Military Review The Professional Journal of the US Army March 1984 THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF THE US ARMY
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HONORABLE JOHN O. MARSH JR. Secretary of the Army LIEUTENANT GENERAL CARL E. VUONO Commandant MAJOR GENERAL DAVE R. PALMER Deputy Commandant
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i VOLUME LXIV MARCH 1984 NO 3
CONJENTS PAGE 2 YOM PING TO PORT STANLEY by Colonel Harry G. SU"I,mers Jr., US Army 17 THE IRAN·IRAQ WAR AND THE FUTURE OF THE PERSIAN GULF I by William J. Olson I 30 SPETSNAZ: THE SOVIET l!JNION'S SPECIAL FORCES by Viktor Suvorov I
I 47 REFORGER: REALISTIC TfAINING FOR THE ARNG by Captain DaVId W. Bafir, Army National Guard, and Captain Paul H. Viviah, Army National Guard 54 EVOLUTION OF US ARM~R MOBILITY by Christopher R. Gab1 64 AIRCRAFT SURVIVABILITY by C. Hudson Carper Jr;
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I-lis article "AirLand Battle: Doctrine, Not Dogma," which appeared in the June 1983 issue, has earned him the $250 prize money and an attractive certificate attesting to his scholarship. The second-place article was "Maneuver and the Operational Level of War" !February 1983) by Lieutenant Colonel Paul T. DeVries. Third place went to "Air Assault Brigades: New Element in the Soviet Desanl Force Structure" (October 1983) by Major Roger E. Bart. These authors were not the only winners. The Tactical Writing Awards Pro gram has inspired numerous officers to share their thoughts on taclical con cepts and battle doctrine. The presentation of differing perceptions and the frank discussion of problem areas have been instrumental in stimulating professional thought and broadening our professional knowledge. Such a trend works for the betterment of us all. In the end, the winners are the soldiers we lead and the country we serve. As General of the Army Omar Bradley once said, "For most men, the matter of learning is one of personal preference. But for Army officers, the obligation to learn, to grow in their profession is clearly a public duty." The Military Review is also a winner, for in publishing these articles MR serves as a major forum for the professional growth bf the US Army. To those who have won the laurels, our congratulations. To those who have contributed to the forum, our thanks. To the entire officer corps, our encour agement to join the discussion, to air your views and to share your thoughts. Specifically, we encourage you to submit your articles for consideration in the 1984 awards program. Many excellent at tides have been received already, but there is always room for another, _better one . . Don't delay. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY MILITARY REVIEW (USPS 123'830) POSTAGE AND FEES PAID DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY U S ARMY COMMANO & GENERAL STAFF COllEGE DOD 314 FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027 OFFICIAL BUSINESS PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE $300 SECOND CLASS UNIV ,VlICROFILMS 01 300 NORTH ZEEB KOAD ATTN S HORTON GGSC LBL5 ANN ARBOR I'll 1It110b 15 DEC 79 Articles to Watch For: CAS3: The Army'S New Staff Officer Course Lieutenant Colonel Karl Farris, US Army The Soviet Conventional• Offensive in Europe Lieutenant Colonel John G. Hines, US Army, and 'Phillip A.• Petersen The Just War Tradition .'~'~2~ Captain David H. Petraeus, US Army , ;",,~ MILITARY REVIEW The original means of strategy is victory-that is, tactical success. ... Yet insofar as fa tactical success/ is not the one that will lead directly to peace, it remains subsidiary. ... Karl von Clausewitz l The uiews expressed in this article are those of Gatling is reported to have said: the author and do not purport to reflect the posi tion of the Department of the Army, the Depart The thought occurred to me that if I ment of Defense or any other government office could get up a gun with which one man or agency.-Editor. would do the work of a hundred, that would to a great extent supersede the necessity of large armies.' Introduction In his analysis of warmaking in the United States from the Civil War to World War I, Berkeley Professor Thomas NE of the most striking features of C. Leonard found a prevalent belief that Othe Falkland Islands Campaign "technology would shorten wars; modern was that, in this modern age of electronic weapons would ensure less bloodshed.'" warfare, of missiles, of high-performance This belief has flourished in our own time aircraft and of nuclear submarines, the when whole military strategies were built decisive battles that, as Karl von Clause· on the premise that nuclear weapons witz put it, "led directly to peace" were would be a substitute for battlefield man won with rifle and bayonet, were won by power. (It is instructive to note that, ac· the age-old infantry tactic of "closing cording to former Army Chief of Staff with the enemy and destroying him by General Edward C. Meyer, the Soviet fire and maneuver." Union saw nuclear weapons not as a sub What makes this even more ironic is stitute for its large conventional forces that those who carried the day-the but (by achieving nuclear parity at all infantry foot soldiers of the Army and the levels-strategic, theater and tactical) as Marine Corps-have always been the poor a means of validating those forces.)' relations of the military family. They are As we will see in the Falkland Islands rarely held up as symbols of military Campaign, modern technology was useful prowess. Rather, it has been those who fly in getting the infantry to the point of planes, sail ships, maneuver ta~ks, decision, and it was helpful in preparing manipulate exotic electronic equipment its way and in supporting its efforts. In and fight wars at a gentlemanly distance the final analysis, however, it was the with cannons and missiles who suppos men who "slogged up to Port Stanley edly represent war-fighting ability in our with rifle and pack" who ultimately car modern age. ried the day. We think of this as peculiar to our own time, but, more than lOG years ago, Rich Reprinted by permission of Westview Press from ard J. Gatling, the inventor of the Gatling Military Lessons of the Falkland Islands War: Views From the United States, edited by Bruce W, gun (an early machinegun), said that his Watson and Peter M Dunn. Copyright © 1984 by iilvention was designed "to save men." Westview Press, Boulder, Colo.-Editor. 4 March YOMPING Modern communications are at one and The Beachhead at San Carlos Water the same time a great blessing and a great curse. Because orders can be instantan eously transmitted around the world'and But, for a while, it looked like they the home-based strategic decisionmaker would neyer have that opportunity. Opel" thousands of miles from the battle scene ation S,;t/Oll, the plan for the amphibious can speak directly to the tactical com invasion, suffered from one grievous mander, the illusion is created that one is fault. It was designed to get the land just as knowledgeable about battlefield forres ashore but was remarkably silent conditions as the other. Thompson was in on what they were to do once the beach daily contact with Northwood, and daily head had been established. This was a they pressured him to move against the predictable (and hence avoidable) failing, enemy. What they could not appreciate at for, as the eminent military historian such a great distance was the enormity of Russell F. Weigley has detailed, the same the problems he faced. error was made at the Normandy inva Two of' the critical assumptions of sion in 1944. Th<;re, too great an emphasis Thompson's plan had gone awry-the on just getting the troops ashore almost assumption that the navy would main canceled out their ability to execute the tain decisive air superiority and the missions for which they were put there in assumption that sufficient helicopters the first place-that is, the destruction of would be available to airlift forces and the enemy's army and his will to fight.' supplies. The failure of the first assump This shortcoming was especially frus tion caused the failure of the second. trating to the senior British officer When Argentine air attacks sank the ashore, Brigadier Julian Thompson, the Atlantic Conveyor on 25 May, 10 Wessex commander of the marine 3d Commando and four Chinook helicopters upon which Brigade. His staff had been given the British movement outside the beachhead responsibility of planning the amphibious had hinged were lost. Further, lack of air invasion but had been specifically di superiority limited the time supply ships rected by Rear Admiral John Woodward, could be off-loaded to only a few night the amphibious force commander, to plan time hours, for, before daybreak, they had no further than the beachhead. Marine to make for the safety of the open sea. Major General Jeremy Moore, the desig Logistics problems on the beachhead nated land force commander, would com were enormous, and there was difficulty plete the campaign plan when he arrived in even getting food to the troops.' with the army's 5th Infantry Brigade. But Thompson's problems with air But no sooner had the beachhead been defense and logistics were overshadowed established on 21 May 1982 than the stra by a problem he had not counted on tegic headquarters for the entire cam political pressure for "good news" from paign, the Commander-in-Chief Fleet the front. Such conflict between political (located at Northwood, near London, and and military priorities is not new. For referred to by the British simply as many years, the US military teok as an "Northwood," much as we would call the article of faith the proposition advanced Department of Defense "the Pentagon"), by Brevet Major General Emory Upton began to pester Thompson for signs of in the late 19th century that military inovement.' operations and politics were radically and 1984 5 MILITARY REVIEW fundamentally things apart. A 1936 Com Commando. and the 3 Para were to shoul mand and General Staff School manual der 120-pound packs and move on foot warned of the danger of violating this pre some 50 miles overland to begin the in cept: vestment of Port Stanley. The 40 and 42 In most of the great wars of history. Commando were kept in reserve at the there can be found military exploits calcu beachhead. On 27 May, the movement to lated to feed the press rather than to beat contact began. the enemy. ... Statesmen at times become unduly impatient in regard to the inevita ble slowness with which the obstacles to The Battle at Goose Green success are overcome in the field. This feeling frequently arouses a desire for a change ofplans. 8 The 2 Para. under the command of Lieu This is precisely what happened to tenant Colonel Herbert Jones. was orga Thompson. Less than a week after he nized into four 90-man rifle companies secured the beachhead. he was ordered by and a support company. The entire bat Northwood to immediately engage the talion would make the attack on Goose enemy. Besides ordering him into battle. G~een. but the absence of transport Northwood also selected the precise loca caused them to cut their heavy weapons tion-the Argenline base al Goose Green. lo two manpacked 81mm mortars. This some 13 miles south of the beachhead. As organic firepower deficiency was compen one account put it. "London needed a sated for by direct artillery support from langible victory. If lhel'e ever was a a three-} 05mm-gun section from lhe 8th politician's batlle. then Goose Green was Battery. 29th Commando Regiment. to be it.'" It was apparent that the battle Royal Artillery. and by naval gunfire sup philosopher for the Falkland Islands port from the frigate Arrow. Harrier air Campaign was to be Clausewitz. not Up strikes would also be available. ton. Since war is parl of policy. policy will Jones planned to move out of the beach determine its character. Clausewitz head on the night of 27 May and make an wrote: approach march under the cover of dark Political considerations do not deter ness to an attack position at Camilla mine the posting ofguards or the employ Creek House. some 11 miles to the south. ment ofpatrols. but they are the more in After resting during the day. the bat fluential in planning of war, of the cam talion would again move out during the paign. and often euen of the battle. In night of 28 May to begin the actual at Nat only were political considerations tack. One rifle company would recon to be paramount. but Thompson was also noiter the 4 miles to the line of departure ordered to do what most tactical rules ("start line" to the Britishl which Jones and regulations specifically warn against. had established across the head of the ap He was ordered to split his forces in the proximately 2-mile-wide isthmus which face of a numerically superior enemy. The linked the two main parts of East Falk 2d Battalion. The Parachute Regiment land Island. He would then attack down ("2 Para" to the Britishl. was to attack the isthmus with two companies abreast the Argentine force at Goose Green (see to seize Darwin. some 6 miles farther Figure 11. The 45th Battalion. The Royal south. Marine Commando Regiment, or the 45 At first. things went according to plan. March VOMPING 10 20 Miles , ! 1'0 io 30 KIlometers Source. The Falklands Campaign The Lessons Her Majesty's StatIOnery Offrce. london, Eng, 1982, p 8 Figure Although some enemy harrassing and in in the day, the 2 Para's lead elements met terdiction fire fell to their flank, the at no resistance when they began advancing tack position was secured by 0300 on 28 at 1800 on 28 May. Led by sappers of the May. But, while they prepared for their 59th Independent Commando Squadron, forthcoming assault, they were startled Royal Engineers, the start line at the to hear a British Broadcasting Corpora head of the isthmus was soon secured. At tion (BBC) World Service News bulletin 0235 on 29 May, the left flank company that "2 Para was within 5 miles of Dar crossed the start line. Meeting light resist win." Jones was so enraged that he told ance, it advanced some 4 miles to its inter the BBC correspondent accompanying mediate objective overlooking the town of the unit that he would sue the secretary Darwin, halfway down the isthmus. of state for defence if any of his men died For some unexplained reason, the at in the forthcoming battle. 11 As a result of tack was not coordinated, and the right this leak, tactical surprise had been lost, flank unit was 45 minutes late in crossing and the enemy was forewarned and fore the start line. It immediately began armed. meeting heavy resistance. Although at , Although they had been fired on earlier tempts were made to clear the enemy 1984 7 MILITARY REVIEW soldiers as they advanced, some Argen Argentines immediately accepted. Intelli tine strongpoints were inadvertently by gence had told them that there was less passed. This required the follow-on com than an enemy battalion in the entire pany to eliminate these pockets of resist Goose Green-Darwin area, and 2 Para ex ance instead of leapfrogging through the pected some 80 Argentines to surrender_ lead company as had been planned. Instead, about 150 men in air force uni As dawn broke, the tide of battle swung form marched out of the town, followed to the ArgenNnes. British troops in the closely by a column of some 900 Argen open were pinned down by a well-armed tine soldiers. enemy in prepared positions supported In remarkable similarity to the US by machineguns, artillery (including experience in Vietnam, it later developed direct fire from 35mm antiaircraft guns) that national-level British signals intelli and close air support by Argentine Puca gence (SIGINT) had intercepted the en ras and Skyhawks. To add to their prob tire Argentine order of battle and the lems, British close air support was fogged Ministry of Defence in London knew the in, and, just when it was needed most, the magnitude of the enemy forces at Goose frigate Arrow was compelled, in the face Green. The high security classification of of threatened Argentine air attack, to this information, however, prevented it .retire to the safety of the San Carlos an from being passed to the commanders in chorage. The momentum of the attack the field." Such gross bureaucratic dere had been lost. liction could have caused a battlefield dis To get his battalion moving again, aster, as similar dereliction did in Viet Jones, in an action that would win him nam when the Special Forces camp out Great Britain's highest award, the Vic side Khe Sanh was overrun by enemy ar toria Cross, led an attack on an Argentine mor that SIGINT (but not the camp com machinegun position but fell mortally mander) knew was there. Fortunately, wounded before he could reach it. The this disaster was averted by the shock command of the battalion passed to his and ferocity of 2 Para's attack. second in command, Major Chris Keeble. The 450 soldiers of 2 Para had done Keeble ordered his reserve company up what no computer-driven, war-fighting along the shoreline on the right to launch model could ever have predicted-beat a an attack on the Argentine flank. well-entrenched, well-armed defender four This successful attack, combined with times their strength. At a cost of 17 men close air support from the Harriers which killed and 35 wounded, they killed some had joined the action as soon as the 250 Argentine soldiers and took more weather cleared, recaptured the British than 1,200 prisoners of war. battlefield initiative. The Argentines Upton would cynically have said that began to withdraw, and, by nightfall, the politicians in London finally had the Goose Green had been invested. battlefield' victory they so desperately Reinforced by J Company of the 42 needed. But there was more to it than Commando, Keeble planned to make'his that. Clausewitz had warned that war is a final attack on the morning of 29 May. remarkable trinity of the people, their Before he did so, however, he sent two government and their army. As we found Argentine prisoners into Goose Green to our sorrow in Vietnam, this interrela under a white flag to invite the Argen tionship causes public opinion at home to tines to surrender. To their surprise, the be an even more crucial military center of 8 March VOMPING gravity than the destruction of an enemy in the field. 13 Yomping to Port Stanlev From a tactical point of view, Thomp· son was correct in opposing the Goose Green operation as a diversion from the After Goose Green, all attention could decisive objective at Port Stanley. But, at then be focused on the recapture of Port the strategic level, what was overriding Stanley which was not only the capital of was the need for an immediate battlefield the Falkland Islands but was also the victory to compensate for the gloom location of the bulk of the Argentine mili caused by the sinking of the frigates Ar tary Isee Filorure 2). Port Stanley is located dent and Antelope, the destroyer Coven at the tip of a 15-mile peninsula on the op try and the container ship Atlantic Con posite side of East Falkland Island from veyor. In restoring public morale, the vic the beachhead at San Carlos Water. torJ of 2 Para at Goose Green guaranteed Across the 5-mile-wide base of this penin the continuation of public support that sula between Teal Inlet to the north and made further prosecution of the war Bluff Cove to the south lies a chain of possible. mountains-Mount Estancia to the north. . _...• Ftrslphase mghtofll-12June _ Second phase night of 13-14 June Kilometers 0 4 6 1-1--'I...-.;-L'-'-,' Miles 0 1 Source Tile Falklands Campaign The lessons Her Majesty's Stallonery Office, london, Eng, 1982. p 11. Figure 2 1984 MILITARY REVIEW Mount Kent in the center and Mount movement on skis but now used to Challenger in the south. Midway down describe cross-country foot marches with the peninsula. about halfway to Port full pack." While the battle at Goose Stanley. is another range of mountains Green was still under way. the 3 Para was .' Mount Longdon in the north. Two Sisters marching on Mount Estancia. reaching in the center and Mount Harriet to the there on 31 May without encountering south. enemy opposition. The 45 Commando was Three miles ahead is yet another range close on its heels. reaching its initial -Wireless Ridge to the north. Mount objective at Teal Inlet to the north of Tumbledown in the center and Mount Mount Estancia. The two left flank bat William to the south. Overlooking Port talions were now in place. Stanley itself is the eastern portion of While this was going on. D Squadron of Wireless Ridge across Stanley Harbor to the Special Air Service (SAS) had been the north. and Sapper Hill is to the south. patrolling Mount Kent. Noting that this These mountain chains were selected as a mountain dominated the first intermedi series of successive. intermediate objec ate objective line. Thompson decided to . tives for the British assault on Port use his limited helicopter assets to occupy Stanley. it in force and airlanded a company of the From the beachhead at San Carlos 42 Commando onto Mount Kent on 31 Water on the west side of the East Falk May. On I June. the rest of the battalion land Islands. it was some 40 miles to the was lifted in to occupy Mount Challenger first intermediate objectives-Mount farther to the south. Vamping overland. Estancia. Mount Kent and Mount Chal the 45 Commando reached Mount Kent lenger. The problem was how to get there. on 4 June. Now. with the exception of the As we have seen. helicopter lift capability 2 Para at Goose Green and the 40 Com had been severely limited by the sinking mando at San Carlos Water. the 3 Com of the Atlantic Conveyor. Argentine air mando Brigade was in position across the attack made amphibious movement ex base of the Port Stanley peninsula. The tremely hazardous. Land transport was investiture of Port Stanley had begun. restricted to the limited number of Bv-202s (arctic warfare tracked transport vehicles) organic to the commando unit Arrival of the Army's 5th Infantry Brigade and two troops (what we would call pla toons) of the Blues and Royals with a combined total of eight Scimitar (30mm As the 3 Commando Brigade closed on gun) and Scorpion (76mm gun) light its first intermediate objective. the reconnaissance tanks. army's 5th Infantry Brigade began dis While these vehicles were to prove to embarking at San Carlos Water. Com have great cross-country mobility and manded by Brigadier Tony Wilson. the subsequently provided excellent support brigade had officially been designated for the marching columns. there was not Great Britain's "out-of-area" force for enough of them to transport forces. The operations outside of NATO. As with the only alternative left was to move the com early days of our own Rapid Deployment bat units by what the Royal Marine com Force. however. it had not been given the mandos called "yomping"-a term origi organic logistics and fire support neces nally coined! to describe cross-country sary for such operations. and. since its 10 March VOMPING organization five months earlier. it had With the brigade came the designated had little training in brigade team opera land force commander, Moore, and his tions. SO-man staff. They had joined the 5 Bri To make matters worse, two of its gade on board the Queen Elizabeth 2 at organic battalions. the 2 Para and the 3 Ascension Island and had been virtually Para. had been detached to the 3 Com incommunicado while the events at Goose mando Brigade at the beginning of the Green and the march on Port Stanley crisis and were replaced by two battalions were unfolding. When Moore finally came withdrawn from "public duties"-that is. ashore at San Carlos Water on 30 May !,'Uard and ceremony. These battalions and assumed operational command of the the 1st Battalion. The Welsh Guards. and land campaign from Thompson, he was the 2d Battalion, The Scots Guards-had faced with an immediate tactical problem. been trained as mechanized infantry to The issue at hand was whether to allow fight from armored personnel carriers. the 3 Commando Brigade to make the Only the brigade's third battalion-the final assault on Port Stanley on its own 1st Battalion, the Duke of Edinburgh's with the 5 Brigade in reserve or whether Own 7th Gurkha Rifles-were trained as to attack with the 3 Commando and 5 regular infantry. These deficiencies were Brigade abreast. not considered critical by the Ministry of Wilson quite naturally favored the lat Defence, for the 5 Brigade was initially ter course of action which would allow his considered merely to be a reserve for the 3 brigade to move on a southern axis of at Commando Brigade. tack staged out of Bluff Cove while British troops head for San Carlos Water 1984 11 MILITARY REVIEW Thompson's 3 Commando Brigade at fashioned and so time-consuming that in tacked on a northern axis from its posi our own Army it is too often ignored, tions on the Mount Estancia-Mount especially by those in mechanized infan Kent-Mount Challenger line_ The sticking try units who equate the ability to move point was the limit of availability of with vehicle maintenance), Moore was helicopter lift to move the 5 Brigade into forced into a difficult decision. The scar position since these limited assets were city of helicopter support precluded the already fully engaged in resupplying the movement of the entire 5 Brigade by air. 3 Commando Brigade and in moving up The threat of Argentine air attack and artillery and ammunition for the final severe weather made amphibious move assault_ ment extremely hazardous. But, because While this campaign planning was the 5 Brigade was unable to march into under way, the Gurkha's had made the battle, the risky amphibious operation yomp to Goose Green to relieve the 2 became the only alternative. Para which then reverted to 5 Brigade At first, the decision was to move the controL In the meantime, the 2 Para com brigade on the two available assault mander, with an ingenious use of civilian ships, the Intrepid and the Fearless_ In telephone lines, discovered that the town particularly bad weather, t.he Scots of Fitzroy, on the shore of Bluff Cove, had Guards embarked on the Intrepid on 5 been evacuated by the Argentines. June, and, after 7 hours,at sea with winds Wilson, on his own authority, com gusting up to 70 knots, they finally strug mandeered a Chinook and airlifted a 2 gled ashore at Bluff Cove. After an at Para rifle company, followed shortly tempt to move the Welsh Guards on the thereafter by yet another rifle company, Fearless on 6 June failed because of bad onto the high ground above Bluff Cove. weather, Northwood decided that hazard In putting 2 Para in this exposed posi ing their scarce assault ships was too tion, Wilson forced the decision in favor risky. They would, however, reluctantly of a coordinated two-brigade attack on risk the smaller and more plentiful civil Port Stanley. The problem now became ian-manned landing ships. one of concentrating the 5 Brigade into an On 7 June, elements of the Welsh attack position at Bluff Cove. The Welsh Guards were loaded on the landing ship Guards began an overland approach Sir Galahad which dropped anchor in the march to move into position, but it soon exposed and relatively unprotected har became apparent that these mechanized bor at Bluff Cove on the morning of 8 infantry troops were not up to the task. June. Five hours later, through an evi Consequently, they had to be withdrawn dent lack of amphibious training com into the San Carlos Water perimeter. pounded by what can only be assumed as It was particularly significant that, in a lack of sense of the danger of Argentine this modem age of troop movement by air attack, many of the Welsh Guards supersonic aircraft, helicopters and were still on board the Sir Galahad. At sophisticated armored personnel carriers, 1310, the ship was attacked by four the abilit:y of infantry to move overland Argentine aircraft, res~ing in 33 Welsh on foot became a strategic issue_ As a Guardsmen and 18 other seamen and result of the failure of the guard bat soldiers killed and 46 others injured-the talions to perform this most basic of in worst British losses of the entire cam fantry tasks (a task so basic, so old- paign. 12 YOMPING As tragic as they were, these losses had had more than six weeks to fortify their little tactical effect. Although two Welsh positions. Guards rifle companies had been rendered Two courses of action were presented combat ineffective by the attack on the to hold in the north and attack on the Sir Galahad, they were soon replaced by south or to attack all along the front. two companies from the 40 Commando. Moore decided to attack all along the The 5 Brigade was now in position for the front and ordered the 3 Commando Bri final assault on Port Stanley. gade. with the 2 Para attached, to seize the next line of intermediate objectives the Mount Longdon-Two Sisters-Mount The Final Assault Harriet line. Once this line was secured, the 2 Para, the 3 Commando reserve, would make a supporting attack to seize Even with his two brigades in position, the western edge of Wireless Ridge while Moore faced a formidable task. Intelli the 5 Brigade, with the Scots Guards, gence, including patrols from the SAS. Welsh Guards alld Gurkhas. would pass the Royal Navy Special Boat Service, as through the 3 Commando Brigade and well as by cadre from the Royal Marine make the main attack to seize Mount Mountain and Arctic Warfare School, had Tumbledown and Mount William. revealed that there were more than 8,000 Once these next intermediate objec Argentine soldiers in the Port Stanley tives were secured, the 3 Commando Bri garrison. These troops were well-provided gade would, in turn, pass through the 5 with heavy guns and ammunition, includ Brigade to continue the attack. Leapfrog ing recoilless rifles, heavy machineguns ging the brigades, it was believed. was and some 30 105mm and four 155mm the best way to maintain momentum and howitzers. In addition. the hill lines cover keep the Argentines from regrouping. ing Port Stanley were covered by On the night of 11 June, the 3 Comman minefields and defended by Argentine do Brigade began the advance with three soldiers whose equipment included ex battalions abreast. The 3 Para was to at cellent night vision devices and who had tack Mount Longdon, the 45 Commando Supplies are transported to the forces advancing toward Port Stanley ~-: ..-~,~~- ~---- MILITARY REVIEW to attack Two Sisters and the 42 Com by mortars and 10 machineguns. A Brit mando to attack Mount Harriet. Although ish artillery officer described these posi they lost some time because of the diffi tions as "exceptionally well-prepared. culty in night movement, both of the com Many fire trenches had deep bunkers at mando battalions quickly seized their tached to them and these often burrowed objectives. The 42 Commando actually under the natural overhang of rock." moved around the Argentine positions on They were so well-prepared that: Mount Harriet and overran them from ... not one man in these well-prepared the rear_ But the 3 Para had a tougher positions was wounded by British artil time of it. lery. The detachments hid in their rock Tactical surprise was lost when one of roofed bunkers, often firin" their "uns on its soldiers stepped on a mine, and the 3 fixed lines remotely bv string" Para soon found that it was not facing a The Scots Guards may have had some company as it had expected but, instead, difficulty in yomping. but they proved a battalion of the Argentine's 7th Regi that there was nothing wrong with their ment. Under intense machinegun and fighting ability. Using classic infantry recoilless rifle fire, the going was particu fire and maneuver, the Scots Guards larly tough. It was not until dawn that closed in on the Argentine defenders and the tide of battle began to turn. Pressing with rifles and grenades routed them out their advantage with fixed bayonets, men of their entrenchments. By noon on ,14 from the 3 Para finally cleared Mount June, the Scots Guards had completely Langdon on the morning of 12 June. For eliminated all opposition on one of the an attack on an entrenched p9Sition, Brit most strongly defended Argentine posi ish casualties were surprisingly light. The tions of the war. 3 Para lost 23 men killed and 47 wounded, While the fight for Mount Tumbledown and the two commando battalions lost a was raging in the center of the line, the 2 total of five killed and 21 wounded. Para, to the north, jumped off to seize The plan called for the 5 Brigade to im Wireless Ridge. Facing the Argentine 7th mediately pass through the Icommandos Regiment and elements of the Argentine on Mount Harriet and Two Sisters and 1st Parachute Regiment, the 2 Para leaned seize the next set of objectives on Mount heavily into its fire support. This support Tumbledown and Mount William. The at included two 105mm batteries, a Royal tack was scheduled for the night of 12 Navy frigate and a troop of the Blues and June, but a delay in helicopter movement Royals. More than 6,000 rounds of artil and the need for the 5 Brigade to recon lery ammunition were fired in support of noiter its objectives forced a 24-hour the attack. Although soldiers of the Ar delay. It was not until the night of 13 gentine 1st Parachute Regiment launched Jun~ that the Scots Guards jumped off to an unexpected counterattack just as seize Mount Tumbledown. dawn was breaking, it was broken up by As they approached the main heights of artillery fire, and the Argentine defense Mount Tumbledown, the Scots Guards collapsed into a rout, with soldiers fleeing ran into heavy opposition. Instead of the in panic toward Port Stanley. hasty field fortifications that the British Meanwhile, to the south of the line, the had faced earlier in the war, they came up Welsh Guards and Gurkhas advanced on against a strongly entrenched company Mount William and Sapper Hill, meeting of the Argentine 5th. Marines supported little resistance. It is interesting to note 14 March YOMPING that. although the Gurkhas played a rela tlefield. It led to the publication by the tively small role in the final assault. their US Army Training and Doctrine Com very presence had evidently sparked fear mand of a whole series of How to Fight in the hearts of the Argentine defense. manuals. Although the Gurkhas fired few shots. Perhaps most importantly of all. that Gook three prisoners and suffered only a statement rescued military history and handful of casualties. the Argentines military art from a generation of neglect have enormously magnified the Gurkha and spurred a "back-to-basics move role. In a recent article circulated widely ment" within the Army that continues to in the Spanish-speaking world. Nobel this day. If Abrams were alive today. he Prize-winning writer Gabriel Barcia Mar would see the British campaign in the quez quoted witnesses as saying that the Falkland Islands as a reaffirmation of his Gurkhas beheaded Argentine soldiers earlier conclusions. "with their assassins' scimitars" and There has been a tendency for many were so bloodthirsty that the English had military analysts to discuss the Falkland to handcuff them to stop further killing Islands Campaign as . torical curios after the Argentines had surrendered. ", ity or as an aberratio with no lessons to With the collapse of Argentine forces offer. Such attitudes a e remarkably simi on the Wireless Ridge-Mount Tumble lar to reaction to the Ko an War a gener down-Mount Williams-Sapper Hill line. ation ago. Examining th war. Lieuten the final assault was at an end. There was ant Colonel John A. English of the Prin no need to attack Port Stanley. for white cess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry flags sprang up throughout the Argen observed that: tine positions. At 2100 On 14 June. Ironically. success in the first major Moore. the British land commander. ac war ofthe Atomic Age hinged not on high cepted the surrender of Major General technology but on the performance of the Mario Benjamin Menendez and the entire old-fashioned soldier on foot, the ancient Argentine Malvinas force-almost 10,000 and unglamorous 'Cinderella' of the soldiers with their arms and equipment. army, 17 The decisive role of infantry. far from being an aberration. is better seen as a Conclusions constant. as the success oj British army and marine infantry in the most recent war in the atomic age has oncE' again In 1973. when then Army Chief of Staff demonstrated. General Creighton W. Abrams was briefed Thq war in the Falklands has also vali on the Arab-Israeli War. he reacted with dated the Army's current approach to characteristic directness. "What this war military theory and military strategy. proved." he said. "was that land forces One of the consequences of our failure in have a vital role to play in national secur Vietnam was a rejection of the nea ity." This simple statement had far-reach Jominian approach to war exemplified by ing implications. It led to the rejection of the mathematical models and cost-benefit the notion that had plagued the Army for analysis that masqueraded for strategy almost two decades that conventional during the Vietnam War. Following the war and conventional tactics were out lead of the Air and Naval War Colleges. moded and irrelevant to the modern bat several years ago. the US Army War Col 1984 15 MILITARY REVIEW lege began to stress the value of Clause them to rely too heavily on resources witzian theory to the conduct of war. rather than human endeavor. "II> Especially important was his rej ection of Finally, the Falkland Islands Cam quantified models and his stress on the paign was a reaffirmation of basic Army importance of moral factors in the con doctrine which, while acknowledging duct of war. " that: The decisive battles in the Falkland ... control of seas and of air space is Islands Campaign were proof of the wis . . . vital to modern land warfare Ifor/ dom of that choice. By any mathematical without this extra-territorial security, model. the British should have had no land control is not likely to be achieved or chance of success against an Argentine sustained, lemphasizes] the fundamental land force, superior in both numbers and truth . .. that only ground forces possess weaponry, fighting from prepared defen the power to exercise direct, continuing, sive positions. The critical difference was and comprehensive control over land, its not material but moral. It is noteworthy resources, and its peoples land] make per in this respect that British analysts laid manent the otherwise transitory ad part of the blame for the Argentine defeat vantages achieved by air and naval on their US training which "had taught forces. 10 NOTES , Karl von Clausewllz, On War. edited and translated by 11 Hastings and Jenkins, op clI, pp 239 and 255·56 See the; dis Michael Howard and Peter Parel With Introductory e'Ssays by Peter cusSlon on how this leak occurred on pages 255·56 Paret, Michael Howard and Bernard Brodie and a commentary by 12 Ibid, p 252 Bernard Brodie Princeton University Press Princeton N J, 1976 13 Clausewitz, op CI/, pp 89 and 595·96 P 143 14 RUSI Journal December 1982, p 78 and March 1983, pp 79·80 2 Thorras C Leonard, Above the Battle War MaIling In Arner For a detailed discussion on "yomping" lwhat the British alfborne Ica From Appomattox to Velsailies. O... /ord University Pros:;, NY, eVidently called' tabbing"), see the exchange of letters in the Cor 1978 p 79 respondence Section 3 Ibid 15 Captain J. B A Bailey, MBE, Royal Artillery, 'Prep'aced 4 Genera! E C Meyer, chl-ef Of staff, US Army' A Ready Land Hardened Field Defences," BrIfish Army Review. August 1982, PD Force, ' Defensel83, Apnl1983 p 3 26·30 5 Russell F Welglny EIsenhower's Lieutenants, Indiana Unl 16 Mark S Smith "Psychological Warfare Aided British,' The verslty Press, Bloomington Ind, 1981, pp 108 C1nd 186·87 Washing/on Post, 17 JUly 1982, pAlS, and Peter 05nos, "Myths of 6 Max Hastings and Simon JenkinS, Baltfe for the Falklands, the Gurkhas," The Washington Post, 2 May 1983, p Al Michael Joseph, london, Eng, 1983, pp 179 and 220, and also Rear 17 lieutenant Colonel John A English A PerspectIVe on Infan· Admiral E F Guentz, "The Falklands JOint Warfare Justified," try, Praeger Publishers, NY, 1981, P 227 RUSI Journal. September 1982 p 48 18 Clausewllz op Cit, pp 13437 7 Hastings and JenKinS, op cJl pp 230 31 19 Hastings and JenKinS, op Cit, P 324, see also Major General 8 Prmclples of Strategy for an Independent Corps or Army In a Jeremy Moore's observations on Argentine diSCipline and morale Theater of Opera/Ions Command and Genera! Staff School Press, m "The FalKlands Experience," RUSI Journal, March 1983, p 31 Fort leavenworth, Kan. 1936, p 20 20 Field Manual 100·1, The Army, Department of the Army, 9 Hastings and JenkinS op cil p 231 Washmgton, 0 C, 14 August 1981, p 8 10 Clausewltz, op Cit, P 606 Colonel Harry G. Summers Jr. is a strategist with the Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisl€ Barracks, Pennsylvania. He received aB.S. from .. the University of Maryland. an M,M,A.S. from "'. the USACGSC and is a graduate of the US .• ~. 'J. Army War College (USA WC). A veteran of the .. Korean and Vietnam Wars, he has taught strat "'"' egy at the USACGSC and the USA we His re view essay of Delta Force appeared in the November 1983 Military Review. ~ 16 March The Iran-Iraq War and the Future of the Persian Gulf William J. Olson \ The situation in the Middle East continues to be volatile. The Iran.Iraq Wal' is but one element ofthe ol'erall situation. The ef· fects of the fighting in this war extend beyond regional boulId· aries, and the final outcome. whatever it might be. will have a fm'.reachillg impact," 1984 17 MILITARY REVIEW The Olews expressed in this article are those of will have serious consequences for the the author and do not purport to reflect the PObl fioll of the Department of the Army. the Depart future of the gulf. ment of Defense or atlv other {{OVernmcllt office A settlement that returns the situation or ageTlcy.-Editor. to the status quo ante will have resolved none of the outstanding differences be· tween the two belligerents. The Shatt-al· ITH the lran·Iraq conflict show· Arab dispute will remain to bedevil rela· W ing no signs of coming to an end tions between the two states, as will other -indeed it appears to be on the verge of differences over border issues. In addi· expanding-it is perhaps premature to tion, the ideological differences between discuss what the political situation is the two states will remain intense. Such a likely to be in the Persian Gulf after the situation is likely to mean an end to the war. Yet, the end of the war and how it shooting but no peace. Indeed, most of ends could have serious implications for the possibilities for a negotiated settle· future US interests in the region. What ment leave open outstanding differences follows is a look at three scenarios for an that could erupt into conflict at any time end to the war and related possibilities for in the future. the future. The first scenario is a nego· It is highly unlikely, barring the com· tiated settlement, the second is an Iran· plete capitulation of one side or the other, ian victory and the third is an Iraqi vic· that a negotiated settlement will remove tory. The related possibilities are permu· the type of deep·seated animosities that tations of these three central scenarios. brought the two powers to blows in the Although there are no clear signs that first place. This means that, even with a the war can be ended through peaceful settlement to end the fighting, the gulf is means, largely because of Iranian intran· likely to witness continuing animosities sigence, it is possible that one of thE: between Iran and Iraq that will threaten numerous efforts at peace will hit upon regional security for years to come. the right combination and get the two A negotiated settlement that leaves parties to accept a cease·fire at least. A both powers intact will mean there are negotiated settlement could take a two militarily powerful states in the gulf number of forms. It could: surrounded by a number of significantly .. Be a return to the status quo ante. weaker states. Iraq, for example, will • Involve some minor readjustments have the most sophisticated army in the of territory. region as well as the largest. Although, in • Be nothing more than a temporary recent years, the Iraqis have moderated truce. their demands in the area, the time was • Be the result of some major change not so long ago that Iraqi leaders made in the political situation in either country. claims in the gulf that threatened the • Come about as the result of some security of other regional states. What a form of foreign intervention. significantly more powerful Iraq could do • Evolve from a gradual winding down must be a prime concern to the other of the war effort-the war ending without states of the gulf as well as to their extra· any formal settlement. regional allies. While an end to the war would be weI· To some extent, a powerful Iraq will be come, no settlement is likely to be lasting. offset by a powerful Iran, but to be Additionally, the form of that settlement caught between this Scylla and Charyb· 18 March PERSIAN GULF ence of Iran and old animosities with Syria, however, are likely to absorb Iraq's attention for the foreseeable future. Any future Iraqi adventurism, at least in the short term, is also likely to be con talned by the need to recover from the ef fects of the war. Iraq's economy is in dis astrous shape, and development plans have fallen behind as a result of the resources needed to conduct the war. This means that Iraq is likely to devote much of its economic and social energy to recon struction. However, continuing animos ity with Iran will not allow thee Iraqis to demobilize significantly. The Baath Party will not only have to resume internal de velopment but also find employment for the military. One possibility would be to use the army to put an end to Kurdish au tonomy efforts. Although the Kurds have not presented a major challenge to the government dur Saddam Hussein ing the war, the Baath Party may find it expedient to keep the army occupied dis may be of small comfort to states that against the Kurds. If this should happen, must find a way of placating both simul Iraq could face several years of internal taneously. A powerful Iraq, with a battle turmoil. There is a further complication. hardened army, also poses a threat to Before the war, the Baath Party asserted Syria. Hafiz al-Assad has alienated Iraq its control over the military by politiciz with his support of Iran and internal ing it. This meant putting politically reli Iraqi opponents to Saddam Hussein, and able officers in key positions throughout Assad cannot look forward to the day the service. This practice, however, did when an Iraq, freed of the war with Iran, not always mean that militarily (lompe can turn its attention to settling old tent individuals were in charge-a short scores. Whether Iraq will be interested in coming exposed most clearly by the war such a reckoning cannot be answered, but with Iran. Assad cannot afford to ignore the The war forced the Baath Party to re possibility, and this factor could increase place many of the political officers-many regional tensions. of whom were executed or retired-with A more remote possibility is that Syria more competent soldiers whose loyalty to and Iraq will compose their differences the regime, however, may not be as cer and turn their efforts more in the direc tain. This presents both the military and tion of Israel. Iraq's war experiences may the Baath Party with a dilemma once the have helped to convince the Iraqis that war is over. The perennial problem of they are more capable of confronting the what to do with the peacetime military Israelis militarily than before. The pres will emerge with a particularly Iraqi 1984 19 MILITARY REVIEW flavor. In addition, the end of the war is Of course, Iraq is deeply in debt to the likely to open up the whole subject of who other Arab gulf states, and, recently, was responsible for getting Iraq into such even before the war, Iraq has sought to a disastrous situation in the first place. improve its relations and image with This debate could have serious conse other Arabs. Indebtedness and a desire to quences for the survival of Hussein or, become the leader of the Arabs may more remotely, of the Baath Party itself. temper Iraq's attitude toward its neigh In any event, adjusting to peace will bors, but it is also conceivable that Iraq present Iraq with a number of internal may seek to use its power despite its in concerns that will undoubtedly absorb debtedness, or because of it. The present much of the nation's attention. Whether policy of conciliation came in with Hus this absorption will direct all of Iraq's sein, and it could go out with him. Being energies inward or whether it will en· owed money is not a very convincing courage the leadership to pursue outward force to apply against a well-armed goals to divert criticism must wait on enemy, especially if Iraq emerges from events to make clear. the war intact and is able to revitalize its An outward·looking policy, though, will oil markets and repay its debts. After the present serious problems to its neighbors. war, Iraq could choose to revert to older Kuwait, for example, could find itself fac· policies of force to promote its leadership. ing an offer it cannot refuse for surrender· There could be further complications for ing disputed islands in the gulf. It is the GCC. doubtful if the Gulf Cooperation Council Iran might also insist on being able to (GCC) will be able to offer Kuwait more join the council. If this should happen, than moral support in dealing with Iraq. the GCC will have lost its original intent The Kuwaitis might turn to Iran as a and will become little more than a new countervailing force, but this leaves open forum for the exercise of Iranian and what the Iranian asking price for support Iraqi power and disputes. The GCC may would be. Whatever the choice, it would be able to resist the demands of one or not be to Kuwait's advantage. both of these states to join, but this The GCC could also find itself threatened would likely increase regional tensions. by Iraqi demands to join the organiza· The GCC states could also dissolve the tion. The original intent of the GCC was body, but then they would have no mech to give the smaller states of the gulf an anism for combining their strength organization that increased their joint (weaknesses?) to balance the two regional cooperation and security. The impetus for superpowers. the GCC came from the outbreak of hos· In a world in which Iran and Iraq re tilities between Iran and Iraq, and much mained at loggerheads, without the GCC, of its rationale remains in giving the the smaller states could become victims smaller states a body to balance the two of the rivalry between the two larger regional superpowers. An Iraqi demand states. At the same time, the survival of to join the GCC would alter the funda· the council could alienate the two larger mental nature of the council. Iraq would states without giving the members of the insist upon being the senior partner and GCC any significant power to resist. could use the GCC for its own purposes Such a situation could involve external purposes that run contrary to the in· powers more deeply in regional affairs. terests of the smaller states. The Kuwaitis have already opened rela- 20 March PERSIAN GULF tions with the USSR, partially as a means The actual extent of these problems is to offset the influence of Iraq. The idea is difficult to assess. Initially, at least, Iran to use the Soviets to restrain the Iraqis. will be absorbed in reconstruction, not A negotiated settlement to the war that only of its infrastructure but also of its left the Gee alone to face Iran and Iraq military. Much of Iran's modern military could be the wedge the Soviets need to ex equipment was destroyed during the war, pand their contacts with regional states. and, once the war is over, Iran will have Since there is already doubt in the gulf to begin rebuilding. Since the United about the ability or willingness of the States is not likely to be the source of sup United States to provide protection in the ply for this reconstruction, the question is interests of the smaller states, the mem who will provide Iran with access to the bers of the Gee may find it to their ad type of modern equipment that it is likely vantage to add another string to their to demand. Of course, Iran may deci!Ie bow. While this would not necessarily in not to embark on a major military devel crease their security, it may appear to be opment project, but this seems unlikely. worth the gamble. In this event, the The experience of the war alone has United States will have suffered a set taught the present government the value back in its regional relations. of a strong military, and it has also helped This setback will be made worse be to erase many of the negative feelings the cause of Iran's continuing animosity. A government had of the regular armed negotiated settlement that leaves Iran in forces before the war. tact will mean that the Iranians will try The revolutionary authorities have also to use their influence in the gulf to ex discovered that the Shah of Iran did not clude the United States. Such a program invent Iran's geostrategic concerns. would try to employ a combination of When out of power, the revolutionists bit economic incentives and political in terly resented the shah's grandiose no timidation. Iran remains the largest state tions of the need to extend Iran's ability in the gulf, and its successes in the war to protect its own interests in the gulf and plus its revolutionary fervor are likely to beyond. Once in power, however, the revo make the Iranians assertive. While the lutionaries have gone through a conver Iraqis might be able to contain some of sion on this issue. Now they, too, have this assertiveness, they would not be able begun to develop an interest in exercising to provide protection to the states in the regional power. Thus, once the war is lower end of the gulf. over, the present regime is likely to em As noted earlier, the smaller states of bark on a program to improve its mili the gulf could find themselves squeezed tary. between the demands of the two larger In this effort, the Iranians are likely to states as well as the concerns of various play the field-that is, they will be in outside powers. In addition, the threat of terested in acquiring arms from a number Islamic fundamentalism as an instrument of sources SO as not to develop the de of Iranian foreign policy remains a live pendence upon one source that character and menacing reality, especially when it ized the shah's armed forces. Likely can be backed up by Iran's military sources' of supply include Brazil, with power. This situation will present re whom Iran has already begun exploring gional and US policymakers with a num the possibilities of advanced arms; North ber of knotty problems in the future. Korea, which already supplies Iran with 1984 21 MILITARY REVIEW some equipment; and possibly China, which is emerging as one of Iran's arms suppliers. The Iranians could also turn to the In dians as a source of supply and expertise. This acquisition strategy will mean that Iran's military will not necessarily have the most modern equipment, nor will this equipment be standardized. However, Iran is likely to be able to meet its defense needs more than adequately through this diversification. Iran is not likely to have to face another major war with Iraq, which has learned a bitter lesson, and so, even without the latest in technology, it will be more than able to acquire equipment in sufficient quantities to meet future needs. Of course, this does not rule out the possibil ity that Iran could acquire more sophisti cated equipment from France, Great Brit ain or the USSR. The point is that Iran will be more than powerful enough in Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini local terms without vast quantities of the most modern arms to meet its needs-or potential rivalry with Iraq and the other to pose a threat to other regional states Arab gulf states. and outside interests. Alternatively, a military coup or a coup All of the possible scenarios for a nego from within the Baath Party in Iraq could tiated end to the war leave open the bring to power a new government with dangers outlined here. The only exception which the Iranians could come to terms. is the possibility of a major change in the Presently, however, any new government political nature of one or the other of the in Iraq that did not meet Ayatollah two regimes that ended the war. This Ruhollah Khomeini's criteria of Islamic would involve a coup in either of the coun purity would probably not be acceptable. tries that brought to power a regime that A coup by any other group in Iraq, espe was acceptable to the other and with cially by the Shi'a, is unlikely to develop whom a settlement was a possibility. in the near future, given the lack of orga A military coup in Iran, for example, nized opposition. could bring to power a government that The death of Khomeini might effect wanted to end the war so it could devote enough of a change in Iran's attitude to its attention to internal security. Al make a negotiated settlement possible. though this is an unlikely situation for The aging spiritual leader is the principal the present, this is one way the war could obstacle to such a settlement, and his de end. Eventually, however, any regime in clining health offers some prospect that Iran would seek to exercise its influence his death might make an end to the war in the gulf and would thus come into more likely. This eventuality offers the 22 March PERSIAN GULF most likely prospect for a speedy end to is not very likely at present. the war. But, first, Khomeini lias to die, There is aIso the remote possibility that and, second, the successor regime must some outside power could intervene in the be willing to negotiate. war to bring it to an end. A threat from It is possible that any successor gov· Turkey, for example, to enter the war on ernment will be so preoccupied with inter· Iraq's side if Iran did not agree to a nego nal struggles after the ayatollah's death tiated settlement might force the Iran that it will be willing to see an end to the ians to negotiate. Alternatively, the war. This scenario, however, rests on a Soviets might threaten a similar interven great many "ifs." Although Khomeini's tion or might decide on an invasion to health is failing, there is no reason to secure the control of Iran's oil and a sig assume an early demise. Nor is it safe to nificant portion of the gulf. Even more assume that any successor regime will be remotely possible is US intervention. It is too preoccupied to continue the war or doubtful, though, that any US interven that it will be eager to end it. Iran has in· tion could be decisive enough to force the vested a great deaI of effort in the war, Iranians to negotiate. In short, for the and a too hasty exit from it could damage present, there is not very much chance a successor government's prestige-some that the war will end by negotiations. thing that it could not afford while it tried Although the war has dragged on for to establish its legitimacy after Kho· three years with neither side displaying a meini's death. strategy for winning quickly, it is possi Another possible change that might ble that the present war of attrition will make a settlement more likely is the inter· eventuaIly wear one of the sides down, naI collapse of one party or the other. culminating in its collapse. In such a Both societies are showing signs of war situation, if the surviving side were not weariness. It is possible that a prolonga aIso on the verge of collapse as well, the tion of the war could undermine the inter war could develop a clear winner. naI stability of one of the two states. In Presently, the war is staIemated. Since the case of Iraq, this would more than April 1983, there have been "few of the ma likely only increase Iranian efforts to con jor offensives that characterized the first tinue the war and thus keep the pressure two and a haIf years of the war. Instead, on. But internaI difficulties in Iran could both sides have settled into a war of attri force the government to divert its atten tion, waiting for the combined effects of tion away from the war. This might make economic dislocation and internaI tension the government more willing to settle to take their toll on the endurance of the with Iraq or just graduaIly disengage other side. The Iranians have aIso taken without any formaI settlement. steps to make this type of war more tell Iran, however, is a long 'way from such ing on Iraq. In particular, the Iranians a <;.ollapse, and the government's convinc have resorted to a form of economic ing handling of the Kurdish insurgency blockade to undermine Iraq's ability to SUgg3sts that, for the present, it is continue the war. They have successfully capable of looking after its internaI prob closed off all of Iraq's oil exports through lems as well as prosecuting the war. Pos the gulf and since have tried to shut down sibilities for the fragmentation of Iran or Iraq's other export routes. Iraq are discussed in greater detail later, Iraq has two principaI oil export routes but the prospect of the dissolution of Iran after the gulf. The first is through Syria, 1984 23 MILITARY REVIEW with a capacity of some one million plus winning strategy and with a deteriorating barrels per day. The second route is economy, it is finding it increasingly diffi through Turkey, with a capacity of some cult both to prosecute the war and to 700,000 barrels per day. In April 1982, justify it or the government's handling of the Iranians successfully negotiated a it. The question becomes, can the Iraqis deal with Syria to close down the Iraqi find a strategy either to end the war or pipe line through Syria in exchange for a reduce the pressure on themselves? very favorable trade arrangement. This I have argued elsewhere that, in fact, arrangement more than made up for the the Iraqis are developing a strategy de losses that Syria would suffer from the signed to force Iran to end the war. This loss of transit fees paid by Iraq to move is not a war-winning strategy as much as its oil through the Syrian pipe line. This it is one to force Iran to negotiate a peace, maneuver has tightened the grip that the but the strategy itself offers serious im war has on Iraq's economy and, in the en plications for the future of the gulf war suing year, has put a strain on Iraq's and after. It is clear that Iraq has vir ability to keep alive its economic develop tually no hope of defeating Iran mili ment and the prosecution of the war. tarily, nor can Iraq afford to wait to see if Iraq now has only one remaining export Khomeini's death will alter Iranian in pipe line. and the Iranians are searching transigence or create enough internal for a mechanism to jeopardize it. Recent strife to force Iran out of the war. Yet, Iranian thrusts into Iraqi Kurdistan have Iraq cannot sustain the war and its been aimed, in part, at increasing the economy at the same time indefinitely. menace to Iraq's economic assets, thus This being the case, the Iraqis have hit forcing the Iraqis to exert more effort in upon their own version of economic war defending areas previously spared attack. fare. These thrusts are also aimed at putting During the past year, Hussein has in the Iranians in a position to give aid to in vested considerable energy in acquiring a ternal Iraqi dissidents who might be able wide variety of more modern equipment to attack the Turkish pipe line. designed to give Iraq more flexibility in This Iranian strategy of economic war coping with Iran. It is interesting to note fare has been reasonably successful. that much of this acquisition effort has Whereas. at the beginning of the war, the aimed at improving Iraq's air and naval Iraqis were able to sustain both the war power. More specifically, the weapons effort and a major internal development Iraq has sought would increase its ability program, in recent months, the Iraqi to strike at sensitive Iranian economic economy has begun to show the strains of targets in the gulf. the war. The Iraqis have had to cancel or The acquisition of Super Prelon heli reschedule projects, they have had to bor copters, Exocet missiles, the Mirage P1 row money from the international com and now the Super Etendard (which is munity and they are deeply in debt to the still uncertain though likely to go ahead) Arab oil-producing states of the gulf. is giving Iraq the capability to attack There are signs that the strains of the Irani~n oil and port installations as well war-its costs in both human and eco as shipping to and from Iranian ports. nomic terms-are beginning to tell on Iran's principal port facilities are within Iraqi morale. The government is not on reach of Iraq's new weapons systems. the verge of collapse, but, without a war- The direction of the Iraqi acquisition pro 24 March PERSIAN GULF Saudi Arabia gram suggests strongly that the Iraqis to destroy Iran's key export and import intend to use their new capabilities in a assets to wage their new strategy. In new effort to force Iran to end the war. stead, the Iraqis could use t.heir equip Of course, attacks against oil facilities ment to interdict shipping to Iran's ports are not an entirely new feature of the gulf or oil facilities. war. What is potentially different is the In August 1982, the Iraqis declared an determination behind the Iraqi effort. Be exclusion zone in the gulf. The idea of this fore, there was a sort of gentleman's declaration was to warn international agreement to leave each other's oil facili shippers that any ships entering this ZOne ties alone. In addition, Iraq lacked the were subject to attack by Iraq. In the skills to sustain an effective assault on course of the year, the Iraqis did, in fact, Iran's key economic assets. With the new attack a number of commercial vessels weapons systems, however, that situa bound for Iranian ports. The Iraqi effort, tion is changing. however, was not sustained, and ships It is still highly unlikely that Iraq could continued to sail to Irairian ports. successfully destroy Iran's oil-exporting Iraq's recent efforts to acquire more facilities. Kharq Island, for example, is a sophisticated arms-in particular, Exocet very large installation with considerable missiles and the Super Etendard-indi built-in redundancy. It would require a cate a more serious determination to put strategic bombing effort far beyond teeth into the program to blockade Iran. Iraq's present capabilities or demon· Attacks on Iranian offshore oil facilities strated abilities to permanently destroy early last year are a further indication of a Kharq. The Iraqis, however, do not have growing Iraqi capability to deliver on 1984 25 MILITARY REVIEW their threats. The increasing number of quately to Iranian threats in the lower statements by various Iraqi statesmen on gulf. If, therefore, the Iranians try to in this subject also indicate a growing deter terrupt shipping in the gulf, it will fall to mination to use the new capabilities others to confront this threat. It is less unless something isldone to end the war. than clear if any of the other gulf states Such an Iraqi strategy has serious im would be able to handle this situation. plications for Western interests, for, if the The prospect, then, is that some exter Iraqis resort to it, they will be expanding nal power will have to respond to the the war. The Iranians also are not likely Iranian challenge unless the international to sit idly by while the Iraqis blockade community is willing to see the cutoff of Iranian ports. Indeed, the Iranians have oil from the gulf. The impact of such a adamantly repeated warnings that, if development upon the international fi Iraq interferes with Iran's oil exports, no nancial community is open to speculation, one's exports from the gulf will be safe. but the dangers are such that the poten Although the exact nature of the Iranian tial spread of the war cannot be ignored. response to the Iraqi threat is not clear, The most likely power to respond to any Iranian response could conceivably such a development is the United States. dangerously expand the war, endangering The Reagan administration has already the free flow of oil from the gulf. It goes gone on record that it would not stand without saying that such an eventuality idly by if there were a threat to the free has potentially catastrophic implications transit of oil. Exactly what the response for the West, at least in the short term. would be was left open, but some form of The Iranians have already begun to direct intervention cannot be ruled out. take steps to implement a response The nature of the response, of course, should the occasion arise. The current would depend upon the nature of the operations in Kurdistan are only one such threat, but the use of naval air power or effort. In addition, the Iranians have also even some elements of the US Central stationed units on Larak Island near the Command are not beyond possibility. Strait of Hormuz, and they have further Other responses might be to develop a units on Abu Musa and the Greater and convoy system, with US ships acting as Lesser Tunbs-small islands just inside escorts. In any case, the involvement of the gulf. Commando units here and on the the United States would mark a signifi mainland could conceivably be used to at cant expansion of the war. tack commercial vessels transiting the The limits to such an expansion would gulf. In addition, the Iranians still retain be difficult to set, for there is little direct some air capabilities as well as naval pressure that the United States can bring forces that could be used to threaten ship to bear on Iran. Additionally, any US in ping. tervention would likely excite internal The geography of the war makes both Iranian opinion, producing a yet further the Iranian and the Iraqi threats to ex determination to continue the war. pand the war feasible. Most of Iran's Although the intervention would aim at chief oil and port facilities are within protecting the free flow of oil, it would reach of Iraqi forces. Conversely, the have unintended consequences that could Iranians are in a position to menace traf involve the United States even more fic moving into and out of the gulf. The deeply in the region. It could complicate Iraqis cannot, however, respond ade our relations with the Arab states and 26 J March PERSIAN GULF with Pakistan, which is not keen on see internal differences without Iranian inter ing a direct US involvement in the area. ference. It is conceivable, but it is not The intervention rrught foreclose on very likely. Iranian efforts to block the oil routes, but The Iranians already maintain an Iraqi such an intervention could incite local Shiite government in exile, and they have dissidents to take action against some of repeatedly voiced the determiriation to the other regimes in the region with Iran· establish an Islamic republic in Iraq. ian aid. Yet, without contingency plans to Should Iraq collapse or a civil war erupt, insulate the world from the potential it is extremely unlikely that Iran would financial shock of an interruption of a ma remain inactive. Instead, Iran would use jor portion of the world's oil or plans to Iraq's internal difficulties to establish an replace that oil, it would be virtually im Islamic republic in Iraq under their tute possible for the West to do nothing if the lage, if not under their direct controL Such gulf oil route were threatened. In addition a government might not control all of to the dangers of a cutoff of oil, the Iraq, at least not at first, but it would pro damage to Western prestige of inactivity vide a base from which Iraqi Shiites with would be long-term and highly damaging. Iranian support could establish control Thus, an Iraqi attempt to expand the war over the rest of the country. It would also presents a number of disturbing issues. give them a base from which to spread the Equally disturbing, however, are the Islamic revolution further. reasons why Iraq sees fit to pursue such a The effect of an Iranian victory on strategy. As noted earlier, the war is hav Iran's determination to change the politi ing a damaging effect on Iraq's economy cal character of the gulf-indeed of the and morale. This raises the question whole region-is incalculable. However, it of Iraq's ability to endure a continuing is quite likely that the Iranians would war of attrition. The Baath Party is find the possibilities for mischief too faced with a situation that potentially tempting to resist. In addition, the threatens its very survival. The new demonstrative effect of an Iranian vic strategy is an attempt to evade the threat tory would encourage a wide variety of of collapse. Such a collapse could have dissident elements in the gulf and beyond consequences as damaging to Western in to renew their own struggles. An Iranian terests 'as the threat of the expansion of victory also holds out the possibility of a the war. linkage between such dissident elements The discussion earlier indicated that and Iran's own agenda. Furthermore, an there were three basic scenarios for' an Iranian victory would significantly end to the war. One of these is an Iranian enhance Iran's regional power. Not only victory. It was also noted that there was would Iran's main enemy be removed for little chance of such a victory as long as the foreseeable future, but Iran would Iraq was able to maintain its internal in also be able to count on at least some tegrity. An Iraqi collapse, however, Iraqi support for a policy of revolutioniz would give Iran an opportunity to end the ing the gulf. war on its terms. It is conceivable that It is extremely doubtful that the Arab Iran would regard the collapse of Iraq, or gulf states could stand up to such a power at least of the current government, as in the region. Either they would have to satisfaction enough and be willing to dis accept Iranian dictates or appeal to out engage and permit Iraqis to settle their side powers for support. This would raise 1984 27 MILITARY REVIEW again the whole question of Western in while it searches for means to break the volvement. Does the West possess the re Iraqi effort. The combination of Iranian solve or the means to respond to such an intransigence and a successful Iraqi appeal? Is the West prepared to cope with strategy could undermine the durability the consequences of failing to respond to of the Islamic republic. such a request? The current clergy-dominated govern· The problems inherent in answering ment of Iran remains in power through a these questions, whether yes or no, illus combination of intimidation of op trate the seriousness of the situation that ponents, acceptance by a majority of the is now pending in the gulf. An Iranian vic population and the acquiescence of the reo tory in the gulf war will have a significant mainder. In part, the legitimacy of the impact on Western interests, willy-nilly, regime rests on its ability to keep the regardless of what the West chooses to do economy and the war going at the same or not to do. Conversely, an Iraqi victory time. The situations of Iraq and Iran are also poses serious problems although analogous on this score. Iran, however, perhaps not quite as dangerous. has enjoyed more advantages in the . The prospect of an Iraqi victory is economic war to date, and the govern remote, and the nature of that victory is ment has been able to keep the economy likely to be limited. The most likely shape moving. If the Iraqis implement their an Iraqi victory would take would be suc· new strategy successfully, however, that cess in forcing the" Iranians to agree to situation could reverse itself, and all of end the war. As noted earlier, that is the the fissiparous forces in Iran could break point of the present strategy. The nature loose. of the Iraqi strategy is not to achieve a If the central government's ability to military victory in which it is possible to overawe its opponents deteriorates and dictate a peace. It is, on the contrary, an the government's attention is diverted to effort to convince the Iranians that ne coping with the consequences of a declin gotiations are the only realistic way to ing economy, ethnic, religious and politi· end the conflict. Thus, current Iraqi cal oppositionists could find more scope strategy is different from Iranian goals, for their activities while the govern in that it does not envisage the complete ment's ability to contain them decreased. change of the political regime in the op' The effect of increased internal op ponent's nation. Iraq's objectives are position and a declining economy would limited, but the success of the new thus have a compounding effect. Further strategy could result in an Iranian col more, as the government's ability deterio lapse. rated, the effects of the Iraqi blockade The key to Iraqi strategy is an would be enhanced, and the Iraqis would economic blockade to strangle Iran and also be able to increase their pressure, force the Iranians to negotiate. The even to aiding various internal opposition Iranians, however, are not inclined to groups. buckle under to such a strategy in short The combination of these actions could order. Iran's economy is large, and it has conceivably so undermine the present a considerable degree of resilience. In ad Iranian government as to precipitate a dition, the present leadership is not likely civil war or a coup. A change of govern· to accept defeat easily and will be willing ment might bring a speedy end to the to endure considerable economic hardship war, analogous to the Bolshevik seizure 28 March PERSIAN GULF of power in Russia in 1917. However, it is United States would have to become in· far more likely to bring on a civil war, as volved in internal Iranian affairs to op no force in Iran would have the power or pose the Soviets. This prospect not only the legitimacy to establish itself without would mean an unpredictable level of in significant opposition. Even a military volvement, but it also holds the danger of coup could precipitate years of armed reo direct confrontation between the two sistance that would keep Iran in a state of superpowers. turmoil for years to come. From Iraq's The permutations of the scenarios out point of view, such a development would lined here are rather dismal. They do not not be unwelcome, but, from a Western suggest any great degree of optimism point of view, such an eventuality holds that the Iran-Iraq War will have a speedy potentially dangerous consequences. end or that any of the solutions will be The prospect of a fragmenting Iran welcome. It is perhaps possible to balance would mean years of regional instability. this pessimism with the belief that some Such a development holds out the po· middle way can be found-that the two tential that rival elements in Iran would belligerents will find a formula to recon n~t confine their rivalry to Iran but would cile their 'differences that not only will end seek allies in the gulf or would try to the war but will also reduce future ten· undermine other regional states. Chaos in sions in the area. Iran would also be an invitation for out Since both societies face impressive side powers to meddle in Iran's internal problems of internal reconstruction, it is affairs. Although a direct Soviet invasion conceivable that they will resolve their is not very likely, it seems highly proba differences and concentrate on internal ble that the Soviets would use the chaos priorities. It is conceivable that both in Iran to support a group in its efforts to states will temper their ideological rivalry establish itself as the dominant power. If and their geopolitical aspirations. Need such a strategy were successful, the less to say, this prospect is remote. The result would be a Soviet client state in gulf is likely to be many things before it is Iran. once again a sleepy backwater to the The threat of such a potential is enough world. to raise the distinct possibility that the William J. Olson is currently a regional secur ity affairs analyst at the US Army War College. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. He received a Ph.D. {rom the University of Texas at Austin. He has previously served as {l research associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, and as a research analyst for the Library of Congress. He is the author of Britain's Elusive Empire in the Middle East. 1900·1921 and Anglo-Iranian Rela· tions During World War I, and he has written numerouS articles on the Middle East. 1984 29 From International Defense Review Spetsnaz: The Soviet Union's Special Forces Viktor Suvorov Reprinted from International Defense Review, Volume 16, Number 9,1983. Copyright © 1983 by Interavla S.A., Geneva, Switzerland. 30 March SPETSNAZ This is believed to be the most detailed article ever published on the Soviet special forces, or Spetsnaz. The author, a professional Soviet army officer, who has defected to the West and who writes under a pseudonym, claims to have had some experience with them during his military career. There have been several brief references in print to the rey doviki (raiders), as the Spetsnaz units based in Eastern Europe are known. In the West, the reydoviki are frequently referred to as 'diversionary' troops since one of their primary tasks is to create confusion and panic deep behind NATO lines by such means as sabotage and the attack of key mobile headquarters. They have the further task ofprovidinR detailed information on NATO targets for Soviet missile and air strikes. It has been established that not only Soviet but also East German, Polish and probably other Warsaw Pact reydoviki often wear Western uniforms and speak Western languages to facilitate these tasks. Viktor Suvorov points out that minisubmarines of the type detected off the Swedish coast belong to naval Spetsnaz units. What this article makes clear, in addition, is that the Spetsnaz are an integral part of the GRU (the Soviet Military Intelligence Service) which operates on foreign territory in peacetime as well as war. Thus, they have their own network of foreign agents now living in the vicinity of their potential targets. The most chilling and thought-provoking of Suvorov 's asser tions, however. concerns not the specially selected conscripts who make up the bulk of the Spetsnaz units deployed with every Soviet army, front and fleet, but the hard-core profeSSionals who wear civilian clothes. These men and women are kill~rs whose mission is to track down and assassinate Western political and military leaders on their home territory, in competition with similar KGB (Committee of State Security) 'hit squads. ' If what Suvorov says is true, the Western nations invite many of these killers to visit their potential target areas in peacetime since they are among the best athletes in the Soviet Union.-Editor. N THE Soviet Union, terminology assistance" and "liberation." In the same I frequently varies according to. the way, "counterespionage," "cypher equip context in which the words are being ment" and "nuclear weapons," which ap used. For instance, "threat," "assault" ply only to the enemy, are referred to in and "aggression" are used to denote an the Soviet Union as "special department," enemy's actions, whereas the same ac "department eight equipment" and "spe tions carried out by Soviet forces are cial weapons." The use of euphemisms ex termed "friendly warning," "brotherly tends to many other fields as well, and it 1984 31 MILITARY REVIEW would be unthinkable for the Soviet direct the company toward its targets. Union to admit to possessing assassina At the front-level headquarters that are tion, terrorist and sabotage units_ In set up in wartime (in peacetime, at the stead, the Soviet Union has the Spetsnaz, headquarters of groups of forces and mili sometimes referred to in the West as tary districts), these activities are con diversionary units_ trolled by the 2d Directorate_ The 2d Spetsnaz is the name given to the spe Directorate consists of five departments cial forces of the GRU_ Although the having the same titles and numbering, GRU is the second largest secret service but it is more powerful in its makeup and organization in the world, after the KGB, influence. it is not subordinate to the KGB, nor does The Spetsnaz Department of the 2d Di it have any connection with it. The two rectorate has under its command a Spets operate on a basis of fierce competition naz brigade plus a Spetsnaz intelligence and conflict_ center which is responsible for recruiting its own clandestine foreign agents_ The front 2d Directorate thus controls two in Chain of Command dependent networks of foreign agents one run by the Intelligence Department and one by the Spetsnaz. The GRU is responsible for reconnais The headquarters of every Soviet fleet, sance (voiskovaya razvedka), agent-de too, has a 2d Directorate similar to that in rived intelligence (agentumaya razvedka), the front headquarters. It has the same Spetsnaz training and operations, proc functions and departments as its land essing and dissemination of information based counterpart, including a group of on the enemy and radio-intercept, or sig intelligence agents, a group of Spetsnaz nals intelligence_ The GRU Central Ap agents and, in this case, a Spetsnaz naval paratus is known as the 2d Chief Direc brigade. torate of the General Staff_ Spetsnaz In order to coordinate the activities of units are deployed from the army level several fronts and fleets in time of war, upward_ High Commands are set up in at least The 2d Department of the staff of every three so-called strategic directions (west all-arms and tank army consists of five ern, southwestern and Far Eastern). The groups, numbered as follows: commander in chief of each strategic di L Reconnaissance_ rection may have one Spetsnaz regiment II. Intelligence. placed under his direct command_ These III. Spetsnaz_ Spetsnaz regiments are normally com IV. Information processing. manded directly by the GRU Central Ap V. Radio interception. paratus, or the 2d Chief Directorate of the The Spetsnaz is thus related to neither General Staff. The 2d Chief Directorate reconnaissance nor intelligence. At army organizes the coordination of operations formation level, the Spetsnaz group of the by all subordinate' levels of Soviet 2d Department has under it an independ military intelligence. Additionally, it has ent Spetsnaz company which may, how its own very high-powered organization ever, be given information from the intel of clandestine foreign agents, some of ligence group's clandestine agents by the whom are recruited for assassination and 2d Department commander in order to terrorist activities. 32 March Groups r-~i;ili",~;-I ["":':" , : (agenlurnaya II I $petsnll' I 'mvedka) I L __- -- _..1 L--I~-.J r---r----, r-- --., I 'nt.lligenc, unit I, Ind,pendtnt I IL ______-l,II L _____unit -1I D Secret intelligence Diversions and sabotage D Organization of the 2d Department at army level. In peacetime, the intelligence and Spetsnaz groups are detached from armies and placed under the command of groups of forces and military districts. The groups are returned to the armies just before the outbreak of war, D Secret intelligence Diversions and sabotage D Organization of the 2d Directorate at front (groups of forces and military district) and fleet level. Figure I 1984 33 MILITARY REVIEW quarters element, a headquarters com The Role and Organization of Spetsnaz Forces pany, three or four parachute battalions and supporting units_ The strength of a brigade's fighting units is between 1,000 In war, Spetsnaz units are tasked with: and 1,300 men. As with the independent • Hunting down and assassinating the company, the brigade may operate as a enemy's political and military leaders. single unit or be subdivided. In this case, This task is also carried out by the KGB. the maximum number of groups would • Seeking out the enemy's nuclear be 135. The headquarters company has facilities and either designating them as only full-time, professional soldiers in its targets for Soviet aircraft and missiles or strength and is maintained at the highest destroying them by independent action. state of combat readiness. This com • Neutralizing command systems by pany's sole task is to seek out and kill the acting against command centers, staffs enemy's political and military leaders, and lines of communication. and it is thus the only company that • Destroying important targets such comes into direct contact with the Spets as airfields, naval bases and air defense naz agents in the field. installations in enemy territory. A Spetsnaz naval brigade has a head • Disrupting the enemy's power sys quarters element, a headquarters com tem. The most important targets are pany (with the saJ;ne role and the same power stations, oil and gas storage cen unofficial title of "anti-VIP" unit as its ters, pipe lines, electricity power lines and land-based counterpart), a group of mid transformer stations. Spetsnaz units are get submarines, two or three battalions of not tasked, however, to engage in guer combat swimmers, one parachute bat rilla warfare. talion and supporting units. The independent Spetsnaz company Spetsnaz regiments consist of six or attached to each army consists of a head seven sabotage companies and have be quarters element, three parachute pla tween 700 and 800 men. These regiments toons, a communication platoon and sup differ from the independent companies porting subunits. The company has 115 and brigades in that they are manned men, including nine officers and 11 war solely by professional athletes of the rant officers (praporschiki). When con highest caliber, including Olympic ath ducting sabotage operations in the enemy's letes. rear areas, the company may operate as a The GRU Central Apparatus is respon single unit or be divided into smaller sible for the Spetsnaz training battalions, groups although the maximum number of training centers and communications groups is 15. The subdivision of the com courses. (Particularly important acts of pany during operations is not rigid, terrorism, in peacetime as well as war, however, and the formation can change would be carried out by specially trained while an operation is in progress. If groups of foreigners-mainly of Asian necessary, each group can operate inde origin-who are under the direct control pendently, and the communications pla of the GRU Central Apparatus.) toon can set up and maintain communica ThE' Soviet Union's aim is to have the tions with all groups over a range of 1,000 following Spetsnaz units available at the kilometers. . outbreak of war: , A Spetsnaz brigade comprises a head • Forty-one independent companies 34 March SPETSNAZ one allocated to each all-arms and tank • Four Spetsnaz naval brigades-one army. In peacetime, the staffs of many of per fleet. the armies are amalgamated with those of • Twenty Spetsnaz intelligence units military districts and will only be sepa -one with each front and fleet. rated from them just before the outbreak • Three Spetsnaz regiments which can of war. However, the headquarters (anti be allocated to commanders in chief of the VIP) companies of Spetsnaz brigades are strategic directions (three or more fronts permanently deployed as separate enti and a fleet). Sabotage agents and ties. detachments controlled centrally by the • Sixteen Spetsnaz brigades-one per 2d Chief Directorate of the General Staff front formation. (the GRU Central Apparatus). ~~ 1 - Headquarters company (anti-VIP) 3 - Signals company 2 - Parachute battalions 4 - Supporting units Organization of a Spetsn.z brigade. In peacetime. the independent companies are formed into a battalion of a Spetsn.z brigade. The peacetime establishment is. therefore. four to five battalions and not three to four as depicted here. 1 - Headquarters company (anti-VIP) 4.- Parachute battalion 2 - Midget submarine group 5 - Signals company 3 - Combat swimmer battalions 6 - Supporting units Organization of a Spetsnaz naval brigade. Figure 2 1984 35 MILITARY REVIEW It is estimated that in peacetime the War II. During the war, all eight airborne Spetsnaz strength is between 27,000 and divisions distinguished themselves in -30,000 troops, a figure that does not in battle and were awarded the title of clude troops serving in training and sup "guard" divisions. Thus, a soldier wear port units and officers involved in recruit ing the uniform' of the VDV without the ing and running agents outside the Soviet guards badge belongs to either the air Union. The groups of forces and military assault or Spetsnaz forces. districts (which in war would become The sole noticeable difference between fronts) have at their disposal 800 to 1,000 Spetsnaz and air assault forces is that the intelligence agents and 80 to 110 Spets Spetsnaz are usually deployed by para naz agents. The fleets have 160 to 200 in chute and very seldom use helicopters, telligence agents and 20 to 30 Spetsnaz whereas air assault troops use nothing agents. The total number of agents avail but helicopters and have no parachutes. able to the GRU Central Apparatus can These differences are minor but can help not even be estimated, and it is impossi analysts when studying photographs and ble to guess the numerical ratio between film. Spetsnaz forces deployed in the intelligence and sabotage agents. Suffice countries of Eastern Europe are stationed it to say that the GR U Central Apparatus close to large Headquarters and wear the has at its disposal a larger number of same uniform as the communications agents than all of the armies, fleets and troops they are stationed with, making fronts put together. identification almost impossible. Spets naz midget submarine crews wear stand ard submariners' uniforms, and all other Spetsnaz Cover officers and men in the Spetsnaz naval brigade wear naval infantry uniforms. No Spetsnaz unit is based independ Because the Spetsnaz is part of the ently, and they normally share barracks GRU, the ordinary citizen in the Soviet with airborne or air assault troops. Naval Union knows practically nothing about it. Spetsnaz units are colocated with naval Many precautions are taken to cover up infantry units. Where Spetsnaz troops its strength, organization, function, de are stationed in proximity to other types ployment and even the very fact of its of troops, they then adopt the latter's uni existence. All candidates for the Spets form. Spetsnaz intelligence units are naz forces undergo a preliminary loyalty deployed in areas where there are particu check and, upon entry, have to sign the larly sensitive targets such as missile and official secrets act. Breaking this is rocket bases, penal battalions and nuclear punished as espionage-by death. weapon storage facilities. Spetsnaz units, for the most part, wear When units share barracks with other the uniform of the airborne forces (VDV) forces, all contact between Spetsnaz per although they have no connection with sonnel and those of other units is for the latter. Air assault troops also wear bidden, and the Spetsnaz unit has its own the same uniform. Distinguishing be enclosed and well-guarded compound. In tween these three types of troops is thus the different military districts and groups very difficult although there is a distinc of forces, Spetsnaz units have different tion between airborne troops and the titles. In the Group of Soviet Forces in others which were created after World Germany, for instance, they are called 36 March SPETSNAZ reydoviki, whereas, in the Siberian mili peacetime, the independent Spetsnaz tary district, they are called ikhotniki companies are detached from their army (huntsmen). As a result, when Spetsnaz level commands to become directly subor troops from different areas meet each dinate to the staffs of the military dis other by chance, they each think that the tricts and the groups of forces. The inde other belongs to a different organization. pendent companies are grouped to form a The generic term Spetsnaz is only used by battalion in the Spetsnaz brigade found the officers when talking among them at that level. In the event of war, this bat selves. talion is broken up, and the independent The Spetsnaz does not have its own companies go back under the command of schools and academies. Officers are trained their respective armies. at the Reconnaissance Faculty of the In order to conceal the existence of the Kiev Higher Combined Arms School and professional nucleus of the Spetsnaz, the at the Special Faculty of the Ryazan brigade anti-VIP headquarters compa Higher Airborne School. While at these nies are detached from their parent bri schools, Spetsnaz personnel are almost in gades to become military district, group distinguishable from their fellow stu of forces or fleet athletics teams. The dents. Higher command personnel and Spetsnaz regiments, which are manned officers involved in secret service work entirely by professionals, are disguised as are trained at the 3d Faculty of the GRU sporting teams belonging to the Central Academy. Army Sporting Club (ZSKA). The same In order to limit the circle of those method is used by the KGB, and profes aware of the GRU and the Spetsnaz in sional KGB saboteurs belong to the _. ~----- ~~. ~ .f:" =--. According to the official Swedish repo.rt on Soviet submarine intrusions into Swedish territorial waters, six Soviet submarines were operating in the Stockholm archipelago in October 1982. Of these, two were minisub marines. Marks on the seabed indicated that one of these had tracks and a single propeller and that the other had a reinforced keel and twin propellers. There were also indications of a rendezvous between the tracked minisubmarine and a mother ship. These drawings depict the track marks and traces of the two submersibles and an artist's impression of what the two vehicles may look like. Figure 3 1984 37 MILITARY REVIEW Dinamo Sporting Club. The Soviet Union's become sergeants return to their parent combined Olympic team is, for the most companies to be employed as private part, made up of professionals from these soldiers. two very wealthy and highly successful Thus, only the very best achieve com clubs. mand. This practice makes it possible to have a permanent reserve of sergeants who can quickly replace any other ser Manning the Fighting Units geant who is not maintaining the high standards required. This causes men to strive at all costs to retain their authori Most Spetsnaz units are manned by ty, and this is only possible through the ordinary but strong, hardy and quick ruthless exploitation of subordinates. witted conscript soldiers. The selection More tlian one-third of all Spetsnaz sol procedure begins long before recruits are diers pass through the training battal called up to reception centers at the start ions, with the result that heavy losses in of their military service. Prior to being war would not cause the lower command called up, every Soviet recruit is catego echelons to be seriously weakened. The rized according to his loyalty to the reserve of warrant officers and officers is regime and his physical and intellectual also very high in Spetsnaz units. Com development_ Those recruits in the high pared to a normal Soviet army company's est category go to the Kremlin Guard, the five officers and one warrant officer, a KGB government communications troops, Sp:3tsnaz company has nine officers and the Spetsnaz and the KGB frontier troops. 11 warrant officers. Thus, the Spetsnaz can select the best men, and this can be done even to the detriment of other elite forces such as the Manning Spetsnaz Professional Units VD V, strategic rocket troops and nuclear submarine units. Once they arrive in their Spetsnaz Mention has already been made of the units, the soldiers undergo a short but number of athletes in the Spetsnaz. The highly intensive course of military train Soviet Union needs prestige, and one way' ing during which the natural leaders show of providing this is by winning Olympic themselves. These men are then sent on medals. The country needs an organiza to Spetsnaz training battalions to become tion with draconian discipline to squeeze sergeants. Each company usually sends the maximum effort out of the athletes. more men to the training battalion than it At the same time, the Spetsnaz needs ath needs sergeants. This is an expensive letes of the highest caliber who have the practice and is unusual in the Soviet opportunity to visit areas in which they Union. may have to operate in time of war. The The idea is that, in the training bat athletes, for their part, need opportuni talions, the competition is so fierce that ties for training and need to belong to an only the best will be awarded the rank of organization that can reward them lavish sergeant_ The training battalion course is ly for athletic achievement, give them extremely tough, and some of the candi apartments and cars, award commis dates ultimately return to their units as sioned ranks in the forces and arrange private soldiers. Even some of those who trips outside the Soviet Union. The Spets- 38 March SPETSNAZ naz thus provides a focal point for the in They are ordinary but carefully selected terests of state prestige, military intelli and trained soldiers, top-grade athletes, gence and individuals who have dedicated foreigners and, at the head of all of these, themselves to sport. the professional intelligence men. The ZSKA sends its athletes all over the world, and the fact that these athletes have military ranks is not hidden. The Spetsnaz Agents KGB, which also has the role of assassi nating enemy VIPs, has its own similar organization. There is a bitter and contin In their country, the word "agent" only uous struggle between the ZSKA (army) refers to a foreigner recruited by the and Dinamo (KGB) for the best athletes Soviet Union's intelligence services. In who are "poached" from other sports telligence agents run by armies, fleets clubs and societies. It is of note that the and fronts (military districts and groups number of women athletes in the Spets of forces) are quite unlike those recruited ntlz is unusually high. by the GRU Central Apparatus who are There is very little published documen more like the spies depicted in thriller tary evidence of the activities of these novels. Spetsnaz intelligence agents carry professional brigades of assassins. How out more prosaic tasks. The recruitment ever, there is one old but convincing ex of foreign agents is often undertaken ample from the Great Patriotic War from within the Soviet Union or from (World War II) prior to the Spetsnaz friendly countries (including Finland). itself being set up. During the war, the There are no restrictions as to who can be People's Commissariat for Internal Af· recruited, but the most valued are those fairs (NKVD) (now the KGB) had the who are not involved with classified mat OMSBON NKVD USSR, or NKVD inde ters and those who are of mature age. pendent special service motor rifle bri Any agent recruited while visiting the gade. This brigade trained and launched, Soviet Union returns to his or her own behind the enemy lines, 212 detachments country and recruits several assistants. and groups totaling 7,316 men. Their In no case do the clandestine intelli basic task was the physical elimination of gence agents of armies and fronts at enemy political and military leaders. In tempt to penetrate into restricted areas. addition, the brigade wiped out known Instead, using GRU-supplied money, they and potential enemies in the territories buy houses close to important targets "liberated" by the Red army. According airfields, bridges, missile emplacements, to official figures, this one brigade alone naval bases, and so forth. The infor annihilated 140,000 people.' The brigade mation they' provide is often fragmen was made up of: tary and laconic, but, in the case ofimpor NKVD and state security workers, tant targets, it is verified by other agents units of frontier and home troops, dis who are quite separately covering the tinguished athletes, including many same target. The intelligence they pro famous top-flight names, and anti-fascists vide will be used by the Spetsnaz sabo of various national groups recommended tage units to deliver sudden and accurate' by the Comintern.' strikes. In this sentence, we find all of the com Spetsnaz sabotage agents, on the other ponents which also exist in the Spetsnaz. hand, are less involved in the collection of 1984 39 MILITARY REVIEW intelligence and generally find jobs or live sional athletes and foreign agents-do close to transport and power installa not have the opportunity to meet each tions. Their task, when ordered by the other and often do not suspect each GRU, is to lay explosive charges and put other's existence. This is due both to the the installation out of action. Often, such efforts made to maintain secrecy and also an agent may do nothing else that is crim to the differences in their combat roles. inal during his or her whole life while The training of secret agents takes, awaiting this order. place, on an individual basis, in special Another important task for Spetsnaz training centers which are mainly on sabotage agents in peacetime is the acqui Soviet territory. One such center is lo sition of houses and plots of land where cated in Odessa. The main subjects of sabotage groups can find refuge in time of the training course are security, commu war. These houses and plots are usually in nications, demolition (~heory and prac the country, not far from the sea or from a tice) and collaboration with professional forest or in the mountains. They will groups. usually have an ordinary nuclear shelter The training of professional athletes is which is stocked with food, water, and so done in small groups and sections. Their forth. In addition, the Spetsnaz sabotage main training subjects are physical train agents may provide sabotage groups with ing (in some cases, to the Olympic level), motor transport, fuel and supplies and foreign languages, the study of the terri guide them to their objectives. tories likely to be fought in (in the course Both intelligence and sabotage agents of sports trips abroad), communications come under the command of senior front and demolition. intelligence officers and can be trans The training of combat units is, in ferred from one category to the other at many ways, similar to that of VDV any time or indeed ordered to fulfill both troops. The strain of this training is wit roles. In principle, Spetsnaz agents in nessed by the fact that, for Spetsnaz offi peacetime have little or no contact with cers and warrant officers, each year of Soviet citizens outside the Soviet Union, service is reckoned as 18 months-that is, . thus adding to their stability as members 10 years of Spetsnaz service as an officer of the community in which they are liv is equivalent to 15 years of normal serv ing. They actually form "sleeping" agent ice. Similarly, Spetsnaz officers and war networks which would be brought into ac rant officers receive 50 percent more pay, tion only in the event of war. In the mean as well as an additional payment for each time, the Spetsnaz has reliable means of parachute jump. Spetsnaz soldiers have checking on them so that it can be reason the same or even greater workload, but ably certain that the foreign recruits will they serve for two years like all other con either carry out their allotted tasks when scripts. called upon or at least will try to do so. In the course of combat training, Spets naz units usually operate against head quarters, missile units and airfields. On Combat Training an average, these units spend half of their time out of the barracks and, when one bears in mind the climate and the lack of In peacetime, the three elements of the sleeping bags in the Soviet army, one gets Spetsnaz-combat. units, units of profes some idea of the conditions of service. 40 March SPETSNAZ Airborne or Spetsnaz troops practicing unarmed combat Soviet India-class submarines could be used as mother ships tor the Spetsnaz minisubmarine group 1984 '. 41 MILITARY REVIEW Combat training is carried out on a same time, raising the combat readiness competitive basis, with competition being ofelements of the home security forces to continuous at all levels. A common test is repel possible raids. to drop groups in totally uninhabited For example, during exercises of the regions hundreds and sometimes thou Fifth Army in the Far Eastern military sands of kilometers from a rendezvous_ district, use was made of the district's The test is one of high-speed movement, Spetsnaz brigade (whose headquarters is without supplies and without means of in U ssuriysk) to attack headquarters and transport. MVD (Ministry of Interior) missile units. On the whole, the brigade's troops are usually called in to search for operations were successful, but, during and try to capture the sabotage groups. an attack on a nuclear-weapon store, the Once a year, the best Spetsnaz units Spetsnaz groups fell into a trap. The store from allover the Soviet Union assemble commanders arranged their vehicles in together at the main training center in such a way that, when the alarm was the region of Kirovograd. For three sounded, all of the vehicles switched on months, they undergo an intensive period their headlights at the same time, thus of training and competition. Coinciden forming a blazing field of light around the tally, the main Spetsnaz training center is field store and blinding the saboteurs. adjacent to the Zheltyye Vody group of Dogs were then let loose. The majority of uranium mines and concentration camps. the Soviet headquarters, signal units and (Similar concentration camps exist in missile units now form a circle at night Kyshtym, Achinsk, Severodvinsk and and set up a system of signals between all Chelyabinsk. Zheltyye Vody is one of the vehicles so that, on command, the sur most frightful of them.) It is possible that rounding area can be lit up. the Spetsnaz training center has no con During combat training, KGB and nection at all with the concentration MVD units and also Soviet army head camp. All the same, there is something quarters make use of a range of counter symbolic in their juxtaposition. measures against saboteurs, from a sys Spetsnaz combat training is made to tem of total control of radio traffic to the resemble actual battle conditions as close use of helicopters and aircraft. Experi ly as possible. The role of the enemy in ence has also shown that dogs are still the exercises is played by the home forces of simplest and most effective way of com the MVD, by KGB government commu bating saboteurs. This opinion is held nications troops, by local KGB units and both by the KGB and the Spetsnaz. by the police (militsiya). The main task of In the course of training, in addition to all of these forces is the security of par operations against real Soviet military ob ticularly important targets and combat jectives, Spetsnaz units are also trained ing subversive activities. For this reason, in centers where likely theaters of action the leaderships of the GRU, KGB and are realistically reproduced in great de MVD are equally interested in carrying taiL In the Carpathian Mountains, in out combined exercises and in the pains the region of Yavorov, the terrain is taking study and analysis of the expe reminiscent of the French Alps, and the rience accumulated. The Spetsnaz is often Baltic coast is like northern Germany. In brought in to carry out mock attacks on flatable models of Lance, Pluton and government and military objectives, thus Pershing missiles, howitzers, Mirage IV practicing their own tactics and, at the aircraft, Jaguars, and so forth are used_ 42 March SPETSNAZ It is considered much more important to try, air assault brigades, divisional deep recreate, not the uniform of the enemy, reconnaissance units, KGB teams and but his tactics and the methods of inter similar groups from the Warsaw Pact rogation to which saboteurs will be sub allies are also operating in the enemy's jected should they be caught. In this con· rear areas. nection, the lessons given to Spetsnaz A massive drop of Spetsnaz units in the soldiers are very instructive and long early part of a war may be preceded by remembered. groups of professionals penetrating into The Soviet Union's involvement in Af enemy territory. They may, for example, ghanistan has given the Spetsnaz new op enter a country in the guise of groups of portunities for training in actual combat tourists, delegations, sports teams or as conditions. Commanders are making full crews and passengers on merchant ships, use of these opportunities. civil aircraft or commercial trucks. Fur thermore, before the outbreak of war, a certain number of Spetsnaz officers and Weapons and Tactics warrant officers may be posted to Soviet embassies and consulates in the guise of technical personnel, guards, gardeners, For combat, every Spetsnaz soldier has drivers, and so forth. On the eve of war, a standard range of weapons: a Kalashni there may be a concentration of Spetsnaz kov automatic rifle, 300 rounds of ammu units (on various pretexts and under vari nition, a P6 silenced pistol, a knife, six ous covers) in neutral states followed by hand grenades or a light grenade launcher, subsequent infiltration into enemy terri and food and medical packs. Each group tory once fighting has begun. of saboteurs has an R350M radio set with The infiltration of Spetsnaz personnel encryption and burst transmission facili into enemy territory before the outbreak ties. Depending upon the actual assign of hostilities is a very risky but necessary ment, the group may have SA 7 Strela 2 operation, especially if nuclear weapons (NA TO code-name Grail) surface-to-air are not being used. The' main Spetsnaz missiles, directional mines and explosives. forces will be dropped simultaneously on The Spetsnaz has no heavy weapons, all fighting fronts. Army independent but, when operating in the enemy's rear, companies will be dropped 100 to 500 saboteurs may seize enemy tanks, ar kilometers in the enemy's rear and front mored personnel carriers or other ve brigades 500 to 1,000 kilometers. The pro hicles. While doing this, they may even fessional "athletics" regiments will oper wear enemy uniforms. ate within range of capital cities regard In a series of experimental exercises, less of how far these are from the front Spetnaz units have used light motor line. Spetsnaz naval brigades will concen cycles and specially constructed, small, trate their efforts against naval bases, the cross-country vehicles. It is difficult to priority being submarine bases. say, however, whether these will become The absence of heavy weapons and standard equipment. equipment makes it possible to use ordi It is considered that Spetsnaz opera nary Aeroflo t aircraft to deploy the Spets tions can only be successful if they take naz. This, in turn, makes it possible to place simultaneously and on a massive concentrate all of the efforts of the mili scale and if airborne troops, naval infan- tary transport aircraft on backing up 1984 43 MILITARY REVIEW operations by the VDV. the area rapidly in order not to be caught On landing, the Spetsnaz units bury in the attack. their parachutes before leaving the drop There are, however, some situations in zone. Their most dangerous adversary at which the Spetsnaz will destroy targets this moment is considered to be the heli independently. This is usually in cases copter. After leaving the drop zone, sev when it is impossible to establish commu eral groups amalgamate and organize a nications with the command base, when defended base in a safer area where all of their express mission is the elimination of the heavier equipment is left. The area of a target or personality or the seizure of the base will be mined and trip flares set. documents, or when an enemy missile is The groups then set about their tasks, ready for firing. In the latter case, an ranging over several tens of kilometers attack will be made in the face of any from the base, leaving several men to odds, even if the group commander is cer watch it from a distance. The position of tain that his whole group will perish the base may be continually changed. If without doing any damage. the base is discovered, the guards will be It is believed that a sudden attack (even alerted by the trip flares and exploding if unsuccessful) may cause the enemy to mines and will make their way to a ren cancel the launch or postpone it in order dezvous point to warn the returning to recheck all systems and equipment. groups of the danger. Equipment will be Having spotted a missile being readied on moved each night from one hiding place the launcher, the sabotage group (or to another. If enemy transport is cap groups) will usually try to destroy it from tured, nO base will be set up. a distance, using fire from sniper rifles or The most complicated task of Spetsnaz grenade.!aunchers. If this is unsuccessful, units is thought to be the search for tar suicide attacks will be made from differ gets of special importance. Those targets ent directions. Sometimes a small group whose location is accurately known in ad will open heavy fire from one direction, vance will be destroyed by missiles or air thereby attracting attention to itself while craft. The Spetsnaz units have to deal other groups approach the target si with those targets whose location is only lently. roughly known. In the search for targets, More than once during training, in the units will use electronic equipment, or stances have been recorded of Spetsnaz the groups will deploy to the limit of units attacking important targets in visual contact (sometimes as much as a stolen cars, armored vehicles and even kilometer between individual soldiers) tanks. It is difficult to say how the sabo before conducting a sweep on foot. teurs will behave in a real situation, but During such a sweep, the Spetsnaz the experience of World War II showed move slowly and make use of camouflage. that the spirit needed for suicide missions Should they meet the enemy, they will is constant and infectious. Since then, it not usually engage in combat. They will is true that quite a lot .has changed. disperse and meet again at prearranged Professional soldiers in Spetsnaz units, spots. Once the target is found, communi unlike ordinary Spetsnaz soldiers, wear cation is established with the army or civilian clothes. Moreover, they can make front headquarters, and the coordinates contact with Spetsnaz agents and obtain of the target are passed on for attack by any necessary information, transport or missiles or aircraft. The groups then leave shelter. Professional Spetsnaz units will 44 March SPETSNAZ operate in towns, especially in capital ters, jeeps and light armored vehicles and. cities, and also in areas where enemy com not dropped by parachute_ Deep recon mand centers are likely to be located. The naissance companies have far fewer men search for government and military lead than Spetsnaz companies. They may ers may be carried out in various ways_ In deploy only five, not 15, sabotage groups this task, the receipt of accurate intelli each_ There are, however, considerably gence from agents is regarded as one of more companies. Deep reconnaissance the most important elements of success. units do not usually work with the Spets naz. Additionally, the range limitation on deep reconnaissance operations to a maxi Command and Control mum of 100 kilometers behind enemy lines allows Spetsnaz units to concentrate their activities further in the enemy's rear Spetsnaz units are conspicuous by their without being distracted by operations considerable independence of action. The close behind them. commander of a sabotage unit usually has • Front air assault brigades. These very great power behind the enemy lines. brigades operate independently, but A Spetsnaz unit is dropped into an area sometimes Spetsnaz units may guide where there are likely to be particularly their combat helicopters to their targets. important targets and from then on oper Occasionally, combined operations be ates independently_ Army, front (and tween heliborne air assault forces and even higher) headquarters interfere in the saboteurs are possible, as is the use of air operations of saboteurs only in the case of assault brigade helicopters for the discovery of more important targets or evacuation of prisoners and Spetsnaz when it is expedient to bring the sabo wounded. teurs out of a given area-for example, • Airborne divisions. These divisions before launching a nuclear strike. operate in accordance with the High Com Higher formation headquarters try not mand's plans. In the event of supply diffi to interfere with the operations of sabo culties, they switch to purely guerrilla tage units in the belief that the com tactics. It is not usual for combined mander behind the enemy lines can see operations to be organized between air the situation more clearly_Coordination borne divisions and Spetsnaz units. How between Spetsnaz units subordinate to ever, the operations of powerful airborne different headquarters is organized mere groups behind the enemy's lines create a ly by the allocation of boundaries and in situation favorable to the operation of the timing of strikes. Spetsnaz detachments. In war, other Soviet units besides those There are two situations in which a of the Spetsnaz will be operating in superior headquarters will organize direct enemy territory. Among these are: cooperation between units operating in . • Deep reconnaissance companies. the enemy's rear. These are when a com These companies are from reconnaissance bined attack is the only way to destroy or battalions of motor rifle and tank divi capture the target, or when Soviet units sions and hardly differ from the Spetsnaz in the enemy's rear have incurred very in their role and tactics_ The only differ heavy losses and the Soviet command ence is that these companies are trans forms improvised groups from the rem ported behind the enemy lines in helicop- nants of various units. 1984 45 MILITARY REVIEW T.he Soviet command is fully aware that crossing of the Driieper River. In the con Spetsnaz operations will involve enor sidered opinion of Marshal of the Soviet mous sacrifices. Experience in training Union Andrei 1. Yeremenko, "without shows that losses may be enormous dur Concerto the forcing of the Dnieper would ing an airborne assault. At the same time, have been impossible." the Soviet command remembers the con Of course, the partisans were on their sequence of two partisan operations car own territory while Spetsnaz troops will ried out during large-scale offensives by have to operate on foreign territory-and the Red army during World War II. Oper not in forests and swamps but in popu ation Railway War began on 3 August lated areas. Somehow, too, they have to 1943, at the height of the battle for get to these areas. Kursk, when Soviet forces went over to All the same, in Soviet headquarters, the offensive. About 100,000 partisans the idea is very popular: "Supposing we took part, derailing 836 special trains and repeat Concerto, not against bridges and blowing up 556 road bridges and 184 rail roads but rather against NATO's nuclear way bridges. The enemy's rear area was weapons and command control systems?" paralyzed over large areas. In one opera tion, 215,000 lengths of railway track were blown up.' NOTES On an even greater scale was Operation 1 Quoted In Home Forces In the Great Patflotic War, Docu ment Number 278, Yunldat, Moscow, USSR, 197~ Concerto in which 120,000 partisans took 2 Ibid part. Concerto was mounted while the 3 Soviet Military Encyclopedia, Military Publishing House of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, Moscow, USSA, Volume 7, p Red army was attacking and forcing the 106 United Kingdom Major Laser Development Reported. A major advance tn pulsed-laser technology has been reported by British and US researchers, with the development of a switch that allows rapid, repetitive firing of gas lasers. The device has potential application in the use of pulsed lasers for defense and chem ical processing. The switch is actually a Thyratron, a gas-filled tube that allows rapid transfer of large amounts of high-voltage, elec trical current to pump certain gas (excimer) lasers. Most Thyratrons degrade in tens of hours when used under these conditions. The new switch has been running continuously for more than a month at Los Alamos National Laboratory's Pulsed Power Test Facllify. The Thyratron device was developed by Great Britain's EEV in collaboration with the Los Alamos Chemistry and Electron ics Dlvlsions.-Journal of Electronic Defense, © 1983. 46 March Realis Tr---. Captain David W. Baer, Army National Guard, and Captain Paul H. Vivian, Army National Guard The first Army National Guard (ARNG) infantry battalion to participate in REFORGER faced unique problems. Lessons that were learned from that experience will assist other Reserve com· ponent units as they undertake similar activities. HE 2d Battalion (Mechanized), 152d REFORGER 81 provided the unit not T Infantry, of the 38th Infantry Divi· just technical operational problems but. sion, Indiana Army National Guard some unexpected physical and psycholog (ARNG), was the first National Guard ical difficulties. While other National infantry battalion ever to participate in Guard units that will participate in future REFORGER. Our intent here is to relate REFORGERs may benefit from this dis the odyssey of one National Guard Lattal cussion, our main goal is to make a point ion, long on enthusiasm but short on made countless times before-that a unit experience, and how that battalion must train realistically if it is to fight suc emerged from a tough and realistic train cessfully. As a corollary of this argument, ing exercise closer to combat readiness. it is essential for Reserve component 1984 47 MILITARY REVIEW units to train on exercises such as RE residence or at the state NCO Academy. FORGER if they are to reach a level of Most of the NCOs qualified educationally proficiency that will permit them to through correspondence courses. undertake combat missions shortly after Because of the "hometown" tradition mobilization. of the National Guard, most soldiers But there will be more on this later. Let spend their entire Reserve component us first examine the background of the careers in the same battalion if not in the deployment of the 2d Battalion (Mecha same company. It is not unusual to find nized), 152d Infantry. This battalion is an NCO who can remember when the divi typical of most National Guard units. All sion was a pentomic division and the bat personnel are drawn from a particular talion an armor battalion, and when he region-in this case, central and south was a member of E Company. Since a eastern Indiana. Most of the people are stable core of personnel grows up and from small towns and rural areas, and stays with a unit, the men not only get to, they normally live within a 30-minute know one another well oveI' a period of drive of their home armories. time but also share common hardships Perhaps the battalion's most unique and adventures. As a result, the unit en sociological aspect, especially in relation joys a high level of cohesiveness. The to Active Army battalions, is the high value of this transcends a sense of well average age of its personnel-27.7 years. being at the annual Christmas party as it While the average age of grades E 1 to E4 is often Itranslated into unit pride and a (23.3) is probably typical for Active Army common willingness to endure setback units as well, the average age of the non and hardship together. commissioned officers (NCOs) (34.6) and As is the case with many other Reserve officers (32.6) is no doubt high. This is component units, the level of operational particularly evident in the case of lieuten experience of the 2d Battalion (Mecha ants. Normally, the word "lieutenant" nized), 152d Infantry, was distinctly brings to mind a recent college graduate. limited. Not since World War II had the In our case, with an average age of 29.6, a battalion conducted sustained opera lieutenant is more apt to be a man with tions. The two-week annual training gray hair and a receding hairline. camp, generally held in the summer, was Since most of the officers served as conducted at a leisurely pace. During the enlisted men prior to commissioning, the first week, the battalion trained during high average age is not surprising. Nearly the day and returned to the cantonment all of the officers received their commis area for the night. While a field training sions through the state Officer Candidate exercise (FTX) was the highlight of the School (OCS) program. While most com second week of annual training, it usually pleted their branch basic course at Fort lasted but 48 hours and almost never Benning, Georgia, the majority of those more than 72 hours. As a result, the bat who had completed the Infantry Officer talion had little experience in conducting Advanced Course did so through the cor continuous operations over an extended respondence program. Only a handful had period of time. attended advanced or specialized schools Maneuver was another weak area in the in residence. The situation is similar for unit's operational experience. No one the battalion's NCOs. Few had attended could. remember the 2d Battalion (Mecha Primary or Advanced NCO Courses in nized), 152d Infantry, conducting tactical 48 March ARNG TRAINING maneuvers as a battalion, much less as a training (battalion-sized operations). As part of a brigade or division-sized ele would be the case in a wartime mobiliza ment. Tactical training was based on the tion, the initial phase was supervised by notion that only squad and platoon-sized the command and control group of the operations needed to be stressed. It was State Area Command. assumed that, if the companies were well Because of REFORGER's length, the trained, the battalions and brigades battalion served three weeks of active would naturally fall into place upon duty rather than two weeks as is normal mobilization. Clearly, this is not a well for Reserve component training periods. founded assumption but was dictated in The battalion deployed to Europe in two part by the lack of trainlng space, limited groups. The first, a small contingent of training time, equipment shortages and 250 personnel, preceded the main body by budget considerations. a week. It drew all of the pre-positioning A third shortcoming was in combined of materiel configured to unit sets (POM arms training where the experience of the CUS) equipment specified in the uniVs 2d Battalion (Mechanized), 152d Infantry, Modified Table of Organization and was quite limited. Although the unit is a Equipment (MTOE). It also inventoried mechanized infantry battalion, several and loaded all vehicles for rail movement years had passed since it had worked with and traveled to the tactical assembly area armor. The artillery fire support teams (TAA). were still being formed and were not yet At the TAA, the first group jOined the fully integrated into the battalion's train main body of the battalion. For the next ing, and engineers were rarely seen. As two weeks, the battalion participated as a for air defense, most of the men had never subordinate unit of the 2d Brigade, 4th seen a Duster, nor had they seen the more Infantry Division, in one week of defen modern Vulcan. The only time the unit sive operations followed by a week of had ever worked with Air Force liaison of offensive operations. After two weeks of ficers was at a division command post tactical training, the first contingent exercise a year or so earlier. In short, returned to Indiana, while'the main body experience with combined arms opera loaded all vehicles on rail cars and trav tions was limited to what had been ob eled back to the POMCUS site where the tained from the field manuals. equipment was cleaned and placed in stor It was against this backdrop of socio age. logical commonality and operational inex The battalion encountered the stress perience that the battalion was notified and strain of REFORGER early in the that it would participate in REFORGER exercise, 'beginning with the drawing of 81. Even though the initial warning came equipment from the POMCUS site. The eight months before REFORGER, the advance party came fully prepared for the unit had only 16 training days in which to mechanics of the POMCUS draw-that complete preparations. During this limited is, battery installation, fueling and inven period, it was not only necessary to com tory-and indeed the POMCUS draw was plete the normal mobilization tasks (im conducted in record time. What the men munizations, dog tags, identification were not prepared for, however, was sus cards and NATO driver's licenses) and tained operations. During the critical conduct specialized training (rail loading) first week, everyone worked and no one blit also to complete essential tactical slept or rested. Everyone desperately 1984 49 MILITARY REVIEW wanted to prove that an ordinary Na to work hard during the day and play tional Guard battalion could hack RE hard at night. Notions of German beer FORGER, that the unit could measure up and medieval castles danced through to the sternest mission handed it by the many a head. But, of course, REFOR Army. Yet, by the end of the first week, GER, like war, is a sustained operation fatigue was rampant, efficiency declined continuous and ongoing. There is little precipitously and the omnipresent poten time for sightseeing and even less for tial for accidents grew. gulping down good German beer. In retrospect, it is not entirely surpris The combination of fatigue, inadequate ing that we made the mistake of attempt physical conditioning and summer camp ing to "will" our way through REFOR syndrome produc<)d a crisis situation just GER. Past training had never forced us as the battalion was about to begin its to conduct sustained operations. Since first week of tactical operations. Morale the typical FTX at annual training rarely sank and with it overall efficiency. How lasted more than 48 hours, will power was ever, the aura of disappointment and usually sufficient to carry us through. fatigue was short-lived. Fortunately, the But the realistic crucible of REFORGER leadership of the battalion-officers and did not permit such luxury. In short, the NCOs alike-saw what was happening. failure to train realistically left us ill No one ordered the junior leadership to prepared to overcome the initial fatigue correct the situation. In fact, not a word and shock of a real test. was uttered. Yet, instinctively, steps Closely related to our initial difficulty were taken to rectify the state of affairs. in conducting sustained operations was a It may not seem very profound, and it generally low level of physical fitness. is certainly not in managerial psychology While obesity was not a significant prob textbooks, but all that was needed was to lem, the men were generally flabby. Few remind the men who they were, the exercised on a regular basis. Naturally, responsibility that had been placed upon the troops tired easily and required more them and what their mission was. It was rest to complete physically demanding not a long process-perhaps 6 or 8 tasks. Moreover, the fact that our sol hours-but, at the end, the battalion had diers were generally older than the Army undergone a metamorphosis. There was a norm meant that the recuperative time newfound sense of enthusiasm and deter after strenuous labor was even greater. mination, a turnabout achieved by sound Psychologically, the men were not well leadership and esprit de corps. prepared for the rigors of REFORGER. The first of several "surprises" en Although the battalion's leadership made countered on REFORGER came while a ~ant attempt to prepare the men for equipment was being drawn from storage the mental strain that would be expe and inventoried. For the first time, we rienced on REFORGER, we encountered had all of our equipment as dictated by a phenomenon we called "summer camp our MTOE. We suddenly found ourselves syndrome," a sort of depression resulting with 100 tracked and 7-6 wheeled vehicles. from dashed expectations. Prior to de In the past, we were fortunate if we had ploying on REFORGER, there was the 55 tracked vehicles and maybe 60 wheeled widespread anticipation among the vehicles. Not only did commanders have troops that REFORGER would be much to become famiIiar with maneuvering like other summer camps. They expected more vehicles, but the supply and main 50 March ARNG TRAINING tenance sections also had to adjust their FEBA. However. on REFORGER. we mind-set for dealing with nearly twice as were forced to place the TOC, combat many vehicles. Fortunately. the adjust trains and field trains a more realistic 3, 6 ment was made fairly well but not with and 10 kilometers behind the FEBA. Con out some temporary awkwardness. sequently, difficulties in coordinating the During the tactical portion of the exer resupply of line units were encountered cise. the greatest single surprise was the almost immediately. Moreover. resupply inadequacy of logistical resupply proce efforts were exacerbated by the frequent dures. Since most of the unit's pre movement of line units from one battle REFORGER training took place on two position to another. Because the tactical National Guard training reservations. SOPs had never been tested realistically, both of which are heavily wooded and we stumbled a bit for a few days until rather small, the logistical procedures of practical procedures were worked out. the tactical standing operating proce Much to our delight, we found that, in dures (SOP) naturally reflected experi spite of inexperience with battalion ences from operating in such an environ maneuver, we generally had little diffi ment. culty with it. During the first week. while For instance. the limited size of the on a motor march. a portion of the bat training reservations caused the tactical talion became separated from the main operations center (TOC). combat trains body because of a failure to properly and field trains to be placed unrealisti understand the division of responsibility cally close to the forward edge of the bat between the unit's own road guides and tle area (FEBA). On occasion. the trains the military police. were only 3 or 4 kilometers behind the Although we were new to combined 1984 51 MILITARY REVIEW arms operations, little difficulty was en FORGER demonstrated that the leader countered in integrating artillery, armor, ship-officer and NCO alike-was compe engineers, air defense and tactical air tent, mature and up to the challenge. For assets. This was, in nO small part, due to decades, there had been an unspoken but the patient understanding of our com widespread concern within the defense bined arms compatriots. During the ini establishment that leadership in the Re tial phase of REFORGER, when we fal serve components, trained largely within tered on the proper use of the assets at state OCS and NCO Academy programs, our disposal, the officers and NCOs from or worse yet by correspondence courses, attached units would point out to us, would not measure up when put to the without hesitation, but with tact, how the test. While the success of one Reserve assets might be best employed. Again, we component battalion does not completely learned quickly, and, as REFORGER banish these concerns, it does strongly progressed, less and less advice was re suggest that these worries are overdrawn. quired from our combined arms col • It should be remembered that many leagues. Reserve component officers and NCOs We have dwelt here with the weak are leaders and managers in their civilian nesses and problems which the 2d Battal.' careers. While, on a superficial level, the ion (Mechanized), 152d Infantry, encoun work of a production line foreman may tered on REFORGER. It should be em seem very different from that of an infan phasized that the battalion, in spite of try squad leader, yet, in another sense, some stumbling, performed in an exem they are very much alike as the leadership plary manner. Besides setting a POMCUS principles are essentially the same. How draw and turn·in record, the battalion dis ever, it is clear that leaders, whether edu tinguished itself during the tactical por cated at West Point or by correspondence tion ofREFORGER as well. A number of courses, must be tested in demanding and valuable lessons and conclusions can be realistic training such as REFORGER if drawn from REFORGER: they are to lead successfully in combat. CII Nearly all of the weaknesses in the • REFORGER drove home the point unit's performance could be traced to that, if a battalion is to be combat-ready, deficiencies in earlier training rather than it must conduct multiechelon training. It to incompetence or poor leadership. In is not enough to concentrate on just short, for the last three decades, much of squad, platoon and company-level train the unit's training had been insufficiently ing. Not only do the companies lose the realistic or rigorous for an exercise on the vital opportunity to learn how to coordi scale ofREFORGER. nate and operate as a part of a greater • Because of the realistic and demand· whole, but the battalion staff is denied ing nature ofREFORGER, the battalion the chance to train as a combat staff. emerged from the exercise with a much • Among the most pressing problems higher level of combat readiness than to face a Reserve component commander ever before. It had demonstrated the abil at mobilization time is the physical condi ity to maneuver as a battalion, carry out tioning of troops. The situation is compli combined arms operations and conduct cated by the high average age of soldiers sustained operations. in many Reserve component units. A • The success of the 2d Battalion 38-year-old soldier who last exercised (Mechanized), 152d Infantry, on RE strenuously in basic training some 20 52 March ARNG TRAINING years earlier will need not only more time must train realistically and rigorously. In but also a carefully constructed condi particular, at least one week and part of tioning program if he is to attain an ac the second week of the two-week annual ceptable standard of physical fitness. training period should be devoted to an For the peacetime Reserve component FTX. A mobility test exercise, which commander who wants to condition his would include movement to a unit's troops for a deployment such as RE mobilization station and complete proces FORGER, there is no simple solution. sing, should be conducted every third or For most of the month, his men are out fourth annual training period. It is im side of his control. The soldier is often perative that Reserve component units either overnourished by his wife's good become accustomed to training for sus home cooking or he is undernourished by tained operations, to conducting multi frequent trips to fast-food outlets. And, echelon training and to carrying out com like many Americans, after a hard day's' bined arms training. work and a satisfying meal, the Reserve • Finally, more Reserve component component soldier puts off until tomor units, battalion size and larger, should row the jog around the block. Yet, while participate in REFORGER annually. At the commander may feel that he is least one-third of all REFORGER units preaching into the wind, he must main should come from the Reserve compo tain the pressure on his men to keep nents. This is essential if the Army Na themselves physically fit. Physical train tional Guard and the Army Reserve are ing needs to be an essential part of every going to be combat-ready shortly after weekend drill, and the soldiers need to be mobilization. It is also important if the educated, not only on the benefits of fit Total Army concept is going to work. ness, but also on how to become and re After all, a unit will only "fight like it main physically fit. trains." Let us hope that the Reserve • The last and most significant con components will be permitted to "train as clusion is that Reserve component units they will be expected to fight." "'k Captain David W. Baer, Army National Captain Paul H. Vivian, Army National Guard, is currently the S1 of the 2d Battalion Guard, is the assistant S2 for the 76th Infantry (Mechanized), 152d Infantry, 38th Infantry Diui· Brigade. Indiana Army National Guard. He re sian, Indiana Army National Guard. He is a ceived a B.A. from Union College and an M.A. graduate of Indiana University. His entire from Indiana University. He has previously military career has been with the 2d Battalion served in the 2d Battalion (Mechanized), 152d In (Mechanized), 152d Infantry, where he has fantry' 38th Infantry Division, Indiana Army served as a platoon leader, company executive National Guard, as a platoon leader, company officer, company commander and S3 for air. executive offi'cer and tactical intelligence officer. 1984 53 Evolution ofUS ArDlor Mobiity Christopher R. Gabel /~~~ I!f\ ,- £ ~~;~,,; .,' - ,,' -" ~tft~: .. i ~t.- ARMOR MOBILITY In the years before World War II, there was considerable debate within the Army about the best way to defeat enemy tanks. One group considered a lightly armored, highly mobile antitank force to be best suited for this task. Others thought tanks, which carried more armor and were less mobile, were more ap propriate. Both concepts were employed during the war with differing degrees of success. ~ ,,~ 1~~'I(t.i"r.lM.''''''i MILITARY REVIEW OBILITY is a vital ingredient of M the successful military system. It is a means of taking the war to the enemy and seizing the initiative. Mobility "multiplies" manpower and firepower by enabling the commander to concentrate his forces at the decisive point. Surprise, shock, maneuver, pursuit and exploita tion all imply the possession of mobility. In world military history, the word "mobility" figUres prominently in analy ses of the great captains such as Alexan der the Great, Hannibal and Napoleon Bonaparte. In the 20th century, mobility virtually disappeared from the Western Front battles of World War 1. The advent of the internal combustion engine and its appli cation to armored fighting vehicles dur ing and after the war heralded the return of mobility to the battlefield. In fact, the potential existed to create mechanized Chaltee elements that would be lnore mobile than any other military formation in history. and the National Defense Act of 1920 But how much mobility would be enough? officially assigned all tanks to the Could a mechanized unit actually be too infantry for that purpose. mobile? Between the world wars, Adna R. Chaffee led the US Army in experiments Armor's High-Mobility Phase, 1928·39 that probed the upper limits of mecha nized mobility. He and his successors con cluded that, for a mechanized force to be a The high-mobility phase in armor decisive element in battle, it must trade began tentatively in 1928 when the War off some of its raw mobility to gain fire Department organized a temporary, all power, armor protection and combined mechanized unit at Camp George G. arms support. At the same time, Lesley.1. Meade, Maryland, for tactical tests. Two MeNair created a program of mol ri7ed years later, another experimental force antitank defense that relied incrcm""gly came together at Fort Eustis, Virginia, upon mobility anti gave up a lot to ac under the command of a cavalryman, quire it. Who was right-Chaffee or Colonel Daniel Van Voorhis. McN air? Battlefield experience in World Colonel Chaffee, of the War Depart· War II provided an answer. ment General Staff, who helped create the The US Army's original mechanized Fort Eustis force (and who was also from element-the Tank Corps of WorId War the cavalry), strongly believed that I-was a low-mobility force. Slow tanks mechanization could restore mobility to supported infantry assaults in France, the battlefield and that armored vehicles 56 March ARMOR MOBILITY long-range reconnaissance missions. Still, the cavalry establishment remained skep tical. Reinforced by motorized infantry; additional artillery and observation air craft, the 1st Cavalry Regiment (Mecha nized) turned in a smart performance at the Second Army's 1936 maneuvers, raid ing the "enemy's" flanks and rear virtu ally at will.' Such feats were spectacular but indecisive, owing to the regiment's relative lack of fighting power. That same year saw the mechanization of another cavalry regiment, the 13th, and, in 1938, the two mechanized units combined to form the 7th Cavalry Bri gade (Mechanized). This brigade was the Army's largest and last experiment in the pure, high-mobility phase of armored development. Brigadier General Chaffee, the brigade's commander, deliberately McNair kept it light and mobile. Although he ob tained mechanized artillery and various supporting elements for the brigade, he could replace the horse in traditional avoided the inclusion of less mobile cavalry missions. Accordingly, the con medium tanks and infantry.' The 7th glomeration of aging tanks, trucks and Cavalry Brigade's greatest test came armored cars that made up the Fort during the First Army maneuvers of Eustis force practiced operations such as 1939, when it stole the show in the final patrols, raids, exploitations and pursuits exercise by slashing into the rear of the that required great mobility but little "enemy army" and severing its com fighting power.' munications. 4 In 1931, the new Army chief of staff, General Douglas MacArthur, dissolved the Fort Eustis force and officially Antitank Acquires Mobility, 1939 assigned its principal elements to the cavalry, the traditional arm of mobility. As the reluctant leader in armored develop During this period of experimentation ment, the cavalry activated the 1st with high-mobility armor, the Army did Cavalry Regiment (Mechanized) at Fort little to develop its antitank capabilities. Knox, Kentucky, in 1933 and equipped it Not until 1939 was serious thought given with scout cars, light tanks and other to a comprehensive antimechanized doc motor vehicles. trine. In that year, the Command and In tests at the Cavalry School at Fort General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Riley, Kansas, during the following year, Kansas, under Brigadier General MeN air, the unit, commanded by Chaffee, re commandant, produced a tentative field peatedly outperformed horse units on manual for antitank warfare. 1984 57 MILITARY REVIEW This study called for meeting mobile In exasperation, Chief of Staff General mechanized attacks with a mobile anti George C. Marshall established an inde tank defense_I t proposed that motorized pendent Armored Force on 10 July 1940 . 50-caliber and 37mm antitank guns be and appointed Chaffee as its first chief. organized into platoons for front-line By this time, Chaffee was convinced that defense and that an additional motorized mobility alone would not assure success antitank battalion be provided to each in armored operations, and he emphatical division for mobile defense in depth:' Iv denied that armored attacks were Utilizing a reasonable level of mobility, ~imply cavalry raids writ large.' Nonethe this scheme would, in all probability, less, mobility remained the foremost have been effective against a light mecha cri terion of armored warfare as envisaged nized force such as the 7th Cavalry by Chaffee: Brigade. Official approval from the War Armored units are employed against Department. however, was not forth vital objective" in rear of the hostile main COIning. battle position usually reached by a pene tration of a weah position of the hostile front or an encirclement ofan open flanh. Mobility and the 1940 Armored Division Such operations are premised on surprise, on rapidity of action, and on ability to sustain this action until the objective is The outbreak of war in Europe lent new gained. 1\ urgency to the development of tank and The table of organization for armored antitank forces by demonstrating that divisions that Chaffee drew up in 1940 armored formations were capable ofstrik was predicated upon mobility. The armored ing decisive blows in battle. The infantry division's offensive punch resided in the pooled seven of its eight tank battalions highly mobile "strike echelon" which con to create a Provisional Tank Brigade sisted of one medium and two light tank under Brigadier General Bruce Magruder regiments, plus a mechanized artillery Chaffee's 7th Cavalry Brigade was regiment. The division's only infantry bolstered by the attachment of the 6th component was a two-battalion regiment Infantry Regiment IMotorized) which that Chaffee relegated to the "support compromised the brigade's mobility but echelon." In battle, the strike echelon was added significantly to its staying power. supposed to carry out the division's offen In May 1940 Iwhile 10 German panzer sive missions utilizing maneuver and the divisions were in the process of wrecking envelopment of enemy positions. The sup the French army), the two brigades joined port echelon mopp~d up, organized defen forces during the Third Army maneuvers sive positions when necessary, manned in Louisiana to form the US Army's first outposts, forced river crossings and provisional armored division. Although covered the strike echelon when the tanks given only 48.hours to organize and as needed to withdraw from action to rest semble, the provisional division, nonethe and refit.' less, functioned effectively." Of the 1940 armored division's 381 Even after the French debacle and the tanks, two-thirds were mobile but weakly Louisiana maneuvers, neither the infan armed and armored light tanks Ispecifi try nor the cavalry showed signs of em cally, the MI, M2 and M3). Chaffee bracing mechanization wholeheartedly, disliked the existing, makeshift, M3 58 March ARMOR MOBILITY medium tank, and the production of light ized, specialized antitank force which con tanks outstripped that of medium tanks sisted of three battalions of towed anti by 2-to-1 as long as Chaffee headed the tank guns as well as strong recon Armored Force_" naissance elements. The groups were organized and trained to seek out enemy armor by vigorous reconnaissance. to High-Mobility Antitank, 1941 move swiftly to the scene and to destroy the enemy'anks with rapid and accurate gunfire." The Chaffee-designed Armored Force received its first test at the hands of the traditional ground elements during the Armor versus Antitank, 1941 Second Army's corps-versus-corps exer cises held in June 1941. The 2d Armored Division, under Major General George S_ The great GHQ maneuvers of 1941 Patton, ran roughshod over the oppo gave the Army an opportunity to pit the sition, largely because antitank develop Armored Force. which was seeking a bal ment had lagged behind progress in the ance between mobility and combined armor field_ Marshall again took 'Patters arms power, against an antitank force into his own hands by ordering the\Opera predicated upon ever-higher levels of tions and Training Branch of the General mobility. Although the maneuvers were Staff to develop an antitank force based intended to provide training for the ArrrJY on "an offensive weapon and organi as a whole. McNair publicly stated that zation. "l! "we are definitEjly out to see ... if and how In June 1941, the War De,artment ac we can crush a 'modern tank offensive. "to tivated an antitank battalio~ within each During the maneuvers, I Armored Corps infantry division." much in the manner of and its two armored divisions were the Command and General Staff School's generally successful in highly mobile 1939 study. Still not satisfied, Marshall operations such as flanking movements also directed that: and envelopments. But, when required to ... prompt consideration be giuen to the engage in sustained action against the creation of additional highly mobile anti enemy main force, it was discovered that tank-antiaircraft units as Corps and the armored division's differentiation be Army troops for lise in meeting mecha tween strike and support functions and nized linits. These units to be in addition the overall shortage of infantry within the to organic antitank weapons." division precluded effective combined Lieutenant General McNair, by now de arms operations. Their mobility notwith facto head of the General Headquarters standing, the armored units took heavy (GHQ) and as such responsible for organ casualties whenever tanks were forced to izing and training the ground forces, em attack antitank positions that would braced the concept of a mobile. Armywide have fallen with relative ease to an infan antitank pool wholeheartedly. In August try and artillery assault. In one six-day 1941, he ordered the creation of three exercise, the two armored divisions mobile antitank groups (of regimental "lost" a total of 844 tanks, 82 more than size) for participation in upcoming field their combined full-strength establish maneuvers. Each group was a fully motor ments.16 1984 59 MILITARY REVIEW Armor Reconciles Mobility With Combined Arms, 1942-45 On the basis of observer reports from the maneuvers and from the European war, the Armored Force undertook a series of reforms aimed at reducing its lingering overemphasis on mobility and increasing the armored division's capaci ty for combined arms. Chaffee had been studying the problem since 1940, but. after his death in August 1941, the re forms actually took place under a new . chief, Major General Jacob L. Devers. Devers' background was with the field ar tillery rather than the cavalry, and it is not surprising that he imparted an in creased awareness of gunnery and fire Devers power to the Armored Force. In March 1942, the War Department offensive puwer,I8 approved a new table of organization for The armored division is organized the armored division. I t increased the primarily to perform missions that re infantry element from two battalions to quire grcat mobility and firepower. It is three, established three identical self given decisive missions. It is capable of propelled artillery battalions, and re engaging in most forms ofcombat but its organized the existing eight tank bat primary role is in offensive operations talions into six (the number of tanks for against hostile rear areas." the entire division i:J.creasing by nine to Missions such as the defense of a posi 390). A further restructuring in 1943 tion, delaying action, local counterattack. reduced the tank element to three bat assault upon prepared positions and even talions~a total of 263 tanks in the divi action against hostile armored forces sion. Although the number of tanks de were also considered appropriate under clined, the proportion of medium tanks the new doctrine. Most significantly, rose from one-third in Chaffee's division armored doctrine now called for the close to two-thirds under Devers." Moreover, coordination of tanks, infantry and ar these medium tanks were a new model tillery in all major operations. Rather the famous M4 Sherman. than relying on a tank-heavy strike eche Doctrinally, the reformed Armored lon as its primary fighting component, Force still accorded high priority to the new armored division included two mobility but no longer to the virtual ex and later three tactical headquarters clusion of other considerations: known as "combat commands." The chiefcharacteristics ofthe armored The combat command was a task force division are high mobility, protected fire headquarters under which any combi power, and shock. Its strength lies in its nation of arms could be brought together. 60 ARMOR MOBIlITY Typically, the combat command would be battalions, to flaws in armored doctrine assigned an artillery battalion to es and training and to the maneuvers rule tablish a base of fire and mutually book which granted unwarranted effective supporting tank and infantry battalions ness to antitank weapons." Nonetheless, for mounting assaults_ In the face of anti McN air believed that the mobility of anti tank fire, the infantry would lead the tank forces, as exemplified by the anti assault. When confronted by small-arms tank groups, had been the key to stopping and machinegun fire, the tanks would ad the Armored Force in the great maneu vance firsL 20 In other words, although the vers." The mobile antitank concept armored division was still a mobile organ solidified into dogma. ization, it was prepared to sacrifice At the conclusion of the 1941 G HQ mobility to gain the support of its infan maneuvers, the War Department elimi try and artillery components_ If neces nated the valuable antitank battalion sary, the division would slow its attack to from the infantry division table of the pace of the walking infantryman. organization, pooled all antitank bat talions under GHQ control and redesig nated them "tank destroyer" battalions. Antitank at the Like the experimental antitank groups, High-Mobility Extreme, 1941-45 the tank destroyers constituted a mobile, Armywide antitank pool that was sup posed to "seek, strike and destroy" The formulators of antitank doctrine enemy armor wherever it appeared. Mo did not emulate the Armored Force's bility and firepower were the sale consid search for a balance between mobility and erations in the creation of the tank combined arms power even though there destroyer battalion table of organization. were indications that the high-mobility Each battalion was fully motorized and antitank concept had its flaws. Observers possessed three companies of towed or at the 1941 GHQ maneuvers variously at self-propelled antitank guns as its only· tributed antitank successes, not to the ex major fighting elements." The ultimate perimental mobile antitank groups, but tank destroyer weapon was the MiS to the relatively static divisional antitank which combined the mobility of a light M18 with 76mm gun MILITARY REVIEW tank with the firepower of a small ar as the grinding war of attrition in Italy, tillery piece. Weighing only 20 tons and the wild pursuit across France, the as carrying a mere 12mm of armor plating sault against the so-called Siegfried line (maximum), the fully tracl,ed MiS could and the containment of the German travel at the astounding rate of 50 miles armored counteroffensive in the Ar per hour even though it mounted a 76mm dennes. high-velocity gun." The tank destroyer concept, by com According to official doctrine, the ma parison, was a failure. At its peak, the jority of tank destroyer battalions were tank destroyer establishment included no to be pooled at the corps and field army fewer than I 06 battalions, but command levels. When a hostile armored force was ing generals in the field never understood detected, the tank destroyers were to race or desired an aggressive, highly mobile to the scene fire-brigade style, locate the antitank defense. Nor could they counte enemy tanks by vigorous reconnaissance nance the powerfully armed tank destroy and destroy them with gunfire: ers lying idle in reserve, awaiting the rare Rapidity of maneuver enables tan" de mass deployment of German armor. In stroyers to strike at vital objectives, fight stead, they sent the tank destroyers to on selected terrain, exercise pressure from the front-line units which had been varied and unexpected directions, and seriously weakened, in the first place, by bring rnassed fire to bear in decisive the elimination of divisional antitank bat areas. Tanh destroyer units obtain results talions. from rapidity and flexibility of action At the front, it was discovered that the rather than by building up strongly tank destroyers had sacrificed too much organized positions. Tank destroyers de in their pursuit of mobility. Lacking a pend for protection not on armor, but all combination of arms, the tank destroyer speed and the use of cover and terrain. units hy themselves were incapable of When maneuvering in the presence of the sustained action, necessitating their frag enemy they habitually move at the great mentation and dispersal among other est speed permitted by the terrain."" units where their mobility did them little In truth, the formulators of tank de good. Most ironically, the super-mobile stroyer doctrine expected to gain a great tank destroyer weapons were found to be deal from mobility. To enhance mobility, lacking in tactical mobility. They were they sacrificed armor plating on their ,often driven to cover and immobilized by weapons and the combination of arms enemy fire that posed no threat to slower within their units. but better armored vehicles. In the end, tank destroyers did yeoman's duty as assault guns and self-propelled The Verdict artillery, but they were rarely called upon to exercise their mobility. When the M4 medium tank was upgunned to the tank The battlefields of Europe issued a destroyer's level of firepower, it was as clear verdict on the divergent philoso good as or better than the tank destroyer phies of US tank and antitank forces. Six in virtually all roles, including antitank teen armored divisions fought with great warfare." success in the European theater, partici The Armored Force created by Chaffee pating in such widely diverse operations and the tank destroyer concept developed 62 March ARMOR MOBILITY under the guidance of McNair both gamble failed. and the tank destroyer pro helped restore mobility to the Army's gram was terminated following the war. combat doctrines. The Armored Force In its place, the Army embraced a princi chose to enhance its effectiveness by're ple that the Armored Force had long ad ducing mobility to a level consistent with vocated: The best weapon to stop a tank is effective combined arms and gained fire another tank. and the best way to counter power and armor protection in the proc a balanced. combined arms armored unit ess. The tank destroyer program staked is with another armored unit." Mobility everything on maximizing mobility. The alone does not win battles. NOTES 1 Mildred Hanson Gillie, Forging the Thunderbolt, Military \l\ank Qroup. ~('e ManeU'lcr MenloranOum Nur"ber 49 Flfs/ Arm>, Sap/Ice Pubhshmg Co HamsblJfg Pa, 1947 PO l41 47 c,ce also Maneuvers 1941 Fr'lill Report. RG 337 S7D National Archlyes. M,Jry lee Stubbs and Stanley RU5sell Connor, Armv r!(leagf' Wa':lt1l!1qlon 0 C Sefles Armor Cavalry Part I Regular Army and Army Reser've US 15 The New Yor/< Times Government Prmtmg 0t110~, Washington, DC 1969 and The 16 Repor(~ 01 Tanl( Lo,,$( S. Armored Force, Command and Canler, Study Number 27 HIS!Of Ica! Section, Arm.,. Ground Forces 2 Glilm, op Cit, pp 62 67 and 98 101 3 General Adna R Chaffee statement Hearings on /lIe Mill tary Es{t1bl,shmenl Appropriations 011/ for 1942 House 01 ForCC' Command. and Cenler ReprQsentatIVes Subcommittee 01 tho Comml\!rm on AppfOp"'] 18 Field MunuallFMI17 100 lions. 77th Congros5 Flf~t SOSSlon. US Govornmont Pronllng 01 7he ArmoreCl DIVISion US Wur DqJddn1('nl fiCO Washmgton. DC 1941 0 557 see alSO GIlIIC op ell Po 1944 paragrBph19 110 11 for Chal1ee s pOliCies on structuring Ihe 7th Cavalry 19 Ibid paragr Christopher R, Gabel IS a l,j,.,itillg a.,.,ocwtc professor with til(> Combat Stl/dies [us/itute, USACGSC, Fort L(;'at'(;,llU'ortil, l\all'-'o~, He ri' caived a Ph,D. from OhIO State Uniller..,it\, He was previously a t'lslting profe ..,.,or u'lih the Df!partmC'lIt ofHistarv, J(ansa~ Stafl' UIIH'cnlty 1984 63 Aircraft Survivability C. Hudson Carper Jr. As Army aviation's combat role expands, there is an increased need for a high degree ofaircraft and crew survivability. Many advances were made in this area as a result ofthe Vietnam War. But still more needs to be done ifaircraft are to survive future battles. ment. The term "survive," however, is so Introduction broad that almost anything can be reo lated to it in one situation or another. The US Army Materiel Development and DOMINANT factor in the effec· Readiness Command illustrates the na· A tiveness of US Army aviation ture and criticality of survivability by de· weapons systems is the ability of those fining it as: systems to survive in the combat environ- ... the characteristic of personnel and 64 March AIRCRAFT SURVIVABILITY' materiel which enables them to withstand pal objective of this article is to empha (or avoid) adverse military action or the size the importance of improving the in effects of natural phenomena which or herent toughness of our aircraft systems dinarily and otherwise would have re in terms of improved survivability as it sulted in the loss of capability to effec directly relates to crew commitment and tively continue the performance of the increased mission effectiveness. prescribed mission. Though broadly stated to encompass the entire spectrum of Army materiel and Survivability and Mission Effectiveness Problems missions. this definition adequately describes the capabilities required for the effective employment of Army aviation. The postulated battlefield of the future Aviation is now recognized as a full with integrated forces operating over ex member of the Army combat team. and tended distances will. without question. Army tactics are predicated on the ability offer a host of opportunities, chaJIenges of aviation to perform its tasks as a part and problems for Army aviation. The Air of the combined arms effort. The ability Land Battle 2000 concept of operations of the aviation weapons system to sur dictates small. self-sufficient organiza vive while performing the necessary com tions which are highly mobile and equipped bat, combat support and training tasks is for maximum firepower. Operations will paramount to the outcome of any conflict. include rear echelon penetration and Further, the human resource. particularly fighting in all quadrants simultaneously. the aviator, is the key element of the avia The basic combat fundamentals of move. tion weapons system, and the aviator's shoot and communicate will control the survival. even after the loss of the air situation. As such, the organization of the craft. is critical. forces and tactical employment will be Survivability issues with respect to strongly influenced or dictated by the Army aircraft are. without question. ex ability of the organic aviation assets to tremely complex. Many factors (often op perform effectively. to survive the hostile posing one another) must come into play. environment and to rapidly reconstitute a including tactics. speed. agility. maneu fighting capability during and after en verability. low signatures, weapons. ac gagement. tive countermeasures. passive survivabil The threats facing aviation operations ity measures (hardening) and crashworth are many and varied. They extend from iness. These opposing factors often lead the small armS of the infantryman to an to controversy in arriving at acceptable abundance of sophisticated air defense solutions that enhance the survivability . systems highly capable of detecting. of our helicopters. tracking and firing upon our aircraft The importance of the passive harden through advanced target detection and ing of Army helicopters to help conserve fire corl.trol subsystems. Field artillery personnel and materiel. considering both and mortar fire can be expected to be used enemy action and crash damage. is of the against aircraft assembly and servicing utmost importance. However, it is contin areas and to deny access to observation· ually underestimated in assessing the or firing positions. value of the various competing surviva Air-to-air combat can be expected with bility enhancement measures. The princi conventional forward area aircraft and 1984 65 MILITARY REVIEW with enemy attack helicopters armed done considering tactics, weapons and ac with guns and air-to-air missiles_ Less tive countermeasures, however, the heli conventional threats may also be present copter will still continue to receive hits in the form of tactical nuclear devices, and suffer ballistic damage. The small chemical and biological warfare, lasers caliber (7.62 and 12.7mm), mass-deployed and other forms of directed energy weap automatic and semiautomatic weapons ons, and electronic countermeasures to will remain a serious threat to the heli degrade the mission capability of our sys copter even on the modern integrated bat tems. tlefield, especially in terms of mission The main emphasis to date in develop abort kills. ing means of enhancing helicopter com The relatively small-caliber, high-explo bat survivability has been on equipment sive (23 to 30mm) projectiles are of to aid in avoiding the higher level threats particular concern to the survivability of or to degrade their performance if en the helicopter in terms of attrition kill. gaged. Examples include detectors, jam Beyond this level of threat, survival is mers, flares, chaff and decoys. Recently, much more dependent upon measures for additional emphasis has been placed on avoiding or degrading the threat capabil the development of improved aircraft ities. To be effective against these ballis weapons and on the improvement of the tic threats, the helicopter must be de speed, agility and maneuverability of the signed to minimize the effects of the pro helicopter. jectiles. This can be done by incorporat These are all essential components of ing specialized vulnerability reduction achieving adequate levels of survivability concepts, damage tolerant materials and and operational effectiveness in combat. structural configurations and techniques There appears to be a growing belief that to reduce the severity of damage and the these measures may be all that is needed. battle damage repair times and complex Experience would indicate that this is not ities. . true and that the survivability and mis Aviation combat operations in the pres sion effectiveness of the aircraft system ence of the additional threats of nuclear in combat depends upon the proper bal and chemical warfare and directed energy ance of both active and passive measures. weapons will present unprecedented chal The aircraft must also possess inherent lenges to both the helicopter designer and toughness to allow it to take hits and/or the user. Considerable effort remains in other types of battlefield damage, allow gaining a good understanding of the ef the crew to survive and complete its pres fect of these enemy systems on the air ent mission and perhaps others before craft, crew and overall operations. repair and to conserve personnel and avia Accidents and crashes within Army tion materiel in survivable crashes. aviation, in both peacetime and wartime With respect t-J the ballistic-type threats operations, appreciably detract from mis in this hostile environment, survivabil sion effectiveness, primarily in terms of ity will depend upon our ability to mini personnel losses, materiel losses and re mize the probabilities associated with the duced morale. Up until approximately 10 key elements involved in an encounter years ago, the principal emphasis within that is, detection, target acquisition Army aviation was placed on accident and track, ballistic hits and kills when prevention. Although this is indeed the hit. Regardless of how good a job is ultimate objective (deserving priority ef 66 March AIRCRAFT SURVIVABILITY forts), the facts of life clearly show that crashes of a potentially survivable nature the accident prevention program alone wherein there were 1,100 fatalities. The simply is not sufficient. Mishaps of all na total cost of these crashes in terms of tures involving Army aircraft have been, crew fatalities and injuries, aircraft are and will continue to be a major, expen damage, property damage and associated sive problem. To reduce the number of in loss of mission capability to the Army is juries or fatalities of Army aircrewmen in immeasurable. potentially survivable accidents and the As mentioned earlier, operational tac rate of material damage or loss, a pro tics will playa vital part in helicopter sur gram that addresses both key issues of vivability on the modern battlefield, and accident prevention and crashworthiness some of these tactics place ever-increas design must be pursued aggressively. ing importance on passive survivability Accident statistics for four currently design. Foremost among these tactics operational Army aircraft (the UHl, will be low and slow flight to achieve AHl, OH5B and CH47), none of which stealth by masking the helicopter behind have crashworthiness in their basic available terrain and vegetation. This tac design, show that, for a lO-year period tic enhances combat survivability by de ending in 1981, there were more than 900 grading the effectiveness of the conven mishaps with nearly 400 fatalities. The tional threat detection and acquisition fatalities would no doubt have been more systems. Unfortunately, however, it re severe had not the crashworthy fuel duces other aspects of survivability by system been incorporated on a retrofit exposing the helicopter to small-arms fire basis. Current peacetime experience and chemical warfare. It also reduces the shows a total cumulative flight time of flight margin of safety. Slow-speed, low approximately 1 112 million hours per level flight eliminates the safety margin year for Army aviation, with a fatality normally associated with altitude as well rate of approximately 2 112 per 100,000 as increases the instances of obstacle hours of flying time. These numbers will strikes. increase severalfold during periods of This observation is supported by the combat, as demonstrated in Vietnam fact that, over the past 10 years, acci when, during peak years, the flight time dents involving wire strikes caused the was in excess of 5 million hours per year, death of approximately one of every six with a fatality rate of 10 per 100,000 US Army aviators killed in helicopter hours. crashes. This problem can only worsen The statistics from the Vietnam era when such flight operations are per warrant further discussion. During that formed in combat conditions and in un period, there were combat losses, noncom familiar terrain. bat-related losses in a combat zone and worldwide training and normal opera tional losses. In a 3 1I2-year period be Importance of Passive Survivability Measures tween 1967 and 1970, nearly 3,000 heli copters were lost in Vietnam. Approxi mately half of these losses were noncom The intent of the foregoing discussion bat-related. Within this same period in was to set the framework for addressing other parts of the world, there were ap the principal topic of this article-passive proximately 2,400 additional helicopter survivability and mission effectiveness. 1984 67 MILITARY REVIEW Arguments will continue concerning prior the system. The result is that the means ities and the proper distribution of the of fostering and promoting them are most various survivability considerations for often undervalued, overlooked or com any new combat aviation system. Of all pletely ignored during the system design the factors that influence or control the trade-offs. effectiveness of the helicopter weapons Further, combat stress may be the system, however, the dominant elements single most critical factor affecting these appear to be the positive motivation and attributes relative to how and to what ex unreserved commitment of the aircrew. tent an individual ultimately performs in Further, the extent to which these can be a given situation in combat. Passive sur maximized appears to be a direct function vivability measures-that is, aircraft of the odds that the system will survive in hardening-have a significant influence combat. on the actual and perceived stress ex These motivation and commitment at perienced by aircrewmen in combat. A tributes-or lack of them-can fully ex brief synopsis of personal conclusions ploit or negate the technological and tac based on experience gained in Vietnam in tical measures employed. They are not the 1968-69 time frame is offered here in well understood and are difficult to support of this position and in support of quantify in relation to other attributes of the need for continued aggressive surviv 68 March AIRCRAFT SURVIVABILITY ability enhancement measures for Army extended periods of time. aircraft. Many factors come into play, starting Several comments are offered in prefac with being away from family and known ing my observations from Vietnam. First surroundings and being placed in the ele and foremost, I came away from that ex ment of the unknown, among strangers, perience with the utmost respecL for the with strange customs and unfamiliar dedication. capability and professional geography. When the additional factors ism of our Army aircrews. Second. al associated with combat are added to this, though I worked with many different extremely high-stress conditions prevail. units and aircrews in all four corps areas, In some aspects, the combat stress causal they probably represent only a small factors in Vietnam were unique, but, in sampling of the total population that many respects, they will be the same served in Vietnam. Finally, I recognize regardless of where the combat occurs. the dangers of drawing hard conclusions Foremost among these factors is that of based on limited data or exposure, espe being shot at by the enemy. cially considering a situation like the one The ballistic threat was perhaps the in which the United States found itself in major stress-producing cause for Army Vietnam. aircrews. In many of the helicopters, the Our involvement and the overall atti crews had demonstrated their desire for tude of our forces in Vietnam appeared to protection by attempting innovations of change over the period of time that we their own. Typical of the tricks that an were there, ranging from a general com aircrew would play to improve its chances mitment in the early 1960s to questioning of surviving in combat included placing of the US role in the early 1970s. The con chest protection (chicken plates). flak clusions that I reached in the late 1960s jackets, helmets and other such devices in were undoubtedly influenced by the pre the lower transparency and other void vailing mood within Vietnam at that areas of the helicopters in the hope that time-that is, a growing concern about some personal protection would be pro possibly being killed in a war that was be vided against small-arms fire; wearing ing fought for somewhat less than clear personal side arms in front and tucked be reasons. There can be little doubt, how tween their legs to help protect that area ever, that stress, no matter what the from damage; and carrying boxes of food, cause, inhibits mission performance. extra personal weapons, extra ammuni The fact that combat induces stress in tion, water containers, and so forth, on an individual is well-established. For the board the helicopter, again for ballistic most part, such stress conditions follow a protection and for use in the event they normal sequential pattern and will occur were forced down in an unfriendly area. in any individual who is exposed long Unfortunately, there was little they enough to certain conditions, including could jury-rig to enhance the probability the threat of physical harm. Stress prin of surviving the impact of a crash. Such cipally manifests itself in physical and efforts may have been psychologically mental fatigue. For some individuals, it helpful, but they resulted in extremely in results in a rapid loss of morale and pro efficient use of aircraft weight and per ficiency and occasionally a total break formance margins. In addition, they were down, while other individuals are able to ineffective compared to what can be done remain relatively calm and proficient for if good, passive survivability measures 1984 69 MILITARY REVIEW are designed into the aircraft from the are a vital, indispensable part of Army start. combat aviation, and overusing aircraft Perhaps equal to the ballistic threat as whenever needed in the heat of battle is a a stress-causing factor was a concern by fact of life. Realizing this, we must the aircrew of being involved in a crash of passively harden the aircraft design to the aircraft. The key to this problem ap make it more forgiving-that is, greater peared to be knowingly flying aircraft structural margins of safety-and to that may have been less than properly make it more crash survivable, thus con maintained and that were, on occasion, serving both personnel and materiel. partially failed, considering both struc In the 1968-69 time frame, another ture and mission equipment. leading concern of the crew was that of Two primary factors came into play in surviving a helicopter crash but then be this regard. It was estimated that a high ing burned to death in a post-crash fire. percentage of the aircraft maintenance Crashworthy fuel systems are now an ac during the high-flying-hour years in Viet cepted part of any future aviation weap nam was conducted by personnel in the ons system design, which should greatly general category of on-the-job trainees. relieve that particular concern. Continually flying aircraft which had Although not directly related to pas questionable flight safety, whether the sive hardening of the aircraft in the flying was combat-related or not, was a same light as the concerns stated earlier, highly stressful situation. Also, on many other stress-causing factors were preva ,occasions during intense moments of lent in Vietnam. Continuous operation in combat, aircraft were flown in a manner cramped, dirty cockpits in either very hot and used for tasks far beyond their design and dry (dusty) or very hot and wet (mon limits. soon) conditions was highly stressful. In a This was more prevalent among some few cases, Army aviators were accumu of the young aviators. They, and, on occa lating as much as 180 hours' flying time sion, more seasoned aviators, would per month, with crew chiefs frequently (when necessary) bore into a situation having half again as much time around with little regard for themselves or the the aircraft. This alone was known to aircraft they were flying to complete the result in slower reaction time, impaired mission, especially if they were being judgment, reduced accuracy during close depended upon by friendly forces. Under support missions and reduced alertness such extremes, the aircraft would occa both in flight and during inspection and sionally fail due to overstressing compo preflight as well as postflight. Under such nents that were already weakened or conditions, it was judged that 2 hours in a partially failed through previous use or Cobra were equivalent to about 6 hours in abuse. a H uey and that, after this period of On other occasions, this hard flying flying, crew effectiveness was approxi would cause a good component to par mately half of what it was at the end of I tially fail, thus causing the aircraft to fall the first hour. inexplicably out of the sky on later, more Comments have been heard in recent routine missions. The statistics presented years to the effect that cockpit air-condi earlier on nondirect, combat-related crashes tioning systems are nice to have in Army of Army helicopters in Vietnam support helicopters but are not mission-essential this observation. Young aviator '''rigers'' equipment. Although the need to provide 70 March A.lRCRAFT SURVIVABILITY chemical warfare countermeasures may due in part to the lack (usually) of naviga make this a moot issue, for the crew to be tion and landing aids which added to the effective over long periods of intense fly difficulty in performing many types of ing, cockpit environmental control is just missions. Being able to see tracers blow as essential to overall combat mission ef ing past at night and flying among illu fectiveness as the mast-mounted sight or minating flares certainly caused more any other such weapons subsystem. stress. Added to all of this was fatigue The degree of stress involved was also caused by continuous exposure to the related to the type of mission being flown. high levels of vibration and noise nor In general, the combat assault mission mally found within the helicopters. caused much higher stress than the com In Vietnam, the cause of stress for the bat liaison mission. Night flying was par Army aircrew did not always end when ticularly stressful for the Army aircrews the day's flying was over. Most of the field units were frequently harassed at night by incoming mortar and rocket fire and occasional sapper action. In addition, much of the required business of running the unit, planning and maintaining the aircraft and equipment had to be accom plished at night. 1984 71 MILITARY REVIEW In coping with such stressful combat conditions, the Army aircrewmen contin Passive Survivability Improvements ually displayed a rather carefree outward appearance. It is highly likely that this was, to a large extent, a surface ap Considerable progress has been made in pearance and that inside there was an recent years in developing passive con underlying concern with survival in most cepts for the vulnerability reduction of of the crewmen, and understandably so. helicopters against armor-piercing incen Further, this survival instinct was prob diary and high-explosive incendiary pro ably motivated as much from the concern jectiles. Although higher levels of harden of surviving a noncombat-related heli ing can be achieved in a new helicopter copter crash as it was from the concern of system design, significant improvements being shot down by the enemy. Also, in Cl!!! be made in providing hardening in helping to cope within this highly stress currently deployed "last-generation" heli ful environment, alcohol often became a copters through retrofit programs. The source of temporary relief. Without ques major obstacle here, however, is that tion, this further compounded the overall retrofit programs are usually expensive stress, morale and effectiveness problems and the older fleet aircraft are already of our aircrewmen in Vietnam. weight and performance limited. It was during these tea sessions that a Effective, efficient, vulnerability-reduc message frequently came across from tion concepts have been demonstrated for many of the aircrewmen. Although they the main and tail rotor systems, mechani talked around the issue, the normally un cal flight control system, drive system, spoken priorities among many of these structure (tail boom) and fuel system. aviators seemed to be, first, "bring me Some of these measures have been incor home" and, second, "bring me home in porated on production aircraft. The fuel one piece." It was apparent that these air system has historically been the major crews would generally make whatever source of aircraft ballistic vulnerability, commitment that was necessary in com and protection from high-explosive threats bat and continue to make such commit in this area is receiving emphasis. ments over extended periods as long as Research and development efforts have they knew that \)Ie were doing everything identified highly efficient and economical within reason to bring them home in one fire protection concepts for Army heli piece. copters. The development of "generic" Based on this experience, one can only components having fairly universal appli conclude that an individual's ability to cation will facilitate the incorporation of perform proficiently and his willingness such advanced fuel fire-suppression con to commit himself in combat over ex cepts. They can also reduce overall vul tended periods of time are greatly af nerable areas against high-explosive in fected by how far away from "kamikaze" cendiary-type projectiles by as much as he falls on the "allowance for survivabil one-third, depending on the size and de ity scale." That is to say, it would depend sign of the helicopter. In general, effi upon the degree of inherent survivability cient, passive ballistic hardening technol features, both passive and active, that he ogy that requires only detail design for has been provided in his aviation weapons specific application is available for imple system. mentation on Army helicopters. 72 March AIRCRAFT SURVIVABILITY Efforts are under way to develop air develop a practical crashworthy design craft hardening concepts, personnel pro criterion, and its integration into Army tective devices and related ground sup aircraft designs is represented by the port equipment required for survivability UH60 Black Hawk and the AH64 against the more advanced threats pre Apache. Although it is not a crashworthi sented by lasers and other directed ness improvement, the retrofit program energy weapons, chemical and biological for improving the survivability of Army warfare and tactical nuclear devices. One helicopters is exemplified by the ongoing of the brightest spots to date in improv efforts to develop and equip the fleet of ing crash survivability was the installa helicopters with a passive wire strike pro tion of crashworthy fuel systems in Army tection system-that is, wire cutters. helicopters. Prior to the use of these systems, postcrash fires occurred in ap proximately 11 percent of all Army heli Summary copter accidents, but thermal injuries ac counted for nearly 40 percent of all fatal ities. Postcrash thermal fatalities have No single tactic, survivability concept been virtually eliminated through the in or weapon system will be "the" right stallation of this system. answer on the integrated battlefield. Another bench-mark event in advanc Issues other than those discussed here ing aircraft survivability design require will also be involved on the modern bat ments was the publication of Military tlefield concerning survivability, includ Standard (MIL-STDI-1290, Light Fixed ing operating at greater standoff ranges and Rotary Wing Aircraft Crashworthi or, on occasion, avoiding or breaking off ness, which addresses crash survivability contact in given combat situations. With in terms of total system design. As in out question, we must develop weapon ballistic hardening, crash survival meas systems with a range capability greater ures must, for maximum effectiveness, be than those of the threat systems we will integrated during the initial design phase be facing, as well as fire:and-forget-type of a new aircraft development, and the missiles. It may require, on occasion, that MIL-STD-1290 design standard is the we neutralize, by whatever means avail vehicle for accomplishing this. There are able, the enemy air defense systems be many improvements, however, that can fore involving our helicopters in the ac be made to existing aircraft systems to tion. enhance their crash survivability. To some extent, all of these considera In general, significant progress has tions will come into play. It is probable, been made over the past 10 years to however, that a large percentage of com develop and field Army helicopters which bat on the modern battlefield, as gener incorporate crash survivability features. ally defined by AirLand Battle 2000, will This type of technology advance in the be that of chance encounter with combat materiel, coupled with a more conscious on a one-to-one basis, wherein the heli accident-prevention program, is man copter will be a necessary extension of the datory for the conservation of aviation ground troop. If that is true, the heli resources and as a measure for improving copter must be able to get in close enough the morale of Army aircrewmen. Con to do its job, receive battle damage as a siderable effort has been expended to matter of course and survive to fight 1984 73 MILITARY REVIEW another day. It must have an inherent sified and extremely lethal threat, Army toughness that gives it staying power or, aviators will generally be flying much' in other words, passive combat and crash more capable and complex aircraft sys survivability levels commensurate with tems in a much more complex environ its mission. ment. Under such conditions, the effec " The business of incorporating passive tiveness of our equipment, regardless of survivability measures into Army air how technologically advanced or sophisti craft systems is subject to a wide range of cated it may be, will be limited by the per emotional reactions, especially with sonnel who operate it. respect to crash survivability, whether Finally, few people today would ques addressing the development of a new sys tion that the helicopter has proven itself tem or retrofit improvement of an exist to be a vital and integral part of the US ing system. Unfortunately, there are peo Army materiel needed to fulfill the grow ple who consider passive combat hard ing number of combat and combat sup ness and crashworthy features for avia port missions being generated by new tac tion weapons systems as only nice things tics. However, the degree to which this to have, frequently offering comments weapon system will be capable of effec such as "we can't afford to have it," "if it tive performance in the future battle area means leaving one bullet or galIon of gas environment will be primarily determined home I don't want it," or "if it won't di by prevailing philosophies and decisions rectly help kill a tank I can't use it." during concept formulation as reflected in The general mood in some key areas of the system's specifications for new air Army aviation appears to be that surviv craft. ability can be ignored and that the pas An awareness of the overriding impor sive hardening measures can be readily tance of crew commitment and a recogni traded off. Experience says that it would tion of the things that contribute to it are be a serious mistake to let this happen essential ingredients for obtaining maxi due to the significant positive impact mum combat effectiveness of the heli such passive hardening measures have on copter weapon system. A large part of the motivation and commitment of the that commitment will be directly related aircrew and the necessity to preserve the to the amount of survivability we build fighting force intact and reconstitute it into our helicopters. How well they fight rapidly, when necessary, until the battle and survive will be a crucial factor in the is won. outcome of any future conflict. In addition to facing a highly diver "k C. Hudson Carper Jr. is a supervisory aero I. space engineer and currently chief of the Safety and Survivability Technical Area, Applied Tech nology Laboratory, US Army Aviatian Research and Development Command, Fort Eustis, Vir ginia. He has more than 20years of experience in Army aviation and was a consultant to the science adviser in Vietnam during 1968 and 1969. 74 March ~ETTERS Army Reserve PSYOP-Whose Castle? Totten's alternate proposal-to give the 1st Special Operations Command operational command of all PSYOP units Here are two and a half cheers for -does have a reasonable chance of suc Lieutenant Colonel Michael W. Totten's cess. It is, after all, logical under the article, "US Army Psychological Opera· Capstone concept. To make the proposal tions and the Army Reserve" (Military stronger, it would be possible to give the Review, December 1983). As one who has 1st Special Operations Command ap done some writing on the Reserve com· proval authority for all PSYOP independ ponents in this journal and who currently ent company, battalion and group com serves in a psychological operations manders in the same way that the US (PSYOP) battalion, I recognize a sophisti· Army Forces Command exercises ap cated effort to address problems that are proval authority over MID(S) com both unique to the PSYOP community manders. This would ensure that all and general to the Reserve components. PSYOP unit commanders are fully Totten's proposals have a great deal of qualified for their positions. merit, and I have little quarrel with most of them, especially as they focus on a Maj John T. Fishel, USAR, dialogue between the Reserve PSYOP and 13th PSYOP Battalion, La Crosse, Wisconsin the Active side of the house. I would, however, disagree with his proposal to create a PSYOP command to which all Desert Deception Reserve PSYOP units would be subordi· nated. I disagree, not on the grounds that I always enjoy reading your publi it is a bad idea, but because of the reo cation, and, as the Middle East has a par sistance it would generate within the ticular fascination for me, I doubly en Reserve component structure. This is joyed reading the July 1983 issue. In par partly because Totten is mistaken as to ticular, I found "General Wavell and the the degree of dislocation involved in at Italian East African Campaign" by Cap least one Army Reserve command-the tain Harold E. Raugh Jr. to be well 88th-which would lose two battalions researched and enlightening, However, it and an independent company. seemed to me that one vital ingredient As a veteran of the Strategic Military was missing-namely, how General Sir Intelligence Detachment (MID(S)) pro· Archibald P. Wavell, with such an extra gram, I have been aware of a proposal of ordinarily small force, could not only tie several years' standing to create an up but could also actually defeat and cap MID(S) command. This would involve far ture the large Italian force, On page 63, less turbulence in the Army Reserve com· the author attributes Wavell's success in mands than a PSYOP command since part to his "superior leadership, morale, these units have a strength of only nine equipment and training," individuals. Suffice it to say that neither . Let me not take exception to this con the MID(S) nor the PSYOP command clusion except to suggest that a far more proposals will fly. intrigning element played the major role 1984 75 / MILITARY REVIEW in Wavell's outstanding success. My can always learn many lessons from reading of the history of those campaigns studying past commanders and past (which includes a number of recently battles. In this case, however, I believe declassified World War II studies) in students of military art and science dicates that Wavell was victorious be should know the more complete reason cause of his outstanding use of tactical for a truly great general's remarkable deception. So convinced was he (and ac success. curately so) of its merit that Wavell actu ally retained a stage magician-one Maj Earl J. Bovce, USAF, Henderson, Nevada Jasper Maskelyne-on his staff. In Wavell's words: "what couldn't be hidden, must be disguised, and confusion and illusion would be used as surely as Article Has "The Right Stuff" shot and shell to demoralize and defeat for This Reader the enemy." The Battle of Sidi Barrani (December 1940) was especially signifi Lieutenant Colonel Bernd W. Englert's cant because Wavell-outnumbered by 7 article, "Failure in Northern France, May to I-made the Italians think he had a 1940," in the November 1983 issue of much larger force. Military Review is very much ap' Wavell's successes were vitally impor preciated. It is the first coherent account tant because they came at a time when of the action in Northern France during the British were getting severely trounced May 1940 that this reader has come in East Asia and Europe. Furthermore, across. Thank you. along with the second battle of El Ala· mein, they formed the proving ground for Lt Gol Robart P. Kingsbury, USAR, Retired, the bigger deception at Normandy. One Laconia, New Hampshire Letters is a fe~ture designed expressly to afford our readers an opportunity to air their opinions and ideas on military topics. It is not restricted to comments or rebuttals on previously published material but is open to any variety of expression which may stImulate or improve the value of thought in the military community. The right to edit is reserved by the staff of the magazine and exercised primarily in deference to available space.-Editor. Military Review Binders. Keep your back issues of the Military Review in a sturdy, hard-covered binder. Available in maroon with gold lettering, the binders hold 12 issues and are $8.00. Orders should be sent to Military Review, US Army Command and General Staff Cc:>lIege, Fort Leavenwor)h, KS 66027. 76 March ~EVIEWS I Report From Afghanistan ... understood long ago-perhaps back at the time of the 1933 Ukrainian geno By Claude Malhuret cide . . .-that a war involving guerrillas Foreign Affairs, Winter 1983-84 and anti-guerrilla fighters would never be won by either side if the emphasis was "The current situation in Afghanistan placed on being in the good graces of the is one of protracted war_ The duration and population. On the contrary, the war character of the war derive directly from would be won by the side that succeeded the Soviet style of anti-guerrilla warfare_" in making terror reign. That is the conclusion of Dr_ Claude Mal The technique is to use "boiling water huret, executive director of the Paris again and again and again, until both the based Medecins sans Frontieres (MSF) guerrilla fighters and the population ask Doctors Without Borders_ His organiza for mercy." Thus, the Soviets have pil tion has sent medical teams to Afghani laged and burned homes, destroyed crops stan since May 1980, five months after and captured inhabitants who were inter the Soviet invasion_ This uninterrupted rogated or summarily executed. The ef presence has allowed MSF members to fect sought was terror, not merely mili evaluate the situation, particularly in the tary victory. areas in which they operate_ Since late 1980, operations of this type Malhuret reports that the Soviet ap have dropped off, possibly because of the proach to guerrilla warfare is consider losses suffered by the Red army. The ably different from that used by many Soviets have found other ways to create a other countries_ "Totalitarian regimes reign of terror_ Air raids are used against have ... found a new answer to the guer the poorly equipped resistance groups. rilla 'problem: one that is simple, logical Mines and booby-trapped toys, which are and effective." The "answer" involves designed to injure rather than to kill, are massive reprisals against the population dropped from helicopters. The Soviets and sometimes the extermination of a "know quite well that in this type of war, large part of the population. This tactic an injured person is much more trouble was used earlier with success in Ethiopia than a dead person." The antipersonnel and Kampuchea, but, thus far, the resist mines affect the economy by killing and ance fighters have made it fail in Af injuring animals in the fields. Livestock ghanistan. in several regions have been slaughtered . The Soviet method is different from to restrict the food supply. that used by the United States in Viet The war has,produced large numbers of nam. Towns are controlled by occupying refugees. The aim is to evacuate the coun forces and used as bases for securing a try so that the guerrilla fighters can be hold over the surrounding area. The rest isolated. Malhuret thinks that "The of the country is not under Soviet control. methodical pursuit of this objective is the Protected villages of the kind seen in only possible explanation for the incredi Vietnam do not exist in Afghanistan, and ble number of Afghan refugees." An esti no effort is made to win the support of the mated four million Afghans of a popula population. Malhuret says the Soviets: tion of 15 to 17 million are now in Paki 1984 77 MILITARY REVIEW stan and Iran. Malhuret is highly critical Hathaway points out, however, that the of the reporting of news from Afghani 1980 embargo was but one instance of stan. He charges that the media have many US uses of food for political pur been negligent. He says: poses. He feels that "Both as a stick and ... if a small organization lik~ ours can as a carrot, these initiatives have by and succeed in maintaining more than 20 large been quite successful." physicians on permanent duty in four In the lean years following World War provinces in Afghanistan, despite govern II, US food aid to Western Europe played ment acts of violence against them, the a crucial role in helping that devastated news media could do likewise. area get back on its feet. "Today this Thus far, the Soviet strategy has not area, stable and largely democratic, con been successful. More than 600 Soviet sists of governments friendly to the vehicles destroyed by the resistance United States and to American purposes forces have been counted just in the areas around the world." where the MSF works. The end result is a A striking example of the effect of food war: power is the case of Salvador Allende in ... in which the balance of power has Chile. When Allende was elected presi not changed in four years, in spite of the dent there in 1970, the United States fact that the two adversaries are unequal moved swiftly to counter the potentially ly matched-on one side the world's big disastrous results of his friendly ties with gest Anr.y, on the other a handful ofpeo Cuba and other communist regimes. Se ple standing tall against the invader. vere cutbacks in US food aid, coupled DVH. with a "wide range of political, economic, and military pressures ... ," contributed greatly to Allende's downfall after only Food Power three years in power. Washington ap proved a huge credit sale of wheat to By Robert M. Hathaway Chile's new junta within a month after' Foreign Service Journal, Allende's ouster. December 1983 The United States can use food aid as a positive force in pursuit of national goals, "Food power is an idea whose time has Hathaway feels, if we respect certain come." So says Robert M. Hathaway, a "rough guidelines" which were largel} ig staff historian in the Central Intelligence nored or overlooked in the Cartel' em Agency. The idea of using the United bargo. Among the guidelines he off9rs are States' unrivaled food resources as a suggestions that: diplomatic tool to further our national in • It is much easier to bend a small terests is not really new, of course. US state with limited resources and large agricultural assistance has paid off in th(> needs to our will than a major country past and can yield future benefits if we re with global interests, the means to seek main realistic about what can and cannot alternate sources of supply, and a na be accomplished through its use. tional pride that precludes backing down The Carter administration's grain em before the threats ofanother country. ... bargo against the Soviet Union in 1980 • Tactics should be adapted to short was intended to compel the Soviets to term market conditions. Clearly, food will withdraw their forces from Afghanistan. provide the most leverage for the supply It clearly failed to accomplish that goal, ing country in times of tight supplies and and the setback has left many US citizens high prices. ... with the feeling that "foodstuffs are at • For food to succeed as a diplomatic best a clumsy and ineffectual weapon." tool. the potential recipient has to. desire 78 March REVIEWS our products more than we want to dis look to the United States for protection, a pose of them. ... situation which has perplexed US admin • Agricultural punishments will istrations for years. But, with a strong achieve maximum impact only as part of Soviet military presence so close to its a more comprehensive package of eco shores, Japan may now be concerned nomic, politica~ and possibly military enough to take the initiative in providing measures. ... more of its own security. Hathaway concludes that: Japan and the Soviet Union have been One fact appears certain: foreign de feuding for almost four decades over terri mand for American food is not going to tory which the Soviets wrested from decrease during the remainder ofthis cen Japanese control at the end of World War tury. ... peoples the world over will look II. The disputed area, northwest of to Washington for both emergency relief Japan, involves the four southernmost and long-term assistance. . .. At a time Kurile Islands. Westwood states that: when many of our traditional diplomatic Among Japan's more tangible interests assets-armed might, economic prepon in the Kuriles are oi~ fish and living derance, industrial productivity-have space. ... Less tangible is the impetus of dwindled in relation to those of other Japanese nationalism which, although countries, food abundance continues to muted in the four postwar decades, has provide us with a resource unmatched by given ample historic proofofits explosive any other nation. Used wisely, this advan potential. tage can serve national interests world Since 1976, the Soviet Union has been wide.-PRD. building up its ground and air forces on the islands to solidify its claim and assure Moscow's sovereignty over the Kuriles. Japan and Soviet Power in the Pacific Until the US-led trade sanctions against the Soviet Union, Japan was its largest By James T. Westwood foreign trading partner. Westwood notes Strategic Review, Fall 1983 that Japan is dependent upon several Soviet resources, including coal, gas, The "Flight 007 Massacre" of 269 peo timber, minerals and oil,. as well as a ple aboard a South Korean airliner in Sep Soviet market for Japanese-manufactured tember 1983 focused world attention, goods. This dependence, combined with temporarily at least, on the Soviet political reasons, has so far softened J a Union's "shoot first and ask questions pan's territorial claim to the southern later" paranoia and total disregard for Kuriles. But, in recent months, the subject the human lives lost in the tragedy. The has received increased interest in Japan. incident also demonstrated "both the ex From Moscow's viewpoint, absolute tensive Soviet military posture in the Far control over the Sea of Japan and the Sea East and Moscow's ultra-sensitivity of Okhotsk is vital to Soviet military about that posture," according to James strategy. If a nuclear war seemed immi T. Westwood, a senior analyst with the nent, Soviet strategic nuclear submarine Melpar Division of E-Systems Inc. forces would operate from protected Westwood feels that the Soviets, by "bastions" inside the southern Sea of their actions over the island of Sakhalin Okhotsk. The Soviets would prefer to fire in the Sea of Japan, "may have spurred a their submarine-launched ballistic mis development that is anathema to their siles from behind the protective curtain of strategic interests in the Pacific: namely, the Kuriles, where they could be launched Japanese rearmament." Since World War from fixed positions, thereby increasing II; the Japanese have been content to their accuracy considerably. 1984 79 MILITARY REVIEW The Japanese now seem to be moving wood believes that "the next ten years ... to improve and enlarge their armed are likely to witness changes in Japan's forces, the Self-Defense Force, but at a defense posture that will be in stark con· rate the US government reportedly con trast with the picture of the past 38 siders too slow. Still, the modernization is years...." IfJapan does shoulder more of bound to be a long process in light of con the responsibility for defending the stitutional, popular and budgetary con region, Westwood feels that: straints which have placed a defense ... the Soviet Ury;on is likely to marshal spending ceiling of 1 percent of Japan's all available means to halt or slow down gross national product. this development. ... It will fall to the Should Japan decide to modernize and United States to p"ovide its Japanese ally expand its naval and air forces at a faster with the needed, additional cushions of pace, Soviet military dominance over the security to enable it to transit the dan area would be severely challenged. West- gerous period ahead.-PRD. COMPS Program for USACGSC Students. Officers selected to attend the US Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC) Command and General Staff Officer Course will receive information about the college's Combat Skills Com prehensive Phase (COMPS) in their welcome packets. COMPS is designed to facilitate learning and accommo dates students with different military specialties and varying levels of experience, knowledge and education. Its purpose is to reduce the classroom time needed for fundamental sub jects and to bring all students to a common level of knowledge early in the academic year. This will allow more classroom time for advanced tactical applications, battle exercises and concentrated study. COMPS consists of nonresident and resident subphases. A student may partiCipate in the voluntary nonresident phase by completing and returning the request form included in the welcome packets. This enables the student to work on the . COMPS subcourses prior to the August in-processing at Fort Leavenworth. The resident phase begins with a pretest of all students during in-processing. Results will determine the areas to be studied during the COMPS period. Some students, depending upon their training and experience, may require more or less study than their classmates. COMPS offers scheduled self-paced study followed by a serie" of subcourse tests. Unlike the nonresident phase, instructors will be available to provide individual instruction to students. At the end of the COMPS period, a student's performance will be evaluated. Ideally, all students will possess the same fundamental knowledge and be prepared to begin the core cur riculum. Those whose performance is less than satisfactory will be subject to remedial programs. 80 March ~EWS- UNITED STATES EYE·SAFE LASER A new hand-held, eye-safe laser tro·Optical and Data Systems range finder will be used by Army Group, EI Segundo, California. troops to pinpoint the range of tar Hughes will build 12 develop gets. The US Army Night Vision ment models of the range finder. A and Electro·Optics Laboratory re mock-up of the lightweight laser, cently awarded a competitive con designated the ANIPVS6, is shown tract for the development of the here. The observation set consists device, called the Mini-Eye-Safe of a range finder, tripod, battery, Laser Infrared Observation Set, to carrying case, shipping case and Hughes Aircraft Company's Elec lens cleaning kit. The Military Review, the Department of the Army and the US Army Command and General Staff College assume no responsibility for accuracy of information contained In the News sec· tion of this publication. Items are printed as a service to the readers. No official endorsement of the views, opinions or factual statements is intended.-Editor. 1984 81 MILITARY REVIEW NEW OPERATIONAL SUPPORT AIRCRAFT FOR USAF The first of 80 new Learjet 35A and easy conversion to such other aircraft will be delivered to the US missions as medevac and long Air Force (USAF) this month. The range ferry flights. aircraft will carry the designation Under the contract with Gates C21A. They are to replace part of Learjet Corporation, company em the Military Airlift Command's ag ployees will provide maintenance ing fleet of CT39s and support the and logistics support for the air USAF's Operational Support Air craft at various USAF bases. Under craft Program. the terms of the agreement, the The C21As will be operated by USAF will initially lease the air the Military Airlift Command to craft with a later option to pur deliver high-priority and time-sen chase. The C21As will have a two sitive cargo, season newly rated person crew and will seat seven pilots and provide passenge, air passengers.-Air Force Magazine, lift. They are also capable of ql!ick © 1983. FLUIDIC MANEUVERING AID The Army is developing a Simple, Army Electronics Research and rugged, low-cost battlefield navi Development Command's Harry gation aid designed to increase Diamond Laboratories (HDL) two the maneuvering accuracy of com decades ago. Fluidics is a way to bat and logistics vehicles over un build sensing and control systems familiar terrain. The aid uses fluidic with no moving mechanical parts. technology pioneered by the US It can produce systems with low in 82 NEWS ilial costs, high reliability and little ogy and Devices Laboratory, Fort or no maintenance requirements. Monmouth, New Jersey. Early research in this field by HDL The system will display a ve has been adopted by the Honda hicle's position, heading and Motor Company Ltd. which built an course as a series of luminous inertial navigation system for its dots on a display screen and pro· Accord passenger cars in Japan. A vide a printed standard digital fluidic angular rate sensor is used readout of coordinates and bear to track the turning of the vehicle. ing. To use the aid, the driver sets HDL has mounted an improved and the graphic position and heading modified version of the Honda nav indicator at his approximate loca igation aid on a four-wheel·drive tion and drives off in a known di vehicle that is available to other rection. After about half a kilo Army agencies for test and evalua meter, the driver can align the dis· tion. played track with a map overlay The first all-Army fluidic naviga· showing geographic landmarks tion aid will consist of a heading such as roads, contour lines, build· reference unit. The device enables ings and streams and can enter the a vehicle operator to manually coordinates and bearing of the enter the bearing of the vehicle position and bearing indicators on into the unit, and the sensor keeps the map. The navigation aid will track of changes in that bearing. then keep track ot the vehicle's By early 1984, the Army expects to pOSition. have a first-generation battlefield The battlefield navigation aid is navigation aid system that uses a aimed primarily at giving the com state-of-the-art flat panel display bat commander a tool to locate and a heading reference sensor to himself and his unit on the battle perform a more complex naviga field. However, it also enables 10· tion function. The electrolumines· gistics support vehicles to find cent flat panel display was devel their way from rear area supply oped for military applications by points to combat units "that move the US Army Electronics Technol· frequently.-Army R, 0 & A. MILITARY REVIEW SELF-PROPELLED HOWITZER IMPROVEMENTS The mainstay of the Army's di rect support artillery units, the M109 self-propelled howitzer, has been in service for more than 20 years. Tests are currently under way on 25 improvements to extend the life of this weapon for another 20 years or more. Three of the more significant im provements include an automatic gun positioning system, an im proved cooling system and an automatic fire-suppression system. The automatic gun positioning system is probably the most Signif icant advancement in that it pro vides a continuous readout of the system's location and the direc tion and elevation of the gun. This provides all of the information nec essary to compute fire missions without external surveys. The im proved cooling system will allow for more efficient operation in hot These and other improvements climates, and the fire-suppression will be tested at Aberdeen Proving system will provide a fixed fire Ground, Maryland, Yuma Proving extinguisher system to enhance Ground, Arizona, and the Cold Re vehicle and crew survivability. gions Test Center, Fort Greely, Some of the other improvements Alaska. Further operational troop include automatic engine test testing will take place later at Fort eqUipment, changes in the starter, Sill, Oklahoma. Currently, the equip easier access to the engine and ment is deSignated the M109E4 transmission, powered gun recoil which indicates a prototype sys spades, a remote-control gun tube tem. When testing is complete and t,avel lock, improved night vision the improvements are accepted as devices and a collective nuclear, standard, the designation will be biological and chemical protection changed to the M109A4.-The Ord system. nance Magazine. 84 NEWS DOUBLE·DECKER The US Navy's first double·deck congestion on the upper deck. pier, designated Pier Zulu, will be Newer ships typically require as built at the Naval Station in many as 25 large cables and hoses Charleston, South Carolina. It will per ship at each berth. With two consist of a lower utility deck and ships berthed, these 50 append an upper ship operations support ages, each of them 2 inches in deck. diameter or more, will be totally According to Gee & Jenson En· clear of the top deck. Locating gineers, Architects, Planners Inc., transformers on the lower deck re West Palm Beach, Florida, the pier's sults in a substantial increase in designer, the double·deck pier will operation space. Forty percent of be a concrete structure 1,245 feet the pier's length and 13 percent of long but only 76 feet wide (com· its total deck surface would be oc· pared to recently constructed con· cupied by transformers if they ventional pier widths of 100 to 120 were located on the upper deck. feet). Founded on concrete pilings, Utility support is more efficient the top deck will be 20 feet above because of easier access to sys mean low water. It will be capable tems for maintenance and modifi of supporting live loads consisting cations. In addition, locating these of 600 pounds per square foot and systems on the lower deck pro the outrigger loads of a 70-ton tects both equipment and person· mobile crane. The lower deck, 10V, nel from the elements and allows feet above mean low water, will for more practical nighttime opera house electrical substations, main tions with better lighting. Vehicles tenance vehicle traffic, utility lines such as forklifts and pickup trucks and all electrical and mechanical would also have unrestricted ac utility outlets. cess to utility systems without in Operational support is enhanced terfering with other support func due to the decrease of clutter and tions. MILITARY REVIEW .,.-:.P· "'~:'~;'t.1 I' I ,1.; AMPHIBIOUS MARINE ASSAULT VEHICLE Production of the LVT7A1 am pulsion comes from two 14,000· phibious assault vehicle has be gallon-per-minute water-jet pumps. gun, following a roll-out ceremony The maximum land speed is 45 at the FMC Corporation's defense miles per hour, and the maximum production facilities in San Jose, water speed is 8 miles per hour. California. Designated the LVT7A1 The vehicle can climb 60-percent (landing vehicle, tracked, series gradients with a full load of cargo 7A1), the new vehicle comes in on either a forward grade or a side three basic variants: the more com slope and is able to withstand mon personnel carrier capable of 10-foot plunging surf waves. The only transporting 25 troops or 10,000 armament for the three-man crew pounds of cargo, a mobile com is a .50-caliber MBS heavy machine mand post equipped as a commu gun mounted in a 360-degree tra nications center and a recovery ve versing turret. hicle outfitted with a heavy-duty An enclosed weapon station is crane and winch. controlled by an all-electric drive The Navy plans to upgrade 984 system for both station azimuth existing LVTs to 7A 1 status and to rotation and gun elevation, Special produce 329 new vehicles by 1986. improvements also include a night The average laden weight of the ve vision driving device and an attach hicle is 25 tons. It is powered by able mine clearance kit with three a 400-horsepower, turbocharged, 350-foot line charges,-Armed multifuel, liquid-cooled Cummins Forces Journal International, © VT400 diesel VB engine. Water pro- 1983, 86 March NEWS ITALY FIRST MONGOOSE FLIGHT The initial flight of the first pro· to control the main and tail rotors totype A 129 Mongoose attack heli· and an override mechanical con· copter took place recently. The nection to couple pilot and co·pilot Mongoose, developed by Agusta controls. of Milan, Italy, is scheduled for de· The Mongoose will be built large liveries of the first series A 129s be· ly of composite materials (the first ginning in late 1986. Four flying prototypes, however, will have prototypes will be built, as well as some metallic panels). Composite a fifth helicopter for engineering materials will represent 45 percent tests and a ground testbed for of the weight of the series A 129s trials of the dynamic systems and and will cover 70 percent of the components. Successful tests have wetted area. already been carried out for the The helicopter is powered by two rotor system and for the digital Rolls·Royce Gem 2 Mk 1004D .tur· automatic stabilization system, boshafts-!wo·stage turbines with adopted for the very first time on a an annular chamber. The high pow· helicopter. er available even from a single en· The Mongoose is a twin·engine, gine allows the A 129 to face any four·bladed attack helicopter with conceivable emergency in any flight fixed tricyclic landing gear and condition. The replacement of the tandem seating (gunner in front engines, which are separated from and pilot in back). The stepped each other by a bulkhead, is crew seating allows for enhanced facilitated by the very limited visibility from minus 34 degrees to number of interconnections with plus 56 degrees in vertical and 260 the airframe. The entire operation degrees on the horizontal plane. reportedly requires only about 30 The co·pilot·gunner station is also minutes.-Military Technology, © equipped with a fly·by·wire system 1983. 1984 87 MILITARY REVIEW UNITED KINGDOM BUZZ-YOU'RE DEAD! The realism of electronic simula tion has reached infantry combat training. Now, there is a new sys tem that fires coded laser pulses from standard-issue rifles or ma chineguns and "kills" the oppos ing soldier by releasing a continu ous buzz that can only be silenced when he lies on his back. Called the SA WES (small-arms weapon effects simulator), the completely self-contained system is built to British Ministry of De fence specifications and has been accepted for use by the British army. The projector is an electro optical package that fits onto a standard sight mount. It is micro processor controlled to fire a low powered, pulsed laser when a blank round is fired. The laser is bore-sighted for accuracy, and the The military exercise is controlled microprocessor ensures that it is by umpires who are linked to the not affected by the gun jump usu SA WES by a seif-contained laser ally caused by firing blanks. projector that can test the opera Accurate firing is detected by a tion of individual . receiver har combination of receivers, eight nesses, kill any target or reactivate worn on the upper body and four "dead" soldiers. The range of the on a headband. Each receiver is laser fire is 600 meters for a rifle connected by wires that run and 2,000 meters for a machine through a nylon harness to an elec gun. The system is capable of tronic decoder worn on the lower 2,000 rounds from a standard PP3 back. The laser fire is converted by battery, and the combined weight a transducer into an acoustic buzz of the eqUipment is 3.2 kilograms -a 1-second buzz indicates a near -2.0 kilograms worn by the soldier miss, and a kill is announced by a and 1.2 kilograms carried on the continuous buzz. . weapon.-Pacific Defence Reporter. 88 March NEWS MORE THRUST NEEDED A new series of tests to investi due to hot gas reingestion and the gate plenum chamber burning effectiveness of different methods (PCB), a method of thrust augmen of reducing hot gas reingestion at tation for future supersonic ver a range of heights and airframe at ticle/short takeoff and landing mili titudes. The tests will also investi tary aircraft has been started by gate the effect of hot exhaust ROils-Royce, Ltd., Bristol, England. gases on various ground surfaces. A Pegasus 2 vectored-thrust tur Pictured is the Harrier airframe bofan engine fitted with PCB has fitted with the Pegasus 2 engine, been installed in the carcass of a modified to run with PCB. The Harrier airframe. The airframe it spray visible between the ground self is suspended from a gantry on and the airframe is produced by a an open-air test site at the Ministry water-cooling injection system. Its of Defence Proof and Experimental purpose is to cool ground-based Establishment at Shoeburyness, instrumentation during the initial Essex. _ running-up phase of PCB opera The test program, sponsored by tion. The system is switched off the Ministry of Defence, intends to after completion of the running-up determine the response of the phase to enable accurate measure Pegasus engine to various levels ments to be made of exhaust tem of intake temperature distortion peratures at ground level. 1984 89 ~oo ( CLAUSEWITZ by MIChael Howard 79 Pages Oxlord Unlver atic analyst of war. slly Press, NY 1983 $1295 clothbound $395 paper The final chapter, "The Legacy of bound Clausewitz," contains an excellent revi sion of Howard's introductory chapter to In this thin volume, Michael Howard, On War. Here, the relevance of air power Oxford University's regius professor of and nuclear weapons, as well as Marxist modern history, encapsulates his exten theories of revolutionary warfare to sive knowledge on Karl von Clausewitz's Clausewitz, is given brief but close atten military thought, These five lectures con tion. While this short study in no way stitute a most convenient starting point develops the ideas more fully explored in for an inquiry into the Prussian general's the writings of Peter Paret and Raymond theories and their impact on defense poli Aron, Howard's essays provide the mbst cies of the 19th and 20th centuries, concise, objective and readable introduc Unlike his introductory essay to the tion to the master of the art of war avail definitive edition of On War he translated able. This book should sit alongside O'n with Peter Paret, this book provides War on the bookshelves of all military of Howard an opportunity lo comment on ficers where they both deserve frequent Clausewitz's philosophy as well as his consultation, legacies. The short chapters on "Theory and Practice in War," "Ends and Means LI Col David C. Skaggs, USAR in War" and "Limited and Absolute War" contain the most detailed analysis Howard has ever written concerning Clausewitzian doctrine. A CAROLINIAN GOES TO WAR: The Civil War Narrative 01 Ar thur Middleton Manigault, Brigadier General, C.S.A. Edited The key to Clausewitz is the overarch by R Lockwood Tower 344 Pages Universily 01 South Caro ing theme of "the primacy of policy in lina Press, Columbia S C 1983 $2495 determining the object of war" which led to that "remarkable trinity" of ideas Often, wartime memoirs are nothing regarding how the interaction of "the more than self-serving attempts to defend directing policy of government, the pro a soldier's actions and rationalize his mis fessional qualities of the army, and the at takes-especially if the writer had been a titude of the population all played an major participant in the conflict. This ac equally significant part" ,in explaining count seems to be different and is, there the nature of conflict. fore, instructive and interesting. General Howard's Clausewitz is not without Arthur Middleton Manigault wrote this faults. He ignores the economic, maritime work a short time after he returned to and technological dimensions of strategy. South Carolina after the Civil War and He never explores the implications of the apparently intended it only for his fam gradation of conflict between limited and ily's eyes. It did indeed lie unseen by his absolute war. His ever-active mind never torians and others until its recent publica stopped to develop a thorough, coherent tion. philosophical argument-hence, On War The narrative is especially important as is disjointed and fragmentary. But there it deals with the relatively less known can be no doubt that Howard considers western army of the Confederacy and is Clausewitz to be history's most system the only firsthand account by a brigade 90 March BOOKS commander in the Army of Tennessee. as he writes about the state of the troops The history spans the time just after the he encountered just after the Battle of initiation of hostilities and continues to Shiloh: "I have never before or since seen just prior to General John B. Hood's in so little order, discipline, or such com vasion of Tennessee in September 1864. plete absence of martial appearance In addition, the publication includes amongst the troops as was here exhib memoirs Manigault wrote at about the ited." same time, detailing his experiences as a In editing the book, R. Lockwood young lieutenant in the Mexican War. Tower accomplished his job well. Each From the spring of 1861, when he vol chapter is prefaced with an introduction, unteered for duty, until the spring of setting the stage for the narrative. Addi 1862, Manigault served in the coastal tionally, a full set of notes is appended to area of South Carolina. Here, he assisted each section, thoroughly explaining state in preparing coastal defenses and in rais ments Manigualt made, identifying per ing and training the 10th Regiment of the sons he mentioned and clarifying dates. South Carolina Volunteers, of which he casualty figures and other matters. In was elected colonel. In 1862, he and his summary, this book is well worth reading regiment were sent to Mississippi where by anyone who is interested in some of they took part in the invasion of Ken the backstage figures in the Civil War tucky, the Battles of Murfreesboro, Chick drama. amauga, and Missionary Ridge, and the Atlanta Campaign. In the Battle of It Col W. Stuart Towns. USAR Franklin, Tennessee, on 30 November 1864, Manigault was severely wounded. His injury kept him out of action for the duration of the war. After the war, he MILITARY POWER AND THE ADVANCE OF TECHNOLOGY. General Purpose Military Forces in the 1980, and Beyond by returned to his rice plantation on the Seymour J Oeltchman 278 Pages WestvIew Press, Boulder. North Santee River and, in 1880, was Colo 1983 $2750 clolhbound $1250 paperbound elected adjutant and inspector general for South Carolina. He was re-elected twice, There is nothing new presented in this was renominated a third time in 1886, but book. It compiles a lot of information that he died before the election. a serious reader can derive from many Manigault was a close observer of other sources. That is the exact strength events, men and his surroundings. These of the book; all of this information is log narratives are not simply battle accounts ically collected into one volume. Seymour but are perceptive observations of his en J. Deitchman has taken a very complex tire environment. For example, he care subject, broken it into several component fully describes the countryside of Ken parts and systematically analyzed the tucky through which his troops passed, military technology available today and not so much from a military perspective, its effect on military operations. He bases but more as a social economist or his his analysis on the history of hardware torian might. In writing of his Mexican development and shows many and varied experiences, he graphically describes the effects of the several types of weapons "abominable" water the troops had avail systems. This allows the reader to reach able and its effect on them. He also re his own conclusions if, in fact, there are flected on the climate, the government conclusions to be reached. and many other aspects of his stay south Deitchman looks at the consequences of of the border. weapons systems on national policy, stra Manigault is not bashful about describ tegic implications, tactical considerations ing his perceptions of Confederate failure and cost analysis/benefit. He has chosen 1984 91 MILITARY REVIEW to develop his essay in three parts. The be forthcoming in the next three or four first part is "The Gradual Revolution of years, it would be wise for the author to Military Technology." This part is fur have the technical aspects of his next edi ther dissected into a chapter on tactical tion reviewed prior to printing and publi nuclear weapons and additional chapters cation. on technological developments for the For an up-to-date treatise on military several armed services. technological capabilities and the present Part Two is entitled, "Using the Gen status of forces (including events through eral Purpose Forces." This title is slightly the middle of 1983), tl!is book is hard to deceiving as Deitchman goes far beyond beat. the simple analysis of the utilization of forces. He looks at the recent history of Lt Col James P. Hariman, USAR warfare, the Soviet threat, the defense of Europe and the use of the Navy in the future. Part Three, "Absorbing Techno THE CONTINENTAL ARMY by ROberl K. Wnghl Jr 451 logical Change," attempts to consolidate Pages Center for Military History. Washmgton, 0 C 1983 the data and analysis from the first two $1500 parts of the book. Of course, by this time, Deitchman and the reader have concurred This volume is the third in a series of that there are no exact choices or courses specialized aspects of the War of Amer of action. At this point, the facts have ican Independence published by the US been presented, and the policy planners Army Center of Military History. It ex must make their decisions. plains in detail how regular forces were When I started to read this book, my organized and where they fought, and it first observation was that the book was provides historians and geneologists a directed only at the professional military useful reference tool. planner or student. By the time I finished The book has three parts. The first sec reading it, I had concluded that it was tion is a 182-page narrative account of the also an excellent book for the casual organizational evolution of the troops reader of military operations. For the pro serving under the authority of the Con fessional, much of the text is redundant tinental Congress. The narrative empha of other sources, and, by necessity, sim sizes the interplay of political, economic plified and condensed. Because of this, and military influences on the evolution the casual reader will find a wealth of in of a major national institution. It ex formation in one book, without being re plains how a collection of yeoman farmers quired to research any particular topic in was transformed into a military force depth. Should one seek further facts or that accurately reflected the special needs data on any subject from the book, and concerns of American society. The Deitchman has compiled a tremendous in Qook argues that George Washington not dex of references. only effectively organized this Army If there is any noticeable shortcoming with the assistance of Nathanael Greene, to the book, it is the very few places in Friedrich Steuben and others-but also which Deitchman lacks a clear under held it true to the political goals of the standing of the functioning of particular Revolution. weapons. For instance, he describes the The second section consists of 18 sub operation of a recoilless rifle as "a rocket sections which include lineages or outline assisted shell out of a tube." This does histories of the 177 individual units which not invalidate the book, but it does cause composed the Continental Army. The a discontinuity for the reader. Since it is subsections cover the 14 state lines obvious that the next updated edition will (Canada was counted as a state in the 92 March BOOKS Army's eyes), other infantry units not rampant in these formative times. J. C. A. tied to a specific state and miscellaneous Stagg's stimulating book tackles the specialized units, artillery and mounted most fundamental issues of the period us units. Each section has a selected bibliog ing the War of 1812 as the centerpiece of raphy, and each state section includes a his inquiry. map which shows county boundaries as of Stagg's research focuses on both the in 4 July 1776. ternal political crises and the foreign The final section contains a detailed policy aspects of what has been called the bibliography arranged topically. General Second War for American Independence. works, a listing of biographies of all gen This research demonstrates the drama, eral officers, studies of special subjects, the humor, the horror and sometimes the works on specific campaigns, diplomacy confusion of honorable men as they at and politics are covered. Appendixes tempted to mature as domestic politi identify key operations and personnel and cians and as. international statesmen. current US Army units that trace their Based almost ekclusively on archival rec lineage to the Revolution. ords and firsthand reports, Mr. Madison's Ten pages of full-color illustrations War gives the reader a never-to-be-forgot separate the three sections. Fifty-four ten, true account of our infant republic black-and-white illustrations are also in growing from war to peace to war and cluded, many for the first time in a publi back to peace again. cation. Several illustrations are docu Popular history holds that England's ments from the National Archives. repeated violations of American sover The reasonable price of The Continental eignty on the high seas and the support Army should make it a widely used and solice given by England to the West source of valuable information. I t is a ern Indian were the primary causes of the super "one-stop" trove of facts about the War of 1812. But, in an exciting new ap Revolutionary War period. proach, Stagg emphasizes Madison's political and social views toward Canada Maj John A. Reichley. USA. Retired as the driving motivation which con vinced the president that he could take on John Bull and win. As Madison saw the issues, eliminate MR. MADISON'S WAR: Politics, Diplomacy and Warlare in the Early American Republic, 1783-1830 by J C A Stagg. 539 England entirely from the North Amer Pages Princeton UniversIty Press, Prmceton, N J. 1983 ican continent and most of the nation's 850 00 clothbound 8 t 8 50 paperbound economic and foreign policy problems suddenly would become manageable. He After eight long, hard years of war, the knew he could not successfully challenge American revolutionaries along the At the vaunted English Fleet. He knew, as lantic seaboard were ready to enjoy the demonstrated at Fallen Timbers, that the development of their experiment in egali Indian, without English support, could be tarian democracy. For the next 40 years, beaten. He also knew that sectional eco the fate of the young republic rested in nomic and political rivalry would pre the hands of this revolutionary genera clude a long war (England had been at tion. George Washington, Thomas Jeffer war with France almost continuously son, Alexander Hamilton, James Madi since 1793). With barely 2,000 British son, James Monroe and others hpd stood Regulars and an untested militia, Canada and fought together. In 1783, they were seemed ripe for the picking. triumphant. But the apparent wartime But Madison's problems were not insig political unity was soon to be shattered nificant. His militia forces were also un by the economic and social sectionalism tested, and there were rumors they would 1984 93 MILITARY REVIEW not fight outside their own states. His nations have seemingly failed to exploit republican coalition was, to be kind, these opportunities for international spe united only in its opposition to the Fed cialization for various reasons as ex eralists, and, even in this event, it could amined in Chapter 4: side with the Hamiltonians on key, vital Ultimately the worry is that all the votes. He headed a fragile, young republic gains from 'ideal' NATO standardization awash in dissent and intrigue but in will be appropriated in inefficiencies as volved in a war that he could not afford to each nation, responding to its political lose. Yet, this was a war he knew he could market, demands its 'fair' share of de not win. How this war strategy was fense work. formed, modified and executed is the Part II of the book gives a case study basic thrust of this absorbing narrative. laerospace) designed to contribute to' As a future generation of historians policy formulation by supplying data on looks forward to this nation's next bicen the magnitude of costs and benefits and tennial celebration on such hallowed actual policy choices. The overall conclu fields as Chippewa, Fort McHenry or sion is that there exists a large savings New Orleans, Stagg's perceptive and potential from introducing competition detailed account of the War of 1812 could into NATO weapons markets. This re well be the work to which they turn for quires the removal of the present barriers the perception and insight into the Madi to free trade in weapons and civilian son presidency. This work could well goods within the alliance-a measure not replace the classical studies in the field. likely to be taken in the near future. In stead of such a radical solution. Hartley Maj Harold W. Youmans. USAR suggests a number of limited changes which policy makers could make, tending in the direction of the competitive model. These changes focus on improving in NATO ARMS COOPERATION: A Study in Economics and POl" tics by KeIth Hartley 228 Pages Allen & Unwin, Wmchester, various ways the efficiency of the existing Mass 1983 $35 00. collaborative arrangements in coproduc tion, work sharing and joint programs for The sustained public pressure for keep research and development and manufac ing a lid on defense expenditures raises turing. This informative. rigorously the question of the efficiency of military argued book should be of benefit to spending within the Atlantic Alliance. NATO military staffs and other policy Keith Hartley's finely crafted study ad makers in the weapons procurement area. dresses itself to the problem of the possi ble economics to be reaped from weapons Jan S. Prybyla, Pennsylvania Siale Universily standardization-what it is, why it has not happened and what the likely benefits of it are. THE NUCLEAR FREEZE DEBATE: Arms Control Issues for the Part I considers the political economy 1980s. Edited by Paul M Cole and William J Taylor Jr 245 of weapons standardization in NATO. It Pages Westview Press. Boulder. Colo. 1983. $20 00. also develops an analytical model for identifying the sources of savings from There were two purposes in selecting standardization under ideal conditions of the issues presented in this text. The edi economies of scale and comparative ad tors hoped to enable the reader to reach a vantage derived from free trade. Stand decision as to whether the nuclear freeze ardization in weapons procurement, it is should replace the Strategic Arms Reduc argued, could result in unit cost savings tion Talks as the immediate arms-control of 20 to 30 percent. Despite this, NATO objective for the United States. They also 94 March BOOKS suggest that the reader might become cide for himself whether the stated pur better informed without becoming an ex poses have been achieved. For me, they pert or subject to a lot of rhetoric. were achieved, and I recommend this This book is essential reading for the book to others equally concerned with one military professional. It is a concise of the most important issues affecting review of many issues affecting the pro mankind. fession of arms and an informed citizenry. In a straightforward manner, the reader • Maj Carl J. Underhill, USA, is presented with relevant information in Combined Arms Operations Research Activity, an academic and impartial manner. Each Fort Leavenworth. Kansas chapter is well-documented by footnotes. The book· concludes with an annotated bibliography of suggested readings from the nuclear age. WESTERN HEMISPHERE STABILITY: The latin·American CDnneetion. Edlled by R Damel McMichael and John 0 The hundreds of referendums in the Paulus 140 Pages World AffaIrs -CounCil of Pittsburgh, Pitts United States on the nuclear fre3ze issue burgh, Pa 1983. $700 provided people an opportunity to grasp a simple and easily understood issue as an This report of the World Affairs Coun alternative to US and Soviet nuclear cil's 19th forum, which took place in May arms policies. Reaching the Congress, the 1982, is doubly valuable. It indicates the nuclear freeze proponents were faced with extent to which a public forum can bring the burden of proving existing US poli together informed opinion to focus atten cies to be inadequate. The strength of the tion on an area of national concern. Addi nuclear freeze proposal was in its simplis tionally, many of its recommendations tic appeal. The result was a commitment are fast becoming the basis for our ac to continue existing nuclear defense tions in Central America, policies and programs. The persuasive The report is the result of a 19-month arguments offered by proponents of the study. Participants in the study included nuclear freeze did not withstand the business and labor executives, lawyers critical analysis of the results that would and scholars. Several of these partici accrue by the adoption of a freeze. pants give the report special relevance to Such a process is both healthy and day. These include Richard B. Stone, now needed in democratic societies. Unlike the the president's special ambassador, and Soviets, defense policies in the Western Mark Falcoff, a resident fellow at the Alliance are more the result of consensus American Enterprise Institute for Public and open debate than the mere adoption Policy Research. At a time when greater of the approved government policy. Some public understanding and support are would say that NATO is weakened by the needed, Pittsburgh's World Affairs Coun turmoil associated with the nuclear freeze cil has made a valuable contribution. and the positioning of nuclear weapons on The forum consisted of panels dealing European soil. Others would conclude the with the economic, political and security opposite. problems of Latin America, Each panel Since the nuclear arms debate knows no began with the consideration of a study parameters, one is left to winnow for him paper written by a panel member. These self from among the plethora of materials papers, panel reports and dissenting available. It is reassuring to see issues views offer concise descriptions of the presented in a way that is neither overly region's problems and appropriate US technical nor lost in polemics. The re strategies. search and style offered in this text pro The economic panel recommended that vide the mature reader the ability to de- US policies encourage a re-emphasis on 1904 95 MILITARY REVIEW agriculture to return farmers to the land liberation." All three panel reports em and lessen government intervention in phasized the need for expanding public the marketplace. The political panel awareness of American vital interests in urged greater support for regimens seek the region, encouraging the larger states ing to broaden popular participation. As a to assume a greater role in preserving member of this panel, Stone advocated hemispheric stability and exercising that the United States commit itself to great care in any relaxation of pressure on rearm friendly regimes, train their mili Cuba. tary here, support amnesty for political The book is very well· written and offers prisoners and increase economic assist· even the casual reader a clearer under ance. standing of problems in the region. It The security panel urged that the should be required reading for those con United States not accept Marxist regimes cerned with our Central American stra as inevitable, block the flow of hostile tegy. arms into the region and raise the polit ical cost of exporting wars of .. national Col John W. Messer, USAR NEW BOOKS RECEIVED This hsting IS provided to bring recently published professlC'nai books to the attention of feuders, ReVieWS of these books have already been solicited from our current reVH'wers. Oth('r hooks are available for review by qualified pro feSSIOnals. For information about the Book ReVIeW Program, contact Mr. Phillip R. Davis, Books Editor, at (913) 684-5642 or AUTOVON 552-5642 Books are not offered for sale through the MIlitary ReVieW WAR IN THE MODERN GREAT POWER SYSTEM, 1495-1975 DECISIONMAKING FOR ARMS LIMITATION: Assessments by Jack S. Levy 213 Pages. Unlversily Press of Kentucky. and Prospects. Edited by Hans Guenter Brauch and Duncan LeXington, Ky t983. $24.00 L Clarke 332 Pages Ballinger Publishing Co , Cambridge, THE DAY tS OURS!: November 1776-January 1777: An Inside Mass 1983. $35.00. Viow of tho Battlos of Tranton and Princoton by William M THE BISHOPS AND THE BOMB: Waging Peace in a Nuclear Dwyer 426 Pages. Viking Press, N Y 1983 $72 50 Age byJlm Casleili. 283 Pages. Doubleday & Co .. N.Y. 1983 LYNDON JOHNSON AND VIETNAM: Tho Unmaking of a Presi $7.95 dent by Herbert Y. Schandler. 419 Pages. Princeton Univer· TWO IF BY SEA: The Development of American Coastal slty Press, Princeton, N.J 1983. $9.95 Defense Policy by Robert S. Browning III. 210 Pages. Green· FIELD ARTILLERY WEAPONS OF THE CIVIL WAR by James C. wood Press, Westport, Conn. 1983. $29 95 Hazlett, EdWin Olmstead and M. Hume Parks Foreword by TACTICAL AIRLIFT: Tho Unitod Statos Air Forco in Soufheast Harold L. Peterson. 322 Pages University of Oe!aware Press, Asia by Ray L Bowers 899 Pages. US Government Printing Cranbury. N.J. 1983 $4500 Office, Washington, D.C. 1983 $14.00. INTELLIGENCE AND ESPIONAGE: An Analytical Bibliography VIETNAM WAR BIBLIOGRAPHY by Christopher L. Sugnet and by George C. Constantinides. 559 Pages Westview Press, John T: Hickey with the assistance 01 Robert CriSPino. 573 Boulder, Colo. 1983 $60.00. 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Edited by JANE'S WEAPON SYSTEMS, 1983·84. Edited by Ronald T. Robert H. Connery and DemetriOS Caraley. 186 Pages Acad· Pretty 968 Pages Jane's Publishing Co .. N.Y. 1983 enly of Political Science, N Y 1983 $7 95 $140.00. 96 March