Eleven

Flashpoint: South Sea

11.1 The Political Seascape and Regional Stability

The has resurfaced as a political and military flashpoint, coin- ciding with China’s spectacular rise in economic and military might.1 The waters are home to rich fishing grounds and, according to some estimates, the world’s second largest oil reserves, containing as much as 213 billion barrels of oil worth over $18 trillion.2 Today the South China Sea may be considered the “center of gravity for the global economy,” with more than $5 trillion in commerce flowing through the region’s sea lines of communication on an annual basis.3 The convergence of political, military, and economic interests among Viet- nam, China, , Indonesia, Brunei, , and the makes the South China Sea the most volatile maritime flashpoint on earth. This is the only chapter in the book dedicated to examining maritime security in a single region, as we believe that tensions in the South China Sea could at any moment erupt into war. Furthermore, the international disputes in the region play out against the backdrop of law of the sea and the maritime rights and duties of States in the region. China is at the center of the South China Sea controversy, and without Beijing’s activism, the stage would be set for a rather drawn out but peaceful horse-trading among the littoral States to resolve conflicting claims. Capitalizing on Washing- ton’s preoccupation with the U.S. withdrawal from South in late 1973,

1 South China Sea Flashpoint: As China Threats Grow, the U.S. Should Signal Support for ASEAN (Op-ed.), Wall. St. J., July 2, 2011. 2 Ray Kwong, South China Sea: China Lays Claim to Every Inch That Matters, Hsin Pao (Hong Kong Econ. J.), Oct. 19, 2011. 3 Gidget Fuentes, PACOM Boss: Fleet essential to protect commerce, Navy Times, Oct. 25, 2011. 314 chapter eleven however, in January 1974 China invaded the Paracel . Vietnam had inher- ited control and administration of the islands from colonial France (French Indo- china) in 1956. The superior PRC expeditionary forces easily overwhelmed the smaller South Vietnamese garrison on Pattle , the largest feature in the Crescent Group of the archipelago. After a brief naval and island engagement, Chinese forces grabbed control of both the Amphitrite and Crescent Groups of the . China has occupied the features since the invasion, drawing illegal straight baselines around the islands.4 In April 2012, Beijing announced that it was considering opening the Paracel Islands to tourism in order to bolster its sovereignty claims.5 A second clash between China and Vietnam occurred in March 1988 as Viet- nam’s closest ally, the Soviet Union, was beginning to disintegrate. On March 14, the People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLA-N) marine forces attacked Vietnamese naval forces in the vicinity of , resulting in the sinking of sev- eral Vietnamese warships and the death of 72 Vietnamese sailors.6 The skirmish extended over six atolls, all of which were then occupied by Beijing. Following this engagement, China occupied six additional key islets in the Spratly archipel- ago—Nanshan, Loaita Nan, Loaita Island, Namyit Island, , and .7 On April 1, 2001, a Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force F-8 Finback fighter aircraft collided with a U.S. EP-3 surveillance aircraft that was conduct- ing a routine reconnaissance flight about 70 miles south-southwest of Island. The Chinese pilot was killed, the fighter jet lost at sea, and the damaged propeller-driven EP-3 aircraft made an emergency landing at Lingshui airfield on Hainan Island. The U.S. flight crew was illegally detained for over two weeks, and the aircraft was not returned until July 2001, by which time it had been dis- mantled and stripped. The Bush administration, which entered the White House just months before the incident, lodged a diplomatic protest with China, con- demning the violation of the aircraft’s sovereign immunity and illegal detention of the crew, and stating that U.S. surveillance activities and reconnaissance flights would continue.8

4 Energy information Administration, Country Analysis Briefs—South China Sea, Mar. 2008. 5 Ben Blanchard & Chris Buckley, China Stakes Claim To Islands With ‘Princess Coconut’ Voyage, Reuters, Apr. 10, 2012. 6 China’s Syndrome: Ambiguity; What Seizing a Tiny Reef Says About Beijing’s Soul, Wash. Post, Mar. 19, 1995, A1. 7 Id. 8 Shirley Kan, et al., China-U.S. Aircraft Collision Incident of April 2001: Assess- ments and Policy Implications, Cong. Res. Service Report for Congress, Oct. 10, 2001, C. Plante, U.S. Quietly Resumes Surveillance Flights off China, CNN.com, May 15,