Appendix: Structure/Action Theories of Bourdieu, Touraine, Giddens and Archer: a Comparison

I shall start by considering the relationship between theories and the society they seek to explain; and then, analysing these theories, examine different perspectives on structure and agency. Bourdieu, as noted above, privileges structural constraints on actors, while Touraine to the contrary emphasises the voluntarism of social movements in a loosely structured (fragmented) context. Both theorists are transformatively engaged in the societies they write about: Bourdieu scrutinises the social institutions of domination: the economic system and the role of education, including the strategic grandes écoles, on the one hand, and poverty among the dominated, on the other, while Touraine advocates social change through the free and creative action of existing or emerging social movements. This concrete engagement of Bourdieu and Touraine at the level both of theory and ‘social reality’ is in marked contrast to the highly abstract theorising of Margaret Archer and Anthony Giddens. I will come back to this point later.

Giddens: structuration theory Giddens – to consider his work ﬁrst of all – nevertheless shares with Bourdieu and Touraine his concern for the issues of social theory: issues that ‘are to do with the nature of human action and the acting self; with how interaction should be conceptualized and its relation to institutions; and with grasping the practical connotations of social analysis’ (Giddens, 1986: xvii). These practical connotations, for Giddens, evidently concern the problem of action, which is traditionally understood in terms of the dichotomy between objectivism and subjectivism. In Giddens’ interpretation (1987, 1997: 59–60) Bourdieu’s perspective is objectivist: ‘the social object (society) has some sort of priority over the individual agent’ and ‘social institutions are regarded as the core concern of social analysis’. Subjectivism (Touraine) essentially means the opposite. ‘The human agent is treated as the prime focus of social analysis’; the ‘main concern of the social sciences is held to be the purposeful, reasoning actor’. For Giddens, each of these perspectives has its attractions. The objectivists, he writes, have surely been correct in arguing that society or social institutions have structural properties stretching ‘beyond’ the activities of individual members of society. Yet those who veer towards subjectivism ‘have quite rightly seen us as beings capable of understanding the conditions of our own action, as acting intentionally and having reasons for what we do’.

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But each perspective also has its shortcomings. Objectivists typically are not adept at capturing qualities that have to be attributed to human agents, such as self-understanding and intentionality. Conversely, the focus of subjectivists tends to lead them away from study of long-term processes of change and large-scale organisation of institutions. Giddens’ alternative approach – ‘structuration theory’ – considers (as I do) that the ‘seeming opposition of perspectives’ actually disguises a complementarity. ‘This dualism should actually be represented as a duality, the duality of structure’:

According to the notion of the duality of structure, by contrast, structure is not as such external to human action, and is not identiﬁed solely with constraint. Structure is both the medium and the outcome of the human activities which it recursively organizes. Institutions, or large-scale societies, have structured properties in virtue of the continuity of the actions of their com- ponent members. But those members of society are only able to carry out their day-to-day activities in virtue of their capability of instantiating those structural properties. (61)

On the one hand, from the point of view of agency, ‘the context of activities in which human agents are implicated’ forms part of ‘the practical mastery of social relations which human agents display’: a ‘complex relation’ between ‘the individual as an agent and the institutions which the individual constitutes and reconstitutes in the course of the duration of day-to-day activity’ (62–3). On the other hand, when structure is understood as ‘rules and resources implicated in the “form” of collectivities of social systems, reproduced across space and time’, then structure is the ‘very medium’ of the ‘human’ element of human agency. (For ‘rules’ comprise both normative elements and ‘codes of signification’, while ‘resources’ are ‘authoritative’ – coordinating human agents – as well as ‘allocative’, stemming from ‘control of material products’: 1986: xxxi, 18, 32–3; in other words, issues of political power and economic system.) Yet, at the same time, agency is the medium of structure, which individuals routinely reproduce. ‘All social life has a recursive quality to it, derived from the fact that actors reproduce the conditions of their social existence by means of the very activities that – in the contexts of time-space – constitute that existence’ (1987, 1997: 220–1). Giddens’ structuration theory is close to Bourdieu’s notion of ‘habitus’, which is both structured (by the ideas and practices of the dominant classes) and struc- turing (when internalised by the dominated classes and thus conditioning their appropriate behaviour). But whereas Bourdieu tends to a deterministic outcome – reproducing domination – even if modified by relations with ‘fields’ and ‘capitals’, Giddens is open-minded. Thus, power, in his view, may be constraining, but it may also be ‘enabling’ (1984, 1999: 25) – that is, providing the liberating capacity to overcome repression. (Giddens, with reference to Touraine’s work, indeed supports the role of social movements: 203–6.) For power is at the very origin of the capabilities of agents to bring about change. Thus, ‘whether mainly as a result of conscious planning or in a fashion more or less unintended by any of those involved, actors modify their conduct and that of others in such a way as to reshape modes of authority relations’ (173, 178). Appendix 151

‘Domination’ and ‘power’, Giddens insists, cannot be thought of only in terms of asymmetries of distribution, but have to be recognised as inherent in human action as such. Signification (symbolic orders or modes of discourse), domination (political and economic institutions) and legitimation (legal institutions, norms) are the three structural dimensions of social systems (30–2). Hence (unlike Bourdieu) agency is important in Giddens’ structuration theory. At the same time, he warns, it is necessary to avoid the tendency (as with Touraine) to ‘regard society as the plastic creation of human subjects’, deriving from the failure adequately to conceptualise the duality of structure. ‘Structure has no existence independent of the knowledge that agents have about what they do in their day-to-day activity’, while social systems comprise the ‘situated activities’ of human agents, reproduced across time and space (25–7). In other words, ‘human practices, fashioning and fashioned by structural properties’ (220). Significantly, however, there is one major difference in theoretical/practical approach between Giddens, on the one hand, and Bourdieu and Touraine, on the other. The latter two, whatever their ‘objectivist’ and ‘subjectivist’ opposition, agree on an ‘intensive’ examination of society, each from a limited, partial, but by the same token, powerfully-charged, engagement. Giddens, by contrast, is ‘extensive’, even eclectic, in the wide theoretical scope of his work. Giddens rejects any single-factor explanation. Indeed, he goes to the other extreme by taking into consideration – with great skill – a multiplicity of rele- vant factors. The result is to leave the reader lost in admiration at his erudition but confused by the ‘embarrassment of choice’. Thus, Giddens takes into account geography and history, time and space, the body and ‘ontologogical trust’, Freudian psychoanalysis and slips of the tongue, linguistic theories and hermeneutics. ‘Knowledgeability embedded in practical consciousness’, he writes about social actors, ‘exhibits an extraordinary complexity’ (281). Indeed, social change itself ‘depends upon conjunctions of circumstances and events that may differ in nature according to variations of context, where context (as always) involves the reflexive monitoring by the agents involved of the conditions in which they “make history” ’ (245). It is hardly surprising that half way through ‘The Constitution of Society’ the author should seek ‘to ensure that the main threads of the discussion do not become too disaggregated in the reader’s mind’ (162). So far from trying to bring these disparate elements into a unified theoretical scheme (such as a Habermasian ‘life-world’ threatened by economic and political ‘systemic imperatives’) Giddens (rightly, in my view) rejects the notion of ‘universal laws’:

There are no universal laws in the social sciences, and there will not be any – not, ﬁrst and foremost, because methods of empirical testing and validation are somehow inadequate but because, as I have pointed out, the causal conditions involved in generalizations about human social conduct are inher- ently unstable in respect of the very knowledge (or beliefs) that actors have about the circumstances of their own action. (Introduction, xxxii)

Hence Giddens’ ‘double hermeneutic’, that is, ‘the reﬂexive relation in which the social sciences stand to the human activities they analyse’ (1987, 1997: 43). 152 Social Movements and Symbolic Power

Unlike the ‘single hermeneutic’ of the natural sciences, the social sciences operate within a double hermeneutic, involving two-way ties with the actions and institutions of those they study. ‘Sociological observers depend upon lay concepts to generate accurate descriptions of social processes; and agents regularly appropriate theories and concepts of social science within their behaviour, thus poten- tially changing its character. This introduces an instability into sociological theorizing.’ Moreover, the social world is an internally contested one, in which dissensus between actors and groups of actors – in relation to divergent world- views or clashes of interest – is pervasive (30–1). Above all, human history is ‘created by intentional activities but it is not an intended project; it persistently eludes efforts to bring it under conscious direction’ (27). Under these circumstances of complexity and instability, ‘every research investigation’ in the social sciences or history is involved in relating action to structure, in tracing conjunctions or disjunctions of intended and unintended consequences of actions and how these affect the fate of individuals. ‘No amount of juggling with abstract consequences’, Giddens rightly emphasises, ‘could sub- stitute for the direct study of such problems in the actual contexts of interaction.’ For the permutations of influences are endless, and there is no sense in which structure ‘determines’ action or vice-versa. ‘The nature of the constraints to which individuals are subject, the uses to which they put the capacities they have and the forms of knowledgeability they display are all themselves manifestly historically variable’ (219). Giddens, then, is very much aware of the ‘main empirical emphases’ (287) which ‘connect with the major tenets of structuration theory’. How, he asks, should we empirically analyse structural constraint? How might we give empirical flesh to the notion of structural contradiction? And what type of research is appropriate to the study of the longue durée (the term used by the French histo- rian Fernand Braudel) of institutional change? The result, in the case of empirical work referred to by Giddens (not, significantly, his own), cannot however be considered to ‘connect’ adequately with structuration theory; nor does it illuminate the structural problems of the educational system in the way that research by Bourdieu and Touraine and their fol- lowers has done (see Chapter 3). Admittedly, the empirical report quoted by Giddens is an ‘ethnographic study’ of one school, in Birmingham, and of working-class pupils within it; a great work of its kind, which does not attempt to analyse the system. Yet Giddens claims that the study ‘conforms closely to the main empirical implications of structuration theory’ (289), which if this is the case does little to enhance the repu- tation of that theory. (Giddens is too modest, however, in arguing that the concepts of structuration theory, for many research purposes, should be regarded as ‘sensitizing devices, nothing more’: 326.) What the matter does show, to the contrary, is the difficulty faced by a highly abstract theorist in ‘connecting’ what I believe is an important theory to what is certainly an important suject (education): precisely in terms of the structural dimensions – signification, domination and legitimacy – that Giddens himself adduces.

Archer: the morphogenetic approach Margaret Archer, too, admits the ‘high level of abstraction’ of her work, but insists (as does Giddens) that ‘all concepts have their referents’ – features belonging to Appendix 153 social reality. The point of theory, she writes (1995: 12–13), is practical. ‘It is never an end in itself but a tool for the working social analyst which gives explanatory purchase on substantive social problems, through supplying the terms or framework for their investigation.’ Archer’s work is illuminating and ingenious. Her model of investigation is brilliantly presented in Culture and Agency (1988, revised 1996). In this work she provides ‘an utterly basic account of the linkage between culture and agency’ or structure and agency, which is not just a technical problem of study, but ‘the most pressing social problem of the human condition’. For it is part of our daily existence ‘to feel both free and enchained, capable of shaping our own future and yet confronted by towering, seemingly impersonal constraints’ (Preface, xii–xiii). Archer’s approach, capable of linking structure (or culture) and agency, is based on ‘analytical dualism’, between the cultural system, on the one hand, and socio- cultural interaction, on the other. Drawing on the ‘seminal’ work of David Lockwood, she distinguishes between logical consistency or inconsistency at the systemic level (ideas about society are consistent with one another, or not) and high or low integration at the socio-cultural level (where causal relations among people – actors or groups of actors – are either orderly or conflictual). The systemic level is concerned with the consistency or otherwise of our attempts ‘to impose ideational order on experiential chaos’, while the socio- cultural level is concerned with causal relations: that is, the success or failure of attempts to order other people. ‘Logical consistency is a property of the world of ideas; causal consensus is a property of people.’ The connection between the two levels (which are analytically distinct) is established by ‘the degree of social uniformity produced by the imposition of culture’ by one set of people on another (4). In other words (28), where there is a high degree of ‘logical consistency’ in the cultural system this is a necessary but insufficient condition for socio-cultural integration; conversely, extensive contradictions in the cultural system encourage but do not determine socio-cultural conflict. In brief (xxii), logical ‘contradictions mould problem-ridden situations for actors’, whose difficulties they must confront in one way or another. By contrast, logical ‘complementarities’ (the internal consistency of ideas) ‘mould problem- free situations for agents’, who are now in a position to (although they may not) build up an ‘elaborate conspectus’ of mutually consistent and reinforcing ideas: ‘a situational logic of reproduction’ of integration. Such ‘subsequent interaction’ is different from earlier action, precisely because it is conditioned by the ‘elaborated consequences’ of that prior action: this is ‘morphogenesis’, the ‘complex interchanges that produce change’ in a system’s form, structure or state (mor- phostasis is the reverse). The morphogenetic perspective is not only dualistic (structure and agent) but also sequential: ‘endless three-part cycles of Structural Conditioning -/ Social interaction -/ Cultural Elaboration’ operating over time. According to Archer, the ‘crucial’ difference between morphogenesis and ‘conflationist’ theories (discussed below), such as Giddens’ structuration, is that ‘culture and agency operate over different time periods’, because the cultural system logically predates the socio- cultural activities transforming it; and ‘cultural elaboration’ logically postdates such interaction (xxiv–xxv). Utilising such a theoretical framework, Archer explains, makes it easier to see how structure and culture intersect. For example, ‘structural interest-groups’ 154 Social Movements and Symbolic Power endorse ‘some corpus of ideas’ in order to advance their material concerns, but then become enmeshed in the situational logic of that part of the cultural domain; conversely, ‘ideal-interest groups’ seek powerful sponsors to promote their ideas, but their cultural discourse is then immediately embroiled in power- play within the structural domain. The final step is to answer the question: ‘when does structure exert more influence over culture and vice versa?’ (xxviii). Theories that ‘conflate’ structure (or culture) and agents, on the contrary, either privilege one level or the other, preventing the autonomy of duality; or if they accept duality (as in Giddens’ structuration) it is in the form of ‘mutual constitution’ of structure and agency which, according to Archer, is equally unacceptable. Conflation, then, is either ‘downwards’ (structure or cultural system dominates actors) or ‘upwards’ (powerful groups dominate the rest through the ‘manipulated consensus’ of ideas, as in Marx’s notion that the ruling ideas about society are those of the ruling class); or conflation may be ‘central’, which is the most insidious form because it appears to allow autonomy to both structure and agents. But this cannot be so (according to Archer), since for Giddens structure is simultaneously both ‘medium and outcome’ of agency, thus preventing their analytical distinction. Downwards conflation, where action is treated as fundamentally epiphenom- enal to structure or cultural system is ‘encountered today in any uncompromis- ing version of technical determinism, economism, structuralism or normative functionalism’ (1995: 81). In Culture and Agency, Archer notably criticises Parsonian functionalism and the structural anthropology of Lévy–Strauss. For Parsons, systemic values, necessary for the functioning of social systems, shape role activities leading to social integration (Archer, 1996: 32–7). In the words of Lévy-Strauss, however, cultural phenomena are those ‘whose inmost nature is the same as language’, where the hidden structure takes the form of a code (ignor- ing the empirical referent). As Archer puts it, ‘the purposive human subject, his practical discourse and consciousness, his promotive interaction with others, are all absent in this theory’. Both functionalism and structuralism, Archer concludes, ‘elaborate on the theme of society predominating over the individual’ (38–42). Conversely, upwards conflation is from the bottom up, ‘since it is Socio- Cultural conflict which generates a common Cultural system – usually represented as “the dominant ideology” ’ or ‘manipulated consensus’ shaped by those in power (47). But direction upwards, so far from being the monopoly of dominant groups at the level of socio-cultural interaction (as in the case of Bourdieu’s theory of habitus) could equally be attributed, in my view, to Touraine’s ‘active subject’. For the subject, grouped with others in social movements, acts both in cooperation and contestation with political institutions, which themselves mediate between the state and the citizen. Here, the active subject, putting pres- sure on the political system, shapes the social structure. In this way – escaping Archer’s strictures – Touraine maintains the analytical duality of structure and agency. On the other hand, Touraine also privileges the actor over the structure, which is ‘fragmented’ (subjectively) into consumerism and search for identity and (objectively) into the power of production and state power. Archer’s upwards conflation would seem to be an unsatisfactory category, if it could include such contrary theorists as Bourdieu and Touraine, both of whom Appendix 155 are moving from social interaction upwards; and even more so, if Touraine’s conceptual framework is both conflated and analytically dualistic. (Perhaps the best way to resolve the conflationary problematic is to adopt Giddens’ theory of ‘mutual constitution’.) Is Archer’s critique of central conflation more coherent, admitting that Giddens’ eclecticism is also open to the charge of incoherence? For, to add to the ambiguity, Bourdieu’s habitus theory (as noted above) is close to Giddens’ structuration: the habitus is structured (by dominant ideas and activities) and in turn structures the behaviour of dominant and dominated alike. Now, Bourdieu’s theory can be interpreted in a way that allows autonomy (like Giddens) to both agency and structure, precisely by putting greater emphasis on the ‘indetermi- nate’ components of the theory, that is, the role of fields and capitals. In other words, Bourdieu’s theory can be considered to be both upwards and centrally conflated. As for the centrist Giddens, Archer reserves her most stringent criticism for his ‘elisionism’, namely, ‘transcending the dualism between individual and society’ by eliding the two, through insistence on mutual constitution. Elisionism (contrary to morphogenetics) denies the separability of structure and agency, because every aspect of structure is held to be activity-dependent in the present tense; indeed, any causal efficacy of structure is dependent upon evocation by agency (1995: 60). Archer accordingly claims that from Giddens’ elisionist standpoint ‘it becomes impossible to talk about the stringency of structural constraints versus degrees of personal freedom, for in theories based upon central conflation, causation is always the joint and equal responsibility of structure and agency and nothing is ever more attributable to one rather than the other’ (64). This is a very serious charge, for it directly concerns the ‘most pressing social problem of the human condition’ (previously cited), that is, to feel free and yet to be constrained. But is Giddens guilty? In my reading, he is saying something different to ‘every aspect of structure’ being ‘activity-dependent’, that is, conflating the two. He writes of a ‘complex relation’ between the individual as an agent and the institutions he constitutes and reconstitutes; and that when structure is understood as rules and resources (authoritative and allocative) then it is the ‘very medium’ of human agency (Giddens, as cited above, in relation to the theories of Bour- dieu and Touraine). But there is no sense in which structure determines action or vice-versa, Giddens declares: the nature of constraints, the uses to which individuals put their capacities and their forms of knowledgeability are ‘manifestly historically variable’. It would, indeed, be possible to countercharge Archer with conflationary ten- dencies. Proposition (ii) of her ‘four propositions’, elaborated throughout Culture and Agency, represents downwards conditioning, that is: (i) ‘There are logical relationships between components of the Cultural System (CS)’; (ii) ‘There are causal influences exerted by the CS on the Socio-Cultural (S-C) level’; while (iii) and (iv) refer to causal relationships, such as conflict or cooperation, at the S-C level; and ‘elaboration’ of the CS due to S-C modifying current logical relationships and introducing new ones (1996: 106). In the second place, why should only logical relationships – consistency or inconsistency – be taken into account at the crucial systemic level? The ‘prime concern’, Archer writes (106), is to establish the existence of objective contra- 156 Social Movements and Symbolic Power dictions and complementarities within a cultural system, independent of any reference to the socio-cultural level. She admits (228) that analytical dualism – including the decision to consider exclusively logical relations at the systemic level and causal relations at the level of agents – ‘is an artifice of methodologi- cal convenience for the components which it disentangles overlap and inter- twine in reality’; but it is ‘only the use of this perspective which has permitted the main phases of cultural morphogenesis to be disengaged . . . and the whole process of cultural dynamics to be given some shape’. This is disarming, but hardly convincing. To exclude substantive issues from the cultural system may promote (or preserve) the theory, but it is at the cost of removing any meaning from culture as derived from beliefs and activities at the socio-cultural level, which is that of ‘people’. Yet it is the ‘relational property of people’, significantly, that inspires Archer’s most interesting work, notably in the excellent chapter, ‘The morphogenesis of agency’ in Realist Social Theory. Here she elaborates on the distinction between ‘Primary agents’ (atomistic, unsystematic, lacking a say in structural or cultural moulding) and ‘Corporate agents’ (controlling resources, articulating ideas and creating organisations), and their interaction, in an analysis of educational development, with examples from England and France. She concludes (274): ‘Struc- ture is the conditioning medium and elaborated outcome of interaction: agency is shaped by and reshapes structure while reshaping itself in the process.’ In case this looks too much like structuration theory, she has to distance herself from the ‘vagaries of mutual constitution’, by insisting (and who would disagree?) that the complexity of the process ‘remains hopelessly indefinite unless the interplay between them is unravelled over time to specify the where, when, who and how’. Nevertheless, Archer’s own ‘vagaries’, in particular the ambiguities of ‘conflation’, do create problems for the practical application of theory which, as Archer rightly points out, is a tool for understanding ‘substantive social problems’. For ‘what social reality is held to be cannot but influence how society is studied’ (1995: 12–13). To conclude: Giddens’ and (for the most part) Archer’s highly abstract studies connect only with difficulty to the social reality they seek to explain. Conversely, despite theoretical weaknesses, it is the empirical engagement of Bourdieu and Touraine that enables them to grapple more effectively with people’s represen- tations and practices. Indeed, the striking contrast between their perspectives (radical and reformist), explored in the third chapter, provides the opportunity for others to contest, modify or confirm their findings. Bibliography

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Note: an explanation of certain themes has been added – see capitalism, civil society and democracy – while for other themes brief notes indicate alternative readings (values). This is an early warning system designed to cope with the empirical confusion of opinions and events. abandonment, feeling of 2, 13, Badinter, R. 109 25–6, 48, 143, 146; see also banlieues, suburbs 22, 25–6 alienation Bard, C. 91, 98 abstention, from voting 1, 12, 15, Barthe, Y. 69 38, 143 Baudelot, C. 103–4 actor, agent 3, 4, 32–4, 37, 40–1, Baverez, N. 17, 28 43–6, 53–4, 80, 86, 138, 149–56 Beauvoir, S. de 89, 94, 97–8, 101–2, Adam, B. 66–7 106, 111–12, 118 administration see State Bechtel, M.-F. 42 Africa, 118 Becker, J.-J. 13, 74, 106 Agacinski, S. 109 behaviour 4–6, 38, 40, 43–4, 84, 89, ageing population 24; see also 120, 150, 154–5 retirement Bell, L. 85 Albistur, M. 91, 93–4, 97, 111, 117, Benton, T. 66, 68 128 Bérégovoy, P. 11 Algeria 5, 6, 15 Bergounioux, A. 16 alienation 5, 12, 15, 25, 137, 143 Berstein, S. 74 Allègre, C. 12 Bianciotti, H. 129–30 Allwood, G. 91, 93, 103, 106–8, 111 biological difference see women’s Alzon, C. 117 movement America (USA) 85, 105, 111, 135, Blanchard, S. 22, 74, 76 141 Borges, J.L. 129 apathy 15, 77 Boulongne, C. 19 Arab 2, 25 bourgeoisie 7, 8, 27, 32, 73, 78–9, Archer, M. 149, 152–6 107 Armogathe, D. 91, 93–4, 97, 111, Bourdieu, P. analysis and critique: 117, 128 31–2, 38–51, 53–6, 78–81, 149–51, artisans 19, 72 154–6; see also 1–6, 13, 16–17, 21, Attac (Association for the Taxation of 22–3, 26, 28, 66, 71–3, 76, 78–81, Financial Transactions – ‘Tobin tax’ 84–90, 137–9 – and Aid to Citizens) 143 Braudel, F. 152 Aubry, M. 11, 19 Bronner, L. 76, 146 authoritarian 20, 32, 101, 139, 142–3 autonomy 36, 44, 49, 78, 80–1, 83, Cadis (Centre for Sociological 99, 111, 140, 147, 154 Analysis and Intervention) 5, 17, 75 Bachman, C. 25 cadres see executives Badinter, E. 109 Calamard, A. 96

163 164 Index capitalism: economy, politics and civil classe dirigeante see elites society are basic to this study. Their climatic change see global warming role, however, is ambiguous. Cohen, D. 25 Capitalism produces wealth; but it Cohn-Bendit, D. 64, 69–71 distributes wealth according to its own Collège de France 5, 16 rules and not those of society – unless, Colmoo, A.-M. 105 of course, society has become so Commoner, B. 65–6 materialistic that it makes no communication 35, 37, 57, 77 difference. Capitalism is omnipresent: Communist Party, communism 6, 8, specific instances follow: 2, 3, 5, 11, 16, 28, 45, 49, 61–2, 65, 69, 88 7–10, 12–14, 16, 18, 23–4, 29, 31–2, community 32, 34–5, 54–5, 64–5, 37, 39–47, 50, 53–4, 56–7, 59–61, 67, 69, 87, 109, 137 64–6, 68–70, 75, 77–81, 84, 88–9, competition, economic 16, 19, 24, 91, 97–8, 100–3, 108–9, 111, 113, 136, 143, 147 116–17, 119, 122, 128, 132, conceptual: scheme, classification, 135–43, 146–7, 149–50, 154; see categories see habitus also global economy; neo-liberalism conservative 10, 16, 25; see also capitals 2, 5, 22, 40–6, 48–9, 55, 62, Right 72, 78, 80, 87, 137–8, 150, 155; see consumerism 3, 7, 8, 10, 17–18, 26, also Bourdieu 33–4, 37, 65, 68, 78–9, 137, 154 Caramel, L. 24 contraception 10, 20, 84, 86, 91, carbon dioxide see environment 106 Carlander, I. 104 corporatism 16, 27, 36, 57, 62, 81 CFDT see trade unions corruption 1, 6, 9–10, 11, 17, 27, CGT see trade unions 107 Chaperon, S. 97 Courtois, G. 105 Chemin, A. 15 Cresson, E. 11 Chirac, J. 1, 9, 11–12, 15, 17, 26, 58, crisis 5, 11, 14, 23, 27, 29, 33–4, 144 49–51, 60, 66, 78, 144 Cixous, H. 111, 119, 128–9, 131–2 culture 2–4, 23, 29, 32, 33–8, 39–46, citizens 12, 14, 16–17, 21, 22, 26, 59, 61, 64, 66, 72, 77, 79, 87, 93–4, 32, 36–7, 48, 80, 83, 96, 108–9, 102, 110, 119, 124, 126–7, 129–30, 142–4, 147, 154 137–8, 153–6 civil society: defined as individuals and cumul: accumulation of elected associations acting independently of positions 106–7, 111 state and economic system: such as schools, universities, media, religious Dauphin, S. 107 bodies, professionals, intellectuals, etc. Davis, H. 19–20 Trade unions are included, because Debord, G. 145 they contest as well as participate in debt 20 the economic system. Civil society decentralisation 11–12, 15 members demand a voice in the Déchaux, J.-H. 74 formation of public policy affecting delinquency 11, 17, 25, 27, 76–7 their lives – and livelihood. ‘Social Delphy, C. 89, 93–4, 104, 111, movements’ are activist elements in 112–19, 122, 126–7, 132, 139–40 civil society: 3, 32, 50, 59, 62, 70, democracy: government by consent of 85, 118, 135–7, 139–40. the governed, through universal class see bourgeoisie; middle class; suffrage, free elections, rule of law, etc. professionals; elites Democracy is not abstract perfection: Index 165 democracy – continued education: prime instrument of it is socially and historically socialisation – but according to whose constituted: Bourdieu’s critique: 44, model of society? Meritocracy, 47–51; Touraine’s critique: 36–8; responsible citizenship or reproducing democratic deficit: 1–5, 14–15, 17, the dominant order? 2, 3, 5, 10–12, 18, 27, 28–9, 140–7; see also 33–4, 15–16, 19, 21–4, 26, 28, 33, 36, 36, 58–60, 72–4, 76, 79, 85–6, 95–6, 41–2, 46–8, 53–5, 57–8, 60, 62, 99, 107, 109–10, 136, 139 71–6, 80, 81, 83–4, 88, 91, 94–5, demonstrations 25, 31, 59–60, 91, 145 99, 103–4, 118, 129, 136, 138, 140, deprivation see poverty 144–5, 149, 152, 156 deregulation 7, 54 election campaigns 1, 4, 9, 11, 12, Derrida, J. 60 15, 38, 58, 107, 110–11, 135, 142–3 determinism 4, 45, 48, 50, 53, 60, Eliot, T.S. 128 62–3, 139, 150, 154 elites 1–2, 5–7, 9, 10, 14, 16–17, differentialist (feminists) 4, 84, 21–3, 27, 31, 38, 48, 54–5, 60, 86–7, 90, 93–4, 109–12, 118, 126, 71–2, 75, 77, 80, 107, 143–4, 146–7 130, 132, 140 emancipation 10, 33, 46–7, 79, 84, Dine, P. 28 86, 88, 95, 108, 112–14, 119 disaffection 12, 17 employees: white-collar workers discrimination 2, 17–18, 20–1, 31, 14–16, 19, 24–5, 72, 99–100, 143 41, 81, 84, 94–5, 99, 102, 104, 106, Enlightenment 33, 127 118, 139 enterprise see capitalism disillusionment 1, 16, 27, 143 environment: fundamental disorientation 22, 77, 137 contradiction between economic disposition see habitus imperatives and need for material division of labour 38–41, 43–4, 46–8, sacrifices to prevent disaster: 3, 5, 85–6, 100, 103, 111, 114, 137–8 11, 12, 15, 38, 50, 53, 61–2, 63–71, divorce 10, 28, 91, 137 81, 83, 99, 137, 145–6 doctrinaire see determinism equality 2, 4, 14, 37–8, 60–1, 71–4, domestic mode of production 94, 84, 86, 89, 93, 95–6, 99, 101–2, 112–18, 122, 127 106–7, 109, 112, 118, 126, 136, domestic work 4, 20, 84–5, 95, 100, 139–40, 142; see also values 111, 115–17, 138 essentialism see feminism domination 2–3, 4, 5, 6, 20, 31–2, Establet, R. 103–4 38–47, 49–50, 53–6, 59–60, 62–4, ethnic minorities 1–2, 4, 7, 61, 109, 137 66, 72, 78–9, 83–5, 87–9, 92, 94, Europe 1, 12, 55, 58, 65, 67–8, 103, 107, 110–11, 113, 115, 117, 119, 105, 118, 139 126, 137–9, 141, 147, 149–52, exclusion 3, 5, 11, 13–14, 17, 19, 154–5; see also power structure 26–8, 31–2, 38, 41, 51, 59, 77, 107, drugs 11, 25, 70 110, 118, 140, 143 Dubet, F. 25, 75 executives: cadres 4, 14, 16, 19, 21, Duhamel, A. 29 22, 24, 38, 54, 74–5, 99, 100, 103–5 Dupin, E. 16 Fabius, L. 11–12, 56–8 Ecole nationale d’administration family 3, 13, 20, 23, 24, 26, 28, 36, (ENA) 7, 9, 22, 42, 48, 55, 75, 41, 48, 53–5, 72, 74–5, 79, 84, 86, 104, 107 90, 99–101, 104, 106, 112–13, ecology see environment 117–18, 120–1, 127, 129–30, 138, economic development see capitalism 140, 145–6 166 Index

Fauroux, R. 9, 22–3, 42, 57 Guigou, E. 11–12, 95–6, 101, 106–8 Fédida, P. 124 Gunther, R. 132 feminism see women’s movement Ferry, L. 145 Habermas, J. 151 fields 5, 43–6, 55, 62, 78, 80, 150, habitus 5, 40, 41, 44–7, 55, 60–3, 155; see also habitus; Bourdieu 78, 150, 154–5; see also field; Fifth Republic 67 Bourdieu Fillon, F. 14 Halimi, G. 92, 101, 106, 108, 110–11 Flandrin, P. 101–3 Hantrais, L. 24 Foucault, M. 127–8 Harismendy, P. 28 Fouque, A. 111, 126–7 hegemony 85, 137; see also Gramsci Fraisse, G. 84–5, 110–11 Heinich, N. 99 freedom 2, 10, 14, 33–7, 47, 51, 54, Hewlett, N. 29 61, 76, 86, 95–6, 98, 102, 136, 138, hierarchical structure 18, 31, 38, 141–2, 153, 155 45–7, 49, 71, 73, 93, 115, 132; see French Revolution 20, 95 also Bourdieu Freud, S. 91, 93, 119–24, 125–7, Holland, A. 21 129, 132–3, 151 Hollande, F. 15 homeless 3, 13, 19, 59 Gaspard, F. 20, 92–3, 96, 106, homosexual: gay 38, 61, 70, 89 108–10 Hulot, N. 70 Gaulle, C. de 6–7, 96–7 human rights see values Gaullist 6, 8, 11, 28 gay see homosexual identity 4, 20–1, 28, 33–7, 54–5, gender 47, 76, 86, 89–90, 109, 76–7, 86, 89, 107, 110, 119, 123, 114–16, 118–19, 138 125, 127, 137, 154 general interest 27, 33, 81; see also ideology 8, 16, 28, 36, 39, 44, 69, values 77, 91–3, 114, 119, 126, 154; see general will 32, 141 also values Genisson, C. 99–100 imaginaire 123, 125 Giddens, A. 149–52, 154–6 immigrant 1, 3, 5, 9, 10, 16, 23, 25, Giscard d’Estaing, V. 7, 106 60–1, 70; see also ethnic minority global economy 5, 11, 14, 16, 23, individualism, personal lifestyle 3, 33, 54–6, 58, 80–1, 135, 137, 143; 16, 20, 24, 26, 28, 32–4, 40, 45, 62, see also capitalism 72, 75, 77, 87, 137–8, 141, 143, global warming: greenhouse effect 146, 150, 152, 155 63–9 industry, -ial see capitalism Godino, R. 24 inequality 2, 3, 4, 5, 14, 15–19, 24, Gouges, O. de 96 28, 31, 37, 47, 53, 58–9, 72–3, 75, Goux, D. 22, 74 86, 88, 92, 94–5, 97–8, 100, 103–5, Gramsci, A. 50, 85, 137, 144, 147 109–110, 112, 114, 118, 138 grandes écoles 5, 7, 22–3, 41–2, 75, inferiority 20, 40, 46, 54, 72, 76, 104, 107, 149 97–8, 109, 112, 126, 137–8 Great Britain 84, 105, 111, 117, information (technology) revolution 140–1, 156 24, 28, 33, 37, 74 Greeks 120, 123–4, 142 insecurity 5, 11, 12, 15, 18, 25–7 Greens, les verts 11, 61, 64, 69–71; institution, -al 3–4, 14, 17, 20, 26, see also environment 32, 35, 37, 41–2, 49, 63, 84, 86–7, Gregory, A. 117 92, 106, 111, 127, 139–42, 149–50, Guibert, N. 23, 76 152, 155 Index 167 integration, social (or lack) 23, 25, 26, legitimacy 31, 40, 42, 44, 50–1, 69, 32–6, 40, 54, 61, 84, 91, 93, 98, 153–4 71–2, 80, 86, 110, 126, 133, 143, intellectuals 14, 29, 37, 39, 44, 50, 151–2; see also values 59–60, 79, 80, 112, 140, 144 leisure 10, 79 internalisation, of dominant lesbians 89 discourse 38–9, 44, 46, 48, 53–4, Lévy-Strauss, C. 154 62, 125, 137–8, 150 Liberatore, A. 67–8 Irigaray, L. 111, 119, 128, 130–3 liberty see freedom libido 120–1, 126, 131 Jacobs, M. 68 Lipietz, A. 69, 110 Jaffré, J. 14, 71, 143–4 Lipovetsky, G. 76–7, 79–80 Japan, 65 literature, literary 47, 89, 93–4, 104, Jones, E. 119–20, 129 111, 125, 127, 129 Jospin, L. 9, 11–12, 15, 22, 26, 56, living standards 7, 10, 13–14, 23, 64, 70, 75, 99, 105–6 66, 79, 136 journalism 9 Locke, J. 83, 85, 141 Joyce, J. 93, 127, 129 Lockwood, D. 153 judiciary, law 9, 11, 33, 36–7, 39, Loiseaux, D. 103 43, 70, 75, 85, 87, 91, 98, 100, 106, Louis, M.-V. 91 108–10, 123, 126, 139–40, 142 love 120–1, 128–32 Julliard, J. 27, 69–70 Juppé, A. 11, 58–9 Maire, E. 101–2 Maire, J. 70–1 knowledge, production of 22–3, 38, male, masculine 20–1, 32, 41, 46, 40, 42–3, 46, 51, 74, 75–6, 84, 111, 84, 86–92, 96–8, 101, 103, 105, 124, 127, 130, 144, 146, 151–2 107, 109–12, 117–19, 122, 124, Kofman, S. 126–7 126, 128, 130–4, 137–40 Krémer, P. 92, 100–1, 117 managers see executives Kriegel, B. 110 marginal, -ised 3, 8, 22, 31–2, 38, Kristeva, J. 111, 119, 122–7 59, 61, 90, 95, 141 Kyoto (environment) 65, 70 market forces see capitalism Maruani, M. 100–1, 105 labour see work Marx, Marxism, neo-Marxist 89, 91, Lallemont, M. 74–5 93, 111–19, 120, 122, 139, 154 Lane, J. 45, 80–1 maternity 91, 103, 111, 124, 127 Lang, J. 12 Mathieu, N.-C. 89–90, 92–3 Lascoumes, P. 69 Mattei, B. 71 Laronche, M. 146 Mauduit, L. 18 law see judiciary Maurin, E. 22, 74 Le Boucher, E. 145 Maurois, P. 11 Leclerc, A. 128–30, 132, 139 McCarthy, M. 64 Le Doeuff, M. 110 Méda, D. 100, 103, 111, 117–18 Le Gall, A. 108–9 media 14, 16, 17, 37, 48, 61–2, Le Gendre, B. 97 78–9, 106, 137 Le Pen, J.-M. 1, 9, 12, 15; see also far Mégie, G. 65 Right; National Front Mény, Y. 1–2 Left (socialism, communism, Greens) middle class 7, 10, 19, 22, 46–7, 75, 9, 11–12, 14, 16, 31, 49, 58, 61, 63, 116 70, 108, 110, 143; extreme Left 2, Mill, J.S. 141 15, 16, 143 Miné, M. 101 168 Index misrecognition 43–4, 78, 80, 86, 92, Perrot, M. 96–7, 109 140; see also Bourdieu personality, personal behaviour 10, Mitterrand, F. 8, 11, 15 34–6, 77, 140; see also mobilisation 35, 43, 44, 47, 50, 56, individualism 60, 70, 78, 84–5, 92, 99, 141 Péry, N. 92 modernisation, modernity 2, 5, petty bourgeoisie 10, 19, 38, 45, 54, 79 32–4, 54, 70, 72, 77, 79, 87, 128, phallus, phallocrat 120–2, 126–8, 136–7 132 moral discourse see values Picq, F. 92–3, 111–12 Mouvement de libération des femmes Pisier, E. 109 (MLF) see women’s movement pluralist Left 11, 15, 16, 64; see also Mucchielli, L. 26 Left myth 39, 41, 123–4, 132 politics, political parties: Politics as mediation between citizens’ desires National Front 9, 25; see also Le Pen and business demands: 1–3, 5, nationalism 1, 9, 17, 33–5, 37, 51, 7–10, 14–17, 20, 21, 26–9, 33–4, 54–5, 89, 125, 130, 137 36–8, 41, 44, 46–9, 54–6, 61, 64, natural order 20, 40, 43, 95, 111, 66, 69, 71, 73, 77–81, 85–6, 88, 133, 137–8; see also Bourdieu 93–4, 96–9, 101, 104, 105–8, neo-liberalism 5, 7, 14, 28, 31, 54–6, 109–12, 114–15, 118, 125, 128, 58–60, 62–3, 81, 119, 143, 147; see 132–3, 135–8, 140–4, 154 also capitalism pollution 65, 68–70 Notat, N. 101–3 Pompidou, G. 7 Nouvelles Questions Féministes see ‘popular classes’, ‘ordinary people’ women’s movement 10, 14, 26–8, 53, 59, 73, 75–6, 84, 102, 143–4, 147, 156 objectivism see Bourdieu Portelli, H. 69–70 Oedipus complex 119–24, 133; see postmodern 28, 76–7, 80, 111–12, also Freud 127–8, 139 officials see State poverty, deprivation 5, 13, 15–19, oppression 37, 88, 90, 92–4, 109, 22, 24, 25, 27–8, 31, 42, 44–5, 51, 113–17, 128, 132 58, 74, 96, 105, 117, 136, 141 Ory, P. 28 power structure 2–3, 18, 21, 27, Orwell, G. 143 33–6, 41, 43, 47–50, 53, 55, 62, 78, ozone layer 65–7; see also 80, 84–5, 90, 93, 96, 107, 109, 111, environment 114, 124–6, 127–30, 137–40, 149–51, 154; see also domination parity (parité) 4, 11, 38, 86–7, 92–4, practice 39–40, 45, 48, 63, 93, 107–11, 118, 139, 141; see also 127–8, 139, 142, 151, 153, 156; see women’s movement; politics also Bourdieu Parsons, T. 154 pragmatism 85–6, 93, 102, 111, 140 Pascal, B. 46 ‘precarious’ work see work Passeron, J.-G. 72 private sector 7, 9, 21, 55, 57, 60 patriarchy 84, 91–2, 95–6, 111–17, private sphere 20, 41, 47, 54, 77, 86, 119, 127, 132, 139–40, 146 138–9 perception, categorisation 31, privatisation 11, 54 39–40, 47–8, 78; see also Bourdieu professions, liberal 4, 10, 19, 38, permissive behaviour 3, 10, 33, 53, 46–7, 54, 74, 88, 94, 97, 99, 101, 62, 76–80, 137 104, 135, 140–1 Index 169 profit see capitalism revolution, -ary 3, 10, 31–2, 36, promotion, ‘glass ceiling’ 4, 84, 99, 47, 49–51, 53, 76–7, 83–5, 92–3, 103–5, 141, 147 95–7, 102, 112–14, 116, 122, property 96, 128, 136, 141 139–40 protectionism, economic 23, 31, 56 Ricoeur, P. 124 protests, acts of see demonstrations Right 5, 8, 9, 11–12, 14, 16, 31, 49, Proust, J. 124 58, 70, 108, 110; see also Proust, M. 129 conservative; Gaullist; extreme psychoanalysis 89, 111–12, 118–22, Right 2, 15, 17, 25; see also Le 124, 126–7, 129, 133, 139, 151; see Pen; National Front also Freud; Kristeva ‘Rights of Man’ 86, 95–6; equal public opinion 14, 35, 48–9, 61–2, rights see equality 69, 107–8, 181 Rioux, J.-P. 73–4 public sector 7, 9, 21, 54, 60 Rocard, P. 11, 24 public service see State Rochefort, R. 27 Rodgers, C. 20, 106, 110–11, 119, Rabinow, P. 127 124–6, 132 racism 26, 51; see also Right, Rosanvallon, P. 16, 29 extreme Roudinescu, E. 109 radicalism 2, 5, 10, 32, 47, 50, 56, Roudy, Y. 100 60, 64, 66, 83–7, 90–4, 114–15, Rousseau, J.-J. 32, 95, 141 136–7, 156 rural society, farmers 7, 19, 29, 38, Raffarin, J.-P. 12, 14, 27, 58, 70 54, 72–3, 102 Ramonet, I. 103 rape 91 Saglietti, C. 24 reason, rationality 32, 33–5, 54, 64, salaries, wages 4, 21, 99–100, 102, 72, 95, 123–5, 128, 137, 144–7, 104–5; see also work 149 sans-papiers 3, 16, 38, 61, Redclift, R. 66, 68 99 reforms, reformism 2, 4, 5–6, 10–12, Sarkozi, N. 27 16, 31–2, 47, 50, 53, 56–9, 60, Sarraute, N. 129–30 63–4, 66, 80, 83–7, 90–4, 105, Sartre, J.-P. 29, 32 107, 110, 114, 116, 139–40, 144–6, Schmid, L. 55 156 school see education religion 17, 28, 29, 37, 41, 43, 78, security see insecurity 109, 119, 123, 130, 133, 137–8 Servan-Schreiber, C. 108–9 Rémond, R. 14 sex, sexuality 10, 33–4, 41, 44, 77, representation see democracy 79, 84, 87, 89–91, 93–5, 100, repression 27, 51, 92–3 102–3, 106, 108–10, 114–15, 120–2, reproduction, of social order 41, 43, 125–7, 132, 137 48, 62, 72, 79, 92, 107, 138, 150–1, Sieyès, abbé 95–6 153; see also Bourdieu social change 2–4, 10, 16, 34–5, Republican model 2, 13–14, 21–2, 38, 42, 46, 53, 55, 59, 62–4, 66, 25–7, 37, 56, 71–3, 80–1, 86, 95, 84–5, 114–15, 118, 140–1, 108–9, 11, 128, 140 149–51 retirement (pensions) 10, 12, 58–60, ‘social fracture’ 2, 5, 14, 15, 17, 18, 144–5 27–9, 38 revolt 26, 55–6, 59–60, 98, 113–15; social justice 27, 35, 61, 85; see also see also demonstrations values 170 Index social movements: the ‘activist’ Surdut, M. 101 element of civil society, uniting specific sustainable development see demands with universal values: 1–2, environment 4–6, 31–2, 35–8, 50, 53, 56, 59–62, symbolic power: dominant vision of the 64, 78, 80, 85, 87, 89–90, 92, 94, world, internalised by the dominated, 95, 102, 105, 119, 137–8, 140–1, conditioning their behaviour: 1, 3–6, 144–6, 149–50, 154; see also 21, 31–2, 38–9, 41, 43, 45–7, 51, Touraine 53, 59, 61–4, 78, 80, 84, 86, 88–90, social order, established order 5, 39, 92–6, 112, 122, 125, 128–9, 137–41, 95 146, 151; ‘reverse’ symbolic power: social security see welfare state largely unrecognised by Bourdieu, social structure 39, 51, 54, 66, 71, becomes possible when ‘utopias’ – 80 alternative visions of society – socialisation 23, 87 mobilise the dominated to challenge Socialist Party, social democracy 8, the established order: 4, 45, 50–1, 11, 15, 16, 25, 62–3, 67, 69, 99, 62–4, 84, 88–9, 112, 128, 139–40, 108–10, 119, 141 146; see also Bourdieu society, ‘social link’ 1–2, 23, 26, 28, 33, 35–7, 39, 44, 49–51, 60, 70, 72, tactics, re. feminism 90–1 76–7, 83–5, 87–8, 90–1, 96–8, 106, Tchernia, J.-F. 10 109, 115, 118, 132, 137, 139, teachers 16, 21, 59, 74, 102, 104–5, 145–7, 149–52, 154–6 145–6 solidarity 14, 35, 37, 60, 64, 86, 89, technocrats 9, 14, 16, 38, 44, 51, 54, 102, 112, 142, 146 56, 60, 66, 72, 80; see also elites Solidarnosc (Solidarity) 37, 50 Tenzer, N. 16 Spitz, B. 58 terrorism 64 State: instrument of elitist domination Third Republic 6, 9, 21 or protector of the people: 3–5, 7–9, Thompson, J. 39 12, 23, 27–8, 31, 33, 35–7, 41, 48, Tocqueville, A. de 32 54–8, 60, 69, 70, 80–1, 84–5, 88, tolerance see values 101, 105, 117, 129, 137–8, 140, Topfer, K. 66 145, 154 Touraine, A. analysis and critique: status 20, 28 31–8, 50–1, 53–64, 77–81, 149–51, Strauss-Kahn, D. 11 154–6; see also 1–6, 13, 17, 23, 29, stress 54, 146 66, 69, 71–3, 75, 77–9, 81, 84–90, strikes 11, 31, 59–60, 62, 145 105, 137–8 struggle 4, 21, 35, 43–5, 49–50, 55, trade unions 3, 5, 8, 20, 26, 35–6, 61, 80, 84–5, 87, 91, 97–9, 102, 38, 50, 53, 57, 59, 61–2, 81, 101–3, 113, 118, 131, 139–40, 146; see also 116–17, 135, 137, 145–6 protests Trannoy, A. 19 students 37, 59–60, 75; and ‘events’, Tratt, J. 110 1968 10, 15, 37, 92, 102, 106, 125 trente glorieuses 7, 13, 17, 73 subject, the 3, 5–6, 31, 34–5, 54, 72, Tricot, B. 96 78, 81, 86, 89, 98, 101, 125, 127, 137, 154; see also Touraine unconscious, the 3, 40–1, 44, 47, subjectivism 17, 39–40, 77, 111, 53, 61, 64, 87–8, 122–3, 125, 131, 149–50; see also Bourdieu 138 suburbs, poor see banlieues unemployment 3, 5, 8, 10, 11, 13, subversion 44, 47, 49–50, 60, 112, 15–20, 23–5, 27, 28, 38, 54, 59–60, 128–9 76, 88, 100, 107, 141 Index 171 universality 4, 6, 17, 21, 33–4, 38, Weill, N. 15 44, 45, 61, 72, 77, 80–1, 84, 86–7, welfare state 3, 5, 7, 10, 12, 23, 24, 109–12, 128, 137, 140, 151 29, 33, 36, 53, 56, 58–60, 83, 85, unskilled see work 116, 138, 140, 145 utopia 49–51, 59, 66, 69, 81, 83–4, Wieviorka, M. 17, 26 86–7 Windebank, G. 117 Wittig, M. 132 Vallet, L.-A. 22 women, condition of 4, 5, 11, 14, 16, values: justification of the established 18, 20–1, 24, 28, 29, 32, 41, 46–7, order or inspiration of the common 53–4, 60, 81, 83–94, 95–112, 121–2, good: 2, 17, 21, 23, 25, 28, 32–7, 124–6, 127–32, 135, 138–41, 146–7 40, 43–4, 46, 49–50, 66, 71, 77, 79, women and politics 2, 4, 86–7, 80–1, 83–5, 87–8, 97–8, 110, 112, 105–11 118, 127, 132, 140–2, 147 women’s movement 3, 4, 10, 32, Varikas, E. 110 35–6, 38, 47, 50, 53, 61–2, 64, Veil, S. 106 84–94, 95–112, 125, 127, 137, 139 Vernant, J.-P. 123–4 work, workers; commodity or value: Vichy 6 2–4, 7, 10–11, 14–16, 19–20, 21–3, Viennot, E. 110 26, 36–8, 45, 50, 53–4, 57, 60–1, violence 11, 15, 18, 25–6, 41, 51, 69, 70, 72–6, 81, 83–4, 88, 92, 94, 76, 91–2, 106, 114, 138, 146 97–9, 100–4, 109, 116–17, 129, 132, Voynet, D. 11, 71 141, 143–4, 146

Wacquant, L. 40, 43, 45–6 youth 3, 10, 12, 14–17, 19, 24–7, Wadia, K. 93, 103, 106–7 37, 57, 60, 73, 76–8, 100, 118, 126, wealth 10, 17, 18–20, 22, 42, 57, 135, 146 107, 113, 136, 146 Weber, M. 136, 142 Zappi, S. 61