Part III
International Governance, Actors,and Institutions Leadershipand International EnvironmentalPolicy Making
COG N. MURPHY' ln manyways, the international environmental issues ofthe late twentiethcentury demand to betreated as fundafnentally new problemsofpublic policy. While Thomas Malthus worried about thepotential forhuman overpopulation andAlexander vonHum- bo!tpromoted thescientific study of the whole earth in the early nineteenth-century,notuntil after the Second world Var, when theeminent British biologist, Julian Huxley, became UNESCO's f!rstExecutive Director, did environmentalissues became a regular topicof intergovernmental conferences andthe subject of interna- tionalpublic policy making.' Yet, when larger-scale environmental issuesbecame a focus of regularinternational discussion they ini- tiallydid so without widespread comment among students of in- ternationaladministration, and without the partiesinvolved say- ingthat they had engaged in any fundamentally new form of in- tergovernmentalcooperation. Governments fotlnd it easyto in- cludethese new issues in what I havecalled the "meta-regime"un- derwhich most intergovernmental agreements dealing with civil mattershave been createdsince the middle of the nineteenthcen- tury. 256 ~ Pdrr III: Ilrtf'rr>etio>i@IE~ol er>retire,.4rtt'rrc:, and Institwrions
Thischapter begins with the premise that something about the prospectsf'or efFectiveinternational environmental regu1ation can be1earned by considering the process through which intergovern- mentalagreements have been formed in otherrealms over the last cemuryand a half.I beginby identifying the similarities benveen current international environmental issuesand the civil tnatters thathave been the focus of efFectiveintergovernrnerital agreements in thepast. Then! consider the three types of leadership thathave characterizedthemeta-reginie under which these agreements have beenestablished, aswell asthe available sources of eachtype of leadershiprelative tocurrent international environmental issues. i%anyanalysts argue that international regimes which require redistributionof property orproperry rights in orderto be effec- tivewill be particularly dificult to negotiate.!n theterminology of theargu.ment outlined here, this diRiculty should betreated asa likelydeficit ofone of the three types ofleadership: fewpotential benefactorsofintergovernmental cooperationare likely tobe will- ingto bear the burden ofunderwriting newinternationa1 institu- tionsthat provide significant property orproperty rights tothe less advantaged.Thisproblem characterizes manyNorth-South envi- ron.mentalissues. However, in the environmental realm the poten- tialdeficit of this form of leadership canbe mitigated dueto the politicalandtechnologicaI characteristics ofthe issues involved. In fact,many international environmental issuesmay actually be mademore tractable if they are connected to North-South divi- sions.I suggest realand hypothetical examples andthen condude byturning a final lesson from the longer history of'international civilcooperation: weshould not expect widespread, effective agreementorlinternational environmental issueswithout concur- rentagreements tomanage otherconflicts thatarise from indusm- alisrm. INTKRNATIONALEWk IRONMENTM, ISSUES AND GOVERNANCEm THOUT GOVZRNMEN I Policyana1ysts whofocus onenvironmental problemsconfined withinthe boundaries ofa single country donot have toconsider thecentral problem faced bythose trying todevise effective inter- LeadershipancfL'si»ironinental Poh'ry ski rig 257 governmentalenvironmental regulation: theneed to concentrate ondevising relativelv iriexpensive, cooperative instruments. %'ith- ina sovereignstateanalysts can focus on the politics ofconvincing legitimateauthorities tolegislate wiseair, water, land-use, andre- sourcepolicies and then to enforce them using appropriate, legiti- matecoercive sanctions and economic inducements in addition to less-expensivecooperative instruments suchas ! monitoringprior pro-environnientcontracts made among citizens and firms, ! helpingdifFerent social groups recognize interests inpreserving the environmentthat they share, and ! workingwith thesame groupsto design new regimes contracts! that favor the environ- rnent contractsbased on sharedinterests that have already been recognized.Mostintergovernmental activityassociated withthe environmenthas used only these three cooperative instruments. Thedivision of sovereigntyamong states makes the effective useof otherinstruments quite a bitharder. The problem is rtot, as manyanalysts argue, that the international system lacks coercive authorities.~ThedifFiculty arises because even when such authori- tiesexist, their actionscan always be treatedas suspect; to some states,those actions are bound to beillegitimate, A preponderant militarypower may be able to forcemany other stares to doits bidding,and so can an intergovernmental organization whose ap- provalisneeded tokeep severely dependent states afloat. In either caseanalysts might argue that the sovereignty of the target states shouldbe understood as"merely juridical." Nevertheless, even the "merelyjuridical" sovereignty of'the many entities that Robert H. Jacksoncalls "quasi-states" assures that the external authority's ac- tionwill beviewed as illegitimate by thoseit commands.This lackof legitimacymakes such iriternational coercive authorities a rathertenuous basis for rhelong-term public policies that most en- vironmentalproblems demand. Moreover,unlike the legitimate political authorities that exist in stateswhere a regularpolitical process assures that the central authorityresponds to some version of thecollective interest, the authoritiesthat existat an internationallevel generally have their ownparticular interests foremost. The U.S.,for example,may speakof theglobal good whenever it replacesa dictatorshipin 258 ' ParIII: Internatio~talGover>tarvia, Actorc,ised In~titutions Panama,but no one would assume that the U.S. wilt use its au- thoritytofoster the global good" by replacing alldictators, in- cludingthose who happen tobe U.S. allies. Similarly, theIMF, likeany successful bank,isdesigned toserve thegood ofthe finan- cialmarkets before any other interest.' Despitethelack of legitimate coercive authority atthe interna- tionallevel, governments havecreated effective and legitimate in- tergovernmentalregulatoryinstitutions ina host offields, from ac- countingtozoology. Typically, theseinstitutions carryoutresearch andhold meetings aimed at discovering andpromoting common interestsamong potentially antagonistic socialforces These have notbeen limited tonational governments, buthave included class, sectoral,and economic-regional interest groups. Vixen govern- rnentsformally agree with one another topursue some form of in- tergovernmentalregulation which usually means pledging that privateinterests within their societies willbe convinced orcorn- pelledtoact in certain ways! international institutions areoften give~thetask ofmonitoring adherence tothe intergovernmental agreements.Occasionally theintergovernmental bodiesaregiven theright to demand thatmember states impose coercive sanctions whenprior agreements areviolated. Much more frequently anin- ternationalexecutive bodyis given the responsibility to provide specificservices tosome orall members, forexample, thetechnical assistancetoTreasury Departments andcentral banks provided by thelMF. ln manycases, the ultimate recipients ofthese services arenot states themselves, buteconomic interests that most nation- algovernments treatas important constituencies. Thus,the oldest of the global-level international institutions, whichdate back to the middle of the nineteenth century, original- lyprovided accounting, security, andtechnical services thatmade it possibleforan international telegraph andrailroad network to becreated. The primary beneficiaries ofthat network were the largefirms involved inthe international saleof industrial goods, Similarly,today some ofthe most active global intergovernmental organizationsprovideservices tothe air transportation andsatellite telecommunicationindustries, which, in turn, create the physical Leadershipand Environmental Policy Making ~ 259 infrastructureof the marketsused by today'sglobal corporations, Veryearly on, global level international institutions also began providingservices that helped manage conflicts between labor and capital,and between newer and older economic sectors. Later, in- ternationalinstitutions concerned with regulatingconflicts be- tweenthe more industrialized, and less industrialized world were added.7 Conflictsdealt with by internationalinstitutions before the Second%'orld %ar resemblemost post-war international environ- mentalproblems of resourcedepletion and pollution in at least fiveways: 1. All areproblems that havebeen caused by, or greatlyexac- erbatedby, the industrialsystem. 2. ln eachcase, decisions about long-term investmentsin in- dustryhave a greatdeal of influence,perhaps a determining influence,over the degreeto which the problemcan be managed. 3. Asa consequence,in each case one productive aim of gov- ernmentaland intergovernmentalregulatory efforts is to shapeinvestment decisions toward more benign ends. 4. The investorswho first move toward thesemore benign endscan become major allies in thelarger regulatory effort becausethey havean interestin imposingsimilar invest- mentcosts on competitors,aslong asthat does not mean thatthe first-movers lose the advantages conferred on them by their earlyinvestment. 5. Oncein place,regimes regulating each of theseproblems may requirelittle enforcement.The stickinessof long-term investmentsmakes the actions requiredby the regimesa matterof habit,at leastuntil replacement investments need to be made. Relativeto the problemof the pollutionof rivers,lakes, and seasthe key large investment decisions include choices among dif-
Lcaders1ii~>andEn viroii>neiita1 PoIicy Mnkivq 26f advocate that all other firms be held to the same, or stricter, envi- ronmental standards.This interest is characteristicof all the corn- paniesthat have become "first movers" on environmentalissues, the firms that have been the first to make massive investments in technologiesthat may reduce environmental damage. Recentpolicy innovations triggered by the Business Council on SustainableDevelopment BCSD! exemplify this process.The BCSDbrings together the leadersof a hostof theworld's largest firms,including Shell, Dow Chemical Company, Nippon Steel, India'sgiant TAIA, and Volkswagen.These companies have learnedfrom experience that it canpay to bean environinental first-mover.Generalizing from their individualexperiences, they haveconvinced the International Organization for Standardization ISO' to establisha StrategicAdvisory Group on the Environrrient whidi,like mostISO groups,essentially represents key compa- nies!to prepareinternational standards for the"eco-efficiency" of industrialproducts and services. The aim is to assurethat products havestandard "eco-labeling" and that publicentities purchasing goodsand products look at life-cycleanalyses and environmental audits.The self-interest of theBCSD firms is transparent, but it is enlightened.They believe that in a globalmarket of Greencon- sumersand af governmentsincreasingly influenced by theenvi- ronmerttalconcerns of their pubjics,ISO standardslabeling the environmentaldesirability of everyproduct an J servicewill benefit environmentalfirst moversover a}l their competitors. ISO standardsthat play to greenconsumer preferences repre- sentonly one of manyways that the self-'interest of firms actingas environmentalfirst moverscan be enlistedto extendthe impactof cooperativeinternational institutions involved in environmental regulation.'Perhaps most significantly, the first largeinvestors in progressiveenvironmental practices have every interest in becorn- ingthe eyes and ears of theregulators, thus strengthening the typi- callyinadequate monitoring systems established through intergov- ernnientalagreement. Moreover, the longerhistory of internation- al indijstrialregulaoon suggests that oncethe investment costs as- sociatedwith a newregulation have been absorbed, the needfor 262 ' PartIll: JriteniationalGoi creance,.4crors, airclI>b.ritutiotis morutoringandfor taking sanctions against. violators diminishes. Conformingwiththe regulations becomes a rnatter ofhabit; aher aH,the major decisions, thedecisions tomake large investments in thecleaner af theavailable technologies, have to bemack very rarely.Even ifa periodof economic stagnation givesfirms ternpo- raryincentives tocut costs hycutting corners, theolder kabit of investmentin conformity with "high cost" regulations islikely to returnalong with the prosperity thatwould make anew round of biginvestments possible. Thereinforcing process of intergovernmental cooperation in- fluencirigthelarge investmcnt decisions ofcorporate first-movers whoin turnbecome the advocates, eyes, and ears of the interria- tionalregulators hasbeen central tomany even more effective formsof intergovernmental regulation forover a century.The c,re- ationof internationaltransportation and communication net- wotkshave convinced firms to investin plantslarge enough to servethe newmarket areas, and to becomeadvocates of interna- tionalagreements onindustrial standards, intellectual property, andrules of tradethat facilitate trade within themarket area just asinternational agreement onhigh labor stan Jards have convincerl companiesto invest in plantsthat roake adherence tothase stari- dardspossible, and they have helped assure that the companies thatbecame first-movers on higher labor standards pushed to see themextended to all theirinternational competitors. The very ex- istenceofthe BCSD suggests that this same process hasbegun in thearea of internationalenvironmental standards aswell.
INTKLLEcTUAL LKADERsHIP Intergovernmentalcooperation canconvince investors to choose cleanertechnologies either through incentives, disincentives, or outrightbans. Most international environmerital regulations ban someactions or restupon the possibility that action.s can be banned.Asmany scholars, perhaps most notably Peter h1. Haas, havepointed out natural scientists haveplayed a key role in the formationof all internationalenvironmental regimes. j l xvrLVviaether theproblem athand isthe depletion ofthe "living resources oEthe
264 ' PartM; Jqteriiatio>ialGoi>ernance, Actor~, and 1ristiti 268 Parf III: Iiirernarioiiai Go>en'~>ice,; ic or>,tiHd 1Hs1iriiri BKNEFACTORSHIP lt isone thing to pickup the bills for a bigglobal meeting, but it is quiteanother to underwriteinternational environmental regimes forany length of time.Benefactors willing to pay for costs of inter- nationalcooperation over many years have been essential to insti- tutionalizationof many international regimes in thepast. In the nineteenthand early twentieth centuries many of the first genera- tionof'major international organizations relied on theiroriginal sponsorstopay for the secretariat thatcarried out research, moni- toredprior international agreements, andprepared periodic inter- nationalconferences. In fact, the presence of such a benefactorof- ten waswhat convincedhabit-bound governments to createnew internationalregimes, at least as experiments. After all, if Napole- Leadershipa»d E»viro»n!e»tat Poh'cy saki>ig ' 269 on III waswilling to pick up mostof the bill for the Telegraph Union,the Kaiserwas willing to payfor the LaborOHice, and Italy'sVictor EmmanuelIII waswilling the underwritethe work of theIIA, no onewas willing to object. In fact, in thesecases one could arguethat the organizations andthe regimesto which theycontributed only becametruly in- stitutionalizedasforms of intergovernmentalcooperation after po- litical or economiccrises destroyed the capacityof the original benefactorto help underwritethe institution. When the noble benefactordisappeared, rnernber governments had to put up or shutup. In the caseof theseorganizations, the experienceof five or moreyears of internationalcooperation made members quite wiHingto pay all the costsof linking the internationaltelegraph system,collecting information on laborand agriculture, and link- ing nationalpolice forces. Sincethe Second%'orld War manyof' the initial costsof new internationalinstitutions have continued to be borne by the insti- tutions'original sponsors. International organizations have acted asthe benefactorsof internationalorganizations, by providing staff,space, and operating funds for monthsor evenyears. Thus, theUN Reliefand Rehabilitation Organization provided much of the initial support for UNICEF, the UN Secretariatunderwrote rnLichof the UN's earlywork on populationplanning, and the WorldBank provided the initial funding for hybridslike the inter- nationalFund for AgriculturalDevelopment. in manyother cases a singlestate, the U.S., actedas the key benefactor.This hasbeen especiallytrue when internationalcooperation demanded large transfersof funds,as in the caseof Europeanrecovery under the OEEC and the Marshall Plan, as well as with the IMF and World Bank,whose earliest subscriptions in internationallynegotiable currencies came from the United States. Varioustheories of hegemonyhave been used to explainAmeri- canbenefactorship of%'estern cooperation in earlypost-war years. Someof the mostconvincing are those that rely on Antonio Gramsci'sideas about consolidation of powerover large popula- tionsand territories. America'spost-war leaders, the argument 270 ' PartIII; hiteriiatioiialGoi~eriiaiue Actors, aridIostiriitions goes,were not pursuing theshort-term self-interests thatunderlie somuch foreign policy behavior. Instead, they were pursuing a morelong-term aspiration fora worldstructured under American leadership,anaspiration atthe heart ofAmerican eliteideology for generations,butone that had never before been a realisticoption fora NewWorld country so isolated from most of theworld' s popuationand territory.' Tocons~rue~ thatworld, and create American hegemony in Grarnsci'ssenseof the word! required that U.S. policy-makers for- gonarrow, short-term advantages inorder to pursue thecollective interestsofthe Western bloc. Arguably then, from this point af view,the entire problem ofthe "decline ofAmerican hegemony" stemsfrom the from the fact that the accumulated debt of the U.S.government andthe long-unattended concerns af'many U.S. citizensmean that now no U.S. government is in theposition to actas a majorbenefactor of international cooperation. Moreover, noother state is in the position that the U.S. was in 1945. Unfortunately,inthe absence ofa starewilling and able to seek a Gramsciansortof hegemony, it can be extremely difficult to buildinternational institutions that require significant funding. Thisis one reason that the so-called North-South "dialogue" af thel970s and early 1980s got so bogged down. It may very wel1 havebeen the case, as the authors ofthe second Club of RomeRe- portand the Brandt Commission argued, that there were interna- tionalinstitutions thatcould have served Northern and Southern collectiveinterests in returning to the rapid economic growth of thel960s, but such institutions could not be formed inthe tradi- tionalway af getting governments toagree tosomething asan ex- perirnentandthen relying ona benefactortokeep them operating foras long as was needed toprove that the experiment wasworth- while.Taken together, theexperiments proposed byboth groups wouldhave required something onthe order of a fiveor six fold increasein aid funds from the U.S., japan, the U.K, anda nurn- berof other donar countries. If one thinks about the size of the lobbyingeRort needed byany group that secures theequivalent af say,aSO billion dollar allocation in the U.S. budget each year, one 272 ' Part III: I»terrtatio»alGiver»attune, Act the industrializedcountries, was the equivalentof reparations paymentsas if a warhad been lost. In fact,the waron poverty, thegreat struggle for deve!opment,had to begiven up. ' Urquidi'sposition has not been taken up in thiswholesale form by advocatesof North-Southcompromises on environmentalis- sues;although those relatively small attempts at "debt for nature" swapsthat leavethe less-industrializedcountry efFective sovereign- ty overthe newnature preserves reflect the same logic. Ocher cases where international instirurions have created re- sourcesand then redistributedthem alsoexist. For example,the BrettonWoods institutions used the initial depositsof'gold and hardcurrencies by the U.S. andthe very few ot.her original mern- berswhose money was convertible! to createa poolof loanmoney thatthe IMF andWorld Bankimmediately were able to expand bothby fiat and by borrowing.As a resultof this precedent,the Keynesianproposal to useadditions to IMF reservesas a poolof fundsfor developmentassistance remained a hardyperennial in discussionsof internationalpublic financeuntil the floatingex- changerate systemappeared in the early 1970s.The new system madethis "reserve-expansion/foreignassistan.ce link" proposal somewhat irrelevant in recent discussions of North-South environ- rnentalissues. Nevertheless, it might be a bettertise of UNFP ana- lysts'time to concentrateon developingproposals of this sort ratherthan on finding newways to importunereluctant donors andpoint out their inconsistencyiri endorsingmultilateral pro- gramswithout providingthe necessaryfinancing. Analogousprograms would. establish regular, evea if initially small,sources of developmentfinance linked to somegrowing as- pectof theworld economy.~~ The most interesting possibilities are thosethat couldbe connected back to thetraditional, proven way in whichbenefactors have played a rolein extendingthe activities of worldorganizations by allowingnew programs to bedemon- stratedin practicebefore all statesare required to beartheir part of theburden, A recentNorwegian initiaove to imposea carbontax on North Seaoil is a casethat couldbe easily be linkedto sucha process.3 274 ~ Pat'rIII: InternationalGover~iatire, Act "ABSOLUTE GREENING AT HOME VERSUS GREATER GLOBAL! GREENING ABROAD Current Norwegianpolicy can again providea startingpoint for thinkingabout such policy innovations that relyon morethan the powerof Greenconsumers. Under current Norwegianair pollU- tion standardsa numberof firmsare facedwith the problemof makingmajor investments to eliminatethe lastfive to tenpercent of variousgreenhouse gases discharged from plantsthat are already some of the cleanest in the world. As is often the case with the eco- nomicsof reducingeffluent, the marginal cost of cleaningup these pollutantsincreases markedly with the percentageof pollutantsal- readyeliminated. Consequently, the Norwegianfirms havenegoti- atedwith theirgovernment to transfertechnology and helpbuild plantsin China that will reducesubstantially more of the same greenhousegases than similar levels of investmentat hore.- Economistsmight note that this could be understoodas one of manytypes of schemesto reduceeffluent that could be thought of asinvolving some kind of exchangeof "rights to pollute."Usually, however,that idea applies within a sovereignentity whereall po1- luterscan be sure that theywill be forcedto abideby somestm- dard.In mostinternational cases, in contrast,we would expect in- dustrializingstates to rejectinternational pollution standards un- lesswealthy countries compensate poorer ones for theopportunity costsof corpplianc.In thiscase, we would expectthat the Chi- neseplants would havecontinued to useolder, more-polluting practicesif the Norwegians had not assisted. Thelesson can be generalized, at least as long as environmental movementsare willing to exchangea higherpollution reduction abroadfor a lowerof reductionthan they could otherwise get at 276 ~ Part III: InteruationalGovernatlcc,3f10fs, and Institwhous home.This probably would noc be seen as a reasonableexchange if theregion in question was wholly within the country where envi- ronmentalmovements were strong: U,S. Audubon Society rnem- bersprobably would not campaign to havethe U.S. government sellthe Cape Cod National Seashore todevelopers in order to buy andpreserve tenor twenty times the length of pristineshoreline in southernMexico. Yec, it would be reasonableFor Northern envi- ronmentaliststo promote schemesaffecting common resources that both"Northern" and "Southern" countries pollute. Manyinternational seas, lakes, and rivers fall into this category. Finnish,Swed.ish, and German environrnentalists, for example, wouldhave reason to supportnations legislation that would allow companiesin their countries to invest in ckaning massive amounts of Estonian,Latvian, Lithuanian, and Russian,efRuent into the Balticin lieuof completelyeliminating efHuent from their own, alreadymuch cleaner, ships and plants.~6 In fact, one might argue thatthe North-South logic of such exchanges isso compelling that it maybe easier to negotiateeffective international regimes For cleaningup bodies of waterthat lie acrossNorth-South divides chanto negotiateefFective regimes co clean up bodies of waterbor- deredonly by statesthat share a highdegree of privilege.For ex- ample,eHective regimes forthe Baltic or che east Asian seas may be easierto achievethan a regimefor theArab/Persian Gulf. On the otherhand, in caseswhere the wealthy states on bothsides af a bodyof water have strong environmental movements and usu- allyas a resulta nationalcommitment to being a "erstmover" in environmentalregulation, the processof negotiatinginterna- tionalregulations should be easier. In the manyNorth-South situations che Northern govern- ments,and the Northern environmentalmovements willing to makethe required trade-oRs would, by their actions, contribute to whatDanie! Duedney has dubbed the "world domesric politics" of "globalenvironmental rescue" in a veryconcrete way. Rather rhanjust "thinking locally and acting globally," worrying about thepollution of commonresources and reducing their local con- tributionto it for example,they would be thinking about a global LeadersIzip orregional! international problem with the logic of domesticpol- itics,the logic ot optimalfeasible compromises and of gettingthe greatest"good" for each expenditure of po/itical resources. CYCLES OF EFFKCTIVK INTERNATIONAL POLICY Evenafter I have invokedthis kind of benignRealpolitik that would haveNorthern environmentalgroups husbanding their powercarefully and targeting it to sitesaround the world, a critic mightstill chargethat the bulk of my argumentis toocongruent with variousrosy liberal scenarios about the interactionbetween the concernsof industrialistsand environmentalistspainted by groupstike the BCSD and the Japanese Ministry for International Trade MITI! when it concludedthat, "environmental concerns will drivethe next generation of economicgrowth," and, there- fore,more government money had to be spentin the "strategic repositioningofJapanese industry" to takeadvantage of this devel- opment. I hiskind of argumentrests on the assumptionthat economicgrowth occurs in "waves"and that initial investmenten- vironmentscreated by governments influences the nature of suc- cessive waves. Of course,many economists do not acceptthis viewof econo- micgrowth. For example, while Richard Cooper, who served on the U.S. NationalAcademy of Sciencespanel that preparedthe U.S.response to UNCED, agreeswith hiscolleagues atthe BCSD and MITI that someof the actionsneeded to diminishglobal warmingmight provide a neteconotnic gain in the short-runas wellas the long-run, he does not believethat all thecostly invest- rnentsrequired in the short-runwill "payofF" simply by "return- ingthe world economy toa high-growthphase."~9 Because Coop- er doesnot see growth as occurring in cycles,he seessome of the actionsdemanded at UNCED asrequiring unacceptably large short-run costs. My own work on the longerhistory of internationalinstitu- tions makes me believe that there is some validity to arguments aboutlong wavesof economicgrowth. Twice in the past,in Eu- ropein the25 yearsbefore rhe First World War aud throughout 278 ~ Purl Ill: btternuriortulGg~vcrriu<1ce,,actor~, urgedhis itvtiotb theOECD world in the25 yearsafter the Second World War, thereappear tohave been waves ofeconomic growth and industri- al transformationthatappear to correspondto the prediction.s of liberalinternationalists going back to AdamSmith: international cooperationhelped create larger market areas which, in curn,en- couragedinvestors to develop new and much more productive technologies andwhole new industries! that led economic growth in theseperiods of relativepeace and prosperity. Unfortunately,thesame research suggests that the problem of creatingthe regulatory environment fora newcycle of growthis not justone of establishinga few clever international agreements andpriming the pump with some public investment. Before each of theprior growth phases could begin a wholehost of conflictsas- sociatedwith industryhad to bemanaged. New institutions, many of theminternational, had to becreated ro mitigatethe conHicts overthe control of industrychat divide labor and capital, the con- flictsover compensation in sectors of waningimportance that di- videolder and newer industrial regions, the conflicts over invest- mentopportunities andlocal autonomy that divide the industrial- izedand the non-industrializedworld, and the conflictsof prestige thatdivide industrial centers. Long wave theorists would argue that international environmental issueshave come to the fore in a periodof relative stagnation, theperiod of slow growth that began almostsimultaneously with theStockholm Conference. It certain- ly maybe possible to imagine scenarios that are both rosy and rea- sonablein which internationalenvironmental management im- provesalong with the world economy, but we should recognize how broadthe internationalpolicy agendamust be if we areto makethat itnaginedworld real. NcxrES PeterM. Haas.1992. From Theory to Practice:Fwological Ideas- andDevelopment Policy. Harvard University, Center for Interna- tional Affairs. Working Paper92-2. CraigN. Murphy.1994. International Organizations and Indus- trial Change:Global Governance Since 1850, Oxford University Press,New York. Leadershipatid Ftt»ironttiet>taI I ob'q %Saki»g~ 279 I understand"authority" in the way that David Bell does,as a po- litical actor able to issueimperative commands with the expecta- tion tharthey will be followed.Bell defines the exercise of authori- ty by distinguishingit from two otherforms of persuasiveaction, theexercise of powerand the exercise of influence.The exercise of powertakes the form, "If youdo X, I will do Y,"where X isthe de- siredaction and Y issome positive or negativesanction. The exer- ciseof influencetakes the form, "If you do X, you will Feelor ex- perienceY," which is a claimto knowledge.I would extend Bell by arguingthat in illegitimateexercises of authority, the force of the authority'scommand rests upon its preponderantpower rather than on somemutually-accepted structure that bindsthe com- manderand commandedinto a singlecommunity. See David V. J. Bell. 1975.Power, Influence, and Authority: An Fssayin Polirical Linguistics.Oxford University Press, New York. For a discussionof such states,see Robert H. Jackson.1990. Qua- si States:Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World. CambridgeUniversity Press, Cambridge. See also VanDeveer, this volume. However,IMF officialscan pursue the interestsof financialmarkets in waysthat aremore, or less,in accordwith widerinteresrs. See, for example,John Loxley. 1986. Alternative approaches to stabiliza- tion in Africa. In Gerald K. Helleiner ed.!. Africa and the Interna- tionalMonetary Fund. International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C. and Victor L. Urquidi. June 1991. Can the United Nations SystemMeet the Challenges of theWorld Economy?The John W HolmesMemorial Lecture to the annual meetingof theAcademic Council on the United Nations System,Mexico City. Murphy 1994,op. cit., pp. 108, 219, and 285-92 providessome detailed data on these means. Murphy 1994,op. cit. and Craig Y. Murphy and Enrico Augelli. 1993. International institutions, decolonization, and develop- rnent. International Political Science Review 14 l!:71-85. Emily T. Smith. 1993. Growth vs. environment.Business %'eek 3265 May 11!:66-75. StephenSchmidheiny ed.!. 1992. ChangingCourse: A Global Perspectiveon Developmentand the Environment. MIT Press, Cambridge,p. 95. 280 ~ Part III: InternatioriaIGovernance, Actors, and Institutions 10. SeeHaufler, this volume,for furtherdiscussion of' "greening"in the private sector 11. PeterM. Haas.1990. Saving the Mediterranean: ThePolitics of In- ternationalEnvironmental Cooperation Columbia University Press, NewYork; Haas 1992, op. cit. and see also Haas in thisvolume. 12. Thescientists sometimes have convinced governments themselves. In mostcases, however, their impact has also been through the pressureof social movements activated byor, at least,willing to use,the scientists' results. See Murphy 1994,op. cit, p. 80. 13. RobertO. Keohane1984. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Dis- cordin the%'orM Political Economy. Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp. 51-57. 14. If weaccept the more complex ideas about human motivation of- feredby Antonio Gramsci, wewould have to add that the intellec- tualtask could also be one of' convincing governments that they havea sharedaspiration tobe the builders of thesocial order that thenew regulations would help create. 15, See,for example, Mario J. Molina, 1992. Science and policy inter- face.In NazliChoucri ed.!.Global Environmental Accords: lrn- plicationsfor Technology, Industry, and International Relations. MassachusettsInstitute of Technology,Cambridge, United ¹ tionsEnvironmental Programme, United Nations Development Programn>e,the%'orld Bank, and the Business Council on Sus- tainable Development. 16. Murphy1994, op. cit., pp.64-67. 17. Haas 1992,op. cit. 18. Ibid., p. 9. 19. Haas 1990, op, cit, 20. Murphy 1994,op. cit., p. 65. 21. Keohane,op. cit. 22. Murphy 1994,op. cit pp. 77-79. 23. Ibid., pp. 181-182. 24. Ibid., pp. 185-186. 25. Thisdevelopment parallels a similar set of fearsabout the "politi- cization"of thesponsorship of international conferences from 282 ~ I'art Ill: I~iteniatinttal C~nr>enhance,.drink'~,atJd htstit~tioiis 35. HaakonSandvold. 1993. Industry-Environment-Sustainability. In Choucri, op. cit. 36. SeeThompson and I'risoglio, and Serafin and Zaleski in thisvol- urne. 37. DanielDeudney. 1993. C lobalEnvironmental Rescue and the Emergenceof World Domestic Politics, In RonnieD. I.ipschutz and Ken Con.ca eds.!. The Stateand SocialPower in GlobalI'.nvi- ronmentalPolitics. Columbia University Press, New York, 38. BhaskarMenon. 1992. International Documents Review. The WeeklyNewsletter on theUnited Nations. 6 March,p. 5. 39. Cooper, op. cit. SeaChanges and State Sovereignty STACY D. VANDEVEER For decadesregional seas such as the Balticand Mediterranean havebeen the focus of growingeRorts, with mixedresults, to pro- tecttheir ecological quality and ensure their continued production of marineresources. In addition, they have served as arenas for the military,economic, and ideologicalconflicts which haveshaped Europeanand global history throughout the twentiethcentury. The implicationsof anytransnational cooperation in pursuitof marineenvironmental protection which occurs across these "high politics"fault linesare worth exploring. This chapterargues that transnationalnorms shape state action bychanging incentive structures and constrainingstate autonomy throughsubtle, so called, "supraration3" influences on processes suchas categorization, interest de6nition, bargaining,negotiation, andperception. As such,the conceptof statesovereignty best understoodas a dynamicset of relatedtransnational norms changesover time, inHuencingstates and their behavior.These processesare especially clear in internationalenvironmental issue- areassuch as the environmentalprotection of internationalregion- alseas, This is a substantialcritique af thecurrent "hegemonic dis- course"within international relations.Rather than arguingthat stateactions and autonomyare dependent only on the powerof 284 PartIII: hrternationatGo~~or>iance,.Rotors, a~idIr NEOREALISTS,NEOLIBERALS, AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS Much recentanalysis of stateaction within the internationalsys- temfalls into thedebate between two generalareas of scholarship: so called"neorealism" and "neoliberalism."Both aregrounded in the rationalself-interest assumptions of traditionalinternational relationsliterature and both rely heavilyon analysesof bargaining processes;interests are generally viewed as given and invariant. The debatewithin this body of scholarshipcenters pritnarily around whetherinterests are generally thought to bein conflictor shared.2 Neorealiststend to concentrateon conflictinginterests, relative gains,and power politics. The neoliberalsand most"international regimetheorists," whom PeterHaas has aptly called"contractual institutionalists,"tend to focustheir examinationson explaining, andat timesattempting to expand,cooperation within the inter- national arena.~Realist and neorealist theorists have traditionally rejected,or haddifFiculty explaining, any significantinfluence of normativefactors such as values,norms, and expectationson state actionand autonomy.Jn addition, they generallyview statesover- eigntyas a universaland unitary concept.It is assumed or "giv- en"!because states, by definition, possessit. Neoliberalsand regimetheorists, however, have argued that in- stitutionsand, by implication,transnational norms, can play a role by changingincentives for states,thereby helping to producecom- pliancewith internationalenvironmental agreements iri the ab- senceof strictenforcement. Yeoliberals have been more willing thanneorealists to treatsovereignty as a conceptualmoving target. In general,however, thcv continue to treat it as a universaland largelyunitary concept. The neorealist-neoliberaldiscourse is by no meansa simpletwo-sided debate; there is substantialvariety. 286 ~ Part[II: InternationalG Yetmost of the participants areinformed byassumptions ofratio- nal actor modelsand continue to treat interestsas exogenous, Mainstreamtheories of internationalrelations suggest that al- thoughthe sheer number of policy options available toa given statemay be reduced byinstitutions, thestate's ability to chose be- twee~these options is notconstrained. Theregime literature ar- guesthat actions areoften guided byinstitutionalized habit,rou.- tinization,oraccepted behavioral and social norms. However, an.- thropologistssuchasMary Douglas argue that institutions help individualsand collectives code experiences and shape the mean- ingsascribed totheir pasts and futures, thereby helping toshape criterionfor judgements ofwhat is "appropriate."~Thus,given thatnorms are social institutions, one can ask what role transna- tionalnorms associated with theconcept of sovereigntyplay in. processeswhichconfer appropriateness or impart meaning on certainpolicies orregime structures. Thatis, what role do they playin socially constructing interests, debate, negotiation, and bargaining? Socialconstructionist literature ernphasiv~s the constraintson autonomypresented bysuch factors aslimited human cogn.ition, categorization,institutionalized rolesand identities, andother formsof socializedbehavior. It unpacksand revealsprocesses whichoperate "all around" and permeate interest bargaining, a sscprarational process ifyou will, influencing assumptions, expec- tations,definitions, preferences, andso on. Robert Jackson putit thisway: "Social and political ideas can become institutionalized asnormative frameworks of human relations likethe rules of a competitivegame withinwhich utilitarian interests andpurpo- siveactivities areplayed out." Thus ideas and the institutioaalized normsthey beget are a significant force inworld politics." Interest in the normativeinAuences on internationalrelations appears to begrowing. Forexample, Robert Keohane acknowledges thevalue of socalled reflective approaches in identifying important con- textualinfluences such as history, culture, and learning which are notwell captured in rationalistic approaches. John Ruggie argues forthe recovery of "principled meanings [which] have come to be 288 ~ Parr III: IrjternatiorialGtlvernzn~e, Actors, a>id It}stitotiorrs "Institutionsare social practices consisting of easily recognized rolescoupled with clusters of rules or conventionsgoverning re- lationsamong the occupants of these roles" while organizations aredefined as omaterial entities possessing physical locations or seats!,oRices, personnel, equipment andbudgets... "i4 Transnationalnorms are distinct from regimes and. internation- alorganizations. Norms are more difFuse, heconiing embedded in theseother institutional arrangements. In fact, standard defini- tionsof regimesidentify norms as only one component ofthese "larger"social institutions.' ~ Normscan be distinguished from imernational lawand legal principle.Like norms and regimes, these international laws are so- cialinstitutions. However the difFerences arebest -seen after distin- guishingbetween "hard" law and "soft" law; Hard law, generally laid downin treaties,imposes binding obligations on statesto en- forcesuch law domestically.'~ Softlaw, on the other hand, ts vague andopen to greater discretion. It usually helps guide implernenta- uonand it emergesfrom resolutions, declarations, andstate prac- tice.'Although transnational norms can be codified through treatyinto international hard! law, this is not necessarily done. Normscan also become legally binding through state custom if statesbelieve that they must abide by thecustom.' This process generallytakesmany years, whereas transnational normscan influ- encestate action and autonomy without being legally bin >zg" pr "eroding."-'As Ken Cpnca points out, much of ~; gs~zrse,at leastwith respectto the"ecology-sovereignty de- refleCtsan "eSSentiallyfunCupnal>St" apprOaCh baSed On a ;mplisticand general view of sovereignty.' A viewreflected ; bauchpf the neorealist-neoliberalliterature. Sovereigntyhas a longand exceedingly complex conceptual ~J empiricalhistpry. It is not onecoherent and consistent whole. sovereigntyisa set thecontents of which is not entirely uncon- of interrelatedand interdependent norms. Although numerousways to articulatesovereignty's constituent norms exist, osemost often identified are the following:equity among states, nonintervention,exclusive territorial jurisdiction, the presumption of statescompetence or capacity,prohibition of bindingjurisdic- tion withoutconsent, exclusive and largelyUnrestricted! use of force,and a positivist!conception of internationallaw as rooted in the free will of states. Sovereigntyisembedded or "nested"within a largerframework consistingof other institutionswith which it hasa dynamicrela- tionship.For example,treaties and regimes concerning the use andecological protection of regionalseas are embedded in larger bodiesof law concerningsuch issues as boundaries, the Use of commonresources and treaty making.~o As normschange within theinternational system, those associated with sovereigntyare also altered.In addition,some of the normsassociated with statesover- eignty,such as exclusive territorial control, non-interference in in- ternalpolitics and "self-help" or the right of the stateto conduct >tsforeign policy pursuant to its interests!are in contradiction with one another.~'These contradictionscreate tension and add to thedynamism within the set of norms.Theoretically, this argu- ment is consistent with those in the social constructivist work on inst>tu SeaChartges and S INTERNATIONAL PLURALISM Thefirst and most obvious strategy amounts tosuggesting more of thesame; those interested in ecological protection must further engagethegrowing international pluralism. Already the interna- 298 ~ PartIII: InternationalG~~ver~iance, Ai-tars,arid Iiisrifiitr'i>r~s sentialfor institutionalization andenforcement ofecological norms ininternational politics. However, telecornrnunications, inforrna- tion,and travel technologies arelowering transaction costsand in- creasingaccessbetween localized environmental groupsfrom less wealthysocieties. Inthis more pluralist organization ofinternational andtransna- tionalrelaoons thatintergovernmental organizations IGQs! and NGOshave begun toplay significant roles. UNEl', for example, hasbeen an extremely important player intransferring norms and establishingcooperative arrangements designedto protect coastal seaenvironmental quality.Similarly, UNESCO hasbeen a central- lyimportant forcein the global promulgation ofnorms associated withscience policy.~~ Transnational environmental NGAssuch as GreenpeaceandCoalition Clean Baltic have also gained promi- nencein seas-related politics and governance inNorthern Europe. Thoseorganizations andinstitutions whichaid in the transfer of theresources andexpertise which allow for participation ateal- readycontributing tothe redefinition ofsovereign authority and autonomy.They,and the values and norms they embody, give voiceto previously unarticulated interests and groups. CONFRONTINGDIFFFRING SOVEREIGNTIKS Secondly,environmentalists mustconfront problems associated withthe existence of differing ideas and norms regarding sover- eignty,inaddition tochallenges presented byvariances ininstitu- tionalcapacity among states. Positing statesovereignty tobe a uni- versalreality masks a number ofchallenges toeffective multina- tionalenvironmental cooperation. Empirical evidence and institu- tionaltheory support thecontention that "state sovereignty" is verydifferent in both theory and practice for different states or typesofstates. Failure totake this into account when designing "regimes"forthe protection ofenclosed coastal seaspresents seri- ouschallenges totheir success. Thatstates possess dramatically dif- ferentlevels of' institutional capability has often hampered such. environmentalcooperation.59 Themyth of universal sovereignty doesnot admit the possibility that some states are not in posses- sionof either internal authority or externalautonomy. Forexam- Si'a <.havge.caiid,State,hei ireignty ' 299 pie, it maybe that the statedoes not havesufficient authority over largeprivate corporations or partsof its territory or citizenryto forcecompliance with environmentalregulations. On the otherhand, environmental policy may expand the au- thorityof the stateby aRordingit theopportunity to conductpoli- cy in an areain whichit wasnot previouslyinvolved.'" Environ- mentalregimes which augmentthe states'institutional capacities for environmentalprotection in wayswhich openthese institu- tions to greaterparticipation appear to be the most effective.~' Theseare the typesof country-specificdi8erences which are often overlookedby assuminga traditional,universal conception of state sovereignty.Jackson's work on lessdeveloped states demonstrates thatmany do not possessinternal order indeedmany do not even havecontrol of the territory which is ostensiblywithin their bor- ders!."For these states, it is theperpetuation of concepts of sover- eigntyor "quasi-sovereignty"by other stateswhich rriaintainstheir existence.~3In addition, it hasbeen suggested that some states ex- ist in an arena of normative conflict with "their" societies that they strugglefor decadesto extendtheir authority,gain "social control," over the rules, values, and norms of their societies.~4 Thus,if sovereigntyconsists of theability to imposeinternal order andto actfreely in relationto other states,then many 'quasi-sov- ereignstates" are maintained only by the latter. Suchconcerns directly impact the ability of cooperativear- rangementsto address coastal sea degradation. For example, in the BlackSea ecosystem countries have agreed to conductenviron- tnentalimpact assessments for major developments.However, a n.ewUkrainian oil terminalis being constructed near Odessa with- out one. Valeriy Mikhailov, directorof the UkrainianScientific Centerof MarineEcology, said of the project,"It is technicallyil- legal,but we don't have laws here anymore."~5 RKCONSTRUCTING SOVKREIGNTIES Lastlyand perhaps most importantly, viewing sovereignty asan evolvingset of normsalters traditional discourse about state capac- ities,policies, and autonomy, allowing sovereignty to be seen as a conceptamenable to reconstruction,"This understanding of state 300 ~ PariIII: lnternaiioil a! Governance,.actors,@tedInst''ft>tl'oils sovereigntyoffersopportunities forthe development andstrength- eningofinternational normswhich are tnore compatible withen- vironAlentalcooperation. Environmentalists mustengage debates aboutstate sovereignty andattempt to participatein itsreconcep- tualization,instead of allowing it. ro be used as a rhetoricalweapon againstinternational actions toprotect environmental quality. F-n- vironmencalinterests are already playing a rolein thisreconceptu- alization.The transnationalnature of theseissues necessitates transnationalcooperation if they are to beaddressed. This is cer- tainlytrue of protecting coastal seas. However, regional coopera- tionis often not enough. Even if a groupof countriesthat share a. seaagree toact to preserve itsecological integrity, international shipping,dumping, orfishing activities may continue tohave seri- ousadverse environmental impacts. This is becoming more irnpor- tancas markets, and the organizations which regulate them, be- comeincreasingly global in scale. If statesare to view seriously themaintenance ofenvironmental qualityasa normwhich contributes toshaping state policy, sover- eigntymost be reformulated in ways which afford opportunities fornorms associated with state sovereignty and environmental protectiontocoexist compatibly. 'I'heinteraction ofthe two would influencethedevelopmenc ofboth. To a limitedextent this has 2- readybegun. There exists a growing body of international environ- men.tallawand legal principle which did not exist a fewdecades ago.It isimportant tonote, however, thatinternational lawis state-cencered.It depends onstate actions forits creation and en- forcernent.Thestrategies outlined above are important because environrnentalistsoften turn to thestate for help in addressingen- vironmentalproblems. There are, however, many problems the statecan not or will notattempt to solve.Thus, engaging debates regardingstate sovereignty mustalso mean building and strength- eningnorms which make more room for non-state actors at all levelsand in all stagesof ecosystemprotection. Reconceptualizingsovereignty cancut both ways, however. Othernorms are already becoming extremely influential inthe de- bateand process bywhich state sovereignty isreformulated somemay be compatible withenvironmental protection and some Sea C:lM>ige-cai>d S'tate .Sot'ercigiity > 301 maynot. The list of justificationsfor "violating"so-called tradi- tional conceptsof sovereigntycontinues to grow. In addition to thechallenges of environmentalproblems, the list includesuniver- salhuman rights, regional and global "free trade," installing or re- installingdemocraticalIy elected officials, humanitarian and/or "peace-keeping"irieevveniios, and economic growth and develop- ment. While some are more controversial then others, all of these issueareas are likely to influericethe future developmentof the normsassociated with statesovereigrity and shapestate action and autonomy.There is alreadya widespreadmovement to defineeco- nomiccompetitiveness and developmentgoals as the justification Forthe state, For example, the evot.utionof the European.Union and the substanceof the Uruguayround of the GAIT negotia- tionsand the NAFTA agreementare clearly engaged in redefining thereIationship between [iberaI trade norms and sovereignautono- my. Somemay argue that aiiother possibilityexists; that moretradi- tionalconcepts of sovereigntycould be reasserted. This is trueof course,but only to a limited extent,Like many contemporary"re- assertions"of nationalism, if an older conceptionof sovereignty makesa comebackit wiH still be differentthaii any formulation whichhas come before. Contemporary empirical and normative contextsare historically uriique. Thus, sovereignty, in thatit iscen- trally relatedto both of thesecontexts, cannot be the saineas it wasbefore. As the old clichesays, "you can never go back."'" If statesovereignty is to be reconceptualizedin ways that con- strainstate autonomy, influence state action, and refocusboth to- ward more environmentalprotection, then scientists,citizen ac- tivists,and academics must engage the normativedebate, not give it up asa lostcause. Institutional change and reformcan follow conceptualinnovation as new norms are createdand old ones evolve.It is thesetypes of dynamicideational processes that help to determinethe possibilities for institutionalsolutions for pro- tectingcoastal seas. If wholemarine ecosysteins are to be kept fromecological degradation, environmenta]ists must engage the conceptualtransformation of sovereigntyand its associatednorms, makingecological norms a morecentral concern of the srate. 302 PartIII: Iriterrtatt'o»alG<>r~er»a»ce,.-ictors, a»d Instit AcKNO%LEDGMENT I amgrateful For financial support from the Department ofE ov- ernrrientand Politics and the Institute for Philosophyand Public Policyat the University of Maryland, College Park, and for the manyhelpful and enlightening comments onvarious clrafts ofthis chapterfrom L. AnatheaBrooks, Ken Conca, Virginia Hatifler, MartinHeisler, Rortnie Lipschutz, M. J. Peterson,Don Piper, DennisPirages, Mark Sagoff, Vladimir Tismaneanu, and Diana Zoelle. Novas Thisusage of"state autonomy" ismore general than that found in comparativepolitics literature i.e., the degree ofautonomy held bythe state vis-a-vis certain domestic social and economic classes!. See,for example, Theda Skocpol. 1979. States and Social Revolu- tions.Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Forin-depth discussions ofthe difFerences between these schools of thought,see David Baldwin ed.!. 1993. Neorealism andNeo- liberalism:The ContemporaryDebate. Columbia University Press,New York; and Robert Keohane ed.!. 1986.Neorealism andIts Critics.Columbia University Press, New York. PeterM. Haasin this volume.This schoolincludes, for example, RobertO. Keohane.1984. After Hegemony: Cooperation arid Dis- cordin the World PoliticalEconomy. Princeton University Press, Princeton;Robert O. Keohane.1989. International Institutions and StatePower. Westviev Press, Boulder, Colorado; Martin List andVolker Rittberger. 1992. Regime theory and international envi- ronmentalmanagement; andLawrence Susskirid and Connie Oza- wa } 992.Negotiating more effective international envirortnxental agreements.InAndrew Hurrell and Benedick Kingsbury eds.! The SeaCh~irges and 5 irrr S International Politicsof the Environment: Actors, Interestsand !n- stitutions.Clarendon Press,Oxford; Elinor Ostrom, 1990. Govern- ing theCommons: The Fvolutionof Institutionsfor CollectiveAc- tion.Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; and Oran Young. 1989.international Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Re- sourcesand the Environment.Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London. Abramand Antonia Chayes. 1991. Compliancewithout enforce- ment:state behavior under regulatory treaties. Negotiation Jour- nal.July: 311-30; ArthurA. Stein.1983. Coordinationand col- laboration;regimes in an anarchicworld. In StephenD. Krasner ed.!. InternationalRegimes. Cornell UniversityPress, Ithaca, Or- anYoung. 1977. Resource Management at the InternationalI 12. StephenD. Krasner ed.!. 1983. International Regimes, Corrtell University Press,Ithaca, p. Z. 13. Actorsgenerally become "relevant" through a combinationofma- terialcapabilities and legitimacy levels vis-a-vis a particularissue area. Oran.Young. 1989. International Cooperation- Building Regimes for Natural Resourcesand the Environinent. Cornell University Press,Ithaca and London, p. 32. See,for example,Stephen D. Krasner ed.!. 1983. International Regimes.Cornell University Press, Ithaca and Young 1989, op. cit PatriciaBirnie. 1992.International environmental law: its adequa- cyfor presentand future needs. In AndrewHurrell and Benedict Kingsbury eds.!. The International Politics of theEnvironment. OxfordUniversity Press, Oxford, pp. 52- 84; see also, Kratochwil, op.cit.; andPaul Szasz, 1992. International norm-making. In EdithBrown Weiss ed.!. Environmental Change and Internation- al Law. United Nations University Press. Ibid, 18. Ibid.; seealso, M. N. Shaw.1991. International Law. Third Edi- tion. GrotiusPublications Limited, Cambridge, UK; andMichael Akehurst. 1974-75. Custom as a sourceof international law. British Year Book of International Law. 19. Fora. discussion of thecomplex debate regarding the frequency andtype of statepractice asthey concern customary law, see Ake- hurst,op. cit. 20. Szasz,op. cit., treats norms and soft law as one and the same. The meaninghe uses,however, is less task-specific than iny useof "norm."Though Szasz uses the termsinterchangeably, hismean- ingis generallythe same as that of softlaw in this chapter. 21. HereI amin agreementwith Kratochwil1989, op. cit. 22. Seechapters in this volumeby Ducrotoy;Francis and I.erner; Haas; and Shirnizu et al. JohnPomfret. 1994. Black Sca, strangled by pollution,is neareco- logicaldeath, The Washington Post, June 20, pp. Al, A10;Frank J. Gable.1993. The Black Sea: an environmental and ecological profilewith a viewtowards UNCED. Paper presented atthe inter- nationalconference of EnvironmentalManagement of Enclosed CoastalSeas. Baltimore, Maryland. November 10-13. 24. R.B.J.Walker and Saul H. Mendlovitz eds.!. 1990. Contending Sovereignties:Redefining Political Community. Lynne Rienner Publishers,Boulder, Colorado, p, 2. 25. In general,such scholars argue that, throughthese "new" issuear- easand the policiesdesigned to addressthem, the stateacquires more authority in the domesticsphere and/or more autonomy from international and/or domesticinterests. See, for example, JaniceThomson and StephenD. Krasner.1989. Global transac- tions and the consolidationof power.In Ernst-Otto Czernpieland JamesRosenau eds.!. Global Changeand Theoretical Challenges. LexingtonBooks, Lexington, Massachusetts. 26. Thesetypes of argumentsgenerally focus on the degreeto which stateauthority and/or autonomyare being limited or constrained vis-a-visdomestic and/or foreign policy arenas.See, for exarnpIe, JosephCarnilleri and Jim Falk. 1992.The End of Sovereignty.Ed- ward ElgarPublishing Limited; EugeneB. Skolnikoff. 1993.The ElusiveTransformation. Princeton University Press, Princeton., NJ; and Mark Zacher 1992,The decayingpillars of the Westphalian Temple.In JamesRosenau and Ernst-Otto Czernpiel eds.!.Gov- ernance%"tthout Government: Order anti Changein World Poli- tics. CambridgeUniversity Press, Cambridge, pp. 58-101. 27. Ken Conca. 1995. Rethinking the ecology-sovereigntydebate. Millenn iurn 23 !. 1-1 1. 28, Thislist is takenfrom RuthI.apidoth. ] 992.Sovereignty in transi- tion. Journal of International Affairs. 45 !:325-346. This list is alsocited in Conca,op. cit. 29. On theconcept of nestedgames see George Tsebelis. 1990. Nested Games:Rational Choice in ComparativePolitics. University of CaliforniaPress, Berkeley. 30. See,for example,Don CourrneyPiper. 1967. The International Lawof the GreatLakes. Duke UniversityPress, Durham, North Carolina. 31, StephenD. Krasner.1993. Sovereignty,regimes and human rights. In VolkerRittberger ed.!. RegimeTheory and Interna- tionalRelations. Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp, 139-167. 306 ~ Part III: Inter>ratioriajGovernance, Actors, at7d Insfitufio~t~ 32. Kratochwil,op. cit.; Jackson,op. cit. 33.UVatson, op.cit.; and Jackson, op. cit. For an analogous discussion of theettd of theslave trade, see Ethan A. Nac}elman.1990. Glob- alprohibition regimes; theevolution ofnorms in internationalso- ciety.International Organization 44 !:479-526; See also, Krasaer 1993, op. cit. 34 The smallerand "weaker" the state or "quasi-state"!the moreim- portantrecognition. becomes. SeeRobert H. Jackson. 1990. Qua- si-states:Sovereignty, International Relations andthe'I'hird%orld. CambridgeUniversity Press, Cambridge. 35 ThomasKuhn. 1970.The Structureof ScientificRevolutions, Secondedition. University of ChicagoPress, Chicago. 36 RobertH. Jackson. 1990. Quasi-stares: Sovereignty, International Relationsand the Third World. CambridgeUniversity Press, Cambridge. 37 Ibid. Introduction. 38. Conca,op. cit. refers to theseas the "inward looking" and "out- ward looking"dimensions of sovereignty. 39. Lapidoth,op. cit., p. 332. 40. Thelist of notions of sovereignty includes the following: "papular" sovereignty,"national" sovereignty, "dual," "de facto," "residual," or"de jure" sovereignty, aswell as "negative," "positive," and "plu- ralist"sovereignty. Cites for which can be found in Lapidoth,ap. cit., pp. 332-334. 41. Ibid. See,Jackson, op.cit. and Steven F.Goldman. 1994, A rightof in. terventionbased on impairedsovereignty. World AfFairs. 156 !-. 124-129. Birnie, op. cit. Lapidoth,op.cit., p. 334. 45. SeeDavid P. Forsythe, 1990. The Politicsof InternationalLaw. LynnReinner Publications, Boulder, Colorado, especially chapter 7 46. PeterM. Haas.1993. Protecting the Baltic and North Seas. In Pe- ter M. Haas,Robert O. Keohaneand Mare A. Levy eds.!.Institu- tionsfor theEarth. MIT Press,Cambridge and Haas, i.n this val- ume.Similar arguments regarding Great I~kes management are SeaChar>ges arrd Sr@reSo!'erer' >rrry~ 307 made in contributions to this volume by Shimizu et al and by Francisand Lerner.Similar processmay be occurring regarding environmental norms and valuesand private sector activities. See, for example,Haufler, this volume, and Alan Miller 1994,Corpo- rationsas agents for sustainabledevelopment. Revised version of paperpresented at Footstepsto SustainabiliryConference, Harri- son Programfar the FutureGlobal Agenda, Washington, D.C., October 1993. 47. Seethe contribution by Sagoffin thisvolume. 48. RonnieLipschutz. 1992. Restructuring world politics:the etner- genceof globalcivil society.Millen.nium 21 !:389-420. 49. StephenD. Krasner,1993. Westphalia and all that. In Goldstein and Keohane,op. cit., pp. 235-264 50, Ibid. Seealso, Benjamin Barber. 1992. Jihad vs. McWorld.At- lantic Monthly. March; Furio Cerutti. l9 . Can therebe a supra- nationalidentity? Philosophy and SocialCriticism 18:2; lawlike Featherstone ed.!. 1990. Global Culture: Nationalism, Globaliza- tion and Modernity.Sage Publications, Iondon; guidonC~ottlieb. 1993.Nation Against State. Council on ForeignRelations Press, New York; Lipschutzand Conca, op. cit., and Michael Walzer. 1993. Between nation and world: welcome to some new ideolo- gies.The Economist.September: 11-17. 51. SeeHaas in this volume. Douglas'"cognitive communities"are conceptualizedin much the sameway. SeeDouglas, op. cit. 52. Haas,this volume. SeeJasanoE in this volume for a discussionof why scientistsneed institutions like epistemiccommunities. 53. For in-depthanalysis of the waysin which growingcirizen. access and participation is altering transnationalpolirics, seeRosenau, this volume; JamesRosenau. 1990. Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Changeand Continuity. PrincetonUniversity Press, Princeton;and JamesRosenau, 1992. Citizens and a changing globalorder. In JamesRosenau and Ernst-OttoCzempiel ed.!. GovernanceWithout Government:Order and Changein World Politics.Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. pp. 272-294. 54. Seealso, Peter M. Hass ed ! ]992. Knowledge,Power and Inter- nationalPolicy Coordination. Special issue of InternationalOrga- nization. 46 1 !.