State Building in Putin's Russia

Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-76088-1 - State Building in Putin’s Russia: Policing and Coercion after Communism Brian D. Taylor Frontmatter More information

State Building in Putin’s Russia

Building a strong Russian state was the central goal of Vladimir Putin’s presidency. This book argues that Putin’s strategy for rebuilding the state was fundamentally flawed. Brian D. Taylor demonstrates that a disregard for the way state officials behave toward citizens – state quality – had a negative impact on what the state could do – state capacity. Focusing on those organizations that control state coercion, what Russians call the “power ministries,” Taylor shows that many of the weaknesses of the Russian state that existed under Boris Yeltsin persisted under Putin. Drawing on extensive field research and interviews, as well as a wide range of comparative data, the book reveals the practices and norms that guide the behavior of Russian power ministry officials (the so-called siloviki), especially law enforcement personnel. By examining siloviki behavior from the Kremlin down to the street level, State Building in Putin’s Russia uncovers the who, where, and how of Russian state building after communism.

Brian D. Taylor is Associate Professor of Political Science in the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University. Previously, he served as Assistant Professor at the University of Oklahoma. He earned his Ph.D. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1998 and holds a master of science from the London School of Economics and a B.A. from the University of Iowa. He is a 2011 Fulbright Scholar to Russia and was a Carnegie Scholar from 2002 to 2003. He was also a Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University. He is the author of Politics and the Russian Army: Civil-Military Relations, 1689– 2000, and his work has appeared in Comparative Politics, Comparative Political Studies, Problems of Post-Communism, Europe-Asia Studies, International Studies Review, Survival, Millennium, and the Journal of Cold War Studies.

© in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-76088-1 - State Building in Putin’s Russia: Policing and Coercion after Communism Brian D. Taylor Frontmatter More information

“The ‘power ministries’ of the police, the security services, and the military have been central to state building efforts in post-Soviet Russia, but have been vastly under- studied. Brian Taylor’s fascinating book pries open the power ministries to explore how organizational pathologies, weak oversight, and increasingly authoritarian rule undermined efforts to build state capacity in Russia. Taylor demonstrates that in many respects, the state is hardly more effective under Putin than under Yeltsin, despite Russia’s return to economic growth and prominence on the international stage. With its keen attention to detail and impressive data collection, State Building in Putin’s Russia is an important work that should interest Russia watchers and scholars of state building alike.” – Timothy Frye, Columbia University

“Brian Taylor offers a clear-eyed account of Vladimir Putin’s efforts to rebuild the power of the state in Russia in the 2000s. Taylor distinguishes between state capacity and state quality, and finds only modest improvements in state capacity under Putin and none in the degree to which the state actually serves the public interest. Focusing in particular on the coercive agencies of the state – the military, police, and security forces – Taylor shows that under Putin, they were largely ineffective in combating crime and terrorism but were often used for the purposes of political repression and intimidation. Taylor concludes that centralizing and consolidating power at the top is a very different enterprise from improving the quality of governance in a state.” – Thomas F. Remington, Emory University

State Building in Putin’s Russia

Policing and Coercion after Communism

BRIAN D. TAYLOR Maxwell School, Syracuse University

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Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication data Taylor, Brian D., 1964– State building in Putin’s Russia : policing and coercion after communism / Brian D. Taylor. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. isbn 978-0-521-76088-1 (hardback) 1. Putin, Vladimir Vladimirovich, 1952 – Political and social views. 2. Yeltsin, Boris Nikolayevich, 1931–2007 – Influence. 3. Russia (Federation) – Politics and government – 1991– 4. Post-communism – Russia (Federation) – History. 5. Power (Social sciences) – Russia (Federation) – History. 6. Federal government – Russia (Federation) – History. 7. Police power – Russia (Federation) – History. 8. Duress (Law) – Russia (Federation) – History. 9. State, The – History – 20th century. 10. State, The – History – 21st century. I. Title. dk510.766.p87t39 2010 947.086Ł2–dc22 2010037099

isbn 978-0-521-76088-1 Hardback

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To My Parents

Contents

List of Figures, Tables, and Maps page viii List of Abbreviations xi Acknowledgments xiii Note on Transliteration and Translation xvii

Introduction 1 1 Bringing the Gun Back In: Coercion and the State 8 2 The Power Ministries and the Siloviki 36 3 Coercion and Capacity: Political Order and the Central State 71 4 Coercion and Capacity: Centralization and Federalism 112 5 Coercion and Quality: Power Ministry Practices and Personnel 156 6 Coercion and Quality: The State and Society 204 7 Coercion in the North Caucasus 250 8 State Capacity and Quality Reconsidered 284

Appendix A Publication Abbreviations 323 Appendix B Interview Index 325 References 331 Index 361

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Figures, Tables, and Maps

Figures 1.1 State quality and state capacity page 20 1.2 Political stability and state quality (WGI 2006) 21 2.1 Fragmentation and consolidation of the power ministries, 1986–2006 38 2.2 National defense and security and law enforcement in Russian budget, constant rubles, 1997–2007 53 2.3 Power ministry budget percentage comparison, 1999–2007 54 2.4 Tenure of FSB directors 56 2.5 Militarization of the Russian elite 58 2.6 Putin’s siloviki network, 2007 60 3.1 Political stability/no violence (WGI) 78 3.2 Deaths from terrorist attacks in Moscow, 1995–2007 85 3.3 Deaths by major terrorist attack, October 2001–June 2007 87 3.4 Government effectiveness (WGI) 90 3.5 Murders per 100,000 population, 1990–2007 92 3.6 Russian state fiscal capacity, 1993–2007 101 4.1 Regional police chief appointments, 1992–2006 136 4.2 Percentage of regional police chief appointments from outside region, 1993–2006 136 5.1 Rule of law (WGI) 159 5.2 Control of corruption (WGI) 160 5.3 Three models of policing 179 5.4 Russian law enforcement types 181 6.1 Trust in the power ministries 206

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Figures, Tables, and Maps ix

6.2 How did the work of police and other law enforcement agencies change in the last year? 208 6.3 How did the state of citizens’ personal safety change in the last year? 210 6.4 Can the Russian authorities defend the Russian population against new terrorist attacks? 210 6.5 Annual number of pardons, 1995–2007 235 6.6 Voice and accountability (WGI) 245 7.1 Deaths from terrorism/insurgency, major attacks, North Caucasus, 2000–2007 259 7.2 Kidnappings, disappearances, and murders in Chechnya, 2002–2007 260 7.3 Deaths from terrorist incidents in Dagestan, 2002–2007 261 8.1 State capacity and per capita GNI 291 8.2 State quality and per capita GNI 292 8.3 Russia: State capacity versus state quality (WGI) 303 8.4 Weak state to police state? State building under Putin 304 8.5 Control over coercion: A typology 305

Tables 1.1 Elements of State Building 35 2.1 Main Power Ministries and Their Approximate Size, 2007 39 2.2 Police Personnel per 100,000 Inhabitants 48 3.1 Law Enforcement Capacity under Putin: Routine versus Exceptional Decisions 108 4.1 Control over Policing, Federal Political Systems 123 4.2 Legal Authority for Law Enforcement Budgetary Support, 1999 124 4.3 Polpreds by Federal District, May 2000–May 2008 131 4.4 Federal Districts and Power Ministry Personnel, 2002 and 2007 132 4.5 “Outsiders” in Regional Power Ministries, 2000–2007 138 5.1 Police Bribes “Price List,” 2002 171 5.2 Main Direction of Activity of Russian Law Enforcement Organs, Percent of Responses, 2006 180 5.3 Russian Encounters with Police Violence and Corruption 182 5.4 Turnover, Education, and Experience of MVD Investigators, 1993–2002 192 8.1 State Capacity (Dependent Variable) and Structural Factors (Wealth, Resource Dependence, Region) 296

x Figures, Tables, and Maps

8.2 State Quality (Dependent Variable) and Structural Factors (Wealth, Resource Dependence, Region) 296 8.3 Predicted Values for State Capacity and State Quality Compared to Actual Russian Scores 297

Maps 4.1 Russia’s federal districts, 2000–2009 129 7.1 North Caucasus 252

Abbreviations

Cheka Extraordinary Commission CJA Center for Justice Assistance CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union EMERCOM Ministry of Civil Defense and Emergency Situations (see MChS) FAPSI Federal Agency for Government Communication and Information FC Federation Council FDSU Federal Road Construction Administration FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency (U.S.) FPS Federal Border Service FRS Federal Registration Service FSB Federal Security Service FSIN Federal Service for the Administration of Sentences FSKN Federal Service for Control of the Narcotics Trade FSNP Federal Tax Police Service FSO Federal Guards Service FTS Federal Customs Service GDP Gross Domestic Product GNI Gross National Income GONGO Government-Organized Non-Governmental Organization GRU Main Intelligence Directorate GU MVD Main Administration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs GUO Main Guards Directorate GUSP Main Directorate for Special Programs

xii Abbreviations

GUVD Main Directorate of Internal Affairs INDEM Information for Democracy Foundation KBR Kabardino-Balkaria Republic KGB Committee on State Security Komsomol Communist Youth League MB Ministry of Security MChS Ministry of Civil Defense and Emergency Situations MO Ministry of Defense MOB Public Order Militia MVD Ministry of Internal Affairs NAC National Antiterrorism Committee NGO Non-Governmental Organization NKVD People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs NPSP Nizhniy Novgorod Project for Justice Assistance Politburo Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party Polpred Presidential Representative PPP Purchasing Power Parity PRI Institutional Revolutionary Party (Mexico) OMON Special Designation Police Detachment OMSN Special Designation Police Detachment RSFSR Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic RUBOP Regional Anti–Organized Crime Directorate SBP Presidential Security Service SSR Security Sector Reform SVR Foreign Intelligence Service USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics UVD Directorate of Internal Affairs VV Internal Troops WDI World Development Index WGI World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators

Acknowledgments

Many institutions and individuals provided assistance on this project. I apol- ogize in advance for those I forget to mention here and stress that the usual disclaimers most definitely apply – all opinions and errors in the book are my own. For financial assistance, I would like to thank: The Carnegie Corporation of New York, for a very generous scholarship that got the project started and, among other things, made much of the field research possible; The Smith Richardson Foundation, for a similarly generous grant that supported writing and additional field research, as well as the publication of a policy monograph in which some of the findings from this book were originally presented; The Maxwell School, for several small grants, field research support (through a grant from the Department of State), and support for course buyouts; The University of Oklahoma, for research leave; The Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs and the Department of Political Science at the Maxwell School, for support for a workshop on the first draft of the book. The most important scholarly community that supported me while working on this project was the Program on New Approaches to Russian Security (PONARS). Specialists will have little trouble spotting the intellectual influ- ences of multiple PONARS members in the book. I thank especially the founder and director (until 2009) Celeste Wallander. Many members offered feedback, data, ideas, and other support, including: Mikhail Alexseev, Pavel Baev, Andrew Barnes, Doug Blum, Georgi Derluguian, Matthew Evangelista, Tim Frye, Vladimir Gel’man, Ted Gerber, Henry Hale, Stephen Hanson, Ted Hopf, Debra Javeline, Mark Kramer, Ivan Kurilla, Pauline Jones Luong, Sarah Mendelson, Robert Orttung, Nikolay Petrov, Vladimir Popov, Regina Smyth, Vadim Volkov, and Cory Welt. I thank the participants in an April 2008 workshop at Syracuse University for their comments on an earlier draft. I am particularly grateful to Mark Beissinger and Vadim Volkov for their thoughtful criticisms, as well as Elizabeth Cohen, Audie Klotz, Vlad Kravtsov, David Rivera, Mark Rupert, Azamat Sakiev, and Hans Peter Schmitz.

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xiv Acknowledgments

I thank the Russia and Eurasia Program of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, especially Marina Barnett, and the Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism of Syracuse University, especially Marlene Diamond and Keli Perrin, for help in organizing a 2007 workshop on the policy monograph Russia’s Power Ministries. The participants provided valuable feedback that helped shape this book. A number of research assistants provided important help with this project over the years: Richard Bodnar, Yulia Ivanovskaya, Katya Kalandadze, Ekaterina Mozhaeva, Tamara Polyakova, Honggang Tan, Tatyana Vinichenko, and Naomi Wachs. I owe a special debt of gratitude to all of those individuals in Russia who helped me in multiple ways with the research on this project, whether in agreeing to be interviewed, helping find contacts, or reminding me that there is much more to Russia than the state and its siloviki. I particularly thank: Dmitriy Babich, Boris Bednikov, Andrey and Larissa Berkenblit, Olga Dmitriyeva, Irina Dmitriyevich, Zhanna Gumenyuk, Nikolay Kulikovskikh, Irina Kurenkova, Sarah Lindemann-Komarova, Tatyana Nikitina, Nikolay Petrov, Viktor Rudenko, Mikhail Rykhtik, Maksim Shandarov, Vadim Volkov, and Aleksandr Voronin. Others who contributed in various ways to this project beyond those listed above include: Pablo Beramendi, Matthew Cleary, Boris Demidov, Mikhail Filippov, Dan Goldberg, Petr Kozma, Cerwyn Moore, Robert Otto, Melanie Peyser, Bill Pridemore, Peter Reddaway, Sharon Werning Rivera, Ekaterina Sokirianskaia, Peter Solomon, Jeffrey Straussman, Daniel Treisman, and Alexei Trochev. Lewis Bateman of Cambridge University Press was, yet again, a model of efficiency in shepherding this project from manuscript to book, and I thank him for his support. Others who contributed to the production process at Cambridge were Emily Spangler, Anne Lovering Rounds, and Mark Fox. I thank Kavitha Lawrence and Newgen for their management of the copyediting and production process, and Nancy Peterson for compiling the index. David Cox produced the two maps used in this book with great skill and efficiency. I also thank the two anonymous reviewers for their very helpful and detailed comments. I am grateful to the following publishers for permission to use portions of previously published articles or book chapters in revised form in this book:

Comparative Politics, for: “Force and Federalism: Controlling Coercion in Federal Hybrid Regimes.” Comparative Politics, 39, 4 (July 2007), pp. 421–440; M.E. Sharpe, for: “Putin’s ‘Historic Mission’: State-Building and the Power Ministries in the North Caucasus.” Problems of Post-Communism, 54, 6 (November– December 2007), pp. 3–16; Rowman & Littlefield, for: “Russia’s Regions and Law Enforcement.” In Peter Reddaway and Robert W. Orttung, eds., The Dynamics of Russian Politics: Putin’s Reform of Federal-Regional Relations, Volume II (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), pp. 65–90; Taylor & Francis, for: “Law Enforcement and Civil Society in Russia.” Europe-Asia Studies, 58, 2 (March 2006), pp. 193–213.

Acknowledgments xv

My final acknowledgments are to my family. I thank my wife Renée de Nevers for her love, encouragement, and sense of humor. Renée is also an academic, which means I am doubly grateful for her willingness to take time away from her own research and writing to tell me how to fix mine. I thank my sons Anatol and Lucian, whose obsession with sports, Star Wars Legos, and general mayhem made it possible for me to finish this book, and whose smiles, hugs, and laughter brightened the times I wasn’t working on it. Finally, I thank my parents, Lois and Merlin Taylor, for decades of love and support. I’m sure that they had no idea when they were raising me that I would become keenly interested in Russian siloviki, but I’m quite certain that they would have loved me anyway. I dedicate this book to them.

Note on Transliteration and Translation

I use the transliteration system of the U.S. Board on Geographic Names, which I believe is easier for non-Russian speakers to read than the Library of Congress system (Basayev rather than Basaev, Serdyukov rather than Serdiukov, etc.). I have also used the familiar English form for well-known names (e.g., Ingushetia rather than Ingushetiya, Khodorkovsky rather than Khodorkovskiy). Soft signs are omitted from the main text (e.g., Rossel instead of Rossel’), but preserved in the notes. In cases in which Russian authors have published in English under more than one spelling (e.g., Nikolay/Nikolai Petrov) I have tried to preserve the spelling used for that publication. Other exceptions to this system may occur and are accidental; my apologies. All translations from Russian are mine unless otherwise noted.

note on interviews and primary sources Much of the material in the book comes from interviews and press accounts. Appendix A provides a list of abbreviations used for Russian- and English- language newspapers and magazines. Appendix B provides a key to the interviews, organized by city and then alphabetically. Anonymity was offered to all respondents and provided when requested. Unless otherwise specified, quotes from speeches by Putin and Medvedev are available at one of the following Web sites: http://archive.kremlin.ru/ (Putin) or http://www.president.kremlin.ru (Medvedev).

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