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Canada • PUBLIC OPjNlO:'l! AND THE BRITISH LEGION IN SPAlN 1835·1838

Richard James

Department of History McGill University, Montreal March, 1996

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research of McGiII University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

(c) Richard James 1996 • National Library Bibliothèque nationale 1+1 of Canada du Canada Acquisitions and Direction des acquisitions et Bibliographie Services Branch des services bibliographiques 395 Wellir ,glon Slroct 395. rua ",e'lington Ottawa, Ontario Ottawa (Ontario) K1AON4 K1AON4

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Canada • ABSTRACT This thesis examines public opinion towards the participation of the British Auxiliary Legion in the Spanish Civil War. Il is based on an analysis of British newspapers, periodicals and political discussion between 1835 and 1838. Il suggests that, although there was some degree of support for the foreign policy of Lord Palmerston in sending the legion to aid Iiberalism in the Peninsula, yet that support declined rapidly. In spite of Palmerston's eventual claim that intervention in Spain had been worthwhile, public opinion

was not to reflect the view that his policy had been a right one, 0 r

that the British Auxiliaries had been indispensable to the cause 0 f Spanish constitutionalism.

• RESUME

Cette thèse met en lumière l'opinion publique envers 1a participation de la Légion Auxiliaire Britannique dans la guerre civile en Espagne. Cette étude s'appuie sur une analyse de journaux, de revues et de la discussion politique pour la période comprise entre 1835 et 1838. Elle démontre que, malgré le support initial qui a trouvé Lord Palmerston pour ses politiques envers le mouvement Iibéraliste en Espagne, ce support a diminué rapidement. À m ê me l'avouement de Palmerston que l'intervention de la légion est nécessaire, l'opinion publique n'a pas confirmé que la politique d e Palmerston était juste et indispensable pour maintenir 1e • constitutionalisme en Espagne. iii • Preface

The participation of the British Auxiliary Legion in the Spanish Civil War of 1833-1840, aroused great passion anù causcd considerable controversy. A British force sent to Iïght in a foreign war represented a dramatic change from the traditional policy of non-intervention in the internai affairs of other countries. It is somewhat surprising therefore that this topic has attracted relatively little attention in British history. There have been several works of prime importance dealing with the foreign policy of the period, but few have offered insight into the changing nature of public opinion at the time, or of the motives behind British involvement in the Carlist war. There will be a discussion of these works in the· introduction to the bibliography. This thesis sets out to document and comment upon the changing attitudes toward the participation of the British Legion, under the command of General Evans, in the Spanish Civil War. It is based upon reaction to events between 1835 and 1838, as expressed primarily through the British press and parliamentary debates. 1 wish to acknowledge the kind assistance shown to me by members of the Reference Desk and Inter-Library loans department of the McLennan Library at McGiIl University, Montreal, in the preparation of this research. 1 would also like to show my appreciation to the staff at Princeton University Library, New Jersey, for their prompt efforts in forwarding the weighty, bound copies of • the Mornin~ Chronjcle and Morning post. i v

My gratitude must also extend to the staff of the Reading Room at • the British Museum, London, for their help,

• • :eJJBLIÇ OPINION ANP THE BRITISH LEGION IN SPAIN 1835-1838

CONTENTS

Preface Page iii

Chapter 1 Palmerston and Foreign Policy

Chapter 2 Public Opinion and Policy 19

Chapter 3 Political Consequences and the Liberal Crusade 32

Chapter 4 Evans, the British Legion and the Press 47

Chapter 5 Perspective on Intervention in Spain 7 1

Bibliography 85

• 1 • Chapter 1 PalmerstQn and FQreiin PQHcy

At the death Qf Spain's Ferdinand VII in 1833, DQn CarlQs, the YQungcr brQther Qf the late king, claimed tQ be the rightful heir tQ the thrQne. HQwcver, in 1830 Ferdinand had changed the right Qf successiQn tQ his daughter, Isabella. After Ferdinand's death, queen Christina then became regent and CarlQs, seeking allies, went tQ PQrtugal tQ make preparatiQns tQ seize the thrQne. 1 The Civil War thus erupted, dividing Spain intQ tWQ camps: the Christino fQrces defcnding the successiQn Qf Isabella against the armies of Don Carlos and his allies frQm the Basque prQvinces. In June 1835 a force Qf men known as the British AuxiHary Legion, was raised in England fQr the service of Christina, the queen regent of Spain. Their mission was to fight in the Spanish Civil War against the Carlist mQvement led by Don CarlQs. Lord PalmerstQn, the British Foreign Secretary at the time, prQPQsed the idea of sending such a force to Spain to help the cause Qf liberalism, which the queen and her forces also purpQrted to serve. Palmerston believed that intervention in Spain was necessary in order to preserve the balance Qf power between the forces of absQlutism2 and the fQrces of liberalism in EurQpe.

1D. Burgess, Evans and the British Lell;jQn, (M. A. Thesis) McGiIl University, Montreal, 1966, p.12. 2The term 'absolutism', as used by Palmerston and others, did not connote 'totalitarianism'. as in the contemporary sense of the word. 'Absolutism' was a • term used loosely to describe the system of government of 19th century However, PalmerslOn's intention to send an expedilionary force tn • the Peninsula was a scheme that was not well received by ail. In the British parliament, the idea of intervention in Spain presented a dilemma for the Radicals; for while some favoured an armed :lttempt to promote liberalism abroad and were generally sympathelic to the liberalist cause, others viewed intervention in Spain as :In nhst:lcle ln the nalUral growth of the liberal movemenl and queslioned whelher the British Legion's role in Spain was really necess:lry'! The Tories. for their part, were reluctant to place trust in the Sp:lnish government3 and showed liule sympathy for l'almerston's policies; some even supported the Carlist claim to legitimacy and later visited Don Carlos in Spain.4 Many were later to doubt, as did Britain's ambassador, whether the liberal element among the people of Spain had been strong enough at the outset to warrant support. The revolutionary movements of 1830 and the following years served to upset and divide the balance of power in Europe through the introduction of an ideological dimension. On one side the eastern powers became identified with traditionalism and autocracy, while England and France moved towards support of liberalism. Although the Spanish civil war did not represent a part of ihat conflicl at the beginning, it was quickly brought to the forefront of affairs through the policy or Lord Palmerston and the British alliance with the French.

monarchical rcgimes which were not restrained by parliament, and is used in that sense throughout this thesis. 3R. Carr, Spain 1808·1939. Oxford, 1966. p.155. 4B. Dolphin, Lord lohn Mannm and the Yoyn~ En~land MoyemeOl. (M. A. • Thesis) McGiIl University, Montreal,1970, p.67. 3

Since the early 1830s, polarisation had devcioped betwecn the • interests of Russia, Prussia and Austria on the one hand, and the interests of Britain and France on the other. At the Congress of Vienna in 1815, there had been an attempt by ail five of the major powers for concerted effort to settle areas of conflict in Europe.5 However, the Concert of Europe had failed to provide solutions to the problems of the east including the Greek war of independence, and to the issues in the west of Belgian autonomy and the war in Portugal. At the Belgian Conference in 1831, it became clear that the British attitude was favourable toward Iiberal movements.6 The motivations of the eastern powers were viewed with increasing skepticism by the foreign ministers of both Britain and France. In turn, the rulers of the principal eastern sta~es, concerned over the stability of their own regimes, distrusted the polides of Great Britain and France.7 The nervousness of the eastern autocracies with regard to any possible revolutionary threat, was manifested in the treaty of Munchengratz in 1833.8 The treaty, which was at first drawn up in secret, provided for mutual aid among the three members. The new entente was uased upon the policy of Metternich, Austria's Foreign minister, as defined at the Congress of Troppau in 1820. It affirmed that:

...A state in which revolution should occur was dangerous to other states, and ceased to be a

5Sir C. Petrie. DiplQmatic HjstQry. LQndQn, 1946, p.125. 6Sir C. Webster. The FQrei~n PQlicy Qf LQrd PalmerstQn. LQndQn. 1969, VQI. l, p.346. 7Burgess. pA. S-. he treaty was nQt signed until 18th September. 1833. by which time the • western PQwers knew Qf its existence. but nQt its contents. 4

member ùf the European alliance. until it could give guarantees for its future stability. • If such a revolution placed other states in immediate danger. the allied po\Vcrs \Vere bound to intervene by pcaceful means. if possible. or if need were. by arms.9

Relations between Britain and Austria became distanced partly as a result of the Munchengratz treaty. Palmerston was concerned \Vith preserving the Ottoman empire l'rom Russian aggression and agreed with the Austrians that the stable regime of the Sultan was essential to the balance of power in Europe. lo However. Austrian commitments to Russia. and the British alignment with France. prccludcd any

deepening commitment between the two po\Vers.1 1 Meanwhile. in Portugal, l'rom late 1832 to the end of 1833. the king. Dom Pedro had been besieged by Dom Miguel. at first in Oporto and later in Lisbon. 12 The Portugese war. like the Spanish confliet. involved a disputed succession and was also to 'have an impact on the European alliances. Britain, Spain and Franc:: preferred to see Dom Pedro succeed, thereby ensuring the establishment of a constitutional monarchy, whereas the eastern powers favoured the accession of Miguel, who represented the forces of traditionalism. 13 When Palmerston received the news of the death of Ferdinand of Spain on the 8th October, 1833, Vial, the Spanish minister,

9The Hon. D. Broderick and J. Fotheringham. The poUlica! History oF En~land. Vol. XI. London. 1906. pp.211-212. IOW. Cargill. Mehmet AU Lord palmerslon Russia and France. London. 1840. p.16. IIWebster. VoU, p.349. 12Ibid.• p.370. • 13Burgess. p.6. 5

announced that he thought a civil war would immediately ensue and • that Don Carlos would go to Toledo and declare himself king. Carlos however, went to Portugal to aid Dom Miguel in return for the

latter's assistance against Christina, the queen regent of Spain.! 4 Palmerston's attitude towards the news prophetically summed up

the events which would come to take place: '.. .1 think the Christinos will carry the day, but if Carlos makes an attempt, there will be a

reaction, and it will end in constitutionalising Spain'.1 5 Britain was concerned for the fate of the Iberian Peninsula. Palmerston, already determined ta encourage the growth of Iiberalism on the continent, believed that it was in the best interests of Britain to defeat the forces of absolutism in the Peninsular. 16 When news came in December, 1833, that the Spanish government wanted to work with Britain in order to expel Dom Miguel and Don Carlos from Portugal,I7 Palmerston then took the first step that would ultimately lead to intervention in Spain and began the initiative for the negotiation of the Quadruple Alliance. Lord Palmerston held a firm conviction that support of Iiberalism in Spain was in the best interests of Britain. The three principal eastern powers of Russia, Prussia and Austria, had pledged their mu tuai co-operation in stemming the tide of the liberal movement in Europe, and as a consequence, had encouraged the

14The Hon. E. Ashley. The Life and Correspondence of Henry John Temple. Yiscounl Palmerslon. London. 1879. p.292. ISlbid.. p.292. 16R. Bullen. 'Party Politics and Foreign Policy: Whigs. Tories and Iberian Mfairs. 1830·6' in Bulletin of lhe Institule of Hjslorjcal Research. Vol. I. London. 1978. p.4S . • 17Ibid.. p.44. 6

Carlists. 18 In response to the ai ms of the eastern powers. Lord • Palmerston called for a "Western Confederacy of free states as a counterpoise to the Eastern League of arbitrary governments." Both Britain and France hoped for stability in Spain. The culmination uf that interest resulted in the trcaty of the Quadruple Alliance in 1R34. of the constitutional monarchies of Britain. France. Spain and

Portugal. 19 The problem of the eastern question and the commitment of Russia, Prussia and Austria at Munchengratz, to defend against the spread of the liberal movement. was in large part responsible for the formation of the western alliance. Bringing together the constitutional powers of Britain, France. Spain and Portugal, the treaty of the Quadruple Alliance was to have as its immediate purpose, the protection of constitutionalism in Spain. The treaty was engineered by Palmerston and signed on the 22 April. 1834.20 The treaty called upon the constitutional monarchies of Spain and Portugal to unite their forces to compel Don Carlos and Dom Miguel to quit Portugal, and for France to close her borders to the Carlists. For Britain, the immediate commitment stipulated that:

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great 8ritain and lreland engages to furnish her Calholic Majesty [Queen Christina] such supplies of arms and warlike stores as her Majesty may require, and further to assist her Majesty if necessary, with a naval force.21

18Webster, Vol. 1. p.349. 19Ibid.. p.390. 20Brjtjsb Parljamentary Papers. LI. 299, 1834. • 21Hansard's Parljamentary Debales. 3rd Series, Vol. 28. London, 1835, p.1134. 7

• Malters changed quickly thereafter in Portugal, where the effect of the trear.y became decisive. The Spanish force defeated Miguel' s army and Don Carlos surrendered to British naval authorities in the Tagus, agreeing to voluntary exile in England. Captain Napier, in charge of the constitutionalist fleet. destroyed Miguel's flotilla and returned victorious to Oporto.22 The Quadruple Alliance had proved its effectiveness by denying Miguel the throne and by forcing Carlos out of Portugal. Palmerston was delighted with the quick defeat of Dom Miguel and, writing to his brother on the 18th. June. said:

Nothing ever did so weil as the Quadruple Treaty; it has ended a war [in Portugal] which might otherwise have lasted months' •...Carlos is come to London and will remain here.23

However. Palmerston's satisfaction did not last long. The defeat of the traditionalist forces in Portugal had done little to dispel the popular support for Don Carlos in his own country. When news arrived that the pretender to the Spanish throne had eluded his captors in England. Palmerston had cause to be concerned. For within a fortnight. Don Carlos had slipped back to Navarre in Northern Spain. to head the Biscayan rebellion which had already begun.24

22Ashley. p.298. 23Sir H. Max.well. The Lire and Lellers of Geo[l:e William Frededck FOU[lh Ead of Cla[endon. London. 1913. p.87. • 241bid.• p.88. 8

The people of the Basque provinces and Navarre had revolted • against the centralising tendencies of the Madrid government, which sought to remove their traditional 'fueros', or privileges. ln a short time Don Carlos had succeeded in bringing together the forces of the Basques and those of his 'Royalist' allies. On the IOth, July, he raised his standard in Navarre and elicited the moral support of the castern powers. With a considerable part of the local population on his side, Carlos vigorously resumed the offensive and looked as if he was about to embarrass the western powers with a victory for traditionalism.25 To Palmerston, the escape of Carlos and his refusai to acknowledge the moral force of the Quadruple Alliance, was a great setback. Palmerston at once thought of declaring war on the Carlists in order to exercise the right of blockade, but declined to follow such a course that would inevitably lead to an escalation of the war. At that time also support in Cabinet for his stance on the the affairs of the Peninsula, was diminishing. Stanley, Graham and Rippon; Palmerston's chief allies. resigned over the question of the revenues of the Irish church. Lord Grey followed suit on the IOth July, 1834, to be replaced by Melbourne as the new Prime Minister.26 In parliament, Palmerston came under attack for his foreign policy with regard to the Peninsula, which was now viewed by many as a failure. Sorne Whigs openly decried the usefulness of supporting the Spanish monarch. Lord Holland, an outspoken critic, was quick to voice his opinion by stating that foreign wars had traditionally been

25Burgess, p.9. • 26Webster, Vol.t. pAO\. 9

an excuse for domestic repression by the Tories and the crown. • Cobden, the Radical, echoed the sentiments of Holland, and went further in his condemnation of interference in the affairs of other countries by stating that, 'the battle plain is the harvest field of the

aristocracy, watered with the blood of the people'.2 7 Matters were further complicated by the large amount of sympathy shown in the British parliament for the cause of the Basques. King William IV himself had expressed his dissatisfaction that, 'the Spanish government can find no way of making an amicable arrangement with the population of Navarre and Biscay' and believed that it was evident that, 'the insurgents are not fighting for Carlos...but for their local privileges.. .'28 Palmerston became increasingly aware that the future of the Quadruple Alliance depended in large measure on the ability to succeed in Spain. He favoured another show of force but did not want to provoke the direct intervention of France. The French had always been ready to intervene overtly in Spain to ensure political stability, but Palmerston was aware that parliament and British public opinion, were against any such action by France. The Cabinet was afraid that the French would move into Spain without first concurring with Britain.29 Meanwhile, the queen regent and her government were suffering from the adverse public opinion generated by the failure of the British and French to keep Don Carlos from Spain. Villiers, Britain's

27J. Snyder, Mylbs of Empire, New York, 1991, pp.182-183. 28Websler. Vol.l. p.404• • 29Ibid., p.403. 10

Ambassador in Spain, wrote to the Foreign Secretary on the 27th • July, 1834, asking that something be done by the British and French governments to show that the cause of the queen had not been abandoned. The Carlists had amassed a large force in the north where, as Villiers described, ' ...the queen' s person is odious. The monks have persuaded the people that she is atheistical and a republican, that she has not enough force to crush the rebellion.'30 The Spanish government, aware that the queen's cause was in jeopardy and that no further support was forthcoming from cithcr Britain or France, claimed that the presence of Don Carlos in Spain meant that the treaty of the Quadruple Alliance was unfulfilled. This provoked Talleyrand, the French minister, to elicit from the Spanish a list of their needs in terms of armaments and men. It was this action which led to additional articles of the treaty being drawn up. The additional articles of the Quadruple treaty required that Britain furnish arms, stores, ships and a naval forces to the Christinos. France engaged herself to actively prevent munitions and supplies from reaching the Carlists and to deter thè passage of men across her border. Portugal, a reluctant partner in the struggle, agreed to commit what troops she could spare in support of the queen. 31 It was the implementation of these articles on the 18th August, 1834 which eventually led Palmerston to convince the king to support the suspension of the Foreign Enlistment Act, and thereby enable recruitment for the British Auxiliary Legion to take place.

30c. Greville, The Greyille Mr~. New York, 1875. p.226. • 31 Parliameptary Paliers. LI. 307. 1835. 1 1

Palmerston had agreed to the additional articles of the treaty, • which signalled a deepening commitment for Britain, but his action was not met wi th widespread approval. Resistance in the British parliament to the Quadruple Treaty itself, had been strong since its inception. The treaty had in fact been in force before its presentation to parliament, as the Whigs had hoped that its hasty application

might forestall any criticism or debate.3 2 The Quadruple treaty represented Whig ideals and was an open repudiation of the policy which the Duke of Wellington had previously pursued. Wellington, a respected force in parliament, and unknowingly soon to be Foreign Secretary, had forcefully vented his opposition to Palmerston's policy as early as January, 1834. He stated that he thought the affairs of Spain would possibly terminate in the success of the queen, but only by her opposing liberalism. He was convinced that the introduction of liberal principles would cause her downfall.33 As a major representative of the Tory attitude toward foreign policy, Wellington held the opinion that the natural allies of Britain were Prussia and Austria. He believed that French aggrandisement was a greater threat than Carlism in the Peninsula, and that il was essential for Britain to maintain her eastern allies as a counterbalance to French power. In Wellington's view, the Quadruple treaty represented not only a defiance of the old allies of Britain, but also a severance from the principle of non-intervention. The Tories,

32Bullen, p.37. • 330reville. p.2 t O. 12

fearful of the French and indifferent to the constitutional movement • in Spain. favoured a policy of strict neutrality.J 4 In a short while, Wel1ington gained an opportunity to put into practice his own policy. The Melbourne administration of the 1834 session drew to a close with the resignations of half of the Cabinet. King William IV, on the 14th November. 1834, had Iittle choice but to call upon Robert Peel to lead the country. This meant that Wellington would once again dictate policy as the new Foreign Secretary. in a new Tory government.35 However. the short Tory interregnum under Peel produced little by way of change, to affairs in Spain. Wellington, after taking up his new position. sought to reduce tensions with the eastern powers and avoid a continuous commitment in the Peninsula.36 While continuing to respect the conditions of the Quadruple treaty as put in place by his predecessor. Wel1ington maneuvered carefully towards a path that would return Britain to a position of neutrality with regard to the Spanish conflict. In an atmosphere of optimism. Wellington sent Lord Eliot and Colonel Wylde to Spain. to seek an agreement between the warring parties to respect the lives of prisoners. Ostensibly, Wellington had hoped t'lat a negotiated seulement could be reached to end the war. However, in April, 1835, just before the negotiations had terminated. the Tory government fell, causing the Whigs to return to power.

34Bullen, p.49. 35J.Hall, England and the Orleans Mooarchy. London, 1912. p.IS3. • 36Bullen, p.52. 1 3

Palmerston, after his sojourn in opposition, found himself once more • at the he lm of control in foreign affairs.3 7 Although Eliot's overtures proved a failure in terms of ending the

war, 38 he did in fact sLicceed in negotiating the convention which would be named after him, providing for the protection of the lives of prisoners on both sides. However, the Eliot Convention, it would later be revealed, was not applicable to foreign prisoners, due to the newly issued Durango Decree of Don Carlos. Under this decree all foreigners participating in the war who fell into the hands of the Carlists, and this would later include members of the British Legion, were to be summarily executed.39 On his return to office, Palmerston viewed the situation in Spain with sorne trepidation. Eliot, being encouraged to complete his mission, sent an unfavourable report on the situation of the constitutionalist forces, claiming that their position was desperate.40 Carlism now looked on the verge of succeeding. The Christino forces, having been poorly led~ were low in morale and the Carlist armies were making sufficient gains to cause consternation. Don Carlos, by cementing the dual aims of succession to the crown together with the defence of traditional fueros, had gathered such considerable support among the general population, that an escalation of the war now seemed inevitable.

37lbid.. p.55. 38Maxwell. p.89 39The threat of the Durango Decree added to the brutality of the war. Palmerston, no doubt, had the well.being of the British Legion in mind when he later sought to convince the Spanish government to avoid savage reprisais against the Carlists. He hoped that more humane forms of warfare would be adopted by ail parties. • 40Bullen. p.55. 14

• Carlism allied two different social groups under a common goal. On the one hand there were aristocrats. ex-officers l'rom Ferdinand's army and members of the c1ergy; on the other hand there were the regional peasantries of the Basque provinces. Navarre and parts of Catalonia. Carlism. as a response to the spread of liberalism. was an example of a traditionalist movement which stressed the importance of established institutions.41 lt linked the defence of the Church against the secular tendencies of liberalism. together with the protection of regional rights l'rom the central regime. Being primarily a rural movement, Carlism drew its chief support l'rom the small

towns which felt menaced by the spread of urban society.4 2 The political leaders of the Carlists were Don Carlos and his ecclesiastical supporters, but the military chiefs were mostly former officers of the late king Ferdinand VlI.43 They acceptcd the ideology of Don Carlos. who advocated a return to a traditional monarchy and respect for institutions, whilst at the same time working in close unison with the values of the Catholic Church. Coupled with these ideais was an inherent dislike of the 'town' by the 'country'. and foremost in the minds of the antagonists became the protection of the fueros of the Basque provinces and Navarre.44 The 'fueros' were privileges which the Basque people had sought to maintain by supporting Don Carlos. They paid no taxes to the

41 A.Wilhelmsen, 'The Political Thought of the Pretender Don Carlos'. in ~ Consortium on Revolutionary Europe 1750-1850. ed.. W. Spencer. Georgia. 1985, p.164. 42S. Payne. Basque Nationalism, Nevada. 1975. p.42. 43Carr, p.187. • 44C. Marichal. Spain 1834-1844. London. 1977, p.114. 15

crown and had free trade in the region. The Basques also possessed • their own patrimonial laws and had exemption from conscription into the regular army. Il was feared th al lhese privileges would be forfeited under liberalism. The origin of the fueros can be lraced back to the end of the 12th century when the Cortes, or assembly of estates of the realm, was formed. The monarch of each separale kingdom generally summoned the Corles when he felt the need of co-operation on matters of urgency or importance. The Cortes was generally made up of three estates, consisting of nobles, the clergy and the people. It was to the third estate of the people, or commoners, that the fueros were granted; the sovereigns, seeing the value of an industrious peasantry and good artisans, encouraged these classes by donations of land and exemptions, thus creating the system of privileges or fueros.45 The predominant attitude in the early part of the 19th century in the Basque provinces had been the protection of fueros, or regional rights and customs. The fueros represented an assertion of traditional autonomy from the Spanish central government, and embodied a reverence for local legislation put in place by Spain's various regions.46 The uniqueness of the Basque region itself was signified by the demarcation point between Spain proper and the Basque territories on the Ebro river, where Spanish tariffs and duties were applied. Thus there was an attitude of independence inherent in Basque culture, which was also strongly reinforced by the exemption from supplying men to the Spanish army.

45W. Walton. Revolutions of Spain 1808-1836, London, 1837, p.12. 46A. Wilhelmsen, 'Carlos VII or an Introduction to Carlism', in Iberian Studies • Vol.VIIJ, University of Keele, 1979, p.34. 16

Since the time of the unification of Castile and Aragon unJer • Isabella and Ferdinand in the 15th century. the people of the Basque provinces and Navarre had been excluùed l'rom military service in Spain. They viewed their allegiance tl) the central monarch of Spain as a contractual agreement for the purposcs of dcfencc. [n Vizcaya, which provides a good example of the rights and privileges enjoycd by the Basques. funds in support of the central state were raised by voluntary donation. Any requests for men for military service in Spain depended on the approval of the local Juntas.47 The Juntas were an important factor in the Basque regional government and helped to keep in check the corregidores. who were royal appointees in charge of the supervision of local districts. The Juntas would meet biannually and be charged with apportioning local taxes; they wouId also grant counsel to the representatives of the royal administration and ratify royal decrees.48 However. the corregidores. as representatives of the. central monarch, frequently came into conflict with the Juntas. who they believed to be corrupted and under the control of powerful rural magnates. ln Vizcaya, the corregidores brought the matter of abuses by the Juntas, to the attention of the centr:&! government. The government used the occasion to denounce the right of foraI privileges and their abuses, and set in place measures for reform of the forai system.49 By November, 1833. the reshaping of the civic administration of Spain into 51 provinces, had taken place. The new royal statute

47R. Barahona. Vizeaya on the Eve of CarlisID. Nevada. 1989. pp.18-19. 48Payne. p.19. • 49Barahona. p.14. 17

which followed in early 1834, effaced the right of inJependent • Basque legal systems and took away their thcir constitutional autonomy. The establishment of a new system and uniform structure for the government of all of Spain's provinces, amounted to the elimination of the traditional fueros. so For the following five years, Spanish government policy was to oscillate between sorne form of compromise on the question of fueros and a tougher approach with regard to Basque demands. However, the immediate result of the new structure in 1834 was an imposition of martial law in the Basque areas which fell under the control of the Madrid government. The Christino commanders of these regions were then authorised to make arrests, confiscate property and hold summary executions of prisoners. It was partly as a result of these measures and the cancellation of forai rights which caused renewed

resistance on the part of the Basques.s 1

In the early spring of 1834, the successes of the Carlist soldiers caused the prestige of Don Carlos and his lieutenant general, Zumalacarregui, to grow quickly. Almost every army sent against the Carlists was defeated. As a consequence, the insurrection was imbued with new vigor and spread rapidly to parts of Catalonia. Aragon and Valencia. By April 1835, the almost complete occupation of the four Basque areas had been accomplished by the Carlists, leaving the way

open for an attempt on the capital, Madrid.S 2

SOPayne, p.44. SI Ibid., p.44. 52E. Chrisliansen, The Orieins of Mililary Power in Spain 1800-1854. London, • 1967, p.52. 18

CaUs were once again made by the Spanish liberals for foreign • help. The implementation of the additional articles of the Quadruple treaty had failed to contain the Carlists and it now seemed as if direct intervention in Spain was essential in order to prevent a victory for Carlos. It was amid these appeals that Palmerston resumed his duties at the Foreign Office in April. 1835. The Spanish Civil War had now created a need for a definite course of action by Britain and was about to have a profound effect on foreign policy and debate on policy. Through agitation in parliament and the workings of the British press. the Whigs. Tories and Radicals wou Id each try to influence the public mind for support on the issue of Spanish affairs. As newspapers and periodicals continued reportlng on the war in Spain. the foreign policy of Lord Palmerston was to be hotly debated and become subject to the close scrutiny and force of public opinion, as never before.

• 19 • Chapter 2 The Press and policy

The press has been the instrument by which the fortunes of Britain have been shaken; by which its old constitution has been overturned...Public opinion has been so powerful. the class of electors has become so numerous, that by no means less universal than this mighty agent can the powers of evil be successfully combated.

(edit0 ria1 from ""B""I...a".c....k..w..,oOl-'o...d"'--·s"--.--JE"'-lo!.d.LinlLll.bJ.!u.Lr.l:.1.Ih Mal:azine. July, 1832)1

By 1835 the newspaper Press had grown to exert a considerable influence on the public mind and the body politic. The widening of the franchise had contributed to an increase in the power of public opinion.2 In London, where political speculation was at the heart of newspapers' interests, politicians were careful not to ignore the force of the press. The dilemma of both the Tories and the Whigs, in the face of an extended franchise, was that of attracting public opinion without compromising their own aristocratie tendeneies.3 Through its affect on public opinion, the press in turn guided the response of government in the shaping of domestie and foreign poliey. The government of the day, being highly sensitive to eritieism,

1BJackwood's Edinburllh Mallazjne, July. 1832, p.356. 2p. Kennedy, The Djp10macy Of Imperialjsm. Glasgow, 1981, p.52. 3N. Gash. Reaclion and Reconstruclion in EOlllish PoUtjcs 1832-1852. Oxford. • 1965. pp.119-122. 20

sought to manuevre around the press and, as far as possible, avoid • confrontation with dissent.4 So powerful indeed were the criticisms of the press, that governments could fall on the strength of public outcry induced by their columns. Such was the case in July, 1834, when, on the resignation of Earl Grey, The Times was more forward and persistent in its attacks on the ailing government. hastening its downfall.s The power of public opinion loomed large over the House of Commons. affecting ail its members.6 Politicians. being awarc thut they could suffer at the hands of a scurrilous article designcd to discredit them. took careful precautions to get the press on their sidc. The most successful politicians. such as Palmerston. were those who learned to manipulate the press in their favour. Many newspapers possessed a political allegiance which had helped to increase their own status. These were susceptible to government influence because of the subsidies, official advertisements and carly information which they received. Politicians frequently aired their own views through articles or information fed to their supporters among the press. A letter or an article sent to a friendly newspaper or journal was a means by which politicians communicated to the public. to foreign powers and to one another.7 On Palmerston's return to the Foreign Office in April. 1835. political instability at home and the force of public opinion required

4P. Hollis. The Pauper Press. Oxford University Press, 1970. p.26. SH. Boume, EniHsh Newspapers. Vo1.2. London, 1887. p.74. 60ash. p.121 • 75. Koss. The Bise and Fall of the Politiea! Press in Bétain. London. 1981, p.9. 2 1

a delicatc framing of foreign policy. Circumstances in Spain were • growing to occupy an important place in the public interest, with news of the Carlist advances and their occupation of the Basque tcrritorics, being reported on regularly. In May, 1835, The Mornjng

Ch r 0 nie 1e published an extract of a letter from a private correspondent in Cadiz, commenting on the urgency of affairs in Spain:

The political condition of Spain gets worse rapidly. Lord Eliot's mission has damaged the queen's cause seriously. The Carlinos [Carlists] are ail joy at it: the liberais of ail shades, are indignant...I see no salvation for the queen's cause except in the aid of a French army;...astonishing how ignorant England is of the real state of Spain and the character of her people.8

What had begun as a revoit in Northern Spain in 1833, had now become a full scale civil war, and consequently demanded a decisive policy on the part of Britain. It became cIear to Palmerston that it was no longer possible to support the aims of the Quadruple treaty, as Wellington had done,9 without recourse to sorne form of intervention. Villiers, Britain's ambassador in Spain, had been anxious to show British military support for Christina and her government, feeling that any time lost in so doing would enable Don Carlos to further

8MQrnjn& ChrQnjcle. 4th, June, 1835. 9WellingtQn. in his brief term in Qffice, had cQntinued tQ respect the terms Qf the Quadruple treaty, but steered a course of cautious nQn-intervention. He permilled British ships to blockade the Biscayan ports, but no further • assistance was given to the Spanish military forces. 22

profit l'rom the momentum gained by his recent victories. Villiers • had hinted that a force of men was needed in Spain to show that Britain was really prepared to back up the aims of the Quadruple treaty. He also indicated that quick action were required in order to avert a defeat of the constitutionalists. However, although Palmerston clearly understood, as did Villiers, the benefits which intervention in the Peninsula wouId bring, he also was acutely aware of the pitfalls of folIowing such a course. Palmerston therefore remained reluctant to commit himself to Villiers' recommendations at that time, knowing also that there was little support in parliament for any action which wouId involve British troops in Spain. An editorial in the Morninl: Post warned against continued support of the queen regent by the western powers, citing British and French aid as the sole cause of the escalation of the Spanish conflict:

The avowed object of the Quadruple treaty was the restoration of internai peace in the Peninsula, but as regards Spain the experiment has now been tried for more th an a year without effect. The sphere of the civil war has in fact been extended by foreign interferenee. 1o

However, when news came that the queen regent and her government were formulating an official request for direct intervention by Britain and France in order to end the war, it beeame evident that Britain could no longer brush aside the Spanish question

• IOThe MOrD;n" post, 5th, June, 1835. 23

and that she would be pushed to change her policy with regard to the war. 11 • 1 : Palmerston at once came under intense pressure in parliament to relinquish Britain's obligations to Spain for fear of deepening her involvement in a foreign war. He was cal1ed upon to revert to the traditional position of neutrality with regard to foreign affairs. The Radicals attacked Palmerston by claiming that his foreign policy was in keeping with the conspiracy of the old order; a continuation of the Concert of Europe whereby aristocratie regimes sought to prevent change. They deemed that the liberalist cause would be hurt by foreign governments taking sides and believed that the liberal movement as a whole would be better served through its own unaided establishment in Spain. 12 Faced with lack of support in Cabinet and temporarily bowing to pressure, Palmerston decided once more to fend off requests from Villiers, Britain's ambassador, for a show of force in Spain. 13 Lord Palmerston's resumption of dulies at the Foreign Office had marked a return to the former Whig policy with regard to Spain. Foremost in Palmerston's mind had been the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe by supporting the constitutionalists in Spain. However. refusaI to comply with the new Spanish demands for direct assistance under the additional articles of the Quadruple treaty, caused a weakening of the queen's position and left the way open for the French to take a controlling interest in Spain. Neither

Il Burgess. p.11. 12A. Taylor. The TrQubJemakers. London. 1951. p.33 • 13Hall. p. J86 24

situation was desirable. Above a11, direct intervention by the French • army in Spain was not in British interests and might also provoke a head on confrontation with the eastern powers. An editorial appearing in The Mornin~ Chronjcle on the IOth. June, after discussing the liberalist point of view, drew attention to the possible dangers associated with French intervention in Spain. The editorial also succinctly echoed the Radicals' viewpoint on the establishment of liberalism abroad by pointing out the weakness of legitimacy of those governments which rely too heavily on foreign help:

...Let us suppose for a moment that a French army marched into Navarre and Biscay...and paralysed the movements of the insurgents; what would be the result? The latter would be dispersed but not conquered...being prepared to give up the contest by a foreign force. they [the Carlists] wouId claim the victory over the Spanish forces arrayed against them; the very name of Don Carlos wouId becorne identified with the wounded pride of Spain; a11 the sentiment of the nation wouId be enlisted on his side. and against the government of a nation who could maintain her throne only by foreign bayonets. 14

In parliament, debates on the •Spanish question' were fierce. Sorne members, such as Lord Grey, favoured further assistance to the queen regent, while others wished to see Britain remain impartial. Palmerston, standing firm in his defence of the Quadruple treaty, nonetheless refused to commit British troops to the Peninsula. The • 14Mornjoi Cbroojcle. 1Dtb. Juoe.1835. 2S

'Spanish question' became a major topic of interest for the informed • public. Sorne private correspondence of the time reveals the preoccupation with the affairs of the Peninsula. Lady Cowper, later to become Lady Palmerston, wrote to Princess Lieven, wife of the Russian ambassador, saying:

We are worried by the affairs of Spain, but there will be no intervention and we have no desire. Those Spaniards must take courage and defend themselves, and the majority must not yield to the minority - that would really be shamefuI...I understand Lord Grey differs From our Government in this respect he would Iike to send ail possible aid to the Queen. 15

Palmerston wanted to uphold liberalism and the aims of the Quadruple treaty, as indeed, his own reputation was closely linked with its success. However, Palmerston feared that support for any direct military intervention in Spain, would not be forthcoming From the Cabinet. When a formai request for troops was then received From the Spanish government, together with a strong endorsement From Villiers, increasing pressure was put on Palmerston to act and to respond favourably. It was then that he entertained the idea that sorne form of expeditionary force, in unison with the French, might uphold the purposes of the Quadruple treaty and yet not embroil England directly in the war. Aided in part by the French Prime Minister, Broglie, Palmerston set about drafting a scheme in early June, 1835, whereby Spanish

15Lord Sudley, The Ljeveo-Palmersloo Correspoodeoce. J828-1856. • London.1943. p.87. 26

demands for troops could be met without recourse to the power of • the British or French regular armies. 16 The proposed plan sought to offset British fears over French domination of the Peninsulll if li powerful French army were sent south of the Pyrenees: the French for their part, appeared satisfied at not having to commit themsclves too deeply in the affairs of Spain at that time. 17 Agreement was thus reached between the two governments on a form of indirect intervention in Spain to aid the constitutionalists. Following a request from the Spanish ambassador, General Alava, to raise a force of 10,000 men in Britain, it was suggested that if France were to supply her Foreign Legion to Spain, then a similar force might be raised in England for Spanish service. However, in order for such a force to be formed in England, as there was no such force in being, the Foreign Enlistment Actl8 must first be suspended, and that required an Order in Council, signed by the king. Palmerston decided to approach the king and explain the need for sorne form of intervention in Spain, putting forward his own plan which had been worked out with Broglie, as the solution to the problem. After sorne consultation, King William, indecisive at first, gradually became convinced of the wisdom of the scheme. The king, realising the consequences if Britain were to act directly in Spain,

16K. Bourne, Palmerston. The Early Years 1784-1841, New York, 1982, p.553 17Hall, pp.I77-l78. 18The Foreign En\istment Act was first introduced in July, 1819. 1t was designed to prevent British subjects from entering into foreign service. At that time many ex-servicemen became soldiers of fortune in the wars for Latin American independence. One such regiment, which was also known as the British Legion, was raised before the act came into effect. This regiment achieved notable success under the command of Bolivar, but was \ittle reported on in the British Press. For a detailed account of their exploits see Hasbrouck's, • Forei"n Le"ionaries in the Liberation of Latin America, New York, 1928. 27

came out in favour of the form of intervention proposed by • Palmerston. Thus on the IOth June, 1835, the very day on which Lady Cowper had addressed her letter to Princess Lieven, the king assented to grant an Order in Council suspending the Foreign Enlistment Act for a period of two years, thereby permitting the formation of the British Legion. 19 It was agreed that the British Legion formed by Alava would become a Spanish force, to be paid for by the Spanish Government and subject to the orders of Spanish generals.20 The British Legion was mandated to remain in Spain for a period of two years. However, in spite of Royal approval having been given, there was to be strong opposition in parliament, and in the press, to such a force being formed. The decision to grant aid to the queen regent in the shape of a force of men, signalled a dramatic departure from the habituai policies of the British and French governments. Until the time of the Order in Council, the principle of non interference in the affairs of other states, had been an accepted rule. In Britain, Palmerston knew that it wouId be difficult to gain acceptance in parliament for the proposed scheme of indirect intervention, even though he had the support of the king. In France, Talleyrand, the foreign minister, faced as much difficulty as Palmerston in promoting the idea. Forced to justify the sudden reversai on the poliey of non-interference by his own government, Talleyrand sought to pass off the term 'non-interference' as, 'a

19Burgess, p.17. • 2oIbid.. p.34. 28

metaphysical and political word which signifies more or less the • same thing as intervention'! 21 Once permission had been granted in England to raise a force for Spanish service, the next task facing Palmerston was to lïnd a suitable leader. Although it appears that Palmerston already had his choice in view, he knew that tacit approval of his selection wouId be difficult to obtain from within the ranks of the regular army. The Tories had deplored the idea of intervention in Spain in support of liberalism and the Duke of Wellington, one of the outstanding critics of Palmerston's foreign policy, still commanded considerable influence and respect among the regular forces. Nonetheless, Palmerston decided to not to change his view on his preferred candidate. He felt that, in order for the expeditionary force to be effective, it was necessary to select a leader who wou Id be acceptable to Spanish authorities and at the same time be prepared to fight for liberal values. That individual should also possess the requisite experience as a soldier to be able to repuIse the threat of the Carlists. The choice fell upon George de Lacy Evans, Radical M. P. for Westminster and veteran of Wellington's Peninsular campaign. News of Evans' selection as commander of the British Legion, spread quickly around London. Many were unhappy that Evans, and not a higher ranking officer, had been chosen as the leader of the British Auxiliary Legion. Among the newspapers, only the Mornjnl: Chronjcle, on the day after the Order in Council had been issued, responded promptly to the appointment by giving its full support to the Radical M. P. in stating: • 21 Hall, p.180. 29

ft gives us sincere pleasure to be able to stal.e • that the Command in Chief of this force will be intrusted to one of the most gallant officers in our service, who greatly distinguished himself in the Peninsula, and whose perfect knowledge of the country will enable him to conduct this expedition in the most satisfactory manner...22

However, the adoption of Evans as leader of the British Legion was by no means a preference to be shared by ail. Evans, as a Radical member of parliament, had been outspoken on European affairs and had managed to provoke the ire of sorne of his colleagues. His Anti Russian campaign had drawn him to the centre of Radical politics in Britain. In the Portugese war he was strongly in favour of sending British troops in support of his friend, Captain Napier;23 a course of action which was frowned upon by other Radicals. With regard to Spain, Evans had openly expressed his support for the Spanish heiress, Isabella II. against the Carlist faction. Evans had also worked for the repeal of the Foreign Enlistment Act before its temporary suspension by the king in 1835.24 The confirmation of Evans as commander of the British Legion was largely the result of Palmerston's recommendation to King William:

Viscount Palmerston, therefore, would humbly submit. that (although he is far from agreeing with Colonel Evans on a variety of points) there is nothing, as far as he is aware.

22Mornipi CbropieJe. 1!th, June, 1835. 23Hapsard, 1833, p.303. • 24Burgess, p.29. 30

in the political tenets of that officer which should justly disqualify him from being • empioyed in any military c::apacity for which his professional qualities might render him fit. 2S

In fact, Evans was admirably suited from Palmerston's point of view, to lead the Legion in Spain. Evans embodied the cause of liberalism and had already shown himself adamantly in favour of British military intervention. For this reason Palmerston. on the subject of the British Legion, emphasised in his letter to the king the importance of selecting men who would be sympathetic to the intended mission:

...It IS therefore essential that the officers who may be employed on the present occa~ion, should be men of Liberal opinions; because if they should be persons at ail favourable to the cause of Don Carlos, or even lukewarm to that of the Queen, they wouId be immediately exposed to every kind of suspicion on the part of the officers of the Queen's army: and distrust and dissension would inevitably lead to failure.26

Thus, the granting of the Order in Council augured weil at the outset of Palmerston's decision, and dl: Lacy Evans seemed an appropriate choice to lead the Legion; that choice having been supported by both William IV and General Alava of Spain. However, subsequent debates on Spain and the events surrounding the British

2SPaimerston to William IV in Webster, Vol. Il, p.809.8tO. • 26Webster, Vol. II, p.809. 3 1

Legion's raie in Spain, were soon to bring resounding criticisms in the • British Press over Palmerston's policy and Evans' handling of the war. The House of Commons remained divided not only on Britain's support of liberalism in the Peninsula, but on the question of the efficacity of an auxiliary force of men, paid for by the Spanish government, and under the command of an outspoken Radical M. P.

• 32 • Chapter 3

pQ1jtical CQnsequences and the Liberal Crllsade

AlthQugh RQyal apprQval Qf the fQrmatiQn Qf the British LegiQn had been given. there was strong oppositiQn in par1jament to such a force and many questioned the suitability Qf Evans as its leader. The Duke Qf WellingtQn openly disapproved Qf the plan and. perhaps due to his experience in the Peninsula eampaign against the armies of Napoleon. was reluctant to see British sQldiers Qnce again cQmmiUed to fight in Spain.1 ReactiQn in the British Press tQ the Order in COllncil was mixed. The MQrnine PQst. espousing WeJJingtQn's view Qf QPpositiQn tQ interventiQn in Spain. at first SQught to deride Evans and the British Legion:

...what kind Qf reception. we ask. can Qur deluded cQuntrymen expect in Spain? On every side they wiJ! be surrounded by a hostile PQPulation...CQIQnel Evans' splendidly equipped vQlunteers may be safe in BilbaQ. but let them penetrate intQ the interior. and their BQnd Street uniforms will no longer protect them.2

ICarr. p.155. • 2Ibe Mornjo& POSI. 131b. June. 1835. 33

Further comments from the MQrninl: PQst warned against any • interference in the Peninsula by the British and French, pQinting Qut that, 'We cannot admit the right Qf eithcr England or France to meddle in the Spanish cQntest' and that ....the Spanish nation has an unquestionable right to be the sQle judges'.3

The Ti mes, Qn the date of the Order in CQuncil, attempting 10 put forward an objective view of the situation, stated plainly that the British people WQuid nQt suppQrt the planned initiative tQ send a batta(iQn to Spain:

Whether England should accede to such an enterprise...we shaH not here Qffer an Qpinion; to any active participation in the land warfare, this whole kingdom would at once object..,France and England should confine themselves within the limits of the additional articles [of the treaty].4

This first stance taken by The Times in response to the Order in Council was foHowed two weeks later by a firmer appraisal of the situation in Spain and an interpretation of the wider reaching consequences of intervention:

But is it necessary that any direct assistance of such a nature should be sent from Great Britain to Spain? ..although we give full credit to the king's government and to Colonel Evans for the belief that they are acting up to the spirit of the [Quadruple] treaty - it is not, we say, in the true and fair discharge of the obligations thereby contracted..,but it is from

31bid.. 15th. June, 1835. • 4Tbe Times. 1Dth, June, 1835. 34

no other motive than to assist the queen of • Spain in making an unjust war upon the Basques...and the possibility at least of an European war created.s

In parliament Palmerston defended the forming of the Legion against the attacks of Lord Aberdeen and other Tories. who voiced strong criticisms over allowing General Alava to raise a ballalion in England. Many M. P.'s thought that interference in Spain would lead to an escalation of the war and least of ail did they want to see increased expenditure for such a venture. Palmerston reassured them that he considered the British Legion would soon help to put an end to the war in favour of the constitutionalist side. and that the British taxpayer and businessman would in no way have to pay for the force, as that responsibility wouId fall on the Spanish government.6 Lord Mahon, a staunch opponent of the measure, ci ted that there had never been a precedent for the raising of such a regiment. He forcefully denounced PaImerston's plan by stating that:

From the period of the [English] revolution down to 1819, there was no instance of any individual being authorised by the king's commission to levy armies in England for the service of a foreign power.7

Mahon, further lent weight to his argument by explaining that, in his view, the nature of the Spanish people wouId prevent them from

SIbe Times, 261h. June. 1835. 6J. Ridley, Lord Palmerslon. London. 1970. p.198. • 7Hansard. 1835. pp.1136·1137. 35

accepting a force such as the British Legion, and described of the • Spaniards: ...that from the highest peaks of the Sierra Morena to the shores of the Tagus, national pride and an intense hatred of foreign interference with the politics of their country were cornmon to every one of them.s

Mr. Henry Bulwer rallied to Palmerston's defence by remarking that Britain had already interfered in France when Napoleon escaped from Elba, passing through France to Paris.9 However, Robert Peel, doubting the wisdom of the present course, expressed his fears that other powers might follow the pattern chosen by Britain and France and resort to veiled interference in the affairs of other nations. He· exclaimed, 'What Iimit could be fixed to such a principle? What nation might not find in it the pretext for interfering in the domestic

concerns of another?' 10 Peel also questioned that, if queen Christina's government, as Palmerston had c1aimed, received the popular support of the Spanish people, why could she not succeed without rccourse to foreign assistance? The queen regent was indeed supposed to have had an estimated 54,000 troops at her disposaI. In conclusion, Peel affirmed that he thought that Palmerston's policy had little chance of succeeding. 11

SHaD5ard p.1140. 9lbid.. p.1173. IOlbid.. p.1158. • Illbid., pp. 1158·t t59. 36

Palmerston's justification of the decision to permit Alava to mise u • corps of men in Britain rested on the cluuses of the ugreement between the four western powers. He stated that the Order in Council was an affirmation of the relationship which had already been estublished through the additional articles of the Quadripurtite treaty. Sorne M. P.'s warmed to Palmerston's interpolation of the treaty and shewed their support for the constitutionalist cause, while others expressed concern that Evans' efforts in Spain might seal the fate of the Basques in their allempt to retain their fueras. Lord Mahon, rising in the House, called the attention of the members to the plight of the Basque people in the protection of their rights. Addressing his discourse to Lord Palmerston, Mahon called for a motion to acknowledge the Biscayan traditions, stating:

As almost every member who has spoken l'rom either side has regrelled that the inhabitants of the Basque provinces have lost their ancient privileges, he [Palmerston) will perhaps make sorne representation in their favour. 12

Palmerston nevertheless considered that the support of the constitutional regime in Spain was of the utmost importance but, in the face of a motion agreed to by the majority in the House of Commons, assented to make what representations he could on behalf of the Basques. However, before any kind of restitution of the Basque fueros were to be contemplated by the Madrid government, the war was to take a • 12 Ibid., p.1179. 37

long and arduous course, leading to only partial restoration of their • privileges at the end. The eventual reinstatement of fueros wou Id not take place until the end of the Carlist war at the 'Convenio', or treaty, of Yergara in September, 1839. 13 By that time public opinion would be turned decidedly against the policy which had come to represent Palmerston's Iiberal crusade in Spain, as the remaining men of the Legion returned home, with sorne 4,000 of their number either wounded, missing or dead. The British Auxiliary Legion at the outset, was intended to be double the size of the French Foreign Legion, at sorne 10,000 men. Its commander, George de Lacy Evans, had not been a popular choice. Although distinguished for his Peninsular service, and having been

promoted through three steps of rank within six months, t 4 resentment to his appointment soon arose among the Horse Guards, who wouId have preferred to see a commander selected from among their own ranks. Evans, aware of the situation, was nonetheless eager to take command of the Legion. In keeping with his impetuous nature, which was later to become evident at the first assault in Hernani, Evans firmly committed himself, and the British Legion, to an official arrangement which made the Legion a Spanish Corps and Evans a Lieutenant-General Commander in the Spanish army. As chief of the expeditionary force, the Spanish government agreed to pay him a salary of 5,000 pounds per year. IS Evans also quickly accepted the offer of the Spanish

13Wilhelmsen. 'Carlos VII'. p.29. 14Pictjonary of National Bioiraphy. Oxford. 1960. p.927. ISe. Spiers, Radical General' Sir Georie de Lacy Eyans 1787-1870. Manchester• • 1983. p.65. 38

government to furnish supplies and pay the wages of the men and • their officers. This hasty agreement with the Spanish government may have been made because Evans believed that Palmerston would intervene and grant British aid should the obligations not be fulfilled. 16 There is also reason to suspect that many of the officers of the British Legion were either given assurances by government departments. or encouraged to believe that the British government wou Id guarantee the settlement of wages and claims by its officers. should the Madrid government fail to provide for the men. Certainly there were later to be many recriminations on the part of the men who fought. denouncing their poor treatment at the hands of the Spanish authorities. Recruitment of good fighting men for the British Legion was not to be easy. Apart from resistance from within the ranks of the regular army and the known displeasure of the Horse Guards, Evans found il necessary to lure new recruits to his service with a bounty of two pounds per man,17 and the offer of 'a pound of loaf and one half pound of biscuit. with a large cut of the best beef or mutton, as much

soup as he can use and a jug of porter.' 18 Evans required no medical inspection of the men in the hope of enticing as many as possible to join up. However, there was an immediate problem of finding good officers for the corps.

16Burgess. p.34. 17 Sir. J. Marshall-Cornwall, 'British Aid in the Carlist War: 1835-1840', in Hjslory Today. VoI.XXVI. London. 1976, p.180. • 18Burgess. pAO. 39

Within a few days of the Order in Council, rumour circulated that • certain military personages were against the Legion in principle, and this had the result of dissuading army officers from joining the corps. However, in spite of the difficulties, Evans did manage to recruit sorne officers, although probably not as many as he would have Iiked. Two months after the Order in Council had been implemented, fiftY four officers drawn from the the regular, half-pay or retired ranks of the British army, had joined the Legion. 19 Evans also succceded in enlisting the help of two of his friends, Charles Chichester and William Reid, on whom he could rely as senior officers. However, many of the Legion's officers had no prior experience as officers, and possessed limited military ability.20 The first detachments of the British Legion reached northern Spain on the 10th July, 1835, landing at San Sebastian, Bilbao and Santander on the Bay of Biscay. The number of recruits fell short of the intended 10,000 as originally proposed by General Alava; instead there were only sorne 7,800, comprised mainly of Scots, Irish and Englishmen. An early report from The Tjmes' correspondent stationed with the men, indicated that the legionnaires, in their first week, had integrated well with their Spanish counterparts:

1 have nothing of moment to communicate to you, further than that the greatest harmony and fraternal feeling continue to exist between the English and the Spaniards. Although they can only make. themselves understood by signs, they are continually

191bid.. pAO. • 20Spiers, p.68. 40

seen going about arm in arm with our men, as • if they had been long acquainted.21 The same correspondent, in his despatch a few days later, continued to attest to the good feeling among the men, but began to foresee sorne of the difficulties which Evans and his commanding oflïcers wouId face in creating an efficient fighting force:

Nothing can be better than the way in which these men [the British Legion] are treated here. In fact it is too good, and will make the establishment of anything like discipline among them, an arduous task in any circumstances, very difficult indeed.22

Evans took command of his troops in August at about the same time as the African regiment of the French Foreign Legion arrived at Tarragona in north eastern Spain.23 The French regiment, consisting of sorne 4,000 men, was directed to march northwards and crush the Carlist forces against the wall of the Pyrenees. The paths of the French and British Legions were to cross briefly at Vitoria later on in the war, when they would conduct joint operations under the Spanish generalship. However, by that time two thirds of the British force would be suffering from sickness and almost 1,000 men would be either dying or dead. The fate of the French was to closely parallel that of the British legionnaires in their neglect at the hands of the Spanish authorities.24

21The Times. 21st, July, 1835. 22The Times, 27th, July, 1835. 23 0' Ballanee, E. The StQry Qf the French FQrehm LelliQn, LQndQn, 1961, p.36. • 24Ibid.,p.36. 4 1

Parliament was led to assume that the British Legion, at the time • of landing in Spain, wou Id swing the campaign decidedly in favour of the Christinos and that the Don Carlos would make a quick retreat. It was not fully appreciated at that time just how efficient the Carlist regiments had been in the defence of their territory from the queen's forces. It was believed that a conventional force, professionally trained, would soon put the armies of the Don Carlos to flight. However, Palmerston in writing to Villiers on the 9th July, seemed unaware of the poor fighting quality of the men:

Evans' ten thousand will turn the fate of the war. The Spaniards ought to give him the chief command if he acquits himself weil when he gets to the ground.25

Due to the speed with which the auxiliaries were raised and sent to Spain, many of the recruits lacked discipline. They were also poorly prepared to fight a contest against the rugged Carlist guerillas, who had been used to maneuvring in the mountains where there were small winding roads. Bad weather in the mountainous regions also proved hostile to the movement of large armies and equipment. Don Carlos and his generals had had a !iule over two years of experience fighting the Christinos in sorne of the most difficult and largely inaccessible terrain in the Peninsula. The Mornini Herald confirmed that the men of the British Legion were largely unfit to fight a war against the Car!ists and pressed home the fact that they were not exempt from the Durango Decree:

• 25Spiers. p.68. 42

The whole however are very inefficient • soldiers: not one in twenty ever handled a musket... In the meantime, aH Englishmcn caught are immediately shot, as Carlos and his generals will not allow them to be considered as coming under the protection of the Eliot treaty.26

In the opening of operations on the 30th August, 1835, Lieutenant-Colonel de Lacy Evans led a quick, unprepared attack on the Carlist base of Hernani, just south of the port of San Sebastian. Hernani was an important town for the Carlists due to its strategie emplacement for the smuggling of supplies from the French border and also for its proximity to the port of San Sebastian. The results of the attack were disastrous for the Legion. The Carlists had been able to defend the town by taking long shots at the advancing Auxiliaries from their hilltop positions. General Gomez, the leader of the Carlist fighters, then bore down on the fleeing legionnaires, killing six and wounding twenty.27 Hernani was the first bitter lesson for Evans and he came under severe criticism in the British press for sending his men into action too soon. The Mornini Post was quick to denigrate the efforts of Evans and his men by publishing an unfavourable account of the operation taken from French newspapers:

26MorninK Herard, 10th, August, 1835. 27Thompson, C. Twelye MODlhs in The British LeKion, London, 1836, p.34. Il is most probable that Thompson's estimate of the dead and wounded was less than • the actual number. The Paris newspapers put the figure considerably higher. 43

According to the Quotidienne and the Gazette de France the English Auxiliaries fled on the • first attack of the Carlists and both they and their Christino allies re-entered San Sebastian with a loss of about 40 killed and 200 wounded, including Colonel Chichester, who had vainly attempted to rally his men.28

The day after the attack, Evans issued a General Order, which was later reproduced by a correspondent of the Mornin~ Chronicle, minimising the importance of the operation at Hernani:

In the reconnoisance of yesterday, the Lieutenant-General desires to observe that not a sixth part of the intended strength of the Legion was employed... The movement had no more important object than to exercise the men and seeing the progress of the enemy's entrenchments on the mountains near Hernani,29

According to Charles Thompson, who fought with the Legion, Evans had made an error by attacking with insufficient troops which a regular army unit wouId not have done. Thompson claimed that Gomez and the Carlists wouId have been forced to flee at the sight of the 1st, 3rd and 7th regiments of the British Legion, had they acted in unison with the Spanish forces under General Alava.3 0 Blackwood's Edinbur~h Ma~azine immediately directed biting eritieism towards Palmerston's poliey of 'indirect' intervention and the use of the British Legion, by elaiming:

28Mornioa: POS!, 8th, September. 1835. 29Mornjoa: ChrooieJe, Ilth, Sep!ember, 1835. • 30Thompsoo. Iwelye Moo!hs p.43. 44

Thus while England does not venture openly • and in the face of day to send her own troops in destroying the independence of Spain...she fits out hired bravoes to do so under borrowed colours.3 1

ln the British parliament, Lord Londonderry, disapproving of the suspension of the Foreign Enlistment Act, exclaimed:

Had the Ministers [Cabinet] openly declared war, they would not have been in the disgraceful position they were in at present, carrying on underhand an infamous and scandalous species of warfare.3 2

In the meantime Evans. still smarting from the first humiliation of his forces, received instructions from the Spanish General. Cordova, to march his men towards Vitoria in the interior. Cordova's plan was to use a large force of his own regulars together with the British and

French Legions, in pushing the Carlists northwards towards the sea.3 3 Evans, reluctant at first to move his troops far from the scene of battle. soon complied with the order and the Legion, moving by a lengthy route to avoid the Carlist battalions, eventually entered Vitoria on the 3rd December, 1835. However. the prompt arrivai of the British battalion at Vitoria was not to signal the immediate advantage which the constitutionalist forces had hoped for; Evans and his men were to suffer their worst period of sickness at Vitoria

31 Blackwood's. August, 1835. 32Hansard. 1835, p.984. 33R. Shelley, The British Le&ion in Spain durin& the Firs! Cadist War 1832 • l8.l2.. Brighton, 1975, p.8. 45

and become subject to neglect of supplies and wages from the • Spanish authorities. On the 15th. December, The Mornin~ Post's correspondent summed up the feelings of the men towards the Spanish authorities. confirming that they had not received their wages:

1 am sorry to say that great dissatisfaction prevails amongst the British. and also the Portugese. in consequence of their arrears not bemg' pal'd....34

Not only had the men not been paid. but they also suffered the humiliation of not having achieved very much since their arrivai on Spanish soil. As a force. they had yet to prove their meule in the war against the Carlists. According to the Mornin~ Post, the whole affair of intervention in Spain had been a debacle and looked less likely of succeeding than when the British troops first arrived. The f2.s1 also reported that the local population had taken to deriding the soldiers:

ln Vitoria the people laugh at the constant parade of Evans' troops. wel1 clad. comfortably lodgcd and wanting nothing but their feather beds. They. however. ask what victories they have achieved. what fatigues they have endured. or what services they have rendered at the end of four months in favour of the queen's cause? ..Whatever hopes the Christinos at first formed of foreign intervention...have now vanished. The experiment of employing auxiliaries has. in facto wholly failed.35

34MQrnio& PpSI. 151h. December. 1835• • 35Mpmjo& ppsl. 281h. Deco. 1835. 46

• Indeed the British Auxiliary Legion had not achieved a great deal for their efforts and for the following few months the patience and determination of the legionnaires and their leader. George de Lacy Evans. was to be tested to the utmost. For within a short time over half the men were to experience a period of severe illness und disease which made the recovery of a full fighting force seem improbable. The legionnaires. also suffering through an exceptionally cold winter,36 began to be disillusioned and demoralised. As news of the plight of the Legion trickled back to London, fresh reports indicated that the Spanish government had not only neglected to pay the wages of the men, but had also failed to provide them with adequate provisions. This news was compounded by the fear that the French, for their part, also dissatisfied with the Spanish and becoming iucreasingly suspicious of British intentions in the Peninsula, looked as if they were about to change sides.

• 36Burgess, p.68. 47

Chapter 4

• Eyans. the British Le~iQn and the Press

As the British LegiQn cQntinued its winter sQjQurn at VitQria, the British public learned Qf the cQntinuing PQor treatment of the men by the Spanish authorities. The unusual severity ,:f the winter weather in Spain at the beginning of 1836, had further weakened the resistance Qf the legionnaires tQ the spread Qf an epidemic, generally thQught tQ be typhus. 1 In ... little less than four mQnths, 4,706 men had been admitted to hospital, of whom 1,400 were to subsequently die.2 In a letter addressed to The Times Qn 26th January, 1836, an officer in the Legion spoke of the difficulties of the winter in VitQria and of the maladies Qf the men:

We have sliffered most severely frQm illness and the number of sick at the present mQment is great. ;:ever has cut Qff many, and what seems vpry extraordinary, frost has done us fearful injury. Many have been crippled by it; sorne have IQst lheir toes, l'md sorne have lost even their feet)

The letter went Qn to reveal the underlying disaffectiQn of the LegiQn with General CQrdova and the Spanish command; a criticism which

1Burgess, p.73. 2Ibid.. p.7\ • 3The Times, \Slh. Feb., \836. 48

later surfaced in Evans in his frustration at the prolonged stay in • Vitoria. The communication pointed to the lack of enthusiasm on the part of the Spanish general to take the baule to the enemy following a recent rebuff from the Carlists. :

For the last ten days the combined army of Spanish, French and English under the command of General Cordova, has been maneuvring and skirmishing with the enemy. The Spaniards and French were partiaily engaged, but the English scarcely fired a shot, though as many of our officers affirm, had they been allowed they would have eut off a great portion of the Carlists. Many are in consequence, greatly displeased. Various strange rumours are afloat, and the opinion is very prevalent that Cordova is jealous of the English.4

A letter addressed to The Times l'rom an ex-calvary officer in England, laid the blame for the poor performance of the constitutionalists not on Cordova, but firmly at the feet of Palmerston. It asserted that matters in Spain had been made more severe due to Palmerston's lack of foresight in providing an adequate fighting force:

If Lord Palmerston would make us forget the miserable policy he has hitherto pursued, let him now stand forward and ask l'rom his country th!\!. 20,000 disciplined troops be instantly despatched to distracted Spain. to give peace and liberty to its subjects.s

4Ibid. • sne Times 12th, Feb. 1836. 49

• In parliament. Palmerston had to repeatedly field questions about the role of the Spanish government in providing for the Legion. The Tories not only accused the Spanish authorities of neglect of the Legion. but also denounced Evans for his somewhat dubious role in the campaign.6 It was also understood by many members that Don Carlos had a large degree of popular support for his cause. It was suggested that Britain should not involve itself in what was shaping up to be a protracted war; consequently them were many representations to have Evans withdraw his men. Although Palmerston could not concede that the war wouId soon be ended. he firmly dispelled rumours that Don Carlos had amassed a force of 100.000 men in arms. with the support of the whole country behind him. Palmerston also warded off attacks against his policy of an alliance with the French and called on the House not to discredit the aims of the Quadruple treaty simply on the basis of past animosities.7 Nonetheless. it became clear that the French were not doing aIl they couId to prevent supplies from reaching the Carlists. News had been arriving in London of the relaxed state of border control between France and Spain. The Mornjn~ ChronjcJe had revealed the contents of a letter of complaint which had been sent from Mendizabel to a member of the French Assembly claiming that :

...aid of ail kinds passes to the Carlists through Bayonnne in a manner no Jess flagrant than of

6Ridley. p. t99. • 7Hansard 1836. p.137. 50

old. The gates of Bayonne were opened, it states, at an undue hour, to let pass a hundred • horses, which were weil known to be passing to Don Carlos.s

The reluctance of the French to enforce stringent border controis was due in part to a more forceful attitude of the French king, Louis· Phillipe, in his support of the Spanish Moderados. Inside the Spanish government there were two parties vying for control: the Progressistas, or constitutionalists and the Mot!erat!os, or conservatives.9 ln 1835, Christina had appointed Mendizabel of the Progressistas, as Minister of Finance. This appointment was made with the strong endorsement of Villiers, the British Ambassador. However, the premiership was under the Count of Toreno, a Moderado who had the support of the French king. With both men representing opposing factions in the Cortes and with equally balanced forces, a stalemate deve10ped which prevented the successful governing of the country.IO At this time the policy of the French government wavered between tacit support of the Carlists and a commitment to the obligations of the Quadruple treaty. Louis-Philipe, the 'citizen king', would have preferred to see the succession of the Spanish throne proceed through the male line, even if it meant the crowning of Don

Carlos; Il there was worry that a Iiberalist Spain would become a harbour for aIl the revolutionists and republicans in Europe.

8Mornjng Cbronjcle, IOtb, December, 1835. 9Ridley, p.198. 1OMal'weil. p.90. • IIR. Guyot. La Premjere Entente Cordiale, Paris, 1926, pp.102-103. 5 1

However. fear of a rift with England and subsequent isolation from • the eastern courts, was also a consideration which. for the time being, prevented Louis-Phillipe from changing sides in the Spanish

contest. J 2 Thiers, the French Premier. whose subsequent downfall in July, 1836 would be precipitated over the affairs of Spain. had willingly supported the planned intervention of Britain and France and had wanted to maintain the Quadruple treaty. However. Thiers was opposed in the Cabinet by Guizot, who was determined to lead France away from the influence of Britain. 13 Any breakdown of consensus concerning the Quadruple treaty posed a threat that Britain and France would become avowed rivais in the contest in Spain. However. for the time being both nations continued, at least outwardly. to uphold the ai ms of the treaty. Back in Vitoria. Evans assuaged the impatience of his men. while waiting for further instructions from Cordova. At this point relations became severely strained between the two men. Adding to the tension were reports that the Carlists had put into practice the terms of the Durango Decree. News arrived that several British soldiers who had fallen into the hands of the Carlists. had been executed. The news brought out recriminations in London over the brutality of the war. The Times published an extract of a letter received from Vitoria. stating:

Sorne men and an officer of the British Legion were lately taken prisoners by the enemy. and shot...the officer who feIl into their hands

12 Hall. p. t 82. • 13Maxwell. p.9t. 52

was a Mr. Street, a native of Brighton...he was then conducted to Castle Guevera where he • was shot the following morning. 14

The initial outrage over the killing of the British legionnaires was only tempered by the fear that the constitutional forces were also guilty of committing atrocities. There had been news of butchery and execution of Carlist prisoners who had been captured by the queen' s armies. Each side claimed that the other had been the first to resort to cruelty. Apprehension that some of Evans' men may have been involved in the unfair treatment of prisoners, caused a guarded response in the press. Many refused to believe that the British Legion could have in any way participated in those activities. A Ti mes editorial, which sought to direct a stinging attack on the policy of Palmerston, avoided raising issues over the conduct of the legionnaires by charging:

lt is dreadful to contemplate our King of England as the ally of a government under which such iniquities can be practised. lt is most painful to see our brave countrymen associated, though ever so indirectly, with cruelties so base and monstrous.15

Blackwood's Edjnburih Maiazjne, being firmly in favour of the Pretender Don Carlos, later used the controversy as fuel in its continuing denouncement of Palmerston's interference in Spain. It referred to the Durango Decree as a retaliatory measure which was used in only in response to the conduct of the queen's armies:

14Tbe Times, t6th, Feb.. 1836. • 15Tbe Times, 18th, March, 1836. 53

The Durango Decree was never resorted to by • the Carlists until years after they had suffered under its atrocious execution by its enemies...The real disgrace, the calamity which England has to mourn, is that of being joined in an alliance to beat down the liberties of mankind... to deprive a gallant prince [Don Carlos] of his rightful inheritance. 16

Amid this controversy Evans waited patiently with his men at Vitoria, longing to be back in battle and fulfill the mandate which had been granted him. Eventually the long awaited orders from Cordova were issued on the 13th April, 1836, for the British Legion to begin ils ·departure. Instructions to Evans were to march his auxiliaries towards Santander on the northern coast, where they were to pick up reinforcements for an assault on the besieged city of San Sebastian. Evans wrote:

We are full of joy at escaping from this centre of inactivity - not of operations. The do nothing, risk-nothing principle guides here in fact it is a diplomatic, not a military war. 17

Evans had more reason to be joyful than he knew at the time. for his movement to the port of San Sebastian would lead the British Legion to its first triumph in the war. However, Evans' road to victory was not to be an easy one, as at home, his character became the subject of further faultfinding. Many in Britain were doubtful as to whether Evans had been the right choice to lead the British Legion

16Blackwood's. May. t837. pp.574-575. • 17Spiers. p.79. 54

and there had been dissatisfaction at the apparent slow progress of • the men; others were curious to know where the honourable member for Westminster was, how long did he expect to be gone and when would he resume his seat in parliament and continue in the duties for which he had been elected? The controversy which had surfaced soon after Evans' nomination as leader of the British Legion, continued to unfold in Britain. There was little doubt that Evans was once an experienced soldier, having served on the staff of the Peninsula, American and Waterloo campaigns, but now he was the sole head of a force of men representing British will in Spain. Lord Mahon, had raised the issue as early as July, 1835, by asking whether:

...a half-pay Lieutenant Colonel was altogether a fit individual to be Commander of 10,000 men? In the scale of military rank, he couId scarcely be suppos~d to have sufficient experience or authority.18

Lord Mahon also questioned:

.. .if it was not extraordinary that the colonel [Evans] did not resign his seat? The honorable and gallant member might find it difficult to return to this country when His Majesty might again call parliament together. 19

18Haosard. 1835, p.1138. • 19Haosard,p.1139. 55

However, Evans. backed by Palmerston in Britain. had little • intention of resigning his seat and had already been reported on in the Morni n ~ Post as saying:

1 shall not resign; it is not necessary 1 should do so.... before the next session 1 shall be back again. My constituents will sustain no injury by my absence.20

ln Spain. Evans continued to enjoy the unswerving support General Alava. It was. after ail the Spanish Ambassador who had aptly weighed up what he saw to be Evans' qualities in June. 1835, when he gave his strong recommendation that Evans be appointed to lead the Legion. Alava had known de Lacy Evans in the Peninsula war and was not only convinced of his abilities as a soldier. but was assured. like Palmerston. of his commitment to the cause of liberalism in Spain.21 Nonetheless, few in Britain shared the confidence which Alava and Palmerston had shown in de Lacy Evans. and criticism of his appointment continued to flow from aH ranks. Lady Cowper interestingly wrote to Princess Lieven. saying:

.. .1 personally think that Alava couId have chosen a better general - that name [Evans] has never been a good omen to him. and everyone was so anxious to be appointed that he would have had no difficulty in finding a better person.22

20Morning Post, 15th. June. 1835. 21 Spiers. p.64. • 22Sudley. p.104. 56

• Villiers, Britain's ambassador in Spain, was privately hostile to de Lacy Evans and would have also preferred to see another leader in his place. Although through the war he had kept his criticisms to a minimum, later. correspondence reveals a strong disenchantment with Evans. Towards the end of the British Legion's campaign, Villiers, unable to contain his feelînps, privately made a scathing denouncement of the Lieutenant General:

...As for Evans, he absolutely constrains me to vomit, and so he would you if you knew him as well as 1 do for a conceited, incapable coxcomb, with no real merit beyond personal bravery. Here [in Spain] he fancies himself for Napoleon; in England he compares himself to the Duke of Wellington, and neither in Spain nor in England was he anything but an M. P. for Westminster...23

While George de Lacy Evans evinced criticism at home, his campaign moved along quietly in Spain. Recovering from the bouts of sickness which the men sustained at Vitoria, Evans, with the remainder of his force, pushed gently on towards Santander on the Biscayan coast. At Santander, the cruisers 'Phoenix' and the 'Salamander,' under the command of Lord John Hay, were waiting to ferry the men to San Sebastian. Instructions from Palmerston had been to commit naval power more firmly in support of the sea-ports held by the Christino forces. Therefore, to Evans' satisfaction, the

• 23Maxwell, p.147. 57

British Legion would be able to rely on a naval bombardment of • Carlist positions for the assault on San Sebastian. A few days before the operation at San Sebastian was carried out, confusion arose in the British parliament concerning the actual orders which Lord John Hay had been given. Rumours circulated that these instructions had amounted to a declaration of war by His Majesty's government. Lord Minto firmly denied the rumours and stated that, 'the co-operation of British seamen was in fact nothing more than a naval co-operation, and nothing else being authorised by the Quadruple treaty'. However, when pressed by his opponents to reveal the contents of the communication forwarded to Commodore Hay, Lord Melbourne tersely replied, 'that it was not judicious to

announce plans of military operations to the whole world. '24 After disembarking at San Sebastian, Evans consulted his chief officers, Shaw and Chichester, who thought that a quick assault on Carlist lines would be successful. On the morning of the 5th May, 1836, without waiting for reinforcements, Evans ordered his men to assemble in the streets of the village near the square. The number of the British Legion assembled was about 5,000 and the Spanish battalion with them totalled sorne 600 men. The Carlists were estimated to have sorne 3,000 men on the near side of the Urema river, exclusive of the number on the other side. Brigadier-General Shaw explained the plan to the men.25 The Light Brigade and Irish Brigade were the first to advance into battle and swept over enemy pickets. The fighting was brutal and

24Haosard 1836, pp.I054-I055. • 25Thompsoo. Twelye MOOlbs, p.22. 58

many men fell victim to exhaustion as they tried to cross the valley. • The cruiser 'Phoenix' opened fire with its 10 inch guns on the Carlist positions along the river. Soon the newly arrived 4th and 8th regiments of the Legion came into the fray and with their added strength, the enemy was forced to retreal. Within a short while the Carlists, realising the battle had been lost, began to nee with the British troops closely in pursuil.26 Evans was jubilant at the success, and quickly sent off a (etler to The Times stating how grateful he was to Lord John Hay for the exactness with which he was able to bombard the Carlist forces. 27 The victory of San Sebastian was indeed sweet for Evans, but perhaps more importantly, signalled to Palmerston a vindication of his poliey with regard to Spain. While an excited public at home clamoured for details of the battle, F:':,,'~rston, capitalising on the success, hastily sent a message to the Spanish government urging that the Legion be properly maintained and that Cordova be replaced with a more efficient commander.28 Lord John Hay and Ambassador Villiers, also quick to profit l'rom the wave of enthusiasm now argued that, with a full force of 10,000 men, Evans should be able to conclude the war favourably before the autumn. The Times, which had not disguised its disapproval of Palmerston's policy in Spain and the management of forces by Evans, relented in its habituaI criticism on receipt of the news of the British Legion's victory. On the 14th May, 1836, true to its independent

26S piers, p.80. 27The Times, tlth, May. 1836. • 28Webster, Vol.l, p.44t. 59

stance, The Times put out an editorial in open praise of Evans' • operation at San Sebastian and of the men who carried it out:

On the present occasion we have by far the more gratifying duty of bearing testimony to the valour of our fellow countrymen from the General Commanding in Chief to the private soldier serving in the cause of the queen of Spain.29

However. on the following day. The Times was quick to render sober judgement of the aforementioned combat. Making known its appraisal of the tension between Evans and Cordova. the editorial questioned whether Evans might not need to more successfully integrate himself with the Spanish command:

...a battle has been fought by our brethren as Sritons are wont to fight...Fears however. have reached us that !ittle positive has been gained beyond the field of battle...The main point is. will General Evans be enabled henceforth to command from certain quarters a more harmonious and absolute co-operation than he is said to have experienced hi therto?3°

Fortuna:ely for de Lacy Evans. he would not be put to the test any further; at least not with Cordova. The Spanish commander soon returned to Madrid where he subsequently resigned. giving his place to General Espartero as the new leader of the northern army.

29The Times. 4th. May. 1836. • 30The Times. 12th. May. 1836. 60

Evans had won a needful victory at San Sebastian. but had not • struck a hard enough blow on the Carlists to win over the confidence of ail his critics. In its habituaI critieism of Evans and the Legion. The Mocojng Post had published an official return of ail the casualties in the attack. It claimed that Evans' casualties had been high anù soughl to minimise the overall importance of the victory at San Sebastinn. On the 13th. May. the f2ll stated that:

The Carlists have lost but a few men in the affair. being sheltered by their own works. The loss of the Anglo - Christinos has been considerable. Accounts agree in rating it at 400 killed and 600 wounded - 70 officers being included among the former.3 1

As a further souring of the note of optimism scored by Evans' victory at San Sebastian, Villiers' communications began to speak of an increasing support for Don Carlos in the Peninsula, calling into question whether the sentiments of the Spanish people were not wholly in support of the Pretender. Villiers, who had initially favoured intervention by regular British forces, began to be disgruntled at the apparent slide in progress of the constitutionalists. He not only disliked Evans and his liberal crusade. but also cast doubt on whether a majority of Spanish were now really in favour of the constitutionalist cause. Events throughout the Carlist war brought Villiers to admit that, 'the great mass of the people is honest, but it is Carlist; it hates what is called liberal government - liberal institutions - liberal men.'32

31Mornjng Post, 13th. May, 1836. • 32Maxwell. pp.IOI-I02. 6 1

Villiers also questioned the ability of either the British or French • governments to impose, through their support of the queen, a system of Liberal institutions on a people who, in his view, were not ready for them. He stated plainly that:

Things are running the eourse they must run in this country. ( don't despair, but ( don't hope...the people govern themselves by a few ancient customs, care Iittle for laws or Royal decrees and do pretty much what they Iike.33

(n spite of Villiers' doubtful view, as the British ambassador in

Spain, he was compelled 10 give his support to Evans and the Legion, and therefore continued to do what he could to assist the Auxiliaries. However, \ittle could be done to aid the Legion in terms of supplies and wages throughou" the spring of 1836, as the system which Mendizabel had put in place, was on the verge of bankrupt(:y.J 4 As the summer months approached. Don Carlos moved to consolidate his forces in the north, and the British Legion made a brier. but unsuccesf.ful attack on Fuentarrabia, When August arrived,

news of the revolution iil La Granja, and the proclamation of the 1812 Constitution, gave fresh hope for the cause of Iibera\ism in Spain and for the renewal of effort against the traditiona\ist forces led by Don Carlos.

In August, 1836, the revolution at La Granja, brought to power a new government under the Progressive party, with Calatrava at ilS

33lbid.. p.102. • 34Carr, p.176. 62

head. This marked an important stage in Spuin's developmcnt • towards a liberal parliamentary state. The qucen regent. sccking comp1'Omise, chose to proclaim the Constitution of 1812, which had declared the Spanish people to be free and independent, with u righl to determine its own laws. This was supposed to invcst full legislative power in the Cortes, leaving a much reduced cxcculive power to the monarch.35 In effeet the 1812 Constitution providcd un impetus for governing the country, but brought ubout l1luch disagreement and was found to be unworkable; sorne believed it ref1ecled the old Spain while others found it too Iibera1.36 The first news Lord Palmerston received, was of un uttempt by the national guard at Madrid to proclaim the Constitution of 1812. However, according to his sources, the attempt had been succcssfully resisted by the queen's government. It was later that he learned of its proclamation by the queen regent. Answering a question in the House posed by Sir George Sinclair, as to whether the British Legion was to be used in any way to support the proclamation, Palmerston reaffirmed that Evans' force was entirely in the pay and under th~ orders of the Spanish government. However, with regard to the forces at the disposaI of Lord John Hay, Palmerston confirmed that

they would, in fact, remain neutraI.3 7 For the remainder of 1836 Evans' force saw little combat other than the brief repulsion by the Carlists at Fuentarrabia and an assault on the Legion's defences at Passages. In the meantime, the

35J. Coverdale, The Basque Phase of Spajo's Eirs! Cadis! War, New Jersey, 1984. p.46. 36Marichal. p.93. • 37Hansard. t 836. p. 1229. 63

commander of the Legion continued to state his case in pressing for • more soldiers. With the approach of the winter months of 1836, Evans' command was reinforced with additional Spanish regiments, bringing his total force for operations close to 10,000 men.38 The added number enabled Evans to lay plans for a major offensive in the new year on the Carlist stronghold of Hernani. This operation was to bring about a turning point in the war. However, in the period since the victory at San Sebastian, not only had there been sorne significant changes in the Spanish government but also a change of attitude on the part of one of Spain's major allies, the French. What had seemed !ike a guarantee for the eventual success of constitutionalism in Spain, the Quadruple treaty, had been put in question by the revolution at La Granja and the ejection of the French favoured Moderados. In September, 1836, the fall of the Thiers government signalled the coming to a close of French support for the Quadruple treaty. Thiers' successor, Count Mole, reversed Thiers' policy of aid to the queen of Spain and began dismantling the dep01s for reinforcing the Foreign Legion.39 Reaction in Britain to the change of French plans was wholly predictable. The disposition of the French king to sympathise with the Carlists had aIready been an open secret. Viscount Melbourne, writing to William IV to inform him officially that the French were curtailing their support of the treaty, insinuated that Louis-Phillipe was behind the change of policy:

38Burgess, p.162. • 39Webster, Vol.t, p.445. 64

The French government have suspended for the present the additional measures which • they were about to adopt... Viscount Melbourne cannot help observing that your Majesty has hitherto viewed the whole of the policy pursued by the King of France towards Spain with great suspicion and distrust.40

It became apparent later how important the Frenel; interest in Spanish politics had been. In a speech publishcù in the Quarterly Revjew, M. Guizot, speaking l'rom the ministerial bench in the French chamber, said:

The French government has never lost sight of the commercial interests of France in Spain; and whenever they seemed to be in any way compromised by this or that particular arrangement between England and Spain, we immediately took measures to prevent any such arrangement being realised.41

Palmerston began to show signs of frustration that his attempts to solidify a western alliance had continually resulted in an uneasy balance between the two principal powers. He was indignant that the French were withdrawing their support of the queen's cause and suspected that Louis-Phillipe wanted to profit l'rom anarchy in the Peninsula. Palmerston privately laid the blame for French intransigence in Spain, on the shou Iders of the French king:

These military insurrections in Spain and Portugal are the devi1; and are doubly

40L.Sanders. ed.• Lord Melbourne's Papers. London. 1889 • 410uarterly ReYiew, Vol.LVIII, 1837. 65

provoking because they would not have happened if our worthy friend and ally, • Louis-Phillipe had fulfilled his engagement and acted up to the spirit of the Quadruple Treaty. But, be the cause what it may, he has prelly nearly thrown us, the Queen [of Spain] and the Treaty over.4 2

On the news of the demise of French support for the aims of the Quadruple tl'eaty, there was once again increased pressure on Palmerston to have Evans withdraw his men from the war. Public perception of Louis-Phillipe also changed: where he had once been labelled as a 'faithful.· and a 'magnanimous ally' in the British press, he was now referred to as an 'ingrate' and ·usurper'. Blackwood's magazine. whose reports had been generally sympathetic to the French king, called for an end to British participation in Spain:

We respect that the combined interference of ail Europe is necessary to the pacification of Spain, nay, the salvation of Spain...We repudiate the intervention of England and France alone for that has been tried covertly and openly...and has failed without dignity.43

The Edjnburl:h Revjew, which had :l..t be.~n in favour of intervention in Spain, expressed the opinion that it would be a mistake for Palmerston's policy to be reversed at this crucial stage. Having stated from the outset that, • No foreign nation has any right to interfere as long as a regular government exists in those countries,

42 Ashley. p.324. • 43Blackwood's, OCI,1836. p.576. 66

whatever be its nature... ·. the editorial, directed at Palmerston und • the French, nevertheless pointed out that:

ln ail circumstances. with ail the disposition which must inevitably arise in the people of England and of France l'rom observing the atrocities committed in Spain. to withdraw and leave the contending parties to fight out their own quarrel in their own way. there cannot be any doubt that. retiring in this manner at the present moment. would be premature and a departure l'rom the spirit of the policy in which the Quadruple Alliunce originated.44

ln April, 1837. the British Legion prepared for what was to be the last major battle under the leadership of Evans before his return to England. At home. anxiety expressed over the irregular payment of the auxiliaries was temporarily relieved when The Mornjn\: Chronjcle published a letter from a correspondent at Bayonne, who had stated with optimism:

1 can announce to you with certainty that arrangements have just been concluded by the Spanish government for the payment of aU arrears due to the British Legion, and that in the course of the week the first instalment under this head will pass here en route for San Sebastian.45

It appears however. that C;:orge de Lacy Evans was less concerned over the payment of his men than he was over his planned assault of

44Edinbureb Revjew. Oct.1836. pp.198.200 • 45Mornjne CbrQojclr. 12tb, May. 1837. 67

Hernani. Within a few weeks of arrivai at San Sebastian, Evans had • primed the British Legion for its attack on one of the key towns which had successfully resisted capture since the beginning of the war. Moving with a full contingent of men consisting of British and Spanish regiments, Evans broke through the Carlist defences at lrun and achieved complete control of the town of Hernani on the 14th May, 1837. Three days later Fuentarrabia surrendered, signalling a major victory for General Evans. The capture of Fuentarrabia brought a fanfare of praise for de Lacy Evans and his men in the British press. Aware that the mandate of the British Legion was drawing to a close with the expiration of the Order in Council fast approaching, The Mornjng ChronjcJe announced:

Thus has ended most triumphantly this part of the operations. General Evans and the Legion have nobly redeemed their late discomfiture; and it is on ail sides said, that never were troops better led or bettrr conducted.46

To which it was added that it was thought unlikely that the British Legion wouId be called to action again, at least not until after the full payment of the men had been effected. The Mornjng Chronjcle subsequently revealed that the Legion was to receive a sum of 30,000 French dollars as partial settlement of wages and that this amount was to have been sent by convoy on the 24th, May, 1837.47

46Mornioi Cbrooiele, 24th, May, 1837 • 47~joi Chroojele, 30th, May, 1837. 68

Although the termination of the arder in Council was near. it is • evident that Lord Palmerston had liule intention of allowing it to expire. Having received a request from the Spanish governmenl as early as April, 1837, asking that the Foreign Enlistment Acl be suspended for a further period. Palmerston. had continued to pressure the king for an extension. King William [V. after a concerted

effort by Palmerston. became convinced of the necessity 10 follow through with operations in Spain. He therefore granted an extension of the arder in Council for one year. with the possibility of renewal if there was still a cause and a willingness on the part of the men to serve.48 However, for Evans the time had come to announce his return Westminster or face a further year in Spain; he chose the former. [t had been a full two years of weariness and war since he had left England and his duties in parliament. His feelings were summed up

bY the correspondent 0 f the ..,MeLOlUJrnLLUin.l<~;;"",,---,Co<.h...... ,r o,,-nLLUic..,ll1<.e at the new headquarters in Hernani:

The Lieutenant General sincerely regrets that the peremptory obligations he is under, as a member of the Legislature, and to his constituents, as weil as the state of his health. preclude the possibility of his continuing his services with those of his comrades who may remain in Spain.49

On the announcement of his return, many of the men who had served under General de Lacy Evans, began to prepare for the

48Burgess. p.204. • 49Mornjni Chronjcle, 9th, June. 1837. 69

journey back to England. Feeling that their cause had been a worthy • one and their battles justly won, they prepared for what they expected would be a heroes' welcome on their arrivaI. Neither they nor Evans suspected the tribulations which they would be forced to undergo. The remainder of forces of the British Legion which stayed behind in Spain amounted to sorne 1,500 men, and were amalgamated with a new force under the command of Brigadier 0' Connell. This force however, was to lay down its arms by Christmas, 1837, due to Jack of wages and supplies from Madrid.5° Sorne important victories had been won by George de Lacy Evans. who, accompanied by many of his men, returned to London to resume his office as M. P. for Westminster. Only the outstanding cIaims of the legionnaires who had suffered from neglect and non payment of wages, weighed upon Evans' mind, and these not too heavily; the Spanish government had agreed in principle to settle ail cIaims of the British Legion as a condition to the extension of the Order in Council.51

The return of the old Legion to England marked th~ close of a phase in the war which had opened with Don Carlos as master of the Basque provinces and Navarre. With the help of the British Legion, Espartero and his forces had been able to drive the CarIist~ from their traditional strongholds and seal off their access to the French

border.52 Although Don Carlos was still able to draw unqualified

50Marshall.Comwall, 'British Aid in the Carlist War', p.187. 51 Burgess. p.202. • 521bid..p.199. 70

support l'rom the Basques. he was no longer able to ho Id territory in • the north with the impunity which he once possessed A failed Carlist attempt later in the year to march on Madrid was to be indicative of the wider l'ailure of the Pretender and his forces to win the war against the Christinos and gain the crown. The C:lrlisls were never to regain the momentum which they had possessed in the early part of the war and. faced with the continued pressure of the Christino armies under Ihe ascending Espartero. eventually submitted to the constitutionalists. The treaty of Vergara, signed in September. 1839, formally ended the confIict in the Basque region. aIthough the confrontation continued in other areas until July. 1840.53 Espartero acknowledged the traditional fueros of the Basque provinces, halted the prosecution of Carlist soldiers and allowed those reactionary officers who wished to return to the Spanish army. to do so. The Carlists had been defeated but not the regionalist cause. That spirit which had been in

evidence long before the outbreak of the Carlist war. was 10 survive its leader. Don Carlos.54

53Wilhelmsen. 'Carlos VII'. p.30. • 54Chrisliansen, p.4S 7 1 • Chapter 5 Perspective on Intervention in Spain

The result of Palmerston's policy towards the civil war in Spain had repcrcussions in parliament and provoked a mixed reaction in the press. Throughout the British Legion's participation in the war, public opinion had wavered between support of the constitutionalists, and a policy of non-intervention for fear that Britain would become involved in another continental war. There is little doubt that there were many who favoured the establishment of liberalism in Spain, b';l there had been no consensus on the methods needed to achieve that goal. Palmerston, having chosen to take the lead and support liberalism abroad, had committed Britain tu an indirect form of intervention in Spain by allowing Alava to raise his 'Spanish Legion' in England. The demands of the Madrid government were met without incurring the risks associated with sending the regular army; that would have certainly amounted to a declaration of war and may have provoked an adverse French reaction. Instead, the motive behind Palmerston's policy was to enable Britain to maintain a certain distance from the war and at the same time minimise the possibility of French control of Spanish affairs. 1

• 1Webster. VoU.. pA78. 72

To what degree, it may be asked, did the principal eastern powers • pose a threat to the establishment of Iiberalism in Spain'! Did Palmerston's determination to send the British Auxiliary Legion discollrage Austrian intentions in the Peninsula'! Apart from the

monetary contribution to the coffers of Don Carlos2, il seems thal there was little danger of overt action by the absollltist powers and that they had little intention of intervening in Spain. Palmerston had already expressed the view that if, 'Spanish affairs were more within

their reach, they would have done something about them, bUI geography forbids.'3 It appears therefore, as Wellington remarked, that the French, who were already poised to intervene as carly as 1833, posed the greoater threat to stability in Spain than Britain's old eastern allies. This, no doubt, had been taken into considerati.:>n by Palmerston when he sought to involve France in the Quadruple alliance. The Quadruple treaty had signalled promise for a new alliance of western states committed to liberalism, but hope for concerted action soon faded when the French government became more conservative under Mole, and withdrew its support of the Spanish central regime after the 1836 revolution at La Granga. From then on, with antagonism between France and England at a new level, Palmerston found it increasingly difficult to justify further support of the queen regent under the auspices of the treaty. He realised that his French allies were more inclined to allow time itself determine the outcome of the Spanish confliet. It is significant also that in the first year of

2According to Marichal's research. the Absolutist powers gave Don Carlos 800.000 pounds sterling in the opening year of the British Legion's operations. • 3Ashley, p.294. 73

their operations, the role of both the French and British legions in the • Spanish confIict had only been a marginal one.4 It may be questioned whether Palmerston thought that the Iiberal clement in Spain was stronger th an it really was, and how realistic were his aims in supporting Iiberalism in the Peninsula? Indeed, a review of Ambassador Villiers' communications reveals concern over the readiness of the Spanish people to accept Iiberal institutions. The immediate purpose of the Quadruple treaty haà been the protection of constitutionalism in Spain, but Villiers' own observations early on

in the war had becIl that the majority of the population was Carlist and that it hated Iiberalism! Hindsight has enabled us to see, from Spain's continuing troubles and subsequent Carlist wars, that Villiers' observations were partially correct. Liberalism was only in its beginningsS and the cause of Carlism continued long after the death of its leader. However, Carlism in the 1830s was an aIliance between those fighting for the succession of Don Carlos and those who wanted to safeguard the Basque traditions and privileges which were threatened by liberal reform. In England, Palmerston' s foremost problem had been to demonstrate how the defence of constitutionalism in Spain was compatible with the oppression of the Basque people, who already possessed 'free' institutions? For Palmerston and his Whig supporters the question to involve the British Legion in Spain had been clear eut. Certainly the decision to aid the constitutionalists did not pose the same dilemma as it did

4D. Porch, The French ForeiiD Lei;QD. New York, 1991, p.34. • SC. Chapman, A Hislo[)' of Spain, New York, 1918, p.498. 74

for the Radicals. The Radicals may have been won over to defence of • the Legion, but they did not adhere to Palmerston's policies.6 What they, the press and sorne other members of parliament objected to was the insistence with which Palmerston equated the defence of the queen of Spain with the defence of liberal values. An editorial in Fraser's Magazine summed up their doubts by asking:

What had we to do with such a war as this? Whether a contest for the succession, or a struggle for institutions, why were we embroiled in that quarrel? ..Lord Palmerston has all along been deceived and imposed upon.7

Here was the underlying problem of a war conducted not only against traditionalism in the form of Don Carlos, but also against the rights of the Basques, whose cause had evoked considerable sympathy in the British parliament and among the public. Lord Carnarvon, openly decried the role of the British Legion in the suppression of the Basques and had remonstrated that:

...It was reserved for the liberal ministers of Great Britain who once professed themselves the friends of constitutional liberty all over the world, to assist in the most oppressive crusade against a free people, that has disgraced the annals of Europe...8

6Ridley, p.200. 7Eraser's Mal:azjne. July, 1837, p.148. 8The Quarlerly Revjew, Vol.LVIII,1837, p.281. A book review of the Earl of Carnarvon's Portul:al and Gallicia. with a revjew of the Social and Political State of the Basque provinces and a few Remarks on the recent cyents in • Spain. 75

• For Palmerston it had been clear that however unfortunate the case of the Basques 'lad been, they had inextricably aligned their cause with that of Don Carlos. The overruling concern of Palmerston's policy was that of not allowing absolutism to triumph in Spain. even if it meant the subjection of the l.:!~.3ques. The plain reply to his critics had bco:.n similar to that which Don Carios9 himself had expressed. notably that, 'The struggle in Spain is not between Persons but

between principles.... IO • and in this view he found the support of Daniel O' Connell. who seemed to have as clear a view as Palmerston about the need for intervention in Spain. O'Connell had remarkeà that. 'the real difference was. that between the principle of absolutism and that of constitutional Iiberty...the cause of Don Carlos was that of absolutism. and that of

Christina was the cause of constitutional liberty' .11 O'Connel1's observation had seemed to offer. for the most part. a simple explanation and adequate reason for support of the queen r::gent. However. insofar as the queen stood for Iiberal principles. few were able to guage with certainty that she did. other than by the many promises which she made throughout her reign for the introduction of reforms. Notwithstanding, the regime of Christina must be associated to sorne degree with the gains of the new Constitution of 1837 and the general consolidation of the liberal system in Spain. Due to the protection afforded her by the constitutionalist forces.

9Wilhelmsen. A. 'The Political Thought of the Pretender Don Carlos'. p.168. IOPalmerston. F.O.. 9th. June. 1836. in H.Temperley and L. Penson. Founda1ions of British Foreien Poljcy. London. 1966. p.I04. Il Burgess. p.148. 76

which included the British Auxiliaries. the culmination of those • efforts did enable the establishment of a two chamber Cortes 1~ und the entrenchment of the principles of a limited monurchy. The contribution of the British Legion in the establishment of those rights. had been a minimal one. but ncverthclcss an importunt one. If the men of the British Legion achievlld less thun \Vus expecled

of them. in part due to their poor training at the outset and luck of :1 full fighting force. their exertions helped to ensure the continuity of the regency of Christina. Evans and his men may have fuiled to hring an abrupt end to the war; indeed. sorne critics claimed thut the intervention of the expeditionary force may have had the efl'ect of prolonging the war. nonetheless. a clear signal had been sent to the traditionalist forces that Britain was not prepared to allow liberalism to collapse in the Peninsula. The attempt to joïn France in the coalition against absolutism had not been wholly unsuccessl'ui either. After the return of Evans to England. Palmerston remained optimistic that British and French interests wouId continue to require mutual support in the years to come, despite signs that French foreign policy had alignec! itself closer to Austrian intcrests. In response to criticism over the failing the Quadruple alliance he was forced to acknowledge that normal rivalry between Britain and France would resume after the Carlist war. Undeterred Palmerston remarked:

12Th: Constitution of 1837. firmly established a Cortes of two houses replacing :ii" one chamber comprised of nobles. c1ergy and representatives of the cities. The monarch retained the power of absolute veto. Although this constitutiGn was short-lived. it served as a model for future constitutions and replaced the • obsolete document of 1812. (Chapman. p.498.) 77

We must make out of our alliance with France what we can, and not expect impossibilities. • The alliance has preserved peace and has hclped us carry a great many points in Europe. 13

The former point was true, but was Palmerston's Iiberal crusade in Spain fully ju~tified? Certainly, it appears that the western alliance acted as a deterrent to any aggression from the eastern powers. Spain, as Palmerston described, remained a constitutional power. Palmerston could weil point to the successes of the British Legion and claim that they resulted in the establishment of Iiberalism in the Peninsula. As he later stated •...We took part with the people of Spain-with those who wanted constitutional liberty, equal laws, a

parliament... We succeeded;...' 14 However, the British press remained largely critical of Palmerston's policy, even when news of the victories of Evans and the British Legion had graced its pages. It is evident that public opinion in the Carlist war, for the most part, was affected by the success of Evans and the Legion, and not on the progress in the overail establishment of liberalism in Spain. Throughout the Civil War, the editorials, letters and columns from overseas correspondents struck their deepest note when reporting on a battle or movement of troops in preparation for conflict. When Evans was down, the press turned sour; when the British Legion routed the Carlists at Hernani. the press rang with praises and the British sense of pride was restored. Although there was much dissent

13Webster, Vol. l, p.414. 14Speeeh of Palmerston. 31sI, July, 1847 in Temperley and Penson. Foundaljons • of British Forcien Poliey, p.106. 78

over participation in the war. there was a great deal of empathy at • home for the fighting man. who was al'ter all. a fellow countryman. Among the returning legionnaires. only Evans it appears. had the most reason to be disenchanted with the reports on the Legion.

The British press throughout the Carlist war seemed fickle 10 Evans. who was at times embittered by the reviews which he received while in Spain. 15 To sorne degree it seems a pily Ihat the British public wouId only retain the memory of Evans as a ·bungling·. somewhat vainglorious leader and not as a dutiful commander in the Spanish Civil War. He had. al'ter all organised and shaped a force of men and led them into battle over a period of two years. Albeit. public opinion chose to ignore those successes and focussed more on the plight of the returning legionnaires. In spite of this. George de Lacy Evans still held hope that he wouId be welcomed as a hero and looked forward to resuming his functions at Westminster. Howevcr. he was Iittle prepared to meet the razor's edge of criticism which greeted him upon his return to England.

The aftermath of operations did not signal an end to the recriminations which Evans suffered for his role in the Spanish Civil War and criticism continued long al'ter his return to England in July. 1837. The brunt of attacks for the poor treatment of his men by the Spanish authorities. were directed at the man himself who. for two years. had led the Legion's fight for constitutionalism in Spain. The outstanding claims of the Legion had still not been resolved and de Lacy Evans continued to be hounded by the press. The poliey which • 15Spiers. p.J03. 79

had first encouraged men to enrol for Spanish service wi th the • British Legion. came under severe condemnation. 16 As early as June, 1835, The Times had foreseen the problems of compensation for the men of the British Legion. It was certainly to have been expected that many of the men, whether successful or not in their undertakings. would have returned home in a less favourable condition than when they set out. However, The Times' cditorial, which went largely unheedcd. had strongly sounded a warning bell to ?aimerston and Evans that arrangements needed to be made for the provision of the men at the outset of operations. It had stated:

Let us urge one thing strongly on Col. Evans and even upon Lord Palmerston. If this expedition... may most probably fail... the end will not be realised, the Basques will not be conquered. In that event we trust that Lord Palmerston would have weighed beforehand the necessity of sorne arrangement with the Spanish ministers, by virtue of which such of our countrymen as are disabled by wounds, or by broken constitutions, from earning their livelihood when they come home, may have a provision sec:ured to them by Spain. equivalent to what they would have been entitled to after similar casualties in the service of their native sovereign.\ 7

By the time of Evans' return the mandate of the Legion was in part fulfilled and there was sufficient rea30n for the prompt settlement of the claims of the legionnaires. Many, including the ex-

\6H!\II. p.211. • nTb.; Times. 26tb. Junc. 1R35. 80

officers of the Legion. thought that the British government should be • held partiy respon~ihle in satisfying those claims. Public opinion was strongly in favour of pursuing compensation for the Legion and Evans himself came under verbal allack from his own soldiers and ex-officers for not having fought hard enough to press the claims of the men. The claims of sorne of Evans' officers were later tabulated in a book entitled A Short Statement of the Case of Clajmants of the Britisi: Auxi!iary Le~ion in Spain, by Charles Shaw and ten other ex officers. They not only allacked Evans, but the British government itself for not compensating the men. The book stated that many half pay officers of the regular army were encouraged to join the Legion and many full pay officers were allowed to go on half-pay for the same purpose. The book also revealed that the Legion had been raised in such a way as to lead the men to believe that the government would assume responsibility for them on completion of their assignment. On the recruitment of the men Shaw wrote:

In Civil departments, assistance and instruction of every description were afforded; and the War Office supplied ail the forms and documents necessary to carry on the Legion after the manner of the British force, such as Pay-lists, Muster-rolls, printecl forms for the Medical Dept. etc. Thus by most unequivocal acts the government declarec! to the world that they took the British Legion of Spaïn under their especial protection. 18

18C. Shaw, A Short Slalemenl of lhe Case of ÇJaimanls of the British AuxjliaCY • Legion of Spain. Haymarkel, 1839. pA. 8 1

• It must have seemed strange to the officers and men when Evans, to ail outward appearances displayed little concern over the,se claims and more concern over his own health upon his arrivai in England, for one of the things he arranged soon after his return was a holiday abroad. This provoked a venomous declaration in a (etter to the Times, which appeared on the 16th, November, 1837, stating:

...worst of ail, the man, reliance on whose honour induced most to venture in the expedition...has been allowed without one public reproach, shamelessly and dastardly to desert his few helpless comrades...to skulk quictly off to distant lands... 19

The conclusion of operations also did not wholly extricate Palmerston from blame. He could have undoubtedly been more helpful to those seeking compensation from the Spanish government; indeed Palmerston could have prevented the whole affair of unpaid arrears to the men by insisting on their full payment before pushing for an extension of the Order in Council. Nonetheless, Palmerston had sealed his commitment to Spanish liberalism by sending out the new recruits for the Legion, regardless of his obligations to those who had already served in Spain. However, to Palmerston's dismay, when the new Legion had taken up its position under the Generalship of Espartero, members of the old Legion had found their way back

(Ij ---_.._-_._- 19Ihe Times, 16th. November, 1837. 82

home and began appearing on London's slreels; many of lhem wcrc • blind, wounded or crippled and having 10 beg for a living.20 Before the claims were settled, and this entailed Evans himself returning to Spain to seek compensation. more public outcry ensued concerning the al1eged unfair treatment of the legionnaires and their sorry plight on their return to Britain. Sorne of the criticism was

directed at the Spanish authorities while Palmerston. seeking 10 al1ay criticism, continually iterated that he held the confident expectation that the claims wouId be settled without furlher delay.21 For the remainder of 1837. further reports of the men continued to surface. attesting to the inefficiency with which the claims had been processed and giving the i'Upression that the whole affair of intervention in Spain had been a debacle. The efforts of de Lacy Evans in Spain were thrown into a most unfavourable light. Just a few days before Christmas The Tjmes reported:

One of those miserable beings, the remnants of the British Legion. who have for sometime pasto ragged and penniless. been infesting the streets of London. was on Friday .:Iiscovered in Shadwell. Iying on the ground in a state of actual starvation. A crowd was gathered .;' Jund; the poor man in a feeble voice. in vain demanded charity. and in despair bitterly cursed every memher of the late unfortunate expedition.22

20 As a sad and curious lestament 10 the men of the British Legion, Henry Mayhew, in his renowned catalogue. London Labour and the London Poor. labelled the 'Spanish Legion men' as 'those who will not work·. and listed them under the heading of "Professional Beggars". (Mayhew, Vol. Il. London, 1857. p.23.) 21The Times. 16th. November. 1837. • 22The Times, 18th. Decemher. 1837. 83

Thus the epitaph of one of lhe legionnaires altested lO the sad • demise of the soldiers of Evans' for<~e upon lheir return to England. George de Lacy Evans relained his scat in parliament but continued to arouse further animosity and objections al'ter his appointment as

Knight of the Order of the Bath 23 The queen regent of Spain also saw fit to award him the grand crosses of the Orders of St. Ferdinand and of Charles 111. 24 Al'ter trying unsuccessfully to divest himself of responsibility for his men, Evans eventually travelled back to Spain in April, 1840, and reached an agreement with the Madrid government for a seltlement of outstanding claims, totalling sorne 300,000 pounds, ail of which are now known to have been paid.25

The altitudes expressed towards the participation of the British Legion in the Spanish civil war of the 183()s were a renection of the political and ideological differences wh".:h existed in parliament and among the informed public at the tim~. Lord Palmerston's policy of promoting liberalism abroad was carried out in response to the Spanish government's request for help and in the face of much opposition at home. Palmerston's determination to aid the cause of constitutionalism in Spain by sending an expeditionary force, represented a significant change in policy; that of supporting a cause rather than a ru1er. Whiist bringing together the western powers, it had the effect of estranging Britain's allies of the Napoleonic Wars.

23Maxwell. pp.146-147. 24L, Stephen and S. Lee. no Djctjonary of National Bjoeraphy, Oxford. 1960• p.927. • 25Burgess. p.255. 84

What had begun as a favourable campaign ended with • recriminations and skepticism. The lïrm establishment of libemlism was an ideal which Palmerston and Evans had hoped to achieve through intervention in the Spanish Civil War, however, many were left with the impression that true libemlism could only be achieved through the readiness and will of the Spanish people. Although there was initial support for the promotion 01' liberalism at the start of Evans' campaign, yet that support had diminished early on in the war and became increasingly hostile towards Evans and Palmerston the men, and the policy which they represented, as the conniet progressed. ln spite of Palmerston's insistence that intervention in Spain had been integral to the survival of liberalism, public opinion remained divided and unconvinced of the success of the venture against Carlism.

• 85 • BIBLIOGRAPHY SYNOPSIS

Introduction

A. PRIMARY SOURCES

1. Parliamentary Papers. 2. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates. 3. British and Foreign State Papers. 4. Newspapers and Periodicals. 5. Published Correspondence. 6. Memoirs and other Contemporary Books.

B. SECONDARY SOURCES.

INTRODUCTION

Throughout the Spanish war the British public were kept informed of events through two main sources: summaries of debates and questions in parliament which appeared in the columns of Hansard, and by reports from corresponden:~, editorials and leuers to the editor of various newspapers and periodicals. Some memoirs were published after 1836, but for the most part the public relied on newspapers, which were divided aiong political lines, for a detailed account of the operations of the British Legion. There is a degree of printed material, particuIarly in the series of Parliamentary Papers. published by the Irish University Press and kept at the McLennan Library of McGill University, relating to the • formation of the Quadruple treaty and the Order in Council. These 116

papers also contain sorne correspondence pertaining to the • outstanding claims of the legionnaires and the services rendered by them to the Spanish army. Temperley and Penson's, A Century pl' Piplomatic Blue Books, has been of use in exploring these papers. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, third series, are also to be found in the McLennan Library, and furnish numerous examples of the political divisiveness of Palmerston's foreign policy with regard to Spain. The Debates provide an excellent source of commentary on the issues surrounding the Spanish conflict and give an important insight into parliamentarians' perception of Don Carlos and the sympathy for the Basque peoples. Most relevant here are the speeches of Lord Palmerston, Lord Mahon and Lord Londonderry concerning the intervention in Spain. The British and Foreign State Papers, edited by E. Hertslet, contain sorne interesting documents which are not found in the Sessional Papers. They relate to conventions and decrees in Spain at the time of the Civil War, as weil as including several speeches of the queen regent in the Cortes. These papers also comprise sorne correspondence between Colonel Wylde and Lord Palmerston, following Lord Eliot's mission to Don Carlos. Newspaper and periodical accounts of the British Legion in Spain, were very much divided along political lines. The Mornin~ Chronicle was as open in its support of Evans and the British Legion as was the Mornin~ Post in its condemnation of the operations of the Legion in Spain. The Times and The Her:lili!. tended to remain ncutral with regard to the conflict in Spain, although the latter clearly moved • towards support of Palmerston's policies. Among the journals, only 87

the Edinburl:h Revjew sided with Evans and the Legion. The • following is a brief consideration of the background and political leanings of the newspapers and periodicals which have been used in this thesis. ln 1835 one of the most influential of the London newspapers was The Times. which frequently attacked both sides in the debate over Spain. Although an autonomous in its character, for it was subsidised by public and not party funds,' The Times stood largely for traditional values. Despite adopting a tone of independence when it chose to defend popular or Iiberal ideas. The Times habitually criticised the policy of the Whigs.2 The McLennan Library of McGill University hoIds microfilm copies of The Times for the entire period of the war. The Mornin!: Chronicle was set up as a rival to The Times but never attained the popularity of the latter. It is claimed that Palmerston frequently Îed news to the Çhronicle, and even wrote many of the articles h'-'self. although he denied the allegations in parliament. The Mornin!: Chronjcle was encouraged., but not subsidized. by the Whigs and was dedicated to the principle of reform. 3 Files of the Marnin!: Chronjcle may be found in the Newspaper Library at Colindale, London and also at Princeton University Library, New Jersey. The fiercest rival of the Mornjn!: Chronjcle. in terms of its politieal bii!s. was the Mornjn!: post.4 In the 1830s the P.2s.l sought to discredit

'HoUis. p.27. =Tbe New Encyc)Qllaedia Brjlannica. Vol. II. Chicago, t992, p.780. 3H.Bourne. English Newsllallers. Vol. II. London. t887. p.12 • oIJ. GraD!. The Newsllaller Press. London. 1871. p.380. 88

the foreign policy of Palmerston and the participation of the British • Auxiliaries in the Carlist war. The Morning post kept a reguhu column devoted to news l'rom Paris newspapers, and oceasionally reproduced accounts of the operations of the Legion other than those officially subscribed to by Evans or Palmerston. Original copies of the Morning Post for the period of the Carlist War, are to be found at Princeton University Library, New Jersey. Notwithstanding the influence of the newspaper press on public opinion, journals, periodicals and reviews also he Id sway over the public InJnd, if somewhat to a lesser degree. Several of the reviews were also strongly affected by political partisanship. The El! i n bu rgh Review started out primarily on principles of neutrality, but went on to embrace Whiggish party doctrines. The Quarterly Rcview. which was established to oppm,e the views expressed by the Whig press and to promote those of the Tories, soon earned a reputation for unfairness.s Both were outstanding examples of party organs. Original copies of the Edinburgh Review are held at the McLennan Library, Montreal. The Quarterly Revjew may be round at The Newspaper Library, London. A brief mention of magazines must necessarily include the Tory backed Blackwood's and Fraser's. [n the scope of magazines, their written articles tended to be light by way of contrast to th~ weighty tone of the quarterlies. The image of magazines was eSiablished primarily by Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, which almost al ways inclined to conservatism and was intended to counterbalance the • SIbid.. p.245. 119

whiggish lid.iDburgh Revjew. Both magazines are to be found at the • McLennan Library, Montreal. The following is an appraisal of the chief secondary sources used in this thesis. As a necessary background to Europea=< affairs, Webster's The Foreign Policy of Lord Palmerston (2 vols,) eovers the period of the Spanish war and includes many relevant documents and correspondence relating to the Quadruple treaty. This work throws light on the essential workings of Palmerston's approach to foreign policy in his dealings with other foreign ministers and provides essential information with regard to European diplomacy in the 19th century. The most outstanding study done on the British Legion in recent years is the thesis Evans and the British Legion 1835- UU1l. by Burgess. His treatment of the trials and tribulations of the men is thorough and he furnishes many details of Evans' relationship with his men. However, less is presented by way of quollltions l'rom primary material relating to public opinion in England and a detailed description of Carlism is sadly lacking. Nonetheless, much material concerning Evans' political acumen is brought out in this work and

'. great attention has been paid to the military operations of the Legion, to which this present thesis is greatly indebted. Spiers' exemplary work, Radical General, provides a great deal of important information on the military career of de Lacy Evans. Il also helps put in perspective the developments of Evans' political profession and his selection as leader of the British Auxiliaries. Mention of political debates and public reaction to Evans al'ter his • return to England have been covered, albeit in a broad way in this 90

book. Nevertheless, much of Spiers' thorough research has supplied • valuable details on the Iife of a man who left neither memoirs nor much in the way of private papers. In his authoritative book, The Basque phase of Spain's First Carlist ~, Coverdale has presented a comprehensive view of Carlism as a counter revolutionary movement, from which many facts in this thesis have been drawn. For an explanation of the political aspect of Carlism, several articles of Professor Wilhelmsen's in the Iberian Studjes series, including 'Carlos VII or an Introduction to Carlism', help underpin any study of the Spanish Civil War. A detailed appraisal of the origins of the Basque regional movement is to be found in Payne's Basque Nationalism. This work provides a g~neral insight into the cultural and political aspirations of the Basques and renders comprehensible their numerous subsequent conflicts in the face of the centralising tendencies of the Madrid government. The evolution of the Basque identity and political systems in Spanish history is adequately documented in this book.

• 9 1

BIBUOGRAPHY • A. PRIMARY SOURCES

(l)PARUAMENTARY PAPERS:

Papers relating to the War in Spain, 1834 to 1838, 1839. [192.) L.191.

Papers relating to the War in Spain, 1839. [186.) L.97.

Papers relating to the Convention of Bergara [Vergara) 1840. [233.) XLVIII, 103.

Quadruple Alliance, 22nd, April, 1834; LI. 299.

Order in Council relative to the exemption of British subjects who may serve in Spain from the Foreign Enlistment Act; 1835 [323.) XXXVII, 629.

Additional Articles to Quadruple Alliance; 1835, LI. 299.

Papers relative to the Services rendered by the British Auxiliary Legion to Spain or to the Spanish army, 1836-37, 1837-38 [116.] UI. 245-264.

Correspondence respecting the measures taken by the Spanish government to pay the claims of the British Auxiliary Legion which served in Spain, 1840. [264.] XXX. 267.

(2)HANSARD'S PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES:

Vols. XXIV - LV., (Third Series), for the years 1834-1840.

(3)BRlTISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS:

Vols. XXII.- XXVII, relating to Spain for the years 1833 to 1840. • 92

(4)NEWSPAPERS AND PERIOOICALS: • 6lackwood's Edjnbur~h Ma~azjne. Edjnbur~h Revjew.

Fraser's Ma~azjne.

Fortni~htly Revjew.

Mornin~ Chronjcle

Morning Herald

Mornjng Post

Quarterly Revjew

The Ti mes of London, issues from 1833-1841.

(5)PUBLISHED CORRESPONDENCE, inc1uding that printed in otherwise secondary works:

Ashley, E., Life and Correspondence of Henry John Temple. Viscount Palmerston, 2 Vols., Richard Bentley, London, 1879.

MaxwelI, Sir, H. TM Life and Letters of George WjIljam Frederick. Fourth Earl of Clarendon. Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1913.

Sanders, L. ed. Lord Melbourne's Papers. Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1889.

Sudley, Lord. ed. and transI., The Lieven-Pa1merston Correspondence J 828-1856. J. Murray, London, 1943.

Temper1ey, H. and Penson, L. Foundatjons of British Foreign Poljcy. Frank Cass and Co., London, 1966 • 93

(6)MEMOIRS AND OTHER CONTEMPORARY BC'JKS: • Bayly, T. The British Legion: A Burletla in One Act. Chapman and Hall, London, 1838.

Cargill, W. Mehmet AIL Lord Palmerston. Russja and france. J. Reid and Co., London, 1840

Greville, C. The Greville Memoirs. 2 Vols .. ed. H. Reeve, D. Appleton and Co., New York, 1875.

Richardson, J. Journal of the Movements of the British Legion. E. Wilson, London, 1836.

Shaw, C. A Short Statement of the Case of Claimants of the British Auxiliary Legion of Spain. T. Brettell, Haymarket, 1839.

Thompson, C. Twe1ve Months in the British Legion. J. Macrona, London, 1836.

Walton, W. Revolutions of Spain 1808-1836. 2 Vols., R. Bentley, London, 1837.

B. SECONDARY SOURCES

(l)BOOKS:

Aspinall, A. PoUtics and the Press. Home and Van Thal, London, 1949.

Barahona, R. Vjzcaya on the Eve of CarUsm. University of Nevada Press, U.S.A., 1989.

Billy, G. Palmerston's foreign PoUcy: 1848. P. Lang, New York, 1993.

Boume, H. English Newspapers Vol.Il., Chauo and Windos. London, 1887.

Boume. K. Palmerston,The Early Years 1784-1841. MacMillan, New • York, 1982. 94

Boume, K. The Forei~n Po1icy of Victorian En~land. Clarendon Press, • Oxford, 1970. Broderick, Hon. D., and Fotheringham, J. The Po1itical History of En~land Vol. XI., Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1906.

Brown, L. Victorian News and Newspapers. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1985.

Burgess, D. Evans and the British Le~ion. 1835-1838. (M. A. Thesis) McGili University, Montreal, 1966.

Carr, R. Spain 1808-1975. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1982.

Chapman, C. A Hjstory of Spain. The Free Press, New York, 1918.

. Christiansen, E. The Ori~ins of Military Power in Spain 1800-1854. Oxford University Press, London, 1967.

Coverdale, J. The Basque Phase of Spain's First Cadist War. Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1984.

Dolphin, B. Lord John Manners and the Origins of the Young England Movement. ( M. A. Thesis), McGill University, Montreal, 1970.

Edwards, W. British Foreign Policy from 1815 to 1933. Methuen and Co., London, 1934.

Gash, N. Reaction and Reconstruction in En~lish Politics 1832- 1852. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1965.

Graham, W. En~lish Literary Periodicals. Thomas Nelson and Sons, New York, 1930.

Grant, J. The Newspaper Press. Tinsley Brothers, London, 1871.

Guyot, R. La premiere Entente Cordiale. F. Rieder, Paris, 1926.

Hall, J. En~land and the Orleans Monarchy. Smith, EIder and Co., London, 1912.

Hasbrouck, A. Forei~n Le~ionarjes in the Liberation of Spanish South • America. Columbia University, New York, 1928. 95

• Hollis, P. The Pauper press. Oxford University Press, 1970. Kennedy, P. The Djp!omacy of Imperia!ism. Allen and Unwin. G!asgow, 1981.

Koss, S. The Rise and FaU of the po!itical press in Britain. Hamish Hamilton, London, 1981.

Lowell, A. Pub!ic Opinion in War and Peace. Cambridge University Press, !923.

Madariaga, S. Bo!ivar. Schocken Books, New York, 1969.

Marichal, C. Spain !834·1844. Tamesis Books, London, !977.

Mayhew. H. London Labour and the London Poor. G. Woodfall. London, 1851.

O'Ballance, E. The Story of the French Forei~n I.e~ion. Faber and Faber, London, 1961.

Payne, S. Basque Nationa!ism. University of Nevada Press. U.S.A., 1975.

Petrie, Sir C. Diplomatie History. HoUis and Carter, London, 1946.

Porch, D. The French Forei~n Legion. Harper Collins, New York, 1991.

Ridley, J. Lord Palmerston. Constable and Co., London, 1970.

Snyder, J. The Myths of Empire. Cornell University Press, New York, 1991.

Shelley, R. The British Le~ion in Spain durin~ the First Carljst War 1832-1839. Spanish Philatelie Society, Brighton, 1975.

Spiers, E. Radical General: Sir George de Lacy Evans 1787-1870. Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1983. • Taylor, A. J. The Trouble Makers. Hamish Hamilton, London, 1957. 96

Temperley, H. and Penson, L. eds., A Century of Piplomatic Blue • Books 18 J4-19 lA.. Cambridge University Press, 1938. Vicens Vives, J. Approacb,~s to the History of Spain. trans. J. Ullman, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1970.

Webster, Sir, C. The Forei~n policy of Lord palmerston. 2 Vols., G. Bell and Sons, London, 1969

The Pictionary of National Biol:raphy. Oxford University Press, 1960.

The New Encyclopaedja Brjttanjca. University of Chicago, 1992.

(2)ARTICLES, REVIEWS etc:

Bullen, R. 'Party Politics and Foreign Policy: Whigs, Tories and Iberian Affairs, 1830-6'. in Bulletin of Hjstorical Research VoI.U., University of London, 1977.

Marshall-Cornwall, Sir, J. 'British Aid in the Cariist War: 1835-1840: in Hjstory Today, Vol. XXVI., Strand, London, 1976.

Wilhelmsen, A. 'Carlos VII or an Introduction to Carlism' in Iberian Studies Vol. VIII, University of Keele, 1979.

(3)CONFERENCES

Wilhelmsen, A. 'The Political Thought of Don Carlos', from the proceedings of The Consortjum on Revolutionary Europe, ed., W. Spenser, Athens, Georgia, 1985

•