Security Trends

NCCI’s Security Trends Analysis providesSecurity internal advice for TrendsAnalysis NCCI members only and should not be forwarded outside your 29th August – 25th September 2012 organization. If forwarded By internally, care must be taken to ensure that it is not passed Analysis

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The NCCI Security Trends Analysis is provided to member NGOs twice a month as an informational and advisory report on possible trends, threats and incidents based on information received from NGOs, the media, international organizations and official sources.

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Table of Contents

Violence Increases between Turkey and the PKK ...... 5 The Free ...... 6 Tareq al-Hashemi Receives and Dismisses Guilty Verdict in Exile ...... 7 Forming of the Tigris Operations Command ...... 8 Al-Qaeda’s Resurgence? ...... 9

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Map of

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Violence Increases between Turkey and the PKK

The period between mid-August and mid-September has seen a major increase in violence between Turkey and the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) around the border regions with Iraq and Iran. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan reported that approximately 500 “Kurdish rebels” have been killed during this period, while 123 have been killed between September 7th and September 17th alone. The recent levels of violence have exceeded those of the past decade and seem to be encroaching further inland within Kurdistan-Iraq, raising questions of stability in the KRG.

Since the PKK took up arms against Turkey in 1984, it has been designated a foreign terrorist organization by the U.S., the E.U., and Turkey. The PKK mostly operates along the Turkey-Iraq border. Although the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union for Kurdistan (PUK) officially govern Dohuk, Erbil, and Sulaymaniyah within Iraq, armed opposition groups against Turkey and Iran still maintain a strong presence in the territories, especially around the mountainous borders with Turkey and Iran. While Turkish and Iranian military operations are sporadic, the Turkish offensive has recently amplified its airstrikes and operations, which have resulted in the deaths and injuries of many civilians, as well as Turkish and Kurdish soldiers and militia.

On August 25th, 4 Iranians were injured when Turkish jets bombarded Sulaymaniyah, while on September 6th, Turkish jets bombarded the Qandeel Mountains, east of Erbil, injuring 3 civilians. Between September 7th and the 14th, F-16 fighter jets were reported to have launched airstrikes near the Iraq-Iran border from Diyarbakir, resulting in the deaths of 80. From 1984 to 2008, according to Mehmet İlker Başbuğ, Chief of the Turkish General Staff, more than 37,000 people have died as a result of the conflict, including 32,000 PKK members, 6,482 Turkish soldiers and security officials, as well as 5,560 civilians.

While the violence has resulted in a massive loss of lives on the humanitarian front, on the political front, Turkish unilateral operations continue to overtly challenge the sovereignty of both the KRG and Baghdad, aggravating tensions between the three parties during a time at which regional politics are undergoing significant shifts. Additionally, with the U.S. pressuring Turkey to become militarily involved in , Ankara would not only be dealing with conflict on two fronts, but also paradoxically suppressing one revolutionary movement while backing another.

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The Free Iraqi Army (FIA)

Information regarding an armed opposition group, calling itself the Free Iraqi Army (FIA), appeared on several social networking and news sites during the month of Ramadan. The group immediately cited the as its inspiration and basis for its goals and values, which include the dismissal of the Iranian occupation in Iraq, as well as the replacement of the Iraqi army. According to Elaph news, the FIA had begun in northern Ninawa and expanded to west al-Anbar and east Diyala. While various officials are saying that the group is fabricated, either by al-Qaeda or the media, looking at the politics and reactions surrounding the existence of the group and the facts on the ground may result a more productive analysis.

Political analyst Ibrahim al-Sumaidi’ says that there is no evidence of a group like this “on the ground,” and while there have been efforts by some armed opposition groups to unify, he does not see this as being likely.

Others attribute it to dissident elements, with no relation to the Free Syrian Army, which are attempting to undermine domestic Iraqi politics in one way or another. Adnan al-Assadi, the Senior Undersecretary of the Interior Ministry, told an official government channel (al-Iraqiyya TV) that “they are al-Qaeda creations. I think that what is called the Free Iraqi Army, or what is being said is a free army, is actually the al-Qaeda organization, or what is called the . It changed its name and it changed its attire. It went from al-Qaeda, or the Islamic State of Iraq, to the Free Iraqi Army…” In a slightly different statement, a member of the Commission of Security and Defense told aswat al-Iraq that “[he] met with leaders of the security and military [in Ninawa] and found that there is a clear and stable security situation.”

As a reaction to the FIA, Grand Ayatullah Sheikh Bashir Hussein al-Najafy, from the south, has issued a fatwa banning the sale of weapons. He stated: “…no Iraqi shall sell the weapons he owns as the enemies will eventually get hold of these weapons regardless of who is the initial buyer. The Iraqi government is called on to eradicate terrorists in Iraq and ensure peace for the oppressed people.” This shows a push by some Shiite clerics to legitimize the government for southern protection and oppose those such as Muqtada al-Sadr, who has previously encouraged southern armament.

With the increase in attacks throughout , Tikrit, and Kirkuk between August and September, it is inaccurate to call Ninawa stable, whether or not the FIA actually exists. Tensions in and around the disputed territories are still palpable, affecting the security and politics in other regions. Additionally, the inconsistency in the official statements above demonstrate the Iraqi government’s anxiety regarding armed opposition groups, as well as its general uncertainty when it comes to intelligence on regional security.

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Tareq al-Hashemi Receives and Dismisses Guilty Verdict in Exile

Tareq al-Hashemi, the fugitive Iraqi Vice-President, was found guilty and sentenced to death on September 9th, allegedly for organizing terrorist attacks on officials and security forces. Al-Hashemi has been in Turkey since April, after fleeing to Kurdistan, , and to evade murder charges from the Nuri al-Maliki government. The charges, issued in December, 2011, consist of over 150 bombings and assassinations. Al- Hashemi called the charges “unjust,” receiving agreement from Turkey’s Prime Minister, Tayyip Erdogan, who welcomes al-Hashemi to stay and “will not hand [him] over.” Recently, Interpol has also placed al-Hashemi on their wanted list, urging extradition.

Al-Hashemi is the second high-ranking government official to be condemned by the al-Maliki government. Last December, al-Maliki attempted to sack Deputy Prime Minister and former Ba’th Party member, Saleh al- Mutlaq, for calling al-Maliki a “dictator” and allegedly harboring pro-Ba’thist sentiments. However, the attempted sacking was eventually dismissed.

Al-Hashemi is the leader of the Renewal List party, a self-described Sunni, non-sectarian party, which is a member of Iyad Alawi’s al-Iraqiyya list, a coalition of various political parties that includes Saleh al-Mutlaq’s Iraqi Front for National Dialogue. While the Iraqiyya list and the Renewal List are cross confessional, the conflict between Nuri al-Maliki and al-Hashemi’s politics can be understood as a push by both to dominate Iraqi politics at a time during which foreign and domestic forces pull at the nation. By attempting to neutralize political opponents and politicize religion (ie, Sunni vs. Shiite), al-Maliki has been able to garner support for his position.

An additional, albeit unintended, consequence is that Erdogan’s asylum for al-Hashemi will only widen the schism between Iraq and Turkey’s governments, possibly affecting policies toward the Kurds as well as Syria.

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Forming of the Tigris Operations Command

The head of the Kurdish region, Massoud Barzani, met earlier in September with the head of the Kurdish Parliament, Arslan Baez, as well as the General of the Peshmerga, the Interior Minister, and other Kurdish leaders to discuss the formation of the Tigris Operations Command. The above officials, as well as Kurdish political parties, opposed Nuri al-Maliki’s push to form the Tigris Operations Command, which would serve as operations coordination force for the police and security apparatus in the disputed territories of Kirkuk, Salah al-Din, and Diyala.

The disputed territories of Ninawa, Kirkuk, Salah al-Din, and Diyala are officially under the jurisdiction of Baghdad. However, as part of the reverse Arabization policy, undertaken by the central government after the fall of , Article 140 of the Constitution of Iraq stipulates a return of Kurds to their home in the disputed region before a referendum can be held on jurisdiction.

Although the forces were officially established in July, by orders from al-Maliki and commanded by the Iraqi army, al-Maliki decided to place their headquarters in Kirkuk airport on August 30th, exasperating the already controversial decision.

The Kirkuk governorate council strongly opposed al-Maliki’s order to make the command in charge of defense and interior deployments because it did not include Kurdish regional security or military forces and it contradicted al-Maliki’s earlier promise to transfer Iraq’s security file from the Iraqi army to local police forces.

According to Halo Najat, a KDP Asayish (security) chief in Kirkuk, "…the security file was managed by a joint operation made up of members from the army, police and the Asayish of Kirkuk." Najat went on to say that the forming of these forces is destructive to the balance of power between Baghdad and Erbil in these disputed territories. By expanding the soft and hard power of the central government, al-Maliki is not only challenging Kurdish sovereignty, but also consolidating his monopoly on violence and increasing coercive power.

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Al-Qaeda’s Resurgence?

The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), al-Qaeda’s parallel in Iraq, has claimed responsibility for the most recent vicious attacks carried out on September 9th, which killed at least 88 people and wounded over 400. These attacks come as an addition to the 131 attacks, during Ramadan, for which ISI claimed responsibility.

The September 9th attacks took place in various provinces throughout Iraq and involved car bombs in Kirkuk and Nasiriyah, near Baghdad, shootings at an Army outpost in Dujail, as well as bombs as far south as Basra. One of the blasts in Nasiriyah happened to be in close proximity to the French consulate and a local hotel. The attacks indiscriminately targeted Sunnis and Shiites, as well as civilians and security professionals in a similar fashion to the July 23rd attacks, which also targeted some of al-Qaeda’s former regions of support.

While ISI claimed responsibility for the attacks, Al-Jazeera was notified that other “insurgent” groups also played a role. This statement alludes to the common problem of classifying asymmetrical groups who have very sparse organization and minimum public communication, if any.

The sheer volume and breadth of these attacks signify the movement’s effort to challenge the government’s monopoly on violence by targeting the police and military, as well as those whom ISI perceives as having natural allegiances to Iraq’s center of power and/or intruding foreign powers, such as Shiites and state employees (demonstrated by the attack at the state-run Northern Oil Company outside the northern city of Kirkuk).

Although the organization is clearly weaker than it was from 2006-2008, but whether these series of recent attacks indicate a resurgence of ISI remains unclear.

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