9.7%! 9.1%! 9.5%! 8.4%! 9.4%! 9.0%! 8.0%! 9.7%!

Data Source: Global Entrepreneurship Monitor!

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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! i Reynolds, P., N. Carter, W. Gartner, P. Greene, and L. Nomura, Masami, and Yoshihiko Kamii, eds. Japanese Cox. The Entrepreneur next Door: Characteristics of Companies - Theories and Realities. Trans. Brad Individuals Starting Companies in America : an Williams. Melbourne: Trans Pacific, 2004. Print. p.15 Executive Summary of The Panel Study of xiii Entrepreneurial Dynamics. Kansas City, MO: Ewing Ibid., p. 17 Marion Kauffman Foundation, 2002. Print. xiv ii Kubota, Yoko. "ANALYSIS - In Risk-averse Japan, Nagayoshi, Hiromi. Jinji Koka Ni Taisuru Hoteki Odds Stack up against Startups | Reuters."Business Kinsei No Nichi Bei Hikaku. Vol. 107. Chuo University, News - Indian Stock Market, Stock Market News, 2000-2001. Print. p. 6 Business & Finance, Market Statistics | Reuters India. xv 19 Apr. 2010. Web. 21 Mar. 2011. Chikura. Http://chikura.fprog.com/index.php?UID=12 . xvi "Total Entrepreneurial Activity." International Rausch, Lawrence M. "Venture Capital Investment Entrepreneurship - Entrepreneur International - Trends in the United States and Europe."Nsf.gov - Entrepreneur - Entrepreneurship. Web. 21 Mar. 2011. National Science Foundation - US National Science . . "CIA - The World Factbook -- Country Comparison :: xvii National Product Real Growth Rate."Welcome to the Rausch, Lawrence M. "Venture Capital Investment CIA Web Site — Central Intelligence Agency. Web. 21 Trends in the United States and Europe."Nsf.gov - Mar. 2011. National Science Foundation - US National Science . . Naoto Kan Is Just Another Salaryman - xviii Newsweek." Newsweek - National News, World News, "Total Entrepreneurial Activity." International Business, Health, Technology, Entertainment, and More Entrepreneurship - Entrepreneur International - - Newsweek. Web. 04 Apr. 2011. Entrepreneur - Entrepreneurship. Web. 21 Mar. 2011. . entrepreneur_activity.asp >. v xx Imai, Y., and M. Kawagoe. Business Start-ups in Ogura, Masao, and David Noble. Delivering the Japan: Problems in Japan. 2nd ed. Vol. 16. Oxford UP, Goods: Entrepreneurship and Innovation in a Japanese 2000. Print. Oxford Review of Economic Policy.p. 5 Corporation. Tokyo: International House of Japan, xxiIbid. p. 5 2004. Print.! xxii Turnbull, Stephen R., and Angus McBride. Samurai: vi the World of the Warrior. Oxford: Osprey, 2006. Print. "The Google Culture · Corporate Information · xxiii "Loans to tackle suicide". Geelong Advertiser About." Google. Web. 22 Mar. 2011. (Australia) 1 - Main Edition. 30 December 2009.! . xxiv "Japan: Ending the Culture of the 'honourable' vii Suicide | Andrew Chambers | Comment Is Free | Morck, Randall. A History of Corporate Governance Guardian.co.uk." Latest News, Comment and Reviews around the World: Family Business Groups to from the Guardian | Guardian.co.uk. 23 Apr. 2011. Professional Managers. Chicago: University of Chicago, xxv West, Mark. Dying to Get out of Debt: Consumer 2005. Print. Insolvency Law and Suicide in Japan. Diss. University of viii Michigan, 2003. Berkeley Electronic, 2003. Print. Fujimoto, Takahiro. Seisan Shisutemu No Shinkaron: xxvi Munen no Tegami [A Regretful Letter], Mainichi Toyota Jidōsha Ni Miru Soshiki Nōryoku to Sōhatsu Shinbun, June 15, 2003, at 13. xxvii Purosesu. New York: Oxford UP, 1999. Print Fairlie, Robert M. Kauffman Index of ix Entrepreneurial Activity. Ewing Marion Kauffman "The Toyota Group, the One and Only Horizontal- Foundation, 2009. p. 2 xxviii Vertical Keiretsu." San José State University - Powering Fairlie, Robert M. Kauffman Index of Silicon Valley. Web. 23 Mar. 2011. Entrepreneurial Activity. Ewing Marion Kauffman . Foundation, 2009. p. 2 xxix x "World Briefing - Asia - Japan - Most Elderly Nation Nomura, Masami, and Yoshihiko Kamii, eds. Japanese - NYTimes.com." The New York Times - Breaking Companies - Theories and Realities. Trans. Brad News, World News & Multimedia. 01 July 2006. Web. Williams. Melbourne: Trans Pacific, 2004. Print. p. 124 02 May 2011. xi . xii

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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! xxx Hatasa, Yukiko Abe., Kazumi Hatasa, and Seiichi "Japanese Business Culture and the Makino. Nakama 2: Intermediate Japanese : Company." Doing Business in Japan How to Start Communication, Culture, Context. Boston: Heinle, Doing Business in Japan. Web. 02 May 2011. 2011. p. 46 ! xxxii "World Briefing - Asia - Japan - Most Elderly Nation "Japan: Ending the Culture of the - NYTimes.com." The New York Times - Breaking 'honourable' Suicide | Andrew Chambers | Comment Is News, World News & Multimedia. 01 July 2006. Web. Free | Guardian.co.uk." Latest News, Comment and 02 May 2011. Reviews from the Guardian | Guardian.co.uk. 23 Apr. xxxiii Fujimoto, Takahiro. Seisan Shisutemu No 2011. ! Shinkaron: Toyota Jidōsha Ni Miru Soshiki Nōryoku to Johnstone, Bob. Matsushita-ryū Okoshi Sōhatsu Purosesu. New York: Oxford UP, 1999. Print Seishin - Wa, Nippon No Mono-zukuri Wa Kōshite xxxiv "Japanese Business Culture and the Yomigaeru. Trans. Shizu Ura. Toyo Keizai, 2006. Print.! Company." Doing Business in Japan How to Start "Key Characteristics of Entrepreneurs: Doing Business Common Traits of Successful Entrepreneurs | in Japan. Web. 02 May 2011. Growthink." Business Plans, Strategy Consulting, . xxxvi McSweeney, Dr. Brendan. "Hofstede’s ‘Model of Koike, Kazuko. Nihon Kigyō No Jinzai National Cultural Differences and Consequences: A Keisei: Fukakujitsusei Ni Taishosuru Tame No Nouhau. Triumph of Faith - A Failure of Analysis, Human Tōkyō: Chūō Kōronsha, 1997. Print.! Relations’." Culture’s Consequences(2002): 89-118. Kubota, Yoko. "ANALYSIS - In Risk-averse Print.! Japan, Odds Stack up against Startups | xxxvii McSweeney, Dr. Brendan. "Hofstede’s ‘Model of Reuters."Business News - Indian Stock Market, Stock National Cultural Differences and Consequences: A Market News, Business & Finance, Market Statistics | Triumph of Faith - A Failure of Analysis, Human Reuters India. 19 Apr. 2010. Web. 21 Mar. 2011. Relations’." Culture’s Consequences(2002): 89-118. .! xxxviii Eberhart, Robert. "Japanese Venture Capital: An "Loans to tackle suicide". Geelong Advertiser Analysis of Start-up Investment Patterns vs. Silicon (Australia) 1 - Main Edition. 30 December 2009.! Valle." Stanford Project on Japanese Entrepreneurship Ogura, Masao, and David Noble. Delivering (STAJE) (2009). Print. the Goods: Entrepreneurship and Innovation in a xxxix Ibid Japanese Corporation. Tokyo: International House of xl Ibid. Japan, 2004. Print.! McSweeney, Dr. Brendan. "Hofstede’s ‘Model REFERENCES of National Cultural Differences and Consequences: A Triumph of Faith - A Failure of Analysis, Human Chikura. Http://chikura.fprog.com/index.ph Relations’." Culture’s Consequences(2002): 89-118. p?UID=1212030122. 2004. Web. Print.! "CIA - The World Factbook -- Country Morck, Randall. A History of Corporate Comparison :: National Product Real Growth Governance around the World: Family Business Groups Rate."Welcome to the CIA Web Site — Central to Professional Managers. Chicago: University of Intelligence Agency. Web. 21 Mar. 2011. Chicago, 2005. Print. .! Mainichi Shinbun, June 15, 2003, at 13. Eberhart, Robert. "Japanese Venture Capital: Nagayoshi, Hiromi. Jinji Koka Ni Taisuru An Analysis of Start-up Investment Patterns vs. Silicon Hoteki Kinsei No Nichi Bei Hikaku. Vol. 107. Chuo Valle." Stanford Project on Japanese Entrepreneurship University, 2000-2001. Print.! (STAJE) (2009). Print.! Nakamura, Yoshiaki, Yoshiaki Nakamura, and Fairlie, Robert M. Kauffman Index of Minoru Shibuya. The Hollowing out Phenomenon in Entrepreneurial Activity. Ewing Marion Kauffman the Japanese Industry. Tokyo: Research Institute of Foundation, 2009. Print.! International Trade and Industry, 1995. Print.! Fujimoto, Takahiro. Seisan Shisutemu No Nomura, Masami, and Yoshihiko Kamii, Shinkaron: Toyota Jidōsha Ni Miru Soshiki Nōryoku to eds. Japanese Companies - Theories and Realities. Trans. Sōhatsu Purosesu. New York: Oxford UP, 1999. Print.! Brad Williams. Melbourne: Trans Pacific, 2004. Print.! Hosler, Akiko S. Japanese Immigrant Rausch, Lawrence M. "Venture Capital Entrepreneurs in New York City: a Wave of Ethnic Investment Trends in the United States and Business. New York: Garland Pub., 1998. Print.! Europe."Nsf.gov - National Science Foundation - US Imai, Y., and M. Kawagoe. Business Start-ups National Science Foundation (NSF). 16 Oct. 1998. Web. in Japan: Problems in Japan. 2nd ed. Vol. 16. Oxford 21 Apr. 2011. UP, 2000. Print. Oxford Review of Economic Policy.!

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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! .! Reynolds, P., N. Carter, W. Gartner, P. Greene, and L. Cox. The Entrepreneur next Door: Characteristics of Individuals Starting Companies in America : an Executive Summary of The Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics. Kansas City, MO: Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, 2002. Print.! Taplin, Ruth. Valuing Intellectual Property in Japan, Britain, and the United States. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004. Print.! "The Google Culture · Corporate Information · About." Google. Web. 22 Mar. 2011. .! "Total Entrepreneurial Activity." International Entrepreneurship - Entrepreneur International - Entrepreneur - Entrepreneurship. Web. 21 Mar. 2011. .! Turnbull, Stephen R., and Angus McBride. Samurai: the World of the Warrior. Oxford: Osprey, 2006. Print.! West, Mark. Dying to Get out of Debt: Consumer Insolvency Law and Suicide in Japan. Diss. University of Michigan, 2003. Berkeley Electronic, 2003. Print.!

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NORTH KOREA’S GROWING ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE ON CHINA Hyun Sun Suh ’12

INTRODUCTION deeply involved in Kim’s regime survival, by remaining its main source of life China is undeniably the most support. China’s policy towards North important ally of North Korea. As North Korea has been characterized by its Korea’s biggest trading partner and main strategic passiveness, but now with the source of food, arms, and fuel, China has more economic and political leverage, helped sustain Kim Jong-Il's regime. In China can voice a stronger opinion on the hope of avoiding potential instability pushing North Korea on the issues of in the region and an uncontrolled influx interest. of refugees across its border, Beijing This paper will analyze the degree wants to keep the authoritarian regime of economic dependence of North Korea afloat. The relationship between the two and China’s growing leverage over countries has taken a different path Pyongyang. First, I will briefly go over the beyond the traditional military-centered history of Sino-North Korea relations, alliance since the dissolution of Soviet specifically, two major turning points that Union and Beijing’s transition to a quasi- led to the isolation of North Korea in the capitalist economy. China’s successful post-Cold War era: the collapse of Soviet integration into the global capitalist Union and China's successful integration economy has made Sino-North Korean into the global capitalist economy. This relations all the more unequal, for isolation, coupled with the failure of Pyongyang cannot afford to offer China North Korean communist economy, has anything in return, with its outmoded and motivated North Korea’s brinkmanship failed economy. policy of nuclear development. As a result, North Korea’s growing economic North Korea’s violent behavior created a dependence on China is important in negative feedback that further isolated solving the Korean peninsula’s two major itself. Second, I will mention the major security problems concerning goals and priorities of North Korea and reunification and denuclearization. As one China’s foreign policies that explain the of North Korea’s few allies, Beijing seemingly imbalanced relationship continues to have more leverage over between the two countries. Third, I will Pyongyang than any other nation. The argue that North Korea’s declining economic leverage in particular has only relations with the international community grown as a result of North Korea's goes hand in hand with its growing declining relations with South Korea and dependence on China. Next, I will look at the international community. After the statistical figures that confirm this trend of recent confrontations between the two North Korea’s growing economic reliance Koreas, the subsequent withdrawal of aid on china. Lastly, I will discuss the from the South have left North Korea all implications of this asymmetric the more dependent on China relationship as a form of economic economically. China has become more leverage. With the recent shift in Sino-

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 37!

North Korean relations, China will exert recognition of both north and South greater influence over North Korea’s Korea. China also took initiatives to widen economy, as inter-Korean relations are its circle of relations, pursuing conciliatory spiraling downward. China’s recent foreign policy. After Beijing and Seoul acquisition of mining rights in North normalized diplomatic ties in 1992, Korea provides such evidence. While China’s increasing collaboration with South Korea has its back turned against South Korea has further isolated the Kim the North, China will continue to pursue Jong-il’s regime.iii North Korea found its interests in North Korea’s natural both Russia and China’s integration resources, developing deeper ties and threatening, for the fear of being deserted ultimately expanding its influence over by its previous allies and being encircled North Korea. by enemies, which bred suspicion and mistrust towards the outside world. I. The History of Sino-North Korean North Korea felt that the shift in Relations the international environment would have an extremely detrimental effect on The acceptance of communism Pyongyang’s survival.iv Kim Jong-Il was brought together the PRC and the DPRK concerned about the possibility of being in the same socialist camp in the twentieth “sold out” by China’s conciliatory policy century, pursuing the common missions toward the United States. This fear based of defeating imperialism and capitalism. on isolation ultimately contributed to Leaders of both countries shared the Pyongyang’s brinkmanship policy. North sense of belonging to a single family of Korea’s nuclear development can be the socialist world, including the Soviet explained as a manifestation of such fear. Union and other satellite states. The Pyongyang would pursue the status of a relationship of the two communist nuclear power at any cost to secure regime countries solidified during the Korean survival. Thus, it is extremely difficult and Wari, when China supported North Korea frustrating to persuade North Korea to by sending millions of Chinese soldiers give up its last resort. As Pyongyang across its border to fight for their refused to observe international norms, comrades. However, the end of the Cold even China became frustrated at its War and the subsequent collapse of the neighbor’s defiance.v North Korea’s Soviet Union and Eastern European uncooperative attitude at six-party talks countries brought about a big change in led to international sanctions against Sino-North Korean relations.ii North Korea. The rearrangement of the During the post-Cold War era, world order coupled with the accommodation and conciliation became brinkmanship policy further isolated the the driving forces in pushing the hermit kingdom. international order ahead, and they were The dissolution of Soviet Union widely accepted as the primary norms of and Pyongyang’s subsequent isolation international affairs. However, North from the international community had a Korea regarded this new world order with devastating effect on North Korea’s strong suspicion as well as antagonism. As economy as well, since the starving nation the former socialist camp reached out to could no longer receive abundant aid or the rest of the world, North Korea support from its formal allies. North became isolated from the international Korea was hardly self-sufficient, which community. In 1990, the Soviet Union meant that it had to be more dependent became the vanguard that adopted dual on its few remaining allies, one of which

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 38! being China. China, on the other hand, the main goals and priorities behind the had been growing remarkably after the foreign policies of Pyongyang and Beijing. successful economic reform in 1978 launched by Deng Xiaoping. Since then, A. Pyongyang's Gains North Korea’s growing dependence on China became more evident. The Understanding the motives of any asymmetric give-and-take relationship country is difficult, but it is even more so between Beijing and Pyongyang fueled for North Korea, which many people China's frustrations with the Kim Jong-Il’s view as an extreme case of a closed and regime, due to Pyongyang's deteriorating totalitarian polity. North Korea’s foreign economic situations and its continued policy decision-making has been especially brinkmanship aimed at receiving more unapproachable as a result of its strong aid.vi ideological commitments, lack of Nevertheless, China seemed transparency, and the overwhelming unlikely to halt or withdraw its support dominance of its dear leader. Over the completely, given that it had too much at course of history, North Korea has been stake in North Korea.vii “The idea that the unpredictable and inconsistent when Chinese would turn their backs on the interacting with the rest of the world, yet North Koreans is clearly wrong,” says it seems clear that it has one unchanging Adam Segal, CFR senior fellow for China goal: the perpetuation of Kim’s regime. In studies. China was persevering in its recent years, China has established itself as relations with North Korea, protecting an undeniable regional power while North Kim’s regime from falling apart. Hence, it Korea has further isolated itself, as becomes appropriate to discuss the discussed in the previous section. In that motivations behind China’s continued context, Pyongyang’s policy towards support despite its seemingly unequal Beijing can be best understood as the relationship with North Korea. desperate search for protection from outside pressures. II. The Dynamics of Sino-North Furthermore, Pyongyang’s survival Korea Relations is fundamentally dependent on China, which provides most of its food and Following the major turning energy supplies. Nicholas Eberstadt, a points in the post Cold War era, Sino- consultant at the World Bank, says that North Korean relations took a different since the early 1990s, China has served as path beyond their traditional military- North Korea's chief food supplier and has based alliance. Therefore, it would be a accounted for nearly 90 percent of its grave mistake to assume that the PRC and energy imports.viii By some estimates, the DPRK still have the kind of relations China provides 80 percent of North formerly dubbed as “lips and teeth.” In Korea's consumer goods and 45 percent fact, Pyongyang and Beijing have a of its food. North Korea's economic noticeably asymmetric relationship dependence on China is rapidly increasing, characterized by the growing economic as indicated by a significant trade dependence of North Korea on China. imbalance.ix Some experts see North This uneven relationship calls for an Korea’s significant trade deficit as an explanation of what has been driving the indirect Chinese subsidy, given that North asymmetric interdependence. In this light, Korea cannot finance its trade deficit the following section attempts to explore through borrowing.x On top of that indirect subsidy, China also provides aid

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 39! directly to Pyongyang. At first glance, it of a barbed wire fence along this border in seems obvious from the figures that China 2006 for that reason.xiii has been continuously giving to its To an extent, North Korea and neighbor without taking back anything China share a common goal: their foreign substantial in return. This brings us to our policies have been geared towards the next point: what does China gain from mutually beneficial end of keeping Kim’s this relentless support? regime afloat. China has been providing North Korea with food, arms and fuel. B. China's Priorities Yet, their relationship has not been invulnerable to external shocks. One of China's support for Pyongyang the major changes was declining inter- ensures a friendly nation on its Korean relations following the South’s northeastern border, and provides a new administration and two recent buffer zone between China and military confrontations. democratic South Korea, which is home to around twenty-nine thousand U.S. III. Deteriorating Inter-Korean troops and marines. This allows China to Relations reduce its military deployment in its northeast and "focus more directly on the In 2008, the inauguration of a issue of Taiwanese independence," Shen conservative government led by Lee Dingli of the Institute of International Myung-bak brought about a fundamental Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai change in South Korea’s policy toward writes in China Security.xi North Korea's North Korea. Upon entering office, Lee allegiance is important to Beijing as a was determined to implement a brand bulwark against U.S. military dominance new policy based on a tough stance of the region as well as against the rise of towards Pyongyang. President Lee’s hard Japan's military. line marked a great departure from the Daniel Sneider, the associate Sunshine Policy that had been adopted by director for research at Stanford’s Asia- the former administrations. The Lee Pacific Research Center, confirms that government established the principle of regional stability is the top priority for the reciprocity in its assistance policy, in Chinese.xii In that sense, North Korea is a which the amount of aid is directly linked time bomb for China, because Pyongyang to North Korea’s cooperation, most could trigger a war on its own. If North importantly progress on Korea does provoke a war with South denuclearization.xiv Lee believed that, in Korea, the United States and China would exchange for providing humanitarian aid, have to get involved, sharing the burden the South should demand more from the of yet another costly war on the Korean North. In fact, one of the plans President peninsula. Thus, China is hesitant about Lee suggested—Vision 3000 proposalxv— withdrawing support, for the fear of requires Pyongyang to completely North Korea’s unpredictable aggressions abandon its nuclear quest before South developing into a full-scale war. The Korea can raise North Korean per capita collapse of Kim's regime can also lead to income up to $3000 per year in a decade. chaos on the border. The flow of refugees Lee pledged to work more closely into China has already been a chronic with the United States in taking a tougher problem, and it is becoming worse due to stance towards Pyongyang. South Korea’s the poor performance of North Korean pursuit of stronger alliance with the economy. Beijing began its construction United States along with the

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 40! discontinuation of aid aggravated North the second summit between the Koreas. Korea’s antagonism. The North’s The rate dropped to 65 percent in 2008, torpedoing of the naval vessel, Cheonan,xvi 64 percent in 2009 and 55 percent last in March and the shelling of the South year, KITA said.xxii The gap between the Korean island, Yeonpyeong,xvii can be, to an amount of South-North trade and that of extent, explained as a manifestation of the North-China trade will further widen North’s dissatisfaction with the South’s unless the tension between the South and current government. As a result, relations North is resolved, according a KITA between the two Koreas plunged to their official in charge of inter-Korean trade.xxiii lowest point after the two confrontations.xviii Seoul said it would IV. Sino-North Korea Trade slash all trade with Pyongyang. In Statistics response, North Korea declared it was cutting all ties with the South until In this section, we will examine President Lee Myung-bak leaves office in Beijing-Pyongyang economic relations in early 2013.xix terms of trade. These figures of Sino- Amid worsened political relations North Korean trade show the extent of between the two Koreas, North Korea's North Korea’s autarky and economic trade with South Korea fell to about half decline in the past decade. of its trade with China in 2010. The two Koreas exchanged US$1.91 billion worth of goods last year, up 14 percent from 2009, according to the Korea International Trade Association (KITA).xx

However, trade between the North and

China jumped 32 percent on-year to slightly over $3.46 billion, indicating Pyongyang's growing economic dependence on its communist ally. The proportion of inter-Korean trade to North Korea-China trade reached its peak of 91 percent in 2007 when South Korean President Rohxxi held a historic summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong-il,

Table 1 China’s Merchandise Trade with DPRK, 1995-2009 ($ in millions) China’s China’s China’s Year Total Trade Imports Exports Balance 1995 63.609 486.037 549.646 422.428 1996 68.638 497.014 565.652 428.376 1997 121.610 534.411 656.021 412.801 1998 51.089 356.661 407.750 305.572 1999 41.722 328.634 370.356 286.912 2000 37.214 450.839 488.053 413.625 2001 166.797 570.660 737.457 403.863 2002 270.863 467.309 738.172 196.446

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2003 395.546 627.995 1,023.541 232.449 2004 582.193 794.525 1,376.718 212.332 2005 496.511 1,084.723 1,581.234 588.212 2006 467.718 1,231.886 1,699.604 764.168 2007 581.521 1,392.453 1,973.974 810.932 2008 754.045 2,033.233 2,787.278 1,279.188 2009 793.026 1,887.741 2,680.767 1,094.715 xxiv Source: China, Ministry of Commerce (excludes Hong Kong and Macau).

As shown in Table 1, Sino-DPRK trade deficit is not likely to improve for a trade has been rising steadily. While that long time, because North Korea does not amount is dwarfed by China’s trade with possess the technology to produce high- countries such as South Korea (total value exportable products and its primary bilateral trade of $156 billion in 2009)xxv, commodities are losing competitiveness in both imports from and exports to the the Chinese market. DPRK have increased significantly over In addition to its bilateral trade the past decade. One notable aspect of with North Korea, China has also been Sino-DPRK economic relations is the playing a major role in North Korea’s trade characterized by chronic and economic relations with the outside world. substantial balance-of-trade deficits for China especially has been exerting a huge North Korea. The cumulative sum of the influence on the implementation of trade balance deficits for North Korea international economic sanctions on the amounted to $7.85 billion during the DPRK. For example, Beijing only agreed period 1995-2009, with total import to UN Resolution 1718xxvii after revisions amount from China at $12.74 billion and removed requirements for tough total export to China only $4.89 billion. economic sanctions beyond those While China remained North Korea’s targeting luxury goodsxxviii, and China's largest trading partner in the 1990s in trade with North Korea has continued to terms of total value, Beijing has allowed increase since then. Bilateral trade Pyongyang to run average annual deficits between China and North Korea reached of approximately $377 million since $2.79 billion in 2008, up 63.5 percent 1995.xxvi In 2009, despite the global compared to 2006. In 2009, China financial crisis, DPRK exports to China provided about half of all North Korean increased to $793 million, although imports and received a quarter of its Chinese exports to the DPRK slowed exports.xxix slightly to $1.9 billion. The bilateral trade is highly imbalanced with China’s surplus exceeding $1 billion in 2009. China’s role in North Korea’s trade would be even larger if barter transactions and aid were factored into these figures. North Korea’s

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Chart 1 North Korea’s Total Foreign Trade 1990-2008 ($ in billions)

9!

8!

7! 6!

5!

4! UN! IMF! 3!

2! 1!

0!

Source: Korea Development Institute, Analysis of North Korean Trade Statistics 1990~2008 (한국개발연구원, 1990~2008년 북한 무역 통계의 분석과 재구성)

percentage share, we observe a noticeable The China percentage of total drop in China’s percentage share around North Korean foreign trade has fluctuated the year 2000. Yet, when we look at the greatly over the years: 1) 25-60 percent total value (see Table 1), Sino-DPRK (but the absolute value was around U.S. trade registered a 51.13 percent increase in $100 million) in the 1950s; 2) about 30 2001 ($250 million). Despite the dramatic percent in the 1960s until 1967 after increase in total value, the China’s share which the ratio declined to around 10 stayed in the range of 20 percent, because percent in the wake of the Cultural North Korea also experienced a big jump Revolution; 3) increased to about 20 in total foreign trade as it was renewing its percent since 1973 (to the level of U.S. economic ties with the South after their $300-600 million); and 4) declined to the monumental joint declaration on June 10-20 percent range in the 1980s, 15th. although its total value had risen to U.S. $3-4 billion.xxx From the post-Cold War decade of 90’s to the recent years, the ratio has been increasing, reaching its peak in 2005. This year, when China experienced the largest trade surplus, coincides with the time period when the United States was escalating its sanctionsxxxi against North Korea. Despite the general trend of growing China’s

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Chart 2 China Percentage of Total North Korean Foreign Trade 1995-2008

100%! 90%! 80%! 70%! 60%! 50%! Trade!with!Others! 40%! Trade!with!China! 30%! 20%! 10%! 0%!

Source: Combined the figures from Table 1 and Chart

North). In addition, the collapse of the V. China’s Aid to North Korea Soviet bloc meant the loss of Russian aid, Statistics export markets, and cheap oil. Trade with the former Soviet Union dropped from as In the late 90’s, nearly one million much as $3.58 billion in 1999 and to $111 North Koreans starved to death.xxxii Major million in 2008.xxxivThis has aggravated the portions of the North Korean population disastrous domestic economic conditions survived primarily through transfers of in North Korea. food and other economic assistance from abroad.xxxiii In that decade, the inefficiencies of North Korea’s centrally Major Food Donors to North planned economy, especially its Korea, 1995-2008 promotion of state-owned heavy Other;! China;! industries, along with high military 18%! 27%! spending—about 15-25% of GDP— joined with drought and floods to push Japan;! the economy into crisis. The food crisis 11%! has since passed, but shortages still exist. The country basically depends on staples U.S.;! ROK;! 18%! 26%! from China, and, (before economic sanctions) from the U.N. World Food Program, as well as fertilizer from South Source: Interfais, May 20, 2009. Korea (when it was being delivered before Lee administration cut off its aid to the

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Since the Soviet Union withdrew with the onset of North Korea’s famine, its patronage of North Korea in the early as China became concerned that the food 1990s, China is widely believed to have situation could lead to the collapse of the emerged as the single largest provider of Pyongyang regime and/or to increased food to North Korea, though the precise numbers of North Koreans crossing the amount is difficult to estimate due to lax border into northeastern China. controls on the North Korea-China border and the overall unreliability of VI. Chinese Investments in North official Chinese statistics. Additionally, Korea food from China is known to enter the North on commercial, concessional, and Detailing the full extent of barter terms, making it difficult to Chinese investment in North Korea is distinguish aid from trade.xxxv During the difficult, as the North Korean government North Korean nuclear crisis of the early provides little information on the subject. 1990s, China cut its food shipments to the The communist party does publish data DPRK dramatically, only to restore them regarding Chinese outward-bound foreign with the onset of famine, which direct investment (FDI), yet it is unclear threatened the possibility of a North whether the official data provide a Korean collapse.19 What is known is that complete picture of the level of PRC after declining in the early 1990s, Chinese investment in North Korea. food shipments to the DPRK increased

xxxvi Source: People’s Republic of China (PRC), Ministry of Commerce “2009 ”

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Investments made by Chinese In fact, North Korea agreed in May 2007 companies in North Korea have increased to a long-term joint mining deal with the dramatically over the past decade. South Korean government xliii and zinc According to China’s Ministry of exports from the North to the South Commerce, investments by Chinese doubled in 2007.xliv companies have reached its peak in 2008, With one fewer competitor in its $41.23 million (USD), compared to only pursuit of mining rights, China can $1.2 million in 2003 (see figures acquire North Korea’s natural resources above).xxxvii A substantial amount of this more easily than before, as it enjoys bigger Chinese investment is taking place in the leverage over the communist state. North mining and mineral resource sectors of Korea made significant economic North Korea as well as in port facilities concessions when it agreed to allow and other infrastructure sectors. Chinese companies to invest in its Among the 45 major commercial potentially vast mineral wealth, as the minerals identified by the U.S. Geological poverty-stricken nation has few other Survey, nineteen of them are faced with options left to keep the cash coming. limited supply in China.xxxviii China's Officials of the two countries signed a demand for minerals exceeds domestic deal to jointly develop the North's mineral supply, and thus, imports are estimated to deposits in Beijing on February 15th.xlv account for more than 30 percent of This joint investment has considerable domestic consumption in 2008.xxxix In political implications beyond the simple order to satisfy this enormous demand for business partnership. natural resources, China has turned to North Korea as an additional source of VII. Implications of China’s raw materials, importing ores, mineral Economic Leverage fuels (coal), iron and steel.xl While this aspect of the minerals trade has existed China gains a lot economically for some time, the nature of the from its asymmetric relationship with relationship has changed in recent years, North Korea. Reportedly, growing as Chinese companies started investing in numbers of Chinese firms are investing in infrastructure projects and joint ventures North Korea and are gaining concessions in North Korea’s mining industry.xli like preferable trading terms and port China has been eyeing North operations.xlvi These economic Korea’s massive mineral wealth for a long development plans also supposedly time.xlii Beijing has been expanding its further China's national interests in mining rights in North Korea to cover as developing its own chronically poor many as 20 sites, while South Korea has northeastern provinces by securing secured only three sites. As North Korea's mineral and energy resources across the closest ally and major benefactor, China border.xlvii But most importantly, Chinese has had better access to its mines than any investment inside the borders of North other country. In exchange for mining Korea means that Beijing can exercise rights, China has helped sustain the bigger political leverage on the important North, providing oil, equipment and food. issues of North Korea. As the South has virtually no mineral Back in 2008, military authorities wealth of its own, South Korea has also in North Korea were still unenthusiastic been eager to acquire mining rights in about the idea of foreign investment in North Korea, until its strained relations mineralsxlviii, even though their trade with Pyongyang severed all economic ties. volume of minerals was growing. The

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North did not want to open up its mineral CONCLUSION resources to foreign countries, because allowing big investments inside its border Before I conclude this paper, I was equivalent to permitting that much want to mention that the incomplete foreign influence. However, recently, Kim nature of statistical data from both the Jong-Il has changed his mind. The abrupt PRC and the DPRK can potentially change following North Korea’s declining undermine the conclusiveness of this relations with the South after the recent paper’s analysis. Nevertheless, I have confrontations seems to suggest that found, from the available statistical and North Korea has become more willing to anecdotal evidence, a dramatic increase in lease its mines realistically as a tool for China’s investments in North Korea along winning favor of China. With the overall with Pyongyang’s growing economic decrease in aid as a result of its hostile dependence on Beijing over the past relationship with the South, the cash decade.xlix However, this increase can be infusion the North could receive from attributed to China’s general trend of such large-scale industrial mining promoting foreign expansion and investments must have been a viable economic growth rather than representing option for Kim. Therefore, it is likely that a calculative plan specific to North Korea North Korea decided to sell off its based on its geopolitical importance. Data underground resources at a cheap price, in on China’s total outward foreign direct exchange for Chinese protection from investment bolster this argument, as outside pressures. Furthermore, if that is China’s amount of FDI into North Korea the case, North Korea will be compelled increased drastically within the same time to make more economic concessions in frame as China’s period of foreign the future, if it does not somehow break expansion. However, the growth of the deepening economic reliance. investments is significant if we look at it China’s recent acquisition of as percentage of North Korea’s total mining rights is politically significant investments. China’s investment in North because investments, unlike trade, imply a Korea not only increased in total value but deeper involvement in a country’s also in its ratio. This suggests that even economy. As opposed to just buying the though Beijing’s promotion of investment minerals from North Korea, China will abroad through its policy may have been a actually invest its capital with partial contributing factor, North Korea and ownership to the mines. As North Korea's China’s unique, imbalanced relationship is single most important ally, China has the a more convincing explanation for this capacity to monopolize investment drastic increase of one-sided investments opportunities in North Korea, earning not represented as percentage of North only financial gains but also strategic Korea’s total foreign investment. benefits. The Korea Chamber of Since the post-Cold War era, Sino- Commerce and Industry voiced practical North Korea relations have taken a concerns that South Korea was falling different path. China’s integration into the behind while China was locking up rights capitalist economy stands in stark contrast to North Korea's minerals. Pyongyang's to North Korea’s isolation. Furthermore, growing economic reliance on Beijing also North Korea’s declining relations with the confirms the fear that Seoul may lose its international community goes hand in leverage in case of political turmoil in the hand with its growing dependence on North. China. After inter-Korean relations spiraled downward, North Korea lost one

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 47! of its major lifelines, and consequently, Korean peninsula: What will China do ended up turning to China for financial with its leverage about the major security reasons. As a result, Pyongyang’s concerns of denuclearization and asymmetric relationship with Beijing gave reunification? As long as the two both means and motives for Beijing to countries, despite its unequal standings in take advantage of their uneven power the international community, can still find structure. China’s exploitation of the a balanced interdependence, North Korea situation has become evident through its and China will cooperate to achieve the rising investments in North Korea, same goal of keeping the Kim Jong-Il especially the recent agreement on joint regime afloat. Then, the question ventures in North Korea’s mining becomes, will China support industry.l While the distance between the transformations at the expense of regional two Koreas keeps growing, China will stability? Is peaceful reunification of the continue to pursue its interests in North Korean peninsula now a distant dream? I Korea’s natural resources. believe having that “China factor” is not Declining inter-Korean relations, a necessarily an obstacle in pursuing both result of President Lee’s tougher policy denuclearization and reunification. It can and the recent military conflicts between actually mean that Beijing may use that the two Koreas, have also created a leverage for South Korea, except in that general sense of anxiety in South Koreans case China will have to lead these that China will enjoy greater control and transformations under its control. In this leverage over North Korea. “The North light, South Koreans’ fear is trivial because Korean economy is being rapidly it is not a contest of who has more incorporated into the Chinese economic control over that situation; rather the sphere. That's why there are people who control should be given to the party that say North Korea is becoming another ensures efficiency. In any case, neither China’s province," Seoul's largest South Korea nor China is likely to absorb newspaper, Chosun Ilbo, voiced its North Korea unilaterally, and we will concerns in an editorial.li inevitably need international cooperation This whole discussion of China’s to solve the problems of either increasing control over North Korea denuclearization or reunification. ultimately brings into light a fundamental question regarding the future of the ! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! i The North and South have technically remained at war since the 1950-53 Korean War ended with an armistice rather than a peace treaty. ii Gloria , “China and North Korea: A Changing Relationship,” Stanford Journal of International Relations (San Francisco, CA: Department of International Relations, Stanford University, 2006). iii China has surpassed the United States as South Korea’s largest trading partner in 2003. iv Tae-Hwan Kwak and Seung-Ho Joo, North Korea's foreign policy under Kim Jong Il: new perspectives, Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2009 v Ariana Eunjung Cha and Glenn Kessler, “Anger May Help Bring New U.N. Sanctions”, Washington Post, May 28, 2009. vi Hu Jintao reportedly insisted on long-overdue market reforms. Aidan Foster-Carter, “Harsh realities for North Korea’s unseen heir”, Financial Times vii Jayshree Bajoria, “The China-North Korea Relationship”, Council on Foreign Relations viii Jayshree Bajoria, “The China-North Korea Relationship”, Council on Foreign Relations ix See section IV for trade statistics. x Scott Snyder, “China-Korea Relations: Pyongyang Tests Beijing’s Patience”, Comparative Connections (A Quarterly E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations), July 2009.

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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! xi Shen Dingli, North Korea’s Strategic Significance to China, China Security Autumn 2006 xii Jayshree Bajoria, “The China-North Korea Relationship”, Council on Foreign Relations xiii “Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao answers reporters’ questions at regular news conference on October 12, 2006.” Beijing Ministry of Foreign Affairs, translated in FBIS, CPP20061012038001, October 12, 2006. xiv Jong-moo Lee, “The History of South Korean Aid to DPRK,” Paper Presented at the 2009 International Conference on Humanitarian and Development Assistance to the DPRK, Seoul, November 24-26, 2009. xv Norimitsu Onishi, “South Korean President Pledges Pragmatism”, The New York Times xvi The Cheonan sinking occurred on 26 March 2010, when the Cheonan, a South Korean Navy ship carrying 104 personnel, sank off the country's west coast near Baengnyeong Island in the Yellow Sea, killing 46 seamen. A South Korean-led official investigation carried out by a team of international experts from South Korea, United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and Sweden presented a summary of its investigation on 20 May 2010, concluding that the warship had been sunk by a North Korean torpedo fired by a midget submarine. xvii The bombardment of Yeonpyeong was an artillery engagement between the North Korean military and South Korean forces stationed on Yeonpyeong Island on 23 November 2010. The incident -- in which two South Korean marines and two civilians died -- is "the first direct artillery attack on South Korean territory since the Korean War ended in an armistice" in 1953 xviii The former UN ambassador Bill Richardson said tensions had escalated to become "the most serious crisis on the Korean peninsula since the 1953 armistice which ended the Korean War." xix Associated Press, “Chafing at South Korea's punishment for ship sinking, North Korea severs all ties, raises war rhetoric”, May 25, 2010. xx Yonhap News, “Inter-Korean trade falls to half of North-China trade in 2010,” March 23 2011. xxi Former President Roh was a strong proponent of the Sunshine Policy. xxii Yonhap News, “Inter-Korean trade falls to half of North-China trade in 2010,” March 23 2011. xxiii Ibid., xxiv China has stopped publicly issuing trade data about North Korea, veiling the potentially sensitive numbers about its wary neighbour under another category while the two countries seek improved ties. xxv Dick K. Nanto and Emma Chanlett-Avery, North Korea: Economic Leverage and Policy Analysis, Congressional Research Service, January 22, 2010 xxvi In contrast, South Korea’s trade with China in 2000 generated a huge surplus of $5.7 billion, while North Korea’s trade with China generated a trade deficit of $414 million. xxvii United Nations Security Council Resolution 1718 was adopted unanimously by the United Nations Security Council on October 14, 2006. The resolution imposes a series of economic and commercial sanctions on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the aftermath of that nation's claimed nuclear test of October 9, 2006. xxviii Jayshree Bajoria, “The China-North Korea Relationship”, Council on Foreign Relations xxix This trade essentially consists of shipments of raw materials and components from South Korea to an industrial zone in North Korea and the return of finished products from the zone to South Korea. For details, see CRS Report RL34093, The Kaesong North-South Korean Industrial Complex, by Dick K. Nanto and Mark E. Manyin. xxx Samuel S. Kim and Tai Hwan Lee, Chinese-North Korean Relations: Managing Asymmetrical Interdependence, North Korea and Northeast Asia xxxi On June 28, 2005, President George W. Bush expanded the authority granted his office to address the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—authority first exercised by President George H.W. Bush in 1990—to freeze assets and property of those engaged in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. xxxii Bill Powell, “The Next Great North Korean Famine”, Time, May. 06, 2008 xxxiii Dick K. Nanto and Emma Chanlett-Avery, North Korea: Economic Leverage and Policy Analysis, Congressional Research Service, January 22, 2010 xxxiv Dick K. Nanto and Emma Chanlett-Avery, North Korea: Economic Leverage and Policy Analysis, Congressional Research Service, January 22, 2010 xxxv Mark E. Manyin, Foreign Assistance to North Korea, Congressional Research Service, May 26, 2005 xxxvi Retrieved from Chinese Infrastructure and Natural Resources Investments in North Korea by Daniel Gearin, Research Fellow, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Backgrounder October 20, 2010 xxxvii Statistical Bulletin on China's Outward Direct Investment, 2009. http://hzs.mofcom.gov.cn/accessory/201009/1284339524515.pdf. xxxviii Pui-Kwan Tse,2008 Minerals Yearbook - China (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey, October 2009), p. 9.2. http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/2008/myb3-2008-ch.pdf xxxix Ibid. xl Ibid. xli Washington Post, "Value of N. Korea Sanctions Disputed," June 12, 2009. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2009/06/11/AR2009061102323.html.

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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! xlii North Korea’s mineral wealth is valued at US$6.3 trillion according to the Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry. There are large deposits of iron ore, zinc and uranium, as well as coal. The North also has the world's largest known deposit of magnesite, an essential part of lightweight metal used in cars, airplanes and electronic equipment. xliii Blaine Harden and Ariana Eunjung Cha, “Korea milking mineral deposits”, The Washington Post, Feb 24, 2008. xliv Blaine Harden and Ariana Eunjung Cha, “N. Korea Cashes In on Mineral Riches: Financial Need Trumps Longtime Aversion to Foreign Trade," Washington Post, February 24, 2008. xlv AFP, “China to explore N. Korean minerals”, Feb 6, 2011. xlvi Jayshree Bajoria, “The China-North Korea Relationship”, Council on Foreign Relations xlvii John S. Park, “On the Issues: North Korea’s Leadership Succession: The China Factor”, United States Institute of Peace, September 2010 "China's brisk investment in North Korea seems part of efforts to develop its poor northeastern provinces," said Chung Ui- jun, a researcher at the KDB institute. Under a so-called Northeast Development Project endorsed by the Communist Party, China has pushed to develop its three northeastern provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning, bordering North Korea, Russia and Mongolia, he said. xlviii Christian Oliver, “China eyes N Korea’s mineral wealth,” Financial Times, October 6 2009. xlix China has reportedly invested a total of $264 million USD in North Korea. Much of this investment has come since 2003 with a 44 percent increase in investment taking place between 2007 and 2008 alone (from $18.4 million to $41.23 million, respectively.) l Washington Post, "Value of N. Korea Sanctions Disputed," June 12, 2009. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2009/06/11/AR2009061102323.html. li Christian Oliver, “China eyes N Korea’s mineral wealth,” Financial Times, October 6 2009.

REFERENCES Gloria Koo, “China and North Korea: A Changing Relationship,” Stanford Journal of International Relations (San Francisco, CA: Department of International Relations, Stanford University, 2006). Tae-Hwan Kwak and Seung-Ho Joo, North Korea's foreign policy under Kim Jong Il: new perspectives, Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2009 Ariana Eunjung Cha and Glenn Kessler, “Anger May Help Bring New U.N. Sanctions”, Washington Post, May 28, 2009. Aidan Foster-Carter, “Harsh realities for North Korea’s unseen heir”, Financial Times Jayshree Bajoria, “The China-North Korea Relationship”, Council on Foreign Relations Scott Snyder, “China-Korea Relations: Pyongyang Tests Beijing’s Patience”, Comparative Connections (A Quarterly E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations), July 2009. Shen Dingli, North Korea’s Strategic Significance to China, China Security Autumn 2006 “Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao answers reporters’ questions at regular news conference on October 12, 2006.” Beijing Ministry of Foreign Affairs, translated in FBIS, CPP20061012038001, October 12, 2006. Jong-moo Lee, “The History of South Korean Aid to DPRK,” Paper Presented at the 2009 International Conference on Humanitarian and Development Assistance to the DPRK, Seoul, November 24-26, 2009. Norimitsu Onishi, “South Korean President Pledges Pragmatism”, The New York Times Associated Press, “Chafing at South Korea's punishment for ship sinking, North Korea severs all ties, raises war rhetoric”, May 25, 2010. Yonhap News, “Inter-Korean trade falls to half of North-China trade in 2010,” March 23 2011. Dick K. Nanto and Emma Chanlett-Avery, North Korea: Economic Leverage and Policy Analysis, Congressional Research Service, January 22, 2010 Samuel S. Kim and Tai Hwan Lee, Chinese-North Korean Relations: Managing Asymmetrical Interdependence, North Korea and Northeast Asia Bill Powell, “The Next Great North Korean Famine”, Time, May. 06, 2008 Mark E. Manyin, Foreign Assistance to North Korea, Congressional Research Service, May 26, 2005 Retrieved from Chinese Infrastructure and Natural Resources Investments in North Korea by Daniel Gearin, Research Fellow, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Backgrounder October 20, 2010 Statistical Bulletin on China's Outward Direct Investment, 2009. http://hzs.mofcom.gov.cn/accessory/201009/1284339524515.pdf. Pui-Kwan Tse,2008 Minerals Yearbook - China (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey, October 2009), p. 9.2. http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/2008/myb3-2008-ch.pdf Washington Post, "Value of N. Korea Sanctions Disputed," June 12, 2009. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/11/AR2009061102323.html. Blaine Harden and Ariana Eunjung Cha, “Korea milking mineral deposits”, The Washington Post, Feb 24, 2008. Blaine Harden and Ariana Eunjung Cha, “N. Korea Cashes In on Mineral Riches: Financial Need Trumps Longtime Aversion to Foreign Trade," Washington Post, February 24, 2008. AFP, “China to explore N. Korean minerals”, Feb 6, 2011.

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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! John S. Park, “On the Issues: North Korea’s Leadership Succession: The China Factor”, United States Institute of Peace, September 2010 Christian Oliver, “China eyes N Korea’s mineral wealth,” Financial Times, October 6 2009. Washington Post, "Value of N. Korea Sanctions Disputed," June 12, 2009. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/11/AR2009061102323.html.

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MAPPING SOUTH KOREAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES Julie Han ’12

ABSTRACT Some of the most recognized issues today include language and cultural barriers, North Korean refugees who poverty, unemployment, and mental resettle in South Korea face a myriad of health (Kim, 2010). obstacles to assimilation. In addition to For newly resettled refugees, social difficulties of adjusting to the radically support and interaction are necessary for different political, economic, and social adequate mental and emotional structures of South Korea, refugees are adjustment (Ahearn, 1999). The friendly, subject to discrimination from South hostile, or indifferent attitudes of host Koreans throughout, and after, the nation citizens can greatly impact the adjustment process. The currently likelihood of successful adjustment. proposed model illustrates three processes Interviews of North Korean refugees who that would facilitate positive South resettled in South Korea revealed many Korean attitudes towards North Korean instances of discrimination because refugees. It also provides descriptions of individuals were from the North. An social, historical, and psychological important step in helping North Korean barriers to these processes and how they refugees overcome other obstacles to prevent positive attitudes towards assimilation is identifying how to promote refugees. Discriminatory attitudes of positive South Korean attitudes towards South Koreans towards refugees not only refugees. This report proposes a model to heighten stress of assimilation but may illustrate the various factors that influence also decrease South Koreans’ future attitudes of South Koreans (Figure 1). support for generous refugee policy and Leading into the outcome of positive for reunification with the North. South Korean attitudes towards North Koreans are three main processes or Recognition of the vast political, channels: perception of a shared identity economic, and sociocultural differences with North Koreans, successful that separate North and South Korea is assimilation of North Korean refuges into necessary to understand the difficulties South Korean society, and South North Korean refugees face after Koreans’ acceptance of perceived costs of resettling in South Korea. While safe refugee resettlement. As the model shows, passage out of North Korea may appear each process can be obstructed or to be the toughest challenge for refugees, facilitated by a number of items. Also adjusting to life after defection is shown in the model is the bidirectional comparable in terms of obstacles and relationship between North Korean stress. Sudden escalation in the number of refugees’ attitudes and South Koreans’ resettled refugeesi following devastating attitudes. As it is a fairly simplified model, flooding and famineii in the North in the it does not provide a comprehensive view 1990s revealed many of these refugee of all factors that influence South Korean problems to the South Korean public. attitudes. It does, however, allow one to

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 52! gain an understanding of not only where individuals who choose to defect from the discriminatory attitudes come from, but country of “other” and who obtain South also how they may affect the experiences Korean citizenship upon resettlement are of current and future refugees. The still seen as outsiders by the people that importance of this research lies in the once considered them brothers. identification of ways to alleviate or Specifically, the barriers to South prevent assimilation difficulties for the Koreans’ perception of a shared identity increasing numbers of North Korean with North Koreans are the changes that refugees. have caused this distancing: the diverging of North and South national identities, PERCEPTION OF A SHARED strained relations between the two IDENTITY WITH NORTH KOREANS countries, and the emergence of younger generations that are further removed from The phrase Hanminjok, or “one the war and a united Korean identity. The people,” is used by South Koreans to refer economic victory of South Korea in the to the ethnic bond that unites Koreans on 1970s, when it surpassed the economic both sides of the 38th parallel (Kim & performance of its Northern neighbor, Jang, 2007).iii In the years following the and the deaths of hundreds of thousands division, a symbolic brotherhood of North Koreans due to famine likely characterized the majority of South contributed to South Korean views that Koreans’ attitudes towards North the North’s socialist system was not only Koreans, despite growing mistrust and incompetent but also dangerous (Lee, opposition towards the North Korean 2010). Refugees who managed to enter government (Hilpert, 2010). In many South Korea before the 1980s were instances, the kinship was not merely enthusiastically welcomed by South symbolic but real; amidst chaos and Koreans delighted at the small “victories” confusion of the war, many families were for capitalism (Park, 2003). More recently, separated by the North-South border stories of torture and persecution by without warning (Lee, 2010). refugees have revealed a horrific side to Over the course of six decades North Korea that alienated it even more since the division of the Korean from its neighbor state (Lee, 2010). Peninsula, many events have weakened Military provocations and hostility the emotional, ideological, and material from the North also reinforced the image bond that once existed between the two of North Korea as an enemy rather than a states (Hilpert, 2010; Lee, 2010). Growing brother nation. For example, nuclear differences between the North and the testing by the North in 2006 triggered South have contributed to the great outrage in the South (Lee, 2010). conceptualization of one another as South Korean administrations under Kim “other,” or “nam” as one would say in Dae-jung (1998-2003) and Roh Moo-hyun Korean. Today, North and South are (2003-2008) had maintained a policy of separated not only by a physical boundary continued contact and unconditional but also by divergences in cultural values, economic assistance, and South Korean experiences, and ideology. The resulting citizens felt betrayed by North Korea’s cognitive and emotional detachment felt decision to develop its nuclear weapons by South Koreans towards North Korea program without any regard for their and its citizens as a whole may contribute agreement (Lee, 2010). The policy, which to South Koreans' discriminatory attitudes was known as the “Sunshine Policy,” was towards refugees. Ironically, the criticized for providing unconditional

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 53! economic aid and perhaps even enabling tradition of ethnic homogeneity is the North to develop a nuclear weapons changing, lessening the importance of a program (Lee, 2010).iv shared ethnic identity with North A poll taken in 2009 revealed that Koreans. 41.6 percent of South Koreans considered In 2003, a national poll reported North Korea as an enemy whereas 47.3 that 58 percent of South Korean percent considered them a partner (Lee, respondents agreed to the statement, “I 2010). More recently, altercations between feel compatriotism for saetomin” (“new North and South military forces have settlers”, another term for North Korean sparked increases in hostility towards the refugees) and 21.7 percent reported that North. The sinking of a South Korean they “do not have any particular emotion” navy vessel, the Cheonan, by a North regarding saetomin. However, in the same Korean torpedo in November 2010 poll conducted two years later in 2005, resulted in the deaths of 46 South Korean 46.8 percent reported “no particular sailors (NY Times, 2010). The nations emotion” and 36 percent reported having also exchanged artillery fire following a either “somewhat friendly” or “very shelling of the South Korean Yeonpyeong friendly” feelings towards saetomin (Korea Island by North Korean forces, which Institute for National Unification, as cited killed two soldiers and two civilians and in Kim & Jang 2007). It is worrisome that injured another twelve. In 2010, following even as the numbers of refugees entering these events, South Korean President Lee Korea are increasing every year, concern Myung-bak declared the North as the for refugee and refugee problems seems South’s “principal enemy,” formally to be declining. Through a combination of reestablishing a hostile relationship that all the factors discussed above, the sense had been avoided in the past. While these of brotherhood that used to surround are just recent examples, similar trends North Korea is being replaced by a have characterized the North-South negative one of nuclear threat, human relationship for many years. rights violations, and duplicity. Lastly, the appearance of new Even in a nation such as South generations that did not experience the Korea where ethnicity and nationality devastation of war also acts as a barrier to have been closely tied, it is difficult for identification with North Koreans. As the South Koreans to think of refugees as direct family ties across the 38th parallel fellow citizens because of the great disappear or are forgotten, members of difference in experiences. Social younger generations have little reason to psychological research on the experiences consider North Koreans their actual of immigrants may shed light on the brothers and sisters. Surveys report low difficult situation of North Korean support for and skepticism towards refugees in South Korea. Deaux (2008) reunification in the younger generationv, writes that we find it difficult to recognize who also seem to hold pragmatic that an individual may have multiple concerns (e.g. cost of reunification to identities (e.g. different ethnic and South Korean economy) over ideological national identities). For example, desires for a united Korea (Lee, 2010). immigrants or hyphenated Americans These individuals are also growing up in a illustrate how two identity categories can period when South Korea is forging its be present in one body. However, we do own identity separate from North Korea not easily accept this notion because of and is becoming more global, multi- our tendencies to engage in a type of zero- cultural, and multi-ethnic (Lee, 2010). The sum thinking that a person who is of one

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 54! category cannot simultaneously be of Three barriers to successful another. For South Koreans, this may assimilation include low socioeconomic mean that their ideas of what constitute a status, poor academic performance, and North Korean identity will hinder their mental health problems. A facilitator, on ability to recognize North Korean the other hand, is resettlement programs refugees’ new status as South Korean run by the Ministry of Unification citizens. The reason behind this relates specifically to aid the adjustment North back to the failure of South Koreans to Korean refugees. Currently, refugees identify with North Korean citizens. The spend their first two months in South view that the two categories (i.e. a North Korea at Hanawon, a facility created to Korean past and a South Korean teach refugees about South Korean citizenship) are incompatible will society (Kim, 2010). During their time perpetuate the idea that refugees can there, refugees receive intensive never become fully accepted members of adaptation education and vocational South Korean society. training. They also receive help looking In a recent change, the Ministry of for employment and education Unification encouraged use of the title opportunities and are assigned to saetomin (new settler) instead of the older residential areas (Kim, 2010). For the first term talbukcha (North Korean refugee). five years, refugees receive help with Perhaps they hoped that removing the social adaptation, economic concerns, connection with North Korea from the employment, and other needs. Various title would decrease associations with the other ministries provide means for country that could lead to discrimination. employment and vocational training Though it is a small change, it may help to outside of Hanawon, opportunities for promote the idea that refugees are new education, social welfare services, and members of South Korean society rather housing arrangements. Private than foreigners from the North. organizations, such as the Society to Support NK Refugees, may assist with ASSIMILATION OF NORTH public relations matters and hold social KOREAN REFUGEES and educational gatherings for refugees (Kim, 2010). A second channel feeding into North Korean refugees who enter South Korean attitudes towards North South Korea hold high expectations for Korean refugees is the success of refugee their new lives, especially in terms of assimilation into South Korean society. economic well-being and employment This channel focuses on the specific (Stein, 1986). However, many face tough characteristics and circumstances economic situations due to high rates of surrounding resettled refugees that are unemployment and low rates of observable to the rest of society. It is promotion, which are especially distinct from the first channel in that it disappointing (Kim & Jang, 2007). encompasses personal situations rather Income comparison studies revealed that than general attitudes towards North refugees received incomes below the Koreans. The two are related, however, societal average (Korea National Statistical since failure of refugees to adequately Office, as cited in Kim & Jang, 2007), and assimilate into South Korean society a separate study by the Database Center reinforces the conceptualization of them for North Korean Human Rights as outsiders incapable of disposing of (DCNKHR) revealed that many refugees their North Korean identity. also experience feelings of relative

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 55! deprivation. Most of those surveyed (57.3 comfortable with the South Korean percent) classified themselves as “lower language (Kim & Jang, 2007). For newly class” and the next greatest percentage arrived refugees and those still learning, (27.5 percent) considered themselves to however, the language barrier strongly be living in “abject poverty.” hinders employment prospects and One explanation for high everyday interactions. According to South unemployment in refugee populations Korean employers, language is the relates North Koreans’ lack of primary reason refugees are not being professional and technical knowledgevi to hired (Kim & Jang, 2007). Inability to few opportunities for employment outside effectively communicate can definitely of temporary and daily work in South contribute to the idea that North Korean Korean society (Kim & Jang, 2007). refugees cannot assimilate to South However, studies revealed that even Korean society. Hearing North Korean college graduates and professionals trained dialect is also a sure give-away to South in North Korea are not being hired in Koreans, and simply recognizing its their fieldsvii and forced to find temporary origins may activate negative stereotypes or unskilled positions. Another towards the speaker. explanation of low employment rates For younger refugees who enter blames the unwillingness of refugees to South Korea, adjusting to school life is yet find work that may lower their status, another obstacle to overcome. Parents of especially low-paying and low-skill jobs these refugees invest much hope into the that may represent underemployment South Korean education system and see (Stein, 1986). It seems fairly likely that a good education as a requirement to combination of inadequate training and succeed in the new society (Kim & Jang, discrimination are at play. A more 2007). However, studies by the Ministry contemptuous view of refugee of Education show worrisome school unemployment claims they are simply performance and adjustment in refugee content to live off of government fundsviii youth: elevated drop-out rates (13.7 (Kim & Jang, 2007). Factors outside of percent, ten times higher than the South hiring, such as negative interactions with Korean national average) and similarly coworkers, may also discourage steady dismal attendance rates (58.4 percent for and long-term employment.ix middle school students and 10.4 percent Language has also been cited as a for high school students). major contributor to the failure of Many reasons have also been refugees to find employment. Though proposed to explain poor academic North and South Koreans technically performance by refugees. Poor education speak the same language, such thorough systems in North Korea could have left isolation of the North and increased the children significantly behind their globalization and modernization of the South Korean peers, and disruption in South have rendered the two versions children’s education due to poverty, family very different. In addition to differences death, or defection could have contributed in words, the North Korean version is as well (Kim & Jang, 2007). North Korean spoken with a strong accent that is also refugee children are placed into South heard in ethnic communities of Koreans Korean school systems based solely on in China. A survey conducted by the how many years of schooling they Korea Institute for National Unification received in the North. While this may help (KINU) revealed that it took the majority to lessen the gaps in knowledge between of refugees close to three years to feel refugee youth and their South Korean

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 56! classmates, it usually places refugees into (Angermeyer & Dietrich, 2005). South classrooms of much younger students.x Koreans’ negative attitudes can play a role Difficulties forging friendships with other in the vicious cycle of impaired mental students and differences in educational health of refugees and the stress of their content and pedagogy have also been new environments (e.g. Kivling-Boden & proposed as explanations for low Sundbon, 2002, as cited in Jeon et al., achievement. Amongst all these 2005). explanations, perhaps the most likely is a The factors discussed in this combination of all these factors added to channel illustrate how failure of refugees the stress of assimilating to a new society. to assimilate (for reasons that may be Mental health problems of related to life experiences in North Korea, refugees are yet another barrier to discrimination from South Korean adjustment to life in South Korea. employers and coworkers, or stress of Importantly, mental illness has a direct assimilation) can hinder positive attitudes influence on refugees’ ability to of South Koreans towards refugees. successfully settle in their new Observers may attribute poor environment (Blair, 2000, as cited in Jeon employment or academic record to mere et al., 2005). Traumatic experiences while laziness or lack of motivation. Stigmas of living in North Korea, such as witnessing mental illness may discourage South public executions, watching family Koreans from befriending refugees, for members die of starvation, or serving a fear that they will be violent or unstable. sentence in a labor camp, may lead to Most of all, they may stimulate views that anxiety or mood disorders (Jeon et al., North Korean refugees are too different 2009). Fearful and anxiety-causing or damaged to be functional members of situations during defection, such as living society. in hiding in Chinaxi, may also contribute to stress-disorders. Disaster research has PERCEIVED COST TO SOUTH shown that affected populations may KOREANS FOR REFUGEE show major mental health problems such RESETTLEMENT as depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, psychosomatic syndromes, According to Professor Yun In-jin suicide attempts, and violence (Jeon et al., of Korea University, Koreans agree with 2009). In addition to previous instances of government refugee aid programs in traumatic stress, refugees also bear the theory, but oppose them when they must burden of significant mental stress from bear the costs and burdens of making adjusting to life in a different society. them possible (Kim & Jang, 2007). For In a study of refugees who had example, refugee placement into lived in Korea for at least one year subsidized housing is a program that can following defection, over 30 percent of affect neighboring South Koreans: areas both men and women reported symptoms with high numbers of resettled refugees of depressionxii and even more showed tend to turn into slums with decreased signs of severe distressxiii (Jeon et al., property value (Kim, 2010). Kangseo, a 2009). In a separate study (Jeon et al., district of Seoul, is one area where a 2005), 29.5 percent of refugees surveyed significant number of refugees are placed. were diagnosed with PTSDxiv. Mental A survey was conducted by the Kangseo illness disorders and behaviors may lead District Office to gauge South Korean South Koreans to view the refugees as sentiment regarding this trend. Residents dangerous, helpless, or unpredictable of the area were asked whether they

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 57! supported or opposed a proposal to policy. In 1997, South Korea experienced continue placing refugees in Kangseo. an economic crisis that required Results revealed that twice as many intervention by the International residents opposed the proposal (46 Monetary Fund, an event that is now percent) as those who supported it (23 commonly referred as the “IMF Crisis” percent) (Kim & Ko, as cited in Kim & (Park, 2003). Powerful corporations Jang, 2007). declared bankruptcy and many lost their The third and final channel jobs as a result. The government, process that could potentially lead to however, increased aid to refugees during positive attitudes of South Koreans is the the crisis after realizing that the refugees recognition and acceptance of personal were the most vulnerable during times of costs of refugee resettlement. Taking the economic hardship (Park, 2003). Not long example mentioned above, the residents after, in 1999, the administration created of Kangseo were reluctant to see more the Office for North Korean Refugee refugees placed in the district since it Settlement Assistance (Hanawon) and would decrease the property value of their expanded it in 2002 (Yonhap News, 2002, homes. If these individuals, on the other as cited in Park, 2003). hand, considered refugee resettlement a Owing to government cause worth the decrease in value of their intervention, North Korean refugees were property, they might have supported the not directly harmed from the IMF Crisis. proposal instead of opposing it. In this However, realistic conflict theory predicts way, encouraging South Koreans to accept that South Koreans’ negative attitudes the perceived cost of refugee resettlement towards refugees increased as a result of could promote positive attitudes towards the government decision. One would North Korean refugees. predict that citizens resented the extra However, social psychological help given to refugees and the extra funds theory on intergroup relations provides at that went to building a resettlement least two reasons why this is not easy. center, especially right after one of the Firstly, realistic group conflict theory worst economic disasters in South Korea. (Sherif, 1961) predicts that competition The frustration of South Koreans in the for scarce resources will increase conflict midst of the IMF crisis, perhaps between groups and possibly lead to compounded by the opinions of some discrimination and stereotyping. In the that refugees are lazy or unmotivated, case of the Kangseo residents, the threat could have increased discriminatory of losing money via loss in property value tendencies. created potential conflict between them A second social psychological and hypothetical refugees that posed this theory that identifies a barrier to South threat. The conflict, though imagined in Koreans’ acceptance of perceived cost this case, might have led to negative comes from Tajfel’s minimal group attitudes towards the hypothetical paradigm (1971). According to Tajfel, the refugees. Importantly, even the knowledge mere recognition of one’s belonging to a that refugees resettlement is correlated group, even a group compiled through with decreased property value might chance, is enough to produce ingroup contribute to generalized negative favoritism and intergroup discrimination. attitudes towards refugees. This presents a barrier to the third and Another example shows the final channel because of the already importance of South Koreans’ perception present idea of the North Korean refugee of loss as a result of refugee resettlement as an outsider to South Korean society.

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Because of the tendency to think of leave North Korea in order to escape the refugees in this way, South Koreans are political and economic conditions, some less likely to accept costs for their benefit. refugees still held mixed feelings about Even though this channel has fewer their new lives in South Korea. xv barriers relative to the other two, it might Perceptions of discrimination also be the most difficult to address. As the contribute greatly to negative impressions barriers are psychological factors of South of South Koreans. Refugees felt that Koreans, interventions must focus on discrimination by South Koreans, changing South Koreans’ perceptions of particularly employers, presented a major the value of refugee resettlement to their disadvantage in finding employment and society (as outweighing potential personal advancing in the workplace (Kim & Jang, costs). 2007). Refugees have also become a targeted population for perpetrators of NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES’ fraud; 21.5 percent of North Korean MISTRUST OF SOUTH KOREANS refugees reported having been victims of fraud by South Koreans, an astounding 43 “South Koreans are very times higher than the national average calculating, cautious, and (Oh & Whan, as cited in Kim & Jang, circumambulatory. Meanwhile, North 2007). Moreover, refugees reported Koreans, frankly speaking, are feeling socially isolated by and emotionally straightforward and stupid, although they distant from South Koreans (Kim & Jang, are actually just simple and naïve,” (Kim, 2007). These accounts suggest a 2010 p. 102). This refugee’s account of relationship between refugees and South adjusting to South Korean life expressed Koreans that is splintered with distrust, great surprise and fear at the cultural hostility, and disappointment. differences separating the two Koreas. It reveals the importance of refugee’s CONCLUSION impressions of South Koreans to both successful adjustment. The following Social support has been shown to section details how refugees’ negative be an important factor in the recovery of impressions of South Koreans may also many different populations (Ahearn, contribute to their own discrimination. 1999). North Korean refugees who Surveys report that many refugees received instrumental (e.g. money, time) have difficulty trusting and understanding or emotional support from South Koreans the motivations of South Koreans (Kim & reported improvements in mood (Kim & Lee, 2009) and that many feel Lee, 2009) whereas those that experienced discriminated against because of their discrimination from South Koreans North Korean past. They resented others’ reported increased difficulty adjusting tendencies to automatically and (Kim, 2010). The model and explanation completely reject all political, ideological, presented here gives just one of many and cultural aspects of North Korea. This ways to understand the many factors that was especially true for refugees who influence South Korean attitudes towards resettled fairly recently and were still North Korean refugees. The complicated trying to reconcile two conflicting images nature of the issue at hand precludes the of South Korea: one based on their possibility of simple solutions, or even personal experiences and the other based simple explanations. A complex system, on North Korean propaganda and however, does present opportunities for socialist ideology. Though they decided to intervention via many different pathways.

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Considering the rapid development Decreases in discriminatory of South Korea and deterioration of attitudes of South Koreans towards North-South relations recently, it may be refugees have great implications for future easier to focus on helping refugees reunification and refugee resettlement assimilate into South Korean culture than policy. Interventions that could reliably trying to promote a shared identity to promote positive attitudes of South South Koreans in general. Interventions Koreans would stabilize support for aimed at facilitating easier adjustment for generous refugee resettlement policies refugees could implement continued regardless of outside factors, such as vocational training programs and North-South relations and economic education services after refugees leave climate. This seems especially important at Hanawon. Specialized employment a time when the number of refugees is counseling that takes both prior training continuing to increase, and concern for and future employment goals into the well-being of refugees seems to be consideration could definitely help declining. refugees find and keep the jobs they need. Perhaps even the option of being !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! accompanied by a translator to interviews i Numbers of refugees that entered South Korea would help refugees to understand the increased nearly every year from 1989 to 2006 (Kim & Jang, 2007). Records show that while 9 refugees entered duties that specific positions entail and in 1990, a staggering 2,019 refugees entered in 2006 reduce room for miscommunication. For (Ministry of Unification, 2005, as cited in Kim & Jang, students, a more thorough evaluation of 2007). ii Famine ravaged the DPRK in the mid 1990s, killing refugees’ academic readiness upon between an estimated 600,000 to 1 million people (Lee, entering South Korea (instead of one 2006). based solely on years of education iii The 38th parallel was where US and USSR troops initially divided the Korean Peninsula. Though they received) may improve poor performance planned on reunifying the North and South under an caused by gaps in knowledge. Perhaps independent Korean government, increasing mistrust even alternative educational programs between the US and the USSR prevented reconciliation of competing Korean governments and precluded joint should be considered, as they may provide elections (Hilpert, 2010). The line that divides the a much-needed transition phrase before DPRK and the ROK is also known as the DMZ, or students are enrolled into normal schools. Demilitarized Zone. iv The Sunshine Policy was continued throughout the Lastly, and maybe most importantly, Roh Moo-hyun administration (2003-2008) but was greater attention to mental health care discontinued by President Lee Myung-bak, who took a should be given from the moment stronger stance against providing North Korea with aid. v A 2009 survey of 20-29 year olds revealed that 30.2 refugees enter South Korea. The percent of them had a negative view of reunification. utilization of resources such as therapists This percentage was higher than the average across all or group therapy meetings should be age groups (18.8 percent). These individuals disapproved of efforts to reintegrate the two states and believed that encouraged and publicized throughout the South Korea had more to lose than to gain by refugee community. Better publicity of all reunification (Lee, 2010). refugee resources, such as optional job vi Of approximately 8,400 refugees surveyed in May 2006, 44 percent of them were unemployed in NK. Of training, could help already established the remaining who held jobs, 77 percent of them programs to be better utilized. These performed manual labor (Ministry of Unification, as suggestions all use the facilitator identified cited in Kim & Jang, 2007). vii Between 2000 and August 2004, 128 “professional” in the assimilation channel (refugee refugees (doctors, teachers, translators, etc.) defected to resettlement programs) to bypass the Korea. Of those, only two found employment in their barriers blocking successful refugee professions (Kim, 2005, as cited in Kim & Jang, 2007). viii Many refugees leave North Korea with the help of assimilation. border guides and brokers, whom they need to compensate once settled in South Korea. Much of

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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! refugees’ start-up money from the Hanawon program is defectors living in south korea for more than one year. used to pay back fees or even to arrange the escape of Psychiatry Invest, 6, 122-130. other family members (Park, 2003). Kim, S. (2010). Tackling the social exclusion ix In a 2001 survey by the Association for Support to of north korean refugees in south korea. Korea Observer, North Korean defectors, 22.4 percent of refugee 41(1), 93-129. respondents answered that “unfair treatment and Kim, J. & Jang, D. (2007). Aliens among prejudice of South Koreans” to be the toughest brothers? The status and perception of north korean challenge faced at work (Kim & Jang, 2007). refugees in south korea. Asian Perspective, 31(2), 5-22. x A 2005 survey by the Database Center for North Kim, H. & Lee, O. (2009). Phenomenological Korean Human Rights revealed that being older than study on the experiences of north korean refugees. the rest of one’s classmates was a commonly given Nursing Science Quarterly, 22(1), 85-88. reason for dropping out of school (13.5 percent). Kim, D. & Oh, H. (2001). Psychosocial Unfriendly relations with other students (16.7 percent) aspects of korean reunification: Explicit and implicit and poor academic records (16.7 percent) were other national attitudes and identity of south Koreans and commonly cited reasons (Kim & Jang, 2007). north korean defectors. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace xi North Korean defectors are considered economic Psychology, 7(3), 265-288. migrants, rather than political refugees, by Chinese Ko, S., Chung, K., & Oh, Y. (2004). North officials. If discovered, they will be returned to North korean defectors: Their life and well-being after Korea and imprisoned or even executed (Ko, Chung, & defection. Asian Perspective, 28(2), 65-99. Oh, 2004). Lee, S. (2010). The south korean view on xii 30.5 percent of men and 34.7 percent of women, the korean unification. In No Confidence in Korea: A Regional Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale Problem in a Global Context (pp. 88-93). Stockholm-Nacka, (CES-D). Sweden: Institute for Security and Development Policy. xiii 33.1 percent of men and 36.1 percent of women, Park, H. (2003). South korea’s policy response assessed with The Psychosocial Well-Being Index. to sudden increases in north korean refugees. Korea xiv Higher PTSD rates (56 percent) were found in a study Observer, 34(4), 731-755. of refugees who settled in China (Lee et al., 2001). This Stein, B. N. (1986). The experience of being a may be due to the stress of living in hiding. refugee: Insights from the research literature. In Refugee xv Kim and Oh (2009) reported that while both South mental health in resettlement countries. ( pp. 5-23) Koreans and North Korean refugees showed more Washington, DC, US: Hemisphere Publishing Corp. favorable attitudes towards South Korea than North Tajfel, H., Billig, M. G., Bundy, R. P., & Korea on explicit measures, North Korean refugees Flament, C. (1971). Social categorization and intergroup showed more favorable evaluations of North Korea behaviour. European Journal of Social Psychology, 1(2), 149- than South Korea on implicit measures. North Koreans 178. doi:10.1002/ejsp.2420010202 also showed neutral national identification on explicit measures but identified more strongly with a North Korean national identity on implicit measures.

REFERENCES

Ahearn, F.L. (1999). Psychosocial wellness: methodological approaches to the study of refugees. In The psychosocial wellness of refugees. (pp. 3-23) New York, NY: Berghahn Books. Angermeyer, M.C., & Dietrich, S. (2006). Public beliefs about and attitudes towards people with mental illness: A review of population studies. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 113(3), 163-179. doi:10.1111/j.1600-0447.2005.00699.x Deaux, K. (2008). To be an american: Immigration, hyphenation, and incorporation. Journal of Social Issues, 64(4), 925-943. doi:10.1111/j.1540- 4560.2008.00596.x Hilpert, H.G. (2010). A comparison of german and korean division: Analogies and differences. International Journal of Korean Unification Studies, 19(1), 126- 156. Jeon, W. et al. (2005). Correlation between traumatic events and ptsd among north korean defectors in south korea. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 18(2), 147-154. Jeon, W. et al. (2009). Prevalence and correlates of depressive symptoms among north korean

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SON PREFERENCE YESTERDAY AND TODAY: The Causes and Implications of Son Preference in Contemporary South Korea Kristen Kim ’13

INTRODUCTION women will continue to be enacted in everyday activities, which will in turn “If you have a daughter, you cry further propel son preference. twice.” This Korean proverb refers to the notion that parents cry once when their CAUSES OF SON PREFERENCE: daughter is born and a second time when Historical and Cultural Roots of Son she gets married and leaves home. This Preference image of parents crying out of disappointment at the birth of a daughter Korea is not alone in its history of effectively captures the prevalence of son male-based sex ratios. In 1994, preference in South Korea (hereafter, representatives from China, India, and Korea). Although son preference, also several other Asian nations gathered in known as boy preference, is often marked Seoul for a conference called the as traditional and outdated, it continues to International Symposium on Issues pervade contemporary Korean society. In Related to Sex Preference for Children in fact, just two decades ago, Korea’s the Rapidly Changing Demographic secondary sex ratio, or the ratio of males Dynamics in Asia.ii The purpose of this to females in a population at the time of conference was to discuss the “missing birth, was the highest in the world (Figure girl phenomenon,” or the dearth of girls 1). The statistically normal sex ratio is among these nations exhibiting strong son estimated to range between 103 and 106 preference. One thing that became clear boys per 100 girls. In 1990, Korea’s sex through the symposium was that the ratio was 117 – a value unattainable “missing girl phenomenon” was not the without human intervention.i Although same in each country represented; thus the government has since managed to treating all of East Asia as a son-preferring normalize the ratio (around 105 in the last monolithic entity is unproductive for this couple of years), I argue that this dilemma. Instead, because the social, artificially deflated value is no longer economic, political, and cultural context representative of the degree of son of each population is distinct, the causes preference in Korea. Son preference may of son preference, the ways in which it is be less detectable and perhaps slightly being practiced and the sorts of weaker today, but it is still rampant and consequences it has also varies among functions as a barrier to achieving gender nations. For example, the dearth of girls in equality in realms of society outside China is most commonly attributed to the reproduction. As it exists today, son state’s stringent fertility regulation through preference is a manifestation of the deeply the one-child policy.iii This coercive policy embedded essentialist belief in the innate has led to the underreporting of female superiority of males. As long as people are births and cases of infanticide.iv In India, socialized to accept such a power son preference and the skewed sex ratio structure as natural, the subordination of are consequences of the expensive

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 62! dowries that parents have to pay at the In eighteenth century Korea, time of their daughters’ marriage.v during the reign of the Choson dynasty Economic concerns specific to Indian (1392-1910), the existing bilateral family marriage customs are what characterize system was replaced with a patriarchal their sex preference. family system.ix Under the earlier bilateral Cross-country comparisons serve family system, both male and female to elucidate the particulars of Korea’s members had enjoyed equal rights and “missing girl phenomenon.” Although the privileges, including those of lineage and Korean government has intervened in inheritance. According to Martina bringing down the sex ratio, the means Deuchler, a professor of Korean studies at that it used, which will be more fully the University of London School of described in later sections, were nowhere Oriental and African Studies, “because of near as restrictive as the one-child policy. this bilateral strategy, the [descent] group Also, there is little to no evidence was equally interested in retaining its male indicating that unreported female births and female members.”x Such a kinship and/or infanticide significantly influence system did not promote a predilection sex ratios as they have in China. towards having sons. However, the newly Moreover, contrary to what one might instated patriarchal system changed expect, sons in Korea have limited kinship relations to be both patrilineal and economic utility; the net expenses of a patrilocal. Patrilineal means that the son’s marriage are actually three or four passage of productive assets was limited times higher than that of a daughter’s. to the males in the family, while patrilocal Clearly concerns about paying dowries are means that couples were required to not central to Korea’s situation. reside at the man’s home with the man’s Considering the rapid urbanization that family after marriage.xi This shift Korea has undergone since the Korean intensified the responsibility of women to War, the advantage of having males for bear a male heir for her husband’s family. labor force participation, which is a This functioned to reduce the value of consideration in more rural countries, is women to their reproductive capabilities. not a major factor either and will continue Furthermore the pressure to bear to decrease in its relevance. sons resulted because sons have the Instead the most commonly cited responsibility of taking care of his causes of son preference in Korea include ancestors in the afterlife by conducting women’s lack of autonomy and the ancestor worship. According to patriarchal family system.vi In a 1991 supernatural belief, through ancestor survey, most women agreed that cultural worship, sons could appease their hungry factors, namely the need to continue ancestors and thereby ensure peace and family lineage and prestige (42.2% and harmony in their families.xii More 34.2% respectively), were the most specifically, this duty is delegated to the relevant reasons for desiring sons over eldest son, which is particular to Korean daughters.vii Only 6.8% of women agreed culture. In parts of India and in China, that receiving financial support in old age sons are considered pretty much equal and was the most important reason, further inherit property equally so the option of clarifying that economic reasons for son having one’s brother’s sons take care of preference are less significant.viii These one in old age and in the after life is responses are not surprising when one available.xiii However, in Korea, the son of considers the family structure of the eldest brother is expected to continue Premodern Korea. the family line and take care of his family

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 63! during and after life. Accordingly, the FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO eldest brother inherits the largest THE DISTORTED LEVELS OF THE proportion of the property and holds the SEX RATIO responsibility of performing ancestor worship.xiv Thus it is common for the wife As Korea started modernizing in of an eldest son to face especially the sixties, the ideal family size and significant pressure from her in-laws to consequently the population’s fertility rate have a son. declined. In the past, it was assumed that Though it would be naïve to strong son preference would prevent or at wholly blame Confucian ideology for least slow down fertility decline because gender inequality in contemporary Korea, people would continue to have children because of its undeniable influence on until they achieved their desired number Korean thought, it is important to of sons.xvii However, the opposite seems examine what aspects may have to have been the case in Korea. Fertility contributed to the development of son rates continued to drop precipitously to preference. The Confucian tenet dictates below replacement level in 1991.xviii As that it is natural for women to be inferior fertility rates dropped, the sex ratio to men; women are to follow the orders became more skewed. This is because as of her father, husband, and son.xv the ideal family size dropped, son Therefore, women socialized by the ethics preference remained the same. Between of Confucianism may not think to 1959 and 1991, as the ideal number of question this gender hierarchy. Another children fell from 5 to 2, the ideal number relevant Confucian value is that of filial of sons fell from 3 to 1.2. Although the piety, which a son could only completely desired proportion of sons did not fulfill by ensuring the continuation of his change, the number of daughters that family’s lineage. These values alongside could be accommodated in the described the establishment of a patriarchal family family composition decreased from 2 to system ushered in a son-preferring nation. .08.xix In other words, there was less room The pressures from one’s family for daughters and greater pressure to have and society to bear sons became so strong sons. Instead of preventing fertility that the practice of taking in concubines decline as people had predicted, son for this sole purpose became acceptable. preference changed how families valued This mindset surprisingly persisted into daughters. modern times. According to results from The accommodation of both a a 1981 survey, about 90% of female lower desired family size and son respondents said that it was either preference was made possible by different important or very important to have a boy contraceptive use as well as the in the family. Furthermore, over half the introduction of sex-detection technology women said they would assume ignorance in 1985. Based on the sex of their existing if her husband were to have an affair with children, parents could manipulate another woman to have a male heir born reproductive patterns and contraceptive to him.xvi These numbers suggest that use to achieve the desired sex even into the eighties, affairs and second composition for their families.xx For wives were permissible as long as it was to example, a couple with one daughter help men fulfill their filial duties and lift would be more likely to continue pressure from their wives. reproducing than one with a son. More importantly, the mass production of ultrasound technology, the most common

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 64! mode of prenatal sex-detection, gave of the unusually high sex ratio of 117, was couples more control over the gender the year of the Horse, parents may have composition of their family. Ultrasound been misreporting their daughter’s birth scans, which were both convenient and dates, timing their childbearing by relatively affordable, influenced couples’ changing coital behavior or contraception decision whether to go through with the usage and/or undergoing sex-selective pregnancy or to abort. abortion. One trend that became clear Although the Korean government through the use of sex-detection outlawed prenatal sex detection practices technology is that sex ratios grow as birth and sex-selective abortion in 1987, the order progresses (Figure 2). This trend unnaturally high sex ratios that persisted was especially noticeable as the nation’s long after indicate that selective abortions sex ratio peaked in 1990. Logically continued to be performed clandestinely speaking, son-preferring couples with only among the masses. Chai Bin Park and daughters would be more likely than those Nam-hoon Cho in their study with sons to resort to prenatal sex “Consequences of Son Preference,” looks screening and sex selective abortion for at the deviance of observed sex ratios later births. This is especially the case if from a “normal” value of 106 to estimate the number of children they already have the number of female births that have it close to or above the desired family been averted through selective abortion. size.xxi Thus the sex ratio becomes more Their results indicate that between 1986 and more distorted for second and later and 1990, about 80,000 female births, or births. 5% of actual female births, were The population’s reliance on sex- averted.xxiv selective technology is also made obvious The persistence of sex-selective in the geographical differences in sex abortion is also evidenced in the fact that ratio. The sex ratio rose earlier in larger in 1990, Korea’s ministry of health and cities, such as Taegu and Pusan, than in social affairs suspended the medical towns or rural areas, which can be licenses of eight physicians who had explained by a greater availability of sex- performed sex determination tests.xxv The selective technology in cities.xxii ministry then revised their regulations so Another noteworthy trend in the that performing sex-determination sex ratio is that it significantly increased in procedures could result in the revocation the years of the Horse. In a study of medical licenses to make it a much analyzing data from Horse years between more risky practice for medical 1970 and 2003, Jungmin Lee and practitioners.xxvi Still in 2004, South Korea Myungho Paik found that the sex ratio at had the highest level of sex-selective birth significantly increased while fertility abortion, due to the accessibility to such decreased in these years.xxiii According to technology.xxvii In sum, as the fertility rate Zodiac astrology, which is widespread in went down and sex-detection technology Korea, one’s zodiac sign determines one’s was introduced, we saw son preference personality traits, and the year of the reflected more and more clearly in the Horse is one that symbolizes an energetic, distorted sex ratio. optimistic, and high-spirited personality. Such qualities are considered masculine THE POLITICS OF SON and unfit for wives, and accordingly, PREFERENCE couples seem to avoid having daughters in the year of the Horse. Since 1990, the year

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Since the patriarchal family system care for their ancestors.xxxv Also in 2005, was first introduced in the Choson the government abolished male headship Dynasty, it has been both reinforced and and allowed parents who wished to undermined by the Korean government. register their children under the mother’s Under the presidency of Syngman Rhee, family name beginning in 2008.xxxvi the state codified the patriarchal family Through these amendments, we see a system in the Family Law of 1958, which gradual deterioration of the legalization of stipulated that family headship belongs to the patriarchal family structure. the males in the line of the eldest sons, Given the historical and political inheritance should be passed through the landscape in which son preference first male line, women should be transferred to appeared and continues to exist, it is clear their husband’s family register after that son preference is not a natural but a marriage, and children belong to their socially constructed phenomenon. Is father’s lineage after divorce.xxviii In 1961, contemporary son preference simply a President Park Chung Hee led a military tradition that has withstood the test of coup and came into office. His militaristic modernization? Has it continued linearly regime continued to emphasize the from Premodern Korea into modernity? patriarchal family system by stressing the Is it merely a refection of the remnants of importance of individual families in the Choson Dynasty’s patriarchal kinship maintaining the social welfare of the system? It is unquestionable that with people.xxix The government also repressed rapid economic development as well as citizen’s demands for democracy and the democratization movement in the late women’s organizations’ calls for greater eighties, Korea on a whole has come to gender equality.xxx place greater emphasis on meritocracy and It was not until 1989 that the equal opportunities for men and Family Law of 1958 underwent major women.xxxvii With such advances, cultural reform; however, even then it continued factors like lineage become less relevant in to support the traditional family roles that determining one’s success. As the tended to marginalize women and their traditional patriarchal family breaks down role in the family.xxxi This reform included and gender equality increases, it should allowing women the to have custody of follow that son preference also children after divorce, encouraging equal diminishes. Conversely, in the rapid inheritance of sons and daughters, and advancement of the eighties, the sex ratio allowing the eldest son to relinquish in Korea continued to rise.xxxviii It seems family headship.xxxii Nevertheless, it that economic and social advancement maintained that family headship had to be does not necessarily lessen son preference, held by males. As women’s groups complicating the characterization of son continued to question the constitutionality preference as a traditional value of the Family Law, the government dependent on the traditional context in continued to make amendments.xxxiii In which it first appeared. Instead, it is a 1997, the Constitutional Court of Korea dynamic concept that is constantly ruled that the prohibition of marriage changing even today. within the lineage was unconstitutional and amended the law.xxxiv In 2005, the GENDER ESSENTIALISM Supreme Court ruled that women could remain members of their natal household So what is driving son preference after marriage and that women and men in Korea today? Although the government have equal rights and responsibilities to managed to reduce the levels of the sex

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 66! ratio, this artificially deflated value is not distinction between the two become an indication that son preference has unclear, gender roles come to be seen as disappeared. In fact, it persists today, inevitable consequences of one’s sex. though not as conspicuously, because of Thus gender roles remain stringent and prevalent essentialist beliefs regarding gender transgression is forbidden. Gender gender. Gender essentialism is the view essentialism groups all women into the that men and women are different not same category regardless of class, because they are socialized to be different, education level, individual personality, but because they are biologically family background, etc. It assumes that different.xxxix It assumes that boys possess because male female biological certain innate properties, such as being differences, for instance in chromosomes strong and aggressive, and girls other, and sex organs, are for the most part such as being meek and passive, that are black-and-white, male female personality not dependent on context. differences are as well. It ascribes what are Prior to the introduction of a “masculine” qualities to men, and patriarchal kinship system in the Choson “feminine” ones to women. It does not dynasty, Korea had a bilateral kinship take into account that girls can be system, which treated men and women as aggressive and boys can be passive. equals. Thus the subordination and Though there has not been marginalization of women that came research conducted specifically to Korea’s alongside the installment of a patriarchal situation, a study in India has shown that family system was very much socially son-preferring communities are more constructed. However, it seems that likely to essentialize gender. It also found people in Korea have lost sight of that. that privileged group members, in this Although the patriarchal family system has case, men, are more likely to endorse been deteriorating with the rise of essentialist beliefs about gender.xl In this women’s rights through feminist way essentialist beliefs can and are being movements and legislative measures, son used to perpetuate the belief in men’s preference lives on because of essentialist superiority. Even though girls may have beliefs regarding gender. Because the increased opportunities for education and notion of men being superior over women work today, public thought is that boys is so salient in a patriarchal family still have an advantage because of certain structure, it seems that people have also intrinsic traits. For example, some may accepted the belief that natural law argue that boys are innately better suited dictates that boys are in “essence better for today's competitive capitalistic society than girls.” People assume that sons are because they are aggressive, independent intrinsically more valuable than daughters, and disciplined. As long as people and such rigid thinking is what makes it so continue to be socialized to think that difficult for Korea to embrace daughters boys are intrinsically superior to girls, as they do sons. gender equality will be difficult to achieve. Essentialist beliefs are problematic because they serve to perpetuate IMPLICATIONS OF SON traditional gender roles. The essentialist PREFERENCE: blurs the line between sex, which is often Consequences of Son Preference used to describe male-female biological differences, and gender, or the One of the most commonly noted characteristics that a society delineates as consequences of a population’s sex masculine or feminine. When the imbalance is the “marriage squeeze,” or

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 67! the surplus of unmarried men, especially partners may have a greater tendency to in rural districts and among the lower essentialize and value men as being class.xli This concern has been criticized macho, and women as being chaste.xlvi because it is often one-dimensional and Although a notable increase in the official focuses only on the plight of men, and not crime rate fortunately has not occurred in that of women.xlii While the difficulty of Korea, it is possible that the surplus of men in finding spouses is understandable, single men has created a more hostile there is no doubt that the “marriage environment and attitude towards women. squeeze” is equally if not more There is no evidence that the scarcity of problematic for women. For one, in women has increased their social value. addressing this problem, Korean men The mere fact that people have called have turned to foreign brides from other upon the economic theory of scarcity in parts of Asia. In fact, this was so common predicting the future value of women that in 2008, 11% of marriages were suggests that the dearth of women may “mixed,” most often between Korean actually lead to further commodification men and foreign women.xliii Though the of women. influx of foreigners is not problematic in Additionally, son preference and a and of itself, these foreign women face masculine sex ratio could lead to the discrimination and have difficulty negative consequences for women’s assimilating into a mostly homogeneous physical and mental health. Before the society. Although Korea is not necessarily advent of prenatal sex detection ethnically homogeneous, it is culturally technology, women faced the pressure of homogeneous, making it difficult for continuously having children until they outsiders to fit in. These women are often had a son. After the advent of prenatal sex comprised of lower class members who detection technology, women faced the come to Korea in hope of economic pressure of undergoing abortion until they prosperity. For this reason, these women bore a son. Although abortion is not as are discriminated against not only based dangerous as childbirth, it still has its on their race but also based on their class hazards, especially when performed and social status. The children of these repeatedly. In any case, before and after mixed marriages also face much the advent of sex-detection technology, discrimination. the need for a son in the family is often However, the marriage squeeze prioritized higher than the physical health does not only affect foreign women but of women. also Korean women and Korean society at Furthermore, son preference can large. Although some scholars argue that affect the mental health of women. the scarcity of women increases the value Korean women have suffered from of women and helps women’s rights, it rejection and mistreatment by her seems that scarcity has little effect on husband and her husband’s family if they women’s social status.xliv In fact, it has failed to produce a son. This is captured been observed in both China and India in an interview with a Korean woman that the surplus of single men has doctor conducted in 2002: “Every woman increased the crime rate, with sex-related in Korea wants to have a son. Even crimes of bride abduction, human though a lot of people are aware that the trafficking, rape, and prostitution.xlv One sex of the child is [biologically] possible explanation for increased determined by the father, women still feel violence in light of the gender essentialism that if their husband had married some view is that males in high competition for other woman, he might have had a son. A

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 68! woman’s domestic life is often badly perhaps abortions are a way in which affected if she does not have a son.”xlvii women can protect their bodily heath.li Women living with such irrational guilt However, when one realizes that the and fear of mistreatment can develop magnitude of societal pressures to psychological problems, such as produce male heirs, one finds that any depression. Additionally, daughters raised reproductive decisions made by women in families exhibiting strong son will likely be a response to this pressure preference may feel neglected and develop and not an expression of their low self-esteem and a sense of inferiority. reproductive autonomy. Furthermore, it is possible that the By cracking down on sex-selective combination of intense male-male abortion, the government was able to competition and a paucity of women leads successfully bring down the sex ratio in a to a more severe social control of and matter of a couple decades. The only way violence towards women. This abuse in that it was able to do so quickly and turn could lead to negative psychological without much resistance is the effects on women.xlviii A study conducted cooperation of its people. Because on areas of South and Southeast Asia government intervention gave women a found that communities with male-based justifiable reason to relinquish the control sex ratios have higher female suicide over the sex of their children, it also rates.xlix With this in mind, it would not be removed a certain level of guilt and too great of a stretch to suggest a pressure on them to bear sons and also to correlation between strong son preference exhibit son preference. It is likely that and the high female suicide rate in Korea. government efforts were so effective China also has one of the highest female because they were in line with women’s suicide rates in the world and some have wishes. Although the legitimacy of attributed this to the fact that women government intervention in personal have difficulty dealing with the guilt that matters of reproduction is debatable, it they aborted or killed their daughters.l seems that the government may have Although the exact cause of suicide may actually furthered the wellbeing of women not be identical in Korea, the relationship in this particular situation. between the “missing girls” phenomenon and women’s mental health deserves CONCLUSION further attention. Between 1985 and 2003, the IMPLICATIONS FOR WOMEN’S percentage of women who answered a AUTONOMY survey saying, “they must have a son” fell from 48% to 17%.lii While these results The performance of sex-selective are somewhat encouraging, it is important abortions begs the question of how such to make the distinction between needing practice shapes women’s bodily agency. Is to have a son and wanting to have a son. this an expression of women’s control Though the former may be a less over their reproductive rights and prevalent notion today, the latter remains autonomy? At first glance, it may be embedded in the Korean mentality and is assumed that such technology to control still important to address. Because the sex their reproduction allows women to ratio has been stabilized and son protect their bodies and their reproductive preference is less conspicuous, people health. After all, induced abortion is have stopped paying attention to the considered safer than childbirth, so consequences of it. However, son

Princeton Journal of East Asian Studies! 69! preference remains a formidable barrier to achieving complete gender equality and deserves further attention.

APPENDIX

Figure 1: Sex Ratio at Birth Park and Cho, “Consequences of Son Preference”; Korean National Statistics Office

Figure 2: Sex Ratio by Birth Order Korea National Statistical Office

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Demographic Dynamics in Asia, Seoul, South Korea, ! i “Gendercide: The Worldwide War on Baby November 1994). viii Girls,” Economist, March 4, 2010, Ibid. ix http://www.economist.com/node/15636231.! Deuchler, Martina, The Confucian ii Judith Banister, “Son Preference in Asia” Transformation of Korea: A Study of Society and (report, International Symposium on Issues Related to Ideology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Sex Preference for Children in the Rapidly Changing Center, 1995), 45. x Demographic Dynamics in Asia, Seoul, South Korea, Ibid., 39. xi November 1994). Das Gupta, et al., Why is Son Preference iii Monica Das Gupta, et al. Why is Son Persistent, 7. xii Preference so Persistent in East and South Asia? Hong, “Boy Preference and Imbalance.” xiii (Washington DC: The World Bank Development Das Gupta, et al., Why is Son Preference Group Public Services and Rural Development, 2002), Persistent, 13. xiv 1. Ibid. xv iv Ibid. Hung-tak Lee, Causes of Son Preference in v Ibid. Korea (research report to W.H.O., 1982), 11. xvi vi Ibid. Lee, Causes of Son Preference, 158-159. xvii vii Moon Sik Hong, “Boy Preference and Banister, “Son Preference in Asia.” xviii Imbalance in Sex Ratio in Korea” (presentation, Chai Bin Park and Nam-Hoon Cho, International Symposium on Issues Related to Sex “Consequences of Son Preference in a Low-Fertility Preference for Children in the Rapidly Changing Society: Imbalance of the Sex Ratio at Birth in Korea.”

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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Population and Development Review 21, no. 1 (1995): li Park and Cho, “Consequences of Son 64. Preference,” 77. xix Das Gupta, et al., Why Son Preference lii Ibid. Persistent, 5. xx Park and Cho, “Consequences of Son REFERENCES Preference,” 65. Banister, Judith. “Son Preference in Asia.” xxi Doo-sub Kim, “Missing Girls in South Report, International Symposium on Issues Related to Korea: Trends, Levels, and Regional Variations,” Sex Preference for Children in the Rapidly Changing Population 56, no. 6 (2004): 869. Demographic Dynamics in Asia, Seoul, South Korea, xxii Park and Cho, “Consequences of Son November 1994. Preference,” 62. Chung, Woojin and Monica Das Gupta. xxiii Jungmin Lee and Myungho Paik, “Sex “Decline of Son Preference in South Korea: The Roles Preferences and Fertility in South Korea During the of Development and Public Policy.” Population and Year of the Horse,” Demography 43, no. 2 (2006). Development Review 33, no. 4 (2007): 757-783. xxiv Ibid., 74. Das Gupta, Monica, Jiang Zhenghua, Li xxv Ibid., 80. Bohua, Xie Zhenming, Woojin Chung, and Bae Hwa- xxvi Ibid. Ok. Why is Son Preference so Persistent in East and xxvii Das Gupta, et al., Why is Son Preference South Asia? Washington DC: The World Bank Persistent, 3. Development Group Public Services and Rural xxviii Woojin Chung and Monica Das Gupta, Development, 2002. “Decline of Son Preference in South Korea: The Roles Das Gupta, Monica and Li Shuzhuo, “Gender of Development and Public Policy,” Population and Bias in China, South Korea, and India 1920-1990: Development Review 33, no. 4 (2007): 762. Effects of War, Famine and Fertility Decline.” xxix Ibid. Development and Change 30, no.3 (1999): 619- xxx Ibid. 652. xxxi Ibid. Deuchler, Martina, The Confucian xxxii Das Gupta, et al., Why Son Preference Transformation of Korea: A Study of Society and Persistent, 27. Ideology Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia xxxiii Chung and Das Gupta, “Decline of Son Center, 1995. Preference,” 763. “Gendercide: The Worldwide War on Baby xxxiv Ibid. Girls.” Economist, March 4, 2010. xxxv Ibid. http://www.economist.com/node/15636231. xxxvi Ibid., 764. Hong, Moon Sik. “Boy Preference and xxxvii Chung and Das Gupta, “Decline of Son Imbalance in Sex Ratio in Korea.” Presentation at the Preference,” 764. International Symposium on Issues Related to Sex xxxviii Korean National Statistics Office, Last Preference for Children in the Rapidly Changing modified May 4, 2011, Demographic Dynamics in Asia, Seoul, South Korea, http://kostat.go.kr/portal/english/index.action. November 1994. xxxix Clancy Ratliff, “Essentialism: Draft of 3W Kim, Doo-sub. “Missing Girls in South Encyclopedia Entry,” Culture Cat (blog), August 7, 2004 Korea: Trends, Levels, and Regional Variations.” (4:13 p.m.), http://culturecat.net/node/486. Population 56, no. 6 (2004): 865-878. xl Mahalingam, Ramaswami, Jana Haritatos, Korean National Statistics Office. Last and Benita Jackson, “Essentialism and the Cultural modified May 4, 2011. Psychology of Gender in Extreme Son Preference http://kostat.go.kr/portal/english/index.action. Communities in India,” American Journal of Lee, Hung-tak. Causes of Son Preference in Orthopsychiatry 77, no. 4 (2007): 598-609. Korea. Research Report to W.H.O., 1982. xli “Gendercide.” Lee, Jungmin and Myungho Paik, “Sex xlii Banister, “Son Preference in Asia.” Preferences and Fertility in South Korea During the xliii “Gendercide.” Year of the Horse.” Demography 43, no. 2 (2006). xliv Monica Das Gupta and Li Shuzhuo, My Name is Kim Sam-soon. Directed by “Gender Bias in China, South Korea, and India 1920- Yoon Chul Kim. 2005. Seoul: MBC. DVD. 1990: Effects of War, Famine and Fertility Decline.” Park, Chai-Bin and Nam-Hoon Cho, Development and Change 30, no.3 (1999): 644. “Consequences of Son Preference in a Low-Fertility xlv “Gendercide.” Society: Imbalance of the Sex Ratio at Birth in Korea.” xlvi Mahalingam, Haritatos, and Jackson, Population and Development Review 21, no. 1 (1995): “Essentialism,” 599. 59-84. xlvii Ibid., 21. Ramaswami, Mahalingam, Jana Haritatos, and xlviii Mahalingam, Haritatos, and Jackson, Benita Jackson, “Essentialism and the Cultural “Essentialism,” 599. Psychology of Gender in Extreme Son Preference xlix Ibid. Communities in India.” American Journal of l Ibid. Orthopsychiatry 77, no. 4 (2007): 598-609.

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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Son and Daughter Storyline 1992 (1/2) [Video]. (2002). Retrieved May 6, 2011, from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kBK8NXOUk3Q Son and Daughter Storyline 1992 (2/2) [Video]. (2002). Retrieved May 6, 2011, from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zFFaNhojPzk&NR =1. !

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