A Rational Choice Approach of Greek- Turkish Relations
Faidon Zaras
PhD in Political Science
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Abstract
Explanations of the enduring Greek-Turkish rivalry found upon neorealist and neoliberal assumptions, undercut by epistemological limitations, have been repeatedly falsified by empirical evidence while culturalist accounts emphasizing the centrality of prevailing norms related to identity and ethnocentrism fail to predict social change. An alternative explanation relying on a thick rational choice approach focusing on the two states‟ domestic scenes and exploring their interaction with interstate bargaining is offered. Methodologically, two analytic narratives of their institutional evolution are constructed by identifying key actors, mapping out their incentives and exploring their strategic interaction. Two policy shifts, namely the Greek Helsinki strategy and the Turkish acceptance of the Annan Plan are selected to explore domestic mechanisms of preference formation and expose the limitations of alternative accounts. In the Greek case the impact of international diplomacy on policy equilibria through its linkage to domestic institutional structures is explored, while in the Turkish case policy equilibria are contingent upon the relative success of anti-Kemalist collective action. These policy equilibria inform negotiators‟ utility functions during interstate bargaining. The thesis, emphasizing the analytical importance of parallel exploration of domestic sources of foreign policy and interstate bargaining, strives to model the interaction over the Aegean Sea dispute using negotiator preferences exposed by the analysis of two shifts on issues only indirectly related to the Aegean Sea dispute. The thesis focuses on two normative constructs, rigidity and Kemalism, as informal institutions which define available strategies on all issues of bilateral interest. Overcoming problems with assigning preferences, the approach demonstrates how the two states are unable to communicate honestly under incomplete information, in order to switch from a non-cooperative to a cooperative equilibrium, despite domestic institutional change. Although realist accounts predict the difficulties with international cooperation, this approach offers a more realistic image of the bilateral relation and is able to account for a broad range of policy shifts.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction 6 I.R Theory and Empirical Reality 7 The Approach: Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy, Interstate Bargaining 19 and Analytic Narratives Thesis Overview 35
2. Greek-Tukish Relations and the Aegean Sea Dispute 38 The Aegean Sea Dispute 39 Greek-Turkish Relations Literature 52 Realism 52 Culturalism, Constructivism and Europeanization 60 Strategic Interaction 64 Outline 68 Data Collection and Analysis 70
3. Historical Narrative and Institutional Settings 76 Section I: Greece 78 Section II: Turkey 91
4. Greek Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics 103 Section I: The Institutional Setting 104 The Moderate Politicians‟ Game 110 Evidence on the Role of Mainstream Media 113 Section II: A Narrative of the Helsinki Strategy 120 Institutional Change 125 Section III: A New Equilibrium 134
5. Domestic Sources of Turkish Foreign Policy 142
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Section I: Greece within the Division 144 Section II: Foreign Policy and Kemalism 150 Section III: The Kemalist Coalition 159 Section IV: A Supply and Demand Model of Anti-Kemalist Mobilization 165 The Model 165 The Narrative 174 A New Equilibrium 188
6. The Aegean Sea Dispute: Interstate Bargaining 191 Modelling the Two Level Interaction 193 The Obstacle to Cooperation 202 Facing Elections 204 Overcoming the Obstacle 209 The Model and Exogenous Shocks 211
7. Conclusions 215
Appendix I: Media Content Analysis 235 Appendix II: Coding Lists 237 Appendix III: List of Interviewees 238 Bibliography 240
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Diagrams, Tables and Figures
Figure 2.1: Map of the Aegean Sea displaying Greek and Turkish positions 48 on continental shelf and territorial waters Table 1: Referential Categories 114 Figure 4.1: Ratio of positive, neutral and self-critical to negative references 115 Figure 4.2: Observations of referential categories and ratios per total 116 number of entries Figure 4.3: Ratios of observations of referential per thematical categories 117 Figure 4.4: Spatial analysis of preferences 135 Table 2: Referential Categories 145 Figure 5.1: Ratio of positive, neutral and self-critical to negative references 145 Figure 5.2: Cyprus Coverage 146 Figure 5.3: Greek Minority and Greece 148 Figure 5.4: Mobilization and Concessions Increase Infinitely 173 Figure 5.5: Mobilization Settles at an Equilibrium Point 174 Figure 5.6: Spatial Analysis of Preferences over Levels of Kemalism 190 Figure 6.1: Payoffs for the first period 199 Figure 6.2: Payoffs for the post-2003 period 205 Diagram 6.3: Negotiator indifference curves 208
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Introduction
The shortcomings of realism in accounting for the evolution of conflict in general and territorial disputes in particular have been exposed by empirical reality and highlighted mainly by scholars relaxing the unitary state assumption as well as constructivist work in I.R. The former have offered analytical depictions of preference formation exploring linkages between interstate bargaining and domestic sources of foreign policy, within a rationalist framework. Such work has achieved to propose bargaining models and two level games, capable of explaining particular situations and outcomes. On the other hand culturalists have emphasized the use of concepts such as norms and values as independent variables affecting state preference formation and international disputes. Although their contribution to the challenge of realism‟s dominance over I.R theory has been widely acknowledged, the main arguments against constructivist accounts‟ explanatory power are related to the the lack of focus on microfoundations which leaves the black box of major players‟ strategic interactions unexplored leading to problems explaining policy change. This thesis aims to combine the linkage of domestic sources of foreign policy to interstate bargaining with the focus on culture all within a rationalist instrumentalist framework in the form of an analytic narrative. It is suggested that this approach is able to deal with the theoretical shortcomings of culturalism and to add to the two level games literature the ability to analyse long-lasting international rivalries. It is argued that the advantages of the approach can be illustrated by a case study, selected to highlight the added value of this synthesis in terms of dealing with culturalist shortcomings and contribution to the two-level game literature. The thesis thus hopes to contribute to the explanation of enduring conflict with its methodological approach, which has not been widely used in security studies and is able to account for patterns of both continuity and change. The case chosen is the enduring rivalry between Greece and Turkey, centering on the Aegean Sea dispute, which is the main point of friction. The bilateral relation has
6 preserved its antagonistic and conflictual character for more than fourty years and literature on Greek-Turkish relations has largely followed the trends of I.R theory with realist dominance being challenged by culturalist explanations. The cause of friction has been located at systemic structures and power maximization strategies as well as ethnocentric norms and strategic cultures, with both clusters of arguments facing important explanatory limitations. The case thus posseses the necessary characteristics to highlight the merits of a rationalist approach which using an analytic narrative, analyses cultural concepts focusing on microfoundations and links domestic sources of foreign policy to interstate bargaining.
I.R Theory and Empirical Reality
The dominance of the realist paradigm for the most postwar era and its significant contribution to the explanation of particular international phenomena is acknowledged by well-known critics.1 Realism is a broad paradigm, encompassing competing theories, which are though based on a few general assumptions. Firstly, that anarchy characterizes the international system and that states, the key actors operate in a „self-help‟ system, secondly, that states possess some offensive capability, thirdly, that states cannot be certain of another state‟s intentions, fourthly, that the basic motive of states is survival and finally that states act as rational actors.2 The paradigm was largely shaped by a debate around the patterns of state behaviour that follow from that combination of such assumptions. Offensive and defencive realists argued over whether states strive to maximize power or security.3 Thus states were viewed either as balancing against powerful states according to the balance of
1 Keohane, R. O. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984). 2 In fact some realists object to some of these assumptions. Specifically, classical realist Morgenthau argues that states have an innate will for power and therefore they can be inherently offensive or revisionist while Waltz maintains that states seek to maximize security. See Morgenthau, H. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, (5th ed., New York, New York: Knopf, 1973); and Waltz, K. Theory of International Politics, (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1979). 3 See for instance Snyder, G. “Mearsheimer's World-Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security: A Review Essay”, International Security, Vol. 27, No. 1 (2002), pp 149-173. 7 power theory4 or bandwagoning with strong states for profit,5 according to offensive realists. Mearsheimer noted that states fear and cannot trust other states and therefore must be prepared for war and that they seek to maximize their relative power in order to secure survival, as the greater the military advantage state has, the more secure it is. States are then both offensively and defensively oriented.6 Defencive realists on the other hand regarded states as seeking to maintain the existing balance of power rather than maximizing relative power.7 A refinement of defensive realism came with the „offence- defence theory‟8 and the conception of the „security dilemma‟9 which laid out the conditions under which war was likely among status quo states. Depending on the magnitude of defence‟s advantage over offence and on military differentiation (between offensive and defensive weapons) states could seek their security without threatening others. The first significant challenge to neorealist conclusions regarding the bleak prospects of international cooperation focused on the emergence and role of institutions in facilitating cooperation and stability. Neoliberal institutionalists,10 accepting basic realist assumptions, particularly the primary role of states acting as rational egoists in a
4 Waltz‟s balance of power theory has been refined into a balance of threat theory by Walt, again predicting balancing state behaviour. See Walt, S. The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987). 5 Schweller, L. R. “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In”, International Security, Vol. 19, No 1 (1994), pp. 72-107. 6 Mearsheimer, J. “The False Promise of International Institutions”, International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (1994), pp. 5-49. Also see Mearsheimer, J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York, New York: W.W. Norton, 2001). 7 See for instance, Waltz, 1979, pp. 126-127; Snyder, J. L. Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 10-13; Grieco, J. M. “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism”, International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (1988), pp. 498-500. 8 See for instance Van Erera, S. Causes of War: Power and the Roots of War (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1999). 9 See Jervis, R. “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma”, World Politics, Vol. 30, No 2 (1978), pp. 167- 214; Glaser, C. “The Security Dilemma Revisited”, World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 1 (1997), pp. 171-201. 10 See Axelrod, R. and R. O. Keohane. “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," World Politics, Vol. 38, No. 1 (1985), pp. 226-254; Keohane, R. O. “International Institutions: Two Approaches”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 4 (1988), pp. 379-396; Keohane, R. O. International Institutions and State Power, Essays in International Relations Theory, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989); Keohane, R. O. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984); Lipson, C. “International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs”, World Politics, Vol. 37, No.1 (1984), pp. 1- 23; Martin, L. M. „Institutions and Cooperation: Sanctions during the Falkland Islands Conflict”, International Security, Vol. 16, No. 4 (1992), pp. 143-178. 8 self-help system,11 focused on the emergence and importance of institutions in creating norms which inhibit defection from international cooperation. Using game theoretic approaches of state interaction, particularly various forms of Prisoner‟s Dilemma, institutionalists highlighted ways in which institutions matter in correcting such political market failures. Firstly, they emphasized institutionalized iteration of state interaction, which increases the shadow of the future and changes the cost of cheating given reputational concerns and ultimately leads to the creation of cooperation-enhancing norms.12 Also, iteration gives the cheated party the chance to retaliate with the „tit-for-tat‟ strategy and finally it implies a reputational reward for honest states. Secondly, institutions offer the chance for issue linkage, increasing interdependence and expanding the scope of interaction and reputational concerns. Thirdly, institutions can increase the amount of information regarding other states‟ behaviour and finally, they can significantly reduce transaction costs.13 Neoliberal institutionalists‟ view of international cooperation was criticized by neorealists on the grounds of limited occurrence within specific domains, particularly in economic and environmental issues rather than security issues.14 Axelrod conceded that: “Political-economic and military-security issues can be analysed with the same analytical framework. Admittedly, economic issues usually seem to exhibit less conflictual payoff structures than do those of military security”.15 The other point of significant disagreement was state concern for relative or absolute gains from negotiated agreements.16 Neoliberal institutionalist work was based on the implicit assumption that states are concerned with absolute rather than relative gains, an assumption emerging out of the game theoretic depiction of strategic interaction. Grieco pointed out the flaw17 that spurred the debate and Krasner found that
11 Oye, K. “Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy”, World Politics, Vol. 38, No. 1 (1985), pp. 1-24. 12 See for instance the norm of „generalized commitment‟ in Keohane, R. O. “The Demand for International Regimes”, International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2 (1982), pp. 325-355. 13 See Keohane, 1984, pp. 89-92. 14 See for instance Mearshmeier, 1994, Lipson, 1984. 15 Axelrod and Keohane, 1984, p 231. 16 For an overview of the relative gains debate see Baldwin, D (ed.). Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993). 17 Grieco, 1988. 9 states are concerned with both relative and absolute gains in economic relations as well.18 Soon institutionalists came to acknowledge the problem,19 offered counterarguments20 and according to Keohane the question came to be reframed from „Do states seek relative or absolute gains‟ to „Under what conditions do they forgo even mutually beneficial cooperation to preserve their relative power and status‟.21 Overall empirical evidence for both sides‟ arguments did not confirm either one.22 Both paradigms‟ predictive power faced challenges fundamentally related to the unitary state actor assumption, its self-evident character, its internal consistency and weak micro-foundations.23 While neorealist and neoliberal theory-building based on simplistic assumptions contributed significantly to our understanding of international phenomena, their limitations, exposed by numerous empirical puzzles pointed towards the need for alternative explanations, constructive dialogue and further sophistication of the framework of analysis. Two main lines of criticism emerged, one critical of both paradigms‟ positivist individualist ontology and one focusing on the counter-productivity of the unitary state actor assumption and neorealist reductionism.
Culturalism - constructivism
Realist and neorealist I.R theory was successfully challenged by constructivism which ascribes to culturalist assumptions. Generally, radically distinct ontological and epistemological assumptions lead to the stark opposition between culturalism and
18 Krasner, S. D. “Global Communications and National Power. Life on the Pareto Frontier”, World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 3 (1991), pp. 336-366. 19 Keohane, R. O. “Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge”, in D. Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 283. 20 Morrow, J. D. 1997, “When do Relative Gains Impede Trade?”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 41, No. 1 (1997), New Games: Modeling Domestic and International Linkages, pp 12-37. 21 Keohane, R. O. “International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?”, Foreign Policy, No. 110, Special Edition: Frontiers of Knowledge (1998), pp. 82-96. 22 Liberman argues that relative economic gains are unlikely to interfere with cooperation in multipolar international systems, Liberman, P. “Trading with the Enemy: Security and Relative Economic Gains”, International Security, Vol. 21, No. 1 (1996), pp. 147-175. Trade between Greece and Turkey remained low under multipolarity until 1999. 23 See Milner, H. V. “The Emerging Synthesis of International, American and Comparative Politics”, International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (1998), International Organization at Fifty: Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics (1998), pp. 759-786. 10 positivism, with culturalists rejecting the notion of universal reason and emphasizing contingency on context.24 Each culture is characterized by its own cognitions and collective conscience, since it involves common knowledge about the past, the present and the future. Within this environment of common beliefs, members of a society develop mutual expectations that enable them to coordinate their interactions. In that way, culture structures preferences contingent upon common norms, values and rules about how the world should be and thus culture is an institution synonymous to morality. Norms are then not just rules imposed externally but are constitutive in the sense that they are so deeply respected and accepted that they come to constitute the self and the group. Therefore action is only meaningful within an intersubjective social context. For an overview of the properties that constitute social order according to culturalism, we follow Lichbach‟s categorization into five sets of properties:25 1) Culture is structured, enduring and hence autonomous. It is structured in the sense that it has an internal unity, logic and order. It is enduring as it is being transmitted from generation to generation via learning and thus change is gradual and mainly generational. Its autonomy suggests that it cannot be considered as another dependent variable; it is autonomous of individuals and therefore must be studied as a social fact governed by its own laws. 2) Culture is a language that enables communication. In order for a single intentional act to have meaning, actions must be materially and externally signed. Culture is a form of discourse that consists of signs, symbols and codes and hence indispensable for social communication based on shared symbols or rules. 3) Culture does not only cause collective outcomes, it constitutes reality. The entire social world is socially constructed: individual and group identities, interests, actions and ideas. Culture is an independent variable that can have major consequences for the state, the economy, and society. Norms and beliefs are not only causal. Culture is reality in that it is embedded in concrete processes, practices and products that are parts of the ordinary life of individuals. Durkheim argues generally that individual identities
24 See for instance Searle, J. R. The Construction of Social Reality (New York, New York: Free Press, 1995); Scott, J. C. Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1985). 25 Lichbach, M. Is Rational Choice Theory All of Social Science? (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2003), pp. 79-87. 11 are constructed by representations (conscience, cognitions) of society that allow one to differentiate one‟s self from others. Culture constitutes groups in that the self is a „communal self‟ developed through interaction with others. Culture defines the elements around which groups are formed. Interests are also interpreted rather than given as people get their ideas about what is and what is not in their interest from society and therefore are exclusively subjective. These ideas also suggest causal patterns that indicate which policies will work towards their benefit. Culture also constitutes action since symbols, norms and the ideological forms they create constitute the indispensable background on which actions acquire meaning. 4) Culture legitimates social order, that is, it defines what is worth fighting over and sets the rules of the fight. Social order has a consensual form derived common knowledge and values as well as a conflictual view – hierarchy – that focuses on legitimacy. Assuming uncertainty and incomplete information characterizes social life, its structural dimension is often misperceived and contested. Values lend credibility and authority to particular structures and award subordination. In short culture legitimizes privilege and prevents mobilization of resources in a struggle for control and domination. However culture also constitutes conflict in the sense that the latter is regulated by a set of self-reinforcing norms. Two sides must agree on the rules of the fight before they fight. Conflict also usually appears between different cultural orientations that are still both part of mainstream public discourse. 5) Culture provides a set of symbols that constitute personal meaning. Human orientations and ideological tendencies are shaped and mediated through symbols. Geertz defines culture as “a historically transmitted pattern of meaning embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes of life26”. Culture constitutes personal meaning in the sense that selfish ends are an insufficient motive for political action. Humans need moral commitments and ideals provided by culture, and their work has meaning only when it serves a greater purpose. Based on such ontological assumptions, individual action is regarded as dictated by goals shaped by personal dispositions, social values and group affiliations. Strong
26 Geertz, 1973, p. 89. 12 empirical claims for the resilience of social values and group identifications are found in a number of studies that argue that there is at best a weak correlation between an individual‟s social circumstances and their public policy stands.27 This understanding of reality and individual action suggest a rejection of methodological individualism and an epistemological preference for the analysis of cultures. Within this framework, constructivists, emphasizing the importance of intersubjective meaning in interpreting state action, produced radically different explanations of international alliances and organizations28 and succeeded in challenging the realist grim view of international relations as dominated by power or security maximizing competition. In addition, they pointed out that the neorealist inference that all states should prefer security independence whenever possible has been approached as a structurally determined behaviour of an actor only to the extent that a single particular understanding of anarchy prevails.29 So Wendt argued that the peaceful or conflictual nature of the international system is not a function of power and anarchy but of shared culture shaped through discursive practices. Because each actor‟s conception of their interests and identity is a product of the others‟ diplomatic gestures, states can reshape structure by process towards more peaceful means and ends.30 On the micro level, constructivists have criticized the unitary state actor assumption and highlighted neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist inability to develop a social theory of the state.31 Wendt argued that with the state as the primitive unit of analysis, the neorealist approach precludes the explanation of its essential properties and state behaviour is understood simply as constrained by systemic structures, themselves reduced to distributions of properties of pre-existing actors. State action is not explained
27 Sears, D. O. “Symbolic Politics: A Socio-Psychological Theory”, in S. Iyengar, and W. J. McGuire (eds.), Explorations in Political Psychology (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1993). 28 See for instance Risse-Kappen‟s analysis of NATO in Risse-Kappen, T. “Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO” in P. J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 357- 399; Barnet‟s explanation of international alliances in Barnett, M. N. “Identity and Alliances in the Middle East” in ibid., pp. 400-450; Lebow, R. N. “The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War, and the Failure of Realism" in R. N. Lebow, and T. Risse-Kappen (eds.), International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 23-56. 29 Hopf, T. “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory”, International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1998), p. 174. 30 Wendt, A. Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 31 See for instance Finnemore, M. National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1996). 13 according to its internal properties, nor interpreted according to relationally or structurally defined properties. Wendt noted: “This inability leads to assumptions about primitive units that are without theoretical foundation, a move which in turn undermines the theories' explanations of state action in the international system”.32 Criticizing the self-evident character of neorealist assumptions, he stressed:
“The issue, then, is not whether some understanding of the state is necessary to build systemic theories (it is), but whether that understanding follows from a theory, grounded in a coherent set of propositions with some correspondence to reality, or simply from a set of pre-theoretical assumptions, grounded in intuition or ideology. Whatever its advantages in terms of analytical convenience, a reliance on un-theorized assumptions about primitive terms leaves us unable to justify particular conceptualizations of interaction situations and leads, therefore, to an untenable „as if‟ approach to systemic theory building…Thus, without an explicit theory of the state's powers and interests in international trade, without a theory of the „rules of the game‟, it cannot be determined whether or not this game really is a Prisoner's Dilemma rather than, as some neo-Marxists might argue, a pure cooperation game. And, without a compelling argument to that effect, we cannot know if a failed prediction is due to an error in our systemic theory or to a misspecification of the (pre-theoretical) rules of the game”.33
Constructivism gained prominence in I.R theory after neorealism had proven incapable of predicting the end of the Cold War. They offered domestic explanations for the collapse of Soviet Union34 and generally focused on cases where state behaviour constituted empirical „anomalies‟ under a realist framework. Culturalism challenged structural neorealist predictions35 on fields such as escalation, grand strategy and foreign policy decision making, with the paradigm relying on diverse epistemologies ranging
32 Wendt, A. “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory”, International Organization, Vol. 41, No. 3 (1987), p. 340. 33 Ibid., pp. 343-344. 34 Bunce, V. “Domestic Reform and International Change: The Gorbachev Reforms in Historical Perspective”, International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 1 (1993), pp. 107-138. 35 See for instance Katzenstein, 1996; Legro, J. W. Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint during World War II (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1995); Katzenstein, P. J. Cultural Norms and National Security (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1996). 14 from positivist to interpretivist. For instance Katzenstein, Okawara and Burger emphasized the role of ideas and norms, particularly regarding Japanese attitudes towards the use of force, in shaping Japan‟s security policy, instead of the causal effects of international structures.36 Similarly, Rosen argued that states with different domestic social structures produce different levels of military power37 and Johnston argued that domestic strategic culture best explains a state‟s grand design.38
Culturalist limitations
Cultural theory difficulties are related to the assessment of the causal significance of norms that ultimately leads culturalism to tautology and problems in accounting for social change. Since culturalists reject the possibility that self-interest interferes with partisan and ideological preferences as such dispositions are formed early in life and are not easily bent by short term material concerns, instances of non-generational normative change and the processes by which certain attitudes are endorsed over others become hard to explain. Lichbach reflects on the shortcomings of cultural theories: “norms are incomplete…There is purpose and movement in history. Rules, values and conceptual schemes and ideas can change abruptly and new ideas are often adopted. More generally there is the question of the historical development of norms”.39 Blake and Davis commented on the renegotiation and redefinition of norms:
“There are some people who regard certain rules as „outdated‟ and „unjust‟ and make efforts to change these rules; and there are people who feeling that the rules are adequate and legitimate, resist change. Because of this criss-crossing, many societies can
36 Katzenstein, P. J., and N. Okawara. “Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms and Policies”, International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (1993), pp. 84-118; Katzenstein, 1996; Berger, T. U. “From Sword to Chrysanthemum”, International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (1993), pp. 119-150. 37 Rosen, S. P. “Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters”, International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (1995), pp. 5-31; Rosen, S. P. Societies and Military Power: India and Its Armies (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1995), pp. viii-xi. 38 Johnston, A. I. Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. x, 247, 262-266; Johnston, A. I. “Thinking about Strategic Culture”, International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (1995), p. 63; Johnston, A. I. “Cultural Realism and Maoist China” in Katzenstein, 1996, p. 257. 39 Lichbach 2003, p. 92. 15 undergo remarkable social transformation, all the while retaining an adequate degree of social control”.40
Ruling out individual self-interest culturalist problems related to normative explanations are related to inability to adequately explain social change and ultimately tautology. As Lichbach puts it:
“Since norms can be a source of conflict and cooperation, stability and change, collective identity and individualism, indeed the potential problem with normative explanations is apparent: tautology. Thus the culture might promote conflict and the norm might be struggle, the culture might produce change and the norm might be innovation, and the culture might promote individuality and the norm might be deviance. Tautology is an ever-present danger because norms are linked to action so that any action can be explained by a norm. For example, citizens vote due to civic duty and people act altruistically because of altruism. To explain an action in terms of the norm that compels the action is redundant”.41
Constructivism in particular received criticisms related to the sui generis nature of culturalist case studies,42 which poses severe restrictions on the scientific ability to generalize by emphasizing cultural variables and rejecting external rationalism, which makes behaviour predictable across cases.43 Geertz, reflecting upon the sui generis challenge to culturalism in security studies has conceded that: “The great natural variation of cultural forms is, of course, not only anthropology's great (and wasting) resource, but the ground of its deepest theoretical dilemma: How is such variation to be squared with the biological unity of the human species?”.44 On such grounds positivists
40 Blake, J., and K. Davis. “Norms, Values and Sanctions”, in R. E. L. Faris (ed.), Handbook of Modern Sociology (Chicago, Illinois: Rand McNally,1964), p. 466. 41 Lichbach, 2003,p. 94. 42 See for instance Waterbury, J. Exposed to Innumerable Illusions: Public Enterprise and State Power in Egypt, India, Mexico, and Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 43 Jepperson, R. L., A. Wendt, and P. J. Katzenstein. “Norms, Identity, and Culture”, in P. J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 44. 44 Geertz, C. The Interpretation of Cultures (New York, New York: Harper, 1973), p. 22. 16 have long accused culturalism of not adequately wrestling with the question of how much common psychology, physiology and physics lead individuals to similar patterns of behaviour.45 Furthermore, critics have also noted the inability of constructivist explanations emphasizing global norms to adequately address the problem of uncertainty in international relations, an issue at the core of realist and neoliberal explanations.46 Were state behaviour to be determined at the international level by shared culture shaped by diplomatic gestures, the problem of uncertainty about others‟ intentions would seize to exist, always with the state as the unit of analysis. Allowing however the exploration of state preferences at the domestic level would highlight the possible dynamic variation of state behaviour, leading to a justification of realist uncertainty about security or power maximising behaviour.
Two levels of analysis
A less radical but nevertheless substancial critique of realism and neoliberalism focused on the unitary state actor assumption as an unnecessary practice that isolated I.R from political science. Scholars argued that giving up the unitary state actor assumption would not imply an inadequate method of exploring systemic influences.47 And if neorealists tended to regard the state as if48 maximizing power or security based on an implicit theory of domestic social relations, then the simplicity of the assumption should be justified on the basis of superior explanatory power. Therefore, criticizing the simplicity of neorealist assumptions was only a part of a general argument against the paradigm‟s explanatory power, which proposed the relaxation of those assumptions and subsequent comparison of explanatory powers.
45 See for instance Dersh, M. “Cultural Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies”, International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1998), pp. 141-170. Also see Duffield, J. S., T. Farrell, R. Price, and M. C. Desch. “Isms and Schisms: Culturalism versus Realism in Security Studies”, International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1998), pp. 156-180. 46 For uncertainty as a problem for constructivism, see Copeland, D. C. “The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay”, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2 (2000), pp. 187-212. 47 Ibid., p. 767. 48 Keohane, R. O. and J. S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston, Massachusetts: Little Brown and Company, 1977), p. 23. 17
Such scholars thus sought to explore domestic politics and formation of state preferences as well as linkages to interstate bargaining. Domestic politics have been analysed as the exclusive source of foreign policy,49 with scholars employing organization and bureaucratic politics theory; however such explanations remained sidelined under the dominance of neorealism and the challenge of neoliberal institutionalism and critical theory. In the 1990s, domestic politics50 re-entered the debate under the democratic peace theory heading. The democratic peace debate,51 revolving around the argument that democracies develop norms of compromise that inhibit the use of force among them, has significantly influenced US policy-making during the Clinton era. Democratic peace theory received criticisms emerging from research findings demonstrating that states undergoing democratic transition phases may be more prone to war52 as well as problems with the definition of democracy.53 A decisive step occurred with scholars‟ turn towards a qualification of the positivist inclination to generalize, which has legitimated the use of the unitary state actor assumption, with the simultaneous incorporation of (at least) two levels of analysis, whilst exploring state behaviour. Indeed the abandonment of statist accounts and the rigorous association of domestic politics and international bargaining54 constituted a decisive refinement of positivist ontology and epistemology in the field of I.R. Domestic sources of state preference formation were explored by scholars using rationalist tools in the 1990s55 and their links to international diplomacy were elaborated in the two level
49 See for instance Allison, G. T. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (1ed., Boston, Massachusetts: Little Brown, 1971). 50 As did constructivist theories after the end of the Cold War which both realism and institutionalism failed to predict. 51 See for instance Doyle, M. W. “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vo. 12, No. 3 (1983), pp. 205–235; Ray, J. L. Democracy and International Conflict (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1995); Russett, B., et al. “The Democratic Peace: And Yet It Moves”, International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (1995), pp. 164–75. 52 Mansfield, E. D., and J. Snyder. “Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength and War”, International Organization, Vol. 56, No. 2 (2002), pp. 297-337. 53 Gowa, J. Ballots and Bullets: The Elusive Democratic Peace (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999). 54 Domestic politics were viewed and modelled as contributing to the clarity of signals sent during international crises. See for instance Schultz, K. “Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 4 (1998), pp. 829-844; and Fearon 1997. 55 Grossman, G. M., and E. Helpman. “Protection for Sale”, The American Economic Review, Vol. 84, No. 4. (1994), pp. 833-850. 18 game literature, initiated by Putnam56 and enriched by scholars such as Milner,57 Pahre,58 Papayoannou,59 Fearon60 and Downs and Rocke.61
The approach: Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy, Interstate Bargaining and Analytic Narratives
This body of work combining game theory, political economy and two level games has provided a framework of modelling bargaining and policy outcomes. This thesis intends to build on work relaxing the unitary state actor assumption in order to offer a methodological approach which can be employed to explain enduring interstate rivalries. The approach adopts the strategic view of I.R, explores interaction between interstate bargaining and domestic politics and employs rationalist narratives of domestic institutions to explore strategic interaction of key players in sequential form. In doing that the existence, evolution and impact of relevant norms and values are analysed instrumentally. The approach is then applied to a case of enduring rivalry between two states, Greece and Turkey to illustrate its merits in terms of accounting for patterns of continuity and change in state strategies. So, states bargain with one another and their strategies are contingent upon the ability of other states to interfere with their goal to maximize individual utility, thus resembling oligopolistic markets. At the same time, policymakers are involved in games
56 See for instance Evans, P., H. Jacobson, and R. D. Putnam (eds.). Double Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Berkley, California: University of California Press, 1993); Putnam, R. D. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games”, International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (1988), pp. 427-460. 57 Milner, H. V. and B. P. Rosendorff. “Trade Negotiations, Information and Domestic Politics: The Role of Domestic Groups”, Economics and Politics , Vol. 8, No. 2 (1996), pp. 145-189; Milner, H. V. Interests, Institutions and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998). 58 Pahre, R., and P. A. Papayoanou. “Using Game Theory to Link Domestic and International Politics”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 41, No. 1 (1997), pp. 4-11. 59 Papayoanou, P. A. “Intra-Alliance Bargaining and U.S Bosnia Policy”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 41, No. 1 (1997), pp. 91-116. 60 Fearon, J. D. “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes”, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 3 (1994), pp. 577-592. 61 Downs, G. W., and D. M. Rocke. Optimal Imperfection? Domestic Uncertainty and Institutions in International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). 19 within their respective constituencies. In Putnam‟s „two level games‟, 62 there is the stage where the negotiators bargain with each other, leading to a tentative agreement (Level 1) and the stage where separate discussions within each group of constituents take place about whether to ratify the agreement (Level 2). Every negotiator has a specific win-set, defined as the set of all possible agreements that would „win‟ – that is, gain the necessary majority among the constituents - when simply voted up or down. Even though his analysis refers to international negotiations that are potentially beneficial for all parties involved or in the worst case can generate relative gains concerns, the notions that will be presented can well apply to international security issues. In the approach offered here, state preferences are formed domestically and are subsequently pursued internationally. Acknowledging the merits of culturalist explanations of conflicts that persevere in time, this thesis relies on a rational choice approach of policy-making, complemented with analytic narratives of institutional continuity and change, aiming to offer comprehensive understandings of bilateral enduring rivalries. The domestic political scene is thus conceptualized as a dynamic political marketplace that consists of politicians, voters, interest groups, NGOs and corporate entities. In the political marketplace, actors obtain information, formulate decisions and undertake actions in accordance with the basic assumptions of rational choice. The outcome of strategic interaction that takes place unde various institutional settings is then carried to the international level where negotiators strive to achieve domestically reached goals. This part offers an overview of the rationalist theoretical and methodological framework employed.
Rational choice: strengths and limitations
Rational choice, by applying microeconomic theory to social science, has relied on a set of assumptions that originate in the homo economicus, and imply that rationality is one, universal, and constitutive of the individual.63 In that sense individuals are thought of as acting instrumentally and consistently with their set preferences in both the
62 Putnam, 1988. 63 This refers to the core of the paradigm which assumes thin rationality. 20 economic and the political sphere, aiming to attain goals they are able to rank, by selecting among a variety of existing alternative options. Under such assumptions, individuals are seen as responding in a systematic and hence predictable way to incentives. Individual behaviour is then explained by concentrating on the changes in the constraints to which the agent is exposed; that is, preferences are assumed to be constant. Applying methodological individualism, positivist rationalists aim to explain macro-problems and social phenomena relying on microfoundations, since ontologically they regard macroscopic entities as having no independent status of their own but only that of the individuals who constitute them. Social outcomes thus can be derived by individual action only since it is the individuals and not societies that choose, prefer and act. Consequently, they derive conclusions regarding social outcomes that are premised on their assumptions about individuals‟ desires, beliefs and choices. Individual choices constitute strategic action since they are a function of others‟ choices and of perceptions regarding others‟ preferences. Therefore, although individual action is instrumental and rational, social outcomes are often unintended and problematic, and rational choice‟s aim is to explain irrational social consequences of rational individual action. Quoting Lichbach:
“Social choice explanations thus focus on the emergent contradictions and paradoxes, comedies and tragedies, ironies and antinomies, and openness and contingency of individual reason. They explore the aggregation, transformation, coordination, and micro-to-macro aspects of interdependent decision making”.64
Methodoligically, models are constructed to depict the choice situation that actors face. The model is initially at Nash equilibrium, a self-reinforcing situation which represents individual‟s best response given the other‟s decisions. Therefore, rather than understanding the world in its continuity, expressed by some sort of established structural or normative order, rationalists following their naturalist ontology, see equilibrium points, that are results of strategic interaction of actors, that emerge contingent upon the balance of power at any given time. That equilibrium is then subjected to a series of
64 Ibid., p. 35. 21 exogenous shocks. The exogenous variables of the rationalist model are beliefs and desires since they direct action. Therefore, by manipulating exogenous variables rationalists seek to generalize and explain social phenomena occurring in various contexts. Their positivist scientific approach thus begins with specific initial conditions and general hypotheses, and ends with the explanation of a social phenomenon and constitutes a proposition-generating machine. Rationalist methodology has been employed extensively in I.R studies and security issues within various I.R traditions under the form of game theory and has offered significant qualifications of theories on alliance formation,65 democratic peace,66 deterrence,67 commitment68 and signaling.69 The analytic rigor of formal theorizing has been argued to ensure the logical consistency of theory-building as formal techniques facilitate the construction of deductively sound arguments based on clear assumptions. Rational choice evidently relies heavily on two separate claims: the self-evidence of its assumptions (such as instrumental rationality) and the ceteris paribus clause, which stipulates that rationalist predictions under the given initial conditions should be precise in the absence of countervailing factors. Therefore, its predictive power, given the theory‟s logical coherence, is only reduced by the omnipresent nature of countervailing factors. After the challenge posed by empirical findings produced by social psychologists contradicting basic microeconomic assumptions, such as the interest-maximizing behaviour and universal rationality,70 economists shifted from Austrian orthodoxy to instrumentalism, the evaluation of a theory according to its predictive power, not the
65 See for instance Morrow, J. D. “Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35, No. 4 (1991), pp. 904-933; Lalman, D., and D. Newman. “Alliance Formation and National Security”, International Interactions, Vol. 16, No. 4 (1991), pp. 239-254. 66 See for instance Bueno de Mesquita, B., J. D. Morrow, R. M. Siverson, and A. Smith. “An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 93, No. 4 (1999), pp. 791- 807. 67 Kilgour, D. M., and F. C. Zagare. “Credibility, Uncertainty, and Deterrence”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35, No. 2 (1991), pp. 305-334. 68 Fearon, J. D. “Rationalist Theories of War”, International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (1995), pp. 379- 414. 69 Kilgour, D. M. “Domestic Political Structure and War Behaviour: A Game-Theoretic Approach”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 35, No. 2 (1991), pp. 266- 284. 70 Abelson, R. P. “The Secret Existence of Expressive Behaviour”, in J. Friedman (ed.), The Rational Choice Controversy (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1996), pp. 25-36; Lane, R. E. “What Rational Choice Explains”, in ibid., 107-126; Taylor, M. “When Rationality Fails”, in ibid., pp. 223-235. 22 realism of the assumptions. Jeffrey Friedman comments on Milton Friedman‟s “The Methodology of Positive Economics” (1953):
“Friedman severed any link between observed behaviour and plausible independent variables. This accomplished, theoretical and empirical research became disassociated from each other: microeconomic model building now takes place without regard to the verisimilitude of posited initial conditions and realistic theoretical assumptions no longer check macroeconomic predictions”.71
In political science the shift to predictivism has not been completed and many rationalists, although they do not repudiate the aspiration of uncovering social laws testable by their predictions, reject instrumentalism on the basis of the self-evident applicability of such laws and invoke ceteris paribus clauses to justify rationalist caveats. For instance, by interpreting Olson‟s caveats as invocations of the ceteris paribus clause alone, Fiorina suggests that Olson posits an always present tendency for large groups to require selective incentives, albeit a tendency that may be offset by „a host of other factors‟.72 Olson also discusses „non-economic lobbies‟ and „groups that are characterized by a low degree of rationality‟, and he proposes that “it would perhaps be better to turn to psychology or social psychology than to economics for a relevant theory”.73 Furthermore, the unobservability of some real causes (mental states) leads theorists aspiring to uncover universal laws to include unobservable assumptions. This hampers efforts to produce accurate behaviour predictions unless they are defined so broadly that the „predictions‟ are empty tautologies. Were they economists, theorists would tend to disregard the theoretical implications but instead they either respond by expanding the theory towards tautology so it can predict more.
71 Friedman, J. “Introduction: Economic Approaches to Politics”, in J, Friedman (ed.), The Rational Choice Controversy (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1996), p. 15. 72 Fiorina, M. P. “Rational Choice, Empirical Contributions, and the Scientific Enterprise”, in J. Friedman, 1996, p. 88. 73 Olson, M. The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 161. 23
On many occasions empirical puzzles have been dealt with, as Green and Shapiro noted in “Pathologies of Rational Choice”74, with post-hoc theorizing and arbitrary domain restriction. The authors, holding rational choice to its own advertized standards75 and originating in a positivist instrumentalist epistemology criticized post-hoc theorizing as an attempt to prevent theory falsification that takes place after prediction has failed. Hence while voting constitutes instrumentally irrational behaviour given the minimal probability of an individual defining the outcome, rationalists attempt to tackle and explain the „paradox of voting‟ post hoc, employing the notion of „selective incentives‟, thus altering the point prediction from zero massive turnout. Furthermore, the authors condemned the practice of arbitrarily restricting the domain of application of the theory in cases where initial conditions and rationalist assumptions are expected to hold well. Voter turnout in elections for instance, has been argued to fall outside the boundaries of rational choice, as a „low cost, low benefit‟ affair, which constitutes a special case of collective action.76 On the macro level, scholars have noted how by assuming knowledge, desires and beliefs as exogenous variables, collective structures are presented as entities detached from the individual, that have control over the individual. As Alexander puts it:
“They do so by arranging punitive sanctions and positive rewards for an actor who is assumed to be a calculator of pleasure and pain. Because this actor is assumed to respond objectively to outside influences, „motives‟ are eliminated as a theoretical concern…The actor‟s response can then be predicted by the analysis of his external environment”.77
74 Green, D., and I. Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1994). 75 Friedman, 1996, pp. 10-11. 76 Aldrich, J. H. “Rational Choice and Turnout”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 37, No. 1 (1993), p. 261. 77 Alexander, J. C., et al (eds.). The Micro-Macro Link (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), pp. 13-14. 24
Lichbach concludes that: “By dichotomizing the objective and subjective parts of the choice problem, rationalist methodology produces a binary view of social life and a schizophrenic understanding of scientific enquiry”.78
Dealing with rationalist foils
Rationalists have responded to criticisms in various ways. A shift to instrumentalism has been noted to a certain extent, with some theorists focusing extensively on sophisticated mathematical models of extremely limited empirical relevance. For instance, Mayer has argued that:
“Even though it should encourage hypothesis testing rather than formal speculation, economists have treated instrumentalism as a „carte blanche‟ for making whatever assumptions provide a tractable model. Formalists have found this highly convenient, since it seems to imply that their „if-then‟ reasoning can by itself solve empirical science problems”.79
An emerging distance between theory and reality has also been noted by prominent scholars in the application of rational choice to I.R and security issues. Walt for instance has complained that: “the bulk of formal work in security affairs does not engage in any empirical testing at all. Anecdotes and „stylized facts‟ are sometimes used to explicate a point and to enhance the plausibility of an argument, but relatively little effort is devoted to rigorous empirical evaluation”.80 Referring for instance to Fearon‟s “Domestic Audience Costs and the Escalation of International Disputes”, where the author argues that democracies, generating higher audience costs, are less likely to back down during the escalation of an international crisis, Walt argues that the assumption that
78 Lichbach, 2003, p. 42. 79 Mayer, T. Truth versus Precision in Economics (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1993), pp. 51-52. 80 Walt, S. M. “Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies”, International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4 (1999), p. 32. 25 democracies generate higher audience costs is not empirically supported and can easily be refuted both theoretically and empirically.81 Instead of instrumentalism some scholars have defended rationalist contributions to solving empirical puzzles,82 while others have responded to criticisms by employing a realist, modest form of rational choice that signifies a shift from universalism to contextualism, or partial universalism. Susan Lochman suggested using theory as:
“A benchmark against which anomalies can be identified and systematic deviations mapped out… without a theory of how much people should contribute to a public good if they are rational and self-interested, there is no way of assessing whether empirical contribution patterns reveal altruism, systematic miss-assessments of the probability that a given contribution will be decisive, or total incomprehension on the part of the individuals involved”.83
Ferejohn and Satz described their view of „partial universalism‟:
“Universalism may only be partial in the sense that the independence hypothesis – the hypothesis that the causal mechanism is sufficiently independent from its contexts of realization that it may be separately described- that stands behind any form of universalism may take on different forms in different domains. Without some form of independence however, explanation becomes inseparable from description”.84
Fiorina also conceded that arbitrary domain restriction implies the non applicability of universalistic assumptions, again arguing implicitly for partial universalism.85 Friedman suggested the use of theory as an „ideal type‟, devized to “explain imagined patterns of behaviour which are not falsified by inaccurate predictions of actual behaviour, because variations in initial conditions and disturbing causes may
81 Walt, 1999, p. 34. 82 Ibid. 83 Lohman, S. “The Poverty of Green and Shapiro”, in Friedman, 1996, p. 131. 84 Ferejohn, J., and D. Satz. “Unification, Universalism and Rational Choice Theory”, in ibid., p. 83. 85 Fiorina, 1996, p. 88. 26 always interfere”.86 The ideal type view denies that the purpose of prediction is to falsify theories, rather it is to falsify hypotheses applied to cases. The goal is to determine how far in a given case the initial conditions of theoretically derived hypotheses hold good and are not disturbed.87 The ideal type approach “incorporates Green and Shapiro‟s anti- universalism, without their predictivism”.88 With this approach inexact predictions and ad hoc/post hoc theorizing and searches for confirming evidence are legitimized. Furthermore, domain restrictions are encouraged and inapplicability does not suggest falsification of the theory. If the task of empirical research is to see whether and to what extent a theory explains a particular slice of reality rather than to see whether reality falsifies a theory, positive evidence will be even more valuable than the negative kind. Therefore, methodologically, the researcher can allow domains to expand to the point at which many „irrational‟ behaviours are redefined. Other theorists have accepted criticisms of the human-nature character of rationality and have recognized the contingency of individual beliefs and actions.89 In that way they have worked on exploiting the common ground between culturalist and rationalist traditions, concluding that there is significant room for theoretical synthesis between alternative paradigms. In one sense „thick‟ or „social situation‟ rationalists extend the boundaries of the rationalist approach by deepening on the micro-level by studying culture, norms and values. Therefore, instead of treating actors‟ interests as exogenously determined, interests are treated as endogenous to social interaction, as a consequence of identity acquisition, as learned through processes of communication, reflection on experience and role enactment.
86 Friedman, 1996, p. 16. 87 Friedman reads Olson‟s “The Logic of Collective Action” as an ideal type theory. While Fiorina interprets Olson‟s caveats as invocations of the ceteris paribus clause (entailing the self-evidence of instrumental rationality, much like prepositivist economists), Friedman proposes the understanding of Olson‟s argument as an ideal type. This understanding would suggest the recognition of unobservable causes‟ existence, such as mental states, that can render the theory inapplicable, and that there is no reason to assume a priori that people are always self-interested or rational, even ceteris paribus. When read under that perspective, Olson appears to insist that the presence of instrumental rationality and self-interest must be proven in each instance thus agreeing that rational choice can be compatible with other explanations and can facilitate them. 88 Friedman 1996, p. 19. 89 In security studies, Putnam has focused on cultural variables in: Putnam, R. D. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, N.J.: Prince- ton University Press, 1993). 27
So norms, values, dispositions and incentives become central to thick rationalists‟ work and their relation leads to the distinction between thick and thin rationality and the adoption of some of form of objectivity of interests. As opposed to being „thinly‟ rational, that is passively responding to choices in a consistent way, „thickly‟ rational individuals are free and able to adjust goals and change the situation or the constraints that they face. Thick rationality inquires into the rationality of desires and beliefs while thin rationality describes the pursuit of whatever aim one has at the moment. Accordingly, a thin version of interests represents a shallow calculation of benefit while a thick version refers to some form of objective need rather than a shallow and possibly temporary desire. In terms of methodology they begin with a certain historical period that is defined by some particular structure that leads to specific desires, beliefs and preferences. Social situation rationality therefore can only produce conditional rather than universal laws that are defined within specific social context. As Lichbach puts it: “This move from biological human nature to worldly social conditions is then a move from rationalism (universalism) to empiricism (contextualism): from establishing truths by introspection and deduction to establishing them by observation and experimentation”.90 This synthesis allowed rationalists to deal effectively with methodological difficulties that rational choice faced related to disequilibria, initial and scope conditions, path dependency and learning. These difficulties are responsible for the significant limitations of rational choice‟s predictive power unless rationalist assumptions are supplemented with additional microassumptions about culture. Thick rationalists argue that the only way to explain social change relying on micro-foundations is to analyse individuals‟ decisions to adopt or reject new values by assuming instrumental action stemming from thick rationality.91 They argue that it is possible for individuals to challenge existing norms and traditions that they had adhered to up until a specific moment in time if the incentives to do so are there. Therefore, even though causal links between personal dispositions and adopted opinions are not rejected, what thick rationalists aim to refute is culturalist value determinism. Chong notes how
90 Lichbach, 2003, p. 31. 91 See for instance Chong, D. Rational Lives: Norms and Values in Politics and Society (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 2000).
28 research findings indicate that values change when the socioeconomic supports for them are undercut, and that value change therefore heavily depends on changing circumstances and corresponding changing social relations and group affiliations.92 That is the way social change occurs and its actual occurrence is contingent upon a number of cultural and structural factors facilitating or obstructing collective action focused on changing existing norms. Their approach however remains methodologically individualist insofar as it is individuals who make decisions not culture or structures. Using this definition of interests, which incorporate social pressures and rewards, enables a distinction between private and public preferences. Political action is then the result of instrumental consideration on which public preference to adopt, given costs and benefits derived from the institutional setting. Then, although individuals might have personal dispositions and past investments they are not identified with a preference and can instrumentally change their behaviour. The risk of combining an extended definition of rationality with a positivist epistemology is obviously related to tautology. If by extending the definition of rationality one aspires to avoid falsification of its human nature character, post hoc theorizing can be seen as constituting a patronizing view of alternative paradigms. Harsanyi notes:
“If we make our motivational assumptions complicated enough, we can „explain‟ any kind of behaviour – which of course means that we are explaining absolutely nothing. To take an extreme example, we could „explain‟ any conceivable action of a given individual simply in terms of one desire on his part to act in this particular way. Obviously that would be a completely useless tautological explanation”.93
On the other hand the move from „universalism‟ to „contextualism‟ suggests that explanation of events can only be historically specific. Rational choice then stops being a proposition-generating machine and becomes modest in recognizing that there can be no comprehensive explanation of a social phenomenon, leaving space for interaction among
92 Ibid., p. 42. 93 Harsanyi, J. C. “Rational Choice Models of Political Behaviour vs. Functionalist and Conformist Theories”, World Politics, Vol. 21, No. 4 (1969), p. 518. 29 alternative perspectives. Combined with a wider but yet clearly stated definition of rationality which incorporates agency in adopting beliefs and values, an approach ascribing to partial universalism incorporates an understanding of rational choice‟s limits and modesty in terms of philosophy of science in the same manner that „ideal types‟ aspire to achieve it. Evaluation of such an approach then is disentangled from questions of falsification and the positivist understanding of the relation between theory and data and obtains a comparative nature. Following this turn of political studies away from ahistorical, objectivist positivism towards contextualism,94 this thesis relies on a clearly defined, thick, or social situation „bounded rationality‟.95 Thus, the positivist aspiration of uncovering universal laws is substituted by partial universalism, and the realist concession that law-like regularities can only be context specific. This thesis relies on realist ontological and epistemological assumptions, leading to the application of modest rational choice. The aim is to produce a framework of explaining enduring international rivalries. This framework still highlights the merits of rational choice against alternative paradigms in terms of empirical validation thus adding to our understanding of international phenomena.
Analytic narratives
After presenting the scope of theory let us now relate the framework to the task at hand. As mentioned above the proposed framework builds on I.R work that employed rationalist tools to explore domestic sources of foreign policy and link them to international negotiations in order to explain and predict bargaining outcomes under specific conditions. Dealing however with long-lasting negotiations, disputes or rivalries, an explanation needs to highlight the impact of the evolution of institutional settings on them.
94 For a critical discussion of this turn see Lawson, S. “Political Studies and the Contextual Turn: A Methodological, Normative Critique”, Political Studies, Vol. 56, No. 4 (2008), pp. 584-603. 95 For a detailed discussion of the term, see Simon, H. A. Models of Man: Social and Rational (New York: John Wiley, 1957). 30
Within the context outlined above, Bates and others have employed an approach they call „analytic narratives‟.96 The term refers to an approach that is narrative in the sense that is preoccupied with specific cases and simultaneously analytic thus applying models or formal lines of reasoning as means of outcome explanation. Analytic narratives investigate events that took place under various contexts, focusing on institutions, exploring sources of political order and conflict, as well as the interaction between international and domestic political economy. Bates has explored the origins and longterm performance of an international institution, the International Coffee Organization (ICO) by seeking to explain how Brazil, a major world coffee exporter was able to deter the entrance of competitors‟ in the market on one occasion and failed on another, despite the fact that the game of interaction between involved actors would be played infinitely. The failure of a statist account leads him to explore how when Brazil and Colombia failed to deter the entry of competitors, they turned to the dominant consumer, the USA, in order to police the agreement by imposing restrictions on coffee imports, and successfully linked the defence of coffee prices to the defence of hemispheric security and the communist threat. Indeed, US participation rested upon a domestic coalition that included the executive and Congress, and with the valuable contribution of large coffee-roasting firms. Focusing on the evolution of European states‟ fiscal institutions until the 19th century, Rosenthal‟s analytic narrative offers an explanation of the uneven process of political and economic development across those states.97 The confrontation of Crown and elite over fiscal authority is placed at the centre of research, is modelled upon its implications for warfare and taxation and the analysis exposes the reasons for differences in the switch to representative institutions across powerful European states. Both Bates and Rosenthal‟s analytic narratives contribute to I.R theory exploring domestic sources of foreign policy and Rosenthal‟s piece specifically contributes to the two-level game literature, offering a causal link between warfare and the outcome of strategic interaction between domestic actors with distinct policy preferences.
96 Bates et al, 1998. 97 Rosenthal, J-L., in Bates et al., 1998, pp. 64-108. 31
Similarly, Levi‟s analytic narrative explores the evolution of conscription in European states of the 19th century. To explain patterns of continuity and change Levi focuses on the impact of war and increased democratization on the incentives of key actors identified within those states.98 Epistemologically, analytic narratives depart from conventional forms of hypothesis testing and theory is used as a tool for empirical research. This allows researchers to incorporate factors into their model that had originally been neglected or overlooked. Bates notes: “The authors derive implications from theory; but when the case materials do not confirm their expectations, they do not respond by rejecting their models. Rather they respond by reformulating them and by altering the way in which they think about the problem”.99 Bates goes on to describe the process of domain expansion, a concept that characterizes Friedman‟s „ideal types‟. He describes how initially the theory is selected because it appears to be a good fit. After its formalization it is open to evaluation by means of logical appraisal and empirical testing. Methodologically the approach blends deductive and inductive techniques. Lichbach refers to a „middle way‟ between induction and deduction: “in contrast to deduction, which may be called idealist, and to induction, which might be called materialist, this approach might be called realist: it explores the interaction of theory and data in which revision and updating is an iterative procedure”.100 Bates employs a number of models, the failure of which leads him to reappraise the case materials: “The interplay between data and analysis promotes a refinement and deepening of our understanding of the political economy of the coffee market and of the origins and significance of its institutions”.101 As discussed above, rational choice applications have found difficulties in explaining an equilibrium that is selected among multiple equilibria that result from repeated games. That equilibrium is usually referred to as „focal point‟102 and implies that actors coordinate on a particular equilibrium based on information and shared understandings that are not part of the formal description of the game. The blend of
98 Levi, M., in Bates et al., 1998, pp. 109-147. 99 Bates, 1998, p. 16. 100 Lichbach 2003, p. 190. 101 Bates, 1998, p. 195. 102 Schelling, T. C. The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1960). 32 inductive and deductive reasoning inherent in analytic narratives facilitates the explanation of the occurrence of one among multiple equilibria as empirical findings inform theory by seeking the forces that interacted and led to that particular occurrence. The first step towards building an analytic narrative is tracing the historical processes that characterized the unfolding of the events of concern. Through extensive empirical qualitative research actors are identified, their preferences and incentive structures are mapped out based on data on the information they possessed, their strategies and the constraints they face. Then an explanation of the outcome is offered by identifying and exploring causal mechanisms linking actors‟ strategies and choices and social outcomes. If the explanation offered is valid then the equilibrium of the model should imply the outcome described. Therefore an analytic narrative consists of a setting, a starting point, a sequence of interactions and an ending. What distinguishes analytic narratives from historic narrative accounts is their focus on seeking elegance and parsimony and the way to establish that is the use of formal rational choice models. Analytic narratives are problem rather than theory driven and although the method rejects rationalist universalism it does employ game theoretic models to evaluate the validity of the narratives themselves. In analyzing institutions from a rationalist perspective, analytic narratives trace actors and explore their interaction in extensive form-games, by analyzing subgame-perfect equilibria. Games in extensive form taking sequence into account, allow researchers to incorporate historical elements, the importance of uncertainty, individuals‟ ability to devise strategies and the constraints they face. Given the modest philosophy of science described above, the use of theory as „nuts and bolts‟ and of evidence as restricting the scope of theory, analytic narratives are prone to nonfalsifiability and to self-serving confirmations. Therefore evaluation cannot rely exclusively neither on the Lakatosian „additional and true‟103 nor the Popperian „different and better‟ standard104 but on a combination of the two.
103 Lakatos, I. “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programs”, in I. Lakatos, and A. Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 91-196. 104 Popper, K. Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (New York, New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965). 33
Therefore, the added value of the approach selected here in explaining enduring international rivalries compared to culturalist accounts should be founded in the analytic narrtives‟ logical consistency and empirical validity. Logical consistency is obviously of foremost importance even for scholars who further originality over it.105 Bates acknowledges its significance but notes how the mathematical logic of a model does not ensure a powerful explanation, especially if the model heavily relies on ceteris paribus clauses. Consequently, the applied model‟s implications should be confirmed by empirical evidence. Given the contextual nature of analytic narratives, explanations of particular cases can be applied and tested in other settings with significant limitations. Specifically, the ability to perform comparative statics relies on the existence of unique equilibria. In the event of the occurrence of multiple equilibria, analytic narratives can be considered as „one-off‟ but their contribution lies in offering a theory of structure: “it suggests a way in which structures create incentives that shape individual choices and thereby collective outcomes…and whereas the specific game may not be portable, these other attributes may offer opportunities for comparative analysis”.106 Ultimately, logically consistent and empirically informed analytic narratives are tested against alternative accounts. A number of alternative explanations of a certain case may exist, each one of them internally coherent and fitting the facts as they are known. It has been argued that individualistic accounts of specific cases are superior to cultural accounts due to their ability to account for social change but the lacunae elaborated so far have highlighted the value of synthesis. Bates notes that: “one response to the existence of multiple explanations is one more general explanatory framework capable of subsuming the competing approaches”.107 That is the strategy that Levi follows, when concluding that the two alternatives explanations for the „buy out‟ policy, the economic and the political can only offer partial explanation, and decides to offer a synthetic approach. This practice should not aim to establish rational choice‟s hegemony over social sciences but should intend to solve concrete empirical puzzles.
105 See for example the discussion between Bueno De Mesquita and Morrow, 1999 and Walt, 2000. 106 Bates, 1998, p. 234. 107 Ibid, 18. 34
Thesis Overview
This thesis therefore offers a framework of analysis of enduring international disputes. The approach follows work in I.R theory that relaxes the unitary state actor assumption to explore domestic sources of foreign policy and their interaction with international structures and interstate bargaing. In order to explain long-lasting disputes domestic policy outcomes are modelled using analytic narratives of institutional evolution, where actors interact in sequential form. State preferences are then pursued through interstate bargaining, occurring within distinct institutional settings. Simultaneously this thesis focuses on normative concepts and examines their evolution and impact on state preferences always within an instrumentalist framework. The approach is then able to efficiently account for patterns of continuity and change of policies and institutions, which culturalist and constructivist explanations find problematic because of difficulties in assessing the causal significance of norms and cultures which renders the incorporation of some degree of agency indispensable. Given the methodology discussed the value of the framework can be exemplified through the study of a particular case. The case selected is Greek-Turkish relations after 1974, when the Aegean Sea dispute arose. The case is chosen as one which has been extensively analysed under realist and culturalist assumptions with both literatures facing problems highlighted in this introduction. Therefore, the approach offered here hopefully contributes both to the security studies as well as to the area study literature. The bilateral relation is characterized by friction over the delimitation of sovereign rights in the Aegean Sea and the two states minority and Cyprus policies. The Aegean Sea dispute is the only purely bilateral and potentially negotiable issue between the two states, although the two sides disagree on the scope of the dispute. State strategies consist of policy prescriptions on all matters of bilateral interest and are contingent on perceptions of eachothers‟ intentions. Both states‟ policies have thus far reflected perceptions of threat to their national sovereignty and that was first manifested with the Aegean Sea dispute when such perceptions and state strategies were first consolidated. The centrality of the Aegean Sea dispute thus emerges out of its impact on the consolidation of perceptions and state strategies. So decisions on minority policies and
35 any other matter are contingent on perceptions of threat derived primarily from state conduct on the Aegea Sea dispute. While the Aegean Sea dispute is indispensable to a model that links domestic preference formation and interstate bargaining (as the only purely bilateral and potentially negotiable issue), it is two policy shifts on other domains that best highlight alternative explanations‟ problems in understanding the formation of state preferences. Namely, the Greek Helsinki strategy in 1999 and Turkey‟s acceptance of the Annan Plan on Cyprus in 2003 constituted empirical puzzles for realist explanations, and the Europeanization literature which developed aiming to understand them left key questions and the existence of causal mechanisms unexplored. So this thesis uses those shifts to identify the mechanisms of preference formation and applies that understanding to identify the actual structure of the Aegean Sea dispute and highlight the problem of communication. In that sense, the thesis contributes both to the understanding of strategy formation in general by simultaneously exposing alternative explanations‟ shortcomings as well as to the clarification of the structure of bilateral interaction regarding the Aegean Sea dispute in particular. Acknowledging the relevance of ideas and cultures in shaping foreign policy, their formation, endurance and impact are assessed by examining individual incentives in adopting or rejecting traditional and new values. The latter are thus perceived as informal institutions which individuals can sustain through coordination or choose to challenge by organized action and the normative order they provide is viewed as resting upon credible promises and threats. Institutions induce choices that are regularized because they are made in equilibrium and therefore “behaviour becomes stable and patterned, or alternatively institutionalized, not because it is imposed but because it is elicited”.108 Therefore once equilibria have been reached, the path of play is determined and appears as an external constraint and for it to be sustainable and viable, corresponding rules and beliefs need to be reconfirmed and reproduced by agents‟ strategic play. Such values in the case at hand reflect conceptions of the „Other‟ and prescribe strategies which render cooperative outcomes difficult in general and the structure of the Aegean Sea dispute game as non-cooperative in particular. The path of play appears as an
108 Bates et al, 1998, p. 8. 36 external constraint to those whose dispositions dictate distinct equilibrium level preferences and there are costs attached to adopting opposing stands. It follows that equilibrium levels of those concepts inform policymakers‟ incentive structures. Therefore, examining two instances of policy change that are only indirectly related to the Aegean Sea dispute and emphasizing the role of normative constructs, the thesis substitutes strategic culture with the concepts of rigidity and Kemalism and explores the implications of equilibrium levels for the outcome of the Aegean Sea dispute. This methodological approach to the impact of values implies a rejection of their stable and tautological character and enables the exploration of mechanisms of change.
37
Chapter 2: Greek-Turkish Relations and the Aegean Sea Dispute
With their national myths recalling ancient wars, Greece and Turkey have shared mutual feelings of mistrust and enmity. The establishment and preservation of those myths ensures that Greeks and Turks share a sense of threat coming from the others‟ country and tend to ignore their responsibility for the hardships of the past and continuing political tension. It also leads to frustration over the misfortune of existing in physical proximity to nations that aspire to harm them and to ignorance regarding common cultural and traditional elements, a result of their centuries-old historical coexistence. What is then the direction of the relation between such perceptions and policy outcomes? Were the former reactive to expansionist strategies of the „Other‟ or were they the ones to contribute to the formation of conceptions of the Other‟s strategies? It is argued here that such conceptions did constitute elements of official narratives and national identifications and were revived in the 1950s as a result of the Cyprus issue. They were thus well in place when the minority rights issue and the Aegean Sea dispute arose and defined their evolution. The thesis focuses on the Aegean Sea dispute, as a purely bilateral and potentially negotiable dispute since human rights cannot be the object of bilateral negotiations. The Aegean Sea dispute will thus allow us to explore the relation between normative frameworks, conceived as informal institutions sustained or challenged instrumentally, and bargaining outcomes, linking domestic sources of strategy formation and interstate negotiations. Again, this will be done within a methodologically individualist framework that facilitates the explanation of patterns of continuity and change in institutional settings and policy outcomes. Starting with a brief narrative of the essence of the dispute, this chapter will then discuss existing realist and culturalist accounts of various aspects of the bilateral relation aiming to illustrate their limitations in accounting for empirical reality, caused largely by their rigid ontological and epistemological frameworks discussed in the introduction. The final part summarizes the structure of the thesis and presents methods of data collection and analysis.
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The Aegean Sea dispute
The Aegean Sea dispute essentially refers to the problems of the two countries in delimiting jurisdiction over the continental shelf of the sea that separates them as well as the breadth of their territorial waters. The geographical particularity of the region with Greek islands spread all over the Aegean up until only a few miles off the Turkish coast, along with the still developing maritime law when the dispute arose contributed to the complexity of the case. Moreover the two states‟ recent history of conflict and the parallel existence and perpetuation of hostile official historical narratives increased its significance and underscored its conflictual character. It is then perhaps necessary to contextualize the dispute within recent Greek-Turkish history.
Historical background
Having gained independence in 1830 and after achieving steady territorial gains at the expense of the declining Ottoman Empire, acting upon the irredentist cause of “Megali Idea”,109 Greece launched an imperialistic military campaign towards Ankara in 1919, initially supported by the powers of the Entente. The campaign was resisted by the Liberation movement established and led by Kemal Ataturk, and the conflict culminated in the Turkish War of Independence. The war ended triumphantly for Turks, and tragically for the Greek Army and the Greek population of Asia Minor. In 1923, the Turkish Republic was established, and in the same year the Lausanne Treaty defined the boundaries of the Republic and enforced a population exchange between the two states, which resulted in roughly two million refugees. The orthodox population of Istanbul and the Muslims of Thrace remained and became minorities within states which intensified processes of national homogenization. Subsequent minority rights‟ abuse in effect was related to perceptions of the „Other‟ and their reinforcement by strategies on the Cyprus problem. The two minorities
109 The concept refers to the goal of establishing “Greece of Two Continents and Five Seas”, The notion was put forth by Greek Prime Minister Kolletis in 1844 and dominated Greek foreign policy for almost a century. 39 were ever since 1923 officially treated as distinct communities despite their citizenship status under the principle of reciprocity and were placed under the jurisdiction of the two states‟ ministries of foreign affairs. The détente that the bilateral relation experienced until the mid 1950s ensured only limited hardships for the two communities even though the official Kemalist narrative regarded the Greek community and the institution of the Patriarchate as treacherous elements, ready to assist Greek irredentist future schemes. While no such conception of the Turkish minority existed in the Greek nationalistic doctrine110 the situation changed after the Cyprus and the Aegean Sea dispute arose. Minorities on numerous occasions became victims of expatriation policies, violence and rejection of basic human and civil rights. The Cyprus problem emerged in the 1950s after the liberation struggle of Greek- cypriots against British rule, which was combined with a demand for Union with Greece. The cause of Union was endorsed by a vast majority of the Greek public and naturally clashed with the anxiety expressed from the Turkish Cypriot community, which activated in mobilizing Turkish officials to prevent that outcome and enforce partition of the island. The Treaty of Zurich-London in 1959 awarded Cyprus independence status, with the Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish-Cypriot communities‟ constitutional rights protected and enabled within a power-sharing system. Peace in the island lasted for no more than three years, during which state institutions functioned inefficiently, and the next decade was characterized as a period of extended inter-communal violence and hostilities. Conflict was halted with the 1974 Turkish invasion/intervention, following the Athens junta inspired coup to overthrow the Greek Cypriot leader, Archbishop Makarios. Turkish military action resulted in the occupation of the northern part of the island by the Turkish Army, whose presence is continued until today. The two states engaged in confrontation in the island and a full-scale war was marginally prevented. It was during that time when perceptions and strategies towards the other began to consolidate, and the Aegean Sea dispute was the domain where they would find their application. The dispute became the set where national strategies emerging within
110 In 1955 Greek Prime Minister Papagos had prohibited the use of the term „Muslim‟ to characterize the minority in Thrace and imposed the term „Turkish‟, at a time when communist Bulgaria was considered as the primary threat for Greek sovereignty and the Greek government aimed to prevent the possibility that the Pomaks of the minority would adopt the Bulgarian identity. 40 cultures constructed around the hardships of the past would play out. This part offers a brief discussion of the scope and basic characteristics of the dispute aiming to present how dominant perceptions would inform policymakers‟ strategy decisions.
International Law
The dispute arose when in 1973 the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) began explorations of the Aegean Sea for oil deposits on the continental shelf that lies west of the eastern Aegean Greek islands instigating an immediate Greek response branding the project a violation of Greek sovereign rights. It appeared that facing the first oil crisis of 1973 and after Greece had granted permission for exploration to international enterprises in the late 1960s Turkey decided to pursue its interests in the region, within a vague legal framework. The delimitation of territorial waters, national airspace and FIR zones of responsibility were soon after exposed as problematic by Turkey with Greece considering those issues as solved by international law and Turkey as attempting to revise the legal status quo. More recently, the sovereignty of islets across the Turkish coast was also disputed by Turkey under the „grey zones‟ argument. Since the dispute arose, the two states have chosen to deal with it in various ways. There have been periods of intense interaction, mainly on the technocratic level and there have been phases of extreme rigidity and no interaction. The two states‟ official arguments although modified throughout the years according to the evolution of international maritime law, retain the essence of mistrust for the other‟s intentions. Generally speaking, Greece argues that Ankara‟s claims, with the exception of the continental shelf issue, are covering issues that have already been resolved by International Law, and on those grounds considers Turkey a revisionist country. Turkey contends that not all disputed matters are legally resolved and supplements legal with political arguments, to prevent perceived Greek expansionism. The two countries remain until today in a negotiation stalemate. Greece is willing to concede nothing to Turkey, whose claims extend to rights that Greece considers indisputable. Greece has in the past favoured an appeal to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), a solution that Turkey has repeatedly rejected, opting instead for a settlement through the means of bilateral
41 negotiations. The two states remain incapable of agreeing on a settlement method, and their strategies are tied to their own preferred framework. Before a presentation of the reasons behind those strategies and a brief historical narrative of the dispute let us review international legal provisions and practices on issues of continental shelf and territorial sea delimitation.111 The legal definition of the term continental shelf was dealt with at the First United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS-I) which lead to the Geneva Convention of 1958. The Convention was only signed by 54 states, Turkey was not one of them, and its clauses did not acquire the customary law character. The Convention‟s Article 1 defined continental shelf as follows:
The seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas or, the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands.112
Article 6 dealt with the delimitation of continental shelves between adjacent coastal states:
Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two or more States whose coasts are opposite each other, the boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to such States shall be determined by agreement between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the boundary is the median line, every point of which is equidistant from
111 For more details on the dispute‟s legal aspect see Marsh, J. E. “Turkey and UNCLOS III: Reflections on the Aegean”, The Aegean Issues: Problems and Prospects (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 1995); Kozyris, P. J. “The Legal Dimension of the Current Greek-Turkish Conflict: A Greek viewpoint”, in D. Keridis, and D. Triantafyllou (eds.), Greek-Turkish relations in the Era of Globalization (Herndon, Virginia: Brassey‟s, 2001). 112 Convention on the Continental Shelf, 1958, Article 1, found at: http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/8_1_1958_continental_shelf.pdf, accessed on 20 April 2012. 42 the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured.113
Since unilateral delimitation was often problematic, it was abandoned in international practice in favour of delimitation based on the principle of equity. A total of eleven continental shelf delimitation cases have since been resolved by joint applications to the ICJ and other arbitration courts. Based on the principle of equity the courts have attempted to provide a fair allocation of the resources of continental shelf between neighbour states.114 In six out of these eleven cases „special circumstances‟ were taken into account by the judges upon the delimitation of continental shelf. The existence of islands and their particular geographical characteristics (size, proximity to neighbouring coast) was treated as signifying special circumstances and their continental shelf was accordingly delimited.115 Geological circumstances116 were only considered as „relevant circumstances‟ in the North Sea Continental Shelf Case117 and the geological definition of continental shelf as the natural extention of territory under the sea was not included in any article of the Law of the Sea Treaty of 1982. Finally, seven delimitation cases were settled by bilateral negotiations, one of which pertainining the delimitation of the continental shelf between Greece and Italy, which was agreed on 1977. Some of these cases, like the agreement between Japan and South Korea in 1974, were settled by substituting delimitation with joint exploitation of the resources of the disputed continental shelf. In others, like the agreement between Spain and France in 1974, joint exploitation was supplementary to the delimitation. Territorial sea delimitation regulations remained inadequate until the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) in 1982. Despite the pertaining prelevance of the 17th century-old concept of freedom of the seas, according to which all waters beyond national boundaries were considered international waters, the principle of
113 Ibid., Article 6. 114 On the principle of equity in international law and details on the continental shelf cases dealt with by the ICJ see Franck, T. “Equity in International Law”, in N. Jasentuliyana (ed.), Perspectives on International Law, (Hague: Kluwer, 1995). 115 For more details see Churchill R.R., and A.V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea (Manchester: Juris Publishing, Manchester University Press, 1999). 116 The definition of continental shelf as the continuation of the mainland until ocean level depths. 117 http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&code=cs2&case=52&k=cc&p3=0. 43 three miles was normal practice for many states including maritime powers of the early 20th century. UNCLOS I and II failed to stipulate maximum allowed levels of territorial waters and an agreement on the issue continued to evade participating states.118 Article 3 of The Law of the Sea Treaty, a „package deal‟ result of nine year-long negotiations, eventually provided every state the right to twelve nautical miles of territorial waters, and came into force in 1994.119 Article 121 of the Treaty clarified that islands or islets that cannot support economic life retain the right to twelve miles of territorial waters. Article 15 of the Treaty refered specifically to the delimitation of the territorial sea between states with opposite or adjacent coasts:
Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each other, neither of the two States is entitled, failing agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its territorial sea beyond the median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two States is measured. The above provision does not apply, however, where it is necessary by reason of historic title or other special circumstances to delimit the territorial seas of the two States in a way which is at variance therewith.120
The Treaty was not signed by eight states, including the USA, the UK and Turkey. It is uncertain whether the Law of the Sea Treaty codifies international customary law. It has been argued that international legal practice has favoured bilateral agreements on the breadth of the territorial sea in cases where special circumstances render unilateral extention to the median line an unfair solution.121 Numerous cases have been resolved by bilateral negotiations, and some of those where islands were in the wrong side of the median line between adjacent coasts were resolved by agreeing on limited territorial waters for those islands.122 Arbitration courts have also heard some
118 Several attempts to come to an agreement on the delimitation of national waters had failed. During the League of Nations Codification Conference, Greece, a maritime power had opted for 3 nautical miles of national waters, while Turkey had opted for 6. 119 http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf. 120 Ibid. 121 Church and Lowe, 1999, pp. 182-183. 122 See for instance the cases between Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago, and Abu Dhabi and Quatar, in Church and Lake, 1999, 201. 44 similar cases and have ruled, as in continental shelf cases, based on the principle of equity. Delimitation of national airspace has been a less controversial issue and has been dealt with also with UNCLOS I and III. The latter specifies that national sovereignty over airspace extends vertically above the mainland and territorial waters borderline.123
The narrative
The legal status of the Aegean Sea in 1973 when the dispute officialy arose included unclear continental shelf limits as well as breadths of territorial waters and national airspace. The complexity of the case related to the particular geographical characteristics of the Aegean Sea and the lack of established and respected international regulations on territorial sea was exacerbated by incoherent reactions towards the other side‟s practices with regards to these three issues.124 Greece had begun granting permissions for oil exploration in the Aegean Sea from the 1960s provoking no Turkish reaction. With regards to territorial waters, the Lausanne Treaty did not include an explicit delimitation but the two states seemed to advance the three miles delimitation. Greece proceeded to an extension of its territorial waters in 1936 to six miles, provoking no reaction from the Turkish side,125 which was internationally favouring the six miles option. Greece‟s extention aimed to control Italian movement in the Aegean Sea at a time when the southeastern Aegean islands were still under Italian sovereignty.126 In fact, Turkey only chose to extend its territorial waters from three to six miles in 1964. As for Greek national airspace, Greece proceeded to
123 http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm. 124 The scope of the discussion here is limited to providing an overview of the main arguments that the two states expressed, mostly in the early stages of the dispute, upon which the analysis of bilateral relations by the relevant literature henceforth formed its basic assumptions. The two sides‟ argumentation is not comprehensive, as an analysis of the legal aspect of the case lies outside the scope of the thesis. Similarly, not all disputed issues are presented, but only those widely accepted as more essential, in the sense of providing evidence of policy makers‟ fears, perceptions and intentions. Implicitly, an evaluation of the relative legal strength of each side‟s arguments is not attempted. 125 In fact reactions to the extension were expressed after the Aegean Sea dispute arose. See for example Aksu, F. “Preservation of Demilitarized Status of the Aegean Islands for National Security of Turkey”, Turkish Review of Balkan Studies, (2002), pp. 107-133. 126 See Sazanides, 1979, 79. 45 extention of its national airspace to 10 nautical miles as early as 1931 and Turkey did not complain until 1974, claiming not to be aware of the 1931 extension. On the contrary Turkey had ever since the late 1960s protested the militarization of the eastern Aegean Sea islands which commenced in that decade and intensified towards its end, again at a time of crisis in Cyprus and after the struggle for „Enosis‟ that was undertaken in the island. Legally, demilitarization of those islands was addressed by the Treaty of Lausanne and that of Montreux of 1936 and seemed to refer to “partial militarization”,127 particularly for the islands of Mytilene, Chios, Samos and Ikaria. Until the end of the 1960s the Greek side‟s response to Turkish protests of militarization mainly argued that the limits set by the relative Treaties were not disregarded. Greece reacted to the TPAO explorations invoking articles 1 and 6 of UNCLOS I which awarded islands their own continental shelf and allowed for unilateral delimitation of continental shelf in cases of no existing agreement. Greece argued that the Greek continental shelf had been unilaterally delimited at the median line of the distance between its eastern Aegean islands and the Turkish coast. Consequently, Turkish actions given the lack of previous signs of challenge of the region‟s legal status were considered as aiming to revise the status quo. Turkey, encouraged by the 1969 ICJ ruling over the North Sea Continental Shelf Case which took the geological criterion under consideration, responded by arguing that a) the continental shelf of the eastern Aegean Sea constitutes the geological continuation of the Turkish mainland and that adjustant islands are mere protuberances within the continental shelf of the Turkish coast, thus favouring the geological criterion for determining continental shelves, and b) that the median line criterion was not applicable in the face of special circumstances (i.e the existence of Greek islands close to the Turkish shore) within a semi-enclosed sea. Therefore for Turkey, “Greece possessed no sovereign rights in the Aegean beyond its territorial waters”.128 Greece was especially wary of the geological criterion which was perceived as furthering Turkey‟s intention to
127 Partial militarization suggests the permission of deployment of conscripts in military camps in the islands but precludes the establishment of naval bases, according to Article 13 of the Lausanne Treaty, http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Treaty_of_Lausanne, accessed on 13 March 2010. 128 The Turkish Representative in the Security Council. UN Doc. S/PV. 1950, August 13, 1976, pp. 7-10. 46 achieve the partition of the Aegean Sea, leaving eastern Aegean Islands enclosed within Turkish continental shelf. At the same time the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea had begun aiming to conclude with a Convention dealing with all matters related to the law of the sea. From the first rounds of negotiations it became evident to the Turkish delegation that a vital issue for Turkish interests, the breadth of territorial sea would possibly be settled with the adoption of the twelve mile rule and the former was quick to state its objections. Turkish diplomats were also aware that were Greece and Turkey to agree on a joint application to the ICJ for the continental shelf issue they would first need to agree on what breadth of territorial waters the court should decide upon. For Greek interests the adoption of the twelve mile rule would de jure limit Turkish claims over the disputed continental shelf. Turkish policy makers interpreted Greek arguments on unilateral delimitation as an attempt to block Turkey‟s access to the Aegean Sea (see Figure 2.1129) and a sentiment of claustrophobia was expressed.130 Evaluating state preferences during the UN Conference, Turkey estimated that international maritime law could advance Greek interests and Turkish diplomats began to shape their preference for a settlement of all unresolved issues through bilateral negotiations.131 After the summer of 1974 Turkey intensified its objections to the militarization of the eastern Aegean islands and Greece reacted by highlighting the latter‟s defensive character in light of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the challenge to the legal status in the region. Turkey also raised issues of delimitation of the region FIR zones of responsibility, promoting the adoption of a dividing line in the middle of the Aegean Sea. Finally, Turkey highlighted the mismatch between Greek territorial waters and national airspace, challenging Greek arguments with flights between the six and ten mile
129 Map extracted from Ortolland, D. “The Greco-Turkish Dispute Over the Aegean Sea: A Possible Solution?”, La revue geopolitique, 10 April 2009, found at: http://www.diploweb.com/The-Greco-Turkish- dispute-over-the.html, accessed on 25 May 2012. 130 See Ecevit‟s argument during the Montreux meetings, in Svolopoulos, K (ed.). Απσεία Καπαμανλή: Γεγονόηα & Κείμενα [Karamanlis Archives: Events and Texts], Vol. 10, (Athens: Ekdotikh Athinwn, 1997), p. 136. 131 Also see Bahceli, T. “Turning a New Page in Turkey‟s Relations with Greece? The Challenge of Reconciling Vital Interests” in M. Aydin, and K. Yfantis (eds.), Turkish-Greek relations: The Security Dilemma in the Aegean, (London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 98-99. 47
Figure 2.1: Map of the Aegean Sea displaying Greek and Turkish positions on continental shelf and territorial waters. radius. Greece argued that Turkey was aware of the 1931 extension, and the long period of acquiescence with that practice, codified local customary practice. Bilateral talks were initiated at various levels in 1974 and Greece suggested a joint application to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), with Turkey stating its preference for bilateral negotiations although not rejecting the solution of the Court and including the issue of territorial sea and Greek national airspace.
48
Indeed the two Foreign Ministers met during a NATO Summit in Rome with the Greek side having prepared a draft joint application which the Turkish delegation refused to discuss, demonstrating the first signs of consolidation of their strategic preference for bilateral negotiations. As mentioned above, Greek and Tukish diplomats alike seemed to share an understanding of UNCLOS I and ongoing negotiations on UNCLOS III as favouring Greek arguments on the continental shelf and territorial waters.132 The two Prime Ministers Karamanlis and Demirel met in Brussels in 1975 with the latter momentarily agreeing on the inclusion of a reference to the ICJ as means of settling the continental shelf issue in the issued joint statement. After harsh criticisms raised domestically133 Turkey retrieted from that position and returned to favouring bilateral negotiations on all unresolved issues. In 1976, and while bilateral talks at various levels were still taking place, Turkish oceanographic vessel Sismik 1 set out to explore the above mentioned continental shelf.134 Greece reacted by addressing a communication to the President of the UN Security Council requesting an urgent meeting of the Council “following repeated flagrant violations by Turkey of the sovereign rights of Greece in the continental shelf in the Aegean” causing a “dangerous situation threatening international peace and security”.135 Turkey responded by restating its legal stand that no violation had taken place, by raising the issue of militarization of the eastern Aegean islands in violation of the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 and asking the Council to urge Greece to enter into meaningful negotiations and halt the militarization of the islands so as to end the threat of peace and security in the region.136 On the same day Greece unilaterally applied to the International Court of Justice against Turkey asking for a resolution in the continental shelf dispute and interim measures of protection by the Court which would ensure that no further explorations or military action would take place pending the final judgement of the Court.
132 Heraclides, 2007, pp. 90-100. 133 Ibid., pp. 100-102. 134 See ibid., p. 102 for an explanation of this decision based on domestic sources of foreign policy. 135 UN Doc. S/12167. 136 After 1974, the Greek argument switched to the necessity of militarization in light of Turkish revisionist intentions. The deployment of Turkish troops along the Aegean coast, and the establishment of the Aegean Army, according to Turkey a reactive strategy to the militarization of the eastern Aegean islands, re- enforced perceptions of the existence of a typical security dilemma between the two states. 49
Resolution 395 (1976) of the Security Council called for restraint in both sides and urged the two sides to resume negotiations in order to reach mutually acceptable solutions and also to take into account the contribution that the International Court of Justice is qualified to make to the settlement of any remaining legal differences.137 The Court decided not to address the resolution issue and declined to consider interim measures of protection.138 The official responses of the two institutions led to mixed reactions from both sides.139 The two foreign ministers met again twice in 1976 and diplomats Tzounis and Bilge signed the Bern Protocol which comprised of necessary actions for the peaceful and productive continuation of bilateral talks, including promises of non-agression which led to fierce domestic criticisms of the Greek government‟s strategy.140 High level talks as well as continental shelf and airspace expert meetings continued to take place until the end of the decade with the two sides insisting on their proposed settlement methods. The bilateral relation entered a second phase during the next decade, marked with PASOK‟s rise to power in Greece and the subsequent halt of bilateral talks as well as the amalgamation of relevant international legal provisions and practices. As mentioned above practices of unilateral delimitation of continental shelf became scarce in light of state reactions and the Law of the Sea Treaty provided the twelve mile rule for breadths of territorial waters and did not include any reference to the validity of the geological criterion which similarly became obsolete. Greece has since argued that the Treaty codifies customary international law, thus covering states that have not signed it, while Turkey objects. Finally, based on Article 15 Greece has insisted on her right to unilateral extension of territorial waters at the median line of the distance between eastern Aegean islands and the Turkish coast, while Turkey invokes the same Treaty‟s mention to special circumstances. In 1987 the two sides allegedly came to the brink of conflict after the Turkish decision to proceed to seismographic research over disputed continental shelf. The costly
137 UN Security Council Resolution 395. 1976, available from: http://daccess-dds- ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/294/83/IMG/NR029483.pdf?OpenElement. 138 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case. 1976, International Court of Justice, available from: http://www.icj- cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=324&code=gt&p1=3&p2=3&case=62&k=81&p3=5. 139 Gross, L. “The Dispute Between Greece and Turkey Concerning the Continental Shelf in the Aegean", The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 71, No. 1 (1977), pp. 31-59. 140 Heraclides, 2007, p. 106. 50 signal of resolve sent by Greece with the immediate deployment of almost the entire Greek navy fleet in the region gave the incident a dramatic character. The seismographic ship did not go on to explore disputed zones, and Ankara significantly de-escalated the crisis with President Özal stating that Turkey would not begin explorations unless Greece did so first. During the 1990s the relation remained dominated by high political tension and two new issues were added to the Aegean Sea agenda. The first is related to Turkey‟s reaction to declare a unilateral Greek extension of territorial waters as casus belli immediately after the Treaty‟s ratification by the Greek Parliament in 1994. The second and more contentious is the grey zones Turkish argument put forth with the emergence of the Imia/Kardak crisis of 1996. Turkey then claimed sovereignty over islands and islets of the Aegean Sea, the status of which had been dealt with by the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. This new issue, founded on a peculiar reading of the Treaty and the rejection of a particular document‟s validity, seemed to surprise Greek officials and was again considered as clear evidence of Turkey‟s expansionist strategy. Article 12 of the Lausanne Treaty stipulates:
The decision taken…regarding the sovereignty of Greece over the islands of the Eastern Mediterranean, other than the islands of Imvros, Tenedos and Rabbit Islands, particularly the islands of Lemnos, Samothrace, Mytilene, Chios, Samos and Ikaria, is confirmed, subject to the provisions of the present Treaty respecting the islands placed under the sovereignty of Italy which form the subject of Article 15. Except where a provision to the contrary is contained in the present Treaty, the islands situated at less than three miles from the Asiatic coast remain under Turkish sovereignty.141
Therefore, Article 12 confirms Greek sovereignty over eastern Aegean islands, naming some of them (Lemnos, Samothrace, Mytilene, Chios, Samos and Ikaria) and excluding Imvros, Tenedos, the Rabbit islands and all islands situated within three miles
141 Treaty of Peace with Turkey, July 24. 1923, found at: http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Treaty_of_Lausanne. 51 of the Turkish coast as well as islands placed under Italian sovereignty with Article 15. Article 15 reads:
Turkey renounces in favour of Italy all rights and title over the following islands: Stampalia (Astrapalia), Rhodes (Rhodos), Calki (Kharki), Scarpanto, Casos (Casso), Piscopis (Tilos), Misiros (Nisyros), Calimnos (Kalymnos), Leros, Patmos, Lipsos (Lipso), Simi (Symi), and Cos (Kos), which are now occupied by Italy, and the islets dependent thereon, and also over the island of Castellorizzo.142
Furthermore, the 1947 Treaty of Peace with Italy included provisions on the transfer of sovereignty of the Dodecanese Islands to Greece. Previously, in 1932 Turkey and Italy had signed a Protocol delimiting the borderline between the Dodecanese and the Turkish coast with the Imia/Kardak islets falling under Italian sovereignty. Turkey has disputed the validity of the document which was not ratified by the Turkish General Assembly and was not posted on the League of Nations chart. On that basis as well as an alternative interpretation of the term „dependent‟ found in Article 15, Turkey has accused Greece of settling rocks in order to alter the status quo and affect the relevance of legal provisions and continues to dispute Greek sovereignty over a number of islets.
Greek-Turkish relations literature Realism
Until recently realism had remained dominant within both the Greek and Turkish I.R communities and the academic debate revolved around policy prescriptions reflecting the rigid (ethnocentric) and moderate (internationalist) realist schools of thought with fundamental assumptions remaining undisputed.143 Controversy was only spurred by arguments over the extent to which the anarchic global system was able to prevent the emergence of norms and institutions facilitating cooperation. Both schools of thought
142 Ibid. 143 For an overview of the Greek I.R community‟s evolution over the past decades, see Mikelis, K. The Self-Reflection of the Greek I.R community: The Decade of the 1990s, paper presented at the 1st LSE PhD Symposium on Social Science Research On Greece (2003). 52 displayed structural elements and reductionist weaknesses in balancing the agency of a state as a decision-maker, the effect of the international structure on state preferences and domestic foreign policy sources. As a result, the majority of existing relevant literature had until recently relied on realist assumptions. How can realist domination of the issue be explained? Firstly, the crisis arose at a time when explanations based on the view of states as self-helpers within a decentralized, anarchic ordering principle dominated the I.R field. Interestingly, the referred period coincided roughly with the establishment of the I.R academic communities in both Greece and Turkey. Faced with the oil crisis of 1973, and given evidence of oil deposits in the Aegean Sea, both communities came to identify national interests with the fate of existing natural resources, and consider the dispute as evidence of an antagonistic relation. In fact, their work was not restricted to the production of academic research, as the nature of foreign policy making allowed for their institutionalized influence on policy-making.144 The appeal of realist thinking within Greek and Turkish decision- makers, as well as within their respective societies was constantly reinstated by the pertaining stalemate. And while the international I.R community produced challenges which led to the evolution of the realist tradition and the emergence of alternative paradigms, certain characteristics of the two states‟ respective I.R communities did not allow for their integration within the international community in terms of academic practice and level of research.145 Heraclides notes that since the late 1980s challenges to moderate realism were posed by rigid realism and strategic studies rather than critical theory or postmodernism.146 Consequently, a large part of those communities had
144 For the contribution of Athanasios Platias, Panayotis Ifaistos and Hristodoulos Giallourides to the conception of the „Single Defense Doctrine‟ between Greece and Cyprus. see Constas, D. Δλληνική και Δςπυπαφκή Πολιηική 1991-1999. Αναλύζειρ και Μαπηςπίερ [Greek and European Policy 1991-1999, Analysis and testimonials], (Athens: Papazisis, 1999), pp. 80-82. 145 Constas 1999, pp. 55-91. 146 Heraclides, A. Η Δλλάδα και ο Δξ’ Αναηολών Κίνδςνορ [Greece and the danger from the East], (Athens: Polis, 2001), p. 169. 53 remained faithful to classical realism in analyzing I.R147 despite its exposed limitations.148 Thus for realists in the Greek I.R community, Turkey was regarded as a revisionist state which constitutes a threat for Greek sovereignty and the distinctions arise in terms of deterring the threat, whether aggressively149 or moderately.150 For Turkish officials and scholars of the same school of thought, Greek aggressiveness and expansionism is a constant in Turkish foreign policy making.151 Within this framework, whether considerations were geopolitical or economic, any concession by one state was automatically regarded by realists and neorealists as a loss in a zero sum game.152 High military expenditures sustained ever since in both states, had been explained based on the existence of an arms race and the security dilemma, while crises and „hot incidents‟ were viewed as deterrence episodes. Realist accounts of Greek-Turkish relations have been repeatedly falsified empirically. Firstly, from a realist perspective, with official rhetoric echoing perceptions of revisionist adversaries, the bilateral talks that took place from 1974 to 1981 are to say the least, problematic and could only be explained by invoking concern for international audiences. More specifically, the two states‟ willingness to converse should be related to their interest in gaining the support of the international community and particularly key NATO allies. Admittedly, the value of the “one step ahead” in settlement initiatives
147 Realist dominance over the Greek I.R community is documented extensively in Constas 1999 and Tsakonas, P. The Incomplete Breakthrough in Greek-Turkish Relations. Grasping Greece’s Socialization Strategy (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010). 148 For the evolution of the I.R community in Turkey, see Aydinli, E., and J. Mathews. “Towards Homegrown Theorizing and Building Disciplinary Community”, in A. B. Tickner, and O. Waever (eds.), International Relations Scholarships around the World (London:T & F Books, 2009), pp. 208-222. 149 Kondylis, P. Πλανηηική πολιηική μεηά ηον τςσπό πόλεμο [Global Post-Cold War Politics], (Athens: Themelio, 1992). 150 Couloumbis, T. Ο πόλορ ηηρ Δλλάδαρ ζηα μεηατςσποπολεμικά Βαλκάνια [Greece‟s Role in the Post-Cold War Balkans], (Athens: Epilogh, 1992). 151 Elekdag, S. “War Strategy”, Perceptions, March-May 1996, pp. 33-57. 152 See for instance Platias, A. “Greece's Strategic Doctrine: In Search of Autonomy and Deterrence”, in D. Constas (ed.), The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s (London: McMillan, 1991); Platias, A. “Η Τνπξθία ζε αλαδήηεζε ξόινπ πεξηθεξεηαθήο ππεξδύλακεο: Σπλέπεηεο γηα ηελ ειιεληθή ζηξαηεγηθή”, in C. Tsakonas, and P. Giallourides (eds.), Η νεα διεθνήρ ηάξη: Η Δλλάδα, η Τοςπκία και ηο Κςππιακό ππόβλημα [The New World Order: Greece, Turkey and the Cyprus Problems], (Athens: Sideris, 1993); Ifaistos, P. “Απνηξεπηηθή Σηξαηεγηθή θαη ειιεληθή εμωηεξηθή πνιηηηθή”, in P. Ifaistos, and A. Platias (eds.), Γιλλήμαηα και πποβλήμαηα ηηρ εθνικήρ ζηπαηηγικήρ ηηρ Δλλάδορ υρ ηαςηόσπονα εςπυπαφκό και βαλκανικό κπάηορ [Dillemas and problems of Greek National Strategy as a Simultaneously European and Balkan State], (Athens: Papazisis, 1992). 54 strategy has been repeatedly demonstrated in various domains.153 Also, Turkey did seek to get the American arms embargo, imposed by the Congress as sanctions after the invasion/intervention in Cyprus, lifted and Greece sought to be reintegrated in the military pillar of NATO (after its withdrawal in response to what was perceived as a passive allied reaction to the 1974 Turkish action), while Turkey was using its own veto power against that prospect. However, if concern for international audiences dictated the necessity of interaction it could not define its characteristics. Evidence from the “Karamanlis Archives” and retired diplomats‟ memoirs leads to the conclusion that the nature of the discussions, with the two sides agreeing on conversing behind closed doors and proceeding to honest argumentation regarding their perceptions, interests and limitations disproves the claim that interaction took place for public display only.154 Talks were obviously meaningful and participants even discussed departing from official red lines. Some of these departures, such as Greece‟s willingness to discuss limited continental shelf for the eastern Aegean Sea islands155 and Turkey‟s intention to forego the extension of the mainland‟s continental shelf so that Greek islands would not end up enclosed156 by Turkish continental shelf, blatantly contradict both realist and neorealist assumptions. Suggesting that talks were meaningful does not automatically translate into a genuine desire to solve the dispute even though both states negotiators of the time (Tzounis157 and Bilge158) have argued that the two sides in fact came very close to a solution. What it implies is that a perceived possibility of solution was existent in both decision makers‟ minds and was contingent on domestic considerations. Therefore it seems that the two negotiators seemed to consider talks as strategic interaction, with the
153 See recent official statements on the strategy of being “one step ahead”: “Greece Backs Greek Cypriot Proposals to jumpstart UN talks”, Hurriyet Daily News, 22 July 2010, found at: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=greece-backs-greek-cyriot-proposals-to-jumpstart-un-talks- 2010-07-22, accessed on 23 July 2010. 154 For details on the talks see Theodoropoulos, V. Οι Τούπκοι και Δμείρ [The Turks and Us], (Athens: Fytrakis, 1988), pp. 247-335; Karamanlis Archives. Vol. 11, p. 55, Sazanides, C. A, Οι Δλληνοηοςπκικέρ Σσέζειρ ζηη Πενηαεηία 1973-1978 [Greek-Turkish Relations, 1973-1978], (Thesaloniki, 1979). 155 See Karamanlis Archives, Vol. 10, p. 134. 156 Ibid., Vol. 11, p. 55. 157 Huliaras, A. C. The Foreign Policy of the Greek Socialists (1981-1986): Forces of Continuity and Change, (University of Hull, 1989), p. 80. 158 Bilge, S. “The Situation in Aegean”, The Aegean Issues: Problems and Prospects (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 1989), p. 9. 55 purpose of providing information on payoffs and strategies, discovering red lines and exploring possibilities of cooperation. Evidently, the relation was not viewed as a zero sum game by both negotiators. Furthermore, the two sides proceeded to costly signals by signing the Bern Protocol159 of no provocation. That agreement which was heavily criticized domestically in both jurisdictions,160 automatically created audience costs that they would suffer ex- post if they did not follow through on their commitment.161 In the 1980s the tense climate preserved through overzealous nationalistic rhetoric and constantly increasing military expenditures that characterized the relation following newly elected PASOK‟s decision to halt bilateral talks consolidated the realist understanding of the relation in academia, the political system and society. In 1987 the two sides allegedly came to the brink of conflict in what has been branded in Greek literature162 as a classic threat-deterrence episode that took place in the Aegean, after the Turkish decision to proceed to seismographic research over disputed continental shelf. The costly signal of resolve sent by Greece with the immediate deployment of almost the entire Greek navy fleet in the region was not however precipitated by a counter-activation of the Turkish Armed Forces and evidence demonstrates that Turkey did not mobilize her forces during the crisis despite aggressive official rhetoric.163 The seismographic ship did not explore disputed zones, and Ankara significantly de-escalated the crisis with President Özal stating that Turkey would not begin explorations unless Greece did so first. Dimitrakis has argued that there was no real Turkish threat during the crisis and that events were meant to be of political rather than of military value. Therefore since there was no Turkish threat to Greek sovereignty, there was no deterrence. Evidence of Turkish
159 Heraclides, 2007, pp. 105-108. 160 Wilson, A. “The Aegean Sea Dispute”, Adelphi Papers, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979. 161 Fearon, J. D. “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs”, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 41, No. 1, New Games: Modeling Domestic-International Linkages (1997), pp. 68-90. 162 See for instance Ifaistos, P., and A. Platias (eds.). Δλληνική Αποηπεπηική Σηπαηηγική [Greek Deterrent Strategy], (Athens: Papazisis, 1992); Kapsis, Y. Οι ηπειρ ημέπερ ηος Μάπηη [The Three Days of March], (Athens: Livanis, 1980). 163 Dimitrakis, P. “Greek Military Intelligence and the Turkish Threat during the 1987 Aegean Crisis”, Journal of Modern Greek Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1 (2007), pp. 99-127. 56 mobilization is at best dubious and insufficient and what gave the incident the character of a deterrence episode was only official rhetoric from both sides.164 Increasing military expenditures throughout the 1980s165 led research to the direction of establishing the existence of an arms race, a result of neorealist thinking based on the security dilemma. However, high military expenditures alone do not establish the existence of an arms race. In fact, much of the work in the field of defence economics166 failed to establish the existence of bipolar causality.167 Smith, Sola and Spagnolo have argued against the existence of an arms race and have pointed at internal explanations of high military expenditures. They modelled the alleged arms race using a simple repeated two by two game, like the Prisoner‟s Dilemma with the two states‟ available strategies corresponding to High and Low military expenditure. Using a discrete state regime-switching model they tested hypotheses related to state strategies and found that they were largely independent from one another and strategies tended to be persistent.168 Brauer in a critique of the relevant literature among others criticized published work for not examining the two states‟ external security concerns as a whole, consisting of multiple potential threats and argued that the possibility of „false‟ reactive armament, resulting from the other‟s preoccupation with other threats cannot be explored using a Richardson arms model in Granger-causality form.169. Furthermore, he also criticized the lack of research on:
164 Ibid., pp. 108, 109-110. 165 Turkey‟s military expenditures as a percentage on GDP appear lower than that of Greece. However, researchers have argued that figures are significantly underestimated, see for instance Günlük-ġenesen, G. Measuring the Extent of Defense Expenditures: The Turkish Case with Turkish Data (Istanbul: Istanbul University, 1999). 166 See for instance Kollias, C., and Paleologou, S. M. “Is There a Greek-Turkish Arms Race?: Some Further Empirical Results from Causality Tests”, Defense and Peace Economics, Vol. 13, No. 4 (2002), pp. 321-328; Andreou, A. S., et al. “Optimal Versus Required Defense Expenditure: The Case of the Greek- Turkish Arms Race”, Defense and Peace Economics, Vol. 13, No. 4 (2002), pp. 329-347; Ocal, N. “Asymmetric Effects of Military Expenditure between Turkey and Greece”, Defense and Peace Economics, Vol. 13, No. 5 (2002), pp. 405-416; Ocal, N., and J. Yildirim. “Arms Race Between Turkey and Greece: A Threshold Cointegration Analysis”, Defense and Peace Economics, Vol. 20, No. 2 (2009), pp. 123-129. 167 Brauer, J. “Survey and Review of the Defense Economics Literature on Greece and Turkey: What Have we Learned?”, Defense and Peace Economics, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2002), p. 91. 168 Smith, R., M. Sola, and F. Spagnolo. “The Prisoner‟s Dilemma and Regime Switching in the Greek- Turkish Army Race”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 37, No. 6 (2000), pp. 737-750. 169 Ibid., p. 90. 57
“The internal decision-making processes that generate levels of military expenditure within Greece and Turkey. Virtually all one finds is the occasional use of a dummy variable for Greece‟s and for Turkey‟s military governments or for Greece‟s socialist government that came to power in 1981. But that is not the same as examining the issue from the point of view of administrative or bureaucratic processes within each country, say by means of a public choice model”.170
Similarly, others have criticized published work for being overly mechanical and lacking a theoretical background that would allow for conclusive answers on the question.171 As Smith puts it: “When we apply statistical tests, what we are almost invariably testing are characteristics of specific models, not theories”.172 In any case, evidence on the existence of an arms race is far from overwhelming. A turning point for the bilateral relation occurred in 1999, when the Greek government decided to lift the veto on the Turkish EU accession course at the Helsinki Summit and proceeded to a wide range of rapprochement policies facilitating interaction between the two states‟ civil societies and business communities, iniating exploratory talks on the Aegean Sea dispute173 and promote negotiations between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots on the basis of an UN solution plan. This turn of events constituted a challenge realists found extremely difficult to deal with. Not more than a year before the Helsinki Summit, at a time when the Ocalan crisis had cast its shadow over bilateral relations, predictions of moderate and rigid realists alike remained bleak.174 After the Summit, such explanations of the Helsinki policy proved inadequate to offer something more than ad hoc, somewhat arbitrary and often conflicting interpretations. On some occasions, the use of a novel concept of „realization‟ was
170 Brauer, 2002, p. 100. 171 Georgiou, G. “Is there an Arms Race between Greece and Turkey? Some Preliminary Econometric Results”, Cyprus Journal of Economics, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1990), pp. 58-73. 172 Smith, R, P. „„Quantitative Methods in Peace Research‟‟, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 35, No. 4 (1998), pp. 421. 173Helsinki European Council. Presidency Conclusions, 1999, found at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1_en.htm, accessed on 19 November 2007. 174 See for instance Couloumbis, T. Δξυηεπική Πολιηική. Γιάλογοι Μιαρ Κπίζιμηρ Δποσήρ [Foreign Policy. Dialogues of a Critical Era], (Athens: Sideris, 1999); Khalilzad Z., and I. O. Lesser. Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century: Strategic Flashpoints and U.S Strategy.(RAND, 1998). 58 employed to account for the radical Greek policy shift.175 Giannis Magriotis argued that: “The main reason was the realization that it was not in Greece‟s interest to be the obstacle in Turkey‟s European course. Most European countries did not favour Turkey‟s prospects but were reluctant to express their opposition relying on Greece‟s objections. Greece was until then spending enormous political and diplomatic resources within various institutions in order to apply the chosen policy towards Turkey‟s European integration”.176 But surely no convincing explanation of state preferences can rely on the notion of preference-realignment on an ad hoc basis. Theodoros Pangalos viewed the policy shift as the continuation and the end result of the successful veto strategy employed in the preceding years.177 But even if that was indeed the case how is the endorsement of close economic, and social interaction between the two states explained and how can that be part of the same rationale? Hypothetically, states acting towards safeguarding national interests under neorealist assumptions should in this case exclude the possibility of rapprochement given perceptions about the other‟s preferences and intentions, and concern over relative gains should constitute an obstacle to the conclusion of any cooperative attempt in trade negotiations. Aydin and Yfantis view the Helsinki policy as a strategic change on behalf of the two states that represented their intention to move away from brinkmanship strategies exhibited on three occasions within the previous three years.178 Two questions arise from this assumption. Firstly, how were the two states able to bypass the security dilemma and cooperate on a tension-reduction strategy? This strategy seems incomprehensible under a neorealist perspective as much as France and Germany‟s cooperation in forming the European Community in the aftermath of World War II was. Secondly, as above how are other aspects of the rapprochement policy, for instance the political endorsement of the Ethniki-Finansbank deal, compatible with such an explanation? The Helsinki strategy and the rapprochement of the following period along with the realist failure to offer convincing answers signified the emergence of foreign policy explanations rooted in the constructivist paradigm and focused on the effects of the
175 See for instance Veremis, T. Greeks and Turks in War and Peace (Athens: Athens News, 2007), p. 225. 176 Interview with Giannis Magriotis, Athens, 26 November 2008; Also see Veremis, 2007, p. 225. 177 Interview with Theodoros Pangalos, Athens, 9 December 2008. 178 Aydin, M., and K. Yfantis (eds.), Turkish-Greek relations: The Security Dilemma in the Aegean (London: Routledge, 2004). 59 process of Europeanization and socialization in transforming Greek and Turkish foreign policies.
Culturalism, constructivism and Europeanization
Recently published work on Greek-Turkish relations has emphasized the significance of culturalist variables in analyzing various aspects, from the pertaining stalemate to foreign policy transformation. Providing normative accounts of the two states‟ political history and development, culturalists sought to disprove the conceptualization of opposing national interests rendering conflict structurally irreversible and argued that cultures and normative creations constitute the structural obstacles to normalization of relations. Education, literature and ethnocentric norms thus came under the spotlight. 179 Millas for instance offered an exhaustive analysis of both peoples‟ images of the „Other‟, promoted by school textbooks, historiography and literature and their effects on the preservation of stereotypes.180 His consistent methodological collectivism ensures a very informative account of the implications of dominant cultures and leads the author to conclude that normative change can only be generational. Therefore, his work exemplifies culturalist limitations discussed in the introduction, related to the explanation of normative shifts disregarding instrumental individual action. Focusing on Greek nationalism, Heraclides discussed distinct forms of ethnocentric conceptions advocated by various groups within Greek society.181 Although his work is rather agent-centric182 the author stopped short from developing a comprehensive framework of explaining individual actions, preferences, the adoption and promotion of ethnocentrism. Throughout his work, plausible explanations of the anti- Turkish sentiment are hinted, ranging from the collectivist „collective psychological void‟ and insecurity, to evidently instrumental individual action related to self-interest: “those
179 See Dragwna, T. Τι Διν’η Παηπίδα μαρ, Δθνοκενηπιζμόρ ζηην Δκπαίδεςζη, [What is our Homeland? Ethnocentrism in Education] (Alexandreia, Athens, 1997); Ozkırımlı, U., and S. Sofos. Tormented by History: Nationalism in Greece and Turkey (New York, New York: Columbia University Press, 2008). 180 Millas, H. Δικόνερ Δλλήνυν και Τούπκυν [Images of Greeks and Turks], (Athens: Alexandreia, 2004). 181 Heraclides, 2001. 182 He refers to the intelligentsia as “creators of reality, when their views and theories come to dominate the public sphere and influence international relations”, Ibid., p. 43. 60 who are worried (about their country’s safety) in Greece and Turkey, who are in danger of losing their role and going into retirement, are there, as if in accord with their counterparts on the other side, ready to raise the tension so that they will be back in the spotlight”.183 Overall, although normative change is acknowledged by the author and sporadically linked causally to instrumental calculations, its explanation remains lingering between an agent-centric and a culturalist framework with no explicitly established theoretical linkage of the two. Another culturalist strand emphasized the role of the EU in transforming member states‟ foreign policies. Analyses of Greek foreign policy in particular have displayed various degrees of theoretical groundation, with constructivist thinking largely employed in theoretically sound work although various attempts to incorporate instrumental considerations are noted. Thus Economides has conceptualized recent Europeanization of Greek foreign policy as a „bottom up‟ process whereby Greece after striving to westernize and modernize its foreign policy-making style then sought to multilateralize her national interests thus using the EU as a collective vehicle of national interest promotion.184 Undoubtedly, Economides‟s largely historical account of the evolution of Greek foreign policy is very informative with regards to the interaction of structural, cultural and strategic elements inherent in the explanation of any political phenomenon. However, seen under that light Europeanization becomes an even broader concept, a conceptual umbrella under which important strategic interactions under distinct structural settings go largely unexplored. Tsardanidis and Stavridis have offered a qualification of mainstream arguments about the successful Europeanization of Greek foreign policy, arguing that only during its last phase has Greek foreign policy been marginally Europeanized.185 However, not much explanation of the mechanisms that enabled any such transformation is offered, but conclusions are merely founded on ad hoc examples of policy-making practices or policy shifts and structural constraints over policy alternatives. In fact the authors do refer to
183 Heraclides, 2001, p. 62. 184 Economides, S. “The Europeanization of Greek Foreign Policy”, West European Politics, Vol. 28, No. 2 (2005), pp. 471-491. 185 Tsardanidis, C., and S. Stavridis. “The Europeanisation of Greek Foreign Policy: A Critical Appraisal”, European Integration, Vol. 27, No. 2 (2005), pp. 217-239. 61
“dysfunction of domestic factors and actors” and acknowledge that: “the Europeanization process in Greece is the result (to a large extent) of the ongoing struggle between conservatives/traditionalists and modernizers/transformers”186 but do not attempt to disentangle the black box of strategic interactions. Tsakonas has offered a theoretically sophisticated culturalist account of the 1999 Greek policy shift.187 The author constructs his theoretical framework around the causal effect of strategic culture and international socialization on foreign policy formation by tracing the exact processes that link international and domestic factors. Conceding his intention to synthesize rationalist and culturalist assumptions, Tsakonas firstly proceeds to the distinction between national and agentic culture, the latter reflecting policymakers‟ culture, and secondly acknowledges that actors can be strategic whilst pursuing socialization strategies. Tsakonas seems to ascribe to the view of socialization strategies as put forth by scholars who sought to synthesize rationalist and constructivist assumptions188 and analyses Greece‟s strategy to socialize the stronger and threatening neighbor by borrowing the “socialization power” component of an international institution. A similar agentic depiction of domestic factors follows whereby distinguishing between agentic and national culture Tsakonas contends that “the dialectic relationship between the two distinct realms of Greece‟s strategic culture can thus explain why there was a major change in Greece‟s strategic behaviour in the mid to late 1990s”.189 Moreover, the author declares his intention to frame this transformation of agentic culture in clearly individualistic terms: “Gradually those who sought change – frustrated in the beginning by the lack of support from partisans of the dominant orthodoxy or the disengaged middle – started moving from minority to majority”,190 but does not follow through with this sort of analysis. Seeking to pinpoint the factors that led to that transformation of agentic culture, the author highlights the importance of the Imia crisis: “the Imia crisis made apparent to
186 Ibid., p. 231. 187 Tsakonas, 2010. P. 188 See for instance Schimmelfennig F. “International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in an Institutional Environment,” European Journal of International Relations Vol. 6, No. 1 (2000), pp 829-844. 189 Tsakonas, 2010, p. 14. 190 Ibid., p. 14. 62 the new administration the need for a reorientation of Greece‟s strategy vis-a-vis Turkey and, most importantly, helped it to distinguish faulty strategic concepts from effective ones”.191 Furthermore, he considers the realization of the counter-productivity of past strategies as motivation for culture transformation: “Having faced the burden of the counterproductive foreign policy of the early 1990s, the Simitis „modernizers‟ were thus called upon to overcome nationalist rigidities”.192 If there is an element of Tsakonas‟s argument that requires further elaboration that is the nature of that change of agentic culture. The explanation of a significant policy shift on the basis of a sudden realization on the part of decision-makers that strategies thus far adopted could actually lead to escalation and conflict, indeed invoked by decision-makers of the time,193 is somewhat insufficient. Surely, a rigid deterrence- oriented foreign policy toward what was perceived to be an undemocratic, revisionist, expansionary and stronger state could lead to the escalation of incidents whose diffusion would then require NATO, American or European mediation. Therefore, it is not enough to suggest that policymakers suddenly realized the danger and counter-productivity of past policies and instrumentally changed their agentic culture. In fact certain officials of that era have explained the Helsinki Strategy as the result of the successful veto strategy applied in the years before, suggesting that there was no change of agentic culture.194 It is argued here that what is missing from this explanation is the explicit methodological focus on actors as interest-motivated agents who select strategies responding to particular incentives. Policymakers can thus be conceptualized as implementing policies according to cost-benefit calculations and this depiction can help explain why certain strategies have persisted and under what conditions the same political system which upheld them managed to transform them. The normative framework then is incorporated in the analysis through individual dispositions and past investments as well as potential reputational costs attached to political choices. Finally, another strand has explicitly scrutinized the effect of the EU on conflicts at its borders. Rumelili for instance has offered an analysis of the role of the EU in
191 Ibid., p. 53. 192 Ibid., p. 69. 193 Interviews with Kostas Simitis, Giannis Magriotis, Dimitris Droutsas, Athens, 2008. 194 Interview with Theodoros Pangalos, 9 December 2008. 63 transforming the Greek-Turkish conflict195 relying on Diez et al.‟s196 framework of EU‟s impact and a classification of border type with the states in conflict. The analysis offers an association of distinct types of borders of the EU with Turkey during various stages of the Greek-Turkish dispute with domestic processes of foreign policy formation. However, the empirical verification of causality rather than association stumbles upon the assumption of the EU as a unitary actor and the simplification of domestic institutional structures.197
Strategic interaction
To my knowledge there have been two game theoretic depictions of the two states‟ strategic interaction over disputed issues, incorporating two levels of analysis. Guner has analysed the Aegean territorial waters conflict using evolutionary game theory, examining particularly the effects of the interaction between domestic political structures and bilateral negotiations on the prospects for a peaceful revision of the status quo.198 Guner offers a model which, taking into account the two states‟ relative military capability and war costs, attempts to predict the evolution of domestic politics and ultimately the outcome of the dispute. Appealing as the model itself is, the empirical evidence supporting its hypotheses, particularly regarding the verification of the evolution of the hawk-dove equilibrium depending on the outcomes of the crises is tenuous. Specifically, the model‟s predictions, expecting “a rise of hawks in Greece followed up by a similar evolution in the Turkish population”199 in the period after the 1996 Imia/Kardak crisis, as well as predicted Greek policy under Prime Minister Simitis have been falsified by empirical reality.
195 Rumelili, B. “Transforming Conflicts on EU Borders: the Case of Greek-Turkish Relations”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 45, No. 1 (2007), pp. 105-126. 196 Diez, T., S. Stetter, and M. Albert. “The European Union and Border Conflicts: The Transformative Power of Integration”, International Organization, Vol. 60, No 3 (2006), pp. 563-593. 197 The author suggests: “The hardliner and moderate positions are not necessarily tied to certain specific individuals or institutions: there is variance within institutions and across time. Therefore, it is more appropriate to analyse the EU‟s influence on these policy positions rather than on specific individuals and institutions”, Rumelili, 2007, p. 114. 198 Guner, S. “Aegean Territorial Waters Conflict: An Evolutionary Narrative”, 16th Annual IACM Conference, (Melbourne, Australia: Social Science Research Network, 2003), pp. 1-35. 199 Guner, 2003, p. 22. 64
Kirisci has depicted the rivalry between Turkey and Greece as a prisoner‟s dilemma where both negotiators choose to defect in light of domestic processes that have rendered defection as the dominant strategy.200 Although Kirisci uses the democratic peace notion of democracies not fighting eachother to suggest that the way out of the stalemate is Turkey‟s completion of a process of democratization, it is argued that a more constructive and theoretically sound reading of his model would interpret his recommendation as stemming from the hypothesis that in that event the game could transform into a coordination game where the cooperative equilibrium could be preferred to defection. Kirisci‟s depiction raises questions which, it is argued, the methodological approach applied in this thesis is best suited to answer. Is the game really a prisoner‟s dilemma? Has its structure remained the same throughout all the phases of the relation? What determines the structure and therefore who are the players? These questions are related more broadly to the limitations of neoliberal institutionalism. Although institutionalism has not been used to develop models of cooperation in the case at hand, the framework could be used if only to highlight the merits of the approach proposed here in linking agentic accounts of preference formation and evolving game structures. Neoliberal institutionalists conceive states as interacting strategically, devising strategies in a way fitting the depiction of oligopolistic markets, in which a limited number of states can cooperate in pursuit of common interests. They stress the subsequent creation or emergence of norms, regimes and institutions as means of achieving international cooperation. Furthermore, institutionalists have argued that various situations in international relations can be de theorized as issue domains with different game structures and have explained differences in international regimes according to the structure of the problem they were meant to solve.201 Let us attempt to discern our case‟s game structure from a neoliberalist perspective. The first, and arguably the most problematic step is then to assign
200 Kirisci, K. “The Enduring Rivalry between Greece and Turkey: Can „Democratic Peace Prevail?”, Alternatives, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2002). 201 For a description of these games see Snidal, D. “Coordination Versus Prisoner‟s Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes”, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 79, No. 4 (1985), pp. 923-942; Stein, A. A. “Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World”, International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 2 (1982), pp. 299-324; Oye, 1985. 65 preferences. After the Turkish invasion/intervention of Cyprus in 1974, Greece officially denied the legitimacy of all Turkish claims and only recognized the continental shelf issue as a matter officially in dispute and argued that it should be a matter of discussion at the ICJ after joint application by the two states. Turkey declared her desire to solve all matters under dispute through bilateral negotiations. Each one of those two distinct solutions was immediately declared unacceptable by the other side in a series of meetings between statesmen and bureaucrats.202 Their possible strategies right after the declaration of their official stands therefore were: Cooperate, which would suggest finding a third way of dealing with their bilateral dispute sending signals of modest claims and Rigid which translates into abstention from negotiations until the other side concedes to one‟s preferred settlement method. Modest signals could be sent by the Greek side by acknowledging the existence of special conditions in the Aegean Sea203 regarding the continental shelf delimitation and by declaring the will to compromise on the continental shelf of the eastern Aegean islands. And Turkey could tie its hands by acknowledging that Aegean islands are entitled to their own continental shelf and that therefore Greece‟s fear for Turkey‟s intent to divide the Aegean Sea in two and enclose Greek islands was unfounded. Decision makers‟ considerations seemed to be informed by uncertainty and mistrust regarding the other side‟s intentions and therefore any unilateral expression of modest preferences was considered as signifying a legitimization of the other‟s claims, therefore opening the door to new claims in the future. Such a strategy would bring them to the negotiation table facing the worst possible payoff. The shadow of the future would thus be a factor inhibiting strategy change, rather than facilitating cooperation, as was suggested by cooperation theorists in PD games. The Pareto optimal outcome would occur if the two sides proceeded to high level talks simultaneously but the Nash equilibrium is the non-cooperative outcome that characterizes today‟s stalemate. A PD structure would imply that the best payoff for each negotiator would result from playing rigid while the other side cooperates. But this does not seem to apply to the
202 Even though temporarily Suleyman Demirel had in 1976 publicly accepted the ICJ‟s jurisdiction in the Brussels Declaration, see Heraclides, 2007, p. 94-96. 203 The existence of „special conditions‟ in the Aegean Sea and the right of islands to their own continental shelf are legally contested matters, with the two sides supporting opposing views in fear of each other‟s intentions. 66 case at hand, and intuitively, if there was any difference between and it would be such that the outcome is greater than , by the size of the international reputation costs that one side would incur if they appeared to be the rigid party. If the international factor was left out of the bilateral interaction, the two outcomes would have identical payoffs. Therefore, it seems that within a neoliberalist framework the Aegean dispute does not constitute a PD situation. James Fearon, elaborating on the limitations of neoliberal institutionalism, has tried to overcome them, sustaining the unitary state actor assumption. He argued that regardless of the substantive domain, problems of international cooperation typically involve first a bargaining problem that resembles coordination games and then an enforcement problem that resembles a re-iterated PD.204 According to Fearon states might face an incentive to renege from the agreement reached at stage one and therefore the shadow of the future can be theoretically important in enforcing the agreement according to neoliberal thinking. The second stage of international cooperation becomes important when it is assumed that monitoring and enforcing an agreement will be difficult given that states will have an incentive to renege. Would Greece or Turkey have an incentive to renege from an agreement on the Aegean Sea dispute? Since any violation of the agreement will be immediately observed and since the shadow of the future is long enough the two sides would in fact have no incentive to renege but would opt to bargain harder in stage one to strike the best possible deal. So is the game structure that of a coordination game? Fearon‟s work has not only contributed to the sophistication of analysing international disputes but has highlighted the problem of assigning preferences.205 Any theory that assumes the state to be a unitary state actor will thus face a problem of assigning preferences and that is neoliberal institutionalism‟s major limitation and methodological inadequacy, which stems from sharing neorealist ontological assumptions. The empirical reality of enduring rivalries illustrates their limitations and leads research towards ways of overcoming the limitations of models of strategic interaction.
204 Fearon, J. D. “Bargaining, Enforcement and International Cooperation”, International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 2 (1998), pp 269-305. 205 Ibid., p. 273. 67
Outline
A model that combines domestic sources of foreign policy with interstate bargaining in the shape of an analytic narrative which applies an interactive relation between theory and evidence has not been offered to explain the particular enduring rivalry between Greece and Turkey. More broadly, the two-level game framework has not been extensively employed as a way of examining policy change in international security issues and it will be used here. It is my belief that such an approach offers an explanation of the case that is superior to alternatives discussed and is able to account for behaviour that constitutes empirical puzzles for the latter. It is able to circumvent the problem of assigning preferences which undercuts both realist and neoliberal explanations, while the instrumentalist framework enables the explanation of normative evolution which curtails culturalism‟s explanatory power. It is argued that a settlement of the Aegean Sea dispute would increase general welfare, through reductions of military expenditure and exploitation of natural resources finds. The analysis will expose mechanisms, related to normative frameworks, which prevent policymakers from pursuing cooperative strategies towards the „Other‟ in general as well as the implications for the structure of the Aegean Sea dispute interaction. Chapter 3 offers contextual knowledge of the processes that led to the emergence of key actors in the foreign policy domains of the two states when the latter consolidated their strategies in the 1970s. Therefore the two countries‟ developmental and modernization attempts within a period defined by two landmark dates: 1923-1924 (establishment of the Turkish Republic and population exchange) and 1974 (Turkish invasion of Cyprus, restoration of democracy in Greece and the beginning of the Aegean dispute) needs to be explored. Apart from the selection of actors used in the empirical chapters, this chapter aims to provide the necessary understanding of prevalent norms, rigidity and Kemalism, their creation and the mechanisms that preserve them as well as institutional structures and the relevant power of various groups and individuals. Methodologically, historical research was conducted again using a blend of inductive and deductive techniques. The search for relevant actors was only restricted by the knowledge gathered from qualitative data collected through elite interviews. Hence, these two
68 separate narratives are presented after an implicit selection of relevant actors and thus focus on the latter, while proving justification for their selection. The empirical chapters that follow build on that information by constructing analytic narratives of domestic preference formation, focusing on the two instances of policy shifts, the 1999 Greek Helsinki strategy and Turkey‟s 2003 Cyprus policy. In both chapters, following the discussion above, conceptions of the „Other‟ rather than preferences on the Aegean Sea dispute are problematized and media content analysis conducted sought to explore the former. Chapter 4 focuses on Greece and offers an analytic narrative of state preference formation, revolving around the Helsinki Strategy of 1999. The influential actors depicted are thought of interacting within certain institutional constraints, and their preferences are shaped according to this thesis‟ definition of rationality. Groups that favour a rigid foreign policy towards Turkey derive their power from coordination around the norm of ethnocentrism, still prevalent in Greece, and resist social change on instrumental rather than habitual grounds. Groups that favour normative and consequently policy change also rely on instrumental decision-making. Decision- makers are depicted as observers of the power struggle and enforcers of the equilibrium. The simulated interaction of moderate politicians –those with a preference for a lower level of rigidity than the status quo- is explored and treated as crucial for the probability of social change. The chapter explores how international diplomacy, namely the Helsinki Summit of 1999, affected domestic actors‟ incentives and led to a new equilibrium policy. Overall, the chapter offers causal mechanisms embedded in the foreign policy- making process as well as a depiction of the institutional setting which informs the Greek negotiator‟s utility function. Chapter 5 focuses on the Turkish domestic scene and illustrates the importance of the ongoing political struggle, branded as one between Kemalism and Islam, in defining the institutional setting under which foreign policy is being made. High levels of Kemalism are linked empirically and theoretically to rigid foreign policy and the shift in Turkey‟s Cyprus policy is perceived as the result of succesfull anti-Kemalist collective action facilitated by the 2002 electoral victory of the AKP. Thus the chapter observes endogenous institutional change as the result of the relative success of anti-Kemalist
69 mobilization and infers implications on foreign policy again through direct impact on the Turkish negotiator‟s utility function. Having incorporated broad concepts such as rigidity and Kemalism into negotiators‟ payoff structure, strategic interaction over the Aegean Sea, the only purely bilateral and potentially negotiable dispute is modelled in its evolving state. Negotiators are depicted as maximizing utility functions, informed by costs related to ongoing excessive military expenditure, political costs from a potential settlement –a function itself of the domestic power struggle-, and probability of re-election. More importantly, it is demonstrated how negotiators‟ decisions depend on whether they think they can outlast their counterpart in costly negotiations before the costs become unbearable. The model depicts distinct phases of interaction, contingent on particular institutional settings and argues that for a certain set of perceptions, their interaction resembles a coordination game where the two sides are unable to switch to the cooperative equilibrium because they fail to send credible signals during pre-play communication. This finding is surprising given received wisdom on the inevitable and perpetual character of bilateral conflict. Finally, the concluding chapter recaps the discussion over the merits of the specific approach in relation to alternative paradigms. Furthermore, the chapter summarizes the findings, acknowledges strengths and weaknesses of the thesis and suggests how further research can build on its methodology as well as the model‟s implications.
Data collection and analysis
Adopting thick rationality, the thesis relies on two research methods: inductive analysis of qualitative, interpretive data from elite interviewing and media content analysis. Data was analysed using a general inductive approach.206 Thomas defines the approach as using: “detailed readings of raw data to derive concepts, themes, or a model
206 For rational choice explanations relying on interpretive data, see Hampsher-Monk, I., and A. Hindmoor. “Rational Choice and Interpretive Evidence: Caught Between a Rock and a Hard Place?”, Political Studies,Vol. 58, No. 1 (2010), pp. 47-65. 70 through interpretations made from the raw data by an evaluator or researcher”.207 Inductive analysis is guided by research objectives but “allows theory to emerge from observation of data”.208 Research objectives guide analysis to the extent that domains of interest are preselected. Although in inductive approaches the findings are to some degree affected by the research objectives, they arise from the analysis of the raw data rather than being based on an a priori design. Data was collected from a series of interviews conducted in both states, between 2008 and 2009. Fieldwork was conducted simultaneously with historical research, allowing for evidence to shape questions, answers to guide research, and for the interaction of evidence and theory-as a set of rationalist nuts and bolts- at a parallel level. Interviewees were individuals whose position granted them inside knowledge of related actors‟ incentive structures and the list comprised of individuals from the political, business and media world, academia and civil society. Discussion was facilitated by a guide of open-ended questions that enabled the exploration of interviewees‟ private preferences. The particular method proved useful in discarding answers that would otherwise constitute disproving evidence, in cases where self-contradictions were made easier to spot and answers to discard. The analysis of data from both countries had an identical purpose, specifically to provide adequate knowledge of actors‟ incentive strategies, determining their actions during policy changes identified in the introduction, as well as the periods before that, on which models of analysis would build on. The transcripts were read several times, interpreted and coded by identifying broad themes and categories, thus allowing for a horizontal reading of the material. These themes then facilitated the building or supported empirically the models applied in the empirical chapters. Secondly, analyses of media content in both states were conducted, for the period between March 2007 and March 2008. The related literature has ascribed various definitions and purposes to media content analysis reflecting behaviouralist, humanist
207 Thomas, D. R. “A General Inductive Approach for Analyzing Qualitative Evaluation Data”, American Journal of Evaluation, Vol. 27, No. 2 (2006), p. 238. 208 Strauss, A., and J. Corbin. Basics of Qualitative Research (2nd ed., Newbury Park, California: Sage, 1998), p. 12. 71 and synthetic traditions.209 A typical distinction between quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis corresponding to opposing ontological and epistemological assumptions has been at the heart of the debate regarding media content analysis‟s scientific and predictive character. The debate has been settled with qualitative methods ascending to parallel levels of respectability.210 Shoemaker and Reese have distinguished between a humanist approach to media content analysis which studies content as a reflection of society and culture and a behaviouralist approach which studies content for its likely effects.211 This thesis uses a blend of qualitative and quantitative methods as it seeks to study media content employing a synthesis of the two traditions. It borrows from the hermeneutic tradition the element of interpretation of texts in order to uncover manifest and latent meanings, and from the positivist tradition its focus on deductively testing hypotheses, thus seeking to secure the validity and reliability of the results. As the purpose of the media content analysis is to support models that were built or applied in the empirical chapters, the analysis employed a strategy closer to deductive analysis. Deductive scientific approaches to research design require a priori design, meaning that decisions on variables to be included and type of measurement are made before the observation begins212 in order to secure validity of the results. However, the difficulty of identifying relevant variables in media content analysis before the observation begins has been noted, and preliminary reading of sub-samples of the media content has been legitimized.213 Here, the two media content analyses conducted had distinct purposes. The Greek media content analysis‟s purpose was to test a set of general hypotheses which were integral to the models of policy equilibria used in the empirical chapters. The hypotheses were related to the bilateral relation‟s commerciality, the existence and possible forms of
209 See for example Berelson, B. Content Analysis in Communication Research (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1952); Neuendorf, K. The Content Analysis Guidebook (Thousand Oaks, Colorado: Sage Publications, 2002), pp. 52-53; Shoemaker, P., and S. Reese, Mediating the message: theories of influences on mass media content (White Plains, New York: Longman, 1996), pp. 32-33. 210 See Patton, M. Utilization-Focused Evaluation: The New Century Text (3rd ed., Thousand Oaks, California: Sage, 1997), pp. 265-299, for a review of why and how this debate has ended. 211 Shoemaker and Reese, 1996. 212 Neuendorf, 2002, p. 11. 213 Ibid., pp. 102-103. 72 bias, the intervening role of political affiliation and the differentiation between columnist input and news reporting. The former are related to the endurance of the norm of ethnocentrism and the mechanism that ensures it, while the latter refers to the establishment of individual incentive structures for journalists and media institutions, which constitute separate actors in the models. The Turkish media content analysis aimed to test the hypothesis that individual political orientation (i.e. secularist v. Islamist) is uncorrelated with perceptions on Greece. Both involved preliminary reading of the content, followed by a priori design. Then, a code list, consisting of variables to be researched was formed. It included variables corresponding to thematic and referential categories to allow for cross categorization comparisons. In both cases, the sample was selected purposely as constituting a representative sample. In the Greek case, the three top-selling dailies of the time were selected, TA NEA, Kathimerini and Eleftherotypia. The dailies selected also nicely reflect traditionally distinct political inclinations, with Kathimerini addressing an audience group composing of elements of conservative neoliberalism and supporting the ND right wing government of the time, TA NEA traditionally addressing social democrat PASOK voters and Eleftherotypia targeting audiences at the left of the political spectrum. A search on the dailies‟ online archives was conducted with Turkey used as the keyword, from 13 March 2007 to 13 March 2008, and the related entries found were: 772 in Kathimerini, 771 in TA NEA and 787 in Eleftherotypia. For Turkey, the thesis had to rely on the English editions of high selling dailies, Hurriyet Daily News and Today‟s Zaman. Hürriyet belongs to the Doğan Holding Group and is renowned for supporting secular ideals, while Zaman is a daily backed by the faith-based Gülen movement214 and a strong supporter of the AKP government. In the Turkish case, the fact that analysis was conducted on English editions precludes the possibility of examining causality between media coverage and public opinion, and therefore findings are related to the image of Greek-Turkish relations the newspapers want to convey to non-Turkish speaking readers and commentators. The first
214 For more ınformatıon on the relatıon between Fethullah Gülen, Islamic capital and the AKP see Ververidou, M. “Δηαζηάζεηο θαη Δξάζεηο ηνπ Ιζιακηθνύ Κεθαιαίνπ ζηελ Τνπξθία: Οη Επηρεηξεκαηηθέο Οξγαλώζεηο MÜSIAD θαη TUSKON” [Dimensions and Actions of Islamic Capital in Turkey: Business Associations MUSIAD and TUSKON], ELIAMEP, May 2010. 73 implication of this fact is that we can exclude identity-reinforcing as an editorial consideration, as found in the Greek Press case. Another implication, again regarding editorial considerations is the elimination of the threat of reader disapproval in case of “provocative coverage” (i.e. coverage conflicting with official arguments). A third implication would be that editorial decisions are not informed by an anxiety about potential progressive coverage‟s effect on public opinion directly and the outcome of negotiations indirectly.215 These three implications theoretically allow for greater freedom to practise true journalism and a less biased coverage of bilateral relations is expected. However, convincing initially unbiased readers for one side‟s rightful claims is also significant to the extent that the international community can affect the outcome of the bilateral relation. If a certain feeling of national responsibility exists within the media institutions it is safe to say that bias could well creep into the coverage. The existence of this feeling is an assumption that will be confirmed by empirical evidence in the Turkish empirical chapter. Furthermore, most journalists who contribute to the English editions are employed by the Turkish editions and have a certain status within Turkish society. Surely reputation costs would be involved were they to express radically different ideas via the two means and that is another factor lowering expectations on level of bias. For those reasons, the same methodology was applied in both Greek and Turkish media. The unit of analysis was set to one piece, regardless of size and was analysed for references corresponding to coded categories. While, typical quantitative analysis involves the use of keywords corresponding to coded categories, this analysis measures references to coded categories, not identifying them with keywords but with any piece of text that is interpreted as belonging to the coded category. This particular method was used to deal with the reality that the adequate comprehension and interpretation of both manifest and latent meanings and their likely effects on audiences requires in depth analysis of the content. Therefore, this part of the methodology, borrows from narratology of the hermeneutic tradition to emphasize meaning. Each unit may include maximum one reference to any coded category. Thus, a small text comprising of one specific category of reference and a larger text with repeated references to the same
215 Evidence from Greece confirmed that a sense of national responsibility exists among journalistic circles and acts as disincentive to divert from official lines and challenge mainstream existing policies. See interview with Pantelis Kapsis, Athens, 25 November 2008. 74 category unavoidably carry the same weight in the final results. This however can be argued not to distort the results of a media content analysis, since the effect of a published story on the reader is unrelated to the size of the text. For the Greek media content analysis, seven thematical categories, themselves divided into sub-categories, were formed: “Bilateral Relations”, “Turkey”, “Cyprus”, “Business-Economy”, “History”, “EU and Turkey” and “Other” and 22 categories corresponding to interpreted references made to Turkey. Categories included references to Turkey as being: “expansive in the Aegean Sea”, “abusing human and civil rights of the Greek minority”, “a close ally of the USA”. For the Turkish media content analysis, thematical categories were the same and 20 referential categories were formed, including references to “Greece as an ally of the West”, “Greek foreign policy as resourceful and organized” etc. The code lists are available in Appendix 1. To ensure the validity of the analyses, both negative and positive references were included in the code list. In both cases categories aimed to capture the full range of negative references to the Other‟s interests and strategies, culture, history, political system etc., as they are all closely linked to the values examined for their impact on the Aegean Sea dispute, i.e. rigidity and Kemalism. Finally, a wide range of historical sources, both primary and secondary, were consulted, in order to construct the historical narrative. As mentioned above, analytic narratives rely on thorough knowledge of historical, institutional context. Hence, for the case at hand, the historical processes that shaped the institutional settings in both states under the period in question were traced with the twofold aim of understanding structures and selecting actors. Methodologically, research into the historical background, aiming to understand the institutional setting and relevant actors was only restricted by the knowledge gathered from qualitative data collected through personal interviews. Hence, these two separate narratives are presented after an implicit selection of relevant actors and thus focus on the latter, while proving justification for their selection.
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Chapter 3: Historical Narrative and Institutional Settings
The bilateral relation entered into a state of increased tension in the first half of the 1970s at a time when the situation in Cyprus had reached a critical point and by the 1974 Turkish invasion/intervention of the island, disputed issues were solidified. The dispute began after Turkey launched oil exploration projects in part of the Aegean continental shelf that Greece regarded as having the right to exercise sovereignty over, as it had de facto done so by granting permissions for oil exploration during the 1960s with no official Turkish reaction. Before the two states had the chance to negotiate a settlement over the issue of the continental shelf and other issues that Turkey exposed as problematic (territorial waters, national airspace and F.I.R zones), events in Cyprus, namely the Greek junta-inspired coup to overthrow Makarios and the subsequent Turkish invasion/intervention in the island brought the two states to the brink of conflict. The relation thereafter can be analytically broken down into three distinct phases. From 1974 to 1980, the two states interacted both officially and unofficially,216 holding consecutive rounds of high level talks over all aspects of the Aegean Sea dispute. In 1976, the Turkish government‟s decision to launch seismographic research in disputed waters escalated into a hot incident and brought the two states at the brink of military confrontation. The second phase began with the rise of PASOK to power in Greece, in 1981 and the subsequent cessation of all bilateral talks, with the meeting in Davos of 1988, between Prime Ministers and business interests‟ representation, constituting the single exception. The decade was marked by increased military spending for both states and yet another hot incident in the Aegean. The period from 1989 to 1999 was marked by sporadic meetings and attempts at normalization but mainly by the rejuvenation of Turkey‟s interest in joining the EU and the strategic exploit of EU membership on the part of Greece, in blocking Turkish European course towards the end of achieving concessions on the Aegean Sea and the Cyprus dispute. The final period, from 1999 onwards, commenced with a radical policy shift by Greece at the Helsinki EU Summit,
216 The distinction is rather vague since negotiations or high level talks were taking place, with Greece officially declaring that there was only one matter of dispute, that of the continental shelf and that a joint application to the ICJ was the appropriate way to settle it. 76 deciding to forego the veto strategy in return for Cyprus EU accession and the reference to ICJ in the Summit‟s Conclusions and continued with a wide range of rapprochement policies that led to the relative decrease of tension. The Aegean Sea dispute remains unsettled, despite the progress that has been reached unofficially during the exploratory talks. So what were the main elements comprising the two states‟ institutional settings when the Aegean Sea dispute arose? Who were the actors involved in foreign policy formation and what determined their power? What was the cultural framework of the time and how did it interact with actors‟ incentive structures? This chapter consists of a presentation of the evolution of the two states‟ normative frameworks, political systems and institutional settings up to that particular point in time. The chapter constitutes the first step towards constructing the analytic narratives to be presented in the following empirical chapters, and aims to provide the necessary contextual knowledge in terms of the historic processes that shaped the two societies into their contemporary form. The comprehension in full of each society‟s institutions and structures legitimizes the selection of actors that are relevant to the case at hand. Sections I and II focus on the Greek and Turkish cases respectively. Methodologically, empirical evidence collected during fieldwork in the two states has greatly affected the scope of research in general and of this historical background part in particular. Hence, this part, especially in the Turkish case focuses on struggles related to normative evolution rather than economic structure, interests and political economy, naturally acknowledging linkages between the two. Evidence from a wide range of sources has established that foreign policy in our case, towards states that have an integral part in a state‟s official historical narrative, is more open to influence from norm- focused groups. In comparison, evidence has shown that both states‟ foreign policy on Cyprus and the Aegean Sea is not heavily influenced by business circles, and politico- economic alliances, although their role will be noted in the relative chapter. Therefore, nationalism and its connection to the instrumental action of groups that feed off it or oppose it is at the centre of attention in this historical background part, after evidence has pointed us to that direction. For Turkey in particular, nationalism is linked to Kemalism, which lies in the centre of the ongoing proclaimed struggle between Secularism and
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Islam, a struggle that has common elements with that of the temperance movement mentioned in the previous chapter. Again, based on rationalist assumptions and methodological individualism, individual incentives remain at the core of this part of the analysis. Political action is directed towards normative and identity policy issues, but individual considerations given structural constraints and cultural realities are at the heart of its explanation.
Section I: Greece Greek nation-state building
For the creation of Greek ethnocentrism we must turn to the early 19th century and the process of ethnogenesis that was set off by Greek intellectuals who, inspired by their encounter with European Enlightenment, laid the foundations that led to the Revolution against the Ottoman rule and the establishment of the Greek state. Greek identity and particularly the conception of the „Other‟ as responsible for the loss of the homeland and the imposition of a backward regime217 was perpetuated by various actors and sources, including school textbooks, academic historiography, politicians, authors and poets, artists and the Greek Church. Millas refers to the process of the two states‟ ethnogenesis: “by developing different approaches of historiography to legitimize policies and by forming the „Other‟ to define the limits of their own identity”.218 Greek identification is part of individual dispositions and thus heavily affects political choice, under this thesis‟s definition of rationality. Greek identity‟s significant constitutive elements include perceptions of the Greek Revolution, the uninterrupted Greek presence in the region for thousands of years, and the role of the Church in preserving and protecting the „Genos’. The revolution was branded as one against an Islamic oppressor that tyrannized Christians for almost four centuries, and the contribution of the Church to the liberation was established by Greek historians. Ottoman rule was defined as a dark period that threatened the continuation of the nation, which ended with the latter‟s rebirth.
217 Millas, 2004. 218 Millas 2004, p. 58-72. 78
The Greek nation‟s historical presence as established by Greek historians of the second half of the 19th century219 geographically was not limited within the confines of the tiny newly-found Greek Kingdom. Consequently, the „Other‟ constituted not only an old historical oppressor that was defeated in 1830 with the creation of the Greek Kingdom but a persisting invader of Greek lands. The irredentist notion of „Megali Idea‟ was propagated to „occupied‟ populations by a wide network comprising of Greek ambassadors to the Ottoman Empire, dynamic cultural associations and Greek schools that employed graduates of the Athens University.220 It was materialized to a significant extent through the continuous extension of Greek borders until 1947 with the acquisition of the Dodecanese Islands, after having suffered a serious blow with the „Asia Minor Disaster‟ of 1922. The „Enosis‟ (Union) of Cyprus (under British rule since 1878) was the last attempt to annex an old ottoman land. Alternative historical explanations of the revolution were offered mainly from Marxist historians. Kordatos denied the national character of the revolution, analyzing it instead as a class struggle against the oppressors, namely both Turkish and Greek landlords, highlighting the Patriarchate‟s denouncement of the endeavour.221As for the continuation theory, Svoronos was amongst those who offered alternative conceptualizations of the history of the Greek nation, by arguing that the first elements of Greek national consciousness can be traced in the 13th century and not in ancient Greece. In a discussion I had with Hercules Millas also noted the Greek Communist Party‟s opposition to the nationalist paradigm followed by Greece ever since its establishment, an opposition that lasted until the mid 1930s.222 Such work merely constituted an exception to the rule and its effects were nullified by the power of the political system of the time, which coordinated around a certain set of values and norms. Hence, it did not have any real impact on Greek identity formation as publications of that sort were rare and the Communist Party‟s appeal was still very limited.
219 See Paparigopoulos, K. Η Ιζηοπία ηος Δλληνικού ¨Δθνοςρ [History of the Greek Nation], (6th ed., Athens: Eleftheroudakis, 1932). 220 Heraclides, 2007, p. 52. 221 Kordatos, G. Η κοινυνική ζημαζία ηηρ Δλληνικήρ Δπαναζηάζευρ ηος 1821 [The Social Dimension of the Greek Revolution of 1821] (Athens: Vasileiou, 1924). 222 Interview with Hercules Millas, Athens, 21 November 2008. 79
Greek democracy of the 20th century
After a series of territorial gains against the Ottoman Empire, the latest one achieved during the Balkan Wars of the early 20th century when Greece annexed Macedonia and western Thrace, the Asia Minor Disaster of 1922, after the failed Greek campaign in Asia Minor, signified a landmark in Greek history. Up until 1912 when the Balkan Wars began and despite Greek expansionism, the Greek (Rum) populations of the Ottoman Empire had not been victims of abuse, on the contrary they continued to prosper (save for religious discrimination resulting in heavier taxation), while important figures of the two sides entertained ideas of a joint Greek-Ottoman empire.223 The Asia Minor disaster of 1922 put an abrupt end to such aspirations. The Lausanne Treaty imposed the exchange of populations leading more than a million Greeks to abandon their homeland and become refugees. The disaster of 1922 caused an outburst of anti-Turkish sentiments, magnified by the personal grievances of the numerous refugees and solidified the notion of „occupied lands‟ and the dominant perception of the „Other‟. Furthermore, the dramatic events deeply affected Greek domestic politics, through the consolidation of the status of the Greek Military as that of a major political actor. Already on the rise since the beginning of the century, as opposed to the steadily decreasing popularity of politicians, following instability and polarization within the Greek political system,224 the Asia Minor disaster initiated a period characterized by the increased presence and interference of the Greek military in political affairs including violent abruptions of democratic rule. The patronage of the Army over the political system, well documented by historian Thanos Veremis, peaked during the inter-war period as proven by the 1936 Metaxas coup and the subsequent imposed dictatorship that violently resolved the pertaining division between Venizelists and Royalists.225 The four
223 See Millas 2004; Veremis, 1999, pp. 33-49; Svolopoulos K. D. Η Δλληνική Δξυηεπική Πολιηική 1900- 1945 [Greek Foreign Policy 1900-1945], (Athens: Estia, 1992), pp. 64, 78; Veremis, 1991, p. 32. 224 By 1916, when Venizelos formed a parallel governmental mechanism in Thesaloniki thereby disputing the legitimacy of the Palace-backed government, the Greek public was divided between Venizelists and Royalists, a violent division that taunted Greek politics until 1936. 225 Veremis, T. Ο Σηπαηόρ ζηην Δλληνική Πολιηική: Από ηην Ανεξαπηηζία υρ ηη Γημοκπαηια [The Army in Greek Politics: From Independence to Democracy], (Athens: Courier, 2000). 80 year military rule signified the bankruptcy of Greek parliamentary democracy and the beginning of an era of oppression of left wing and liberal ideals. The end of World War II saw Greece undergo a dramatic two stage Civil War between communists, libertarians and the right wing regime that scarred the political system in a profound and permanent way. The Civil War ended in 1949 with the right wing regime overcoming guerrilla warfare relying heavily on British and American economic and military support. The winning side thus found itself in a privileged position to shape the normative framework, around the concept of “national-mindedness”, a rather introvert dogma that managed to fit the threat of communism into the xenophobic aspect of Greek identity. The norm was wholeheartedly embraced by the right wing party, the Palace and the military; it was promoted by the Greek Church226 and served as a vehicle for practical and ideological exclusion of the Greek left from the political system. Complemented by a US aid-induced modest economic development achieved around local industry, the legitimacy of the new regime‟s political spectrum would be reflected in successive successful electoral campaigns. The right wing remained in power continuously until 1963, forming a functioning coalition with the Palace, the NATO- influenced Army and local bourgeoisie. The losing side of the civil war was persecuted physically, defeated politically and obliterated normatively. Thousands of Greek citizens were imprisoned and exiled for participation in the civil war, or suspicion of communist treason, the Greek Communist Party was banned and demands for civil rights equality were persecuted as dangerous for Greek democracy. Kioukias has explored the properties and functions of that coalition under an elitist perspective arguing:
“In the post-war years up to the establishment of the 1967 dictatorship the Greek political system witnessed a precarious democracy that was often disturbed by crises of political participation and where the ruling elites used traditional clientelism to exclude the masses from the political game, to co-opt them selectively through the exchange of
226 Diamandouros, N. “Greek Political Culture in Transition: Historical Origins and Evolution”, in R. Clogg (ed.), Greece in the 80s, (New York, New York: St. Martin‟s Press, 1983), pp. 57-58. 81 political allegiance for particularistic benefits, and to discourage collective organization and action. In addition, the elites used corporatist policies of the statist variety to keep the organized interest groups of the popular sector inactive and conformist. Thus, by controlling the interest groups' finances, internal organization, and rules of selecting leaders, a state-dominated industrial relations system (involving, for instance, state incomes policy, centralized collective bargaining conditioned by the state, and/or compulsory arbitration), or an unofficial system of conflict resolution (involving, for instance, the courts and the police) kept trade unions and farmers' associations under tight control...Furthermore, the elites reinforced such policies on the value level by establishing an ideological bias that secured reverence for the established social order and prevented the articulation of unfavorable political issues. In this way, they exhibited their own „mobilization of bias‟. The success of informal practices such as clientelism, corporatism, and ideological bias was guaranteed so long as the nature of the political system -characterized by limited party pluralism, a one-party state, and a guardian role played by non-party elites like royalty and the military- permitted absolute or nearly absolute domination by the ruling elites”.227
The alliance of vested interests in the economic and political world exploited the specific institutional setting in securing the preservation of its economic and political power by the exclusion of political, social and economic groups which sought to overthrow it.228 The domination of that alliance of vested interests was momentarily disputed in the economic sphere through the emergence of a new class of business entrepreneurs and their political representation. Tayfur, in his world-system analysis of Greece as a semi-peripheral developing state, has linked American interests in the area and in Greece in particular with the patterns of credit and tax incentives during the
227 Kioukias, D. “Interest Representation and Modernization Policies in Greece: Lessons Learned from the Study of Labor and Farmers”, Journal of Modern Greek Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1997), pp. 307-308. 228 For an analytic presentation of Greek political economy of the postwar era also see: Pagoulatos, G. Greece’s New Political Economy: State, Finance and Growth from Postwar to EMU (London and New York, New York: Oxford St. Antony‟s Series, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); and Sotiropoulos, D. A. The Remains of Authoritarianism: Bureaucracy and Civil Society in Post-authoritarian Greece, Working Paper, Centro de Estudios Avancados en Ciencias Sociales (CEACS), Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones, Madrid, 1995). 82 development process of the Greek economy.229 He described the ruling elites‟ status as “US-oriented peripheral-like capital” and went on to analyse how their interests were challenged by a new emerging politico-economic coalition. At the time when the Center Union (CU) came to power in 1964, the Federation of Greek Industrialists (SEV) comprising then mainly of small and medium size enterprises seeking to obtain larger market shares, had already begun to promote its interests protesting borrowing restrictions small-size firms were facing while dealing with the Commercial Bank. Tayfur comments: “It was obvious that the existing system was hindering industrial expansion and the inflow of new investment capital. These hindrances resulted in the strengthening of unfair competition and non-competitive industries, the dampening of entrepreneurial activity, the creation of monopolies and production with antiquated equipment”.230 Greece‟s association with the European Community represented an opportunity for a more efficient and competitive economy through the modernization of production techniques and equipment, and the inflow of private capital from European states. However these developments were thought to challenge the vested interests of the American-oriented, periphery-like traditional economic elite. CU policies as communicated by Georgios and Andreas Papandreou‟s public statements were directed towards promoting the interests of existing and potential (but weak) “Europe-oriented, core-like producers” who had found themselves a place in SEV. These developments were echoed in the political sphere. A part of the parliamentary elite (European-oriented parliamentary elements) challenged the political orientations of the Greek establishment, comprising of the rest of the parliament, the Palace and the Army at the time under direct US influence. However, the coalition collapsed when CU conflicts with the Palace led to the government‟s resignation and continuous political struggles against the establishment that eventually caused labor unrest and widespread strikes. SEV‟s interests laid firstly in stability and „labor-free‟ state corporatism. In addition, the CU government was overthrown not only because of the King‟s role in George Papandreou‟s resignation but also by 49 of its members‟ departure to the conservative party.
229 Tayfur, M. F. Semiperipheral Development and Foreign Policy: The Cases of Greece and Spain (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003). 230 Tayfur 2003, p. 52. 83
The Palace has often been reproached for its destabilizing role within the Greek political system. In fact the destabilizing effect of the Palace was manifested in the case of the resignation of the CU government in 1965, a crisis that eventually paved the way for the military coup in 1967. After the restitution of democracy in 1974, the Greek public voted in favor of regime-switch to Presidential Democracy by a 70%-30% margin and the royal family was subsequently ousted. As for the role of the Army in Greek politics of the time, post-war institutional reforms and personnel policies had contributed to an officer corps much devoted to uphold the governments‟ moral and political values. It is during that time that corporatist behaviours from army officials are reported. Faithful to a long tradition of military intervention in state affairs, the main corporate interest of ambitious young military officers was to bring the officer corps again to the forefront of political life. International détente and NATO strategy designs had switched the army‟s orientation from protector of Greek sovereignty to guarantor of internal order and regime stability and when the colonels imposed the 1967 dictatorship, the internal communist threat was invoked as justification. 231 Conspiracies within the corps had been taking place for years, with right wing governments unable or unwilling to discourage them. In fact, right wing circles were still highlighting the existence of a communist threat and many were personifying the threat in George Papandreou‟s son Andreas.
Foreign policy
Regarding foreign policy, the executive had absolute authority over policy making and its design seemed to be a product of close cooperation between limited MFA personnel and a few members of the diplomatic corps.232 Historian Thanos Veremis in a discussion I had with him argued that: “Up until 1967 the MFA was independent, deciding and implementing policies on its own will. There was an elite of diplomats
231 Veremis, 2000. 232 Coufoudakis, V. “Greek-Turkish Relations, 1973-1983: The View from Athens”, International Security, Vol. 9, No. 4 (1985), pp. 185-217. 84 deciding on all foreign policy matters, under the supervision of course of Konstantinos Karamanlis”.233 However, further evidence and a wider understanding of political power allows for the exploration of other influences on foreign policy outcomes. Namely the Palace, maintaining a strong interest in international relations and NATO, through its representatives in Greece and its strong connection to the Greek military, were also influential in agenda-setting, mainly through the exclusion of „un-patriotic‟ and „anti- western‟ policy options. The normative framework, with the dominance of national- mindness was also re-enforced by civil society associations preoccupied with national issues. A number of politically accommodative professional associations existed, mainly representing professions of considerable status that were directly linked to the political system through the patron-client relation and to the Greek Church.234 In addition, a host of non-professional interest groups, such as refugee and irredentist, regional and cultural, veteran and war victims associations existed and were willing and indeed did “jump on the wagon of a good nationalist cause”235 under politicians‟ and academics‟ encouragement. As Stefanidis informs us, the “irredenta unionism” phenomenon was expressed through highly participated organized events, with the participation of clergy, local politicians, academicians, all praised by the Press and politicians. Even before the Cyprus liberation fight began in 1955, various Union-propagating committees were formed in Greece after the initiative of local bishops, local government, professionals and local “brotherhoods” of Cyprus expatriates. The aim was to declare the will of the nation for Enosis, and academia, the Athens Academy included, participated in the task. Political leadership, to an extent reticent to pursue high-risk irredentist policies on the matter, was unable to renounce the mobilization and disturb close personal ties between right wing politicians and the Church as well as all associations and individual members. Stefanidis writes:
233 Interview with Thanos Veremis, Athens, 19 December 2008. 234 See Stefanidis, I. D. Pressure Groups and Foreign Policy 1945-67, Paper Presented at the Hellenic Observatory, The European Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2001. 235 Stefanidis, 2001, p. 17. 85
“Universities and schools were permitted to suspend classes in order to ensure the success of mass meetings for which the police had given permission. The press offered wide publicity and whole-hearted support to these activities. Political parties generally appeared happy to leave the initiative to the Church and the various non-political groups”.236
Stefanidis also highlights the individual incentives of participating opinion leaders among the press, interest groups and opposition parties to outbid each other in intransigent, maximalist rhetoric.237 The mobilization achieved did not affect the outcome on this occasion as Karamanlis settled for the unpopular outcome of an independent Cyprus. Puzzling as this outcome appears, its explanation could perhaps be based on the effect of strong patron- client relations and exclusionary character of Greek democracy of the time on possibilities of re-election. A thorough analysis of that outcome remains however outside the scope of this thesis. What is significant at this stage is to observe traces of mobilization around irredentist causes in that period and perhaps more importantly to note individual incentives of participating politicians, opinion leaders and civil society to embrace such mobilization and compete in maximalist rhetoric, as noted above. A second popular pro-Enosis movement occurred during 1963-64 as Stefanidis narrates:
“The initiative, it seems, came from societies of Greek Cypriot students in Athens and Thessaloniki. Together with national student unions they began holding mass meetings and issuing resolutions. Before long, the usual array of organized interests and institutions joined in. They invariably urged the government to denounce the Zurich-
London accords and support the Greek Cypriots‟ bid for self-determination. While the Holy Synod gave its blessing and clerics were still at the lead of marches, this time the driver‟s seat was not reserved for the Church. The effort was much more diffused…The Left was now able to make its presence felt through its own Committee for Cypriot Self-
236 Ibid., p. 26. 237 Ibid., p. 27. 86 determination. The party of EDA and its youth organizations were better organized, more numerous and stood to benefit from the relaxation of the security regime under the Centre Union government”.238
The newly elected government‟s decision to reject the Acheson Plan and to send 12,000 Greek soldiers to infiltrate the island was this time in accord with the public sentiment. Therefore evidence suggests that despite the intense political conflict within Greek society (albeit not expressed in the decision-making process as the result of Communist Party‟s exclusion), the liberation struggle of Greek-Cypriots and the demand for Enosis was legitimate in the eyes of the public, the nationalistic right wing and for large segments of the left wing. The normative framework, with „national-mindness‟ at its core was unchallenged, since segments of the Left that were permitted political existence did not oppose the „Enosis‟ struggle. With no intention of analyzing that political decision in depth, again plausible explanations for the endorsement of the cause by the left wing could include: the honest endorsement of patriotic values or desire to rid the left of the treason mark assigned to the communist party for its stand in the Macedonian issue at the end of World War II, the strong anti-western character of the movement that coincided with left wing orientation in a polarized world system, the ongoing competition with opposing parties in terms of nationalistic fervour or various pressures to reject „unpatriotic‟ policy options. In any case, public discourse on similar issues did not display any ideological diversification and did not expose any crisis of identification.239 As noted above, the political system, whose boundaries were regulated and defined by a normative alliance between the Palace, the Army, the Church, the right wing and a class of favored businessman did seem to have the ability to absorb and appease public reactions, much because of its exclusionary character. Karamanlis did not
238 Ibid., p. 29. 239 The case is of remarkable political interest, given that the leader of EOKA was General Georgios Grivas, leader of the “X Team” during the later years of Nazi occupation and the Civil War. Grivas and the X Team were despised by segments of the population related to the Left, both for its alleged cooperation with the Nazi regime against leftist guerilla forces and for their practice just before and during the explosion of the Civil War in 1946. 87 succumb to pressures for Enosis, opting for an independent Cyprus in 1959 and went on to win the 1961 election. Earlier in 1955, the Papagos government, which had enthusiastically endorsed the Cypriot liberation fight, had prohibited the use of the term „Muslim‟ to characterize the minority in Thrace and imposed the use of the term „Turkish‟. Striking as it may sound, this policy was applied at a time when communist Bulgaria was considered as the primary threat for Greek sovereignty and the Greek government aimed at preventing the possibility that the Pomaks of the minority would adopt the Bulgarian identity. In order to explain policy making of the time a deeper analysis of the institutional setting and of actor‟s strategies is needed. Evidence points at the role of the exclusionary nature of the political system, the weak character of Greek civil society and the reliance of the political system on the patron-client relation as key factors.
1974, Metapolitefsi
The restoration of democracy occurred within a political climate that imposed the need for further democratization compared to the pro-junta period, although state corporatism continued to shape state-civil society relations.240 The military along with the Palace‟s influence had in a number of occasions inhibited the consolidation of democracy and the seven year military dictatorship dealt a lethal blow to the legitimacy of political action from their part. Transitional justice measures effectively appeased the few remaining radical elements within the military and set off an attempt for reconciliation between the left and the right wing within Greek society in order to rebuild social trust. These policies effectively constrained the military‟s political power and renegotiated its scope to the defence of the state against external threats. No evidence of military interference in politics and particularly foreign policy after 1974 have been found and its institutional power is clearly defined. The military operates under the civilian authority of the Defence Ministry which represents the military in governmental budgetary decisions while the Chiefs of the Hellenic Army of General Staff participate in the sessions of the
240 See for instance Sotiropoulos, 1995. 88
Government Council for Foreign Affairs and Defence (KYSEA) with no voting rights. Therefore the military does not need to be included in the model as an independent actor. Furthermore, the communist party was legalized and the rise of the socialist party PASOK ensured that the biased ideological neutrality established in the previous decades no longer characterized the Greek political system. In terms of foreign policy the ideological confrontation took place with regards to the extent of western influence on Greek foreign policy which the Left condemned as having rendered Greece into a fully dependent state. That was the theme of opposition to the conservative governments until 1981 and was a determinant factor in the formation of Greek preferences during bilateral talks between Karamanlis and his Turkish counterparts,241 as negotiations with Turkey were widely considered as results of American pressures aiming to ensure concessions to Turkish claims.242 The new regime endorsed freedom of expression, ideological confrontation and civil participation. Kioukas narrates:
“Although the basic power structure of the state remained more or less intact, developments such as the removal of the non-parliamentary „guardians of Greek democracy‟, the formation of modernized public opinion, the cultural transformation of Greek society, and the establishment of true political rights promised great opportunities for the mass of the people. If the political system was denied modernization „from above‟, there seemed to be a chance that it could be modernized „rom below‟, that is, through certain opposition parties and social groups. In fact, opposition parties, taking advantage of an extremely liberal climate, established advanced channels of communication with the popular strata, particularly with both old and new social movements (e.g., trade unions, farmers' movements, local government movements), which they used as social opposition against a non-participatory social order. PASOK materialized a plan which involved the pursuit of extensive social mobilization against the established political order. Within this framework, the party machine worked
241 See Heraclides, 2007, for a narrative of the bilateral talks of the period, and domestic reactions. 242 See for instance Papandreou‟s speech in the Greek Parliament, in ERT Video Archive: http://www.ert- archives.gr/V3/public/pop-view.aspx?tid=37780&tsz=0&act=mMainView, http://www.ert- archives.gr/V3/public/pop-view.aspx?tid=37786&tsz=0&act=mMainView , accessed on 11 January 2011. 89 strenuously to penetrate, politicize, activate, and radicalize various social groups and particularly the organized expressions of the popular strata. These were used as syndicalist-protest formations under the party's guidance and sponsorship. The usual means of protest action involved projection of radical demands such as workers' „autogestion‟, mass demonstrations, and many strikes”.243
This policy was compatible with the party‟s rhetoric, focusing on priorities such as “national independence - public sovereignty - social liberation”.244 The halt of all bilateral talks between the two states was in agreement with Greek public opinion, which remained ethnocentric on foreign policy issues. Elements which mobilized around nationalist causes during previous decades were still actors in this particular policy domain and a bizarre but pragmatic alliance with segments of the left was formulating, around strong anti-American sentiments.245 Within that normative framework, any negotiation with Turkey was considered a route to concessions in the eyes of the public. The government‟s –as a unitary actor- preference for a less rigid stand towards Turkey has been established, but the political cost of denouncing proclaimed axioms of foreign policy appeared too high for a strategy switch.246 The exception of the Davos negotiations of 1988 and their quick denouncement by Papandreou himself as a personal mistake marked the end of an era of extreme rigidness in Greek foreign policy and coincided with the rejuvenation of the European accession dream for Turkey that materialized with an official application in 1989. In the following decade Greece in a number of occasions became the main obstacle to Turkish European accession ambitions.
243 Kioukias, 1997, p. 309. 244 See the Party‟s founding declaration, found at: http://www.pasok.gr/portal/resource/section/idrutikiMenu, accessed on 7 February 2010. 245 As mentioned previously, segments of the Left had already participated in such mobilization, much because of the anti-imperialistic implications of Greek foreign policy demands. However anti-Americanism grew dramatically during the dictatorship due to suspicion of US involvement in staging the coup as well as the events in Cyprus. 246 See for instance, Veremis, 1991, p. 107. 90
Section II: Turkey Turkish nation-state building and Kemalism
The Turkish state‟s creation preceded the consolidation of a Turkish identity, as opposed to the Greek case. While it is difficult to pinpoint the emergence of the Turkish identity in a specific point in time, its roots lye in the second part of the 19th century. Ottoman intellectuals, by then preoccupied with ways of salvaging the state along with Ottoman Sultans, political leaders and military officers, embarked on a series of West- inspired reforms. This intense, by the turn of the century, process was a result of a growing insecurity among Turkish speaking Muslims of the Ottoman Empire who saw the Empire diminishing in size over the past century. The idea of Ottomanism, the establishment of an Ottoman identity as a bond among the citizens of the region failed when non-Muslims began to detach themselves from the Ottoman state and so did Islamism when Arabs and Albanians resorted to national revolts. The idea of Turkism started to gain ground and was first expressed by the Young Turks movement and was afterwards imposed and solidified by Kemalism. Kemalism has been the constitutionally guaranteed official ideology of the Turkish state since the establishment of the Republic in 1923 after successfully suppressing alternative identifications.247 Kemalism established the Turkish state as a „higher power‟ which rules on behalf of the people and Kemal Ataturk along with the state elite as the „chosen ones‟ with the task of applying the principle of public sovereignty. The Kemalist state acting in the name of the community was declared the cohesive glue of Turkish society248 and was authorized to preserve the basic principles of its Kemalist character: nationalism, revolutionism, secularism, populism, republicanism and statism. Despite Ataturk‟s secular vision, Islam was the raw material he relied on to carry out the Liberation War against the non-Muslim West. Furthermore, numerous
247 See Brockett, G. D. “Collective Action and the Turkish Revolution: Towards a Framework for the Social History of the Ataturk Era (1923-1938), Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 34, No. 4 (1998), pp. 44-66, for a narrative of instances of Islamic anti-Kemalist collective action from 1923 to 1938. 248 “The Turkish nation is a state governed by a Republic, whose power is owned by the people”, in Afetinan, A. Medeni bilgiler ve M. Kemal Atatürk'ün el yazıları, [Civil Information and the Writings of Kemal Ataturk], (Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1969). 91 symbolisms of the Chaliphet and of Islamic tradition in general were embedded in Kemalist ideology and the role of the state.249 Religion was respected to the extent that its role was that awarded by Kemalism and Ziya Gökalp‟s pillars of ideal society: “In terms of nation I am Turk, in terms of community I am Muslim, in terms of culture I am western”.250 Under this vision, summarized by the motto: “How Happy is he/she who calls himself/herself a Turk”,251 Kurds were declared Turks and their rebellions were violently suppressed. During a process of a series of top-down imposed reforms, Islamic tradition was persecuted in favor of secularism and a number of westernizing cultural reforms followed. Kemalism prevailed over expansive Pan-Turkism, establishing the stability of Turkish borders and foregoing imperialistic or irredentist aspirations. The Republic‟s borders were justified based on the „National Pact‟, a document signed by both Kemalist and Ottoman deputies in 1920, which became the official statement of nationalist aims.252 The Pact accepted the loss of parts of the Ottoman state populated by Arab majorities, which were occupied by the Entente during the Mudros armistice of 1918. The Lausanne Treaty of 1924 officialized the Republic‟s borders, granting sovereignty over the Aegean islands to Greece, with the exception of Gökçeada and Bozcaada and all islets within three nautical miles off the Turkish coast. Italy retained sovereignty over the Dodecanese islands. In the 1930s the task of forging a national historical narrative around which historical consciousness would develop relied on two main theories: the „Turkish History Thesis‟ and the „Sun Language Theory‟ and state education was the main means of their proliferation. Briefly, the Turkish History Thesis established the continuation of the Turkish nation throughout history and highlighted its contribution to the world civilization. The theory also established Turkish historical roots in Asia Minor by considering all ancient nations of the area (such as the Hittites and the Ionians) as Turks, mainly as a response to negative western and Christian images of Turks. The Thesis itself announced the state and the nation as notions superior to the individual. It was
249 Anagnostopoulou, S. Τοςπκικόρ Δκζςγσπονιζμόρ [Turkish Modernization], (Athens: Vivliorama, 2004), p. 62. 250 Gökalp, Z., in Anagnostopoulou, 2004, p. 63. 251 Atatürk‟ün Söylev ve Demeçlerı, in ibid., p. 63. 252 Hale, W. Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000 (London: Frank Cass, 2000), p. 47. 92 complemented by the Sun Language Theory, which identified the Turkish language as basis for most other languages and traced its origins in antiquity. The imposition of these theories as compulsory readings in formal education was not without resistance and fierce albeit fruitless resentment from Ottomanists, Islamists, citizens devoted to traditional values, Kurds and many others. As in the Greek case, the formation of Turkish identity also relied on the construction of a sharp contrast with a number of „Others‟. Arabs, the West, and Greece were vindicated in order to promote identification with the newly formed identity. Turkish historiography rejected the Greek nation‟s continuation theory as it undermined the reliability of the Turkish History Thesis. Modern Greeks were presented as a nation with no heritage, entertaining expansive ambitions against Turkish territory, whose materialization was facilitated by their western allies. Specifically, they were viewed as being obsessed with the irredentist notion of „Megali Idea‟ ever since their 1821 „sedition‟ (despite conditions of peace and prosperity they enjoyed under Ottoman rule), whose fate was determined by their Western allies‟ intervention. Greeks who remained under Ottoman rule after the establishment of the Greek Kingdom and especially the Orthodox Patriarchate were regarded as treacherous elements and simultaneously as obstacles to the economic prosperity of Turkish citizens. Therefore, in comparative terms while the Greek official narrative regards Turkey as the occupier of Greek lands, the Turkish narrative focuses on the threat posed to the state‟s social cohesion and ultimately its sovereignty by the existence of treacherous elements among its minorities. The Turkish History Thesis was gradually sidelined within Turkish historiography, especially after the death of Kemal Ataturk. However, various groups and institutions seek to preserve its spirit and the framework of thought it introduced. Alternative identifications, which Kemalism successfully supressed in the early days of the Republic, rooted in regional cultures, managed to persevere despite the prevalence of Turkish nationalism.253After the introduction of the multiparty system in 1950, Turkish identity returned to the forefront of politics with various forces colliding,
253 Alternative identifications persevered also through Turkish literature. Hercules Millas, in an extensive analysis of stereotype formation through literature has categorized Turkish writers into Ottomanists, nationalists, Islamists, Orientalists, Marxists, Humanists and minority writers. Millas, 2004. 93 alternative identifications were once again proposed254 with Islam at the core of the discourse.
Turkish politics, instability and the discourse on identity
In the post-war era the Kemalist state and bureaucracy began to approach Islam as means of re-enforcing social cohesion, viewed as threatened by reactions to growing inequality between centre and periphery, as well as a response to the formation of social classes which was considered a communist threat. Furthermore, the introduction of the multiparty system created a political system where political parties, heavily relying on the patron-client structure, were competing on the succession of Kemalism‟s representation and ironically Islam was manipulated to gain electoral support255 from religious segments of the population. The practice of promoting right-wing religious nationalism followed by both main political parties during the 1950s contributed to the radicalization of small leftist parties and its implications for political stability were causally linked to the TSK‟s first military coup in 1960, which aimed to reinstate the orthodox Kemalist doctrine, as the only means of homogenization of society. In effect the TSK acted on behalf of the state, as opposed to practices of political elites which were perceived as having betrayed basic Kemalist principles. Politicians proclaimed themselves as proponents of the „nation‟s will‟ against the „state will‟ and as the protectors of the people against the state elite,256 pushing Kemalist ideology‟s boundaries. As Heper and Tachau comment, the institutional setting which occurred after the coup was partisan, allowing CHP (Ataturk‟s party, devoted to Kemalist ideals) to dominate the parliament and draft a new constitution.257 Attempting to explain the TSK‟s motivation behind the military coup, historians have suggested that consideration of its own status as the guarantor of the nation-state‟s identification with Kemalism, as well as
254 The Anatolia-based identity branding Turkey heir of all civilizations that inhabited Asia Minor was supported by segments of society that supported Turkish Westernization. It is thought that Turgut Özal‟s “La Turquie en Europe” reflects such an identification. 255 Anagnostopoulou, 2004. 256 Heper, M., and E. F. Keyman. “Double-Faced State: Political Patronage and the Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 34, No. 4 (1998), p. 261. 257 Heper, M., and F. Tachau. “The State, Politics and the Military in Turkey”, Comparative Politics, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1983), pp. 21-22. 94 the economic losses that military personnel had suffered during the previous decade as a result of DP policies, were both integral parts of the Generals‟ rationale. Heper and Tachau comment:
“Primary among these (concerns) was the rise of a middle class of entrepreneurs and businessmen in place of the non-Muslim minorities who had fulfilled these functions in the Ottoman Empire… Consequently, a military career was no longer the only channel for upward mobility… Indeed, the twin pillars of the Kemalist regime (the military and civil bureaucracy) receded in power and significance during the decade of the 1950s, overshadowed by the commercial entrepreneurs and businessmen as well as by segments of provincial and regional elites… What is more, in the inflation which developed under the Democrats' ambitious policies of rapid economic development, the civil and military bureaucrats suffered material and psychic losses because their salaries failed to keep up with rapidly rising costs. Thus, the military felt they had lost access, not only to the pinnacle of power, but to social status and prestige as well”.258
Military coups would thereafter come to be considered as legitimate political action by one of the most influential actors in the Turkish political system. The TSK took up the role of the state (and hence the nation) and of the guarantor of the dominance of Kemalist ideology. Furthermore, the TSK awarded itself with the role of the regulator of economic liberalization, firstly by establishing OYAK (Armed Forces Pension Fund) in 1961. In the following years the TSK evolved into the largest economic consortium in Turkey, controlling large conglomerates and reaping direct benefits from the market‟s liberalization, still regulating it in the name of Kemalism. By 1974, when TSKGV259 (Turkish Armed Forces Support Foundation) was established, the TSK was applying „military capitalism‟260 and OYAK had taken large equity stakes in a number of enterprises, as well as joint ventures with foreign partners such as Renault.261 By 1985 the
258 Ibid, pp. 20-21. 259 Some subsidiaries of the TSKGV are: ASELSAN and HAVELSAN (high technology), ROKETSAN (missile and rockets programming), ISBIR (energy), TAI (defensive fighter jet production), http://www.tskgv.org.tr/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=56&Itemid=61 260 Anagnostopoulou, 2004, p. 97. 261 Waterbury, 1992, p. 105. 95
TSK‟s economic status as well as its connections to members of the state elite (public officials) and the financial oligarchy262 had reached their peak.263 Waterbury, in his comparative analysis of public sector evolution inTurkey, India, Mexico and Egypt, sought to highlight similar patterns despite diverse cultural traditions and constellation of class actors. In Turkey, he observed:
“Over the decades in which Turkey implemented ISI (import substitution industrialization), the resultant system of resource allocation helped create a broad-based and costly coalition of interests. This coalition came to rest on a set of entitlements, sometimes referred to as a social pact which became the cornerstone of regime stability…Management boards of the SOEs (state-owned enterprises), governmental agencies created to monitor and supervise public enterprise, private sector interests that had come to thrive on public credit, production subsidies and tariff protection, organized labor and most importantly the Turkish military all had an important place within that coalition of interests”.264
The specific re-alignment of economic and political institutional power emerged as the result of the confrontation between an alliance of private interests, created by statism, and the military-bureaucratic complex. The confrontation took place within a framework of weak institutional constraints, given the fairly recent establishment of the Republic, the political system and Turkish bourgeoisie. The sustainability of the forged coalition relied on economic success and rent-seeking behaviour on the part of vested interests. By the 1970s Turkish identity was again heavily contested in light of institutional change enabled by the liberal character of the 1961 Constitution. Trade unions and the working class had solidified their political influence, the Marxist doctrine was gaining in support, and Socialists attacked Kemalism, branding it an oppressive, authoritative state.
262 Sakip Sabanci was a board member of the Defence Industry Support Fund, established in 1985. 263 Waterbury: 1992, p. 194. 264 Waterbury 1992, p. 191 96
The Turkish Alevi minority was becoming more active in their demands265 and Kurdish populations similarly proclaimed their ethnic otherness. At the same time the popularity of Islam saw an increase in its political influence, with Islamists demanding that it became Turkish society‟s cohesive element. That resurgence was closely linked to the economic liberalization which was slowly sidelining Kemalist statism, paving the way for the emergence of strong Islam-based private interests, which demanded satisfying political representation. Necmettin Erbakan‟s Islamic party turned to that space in order to mobilize Islamic support. Alternative identities therefore came to the political foreground, within a political environment tormented by increasing instances of political violence. Adamson notes: “The widening of the political spectrum in the absence of strong democratic institutions able to incorporate new social groups into the political process was undoubtedly a contributing factor to the increased radicalism, political violence, and overall weakening and fractionalization of the party system that occurred in the late 1960s and 1970s”.266 By the end of the decade society was tormented by clashes among armed extremist political groups, which the political system found impossible to represent, incorporate or subdue. The TSK intervened again with another coup on 12 September 1980 and held on to power until 1983, once again acting upon its role as the guarantor of the Kemalist state and nation, while at the same time protecting its economic interests as well as those of the financial oligarchy that were endangered by the empowerment and radicalization of the labour movement.267 The coup signified the end of the coalition of interests built upon Turkey‟s import substitution development strategy and export-led growth attempts during the next decades solidified a new one, where Islamic elements were represented. By 1980 the Turkish political system was shaped into a „moderate military rule‟, with the military exercising a
265 The minority became the target of deep-state violence in the 1970s. For details on the evolution of Turkish Alevitism see Tsakiris, T. “Ταπηόηεηα, Δηαζιάζεηο θαη Εμειηθηηθή Πξννπηηθή ηνπ Αιεβηηηθνύ Φαηλνκέλνπ ζηε Σύγρξνλε Τνπξθία” [Identity and Evolutionary Prospects of the Alevi Phenomenon in Modern Turkey], EKOME, Athens, 1998. 266 Adamson, F. B. “Democratization and the Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy: Turkey in the 1974 Cyprus Crisis”, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 116, No. 2 (2001), p. 282. 267 Ayres, R. “Arms Production As a Form of Import Substituting Industrialization: The Turkish Case”, World Development, Vol. 11, No. 9 (1983), pp. 813-823; Also see ÖniĢ, Z., and U. Türem. “Entrepreneurs, Democracy and Citizenship in Turkey”, Comparative Politics, Vol. 34, No. 4 (2002), pp. 439-456, for an account of TÜSĠAD‟s reaction to the 1980 military coup. 97 veto over civilian authorities with the aim of preserving the social and economic status quo.268 The obvious lack of adequate levels of coordination around a common identification led Kemalist intellectuals to the conception of the self-explanatory notion of „Turkish-Islamic Synthesis‟ as a way of forging a nationalistic, religious and conservative normative alliance with the aim of annihilating communist and socialist ideals. Commenting on the institutional setting which occurred and was sustained throughout the 1980s, Sia Anagnostopoulou notes:
“The failure of modernization of a society that in its majority remains excluded from the political centre, the danger of a rupture of the military type social cohesion and the appearance of ideological movements with revolutionary dynamic, leads to the tolerance of religious activation by the army, as means of the mobilization of the politically and economically excluded groups as well as means of bridging the inequality gap between the centre and the periphery”.269
Indeed, the TSK and the new Constitution of 1982 did nothing to halt Islam‟s appeal to the masses, allowing it to evolve into a cohesive element.
Foreign policy
Foreign policy-making in the 1950s was arguably the exclusive privilege of a small elitist group within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the diplomatic corps and public criticism of government foreign policy was generally considered unpatriotic.270 Evidence in fact suggests that the value of the norm of ethnocentrism as a political tool was discovered immediately after the introduction of the multiparty system in 1946. On some occasions, the state as well as political parties utilized or manipulated Kemalist
268 Nordlinger, E. A. Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1977), pp. 22-23. 269 Anagnostopoulou, 2004, p. 74. 270 Aydin, M. “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Changing Patterns and Conjunctures during the Cold War”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 36, No. 1 (2000), p. 117. 98 nationalism either to implement policies or to safeguard party interests through public mobilization. In September 1955, while a tripartite conference was taking place in London between Greece, Turkey and Britain on the Cyprus issue, massive anti-Greek riots broke out in Istanbul, resulting in devastating losses for the Rum population of the city. Riots were instigated after Turkish Intelligence, as it was uncovered during the Yassiada trials, had staged a bombing attack in Kemal Ataturk‟s house in Thesaloniki. The trials also uncovered state involvement and planning of the riots, with the participation or manipulation of civil society organizations like the National Turkish Student Union and the Cyprus is Turkish Society.271 The appeal of the populist, nationalist discourse, with strong xenophobic undertones, was accentuated by the trend of fast urbanization of and the subsequent development of shantytowns in the major cities of Turkey. The riots in Pera were mainly carried out by the growing urban poor who were making their social and political presence felt more strongly thanks to the democratization of Turkish politics.272 Explanations of the events have focused on the diplomatic gains from such a clear, supposedly spontaneous public reaction for the outcome of the London Conference,273 but analysis establishes the interaction between the dominant normative framework, specifically the Kemalist stereotype of the prospering treacherous minorities274 and individual incentives of the perpetrators. As noted above, the institutional setting was solidified in the 1960s as one characterized by the TSK‟s influence over policy making, the significance of Kemalist nationalism and the fragmentation of the political system as a result of the liberalization that occurred after the 1961 Constitution, the appearance of the Left wing and the implications of proportional representation. TSK‟s patronage, further solidified institutionally after every military coup, was also becoming apparent through the securitization of foreign policy. Consequently, the size of the public sphere was
271 Vryonis, S. The mechanism of Catastrophe: The Turkish Pogrom of September 6-7, 1955, and the Destruction of the Greek Community of Istanbul (New York, New York: Greekworks.com, 2005). 272 Kuyucu, A. T. “Ethno-Religious „Unmixing‟ of „Turkey‟: 6-7 September Riots as a Case in Turkish Nationalism”, Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2005), p. 368. 273 Holland, R. Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), p. 76. 274 Ergil, D. “Past as Present”, Turkish Daily News, 12 September 2005. 99 constantly diminishing with opposition in a series of political issues coming to constitute anti-patriotic practice. The securitization of a wide range of foreign policy issues brought the unavoidable connection to a number of domestic political issues and further consolidated the impact of the state and the TSK in policy making. Kaliber notes:
“The military‟s decisive role and impact on „foreign‟ affairs has been tolerated and at times deemed necessary, both by governments and the public in Turkey… The Kemalist state elite conceived „foreign‟ policy and wanted others to conceive it as a vital sphere in pursuit of Turkey‟s national interests and security goals. During the Cold War years, most political leaders, either willingly or because they avoided assuming the responsibility for any deviancy from the politics of security, contributed to the reproduction of securitizing discourses in the field of „foreign‟ affairs. In most cases, „foreign‟ political acts of the Turkish state have been presented by the ruling elite as endeavors to ward off external threats directed against the state‟s unity and integrity. Thus, in the official rhetoric, as exemplified in the Cyprus case, „foreign‟ policy referred to a battlefield to be entrusted only to those cognizant of its peculiar rules and techniques”.275
Kaliber also highlighted that: “even seemingly reformist politicians avoided publicly questioning the democratic legitimacy of the Republicanist tradition of „foreign‟ policy-making, placing „foreign‟ policy beyond normal politics and public debate”.276 Nationalism, introduced by the official historical narrative, had by now become a vital part of various political groups‟ ideological agendas, as there was consenus among the public regarding the direction of foreign policy. The Left wing had based its critique of foreign policy on its conception as dependent or subordinate to the West, leading to the concession of rightful national claims. Islam-based groups and political formations‟ diversification from Kemalism was related to their struggle over the normative dominance of Islam or Kemalism as the cohesive element of Turkish society and not the
275 Kaliber, A. “Securing the Ground through Securitized „Foreign‟ Policy: The Cyprus Case Revisited”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 36, No. 3(2005), p. 329. 276 Ibid., p. 329. 100 direction of foreign policy. As noted above, the nature of the political system, with parties maintaining weak organizational structures, and struggling to form winning coalitions led to heavy reliance on nationalism, vertical ties with society through the patron-client structure and Islamic accommodation to gain votes. Especially within the context of successive coalition governments, foreign policy on the Cyprus issue was an easy field for antagonism, when official policies could be challenged on the basis of their dedication to national interests and their independence from external influences. Ġsmet Ġnönü‟s decision not to intervene in Cyprus in 1964 after the Johnson Letter, was interpreted as yielding to American pressures277 and came at a high political cost. The official reaction to the Johnson letter set off a wave of unseen anti- Americanism,278 promoted by various factions of Turkish society, with TĠP (Turkish Workers‟ Party) setting the tone and demanding Turkey‟s exit from NATO. From that point onwards the political cost of appearing as having conceded to Greek demands rendered moderate decisions politically risky. The same scene re-occured in 1967 after the Greek Cypriot National Guard attacked Turkish-Cypriot positions in the island. Demirel faced enormous pressure from the public and political opposition to intervene, and the crisis set off a second wave of anti-Americanism, with nation-wide demonstrations and political reactions from CHP and radical left wing parties. Demirel again opted for no intervention, after consultations with American officials and his decision was interpreted and criticized by both the right and the left end of the political spectrum, as one of yet another politician bowing to American pressures:
“So intimately was Demirel identified with the U.S. that he no longer had the prestige to heal wounds at home. He was unable to establish a new consensus on foreign policy or to curb increasing anti-Americanism, except by coercion. In the end, the armed forces intervened on 12 March 1971 to cope with a situation Demirel found impossible to resolve”.279
277 Bolukbasi, S. “The Johnson Letter Revisited”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 29, No. 3 (1993), pp. 505- 525. 278 Bülent Ecevit had reacted fiercly to the Johnson letter, see Bolukbası, 1993, p. 506. 279 Feroz, A. The Turkish experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975 (London: C. Hurst, 1977), p. 416. 101
In 1974, the CHP-MSP (under Islamist leader Necmettin Erbakan) coalition, having shared an expressed anti-Americanism throughout the previous years did not repeat its predecessor‟s mistake and decided for Turkish military action on the island.280 Soon after the attack, during negotiations in Geneva, domestic constraints on foreign policy, stemming from inter-coalition politics, public opinion and the TSK,281 became evident.282 Again, an analysis of state preference formation is not attempted here, but merely a presentation of evidence pointing at relevant actors and the institutional setting.283 The following decade found the Turkish political system isolated from society much because of the new institutional setting established after the 1980 military coup and the subsequent ban on political parties, the dramatic restriction of civil rights and union power. Within that setting the coalition comprising of state officials, business interests and the TSK gained a monopoly over all aspects of policy-making, including foreign policy. The revitalization of Turkey‟s European accession course occurred, as a result of the interaction between the actors comprising the coalition.284
280 For an analytic account of the decision making process, see Çuhadar-Gürkaynak E., and T. B. Özkeçecı. “Decision-making Process Matters: Lessons Learned from Two Turkish Foreign Policy Cases”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2 (2004), pp. 43-78. 281 See “Turkish Withdrawal”, New York Times, 25 July 1974. 282 Birand, M. A. 30 Hot Days (Nicosia: K. Rustem Brother, 1986), p.70. 283 In fact a similar trend of moving from unpopular choices to yelding to patriotic pressures as the democratization process deepens is noted in both states, but further analysis is needed before plausible arguments about democracy and foreign policy can be made. 284 See Waterbury, J. “Export Led Growth and the Center-Right Coalition in Turkey”, Comparative Politics, Vol 24, No 2 (1992), pp. 127-145, for an analysis of the centre-right coalition and export led growth. 102
Chapter 4: Greek Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics
The previous chapter offered a historical narrative of the evolution of the two states‟ normative frameworks and institutional settings, thus completing the first step towards constructing analytic narratives of state preference formation. As already discussed, normative frameworks constitute negotiators‟ major domestic constraints upon considering a switch to a cooperative strategy on the Aegean Sea dispute and not various groups‟ preferences over the dispute itself. The following two empirical chapters explore the mechanisms through which those normative frameworks, themselves the result of actors‟ instrumental rational and strategic interaction, inform negotiators‟ decisions. Applying methodological individualism, we demonstrate how there is nothing stable about domestic institutional settings and the relation between dominant normative frameworks and policy outcomes by analysing two instances of significant policy shifts. These policy shifts are only indirectly related to the Aegean Sea dispute, however they serve us well in exploring mechanisms of preference formation and policy change while simultaneously exposing the limitations of alternative approaches. This chapter in particular explores the impact of intergovernmental negotiations within the EU framework on domestic actors‟ incentives to support or challenge the normative framework, leading to policy and institutional change. The first section consists of a description of the institutional setting at the eve of a significant policy shift as well as empirical evidence regarding the role of one particular actor, mainstream media.285 The second section focuses on the policy shift and its implications in terms of institutions offering a link between international diplomacy and the domestic scene. Therefore, diplomatic events are here considered as an exogenous shock that affect the parameters of the model. The final section presents the new policy equilibrium, explains it in terms of the existing institutional framework, thus providing a mechanism through which policy equilibria occur and change.
285 Although referred to as one actor, mainstream media are in fact treated as a domain consisting of multiple institutions with identical incentive structures, despite wide variation in political affiliation. Their incentive structure is elaborated in the next section and backed by empirical evidence. 103
Section I: The institutional setting
This part builds on the historical narrative of the previous chapter and focuses on the institutional setting and normative framework as it was shaped at the end of the third phase of the bilateral relation, when a significant foreign policy modification was materialized by the Greek executive. The approach, as outlined in the previous chapters, considers foreign policy as an equilibrium result of strategic interaction among relevant actors with particular conceptions of the Other and under the institutional setting that is itself affected by that interaction. Let us first explicate theoretically the way in which individuals interact with the normative framework and public discourse. Firstly, individuals are seen as possessing private dispositions, a set of ideas and skills they developed during socialization which to some degree are both constitutive of the individual and act as constraints of their subsequent political choices. Chong argues that people have to adapt their behaviour to the new system when social change occurs, otherwise they will suffer social losses.286 Whether people adapt or not, depends on their incentives and dispositions. People who have developed their ideas and skills under a certain set of norms might face problems adapting to the new conditions. According to the sociological model people‟s choices throughout life are controlled by dispositions formed early in life and therefore conflict over changing norms is one due to deeply held values and group identifications rather than current calculations. That basic conclusion of the sociological model is then to some extent shared by a thick rational choice approach that assumes Simon‟s „bounded rationality‟.287 However, as Chong notes, rational choice theory‟s explanation of individual action goes on to stress that it is not ideological differences per se that constitute the essence of the conflict but the real and perceived material and social consequences of those value differences. When some people‟s lives are threatened with obsolescence by social change, they are expected to prefer the status quo ante. Chong argues that: “Conflicts over social norms have their origin in past events only insofar as the path dependency of life
286 Chong, 2000. 287 Simon, 1957. 104 socialization and personal development affects people‟s ability to adapt to current prospects”.288 When social change comes the older incentive structure is the obvious choice for those who are constrained by their early decisions. Those people for whom the adaptation process will be harder and the possibilities of its success will be lower will have a vested interest in the preservation of the status quo as coordination around a different set of values will come at a social and/or economic loss. Furthermore public discourse influences individual preferences externally, as a structure determining the width of available choices as well as costs and benefits accosiated with each one. So, public discourse and dominant culture reinforce the normative equilibrium by providing the limited information based on which rational individuals develop opinions and beliefs. Individuals opinions on Greek foreign policy then become contingent on the nature of information they posess. Finally, people rely on public discourse to obtain information about the benefit of coordinating around the normative equilibrium and the costs of acting to upset it and vice versa, thus forming some idea regarding the intentions of others. The institutional setting includes a political system which confers exceptional power to the governing party in introducing bills, passing legislation and ratifying international agreements with a simple parliamentary majority vote that it de jure holds in the parliament. However incorporating norms in our explanation and definition of rationality, exploration of policy outcomes exceeds the limits of the decision-making process and examines agenda setting power as well as the ability to influence public discourse by upholding or challenging dominant norms. Therefore, although not intensely manifested in the decision making process, conflict, manifest or latent, did exist and so do a number of relevant actors with distinct power and preferences who interact strategically to form equilibrium points of rigidity. Relevant structures also include the nascent state of civil society, complemented with the lack of pluralism and the incontinuity of Greek bureaucracy289 ensuring the limited relevance of non-governmental organizations in the decision making process.
288 Chong, 2000, p. 114. 289 The incontinuity of Greek bureaucracy refers to the common administrative reforms in terms of staff and procedures that ensues after a shift in political leadership. See interview with member of executive board of ALPHA Bank, Athens, December 2008. 105
The normative framework in Greece at the end of the 1990s consisted mainly of ethnocentric conceptions of foreign policy,290 national issues and Turkey in particular which largely reflected the Greek identification and has been much more comprehensively explored elsewhere.291 This framework had been preserved through education, literature and media coverage given the little substantial political confrontation around it and strong incentives to coordinate around it. Poll results illustrate the effect of public discourse on individual opinions.292 Consequently, the basic directions of Greek foreign policy on “national issues” had not been contested by the major political formations ever since the restoration of democracy in 1974. It follows that individuals with private preferences contradicting the dominant framework faced increased costs of expressing them as well as obtaining accurate information on others‟ intentions. This thesis uses the term rigidity as a theoretical construct which aims to pinpoint the essence of relevant actors‟ strategic interaction, thus replacing the much broader concept of strategic culture. Rigidity is conceptualized as a state strategy as well as a social norm. As a strategy, rigidity refers to the interaction between the Greek and Turkish negotiator on the main bilateral dispute over the Aegean Sea. As elaborated in the introduction, after the Turkish invasion/intervention of Cyprus in 1974, Greece officially denied the legitimacy of all Turkish claims and only recognized the continental shelf issue as a matter officially
290 For more on Greek ethnocentrism see Frangoudaki, A., and T. Dragona, “Greece between Tradition and Modernity, in Search of an Equal Place in the European Taxonomy of Peoples”, in M. Angvik, and B. Von Borries (eds.), Youth and History: A Comparative European Survey on Historical Consciousness and Political Attitudes Among Adolescents (Hamburg: Korber-Stiftung, 1997). 291 See for instance: Diamandouros, N. “Greek Political Culture in Transition: Historical Origins, Evolution, Current Trends”, in R. Clogg (ed.), Greece in the 1980s, (London: Macmillan, 1983); Diamandouros, N. “Politics and Culture in Greece, 1974–1991: An Introduction”, in R. Clogg (ed.), Greece 1981–1990: The Populist Decade, (London: Macmillan, 1993); Diamandouros, N. “Greek Identity in the Context of Globalization”, in L. Tsoukalis (ed.), Globalization and Regionalism. A Double Challenge for Greece, (Athens: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) and The Hellenic Observatory of the European Institute at LSE, 2001); Coufoudakis, V. “Greek Political Party Attitudes towards Turkey”, in D. Constas (ed.), The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s, (London: Macmillan, 1991); Kalpadakis, G., and D. A. Sotiropoulos. “Europeanism and Nationalist Populism: The Europeanization of Greek Civil Society and Foreign Policy”, Hellenic Studies, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2007), pp. 43-66; Tsakonas, 2010. 292 Results of polls conducted during a decade of peace between the two states are illuminating. According to a poll published in Kathimerini on January 2008 70.5% of the Greeks have a negative opinion on Turkey, in another one published in TO VIMA on June 2006 only 11.8% believe that the bilateral relation will improve if the two states agree to settle the Aegean dispute at the International Court of Justice, Kappa-Research, Δλληνοηοςπκικέρ Σσέζειρ [Greek-Turkish Relations], January 2008. 106 in dispute and argued that it should be a matter of discussion at the ICJ after joint application by the two states. Turkey declared her desire to solve all matters under dispute through bilateral negotiations. Their possible strategies right after the declaration of their official stands therefore were: a) cooperative, which would suggest finding a third way of dealing with their bilateral dispute sending signals of modest claims, and b) rigid, which translates into abstention from negotiations until the other side concedes to one‟s preferred settlement method. Modest signals could be sent by the Greek side by acknowledging the existence of special conditions in the Aegean Sea regarding the continental shelf delimitation and by declaring the will to compromise on the continental shelf of the Eastern Aegean Islands. And Turkey could tie its hands by acknowledging that Aegean Islands are entitled to their own continental shelf and that therefore Greece‟s fear for Turkey‟s intent to divide the Aegean Sea in two and enclose Greek islands was unfounded. The two sides have played rigid up to the present day. Rigidity is also conceptualized as a value embedded within the Greek identity insofar as perceptions of Turkey, and Turkish intentions in the region dictated a rigid stand as means of deterrence of the Turkish threat. While rigidity is one of the two available strategies of the Greek negotiator on the Aegean Sea dispute, as a norm, rigidity can take different values. Various actors are then considered as having distinct preferred levels of rigidity of Greek foreign policy toward Turkey. These different levels reflect specific conceptions of Turkish interests and strategies which prescribe suitable policies on every issue of bilateral interest. Specifically on the Aegean Sea dispute, constituents who perceive Turkey as a revisionist, expansionist state which violates human rights implicitly are assumed to hold a strong preference for a rigid Greek stand as any negotiated compromise settlement would constitute a unilateral concession of Greek sovereign rights.
The actors
The particular setting, reflected in an equilibrium level of rigidity, corresponds to a particular distribution of power among groups and individuals. Let us now turn to the
107 presentation of the relevant actors of the model and their incentive structures. The actors selected based on empirical research comprise of: politicians (moderate-liberal, traditionalists),293 academicians-journalists (liberal, traditionalists), business, media (mainstream, liberal-progressive), NGOs (liberal-progressive, traditionalist-nationalist), constituents and the executive. Academicians and journalists have specific preferences over the level of rigidity. A decision on which public preference to adopt depends on the divergence of expected benefit from free expression and expected cost in terms of social pressures. Their actions are directed towards influencing public discourse either individually or through the work of civil society organizations. A distinction can be drawn between liberal and traditionalists. Business, especially exporting firms and large size enterprises have a declared preference for low levels of rigidity that would enable mutual understanding, peace and stability in order to promote economic interaction. Their interests are promoted both independently from one another as well as by a number of associations and business chambers while their actions are directed both towards the executive through organized lobbying and towards influencing public opinion. Numerous civil society organizations also have distinct preferences over the level of rigidity. Such organizations comprise of local associations, refugee associations, human rights groups, antiracist groups, Greek-Turkish friendship groups, nationalist groups and networks and groups of the Greek Diaspora. These NGOs focus on raising awareness on their agenda and mobilizing public support behind their goals and thus their efforts rely on communication with the public through any means available. They are also classified under liberal (progressive) and traditionalist. Mainstream media‟s interests are sales-oriented and therefore media institutions as corporate entities have no specific preference over the level of rigidity per se. Their coverage is centred on the bipolar political distinction, i.e. the confrontation of the two main political parties, thus still promoting this division. Therefore, any issue which does
293 Regarding the distinction between liberal/progressive and traditionalist/nationalist, it has been implied that it is closely related to the theoretical debate within the Greek I.R community, with traditionalists relying on realism as already demonstrated. It should be made explicitly clear that it is not this paper‟s intention to appear critical of realism based on its endorsement and application by parts of Greek academia and its influence on Greek foreign policy. 108 not allow for confrontation between the two, as their views converge, is covered in a way which highlights the consensual argument and enforces the equilibrium. Media institution employees however do have preferred levels of rigidity. Their incentive structures resemble those of politicians (to be analysed below): personal success and status, organization success, policy outcomes that serves their past investments and dispositions. Regarding the role and preferences of the public, media and journalists, the following assumptions are made here and will be backed by evidence in the next section: a) Turkey and Greek-Turkish relations constitute a commercial topic, judging by the number of related entries, b) the coverage is biased to the extent needed to enforce the current equilibrium of rigidity, c) differences in media institutions‟ political affiliation do become apparent even in an issue where the general lines of foreign policy are respected by the two main political parties,294 d) there is a noticeable disparity between news reports and columnists‟ input in terms of scope and style. The outcome of the normative struggle is reflected on constituents‟ perceptions of Turkey and preferred level of rigidity. Throughout the 20th century public opinion has remained negative as a result of the ethnogenesis process that defined Greek identity in contrast with the „Other‟.295 The executive‟s preferences are informed by the costs of various levels of rigidity on the state budget but the actual policy outcome is a function of public opinion as shaped by mainstream media and influences of competing coalitions, direct influence of coalition of interests and the outcome of moderate politicians‟ interaction. The executive is treated here as a unitary actor and that assumption is based on empirical knowledge of the Greek political scene related to the benefit of all ministries from a reduction of military expenditure and costly party disciplinary measures.296
294 This assumption is necessary in order to establish that mainstream media would enforce a new equilibrium if that was not an object of confrontation between the two major political parties. 295 See Millas, 2004 and Heraclides, 2001. 296 The behaviour of the executive could be treated as a collective action situation. Regarding the prospect of cooperation towards achieving a decrease of rigidity and given all ministries‟ benefit from a reduction of military expenditure and the high costs of defection related to disciplinary measures, the Minister of Foreign Affairs should be the only one tempted to defect if and only if he/she had radically opposite individual dispositions . Theoretically that is possible under extreme combinations of prospective costs and benefits and empirical reality establishes that such defections indeed occur rarely. Therefore, the executive 109
The Moderate Politicians’ Game
Generally, politicians‟ incentive structures are similar to those of journalists: re- election, party election and an equilibrium that serves their past investments and disposition. So, politicians do have private preferences over the level of rigidity and we can theoretically establish that there is a group of „moderate‟ politicians, dispersed in various political parties with a preference for a lower than the equilibrium level of rigidity. Those moderate politicians can theoretically collaborate by simultaneously publicly declaring their private preference aiming to influence policy-making. Successful cooperation will signify a certain probability that a less rigid ( ) foreign policy outcome will be achieved from which each one of them would derive some benefit, related to past investments and personal dispositions. That probability is positively correlated with the size of the group, obviously the more people publicly endorsing a policy shift the more influence they can exert over the policy-making process. Therefore, cooperation of moderate politicians does not suffice to secure a less rigid foreign policy. Adopting a cooperative strategy, each moderate politician instantly incurs a cost by publicly stating their private preference, which involves party disciplinary measures and negative publicity. Each player incurs the cost at stage 1 (public statement) while the flow of benefits would only be possible with probability and commencing at a later stage. Therefore each politician faces an incentive to abstain from public collective action at stage 1 and hope to derive the benefits from stage 2 once there will be a new policy equilibrium. It is realistic to assume that there are politicians for whom endorsing such a policy shift would not be costly as their private preference is compatible with their official party line. So their contribution is not contingent on others‟ actions but is their dominant strategy and could be viewed as providing leadership to the group. However, the size of that sub-group can be plausibly assumed to be too small for others to acknowledge it as Schelling‟s classic „critical mass‟.297 Other moderate politicians would
is treated as a unitary actor. Instead, again informed by empirical reality the introduction of moderate politicians is considered as the most useful application of rationalist tools. 297 Schelling describes critical mass as: “some activity that is self-sustaining once the measure of that activity passes a certain minimum level”, Schelling, T. C. Micromotives and Macrobehavior (2nd ed., New York, New York: Norton Company Ltd, 1978, 2006). 110 thus wait to assess the magnitude of contribution from those for whom participation is costly. Problems of defection are exacerbated by the low probability of repeated interaction. For every equilibrium level of rigidity there is a certain group of moderate politicians, suggesting that a change in that equilibrium level materialized through a policy shift, leads to a change in the composition of the group. This attribute of their interaction implies that repeated interaction and therefore any likelihood of effective monitoring and punishing defections are limited only within phases of the bilateral relation characterized by a stable equilibrium. So every moderate politician plays a game with the group at stage 1 having incomplete information on the composition of the group. Since that information is not available any single member‟s defection cannot lead to the breakdown of any level of cooperation achieved and therefore the collective good of less rigidity is not an all-or nothing good. So, a certain number out of moderate politicians would be sufficient to ensure that the positive outcome is derived with probability . If cooperation is not attained, that is less than players cooperate, the outcome is the status quo ( ). Let us see what kind of a game that is. If Player 1 cooperates and overall players cooperate (CC) Player 1‟s payoff will be:
If Player 1 cooperates and less than players cooperate (CD), Player 1‟s payoff will be:
If Player 1 defects while overall players cooperate (DC), Player 1‟s payoff will be:
If Player 1 defects and less than players cooperate (DD), Player 1‟s payoff will be:
In fact it becomes obvious that any player has a dominant strategy of defecting for any . For probability that cooperation will be achieved and probability that cooperation will fail, Player 1‟s expected utility of having a dominant defecting strategy exceeds the expected utility of having a dominant cooperation strategy:
111
,
The Prisoner‟s Dilemma preference order is: DC›CC›DD›CD. Therefore if our game is a classic PD:
(I)
Hence when (I) applies the game is a PD with DD as the Nash equilibrium. On the other hand when , the game is Deadlock; there is no conflict as the equilibrium DD is Pareto optimal. Therefore the game is either deadlock or PD depending on the relation of the cost with the probability of production of the good and the difference between new outcome and status quo. When the order of preference is the following: CC›DC›DD›CD the game is an assurance game. In order for the game to be transformed to an assurance game:
Therefore moderate politicians would be willing to cooperate if the sum of party disciplinary measures and negative publicity would obtain a negative value through a transformation of disciplinary measures into rewards and/or of negative into positive publicity. Data is therefore needed to evaluate the game dynamically during the course of the last 35 years. The moderate politicians‟ game is part of the Greek institutional setting and empirical evidence is therefore required in order to explore variations in the structure of the game during different phases of Greek-Turkish relations. In doing so, this chapter
112 offers a link between domestic politics and international diplomacy and explores the effect of such an exogenous shock on the equilibrium level of rigidity and the outcome of moderate politicians‟ interaction.
Evidence on the Role of Mainstream Media
The previous section listed assumptions regarding mainstream media preferences, the coverage of the case at hand and consequently of the shape of public discourse under which constituents express preferences and which coalitions formed are aiming to influence. A presentation of empirical evidence supporting those assumptions is in order before the exploration of key actors‟ interaction. The specifics of the applied methodology, a blend of qualitative and quantitative analysis, were outlined in the methodology chapter. Briefly, seven thematical categories, themselves divided into sub- categories, were formed: “Bilateral Relations”, “Turkey”, “Cyprus”, “Business- Economy”, “History”, “EU and Turkey” and “Other” and 22 categories corresponding to interpreted references made to Turkey, listed in Table 1. Categories reflected stereotypical negative references to Turkish interests and strategies, culture, history, political system etc., which form the full range of ways in which individuals might adopt a biased understanding of the bilateral relation, its prospects and the two states‟ share of responsibility for the stalemate or the hardships of the past. The three top selling dailies of the period under question, March 2007-March 2008, TA NEA, Eletherotypia and Kathimerini constituted the sample. The dailies selected also nicely reflect traditionally distinct political inclinations, with Kathimerini addressing an audience group composing of elements of conservative neoliberalism and supporting the ND right wing government of the time, TA NEA traditionally addressing social democrat PASOK voters and Eleftherotypia targeting audiences at the left of the political spectrum. The first conclusion reached is that the subject is commercial, with all three dailies publishing over 700 related stories per year, half of those being only Turkey- related. This first finding supports the argument that there is a strong correlation between public opinion and the type of coverage.
113
A Turkey as revisionist, rigid or revisionist in the Aegean Sea dispute B Turkey as expansionist, rigid or responsible for the political division in Cyprus C Turkey as violator of the Greek minority‟s human rights and as oppressing the Patriarchate D Turkey as an incomplete democracy, under the political patronage of the TSK E Turkey as aspiring to obtain regional power status F Turkey as opposing Greek interests in the latter‟s bilateral relations with other states G Turkey as expansionist in Thrace I Turkey as incapable of bilateral cooperation on other issues (i.e. illegal immigration) J Turkey as a close ally of the USA K Turkey as violator of human rights (not Greek minority related) L Turkey as a close ally of European states N Neutral references and analyses of bilateral issues P Inflammatory, provocative, derogatory references, which spur the anti-Turkish sentiment Q Criticisms of Greek foreign policy acceding to international and Turkish pressures R Turkey as the stereotype of the Ottoman negotiator, bargaining hard and heavily relying on threats S Positive, cooperative images of Turkey and Turks and references to cooperative efforts U USA and western “structural” pressure on the two states V Turkish foreign policy as organized, meticulous, coherent and resourceful as opposed to that of Greece W Turkey opposing USA pressures and demands X Turkey as a nationalist state Y Criticisms of Greek foreign policy for the state of the bilateral relation and particular aspects of it Z The two states as victims of nationalism
Table 1: Referential Categories.
Secondly, the coverage is generally dominated by negative references. Figure 4.1 displays the ratio of positive, neutral and self-critical references to negative references.298
298 Positive, neutral and self-critical references refer to categories N, S, Y, Z while all other categories correspond to negative references, excluded category U, which refers to international structural pressures. 114
Obviously, the ratio is low in all three dailies, with Kathimerini scoring the highest at 0.25.
TA NEA KATHIMERINI ELEFTHEROTYPIA
Positive, Neutral or Self-Critical 143 162 136 Negative 715 650 809 Ratio 0,2 0,25 0,17
Figure 4.1: Ratio of positive, neutral and self-critical per negative references.
Thirdly, distinct political inclinations do manifest themselves in the coverage despite the low level of controversy around attitudes towards Turkey. This finding supports the hypothesis that any new equilibrium should be enforced by mainstream media if it does not become an object of confrontation between the main political parties. Figure 4.2 displays each daily‟s focus on distinct aspects of the relation and on distinct referential categories by displaying the total number of occurrences of a referential category as well as the ratio per total number of entries. So, TA NEA‟s coverage in relative terms overstates Turkish expansionist tendencies in the Aegean Sea (with 106 observations in category A),299 uses inflammatory references that spur the anti-Turkish sentiment (175 observations in category P), while simultaneously highlighting the effects of nationalism on both states (18 observations in category Z). The daily downplays the stereotype of Turkey as the rigid Ottoman negotiator (26 observations in category R), the existence of structural pressures on the two states, mainly from western states and institutions (18 observations in category U) as well as close ties of Turkey with European states that work to the detriment of Greece‟s national interests (12 observations in category L). Overall, this evidence suggests that the daily discounts international pressures and Turkey‟s geopolitical alliances as factors of policy formation and focuses on the regional aspect of the conflict, induced by the revisionist tensions of one state. Kathimerini, always in relative terms, downplays Turkey‟s expansionist intentions, uses less inflammatory references than the other dailies, is less critical of
299 See Appendices 1, 2 for a full list and explanation of categories. 115
„soft‟ Greek foreign policy makers (18 observations in category Q) and reports more on cooperative stories, offering positive images of Turkey (100 observations in category S). Again, this data alone suggests that the daily seeks to downplay the significance of the Aegean Sea dispute, the causality between the conflict and Turkish expansionism and portrays the dispute as a normal occurrence between neighboring states, which can be resolved in the future. Eleftherotypia projects Turkey as aspiring a regional power status (25 observations in category E), as a close ally of the USA (98 observations in category J), as a violator of human rights (80 observations in category K), and as exercising a coherent and effective foreign policy as opposed to Greece (21 observations in category V) and is most critical of Greek foreign policy makers for acceding to Turkey‟s demands and international pressures. Eleftherotypia, addressing audiences on the left of the political spectrum emphasizes human rights violations, international alliances and the role of the west in promoting Turkish interests.
A E J K L P Q R S U V Z TA NEA 106 3 57 45 12 175 22 26 70 18 9 18 0,13 0,00 0,07 0,05 0,01 0,22 0,02 0,03 0,02 0,00 0,02 % 7 4 4 8 5 6 8 3 0,09 3 1 3 KATHIMERINI 45 15 58 57 19 104 18 63 100 38 8 9 0,05 0,07 0,07 0,02 0,13 0,02 0,08 0,12 0,04 0,00 0,01 % 8 0,02 5 4 4 4 3 1 9 9 1 1 ELEFTHEROTYPI A 56 25 98 80 29 148 36 45 68 37 21 7 0,07 0,12 0,10 0,03 0,18 0,04 0,05 0,08 0,04 0,02 0,00 % 1 0,03 4 1 7 8 5 7 6 7 7 9
Figure 4.2: Observations of referential c ategories and ratios per total number of entries .
An even closer look at the data offers a fuller comprehension of the coverage. Figure 4.3 displays data weighing the relation between thematical and referential categories, providing further information.
116
Coverage of the Cyprus category is very informative for the Kathimerini daily. Out of 47 published stories related to Cyprus, 26 included references to Turkey being rigid and expansionist in Cyprus (category B), a percentage (0.55) much higher than those of the other two dailies. Moreover, the percentage of neutral-objective analyses (0,08) is again lower than those of TA NEA and Eleftherotypia, with 0.15 and 0.19 respectively and so is the percentage of criticisms of Greek policies. Therefore, the content of the majority of Cyprus-related stories and editorials uncritically followed the official narrative that holds Turkey solely responsible for the situation in the island and fewer neutral pieces appeared in Kathimerini. Eleftherotypia covered news about Turkish domestic politics using the most inflammatory phraseology, 0,14 compared to 0,08 and 0.07 for TA NEA and Kathimerini respectively, while publishing the least cooperative- positive images of Turkey under the bilateral relations category, with 0,04 compared to 0,09 and 0,19 for TA NEA and Kathimerini respectively. TA NEA interestingly used a high percentage of references to Turkey being a “military democracy” (category D) in the bilateral relations category. Every entry under that category contains 0,18 references to Turkey as a military democracy, compared to 0,04 and 0,08 for Kathimerini and Eleftherotypia respectively. Furthermore, 0,336 of such references were found under bilateral relations related entries, while the percentages for Kathimerini and Eleftherotypia were 0,08 and 0.13 respectively.
Cyprus Turkey B.R
Total B N Y Total P Total S D TA NEA 66 22 10 9 304 26 200 19 36 Ratio 0,33 0,15 0,14 0,08 0,09 0,18
KATHIMERINI 47 26 4 5 383 29 157 30 7 Ratio 0,55 0,08 0,11 0,07 0,19 0,04
ELEFTHEROTYPIA 101 36 19 13 364 52 146 6 11 Ratio 0,36 0,19 0,13 0,14 0,04 0,07
Figure 4.3: Ratio of o bservations of refential categories per thematical categories .
117
So a second look at the data adds the following to our understanding of the distinctions among the dailies‟ coverage: While Kathimerini downplays the Aegean Sea dispute and fears of Turkish expansionism, and offers the most cooperative and friendly coverage in relative terms, the coverage of Cyprus related stories has the opposite characteristics, following the official narrative, more so than the other dailies. The qualitative difference of the coverage of Cyprus related stories is evidence that the daily seeks to offer support to the right-wing government of the time in maintaining low tension between the two states. Conclusions regarding Eleftherotypia‟s coverage are confirmed by the daily‟s emphasis on inflammatory references in Turkish politics-related stories and the low number of positive-cooperative references on issues of bilateral interest. Finally, TA NEA‟s focus on Turkish expansionism on the Aegean Sea is complemented with emphasis on Turkey as a military democracy, thus offering a causal relation between the TSK‟s political power and Turkish foreign policy. The data presented above, a result of a blend of quantitative and qualitative analysis is complemented by a few additional comments that could not be incorporated in the analysis because of the method used. Firstly, the ethnocentric bias in the coverage is also manifested by story selection. Selection bias is mostly apparent in the “Cyprus” and “Political Bilateral Relation” categories. Regarding the first category, entries in all three dailies tend to reflect the official national narrative of the case thus usually overlooking the repercussions of Greek Cypriot policies during the 1960s, as well as the implications of Greek Cypriot rejection of the Annan Plan (even though TA NEA supported the Annan Plan according to Pantelis Kapsis300), and aspects of the “economic isolation of Turkish Cypriots” issue between Turkey and the EU. Eleftherotypia offered a certain amount of articles related to otherwise underexposed topics (all by one columnist) and balances that input with direct replies by other regular columnists. Regarding the second aforementioned category the selection bias is more evident in cases of minority rights abuse in Thrace. Greece has been found guilty of human rights abuse by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in two related cases, where two
300 Interview with Pantelis Kapsis, Athens, 19 September 2008. 118 minority associations were found illegal by Greek judicial authorities.301 The Court‟s decision was downplayed by mainstream media and the Press as evidence shows (there was only one entry per daily in the following day).302 Furthermore even though the Greek Orthodox minority rights receive a lot of attention and the Turkish government is systematically criticized for their abuse, the fact that Athens still does not have a mosque for its large Muslim population was rarely mentioned. Kathimerini has provided some information that has escaped the attention of other newspapers, either in news reports or columnists‟ articles. Examples include positive news for Greek national interests, positive remarks on Greek policies or simple facts that fall under the selection bias of the other two dailies. Furthermore, the daily conducted and published four interviews with high-rank Turkish officials, compared to three interviews found in the other two dailies, while Eleftherotypia published eleven interviews with members of the PKK. Secondly, story titles often enough did not flesh out the essence of the text which equally often was not as biased as the title suggested. Therefore, some entries offered an inflammatory title followed by a relatively neutral piece. Finally, there was noticeable disparity between news reports and columnists‟ input in terms of scope and style. That disparity is more striking in TA NEA and Kathimerini. In general opinion pieces written for TA NEA by regular columnists like Pavlos Tsimas or by academicians like Alexis Heraclides and Panos Ioakimidis were objective and progressive for Greek mainstream standards. There were of course articles echoing the traditionalist, patriotic front. However, while the expressed opinion of scientists was overwhelmingly progressive and unbiased, the newspaper balanced that
301 European Court of Human Rights. Case of Tourkiki Enwsh Xanthis and Others v. Greece, 27 March 2008, found at: http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=26698/05%20| %2026698/05&sessionid=80974710&skin=hudoc-en, accessed on 11 June 2009. 302 Kallergis, K. “Επξωαπόθαζε γηα Πξνζθπγέο Μεηνλνηηθώλ‟‟ [Eurodecision on Minority Application], Kathimerini, found at: http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_politics_2_28/03/2008_264311, accessed on 10 June 2009; Zervas, C, and N, Roussis, “Οκόθωλε Επξωθαηαδίθε γηα ην „Όρη‟ ζηηο Μεηνλνηηθέο Ελώζεηο” [Unanimous Condemnation for No to Minority Associations], Eleftherotypia, at: http://archive.enet.gr/online/ss3?q=%E5%F5%F1%F9%F0%E1%FA%EA%FC+%E4%E9%EA%E1%F3 %F4%DE%F1%E9%EF&a=&pb=0&dt1=25/03/2008&dt2=03/04/2008&r=0&p=0&id=57444208, accessed on 8 November 2009; “Επξωδηθαίωζε δπν Μεηνλνηηθώλ Σπιιόγωλ ζηε Θξάθε‟‟ [Eurovindication for Two Minority Unions in Thrace], TA NEA, found at: http://www.tanea.gr/default.asp?pid=2&ct=1&artid=62311, accessed on 10 June 2009. 119 input with the nature of its daily news reports as shown above. The situation is similar in Kathimerini where columnists such as Stavros Lygeros address the traditionalist values of the Greek public and come to contrast the neoliberal cooperative, and moderate stand the daily wants to impose on the coverage of the bilateral relation. Overall the daily, much like the other two presented here, was at pains trying to balance columnists‟ and news reports‟ inputs.
Section II: A Narrative of the Helsinki Strategy
After having identified the relevant actors and defined the institutional setting we are able to begin to comprehend the domestic process of state preference formation. For that a policy shift that occurred in 1999 and overtly exposed realist limitations in predicting foreign policy outcomes is used. The shift is only indirectly related to the Aegean Sea dispute but can illustrate the strategic interaction of relevant actors under a particular institutional framework and linkages between international diplomacy and domestic politics. In 1999, during the Helsinki EU Summit, the Greek government proceeded to a significant policy modification. Greece ceased to be the obstacle to Turkey‟s EU accession course, a role that it held since 1989,303 as part of the strategic exploit of its EU membership status in order to coerce Turkey into concessions on the Aegean Sea and the Cyprus issue. By the end of the 1990s it was clear that the particular strategy had not brought about the desired results, in fact it was during that time that Turkey presented claims over the sovereignty of eastern Aegean islands under the “grey zones” argument. But the Helsinki policy was not simply restricted to lifting sanctions. The Greek executive went on to push for consecutive rounds of exploratory talks on the Aegean Sea dispute, worked towards the solution of the Cyprus issue within the UN framework, while simultaneously focusing on establishing closer ties between the two states‟ societies. At the same time the Greek government exploited the „Earthquake climate‟ to promote a communicative friendship strategy which would be advertized by the mainstream media, centred on the personal warm relation between Foreign Ministers
303 Despite the temporary acceptance of the Customs Union with Turkey in 1995. 120
George Papandreou and Ġsmail Cem. Within this period, Greek diplomacy devoted a significant part of its resources to the direction of rapprochement. Explanations of the policy shift varied and included emphasis on the effects of Europeanization and other factors which rendered the new strategy rational for Greek national interests. Some of my interviewees referred to the concept of “neofunctionalist detour” as an attempt to circumvent existing territorial problems based on a functionalist approach through economic interdependence.304 Kostas Simitis mentioned how a closer relation between Turkey and the West was favoured both by the EU and by the US and therefore Greece‟s veto was counterproductive,305 while Theodoros Pangalos viewed the shift as enabled by the succesfull veto strategy.306 However, a strategy beneficial for national interests is not simultaneously an implementable strategy as the handling of the Macedonian issue amongst others, exemplifies. Loizides comments on the „rational incentive‟ approach (referring to the state as an actor): “The „rational incentive‟ approach, though, does not explain previous failures of the two countries to turn confrontation into regional cooperation, the delay in reaching a consensus in Greek-Turkish relations and the general prevalence of hawkish politics in the pre-Helsinki era”.307 In fact Simitis has confessed the Greek executive‟s preference for a lower level of rigidity since 1996, but the realization of a policy shift was not possible and Greece remained at high levels of rigidity during a heated period of Greek-Turkish relations.308 This important piece of evidence highlighting the need for alternative explanations has not been given the proper attention. What was confirmed by all my interviewees is that the shift would not have been made possible if Greece had not managed to disassociate the island‟s EU prospects from its political division, during the Helsinki Summit. Literature on the effects of Europeanization and the EU‟s impact on conflicts at its borders has offered links between international institutions and domestic sources of foreign policy. However, as noted in Chapter 2 the assumption of the EU as a unitary actor combined with weak theoretical
304 Interviews with Theodoros Couloumbis, Dimitris Droutsas and Panos Koutsikos, Athens, 2008. 305 Interview with Kostas Simitis, Athens, 16 December 2008. 306 Interview with Theodoros Pangalos, Athens, 9 December, 2008. 307 Loizides, N. “Elite Framing and Conflict Transformation in Turkey”, Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 62, No. 2 (2009), p. 280. 308 Simitis, K. Πολιηική για μια Γημιοςπγική Δλλάδα 1996-2004 [Politics for a Creative Greece, 1996-2004], (Athens: Polis, 2005), pp. 75-86. 121 frameworks of analyzing domestic sources of foreign policy significantly curtail this literature‟s explanatory power. 309 In order to explain the policy shift, a rationalist approach that effectively builds explicit links between domestic preferences, institutions and international diplomacy is needed. This requires an adequate analysis of domestic institutional structures and relative actors‟ incentives as well as the disaggregation of policy outcomes at the EU level.310 How was it then that this particular outcome of international diplomacy311 affected the domestic institutional setting enabling the implementation of a new strategy? Firstly, a less rigid foreign policy was appealing to the executive, as it would promote economic interaction and stability and could potentially lead to Turkey‟s democratization thereby decreasing the possibility of confrontation and perhaps the levels of military expenditure. Until then, in light of negative public opinion and expected reactions from the opposition such a shift was politically unattainable. Preparing for the Helsinki Summit Greek policymakers correctly estimated that if they were able to disassociate Cyprus EU accession from the island‟s political situation the strategy could become appealing to moderate politicians in all parties. Given the islands‟ prosperous economy, political division was the main obstacle for accession and with that lifted, Cyprus would, more likely than not, enter the EU. Thus, a package including Cyprus EU accession, increase of bilateral trade and economic interaction, decrease of tension and Turkish democratization could appeal to the public and therefore moderate politicians could endorse it without incurring costs. Turkey was after all only accepted as a candidate state for accession and membership was far from guaranteed. Specifically regarding moderate politicians of the opposition, they were expected to
309 See Rumelili, B. “Transforming Conflicts on EU Borders: The Case of Greek-Turkish Relations”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 45, No. 1 (2007), pp. 105-126; Rumelili, B. “Civil Society and the Europeanization of Greek-Turkish Cooperation”, South European Society and Politics, Vol. 10, No. 1 (2005), pp. 43-54; Rumelili, B. “Impacting the Greek-Turkish Conflicts: The EU is What we Make of it”, in T. Diez, S. Stetter, and M. Albert (eds.), The European Union and Border Conflicts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 94-128. 310 This is not attempted in this thesis. However the disaggregation of EU policies to its interstate negotiations is assumed as a continuation of the Two Level game framework adopted for Greece and Turkey. EU policies thus are referred to simply as outcomes of interstate diplomacy and negotiations, thus excluding the EU as a unitary actor. 311 The Helsinki Summit is treated as an exogenous shock on the model, despite the participation of both Greece and Turkey. Negotiations were multilateral, comprising of all EU member states and potential candidate for accession states. 122 recognize that on top of their own personal favourable disposition to the new strategy, they were given the chance to ripe the benefits were they to win the 2000 election, rather than being locked in a counter-productive veto strategy. Furthermore, poll results prior to the Summit demonstrated some degree of empathy within the Greek public toward Turkey after the 1999 earthquakes.312 Indeed the outcome of the bargaining on Cyprus accession and the Summit Conclusions reference to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as last resort to be used for the two states to solve their bilateral dispute before Turkey could begin accession negotiations,313 rendered support for the new strategy a popular view. Therefore, the reputation benefits for policymakers, as well as for those who endorsed or did not oppose it, counterbalanced reputation costs, the structure of the moderate politicians‟ game changed and cooperation was achieved.314 Greece was seen as having concluded a significant diplomatic achievement while the concession of lifting the sanctions on Turkey was considered as marginal compared to the benefits of the policy by an overwhelming majority of the Greek public.315 The new policy was exactly the one preferred by the executive, who saw it as an opportunity to increase economic ties and use it as a means to decrease tension, as well as the beginning of a new phase in Greek- Turkish relations, initiated by Turkey‟s European course which was thought to modernize Turkish policy-making thus indirectly benefiting the Greek side.316 The same view was held by moderate politicians from the opposition, 317 which faced great difficulties trying
312 Karanasopoulou, E. August 25, 1999. “Yes to Money for Turkey.” TA NEA. Available at: http://www.tanea.gr/ellada/article/?aid=4085354. (Accessed March 20, 2012.) 313 “The European Council...urges candidate states to make every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes and other related issues. Failing this they should within a reasonable time bring the dispute to the International Court of Justice”, Helsinki Summit Conclusions 1999. 314 Numerous prominent MPs from ND and SYN expressed their support for efforts to improve bilateral relations, including Andreas Andrianopoulos, Konstantinos Mitsotakis, Mihalis Papakonstantinou, Dora Bakoyannis, Vasilis Kontogiannopoulos, Spyros Danelis, Giannis Diamantidis, Leonidas Kyrkos, Nikos Mpistis and Michalis Papagiannakis. 315 Metron Analysis, Public Opinion Poll on the European Union, 2002, found at: http://www.metronanalysis.gr/gr/polls/pub6151/index_files/v3_document.htm, accessed on 18 November 2008. 316 See Rumelili, 2007, for an analysis of the EU‟s capability of transforming conflicts at its borders. 317 See for instance a common statement supporting rapprochement signed by 272 individuals, including politicians from opposition parties, “Υπέξ ηεο Ειιελνηνπξθηθήο Πξνζέγγηζεο” [For Greek-Turkish rapprochement], TA NEA, 1999, found at: http://www.tanea.gr/default.asp?pid=2&ct=1&artid=4094958, accessed on 12 July 2009. 123 to reconcile its desire to criticize the new policy and the latter‟s approval by moderate deputies.318 Criticisms focused on the Summit Conclusions reference to „outstanding border disputes and other related issues‟, claiming that it implied an acceptance of disputed issues other than that of the continental shelf, as opposed to Athens‟ official position ever since 1974. However the reference was largely overshadowed by the overall appeal of the package deal. Indeed the new strategy was not effectively criticized and mainstream media came to observe and enforce the new equilibrium. Therefore it was an exogenous factor that enabled moderate politicians‟ cooperation and made the policy shift possible. Attention then should not simply focus on whether and why the executive of the time did prefer lower levels of rigidity or whether and why a new strategy would serve Greek interests better than the veto strategy. Any convincing explanation of this shift should go beyond the necessary but not sufficient conditions rendering the shift possible and seek to illustrate causal mechanisms at work which enable it. Even more crucially, unobservable structures such as normative frameworks and public discourse can contribute to the analysis of preference formation and change when they are agentially analysed. Loizides for instance, has explored elite framing as determining Turkish foreign policy outcomes. Distinguishing elite framing from discourse, ideology and narratives he stresses: “the degree of strategy involved, particularly in appropriating, challenging or negotiating the shared meaning of a given situation...In other words, frames imply agency, deliberation or even manipulation in the construction of „new realities‟”.319 He then proceeds to examine the degree to which framing reflects institutional or structural factors or can develop an independent influence on policy making.
318 Amongst those who endorsed or did not oppose the Helsinki strategy were: former Prime Minister Konstantinos Mitsotakis, see for instance Karanasopoulou, E, “Ναη ζηα Φξήκαηα γηα Τνπξθία» [Yes to Money for Turkey], TA NEA, 25 August 1999, found at: http://www.tanea.gr/default.asp?pid=2&ct=1&artid=4085354, accessed on 13 March 2008; Papakwnstantinou, M, Interview at Flash 9.61, Athens, August 3, 1999, found at: http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/greek/pressrelease/flash-papak-3-8-1999.html, accessed on 10 January 2009; Bakoyianni, D, Interview at Flash 9.61, Athens, August 4, 1999, found at: http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/greek/pressrelease/flash-4-8-1999.html, accessed on 10 January 2009. 319 Loizides, 2009, p. 4. 124
The analysis of the moderate politician‟s game transformation is an example of such agency-instigated framing of Greek-Turkish relation by Greek moderate politicians. At any given time, the structural and institutional setting is manifested in the size of the costs involved for potential cooperation while cultural realities are incorporated in the definition of moderate politicians. Moderate politicians play a game of cooperating on reframing Greek-Turkish relations, hoping to decrease the equilibrium of rigidity. This chapter demonstrates how this „framing game‟ can be affected by exogenous shocks, such as international diplomacy.
Institutional Change
As mentioned above having concluded the shift the Greek government went on to pursue a wide range of rapprochement policies. These policies were adopted with the institutional setting simultaneously going through a transformation process instigated by the new equilibrium. Even though securing Cyprus accession could not cause a permanent transformation of the politician‟s game into a coordination game, the foreign policy that came with it laid the foundations for more enduring institutional change, through the reconfiguration of the balance of power in the domestic struggle over rigidity, through three distinct influences: a) increase of progressive input on public discourse, b) the consolidation of a level of international cooperation and economic interdependence and c) the fragmentation of the electorate with the simultaneous emergence of the extreme right wing as a political factor. Let us examine each one in turn.
a) As it was mentioned above the new equilibrium was enforced by mainstream media, thus suggesting a qualitative modification of the bilateral relation‟s coverage which in effect facilitated the public expression of views that had not until then received any considerable media attention. NGOs and individuals who favored a settlement of the dispute and a lower level of rigidity according to their own personal dispositions were encouraged to offer their input on public discourse. Within this climate the existence of a part of society which favored normative change surfaced and came to
125 be acknowledged by the political system and by its opposition in terms of normative change. Evidence suggests that NGOs with a specified pro-friendship political agenda existed since the 1980s.320 The Greek-Turkish Friendship Association and the Ipekci Awards were set up in the late 1970s and „Journalists for Peace in the Aegean and Thrace‟, „Helsinki Citizens Assembly‟, „WINPEACE‟ and the „Greek Turkish Forum‟ (GTF) followed in the 1990s. The public appeal of such organizations remained limited within a hostile environment. Kostas Karras identified the period after 1999 as the golden era for the GTF321 and that is the case for all organizations with a similar agenda. Until then their number, participation and coverage by the mainstream media were low. After the policy shift, individuals‟ willingness to express their private preference was increased as a response to the realization that the institutional setting was changing, providing more fertile ground for mobilization with reduced reputation costs and higher possibilities of success. George Papandreou was setting the tone of the new policy making brave statements on taboo issues,322 and as mentioned above, the new direction was endorsed by moderate politicians and NGOs of the field found a positive climate in which to flourish. The transition to a new institutional setting was signaled and facilitated by the mainstream media which in fulfilling their role as the enforcer of the new equilibrium, reported on the results of the rapprochement policy and the dynamic it created while focusing on the warm personal relation between the two states‟ foreign ministers. Many new organizations were formed after 1999 and are today active in the fields of Greek-Turkish friendship, human rights and antiracism in general,323 such as „People‟s Movement for Communication and Coexistence in the Aegean‟, „Greek Helsinki Monitor‟, KEMO (Centre for Minority Studies), HLHR (Hellenic League for Human
320 Zeynep Oral brought to my attention the interaction of figures such as Zülfü Livaneli, YaĢar Kemal, Mikis Theodorakis, Maria Farantouri, Melina Merkouri and others during military coups in both states in the 1970s and 1980s. 321 Interview with Kostas Karras, Athens, 26 November 2008. 322 Papandreou, G. Interviewed by Stavros Theodorakis, KLIK, August 1999, found at: http://www.klik.gr/148/papa/index.htm, accessed on 10 January 2009. 323 According to Nikhtas Lionarakis, former President of the MFA Commission on NGOs, their number increased from almost 800 to above 30.000 in the aftermath of 1999, Lionarakis, N. “Οη Δηεζλείο Με Κπβεξλεηηθέο Οξγαλώζεηο ζηελ Ειιάδα”‟[International NGOs in Greece], To Vima, August 13 2003.
126
Rights) and KEPAD (Human Rights Defence Centre). As a general assessment, evidence from interviews suggests that only a few of them are influential and very few of them are able to attract members. Usually they are either forums of discussion among businessmen, academicians and politicians that organize events and make recommendations aiming to be heard by political leadership.
b) Secondly, numerous individuals and formations, such as environmental organizations, tourism agencies, municipalities and business associations, with an interest in closer cooperation with their Turkish counterparts existed but did not have the capacity to proceed to the establishment of international networks. MFA funding significantly facilitated that process. Municipalities and tourist agencies were also reticent to establish cooperation with their Turkish counterparts under a climate of political tension and uncertainty and rapprochement policies represented an opportunity for them to explore cooperation possibilities. Finally, the Greek business community was similarly hesitant to invest in an otherwise extremely attractive market because of political insecurity and therefore the policy shift was welcome by them. So overall, MFA funding, public opinion approval and a more stable political environment for investors provided a golden opportunity to establish cooperation, participate in international networks that would add to any organization‟s status and size and invest heavily in an economically attractive market. The MFA took up the role of a main sponsor of such NGOs and established units (Committee for NGOs and International Developmental Cooperation Agency) responsible for funding and monitoring NGO activity. Furthermore Business Councils were set up in order to facilitate economic cooperation and investments in Turkey. Overall the number of active NGOs in the field boomed as Dimitris Droutsas noted in a discussion I had with him,324 in the beginning of the last decade and experienced a decrease in the second part of the decade still remaining considerably higher and more productive compared to previous decades.
324 Interview with Dimitris Droutsas, Athens, 18 December 2008. 127
The benefits from economic cooperation325 between the two states had been recognized almost unanimously in Greek business circles326 as well as by Greek governments since the 1980s. Benefits would be financial (to all sectors of the Greek economy327) as well as political to businessmen‟s thinking. The economic cooperation opportunities in 1999 were immense considering low levels of bilateral trade and investment until that time, due to political tension.328 Indeed the policy shift of 1999 had the following results according to Panos Koutsikos:
“Commerce volume at that point was at 200 million dollars; today it has reached 3.5 billion dollars. If one looks at Greece‟s economic history, it becomes clear that such a rise of commerce in a given period time is unprecedented...Coming to investment, at the moment Greek investments in Turkey amount to 5 billion euro (banks included) when the total of Greek investment in Bulgaria, and note that Greece is the prime foreign investor in Bulgaria, is around 2.8 billion euro”.329
Furthermore, interaction was established between numerous business and sectoral associations. SEV (Hellenic Federation of Enterprises) held and continues to hold meetings with TÜSĠAD (Turkish Industrialists‟ and Businessmen‟s Association), and the two associations issued a joint declaration on the Cyprus issue in 2009330 along with their
325 See for instance Kotios, A., and G. Petrakos. “The Industrial and Trade Structure of the Greek and Turkish Economies: Possibilities for Cooperation”, Discussion Paper Series, Vol. 9, No. 11 (2003), pp. 233-248. 326 Liargovas, P. “Greek-Turkish Economic Relations”, in C. Kollias, and G. Günlük-ġenesen (eds.), Greece and Turkey in the 21st Century: Conflict or Cooperation. A Political Economy Perspective (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003). 327 According to Mr Koutsikos, President of the Greek-Turkish Business Council, there is no sector of the Greek economy that would suffer losses neither from the rapprochement policies nor from a possible Turkish accession in the EU. This view is also shared by Mr Mamos, Head of Development of Foreign Cooperation Division of the Hellenic Organisation of Small Medium Sized Enterprises and Handicraft. Interview with Panos Mamos, Athens, 7 November 2007. 328 For details on trade and investment see Aksu, F. “Confidence Building, Negotiation and Economic Cooperation Efforts in Greek-Turkish Relations, 1990-2004”, Turkish Review of Balkan Studies, 2004, pp. 31-109. 329 Interview with Panos Koutsikos, Athens, 9 December 2008. 330 Joint Declaration by Cyprus Employers & Industrialists Federation, Turkish Cypriot Businessmen’s Association, Hellenic Federation of Enterprises and Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association, 12 March 2009, found at: http://www.tusiad.us/Content/uploaded/CYPRIOT,%20GREEK,%20TURKISH%20PR.PDF, accessed on 26 February 2009. 128
Cypriot counterparts, in one of the rare occasions where political issues were on the agenda, as Hale Onursal informed me.331 In January 2008 a Greek-Turkish Business Forum was organized in Istanbul during the Greek Prime Minister‟s official visit to Turkey by SEV, TUSIAD, DEIK (Foreign Economic Relations Board) and the collaboration of the Greek Turkish and Turkish Greek Business Councils. In 2010 a Greek-Turkish Regional Business Forum took place in Edirne while in the same year an extended delegation of the Turkish business community accompanied Premier Erdogan on his visit to Greece again within the framework of the Greek Turkish Business Forum. A similar interaction was established between SETE (Association of Greek Tourism Enterprises) and TURSAB (Turkish Tourism Investors Association) and numerous other sectoral associations.
c) Finally, as discussed above during the six months of intense diplomatic activity before the Helsinki Summit the opposition retained a consistently incoherent stand towards the possibility of lifting of sanctions with prominent MPs expressing conflicting views.332 The Helsinki Summit Conclusions and the policy that followed were not heavily contested by the right-wing opposition, ND. However, the direction of foreign policy being so suddenly and radically shifted towards a philosophy that contradicted what had become basic axioms of foreign policy, such as the mistrust for Turkish intentions and the value of Greek aggressiveness, did have an impact on public opinion. Some part of the public which found such a radical shift of foreign policy difficult to endorse, along with individuals who realized that the process of adaptation to a new normative framework would leave them bearing significant costs were not any more represented politically since ND‟s reactions were far too mild. Therefore a political space was formed that begged for representation. Chong discussed how the preference for the status quo is reinforced by the political benefits that derive from coordinating collective action around existing group norms and identifications. Those who share common values and cultural knowledge can
331 Interview with Hale Onursal, Istanbul, 5 March 2008. 332Politis, G. “Πξνβνιείο” [Headlights] TA NEA, 30 November 1999, found at: http://www.tanea.gr/default.asp?pid=2&ct=1&artid=4100969, accessed on 13 March 2008; Karanasopoulou, 1999. 129 be readily mobilized for social and political goals. Once such affiliations exist it is rational for group leaders and politicians to elicit and reinforce them. The more cohesive the group in terms of values the more suitable the conditions for political mobilization. Those propositions were verified in this case. Indeed, soon after the Helsinki Summit, politicians from the patriotic part of the two big parties perceived a possibility to mobilize the parts of society that seemed not to favor a turn towards more liberal policies. Two new parties were formed, LAOS (Popular Orthodox Rally) and Democratic Revival, that sought to attract votes from those worrying about the preservation of Greek identity, with LAOS managing to enter the Parliament after the 2007 election. It is should be stressed here that the elements that undertook the task of uniting to represent that traditionalist space existed during the previous setting. Politicians with extreme nationalist or extreme right wing dispositions existed in the past and so did relevant political parties. However they enjoyed negligible electoral support as the political system upheld the existing normative framework and thus ensured the perseverance of the existing institutional setting. The Macedonian issue, which dominated the foreign policy discourse in the early 1990s, divided the right wing ND government and the Foreign Minister at the time, Antonis Samaras, took up the opportunity of expressing nationalist sentiments against Prime Minister Mitsotakis‟s moderate stand.333 The institutional setting survived since the government decided to succumb to public pressures, instigated by an alliance of traditionalist forces. During the next „national issue‟ crisis of the decade, the Imia/Kardak episode, nationalist and right wing elements did have an opportunity to accuse decision makers of cowardice and treason. That stand however was represented by the right wing ND opposition albeit at a relatively lower scale. Also, in the economic domain, the convergence334 between the two main political parties around the principles of market
333 Prime Minister Mitsotakis did not preclude the use of the term “Macedonia” within the new state‟s name, thus opposing Foreign Minister Samaras and the majority of the Greek public. 334 Nanou and Dorussen have explored causality between European integration and a decrease in available domestic policy positions, founding that relation on the logic of two level games. Although their findings refer to instances of party convergence against an EU directive, while the convergence discussed here occurred in line with European and global economic trends, the framework utilized offers a similar linkage between domestic politics and international negotiations to the one examined in this thesis. See Nanou, K, 130 economy335 was criticized by objectors within the two parties. A separate political space was again not created as the opposition was always able to take up the task of representing traditionalist voices with varying degrees of success. Evidence demonstrates that the formation of such a political platform was conceptualized much earlier than 1999 and a number of individuals went on to form organizations towards that end. Since the early 1990s, a formation centred around common traditionalist values had been conceived by individuals such as Antonis Naxakis336 and George Karabelias, who admitted that his “alliances that used to be located within the westernization field had moved to a force of resistance that gained its power from tradition and identity and wished to reproduce the glory of ancient Greece or the Byzantium era”.337 To that end, media publications such as “Endoxwra” and “Ellopia”, with a similar agenda were established. It seems though that the Helsinki policy and the simultaneous formation of an influential nationalistic party led to the consolidation of a „national camp‟, comprising of traditionalist-nationalistic elements expressed through various channels and linked to the majority of political parties, which has exerted its power on decision making on a number of occasions. These agents are brought together by a common emphasis on traditionalist values, an expressed anxiety regarding globalization phenomena and their impact on Greek identity, as well as mistrust towards state institutions‟ and the mass media‟s commitment to the values they share. In that context this political space does not favor the prospect of lower levels of rigidity. It is important to establish that individuals participate not solely based on norm- induced motivations, but their dispositions and adaptability to change re-enforce their
and H, Dorussen, “European Integration, Intergovernmental Bargaining, and Convergence of Party Programmes”, European Union Politics, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2006), pp. 235-256. 335 Socialist PASOK government‟s efforts to secure Greece‟s entry in the Monetary Union and the vision of a “strong Greece” relied on tight fiscal policies, control of inflation and privatization policies, uncharacteristic of the party‟s previous terms in office. For a brief account of PASOK‟s transformation into a social democratic party, see Grigoriadis, I., and Z. Onis. Europe and the Impasse of Centre-Left Politics in Turkey: Lessons from the Greek experience, Paper presented at the 10th Mediterranean Research Meeting, Florence and Montecatini, 25-28 March, 2009. 336Naxakis, A. Interviewed by Dimitris Zafeiropoulos, Ellinikos Kosmos, 2 February 2003, found at: http://www.elkosmos.gr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=417:--l------r- &catid=100:2008-10-17-07-36-05&Itemid=302, accessed on 30 February 2008. 337 Karabelias, G. Athinaiki, 2 June 2000, found at: http://www.iospress.gr/ios2007/ios20070311.htm, accessed on 19 March 2008. 131 incentive to do so at any given time. The agents of this formation are academicians, politicians, members of the Greek Church and Church organizations, journalists, publishers and NGOs. Regarding academia, as noted in the introduction, a large part of the Greek I.R community have been proponents of a certain theoretical framework, and have abstained from meaningful, scientific discourse with proponents of other paradigms, due to particularities of Greek academia.338 Furthermore academicians of the traditionalist school held influential posts and their work was often employed by state institutions.339 The policy shift that occurred caused some loss of status for that part of the academic community which continued to insist on similar analyses, unable to account for and adapt to change. Journalist and columnist‟s incentive structures are rather similar, with those being identified for a particular stand on „national issues‟ facing the danger of loss of popularity were normative change to occur. Many traditionalist groups and individuals were identified by many of my interviewees as constituting a particular school of thought regarding „national issues‟. Former Prime Minister Kostas Simitis, in a discussion I had with him, spoke of people who have lived their lives with ideological and economic interests with the current situation, people who made a living out of excessive nationalism, propaganda and cultivating confrontation with Turkey.340 Marietta Giannakou, spoke of „professionals‟ who present themselves as super-patriots341 and Kostas Tsitselikis referred to reactions against KEMO‟s activities from “local writers and local government employees who practically make a living out of the „We are the Pure Greeks‟ motto”.342 The various formations and groups are promoting and advertizing each other, and their actions coincide in a series of issues such as the history textbook343 and the demand
338 Constas 1999, 76-88. 339 See ibid.,1999, 80-82, for the contribution of Athanasios Platias, Panayotis Ifaistos and Hristodoulos Giallourides to the conception of the „Single Defense Doctrine‟ between Greece and Cyprus. 340 Interview with Kostas Simitis, Athens, 16 December 2008. 341 Interview with Marietta Giannakou, Athens, 28 November 2008. 342 Interview with Kostas Tsitselikis, Athens, 5 December 2008. 343 In 2002 a competition for a new 6th Grade history textbook was announced and the competition was won by Maria Repoussi‟s editorial team. The book was introduced to schools in 2007 but was eventually withdrawn just before the elections of September 2007, after fierce reaction from various circles leading to public opinion reactions. The book was attacked as rejecting or discrediting vital parts of Greek history. 132 for a „referendum‟ on the I.D cards issue.344 Even though there is no formalized structure of interaction, most of those groups have managed to form almost a unitary front on a number of occasions. The term „network‟ is perhaps a more accurate term to describe the camp, given its loose organization, as various groups are linked by some members‟ participation and contribution to more than one. Analyzing their structure, one can notice the repetition of names of people who contribute to more than one organizations and publications and of people who have pursued political careers based on their patriotic stand. Within civil society there are a number of active groups, like „Network 21‟, „Antivaro‟, „Pan-Macedonian Association of USA‟, „Society for Macedonian Studies‟, the Greek Church through its publications and various organizations,345 and various regional or refugee associations. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, such activities is not a new phenomenon in Greek society, in fact it is rooted in public mobilization initiated by cultural, regional and refugee associations since the post-war era.346 Within the media world one will also find numerous publications, such as „Ardin‟, „Rixis‟, „Resalto‟, „Stratigiki‟, „Free World‟, „Ellinorama‟ and „Ellinikes Grammes‟ that rely heavily on individuals who contribute to the above organizations. Again, their influence on Greek policymakers‟ decision to maintain a rigid strategy towards Turkey is hard to be established by explicit empirical evidence. Such groups‟ existence and influence is related to unobservable structures, particularly that of identity and culture, which render the exertion of power almost untraceable. Therefore, such evidence could only consist of interviewed politicians‟ admission of their incentive structure as elaborated in this chapter and consequently of the magnitude of political costs related to the nature of public discourse and such groups‟ power. Marietta Giannakou did highlight the role of
344 In June 2000 the Greek Church organized the collection of signatures from citizens who demanded a referendum on the newly passed law that dictated the omission of personal data, like religion, from Greek I.D tags. In April 2001 the Church declared that almost three million citizens had signed. The then head of the opposition Kostas Karamalis (along with most ND members) signed the petition, “Σεθώλεη ην ιάβαξν ζηνλ Πόιεκν ηωλ Ταπηνηήηωλ» [Raises the Flag in the I.D War], Ethnos, 29 January 2008, found at: http://www.ethnos.gr/article.asp?catid=22733&subid=2&pubid=388467&tag=8967, accessed on 3 July 2009. 345 For the Greek Church and political discourse see Stavrakakis, Y. “Politics and Religion: On the Politicization of the Greek Church discourse”, Journal of Modern Greek Studies, Vol. 21, No. 2 (2003), pp. 153-181. 346 Stefanidis, 2001. 133 such groups in achieving the withdrawal of the history-textbook.347 Interviewed politicians merely pointed at such groups‟ relevance and impact without referring to the means of their power explicitly.
Section III: A New Equilibrium A spatial model of rigidity
After having identified and presented all the key actors, and having established their incentive structures and patterns of interaction we can adopt a spatial framework to illustrate alterations in the institutional setting. The policy space represents preferred levels of rigidity in foreign policy on the part of the key actors. Each point on the axis signifies a level of rigidity and corresponds to the specific cost of that level of rigidity. Figure 4.4 offers a spatial portrait of their preferences from 1989, when sanctions on Turkey were first imposed, until the present day. As discussed in this Chapter‟s first part, the two states can either play cooperate or rigid. However there are levels of normative rigidity that correspond to different policy options on issues excluding the Aegean Sea dispute. Therefore if the Greek government decided to adopt an alternative policy option on such issues there will be a corresponding move of the level of rigidity always remaining within the rigid strategy of the game. Such policy modifications do have implications for the institutional setting. The axis is divided in two parts: C (cooperative) and R (Rigid) with those preferring policy stances falling in that half having the containment of the Turkish threat as their priority and those favouring policies of the other half having the settlement of bilateral disputes as theirs. Again, the executive‟s preferences are informed by the costs of various levels of rigidity on the state budget, related to the excessive weight of military expenditures and hence its ideal point lies left of the status quo mark. However the actual policy outcome is a function of the conflict between the coalitions presented, which is influenced by the outcome of moderate politicians‟ interaction and media coverage and is reflected upon public perceptions. The 1999 policy shift marked a decrease in the level of rigidity corresponding to a decrease of related costs through a minor decrease of military
347 Interview with Marietta Giannakou, Athens, 28 November 2008. 134 expenditures348 and an increase of mutually beneficial economic activity. Moreover, it facilitated the introduction of new actors, thus altering the institutional setting.
Panel A: 1989 to 1999
C R
B E SQ P
Low MM High
Level of Rigidity
Panel B: 1999 to 2009
C R
NGO B E SQ N
Low MM High
Level of Rigidity
Figure 4.4. Spatial analysis of preferences. NGO (civil society organizations), B (Business), E (Executive), SQ (Status Quo), MM (Mainstream Media), N („traditionalist camp‟), P (Public Opinion). The panel demonstrates the decrease of SQ level of rigidity and the consolidation of the traditionalist camp (N) and progressive civil society (NGO).
Explaining the equilibrium
Setting the equilibrium policy mark in the rigid part of the axis is justified by empirical reality of zero progress on disputed issues. Decision makers have been reluctant to proceed to a further decrease of rigidity, due to their calculations on expected utility. After having presented the current configuration of power and the way it was
348 Androulakis, G, Αμςνηικέρ Γαπάνερ, 14 March, 2006, found at: http://ellinikos- stratos.com/arthra/dapanes.asp, accessed on 18 June 2010. 135 affected by the Helsinki strategy, the equilibrium policy of SQ needs to be explained by reviewing the changes that occurred in the institutional setting after the policy shift. Moderate politicians, as explained earlier, favoured the 1999 policy shift because the costs were rendered negative as a result of an exogenous effect, Cyprus EU accession. It is safe to assume that moderate politicians always existed, although their definition is contingent on the level of rigidity at any given time.349 Until 1999, the magnitude of political cost (popularity loss and party disciplinary measures) associated with expressing a moderate – liberal stand on rigidity amounted to such levels so that moderate politicians were not faced with a dilemma. The potential possible benefit from cooperation towards a less rigid foreign policy was vastly outweighed by the costs. Therefore the beneficial outcome for all, DD, coincided with every player‟s dominant strategy. The changes brought by the Helsinki policy led to a realignment of the incentive structure of moderate politicians. After Cyprus EU accession became a reality in 2004 the exogenous factor that transformed the game from Deadlock to assurance was nullified. But the game did not return to its pre-1999 form. Today, reputation costs considerations on the part of moderate politicians are definitely different than those they faced in previous decades. Any argument made publicly for less rigidity would have some appeal on established and well-organized groups and business interests. The figures of Greek investments in Turkey given above illustrate that while in the past business interests were lobbying against political tension in order to gain potential benefits, today there are existing interests which lobby for very real rather than potential costs and benefits of any given policy.350 Furthermore, a number of peace-friendly, antiracist, and anti-nationalist NGOs exist today and their appeal has increased, still though lagging behind that of the national camp. The fragmentation of the electorate, the appearance of distinct groups and the increased and diversified pluralism
349 See Heraclides 2007 for a distinction between moderate politicians and hawks in the 1970s and 1980s. 350 The argument here could be considered as one falling outside rational choice theory as it refers to prospect theory‟s concept of „preference reversal‟ which is based on the idea that framing or reference- dependent effects violate the assumption of transitive preferences, see for example Levy, J. K. (1997) “Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 1 (1997), pp. 87-112. However our definition of rationality and partial universalism allows for the omission of the independence hypothesis, the hypothesis that preferences are independent of choice situations. Ferejohn and Satz present forms of rationality that rely on the regret principle, according to which actors construct situation specific preferences, from more basic preferences, Ferejohn and Satz, 1996, p80. 136 of the political system at least in terms of foreign policy and the norm of rigidity give a fuller picture of preferences of the Greek public and facilitates alliance-building for every policy choice. Therefore, two elements of the equation (see the game analysis) have been modified as a result of the reconfiguration of the balance of power, (the cost of participation) has decreased and (probability of cooperation leading to policy change) has increased so that . The game has transformed into a PD. Moderate politicians still choose defection as a dominant strategy because they cannot resist the temptation, according to PD game‟s characteristics. The equilibrium is sub- optimal but the new element, the progress achieved after 1999, is that defection is a temptation they cannot resist despite the existence of an alternative Pareto optimal outcome. That temptation is at the moment impossible to overcome but progress has been achieved nevertheless considering the sub-optimality of the equilibrium. In fact, moderate politicians‟ cooperation could under this institutional setting be deemed as decisive in strengthening the demand for normative change. Given that moderate politicians are dispersed throughout the political system, their contribution would ensure that mainstream media would remain partially neutral or at least moderately critical of a rigidity decrease since the issue would not invite partisan-based arguments. Hence, constituents‟ reaction would be expected to remain unaffected by traditionalist outcries and therefore the government would face decreased political cost. However, moderate politicians would arguably be the last to cooperate and contribute to such mobilization bearing in mind that the level of costs required would be extremely difficult to attain save for an exogenous factor. So given that moderate politicians‟ cooperation is theoretically unlikely and practically non-existent, attention turns to relevant actors and groups promoting or inhibiting change. Were a government to consider proceeding to further reduction of rigidity without the trans-partisan cooperation of moderate politicians, they would have to expect that the opposition party would automatically challenge the government, thus upsetting the equilibrium, which would be decided after a power struggle between the opposing alliances. As mentioned above, the government constitutionally has a majority in parliament and is therefore able to pass laws of her liking. Therefore, considerations in
137 the mind of decision makers would be primarily related to political cost and only in an extreme scenario related to the viability of the government. The challenge of the opposition would be reflected in mainstream media where the confrontation would take place. The outcome would then be decided by the relative strength of the opposing alliances. Let us examine the relative power of the two alliances related to their ability to influence public discourse and public perceptions. At the moment the national camp‟s strength lies in two basic realities: a) the pertaining dominance of traditionalist elements of the Greek identification related to perceptions of the „Other‟ and appropriate stand, and b) political representation by LAOS. Firstly, the values the traditionalists aim to preserve are still respected by the majority of Greek citizens. Kathimerini‟s columnist Stavros Lygeros, in a very fruitful discussion I had with him depicted Greek political attitudes within a trigonometrical circle with left, right, upper and lower parts where „patriotism‟ is above and „cosmopolitanism‟ below the horizontal axis and argued that “society in general is more on the patriotic front, with the national security concept being clear there, more impulsive with not much analysis needed”.351 Ligeros‟s perception of society coincides with this analysis. This fact has two less obvious implications: a) The national camp can draw ad hoc allies from a big pool of citizens. Along with the camp even though not associated with it (in fact they have often been in opposing camps), one can in a number of occasions find prominent Greek citizens who further the struggle for the preservation of Greek identity.352 b) The existing normative framework being closer to their preferred levels than that of their opponents, traditionalists are well-situated within mainstream media. As shown above, in enforcing the equilibrium policy, mainstream media do not challenge the basic direction of Greek foreign policy towards Turkey, but continue to provide a biased coverage. Through their presence in the mainstream media, individuals of that space are able to articulate and communicate their
351 Interview with Stavros Ligeros, Athens, 16 December 2008. 352 Georgousopoulos, K. “Εξγνιάβνη Λήζεο” [Constructing Oblivion], TA NEA, September 27 2008, found at: http://www.tanea.gr/default.asp?pid=30&ct=19&artid=1401300, accessed on 30 September 2008; Theodorakis, M. “Τέινο ζηελ πξνδνζία θαη ζηελ αζρήκηα” [End to Treason and Ugliness], 27 February 2008, found at http://www.greekalert.com/2008/02/blog-post_27.html, accessed on 22 October 2009. Maria Repoussi mentioned the personal attacks she received from Eleftherotypia‟s cartoonist Stathis, Interview with Maria Repoussi, Athens, 3 November 2008. 138
criticisms against progressive NGOs.353 Criticisms are related to the latter‟s contested liberal character, their alleged ties with western agents354 and their rent- seeking behaviour. This fact was acknowledged by Kostas Tsitselikis who conceded that some NGOs have too easily fallen for the economic dependency trap for their survival and existence, mainly dependence from state institutions and the MFA. He admitted that such incidents hamper civil society‟s progress as the public does not trust NGOs‟ intentions.355 Secondly, the camp benefits from strong parliamentary representation. This fact has three implications: a) the party is represented in the Parliament and therefore has institutional influence over policy making,356 b) LAOS voters are contested by both PASOK and ND and therefore the party‟s stand on any given issue related to the discussion here has the property of drawing policies of the two parties towards its own. The history textbook was withdrawn right before national elections after a reactionary campaign that was led by LAOS,357 c) mainstream media tend to focus on coverage of any issue from a partisan perspective. Consequently, LAOS is awarded considerable media attention thus enhancing its public appeal. On the other hand, the liberal camp‟s power is severely undercut by the weak character of civil society in Greece. Polina Lampsa attributed the weakness mainly to the lack of culture of volunteerism and the perseverance of the patron-client structure. Its weakness is reinforced by strong partisanship that casts its shadow over civil society: “Strong partisanship has led to a party-state and people tend to believe that joining a party will better serve their interests when the party takes government instead of joining an NGO to fight for something. In addition, sometimes the distinction of parties and NGOs are not perfectly clear. There is an issue with parties taking advantage of NGO
353 Ligeros commented on American NGOs contributing to the „Yes‟ campaign for the Annan Plan in Cyprus. Interview with Stavros Ligeros, Athens, 16 December 2008. 354 Malkides, F. “Ιπεθηζί θαη Ειιελνηνπξθηθή Φηιία” [Ipekci Awards and Greek-Turkish Friendship], Ardin, 1997, found at: http://www.ardin.gr/node/850, accessed on 13 November 2009. 355 Interview with Kostas Tsitselikis, Athens, 5 December 2008. 356 The party received 3.8% of the vote in 2007 amounting to 10 parliamentary seats, and managed to increase those figures in 2009 with 5.63% and 15 respectively. 357 Interview with Maria Repoussi, Athens, 3 November 2008. 139 dynamic in that sense; sometimes there is not enough respect for the boundaries of NGO powers”.358 Progressive elements‟ mobilization also remains affected by the effect of the normative framework in terms of social pressures. The policy change of 1999 enabled progressive civil society elements to flourish and get some share of media attention, but mobilization did not take off to the extent necessary to cause a shift of coordination around a new form of Greek identity. Although leadership could be provided by individuals whose dispositions and past investments rendered contribution as a dominant strategy, followers‟ participation remained limited.359 Deliberation on contribution to the progressive mobilization still contains a strong defection incentive due to high social costs for a number of potential participants. A possible factor at work inhibiting the power of progressive mobilization is the existence of widespread preference falsification.360 Kuran defines preference falsification as “the act of misrepresenting one‟s genuine wants under perceived social pressures”. Kuran uses the notion of preference falsification to explain the reason for the persistence of unwanted social outcomes. Juxtaposing it to the Olsonian notion that unpopular choices persist because the many that support change are less well organized than the few who oppose it, Kuran suggests preference falsification as a „vehicle of collective conservatism‟, as a phenomenon that prevents people who may privately be supportive of change, to underestimate the extent of popular dissatisfaction and therefore opt not to change their public preferences. Indeed, the existence of preference falsification could cause moderate politicians to underestimate the size of the group. Unfortunately, the exploration of the existence of widespread preference falsification would require data coming from survey research, something that wasn‟t possible for the needs of this thesis, so further research is required. However, evidence of preference falsification and self-censorship on the part of individuals with the ability to influence public discourse were found during the interview process. Giannis Tsapogas agreed that “it is a fact that some people impose censorship
358 Interview with Polina Lampsa, Athens, 30 October 2008. 359 See Chong, D, Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1991), for a discussion of leadership and followers in public spirited collective action. 360 See Kuran, T. Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1995). 140 upon themselves, as their private opinion wouldn‟t be acceptable to public opinion and therefore its expression would be costly”.361 Maria Repoussi commented that “Politicians hosted on TV channels could not really speak freely on such issues”.362 Phenomena of preference falsification or at least self-censorship in the academia were brought to my attention by Pinelopi Fountedaki and Kostas Tsitselikis. Pinelopi Fountedaki confided that phenomena of sanctions within the academic field depended on one‟s particular values and affiliations363 and Kostas Tsitselikis also complained about the „silence‟ of many academicians on „nationally sensitive issues‟.364 Obviously, a confrontation between the two alliances initiated by a reduction of rigidity on the part of decision makers would end with the oppositional alliance prevailing, since the latter would include the main opposition party ND. In such an event the government would incur significant political costs and would be lucky to avoid internal party turbulence. Therefore, decision makers have at the moment no incentive of proceeding to such a shift under the current institutional setting, unless they could rely upon moderate politicians‟ cooperation and contribution.
361 Interview with Giannis Tsapogas, 7 November 2008. 362 Interview with Maria Repoussi,, Athens, 3 November 2008. 363 Interview with Pinelopi Fountedaki, Athens, 17 December 2008. 364 Interview with Kostas Tsitselikis, Athens, 5 December 2008. 141
Chapter 5: Domestic Sources of Turkish Foreign Policy
As already discussed in Chapter 3 the two states‟ official historical narratives reflect the centrality of the particular conception of the „Other‟ for national identifications. And while the Turkish historical narrative had always conceived of Greece as irredentist as well as threatening Turkish sovereingty through the treacherous Greek minority, the Greek dominant narrative once portraying Turkey as an occupier of Greek land has come to acquire a defensive understanding of the relation, which is threatened by Turkish revisionism and expansionism as demonstrated in the Aegean Sea, Cyprus and Thrace. Therefore, as illustrated through the discussion of culturalist accounts of Greek, Turkish foreign policy and of the bilateral relation the two countries‟ strategic cultures share similarities. Moreover, both states have recently proceeded to significant policy shifts, with Turkey accepting the UN Annan Plan on Cyprus in 2004. Notwithstanding however the appeal of the idea that Europeanization processes led to reduction of rigidity, that literature‟s limitations were noted in Chapter 2 and proceeding with a rationalist framework we need first discuss the possibility of applying a similar model to Turkey with that applied to Greece. Chapter 3 illustrated the historical processes that consolidated key actors in the foreign policy domain and shaped the institutional settings under which their interaction occurred. Chapter 4 built on that contextual knowledge and illustrated a normative division between progressive and traditionalist conceptions of Greek identity which reveal themselves perfectly through preferences over levels of rigidity. On the other hand, even a superficial analysis of Turkish politics suffices to establish the nature of the struggle the country has been undergoing during the last decade. The power struggle is usually depicted and defined in terms of identity and the two large coalitions identified are commonly referred to as the secular versus the Islamic coalition. Even though the proceeding analysis aspires to disprove the validity of the coalition‟s names and meaning as well as their motivation for action, at this stage what needs doing is the examination of whether this division corresponds to a division in terms of preferences regarding foreign policy in general and policies towards Greece in particular. If it does not, an alternative model, one that focuses on that division needs be employed. For it is not realistic to
142 expect coalitions of citizens and politicians to emerge on the single basis of a common desire for a settlement of Greek-Turkish bilateral disputes. This point could be clarified through further research but it seems rather as a redundant exercise to analyse why individuals and groups that are in opposing sides of an extremely intense power struggle, within a state whose people identify themselves as nationalists,365 would not cooperate with any means available towards a settlement of the Greek-Turkish dispute. Another reason for the need of an alternative model for Turkey is related to differences in deputies‟ electoral procedures in the two states. In Greece party deputies are listed in ballot papers amongst which voters choose deputies. Turkey on the other hand uses a closed-list proportional representation system, where voters choose parties and have no mechanism to express their preference over individual candidates. In open- list systems voters still have the chance to influence the order of names on the list whereas closed-list ones obviously confer more power to party elites and generate strong incentives for candidate deputies to submit to party discipline. Therefore, the analytical tool used in the Greek case, moderate politicians, is of no value for analyzing Turkish policy-making since incentives for moderate deputies to break party discipline are even weaker than in the Greek case. Therefore firstly, evidence is needed to place perceptions towards Greece within the existing political division in Turkey, and to that end the results of media content analysis conducted are presented in this chapter‟s first section. The second section establishes the centrality of the notion of Kemalism in explaining foreign policy outcomes and provides the main elements of the model to be analysed in the preceding part. Selected relevant actors are presented and their strategies are explored. The third section offers a presentation of the Kemalist coalition and the fourth section provides a model of anti-Kemalist mobilization and its application to the case it hand, so as to provide an explanation of the current equilibrium level of Kemalism and state preferences.
365 The International Republican Institute. Survey of Turkish Public Opinion (Salem, Massachusetts: Williams and Associates, 2007). 143
Section I: Greece within the Division
The sample used comprised of two English editions, Hurriyet Daily News (HDN) and Today‟s Zaman (TZ)366 and was conducted with the method presented in the methodology chapter. Thematical categories formed were the same with the Greek media content analysis: “Bilateral Relations”, “Greece”, “Cyprus”, “Business-Economy”, “History”, “EU and Turkey” and “Other”, while the referential categories (outlined in Table 2) again aimed to cover the full range of bias towards Greek strategies, history, culture and ties with the West. The two dailies‟ Turkish editions are in the list of the top- selling Turkish dailies and nicely reflect opposing sides of the political and normative division that Turkey is experiencing. HDN belongs to Aydin Doğan‟s “Doğan Publications Holding” with the group traditionally echoing Kemalist ideals. Over the past few years Doğan has been involved in open confrontation with the AKP government.367 On the other hand TZ is backed by the faith-based Gülen movement and is a strong supporter of the AKP government.
A Greece as expansionist, rigid or revisionist in the Aegean Sea dispute B Greece as expansionist, rigid or responsible for the situation in Cyprus C Greece as violator of the Turkish minority‟s human rights D Greece as a close ally of the USA against Turkish interests E Greece as a close ally of European states against Turkish interests F Greece as harboring terrorism (PKK) H Greece as a nationalist state I Greece as a violator of human rights (other minorities, immigration etc.) J Greek foreign policy as organized and coherent as opposed to that of Turkey
366 There are three English editions of Turkish dailies, Hurriyet Daily News, Today‟s Zaman and The New Anatolian. 367 See for instance Strauss, D. “Shock at Turkish Media Group‟s $2.5 Billion Fine”, Financial Times, 24 September 2009, found at: http://cachef.ft.com/cms/s/03709e5a-a928-11de-9b7f- 00144feabdc0,Authorised=false.html?_i_location=http%3A%2F%2Fcachef.ft.com%2Fcms%2Fs%2F0%2 F03709e5a-a928-11de-9b7f-00144feabdc0.html&_i_referer=#axzz1RsmNJIUj, accessed on 12 July 2011; and KeneĢ, B. “Dogan, Erdogan Row Dates Back to the 70s”, Today’s Zaman, 15 September 2008, found at: http://www.todayszaman.com/columnistDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=153097, accessed on 12 July 2011. 144
K Greece as oversensitive towards the “Turkish threat” P Inflammatory, provocative, derogatory references, which spur the anti-Greek sentiment N Neutral references and analyses of bilateral issues, the Greek side of the story Q Criticisms of Turkish policy being unpatriotic and acceding to Greek and international pressures S Positive, cooperative images of Greece and Greeks, references to cooperation T The Greek Church as an influential Greek institution X Greek Cypriots as nationalists U Inflammatory, provocative, derogatory references, which spur the anti-Greek-Cypriot sentiment W Greek Cyprus as a close ally of the West, against Turkish interests Y Criticisms of Turkish policies, for violation of human rights, the state of the bilateral relation and particular aspects of it Z Both states as victims of nationalism
Table 2: Referential Categories
The first conclusion to be drawn is that Greece and Greek-Turkish relations were considered more commercial in HDN, publishing 433 related stories than in TZ which published 266. Secondly, as illustrated in Figure 5.1, the ratio of positive, neutral and self-critical to negative references was 1 in HDN, suggesting perfectly neutral coverage and 0,34 for TZ, displaying bias against Greece.
Hurriyet Daily News Today's Zaman
Positive, Neutral or Self-Critical 187 84 Negative 187 247 Ratio 1 0,34
Figure 5.1: Ratio of positive, neutral and self-critical to negative references .
The coverage of Cyprus is of particular interest. Firstly, TZ devotes 36% of its coverage on Cyprus-related stories, compared to HDN‟s 16%. As we look closer at the
145 data, initial conclusions on neutrality are qualified. Out of TZ‟s 97 stories, 49 were columnists‟ pieces and 48 were news reports, while the numbers for HDN‟s 68 stories were 38 and 30 respectively. While the coverage in news reports does not display significant differences, columnists‟ pieces were radically more negatively biased in TZ, as illustrated in Figure 5.2. The difference in the number of references to categories B, H, P, U and X is evident and the coverage is dominated by references to Greek and Greek Cypriot nationalism, inflammatory wording and stressing Greek expansionist intentions in the region. Interestingly the input of opinion pieces at TZ is attributed almost exclusively to one author368 who has contributed 46 out of the total of 49. Prof. Atun is a renowned academician in Turkey, so it could be argued that his opinion is unrestricted by editorial considerations. However, this is merely a presumption.369 Any interpretation of the implications of this fact can be countered and further evidence is necessary in order to be conclusive as to the daily‟s intentions.
Cyprus B H P U X W D E N
TZ Total 97 55 25 27 42 37 5 1 2 9 News 48 23 6 4 1 4 Articles 49 32 25 27 36 33 4 1 2 5 Ratio 0,65 0,51 0,55 0,73 0,67 0,08 0,02 0,04 0,1
HDN Total 68 25 6 12 16 8 8 5 5 12 News 30 15 2 3 2 6 Articles 38 10 4 9 14 8 8 5 5 6 Ratio 0,26 0,11 0,24 0,37 0,21 0,21 0,13 0,13 0,16
Figure 5.2 : Cyprus coverage . Number of referential category observations per total number of entries in the particular thematical category
368 Ata Atun is a Turkish Cypriot Professor, has served as an MP in northern Cyprus and has been Serdar DenktaĢ‟s advisor. He was also Chief Negotiator of the Turkish Cypriot Delegation in discussions set up under the auspices of the UN in 2004 369 Unfortunately, an interview with the daily‟s editor in chief was not achieved. Content analysis for the period 2003-2004, when the AKP government was negotiating the Annan Plan, could perhaps be illuminating. 146
However, although HDN‟s coverage refers much less to Greek nationalism and expansionism and uses moderate language, therefore appearing seemingly more neutral, both the number and the percentages of references to Greece and Greek Cyprus being close allies of the West (categories D, E and W) is much higher than those found in TZ suggesting bias in favour of the official narrative. More interesting findings emerge by looking at the coverage of the sub-category “Greek Minority-Patriarchate” under Bilateral Relations and coverage of Greece, as illustrated in Figure 5.3. 37% of HDN‟s Greek minority related stories contain references critical of the Turkish state‟s respect of the minority‟s rights, while the percentage rises to 91% in TZ. Additionally, 63% of HDN‟s stories include positive references to the Greek minority and the Patriarchate, as an element of multiculturalistm in Istanbul, giving it the cultural richness that has always characterized the history of the city. TZ‟s coverage of this category consists of no such positive references, even though abuse of minority rights is referred to in every published story. Evidently, the dailies tend to reflect the competing political formations‟ stand on the issue of minorities. The AKP government has attempted to introduce legislation (The Foundations Law) in favour of minority rights while CHP and MHP have propagated the TSK‟s conception of an extention of minority rights as a threat to state unity. Having said that, the 37% of related stories found in HDN including criticisms of minority rights‟ abuse is not too low, but as mentioned in the second chapter, HDN is an English edition of Hurriyet, addressing English speaking audiences, a priori sensitive to human rights violations.370 As for the coverage of Greece, TZ covered Greek news very superficially with limited references to any of the coded categories. The coverage of HDN is more extensive both quantitatively and qualitatively, with some references to Greek nationalism (category H), the Greek Church as an important institution (category T) and some positive references (category S).
370 Again, content analysis of the Turkish editions would be illuminating, providing stronger evidence for this claim. 147
Bilateral Relations Greece Greek Minority Greece Y S H S
TZ 10 0 4 0 0,91 0 0,09 0
HDN 7 12 15 8 0,37 0,63 0,16 0,09
Figure 5.3: Greek minority and Greece. Ratios of self-critical and positive references per number of entries in the Greek minority sub-category and ratios of positive references as well as references to Greek nationalism in the Greece sub-category.
Overall, HDN can be said to portray the bilateral relation as a close one, sustained through strong economic and cultural ties and with cooperation at place among a number of regional, civil, private or state institutions, albeit with some issues to be resolved. On those issues, the Turkish official arguments are predominant and Greece is portrayed as a somewhat „annoying‟ neighbor.371 A point worthy of mention is the role assigned to Greek columnists. It seems that they, along with only a few Turkish columnists, have the task of moderating bias. The rest of the input lies within the traditionalist mainstream, including inflammatory articles by the Secretary of State and the acting President of the Ankara-based TUSAM (National Security Strategies Research Center). Greek arguments on the Aegean Sea dispute are not mentioned at all. The coverage of the Cyprus dispute includes relatively moderate news reporting where the fundamental axioms of Turkish foreign policy372 are well respected. Having said that, every Cyprus related news report in both dailies is supplemented with a template text providing the context of the issue, i.e. the escalation of the crisis since the 1950s. This supplement is biased, most commonly naming the 1974 coup that overthrew Makarios in Cyprus an “Athens-engineered coup”, while only few of them refer to a “coup engineered by the Athens junta”.
371 This view was confirmed by Barçin Yinanç, Managing Director of Hurriet Daily News, Istanbul, 1 May, 2009. 372 Those include the character and purpose of the invasion/intervention, and the rightful Turkish demands for abolition of the economic isolation and political equality of the Turkish-Cypriot community within a two states solution of the Cyprus issue. 148
Columnists‟ input overall is leaning towards traditionalist conceptions of the bilateral relation. There are of course pieces that display an honest desire for peace and analyse policy proposals towards that direction, but their thought and framework lies within the mainstream, and is restricted by a sense of national responsibility. Again Greek arguments or the legality of the 1974 Turkish invasion/intervention of Cyprus are not reflected upon. Overall columnists appear to abide by official arguments, although sentiments of hostility are definitely less strong. In fact, opinion pieces offer a more biased coverage of the Cyprus dispute than the news reports, backing the individualistic framework analyzing individual incentive structures. In TZ, the state of the relation is also portrayed as positive with some problems that cause tedium rather than fear or anxiety. Again, the coverage accurately reflects official Turkish arguments, with rare examples of criticism, with the Greek minority being the exception. Friendship and cooperation entries are much less than HDN‟s while the Aegean Sea dispute is covered under the official narrative, like in HDN. Compared to other dailies examined, Today‟s Zaman offers a poor coverage of the bilateral relation, a fact pointing at low interest from the public as well as low demand for challenges of official foreign policy lines. An interesting observation that strengthens the claims made above regarding distinct political inclinations which manifest themselves in the coverage of the Greek minority is related to outright criticism of Kemalism and its links to Ergenekon in stories found in TZ. Criticisms revolve around the Turkish Orthodox Patriarchate as a deep state- initiated attempt to discredit and weaken the Patriarchate. Overall, there are more negative references to Greece as displayed above, much due to Prof. Atun‟s input, but the findings do not establish the need to analyse Turkish foreign policy according to a division in Turkish society based on perceptions of Greece. The coverage of the bilateral relation offered by the two dailies has common elements, and the dailies appear as divided along political lines, specifically around Kemalism, nationalism, Islam and identity. Consequently, we can derive that media institutions do not have a specific preference over foreign policy towards Greece, unless that policy is dictated by their position along the aforementioned division. Hence where foreign policy cannot be turned into a battleground between the two main coalitions, the
149 media, as in the Greek case, will act towards implementing the equilibrium. In instances where domestic issues are at least partially contingent upon foreign policy guidelines, one observes opposing views expressed by media belonging to opposing formations. Ethnic minorities are such a case, since the principle of reciprocity applied by both Greece and Turkey towards their respective minorities renders Turkish citizens‟ rights a matter of foreign as well as domestic policy. Therefore, the above presentation should suffice to establish that no correlation can be established between public political orientation and perceptions towards Greece. YaĢar YakıĢ confirmed that those who are in favour of improving relations with Greece should not be divided according to secular or anti-secular stand and that there are proponents and antagonists of it on each side373. Murat Belge and Hercules Millas also argued that proponents of friendly relations exist in both sides of the division.374
Section II: Foreign policy and Kemalism
If then no such correlation exists, should one expect to see coalition formation on the single basis of a common desire for a settlement of Greek-Turkish bilateral disputes? Or can the outcome of that struggle be considered as critical for the direction of foreign policy in general, and foreign policy towards Greece in particular? Can the level of Kemalism, as the level of rigidity in the Greek case, be linked causally to rigid foreign policy? The main three hypotheses to be explored in this chapter are: a) high levels of Kemalism are positively correlated with rigid foreign policy on issues historically identified with Kemalist principles, b) the level of Kemalism has decreased over the last decade and c) reduction was made possible by the rise to power of the AKP and the subsequent reconfiguration of individuals‟ incentive strategy with regards to coordinating on anti-Kemalist action. Sufficient evidence backing the first hypothesis would suggest that the focus on the ongoing struggle‟s effect on foreign policy is legitimate. The other two, specifically the direction of the causal relation between AKP‟s rise to power and the subsequent
373 Interview with Yasar Yakis, Ankara, 4 May2009. 374 Interview with Murat Belge, 4 March 2009. 150 reconfiguration of individual incentive structures, will be explored throughout the rest of the chapter. In order for these hypotheses to be explored we must first address the issue of operationalization. Kemalism, as rigidity in the previous chapter, is treated as an endogenous institution, inducing choices that are made in equilibrium and thus become stable or patterned not because they are imposed but because they are elicited.375 Kemalism has been the constitutionally guaranteed official ideology of the Turkish state since the establishment of the Republic in 1923 and composes of the following principles: nationalism, revolutionism, secularism, populism, republicanism and statism.376 These principles came to forge salient policy domains where policy choices were restricted to the set derived from them. They are constitutionally protected, they occupy the centre stage of public discourse and when needed state institutions such as the TSK and the Constitutional Court intervene to punish defectors and reconfirm the validity of established rules. Thus credible threats have been integral in defining the self- enforcing character of the equilibrium. So, in this thesis Kemalism is identified with formal and informal rules as well as mechanisms of policy-making which safeguard policy equilibria derived by Kemalist principles. Kemalism then has two dimensions: that of an informal institution which endogenously restricts political action against it by rendering compliance the dominant strategy and that of formal mechanisms of policy-making embedded in state processes. The second dimension is obviously contingent on the preservation of the first at equilibrium and therefore in order for institutional change to occur anti-Kemalist action rather than compliance needs to be rendered a valid political choice. Only then can the legitimacy of such mechanisms be contested. As an informal institution Kemalism comprises of: a) the formal (legal and constitutional) and informal rules (legal and constitutional framework) that induce certain political choices in policy domains of security, foreign policy, democratization and human rights, b) patterns of possible interpretation of those rules by relevant state bodies,
375 Bates, 1998, p. 8. 376 Statism was challenged early in the multiparty democratic period and was subjected to revision and change through processes of institutional change that lie outside the scope of this paper, which revolves around Kemalist nationalism and secularism. 151 c) state institutions‟ ability to reinforce existing equilibria by punishing defections, and d) the degree of Kemalist domination over public discourse and education which inform private preferences, while public discourse is also the source of the limited information that actors hold about the rules of the game and others‟ preferences and intentions. Hence, Turkish journalists for example are aware of the legal means available to prohibit the insult of „Turkishness‟, they are aware of possible interpretations of legal and constitutional clauses that render their work liable to legal repercussions and they are aware that state institutions have the authority to reinforce Kemalist equilibria by proceeding to prosecution. They then estimate the likelihood of prosecution as well as the number of other journalists willing to challenge the equilibrium based on limited information from public discourse. As a formal institution Kemalism is defined in terms of Kemalist institutions‟ participation in policy-making mechanisms and thus direct effect on policy outcomes. Therefore, the TSK‟s participation in the MGK is a means of direct influence over security and foreign policy. This definition holds the advantage of some quantifiability or at least comparability allowing for the empirical validation of a decrease of equilibrium levels of Kemalism. A decrease of Kemalism has thus occurred if one or any combination of the following has occurred: a) reform of constitutional provisions establishing the Kemalist character of the state, b) legal amendments and constitutional reform that disturb the balance within Kemalist state institutions, affecting the interpretation and enforcement of equilibria, c) legal amendments decreasing Kemalist ability to reinforce equilibria, d) constitutional reform which limits Kemalist institutions‟ policy-making authority, and e) qualitative adjustment of public discourse and education system. Let us then explore empirical evidence validating the above mentioned hypotheses. Regarding the first one, given the particular development of the Turkish political system, TSK‟s political power should suffice to establish that until 2002, the system operated under high levels of Kemalist influence. An overview of Turkish foreign policy until 2002, on issues stongly linked to Kemalist principles, indeed validates the claim for correlation. The perception of threat and high levels of securitization are associated with problematic relations with neighbour states and ethnic minorities. Greek-
152
Turkish relations aside, the Turkish state had displayed an extremely rigid stand on relations with Armenia, which are still tainted by Armenian efforts for Genocide recognition and Turkey‟s persistent efforts to prevent that outcome. Regarding minorities, the Kurdish minority has long suffered human rights discriminations, officially justified by the Turkish constitution‟s clause regarding the indivisibility of the state.377 Other ethnic minorities, including the Greek-Orthodox minority have also suffered from discriminatory measures and denial of basic civil rights. Finally, Turkish Cyprus policy had also remained rigid until the period between 2002 and 2004 and the constructive approach of the AKP government to the Annan Plan. At this point it should be noted that Turkish policies on all those issues could be analysed based on realist assumptions. Again, the problem would be related to assigning state preferences and consequently decreased explanatory power on instances of policy shifts. How could the shift in Turkey‟s Cyprus policy be explained then? Analytically the Cyprus issue falls under the same category with the Greek Helsinki strategy, since it extends beyond the Aegean Sea dispute. The fundamental question to be addressed is: would a traditionalist secular government under the usual level of influence from the TSK have adopted the same policy given the final outcome of the Annan Plan? If the answer is positive, then theories employing the unitary state actor assumption would be able to provide just as good an explanation. Obviously we are faced with a hypothetical question but nevertheless evidence of Kemalist reactions to Turkish foreign policy can be quite informative. Main opposition party CHP had openly protested AKP‟s support for the Annan Plan in 2003, with leader Baykal on a number of occasions stating that the Plan would make Cyprus a Greek island.378 Nationalist MHP had also strongly objected to the Plan, graphically publishing a report entitled: “Battle between dignity and submission”.379 As for the TSK itself, it should be noted that at the time, moderate Chief of Staff, General Hilmi Özkök, had
377 See Loizides, 2009, for a comparative content analysis of elite framing of the Kurdish issue and Greek- Turkish relations. 378 “Baykal: Annan planı Kıbrıs'ı RumlaĢtırır” [Annan Plan, Making Cyprus a Greek Island], 19 December 2002, found at: http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=60102, accessed on 20 September 2009. 379 MHP, “Haysiyet ile Teslimiyetçiliğin Mücadelesi: KIBRIS GERÇEĞĠ ve ANNAN PLANI” [Battle Between Dignity and Submission], February 2003, available at: http://www.mhp.org.tr/files/raporlar/kibris/kibrisraporu.pdf, accessed on 20 September 2009. 153 refrained from expressing a political view on the Plan, while Yasar Buyukanit (Chief of Staff during period of research) had expressed his opposition to the plan.380 Another cluster of evidence emerges out of the indictments of the Ergenekon case trial. The Ergenekon case involves the prosecution of an alleged terrorist organization aiming to overthrow the government. According to the case‟s three indictments the organization was responsible for planning and carrying out attacks and assassinations of judges, Christian clergy, journalists and attacks on Press institutions as well as coup plans to topple the AKP government. Among members detained and charged for participation one finds prominent Turkish figures of the academic, military, political and media world.381 In 2008, amidst a wave of exposed alleged military coup plans aiming to topple the AKP government, evidence demonstrating that Turkish policy on Cyprus during 2003-2004 was a cause of great concern among the TSK ranks and a legitimate reason to overthrow the government emerged. In 2007, the Nokta magazine had published diaries of Admiral Örnek, which disclosed two attempts for a direct military coup in 2003 and 2004 to be led by General ġener Eruygur. In the diaries, the fear of “surrendering or giving Cyprus away” was made explicitly lucid.382 The diaries were submitted as evidence in the second indictment of the Ergenekon case. Furthermore, Özkök himself testified in the Ergenekon trial that he knew there were plots to topple the ruling government but did not investigate because the documents he saw were not considered sufficient evidence for an investigation to take place.383
380 Abatzis, A. “Τώξα δελ ηνπ αξέζεη ην Σρέδην Αλάλ” [Now he disapproves the Annan Plan], Eleftherotypia, 30 March 2007. 381 The case has been ongoing for more than three years and there have been no convictions yet, while arrests are still being made and separate cases have been attached to the Ergenekon indictment. 382 “Jan. 19, 2004: „When I got up, I looked at the newspapers before leaving the house. The Army's Aegean Division Commander Gen. HurĢit Tolon said during a visit to a village yesterday that those who are steering a 'give-away-and-be-comfortable' strategy in regard to Cyprus are traitors. Today's papers were full of similar news articles. Of course, the real traitors, those columnists who have signed away their souls to the EU and who anticipate a material benefit from them, criticized HurĢit.‟, in Yavuz, E, “Observers Cheer Inclusion of Coup Diaries in New Indictment”, Today’s Zaman, 14 March 2009, found at: http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-169542-observers-cheer-inclusion-of-coup-aqua-aquadiaries- in-new-indictment.html, accessed on 14 March 2009. 383 “Top General New of Coup Plots”, Hurriyet Daily News, 6 August 2009, found at: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=top-general-knew-of-the-coup-plots-2009-08-06, accessed on 7 August 2009. 154
Many of my interviewees identified Kemalist institutions, defending Kemalist principles - and simultaneously their own interests – as obstacles to solution-oriented foreign policy making. Professor Murat Belge, reflecting upon obstacles to a peaceful settlement of the Greek-Turkish dispute on the Turkish side pointed at: “The sort of highly paranoid state apparatus, being totally defensive...Part of that may exist to justify the existence of the state apparatus...Even a lot of that is sort of manipulation. I am sure there is also sincere belief, there are people used to that, a peaceful world would be discomforting for them they wouldn‟t be comfortable”.384 Cem Duna commented: “Obviously there are elements within each society which are not very pleased with this idea (improving Greek-Turkish relations) as it takes away the raison d‟être in their respective society... An Army is an Army. Irrespective of priorities they want to have those toys (military equipment). And in order to have those toys they need to justify having them. So although it is not a high priority on the threat list it is still on the list”.385 Soli Özel commented on Kemalist action against AKP reforms of the Foundations Law, a matter of domestic policy which falls under the general framework of Greek-Turkish relations under the principle of reciprocity.386 Kemalist obstacles to solving minority problems were also cited by Professors Ayhan Aktar and Umut Özkirimli.387 Others also acknowledged the impact of the AKP government on foreign policy. Barçın Yinanç argued that: “the AKP was instrumental in changing foreign policy on Cyprus”,388 while Umut Özkirimli went even further by saying that: “They (The TSK) are still very dominant and powerful, they are probably the main actor in Turkish foreign policy but they are changing. We have seen a change of government policy in Cyprus which was unthinkable 10 years ago... The army would never let Rauf DenktaĢ go but we have seen in that particular case that the government weighed in and managed to steer public opinion in a different direction”.389 Murat Belge argued that the current
384 Interview with Murat Belge, Istanbul, 4 March 2009. 385 Interview with Cem Duna, Istanbul, 24 April 2009. 386 Interview with Soli Özel, Istanbul, 10 April 2009. 387 Interview with Ayhan Aktar, Istanbul, 18 March 2009. 388 Interview with Barçın Yinanç, Istanbul, 1 May 2009. 389 Interview with Umut Özkirimli, Istanbul, 27 April 2009. 155 government being away from Kemalist principles that produce chauvinism would be a better interlocutor to negotiate Greek-Turkish relations.390 So, evidence suggests that a secular government‟s support for the Annan Plan would be unlikely and that Kemalism can be linked causally to rigid foreign policy. Therefore, focusing on the ongoing struggle is a legitimate method of analyzing foreign policy and in fact provides the tools to explain policy change where unitary state actor explanations failed. Attention now turns to the other two hypotheses, to be explored through a model of anti-Kemalist mobilization suggesting mechanisms of state preference formation. The rest of this section offers a presentation of the basic parameters of the model, that is the relevant actors and their preferences. The actors, selected for their ability to influence the institutional setting are: media, business, academicians-journalists, NGOs, politicians, the AKP government and the TSK. Although the struggle depicted can easily be and often is attributed to conflicting ideological preferences and values, it will be analysed here assuming instrumental rather than expressive or habitual action. The battle takes place in two simulated fronts: a direct one between institutions of the opposing sides aiming to decrease each others‟ political power as well as an indirect one with the two coalitions aiming to shape public discourse according to their own agendas so as to influence public opinion.
The actors
Academics and journalists have preferences over levels of Kemalist nationalism informed by past investments and can be roughly categorized into Kemalist, liberal (second republicans391) and Islamic. They contribute to the public discourse through academic work, the Press and media, as well as through participation in civil society formations.
390 Interview with Murat Belge, Istanbul, 4 March 2009. 391 A group of Turkish intellectuals who argue that the republic established by Ataturk has fulfilled its mission and has become a conservative and regressive entity, Open Source Center, Turkey, Guide to Major Turkish Daily Newspapers 2008, 7 October 2008. 156
Business can also be attributed a political inclination towards secular/Islamic identifications. A new class of Islamic capitalists that has emerged during the last two decades seeking to acquire status within the Turkish business community has come to challenge the traditional Kemalist capitalist class. Business interests are promoted both independently from one another as well as by a number of associations and business chambers. Their lobbying efforts are directed to the executive but efforts to contribute and shape the public discourse are also noted. There are numerous civil society associations with distinct preferences over the level of Kemalism. Such organizations comprise of human rights groups, pro-democratic groups, Islam-influenced pro-democratic groups, nationalist groups and networks and organizations located abroad. They focus on raising awareness of their agenda and mobilizing public support behind their goals and thus their efforts rely on communication with the public through any means available. Again, the can be categorized as nationalist, liberal and Islamic. Constituents are heavily influenced by the public discourse shaped by mainstream media. Mainstream media strategies rely on the sales criterion. However, that does not translate into indifference regarding preferred levels of Kemalism. Mainstream media institutions display political inclinations, contingent on the owner‟s political background and incentive structure. CHP, the centre-left successor of Kemal Ataturk‟s party and main opposition to the AKP, intends to decrease AKP‟s popularity and return to power. As a main proponent of secularism and republicanism, CHP has an incentive to attack the AKP on the grounds of an alleged „hidden Islamic agenda‟. In that way, CHP is currently allied to the TSK even though their preferences on issues like the EU candidacy differ considerably. The TSK,392 as the self-proclaimed guarantor of the Kemalist-secularist state, is the most highly respected institution for Turkish citizens and has immense power over
392 The TSK, as pointed out to me by Brendan O‟ Duffy, is not a unitary actor, as one can observe in the annual review of appointments and promotions. However, the lack of empirical evidence regarding distinct preferences among its ranks on the sensitive issues discussed here, dramatically affects the validity of any theory regarding the relation between policy choices and internal power struggles. The TSK‟s official stand on various issues has indeed displayed some degree of inconsistency, depending on the preferences of high rank officers. It can be argued that while in fact there is rarely consensus among the ranks, the regressive 157 policy making. The TSK has legal authority393 to force, if needed to repel both foreign and domestic threats. It is assumed that a sense of threat, both domestic and international is indispensable in order for this mandate to remain relevant and avoid becoming an anachronism. Therefore the TSK is assumed to have no motivation to use its political power in a constructive manner towards solving international disputes, and therefore constitutes an obstacle to democratic and solution-oriented foreign policy. A decrease of its political power would alter the incentive structure of the Turkish negotiator dealing with the Greek-Turkish dispute, as well as that of opposing political parties. The AKP government and the social change that came with it pose a clear threat for the TSK‟s political power and status. Therefore its actions are directed towards the preservation of its status by propagating and highlighting both external and internal threats such as Islam and the PKK as well as the political defeat of the AKP. The Turkish executive‟s primary concern is to remain in power.394 Considering AKP‟s Islamic-based profile, the executive seeks to form winning coalitions around that base, which places it in manifest or latent confrontation with secular forces. Therefore the AKP has an incentive to decrease Kemalists‟ institutional power through legislative and constitutional reforms as well as to alter the quality of public discourse, while seeking to secure winning coalitions. It is important to stress here that whether the AKP truly pursues or only appears to pursue a decrease of Kemalist power is not a point that requires clarification in order to
faction of the TSK, described above, always manages to express itself and exert power. Instead of substituting the term TSK with the regressive faction within the TSK, which would require empirical validation at every instance, as well as treating the two terms interchangeably, perhaps it would be best for the reader to have that faction in mind when the TSK is mentioned. 393 Turkish Republic Constitution, Article 85, found at: http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/images/loaded/pdf_dosyalari/THE_CONSTITUTION_OF_THE_REPUBLIC_ OF_TURKEY.pdf, accessed on 16 May 2011. 394 The possibility of a „hidden (Islamic) agenda‟ will not be taken into account in this thesis. With evidence supportive of such a conception being insufficient, anti-AKP rhetoric branding it “a clear and present danger” to secularism will be treated as part of Kemalist counter-mobilization‟s detterent effect. Certainly if evidence sufficed to establish that the ongoing battle is between Islam (and the prospect of a theocratic state) and secularism a different form of foreign policy analysis would be required, one that would not have the TSK‟s political power at its core. However, at the moment what appears to be „clear and present‟ is the motivation of the Kemalist coalition to misrepresent or exaggerate the possibility of such an outcome‟s occurrence. Therefore, the antisecular coalition is conceptualized as a vehicle of democratization (in accordance with EU requirements), placing the TSK (as leading the Kemalist coalition) at the core of analysis.
158 establish whether the latter should be at the core of the analysis. Given that its policy agenda has spurred an anti-Kemalist movement, the AKP‟s true incentives and their implications for its political behaviour can only affect the actual outcome of the power struggle.395 The legitimacy of the analysis would remain intact as social outcomes are, according to rationalist theorizing, unintended consequences of intentional human action and therefore a decrease of Kemalist power remains a possible outcome.
Section III: The Kemalist Coalition
After having identified the independent variable of the model, and the actors that make up the institutional setting, a presentation of the two coalitions based on empirical evidence from various sources is in order. Again, it is vital to establish theoretically and empirically that actors‟ decisions and strategies are informed by their perception of their interests, rather than constituting habitual norm following. The Kemalist coalition is led by the TSK and the opposition parties CHP and MHP. Around state institutions that are still dominated by Kemalist elements, a large normatively homogenous coalition has formed. State institutions, such as the Higher Education Board and the judiciary have been and continue to be Kemalist and contribute significantly to the struggle. That is due to the -individually constructed based on incentives and dispositions- interests of the majority of their members, according to today‟s composition, and their existence as institutions are not threatened by social change and the AKP. Therefore they do not need to be included in this presentation.396 The TSK and its interests have been extensively presented in Chapter 3, so this part focuses on media institutions and civil society organizations. Similarly to Greek traditionalists‟ anxiety for the preservation of Greek identity and heritage, motivation for Turkish Kemalists‟ actions and life choices stems largely from instrumental considerations. Firstly, identification with a group, national, or cultural
395 As it will be shown below, if the AKP has no real intention of insisting on its attack on the Kemalist front and only intends to preserve its governmental status, that will affect anti-Kemalist mobilization and hence the outcome of the struggle. 396 Those institutions‟ political identification is undisputed in Turkey. This section would only need to include individual members of those institutions, but again data collection for such an endeavour is particularly difficult. 159 is a matter of simple coordination. As elaborated in Chapter 3, Kemalism constitutes the dominant normative framework since the establishment of the Republic. Individuals with an aspiration to contribute to public life and public discourse had a lot to gain from coordinating with the dominant normative framework and a lot to lose from failing to do so. Coordination is facilitated by information provided within any normatively homogenous community which has created a collective conscience and whether coordination is considered as a good in itself because of the comfort it provides or a means to end, individuals have an interest in maintaining it. The point is, once an individual has that identification it is rational to further the interests determined by that identification. Therefore individuals, who at any point of their life identified themselves with Kemalist principles, and in some occasions have lived their whole lives defending them, have an interest in maintaining coordination around them. In their attempt to preserve secularism‟s dominance against groups that have coordinated around Islam, members of the Kemalist coalition have an incentive to present any divergence from the official doctrine as a threat to the secular character of the state. Realizing that democratic elections can become a tool of normative change, individuals of the Kemalist identification have an incentive to preserve the TSK‟s political power as a safety clause against democratically elected governments committed to normative change. And in order to maintain the TSK‟s power, external as well as internal threats need to be presented as relevant whether they are or not. This part offers a brief presentation of the Kemalist coalition aiming to inform on incentives for participation and extent of political power.
Kemalist media
Secularist media are dominated by “Doğan Publications Holding” (DYH) and Çukurova Media Group. The two institutions have benefited from their owners‟ network connections to the state, as will demonstrated below. DYH, Turkey‟s leading media conglomerate, publishes Hürriyet, Milliyet, Radikal, Posta, Fanatik, Referans and Turkish Daily News, controlling almost 40% of
160 daily sales. DYH is considered as the main opponent of the AKP government and its perceived Islamization agenda within the media world. In attracting 40% of total newspaper readership the conglomerate has attempted to diversify its coverage somewhat so as to appeal to various segments of society by accordingly shaping the coverage and by incorporating liberal columnists, critical of the secular campaign against AKP. So, Hürriyet and Milliyet are considered nationalistic, pro-army and pro-secular dailies, with Milliyet being favored by well-educated readers. Posta has a similar coverage, while Radikal, although considered as one of the most liberal dailies of DYH, also hosts old- style nationalist columnists. Referans is a purely liberal daily with limited sales and democratic columnists. Sözcü on the other hand is “the voice of radical Kemalist opposition and acts as a defender of Ataturk and republican principles”.397 Among its key journalists one can see Sinan Aygün, the leader of the Ankara Chamber of Commerce, who was briefly detained in 2008 in relation to the Ergenekon trial case. Vatan is a moderate secular daily with liberal as well as nationalistic input. The Çukurova Group‟s activities spread over the fields of industry, construction, communication, information technology (Turkcell), energy and the defence sector (BMC is a supplier of the TSK). The group entered the Turkish media world in the 1990s with the acquisition of AkĢam in 1994 and the establishment of GüneĢ in 1997. AkĢam is considered to be a pro-business nationalistic paper, with columnist Güler Kömürcü also briefly detained on suspicion of participation in the Ergenekon case. GüneĢ is also critical of the AKP government while Tercüman, established in 2003 is another Kemalist and nationalistic newspaper with Chief Editor Ufuk Buyukcelebi also being briefly held on suspicion of participation in the Ergenekon case. On the fringe of the secularist coalition lay some more radical newspapers. Cumhuriyet is a historic Turkish daily established in 1924 and published by a group led by Ilhan Selcuk since 2001. Both Ilhan Selcuk and Mustafa Balbay are facing charges in connection with the Ergenekon investigation. The paper also employs left-wing columnists like Zeynep Oral. Oral Calislar, one of the paper‟s liberal columnists left
397 Open Source Centre, 2008, p. 10. 161
Cumhuriyet for Radikal in 2008 because of what he described as a shift towards anti- democratic radical secularism.398 Yenicag is an extremely nationalistic and anti-western daily established in 2002 to express radical opposition within the MHP with Rauf Denktas contributing Cyprus- related opinion pieces. Yeni Mesaj advocates a mixture of Kemalism and Islamism, opposes interfaith communication and is published by Professor Haydar Bas‟s Independent Turkey Party (BTP). Aydinlik was established in 1960 by Labor Party‟s (LP) leader Doğu Perinçek as a Maoist newspaper and today advocates Kemalism. Doğu Perinçek who is also at the head of the Talat Pasha Movement (along with Rauf Denktas), which fights against “the recognition of Armenian genocide” as well as other columnists of the paper, were detained in relation to the Ergenekon investigation.
Civil Society
Kemalist civil society organizations rely on individuals who, coordinating around Kemalist ideals, seek to enhance their careers and preserve their relation to the state. Some of the most prominent Kemalist organizations will be listed in this section, hoping that the significance of individual incentives in political action is brought out. The Ari Movement was established in 1994 by young professionals399 and during the current decade the organization has taken „cautious‟ stands on the Ergenekon case and the Armenian genocide issue. According to Zaman reports, Ari Foundation‟s Washington representative, Yurter Özcan, is a research analyst of Soner Çağaptay, an expert at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), a pro-Israel think tank also based in Washington, D.C. “Mr. Çağaptay is known to have been writing about the AK Party government along the lines that the party will Islamicize the country”.400 Özcan
398 Ibid., p. 15. 399 Ari Movement, Mission-Vision and Values, found at: http://www.ari.org.tr/english/index.php?page=mission_vision_and_principles, accessed on 16 March 2009. 400 Yilmaz, I. “Ergenekon‟s Counter-Attack in the US”, Today’s Zaman, 17 November 2009, found at: http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/columnists-193131-ergenekons-counter-attack-in-the-us.html, accessed on 17 November 2009. 162 was also a participant in a rally organized by the Atatürk Society of America (ASA) against the AK Party government and Islamic scholar Fethullah Gülen.401 The Talat Pasha Movement was established in 2005 with the aim to counter „the Armenian Genocide recognition propaganda‟. A high number of prominent Turkish citizens are members of the movement, mostly academics, MPs, retired military officers and members of the judicary, and many of them are linked to other civil society organizations with similar agendas.402 The Contemporary Education Foundation (ÇEV), established in 1994, has sponsored numerous educational projects since 1994 and is yet another education foundation committed to proliferating Kemalist ideals. In 2002, the Istanbul State Security Court (DGM) held a case against the foundation‟s chairman and 8 other members. According to the prosecutor's indictment, ÇEV funded an alleged PKK member university student, Bayram Özbek, on the condition that Özbek would testify against Islamic scholar Fethullah Gülen.403 The foundation has been targeted on other occasions,404 and was raided by the police as part of the Ergenekon investigation.405
401 “Ari Foundation Invites pro-Ergenekon Speaker to the Congress Event”, Today’s Zaman, 18 November 2009, found at: http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-193269-ari-foundation-invites-pro-ergenekon- speaker-to-congress-event.html, accessed on 18 November 2009; “Cagaptay Uses Foreign Policy in Smear Campaign Against Gulen”, Today’s Zaman, 28 February 2010, found at: http://www.todayszaman.com/tz- web/news-202831-cagaptay-uses-foreign-policy-in-smear-campaign-against-gulen.html, accessed on 28 February 2010; Cagaptay, S, “What‟s Reality Behind Turkey‟s Coup Arrests?”, Foreign Policy, 25 February 2010, found at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/02/25/whats_really_behind_turkeys_coup_arrests, accessed on 28 February 2010. 402 For instance: Rauf Denktas serves as the President of the Board, Prof Mustafa Erkal (president of enlightened people association), Ferit Ġlsever, GS of the Labour Party (LP), Nüzhet Kandemir (vice president of DYP and ex ambassador), Ertuğrul Kazancı (President of Ataturk Society), Salih Kılıç (president of the Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions, TURK-IS), Ensar Öğüt (CHP MP), Prof. Dr. Nevzat YalçıntaĢ (AKP MP), Prof. Dr. Kemal Alemdaroğlu (former Rector of Istanbul University, arrested under suspicion in the Ergenekon gang), Servet Cömert (retired General), Mehmet Dülger (President of parliamentary Foreign Affairs Commission), Mehmet Gül (ex MHP MP), Prof. Dr. ġükrü Sina Gürel (former Deputy PM under DSP government and Minster of Foreign Affairs), Prof. Erol Manisali ( Cumhuriyet columnist), YaĢar Müjdeci (retired General), Doğu Perinçek, Vural SavaĢ (Honorary president of Court of Appeals and columnist for Sözcü). 403 “DGM Tries Contemporary Education Foundation Chairman”, Hurriyet Daily News, 26 October 2002, found at: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=dgm-tries-contemporary-education-foundation- chairman-2002-10-26, accessed on 1 March 2010. 404 “Gulen‟s Lawyers Deny he Seeks Religious State”, Hurriyet Daily News, 4 March 2003, found at: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=gulens-lawyers-deny-he-seeks-religious-state-2003-03-04, accessed on 1 March 2010. 405 “Latest Ergenekon Raid Nets Academic and NGO Heads”, Hurriyet Daily News, found at: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/domestic/11425661.asp, accessed on 2 March 2010. 163
Ataturkist Though Association (ADD) is a neo-nationalist secular association which aims to protect and maintain the legacy of Kemal Ataturk often so cooperating with academic institutions. Chairman of the Association is retired General ġener Erygur, one of the prime suspects in the Ergenekon case. Professor Mustafa Yurtkuran, deputy chairman of the association, was also detained in 2009. According to Zaman, ADD along with ÇEV and the Social Economic and Social Research Foundation (TESAV), were named by Ergenekon defendant Ümit Sayın as civil society organizations that acted in parallel with a group inside the military plotting a coup d‟état during a hearing of the Ergenekon case.406 The Kuvayi Milliye Movevement (National Liberation Movement) was founded in 2005 and claims to be anti-imperialistic and neo-nationalistic.407 The association attracted media attention when footage from the armed pledge ceremony was released.408 Fikri Karadağ, a retired military officer and independent MP candidate in 2007 was the president of the Movement in 2005. He is currently imprisoned facing charges on participation in the Ergenekon gang. The organization‟s former president, Bekir Öztürk, also faces charges for participation in the Ergenekon gang as well as alleged assassination attempts against Patriarch Bartholomew. Patriotic Forces Union of Power Movement Association (VKGB) is an association with similar purposes and activities with the Kuvayi Milliye Movement. A number of its members have been arrested for criminal acts, often violent and in relation with the Ergenekon trial. Again retired military personnel are in abundance within the association‟s ranks, some of them arrested on similar grounds. The association was linked to police force personnel as well as the National Intelligence Organization (MĠT).409 VKGB's objectives are: “to stand up to the IMF, to prevent Jews from buying land in
406 “Ümit Sayin: CDD, CEV Are Parts of Ergenekon‟s Civil Society Network”, Today’s Zaman, 9 9 December 2009, found at: http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-195018-umit-sayin-cydd-cev-are- parts-of-ergenekons-civil-society-network.html, accessed on 2 March 2010. 407 The president of the Mersin branch stated: “Mersin is invaded by PKK and Zionists, 90% of the people who commit crimes in Mersin are from east or southeast. Turks don‟t commit crimes”. Saymaz, I, “Mersin‟e Dikkat” [Attention on Mersin], Radikal, 14 February 2007, found at: http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=212992, accessed on 3 March 2010. 408 Yenigun, S. “Kuvayı Milliye‟den Tabancalı Yemin” [National Liberation‟s Gun Oath], Milliyet, found at: http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2007/02/10/guncel/agun.html , accessed on 3 March 2010. 409 “A General‟s Conversation on a Gang Phone”, Yeni Safak, 25 July 2007, found at: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=turkish-press-scanner-2007-07-26, accessed on 3 March 2010. 164
Anatolia with secret agreements, to defend Turkish Cyprus and to fight against the PKK which is believed to aim at invading Turkey”.410
Section IV: A Supply and Demand Model of Anti-Kemalist Mobilization The Model
Chong has analysed the American civil rights movement as an instance of succesfull public spirited collective action,411 arguing that it resembles an assurance game in which potential activists participate if they can be confident that enough other activists will also participate to make the campaign worthwhile. In general he analyses how factors such as organization, leadership, government responsiveness, incremental success, steadfastness in the face of setbacks and resistance to intimidation and harassment from opponents affect individual choices as well as the course of the movement itself. This chapter applies a slightly modified version of Chong‟s model to the analysis of anti- Kemalist mobilization. A few basic differences exist however and clarification is needed. In Chong‟s model, the government was the actor authorized to satisfy protestors‟ demands and therefore, concessions were considered as means towards maximising the probability of re-election. Moreover, the governing party‟s political profile and basis were also considered as factors inhibiting or facilitating the movement‟s cause. In the case at hand the government is leading the movement rather than being an independent broker while the state is similarly problematized. In the absence of an impartial broker satisfying demands in exchange for political support, the size and momentum of mobilization as well as the rate of Kemalist counter-mobilization both become directly linked to the movement‟s degree of success. The definition of Kemalism elaborated in section II helps us trace the process by which those three factors determine institutional change. Given the AKP government‟s authority to challenge the Kemalist status quo, the course of concessions and therefore the degree of institutional change depends on its
410 Ozmenek, E. “Patriotic Forces vs. Crime”, Hurriyet Daily News, 10 July 2007, found at: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=patriotic-forces-vs.-crime-2007-07-10, accessed on 3 March 2010. 411 Chong, 1991. 165 support by the electorate, which is informed by public discourse and therefore by civil society and the media world and Kemalist counter-mobilization. Moreover, the case at hand lacks certain other typical characteristics of collective action situations. The movement depicted lacks strategy design, organization among its parts and co-ordination of their actions. Be that as it may, some fundamental elements exist, primarily the perception of a lower equilibrium level of Kemalism as a collective good by vast segments of society and some level of information regarding the actions of others. Arguably free-rider problems would be exacerbated by the limited ability of organization and co-ordination. However, selective incentives, including social and psychological benefits can be awarded within domains where monitoring defections is possible, whether it be academia, the media world or civil society. Generally, public-spirited collective action is viewed here as well as potentially facilitated by selective incentives. Prospective participators to collective action face free- rider disincentives and participation can be encouraged if we assume that people that people infer social and psychological benefits from contributing to collective action.412 The existence of selective incentives is a necessary requirement for the situation to transform into a coordination game. More is needed though for that to materialize in successful collective action. In coordination games everyone has an interest in participating in collective action if they can reassure themselves that they share a common interest and that a sufficient number of others will also participate. Therefore the strategy of defecting is no longer dominant and the payoff of defecting while everyone else contributes is no longer superior to the cooperative equilibrium. The possibility of success and therefore the number of participants at any given time are the factors that can transform a PD-like situation into an assurance game in the mind of each individual. Very few people would be inclined to participate in movements with low probability of success or a negligible amount of participants. Each individual has an individual threshold, a level of success and mobilization that would transform the
412 See Chong, 1991, especially chapter 3, for a rationalist analysis of the Civil Rights Movement and a justification of the use of psychological and social selective incentives. Olson had argued against the use of psychological incentives as: “it is not possible to get empirical proof of the motivation behind any person‟s actions…A reliance on moral explanations could thus make the theory untestable, Olson, 1971, p. 61. However their inclusion in individual motivation is consistent with the definition of rationality that this thesis employs. 166 situation for them. So the more people contributing, the less each individual benefits from choosing defection, until a certain number of participants is reached that will persuade each individual to participate as well. In such situations there is usually a coalition of members that can successfully collaborate and produce some level of the collective good while many individuals are still defecting. The problem is that their cooperation and the collective good they produce also improve defectors‟ payoffs. This leads members of that coalition to the temptation of defection in order to enjoy defectors‟ higher payoffs and eventually destroy the viability of the coalition. However, as noted above there is a certain level of participation that will eliminate the temptation of defecting by rendering the contribution payoff higher than that of defection. Overall, what is needed for collective action to succeed is a suitable distribution of thresholds among potential participants. In our case collective action analysed is anti-Kemalist mobilization and the model is essentially a supply and demand model of Kemalist concessions. There are groups and individuals with an interest in lower equilibrium levels of Kemalism as there are groups and individuals that counter-mobilize to prevent such an outcome. In our case it is the state, rather than the government, which is at the position of supplying the demanded concessions. Given that a sufficient number of participants contribute to anti-Kemalist mobilization and collective action is achieved, the equilibrium level of Kemalism will depend on Kemalist countermobilization and its ability to obstruct concessions. Any public expression against basic Kemalist ideals, rhetoric and policies will be considered as an action of coordination against the latter and thus of contribution to the anti-Kemalist coalition. We distinguish individuals between leaders and followers. Leaders are those who are willing to participate regardless of others‟ intentions413 and Chong identifies them as individuals who contribute first due to stronger identification with ideological goals, sustained activism and strong reputational concerns. Followers are individuals who express sympathy for the goals of the cause but with reduced intensity compared to leaders. In our case the leader of the anti-Kemalist struggle is the AKP
413 See Schelling‟s examples of situations where some fraction of the population engages in an activity independently of how many do and some other fraction will not, Schelling, 1978, p. 97. 167 party, for which anti-Kemalist action suggest a dominant strategy aiming to ensure its political survival. Followers‟ participation in the movement is according to Chong contingent on two effects: the bandwagon effect, which translates into participation after the movement has already succeeded to some degree, and the contagion effect which is related to participation‟s dependence on the number of individuals who are committed to the campaign. Each follower has an individual distinct threshold (Schelling‟s cross-over points),414 after which they are willing to contribute. Moreover, information regarding other people‟s thresholds is limited especially in large groups and that is a common problem for collective action in coordination games. This threshold is related to each person‟s dispositions which inform the value they assign to the collective good and the costs of participation. The supply of concessions in each period then is derived from the following function:
(1.1)
Where: is the level of supply in period , is the level of anti-Kemalist mobilization in period , is the level of Kemalist opposition in period .
Kemalist opposition is a function of anti-Kemalist mobilization, as it is reactive to anti-Kemalist action so that:
(1.2) Where: is the level of Kemalist opposition in period , is the level of anti-Kemalist mobilization in period , and is the Kemalist opposition‟s rate of counter-mobilization.
414 Ibid., p. 97. 168
It was mentioned above that the autonomous leadership needed to kick-start the mobilization movement was supplied in this case by a political party, the AKP. There are two main implications of this difference for our model. Firstly, the government that provides the autonomous leadership needs to remain in power in order for mobilization to continue. The AKP party would be in no position to effectively challenge Kemalist principles as an opposition party nor is it certain that the incentive to do so would be there. Secondly, the movement‟s success is highly correlated with constant demonstration of the leader‟s resolve. Signs of decreased intensity in pursuing concessions would be translated by other participants in the following way: The government has re-evaluated their targets as they estimate that they cannot complete the normative switch and have opted for moderate policies that will allow them to remain in power. Their incentive for continuing the struggle with lower levels of resolve can only be informed by the will to preserve the winning coalition. Such a conception of the leader would damage the bandwagon effect and would ultimately lead to the breakdown of mobilization. Leader‟s resolve aside, the outcome of the struggle also depends on the opposition‟s power. Apart from the level of counter-mobilization around Kemalist principles, Kemalist power includes a deterrence capability which is related to Kemalist institutions‟ ability to prosecute individuals based on Turkish Law, to block reforms using parliamentary procedures, presidential authority and judicial interventions and to directly threaten participants in the anti-Kemalist movement. Furthermore, the opposition can also demonstrate various levels of resolve, with a military intervention constituting the last resort and highest level of resolve. When all of these factors are combined, the level of mobilization in a given period equals:
, (1.3) Where: is the size of autonomous leadership, is the bandwagon rate due to success on the previous period, is the contagion rate due to successful mobilization in the previous period,
169
is the deterrent effect of the opposition, is the level of resolve of the anti-Kemalist leadership, and is the level of resolve of the Kemalist opposition.
As elaborated in Section II, successfully extracted concessions include (and therefore the badwagon effect appears after): reforms of constitutional provisions establishing the Kemalist character of the state, legal amendments and constitutional reform that disturb the balance within Kemalist state institutions affecting the interpretation and enforcement of equilibria, legal amendments decreasing the Kemalist enforcement capability, restructuring of the media world which increases the frequency of anti-Kemalist references and shapes perceptions of others‟ intentions accordingly and decrease of Kemalist institutions‟ policy-making authority. As for the contagion effect, we assume that individuals consider the number of anti-Kemalist media and the frequency of anti-Kemalist references as indicative of the number of people already participating in anti-Kemalist action or would broadly favour a new equilibrium. These coefficients are treated as constant within different stages of mobilization for simplicity‟s sake. Consequently, an increase in the bandwagon rate becomes visible after the level of supply has increased during the previous stage and similarly the contagion rate increases once higher participation has been noted during the previous period. This variation explains the importance and the difficulty of the early stages of the movement when both the number of concessions and participants are low as opposed to later stages when participation becomes easier if supply and numbers of participation have reached some certain level. Similarly, coefficient is inversely related to the level of supply and the resolve of anti-Kemalist mobilization, , is contingent on the factor since the movement‟s leader is a political party with a primary interest of remaining in power. By substituting the supply in the demand equation we have:
=
=
170
Examining the time path of the system, our function is of the following form:
, (1.5) Where: A = (1.6) And B = (1.7)
By giving various values we are able to come up with the dynamic form of the model. At :
At :
At :
In general for any : ,
Let us now examine the long term behaviour of . If , , and therefore will diverge monotonically to positive (when ) or to negative infinity (when ) depending on the slope of the function, . If , the function will remain constant at .
171
If , will converge to zero and will converge along a monotonic path from to , since when . If is greater than the time path of will decline, if is less than the time path will rise. If , will increase monotonically without bound and so will . If , will oscillate between negative and positive values depending on whether is odd or even. This oscillation will converge to zero to the limit and consequently will again settle on the equilibrium level .
If , will oscillate between when is odd to when is even. And will oscillate within bounds around the equilibrium level without ever reaching it. If , and will oscillate along a divergent path. Let us now examine the term A in more detail since it determines along with the initial level of mobilization the path of .
Starting at , when the autonomous leadership, the AKP, proceeds to its first anti-Kemalist action coefficients and are still equal to zero. As shown above when so that and assuming that is positive, the level of mobilization in any period will equal the level of mobilization at the previous period plus . So when the government shows full resolve and potential participants are perfectly responsive to supply, mobilization will keep rising, demand will feed off supply, leading to constant Kemalist concessions until infinity. Obviously, such escalation (see figure 5.4) can only occur within the simplifying assumptions of a model and not in empirical reality. The appearance of coefficients and comes after the creation of the movement and limit the chances of such an occurrence to the possibility that the relative power of the movement is significantly stronger than that of the opposition so that .
172
3,5 Mobilization 3
2,5
2
1,5 Concessions 1
0,5
0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Time
Figure 5.4. Mobilization and concessions increase infinitely.
If , mobilization will be initiated and will take off as it will diverge upwardly without bound. If , as shown above, the system possesses an equilibrium which is larger than and therefore mobilization is expected to rise monotonically until it gradually dampens down to settle at the equilibrium level as figure 5.5 illustrates. That means that the relative power of the movement is sufficiently greater than that of the opposition so that a considerable level of Kemalist regression has been achieved. The movement does not achieve large-scale mobilization but supply remains satisfying. If , this means that the deterrent power of Kemalist opposition is sufficiently greater than that of the movement so that mobilization will dampen down at a low equilibrium. If , mobilization will be initiated but will be crashed by a more powerful opposition. This brief presentation of the model hopefully helps to illustrate the potential time path of a mobilization movement with the characteristics of the Turkish case. Now let us examine empirical evidence in order to evaluate the course and potential of the anti- Kemalist movement.
173
Mobilization 1
0,8
0,6
0,4 Concessions 0,2
0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Time
Figure 5.5. Mobilization settles at an equilibrium point.
The Narrative Islam in the 1990s
A number of attempts to renegotiate Turkish identity, by a number of groups have been noted in contemporary Turkish history, as elaborated in Chapter 3. Islam has constituted the strongest opposition to Kemalist domination, but coordination around Islam has been averted. In the 1990s new efforts to challenge the status quo were undertaken again on the basis of an Islamic identification.415 Even though Islam had previously been strongly represented in the political system, Necmettin Erbakan‟s Welfare Party (RP) gained the highest level of electoral support during the 1990s and Erbakan served as the Prime Minister in a coalition government with the True Path Party (DYP) before being overthrown by the latest and post-modern coup of the TSK in 1997. RP‟s broad appeal in the 1990s, apart from poor marginalized Islamic segments of society, can be attributed to support from urban areas and educated businessmen with a modernist orientation who were seeking to consolidate their position as an elite group
415 In fact the TSK and the coup regime of 1980-1983 had contributed significantly to the rise of Islamic identification as a deterrent to the perceived communist threat. 174 within Turkish society on the basis of a common Islamic identity. Ziya ÖniĢ has provided a narrative of the development process of Islamic business activity after the 1980s and the inflows of Saudi capital, as well as the organizational structure that relied on Islamic brotherhood organizations (tarikat), which engaged in investment activity.416 Furthermore, the Independent Association of Industrialists and Businessmen (MÜSĠAD), founded in 1990, and comprising of more than 3000 medium sized firms417 contributed significantly to RP‟s goals and today offers its support to the AKP government. So once again, a significant part of Turkish society had begun to express their preference for normative change. A number of civil society organizations with a pro- democratic and liberal agenda were established during that time, some of them of Islamic background (MAZLUM-DER, Association of Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed Peoples), some not (Association for Liberal Thinking, TESEV, The Economic and Social History Foundation of Turkey). However, their scope, agendas and activities were restricted under a regime dominated by Kemalist institutions and values. In many occasions members were prosecuted under articles of the Turkish Penal Code dealing with preserving Kemalist principles.418 The existence of such business interests and organizations demanding normative change did not have a significant effect on public discourse and did not result in an outright challenge of Kemalist dominance. The media remained largely under Kemalist influence in terms of structure and coverage of state policies and institutions. Pro-Islamic newspapers existed during that time (Yeni ġafak, Zaman, Türkiye) but their share of sales remained limited. At the time, the media sector resembled a duopolistic structure, with the Sabah/Bilgin Group and the Milliyet/Doğan Group holding about 70% of the market share in national daily newspapers. The holdings were heavily involved in public works and depended, to a greater extent, on works commissioned by the state. Murat Belge provided me with an interesting narrative of media evolution focusing on how Turkish
416 ÖniĢ, Z. “The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: The Rise of the Welfare Party in Perspective”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 4 (1997), pp. 743-766. 417 Including firms from small Anatolian towns that have been identified as success stories by the media for managing to establish themselves as significant exporters of manufactures to the world market without receiving state subsidies, and have come to be known as the “Anatolian tigers”. 418 For instance Professor Attilla Yayla, current President of the Association for Liberal Thinking, has been prosecuted by Turkish judicial authorities for insulting the memory of Kemal Ataturk under Law 5816 and currently lives in self-imposed exile in England. 175 political history of military interventions and a political environment that facilitated close ties between politicians and business had been vital in creating a media environment friendly to the Kemalist state.419 Hatzidimos comments: “Due to the dependence on state commissioned works and public credits, press reports never take an adversary stance to state interests. In order to guarantee that remains unchanged, the state ensures the duopolistic structure in the print media to remain untouched”.420 Self-censorship seemed to constitute common journalistic practice, imposed by provisions of the Turkish Penal Code. Articles 8 and 301 of the Anti-Terror Law and Law No. 5816 prohibit inducing conscription objections, insulting Kemal Ataturk and Turkishness and propagating against the indivisible integrity of the state. According to a Report issued by Reporters Sans Frontiers: “A report entitled „There are no Turks in Greece or Bulgaria, and no Kurds in Turkey‟ caused the seizure of the first issue of the newspaper Sokak by a State Security Court for „elements of separatist propaganda‟ in early 1997”.421 Therefore, suitable conditions for a game restructuring did not exist. Firstly, the anti-Kemalist movement in the 1990s was Islam-based to a large degree. Activities of business associations, media and most of human rights organizations revolved around the Islamic identity that was favoured by the RP. Enough actors managed to coordinate in order to produce some level of the collective good and elect RP to government, but the required level described above was not reached. The movement and its leadership‟s strong Islamic identification constituted a disincentive for other individuals and groups with anti-Kemalist dispositions to participate. Secondly, possibilities of success seemed bleak throughout the decade. With Kemalist power manifested in the state, in the media and civil society, aspirations of normative change seemed somewhat utopic, despite the proclaimed support by Islamic circles. At the peak of the pro-Islamic movement the RP only managed to find itself in a coalition government. That meant that any reformative legislative initiatives would need to overcome intra-cabinet disagreements, Presidential obstacles, parliamentary majorities
419 Interview with Murat Belge, Istanbul, 4 March 2009. 420 Hatzidimos, K. The Role of the Media in Greek-Turkish Relations, Robert Bosch Stiftungskolleg fur Internationale, 1999, p. 12. 421 Reporters Sans Frontiers Report, in Hatzidimos 1999, p. 14. 176 and ultimately constitutional challenges. Indeed the RP did not show significant signs of regression from the Kemalist dogma and began to receive criticisms even from pro- Islamic media,422 a sign that the party was distancing itself from its electoral base which pressed for social justice reforms. The challenge that Kemalism faced in the 1990s is a good illustration of the dual- coordination theory. The argument begins by establishing that state power depends on coordination at the level of government and on lack of coordination at the level of any potential popular opposition. “The state need not compel everyone at gunpoint, it need merely make it in virtually everyone‟s clear interest individually to comply with the law even though collectively it might be their interest to oppose the law”.423 So, coordination creates power by making revolutionary action less rewarding than it would be against an uncoordinated group. State power thus depends on coordination at the level of government and lack of coordination at the level of any potential popular opposition.424 Examples of state power maintained by organized minorities against unorganized majorities are abundant in world history. Hardin notes that this theory of state power makes it easy to understand the surprising shifts of loyalty of a large populace after a radical change in government, using the example of high levels of Nazi support, followed by submission to post-war governments in Germany.425 Order is under these conditions easily maintained until it is cracked by a tipping event or a signal that coordinates opposition.
AKP and anti-Kemalist action
The electoral victory of the AKP in 2002 and the prospect of a stable government (the first one in 15 years) within a positive and reformative climate induced by the prospect of EU accession seemed to be exactly that tipping event that altered the incentive structure of individuals belonging to the majority of the Turkish populace that
422 Karadjis, M. “Behind the Turkish Military‟s Soft Coup”, Green Left Weekly, No. 294, 19 October 1997, found at: http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/51/294.html, accessed on 18 March 2010. 423 Hardin, R. One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 30. 424 Ibid., p. 30. 425 Ibid., p. 29. 177 were until then coordinating around Kemalism (or defecting from anti-Kemalist collective action). The AKP government, facing a heterogeneous constituency, needed to solidify a winning coalition that would secure its re-election and the leading members of the party decided to form that alliance around anti-Kemalist ideals. That was the desire of a part of the electorate that had expressed itself in the 1990s through electoral support to Erbakan‟s RP and constituted AKP‟s political base, as well as of individuals and groups who criticized the Eurosceptic regression that occurred with the 28 of February process.426 Indeed the party chose to favour a pro-western agenda through expressed fervor for EU membership as the EU dynamic in the early 2000s legitimized democratic reforms and the AKP benefited from that reformative momentum in its early stages of conflict with Kemalist institutions. Therefore, strategic considerations among party officials at the time served as the underlying cause for providing the leadership needed for collective action to begin. Downplaying the Islamic element and exhibiting a strong will to carry out challenging reforms towards achieving the Copenhagen criteria, the new government targeted the TSK‟s political power. The AKP government introduced four harmonization packages during its first two years in office, some including challenging reforms. Some amendments resulted in the abolition of available legal means to prosecute political opponents. For instance, Article 11 of the Law on Political Parties was amended to allow the election of political leaders previously convicted of inciting religious hatred. Others affected Kemalist ability to interpret threats to the Kemalist character of the state. So Article 98 of the Law on Political Parties increased the majority necessary in the Constitutional Court to impose a closure of a political party. Others affected Kemalist institutions ability to enforce existing equilibria. Article 102 for instance, altered the appeal process in favor of prosecuted parties. Legislative amendments on freedom of expression, foundations, minority rights and religious freedoms introduced with the sixth harmonization package similarly were
426 For the formation of a pro-EU camp transcending the Islamist-Secular division, see ÖniĢ and Keyman, 2004. 178 considered as instances of extracted concessions.427 Furthermore, amendments on freedom of expression did have some effect on the quality of media coverage with anti- Kemalist dailies finding space to express their political preference. The seventh reform package imposed the reform of MGK, altering its synthesis and reducing its authority, thus constraining Kemalist institutions‟ influence over policy equilibria. The endorsement of the Annan Plan and the resulting Cyprus policy shift was interpreted as a signal of reduced Kemalist influence over foreign policy. These early successes against the Kemalist establishment consolidated the formation of a broad anti-Kemalist coalition comprising of diverse elements such as radical Islamists, radical leftists, second republicans, liberals and pro-EU groups who had expressed their preferences since 1999. All these elements shared a common interest in the collective good of a lower equilibrium level of Kemalism. Ayhan Aktar has identified the anti-Kemalist campaign in a similar way noting the participation of diverse elements such as “graduates of Imam hatepi schools, voters of Erdogan‟s party, some businessmen who believe they are being discriminated against...”.428 Participating in anti-Kemalist action was the dominant choice for all favouring a decrease of Kemalism, despite possible disagreements with the AKP‟s political agenda. Murat Belge commented on his stand towards the AKP: “But I usually refrain from criticizing the government at this time so as not to give ammunition to undemocratic forces. We may criticize the government for „bad policy‟, but that doesn't justify the „legal‟ threats it now faces. We are at such a point in time that it is crucial to defend basic democratic rights”.429 Business associations that were backing RP in the previous decade offered their support to AKP anti-Kemalist reforms and even proceeded to significant goal reorientation in order to sustain their support to the movement, as shown by the example of MÜSĠAD which updated its anti-European profile.430 After 2005 new associations
427 An exhaustive list of legal reforms classified under their effect on Kemalist power could constitute a subject worth further research. For more information on the harmonization packages, see Directorate of Political Affairs, 2004. 428 Interview with Ayhan Aktar, 15 April 2009. 429 Belge, M. “Only Remedy to Current Deadlock is Democracy”, Today’s Zaman, 23 June 2008, found at: http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-145524-monday-talk-belge-only-remedy-to-current-deadlock- is-democracy.html, accessed on 3 December 2009. 430 “Conservative Bosses Warn Government”, Hurriyet Daily News, 26 September 2008, found at: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=conservative-bosses-warn-government-2008-09-26, , accessed on 14 March 2009. 179 were established and openly supported the AKP. The Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists of Turkey (TUSKON), founded in 2005, has provided political support through the endorsement of a number of critical reforms the AKP has attempted to materialize.431 The same apply for the Business Life Co-operation Association (ISHAD), a member of TUSKON, which has been reported as one of the main donors to the Gülen movement.432 AKP‟s successes over secular forces which gave rise to optimism about the final outcome of mobilization along with the practical implications of amendments on freedom of expression highlighted above led to a challenge of the state-backed status quo in the media world and contributed to the reconfiguration of the media sector towards normative pluralism.433 A number of dailies, liberal, Islamic, and nationalistic, were established under such favorable conditions while others reshaped their coverage to accommodate anti-Kemalist overtones. Prominent anti-secular elements and second republicans thus found the opportunity to express their preferences. Bugün for instance was established in 2003 and is reportedly funded by the Gulen group. Star was purchased by pro-AKP businessman Ali Ozmen Safa and employs journalists such as the famous second republicans Mehmet Altan and Eser KarakaĢ. Birgün was established in 2004 by trade unions Egitim-Sen, KESK, TMMOB and TTB. The leftist daily is critical of the undemocratic character of the political system and argues that state-sponsored secularism allows the state to use Islam as a political tool.434 Taraf, the daily that has remarkably exposed a number of alleged military coup plans, brings together some of the most prominent „second republicans‟ and liberal intellectuals and journalists. Undoubtedly, significant progress in terms of diversification and freedom of expression has occurred in the media world and even though the Turkish Penal Code still
431 Kilic, A. A. “Business World Boosts Government‟s Moral on Reform Package”, Today’s Zaman, 26 March 2010, found at: http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-205442-business-world-boosts-govt- morale-on-reform-package.html, accessed on 26 March 2010. 432 Atac, Y. “ĠĢ dünyasında 'Gülen'li örgütlenme” [Gulen Organization in Business], Millyiet, found at: http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2006/03/21/ekonomi/eko01.html, accessed on 27 March 2010. 433 Naturally, the politico-economic phenomenon of the appearance of Islam-friendly capital during the last three decades was a necessary condition for that reconfiguration. In fact, news reports have claimed the existence of close ties between AKP officials and media institution owners, similar to those between Kemalist institutions and media owners during the previous regime. Particularly, the acquisition of the Sabah daily and ATV by the Çalik Group from the Bilgin Group was reported as facilitated by the AKP. 434 Open Source Centre, 2008, p. 27. 180 offers the legal means for censorship, Kemalist deterrence capability has surely decreased. Given that prosecution under such articles is a political matter, and given the amendments achieved, prosecutions have drastically decreased, and that is manifested in the quality of journalistic coverage. Therefore, the period 2002-2005 was one of constantly increasing participation for the anti-Kemalist camp. With this broad coalition established and with original successes having already decreased the Kemalist deterrence effect, the AKP after 2005 went on to demand further concessions which ultimately demonstrated the resilience of the Kemalist camp and the particularities of movement leadership provided by a political party. During this period, educational reforms were drafted seeking to decrease the Council of Higher Education‟s (YÖK) ability to interpret Kemalist principles and discipline academia accordingly, by transferring authority to the Ministry of Education. They were successfully deterred by the Kemalist coalition stirring up public reactions leading to the bills‟ withdrawal. Similarly, between 2006 and 2007 the AKP attempted to introduce structural reforms of the judiciary, again targeting the body‟s interpretive power. The reforms aimed to alter the composition of the body, with measures including the hiring of four thousand judges, the increase of government influence over appointment of new members to the Court of Appeals and the introduction of an exam for appointing judges and prosecutors. However, after Kemalist President Sezer‟s veto the AKP did not insist on passing the bill. During the same period the AKP sought further amendments of legislation on freedom of expression. Specifically the abolition of article 301 of the Penal Code, used by Kemalists to prosecute the insult of state institutions and the nation, was contemplated but not materialized after Kemalists accused the government of not protecting the state‟s republican values. Instead of abolition the AKP government achieved to amend the article only in 2008, replacing „Turkishness‟ with „Turkish nation‟ and granting the Minister of Justice authority of final approval of law suits. Since 2008, the number of law suits filed based on 301 have drastically decreased435 achieving a reduction of Kemalists‟
435 European Commission. 2008. Turkey Progress Report. November 5. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/press_corner/key- documents/reports_nov_2008/turkey_progress_report_en.pdf.
181 ability to enforce existing equilibria with successful prosecutions of anti-Kemalist actions. By 2007 the Kemalist opposition had consolidated the expression of its counter- mobilization, resulting in some qualitative modification of the anti-Kemalist movement. The AKP‟s intention to elect Abdullah Gül as President and more importantly the launch of the Ergenekon investigation led certain actors who had originally supported EU- inspired reforms to focus on their ties to the Kemalist establishment assisting Kemalist counter-mobilization. The Turkish Industry and Business Association (TÜSĠAD) for instance, somewhat disillusioned with the EU accession course, selected a cautious stand towards the Ergenekon investigation. On the other hand actors with a primary focus on civil-military relations became more enthusiastic by this demonstration of resolve. Moreover, changes in the media world structure and the nature of public discourse that occurred during the previous stages were observed by constituents who re-aligned their expectations about others‟ participation, thus increasing the contagion rate. New civil society organizations were created after 2006. DURDE, an antiracist and antinationalist group, has organized protests and has taken legal action against Kemalists for promoting racist and nationalist values.436 They receive criticisms from Kemalist institutions and columnists on their causes along the lines of separatism and Armenian propaganda.437 The “Young Civilians Movement” is a political initiative of young religious as well as secular individuals, who stand for democratization of Turkish society. The Human Rights Joint Platform (IHOP) is an independent platform consisting of Helsinki Citizens‟ Assembly, Human Rights Association, Organization of Human Rights, MAZLUM-DER, and Amnesty International Turkey. Among the platform‟s main areas
436 “Öymen hakkında suç duyurusu” [Criminal Complaint Against Oymen], 18 November 2009, found at: http://www.tumgazeteler.com/?a=5721135, accessed on 27 March 2010. 437 DURDE organized a protest in February 2010 against the hacking of AGOS weekly (hackers had uploaded a photo of Hrant Dink‟s killer on the weekly‟s webpage), where participants were chanting “We are all Armenian, we are all Hrant Dink”, which was the main chant in protests carried out after Hrant Dink‟s assassination. Yeni Cag‟s columnist Ozcan Yenicari accused DURDE for anti-Turkish and anti- Islamic, pro-Armenian propaganda under the veil of anti-racism, Yenicari, O. “Liberallerin çeliĢkili halleri” [Contradictory Liberals], Yeni Cag, 18 February 2010, found at: http://www.yg.yenicaggazetesi.com.tr/yazargoster.php?haber=12099, accessed on 28 March 2010. 182 of interest is the legal framework prohibiting freedom of expression (Law 301) and prison conditions (F Type Prisons). Özgür-Der (Freedom Association) has also organized protests against coups and the 28 February process and encourages Turkish students to: “adopt a stance against ceremonies438 that impose on us the official ideology and despise our beliefs and identities”.439 The association faced closure in 2009 over this statement and has also been prosecuted under Article 318 of the Penal Code. The “70 million steps against coups” coalition440 was formed in 2008 by a number of political parties and NGOs such as DSIP (Revolutionary Socialist Workers Party), MAZLUM-DER and the Young Civilians Movement. Numerous prominent Turkish citizens of various backgrounds have participated in the coalition‟s activities.441 MAZLUM-DER intensified its efforts and has filed criminal complaints against General BaĢbuğ under Articles 277 and 288, which criminalize “influencing those performing a judicial duty” and “attempting to affect a fair judicial process” respectively, as well as other commanders who have been linked with coup planning action. The
438 Since 1933, Turkish students are obliged to stand in military-style ranks and repeat the national pledge of allegiance in a daily, compulsory ceremony. 439 Oikonomakis, L. “Freedom of Expression in Contemporary Turkey: Beyond Article 301”, ELIAMEP, 2 September 2009, found at: http://blogs.eliamep.gr/en/oikonoleon/freedom-of-expression-in-contemporary- turkey-beyond-article-301/, accessed on 29 March 2010. 440 The announcement of a protest organized last year in Ankara was signed by the following formations: Amargi Women‟s Cooperative, Antikapitalist Group, The Women‟s Rights Association Against Discrimination (AKDER), Peace Council, We Are Looking After Each Other Platform, The Confederation of Right Worker Unions (Hak-ĠĢ), Helsinki Citizens Association (HYD), We Are Not Free Yet Platform, Proletariat Movement Party (EHP), DSĠP, Young Civilians, The Initiative to Say No To Racism And Nationalism, Global Action Group (KEG, environmental NGO), Lambdaistanbul LGBTT Solidarity Association, MAZLUM-DER, Socialist Democracy Party (SDP), Political Horizon Movement and Confrontation Association.(BÇ/EZÖ/TB). 441 Engin Cinmen, the lawyer who organized the “One Minute of Darkness for Light Forever” protest after the Susurluk incident. The campaign was Turkey's first mass anti-state protest, with thousands of citizens turning off their lights for a minute to show their opposition to deep state formations. Fethiye Çetin, Hrant Dink‟s family lawyer and member of the Board of Human Rights of the Istanbul Bar Association, Ahmet Insel, Professor of Economics at Galatasaray University and one of the initiators of the “I am sorry to Armenians” campaign along with Baskin Oran, Ali Bayramoglu and Cengiz Aktar, Orhan Miroğlu, Kurdish politician and writer, has served as Vice President of HADEP and DEHAP and has spent 8 years in prison after the 1980 military coup, Ragıp Zarakolu, a human rights activist and publisher who has long faced legal harassment for publishing books on controversial subjects in Turkey , especially on minority and human rights, Atilla Keskin, leftist activist since the 1970s, Adalet Ağaoğlu, a prominent writer, Fahri Aral, the general coordinator of Bilgi University‟s publishing house and a victim of the 1980s military coup, Karin KarakaĢlı, an Armenian short story writer and a columnist for Agos weekly, Yıldıray Oğur, a columnist for Taraf daily and one of the founders of the Young Civilians Movement and Semiha Kaya, a Board member of MAZLUM-DER‟s Istanbul branch. 183 organization has incorporated individuals of a non Islamic background and its website hosts articles from prominent newspaper columnists like Oral ÇalıĢlar, Ali Bayramoglu and Mustafa Akyol. MAZLUM-DER members have benefited from activism and their support to the anti-Kemalist struggle and have since pursued political careers. Ayhan Bilgen is the former president of the organization and also a Konya MP candidate in 2007 under the “1000 hope candidates” platform.442 The democratization block joins forces with leftist, Kurdish and revolutionary political formations, such as the Revolutionary Socialist Workers‟ Party (DSĠP), the Social Democratic People‟s Party (SHP), the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Democratic Left Party (DSP), Rights and Freedoms Party (HAK-PAR). Parties and leaders have publicly condemned the TSK and its Chief of Staff in the last years after a series of coups plans drawn within the military have been exposed. Numerous trade unions participate in anti-Kemalist mobilization, stating their objection to the position of the military, alleged coups plans and their support for the Ergenekon trial process. The Civil Servants' Trade Union (Memur-Sen), the Confederation of Turkish Real Trade Unions (Hak-ĠĢ), the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey (DISK), the Confederation of Public Sector Trade Unions, (KESK), have all been adamant in their condemnation of military influence in politics. The effective coordination of such organizations and higher public participation enabled by the bandwagon and contagion effects activated after AKP‟s initial success443 led to massive public demonstrations. ġenol KarakaĢ, a spokesperson for the “70 Million Steps Against Coups” initiative, recalled that demonstrations against the Sept. 12 coup in the past were largely ineffective, expressing his hope that this would change that year due to the Ergenekon trial: “Various demonstrations were also organized in the past, but they were mostly about calling attention to the anguish and pain caused to victims. Today, the obvious connection between anti-democratic interventions, gangs and coups is much
442 In 2007 the platform “1000 hope candidates” was created by parties with a strong Kurdish element that were disillusioned about passing the 10% threshold as a means of achieving the election of as many independent candidate MPs as possible. 443 Individual incentives to participate also include career enhancement through anti-Kemalist mobilization. That was the case for Ayhan Bilgen, former President of Mazlum-Der who pursued a political career, running as an independent Konya MP candidate in 2007 under the “1000 hope candidates” platform as well as Ali Bayramoglu, the second President of MÜSĠAD who became a MP candidate for AKP in 2007.
184 more visible and out in the open”.444 Ahmet Zeki accepted the positive role the AKP played in the increase of anti-Kemalist action, arguing that the process that began with the 2002 election, AKP‟s stand against the e-memorandum of the 27th of April and the Ergenekon trial made people feel more comfortable and free to express their demands and overall strengthened the anti-militaristic campaign.445 As mentioned above, in 2007, the AKP did manage to elect Abdullah Gül as President of the Republic. Some of the President‟s authorities include: the return of laws to the parliament to be reconsidered, their submit to referendum if deemed necessary, legislation regarding amendment of the constitution, appeal to the Constitutional Court for the annulment of certain provisions or the entirety of laws, appointment of members and the chairman of the State Supervisory Council, the Council of Higher Education and university rectors. A few months before the 2007 general election, secular opposition parties boycotted the first round of the Presidential election, with AKP‟s Abdullah Gül standing as the only candidate. The possibility of losing a Kemalist stronghold led to the „soft‟ intervention of the TSK by an e-memorandum issuing an official warning the AKP to stop attempts to alter the country‟s secular tradition. Several days after that demonstration of high resolve by the TSK, the Constitutional Court annulled the first round for failing to meet a quorum. The AKP withdrew Gül‟s candidacy, brought the general election forward to 22 July and achieved to get Gül elected immediately after three rounds of parliamentary voting. This outcome suggested a decrease in Kemalists‟ capability of maintaining the Kemalist character of Kemalist institutions and influence over policy- making mechanisms. The election of 2007 and AKP‟s landslide win highlighted the magnitude of mobilization achieved. However, the pace of extracted concessions had obviously slowed down as Kemalism achieved satisfactory levels of counter-mobilization, retained crucial levels of deterrence effect and demonstrated high levels of resolve. Prior to the 2007 election massive secular protests were organized by Kemalist institutions and two secular
444 Karabat, A. “Civil Society Demands Trial of Coup Generals”, Today’s Zaman, 12 September 2008, found at: http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-152923-civil-society-demands-trial-of-coup- generals.html, accessed on 6 March 2009. 445 Interview with Ahmet Zeki, Istanbul, 12 April 2010. 185 and nationalistic parties, CHP and MHP were elected in Parliament. Their co-operation proved adequate to block judiciary reforms thus preserving Kemalist institutions to enforce existing equilibria. In 2008 the Supreme Court of Appeals filed a case for closing down the ruling AKP and that outcome was only marginally prevented while a year later the Constitutional Court banned DTP (Democratic Society Party) and its leader Ahmet Turk from political life, accusing the party of becoming a focal point of activities against the indivisible unity of the state, the country and the nation. AKP attempts of introducing laws expanding minority rights and increasing transparency have stumbled upon Constitutional Court objections. A constitutional amendment abolishing the headscarf ban was voted by the Turkish parliament but was annulled by the Constitutional Court and so was a bill which assigned jurisdiction of civilian courts over military personnel. Furthermore Kemalism retained significant levels of influence over education and public discourse. As discussed above the Council of Higher Education remains a Kemalist stronghold and the TSK is still involved in primary and secondary education. It is worth mentioning the compulsory „National Security Class‟ high school course, which is taught by high-ranking military personnel and highlights both internal and external threats to Turkish national security.446 BüĢra Ersanlı, in a discussion I had with her, referred to the three T‟s of Turkish history textbooks: “Tehlıke, Tehdit, Terör” (Threat, Terror, Danger).447 A report titled “Human Rights in Schoolbooks,” the result of a collaborative effort between the History Foundation and the Turkish Human Rights Foundation (TĠHV) involving a survey of 139 textbooks, found that textbooks still contain many militarist, nationalist, racist and gender-biased sections. According to the report only 11% of the books‟ content was found to be unproblematic.448 Similarly, Kemalist media institutions have retained significant market shares despite the rise of anti-Kemalist media described above and despite governmental attacks
446 Hercules Millas shared a personal experience at a History conference where, following his criticism on Turkish historiography and the National Security course, a fellow panelist openly admitted the course‟s imposition by the TSK causing a moment of awkward silence in the room, interview with Hercules Millas, Athens, 21 November 2008. 447 Interview with BüĢra Ersanlı, Istanbul, 20 April 2009. 448 Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, Human Rights in Textbooks Project, found at: http://www.tihv.org.tr/Human%20Rights%20in%20Textbooks%20Project, accessed on 15 November 2009. 186 on Kemalist moguls such as Aydın Doğan, whose tax evasion case was widely branded as politically instigated by Kemalist media, as demonstrated by Hurriyet Daily News‟s reports on February 21, 2009. Moreover, as demonstrated by media reports on the establishment of pro-secular websites by the TSK, Kemalist civil society organizations were activated to counterweight the public appeal of anti-Kemalist action highlighting the Islamic threat. Overall, the Turkish Constitution remains largely unaffected in its Kemalist principles, much because of Kemalist institutions‟ ability to preserve it and the latter remain influential and relevant as long as the Constitution is not radically amended. Succeeding in obstructing further reforms Kemalists achieved a reduction of the bandwagon effect with anti-Kemalist mobilization reaching its limits. Similarly, the new balance achieved in the media world along with the election results would disseminate information on the latter‟s limits, halting the contagion effect. The course of the Ergenekon case and its coverage by the Press support both the claim that Kemalism retained a crucial level of deterrence effect obstructing further reforms as well as that anti-Kemalist mobilization could not attract more participants. The Ergenekon organization is being charged with violent acts aiming to create chaos within the Turkish society thus enabling a TSK intervention. Many prominent members of Turkish society, including prominent secularists of Kemalist institutions discussed in this thesis have been charged and the trial is ongoing. In 2009, a number of military coup plans which were unveiled by daily Taraf have also been merged with the Ergenekon trial. The case has yet to lead to any convictions, highlighting the limitations of anti- Kemalist power. The coverage of the case highlighted the division of the media world with anti-Kemalist media targeting the TSK‟s patronage over politics and secular media highlighting the threat of Islamization. The two camps were consolidated and their support was stabilized as demonstrated by opinion polls showing only marginal decrease in the popularity of state institutions.449
449 Sarigil, Z. “Deconstructing the Turkish military‟s popularity”, Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 35, No. 4 (2008), pp. 709-727. 187
A New Equilibrium
Overall, evidence suggests that the anti-Kemalist campaign did result in some decrease of Kemalism. Ahmet Zeki noted that the fact that people discuss Kemalism, the need for constitutional reform, and are free to protest using anti-militaristic slogans is a sign of Kemalist decline.450 Umut Özkirimli noted the change in TSK‟s approach on certain issues:
“The Army‟s role is changing for the first time in the history of the republic. They are still very dominant and powerful, they are probably the main actor in Turkish foreign policy but they are changing. We have seen a policy change in Cyprus which was unthinkable 10 years ago... The army would never let Rauf Denktas go but we have seen in that particular case that the government weighed in and managed to steer public opinion in a different direction. Even now on the Kurdish issue the Army started to say things they wouldn‟t say 10 years ago...”.451
Barçın Yinanç commented on progress achieved regarding freedom of expression: “we are coming to that space, to the point where we start to criticize things that have been wrong. Turkey is facing its past more and more. When we come to the events of 6th September 1955 we are more critical, the minority issues, the existence of the Greek minority, the fact that there has been some injustice done to them. There is more and more people talking about that and researching that”.452 However, radical normative change has not occurred, as anti-Kemalist mobilization did not take off monotonically mainly due to the preservation of some crucial level of Kemalist deterrence capability and a new slightly different equilibrium has been reached. As the Kemalist deterrence capability decreased, the correspondent increase of resolve seems to have counterweighed that of the AKP. Given its primary incentive to remain in power and realizing that the level of concessions achieved, as well as the particular phase of the Ergenekon case, would secure its re-election, the party-
450 Interview with Ahmet Zeki, Istanbul, 12 April 2010. 451 Interview with Umut Özkirimli, Istanbul 8 April 2009. 452 Interview with Barçın Yinanç, Istanbul, 1 May 2009. 188 autonomous leader had no incentive to proceed to a risky aggressive strategy. Consequently the system seems to have settled around a new equilibrium, within a modified, bipolar institutional setting, which is lower than the one within the previous purely Kemalist setting, but still remaining on the rigid part of the foreign policy axis. The unfolding of the Ergenekon case and the alleged military coup plots demonstrates how anti-Kemalist mobilization reached its limits. Both cases have so far led nowhere and no convictions have been made, suggesting that the Kemalist front managed to avert them. Referring back to the dual coordination theory, a sucessfull movement that aims to overthrow the established regime requires simultaneous failing coordination in any central authority and increased coordination around a new leadership. When only one of those conditions is met political order is expected to be able to survive. We can again adopt a spatial framework to illustrate the new equilibrium. Since we have established that high levels of Kemalism are causally linked to rigid foreign policy, the policy space can simultaneously reflect levels of Kemalism as well varying levels of rigidity for foreign policy in general and foreign policy towards Greece in particular. Therefore, even though various actors‟ position on the policy space reflect preferences over levels of Kemalism and not levels of rigidity, the actual equilibrium outcome corresponds to a level of cooperative versus rigid foreign policy attitude. As elaborated above, it is assumed that the election of AKP was instrumental in introducing change to the Turkish political system. As shown in figure 5.6 the level of Kemalism has dropped after the AKP election, still however remaining in the rigid part of the axis in terms of foreign policy.453
453 Note that in the first panel Islamic and Liberal Media as well as Islamic and Liberal NGOs are not shown. That is a simplification and reality is that they were existent in significantly smaller numbers, limited activity and impact so as to make their existence almost negligible in terms of effect on the outcome.
189
Panel A: Pro AKP
C R
B E SQ TSK
Low MM N High
Level of Kemalism
Panel B: Post AKP
C R
BI E B SQ TSK
Low I L KM N High
Level of Kemalism
Figure 5.6: Spatial analysis of preferences over levels of Kemalism. B (Business), E (Executive), MM (Mainstream Media), N (Nationalists), I (Islam, encompassing media, NGOs), L (Liberal media and NGOs), BI (Islamic Business), KM (Kemalist Media). The panel demonstrates the decrease of level of Kemalism the appearance and consolidation of Islamic business and anti-Kemalist civil society, both liberal and Islamic.
190
Chapter 6: The Aegean Sea Dispute: Interstate Bargaining
The empirical chapters provided analytical depictions of the two states‟ processes of preference formation. This chapter incorporates these processes in a model of interstate strategic interaction which aims to offer insight into the pertaining nature of the dispute and deal with problems of realist and culturalist explanations. As discussed in Chapter 2 the dispute officially begins in 1974 and soonafter the two states solidified their strategies which reflected mirror conceptions of the Other‟s threat. They both proclaimed their favorite settlement method with Greece favoring a joint application to the ICJ for the continental shelf issue and Turkey advancing bilateral negotiations on all disputed matters. Henceafter, their available strategies were: Cooperate, suggesting sending credible signals of modest claims to the other side,454 and Rigid, translating into abstaining from negotiations until the other side conceded to their preferred settlement method. The relation can be broken down to three chronological periods: 1974-1999, 1999-2003,455 2003 to today, that correspond to specific domestic institutional settings. Evidently, 1999 and 2003 constitute turning points when institutional change occurred. The first period could be divided into two sub-periods that correspond to distinct approaches from policy-makers. As we saw in the introduction, from 1974-1980 talks were consistently taking place at the bureaucratic and political level, an interaction that was halted in the beginning of 1980 after PASOK‟s rise to government. Bilateral discussions only reoccurred after 1999 between technocrats exploring possible compromise packages after the recommendation of the EU Helsinki Summit. These talks lost momentum after the two states decided not to pursue official negotiations on a joint application to the ICJ in 2004. On both occasions talks did not constitute official bargaining, but efforts and opportunities to explore preferences, red lines and possibilities
454 Signals of modest claims could include public statements from Greece committing to pursue a solution which would not drastically curtail Turkey‟s access to the Aegean Sea and Turkish commitments to respect eastern Aegean islands‟ right to their own continental shelf. 455 The selection of 2003 is somewhat arbitrary and aims to account for a process of institutional change within Turkey that cannot be pinpointed at a specific moment in time. That process was initiated as demonstrated in the previous chapter by the rise of political Islam, gained momentum after AKP‟s election to power in 2002 and resulted in some decrease of Kemalist strength before 2004, as was exemplified by the Turkish Cyprus policy in years 2002-2004. 191 of cooperation. However, strategies of the two sides‟ negotiators remained rigid, according to our definition.456 Until 1999 Greek public opinion was extremely negative towards Turkey, moderate politicians faced a deadlock cooperation game and progressive elements‟ existence and influence was negligible. Under those circumstances a very rigid stand was the equilibrium policy. Similarly, Turkish public opinion was equally negative, Kemalism was dominant and anti-Kemalist mobilization still unattained, thus also leading to very rigid policy outcomes. The second period is defined by institutional change which occurred in Greece after 1999, made possible by the cooperation of moderate politicians, which ended in 2004 with the accession of Cyprus in the EU. Peace-minded organizations attracted media attention and increased their popularity, cooperation between the two states at various levels solidified inter-state vested interests with an incentive to promote peaceful relations, and the emergence of a nationalistic space and a political party eager to represent it revealed rigid preferences of parts of the electorate. Turkey during that period remained at a state of high levels of Kemalism, despite the establishment of regulated rounds of exploratory talks between diplomatic delegations and the acceptance of Cyprus accession in the EU.457 The third period, from 2003 to today is characterized again by rigid strategies from both negotiators. However, anti-Kemalist mobilization did occur in Turkey leading
456 The relative success of the exploratory talks does not suggest that the two sides switched to cooperative strategies. Exploratory talks were indirectly suggested by the Helsinki Summit Conclusions that urged Turkey to solve issues with neighboring states by 2004 (date when candidacy status would be decided) and use the ICJ as a last resort if needed. During the Summit Greece had attempted to exploit its membership status in order to extract a reference to the ICJ as the appropriate means of settlement. Indeed a joint application to the ICJ implied negotiations in search for common ground, and that was the goal of the exploratory talks. Both sides‟ reticence to resort to the ICJ at the end of 2004 is evidence of the continuation of their rigid strategies. 457 Turkish acceptance of the Helsinki Summit Conclusions, i.e. accession of Cyprus into the EU regardless of the island‟s political situation could be mistaken for a decrease of rigidity, which does not correspond to institutional change in Turkey. Such a conception of the Turkish strategy would be problematic for the method of analysis selected here, which links foreign policy to domestic sources. However, it does not qualify as a decrease of rigidity, as it is defined in this thesis. The Greek side had opted for the strategy of vetoing Turkish accession in order to gain concessions from Turkey and the EU and in 1999 decided in favor of a switch of that strategy, signifying a decrease of rigidity, remaining on the rigid part of the spatial axis. Turkey as a non-member did not have a say and consequently a strategy on Cyprus‟s EU accession. When the issue of Turkish accession arose because of Greek willingness to lift the veto, Turkey was given a choice she didn‟t have before. Hence, there was no decrease of rigidity. 192 to some decrease of Kemalism. In Greece, moderate politicians, now with a renewed composition failed to cooperate towards a cooperative strategy even though the structure of their interaction had transformed possibly resembling a PD, thus leaving the theoretical possibility of cooperation due to repeated interaction458 open. However, their dispersion all over the political spectrum and the lack of information on the composition of the group renders monitoring, let alone punishing defection almost impossible and therefore cooperation unattainable in the absence of a significant reduction of participation costs. It follows that the switch from Deadlock to PD will not be reflected in the analysis of reactions to governmental policies and therefore political costs, as they simply either cooperate or they do not.
Modelling the Two Level Interaction
The introductory chapter offered a description of the interaction of the two states under neoliberal assumptions. In this chapter, that interaction is revisited, with the addition of insight gained on the two states‟ domestic institutional settings in the empirical chapters. Greece and Turkey are modelled as represented at the international level by their governments-negotiators possessing distinct preferences over different outcomes, which can be estimated, explained and predicted for any period, ceteris paribus, according to the models of their domestic institutional settings and foreign policy-making. Essentially then, negotiators are involved in a nested game where they negotiate or contemplate negotiations based on utility functions reflecting domestic constraints. As discussed in the introduction much work has been devoted to modelling two level bargaining games. Exploring what has been branded as the „Schelling conjecture‟459
458 Repeated interaction could be conceived under the following assumptions: the issue of cooperation comes up during periods when a political decision is imminent; these periods would constitute the rounds of the game. But the realism of repeated interaction could be criticized on the grounds of conceptualizing Greek-Turkish dispute as a finitely repeated game. However, for the case at hand it would not be far- fetched to expect moderate politicians to remain moderate on other „national issues‟, such as the Macedonian issue, thus not excluding the possibility of repeated interaction. Further research is required to make such a claim though, and problems of monitoring discourage the conceptualization of moderate politicians‟ interaction as repeated. 459 Milner, 1997. 193
– whereby a negotiator uses domestic constraints to extract concessions from his/her counterpart – theorists sought to explore the implications of adding another level to bargaining models. Putnam, inspired by the Bonn Summit of 1978, first formalized the interaction between interstate bargaining and domestic ratification procedures and suggested specific propositions on the impact of the size of a negotiator‟s win-set (all possible deals that can be ratified by the domestic principle) on his/her bargaining position and the prospect of bargaining completion.460 Mo further sophisticated Putnam‟s analysis by distinguishing between the preferences of negotiator and those of domestic groups and explored the validity of Putnam‟s results.461 Iida attempted to qualify Putnam‟s propositions clarifying his informational assumptions and thus distinguishing between publicly known domestic constraints, assymetrical international information and domestic incomplete information.462 Milner and Rosendorff focused on how legislative elections can affect ratification of international agreements in the event of an upset which invalidates executives‟ information on median voters‟ preferences.463 Tarar pointed out that all these models simplify reality by assuming that only one side faces domestic constraints, questioned the generality of the results derived and explored how bargaining outcomes are affected assuming that both sides are constrained under complete and incomplete information.464 Fearon specifically highlighted the importance of credible signals under uncertaintly for communicating private information during strategy design and crisis escalation, which can enable a succesfull (peaceful) bargaining outcome.465 The case explored here however is one where official negotiations aiming to conclude with a settlement deal have never taken place. Thus the aim of this chapter is to use a formal depiction of the interaction between domestic sources of foreign policy and state strategic behaviour which explains the non-bargaining outcome. To reiterate, realist
460 Putnam, 1988. 461 Mo, Y. “The Logic of Two-Level Games with Endogenous Domestic Coalitions, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 38, No. 3 (1994), pp. 402-422. 462 Iida, K. “When and How Do Domestic Constraints Matter? Two-Level Games with Uncertainty”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 37, No. 3 (1993), pp. 403-426. 463 Milner, H. V., and B. P. Rosendorff. “Democratic Politics and International Trade Negotiations: Elections and Divided Government as Constraints on Trade Liberalization”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 41, No. 1 (1997), pp. 117-146. 464 Tarar, A. “International Bargaining with Two-Sided Domestic Constraints”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 45, No. 3 (2001), pp. 320-340. 465 Fearon, 1997. 194 and culturalist explanations of the situation have been found wanting and thus the value of this attempt lies in exposing the structure of interaction which implies certain types of difficulties and can productively guide policy-oriented research. One of the differences of this model with the ones discussed above is that the launch of negotiations is problematic and risky for both sides. The institutional analysis of the empirical chapters revealed the nature of the high constraints to pursuing a cooperative strategy. The latter manifest themselves in informal political considerations as there are no groups represented in the parliament that favour a strategy shift. Therefore this is not a case of how much of a good the executive can get out of negotiating, but instead one where negotiating after having sent modest signals is costly in itself. In both Greece and Turkey progressive elements are dispersed throughout the political system and face great difficulties in acting collectively to pursue their preferred outcomes. An institutional difference however exists, the existence of moderate politicians in Greece and their potential to act, provided by the electoral law whereby deputies are chosen from a ballot as opposed to Turkey‟s party-list system. The impact of this distinction will surface from the analysis below. Therefore, bargaining is the costly choice and if attained negotiators should be conceived as possessing time-spans for which they are able to endure the costs involved. It follows that bargaining cannot resemble the form of the Rubinstein model where the two sides make offers and counteroffers indefinitely and a deadline needs to be agreed.466 Moreover, bargaining is a risky choice as each negotiator runs the risk of appearing compliant if the other side remains rigid. Secondly, this model departs from conventional positivist methodology in incorporating unobservable variables which have been explored throughout the thesis and determine costs and negotiator utility expectations in general. Instead of observing individual preferences on the Aegean Sea dispute within the decision-making process and exploring those of the median voter the model focuses on two normative constructs, rigidity and Kemalism and formalizes them by linking them to political costs. This is done firstly because as explained in the empirical chapters, both executives possess
466 Rubistein, A. “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model”, Econometrica, Vol. 50, No. 1 (1982), pp. 97-109. 195 significant legislative power, constituting the focus on ratification processes unproductive. Secondly, the scope of the thesis exceeds the Aegean Sea dispute as discussed in the introduction and those two informal institutions are intrinsically linked to the state of the bilateral relation in general. Ever since the consolidation of their rigid strategies negotiators can be modelled as contemplating a switch to a cooperative risky strategy or remain on the safe rigid one. Switching strategies is costly for both negotiators given strong domestic support for rigid strategies and is irreversible as the costs are sunk even if cooperation is not attained. Costs can be incurred either for one period if a non-cooperative outcome entails or can cumulate in the event of a cooperative outcome that leads to negotiations. Therefore, negotiators have specific time-spans for which they would be willing to endure political costs in order to achieve a settlement, thus demonstrating distinct degrees of resilience to political costs. A settlement of the dispute on the other hand provides an electoral benefit for negotiators related to the exploitation of funds previously assigned to military expenditure. We assume that time-spans differ according to distinct domestic institutional settings. Negotiators hold private information on their domestic constraints but only have limited understanding of those of their counterparts. Given the importance of time, bargaining would resemble a war of attrition where both sides state their preferences and hold out until their counterpart gives in. The two players (Greek negotiator) and (Turkish negotiator) decide simultaneously between two available strategies, C (Cooperate) and R (Rigid). The payoffs for all possible outcomes are the following: Starting with the current status quo outcome , both players receive: , where signifies excessive military expenditure incurred by each negotiator until the end of their current term in office, . The outcome awards to the player who switched to C some positive reputational effect, , , in the eyes of the world community, or more precisely key NATO allies, EU members and international institutions.467 The term can be viewed as a continuous flow of reputational benefit for as long as the other side remains on a rigid
467 Officials from both states regularly refer to their states being „one step ahead‟ in peace-oriented policies, both in bilateral issues and the Cyprus dispute. See for instance: “CoE Chair Turkish FM Davutoglu skips EU critics on Cyprus, Press Freedom, Torture: Multi-Culti Aims”, 10 November 2010, found at: http://www.eurofora.net/newsflashes/news/turkeycoechair.html?mylang=serbian, accessed on 10 November 2010. 196 strategy. Generally it refers to the fluctuation of pressures from third parties with specific interests in the outcome of the relation, in the Cyprus issue or Turkish EU accession.468 Furthermore, results in a political cost, , given strong domestic support for rigid strategies in both states. The term implies that costs will be incurred for one period while are assumed to remain constant until .469 On the other hand signifies a negative reputational effect (equal to the positive effect of the cooperative side) for the rigid side and suggests the continuation of high military expenditure until . The outcome suggests that the two negotiators will enter the bargaining stage where prefers deal and prefers . and translate into a benefit for the negotiator who achieved the best deal, incorporating the availability of extra funds from decreasing military expenditure ( ) and the reputational benefit of defeating their opponent at the bargaining table ( ). This positive reward could be propagated by government-inclined mainstream media and could materialize in traditionalist/kemalist votes. On the other hand, getting the worse deal eliminates these electoral benefits. At the end of this stage, time , the outcome will be either or depending on who has the longest time-span, so will occur with probability and with probability .470 Negotiators‟ exact payoffs from the outcome depend on domestic institutional settings and therefore we need to distinguish among three time periods.
1974-1999
In the pro-1999 period for outcome entails political costs until point , remaining stable for each period from , at the level they were at point , when the
468 Evidently, the term itself could be the object of further analysis under an I.R perspective, but for the needs of this thesis, all elements that are related to the two states‟ relations with third parties will be incorporated in this factor. The reputational effect can be linked to the negotiator through its effect on the latter‟s ability to conduct foreign policy effectively in order to be positively assessed by domestic audiences. 469 In the Greek empirical chapter it was suggested that there has been a cost reduction after the decrease of rigidity. That reduction referred to the cost reflected on social welfare, and its reduction was mainly made possible through an increase of economic interaction, direct trade, investment and joint ventures. The level of military expenditures has remained at similar levels and for simplicity sake‟s it will be assumed as constant during the period in question. 470 The existence of only these two possible outcomes rests upon the implied assumption of inability of both sides to credibly commit to an agreed deadline, which will be elaborated below. 197 cooperative strategies were publicly declared. How would moderate politicians respond to such an outcome? Given that the available option of politically exploiting budgetary surplus would dramatically reduce the costs of participation it makes sense to evaluate that as an event that would change the structure of the game into an assurance game. With moderate politicians not criticizing or endorsing a compromise settlement, the opposition would only be able to mount certain levels of support for their criticisms. Subsequently, media would opt to enforce the new equilibrium and the traditionalist camp would be weakened so that political costs would disappear. For , would eliminate electoral benefits and ensure that high political costs were incurred until the end of his/her end of term. The Turkish negotiator in the event of would incur political costs until albeit reduced for the post-settlement period, as kemalist institutions would continue to criticize the government but with less intensity and success as a result of achieving the best possible deal. For the Greek negotiator, would eliminate the electoral benefit of a settlement and extend the duration of political costs until the end of the negotiator‟s term in office. Therefore the values of benefits from restructuring the budget, electoral reward, political costs, international reputation and military expenditure define negotiators‟ time spans and strategies. The empirical chapters demonstrated how strong support for rigid policies existed in both states so we can expect similarities in the actual values of electoral benefits and political costs despite the obvious problem of quantification. Furthermore, negotiators can be considered as having full information over military expenditures and international reputation. By assigning values to these variables the model used can highlight the institutional difference between the two states related to the existence of moderate politicians in Greece. Indeed for the pro-1999 period we assign the value of 10 to political costs (reduced to 5 for after in the event of ) and military spending for each period , the value 5 for budget and electoral benefits and value 1 to international reputation. Finally, will take values from 1-2-3-4, as both governments‟ maximum term period is four years, and one period is considered the equivalent of one calendar year.
198
So, at :
For , : , and : .
For , : , and : .
So overall the payoffs are:
, , , , for , and
), for .
Let us then see how negotiators rank these payoffs. Obviously, , for both negotiators. Figure 6.1 depicts the payoffs for this first period.
,
,
, ,
Figure 6.1: Payoffs during the first period, 1974-1999.
199
For when:
(I)
I holds for , when negotiations last for two years ( and ), and for when negotiations only last for one year ( and .
For , when:
(II)
II holds for any , when negotiations last only for one year ( and ).
Therefore in the pro-1999 period if negotiators could commit to a deadline of one year they would in fact be facing a coordination game ( ) as long as the Greek negotiator believed the chance of getting his/her preferred deal was greater than 0.25. could also negotiate for a period of two years if was greater than 0.66.
1999-2003
Briefly, changes that occurred in the Greek domestic scene after 1999 can be reflected on the decrease of the level of political costs sustained for every period that a cooperative strategy is applied. The emergence of a part of society that favored normative and policy change, the establishment of a wide range of vested interests, results of cooperative efforts of social and business elements from the two states and the new equilibrium that was enforced by the media, can be reflected in the negotiator‟s utility
200 function through a reduction of political costs. We substitute value 10 assigned to political costs with value, 5. Then for when:
(III)
III holds for , when negotiations last for three years ( and ) and for any , when negotiations last for two years ( and ) or less. So, institutional change resulted in the extention of the Greek negotiator‟s time span while no change occurred then for the Turkish negotiator.
2003-today
The last period is one of institutional change in Turkey, with the realization of significant decrease of levels of Kemalism. For our model that change is reflected in a decrease of political costs incurred for switching strategies and a value 5 rather than 10 is assigned. In the event of , reduced costs are incurred until the time of the deal after which they are expected to return to their previous higher level until the government‟s end of term as the bad outcome is expected to lead to Kemalist counter-mobilization.471 So for , when:
(IV)
IV holds for , when negotiations last for two years ( and
) and for when negotiations last for one year.
471 The possibility of military action although empirically sustainable, can be replaced by a high value for the cost term, rendering that outcome the worst one for the Turkish negotiator. 201
The obstacle to cooperation
Results so far demonstrate how the interaction between the two sides is in fact a pure coordination game with and as the game‟s two Nash equilibria, and the outcome being Pareto optimal especially in the post-2003 period under a wide range of combinations of outcomes and bargaining duration. We have simplistically assigned values to benefit and cost variables to demonstrate the role of institutional disparity between the two states and highlight the significance of patience in a negotiation situation where pursuing bargaining is instantly costly. The problem is then one of choice among a variety of multiple stable equilibria. Simple coordination games are easy to solve through pre-play communication. Cheap talk is considered as credible as no side has an incentive to defect. So with complete information, the two negotiators could easily and honestly communicate the negotiation time-span that renders the game a coordination game. However incomplete information renders pre-play communication untenable and that can be sufficiently demonstrated by the simplified depiction of the situation attempted here. Firstly, by allowing for two possible bargaining outcomes, and we have implicitly assumed that the two sides are unable to credibly commit to an agreed bargaining deadline. Indeed, if they could signal that the deadline would be respected bargaining would resemble a war of attrition where both sides would settle for a fair deal at the last minute since a non-agreement outcome is ranked as the least preferred outcome by both negotiators. Having incurred political costs until time , both sides would prefer an agreement that would at the very least terminate excessive military spending. Indicatively for the post-2003 period:
For , , and For , .
However negotiators cannot tie their hands in the same way they would if they were making credible threats. Researchers have suggested various ways of exploiting
202 domestic constraints to communicate private information by demonstrating resolve472 but this is a case where negotiators contemplate a switch to an a priori costly strategy and cannot therefore transform domestic constraints into costs in the event of breaching an agreed deadline aiming to achieve the best possible deal. So were the two states to engage in pre-play communication they would both conceive getting the worst possible outcome as possible. Also note that under these conditions none of the two sides would have an incentive to cheat at that stage by presenting a smaller time-span as getting the sucker‟s payoff would remain possible if the other negotiator could outlast them. However a more fundamental problem exists with the occurrence of honest pre- play communication and relates to the question: Does any side have the incentive to kickstart pre-play communication and reveal their time-spans? In order to answer that we first need to compare negotiators‟ expected utilities from the least preferred deal to the payoff of the current outcome, .
So for the post-2003 period, for , , which holds for ‟s time span.
On the other hand, the expected utility of , for the Turkish negotiator is smaller than the utility of :
For , , so for , .
Suppose then that the Greek negotiator proposes a bargaining deadline. If that deadline falls beyond the Turkish negotiator‟s time-span the latter will not switch strategies as the non-cooperative outcome is better than getting the sucker‟s payoff. Or imagine that the Turkish negotiator suggests an official negotiation deadline, two years after their commencement and the Greek negotiator readily agrees. The Turkish
472 Much research has been conducted on credible signals as means of successfully communicating private information and reducing the likelihood of war. Examples include audience costs (Fearon, 1994), military mobilization (Fearon and Slanchev, 1997) and opposition endorsement of government threats (Schultz 1998). 203 negotiator has thus realized that and therefore is unwilling to begin negotiations.
On the contrary if the Greek negotiator suggests the same deadline first and the Turkish negotiator agrees, the Greek negotiator, proceeds to negotiations, as regardless of , he prefers any settlement within that time frame than the outcome . Evidently, the lack of information cancels cheap talk and any time-span related statement can determine the possibility of cooperation. The Greek negotiator is not aware of having the longer time-span and is also unsure about the Turkish negotiator‟s payoff from the bad settlement and the rigid outcome. Therefore, even though he/she wants a deal, he/she is unwilling to suggest a deadline in fear of scaring the other side off. Indeed, if he/she were to suggest a three-year deadline the Turkish negotiator would want to reject the proposition but he/she would also not want to reveal that he/she has a shorter time-span.
Facing elections
We have so far assumed that negotiators are newly elected and that a settlement is reached before the end of their current term in office, .473 We can easily accommodate the hypothetical scenario where falls after but still for simplicity‟s sake, before the end of the next term in office, , thus extending the model‟s time-line to , to account for the behaviour of negotiators‟ facing elections while bargaining is under way. Payoffs for this case should naturally include the probability of each negotiator‟s re- election. In the event of no re-election, payoffs for outcomes , , and remain as outlined above. The cooperative outcome awards the negotiator who lost the elections the payoff . For the re-elected negotiator the payoffs include military expenditure costs incurred until while the payoff from is similar to that analysed so far substituting with . So for the post-2003 period the payoffs are:
,
473 Parliamentary elections are held every four years in both states. 204
, , , for and
, for
.
Figure 6.2 displays the payoffs for the third post-2003 period.
,
,
, ,
Figure 6.2: Payoffs for the post-2003 period.
For then, when:
205
(V)
By substituting with , we find that V holds:
For , and , with (so that ),
For , and , with ,
For , and , with ,
For , and , with .
These are the conditions under which the Greek negotiator is willing to switch to a cooperative strategy. For any given possible time-span the negotiator decides based on the relation between the belief that they have the longer time-span and the probability of re-election. So, for instance if negotiations start one year before the end of the current term in office and last for two years after that point, the relation between probabilities and must be: , so that the Greek negotiator will be willing to switch to a cooperative strategy. Note that keeping the term steady, needs to be higher for any level of and , which is intuitively logical. This means that facing a short time-span, the negotiator needs to be very confident on their time-span being longer than their counterpart, in order to switch strategies. Also note that if negotiations were to last for a maximum period of two years, and the probability of re-election is 0.5, the Greek negotiator would be willing to switch to a cooperative strategy regardless of their perception on time-span and of the probability of getting their preferred outcome. Also note that in fact the above conditions do not imply any limitations for the term , which suggests that a negotiator can theoretically incur political costs during a negotiation period of maximum six years.474 That appears in fact problematic, but that is so because of the theoretical omission of an existent relation between and , the
474 V also holds for , and with .
206 probability of re-election. It seems plausible at this point to establish that in fact the probability of re-election becomes inversely related to the time-span of negotiations under the negotiator‟s current term in office, when that reaches high levels. Specifically, if a negotiator has been negotiating for three years before the election, they should be facing a correspondingly lower probability of re-election. Let us now turn to the Turkish negotiator and estimate the relation between probabilities for the above combinations of and , which changes their incentives to switch to a cooperative strategy. For ,
(VI)
VI holds:
For , , , with (so that ),
For , and , with ,
For , and , with ,
For , and , with .
So, were the negotiations to start one year before the current end of term and last for three years the Turkish negotiator would require a probability of re-election more than 0.33. Note that for all these bargaining time-spans the Turkish negotiator requires slightly higher probabilities of re-election than those of his/her counterpart. As in the case where , when we have identified time periods and combinations of probabilities for which negotiators would be willing to switch to cooperative strategies. The situation can de diagrammatically depicted drawing the two negotiators‟ indifference curves for each possible time-span. In Diagram 6.1 any point
207 above ‟s indifference curve represents a combination of probabilities for which the cooperative equilibrium is preferred to the rigid one, while for those points lay below his/her indifference curve. The shaded area represents combinations of probabilities that are suitable for both negotiators. Working similarly we can calculate combinations of time-spans and probabilities that would allow negotiators to switch to a cooperative strategy, when one of them is newly elected and the other faces an election in the near future, or for two newly elected negotiators.
Diagram 6.1: Each box represents a common time span (A for and , B for and , C for and and D for and ). Indifference curves demonstrate all combinations of expectations for the final outcome and probability of re-election for which the two negotiators are indifferent between remaining rigid or switching to cooperative strategies. The shaded areas represent those combinations for which their interaction is a coordination game.
208
Overcoming the Obstacle
The obstacle to cooperation highlighted here can theoretically be overcome only with the contribution of an intermediary third party. Again, the difficulty in reaching cooperative outcomes is twofold: Firstly both states are reluctant to kickstart talks to explore time-spans in fear of scaring the other side off and secondly they are unable to credibly commit to respect the agreed deadline. The solution could be offered by the voluntary participation of an international institution with the following characteristics. Firstly, the mediator would be assigned the responsibility of setting a deadline, after receiving information from both negotiators on their time-spans in privately held sessions with the international institution‟s representative. Secondly, this mediation would need to result from an initiative of that party so that its impartial character would not be put into question. Thirdly, the institution would have to guarantee the confidentiality of the information obtained regardless of whether a time-span that satisfies both negotiators exists. Finally, such a proposal would need to include audience costs of some form in the event of any attempt by either side to breach the deadline by insisting on their preferred deal. The form of intervention discussed here is simpler and less engaging than any form of third party participation in international disputes,475 i.e. third party consultation,476 mediation477 and arbitration and excludes the possibility of socializing effects of the interaction, as is expected of third party consultation.478
475 The topic of third party intervention in interstate conflict has attracted increased academic interest in the last decades. See for instance Bercovitch, J., and J. Z., Rubin (eds.). Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Managements (New York, New York: St. Martin‟s Press, 1992); Stedman, S. J. Peacemaking in Civil War (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1991); Touval, S., and I. W. Zartman. “Mediation in Theory”, in S. Touval, and I. W. Zartman (eds.), International Mediation in Theory and Practice (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 7-17; Princen, T. Intermediaries in International Conflict (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992); Keashley L., and R. J. Fisher. “The Potential Complementarity of Mediation and Consultation within a Contingency Model of Third Party Intervention”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 28, No. 1 (1991), pp. 29-42. 476 See for instance Fisher, R. J. “The Problem-Solving Workshop in Conflict Resolution”, in R. L. Merritt (ed.), Communication in International Politics (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1972), pp. 168-204. 477 See Wall, J. A. “Mediation: An Analysis, Review and Proposed Research”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, No. 25 (1981), pp. 157-180. 478 See the work of Burton on “controlled communication”, Burton, J. W. Conflict and communication: The Use of Controlled Communication in International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1969). 209
Given that the ICJ has been extensively discussed as a potential actor in the dispute, and technocrats have been conducting exploratory towards the prospect of a joint application to the ICJ, the latter would seem like a suitable institution to be granted with the deadline setting authority. In that case, the multiple available settlements discussed above would translate into multiple possible shapes of that application. Negotiations then would again have the war of attrition attributes mentioned earlier with the two sides insisting on their initial positions and conceding to a compromise on the scope of the application at the last minute. Since the ICJ would then need to rule over a settled scope, its ruling could be conceptualized as having the characteristics of a fair settlement , discussed earlier. Even though theoretically, such a scenario would eliminate the problem of setting a deadline, the realistic chances of the ICJ undertaking such a task are slim. Such activities lie outside the scope of the ICJ‟s authority and capacity. On the contrary, such an initative falls well within the scope of the UN Secretary General‟s authority. The implications of accepting UN mediation of that scope require further research. More specifically, as has been analysed repeatedly, Turkey has since 1976 declared her preference for bilateral negotiations as means of settlement479 while Greece propagated the use of International Law and international institutions. Therefore, the implications of publicly announcing negotiations under the auspices of the UN could be regarded from segments of Turkish society, most likely from Kemalist opposition forces, as strategy switching in favor of Greece‟s preferred settlement method. Such a perception of the process would signify a differentiation of political costs as outlined in the Turkish empirical chapter and in the analysis of this chapter. Since relevant research is outside the scope of this thesis, the possible implications of the involvement of an international institution in the process will be left open for consideration.
479 Turkey has since shifted its stance somewhat, see for instance Prime Minister Yilmaz‟s statement after the de-escalation of the Imia/Kardak crisis: “I am proposing to Greece to engage in a comprehensive process of peace settlement that will not exclude from the beginning any method of settlement including third-party arbitration”, in Pratt, M., and Schofield, C. “The Imia/Kardak Rocks Dispute in the Aegean Sea”, International Boundaries Research Unit Bulletin, Spring 1996. 210
The Model and Exogenous Shocks
The model offered can be modified so as to become more complex and closer to empirical reality in a number of ways. Firstly, we have assigned values to excessive military spending, political costs and settlement benefits. These values are to an extent arbitrary and were used to highlight the institutional difference between the two states, i.e. the existence and relevance of the uninstitutionalized group of moderate politicians in Greece, and its implications for the prospect of cooperation under complete information. Obviously, a slight change in any one of them would modify the conclusions reached from this model. For instance, excessive military spending has been assigned the value 10 for both countries. It could be argued that it is in fact different for the two states. If for instance excessive military spending in Turkey was assigned a smaller value, the Turkish negotiator‟s utility functions would reflect a different incentive structure in terms of combinations of probabilities and time-spans. The values assigned to political costs could also be argued to differ from the ones chosen here. Also, values of these variables could be conceptualized as fluctuating over time periods, thus exiting the ceteris paribus umbrella. Secondly, we have restricted the amount of available settlements to three. The basic implication of this restriction is that each negotiator has one favorite settlement. Empirically, a greater number of possible settlements could exist, that the two negotiators would rank hierarchically. Using the three settlements restriction, we found that the Greek negotiator prefers settling for the Turkish negotiator‟s favorite settlement rather than continuing playing rigid, while the same does not apply for his counterpart. This conclusion defines the nature of pre-play communication, as one where the Greek negotiator wants to initiate negotiations but is unsure of the time-span to propose. Allowing for more possible settlements, we could observe a different behaviour from the Greek negotiator, who might not prefer all possible settlements to playing rigid. Therefore, the strategic interaction between the two negotiators could be of a different nature.
211
Therefore, this model is not conclusive over which side is more patient and thus more eager to cooperate. It merely aims to explose the structure of interaction and expose the obstacles to cooperation. It does so using an analytic way of linking domestic sources of foreign policy with international bargaining outcomes, thus emphasizing the significance of analytic clarity for predictive power. The model demonstrates how a bilateral dispute can be successfully conceptualized within a rational choice framework that incorporates two levels of analysis, the domestic and the international. It can offer a sound basis of analysis of the bilateral dispute and others with similar structural characteristics and it can be readily modified to incorporate effects of exogenous shocks. Furthermore, the model offered here is based on a set of assumptions, which guarantee institutional stability throughout the time set of the model. Therefore any change to the Greek or Turkish political system, such as the introduction of an influential political party or dramatic macroeconomic shifts, which would directly affect governmental considerations of military expenditure would have direct implications for the institutional setting. The introduction of a ceteris paribus clause is indispensable for the assessment of identified variables. We will now examine a few hypothetical changes, both structural and preferential, that are likely to occur in the near future, based on empirical reality, that are expected to alter the final conclusions regarding both negotiators‟ behaviour. For instance, the Greek economic crisis and the austerity measures that ensued the signing of the IMF-EU loan, can enter the model through an increase of the opportunity costs of excessive military expenditure.480 By assigning a higher value to , and working with ‟s utility functions we would find that the Greek negotiator, within the previous time-span would be willing to negotiate for even smaller values of , and that their time- span is even extended for a high value of . This means that the Greek negotiator would be almost indifferent to who‟s time span is greater and would be willing to negotiate within their capacity. However, that would have no consequence on the strategic problem of cooperation the two negotiators face prior to negotiations. Diagrammatically, the
480 Admittedly, an economic crisis of the magnitude that Greece experiences today carries important institutional implications for the Greek political system and affects a number of causal mechanisms identified in the Greek empirical chapter. This part merely aims to highlight the impact of increased opportunity costs of excessive military spending on the prospect of cooperation considering the institutional setting as stable. 212 increase of ‟s cost would lead to a shift of ‟s indifference curve downwards but would have no effect on the Turkish negotiator‟s incentive structure. The Turkish negotiator would still negotiate if he/she thought the probability of getting the least preferred outcome was less than 0.43, therefore knowing that the Greek negotiator‟s time span has not decreased, the decision would be identical. The economic crisis is an observable event and the Turkish negotiator is aware that an increase of military expenditure‟s costs, has made the Greek negotiator more eager to negotiate. That intuitively leads to the perception that a better settlement can be reached since Greece is eager to settle. Therefore, one could expect the Turkish negotiator to attempt to secure a better deal than . However, since no change has occurred in the structure of the interaction, the two sides remain unwilling to communicate on their time-spans and therefore unable to begin negotiations. Let us also examine the hypothetical scenario of a further decrease of levels of Kemalism in Turkey. In the Turkish empirical chapter it was demonstrated how anti- Kemalist mobilization peaked at a level which was insufficient to bring about coordination around a new equilibrium, and therefore the country is seen as divided in terms of institutional power. Social change in the future naturally cannot be excluded as a possibility and it is outside the scope of this thesis to predict it. For instance a constitutional reform package introduced by the AKP government is voted by the Parliament and the judiciary system is reformed radically so as to liberate the institution from Kemalist influence. How would foreign policy towards Greece be affected by such an event and its subsequent implications on the influence of Kemalism over foreign policy? Working again with the Turkish negotiator‟s utility functions, we would amend them so as to decrease the political costs incurred by the occurrence of from 10 to 5 and eliminate post-settlement costs in the event of ‟s occurrence. The effect of these changes would in fact be the increase of the Turkish negotiator‟s time-span, thus increasing the available range of negotiation deadlines. The two sides would be able to negotiate for an adequate amount of time, were they able to bypass their cooperation problem.
213
So, as in the case of the economic crisis and its effects on Greek foreign policy, a further decrease of Kemalism would expand the negotiation time that both negotiators could afford but would not assist in tackling the cooperation problem of switching from a non-cooperative to a cooperative equilibrium. The two sides remain unwilling to discuss time-spans and deadlines without the involvement of an international institution.
214
Conclusions
Walt has argued that theoretical innovations emerge not from abstract modelling exercises, but by efforts to solve concrete empirical puzzles481 and Bates notes that scholars employing analytic narratives were impelled to „do social science‟ by their fascination with particular cases and that they are motivated by a desire to account for particular events or outcomes.482 Likewise, my interest in the case was instigated by events unaccounted for by dominant explanations and intuitive beliefs about the effect of academic practice on policy outcomes. Greek-Turkish relations have been extensively covered from a historical perspective in both Greek and Turkish literature. Political analyses often tend to resemble the descriptive nature of historical narratives. The particular characteristics of the Greek and Turkish I.R communities, the ones predominantly interested in the case, have obstructed the adoption of a positivist methodology in I.R studies as well as the subsequent influence of critical theory and postmodernism on the scientific project. The majority of scholars have retained their support for realist assumptions, themselves rooted in subjective interpretations of international law and state strategies. Consequently, analysis follows the classification of states into revisionist and status quo, teleologically leading theorists to argue over the possibilities of occurrence of cooperation, rapprochement, deterrence and containment. The correct prediction of such outcomes is severely undercut by assumptions regarding the nature of states and the unit of analysis as well as the ambiguous relationship between systemic pressures and state agency on interstate conflict and bargaining. Facing numerous incidents of empirical falsification, attempts to increase such explanations‟ instrumentalist value have led to the ad hoc adoption of those initial conditions with which any particular outcome can be explained. So, a policy shift from a long-term veto policy against Turkey‟s EU accession prospects, branded as a successful strategy by realists, is not predicted but is post hoc explained, under assumptions hand-picked to rationalize the shift. Similarly, a policy shift towards a cooperative outcome in Cyprus, again not predicted while the structure of the
481 Walt, 1999, p. 30. 482 Bates et al., 1998, pp. 11-13. 215 game remained the same, is rationalized post-hoc under a neorealist reading of Turkey‟s payoff structure, with scant empirical validation of altered conditions which enabled the switch. And while scholars who sought to explain such shifts using obsolete realist tools are proponents of peaceful relations and economic interaction, their understanding of the other as a revisionist threat remains intact. The implications of the persistence of such conceptualizations of international relations are profound and have hopefully emerged through this thesis. Firstly, this attachment to realism has stood in the way of the evolution of the academic debate in these two countries Secondly, following from the first, the nature of the academic debate is itself a structural determinant of policymaking and a factor inhibiting change. Either directly, through participation in consultative committees, or indirectly, through their influence over public discourse, realists have had an impact on reaching specific policy equilibria. This thesis indeed confirms and incorporates the structural power of the academic debate in the institutional setting within which all related political actors interact strategically to form policy equilibria and in doing so, it aims to contribute to the modernization of the I.R debate.
Thesis Contribution, Theoretical and Methodological Framework
This thesis offers a framework of analysing enduring international disputes. The case at hand involves an enduring regional rivalry between two states facing a yet unsolved territorial dispute. Although Greek-Turkish relations include other domains of friction, mainly minority and the Cyprus issue, the Aegean Sea dispute is the only purely bilateral and potentially negotiable issue between the two states, although the two sides disagree on the scope of the dispute. Both states‟ policies have thus far reflected perceptions of threat to their national sovereignty and that was first manifested with the Aegean Sea dispute when such perceptions and state strategies were first consolidated. The centrality of the Aegean Sea dispute thus emerges out of its impact on the consolidation of perceptions and state strategies. So decisions on minority policies and
216 any other matter are contingent on perceptions of threat derived primarily from state conduct on the Aegea Sea dispute. While the Aegean Sea dispute is indispensable to a model that links domestic preference formation and interstate bargaining (as the only purely bilateral and potentially negotiable issue), it is two policy shifts on other domains that best highlight alternative explanations‟ problems in understanding the formation of state preferences. Namely, the Greek Helsinki strategy in 1999 and Turkey‟s acceptance of the Annan Plan on Cyprus in 2003 constituted empirical puzzles for realist explanations, and the Europeanization literature which developed aiming to understand them left key questions and the existence of causal mechanisms unexplored. So this thesis uses those shifts to identify mechanisms of preference formation and applies that understanding to identify the actual structure of the Aegean Sea dispute and highlight the problem of communication. In that sense, the thesis contributes both to the understanding of strategy formation in general by simultaneously exposing alternative explanations‟ shortcomings as well as to the clarification of the structure of bilateral interaction regarding the Aegean Sea dispute in particular. Theoretically, the approach adopted combines a rationalist institutionalist analysis of domestic sources of foreign policy and an interstate bargaining model. The thesis thus relaxes the unitary state actor assumption, thus circumventing the preference assignment problem, to allow for a comparison of results and in so doing attempts a synthesis of international and comparative politics. Furthermore, the contribution of culturalist and constructivist I.R accounts is acknowledged and the thesis similarly explores the causal significance of norms. Constructivist and culturalist accounts of Greek-Turkish relations in particular have either emphasized the role of normative structures in perpetuating non- cooperative outcomes or the impact of Europeanization on the transformation of foreign policies. And while usually the former have proven incapable of sufficiently explaining social change, the latters‟ lack or ambiguity over the importance of microfoundations have produced explanations which are not theoretically robust. The rationalist approach employed therefore differs from the thin core of the paradigm and practically employs a synthesis of rational choice and culturalism to the extent that norms are central to the analysis, albeit instrumentally adopted and breached.
217
Traditional values are thus perceived as informal institutions which individuals can sustain through coordination or choose to challenge by organized action and the normative order they provide is viewed as resting upon credible promises and threats. Institutions induce choices that are regularized because they are made in equilibrium and therefore “behaviour becomes stable and patterned, or alternatively institutionalized, not because it is imposed but because it is elicited”.483 Therefore once equilibria have been reached, the path of play is determined and appears as an external constraint and for it to be sustainable and viable, corresponding rules and beliefs need to be reconfirmed and reproduced by agents‟ strategic play. Such values in the case at hand reflect conceptions of the „Other‟ and prescribe strategies which render cooperative outcomes difficult in general and the structure of the Aegean Sea dispute game as non-cooperative in particular. The path of play appears as an external constraint to those whose dispositions dictate distinct equilibrium level preferences and there are costs attached to adopting opposing stands. It follows that equilibrium levels of those concepts inform policymakers‟ incentive structures. Therefore, examining two instances of policy change that are only indirectly related to the Aegean Sea dispute and emphasizing the role of normative constructs, the thesis substitutes strategic culture with the concepts of rigidity and Kemalism and explores the implications of equilibrium levels for the outcome of the Aegean Sea dispute. This methodological approach to the impact of values implies a rejection of their stable and tautological character and enables the exploration of mechanisms of change. Moreover, this thesis follows a modest philosophy of science and a shift from universalism towards partial universalism. Traditional positivism dictates the role of science as uncovering universal laws operating and regulating relations among things. To that end, deductive theory begins as abstract and foundational and becomes integrating and unifying, evidence is oriented towards falsification and evaluation is related to the exposition of universal laws that resist falsification. In this thesis theory consists of a set of tools and causal mechanisms that are combined into models of theory that suggest lawful regularities. Evidence establishes the applicability of a theory for the models of
483 Bates et al, 1998, p. 8. 218 data that exist in particular domains and evaluation deals with the possible occurrence of non-falsifiability and self-serving confirmation, as a result of the first two principles.484 The thesis relied on a clearly defined, thick, or social situation „bounded rationality‟, which enabled us to explore norm-supporting and norm-breaching behaviour. Again, the aim was not to test whether rational choice can be used in its human nature form to produce or falsify any universal laws, but rather to produce a better explanation of the case at hand than what alternatives can offer. This approach deals effectively with Green and Shapiro‟s instrumentalist criticism of rational choice, as well as social psychologists‟ evidence against the self-evidence of basic rationalist assumptions. Methodologically, the thesis was based on the construction of two analytic narratives of domestic institutional evolution. The term refers to an approach that is narrative in the sense that is dynamically preoccupied with specific cases and simultaneously analytic thus applying models or formal lines of reasoning as means of outcome explanation. The first step towards building an analytic narrative is tracing the historical processes that characterized the unfolding of the events of concern. Through extensive empirical qualitative research actors are identified, their preferences and incentive structures are mapped out based on data on the information they possessed, their strategies and the constraints they face. Their interaction is presented using extensive form games and analyzing subgame-perfect equilibria. Games in extensive form taking sequence into account, allow researchers to incorporate historical elements, the importance of uncertainty, individuals‟ ability to devise strategies and the constraints they face. Then an explanation of the outcome is offered by identifying and exploring causal mechanisms linking actors‟ strategies and choices and social outcomes. If the explanation offered is valid then the equilibrium of the model should imply the outcome described. Therefore an analytic narrative consists of a setting, a starting point, a sequence of interactions and an ending. Analytic narratives blend deductive and inductive reasoning. Lichbach refers to a „middle way‟ between induction and deduction: “in contrast to deduction, which may be called idealist, and to induction, which might be called materialist, this approach might be called realist: it explores the interaction of theory and data in which revision and updating
484 Lichbach, 2003, p. 169. 219 is an iterative procedure”.485 Bates employs a number of models, the failure of some leads to the reappraisal of the case materials: “The interplay between data and analysis promotes a refinement and deepening of our understanding of the political economy of the coffee market and of the origins and significance of its institutions”.486 The thesis relied mainly on three sets of data: media content analysis, elite interviewing and historical research. Data from interviews was collected and analysed using a general inductive approach, a systematic procedure of data analysis, which is guided by research objectives but allows theory to emerge from observation of data. Research objectives guided analysis to the extent that domains of interest were preselected. Fieldwork was conducted simultaneously with historical research, with evidence shaping questions, and answers guiding research, and interacting with theory as a set of rationalist nuts and bolts at a parallel level. Discussion with the interviewees was facilitated by a guide of open-ended questions that enabled the exploration of interviewees‟ private preferences. The particular method proved useful in discarding answers that would otherwise constitute disproving evidence, in cases where self- contradictions were made easier to spot and answers to discard. The transcripts were read several times, interpreted and coded by identifying broad themes and categories, thus allowing for a horizontal reading of the material. These themes then facilitated the building or supported empirically the models applied in the empirical chapters. As for the media content analysis, a blend of deductive and inductive techniques was employed. This method borrows from the hermeneutic tradition the element of interpretation of texts in order to uncover manifest and latent meanings, and from the positivist tradition its purpose to deductively test hypotheses, thus seeking to secure the validity and reliability of the results. As data were used to support models applied in the empirical chapters, interpretation aside, collection relied on the deductive scientific approach which requires a priori design, so that variables to be included and type of measurement are decided before the observation begins in order to secure validity of the results. Hence, a preliminary reading of sub-samples was conducted beforehand and then a code list, consisting of variables to be researched, was formed. It included variables
485 Ibid., p. 190. 486 Bates, et al, 1998, p. 195. 220 corresponding to thematic and referential categories to allow for cross-categorization comparisons.
Greece, the Helsinki strategy
In the Greek case, research into the country‟s economic and political development pointed at the academic community, journalists, business, civil society, constituents, media and moderate politicians as key actors in foreign policy making. The Greek chapter explores the concept of rigidity in its duality. Rigidity corresponds to a strategy of the Greek negotiator in interstate interaction and translates into abstention from negotiations until the other side concedes to the Greek preferred settlement method. Simultaneously, rigidity constitutes a social norm, closely identified with Greek identity and the stereotypical view of Turkey as an expansionist, revisionist state. Notice then that the negotiator is constrained by constituents with specific preferences over the level of rigidity not preferences on possible outcomes of the Aegean Sea dispute. Rationalist theory, with the scope applied in this thesis suggests that the actors identified above each hold distinct preferences over the desired level of rigidity and the equilibrium point can be explained as a result of their strategic interaction. Indeed, the analysis in the relevant chapter uses evidence to inform theory so as to build an analytic narrative of the post- 1999 period, which explains Greek strategy and the evolution of political institutions. Actors are divided in traditionalists, with a preference for high levels of rigidity, and progressive, preferring lower levels. Mainstream media have no specific preference and tend to enforce the current equilibrium at any given time, unless the latter becomes a point of contestation between the two major political parties. This hypothesis was confirmed by data derived from media content analysis, establishing the bias of the coverage, the emergent divergence of coverage depending on political orientation and the distinction between preferences of media institutions and employed journalists. Moderate politicians, dispersed in various political parties, prefer a lower level of rigidity than the status quo level. The structure of their interaction‟s game however hinders the expression of their private preference and the possibility of collective action towards attaining a lower equilibrium. The factors that determine the payoffs and outcome of the game
221 include the possible public reception of a declaration of a moderate preference, the possibility of inner-party disciplinary measures and the impact of their collective action on the outcome. For cooperation to be achieved, the costs of participation need to turn positive. Until 1999, public opinion was overwhelmingly negative towards Turkey and the prospect of cooperation, and governing political parties kept a rigid bargaining stand. Under that setting the moderate politicians‟ game was deadlock, with no one having any incentive to express their private preference. With strong public anti-Turkish sentiments constituting the strongest structural determinant, bestowed upon Greek society originally as part of the ethnogenesis process and subsequently as part of the national-mindedness ideal, the expression of progressive preferences amounted to high political cost. Traditionalists in academia and the media world continued to dominate the shape of the public discourse as well as influenced policy-making directly through institutional involvement. Pro-friendship civil society organizations existed in their elitist form, unable to attract public support in a society coordinating around the norm of rigidity. Business interests, lobbying for the decrease of political tension in favor of economic interaction and mutual benefits, were the only influential to some extent group that managed to exert some pressure on decision-makers through direct interaction and personal networks. With the majority of the political world agreeing, at least in principle, with the view of Turkey as revisionist and expansionary, mainstream media observed and enforced the equilibrium level of rigidity. The 1999 Greek policy shift, which corresponded to a decrease of rigidity without however suggesting a switch of the Greek strategy on the Aegean Sea dispute, occurred as a result of international multilateral bargaining within the EU framework, given the domestic institutional setting. Securing Cyprus EU accession despite the islands‟ political situation was rightly considered to counterweight the costs of expressing an endorsement of the policy shift on the part of moderate politicians. Indeed, in the eve of the Helsinki Summit the opposition had failed to unite in condemning such an outcome and after the conclusion of the Summit moderate politicians achieved to act collectively in endorsing or not outright opposing the Helsinki strategy. Their cooperation meant that mainstream media opted to enforce the new equilibrium since the matter did not lend itself to classic
222
PASOK-ND antagonism. Therefore, progressive and pro-peace groups and interests were given the chance to increase their input on the discourse, with the coverage remaining however, biased. The policy shift, complemented with a wide range of rapprochement policies, seemed to adhere to a new conceptualization of the bilateral relation and left big segments of Greek society unrepresented. Individuals who felt threatened by an evolution of the normative framework towards less rigid levels, sought to organize collective action towards the preservation of Greek identity, and politicians exploited the opportunity to derive political benefits out of rallying support behind a traditionalist agenda. Indeed LAOS achieved considerable electoral success ever since it‟s establishment in 2000 and a vast network of groups and professionals has repeatedly organized action against any policy proposal regarded as threatening for traditionalist values. On the other hand, the new policy equilibrium has favorably influenced a wide range of pro-friendship, antiracist and human rights groups by increasing their exposition and public appeal. Furthermore, rapprochement policies have enabled Greek-Turkish cooperation at the economic, social and regional level, creating a web of vested interests with a preference for peaceful relations. These interests were until then unable to pursue cooperation, due to the extremely tense political climate. Overall, the institutional setting has transformed significantly, mainly as a result of international multilateral diplomacy. Consequently, the model of foreign policy- making towards Turkey was affected by an exogenous shock, altering the structural constraints that actors face whilst deciding upon adopting their public preference. Firstly, the structure of the moderate politicians‟ game switched from deadlock to coordination, as long as participation costs remained positive. Then, the institutional setting facilitated cooperation among progressive groups, as well as in the newly shaped traditionalist space. The transformation of the institutional setting was completed with the change of the structure of the moderate politicians‟ game. The game went from deadlock to coordination from 1999 to 2004 and moderate politicians supported rapprochement policies and negotiations on Cyprus until the 2004 Annan Plan rejection by Greek Cypriots. Following the rejection of the plan, Greece and Turkey opted not to capitalize
223 on the results of exploratory talks by submitting a joint application to the ICJ, as the Helsinki Summit Conclusions had advised.487 Although research on this instance has not been conducted, a similar method would point to the failure of cooperation on the part of moderate politicians, defined by the new, cooperative equilibrium. In any case, the moderate politicians‟ game in the post 2004 era, did not return to its pro 1999 form. The changes outlined above affected the strategy payoffs leading to a decrease of costs of participation and an increase of cooperation‟s effect, altering the structure to that of a Prisoner‟s Dilemma. Cooperation is still not attained, but only because moderate politicians are tempted to free-ride rather than having no incentive altogether to support a policy shift.
Anti-Kemalist mobilization and Turkey’s Cyprus policy
In the Turkish case, the depiction of actors corresponds to an ongoing struggle unfolding around the norm of Kemalism, since evidence demonstrates that perceptions towards Greece do not vary depending on political orientation. The latter is portrayed as an interest-based struggle following the definition of rationality employed in this thesis, encompassing the ability of individuals to challenge norms that they had previously adhered to when the incentives to do so were there. A necessary condition for rendering Kemalist the main independent variable is establishing correlation between high levels of Kemalism and rigid foreign policy on issues related to Kemalist principles. Indeed the hypothesis is supported both by theoretically deducing policy implications stemming from those principles, as well as empirical evidence linking particular policy equilibria with institutional settings corresponding to varying levels of Kemalism. Relevant actors identified include academicians, journalists, media, business and civil society, divided among Kemalists, liberals and Islamists. The executive has an incentive to remain in power and thus confront Kemalist institutions, while the TSK is at the core of the Kemalist alliance and opposition party CHP‟s strategy is currently tied to the survival of Kemalism through the preservation of its institutional power. The
487 The fact that the Conclusions‟ wording on that point was not in any way binding for the two states, supports the classification of the two sides‟ strategies of the time as rigid rather than cooperative. 224 popularity of the AKP government and its pro-European, anti-militaristic stand solidified a struggle between actors organized in two opposing camps, achieving collective action with various degrees of success. This struggle comes after a series of contestations of Kemalist dominance over the notion of Turkish identity. Particularly, actors participating in the ongoing confrontation had been involved in previous ones, fought under different banners. Islam had been at the heart of alternative identity propositions and has constituted the predecessor of the autonomous leader of today‟s anti-Kemalist movement, but has failed to achieve institutional reform and policy change. The explanation of the 2003 policy shift lies exactly in pinpointing the difference between the failure of Islamic mobilization to achieve institutional reform and the subsequent success of the anti-Kemalist mobilization led by an Islamic party, the AKP. Beginning with the conception of any collective action situation as one facing PD- like problems, assuming that people infer social and psychological benefits from contributing to collective action, and considering them as substituting the notion of „selective incentives‟, opens the possibility for a PD situation to be transformed into a coordination game. The possibility of success and the number of participants at any given time are the factors that can transform a PD-like situation into a coordination game in the mind of each individual. Very few people would be inclined to participate in movements with minimal potential of success or a negligible amount of participants and they would also incur minimal social costs for taking what seems to be a prudent decision. Each individual has an individual threshold, a level of success and mobilization that would transform the situation for them. So the more people contributing, the less each individual benefits from choosing defection, until a certain number of participants is reached that will persuade that individual to participate as well. In that kind of situations there is usually a coalition of members that can successfully collaborate and produce some level of the collective good while many individuals are still defecting. The problem is that their cooperation and the collective good they produce also improve the payoffs for defectors. That eventually leads members of that coalition to the temptation of defection in order to enjoy defectors‟ higher payoffs and hence to the destruction of the coalition‟s viability. However, as noted above there is
225 a certain level of participation that eliminates the temptation of defecting by rendering the contribution payoff higher than that of defection. Overall, what is needed for collective action of that sort to succeed is a suitable distribution of thresholds among potential participants. Islamist mobilization achieved in the 1990s around Erbakan‟s RP, comprising of business interests, civil society organizations, academics and journalists did not result in institutional adjustment. Kemalist dominance over the media world, exerted through particular business interests coordinating around Kemalist values and collaborating with the TSK, left Islamic publications at the fringe of the media world and journalists with a strong incentive to impose self-censorship, considering legal obstacles to free speech imposed by the TSK inspired 1982 constitution. The Islamic character of the movement excluded the participation of non-Islamic actors, the possibilities of success given the institutional framework remained low and therefore the cost of participation was considered too high by many individuals who coordinated around a norm they did not privately endorse. Dual coordination theory suggests that order under such circumstances is maintained unless a tipping event or signal coordinates opposition. That tipping event in the Turkish case was the election of the AKP, with its specific policy agenda under the particular institutional setting. Its Islamic roots, combined with the pro-EU campaign, amidst wider popular mistrust for existing political formations, rendered its incentives to collide with existing power structures clear and its intentions to do so credible. The AKP thus acquired the role of the autonomous leader of anti-Kemalist mobilization, as its political survival, let alone its prospects of re-election depended on its success in gaining concessions from the Kemalist state, so as to decrease equilibrium levels of Kemalism. In need of establishing a winning coalition and given: a) the popularity of the EU prospect, b) the public demand for the consolidation of democracy and c) the Islamic base of the anti-Kemalist movement of the previous decade, the AKP formed an alliance around anti-Kemalist, rather than Islamic ideals. Followers‟ participation in the movement was contingent on two effects: the bandwagon effect, which translates into participation after the movement has already succeeded to some degree, and the contagion effect which is related to participation‟s dependence on the number of
226 individuals who are committed to the campaign. Indeed, the initial success in the form of legal and institutional reforms attracted popular support, human rights and minority organizations were strengthened and increased their activity as individuals felt more comfortable participating in anti-Kemalist action. Academics and journalists, Islamic as well as liberal, observing the equilibrium shift similarly found the opportunity to express their private preferences in a media world which also experienced a normative division, oftentimes as a result of direct governmental influence. The analysis in the empirical chapter is based on a supply and demand model of Kemalist concessions, linking equilibrium levels of Kemalism with Turkey‟s stand on the Aegean Sea dispute. Anti-Kemalist mobilization leads to Kemalist counter-mobilization and the equilibrium at any given time is determined by the bandwagon and contagion effects of anti-Kemalist mobilization, the resolve of both coalitions leaders‟ as well as the Kemalist deterrence effect. Examining the dynamic form of the model, we are able to track the evolution of Kemalist concessions and predict its future course. Depending on the combination of factors outlined here, Kemalist concessions can theoretically increase monotonically without bounds, decrease to a lower equilibrium than the original level, converge to 0 suggesting that mobilization has been crushed by powerful Kemalist counter-mobilization, or increase and settle to a higher equilibrium level. Empirical evidence demonstrates that anti-Kemalist mobilization achieved Kemalist concessions, but did not reach the levels necessary to cause a collapse of the Kemalist coalition and a radical change of the normative framework. Kemalism preserved some degree of institutional power through its expressed resolve and managed to deter coordination around a purely anti-Kemalist equilibrium. The AKP facing Kemalist reactions seems to have identified the limits of the coalition‟s power and appears content with the existing level of Kemalist concessions and its electoral appeal at the moment. However, institutional change has occurred, and the Cyprus policy shift is seen under this light.
Interstate bargaining
227
Strategic interaction between the two negotiators, resembling the neoliberal structure outlined in Chapter 2 is revisited in Chapter 6 and is complemented with knowledge regarding domestic sources of foreign policy. Greece and Turkey are modelled as represented at the international level by their governments-negotiators, and assigning different values over possible outcomes, which can be estimated, explained and predicted for any period, ceteris paribus, according to the models of their domestic institutional settings and foreign policy-making. The analysis follows the logic of two- level games, only here the simulated game between the two negotiators is about whether to interact at all, so effectively there is no interplay between the two levels of bargaining. The model of interaction offered here, supplemented with a ceteris paribus clause, explains the current state of the relation and can be used as a framework capable of predicting future outcomes, contingent on specific domestic institutional settings. The relation is broken down to three chronological periods: 1974-1999, 1999- 2003488 and 2003 to today, which correspond to specific institutional settings. Evidently, 1999 and 2003 are considered as turning points when institutional change occurred in Greece and Turkey respectively. For each phase negotiators‟ utilities are calculated by assigning corresponding values to costs and benefits of switching to a cooperative strategy. Under incomplete information and since the two negotiators are modelled as contemplating switching to a cost-sinking cooperative strategy, their distinct ability to endure political costs is essential for the outcome of their interaction. By assuming a hypothetical chronological point of settlement , we are able to construct utility functions and derive time-spans for which negotiators are willing to switch to a cooperative strategy. With this methodology, we are able to estimate negotiators‟ relative payoffs and clarify the structure of the game of interaction during all phases of the bilateral relation, depending on distinct domestic institutional settings. Hence, the problem of assigning preferences to states, which curtails neorealist and neoliberal explanations‟ explanatory power, is dealt with by analytically exploring domestic institutional settings and by linking them causally to negotiators‟ strategies.
488 The selection of 2003 is somewhat arbitrary and aims to account for a process of institutional change within Turkey that cannot be pinpointed at a specific moment in time. That process was initiated as demonstrated in the previous chapter by the rise of political Islam, gained momentum after AKP‟s election to power in 2002 and resulted in some decrease of Kemalist strength before 2004, as was exemplified by the Turkish Cyprus policy in years 2002-2004. 228
The analysis demonstrates that for certain sets of negotiator beliefs (about the other‟s time-span) and probabilities of re-election both negotiators in fact face a stag-hunt structure where they would be better off from switching to the cooperative equilibrium. The problem is then one of choice among a variety of multiple stable equilibria and under complete information simple coordination games are easy to solve through pre-play communication where cheap talk is considered as credible as no side has an incentive to defect. However incomplete information renders pre-play communication untenable and that can be sufficiently demonstrated by the simplified depiction of the situation attempted here. Firstly, the two negotiators cannot credibly commit to respect an agreed bargaining deadline as they could commit while making credible threats using audience costs or military mobilization. This is a case where negotiators contemplate a switch to an a priori costly strategy and cannot therefore transform domestic constraints into costs in the event of breaching an agreed deadline aiming to achieve the best possible deal. So were the two states to engage in pre-play communication they would both conceive getting the worst possible outcome as possible. Also note that under these conditions none of the two sides would have an incentive to cheat at that stage by presenting a smaller time-span as getting the sucker‟s payoff would remain possible if the other negotiator could outlast them. A more fundamental problem related to incomplete information is both negotiators‟ disincentive to kickstart pre-play communication and reveal their time-spans. If it is possible for one negotiator to prefer the non-cooperative outcome rather than the sucker‟s payoff, then instantly both become reluctant to engage in communication. Suppose then that the Greek negotiator proposes a bargaining deadline and the Turkish negotiator has the shortest time-span and prefers the non-cooperative outcome over Greece‟s favored outcome. If that deadline falls beyond the Turkish negotiator‟s time- span the latter will not switch strategies as the non-cooperative outcome is better than getting the sucker‟s payoff. Or imagine that the Turkish negotiator suggests an official negotiation deadline, two years after their commencement and the Greek negotiator readily agrees. The Turkish negotiator has thus realized that the possibility of getting the
229 best deal is lower than the level that makes him/her indifferent and therefore is unwilling to begin negotiations. Evidently, the lack of information cancels cheap talk and any time-span related statement can determine the possibility of cooperation. The Greek negotiator is not aware of having the longer time-span and is also unsure about the Turkish negotiator‟s payoff from the bad settlement and the rigid outcome. Therefore, even though he/she wants a deal, he/she is unwilling to suggest a deadline in fear of scaring the other side off. Indeed, if he/she were to suggest a three-year deadline the Turkish negotiator would want to reject the proposition but he/she would also not want to reveal that he/she has a shorter time-span. In theory, a third party such as an international institution could intervene to set a deadline, after receiving information about the two sides‟ time-spans in privately held sessions. The object of negotiations could then become the multiple available joint applications to the ICJ, upon which the Court would provide a fair, compromising ruling. The difficulties of such a prospect are related to the nature of that third party and its authority over setting a deadline unilaterally, as well as its conceptual affiliation with international institutions, for the participation of which Turkey has long expressed its disapproval. This thesis did not attempt to tackle the model‟s practical implications, it merely contributes by offering a completely different image of the dispute than the one dominating public discourse in both states. As mentioned above, a ceteris paribus clause is at force while analyzing the parameters of the model. If that clause is lifted, a number of domestic or international, structural or preferential changes, such as an economic crisis, can affect the model‟s parameters as exogenous shocks and lead to varying conclusions about the prospects of a settlement. Such effects can easily be incorporated in negotiators‟ expected utility functions and alter the time-spans as well as probabilities of larger time-span for which the two negotiators are willing to switch strategies.
230
Strengths, weaknesses and further research
The model demonstrates how an enduring bilateral rivalry can be successfully conceptualized within a rational choice framework that incorporates two levels of analysis, the domestic and the international. The contribution of this thesis lays not so much in exposing bits of reality, theoretically deduced from the models applied, but in emphasizing the benefits of analytic clarity and rigor while constructing an approach which is sensitive to structural particularities. Though the methodology employed, stemming from a modest philosophy of science, is suited more to explain existing outcomes than to predict future ones, the notion of causality is central to the analytic narratives employed and the mechanisms uncovered can be used as basis for predictions. As demonstrated in the last chapter, the model can be readily modified to incorporate effects of exogenous shocks. Therefore, the strength of the approach lies in its explanatory power and its value as a theoretical framework which can be developed to produce predictions of future outcomes. In applying the particular methodology, the thesis proceeded to some novel suggestions on the analysis of the interstate bargaining stalemate as well as domestic politics of the two states. In the Greek case, moderate politicians, treated as a nascent or potential actor, were in the core of the explanation of the stalemate, the successful implementation of the Helsinki strategy, subsequent institutional change and predictions on the effects of exogenous shocks. Approaching aspects of Greek politics as collective action problems of previously unidentified groups is effective in exposing the limitations of research relying on purely institutionalized groups. This is so since high institutionalization often leads to the neglect for individual incentives and the conceptualization of groups as actors with an inadequately explained common interest. By identifying suitable actors on the basis of methodological individualism, using rationalist tools to explore their interaction, while acknowledging structural determinants, we were able overcome problems in explaining what is commonly labeled as incoherent, indecisive party behaviour in the case of the Helsinki strategy. This methodology can be replicated along similar lines to explain policy outcomes in any aspect of political life, whether it be social, economic or foreign policy-related.
231
In the Turkish case, the thesis used a model of public-spirited collective action used by Chong to analyse the civil rights movement. The depiction of the power struggle in Turkey as one between Islam and Kemalism suffers from similar problems facing the status politics analysis of the temperance movement and begins with the assumption of expressive action. Assuming instrumental action instead, enables us to understand normative challenges from groups and individuals who had previously adhered to dominant norms. The Islamic challenge to Kemalism, the support it was given by non- Islamic groups, its shape and course were analysed following the template of public spirited collective action. Again, analytic rigor is the element that ensures satisfactory explanation of the movement‟s achievements and limitations, as they are causally linked to the interaction of key actors comprising the opposing coalitions and their different incentive structures at any stage of the movement. Models employed were contemplated with empirical evidence mainly collected from media content analysis and elite interviewing. Particular points where further evidence would add to the validation of certain theoretical deductions were pointed out in the text. Such problems occurred to a significant degree as a result of the language barrier. Knowledge of the Turkish language would for instance allow for data collection from a more representative sample of Turkish editions of dailies and suggest the completion of interviews with more integral actors. In any case, the shortcomings of this thesis as much as its strengths point to possible ways of building on its contribution. This thesis‟s broad scope precluded detailed research on certain aspects, which offer themselves for further research. The interaction of moderate politicians could be further explored theoretically as well as empirically in various contexts. Lending itself easily to any norm or value-related policy issue, for which politicians could have a strong private preference contingent on their personal dispositions, the classification could also be employed for the analysis of Greek foreign policy on the Macedonian issue. Applying the same methodology but restricting the scope of data collection to illuminate moderate politicians‟ considerations, specifically designed open-ended questionnaires combined with skillful interviewing could provide sound empirical grounds for their classification as potential influential actors and validation of theoretical deductions. Sought after data could revolve around
232 moderate politicians‟ understanding of the size and composition of the group and the distribution of preferences within it. Furthermore, the researcher could attempt to explore the possibility of iterated interaction under specific circumstances as well as problems with monitoring defection. Similarly, in the Turkish case, the analysis of the anti-Kemalist movement as public spirited collective action can be complemented with sounder empirical research. The thesis relied on data from elite interviewing who shared their knowledge and personal experience on the phenomenon‟s parameters. Perhaps a quantitative approach based on survey questionnaires could help further consolidate the relevance of the model applied to the particular data domain. Lack of sufficient funds precluded the use of the particular research option in our case. The survey method could also be employed in both states to expose the magnitude of the phenomenon of preference falsification, the existence of which was hinted at in the empirical chapters. Following Kuran‟s work, emerging distributions of private preferences could be a valuable asset for policy makers while weighing payoffs of different strategies. Kuran has demonstrated how a minor policy change can affect certain distributions dramatically enough to lead to normative change and coordination around new equilibrium points. As for interstate bargaining, the thesis demonstrated how negotiators incorporate domestic politics in their utility functions. That way the problem of assigning state preferences is overcome and the structure of strategic interaction is shown to vary depending on domestic institutional settings. The model could however benefit from both theoretical and empirical development. Theoretically, we have restricted the amount of available settlements to three. The basic implication of this restriction is that each negotiator has one favorite settlement. Further theoretical development of the model could include number of settlements, ranked hierarchically. Using the three settlements restriction, we found that the Greek negotiator prefers settling for the Turkish negotiator‟s favorite settlement rather than continuing playing rigid, while the same does not apply for his counterpart. This conclusion defines the nature of pre-play communication, as one where the Greek negotiator wants to initiate negotiations but is unsure of which time-span to propose. Allowing for more possible settlements, we could
233 observe a different behaviour from the Greek negotiator, who might not prefer all possible settlements to playing rigid. Therefore, strategic interaction between the two negotiators could be of a different nature. Empirically, arbitrary values have been assigned to excessive military spending, political costs and settlement benefits. The value of 10 has been assigned to excessive military expenditure, the only quantifiable variable, for both states. This arbitrary value as well as those assigned to political costs and settlement benefits were used for analytic purposes only. A more precise model could attempt perhaps to estimate the share of military expenditure allocated to the deterrence of the Greek/Turkish threat, or the burden of excessive military expenditure on economic growth for both states489 and incorporate it in the expected utility functions. Furthermore, there could be an attempt to measure political costs and settlement benefits for negotiators from the two states on a relative scale, based on analyzing data from specifically designed questionnaires. Also, values of these variables could be conceptualized as fluctuating over time periods, thus exiting the ceteris paribus umbrella. Such policy-oriented research could help bring the model closer to empirical reality by defining relatively accurately, utility functions, time-spans and payoffs. Finally, further research could also build on the implications of the model regarding the intervention or participation of an international institution as a mediator with a clearly defined authority. More specifically, the focus could be on which international institution would be the most suitable and most likely to be accepted as a mediator by the two states, possible reactions from the two sides (given especially Turkey‟s explicitly proclaimed preference for open bilateral negotiations), and the specific process to be followed past the mediation point (bilateral negotiations or joint application to the ICJ).
489 Antonakis has highlighted the difficulties in generalizing conclusions regarding the effect of military expenditure on growth and has argued in favour of case-specific research. See Antonakis, N, “Military Expenditure and Economic Growth in Greece, 1960-1990”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 34, No. 1 (1997), pp. 89-100. 234
Appendix I
Kathimerini TA NEA Eleftherotypia
B.R T C B H EU O B.R T C B H EU O B.R T C B H EU O
772 157 383 47 55 25 52 49 771 200 304 66 36 83 28 54 787 146 364 101 40 27 52 67
A 45 35 7 0 0 2 1 0 106 85 9 0 0 11 1 0 56 46 6 1 0 0 3 0
B 49 6 8 26 2 0 7 0 42 4 5 22 0 6 5 0 57 9 8 36 0 0 4 0
C 40 27 1 2 0 3 7 0 27 22 1 0 0 1 3 0 29 18 1 0 0 4 5 1
D 88 7 69 3 2 3 3 1 107 36 49 2 5 3 2 10 85 11 61 5 0 1 4 3
E 15 1 9 0 5 0 0 0 3 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 25 0 18 0 3 0 4 0
F 5 4 0 1 0 0 0 0 5 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 1 0 0 0 0
G 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 13 11 1 0 0 1 0 0 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0
I 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
J 58 3 40 6 4 1 1 3 57 5 31 3 1 16 0 2 98 3 76 10 1 1 1 6
K 57 7 35 0 0 3 4 8 45 2 24 2 0 1 6 10 80 2 52 4 0 1 12 15
L 19 0 4 7 2 2 4 0 12 2 1 5 0 3 1 0 29 1 10 9 1 0 8 0
N 26 11 3 4 0 7 0 1 30 6 2 10 0 12 0 0 41 6 10 19 0 6 0 0
P 104 46 29 15 4 4 2 4 175 98 26 20 10 18 2 1 148 46 52 30 3 1 7 9
Q 18 8 2 3 0 5 0 0 22 15 2 1 0 3 0 1 36 22 2 6 1 3 0 2
R 63 4 41 2 1 0 0 15 26 7 16 1 0 0 0 2 45 2 31 5 2 0 1 4
S 100 30 21 4 27 5 1 12 70 19 11 0 17 5 0 18 68 6 14 0 21 5 0 22
U 38 7 25 1 3 0 0 2 18 2 8 2 1 5 0 0 37 6 27 1 3 0 0 0
V 8 3 1 0 0 1 0 3 9 7 0 0 1 0 0 1 21 11 5 1 2 0 1 0
W 18 0 15 1 0 0 0 3 16 0 11 1 0 0 0 4 31 0 27 0 0 0 0 4
X 52 7 28 3 2 7 0 5 48 14 22 1 1 3 0 7 51 6 31 3 0 3 1 7
Y 27 8 1 5 0 11 0 2 25 6 1 9 0 8 0 1 20 3 0 13 0 2 0 2
Z 9 1 0 1 1 5 0 1 18 2 1 1 0 12 0 2 7 0 3 0 0 4 0 0
Figure A: The Greek Press
235
HDN A B C D E F H I J K N P Q S U X W Y Z T 433 16 26 8 9 8 5 35 8 3 7 42 42 112 19 9 9 20 13 13 B.R 176 15 1 7 4 3 3 12 3 1 3 19 24 60 3 1 1 12 9 3 a.s. 20 11 1 1 1 2 7 2 1 g.m. 19 1 1 5 12 7 1 v,m,s. 50 1 3 1 7 4 12 1 t.m. 4 1 1 2 2 1 1 gen. 31 3 1 2 2 3 3 6 3 1 1 2 9 12 3 1 1 3 5 3 o. 1 2 21 2 pkk. G 93 15 1 3 5 5 8 7 fyrom. 1 4 g.s. 13 1 2 1 2 2 3 5 o. 1 1 3 6 2 2 C 68 1 25 1 5 5 2 6 12 12 4 16 8 8 4 3 1 n. 30 15 1 2 6 3 2 2 1 a. 38 1 10 5 5 2 4 6 9 2 14 8 8 4 2 1 B 57 1 38 H 3 1 2 1 O 36 2 4 2 6 12 2 arm. 2 1 1 arts. 2 2 10 1 imm. 4 3 1 1
TZ A B C D E F H I J K N P Q S U X W Y Z T 266 9 56 9 3 2 4 31 4 3 1 23 35 40 42 37 5 17 4 6 B.R 71 8 9 1 2 2 1 11 4 15 11 a.s. 11 6 2 g.m. 11 2 1 10 v,m,s. 17 2 1 4 5 t.m. 6 1 3 2 1 2 gen. 10 1 2 1 1 1 5 3 1 o. 2 G 43 1 4 1 1 1 4 C 97 55 1 2 25 1 9 27 4 42 37 5 3 2 2 n. 28 18 1 4 2 6 4 1 1 a. 49 32 1 2 25 1 5 27 2 36 33 4 2 2 2 B 24 15 H 3 1 2 1 1 1 o 28 1 2 3 1 1 2 5 3 1
Figure B: The Turkish Press
236
Appendix II
B.R: Bilateral Relations T: Turkey C: Cyprus B: Business, economy H: History O: Other
B.R: Bilateral Relations a.s.: Aegean Sea dispute g.m.: Greek minority and Patriarchate v,m,s.: Visits, Meetings, Statements t.m.: Turkish Minority gen.: The whole complex of bilateral relations o.: Other G: Greece g.s.: Greek society and politics C: Cyprus n.: News reports a. Articles, opinion pieces B: Business, economy H: History O: Other Arm: The Armenian Genocide Imm: Illegal immigration
237
Appendix III: List of Interviewees
Greece
Dimitris Droutsas, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs
Giannis Tsapogas, I. R Editor of Eleftherotypia
Panos Mamos, Head of Development of Foreign Cooperation Division of the Hellenic Organization of Small Medium Sized Enterprises and Handicraft
Pinelopi Foudedaki, Professor at Panteion University
Marietta Giannakou, Former Minister of Education
Kostas Karras, Greek coordinator of the GTF
Theodoros Couloumbis, Professor, Director of ELIAMEP Panagiotis Koutsikos, President of the Greek-Turkish Business Council
Stavros Ligeros, Columnist at Kathimerini
Giannis Magriotis, Former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Hercules Millas, Professor X, Alpha Bank
X, Defence Sector
Theodoros Pagalos, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs
Miltiadis Papaioannou, Former Minister
Pwlina Lampsa, PASOK and Helsinki Citizens Assembly member
Maria Repoussi, Professor, Editor of withdrawn History textbook
George Drakopoulos, BOD of SETE
Kostas Simitis, Former Prime Minister Pantelis Kapsis, Chief Editor for TA NEA
Kostas Tsitselikis, Professor, member of KEMO
Thanos Veremis, Professor
238
Turkey Ayhan Aktar, Professor
Barçin Yinanç, Chief Editor of Hurriyet Daily News
BüĢra Ersanlı, Historian
Hale Onursal, Deputy Secretary General at TUSIAD
Harry Tzimitras, Professor at Bilgi University
Müfıde Pekin, Lausanne Refugee Foundation
Murat Belge, Professor
Soli Özel, Haberturk, TUSIAD, GTF
Ümut Özkımlı, Professor
YaĢar YakıĢ, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs
Zeynep Oral, WINPEACE, Cumhurriyet
Cem Duna, Diplomat
Ahmet Zeki, Mazlum-Der
239
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