BRICS AND ITS COMMERCIAL AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS: GROUNDS FOR A PLURAL AND CONSISTENT GLOBAL FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ARCHI- TECTURE
ARCÉNIO FRANCISCO CUCO1 JEFFERSON PECORI VIANA2
Abstract: This essay intends to show the importance of commercial and social dimensions to make BRICS insti- tutionalization more consistent and to validate a plural financial and economic architecture with BRICS require- ments. It is an attempt to demonstrate the current challenges faced by BRICS and how, in an intellectual perspec- tive, it is possible to think about making the political arrangements more connected with business interests and civil society demands. Our perspective took into account the south-south cooperation principles and the conjunc- ture of the world capitalist system dealing with the necessaries advances in BRICS cooperation, to make it more solid, enduring and tied to the social perspective. The elements that supported our main hypothesis are the busi- ness claims for a commercial arrangement; the importance of civil society participation in order to permit a plu- ral coalition; and the impacts of these challenges to the global financial and economic architecture. The essay is organized in three topics: first, an accountability of BRICS agreements on the political level; second, the claims for a commercial arrangement and; third, a demonstration of the possible social gains derived from commercial arrangements and their impacts on the road of a plural and enduring global financial and economic architecture with BRICS requirements.
Keywords: BRICS dilemmas; commercial dimension; social legitimacy; plural financial and economic architec- ture; intellectual leaders
1Doutorando em Ciência Política pela UFRGS. Mestre em Ciências Criminais pela Pontifícia Universidade Cató- lica do Rio Grande do Sul. Integrante do Grupo de Pesquisa Direito à Verdade e à Memória e Justiça de Transi- ção e do Grupo de Pesquisa em Criminologia (GEPCRIM). É membro do Conselho Editorial da Revista Direito & Inovação do Curso de Direito da URI/FW. Bolsista da Capes. País de residência: Brasil. E-mail: arcu- [email protected] 2Doutorando em Estudos Estratégicos Internacionais pela UFRGS. Mestre em Relações Internacionais pela UFSC. Pesquisador do Núcleo de Estudos sobre os BRICS (NEBRICS/UFRGS) e do Centro de Estudos Sócio- Políticos e Internacionais da América do Sul (CESPI-América do Sul/UNILA). Integrante do Instituto de Estudos Latino-Americanos (IELA/UFSC). Bolsista da Capes. País de residência Brasil. Email: [email protected]
INTRODUCTION It is important to remember that the Goldman Sachs economist Jim O’Neill minted the acronym BRIC [S], in 2001, in a publication called “Building Better Global Economic BRICs”3. Why remembering this is important for us? Because it is an indicative that we should care about the real target of the BRICS’ trademark (not only “mark” matters!): the BRICS “stamp” was created for the core countries companies’ interests, not for BRICS own companies’ or for peoples’ interests. The first urgent action that intellectuals from BRICS countries have to operate is the appropriation of the meaning of being a part of BRICS in the current world capitalist system. Most of publications about BRICS4 does not explore the significance of the BRICS group instead they usually present each country situation in isolation while trying to make an account of the group dynamics: it is a false attempt, since this way of accounting BRICS’ im- portance does not say much about how these countries together could guarantee possible gains. Moreover, this analysis should consider manners to occupy and transform the current institutionalization of World Economic and Politics issues. Stating that the BRICS group can become an important institution with strong mus- cles, capable of influencing the emergence of new regimes in the current context of uncertain- ty in the power distribution scenario is not the same as affirming that individual countries within BRICS could not play a fundamental role: that is China’s case. China and its region became an articulating center for the rest of the world economy. More than that, China could become a “peripherizator” and an attractive pole for undeveloped countries (FRANK, 1998; ARRIGHI, 2008). If the BRICS group moves in this direction, it can face a Western counter-attack based in the prevention of speculative financial movements in BRICS economies – especially in Russia, China and India. Because of that, the most important thing is not only proceeding with the peripherization agenda, but with institutional peripherization (in other words, the peripher- ization of global governance structures). These preventive speculative financial attacks are becoming more frequent not only due to BRICS economic weight, but also because of its ge- opolitical possibilities.
3 Available at:
BRICS include five continental countries in their dimensions and importance. Besides this, differently from past accumulation centers (city-states in Italy, Netherlands, England and USA), the BRICS worked hardly “to save” labor and were intensive in technology –, current accumulation centers based on East Asia and with the strong participation of Russia, Brazil, India and South Africa cannot afford to save labor: this is the current common feature of BRICS, they have to provide labor to its population and ensure high-income (VISENTINI, 2013, 2013b). These are the ideas we are trying to introduce in this article. In the first part, we tried to assess the political level of BRICS cooperation and its efforts in this field. It is our intent to demonstrate how, in the World Capitalist System, Economics and Politics are intertwined and influencing each other mutually. Recognizing this fact is important to problematize the fun- damental aspects of geopolitical possibilities for a more autonomous and sustainable interna- tional BRICS articulation. In the second part, we approach the importance of commercial arrangements to bring BRICS elites together around a shared project. In this part, we based our analysis on the major problems of the current World Capitalist system in order to propose actions for the BRICS group, in the sense that it opens its doors for their own enterprises and for an integrated eco- nomic management. In the last part, we demonstrate the importance of the social dimension as the cement that links the political level to the necessary advances in commercial arrangements. Histori- cally all hegemonies had to present a “social pact” for their dominance. BRICS does not nec- essarily need to operate in the same way. For us, social dimensions are an opportunity to in- tegrate popular groups that were colonized, oppressed, excluded, and exploited for centuries. It is a big “open window” to make the political level more democratic, away from the palaces, and with many and valued labor (provided by commercial opportunities) receiving the support and consent of the majorities of their populations: only this could make of BRICS a consistent and plural institution capable of redesigning economic and financial architecture.
1. THE POLITICAL LEVEL OF THE BRICS GROUP: THE OUTCOMES OF THE CURRENT HISTORIC MOMENT AND THE NEED FOR A SOUTH-SOUTH GEOPOLITICAL FRAMEWORK
The World Capitalist System5 is marked by the occurrence economic cycles with their difficulties and, according to some academic perspectives, the world economy is headed by a hegemonic power. This hegemonic power articulates a consensus in addition to domination: it is very difficult to maintain hegemony only based on domination, consensus is a necessary part of being the leader country. Through the last five centuries, these hegemonic cycles have occurred and the cycles usually presented a productive phase and a financial phase (CHESNAIS, 2010; FIORI, 2004, 2007; PLIHON, 1995). The United States established its hegemony after the Second World War, creating a framework based on the Bretton Woods Institutions (the IMF – International Monetary Fund; the World Bank and the UN – United Nations) and on Security Institutions (especially the North Atlantic Treaty Organization – NATO). In addition to the institutions, the Bretton Woods system was organized around the Dollar as an international currency, based on its convertibility: it should be converted to gold at a fixed exchange rate of US35 per ounce (SERRANO, 2004). However, in 1971, the Nixon government made the abolishment of official fixed ex- change rates. This was the end of the “productive cycle” of the North-American hegemony. After that, the orthodox economic thought – and political authorities (Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Regan, George Bush, Bill Clinton, Pope John Paul II, and others) – were imposed, generating the financialization path: the second cycle of US hegemony (DOS SANTOS, 2003) By the end of XX century and with the consequences of the last twenty-five years of “financialization party”, some countries have appeared like new possible economic “drag- ons”, this was the case of BRICS: the world in the XXI century presented new possibilities for other international coalitions (FRANK, 2003). Guided by the regionalization tendency in the 1980’s (globalization required a wave of regional agreements, which worked as an “exit” to protect some strategic economic sectors),
5 More details in: (ARRIGHI, 2008; CHESNAIS, 1996; HOPKINS, WALLERSTEIN, 1987).
each country of the BRICS has gained experience on this. This is an important feature that should be taken into account. BRICS is a real possibility for “south-south” appropriation and transformation of those regional integration processes based only on the competitive objec- tives (GARDINI, 2005; HOBSBAWN, 1995; TAVARES, MELIN, 2007). This conjuncture on the political level led to the first step for BRICS institutionaliza- tion: appropriating the Goldman Sachs term articulating themselves in an informal group. This was necessary to bring these countries closer. Here is the first important attribute that permitted BRICS to become a true group: their political leaders and their geoeconomical situ- ation. Russia had the strong and coherent leadership of Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev, with strategic plans to guarantee capabilities to Moscow. Brazil had Lula’s cha- risma and a critical intelligentsia in Foreign Politics who allowed international relations to be conducted with new principles (or resuming some principles of “independent foreign policy” from the 1960’s. China and India had their own trail in their regions and their economic growth (and their needs to maintain the level of growth) required them to expand and diversi- fy foreign affairs. South Africa was an important complement to connect the “forgotten” con- tinent to validate not only BRICS world representativeness, but also to give the BRICS more south-south characteristics and an important social approach (FUNAG, 2013b; LIMA, RO- CHA, 2012). After this initial approximation between the countries, the reality of BRICS was un- questionable. The second step was to formalize the informal meetings and articulate them- selves in international coalitions, such as the financial G-20 and commercial G-20. Here, they started to discuss the “hard themes”: countries presented different economic international ob- jectives (in 2008, above all, the interests of Brazilian agribusiness distanced themselves from the Indian posture in defense of their at least 700 millions of peasants). This was not a proof of BRICS defeat, instead, it was a proof of BRICS successful institutionalization, because even with a “hard and big” problem like this, BRICS continued to be a Forum where Brazil and India kept their mutual interests in the other fields whenever it was possible. BRICS re- sisted the test of disharmony (OLIVEIRA, 2014). This brings us to another important topic: besides economic interests, BRICS repre- sents, with its regional distribution, a new important and influent actor in global geopolitics. The BRICS’ alliance is not only an achievement of Goldman Sachs appointments in 2001, but
it is becoming an instrument for the deeper pursuit of a new geopolitical and geoeconomic organization of the World (HURELL, 2009). Russia is concerned about the importance of the Arctic issue; China is leading a new tributary system in East Asia and increasing its presence in the Pacific Ocean; India is a basi- lar actor, since it is the responsible for the Indian way out – in other words – the entrance of Middle East. Moreover, the demographic importance of India is unquestionable; On its turn, Brazil is the speaking trumpet of Latin America, and its petroleum reserves in Western Atlan- tic makes it an actor with serious interests on defending it. Finally, South Africa is a front door in Africa, because of its representativeness of the African continent and also because of its geopolitical position, in the corner of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, which is an im- portant factor in the Eastern Atlantic Ocean. And to further explore the geopolitical and geo-economic issue, BRICS brings up the importance of social content in the future international order. The World Capitalist System was – since its formation – ruled by Western countries and its major feature was not the im- possibility of saving labor. BRICS – maybe with the exception of Russia – cannot think about saving labor, they need – in capitalist terms – to provide employment for their population, this is the new geopolitical variable that should be taken into account (ARRIGHI, 2008). Nevertheless, on the political level of the BRICS group, one question remains unan- swered: Does the BRICS aim to occupy the traditional international organizations – and it would mean that the target is “to increase” the legitimacy conditions instead of creating alter- natives? – or do these countries together aspire to transform the international organizations (and by consequence the international regimes), maybe not creating new ones, but giving them their (majority of human population that lives below the Ecuador line) own social, cul- tural, economic and political attributes? (DOS SANTOS, 2003, 2000). The third and fourth steps would be complementary: in the trail of occupying and transforming “traditional organizations” (such as the Security Council; the World Trade Or- ganization; Financial Organizations, the United Nations System, etc) BRICS needs to concert their position, working on the idea of “shared hegemony”. Furthermore, the proposal of new international arrangements is completely necessary, such as the BRICS Development Bank and other mechanisms that we will suggest further in this article. Considering the World Capitalist System, it is important to observe that US hegemony faces structural problems (above all, economic problems), but another important and funda-
mental factor for their power maintenance is their “internal social pact”. One of the features of the capitalist and interstate System is the re-creation of geopolitical arrangements with new opportunities that could be taken. This brings us to the fifth step: occupy and advance in the field of new international issues. The contemporary important issues on the political economy level should be faced. The issue of espionage6 challenges not only the states capabilities (it means one state can con- trol information inside and about other states), but the human freedoms and preferences, since the state that controls information (personal, commercial, political information, etc) could create preferences and (re)create realities. This double dimension (state-individual) issue con- cerning espionage is the most recent agenda: BRICS should act together to tackle this issue in order to protect not only their state power project, but also their populations. The second issue concerns the new agreements that US hegemony and its partners are trying to achieve, especially the Transpacific Treaty (a giant economic agreement with the European Union) and the Pacific Alliance (which came into force last year on February 10, 2014, with some countries located at the border of the Pacific Ocean and which intends to include more countries of the Pacific Ocean). These initiatives are important not only as a result of their scope, but also due to previous issues. The weaker parts of BRICS – South Af- rica and Brazil – would have to act, maybe not resisting and going to institutions with new principles (not only competitive principles), but integrating themselves to the US proposals, as it seems to be the case of the agreement between Mercosur and the European Union (LINS, 2014). This is in some way a result of the unreality of soft balancing.7 Many analysis suggest that soft balancing operates like a “stair” for the enlargement of international influence (capa- bilities), but in some instance there is a problem with this argument: how could the global south countries propose soft balancing if they do not introduce new political and economic (financial) bases for that? The tenuous line between hegemony and dominance is the ability of the hegemon to make its followers believe they are included in the leaders’ project; the ques- tion here is that countries of the South are not the core sphere of the international system: we
6 WikiLeaks published documents those dealt with the US eavesdropping on the cell phones and other communications of 29 leading Brazilian government and economic officials, includ- ing President Dilma Roussef. Julian Assange said NSA (US National Security Agency) inter- cepts 98% of South American communications (CITIZENFOUR, 2015; RT, 2015). 7 In this way of thinking our perspective is different of Flemes’ (2010).
cannot feel as part of soft balancing if we are not reaping the economic benefits and political tools (BURGUES, 2008; MALAMUD, 2011). When the Non-Aligned Movement came up as an instrument where third world coun- tries could make their interests public and obtain support, so much hope was deposited on this initiative. By that time it was really important, but years followed and the claims did not be- come true, which showed soft balancing is important, but we cannot overestimate it: the intel- lectuals (intelligentsia) love to create new terminologies for what they think they understand, but do they ask themselves if their theoretical schemes are truly connected with the necessary changes for the social forces correlations? (SAULL, 2006) This situation brings up the issue of interests and preferences of the political and eco- nomic elites of BRICS countries: are they really compromised with a BRICS strong articula- tion? What steps should be taken to give incentives to these elites and make them bet definite- ly on the BRICS? (OLIVEIRA, ONUKI, 2001) These questions connect the required steps on the political level and the construction of new solutions for international and BRICS own internal problems: the necessity of com- mercial arrangements for obtaining people and business class support. In other words, it means to reinvent their power.
2 THE NEED FOR A COMMERCIAL ARRANGEMENT: PEOPLE AND BUSINESS MATTER!
The mistake of critical thought is not paying attention to expanded social dimension: talking about social dimension is not only saying that people matters: this is a prerequisite in the discussion. But, in the capitalist system (the current social system we live in) how can we meet people’s needs? In these countries where most of people were – most times in the last centuries – only excluded from social benefits of economic action, it’s necessary to think about how to improve businesses that could generate high-wages jobs. BRICS commercial agenda is concentrated on some countries which provide commod- ities (Brazil, South Africa and Russia), and on large services providers (India) and a giant services and manufactured provider (China): this commercial picture reflects the current in- ternational division of labor, not pursued by BRICS interests (with the exception of China, the only BRICS member that presents a national project since the 1970’s is Russia, which has a
political leadership not sponsored by economic elites), but “imposed” by core countries and accepted by political and economic elites. What does this scenario tell us? For example, what Brazil exports to the BRICS coun- tries are composed, in their majority, of primary products, which represented 80,1% of their total amount in 2014 (MRE, 2015). This limits the scope and scale gains of the BRICS com- mercial exchanges, because a miniscule part of Brazilian workers and companies (which gives us a partial notion about the consequences of taxing and of generating low income salaries – this framework configures overexploitation) are really integrated in the “agribusiness” value chain. This limitation has a big impact on the social construction and cohesion provided by BRICS potential gains. This is the same case of South Africa. Just a small set of products (encompassing fuels, minerals, and metals sectors) and exporters make up for around half of all exports by value and accounted for almost 90 percent of South Africa’s export growth over 2007– 12 (COMPCOM, 2014, pp. 2-3). If in the Brazilian case “agribusiness” does not generate neither taxes neither high sal- aries incomes, in the South African case, the workers of mining receive a salary of R5 000 (equivalent a 375 US dollars8), a situation that makes possible the longest wage strike in South Africa (SAHO, 2014). In both cases, an “openning” of the economy was conducted in the 1990’s, and it per- mitted the entrance of international services (banks, telephone-energy companies) and the liberalization of the capital account for international capitals movements: this “reforms” also changed the developmentist paradigm9. In the beginning of the XXI century and, even with BRICS strengthening, those opened sectors and the traditional agrarian sector kept accruing the most economic gains and it is known that these enterprises – in the Global South – are specialized in the overexploitation of labor.
8 Exchange currency provided by FxChange.Rate at:
Business elites10 – elites who are not contemplated in the “winner” economic sectors – seems to dismiss BRICS possibility of including them like real agents: they assume there is an agenda which is concentrated in a few businesses (and the question that matters here concerns the amount of possibilities not only the quality of possibilities, but as many segments are in- cluded, the potential scope and scale possible benefits become larger) and they see no alterna- tives for increasing their participation in BRICS trade exchanges (MASSEY, 2007; CHASE- DUNN, 2004; SKLAIR, 1999). How BRICS can face this problem? The New Development Bank (NDB) or “BRICS Development Bank”11 has become institutionalized with the amount of 50 billions dollars. This represents less than 15%12 of the commercial amount generated by the interaction be- tween Brazil, South Africa, China, Russia and India together. It is necessary to think about NDB functionality: is it only to finance export and import traditional sectors or will it ensure the increase of new businesses? This indicates the current limits of the socioeconomic dimension. It is necessary to think about how to deepen trade integration in a way that benefits social (and business) actors most. The current quantity of selected sectors is insufficient to guarantee a social cohesion for BRICS existence independent of conjunctures governments in the countries individually. The first task force needs to achieve the most important historic dilemma: creating a BRICS tributary system which could beneficiate their own companies, helping them to make profit, to improve trade exchange and the level (quality and quantity level) of employability. As BRICS develops itself, it becomes more necessary to build a directive board (and why not
10 This point of view is corroborated by Frederico Luiz Behrends in an interviews granted at 18 august 2015. Mr. Frederico opinion is important because he is the coordinator of the Inter- national Relations and Foreign Trade Committee of Federation of Industries of Rio Grande do Sul/Center of Industries of Rio Grande do Sul. Interview link is available [in Portuguese] at:
with academic, intellectual and social participation?) in charge of identifying trade opportuni- ties. In this task, UNCTAD could be welcome to help. Moreover, one of the biggest problems in the South Global countries is the increasing informality in the productive sector. That is why a wide and open directive board is required, since it could not only identify the sectors and good economic practices but it also could de- mand and receive the attention of the official BRICS financial institutions– above all, the NDB. It will also demand a special regime in order to facilitate inter-BRICS foreign invest- ments. If the new commercial demands beneficiate non-traditional sectors and could generate high-income jobs, then it is possible to conceive the wider support of the working class, be- cause they will feel that the BRICS alliance contemplates part of their lives. The second task force is focused on the most contemporary deadlock: reversing the current dominance of “financial hegemony”, in other words, the western financial influence in BRICS economies. In the near future, the BRICS, pushed up by China, will have – someway – to privilege the commercialization of government public bonds over other objectives (CHESNAIS, 1996). This will not be an easy and quick operation. It will require an articulated committee to create joint macroeconomic solutions (control of capital outflows; more restricted control of services and income account; regulation of foreign investment, etc). This does not mean that they should only think about the possible solutions but also that they should take deci- sions together, in a way that facilitates and legitimates the BRICS economic measures. If the BRICS succeeds it could work like an “imam” for uniting underdeveloped countries and to deal with the new counterattack of western traditional countries (Trans- Pacific Partnership – TPP; Pacific Alliance; espionage and the possible agreement between Mercosur and European Union which will approximate Mercosur of TPP) (GUIMARÃES, 2014). Brazil in Latin America, South Africa in the Sub-Saharan African; India in Indian Ocean and Indian Subcontinent; Russia in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and in Central Asia and China in East Asia and in Pacific Ocean. Another path is to articulate the first and second task: thinking about commercial pos- sibilities with new possible social gains and creating a new financial arrangement for govern- ment public bonds which could provide a kind of “mix-state-combined public companies”, which could keep the BRICS gains and guarantee deep social cohesion. This would require further new opportunities for more economic sectors and (new?) financial mechanism: it
would be necessary to intervene in the currency market in order to favor not only BRICS members, but also BRICS partners in the five different global regions. Although this possible reality seems to be far away, it is one way of thinking about strategies to face the international financial attacks (that Russia faced in the beginning of 2015 or that China is facing right now), the traditional western sanctions (like the sanctions that European Union, forced by United States, imposed on Russia because of their disagreement about the Ukraine issue) and the unequal international division of labor. Commercial and For- eign Direct Investment agreements denominated in their own currency are parts of the shared hegemony that BRICS could execute. At this stage, it is necessary to explain that the preferential commercial arrangements between the BRICS, for example, does not mean that Brazil, should not produce commodities to export, but it could allow Brazil to go beyond it, participating in high value chains, obtain- ing high incomes for workers. In short term, it would change the current and historic unfair international division of labor, guaranteeing a strong cohesion for internal political actions. To develop this matter, much more agents and actors could be involved, and as more agents are involved, stronger will the BRICS institutionalization13 become.
3. SOCIAL DIMENSION: THE LINK BETWEEN THE COMMERCIAL GAINS, THE POLITICAL LEVEL AND A GLOBAL FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC ARCHITEC- TURE OF BRICS INTERESTS.
The international order built after the Second World War created international cohe- sion (in both sides: in the socialist bloc and also in the capitalist bloc) because it observed the importance of taking into account the social dimension. In the capitalist bloc the “con- cept/reality” of development was largely broadcasted; in the socialist bloc, the national revo- lution experiences were undertaken for the path of self-determination and “de facto” inde- pendence in the Third World. In both cases, the economic and political situation required a social pact (COX 1994, 1981).
13 Like in the words of Professor Cohen (2009, p. 21): “a commitment to broad financial- market development, building up the exchange convenience and capital certainty of their cur- rency, in order to attract the interest of private investors and portfolio managers. […] a com- mitment to wider use of their currency in trade invoicing and settlement, reshaping commer- cial relationships, in order to attract the interest of foreign central banks”.
Since the middle of the 1970’s when the disruption of the Bretton Woods Institutions took place, most countries of the Global South presented no “substitute pact” to cope with the working class in a national project. On the contrary, the orthodoxy economic thought materi- alized the overexploitation of workers and reduced their social rights as counterpart of finan- cial accumulation: it was the end of any “developmentist paradigm”. From the middle of the 1970’s until the beginning of first decade of the XXI century, the prescription was based on the neoliberal ideas and practices. This twenty-five years of economic liberalization produced new contradiction, above all, it is important to emphasize two of them: the rise of China as the new capitalist dynamic center of accumulation and the popular movements in some part of underdeveloped countries, which succeeded in ascending to power – accessing power, in most of the cases, did not mean changing or “reinventing” the power. This conjuncture produced a new contradiction: even in the countries where new pro- gressive political elites did not ascend to power there were some kind of positive economic effects of China’s rise. The reason is found in the productive answer to the necessity of finan- cial accumulation. China’s productive success was fundamental to financialization in US and to the spreading of the financial system all over the world. However, the requirements of this massive productive system in China demanded commodities and the connection of some value chains (mainly in East Asia), which were able to receive large amounts of foreign currency (also causing the increase in the prices of com- modities, generating a larger remuneration for the financial capitalists). This allowed some countries, as Brazil, South Africa or India to promote some income distribution programs which appeared to be a new “social pact”: this is false, because the scale of profits of financial capitalism – to keep the profit level – had to permit some distribution to maintain social order under control. That was what happened. This situation is not necessarily dramatic because it is at same time an opportunity for BRICS to consolidate a new social pact that could include (and not only in the appearance) the large excluded mass of population. BRICS has the chance to mobilize its domestic forces politically and socially in order to propose a new social content for the future (current) global order. It will be the possibility of writing the history of the oppressed majorities in the world (SINGH, 2013).
The first responsibility is on the hands of the intellectual community, which has a great mission in this pursuit: to decolonize knowledge. That is why one of the BRICS major actions in this direction was the combination of the efforts of academic communities and the exchange of scientists, theories and, above all, opening the doors of authentic popular knowledge for most part of the population. Without decolonizing the knowledge it will be hardly difficult to implement a new financial and economic architecture (COX, 1981; VIEIRA, 2011). The second important intervention concerns mass media. Mass media is dominated by western companies that promote not only western economic and financial interests but also cultural and social patterns of their civilization of destructive consumption. Just like Russia is experimenting with Russia Today Press Agency, others members of BRICS should act to cre- ate real diversity and plurality in their communication media. Furthermore, they should allow these new press agencies – guided by national popular interests – to circulate and operate in all BRICS countries (CHOMSKY, 2003). Decolonizing the knowledge and changing the current mass media could facilitate new forms of cultural intervention. BRICS presents two large cultural intersections: Africa-Latin American historic construction (what some people called as “the calling” of World Social Forum) and Eurasia historic construction. A social pact capable of rooting these traditions and cultural affirmation will be able to consolidate itself like a planetarium civilization. In order to achieve this, it is essential to promote tourism facilities (like less bureaucratic travel and work visa applications) and sharing social and environmental goals (SANTOS, 2009). Here we must make an addendum: Brazil and South Africa – and India on a smaller scale – complicate the decision processes, since these countries did not conducted national reforms that could created a consensus among elites (in an economic, cultural and political dimension), they lack a consistent initiative and a strategic coordination of its agencies and state capabilities. BRICS , especially China and Russia have to promote incentives to make Brazilian and South African elites more prone to decide about the BRICS path in the XXI century.
A coherent and solid economic and financial architecture requires a social pact to maintain the cohesion between the parts that share the hegemony14. A new social contract that goes beyond cultural diversity, cultural tolerance, multilingualism and environmental development and presentation is required. In other words, we need to reinvent solidarity. In this sense, it is not less important to take into account the previous experiences, like the European Union, the United Nations, the African Union, the regional agreements (such as Nafta and Mercosur), but the most important task is to look carefully to new organizations creation: UNASUR; ALBA; IBAS; ASEAN - these new organization could teach something that the older international organizations did not tell us: people’s participation in the institu- tional framework of BRICS could make it a more plural and diverse experience and it could make it more durable, consistent and plural, capable of achieving social cohesion and legiti- macy (COX, 1994). Social cohesion could rest on the fact that “commercial is not only commercial”. When the economic sectors and companies from these countries become capable of generat- ing employment (and good income levels) the workers will associate the companies and the BRICS partnership, in a new idea about others’, this is what we mean by social cohesion be- tween BRICS. The greater gain in this case is the fact the BRICS foreign policy could be traced beyond the view of the world politics of the party that rules the government and could be tied like a durable State Policy.
CONCLUSION In the current context of multipolarity and multilateralism, it is necessary to be aware of elite’s decisions and assess which national interests are included and which ones are ex- cluded. An articulated agenda of geopolitical and commercial actions is fundamental to over- come the indecisions and lack of initiative of elites in the BRICS project of counter balancing the current international order. Nevertheless, while the BRICS means for some elites a new possibility of international insertion, for others it means the permanence of an internal order
14 “Money is a social construction. Society realizes itself like a general equivalent of money currency, but nationally limited. The only currency could extrapolate that was the US dollar”. From its original: “A moeda é uma construção social. A sociedade se vê no seu equivalente geral, mas limitada nacionalmente. A única moeda que extrapolou isso foi o dólar norte- americano” (VIEIRA, 2010).
that could provide them with the benefits that are denied for most of the citizens. Awareness of this social pact and its variants is an urgent duty. The potential of BRICS alliance rests on its material, ideational and institutional capa- bility buildup. It is the real possibility of exercising a shared hegemony that can create the basis for a planetary civilization. In order to achieve this, and according to the topics we de- veloped in this article, the elites’ actions are a fundamental prerequisite to build a strong, co- herent and plural institution. The BRICS future depends on the economic course of China; on the political-military course of Russia; on the demographic course of India and on the class conflict (in the sense of creating a national project) in Brazil and South Africa – which will have consequences to the BRICS movement. The longer BRICS will take to do this, the more the actions of West will be strong to destabilize and to influence BRICS’ path in a negative direction. The biggest problem, we need to emphasize, concerns Brazil and South Africa elites vagueness and lack of initiative. In turn, what is happening in Brazil and South Africa will influence most of countries fortune in Africa (Sub-Saharan) and in Latin America (especially in South America). This situation brings up the importance of the social content in the emerging international order. At last but never at least it needs to be said that BRICS does not deny the United Na- tions System, but the challenge is transform the UN System values, deepening the role of so- cial justice, democracy self-constructions, and tolerance for diversity. Together, the BRICS countries could occupy and make the General Assembly the voice of the excluded majorities, and, by pacific means (like the manifest about the lack of representativeness and legitimacy of the Security Council), they could compel the Western countries to work together with BRICS in the drawing of a new international, plural and democratic order. In order to achieve this, the steps we mentioned here could enrich the current discus- sions about new actions in the commercial arena, and connect with actions on the political level, in the sense of making these arrangements durable and stable, and focused on social cohesion. A new (or a remake) of the financial and economic architecture requires not only prudency (prudency is essential) but also a dose of creativity and boldness: these are features that BRICS and its people’s traditions carry with them and are willing to share with all people of the world, “the voice of many”.
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