Final Version, June 8, 2017 Do Not Resist Towards a Militarized Protest Policing Style in the Netherlands?

Kirsten Zweers - s1779974 Supervised by Anouk van Leeuwen en Jelle van Buuren

Thesis in fulfillment of the Master of Science in Crisis and Security Management at the Faculty Campus The Hague at Leiden University, June 2017

Do Not Resist Master Thesis K. Zweers

Abstract Police militarization is becoming increasingly apparent in many different sectors of society in the United States and in the European Union. While there is a substantive body of knowledge on the militarization of law enforcement activities, such as protest policing, in the United States, research on this topic for Member States of the European Union is scarce. It is however important to research police militarization of protest policing styles of Member States of the European Union, because the extent to which police conduct is militarised has a considerable impact on whether a demonstration turns violent or not. This thesis therefore aims to answer to what extent a shift is noticeable towards militarization noticeable in the protest policing style of the Netherlands since 2002? To do so, this thesis studies the theoretical development of police militarization through a qualitative analysis, and tests whether the theoretical findings translate to practice through a Protest Event Analysis. It does so by combining a model on police militarization and a model on strategic incapacitation, and by examining police militarization in three dimensions of militarization: the military dimension, the organizational dimension, and the operational dimension. The results of the qualitative and Protest Event Analysis show that in general, police militarization of the Dutch protest policing style, apart from a peak in 2010, is low. After stating possible suggestions for this result, this thesis concludes that a spillover effect from militarised sectors such as the protection of individuals and objects and border security, to non-militarised sectors such as protest policing, has not yet occurred because a significant event, such as the 9/11 attacks in the United States, has not happened in the Netherlands.

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Foreword This thesis is written as a final assignment of the Master Crisis and Security Management of Leiden University. This thesis analyses the extent of police militarization of the Dutch protest policing style. To the best of my knowledge, this thesis is the first research that touches upon police militarization of the Dutch protest policing style. The results and the assessments of this thesis therefore provide for important ideas for future research. The idea for this current topic came after I read the paper Blurring the Dividing Line ​ by Lutterbeck (2015) during the course of Internationalisation of Crisis and Security Management. During the course of the Master, I remained intrigued as to find out in which ways and to what extent police militarization occurs in the Netherlands. I am therefore grateful to complete this Master with a thesis on the topic which has captured and held both my attention and my curiosity. Herewith I would like to thank Anouk van Leeuwen and Jelle van Buuren for their help and guidance during the process of writing this thesis. Their knowledge and support helped me to fully explore and analyse the topic of police militarization of the Dutch protest policing style to the best of my ability.

The Hague, 8th of June, 2017

K. Zweers

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Index

1. Introduction 5 ​ 1.1 Reader’s Guide 8 2. Theoretical Framework 9 2.1 Police Militarization 9 2.2 Protest Policing 11 2.3 Militarization of the Dutch Protest Policing Style? 14 2.4 Providing Context 15 2.4.1 The influence of Mass-Behaviour 15 ​ 2.4.2 The Dutch Protest Culture 17 ​ 2.4.3 A New Policing Structure 18 ​ ​ 3. Methodological Framework 20 ​ 3.1 Case-Selection 20 ​ 3.2 Part One: A Qualitative Analysis 20 ​ 3.3. Part Two: a PEA Analysis 22 ​ 3.4 Time-Frame: from May 2002 until December 2016 23 ​ 3.5 Measurements 24 ​ 3.6 Threshold 26 ​ 3.7 Limitations 27 ​ 4. Militarization of the Dutch Protest Policing Style in Theory 28 ​ 4.1 Extent of Martial Weaponry and the Use of Advanced Military Technology 28 ​ 4.1.1 Military Material and Equipment 28 ​ ​ 4.1.2 The Use of Military Technology 29 ​ 4.2 The Expansion of Specialised Police Forces 31 4.2.1 The ME 31 ​ ​ 4.2.2 The Mounted Police, Dog Brigades and BRATRA-units 32 ​ ​ 4.2.3 Arrest Teams of the Marechaussee 32 ​ ​ 4.3 Operational Patterns Modeled After the Military 33 ​ 4.3.1 The Influence of New Communication Technologies 33 ​ ​ 4.3.2. Physical Violence and Police Aggressiveness 35 ​ ​ 4.3.3 Operational Tactics and the Controlling of Space 37 ​ ​ 5. Militarization of the Dutch Protest Policing Style in Practice 39 5.1 Detailed oversight of the years 2002-2016 on police conduct during protests 39 5.2 Results 47 ​ 5.2.1 The Military Dimension 47 ​ ​ 5.2.2 The Organizational Dimension 48 ​ ​ 5.2.3 The Operational Dimension 49 ​ 5.3 The Period From 2002 Until 2010 50

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5.4 The Period Since 2010 51 ​ 6. Discussion 53 ​ 6.1 Newspaper Coverage of Police Conduct during Protest Events 53 ​ 6.1.1 Summary 54 ​ 6.2 Militarization In Other Sectors 54 ​ 6.2.1 The Protection of Objects and Individuals 54 ​ 6.2.2 Border Protection 56 ​ 6.2.3 Summary 57 ​ ​ 7. Conclusion 58 ​ 8. References 60

9. Annex 72 ​ ​ 8. 1 PEA analysis from 2002-2016. 72 ​

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1. Introduction

“The human rights organization Amnesty International has expressed concerns about police action during the ‘Black Piet’- protest in Rotterdam in a letter to the mayor of ​ ​ Rotterdam, Aboutaleb, and the police. Most of the 198 arrests - all arrested persons have currently been released - were unlawful according to the organization. Amnesty International points out that above all an investigation needs to be conducted in order to investigate the violence that the police used against one of the protesters. The video footage of the arrest of the anti-Zwarte-Piet-activist Jerry Afriyie allegedly shows that ​ ​ the police used disproportionate violence during the arrest” (Volkskrant, 2016, Own Translation1)

The above quote summarizes how Dutch policing units managed the street demonstrations staged against the Dutch character of ‘Black Piet’ (Zwarte Piet), a traditional figure that is ​ ​ considered discriminating by participants of the street demonstrations. It makes us question whether this example indicates a trend towards an increased characterization of the protest policing style of the Netherlands by means such as mass arrests, surveillance, and the use of violence. Such a process, known as militarization, is defined by Peter Kraska (2007) as the “process of arming, organizing, planning, training for, threatening, and sometimes implementing violent conflict”, by using military power, hardware, operations, organization, and technology as its primary problem-solving tools (p. 3). More specifically, police militarization2 of protest policing is the process whereby “civilian police increasingly draw from, and pattern themselves around, the tenets of militarization . . .”, and police units increasingly consider the use of force as the most effective or appropriate means to manage protests (p. 3). The question that therefore arises is: to what extent is a shift towards militarization noticeable in the protest policing style of the Netherlands since 2002? This thesis seeks to provide an answer to that question. Kraska (2007) points out the effect of the 9/11 attacks on the policing culture in the United States (US), as powers

1 The author is responsible for the translation of quotes of Dutch sources such as newspaper articles and documents. 2 The concept of militarization can also be used as theoretical lenses to make sense of a wide range of issues and trends in society (Kraska, 2007, p. 5). This thesis however solely focuses upon police militarization. 5 Do Not Resist Master Thesis K. Zweers

assigned to the US government in the name of protecting the country from terrorists have also been used in other sectors, such as protest policing (p. 10 & 11). As such a striking event has not occurred in the Netherlands, this thesis takes the murder of Pim Fortuyn in May 2002 as the starting point for its analysis, because it has had a most similar effect in the Netherlands3. This thesis therefore analyses the extent to which the protest policing style of the Netherlands is militarized in the period from 2002 until 2016. It is important to point out that by taking May 2002 as the starting point for its analysis, this thesis solely focusses upon the effect of terrorist attacks on police militarization, although the dynamics of police militarization is also shaped by other factors. In order to answer the question at hand, the analysis of this thesis is divided into two parts: the first part of the analysis constitutes a qualitative analysis of existing theoretical ​ information on militarization of the Dutch protest policing style in the Netherlands. The second part of the analysis of this thesis asks whether the theoretical findings of the extent to which police militarization occurs in the Dutch protest policing style are also translated into practice. In order to do so, this thesis studies Dutch national newspaper articles on protests ​ since 2002 which include descriptions of police conduct. Newspaper articles are chosen as the primary source of information for the second part of the analysis of this thesis, foremost, because newspaper articles not only provide for factual information, but also provide contextual information that is necessary for the study of the extent to which police conduct during protests is militarized in the Netherlands (Fillieule & Jiminez, 2003, p. 260). It is of scientific importance to research the extent to which the protest policing style is militarized in the Netherlands because of two reasons. Scholarly attention has been paid to police militarization of protest policing in the US (McPhail, Schweingruber & McCarthy, 1998; Maguire, 2016; Narr et al., 2006). In addition, striking documentaries such as “Do Not Resist” (2016) by Atkinson show the growing militarization within the US police forces (VRPO, 2017). Research on this topic in the European Union (EU) is however scarce (Della Porta & Reiter, 1998; van Leeuwen et al., 2016; Gillham & Noakes, 2005; Gillham, 2011). Indeed, van Leeuwen, McCarthy, van Stekelenburg, Klandermans (2016) have conducted research on the protest policing style of EU Member States and have investigated the

3 This thesis does not assume that before May 2002 there was no sign of militarization in the protest policing style of the Netherlands. The period since May 2002 is foremost chosen for the analysis of this thesis because of the significant effect of the assassination of Pim Fortuyn on the Dutch protest policing style. 6 Do Not Resist Master Thesis K. Zweers

diffusion of the strategy of ‘strategic incapacitation’ from transnational protests to national protests. Van Leeuwen et al. have found that in the EU the diffusion of strategic incapacitation at protests, marked by selective and one-sided communication, mass arrests, the use of force, extensive surveillance, and the control of space from transnational protests to national protests is limited (p. 146). It is however important to point out that van Leeuwen et al.’s (2016) research has investigated specific protests in time between 2009 and 2013, rather than investigating police militarization as a process within an established time period. In addition, as is pointed out by Della Porta, Peterson and Reiter (2006), there is great variation and fluidity in the protest policing strategies of the EU Member States (p. 87). As van Leeuwen et al.’s research touches upon protest policing events in several EU Member States, it is important to focus on a specific EU Member State in order to gain full understanding of its protest policing style and the extent to which its protest policing style is militarized. As a result, this thesis tests the validation of the study conducted by van Leeuwen et al., firstly, by studying police militarization in the field of protest policing in a period of time, being from 2002 until 2016, and, secondly, by studying the protest policing style of the Netherlands in particular. It is also of societal importance to investigate this topic because greater insight in police militarization of protest policing in the Netherlands can help reduce conflicts at protest events. When police units increasingly consider military power, technology and hardware as the most appropriate and effective means to manage protests (Kraska, 2007, p. 3), this will have implications for the interactions that police officers have with citizens, and more specifically, protesters. In fact, as van Leeuwen et al. (2016) point out that “research revealed that the police conduct has a considerable impact on whether a demonstration turns violent or not” (p. 124). Thus, when the Dutch protest policing style indeed is making a shift towards militarization, police handling of protest events could in fact lead to more conflicts at protests since police officers are more likely to use aggressive approaches and protesters can react to such approaches more violently (p. 124). Therefore, the conclusions of this thesis are of importance to Dutch policing units which aim to limit such conflicts during protest events.

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1.1 Reader’s Guide

This thesis proceeds as follows. The second section, the Theoretical Framework, is divided into four parts. In Police Militarization, the concepts of militarism and militarization are defined, as well as existing literature on police militarization both in the EU and in the US. The second part outlines existing knowledge on protest policing, with a focus on the three different protest policing styles: escalated force, negotiated management, and, most importantly, strategic incapacitation. The third part of this section explains gaps in literature on police militarization and protest policing and establishes the foundation for the analysis of this thesis. Lastly, the Theoretical Framework establishes background information on factors which influence protest policing in the Netherlands and which provide for a context of the analysis. In the third section of this thesis the Methodological Framework is outlined. The case-selection of the Netherlands is explained, as well as the decision for the time-frame 2002-2016. The methodology for the qualitative analysis and the Protest Event Analysis will be stated. Moreover, this section explains the thesis’ combination of two different models, one on police militarization and one on strategic incapacitation, which are essential for the analysis of this thesis. Lastly, this section states the limitations of this methodological framework. The fourth section of this thesis, Militarization of the Dutch Protest Policing Style in Theory, focusses on a qualitative analysis in order to research the extent of militarization of the Dutch protest policing style in theory. In addition, it poses expectations for the fourth section, Militarization of the Dutch Protest Policing Style in Practice, which implements a Protest Event Analysis in order to research the extent of militarization of the Dutch protest policing style in practice. The fifth section therefore establishes whether the expectations of the correlation between police militarization in theory correlates with police militarization in practice. The sixth section of this thesis, the Discussion, touches upon possible suggestions for the results of the qualitative analysis and the Protest Event Analysis. It does so by focussing upon the methodological limitations of this thesis: the use of newspaper articles and the use of terrorism as the context for the analyses. The last section of this thesis is the Conclusion,

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which provides for a summary of the theoretical framework, the methodological framework and the results. In addition, the Conclusion states the limitations of this thesis and poses ideas for further research in the area of protest policing.

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2. Theoretical Framework This section firstly conceptualizes the concept of police militarization, after which it outlines existing literature on protest policing and outlines the societal and scientific importance of investigating the extent to which the protest policing style of the Netherlands is militarized. In addition, this section provides context for the analysis of this thesis by outlining the protest culture, the movement of mass-behaviour, and the development of the structure of the policing system of the Netherlands.

2.1 Police Militarization

Different actors are responsible for maintaining safety and stability in the Netherlands. These actors protect vital interests such as territorial safety, economic safety, social and political stability, physical safety and ecological safety in order to prevent the Dutch national security from being compromised (NCTV, 2012, p. 3). Firstly, the Dutch military traditionally has been responsible for the protection of its own territory and that of its alliance’s partners, for the improvement of the international legal order and stability, for the support of civil authorities in law enforcement duties, and for disaster relief and humanitarian aid, both nationally and internationally (Ministerie van Defensie, 2013, p. 57). Secondly, the Dutch national police has been responsible for preventing and challenging crime, for maintaining public order, for detecting illegal acts, assisting in emergency situations, performing policing duties for the Ministry of Justice, and by enforcing the law (NCTV, 2012, p. 4). A development is however noticeable in which this clear dichotomy between the military and the police is blurring and powers and tasks of the two are slowly converging (Lutterbeck, 2015; Kraska, 2007; Dunlap, 1999). As Kraska (2007) points out: “we have been witnesses to a little noticed but nonetheless momentous historical change - the traditional distinctions between military/police, war/law enforcement, and internal/external security are rapidly blurring” (p. 1). One such way by which this distinction is blurred is by the police-ization of the military (Dunlap, 1999; Kraska, 2007). Firstly, police-ization of the military is illustrated by the increased involvement of the military in for example counterdrug activities, as military personnel is used to perform drug prevention practices (Dunlap, 1999, p. 221; Kraska, 2007, p. 2). Secondly, the ‘Golden Age of Terrorism’ will continue to

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reinforce the need to use military force for law enforcement activities because this unprecedented security challenge overwhelms police resources (Dunlap, 1999, p. 220; Kraska, 2007, p. 2; Bergen, 2015). Lastly, military forces are increasingly deployed for routine patrol operations, house-to-house searches and for arresting law-breakers in order to combat crime (Kraska, 2007, p. 10). Dunlap (1999) for example points out that in the case of the US “ military forces have been used to enforce civil law against domestic violence, mostly to suppress riots and similar civil disorders; in particular, troops were used on several occasions to counter labor unrest” (p. 219). A second way in which the convergence of the powers and tasks of the police and the military is noticeable is through the process of militarization. Militarization, according to Kraska (2007), is a development in different sectors of society as domestic security efforts such as the war on drugs, crime and terrorism “increasingly draw from, and pattern themselves around, the tenets of militarism and the military model” (p. 3). Such tenets include the use of military technology, hardware, operations, and organizational structure (p. 3). Militarization, then, is the implementation of the ideology of ‘militarism’, which is “a set of beliefs, values, and assumptions that stress the use of force and the threat of violence as the most appropriate and efficacious means to solve problems” (p.3). Militarization therefore is a concept that helps us to understand how the influence of military power and military technologies influence different day-to-day aspects of society. In fact, as Kraska argues, “militarism and militarization can operate as powerful theoretical lenses to make sense of many issues and trends in society . . .” (p. 4 & 5). Militarization in the sector of law enforcement, known as police militarization, constitutes the process whereby police units consider the use of force as the most effective and appropriate means to manage national security threats such as organized crime, the war on drugs and the war on terrorism (Kraska, 2007, p. 3). Arguably, the most pronounced example of the manifestation of police militarization is that of the US (Kraska, 2001; Maguire and King, 2004; Mcculloch, 2004; Zimmerman, 2005). Police units in the US have incorporated tenets of militarization in several ways. Firstly, there is a growth in the formation of special police units that are modelled after military special groups (Kraska, 2007, p. 2). For example, Police-Paramilitary Units (PPU’s) in the US have found to “derive their appearance, tactics, operations, weaponry, and culture to a significant extent from military special operations units” (Kraska, 2007, p. 6) in for example training in hostage

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rescue. In fact, 89% of the police departments in the US in the late 1990’s adopted PPU’s - almost double the size compared to the mid 1980’s (Kraska, 2007, p. 6). Secondly, both special units and normal civilian police which have incorporated certain tenets of militarization are not only more employed in drug raids, terrorist situations, sniper, and hostage situations, but also in for example routine patrol work (Kraska, 2007, p. 7). Whereas literature on police militarization is extensive for the US, literature which extends research on police militarization to the case of Europe is less well developed (Lutterbeck, 2015; McCulloch, 2004). The most apparent case of police militarization in the EU is in ‘border policing’ practices (Lutterbeck, 2015, p. 234). Militarization of border policing in the EU is pronounced because of the Schengen treaty which was signed in 1985 and which largely abolished internal border checks. For instance, at Germany’s and Austria’s borders police units patrol with military-type thermal cameras which were previously used by the US in the Vietnam War. Thus, as put in the words of Lutterbeck (2007):

One implication of these heightened ‘border anxieties’ in EU or Schengen countries has been that police forces responsible for border enforcement have been resorting to a growing amount of military-style technology and hardware to secure the outer frontiers of the Schengen area development often decried by human rights organisations as unacceptable ‘border militarisation’ (p. 234).

Secondly, police militarization in the EU is visible in the modus operandi style of Member ​ ​ States’ police units as they increasingly turn to military style technologies and structures in order to maintain public order (p. 235 t/m 238). For example, In Germany institutional rearrangements and legislative changes have not only facilitated cooperation between its foreign intelligence agency and its civil police, but even have transferred surveillance powers to its civil police in order to manage public order (p. 239.) In addition, in the United Kingdom (UK) police units have adopted military-style command and control structures in the area of public order (p. 241). ​

2.2 Protest Policing

Police militarization is thus apparent in many different sectors of society in the US and in the EU, even in routine law enforcement practices such as maintaining the public order (Kraska,

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2007; Lutterbeck, 2015). What does existing literature say then about police militarization in the area of protest policing? Protest policing, according to Della Porta and Fillieule (2006) is “the police handling of protest events” (p. 217). Such police handling roughly has taken on three different styles in the history of protest policing: escalated force, negotiated ​ management, and strategic incapacitation (Gillham, 2011, p. 83). ​ ​ ​ The first protest policing style, which prevailed through most of the twentieth century, is that of escalated force, defined by Gillham et. al (2011) as “a repertoire of tactics revolved around the use of arrests, beatings, tear gas, bullets, and other weapons meant to quell protests by inflicting pain and suffering” (p. 82). During the twentieth century, protests were considered to disturb the public order as protesters were seen as unpredictable (van Leeuwen et al., 2016, p. 126). As a result, policing revolved around the use of repressive and aggressive means in order to manage such ‘unpredictable’ protests and their participants. Secondly, negotiated management, described as a “decidedly softer approach”, followed after the normalization of protests in the 1960’s and 1970’s (van Leeuwen et al., 2016, p. 126). Protests such as for example on gay rights and abortion stimulated an approach by which police units negotiated agreements with protesters prior to protest events in order to prevent conflicts (McPhail et al., 1998, p. 51). Lastly, strategic incapacitation is used to manage protest events through the use of force, selective communication, mass arrests, the control of space and the extensive use of surveillance (van Leeuwen et al., 2016, p. 127). Its use increased after police units failed to effectively manage transnational protests through negotiated management (Della Porta, Reiter and Peterson, 2006; Gillham, 2011; van Leeuwen et al., 2016). According to Gillham (2011) that the goal to accomplish effective protest management with strategic incapacitation is achieved in three ways:

1) the use of surveillance and information sharing as a way to assess and monitor risks, 2) the use of preemptive arrests and less-lethal weapons to selectively disrupt or incapacitate protesters that engage in disruptive protest tactics or might do so, and 3) the extensive use of ​ ​ fancing and barrier to isolate and contain disruptive protesters whether actual or potential (p. ​ ​ 3).

Consequently, there are 8 different dimensions that characterize the strategic incapacitation approach: mass arrests, the use of force, extensive surveillance, the control of space, selective ​

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and one-sided communication, selective protection of demonstrator’s constitutional rights, selective tolerance for community disruption, and the widespread sharing of information on ​ ​ ​ protest organizations (Gillham, 2011; van Leeuwen et al., 2016). The strategic incapacitation approach clearly incorporates tenets of militarization. In fact, according to Kraska (2007) there are 4 dimensions in which militarization can occur: the ​ cultural dimension, the organizational dimension, the operational dimension, and the ​ ​ material dimension (p. 4). Kraska defines the cultural dimension as “martial language, style ​ (appearance), beliefs, and values” (p. 4). Similarly, van Leeuwen et al. (2016) point out that in the protest policing style of strategic incapacitation communication is only established with cooperating participants of protest events and is selective and one-sided (p. 127). In addition, Kraska explains the organizational dimension as the “martial arrangements such as ‘command and control’ centers . . . or elite squads of officers patterned after military special operations patrolling high-crime areas” (p. 3). The strategic incapacitation approach thus shows militarized characteristics in its organizational dimension in for example the use of force against protesters as special police units are used such as mounted police or riot police (van Leeuwen et al., 2016, p. 127). Thirdly, Kraska (2007) outlines the material dimension of militarization as the use of “martial weaponry, equipment, and advanced technology” (p. 3). In the approach of strategic incapacitation militarization of the material dimension is thus apparent as martial weaponry and equipment is used for the control of space, the use of force and conducting mass arrests. Lastly, Kraska points out that the operational dimension of militarization shows “patterns of activity modeled after the military such as in the areas of intelligence, supervision, handling high-risk situations, or war-making/restauration” (p. 3). As van Leeuwen et al. (2016) argue, the extensive use of surveillance such as the infiltration of protest organizations, and real-time filming and photographing, are functions that distinguish strategic incapacitation from escalated force and negotiated management protest policing styles (p. 127). Thus, also in the operational dimension of the strategic incapacitation approach some tenets of militarization have been incorporated. In the case of the US, several scholars have addressed the militarization of its protest policing style because of its history of police violence during such demonstrations (Maguire, 2014; Geron, 2014). Most noticeably, protests following events such as for example the Ferguson shooting, during which a white officer shot and killed an 18-year old

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African-American man, and the Occupy-Movement, have resulted in the view that “the way area police departments responded to the protests . . . [was] heavy-handed and overly militarized” (Maguire, 2014, p. 67). In fact, scholars have recognized a pattern of unconstitutional and abusive practices in the policing of protests in the US whereby policing units increasingly rely upon the use of force due to a change of technology and a change of the public’s priorities (Geron, 2014, p. 149).

2.3 Militarization of the Dutch Protest Policing Style?

As the process of militarization can be seen in different sectors of society in the EU and we have witnessed the militarization of the protest policing style in the US, to what extent has the protest policing style in the EU militarized, and even more specifically, in the Netherlands? Van Leeuwen et al. (2016) conclude in their research on the diffusion of the protest policing style of strategic incapacitation from transnational protests to national protests, that whereas the protest policing style in the US is repressive and strategic incapacitation is indeed increasingly used as a protest management style, this development is less apparent in the EU (p. 146). As the strategic incapacitation approach shows congruence with tenets of militarization, this could indicate that the process of militarization in protest policing is also less apparent in the EU than in the US. This thesis validates the study conducted by van Leeuwen et al. (2016) in two different ways. It is important to point out that van Leeuwen has studied the diffusion of strategic incapacitation in 8 different EU member states (Belgium, Czech Republic, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom), between 2009 and 2013. This thesis validates the study conducted by van Leeuwen et al. therefore firstly, by solely focussing upon one member state: the Netherlands. As is pointed out by Della Porta, Peterson and Reiter (2006), there is great variation and fluidity in the protest policing strategies of the European Member States (p. 87). This thesis argues that a thorough research solely focused on the Netherlands could indeed reveal a process of militarization of its protest policing style. Most importantly however, is that this thesis investigates whether van Leeuwen et al.’s (2016) findings endure when a different methodology is applied: instead of using samples of random protest events between 2009 and 2013, this thesis investigates the process

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of militarization of the Dutch protest policing style in the period between 2002 and 2016. This thesis thus assumes that the process of militarization in the protest policing style can in fact become apparent when investigating protest events in a time period, rather than investigating police behaviour at protest events at specific points in time. Therefore, this thesis asks to what extent a shift towards militarization is noticeable in the protest policing style of the Netherlands since 2002?

2.4 Providing Context ​ In order to gain a thorough understanding of the question at hand, it is important to provide some background information on factors which shape and influence the context of the Dutch protest policing style.

2.4.1 The influence of Mass-Behaviour

As is pointed out by Postmes, Bezouw, Tauber, and van de Sande (2013), the nature and intensity of mass-behaviour in relation to protests has shifted considerably in history although protest, demonstrations, and riots have been ‘of all times’ (p. 5). In order to understand the influence of mass-behaviour on the increase and peak of militarization up until 2010, it is firstly important to gain some understanding of mass-behaviour itself. Postmes et al. establish several variables which influence mass-behaviour: the economic situation, the political situation, physiological predictors (drugs, alcohol, and temperature), the influence of the surroundings (segregation), structural opposition (leading to the formation of a group-identity and shared moral emotions), and psychological variables (social identity, moral involvement, and expected effectiveness) (p. 7 & 8). On the background, the political situation only has its effect on mass-behaviour in protests when contradictions between two groups become centralised in the political agenda. Similarly, the economic situation can lead to tensions between different groups in society when the differences between groups such as adolescents, elderly or immigrants is highlighted (Postmes et al., 2013, p. 9). As a result, political and economic predictors relate only indirectly with civil unrest, and normally only lead to unrest when contradictions

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between those with power and those without power, or when contradictions between two groups with similar powers, such as women and men, or protestants or catholics, leads to severe polarisation (p. 76). On the foreground, physiological predictors, alcohol, drugs and temperature do have their effect on individual aggression and assault, although their precise effect on mass-behaviour is unknown (p. 77). In addition, there is a clear relation between unrest and location: segregation of economic or ethnic minorities can lead to unrest when such minorities are being stigmatised and which can lead to individual criminality and isolation (p. 80). Lastly, with regards to the interpersonal sphere, psychological predictors such as collective moral involvement, expected effectivity of a protest, and the awareness of a shared identity have significant impact on mass-behaviour (p. 81-83). Up until 2010, there are a few significant indicators that explain the development of mass-behaviour in the Netherlands in the case of protest events. For example, the economic crisis, which started in 2007, has led to oppositions between different population groups and between the population and the government, also in the Netherlands (Postmes et al., 2013, p. 91). Important to point out is, that according to Postmes et al. (2013) the recession not only influenced mass-behaviour with regards to protests, but did also affected protest policing of the Dutch police force as they are “more inclined to act repressive” during demonstrations against governmental failures ( p. 91). Similarly, the political variability is substantial in the Netherlands since the elections of 2002: twenty to twenty-five percent of the Dutch population votes for anti-establishment parties, such as the one of Pim Fortuyn (p. 93). In addition, the stigmatising of population groups such as immigrants in the Netherlands has been an ever increasing problem (p. 94). This is exemplified by the increase of population of the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV), which has been increasingly able to mobilise voters with fear and hate towards islamic immigrants (p. 95). As argued by Postmes et al. “unrest goes hand in hand with the need for powerful leadership and a zero-tolerance policy” (p. 94). Therefore, in a context where the opposition between the Dutch population and immigrants increases repressive performance may occur in the policing of protests on such topics. Lastly, with regards to demographic, psychological and physiological predictors, Postmes et al. conclude that “we have assessed that there are no specific risks for the Netherlands following these predictors” (p. 98). Moreover, as is argued by Postmes et. al (2013) “the risk for unrest increases when participants of protests have an explicit common goal. Such protests do not occur so often in

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the Netherlands at the moment. The greatest risk for the Netherlands however remains spontaneous disturbances . . . Although in such situations a brief contrast between ‘we’ (the protesters) and ‘they’ (police and the ME) can exist, such contrast does not have a long lasting effect” (p. 102). Therefore, although political predictors, economic predictors, physiological predictors and psychological predictors in the Netherlands indicate the increase of spontaneous, bottom-up protests, characterised by a short-term discrepancy between protesters and the police, there have not been specific risks that show a mass movement of protest.

2.4.2 The Dutch Protest Culture

It is of essential importance to look at the historical context of protests in the Netherlands. As is argued by Postmes et al., (2013) “the willingness to demonstrate is the highest in countries which have a long tradition of protest and which have a police force with a burdened past” (p. 58). It is for this reason that protests in the south of the EU are usually more violent than in countries such as the Netherlands. As is pointed out by Postmes et al. “on the executive side [repressive] policy in the Netherlands is usually employed in an intelligent, conscientious and effective manner - the police in general is reticent to use violence and aims to solve incidents as much as possible through conversations” (p. 94). In addition, a crucial aspect of the Dutch method of working is the direct communication between police officers, civilians, and victims, in combination with directed repression (p. 97). As a result, the Dutch police usually enjoys high legitimacy from the Dutch population (p. 94). It is for this reason, amongst others, that the Dutch population is less willingly to demonstrate than in countries such as for example the US. The same is true for trust in the Dutch government as it usually enjoys high legitimacy (p. 93). Indeed, as mentioned above, anti-establishment parties have received votes and there has been a slight decrease in the trust of the Dutch government. In general however, the trust of the Dutch population is amongst the highest in European countries (CBS, 2016, p. 11). In addition, the Netherlands has been, even during the economic crisis, one of the richest countries in the EU (CBS, 2016, p. 69). Based on this historical context, the chance that a

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sharp contradiction between Dutch civilians and the government, or amongst Dutch civilians on economic or political issues sparks violent protests is minimal compared to countries such as Italy, Spain and Greece. Only with regards to minorities the Netherlands has had radical tensions as an undeniable factor of risk for the escalation of protest events (Postmes et al., 2013, p. 110). In the period between 1960 and 1990 there was resistance of the Dutch population against immigrant workers (Adang et al., 2010). In addition, since 2002 there is substantial attention for fear and hate against Islam and immigrants, which is proven by the electoral success of the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV) (Postmes et al., 2013, p. 111). Moreover, according to Postmes et al. (2013), the greatest sources of popular unrest during protest events in the Netherlands are protest events in which radical groups (extreme-left or anarchistic individuals) participate (p. 51). In the Netherlands, protests of squatter movements and anti-globalists are such a source of commotion and violence (p. 51). Research has examined that the expression of radical goals might influence police repression at protest events (Earl et al, 2003). In fact, as Earl et al. (2003) point out, the presence of social movement organizations with radical goals influence police influence, as organizations which directly target the government and its various actor “present a more clear threat to power than other miscellaneous or single issue protests representing a variety of claims” (Ratliff, 2011, p. 30). It is important to point out however that such contradictions between left-right and immigrants-natives indeed have existed in the Netherlands, and remain to exist now, they do not necessarily lead to confrontations at the neighbourhood level (Postmes et al., 2013, p. 95). As a result, there is not necessarily a positive relationship between such tensions and the increase of protests. Therefore, the risk for structural unrest because of segregation, social exclusion or discrimination appears to be minimal.

2.4.3 A New Policing Structure

Apart from the historical and the economic, political, and social context of protests in the Netherlands it is important to mention the recent re-organization of the police structure. The change to a centralised police structure, which was established in 2013, may not directly affect the nature of protests, but does influence the management of protests. Before 2012,

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each regional corps in the Netherlands - being 25 in total - had its own police units, with 167 units in total (Politie, 2012, p. 12 & p. 13). This system of independent regional police departments was however heavily criticised for its ineffectiveness and inefficiency in solving safety, crime, and security challenges. Consequently, the Policing Law of 2012 established a system in which all police units became combined as ten regional districts in the under one nationale police authority (Politie, 2012, p. 14). With the new system of a centralised national police, the Dutch government aims to increase efficiency, reduce overhead within the police and aimed to achieve greater trust of the Dutch population (Politie, 2012, p. 2). It is important to point out that researches have issued Figure 2: Effect of Centralization on Policing Strategies (Das et. al, 2007, p. 530). concerns about a possible increase in the extent of repression, combined with the centralisation of police forces (Cachet & Marks, 2009; Das, Huberts & van Steden, 2007). Cachet & Marks (2009) for example argue that the nature of Dutch policing has changed dramatically during the past decade as “Dutch policing and justice apparatus has traditionally been associated with pragmatism, tolerance and a systematic distaste for ‘anything which smacks of militarism” whereas nowadays “the Netherlands seems to drift toward the opposite side of the previously progressive ideal” in a more repressive climate” (p. 110). The relation with the development whereby Dutch police forces increasingly concentrate their efforts on more repressive tactics and the centralisation of police forces thus lies in the observation that “Crime, terrorism and general public fears have caught front-line police officers in a “crossfire” between liberal ideals and burning security issues [which] has resulted in

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tendencies of centralization, penalization and responsibilization” (Das et al., 2007, p. 529). Das et al. (2007) have illustrated this relationship in Figure 2 above (p. 530). It is important to point out, that a greater centralised policing system does not lead to greater use of repressive means per se, but in combination with responsibilization and penalization it can indeed be ​ ​ highly influential on militarised tendencies (p. 530).

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3. Methodological Framework In order to gain a thorough understanding of the extent to which a shift towards militarization of protest policing is noticeable in the Netherlands, this section outlines the qualitative analysis and the protest-event analysis (PEA) that is applied in this thesis and the operationalization of this methodological framework.

3.1 Case-Selection This thesis researches the extent to which the protest policing style of the Netherlands is making a shift towards militarization. Van Leeuwen et al. (2016) have focussed in their article To What Extent Has Transnational Protest Policing Diffused to National European ​ Protest Events? on protest events in eight different European countries: Belgium, the Czech ​ Republic, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom (p.

122). Although van Leeuwen et al. conclude that the diffusion of the protest policing style ​ ​ strategic incapacitation to national protests is limited, the author also argues that:

our sample of demonstrations is not necessarily representative for the eight countries under study. This is because the CCC project, which gathered the dataset, only included demonstrations that were large, (foreseen to be) non-violent, staged by a diverse range of social movements, and known at least two weeks in advance (p. 147).

In addition, as Della Porta et. al (2006) point out, there is great variation and fluidity in the protest policing strategies of the European Member States (p. 87). This thesis thus studies the protest policing style of the Netherlands not only because a focus upon one European country of the selection of van Leeuwen et al’s research could reveal a variation, but also because a focus on smaller and more local protests could indeed indicate a process of militarization of the protest policing style in the Netherlands.

3.2 Part One: A Qualitative Analysis

The first section of the analysis of this thesis focusses on qualitative sources in order to assess whether in theory a process of militarization of the Dutch protest policing style exists. It is ​ ​

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important to point out, that this thesis uses the framework developed by Kraska (2007) who identified four dimensions of police militarization, which can be seen in the table below.

Table 1: Kraska’s (2007) Model on Police Militarization.

Cultural Dimension Operational Organizational Material Dimension Dimension Dimension

● martial ● patterns of ● martial ● martial language activity arrangements weaponry ● style modeled (command ● equipment (appearance) after the and control ● advanced ● beliefs military structures, technology e ● values (intel, elite squads) supervision, handling high risk situations, war making/resta uration)

It is important to point out that whilst militarization can occur in each dimension, it is not ​ ​ necessary for indicators to be found in all dimensions in order for police militarization to ​ ​ occur (Kraska, 2007, p. 3). In fact, as Kraska argues, “police militarization, in all countries across any time in history, must be conceived of as the degree or extent of militarization. Any assertion that the police are or are not militarized is simply misguided” (p. 3). Since this paper focuses on police conduct during protest events, this thesis therefore solely focuses upon the operational, the organizational and the material dimension. As a result, the cultural dimension of police militarization will not be taken into account. When conducting a qualitative research on police militarization in theory, this thesis therefore focuses on the development of the material available to police forces, to the development of military-like specialised police units, and to operational powers and functions assigned to police agencies. Such information will be retrieved from sources such as government papers, newspaper articles, journal and magazine articles, and books.

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3.3. Part Two: a PEA Analysis

Following the qualitative analysis, a Protest Event Analysis (PEA) will determine whether the findings of the extent of police militarization in theory also translate to practice. PEA is a ​ ​ form of content analysis which solely uses press articles in order to explain the process of social movements (Fillieule & Jiminez, 2003). PEA, as a content analysis, is a method to “systematically assess the amount of and features of protests across various geographical areas (from the local level up to the supranational level) and over time (from short periods of time up to several decades) (Hutter, 2014, p. 1 & Fillieule & Jiminez, 2003, p. 261). As a result, PEA focusses on social movements as a process, rather than regarding that social movements exist in isolations from other movements (Fillieule & Jiminez, 2003, p. 258). Especially over the last decades, PEA has become a key method of social movement research (Hutter, 2014, p. 1). Although PEA originally was used for social movement research purposes solely, the method has refined and adapted to study other research fields. As this thesis aims to systematically assess the militaristic features of Dutch protests over a period of time and to develop an analysis on the process of militarization of the protest policing style in the Netherlands, PEA thus provides for a helpful methodological framework in order to answer this thesis’ research question. In order to conduct the PEA analysis, this thesis uses a dataset of Dutch newspaper articles, news bulletins, news blogs and forums, gathered by LexisNexis. As this thesis aims to investigate the extent to which a shift is noticeable towards the militarization of the protest policing style in the Netherlands with PEA, it solely uses Dutch national newspapers articles which are retrieved from this dataset. It is not in the scope of this thesis to analyse all daily newspaper articles since 2002. Therefore, newspaper articles on protest events of both newspapers are analyzed for each first and third monday of the month from May 2002 until February 2016. In addition, newspaper articles are selected through a selection of keywords, noticeably protest (protest), ​ ​ demonstratie (demonstration), activisten (activists), betoging (demonstratie), and ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ politieoptreden (police conduct). An analysis of these newspaper articles will then give a ​ valid portrayal of the extent to which the protest policing style in the Netherlands is

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militarized.

3.4 Time-Frame: from May 2002 until December 2016

It is important to point out that this thesis uses May 2002 as the starting point for its analysis because of the assassination of Pim Fortuyn on the 6th of May, 2002. According to Kraska (2007) the process of militarization has accelerated since the 9/11 attacks, as the war on terrorism has pushed “the US military’s mission of creeping into functions traditionally viewed as the purview of the police” (p. 10) in order to keep the public secure from the acts of terrorism. Similarly, Lutterbeck (2015) points out that events such as the London bombings and the 9/11 attacks have changed the “traditional rules of engagement” for police officers and have replaced them by more militarized means such as ‘shoot-to-kill’ policies (p. 235 & 236). The 9/11 attacks thus have resulted in an increase of “the US military’s mission of creeping into functions traditionally viewed as the purview of the police” (p. 10). In fact, the author points out that whereas the US government has claimed a number of new policing powers in the name of protecting the country from terrorists, similar powers have also been used in other sectors (p. 10&11), such as in the policing of protests. As in the Netherlands attacks such as the London bombings or the 9/11 attacks have not occurred, this thesis assumes that the assassination of Pim Fortuyn in May 2002 has had the most similar effect on the process of militarization on the protest policing style of the Netherlands. It therefore analyses newspaper articles on police conduct at protest events in the period from 2002 until 2016. De Wijk (2012), previous director of the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS), has pointed out that the assassination led to societal and political polarisation and indicated a “new era” (p. 6) of terror in the Netherlands. In fact, after the assassination of Fortuyn a new system of ‘supervise and secure’ was implemented in the Netherlands which aimed to prevent (terrorist) attacks on persons, objects and services through an extended cooperation between regional police units, the Dutch royal military police (KMAR), and the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Agency (AIVD) (p. 6 & 7), whilst using methods such as protective intelligence (p. 12). The effect of the murder of Pim Fortuyn therefore foremost had its effect on militarization of personal security. In fact, as is argued by Cachet & Marks (2009) “The performance crisis around 2000, the terrorist attacks

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in New York, London and Madrid and the murders of politician Pim Fortuyn and writer Theo van Gogh fuelled a strong demand for more effective as well as more repressive police work” (p. 110). This thesis therefore assumes that the assassination of Pim Fortuyn has had an accelerated effect on the process of militarization since repressive measures sparked by the murder may have diffused to the Dutch protest policing style.

3.5 Measurements

In order to measure the extent to which the protest policing style in the Netherlands has been militarized since 2002 in newspaper articles on protest events, this thesis combines the two different models provided by Kraska (2007) and Gillham (2011). As mentioned above, this thesis uses Kraska’s dimensional model (2007) on police militarization. In addition, Gillham (2011) has developed a model on strategic incapacitation as a protest policing style, which consists of eight different dimensions (Table 2).

Table 2: Gillham’s (2011) model on Strategic Incapacitation.

First Amendment Rights ● protesters who follow pre-determined guidelines will be protected

Tolerance for Community Disruption ● selective determination of location, time and behaviour that are tolerated

Communication ● selective one-way communication ● issue commands ● often refusal to communicate

Extent and Manner of Arrests ● are selectively applied ● to arrest transgressive actors

Extent and Manner of Using Force ● use of less-lethal weapons such as tear-gas, pepperspray ● cause injury ● elite squads

Use of Surveillance ● infiltration or informants ● before and during protest events ● information used to disrupt protest activities

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Information Sharing ● extensive reliance on the share of information ● selective engagement of media

Controlling Space ● elaborate fencing system ● arrests

In order to create a model of the militarization of the protest policing style, all 8 dimensions of Gillham’s strategic incapacitation model are combined with Kraska’s 4 dimensions of militarization, leading to the following model (Table 3):

Table 3: Combination of Kraska’s (2007) and Gillham’s (2011) model:

Militarization of the Strategic Incapacitation Protest Policing Style

Material Dimension ● extent and manner of using force - martial weaponry, technology, advanced equipment

Organizational Dimension ● extent and manner of using force - martial arrangements

Operational Dimension ● controlling space - patterns of activity modeled after the ● use of surveillance military ● sharing of information ● extent and manner of arrests

As mentioned above, this thesis focuses on police conduct during protest events and therefore does not take into account the cultural dimension of Kraska’s framework. Similarly, the indicators of communication, first amendment rights, and tolerance for community disruption of Gilham’s model will not be taken into account since they belong to the cultural dimension of police militarization of protest policing. Since both models are not specific to the case study of the Netherlands, it is important to outline the specific regulations with regards to the material, the organizational, and the operational specifics of Dutch police units. When such specifics4 are added the following, and final, model on the militarization of the Dutch protest policing style can be found below (Table 4):

4 The specifics of the material, operational, and organizational dimension follow from the qualitative analysis conducted in section 4 of this thesis and from Gillham’s (2011) model on strategic incapacitation. 27 Do Not Resist Master Thesis K. Zweers

Table 4: Combination of Kraska’s (2007) and Gillham’s (2011) model + indicators.

Militarization of the Strategic Incapacitation Protest Policing Style

Material Dimension ● extent and manner of using force - martial weaponry, technology, advanced - wapenstok (baton) ​ ​ equipment - helmen (helmets) ​ ​ - schilden (shields) ​ ​ - dienstpistool (service gun) ​ ​ - pepperspray ​ - semi-automatisch pistool ​ ​ (semi-automatic gun) - kogelwerend vest (bulletproof vest) ​ ​ - traangas (tear-gas) ​ ​ - machine geweer (machine gun) ​ ​ - helikopter (helicopter) ​ ​ - waterkanon (water cannon) ​ ​ - speedboat (speedboat) ​ ​

Organizational Dimension ● extent and manner of using force - martial arrangements - politie te paard (mounted police) ​ ​ - hondenbrigade (dog brigade) ​ ​ - ME (Mobile Unit) ​ ​ - (Marechaussee (Military Police)) ​ ​ Operational Dimension ● controlling space - patterns of activity modeled after the - charges (charges) ​ ​ military ● use of surveillance - surveillance (surveillance) ​ ​ ● sharing of information - filmen (police filming) ​ ​ ● extent and manner of arrests - massa-arrestaties (mass arrests) ​ ​ - gewonden (injuries) ​ ​ - agressie (aggression) ​ ​

3.6 Threshold

In addition, it is important to point out that this thesis assumes that at least two of the ​ ​ indicators from the table above should be mentioned in a newspaper article in order for police conduct at a protest event to be labelled as militarized.

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3.7 Limitations

The use of newspaper articles for a qualitative analysis and a PEA analysis has some limitations. Firstly, with regards to the qualitative analysis of this thesis, use of secondary sources. Secondly, with regards to the PEA analysis, it is important to point out that newspaper articles are subject to biases, as there is an “inevitability of bias in basic cognitive and perceptual mechanisms” (Zelizer, 2002, p. 3). Lastly, the data allows to capture only a small proportion of the ensemble of newspaper articles on police conduct at protest events as the collection and analysis of such articles is very time consuming (Fillieule & jiminez, 2003, p. 276). The conclusions that are retrieved from the data in this thesis therefore do not provide for a full overview of the extent to which the protest policing style in the Netherlands is militarized, but rather give an indication of such a development.

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4. Militarization of the Dutch Protest Policing Style in Theory

This section analyses the extent of theoretical militarization of the Dutch protest policing style in the organizational, operational and material dimension. It does so by focussing on militarization as a process between 2002 and 2016. It does so by outlining the developments in this time period for all three dimensions through a qualitative analysis of government papers, newspaper articles, journal and magazine articles, and books. .

4.1 Extent of Martial Weaponry and the Use of Advanced Military Technology

In order to understand the theoretical development of militarization of the Dutch protest policing style in the material dimension, it is important to look at changes in the use of martial weaponry and the adoption of military technology which are used in order to manage protest events.

4.1.1 Military Material and Equipment

Nowadays, police officers has several kinds of material to its availability. The standard ​ ​ armour of a regular police officer is a short baton, a Walther P5, handcuffs, and pepper spray. In addition, a police officers can use a long baton when the situation demands it. The use of handcuffs is a standard precautionary tool which is used extensively, except when there are no signs of flight risk such as with elderly people. Pepper spray is also a commonly used tool since it is more effective in neutralising aggressive suspects but results in less injuries than for example physical violence (De Nationale Ombudsman, 2013, pp. 58-67). A baton on the other hand, is not used regularly as it results in injuries and is used foremost as a means to deter suspects (De Nationale Ombudsman, 2013, pp. 58-67). For example, when a line is formed in order to keep for example protesters at a distant, police officers have to use the baton aggressively in order to achieve some effect, and therefore prefer to use pepper spray in order to achieve a greater effect but to limit physical injuries. Lastly, in some cases, police units can make use of water cannons which are deployed at high risk situations (de Nationale Ombudsman, 2013, pp. 58-67).

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Specialised units on the other hand have more equipment to their availability. The ME for instance, can use a Walther P5, pepper spray, CS-tear gas grenades, a MZP grenade launcher, a semi-automatic fire gun of Heckler and Koch, and a MP5A handgun (De Nationale Ombudsman, 2013, pp. 58-67). The last three mentioned in this last are only used in extraordinary high-risk situations. In addition the unit has protective clothing such as helmets, a shield, torso-, shin-, hip- and arm protectors and ME officers can make use of a short and a long baton and a gasmask. Because of the specialised tasks which such units have to perform, their material is therefore more extensive than that of standard police officers. Although specialised units have such equipment to their availability, scales of unrest determine when such equipment may be used. During most ‘resting scenario’s’ of public law enforcement the police, together with emergency services, will be prepared in such a way that deployment of the ME is not necessary (De Nationale Ombudsman, 2013, pp. 58-67). In some cases however, the ME is deployed with uniforms similar to ordinary police officers, whereby both cannot be easily distinguished. In a stadium of a disruption and public order, a ‘scenario of unrest’, the ME wears its standard uniform, without violent attributes such as automatic rifles and tear-gas. Only in a serious ‘scenario of escalation’ the ME appears fully clothed with such materials (De Nationale Ombudsman, 2013, pp. 58-67 & Staatscourant, 2007, pp. 1-8). There are only a few significant developments in the adoption of martial weaponry by police departments in the policing of protests. As mentioned above, the debate about police violence has recently become more intensive. Although the adoption of new equipment has been more difficult because of the intensified debate, there are two developments in the adoption of new weaponry: the long baton and a taser (Meulen et al., 2013). However, they are only being tested and they have not yet been integrated in standard police uniforms.

4.1.2 The Use of Military Technology

The Dutch police is changing its organization, its operational tactics, and to some extent its equipment in order to maintain effective management of protest events (Baltink, 2006, p. 530). In order for police militarization of the Dutch protest policing style in the material dimension to occur, available military technology has to be adopted by police forces. As

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pointed out in 2006 however by Baltink, in practice the standardisation of the use of military technology by police forces in law enforcement activities such as protest policing is not easily feasible, although chances for such standardisation indeed occur (Baltink, 2006, p. 530). Even the Ministry of Internal and Royal Affairs (BZK) has pointed out in its policy document Vision on Safety and Technology, that relatively little attention had been paid to the ​ technological possibilities for increasing safety up until that period (Baltink, 2006, p. 530). It is therefore interesting to look whether standardisation of military technology has occurred since the policy document. The “bluetrace crowd control” system is a system which allows police forces to map the movements of individuals through bluetooth phones (Akkerman, 2012, p. 10). The system is developed by TNO, a company that focusses on the cooperation between emergency services, the national police, and defence by focussing on the sharing of technology. In addition to the “bluetrace crowd control” systems, surveillance systems such as LOTUS (developed by TNO) and Gatekeeper (developed by Thales Netherlands) have been developed and are now distributed on the global market (Akkerman, 2012, p. 11-13). The standardisation of military-like surveillance technologies by police departments in protest policing is therefore the most prominent development in the standardisation of military technology. A more recent development in the process of adopting military technology by police forces is the use of the drone for surveillance possibilities. As is stated by Koster (2013), “the use of drones for domestic affairs has developed itself rapidly, for example in the extension of surveillance-possibilities of law- and police services” (p. 37). Although the use of drones for domestic affairs is progressing fast in the US, in the Netherlands the use of drones has not been regulated yet. Indeed, the possibilities of the usage of drones has been acknowledged by for example the Minister of Internal Affairs who “has noticed that the usage of ‘flying cameras’ for law enforcement of the public order can be necessary to maintain an overview of the movement of masses in public spaces” (Custers et al., 2015, p. 115). However, although the debate concerning the usage of drones is progressing, up until now the Dutch government has not dispensed permits or exemptions for the usage of drones by police forces.

The material available to law enforcement for the policing of protests therefore has changed only together with the introduction of specialised police units with the 2002 and 2007 regulations. Similarly, there has not been a sufficient legal base for the adoption of military

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technology by police forces in the policing of protests. This thesis expects that the minimal development in the adoption of new (military) weaponry and technology is not sufficient enough to influence the material dimension of militarization of the Dutch protest policing style. As a result, this thesis expects that in practice, the lack of standardisation of new ​ martial weaponry and technology results in a low militarization of the material dimension of the Dutch protest policing style.

4.2 The Expansion of Specialised Police Forces Police Paramilitary Units (PPU’s) are police units which “derive their appearance, tactics, operations, weaponry, and culture to a significant extent from military special operations units” (Kraska, 2007, p. 6). An expansion of such units is an integral element to the development of the operational dimension of the militarization of a protest policing style. In the period between 2002 and 2016, several of such units stand out in the Netherlands: the ME, the mounted police, the dog brigade, BRATRA units, and arrest teams from the Dutch military police: the Marechaussee.

4.2.1 The ME

The ME is an organization for the execution of specific activities within the police task (Staatscourant, 2007, p. 4). With its 1994 regulation, the ME was set to support the Dutch police force in extraordinary cases during which the capacity of the police force alone was not sufficient for coping with law enforcement disturbances (Staatscourant, 2007, p. 4). In 2002 this situation changed when in a police document on the Frame of Reference of Conflict- and Crisis Management which altered the availability, interchangeability, uniformity and quality of the ME with regards to law enforcement support (Staatscourant, 2007, p. 4). The most outstanding change in the functions of the ME was however established with the 2007 regulation which facilitated an increased deployment of the ME by the Dutch police force (Staatscourant, 2007. p. 4). The main difference between the 2002 police document and the 2007 regulation is that whereas the former facilitated an optional cooperation between the ME and Dutch police departments, the latter regulated the deployability and functions of the ME uniformly for all police departments (Kroon &

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Hoeksema, 2014, p. 7). Following the 2007 ME regulation the core tasks of the unit widened from operating primarily at emergency public order situations to everyday law enforcement tasks such as event accompaniment and crowd control.

4.2.2 The Mounted Police, Dog Brigades and BRATRA-units

Besides the widening and deepening of law enforcement tasks of the ME, the 2007 regulation established the functions of recon units, mounted police, dog brigades and BRATRA units (Staatscourant, 2007, p. 4). Although such units existed already before this regulation, the theoretical functions and deployment of the units where theoretically established for law enforcement. Firstly, according to Art. 4, recon or scout units’ principal task is to “scout the situation inconspicuously prior to large scale law enforcement activities” in order to provide law enforcement executives with necessary intel (Staatscourant, 2007, p. 5). Similarly, the mounted police and dog brigade units, respectively established by Art. 5 and Art. 6, are specialised in the use of horses and dogs for violent incidents or in support of the ME during big events. Both units are imposing units and are therefore primarily used in order to control a crowd through for example charges. Lastly, the 2007 regulation established fire and teargas (BRATRA) units (Art. 9) which primary tasks is to clear blocked or barricaded infrastructure and to protect ME personnel through the use of teargas (Staatscourant, 2007, p. 5 & 6).

4.2.3 Arrest Teams of the Marechaussee

In addition to an expansion of PPU’s, Dutch law enforcement agencies also increasingly deploy actual military units in order to enforce law during protest events. In particular, arrest teams of the Marechaussee have become increasingly integrated in every-day law enforcement tasks such as protest policing. Traditionally, arrest teams were foremost occupied with the security of threatened individuals, the managing of hostage situations, and the arresting of highly dangerous suspects (Timmer, 2005, p. 518). Recently the tasks of arrest teams have however become more complex, more dangered, and more extensive (Timmer, 2005, p. 518). In fact, whereas previously the criterium for the involvement of arrest teams was ‘imminent firearm violence’, this criterium has now expanded to ‘life

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threatening’ or ‘dangerous’ situations (Timmer, 2005, p. 518). The widening of the criterium for the deployment of arrest teams in the beginning of the 21st century demanded a legal basis in order for such teams to adhere to the rising needs of police departments (Timmer, 2005, p. 518). As is pointed out by Timmer (2005), “the AT’s after all constitute the life insurance of the regular police officer, but when the extra charge is not paid, such coverage expires” (p. 518). It was however not until the 2007 regulation, that the legal basis for arrest teams in the use of everyday law enforcement tasks such as protest policing was established (p. 5).

Timmer points out that “the application of the violence monopoly [of the police] has gained quality because of an improved legal anchoring” (p. 521). The creation and development of specialised units between 2002 and 2016 therefore indicate a significant development in the process of militarization in the organizational dimension of the Dutch protest policing style. As a result, this thesis expects that in practice, the coming into existence of and the ​ development of specialised units such as the ME, arrest teams of the Marechaussee, the Dog Brigade, the Mounted Police, BRATRA-units and the BSB, leads to a highly militarised Dutch protest policing style in the organizational dimension.

4.3 Operational Patterns Modeled After the Military

In order to understand the development of the operational dimension of protest policing in the Netherlands between 2002 and 2016, this thesis looks at physical violence in order to determine the development in the extent and manner of arrests, at factors that influence the development of surveillance and the sharing of information, such as new communication technologies, and at operational tactics, in order to determine the theoretical development of police militarization of the Dutch protest policing style in the operational dimension.

4.3.1 The Influence of New Communication Technologies

In order to understand the influence of new communication technologies on surveillance possibilities and the sharing of information, it is firstly important to outline the importance of

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communication to collective action. With modern protests, the influence of communication technology is undeniable. Today, mobilisation occurs more and more through social media which makes the possibilities for bottom-up movements even greater. Although social movements which organise protests in a top-down fashion also use social media, such movements are more likely to fall back on traditional channels such as the regular media or a strike (Postmes et. al, 2013, p. 56). On the one hand, the information-age therefore has its direct effects upon mobilisation for protest events because according to Postmes et al (2013), firstly, “the internet, like no other medium, makes visible, through personal networks and social media, who ‘we’ are” (p. 84). Secondly, “the internet provides a platform for the alternative provision of information and with that an independent vision on “they” and their actions and responsibilities” (p. 85). Thirdly, there is an “accelerated distribution of feelings such as dissatisfaction or indignation” (p. 85). Moreover, “the speed of such distribution of information results in better information about locations, opportunities and means to protest - which all contributes to a feeling of efficacy”, such as the Occupy-movements or the demonstrations of the Arab Spring in the Middle-East and North-Africa in 2011 (p. 85). Lastly, the boundaries between personal and mass-communication increasingly blur which “results in the fading of the difference between the ‘outsider’ and the ‘insider’ to some extent: it creates the possibility of bottom-up formation of large amounts of groups with a shared social identity” (p. 85). The development of such technology has occurred foremost in the twenty-first century, and the Netherlands, together with Iceland, has been a frontrunner in the use of social networks and instant messaging in the EU (Postmes et al., 2013, p. 101). With regards to the organization of protest such an increase of the use of the internet means that the chance for spontaneous actions and initiatives increases: mobilisation of protesters today occurs foremost through social networks. In addition, the range of the internet means that people can mobilise support for a cause at different locations and in large numbers (Postmes et al., 2013, p. 121). Therefore, new communication technologies increase the possibilities for a bottom-up organization of protests. Not only does the increased use of the internet have its effect on the organization of protest, communication technology also affects the type of information that reaches the people: people become more autonomous in their choice of knowledge and use which makes image-forming even less controllable.

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Besides the effect of new communication technologies for the organization of protest events, media such as Facebook and Twitter also effect the law enforcement during such protests. In fact, law enforcement agencies nowadays use social media in order to obtain information for tactical purposes for the policing of (mass) demonstrations (COPS, 2013, p. 1). Policing agencies increasingly make use of such intelligence, as argued in a report by the US Community of Oriented Policing Services (COPS) (2013), “in order to gauge the mood of a crowd, assess whether threats of criminal activity are developing, and stay apprised of any plans by large groups of people to move to other locations” (p. 1). While the use of social media and the intelligence resulting thereof can be used to optimize practices in order to prevent the unnecessary use of force, there could however also be an opposite effect: “one worry is that a lack of training for and understanding by investigators about what they are seeing online could lead to the criminalization of innocent individuals” (Mateescu et al., 2015, p. 6). As the Netherlands is a frontrunner in the use of new communication technologies and policing agencies, also in the Netherlands, increasingly turn to intelligence flowing from such media, the increased militarization of the Dutch protest policing style since 2002 could partly result from the criminalization of participants of protests organised through social media. For example, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in the United States has been monitoring the Black Lives Matter movement by collecting location data, activities of the movement, and other gatherings through Facebook, Vine, and Twitter (Joseph, 2015). When a bulletin of the DHS on a Black Lives Matter movement protest was shared, it said that “for unspecified reasons ‘we remain concerned that (un)affiliated individuals could potentially use this event to commit acts of violence in the Chinatown area”, thereby criminalizing participants although there was “no information suggesting violent behaviour [was] planned for Washington, DC” (Joseph, 2015). The violent and militarised nature of the policing of these demonstrations in the US therefore partly results from the criminalization of participants because of the gathering of intelligence of social media.

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4.3.2. Physical Violence and Police Aggressiveness

When looking at the extent and manner of arrests the procedural arrangements for the use of physical violence by police officers are outlined. In essence, the Dutch police force is reticent in the use of force and intent for the de-escalation of crisis situations while aiming to maintain a “balanced use of violence” (de Nationale Ombudsman, 2013, p. 49). The degree of physical violence depends on the extent to which violence is justified: a) when a suspect for example curses at a police officer, the officer is not allowed to use physical violence but has to de-escalate the situation through communication. When b) a suspect does not cooperates with his arrest by for example running away light physical violence is permitted such as grabbing and pushing. Moreover, c) when a suspect is resisting heavily during an arrest the police office is, in addition to grabbing and pushing, an officer is also allowed to floor a suspect and to use handcuffs. Lastly, d) when heavy physical violence such as pushing and hitting is directed against police offices, or when the suspect (possibly) carries a firearm, the police officer is allowed to use heavier physical violence such as the use of a baton, pepper spray, police dogs or firearms (De Nationale Ombudsman, 2013, pp. 43 t/m 56). Important to point out is however that the police officer has to use the least radical means in order to calm down a suspect (de Nationale Ombudsman, 2013, pp. 43 t/m 56). These standards, amongst others, have been established by the Dutch Police Law of 1993 and the procedural arrangements for the police in 1994 and it is important to point out that such standards for the use of physical violence have remained the same in the period between 2002 and 2016 (Besluit van 8 april, 1994). The strive for de-escalation, a balanced use of violence, and a proportional use of physical violence therefore have always been core elements of the Dutch police. What is striking however, is that in the Netherlands the debate about police violence not only in protest policing but in law enforcement in general has intensified throughout this period. Firstly, the debate on police violence has intensified in the period since 2002 in the media. Newspaper articles and social media increasingly express concern about police conduct in general. According to Kosse (2013), “There is a societal trend which indicates a high sensitivity for incidents and media-related hypes” (p. 12). As a result, the intensification of the debate on police conduct in for example the US, leads to a similar development in the

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Netherlands as Dutch civilians relate concerns to the Dutch police. Secondly, since the implementation of the national Dutch police (first of January, 2013), in parliament debates revolving around police violence have been high on the political agenda. On the 3rd of July, 2015, for example, several debates were held in parliament about the suspect Mitch Henriquez which died during an arrest due to police violence (Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal, 2014-2015). Even the National Ombudsman has initiated a national investigation on the use of violence by police officers, of which papers such as Justified Police Violence ​ and Contrasting Images were released in 2013 and 2014. Lastly, literature on police violence ​ ​ in the Netherlands has expanded since 2002. For example, research papers like Police ​ Violence (Timmer, 2005) and Hard and Soft (Naeye et al., 2006) on police violence in the ​ ​ ​ police department of Amsterdam-Amstelland have brought to attention ethical questions about police conduct. Although the debate on police violence touches upon a wider area of law enforcement tasks than protest policing, it also indeed indicates theoretical police militarization in the operational dimension of protest policing.

4.3.3 Operational Tactics and the Controlling of Space

As is mentioned above, there are several protest policing styles which prevail in managing protest events. The strategic incapacitation approach, although to a limited extent, has ​ ​ diffused from the policing of transnational protests to national protests. Especially the use of taping to restrict access, the use of mobile nets, and erected barricades, in order to control the protest space has increased since the beginning of the twenty-first century (van Leeuwen et. al, 2016, p. 145). As is argued by van Leeuwen et al, (2016), tactics of the control of space “were incidentally deployed at non-threatening protests . . . [and] somewhat threatening protests and, especially, threatening protests witnessed strategic incapacitation tactics more often than non-threatening events did” (p. 142-144). Mass arrests on the other hand were quite rare in the period between 2009 and 2013 (p. 143). Although substantive data on the diffusion of strategic incapacitation for the Netherlands is not available, its (limited) diffusion to protest policing of national protests indicates that the operational tactics and the controlling of space by police departments indeed have changed and have become more militarised since 2002.

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The influence of new communication technologies on collective action and the use of surveillance in order to predict such collective action therefore have shaped the operational dimension of police militarization of the Dutch protest policing style. As a result, a significant increase in the use of surveillance and the sharing of information can be expected in the PEA analysis later on in this thesis. Similarly, Although standards for the use of physical violence have remained the same throughout the period of 2002 until 2016, the debate on police violence has intensified. In addition, the diffusion of the strategic incapacitation approach has changed the operational tactics of protest policing. This thesis therefore expects that newspaper articles of police conduct during protest events increasingly focus on the the extent and manner of arrests, injuries following protest policing, and police aggression, parallel to the intensification of the debate on police violence. This thesis therefore expects that in practice, the influence of new communication technologies, the intensified debate about police violence, and the (limited) diffusion of the strategic incapacitation approach, lead to a highly militarised Dutch protest policing style in the operational dimension.

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5. Militarization of the Dutch Protest Policing Style in Practice

This section tests whether the theoretical development of militarization in the Dutch protest policing style translates to practice through a PEA analysis of Dutch national newspapers which describe police conduct at protest events. After providing a detailed oversight of such police conduct in the years between 2002 and 2016, this section measures the extent of militarization of the protest policing style for the operational, organizational, and material dimensions. In addition, this section outlines whether the expectations on police militarization of the Dutch protest policing style in practice, which are stated in the theoretical part of the analysis, are met.

5.1 Detailed oversight of the years 2002-2016 on police conduct during protests

Based on the indicators which result from Kraska’s (2007) model on militarization of police conduct and Gilham’s (2011) model on strategic incapacitation which can be seen in table 3.2, this thesis categorized protests between May 2002 and December 2016 into protests during which police conduct occurred and of which police conduct was militarised or non-militarised. The following section outlines the context and nature of (militarised) police conduct during these protests.

2002 In 2002, only two protests took place: one on the 4th of February during the Dutch Royal wedding between Prince Willem-Alexander and Maxima (Trouw, 2002, a; NRC Handelsblad, 2002), and one on the 19th of August during which young Molukkers demonstrated against the situation at the South-Molucca islands (Trouw, 2002, b). Although the ME was present during the protest on of the Molukkers, there is no further information provided in the articles that indicates a militarization of police conduct during this protest (Trouw, 2002, b). Secondly, the ME was present during the protest on the Dutch Royal House. As is written in NRC Handelsblad, “the police are so massively present that the ​ ​ answer to the question of which group there are more people on the square, police or civilians, can barely be given” (NRC Handelsblad, 2002). However, since police conduct

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during this protest showed no further tenets of militarism, police conduct, like the conduct during the protest on the Dutch Royal House, was not militarised.

2003 Of the 12 protests that were held in 2003 the Dutch national newspapers wrote several articles. In those articles police conduct of only 4 demonstrations was described. Police conduct during the demonstration on the 17th of february about the war of Iraq and the demonstration on the 3rd of november about the Dutch cabinet’s plans was marked by ‘arrests’ and ‘aggressiveness’ (Cornelisse, 2003; Trouw, 2003; Beusekamp & van Keken, 2003). However, since in both cases police conduct did not show more tenets of militarization, police conduct during these two demonstrations cannot be considered militarised. Interesting to point out is, that in an article of the NRC Handelsblad on the ​ ​ demonstration about Iraq an interesting statement is made. In other countries the turnout at protests on the war in Iraq was much higher than in the Netherlands. Klandermans (2003) explains during an interview of the NRC that “Since the ‘80’s nothing has happened in the ​ ​ Netherlands. The two protests against the cruise missiles in certain ways were the ultimate protests, and they did not have the effect that the protesters wished for. I think that because of that a lot of people quit going to protests” (De Bruin, 2003). On the 19th of may, 2003, however, during a demonstration of extreme-right fascists in Apeldoorn, the turnout of protesters was significantly higher than that of the other demonstrations in 2003 and the police had to deploy not only 385 agents, but also 70 ME’ers (Volkskrant, 2003; Nijen-Twilhaar, 2003). In addition, a helicopter was deployed which circled above the terrain of the demonstration. Although 17 arrests were made by the police, the demonstration itself was relatively quiet (Volkskrant, 2003). It is however important to point out that when looking to the police/civilian rate, being 455/70, that the police was overwhelmingly present. A few months later, on the 16th of August, 2003, a demonstration was held for the shooting of Moroccan Driss Arbib by a police agent (Pels, 2003; NRC, 2003). De Telegraaf of Monday, the 18th of August, 2003, points out that the “police had ​ ​ deployed several vans of the mobile unit, the mounted police, and a water cannon at some distance of the area” (Pels, 2003). As a result, police conduct at both the demonstration of the extreme-right and the demonstration on the shooting of Driss is considered militarised.

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2004 In 2004, it is remarkable that whilst there were articles by the Dutch national newspapers on 11 different protest events, of only three of these demonstrations police conduct is also described. On the 7th of June, two different demonstrations took place: one on the legalisation of drugs, and one of anti fascists and fascists. Police conduct during the former was foremost designed to guide the demonstration, which rather had the nature of a parade, through the ‘Ij’ tunnel. Although the ME had to help when fans of the Dutch soccer team Ajax were involved in a few fights, the demonstration went by without any major incidents (Rombouts, 2004). During the second demonstration however, which was held by anti-fascists and fascists in The Hague, the police arrested no less than 330 antifascist activists (NRC Handelsblad, 2004; Het Financieele Dagblad, 2004). In addition, the police conducted a few charges on the antifascists since they did not follow predetermined guidelines as to where they were allowed to demonstrate. During these charges, two police officers and three activists were injured. What is strikingly militarised about the police conduct during this protest is the mass-arrest of 330 activists, the use of charges, and the wounded activists resulting from these charges (NRC Handelsblad, 2004). Lastly, on the 5th of July, a demonstration against an asylum centre in Vlagtwedde, accompanied by the police, ran without any incidents (Parool, 2004).

2005 As opposed to 2003, and 2004, there were only four demonstrations of which articles were written in 2005. Of those articles, police conduct was only described for one protest: on the 4th of April police officers arrested a few activists which were demonstrating against ‘prison boats’ (Volkskrant, 2005). This is however the only information provided about the police conduct during this demonstration. Police conduct can therefore not be labelled as militarised.

2006 In 2006, four demonstrations took place about which national newspapers have written articles. Only two of them however, described police conduct. Firstly, on the 6th of March, a demonstration took place of fascists and antifascists. Police conduct during this demonstration is a clear case of militarization: the ME, the dog brigade and the mounted police aimed to de-escalate the encounter of both groups (Reformatorisch Dagblad, 2006). In

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addition, the Marechaussee (the Dutch military police) provided aid to the police in managing the protest (Reformatorisch Dagblad, 2006). A second demonstration of the extreme right and the left took place on the 2nd of October, this time in Arnhem (Algemeen Dagblad, 2006). The police made 47 arrests, and the ME supported the police during the demonstration (Algemeen Dagblad, 2006). Police conduct during this demonstration therefore shows several tenets of militarization and is also considered militarised.

2007 Of the 7 demonstrations that took place in 2007, police conduct was described of four of them in Dutch newspaper articles. In only one case however police conduct was militarised: on the 17th of September, a demonstration took place at an asylum centre in Soest (Het Parool, 2007, a; Metro, 2007, a; Spits, 2007). This demonstration escalated quickly as the police, the ME and the protesters engaged in an encounter that ended in three injured protesters from police dogs and from police batons. Police conduct during this protest thus shows clear aggressiveness from the police officers as they “smashed into the protesters with their batons” (Het Parool, 2007, a). In addition, 23 arrests were made (Het Parool, 2007, a). During the other three demonstrations, respectively on the situation in Myanmar (Het Parool, 2007, b), of animal activists against the use of fur (Metro, 2007, b), and of Turkish and Kurdish protesters against the war between Turkey and the PKK (DAG, 2007, Het Financieele Dagblad, 2007; Metro, 2007, c), the police solely engaged in regular policing activities. Only during the protest against the war between Turkey and the PKK, the ME was present. There were however no further indications of the militarization of police conduct during this protest.

2008 In 2008, no less than 17 demonstrations took place about which national newspapers have written articles. It is interesting that of only nine of those demonstrations police conduct was described. Most importantly however, is that only two times police conduct at these demonstrations showed tenets of militarization. Firstly, on the 7th of July, a demonstration took place of anti-globalists in the wake of the G8 meeting later that week (Metro, 2008; Spits, 2008). The Dutch police, although it was no violent demonstration, arrested 15 protesters, used a police helicopter, speedboats (as the demonstration took place in the

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Merwede-port), and horses (Spits, 2008). In fact, according to the Spits (2008) protesters said ​ ​ that “the police randomly arrested protesters”, and spoke of an “embittered police force. . . “. Secondly, on the 1st of September, a demonstration took place of the extreme right Dutch party, the Volksunie (de Volkskrant, 2008; Het Parool, 2008). As this demonstration ​ ​ ​ ​ turned violent very quickly, the police arrested 20 participants. In addition, the ME accompanied the police with horses and batons, and performed charges in order to stop fights that broke out between the public and the protesters. As mayor Henk Jan Meijer of the town where the demonstration took place points out in the article of the Parool: “never was there such a big police force deployed for accompanying a protest . . . 160 police officers and ME were present” (de Volkskrant, 2008).

2009 In 2009. 9 demonstrations took place about which Dutch national newspapers have written articles. Although of these 9 demonstrations, of 4 demonstrations police conduct was described, only police conduct during one particular protest can be considered militarised. On the 2nd of March, a demonstration took place of the extreme right and the left in Maastricht (Reformatorisch Dagblad, 2009, a). The police, which made 10 arrests during the demonstrations, deployed no less than 300 police officers, horses, and three units of the ME. The police and the ME performed charges and even enclosed 200 protesters of the left for a period of time (Reformatorisch dagblad, 2009, a). Police performance at other demonstrations that year did not show tenets of militarization. On the 5th of January, during a demonstration against the Israeli involvement in Gaza, the police only made a few arrests (Metro, 2009, a). Two weeks later, during a demonstration on the same topic, the police removed a few items with a swastika print and a few flags (Metro, 2009, b; Reformatorisch Dagblad, 2009, b). Later that year, on the 15th of June during a demonstration on the elections in Iran, the police and the ME patrolled in order to prevent escalation (Spits, 2009). However, as the demonstration went quietly and no other information is written about the police conduct, it cannot be considered as militarised.

2010 Of the 10 demonstrations about which newspaper articles were written in 2010, only 5 of them contained information about police conduct during those protests. Interesting to point

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out however is that police conduct at all 5 demonstrations was militarised. Firstly, on the first of February, a protest of the extreme right Dutch Volks-Unie in Den Haag led to 32 arrests. The police, together with the ME and a police helicopter, were able to prevent the protest from escalating (Metro, 2010, a). Secondly, on the 3rd of May, during a protest on Labour Day, the police used the dog brigade and mounted police, and was aided by the ME as protesters were carrying sticks, leading to an escalation between the police and the protesters as they were performing charges (NRC handelsblad, 2010, a; Telegraaf, 2010). Interestingly, according to the NRC Handelsblad ​ (2010) the committee of the protest said the sticks were intended to carry banners and flags and is of opinion that the police has used “heavy violence” and officers acted “unnecessarily repressive”. Thirdly, on the 4th of October, during a protest of squatters, several protesters, police officers, and horses became injured (NRC Handelsblad, 2010, b; Parool, 2010, a; Metro, 2010, b). The police, according to NRC Handelsblad (2010, b), was accompanied by the ME ​ ​ which used batons in charges in order to contain the protest. In fact, according to the Parool ​ (2010, b), one girl was hit by 6 ME officers with batons as a result of which she got serious injuries. In the Dutch national newspaper the Metro (2010, b) it is even mentioned that tear-gas was used by the police when the confrontation between the squatters and the police escalated: “the police anticipated a violent encounter between them and the protesters. Such an encounter indeed happened. And the intervention of the police was very much repressive. The mounted police rode in the crowd and used their batons . . . The situation was settled when the police decided to use tear-gas” (Eigen Vertaling). As a result, this example is one of the most striking cases of militarised police conduct during protest events so far. On the first of November, more or less 60 supporters of the right Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV), and more specifically, supporters of its party leader Geert Wilders were protesting in Amsterdam (Algemeen Dagblad, 2010). Although the protest is small and calm, the terrain looks like a “warzone”:

“an unknown police force surrounds the field. dozens of ME-vans stand prepared to intervene. Hundreds of agents are watching. A helicopter is circling above the city. A water cannon is set up in a neighbouring street. And then there is the unprecedented amount of press which is present. For each protester there is at least one reporter and two police officers present, so it seems (Algemeen Dagblad, 2010).

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Apart from 34 arrests that the police made, there were no further incidents (Algemeen Dagblad, 2010). Lastly, on the 15th of November, during another protest of squatters in Den Haag, the police attended with horses and the ME, wearing helmets, because of the previous demonstration of squatters earlier that year which got out of hand (het Parool, 2010). This demonstration however went by without major incidents.

2011 In 2011, articles were written about 11 protests. Only 4 of them also described police conduct. During two protests, one of animal activists on the use of fur and one on of the extreme right, the police only made arrests and conducted patrolling activities. On the first of May however, during the Dutch Labour Day, protests were managed by the ME and the police, who performed charges in order to prevent escalation (Algemeen Dagblad, 2011). In addition, 11 arrests were made (Algemeen Dagblad, 2011). As a result, police conduct during this protest was militarised. Moreover, on the 3rd of October, another protest of squatters took place. Similar to police conduct at other protests of squatters, the police managed the protest with help of the ME, mounted police and the dog brigade. Charges were executed and arrests were made during which a few of the protesters got injured (Telegraaf, 2011). According to the Telegraaf (2011) it was more or less the same situation as during the earlier ​ ​ protest of squatters “the amount of police officers that had to contain a protest of squatters in Amsterdam this weekend, was as big as the amount of protesters themselves. Every squatter pretty much had its own personal security guard”.

2012 Like 2010 and 2011, there was a high amount of demonstrations about which Dutch national newspapers have written articles: no less than 9 protests took place. Most importantly however is that none of the articles on these 9 protests contained information about police conduct. Consequently, it is not possible to assess the militarization of police conduct during protest events for this year.

2013

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In 2013, 5 protests took place about which articles were written. Interesting is is that of only one protest police conduct was also described. On the 18th of November, during a demonstration of activists against the Dutch traditional character ‘Zwarte Piet’, police ​ ​ officers were visibly carrying bulletproof vests and a gun (NRC Handelsblad, 2013). In addition, a “special unit” was seen by visitors of the entry of Sinterklaas (NRC Handelsblad, 2013). As a result, police conduct during the demonstration on Zwarte Piet is considered militarised.

2014 Seven protests took place in 2014, of which three articles wrote also about police conduct during protests. In one occasion, during a protest of Greenpeace on June 16, several arrests were made by the police (Telegraaf, 2014). Also during a protest of activists against Zwarte Piet, the police made no less than 90 arrests (het Parool, 2014). However, as no further information is provided on police conduct during both protests, police conduct cannot be considered as militarised. On the 4th of August however, the police, accompanied with the ME and a police helicopter, was able to successfully manage a protest against the violence in de Gaza (Volkskrant, 2014). Consequently, police conduct during that protest is indeed considered as militarised.

2015 2015 shows a similar situation to that of 2014: 8 demonstrations took place, of three of which Dutch newspaper articles also described police conduct. Police conduct in 2015 is only considered militarised in one occasion. On the 16th of March, students of the ‘New University’ criticised police performance during one of their protests (Het Parool, 2015): “the police smashed into the students with ‘fists’ and ‘batons’. According to the New University the violence was unnecessary, because the protest went peacefully. Students say that one protester has bruised ribs and two bruised fingers” (Het Parool, 2015). During the other two protests however, militarization of police conduct did not occur. Although during a demonstration of the extreme right Pegida the ME aided the police, no other information is given that shows a militarization of police conduct (Telegraaf, 2015). In addition, police conduct on the 2nd of November during a protest nearby an asylum centre also shows no tenets of militarization besides the use of a baton (Volkskrant, 2015).

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2016 In 2016, 13 demonstrations took place. Dutch newspapers wrote articles on police conduct of no less than 8 of these demonstrations. It is interesting to point out however, that only in two occasions police conduct showed tenets of militarization. Firstly, on January 18th, a quiet protest of the extreme right Pegida was managed by both the police, mounted police and the ME by means of arrests (Reformatorisch Dagblad, 2016). In addition, on June 20 during a protest of anti-fascists, both the police and the ME made 24 arrests, which in this case can be considered as mass arrests (Trouw, 2016; NRC Next, 2016). In the article of NRC Next ​ (2016) that day it was even written that

Making arrests on such a scale is a way to silence people who want to voice opponent opinions. Provocation can lead to confrontation, which the police aims to prevent as much as possible, according to van den Brule. ‘But you can wonder who was provoking this situation, with so many police officers on the street’. When a police officer tells a person to leave twice, it can arrest that person afterwards. ‘But police officers have to abide by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality’. van den Brule thinks however that those are elastic concepts. ‘the police thinks that they are allowed to go far. I often think that they go too far.

5.2 Results

The analysis is continued by researching to what extent the protest policing style in the Netherlands is militarised. To do so, indicators for the material, operational, and organizational dimensions of militarization are measured and compared in each dimension from 2010 until 2016.

5.2.1 The Military Dimension

For the material dimension, the use of the baton and the use of a police helicopter are both mentioned five times in Dutch newspaper articles on police conduct during protests. The use of bulletproof vests, a speedboat, a

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service gun, tear-gas, and a water-cannon on the other hand, have only been mentioned one or two times. All other indicators have not been mentioned in the articles analysed in this thesis. This thesis adopts Kraska’s (2007) figure (p. 4) to assess police militarization using continuums whilst also incorporating Gilham’s (2011) indicators. Following figure (1) this thesis points out that whereas the use of helicopters and police batons has occurred more often between 2002 and 2016, the overall militarization of the protest policing style of the Netherlands in the material dimension occurs to a significant low extent, with most indicators to be found, only one or two times, or weren’t even mentioned at all in Dutch newspaper articles on police conduct during protest events (table). As a result, the expectation that the ​ lack of standardisation of new martial weaponry and technology results in a low militarization of the material dimension of the Dutch protest policing style, is therefore ​ confirmed by the results of the PEA analysis.

5.2.2 The Organizational Dimension

When looking at the organizational dimension, all indicators are mentioned several times in Dutch newspapers articles on police conduct during protest events between May 2002 and December 2006. In addition, in one occasion even the military police (Marechaussee) was providing aid to the police during a protest.

Following Figure 2 and Table 5 militarization in general indeed occurs to a high extent in the organizational dimension of the Dutch protest policing style, as the use of the mounted police was counted nine times, the use of the ME was counted twenty times, and the use of the dog brigade was counted 4 times in Dutch newspaper articles on police conduct during protest events in the Netherlands. As a result, the expectation that the coming into existence of and ​

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the development of specialised units such as the ME, arrest teams of the Marechaussee, the Dog Brigade, the Mounted Police, BRATRA-units and the BSB, leads to a highly militarised Dutch protest policing style in the organizational dimension, is therefore confirmed by the ​ ​ results of the PEA analysis.

5.2.3 The Operational Dimension

Lastly, militarization occurs only in some sub-areas of the operational dimension of the protest policing style of the Netherlands (Figure 3). Whereas militarization indeed can be found in the extent and the manner of arrests and the control of space, no indicators were found in Dutch newspaper articles which indicate the use of surveillance and the sharing of information by the police during protest events. In addition, tactics intended to control the protest space such as for example the erection of barricades were not mentioned in any of the articles on police conduct during protest events.

Therefore, the extent of militarization of the protest policing style in the operational dimension is low to average, as indicators in the control of space and the extent and manner of arrests indeed have been found five to seven times whereas other indicators were not found in the Dutch newspaper articles at all (Table 5). As a result, the expectation that the influence ​ of new communication technologies, the intensified debate about police violence, and the (limited) diffusion of the strategic incapacitation approach, lead to a highly militarised Dutch protest policing style in the operational dimension, is therefore not confirmed by the results ​ of the PEA analysis.

Table 5: Results PEA Analysis of Militarization of the Protest Policing Style.

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Militarization of the Protest Policing Style

Material Dimension ● extent and manner of using force - martial weaponry, - wapenstok (baton) 5x ​ ​ technology, advanced - helmen (helmets) 1x ​ ​ equipment - schilden (shields) 0x ​ ​ - dienstpistool (service gun) 1x ​ ​ - pepperspray 0x ​ - semi-automatisch pistool 0x ​ ​ (semi-automatic gun) - kogelwerend vest (bulletproof vest) 1x ​ ​ - traangas (tear-gas) 1x ​ ​ - machine geweer (machine gun) 0x ​ ​ - helikopter (helicopter) 5x ​ ​ - waterkanon (water canon) 2x ​ ​ - speedboat (speedboat) 1x ​ ​

Organizational Dimension ● extent and manner of using force - martial arrangements - politie te paard (mounted police) 9x ​ ​ - hondenbrigade (dog brigade) 4x ​ ​ - ME (Mobile Unit) 20x ​ ​ - (Marechaussee (Military Police)) 1x ​ ​ Operational Dimension ● controlling space - patterns of activity - charges (charges) 7 x ​ modeled after the military ● use of surveillance - surveillance (surveillance) 0x ​ ​ ● sharing of information - filmen (police filming) 0x ​ ​ ● extent and manner of arrests - massa-arrestaties (mass arrests) 7x ​ ​ - gewonden (injuries) 5x ​ ​ - agressie (aggression) 1x ​ ​

5.3 The Period From 2002 Until 2010

As this thesis aims to analyse militarization as a process, rather than as an event in a specific point in time, this section points out the distinctive patterns of the process of the militarization of the protest policing style in the Netherlands since 2002. Graph 1, which follows from Table 6, shows the measurement of the indicators for the material, operational

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and organizational dimension for the protest policing style in the Netherlands for each year between 2002 and 2016. In the case of the material dimension a clear pattern can be seen: from 2002 until 2010 there is a gradual increase of the amount of indicators found in Dutch newspaper articles. 2010 and 2011 then show a peak in the amount of material indicators found. Such a development, although to a lesser extent, can also be seen in the operational and organizational dimension.

5.4 The Period Since 2010

The measurement of material indicators of militarization of the protest policing style in the Netherlands, after a short period of increase, can be seen gradually declining since 2013 (graph 1). The amount of operational indicators measured in Dutch newspaper articles on police conduct during protest events shows a similar pattern. What is interesting, however, is the gradual increase of the amount of organizational indicators measured since 2013.

Following the PEA analysis, it can thus be concluded that, on the one hand, with regards to the organizational dimension and the material dimension, theory translates to practice. With regards to the operational dimension on the other hand, this was not the case. Most importantly however, is that apart from a peak in 2010, police militarization of the Dutch protest policing style in the Netherlands is low.

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Graph 1: Development of Militarization Between 2002 and 2016 in Each Dimension.

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6. Discussion

This section provides possible suggestions for the result that police militarization is low in the Dutch protest policing style. It does so by focussing on the limitations of the methodology of this thesis: the use of newspaper articles and the use of terrorism as context.

6.1 Newspaper Coverage of Police Conduct during Protest Events

Following the qualitative and PEA analyses, this thesis concludes that the development of police militarization of the Dutch protest policing style is low. However, since the methodology of the analysis involves the usage of newspaper articles, the results indicating a low police militarization of the Dutch protest policing style could result from the possibility that Dutch newspapers do not extensively cover police conduct during protest events in their articles. In fact, what is striking about Dutch newspaper articles on protests between 2002 and 2016, is that of only 40% police conduct during such protests was described in newspaper articles. One explanation for the low coverage of police conduct during protest events can be that objective matters such as the characteristics of protests have little bearing on whether and how the protest event is reported in the media. Smith et al. (2001) point out that “media agendas can drive the selection of protest events that are reported, independently of the numbers or activities of protesters themselves” (p. 4). Therefore, the media will be looking for images or quotes that appeal to their readers. In fact, “the requirements for social movement events are to have characteristics that make them newsworthy - such as drama, conflict, and personalization” (Vliegenthart and Walgrave, n.d., p. 4). Mass-media thus plays an undeniable role in collective action and protest as it creates and regulates the social reality of such protests: on the one hand, the framing of protests by the media can be positive when it stimulates understanding between groups. On the other hand, the framing of protests can induce conflict when it provides a misrepresented image of events. Another explanation for the low coverage of police conduct in Dutch newspaper articles is that it is in the interest of political actors to limit negative media reports on (militarised) police conduct during protest events. When violent or harsh police conduct is

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described in newspaper articles it can lead to mobilization of different groups, ultimately increasing the conflict (Postmes et al., 2013, p. 93). For example, after the shooting of Mitch Henriquez by a police officer, protests against police violence directly affected not only the trust of the Dutch population in its police force, but also in its government (RTL, 2016).

6.1.1 Summary

The conclusion that police militarization of the Dutch protest policing style is low could therefore result from the fact that police conduct is a less covered topic in newspaper articles on protest events, as newspaper articles focus on other newsworthy facts.

6.2 Militarization In Other Sectors

In addition to the use of newspaper articles, it is important to point out, as it was stated in the introduction, that this thesis has analysed Dutch police militarization of protest policing in the context of terrorism. Although police militarization in the context of terrorism is not so evident in the policing of protests, the dynamic of police militarization can indeed become evident when looking at (law enforcement) sectors other than protest policing.

6.2.1 The Protection of Objects and Individuals

Kraska (2007) points out that in the case of the US, that “what is less known is the long history—predating the terrorist event of 9/11—of the US military’s mission of creeping into functions traditionally viewed as the purview of police”, resulting in a spillover effect which affected the framing of crime, terrorism, the war on drugs, and eventually law enforcement such as protest policing (p. 5 t/m 11). It is therefore important to provide a short overview of the development of militarization of law enforcement in the Netherlands. The most striking development in the militarization of law enforcement in the Netherlands is in the protection of objects and individuals. The protection of objects and individuals has changed substantially already after the murder of Pim Fortuyn in 2002 with the creation of the system of Supervision and Security, established in 2002. According to the a report of The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies on this system (2012), it was designed in

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order to “prevent (terrorist) attacks on individuals, objects and services” (p. 5). Before the murder, such tasks were managed by regular police forces. With the introduction of the system of Supervision and Security, a National Coordinator of Supervision and Security (CBB) was established who is responsible for “both policy preparation and the execution of the security of objects and individuals” (p. 12). In addition, the system established a foundation for the use of protective intelligence, such as the use of risk-analyses through ​ ​ open sources, for example the media, and closed sources (p. 12). Already in 2004, an extension of the system was necessary since the demand for supervision and security of objects and individuals significantly increased (De Wijk, 2012, p. 12). As a result, the unit of Supervision and Security (EBB) was founded, the Marechaussee invested in extra technical facilities and vehicles, and the function for national deputy was introduced in order to cope with the rising demand (p. 12). Most notably, the Dutch House of Representatives established in 2004 that the Military Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) and the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) would function as the supplier of information necessary of the Security and Supervision of persons and objects (p. 13). Threats following the release of Fitna (2008), a movie made by the Dutch PVV leader ​ ​ Geert Wilders, the Lebanon Tribunal (2009), the Afghan Conference (2009), The European Elections (2009), and the attack on Queens Day (2009), have proved that in the period since 2004 that Security and Supervision of persons and objects has become an independent security discipline (p. 38). Since the characteristic changes in the militarization of the security and safety of threatened individuals and objects, a spillover effect is observed to the ​ ​ protection of non-threatened individuals and objects. ​ ​ Most noticeable, is the introduction of the High Risk and Safety Squadron (HRB) which was established in 2015 for the surveillance of persons, objects, and services with high importance. In addition, units such as the Brigade of Special Security Assignments (BSB) and the Special Service for Interventions (DSI) nowadays can assist the high risk safety squadron when the situation requires so (De Wijk, 2012, p. 13). Moreover, in 2016 an article was released which stated the “deployment of police with machine-guns” in the protection of public spaces such as shops and railway stations (NOS, 2016). Police officers will be equipped with an MP5-machine gun, which has a greater reach and can fire more bullets than an ordinary gun (NOS, 2016). In addition, a similar development can be seen in the recent

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re-organization of the Dutch ME. As is argued above, the 2007 regulation of the ME established the possibility for regular police units to deploy everyday law enforcement tasks, also outside the sphere of its traditional tasks where the ME was set to support the Dutch police force only in extraordinary cases during which the capacity of the police force alone was not sufficient for coping with law enforcement. It is important to point out that, the main reason for the development of police militarization in the field of the protection of civilians and objects in the Netherlands, were terrorist attacks in other countries. In fact, as argued by Akkerman (2016):

During the Cold War, safety was relatively easy defined: the main goal was to keep the Soviet Union outside by means of collective defense. Safety was foremost a task of defense. In modern times, safety is defined in terms of the infraction of the economical, societal, and political stability. Or, more specifically, after the attacks of the 11th of September, 2001, in terms of the protection against terrorist attacks. It is therefore no surprise that since 2001 the Dutch government has been thinking about a new approach (p. 7).

6.2.2 Border Security

The importance of border security has increased since the recent Syrian refugee crisis. As is stated by Akkerman (2016) there is one group in particular that has profited from this crisis: military and security-companies have seen an increase in the demand for material for border guards, surveillance technologies for monitoring borders, and IT-infrastructure for following flows of migration (p. 1). Especially during its presidency of the European Union in the first half of 2016, the Netherlands was a frontrunner in the increase and militarization of border security. In fact, EASP (Schiphol), Vigilance (Eindhoven), and TNO (Eindhoven), are a few of the Dutch organizations that have developed such militarised technology, not only for the protection of the south-eastern borders of the EU, but also for the borders of the Netherlands (p. 31). Apart from the provision of such military technology, the Netherlands is also involved in the training of the Marechaussee for Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Akkerman, 2016, p. 31). Whilst doing so, officers of the Marechaussee, who as mentioned above also increasingly participate in every-day law enforcement tasks, learn how

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to use military technology. Amongst such technology, is the @MIGO-system, which can read license plates through the use of a laser, and the use of SURPASS, which is a surface picture assessment-tool (Akkerman, 2016, p. 31). The militarization of border security is in essence a (para)military function, and military technology for the protection of European borders is developed by privatised organizations, a spillover effect to the area of law enforcement can however occur since the tasks and functions of special units of the Marechaussee, such as arrest teams, and of police departments increasingly blur. The increase of border militarization in the Netherlands, like the increase of militarization in the protection of individuals and objects, has been foremost stimulated by the threat of a terrorist attack. As pointed out by Jones and Johnson (2016):

The changes at the edges of the USA and the EU – and the violent consequences for migrants – are emblematic of a global trend over the past three decades as many borders have been transformed from sites primarily characterised by law enforcement and policing activities designed to intercept people who violate immigration laws to sites for militarised security activities ostensibly focused on preventing violent threats from entering the state’s territory (p. 187).

6.2.3 Summary

The development of the process of militarization in law enforcement, especially in the areas of safety and supervision of individuals and objects, and of border security, indicates that police militarization does indeed occur in the Netherlands to some extent. However, police militarization in the field of public law enforcement, and in the field of protest policing in particular, is less evident. This could result from the fact that a spillover effect from militarised sectors to non-militarised sectors, similar to the one which occurred in the US following the 9/11 attacks, has not occurred in the Netherlands because such a significant event has not happened.

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7. Conclusion

In this thesis, the extent to which the protest policing style in the Netherlands between 2002 and 2016 is assessed. This thesis aimed to validate van Leeuwen et al.’s (2016) research, which concluded that the use of strategic incapacitation as a protest policing style is limited in the 8 European countries the author investigated. It did so by focussing on one particular Member State, being the Netherlands, and by focussing on a period of time in order to establish militarization of the protest policing style in the Netherlands as a process, rather than a specific event in time. A qualitative analysis and a Protest Event Analysis were conducted whereby the thesis investigated whether the theoretical regulation of militarization is also translated into practice. The thesis analysed secondary sources such as government papers, newspaper articles, journal and magazine articles, and books for the theoretical section of the analysis, and Dutch newspaper articles between May 2002 and December 2016 for the practical section of the analysis. The newspaper articles have been analysed for several indicators of police militarization which can be divided in three dimensions of militarization: the operational dimension, the organizational dimension, and the material dimension. In order to do so, this thesis has combined two models: Kraska’s (2007) model on police militarization, and Gilham’s (2011) model on strategic incapacitation. Several observations can be made following the analyses. Firstly, theory and practice correlate in the material dimension since the slow normalisation of the use of material weaponry and technology translates in the minimum coverage of newspaper articles of the use of such material and technology by police forces. Similarly, the introduction and regulation of specialised police units in the organizational dimension of protest policing is recognisable in the extensive manner in which newspapers have discussed the use of specialised units such as the ME, the dog brigade, and the mounted police in their articles between 2002 and 2003. With regards to the operational dimension however, the adoption of surveillance and information-sharing techniques and the increasing debate about police violence resulted in the expectation that such matters were extensively covered in Dutch newspaper articles on police conduct during protest events. This was however not the case, leaving a gap between theory and practice.

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The answer to the question to what extent police militarization in the protest policing style of the Netherlands is noticeable is therefore that, apart from a peak in 2010, police militarization of the Dutch protest policing style is low in comparison to countries such as the US. This could however be explained by the limitations of this thesis. Firstly, newspaper articles are subject to bias: the fact that only 40% of the newspaper articles research between 2002 and 2016 reported police conduct indicates that articles rather focussed on other newsworthy events. In addition, the demarcation of the thesis to research police militarization in the field of protest policing does not take into account other developments that influence the dynamic of police militarization in the Netherlands. Following a short outline of such developments, the thesis concludes that police militarization does indeed occur in the Netherlands to some extent. However, police militarization in the field of law enforcement, and in the field of protest policing in particular, is less evident. This could result from the fact that a spillover effect from militarised sectors to non-militarised sectors, similar to as what occurred in the US following the 9/11 attacks, has not occurred in the Netherlands because such a significant event has not happened. This thesis as such confirms the findings by van Leeuwen et al. (2016) that militarization in protest policing is less apparent in the European Union than in the US. It was nevertheless of societal and scientific importance to research this topic since the understanding and development of concepts such as militarization are essential for accurately analysing the changing the activity of policing and the changing nature of society. Whereas on the one hand, the civil police is empowered to defend the right to protest, the police is also responsible for public order. Thus, when a spillover effect from militarised areas, such as border protection and the protection of individuals and objects, to areas of public law enforcement, such as protest policing, indeed occurs in the future, this cannot only result in the escalation of tensions between police forces and protestants, but also ultimately diminishes the quality of the Dutch democracy. As a result, the development of militarisation in all areas of law enforcement should be closely monitored by both practitioners and theorists, not only for the Netherlands, but for every member state of the EU. Such a close monitoring of the process of militarization needs to occur because weapons and military rhetoric instill the idea of the police force in opposition, as both a threat and the answer to the threat.

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73 Do Not Resist Master Thesis K. Zweers

9. Annex

8. 1 PEA analysis from 2002-2016.

The PEA analysis of this thesis includes newspaper articles of all Dutch national newspapers on the first monday and third monday of each month from May 2002 until December 2004, which are analyzed on police conduct during protest events and the amount of newspaper articles of which this police conduct was militarized. p= number of articles including protest events o = number of which include police conduct during protest events m = number of which police conduct was militarized

‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09 ‘10 ‘11 ‘12

2 d 12d 11 d 4 d 6 d 7 d 17 d 9 d 10 d 11d 9 d 2 p 4 p 3 p 1 p 2 p 4 p 9 p 4 p 5 p 4 p 0 p 0 m 2 m 1 m 0 m 2 m 1 m 2 m 1 m 5 m 2 m 0 m

‘13 ‘14 ‘15 ‘16

5 d 7 d 8 d 13 d 1 p 3 p 3 p 8 p 1 m 1 m 1 m 3 m

74