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The Dynamics of Restraint in Côte d’Ivoire

Jeremy Allouche and Patrick Anderson Zadi Zadi*

Abstract Research on conflict prevention has mainly focused on the causes of war and post-conflict reconstruction. Our knowledge on how civilians manage to contain violence in unstable and conflict environments is, however, very limited. This article aims to understand, in the context of the civil war in Côte d’Ivoire, how and why ‘islands of peace’ emerge during outbreaks of violence. It identifies both the local and structural conditions and mechanisms (including formal and informal) that help to mitigate violence and encourage restraint in conflict-affected and unstable situations. Our research and analysis has focused on the western region, which is the epicentre of violence. Semi-structured interviews with Young Patriots members, the military, the business community, representatives of women’s NGOs, traditional leaders and representatives of the religious community, along with interviews in , provided the primary data for our analysis.

1 Introduction The split of Côte d’Ivoire cannot be understood Côte d’Ivoire used to be known in sub-Saharan within the constructed borders imagined by the Africa for its political stability, but the 1990s politicians or even those drawn as a result of the revealed social and economic fragilities which Linas-Marcoussis agreement.1 Those authors plunged the country into precarious unrest and who follow such an analysis usually wrongly instability. The coup of 1999 and the describe this split as between ‘a governmental unsuccessful coup attempt of September 2002 Christian and animist zone in the South versus a were manifest illustrations of this socioeconomic rebel Muslim zone in the North’ (see the and political fragility. Since then, Côte d’Ivoire criticism by Bassett 2003). The west has been the has suffered from outbreaks of violence, epicentre of violence since the beginning of the especially in Abidjan and in the west of the civil war in 2002. The political crisis that country. For many specialists, the crisis is one of resulted from the 2010 presidential elections identity (Dembélé et al. 2002). However, escalated into a full-scale military conflict according to our field analysis in the most between forces loyal to Laurent Gbagbo, the affected areas, the question of land tenure is by president of Côte d’Ivoire since 2000, and far the most important issue. Indeed, the most supporters of the internationally recognised affected area in Côte d’Ivoire is the western president-elect Alassane Ouattara, with again region of the country, the most important one for the west as the geostrategic centre of the cocoa production. The region has attracted a military battlefield. The interesting paradox of number of migrants from neighbouring the 2011 post-electoral crisis is that except for countries, especially from Burkina Faso but also the massacres in (see Table 1), violence Mali and Guinea, as well as internal migrants has been more limited in urban centres (in terms from the Baoulé region. The land tenure issue of numbers of events and the scale in proportion has become politicised and the question of Ivoirité to the size of the area). This is not the case in (i.e. ‘Ivorianness’ – a radical ethno-nationalist rural areas where cycles of revenge and understanding of Ivorian citizenship) has been retaliation have continued well after the post- instrumentalised to the needs of the most electoral crisis. The objective of this article is to powerful in the region. As a result, local highlight a number of factors that could explain incidents can easily become regional conflicts this dynamic of restraint in urban areas in the and create national tensions. west, and to explain why there has not been

IDS Bulletin Volume 44 Number 1 January 2013 © 2013 The Authors. IDS Bulletin © 2013 Institute of Development Studies Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA

72 direct violence against the civilian population in try to understand rationally why ‘other’ human urban areas in the context of the post-electoral beings commit violence, thereby ignoring how crisis. This research angle is interesting and individuals and groups have managed to escape original (if not provocative) in the sense that from this violence during periods of armed there are not many, if any, sociological and conflict. In general, these third party actors have political analyses which have looked in detail at been seen as passive, as the storylines and the dynamics of restraint during civil war. analyses of most civil wars focus on the insurgents and the army. There have been a few This article is divided into four parts: the stories and narratives of acts of resistance that following section will review the relevant were reported in Rwanda, for example, but these literature while sections 3 to 7 will focus are just anecdotes that fail to illustrate the respectively on the west as the epicentre of the potential political strategies that are used by conflict, a presentation of the cities visited for non-combatants to escape violence. this research and an explanation of why violence was absent or restrained in a number of places. Recent work by Blattman and Miguel (2009: 1) Section 8 concludes. argues that micro-level analysis and data are needed to better understand the roots of war and 2 Inverting the question the behaviour of armed groups. The same stands How can we explain why physical violence during for the dynamics of restraint (Straus 2012). The a civil war is limited to a specific geographical principal aim of this article is therefore to use area? This has become a classic puzzle in recent Côte d’Ivoire to discuss how and why ‘islands of studies on violence and civil war. Kalyvas (2006), peace’ emerge during civil war. The crisis in Côte for example, starts his book with the example of d’Ivoire has not received much scholarly attention. two very similar and contiguous Greek villages in Most of the political analyses have displayed a the peninsula of the Peloponnese that faced two stereotyped understanding of the dynamics of the different trajectories: one resulted in a general conflict as a north–south issue, basically a massacre while the other prevented this type of religious conflict between the Christian South and violence. These micro-level theories on violence the Muslim North. There are, of course, more and civil war (see also Varshney 2002; Wood serious analyses on the long-term causes of the 2003) have clearly shifted the debate away from civil war (e.g. see Dozon 2011) but there is no the habitually cited causes of group division (e.g. clear micro-level analysis and data, especially for social or ethnic polarisation) that often fail to the west (for Abidjan, see Banegas 2011). These account for the actual dynamics of violence. In micro-level dynamics are central to supporting fact, these new theories have been very successful our understanding of the crisis, and providing a in explaining the causes of variation in violence link between the political crisis and the logic of and distinguishing them from a general theory of violence. conflict and war. However, most academics, whether Varshney (2002) in terms of social 3 The conceptual puzzle cohesion or Kalyvas (2006) in terms of levels of Our conceptual puzzle is a difficult one, as there territorial contestation, use the same variables to is not an explicit literature on the topic. Given explain both the prevalence of violence and its the reverse focus of existing research (the logic absence. However, one could contend that the of violence rather than of its constraints – the political dynamics of the avoidance of violence only exception being Straus 2012), let us first can be separated from those of violence. assume that in most instances the absence of violence is the opposite of violence. What are the Like many large-scale modern violent conflicts, key indicators that could be used to demonstrate the war in Côte d’Ivoire was a combination of how and why communities or individuals would conventional warfare between military choose to avoid violence during civil war? insurgents and the army, and targeted violence by both insurgents and the army against non- The literature on the logic of violence is still in combatants. This article will focus on the latter its infancy and most of it focuses on the dynamics but wishes to invert the debate by examining of civil war. This literature poses several spaces where this violence did not happen. Our analytical challenges. First, it is unclear whether general ‘obsession’ as human beings has been to and how the dynamics of civil war are distinctive

IDS Bulletin Volume 44 Number 1 January 2013 73 from ‘interstate war, terrorism, coups, communal comparatively strong military control of violence, political repression, and crime’ populations. Violence against civilians is (Blattman and Miguel 2009: 4). Second, most therefore less concerned with military analysts have assumed that the dynamics of civil competition. Direct violence2 is generally the war are universally the same. Although a number result of civilians directly interacting with of patterns and mechanisms stand out in the military actors. Civilians may ‘denounce their literature and hypotheses on the roots of civil neighbours, help identify them, or even arrest war and potential causal dynamics are available, them (this enhances a group’s capacity to a robust body of generalisable research remains assassinate the civilian supporters of its rival)’ out of reach (Blattman and Miguel 2009). (Balcells 2010: 4–5). Civilians can also aid in hiding ‘potential victims, they can help them flee It is important to understand the dynamics of civil to other places, or they can give false indications war as it will likely determine the logic of violence. to the groups (this constrains the lethal capacity Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) have identified three of groups)’ (ibid.). Direct violence against different categories of violence in civil war: civilians during conventional civil war is ‘conventional’, ‘irregular/guerrilla warfare’ and ‘counterintuitive’ because there is little apparent ‘symmetric non-conventional’. While it is difficult gain for armed groups in killing civilians under to characterise a particular conflict in precise (or their control. Violence that does occur against specific) categories, the civil war in Côte d’Ivoire civilians tends to take place as a result of could be described as a conventional civil war. acquiring additional territory (Balcells 2010: 5) – Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) separate two distinct which was clearly the case in Côte d’Ivoire where strands for irregular warfare, namely minor the ‘New Forces’ took town after town following peripheral wars and insurgencies with a radical the fall of the geostrategic town of Duékoué. Islamist outlook. Minor peripheral wars have tended to derive from what Fearon (2004) The targeting of civilians is typically the result of describes as ‘sons of the soil’ insurgencies. In a ‘pre-war political alignments’ (Balcells 2010: recent article, Fearon and Laitin (2011) reveal 6–7). Balcells posits two hypotheses: that in nearly a third of ethnic civil wars since 1945, the conflict develops between members of a 1 ‘The greater the degree of pre-war electoral regional ethnic group that considers itself to be parity between groups, the higher the level of the indigenous ‘sons of the soil’ (autochthons in direct violence perpetrated by the armed group French) and recent migrants from other parts of controlling the locality’ (Balcells 2009: 9). the country (allogènes). The migrants are typically 2 ‘The greater the electoral support towards a members of the dominant ethnic group who group during the pre-war period, the greater migrate in search of land or government jobs, the likelihood that a locality will be the target often supported by the state with economic of indirect violence by the enemy group’ incentives and development schemes. In some (Balcells 2009: 10). ways, one could understand the civil war in Côte d’Ivoire as a combination of two types of war, a Direct violence is not linearly associated with the conventional civil war opposing a divided army number of supporters of the enemy group (i.e. and political class, and a ‘sons of soil’ insurgency we do not observe greater leftist violence in in the west. In fact, the indigenous youth places with a greater proportion of rightist returning from Abidjan and other big cities of supporters) as one could naively assume (i.e. the Côte d’Ivoire where they were unable to find ‘non-domination hypothesis’); instead the work, denounced the selling of land to migrants relationship is curvilinear. There tends to be and immigrants by their parents, claiming that greater violence in locales in which there is the piece of land, their inheritance, was sold greater ‘parity between political blocs’ as there without their consent. However, as this article will are stronger incentives to shift the balance of show, the political dynamics in the west cannot be power (Balcells 2009: 25). Earlier work by Barron fully dissociated from the national crisis and the et al. (2004) and Caselli and Coleman (2006) also conventional civil war facing both parties. seems to confirm this hypothesis.

Conventional civil wars are distinguished from This counterintuitive hypothesis is interesting irregular or guerrilla wars because there is for our work in that it can both explain the logic

74 Allouche and Zadi Zadi The Dynamics of Restraint in Côte d’Ivoire and restraint of violence in the west. However, especially in urban areas, day-to-day interactions this hypothesis is very difficult to check as are sufficient to provide a bridge across demographic and ethnic data are either not ethnic/religious groups and stop conflicts from available or not adequately collected. The escalating into communal violence. Communal different results of the presidential, legislative violence therefore proves less likely in cities and municipal elections nonetheless give us a where associations can act as bridges across good idea of parity between political parties in groups (Barron et al. 2004: 9–10). This hypothesis the different towns examined. In fact, the case of is very interesting for Côte d’Ivoire as it could Duékoué seems to confirm this hypothesis with explain why, in urban areas in the west, violence regards to the logic of violence. But Gagnoa and has diminished in contrast to rural areas. This San Pedro also have a certain parity between has inspired other work on social cohesion and political parties and nonetheless have had no levels of trust. Levels of trust and the charisma of violence, at least during the 2010–11 events.3 key individuals play a further role in shaping the Although this hypothesis provides a key scale of violence. Bhavnani and Backer (2000) contribution in structuring a spatial analysis, it argue that low levels of inter-ethnic trust during may become problematic in contexts where the conflict results in higher levels of violence. This is civil war is lengthy and has been going on because communities with weak levels of trust through different episodes, as in the Ivorian case are likely to maintain moderate levels of violence (2002–12). In fact, data analysis on conflict over longer timeframes. This indicates that the duration of civil war has shown that trustworthiness among competing groups is just ‘[A]utonomy-seeking peripheral region as important as levels of trust within them when insurgencies and “sons-of-the-soil” movements perpetrating violence. (fought by the local majority against immigrants) tend to last much longer’ (Blattman Mkandawire (2002: 181) explains rural violence and Miguel 2009: 43), bringing us back to our as follows: the African rural setting is generally first point that we also need to understand the deeply inimical to liberation war, because factors that might constrain violence. peasants enjoy direct control over their own land, and surplus expropriation takes place through Understanding the historical trajectories of the market, rather than through an exploitative violence and its restraint is therefore key for a landlord class. The African situation, too, has better understanding of the conflict. A number of tended to favour ‘roving’ rather than ‘stationary’ other explanations could help us to explain the rebellions, in Olson’s terms (Olson 1993); many historical dynamics of the conflict. Historical rebels are merely passing through the economic analysis, for example, could highlight countryside, on their way to seek power in towns. the impact of the price of cocoa on the causes and Having little in common with the peasantry, and dynamics of the conflict. This is certainly an nothing to offer it, they resort to violence as the important dimension to keep in mind as Côte only way to control it. However incoherent their d’Ivoire leads the world in the production and objectives, and however brutal their methods, export of cocoa beans. One of the interviewees in rebellions nonetheless reflect a serious urban the town of Guiglo actually mentioned that the malaise that needs to be addressed. market price of cocoa beans had an impact on the cycle of violence. The problem with this A further variable to explain this urban/rural explanation is in fact the opposite to Balcells’ paradox is security. Barron et al. (2004: 29–30) hypothesis (Balcells 2009); it does not help to have shown that the presence of communal explain the variation and constraints of violence security arrangements is associated with lower in the region throughout which cocoa is produced. levels of conflict in rural areas. Local governance arrangements are also key for mediating Ashutosh Varshney’s (2002) work on India has potential conflict. Barron et al. (2004: 31–2) argued that fragmented social infrastructures, found that the absence of a democratically where participation in associational structures elected village council is associated with a higher and informal networks consolidates identities and conflict potential. As we will see in our study, interests along, rather than across, religious and local governance institutions and key ethnic lines, explains variation in violence and personalities have played a key role in peace in otherwise similar areas. He argues that restraining violence.

IDS Bulletin Volume 44 Number 1 January 2013 75 Map 1 Côte d’Ivoire: mapping urban and rural violence after the 2011 post-electoral crisis MALI BURKINA FASO

Odienne GUINEA

Seguela Bondoukou Bouake

Man

Bedi-Goazon Bouafle Duekoue Abengourou Blolequin Dimbokro Guiglo Toulepleu Issia Oume GHANA Gagnoa Tai Agboville Soubre Divo

LIBERIA Aboisso

Abidjan Fresco Sassandra San Pedro Atlantic Ocean

Rebel forces control zone/Zone de contrôle des forces (rebelles) Area of control of the Government forces (loyalist)/Zone de contrôle des forces gouvernementales (loyalistes) Trusted zone/Zone de confiance Rural violence: Ottawa, Zogbodoua, Liguiyo Rural violence: Sago Rural violence: Toa Zeo, Blodi, Guinglo Zia, Yorozon, Guitrozon, Fingolo, Behoue, Dahoua, Niambli Rural violence: Zeaglo, Beoue, Doke, Meo Rural violence: Toulepleu village, Seizahibli Urban violence Field research

Redrawn from www.parti-ecologique-ivoirien.org/contact/carte-administrative-de-cote-d-ivoire.php.

76 Allouche and Zadi Zadi The Dynamics of Restraint in Côte d’Ivoire Finally, land tenure and mercenary recruitment By looking at the perspective of other political are two additional elements important in the actors in the conflict, one could broaden the Ivorian context that are often highlighted as key debates on violence and civil war from those that factors in the dynamics of civil war. While formal strictly look at the causes of variation of violence land tenure may not necessarily denote security to those that focus on other important elements of tenure (World Bank 2003), Bennet (2002) such as the strategies used by third-party actors emphasises, for example, that lack of clarity in (to avoid using the term neutral) to escape from land rights may be an important factor associated violence. It appears that there is still a strong with conflict, while Barron et al. (2004: 8) suggest bias in the current literature (that can be partly that the absence of formal property rights for explained by earlier theories on civil war) to private agricultural land may make this a trigger focus on a polarised view of society with, to put it for violent conflict, especially as land grows more simply, one camp opposed to the other. There are scarce. Macours (2009: i), writing on India, two major problems with this view. Firstly, on a further ‘[s]hows that recruiting by Maoists political level, the ‘third wave of democratisation’ through abduction of young people was more has opened the spaces for alternative views and intensive in districts where inequality between hence the number of political parties has been the landed and the landless had previously growing and diversifying throughout the African increased’. This is particularly important as one continent. Although civil war usually implies a could observe that the army coming from Bouake dispute between the ruling party and the major was more of a professional army compared to the opposition party, there are still a number of west where the army was recruiting many influential actors that may situate themselves mercenaries. This could explain both why outside of the dispute by not taking a particular violence was more widespread in the west and side. These actors nonetheless can still play an why recruitment was possible. important role during a conflict. Secondly, on a societal level, there are still a number of If the literature on civil war fails to account for individuals and ‘groups’ that consider that a these dynamics, one would have expected scholars resort to military confrontation and physical in peace studies to have researched these spaces violence is not necessary. of ‘peace in conflict’. However, since the discipline has been influenced and built around concepts of 4 The civil war in Côte d’Ivoire and violence in structural violence (Galtung 1969), useful the west approaches in terms of conflict transformation The civil war started on 19 September 2002. The essentially have been applied in post-conflict government of Gbagbo was threatened by a settings or peaceful societies (Howell and Willis rebellion in the north and the west4 and the 1989) and most peace scholars have not engaged country became divided into three areas. A with issues related to physical violence. reconciliation process under international auspices was started in 2003. Several thousand French and Overall, the debates have progressed as far as then West African troops intervened under a UN decoupling micro-level conceptual explanations for mandate to maintain peace in the country. physical violence from general theories on conflict and war but they have failed to explain the Elections were finally organised in November 2010. dynamics of ‘peace havens’ for non-combatants Gbagbo was designated as the presidential during conflict and war. Existing theories have candidate of the ruling Front Populaire Ivoirien mostly studied violence through a war and conflict (FPI, Ivorian Popular Front), Alassane Ouattara, lens by focusing on the perspective of the insurgents who was prime minister from 1990–3, was or on the government, or even sometimes on the designated as the presidential candidate of the victims. However, by focusing on the perpetrators Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR, Rally of and victims of violence, the existing theories ignore the Republicans), and Henri Konan Bédié, who other political actors and other geographical spaces was president of Côte d’Ivoire from 1993–9, ran as in civil wars where the level of violence was low or the presidential candidate of his party, the Parti non-existent. The narratives and theoretical Démocratique de la Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI, explanations that emerge from the perspective of Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire). However, the insurgents, government and victims may overstate results become a source of dispute between the lack of social cohesion or insecurity. Gbagbo and Ouattara, leading to a cycle of

IDS Bulletin Volume 44 Number 1 January 2013 77 Table 1 Post-electoral incidents in the west in 2011 according to INGOs and IOs

Date Location Event Source

3 January Duékoué 35 civilians killed and more than 100 wounded, and 230 houses Amnesty burnt down. Reprisal and counter reprisal attacks by both International 2011 allogène and Guéré populations following the killing of an allogène female trader by an autochthon Guéré highwayman Mid March Duékoué 100 Dioula (allogènes) murdered by pro-Gbagbo forces Minority Rights Group International 2011 22 March Bedi-Goazon At least 37 West African immigrants killed by pro-Gbagbo Human Rights militias and Liberian mercenaries Watch 2011a; 2011b 28 March Blolequin More than 100 men, women and children from northern Human Rights Côte d’Ivoire and neighbouring West African countries killed Watch 2011b by pro-Gbagbo militias and Liberian mercenaries 29 March Duékoué 330 or 800* Guéré killed by pro-Ouattara forces Le Monde 2011

* 330 or 800 respectively according to UN or ICRC. Source Author’s own. violence and armed confrontations between the organisations (IOs) and international non- insurgents and the army. According to our governmental organisations (INGOs). The interview with the US ambassador in Côte d’Ivoire, number of victims in Duékoué has been a major Ouattara decided on the military option when point of debate. While the International seven women were assassinated in Abobo and he Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) considers concluded that political negotiation had failed. that more than 800 civilians were killed on 29 March 2011 (ICRC 2011), the United Nations One can distinguish two major dynamics of Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (ONUCI) contests this violence: an urban repressive violence that number and talks about 330 victims (Le Monde targeted Muslim Ivorians of northern provenance 2011).5 However, during our fieldwork, we found and West African nationals; and a rural violence, that rural violence had been very widespread. primarily between ‘autochtones’ and ‘allogènes’ (Straus 2011). Most of the urban violence was in The current death toll in the west is estimated at Abidjan and Duékoué and the rural violence more than 500 deaths. The data above are not occurred in the western part of the country, in exhaustive. In fact, during our fieldwork, it was the rural areas around Blolequin, Duékoué, reported to us that there had also been violence Guiglo, and Toulepleu (see Map 1). against civilians in the town of Issia. One could distinguish two different phases in this dynamic We have much more knowledge about urban of violence in the west – the first one is a violence than rural violence, as the dynamics of dynamic of retaliation and reprisal from January rural violence have been less well documented. As to March (a spiral pattern of reprisal killing, pointed out by Straus (2011), many lingering sometimes on a large scale, in which civilians of questions remain about the violence in the west, one group are collectively punished for the including why certain rural towns but not others violence of their co-ethnics) and a second phase were flashpoints, who precisely were the of pacification and domination by the Forces perpetrators, and how extensive was the violence. Républicaines de Côte d’Ivoire (FRCI) from April onwards (see Straus 2011). The situation is Most of the reported violence has only focused on still unstable; an administrative officer for the urban casualties. Table 1 summarises the Moyen Cavally region reported to the perceived major sites of violence in the west International Crisis Group (ICG) in May 2011 against civilians according to international that the security situation is likely to worsen,

78 Allouche and Zadi Zadi The Dynamics of Restraint in Côte d’Ivoire with fears that the conflict is being transformed say that the region as a whole has not benefited into an inter-ethnic confrontation rather than from this migration, but it was allowed to economic one (i.e. land) (ICG 2011). develop in an unplanned way. No rules or regulations were established, especially after While the political climate is one of fear, and the Houphouët-Boigny’s famous slogan, ‘the land data in Table 1 may reveal a cycle of urban belongs to those who put it to good use’. Land violence in the post-electoral crisis, violence disputes became inevitable. against civilians was mainly concentrated in Duékoué, Bedi-Goazon and Blolequin. All the The crisis took on a political dimension following other major towns had no signs of violence (we the economic crisis that hit Côte d’Ivoire in the focused on Gagnoa, Guiglo and San Pedro, but this early 1980s and the advent of multipartism in is also true of Daloa, Divo, Fresco, Oumé, the early 1990s. The rise of multipartism, which Sassandra, Soubré and Tai). On the other hand, led to the resurgence of ethno-linguistic and rural violence was widespread in the villages of regional political discourses, reanimated Soubré (Ottawa, Zogbodoua, Liguiyo), Sassandra problems of the past in the region. In the forest (Sago mainly), Duékoué (Toa Zeo, Blodi, Guinglo regions, the political party of President Zia, Yorozon, Guitrozon, Fingolo, Behoue, Dahoua, Houphouët-Boigny, the PDCI, was perceived as Niambli), Blolequin (Zeaglo, Beoue, Doke, Meo) the one that had legitimised the presence of and Toulepleu (Toulepleu village, Seizahibli). ‘foreigners’. Some citizens from the western region felt that the political authority was 5 The causes of the conflict in the west organising migration without involving the While the civil war in Côte d’Ivoire has been traditional authorities, thereby guaranteeing an described as a north–south conflict, the epicentre unstable relationship between the landowners of the conflict and violence was the western and the migrants. Whether this is the case or region (Région des 18 Montagnes, Région du not, the problem lay in the fact that the Haut-Sassandra and Région du Bas-Sassandra, migration process did not abide by any legal see Map 1). Of course, the largest city, Abidjan, framework. Furthermore, the traditional chiefs suffered from military and civilian casualties, had lost their legitimacy and authority as they especially during the post-electoral crisis had been politicised since the advent of (2011–12). However, the west has been the multipartism, and could not play their potential battlefield since 2002 (Gaulme 2003) and the role as alternative mediators. region in fact shows that the underlying structural causes of the conflict go beyond the This legal vacuum, as well as the dualism between concept of Ivoirité and the leadership battle political and traditional authority, created the between Laurent Gbagbo, Henri Konan Bédié basis for the land crisis that started when young and Alassane Ouattara. These underlying causes students native to this region returned to their include the impact of former president homes. Confronted with unemployment in Houphouët-Boigny’s (as well as colonial) policies Abidjan and other major cities, the youth in the region, the repression of politicians of returned to the west to discover that their ethnic Bété origins, the politics of modernisation families’ land had been leased or sold, creating a and the management of the land and number of tensions between the autochthones and agricultural policy (see Dozon 2011). the migrants. The temptation by this group to regain control of what they saw as their land Modernisation policies, in terms of agricultural created a number of conflicts with the migrants. reform under the government of Houphouët- Boigny, propelled Côte d’Ivoire to become the This crisis was further exacerbated by its political world’s major producer of cocoa beans. The instrumentalisation with the concept of Ivoirité western region has been central to the under the presidency of Henry Konan Bédié, production of cocoa since 1987. However, this was which treated the migrants (even those from the not without consequences. The expropriation of north of the country) as not being genuinely land to accommodate the port of San Pedro, as Ivorian (Chauveau 2000). Indeed, the new Land well as those displaced to the cocoa region as a Law was produced in an ethno-nationalist result of the Koussou dam, is still part of the context, allowing some dubious interpretations by collective memory of autochthons. This is not to various local politicians. This new law in fact

IDS Bulletin Volume 44 Number 1 January 2013 79 Figure 1 Price of cocoa beans per tonne, 2002–12

3.5

3.0

2.5

2.0 Thousands of tonnes

1.5

1.0 Dec 11 Dec 10 June 11 Dec 07 Dec 05 Dec 03 Dec 04 Dec 06 Dec 02 Dec 09 Dec 08 June 12 June 10 June 07 June 05 June 03 June 04 June 06 June 02 June 09 June 08 Source www.data.worldbank.org. brought back to the forefront the tensions that these divisions. Political parties and militias at the existed between natives and migrants, not only local level, and ideological and political division at between Ivorians and migrants from the national level, created a new boundary neighbouring countries but also migrants from between the north-west and the south-west. The other regions of Côte d’Ivoire. Social cohesion is creation of two new political parties, the not only affected by these tensions between Mouvement Patriotique du Grand Ouest migrants and landowners, but also by the (MPIGO) and the Mouvement pour la Justice et la tensions between the disillusioned unemployed Paix (MJP), is an illustration of this new divide. As educated youth and the elders and migrants that a counter-weight, the pastor Gammi created in had developed a special relationship. There is a 2005 the Mouvement de Libération de l’Ouest de sense of betrayal from the viewpoint of the youth la Côte d’Ivoire (MILOCI). This division is new in who consider that their parents have leased the the Ivorian political landscape and continues to family land at a time when they needed it the exist up to the present day with the creation of the most. Some youths have therefore started Union pour la Démocratie et la Paix en Côte contesting these arrangements and have started d’Ivoire (UDPCI), that now represents the leasing the land to other migrants, creating Yacouba group, and the recent election of Mabri complex and explosive situations within families Touakeusse as the president of the regional council and between migrants. of Danané, and as a member of parliament.

In 2002, national politics became further confused Finally, the increase in the price of cocoa since with the divisions in the region. Many people from 2002 (see Figure 1) has also accentuated the the Yacouba region considered Laurent Gbagbo to crisis with the expulsion of many Burkinabé in be behind the assassination in 2002 of former the Région des 18 Montagnes. Producing cocoa General Guéï, which had important implications and hévéa (rubber) became an attractive business for the region as he was a Yacouba from the and landowners wanted to benefit from it. western Région des 18 Montagnes. This created a Although migrants were expelled from their division between the Guérés and the Yacouba, very lands, a narrative commonly heard was that the similar to the one observed in Liberia. Obviously flow of migration in the region did not stop but the civil war in Liberia reinforced and nurtured actually increased because of terrible droughts

80 Allouche and Zadi Zadi The Dynamics of Restraint in Côte d’Ivoire Table 2 Cycle of violence in Gagnoa, 1995–2010

October 1995 (after the presidential elections) 17 civilians killed following violence between the Bété and the Baoulé and many displaced 26 October 2000 (after the presidential elections) 2 civilians killed and 5 injured, involving combat between militants from the FPI and RDR November 2003 Hundreds of migrants flee from villages neighbouring Gagnoa, leading to 8 civilians killed and 11 injured 7–9 November 2004 Violent intercommunal outbreaks leading to 7–15 civilians killed and 29–59 injured 11 August 2005 2 UN military observers attacked by Young Patriots 18 February 2010 (following the dissolution of the 5 civilians killed and 11 injured following a political national unity government) demonstration organised by the opposition parties in other Western African countries and new the New Forces by the population and militias in illegal plots being developed in the sacred forests. order to defend the president, especially since every presidential election since 1995 was One can distinguish six major issues in the south- followed by the killing of civilians (see Table 2). west (Gagnoa, Soubré) and the west (Man, Guiglo): The town of Guiglo is just 15 miles away from the 1 The frustration of the Bété population within town of Duékoué. While the towns of Duékoué, the Ivorian nation (Dozon 2011); Toulepleu, and Blolequin (see Map 1), as well as 2 The land tenure issue in the context of an the rural areas surrounding these towns, have urban economic crisis which has created inter- suffered major civilian massacres, Guiglo has not ethnic and inter-generational disputes and been affected by a high level of violence against political instability; civilians. This provides a very interesting case for 3 The declining legitimacy and authority of our research in that the town had a strong militia traditional chiefs; governed by Mao Glofiehi and the town was also 4 The desire for revenge among the Yacouba under the rule of a military prefect. Liberian population following the assassination of mercenaries, under the leadership of one so- General Guéï; called ‘Bob Marley’, were also present. 5 The proximity with Liberia and the impact of civil war on the region; The town of San Pedro is the most important 6 The price of cocoa. town in economic terms in the west, as it constitutes the biggest port for cocoa export in 6 Gagnoa, Guiglo and San Pedro the world. The wealthy Lebanese community was We decided to focus our study of the factors very close to Gbagbo, and Young Patriots (les constraining violence during the civil war on Jeunes Patriotes, a youth militia movement) three major towns in the west, namely Gagnoa, were also very present, including the nephew of Guiglo and San Pedro, for the following reasons: Blé Goudé (Goudé was the leader of the Young Patriots movement). The town of Gagnoa is seen as the capital city for the Bété ethnic group of the former president In order to understand the dynamics of restraint Laurent Gbagbo. It is a very important town in in Côte d’Ivoire, we conducted 40 semi-structured the political history of Côte d’Ivoire as Kragbé interviews in Abidjan and in the three towns Gnangbé, who had created an opposition examined. In Abidjan, we interviewed journalists, political party against Houphouët-Boigny in the university researchers and international civil 1970s, is also from this region. It essentially servants at ONUCI. In the three towns in the symbolises the major political opposition to west, we conducted interviews with Young Houphouët-Boigny’s rule from the 1970s to the Patriots, the military, the business community, 1990s. In this political bastion, one therefore traditional leaders, and representatives of could have expected a strong resistance against women’s NGOs and the religious community.

IDS Bulletin Volume 44 Number 1 January 2013 81 7 The dynamics of restraint ideological, political, military force to an It is important that micro-level histories do not organisation of corrupted people; demobilised ignore the national environment’s role in militiamen engaged in organised crime and shaping and containing violence. The following gangster activity. In San Pedro, for example, it factors are important for understanding why the was reported that different sorts of illegal taxes conflict in Côte d’Ivoire, which had the potential (road, consumer and property taxes) were to turn into genocide, did not. collected by the movement. An interviewee in Gagnoa, a local leader of the Young Patriots, told The first key factor is the role of the army in the us that this can be explained by the fact that the crisis. In most of the towns we visited, there were most radical elements had left to be enrolled in no direct confrontations between the New Forces the national army (3,000 in 2003 and 3,000 in and the army that was under the orders of 2009). Gbagbo. In fact, since 2002, there has been a crisis of confidence between the former Thirdly, the New Forces, and especially the president, Laurent Gbagbo and the army. While Dozos, were feared, at least in the western General Philippe Mangou was the Chief of Staff region, for their mystic powers. Similar to Sierra of the army, he had no real control over the Leone, these groups were believed to have military’s strategic decisions. Vagba Faussigno magical powers to become invisible soldiers. In (Commander of the Navy under Gbagbo), Guiai addition, Dozos have the reputation of killing Bi Poin (Commander of the Centre for Security any adversary they have and of being invincible. Operations – CECOS – under Gbagbo), and After the first battle in Duékoué, one should not General Dogbo Ble Denis (Commander of the underestimate the impact of fear and rumours Republican Guard under Gbagbo) were the key on the logic of the restraint of violence. individuals in the army headquarters. It is unclear how loyal the other sections of the army Finally, one should not forget that the were besides these three regiments. This largely government of national unity in 2005 created a reveals the underlying structural tensions within new dynamic in the conflict, and the different the army in Côte d’Ivoire. Indeed, since sides were not as polarised as it may first seem. Houphouët-Boigny, there have been many In fact, during 2005–10, there were no major attempted coups d’etat which resulted in purges violent events in the towns in which we of the army. As a result, it has been difficult to conducted our fieldwork. This coalition build a republican army. The army, up to the government certainly had an effect on political present day, is a clan-based army. alignment and stability in society, although the underlying tensions were still present. In fact, in This lack of confidence led to the creation of February 2010, as soon as the government and parallel militias and mercenaries and the young the independent electoral commission were militant movement, the Young Patriots. The dissolved, violent incidents occurred in the town army was either neutral or was slowly taking of Gagnoa resulting in five deaths and 11 sides with Alassane Ouattara. Many interviewees injured. Nonetheless, this period was marked by talked about a lost war. In fact, there were many ambiguity in terms of political alignment. For in the army that changed sides after the 2010 example, it is unclear to whom the former prime presidential elections. It was reported during our minister and now president of the National field trip that the military commander in charge Assembly, Guillaume Soro, was aligned. Rumours of the second battalion of Daloa changed sides after the election were circulated that 100 per during the war. This was the most important cent of the votes in his home village were for military installation in the west besides Laurent Gbagbo. Another interesting fact in this Duékoué. In fact, it has been estimated that messy political dynamic was that Mao Glofiehi, 63 per cent of security forces (including the the principal leader of the Young Patriots in the police and gendarmerie) had voted in favour of Guiglo region, revealed after being arrested that Alassane Ouattara (Zion 2011). he had met Soro after a failed assassination attempt on the former prime minister. The second key factor is the changing nature of the Young Patriots movement. One could argue At the local level, we found four major factors that the movement transformed itself from an leading to restraint. Probably the most important,

82 Allouche and Zadi Zadi The Dynamics of Restraint in Côte d’Ivoire and to a certain extent surprising for external In our interviews, we noticed that in the three observers of the region, is the level of motivation. municipalities, the role of the governors, sub- We argued above that the Young Patriot governors and mayors were vital. In the long movement changed during 2002–12. At the local term, they have derived their authority from level in Gagnoa and San Pedro, the Young Patriots mediating land disputes. This was especially the interviewed (those in Guiglo had essentially fled) case with Mr Gauze Ignace Desire, the current considered that the local politicians had betrayed sub-governor of Gagnoa. There was one major them. On the one hand, during the post-electoral incident in the town of Gagnoa during the post- crisis, arms were apparently not delivered to the electoral crisis. A young Baoulé peasant was Young Patriots, especially in Gagnoa. In fact, it was burnt by the Young Patriots. The sub-governor reported that Bertin Kadet Gahie, former intervened straight away and managed to find a Minister of Defence under Laurent Gbagbo, was negotiated solution between the different travelling to Gagnoa to provide arms when he had communities. In Guiglo, Yahi Octave from the an accident. In addition, some of the local departmental council and Ahoua Touré from authorities who had arms did not give them to the Duékoué have played an active role in mediating Young Patriots. They also shared with us that all potential conflict. Reconciliation efforts are the DDR6 promises in terms of training and made through: the inter-ethnic alliances and indemnisation were never realised. It is difficult to joking kinships whose main function is to defuse say whether this low level of motivation would conflict situations between allied communities; have been a deterrent if they had had the the purification of the earth and the sacrifices opportunity to bear arms during the crisis. (In initiated by the masks society; and the actions of Rwanda and Sierra Leone violence was civil society. These various initiatives have so far perpetrated with quite primitive weapons). helped to consolidate social cohesion. Obviously However, an important incident in Gagnoa may there are limits to these conflict resolution indeed confirm that the trust in local politicians techniques, as these seemed to have worked in and the desire to fight for their president was Guiglo but not in Duékoué. slipping away. In Gagnoa, there was an explosive situation as the security forces had deserted their Not only state and political authorities were barracks and the youth from both political wings active but also religious figures. In San Pedro, one had stolen all the arms. What happened was that of the imams realised how explosive the situation robbery in the major shop of the town became could become as most of the youth were armed more attractive for both youth groups and acted as following the departure of the security forces. He a dynamic of restraint. The situation could have created his own disarmament programme by easily degenerated but both groups were together asking all the youngsters to deliver their arms to in the shop and all became young individuals his house. Some enlightened individuals, interested in immediate material gain rather than including some military commanders from the political confrontation. There was a low level of New Forces, also played a key role in restraining mobilisation from the population too, especially in the dynamics of violence. Many interviewees in Gagnoa. This is all the more surprising as this is Guiglo mentioned the name of the Commander the home town of Laurent Gbagbo. The Bété Moses and the Lieutenant Touré. population did not feel that they had fully benefited from any presidential favour. The last major factor in these three towns was Untarmacked roads in the town of Gagnoa were social cohesion. While conflict between different often given as an example. In fact the major road communities clearly exists, the threat of external axes between Gagnoa–Oumé and Gagnoa–Soubré actors creates a sense of solidarity within these were not in good shape. Overall, the Bété region towns. The most revealing example was in the has not received many benefits in terms of town of Guiglo where Liberian mercenaries were economic and social development programmes or expelled from town by all the different infrastructural development (apart from the communities after they started attacking the Chinese-funded new hospital in Gagnoa). migrant community. There are several factors that could explain this social cohesion. The first one is The second major factor is that unlike many civil that inter-community marriages are quite wars in the region, state institutions and local widespread and while some neighbourhoods were governance remains strong and well respected. labelled with a particular community

IDS Bulletin Volume 44 Number 1 January 2013 83 (e.g. Dioulabougou in Gagnoa), individuals live Otherwise there would have been domino effects across the different spaces irrespective of their across the major urban areas in the west. The neighbourhood denotation. Many Young Patriots recent events in July 20127 in Duékoué show a in Gagnoa were living in Dioulabougou, which may particular political history and tragedy that has be surprising. Of course, extensive inter-marriage been going on in this town for the last ten years between Hutu and Tutsi did not stop the genocide around revenge and retaliation. in Rwanda. Inter-marriage cannot be a restraining factor on its own. The second factor reinforcing The second important aspect relates to different social cohesion is that a number of conflict dynamics of violence and restraint in rural and resolution programmes like the GIZ Programme urban areas. In urban areas, local governance on Peace and Development clearly enabled some institutions and important personalities have of the youth to access alternative livelihoods and proved to be key figures in the constraint of reinforced social cohesion. Besides GIZ, CARE violence. This was not the case in rural areas International was running a peace programme. where the governor and sub-governor had no Peace committees were set up in villages (between physical presence and where the traditional Duékoué and Bangolo). These peace committees chiefs had lost their authority and legitimacy. were in charge of preventing further violence by This reveals the specificity of the civil war in solving any issue coming up in the villages. Some Côte d’Ivoire which is unusual in that it took of the peace committees are still functioning today. place in a country with strong state institutions. The World Food Programme (WFP) has While state local institutions were legitimate implemented a ‘cash for work’ peace dividend and strong enough to contain violence in urban programme aimed at supporting people who work areas, the declining authority of chiefs in rural either on their farms or contribute to areas meant that no mediator existed in the implementing a project of common interest. In the rural spaces to contain violence. west, Search for Common Ground (SFCG) has broadcast radio programmes promoting social Researching the reasons for restraints on cohesion. By implementing this programme, violence also led us to ask questions about the SFCG has financially supported local radios. different outcomes that could have happened in Although international organisations have been western Côte d’Ivoire. If there had been no active in the west, it is unfortunate that except for rebellion in northern Côte d’Ivoire and if CARE International, these programmes have been General Guéï had not been assassinated, would less active in the villages. In addition, a big failure western Côte d’Ivoire be different from how it is of these programmes was that they could not today? Our analysis has highlighted that the address the land tenure issue. problems of land ownership must be a central concern for the stabilisation of the western 8 Conclusion region. Land tenure issues result from This article has focused on a surprisingly governance failures dating from the period of neglected topic as strategies to restrain violence Félix Houphouët-Boigny. The strategic can inform policymakers on conflict resolution importance of this region (the main area of mechanisms. Whether it is due to a lack of cocoa production) requires the resolution of material on the topic or because it is inextricably problems of cohabitation. The search for peace linked to the logic of violence and the political and national reconciliation must begin in the dynamics of the civil war, it has been difficult to west, especially as the stigma and the concentrate our analysis exclusively on the politicisation of the Ivorian conflict as a north– dynamics of restraint in Côte d’Ivoire. In fact, south conflict cannot mask the major problem of concentrating on individuals and communities the Ivorian crisis: the issue of land ownership. It would have bypassed one of the major reasons for is unfortunate that peace programmes in the the dynamic of restraint. In line with Straus west did not sufficiently address this issue. Most (2012), the national environment, and in programmes, except for CARE International, particular the institutions of the army and were focusing on promoting social cohesion and militias, proved to be a decisive factor in this mainly in towns. The new government has shown dynamic of restraint. The few cases of urban some positive signs of will to solve the issue of violence are properly explained by local factors land tenure but it will be a difficult political and isolated from the rest of the country. game given the current coalition with the PDCI,

84 Allouche and Zadi Zadi The Dynamics of Restraint in Côte d’Ivoire as well as the positive relationship with President initiated Dozos, has rendered the land issue Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso. Furthermore, more fragile and explosive. The land issue in the new security situation in the west following Côte d’Ivoire, and in the west particularly, is far the crisis and the presence of Dozos, or newly from being resolved.

Notes majority for Laurent Gbagbo. But whilst the * The authors would like to thank David mayor of Duékoué, and the members of Leonard and Scott Straus for their very parliament elected in Duékoué, Gagnoa and valuable comments, Matthew Benson and San Pedro are from Gbagbo’s political party, Mathilde Gingembre for their work as the mayors of Gagnoa and San Pedro were research assistants, and Shona McCulloch and elected from the Rassemblement des Freida Ibiduni M’Cormack for their editorial Républicains (RDR, Rally of the Republicans), support. the party of Alassane Ouattara. 1 The Agreement was signed in France on 4 By three rebel movements: the Mouvement 24 January 2003 by the main political parties Patriotique de la Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI), the and rebel groups to put an end to the political Mouvement Patriotique du Grand Ouest crisis and civil unrest that had engulfed Côte (MPIGO) and the Mouvement pour la Justice d’Ivoire since 19 September 2002. President et la Paix (MJP). Gbagbo was to retain power and opponents 5 www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2011/04/02/ were invited into a government of des-affrontements-ont-fait-au-moins-800- reconciliation and obtained the ministries for morts-a-duekoue-selon-le-cicr_1502042_ Defence and the Interior. A peace line was 3212.html#ens_id=1476585. established with the presence of the Economic 6 Disarmament, Demobilisation and Community of West African States Reintegration of ex-combatants. (ECOWAS) and French soldiers. 7 On 20 July 2012 the Internally Displaced 2 Indirect violence could result from heavy Persons camp of Nahibly, where 5,000 weaponry such as tanks and fighter planes and indigenous Guéré had been living since March therefore does not demand direct contact 2010, was completely burnt out by Dozos and between combatants and non-combatants. northerners, arguing that bandits and pro- 3 During presidential elections in 2000, Gbagbo militias were living in the camp. Duékoué, Gagnoa and San Pedro voted in the Officially 11 people were killed.

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86 Allouche and Zadi Zadi The Dynamics of Restraint in Côte d’Ivoire