Naval War College Review Volume 54 Article 24 Number 1 Winter

2001 Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution, James Goldrick

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to discern any real patterns from his his- operational and tactical concepts with a torical survey, and even if any exist, the skill that illuminates the linkages between stockbroker’s warning that “future results the various levels and gives them all suffi- cannot be predicted from past performance” cient and appropriate weight. His treat- applies. At best, “if anything approaching ment not only lays bare the superficial a principle emerges from the confused nature of much previous historical re- record of the past it may be that the nat- search in this era but also indicates the ural political environment for navies, degree to which that superficiality has their raison d’être, is the unforeseen.... caused our understanding of the period Warships allow choice, naval force is a to be profoundly flawed. flexible instrument.” The book is not an easy read, but Lam- The book is a good short summary of the bert’s solid prose and grasp of his narra- political uses of naval force, both in- tive allow the reader to follow his way tended and unintended, over the past through the labyrinth that was British fifty years. However, it is of limited value naval policy in the Fisher era. To detail in helping today’s defense analysts and all its facets would take up an entire issue policy makers think through the require- of the Naval War College Review, but ments for tomorrow’s naval forces. some explanation is worthwhile.

JAN VAN TOL Lambert makes clear that Fisher was in- Commander, U.S. Navy stalled as First Sea Lord in 1904 primarily CNO Executive Panel Staff to cut spending at a time when the Brit- ish government desperately needed to achieve economies in its budget. He shows that Fisher developed extraordinary Lambert, Nicholas. Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revo- schemes to utilize emergent technology lution. Columbia: Univ. of South Carolina Press, to maintain Britain’s naval dominance 1999. 364pp. $39.95 when that dominance was being increas- This is a very good book and a very im- ingly challenged and the country’s ability portant one. Nicholas Lambert has fol- to pay becoming ever more dubious. He lowed in the path of Jon Sumida’s In shows too that Fisher’s ideas of dominance Defense of Naval Supremacy to present a always focused on Britain’s worldwide re- lucid, compelling, and comprehensive quirements, particularly in the protection analysis of the policies of Admiral Sir of sea communications (the threat from John Fisher and the in the Germany was not the primary motivation decade before 1914. This work is based of British naval policy until much later). upon Lambert’s doctoral study of the de- Lambert shows the devious way in which velopment of the submarine, but it goes Fisher operated, often concealing his true much farther than his original work in motivations from politicians and naval explaining the fundamental elements of colleagues alike, but he also maps out the Fisher’s naval policies and their effects on logic behind the admiral’s approach. To the Royal Navy. Sumida’s explanation of the origins of Lambert’s command of the primary the battle as the worldwide in- sources is remarkable. He supplements strument of commerce protection, Lam- grand strategy, national financial policy, bert adds the concept of the “flotilla,” by and politics with the details of which small craft—both surface and

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submersible—with torpedoes would crisis of 1909 may thus have had Fisher’s close the “narrow seas” around the Brit- desire to sustain that capability as its pri- ish Isles and the Mediterranean to the mary cause, rather than his fears of Ger- operation of enemy battle fleets and pro- man expansion. tect Britain and its possessions from at- The British also faced a crisis of man- tack. “Flotilla defence” would effectively power. Not only was the Royal Navy replace the capital ship as the primary el- hard pressed to recruit sufficient per- ement in Britain’s naval strength. sonnel to man the increasing numbers Lambert shows how Fisher always returned of and armoured to these ideas as the best ways for Britain entering service in the first years of the to utilize both its technological advantages century, but retention was poor, partic- and its strategic geography to achieve af- ularly amongst the more highly skilled fordable naval supremacy. Even in retire- ratings vital to their operation. Even if ment Fisher continued his efforts, and the government provided the funds, Lambert has discovered incontrovertible the Navy did not have the human ca- proof that in 1914, when the overseas pacity to expand indefinitely to match building rates of battleships had become increases in foreign naval capability. The more than British finances could match, primary focus of the redeployment pro- Fisher persuaded Winston Churchill, the cess, which saw the removal of ships young First Lord, to cancel the construc- from overseas stations and the appar- tion of at least two battleships and divert ent concentration of forces in British the funding to submarines and destroy- waters, was not the German threat but ers. In other words, the British in 1914 the need to employ manpower more ef- were on the point of stopping ficiently; perhaps, also, by retaining construction altogether. ships in home waters rather than keep- Lambert’s mastery of detail is apparent ing them semipermanently overseas it throughout this volume, but there are would improve the quality of life of the four aspects that are most important for ships’ companies. The peacetime de- the readership of the Naval War College ployment of the fleet therefore did not Review and for the challenges ahead. necessarily reflect the intentions for its operations in a conflict. The first is Lambert’s exposition of the issues that the Royal Navy faced as an or- A corollary to this is the fact that the pri- ganisation, some of which will have a mary focus of the Admiralty’s effort was particular resonance for the contempo- the defence of the empire as a whole; the rary audience. Finance was always a fun- force that it sought to create was always damental concern, but there were other intended to have worldwide responsibili- factors as well. Cutting construction to ties. The fleet that fought the 1914–18 save money jeopardised the existence of war in the North Sea, the “Grand Fleet of the industrial capacity on which Britain’s Battle,” was an attempt to use resources latent supremacy at sea rested. Much of that had been created the previous decade Britain’s power derived from the fact that to the greatest effect within a theatre that it could, in the final event, construct and was much more confined than had been arm more warships more quickly than expected only a few years earlier. The en- any rival; it was essential that this ability emies that Britain faced in 1914 did not be maintained. The “We Want Eight” include Italy or any other power with the https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss1/24 2 174 NAVAL WAR COLLEGEGoldrick: REVIEW Sir John Fisher’s Naval Revolution,

potential to interfere with British mari- developed to answer, in the time avail- time communications to the degree Rus- able, the problems that the Royal Navy sia or France could have. As it was, the faced. He places clear and necessary em- problems of organising the Grand Fleet phasis on the British need to maintain to be an effective tactical entity were such warfighting capabilities year by year, in that many in the Royal Navy did not re- spite of all the stresses on the budget and gard it as a practical offensive force. The the “stop-go” nature of so many of the results of Jutland show they had a point. new capabilities, such as the submarine Thus we see the importance of Lambert’s and long-range gunnery fire control. In careful inclusion of what was going on in the uncertain strategic environment of the fleets at sea in terms of operational inno- the opening years of the twentieth cen- vation and development. Sir John Fisher’s tury, the Royal Navy could not afford to Naval Revolution makes it absolutely surrender existing or immediately avail- clear that whatever their failings in criti- able battle power in favor of unproven cal thinking, staff work, and analytical systems. Nor could it permit the deterio- method, the senior officers of the Royal ration of the industrial capacity that al- Navy were not operating in an intellectual lowed it to outbuild rivals in an vacuum, and that those in seagoing com- emergency, or continue to seek “more of mand were energetically attempting to the same” at the expense of national fi- exploit the emergent technology to the nances. However ambitious Fisher’s full. Because these officers were responsible ideas, all of what he did was influenced by for the fighting efficiency of the Royal these imperatives, as he sought to position Navy, however, they were required to work the navy to exploit new possibilities. with what they had. As with the aircraft Lambert’s story of the Royal Navy before carrier in the 1920s and 1930s, this reality 1914 presents a picture completely differ- explains the contemporary logic of many ent from the accepted one, but it is a pic- decisions that seem misguided in retro- ture that is solidly founded in primary spect. It also explains a good part (though sources. Equally to the point, it is one not all) of the opposition to Fisher’s ideas, that is wholly convincing in total and even amongst his erstwhile supporters, represents a more satisfying explanation and thus a good part (though not all) of of what happened, and why, than we Fisher’s deviousness. At the same time, have ever had before. It is a study that Lambert does not neglect the effects of should sound a familiar note for those personality and party in his description of who have themselves had to struggle with the controversies that raged over Fisher the same sort of problems in other navies and naval policy. There are human beings and defence forces in recent years. in this book. As one who has written on the opera- Lambert’s mastery of context is, above tional history of the Royal Navy in the all, why this work should be read by all opening months of the First World War, who are involved with naval policy. He I now believe that such history, and in- analyses the elements of British decision deed the entire history of the war at sea, making and its consequences in terms of needs to be approached anew. I also be- contemporary conditions, not hindsight. lieve that Lambert’s work proves that we Lambert clearly explains the ways in should look again at more of the history which solutions and makeshifts were

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of twentieth-century navies with the around the world, was able to provide a same comprehensiveness. continuous flow of intelligence to the gov- ernment, but it is fascinating to learn JAMES GOLDRICK Captain, that by virtue of opening diplomatic and personal mail, the British Post Office became the largest intelligence-gather- ing branch of the government. Maffeo, Steven E. Most Secret and Confidential: In- Subsequent chapters treat other aspects of telligence in the Age of Nelson. Annapolis, Md.: Na- the British intelligence effort. The Admi- val Institute Press, 2000. 355pp. $32.95 ralty’s collection and use of intelligence is In Most Secret and Confidential, Steven discussed in depth, and so is the transmis- Maffeo has written an exceptional study sion of information. The difficulties are of how intelligence was collected and shown of sending any type of message, es- used during the French Revolutionary pecially when the usual form of communi- Wars and the Napoleonic Wars of the late cation at sea was signal flags, which were eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. useless at night or in limited visibility, To limited degrees, the intelligence activi- such as in battle. The subject of several ties of the United States, Spain, Russia, chapters is the commander as his own in- Denmark, and several other European telligence officer. Some commanders, such nations are described. More detail is pro- as Nelson, were expert intelligence offi- vided concerning the excellent French in- cers; others were not. However, all com- telligence efforts under Napoleon. The bulk manders had to sort through whatever of the text, however, deals with the use of information was available to them and intelligence by the British government, make the best decisions they could—they especially the Admiralty, during the years were literally on their own. Communica- between 1793 and 1815. tions between detached fleets and the Ad- Maffeo, who is a commander in a naval miralty often took weeks, if not months. reserve intelligence unit, has combined Commanders, therefore, without knowl- his intelligence expertise with the skills edge of the current government policy, of an accomplished historian to write would ultimately decide on courses of ac- this informative and most enjoyable tion. The fact that they were fully sup- history of British intelligence efforts ported by the Admiralty and the during this period. His knowledge of government demonstrates the high level the history of intelligence operations is of intelligence skills among the officers of excellent, and his grasp of the British the Royal Navy. navy of this era is unsurpassed. He uses The concluding chapters are case studies not only primary sources (government that show what role intelligence, or the papers and personal letters) to docu- lack thereof, played in three naval en- ment his work but also the books of such gagements. They are remarkable summa- novelists as C. S. Forester and Patrick tions of the Indian Ocean action of Pulo O’Brian to make his points. Aur in February 1804, the Copenhagen The opening chapter describes how the expedition of December 1800–April British government collected intelli- 1801, and the Nile campaign of March gence. It has been clear that Lloyd’s of through August 1798. These three chap- London, by means of its agents located ters form an excellent conclusion. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss1/24 4