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Home , Ibrahim Sarsur, Likud Yisrael Beiteinu, Mohammad Barakeh, Naftali Bennett, Tzipi Livni

R.A. Muhammad Shabbir

Israeli Elections 2013: Implications for the Region

Introduction

The initial phase of post January-22nd elections process in has been completed and PM once again has succeeded in forming a coalition government in the country. These elections and resultend government carry significant implications for the region and for us due to Israel being the only undeclared nuclear power to the West of Indus.

This study discusses the background of 2013 and compares it with 2009 elections. It also talks about current political makeup of the country along with underlining the regional implications of 2013 elections.

Context

Elections of nineteenth were scheduled to be held in October 2013, but the snap election was precipitated by the failure to agree the annual budget with the coalition partners. Earlier in May 2012, public debate over the Tal Law (which allows Haredi to indefinitely defer national service), had nearly led Israel to early elections in May 2012. Nevertheless, despite having avoid the bullet of early elections on Tal Law controversy, failure of agreement over annual budget forced Israel to held elections in January 2013.

A comparison with 2009 elections

The 2013 Israeli elections once again saw the alliance though weakened as compared to 2009 but still emerge as the largest faction in the Knesset, winning 31 of the 120 seats. Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu succeeded once again in forming a coalition government in the country. Nevertheless, contrary to 2009 elections, this time the ultra-Orthodox parties are weakened because they could not get majority.

The following table illustrates the number of seats each party holds in current Knesset and compares their position with 2009 elections showing the increase in the seats with + and decrease with – sign. Coalition parties in current government are marked with * sign.

1 Party Current Chairman Seats in 2013 +/- 2009 Likud Yisrael Beiteinu * Benjamin Netanyahu 31 -11 * 19 +19 Labor Party 15 +7 * 12 +9 11 +1 7 +2 Hatnuah * 6 +6 Zahava Gal-On 6 +3 –Ta'al Ibrahim Sarsur 4 0 Mohammad Barakeh 4 0 Balad Jamal Zahalka 3 0 2 -26

During their 2013 electoral campaigns, the parties and alliances put the socio-economic agenda at the top of their programs. The following table lists the issues that remained in focus in both, 2009 and 2013 elections:

Major issues in 2009 elections 2013 Elections: issues in focus 1. Talks with the Palestinians and Two-State 1. Rising prices and increase in income Solution inequality 2. Jewish settlements in the and 2. Tal Law or the unfairly shared burden of military service 3. Gaza conflict and responses to 3. The peace process with Palestinians 4. Iran's alleged progress towards developing 4. Jewish settlements in the West Bank and a nuclear bomb and options to deal with it East 5. Israeli security and perceived threat from Iranian nuclear program The above table shows a major difference between the two election campaigns that while in 2009 security was Israeli’s chief concern, this time socio-economic and domestic issues remained at the top of the election campaign.

Emerging political situation in Israel after 2013 elections

Israeli politics is characterized by short-term coalitions in which big parties make concessions to smaller parties in exchange for their participation. Except for a short period in 1969, when the Labor Party merged with the leftist party Mapam, a single party has never held a majority of seats in Knesset.

2 The outcome of the elections was something of a surprise. After a lackluster run-up to the polls, Israelis cast their votes amid predictions of a slender win for Benjamin Netanyahu, who would form a new coalition more right-wing than before. All eyes were on Naftali Bennett, who was expected to emerge as kingmaker with his ultra-nationalist Jewish Home party. However, as it turned out, Jewish Home was eclipsed by the performance of a new, centrist party, Yesh Atid led by former TV personality Yair Lapid.

The coalition building process in the new government has been defined by an alliance between the centrist-secular Yair Lapid and the national-religious Naftali Bennett. Despite having very different world views, these two share positions in the socio-economic sphere. They agree on reducing the growing economic burden created by the ultra-Orthodox by drafting them to national service and more importantly, by bringing them into the workforce. Both constituencies want to see the over-concentration of wealth in the country to be addressed and a reduction in the cost of living.

Lapid, therefore, wanted Bennett in the government to keep out the ultra-Orthodox. Bennett, for his part, needed the alliance with Lapid to get his party into government. Despite appearing ostensibly to be a natural partner for Netanyahu on peace and security issues, Netanyahu did not seem keen to have him, with a history of personal animosity between the two. Netanyahu unsuccessfully explored the options of including Labour or the ultra-Orthodox, before finally bringing Bennett in.

Completing the picture, and balancing the government out on the left is Tzipi Livni, now at the head of her own hand-picked faction. Leading a small faction and with no appetite for another spell in opposition, she turned out to be the easiest partner for Netanyahu to bring in, and fulfil his desire for a coalition in which he sits at the centre of a range of views on the peace process.

Regional Implications

The implications of Israeli elections on the region may be viewed with a six-fold focus:

First, on Iranian nuclear issue, Netanyahu still presents himself as “the savior of the free and democratic world” from the “Iranian devil”, as he calls it, determent to stop its nuclear

3 program, even through a military attack if needed. Also, there is a clear majority within the new Israeli government that supports armed action against Iran if economic sanctions and the secret electronic war do not dissuade Iranian leadership from the further development of the nuclear programme. However, military intervention in Iran that Netanyahu is seeking the support for, could engulf the region in a deadly confrontation that no one desires.

Second, a diplomatic pressure is now likely to build on Israel to offer gestures to the Palestinians in return for which the Palestinians would re-enter negotiations and hold off further unilateral steps. It will be a key test of Netanyahu’s intentions and those of his coalition partners to find equilibrium among Naftali Bennett, Tzipi Livni and Lapid given the differences in their positions on the issue of negotiations. Moreover, most rightwing, center and left-center parties tend to perceive settlement building and settlements as part of Israel’s legitimate rights. Therefore, this will be a hot topic before the EU and even the US administration, since continuing settlement activity weakens the chances of achieving a two-state solution.

Third, arguably, the greatest impact on the Israeli military’s behavior towards the Palestinians and Arabs will be the appointment of Moshe Ya’alon as minister of defence. Having once led the military unit that is responsible for assassination operations in Arab countries and taken command of the intelligence division and the presidency of the general staff of the army, Ya’alon believes that the "sting of the collective Arab consciousness" can be suppressed through the use of force. According to a doctrine he explains in his 2008 book, A Long Short Road, force alone can convince Arabs to recognize Israel’s existence in the region, and "what cannot be achieved by force will be achieved by greater force." It is thus widely expected that the new government will step up its military operations against the Palestinians under any pretexts. The application of this policy may be delayed by an aggravation of the situation in Syria and the possibility that the prolongation of the Syrian crisis will effect Israeli security in one way or another.

Fourth, considering that most of 2013 election campaign remained focused on socio- economic issues of Israel, it is expected that priorities of newly formed government would focus on addressing growing discontent with rising both: poverty and the cost of living, besides the thorny issue of ultra-Orthodox exemptions from national service - all of which generated a wave of support for Mr Lapid.

4 Fifth, the results of these elections are perhaps the most compelling indication possible that change in the status of the West Bank and the Palestinians, will not come from inside Israel. This places even greater pressure on the United States, if it hopes to affect real change in the region.

Sixth, as things currently stand, if change in the Palestinians status were to occur, the catalyst to the process will not be simple or pretty: it will either be renewed violence in the (that is, a third Intifada) or growing international pressure. If President Obama believes, as he suggested in the run-up to the election, that "Israel doesn't know what its own best interests are" by continuing new settlement construction, then he will need to act boldly and decisively in using American power to change that political calculation.

To sum up, the shifts in the balance of power, as seen in the new cabinet, is an indicator of further changes in the domestic balance of power, and will produce new frameworks for domestic policy. However, these changes do not at all guarantee a change in Israel’s foreign policy. The composition of the new government in terms of parties and individuals represents a determination to resume the settlement and Judaisation policies and a refusal to respond to the conditions necessary for a political settlement for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. There are also factors that portray that Israel will plunge deeper into settlement and Judaisation initiatives, become harsher in terms of its relationship with Palestinians and Arabs in general, and is more willing to resort to force in dealing with Iran on its nuclear program.

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