Polish Floods

Clues for Civil Society and the State Post-Communism1

Don Kalb and Herman Tak

Kalb, Don and Tak, Herman 2001: Polish Floods. Clues for Civil Society and the State Post-Communism. – Ethnologia Europaea 31: 63–74.

A collective panic, which spread in Poland during the flood of July 1997, revealed off-stage properties of state-citizens relationships, i.e. the inability to trust, as an

important aspect of post-communist societies. In this article the city of Wroclaw is a local string point for a study of citizenship-relations in post-communist Poland which are related to specific hidden histories – the communist heritage as well as the repressed German past of the region. Both factors, by producing overcentral- ization and unaccountability of state structures, deep rivalry among political actors, disrespect and distrust among citizens and between citizens and states, as well as collective amnesia, explain the incapacity of Wroclaw’s citizens to keep control over their city, the Odra river, the state organizations and their imagination.

Dr. Don Kalb, Department of Anthropology, Utrecht University, P.O.Box 80140, NL- 3508 TC Utrecht. E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Herman Tak, Department of General Social Sciences, Utrecht University, P.O.Box 80140, NL-3508 TC Utrecht. E-mail: [email protected]

In July 1997 a heavy downpour hit Poland and erties of state-citizen relationships in this “suc- the Czech Republic. Followed by continuous cessful transition country”. We will take the rainfall, it caused the flooding of alluvial areas flood and associated social and governmental and the breaking of dikes, in particular in the processes as a starting point for a situational mountains and swamp areas of Lower-Silesia.2 analysis (Handelman 1996) that will help us In Poland, 1 358 villages and towns – 2.1% of the perceive a cluster of hidden histories which national territory – were flooded, 160,000 peo- crucially shape popular cognitions, expectations ple fled their houses, and 54 casualties were and sensibilities. These popular sensibilities

3 registered. This calamity made headlines in pervade social interactions within formal insti- European media for weeks. National govern- tutions and between these institutions and cit- ments sent help, and the European Commis- izens in contemporary Poland. We aim to show sion offered financial support. A collective panic that such interactions are, compared to (what is spread in Poland. The outside world got the idealized as) ‘the West,’ marked by problems of impression that at least half the country was trust and trustability between actors. The ab- flooded. In Poland itself the flood became sence of trust, and its consequences for citizens, wrapped in almost biblical imagery. The waxing citizenship, and political culture, is an impor- waters took both the population and the author- tant aspect of most post-communist societies. It ities by full surprise. On July 9, for example, the forms the downside of problems of democratic local authorities declared the inhabitants of the consolidation as discussed by political scien- town of Opole to be safe that night, but waking tists such as Linz and Stepan (1996) and Offe up they found their houses surrounded by flush- (1995). It should also be seen as that everyday ing waters.4 aspect of social relations on which the rising

The Polish flood of 1997 occasioned a social tide of ethnonational, exclusivist, and parochial drama that revealed important off-stage prop- ideologies as studied by Tismaneanu (1998)

EthnologiaEthnologia Europaea Europaea vol. 31: vol. 2; 31: e-journal. 1. 2004. 2004. ISBN 87 635 0136 8 63

and evoked by Jowitt (1992) is based (see also producing over-centralization, unaccountabili- Niedermüller 1999). Poland occupies an un- ty of state structures, collective amnesia, and steady place in such accounts, since the gravest deep rivalry among political actors, as well as reservations about democratic transition spring disrespect among citizens and distrust between from the experience of the ex-Soviet “inner citizens and states, explain the incapacity of empire”, ex-Yugoslavia, and the Balkans. This Wroclaw’s citizens to keep control over their is also true for the much more sensitive anthro- city, the Odra, the state organizations and their pological writings of Katherine Verdery (1996) imagination. and Gail Kligman, who both concentrate on Romania. In the conclusion we will dwell on this City in the Odra intra-regional comparison and on Verdery’s ‘unruly coalitions’ as an explanation for civic dis- Wroclaw (640,000 inhabitants) is Poland’s fourth trust and obstacles for civic democracy. city and situated in Lower Silesia (Dolny ;lask). The importance of relating problems of trust Its landscape is partly suburban. Around the to the quintessentially anthropological notion former German administrative and cultural of hidden histories (Schneider 1996) is twofold. centre, extensive residential settlements have First, the notion encourages us to see that the been erected, consisting of the typical low qual- observation that these societies can now be ity/low cost tenement blocs of communism. Its placed under the general rubric of democratic economy, with its wide variety of industries – capitalism is the start rather than the endpoint chemicals, textile, steel/engineering, electrical of social analysis. Most state-nations, including industries, food and transport – is still a (post) the post-communist ones, have now joined the communist ‘update’ of an advanced nineteenth club of capitalist democracies. But this does not century German industrial location. imply that they have become or are even in the Today, Wroclaw is the third most successful process of becoming replicas of ‘the West’. Rath- transition area of Poland.5 Capitalist transfor- er, it means that the rubric of democratic capi- mation has led to a rapid class differentiation talism itself has lost any critical edge for under- within neighbourhoods, primarily between lowly standing basic aspects of local, contextualized, skilled industrial workers on the one hand and embodied social relationships that necessarily the higher educated service class on the other. remain hidden for analyses that do not aim Distinctions in wealth, however, have not yet beyond abstraction (see Geertz 1998). led to residential segregation, except perhaps Secondly, the notion of hidden histories al- for the upper-ten who are now moving to newly lows us to trace significant variations and dy- developed ex-urban sites of country house de- namics within a generic type of social formation velopment or to gentrified urban apartments. to local historical conditions prior to its inclu- With some exceptions, then, everyone still lives sion in the wider rubric, as well as to the in the same urban ecology of large-scale tene- sequences of social events that have subse- ment blocs or badly maintained inner city are- quently unfolded. The notion of hidden histo- as. These areas, nevertheless, are rapidly turn- ries presumes that ‘cultural’ idiosyncracies are ing into stages for post-communist status dis- not the inevitable result of essential cultural play, mainly through the medium of cars and otherness, but are rather the provisional prod- other mobile items of conspicuous consump- uct of particular people acting in a specific tion. conjunction of ‘local time’ and ‘universal time’. Wroclaw is located in the core of a swamp In this article, we take the city of Wroclaw as area where the rivers Bystrzyca, Widawa, Sleza a local starting point for a study of civic rela- and Olawa pour their waters in the river Odra, tions in post-communist Poland. It shows how the branching arms of which embrace the cent- waxing waters can reveal the contemporary er proper. This conjunction of various riverbeds civic consequences of the communist heritage was the cause of the unexpectedly rapid and as well as the repressed German past of the threatening waxing of water levels on July 12, region. These are the hidden histories that, by 1997.

EthnologiaEthnologia Europaea Europaea vol. 31: vol. 2; 31: e-journal. 1. 2004. 2004. 64 ISBN 87 635 0136 8

Map of Wroclaw. The darker parts show the flooded areas.

The first rumours about the threat of flood port for the volunteers. The Odra reached its started to spread on Wednesday July 9. That peak-level around midnight. But in the subse- day, the Regional Committee of Flood Control quent days fears remained for dikes and bridg- had concluded in its joint meeting that the city es, which were under continuous pressure from could rely on its extensive system of water- strong alluvial currents, causing the popula- works to channel the excess water safely through tion to remain on guard. the area. Despite the Committee’s confidence, Except for the nineteenth-century neighbour- or perhaps even as its consequence, rumours hood in Traugutta Street (called ‘the ghetto’), about a coming flooding were being raised in the old centre was not flooded. The water main- tandem with the rising level of the Odra river. ly hit the postwar residential areas in the north On Thursday, a local newspaper on its own and the south-east. Of the city’s territory, 26.5 account published a doom scenario, self-confi- per cent was flooded. At some places, the water dently predicting which neighbourhoods would reached seven meters, such as in the post-war be flooded. In response to the mounting pres- neighbourhood of Kozanow. But the average sure of public fear, the Regional Committee depth was between 30 and 60 centimetres. There decided to blow up a dike near Lany to show were two casualties in the community, one of that it was preparing to spare the city. Angry whom was drowned. peasants from Lany, however, prevented min- The flood brought, of course, everyday public ers from doing so and clashed violently with life in disarray. Many neighbourhoods were police forces. The administration willy-nilly re- without electricity for many days, and the whole treated and later attempts failed too. A dike in city was without tap water for one and a half the area of Brzeg broke spontaneously however, week. Each day people stood in long lines for which served to postpone the flooding of the pumps and tankers. The telephone network 6 urban area. was completely in disorder and on July 17, In the city itself, manifest collective action thirty thousand telephone numbers still did not only started on Saturday afternoon, on July 12. function. For many people it took more than a Thousands of volunteers – called on by the month to become re-connected again. The city popular media – started to reinforce riversides centre was completely deserted for one long with sandbags. They also blocked off streets and week, and the re-establishment of daily urban posted guards at critical points. The national routines took certainly another week. Moun- government responded by sending military sup- tains of litter dominated the street scenery for

EthnologiaEthnologia Europaea Europaea vol. 31: vol. 2; 31: e-journal. 1. 2004. 2004. ISBN 87 635 0136 8 65

about a month because the refuse dump was city. They kept people mobilized for days during flooded too and neighbouring communes de- the flood. And almost a week later, on July 18, a clined to make space available. It took four rapidly spreading rumour about a second wave months before tram-traffic functioned as be- of water motivated many people to barricade fore. themselves in their houses again, incredulous The economic damage was considerable: 3,476 of the authorities’ prediction that this second buildings were flooded, among which thousands wave would only threaten those areas where of apartments, 840 shops and other services.7 dikes had been broken before (as it turned out, Shortly after the water receded, local authori- the Odra stayed several meters below its former ties claimed that hundreds of apartments should peak-level). be demolished and replaced. A dilapidated house Rumours reflected a popular anticipation of in Traugutta Street neighbourhood had col- the state’s incapacity to deal with the emerging lapsed. A year later, several nineteenth century dangers. Effective local government was made tenement houses in ‘the ghetto,’ notorious for its impossible by the lack of reliable and authorita- lack of maintenance since the thirties, were tive administrative knowledge, which was, in blown up to prevent the same. its turn, produced by unclear and overlapping The flood and the social events surrounding responsibilities, over-centralization, and politi- it, made a strong and unique impression on cal rivalry. Consequently, after spontaneous civic

l Wroc aw’s citizens. In the late summer and in action had initiated the collective rescue of the autumn, two large photo exhibitions remained city, the public administration had a hard job open for months, visited by thousands of people. regaining the initiative. It’s actions in the two Five illustrated books on the flood have as yet crucial days – July 12–13 – were characterized been published, as well as a video, entitled by panic. When the Odra was already well ‘Historical Catastrophe.’ under its maximum, armoured vehicles drove on high alert through the city centre. At the

same moment, arriving travellers at the central State-Citizen Relations in Post-Com- railway station were ordered back by the police munism with the warning ‘The whole city is under water, It is no fresh discovery that during calamities epidemics are breaking out, it is perilous.’8 rumours, as an informal means of communica- Local authorities misjudged situations and tion and coordination, frequently take over from panicked because of their fundamental igno- formal media and routine governmental proce- rance about the water circulation, the infra- dures. Wroclaw too, during the flood-episode, structure systems for its management, and the was dominated by rumours. But rumours, here, vulnerability of specific residential areas. As a signified something more fundamental than result, it was completely unclear where the just the cognitive and practical self-organiza- problems would arise and how they could be tion of people in the face of danger. They were prevented. The deeper cause of this ignorance the expression of a basic feature of many post- had its roots in the communist past. Water communist societies: the profound popular dis- management had been treated as an exclusive- trust of the purposes and capacities of authori- ly military domain, information about which ties, the enduring lack of accountability and was kept at military regional headquarters and transparency of political structures, as well as in Warsaw, but not at the level of local public the deep rivalry and disrespect between con- authority. The ensuing deficiencies of predic- tending political factions and between different tion and management were, moreover, aggra- population segments. vated by rivalry between different governmen- Before, during, and after the flood, rumours tal agencies, headed by protagonists from op- virtually defined citizens’ conceptions. They were posing political parties, with on the one side the the effective vehicle of public fear that prepared city government under leadership of the inde- people for spontaneous action in defiance of the pendent local politician Mayor Bogdan Zdro- authorities well before the flood reached the jewski, and on the other the Regional Commit-

EthnologiaEthnologia Europaea Europaea vol. 31: vol. 2; 31: e-journal. 1. 2004. 2004. 66 ISBN 87 635 0136 8

tee of Flood Control headed by the post-commu- and profound disrespect of political rivals char- nist regional governor (voivod) Janusz Zaleski. acteristic for a nation as Poland, with its long

Lack of expertise led to governmental inertia years of people’s protest, frustrated any co- as the floods were approaching the city, causing operation between the administrative levels a temporary power-vacuum which was instant- and obstructed all possible action. ly filled up by the local media. Local broadcast- The structure of regional governments, more- ing stations (radio and TV) became, for better or over, was inherited from the communist regime, for worse, co-ordination centres for popular and its set-up reflected the centralizing plus mobilization. Volunteers now took the lead. fragmentalizing aims of the politburo vis-à-vis But, understandably, in absence of well defined the provinces. In 1975 the regime changed the plans, many things went wrong. For example, administrative division from 22 into 49 voivod- dikes of sandbags were erected on places where ships – the region Wroclaw, for example, was they were useless or even counter-productive. divided into 4 different voivodships.11 This pol- Local authorities were not capable of removing icy of centralization through fragmentation was such obstacles in the next days, fiercely defend- meant to strengthen the vertical lines within ed as they were by local residents who believed the command economy by cutting off lower- such dams would protect their houses against level communication between districts and al- the upcoming flood, the extent of which no one lowing optimal local penetration by the centre. could really predict. The organized lack of contacts between adja- It was Mayor Zdrojewski who understood cent local units is a basic and little recognized the crucial importance of local media in this administrative feature of (ex-)communist soci- situation. He promptly removed his headquar- eties, as the former Polish deputy Minister of ters to the television station TD (Telewizja Housing, Irene Herbst, emphasized in an inter- Dolnoslaska) and before long became the hero view.12 During the flood, this administrative of the flood, compared in the vernacular with heritage obstructed the transmission of infor-

Kordecki, the Prior who in 1655 had led the mation between local public authorities and defence of the Jasna Gora monastery against a inhibited any effective ‘voice’ from below (which Swedish invasion (today a national pilgrimage is of course something other than direct popular site near Czestochowa). 9 Voivod Zaleski, on the action). other hand, became the bogeyman, allegedly It is interesting to make a comparison with lacking any organizational talents. Zaleski’s the grass-roots information and co-ordination failure on July 13 to blow up a dike near Lany system characteristic for the ‘civic’ systems for was expatiated in the press and his reputation water control in a country so deeply dependent was thoroughly destroyed.10 on the effectiveness of such social structures as

But more than lack of personal talent, it was the Netherlands. In this river-delta country, political rivalry that aggravated governmental control of waterworks is characterized by de- incapacity. The regional administration was centralized district water boards with demo- appointed by the national government, at that cratically elected boardmembers and a profes- moment a coalition of post-communist and peas- sional chair (dike warden) appointed by the ant parties. The regional governor (voivod) Zal- crown. These boards have great professional eski was a post-communist. The town council, autonomy, and short communication lines with however, was controlled by a coalition of local higher executive levels. Board members are and opposition parties, and Mayor Zdrojewski – regularly recruited from local interests with chosen by the council – was an independent intimate knowledge of, and high dependence politician. Conflicting political (and electoral) on, local river landscapes, such as farmers and interests between on the one hand the post- landlords, who have extensive democratic rights communist central government and its repre- (voting, information, etc.) vis-à-vis the dike sentative the voivod, and on the other opposi- warden.13 As the water rises – for instance in tional politicians in control of the local admin- February 1995, when 200,000 people were evac- istration, certainly in the atmosphere of deep uated – district water boards install warning

EthnologiaEthnologia Europaea Europaea vol. 31: vol. 2; 31: e-journal. 1. 2004. 2004. ISBN 87 635 0136 8 67

systems and inform and advise higher public oric. Prime Minister Cimoszewicz aroused coun- authorities, i.e. mayors and provincial gover- try-wide indignation as he first remarked that nors who are in charge during such operations. the number of the flood’s casualties was far

The role and influence of the national govern- below the daily average in Polish traffic. In the ment is a minor and supportive one. Of course, second instance, when it became clear that this this system can bring about conflicts, as it did in was a serious event, the government started to 1995, but such conflicts are typically based in put blame on the neighbours. According to a an excess of power and autonomy on the part of government spokesman, the situation was made the boards and the professional water-manag- worse by the Czech Republic emptying its water ers as compared to other civic interests, such as reservoirs. That same day, July 12, Prime Min- those of the village inhabitants, rather than on ister Cimoszewicz visited some flooded areas their weakness/dependence. and declared that farmers would not get any Ideologies of state policy-making in a post- restitution for destroyed crops by saying ‘You communist country such as Poland also worked have to take precautions, and get insured for to disqualify governmental responses. Initially, eventual disasters. But unfortunately this has the national post-communist government saw not been a popular attitude’.14 Next, on July 9, the flood as an alibi for regional claim-making. local authorities incapable of managing the

It tried to play it down just like it would have approaching water masses, bid the national done with other popular claims on its highly government to announce the state of emergen- conservative public budget. This response was cy, but the Ministry of Internal Affairs deemed firmly rooted in the ideological conditions of such a step unconstitutional and claimed that post-communism. In East Central European regional governors had all the means at hand to citizenship-discourse, a sharp demarcation is tackle the problems. Remarkably enough, the nowadays drawn between ‘real citizenship’ on Polish army had earlier declared that it was the one hand, which is held to be highly ‘self- ready for action, but the authorities did not ask responsible’, and ‘ordinary claim-making’ on for systematic help, even though all knowledge the other, which is negatively associated with of waterworks had been under military control 15 the communist heritage of popular distributive for decades. demands vis-à-vis a state with which nobody in There are Polish ways to solve such a situa- the end would identify. Surely, in historical and tion of governmental unaccountability: In Wro- comparative perspective this is a dubious and claw, during the night in which the waters moralistic contrast. It overlooks the origins of reached their peak, as we were told, a pensioned contemporary citizenship practices in 18th and military officer came up to town hall and offered

19th century popular contestation with states, his help. He was active there for a couple of days, and it suppresses the question under which and as he suddenly disappeared local adminis- circumstances of governance people can be- trators understood that ‘the flood was over’ come ‘self-responsible’ citizens rather than ego- (evidently, his name was not known then or istic and non-committed claimants. But the now). distinction between self-responsibility and Centralism, rivalry, unaccountability, and the claim-making is of course political rather than political rejection of state responsibilities fed scientific. It serves to bring citizenship-discourse, back and forth into a profound lack of trust and with its roots in the dissident culture of the co-operation among citizens. Some towns suf- 1970s and 80s and its powerful mythical and fered from large-scale and sometimes clearly legitimating functions for the new democratic organized plundering, a problem bluntly de- state, in line with the requirements of conserv- nied by the national government. Many people ative social policies and neo-liberal public fi- anticipated this and refused to be evacuated. nances such as demanded by the international Problems with enforcing authority also sur- institutions. faced in the attempts to blow-up dikes up-

In the case of the flood, this ideological pre- stream from Wroclaw. Voivod Zaleski personal- disposition led to politically self-defeating rhet- ly mediated with the inhabitants of Lany and

EthnologiaEthnologia Europaea Europaea vol. 31: vol. 2; 31: e-journal. 1. 2004. 2004. 68 ISBN 87 635 0136 8

offered them financial compensation. However, produce and reproduce barriers to a smooth he had to be rescued by a police escort in an functioning civil society. Yet another element

‘atmosphere of threat’ (Wrzesinski 1997: 39). surfaced in the Polish flood: the repressed Ger-

Months later it turned out that he had been man past. This repressed past was conveyed in taken hostage for some hours. Especially the public exclamations as ‘This is the first flood countryside was rebellious. Inhabitants of Siech- here for centuries’ or ‘for a thousand years’ and nice – a village a few kilometres from Wroclaw ‘We don’t have any experience with this.’ Re- – first changed the nameplates of their village markable utterances in a city which was built in into ‘Witamy w zbiorniku retencyjnym Siech- a notoriously swampy area with extensive wa- nice’ (Welcome into water reservoir Siechnice) ter works which had been flooded as late as and then turned to less frivolous protest, throw- 1932. ing up road-blocks to add strength to their During the conferences of Yalta and Potsdam demand for the construction of a canal to empty (1945) the Polish borders were revised under their village of water.16 pressure of the Soviet Union and were removed To disguise the fact that there was no effec- westward for several hundred kilometres. The tive government in Wroc law for at least two eastern Polish districts were appropriated by days, President Aleksander Kwasniewski com- the Soviet Union (today Lithuania, Belarus and plimented the citizens of Wroclaw with their Ukraine) while the new state got Eastern Ger-

‘excellent rescue operations.’ He was followed man territories, those east of the Oder and the 17 suit by Mayor Zdrojewski whose growing pop- Neisse rivers (among others, Pomerania, Upper ularity was founded in the fact that he choose and Lower Silesia) in return. not to let his council, civil service or other In 1945–47, the ex-German city of Breslau professionals do the job, but the local popula- was repopulated by Polish refugees, among them tion at large. By doing so, and by using the local many from Lwow (today L’viv in Ukraine), as media for this purpose, he turned the lack of well as by Poles from other evacuated areas. administrative capacities into populist elector- The town itself was nearly deserted after Hitler al advantage. During the national elections of had declared it ‘Festung Breslau’ in August September 21, 1997, he was easily elected to the 1944 – a stronghold against marching Russian senate. The election campaign also for parlia- troops on their way to Berlin. The town, having ment (Sejm) – was a tough and expensive one. been safe for allied aircraft all during the war, But on the eve of the elections Mayor Zdrojew- was heavily ravaged. During the final battle, ski announced that his budget had been zero. about 17,000 citizens were killed. It became a His campaign had taken place during the flood. ghost town, perhaps not like Dresden but cer-

Because the governmental coalition lost the tainly like Cologne or Nuremberg. Subsequent- elections, Voivod Zaleski had to resign. The new ly, between 1945 and 1949, some 3.2 million national government – a coalition of Solidar- Germans were ousted from the new Polish ter- nosç parties and Unia Wolnosci (Freedom Un- ritory. In Lower Silesia about a hundred thou- ion) – appointed new regional governments and sand Germans stayed behind, of which thirty immediately prepared the ground for the reor- thousand migrated in the 1950s. Many of these ganization of local and regional administra- stay-behinds were forced to do so, being indis- tions. Since August 1998, the former 48 voivod- pensable for the industrial built up of the new ships have been negotiated down to 16. Poland. The highly developed German areas offered a new chance for rapid urbanization and industrialization, a modernization which Po- History Strikes Back land had failed to generate on its own in the While Poland is now beyond doubt a deter- interwar period.18 mined democratic and capitalist country, the Wroclaw, subsequently, became the destiny communist heritage and its particular conse- of several internal migrations in the 1950s, as quences for governance, trust and co-operation people were attracted by housing and industri- 19 are elements of specific hidden histories that al employment. In Breslau the number of

EthnologiaEthnologia Europaea Europaea vol. 31: vol. 2; 31: e-journal. 1. 2004. 2004. ISBN 87 635 0136 8 69

remaining Germans was small – today the local toric or Catholic ones – but the prevailing knowl- German community counts some 800 mainly edge about the past did not change. Also in more elderly people – and those who stayed behind serious literature the post-war arrival of the were considered second-class citizens and were Polish population is still referred to as a ‘repat- 20 closely observed by the authorities. riation’ and it is stated that after the war Silesia Public exclamations like ‘this is the first was ‘re-Polonized.’ Invented histories create an flood here for a thousand years’ reveal a con- imaginary continuity with the past, as in the structed – and false – social memory, a reflec- local ale called ‘Piast’ – “brewed since 1893.” tion of the dramatic historical caesurae of the During the flood, suppressed German histo- city itself as well as of elaborate communist and ry “struck back.” Ignorance about the past re- nationalist efforts to suppress the memory and sulted in a gross lack of common as well as

21 facts of the German past. In this constructed professional knowledge about local waterworks. memory, an overwhelming historical continuity During the flood an old map was dug up in the of the Silesian region as Polish is claimed by town hall with the markings of the flood of 1932, stressing the Piast origin of local rule. The but no one could decipher the lines and symbols. Polish kings of the 11th, 13th and 14th centuries Other historical sources, such as Das Breslau would have descended from the Piast dynasty, Lexicon or publications of the Schlesische Zei- which controlled parts of Silesia. After the Sec- tung would also have been sufficient to predict ond World War, a myth was created about these what was going to happen, but familiarity with 24 Piast rulers as quintessentially Polish in order such material was lacking. Ignorance was to legitimate the “recovered territories” and the such that the Traugutta Street neighbourhood new borders once and for all. The German would not even have been flooded had the ma- presence in the western areas was now present- terial of a temporary dam not simply been ed as a historical mistake, a temporary and removed years ago. During the flood of 1854, the unimportant deviation from Polish cultural con- central railway station, a magnificent structure tinuity, and the presence of German minorities illustrative of eclectic German architectural 22 was flatly denied. styles of the time and put into use that same In Wroclaw, this ‘invented’ history served to year, had been flooded. This had occasioned the transform ‘their’ town into ‘our’ town. At least construction of an extensive system of hydro- two generations of students had to learn all the graphic projects, i.e. weirs, locks, sluices, pol- long-lasting Piast dynasties by heart. As a ma- ders, and drainage polders around the old cen- terialization of this process, many manifesta- tre. But the post-war communist authorities, tions of the German past were erased. Names of unknowingly, had destined these vital polders streets and squares were altered and Polonized, near the urban core as the site for large-scale now memorizing communist heroism and Polish building projects, such as the Kozanow neigh- patriotism, which was also expressed in numer- bourhood, which, predictably, was virtually ous monuments. This process of ‘mythical incor- drowned in 1997. poration’ of the region took some time, because the regime itself initially feared for the durabil- Conclusion ity of the western borders. But at the end of the

1960s German cemeteries were cleared away In Wroclaw a new mythology arose after the and turned into public parks. The only two flood. It was characterized by two interrelated cemeteries surviving were Jewish, as a conse- exaggerations: one concerning the extent of quence of which contemporary citizens often danger and damage and the other on the sup- assume their city to have been predominantly posedly close spontaneous cooperation among Jewish. But pre-war Breslau (circa 660,000 citizens protecting their collective safety. In a inhabitants) accommodated not more than some special issue of The Warsaw Voice (31-8-1997) 25,000 – mostly liberal – Jews.23 Mayor Zdrojewski claimed one-third of the city

After the fall of the communist regime, street to have been flooded. The Sociologist Wojciech names were altered – preferably into new his- Sitek even writes in his book Wspolnota i Zagro-

EthnologiaEthnologia Europaea Europaea vol. 31: vol. 2; 31: e-journal. 1. 2004. 2004. 70 ISBN 87 635 0136 8

zenie (Community and Danger) (1997) that half trust, justice and transparency of public gov- the city had stood under water. In reality, 26.5 ernance. Instead, their actions following 1989 per cent of the commune’s territory, the larger often reproduced civic distrust and institution- part of it fully undeveloped, had been inundat- al unreliability (Linz and Stepan, 1996, pp. ed. While we do not want to deny that spontane- 255–293; Gross 1992). Polish populist national- ous civic cooperation was widespread, one should ism apparently does not transform itself easily also point to frequent self-seeking behaviour, into the mind-scape of a state-nation. plain sabotage and plundering, and a remarka- The particularities of the Polish path out of bly non-collaborative attitude vis-à-vis public communism mattered. After 1989, the Polish authorities trying to coordinate collective action. opposition, and certainly Adam Michnik, the

Myth-making in Wroclaw served a populist editor in chief of the Gazeta Wyborza, has ac- and mildly redemptive function. Sure, it did not cepted and argued in favour of the policy of the posit any internal enemy to be deported nor did Thick Line. Ex-communists would be forgiven it envision any final-solution, as redemptive for their earlier practices and would face no myths, also in post-communist Europe, regular- revenge in the new Polish state. Although many ly do (see Tismaneanu 1998). But it helped to post-communist states have adopted the same reactivate and ‘re-member’ a basic mythic as- stance (the Czech republic is a partial exception, pect of Polish nationalism: the whole nation’s as is, of course, East Germany), there was a fight against an alien and intrusive state in special non-voluntary reason for this in the order to protect its integrity. A similar vision of Polish case, creating a situation not particularly ‘the people against the state’ had been wrapped conducive to the consolidation of civic democracy. into the idea of anti-politics, the well-known Since Poland was the first nation to take the cultural banner of the Polish and Central Euro- decisive steps out of communism, develop the pean opposition under Communism, an idea roundtable and agree to elections, nobody could which has itself grown into a founding myth for be certain how the Soviet Union would react. the new democratic state after 1989. Anti-poli- Moreover, the Communist Party in Poland had tics was about the liberation from communism moved toward negotiations on its own during by civic self-organization. A self-organization 1988. Contrary to a widespread and important that was not primarily meant to lead to the myth, it was not primarily pressed by popular conquering of the state. Rather, it was a goal in protest. Rather it initiated the pact with the itself, an everyday practice that should lead to opposition itself, as a deliberate way out of a ‘parallel polis’. This parallel polis could per- economic crisis and social stagnation (see above haps (gradually) substitute for the state. But all Staniszkis 1992). This created a special more importantly, precisely as a consequence of heritage: the birth act of the new Polish nation- its state-abstinence, it would remain authentic, al and democratic state, the outcome of the spontaneous and personalistic rather than bu- roundtable, was not the product of democratic reaucratic and artificial. concertation, certainly not the constitutionally Linz and Stepan, in their recent comparative enshrined enduring position in state and econ- work on consolidating democracies (1996), have omy of the ex-communists. rightly called attention to the potential incom- At the same time, Poland had been the only patibility of this populist cultural configuration East European nation with an heritage of large- with the ideological requirements for the con- scale and tenacious popular protest against, solidation of democracy in Poland. They have and non-acceptance of, the communist state, shown how a perceived inevitable incongruity which was not unreasonably perceived as an between the nation and the state prevented alien, Soviet imposed, intrusion. The almost above all Walesa himself, the embodiment of general rejection of communism expressed it- Polish populism, but also many Solidarity-in- self again in the 1989 elections. Against all tellectuals, from playing the careful, construc- predictions and expectations, and facilitated tive, and responsible role in relation to the unintentionally by the technicalities of the vot- state’s institutions that is required to help instil ing procedure which were expressly designed to

EthnologiaEthnologia Europaea Europaea vol. 31: vol. 2; 31: e-journal. 1. 2004. 2004. ISBN 87 635 0136 8 71

guarantee a planned communist majority in visible social differentiation, inequalities, wide- the Sejm, people expressed their own idea of a spread status anxiety, and frequently surfacing

Thick Line: eliminating all the names of the group conflict. communists from the voting lists and with this In her essay on pyramid-schemes in Roma- trick allowing Solidarity a great victory. But nia, Verdery (1996) proposes the notion of ‘unru- here the paradoxes of the first post-communist ly coalitions’ as harbingers of populist, nation- elections came immediately to the fore: the alist, and mythically inclined movements in victory was unconstitutional (because not East Central Europe. These unruly coalitions planned during the Roundtable) and Solidarity are locally or regionally based and shape local decided it would allow the communists their politics by operating behind the scenes, poten- pre-planned seats. The new Polish democracy tially through violence, and they usually in- was squeezed between popular anti-commu- clude local nomenclature, ex-security agents, nism on the one side and its own provisional large proprietors, managers, members of the constitution and the policy of the thick line on judiciary etc. the other. Now, it makes sense to see the Polish flood as It was precisely this contradictory heritage having occasioned an unruly coalition in the of popular anti-communism caged in by the Silesian region with Mayor Zdrojewski as its constitutionally enshrined Thick Line that al- centre. Unruly coalitions are certainly not lim- lowed the populist idea of the Polish self-organ- ited to network politics in the Balkans or the ex- izing nation as in its qualities clearly distinct Soviet ‘inner empire’. Nor are they necessarily from, distrustful of, and somehow against the mafia-like. Rather, we would suggest, they are state, to be reproduced under post-1989 circum- the consequence of the absence of well defined stances. The flood of 1997 helped to reactivate, and well structured local party-organizations relive and “re-member” this fundamental con- and grass roots political platforms. Political tradiction. The popular self-defense against the parties everywhere in CEE countries are very flood was felt to signal the people’s superiority thin institutions, with few members, little for- over, and defiance of, the state and its ex-com- mal organization, high visibility of key per- munist ruling party. Mayor Zdrojewski success- sonalities, and a heavy emphasis on capital fully rode this sentiment in his victorious as- cities and national politics. In such a situation, sault on the ex-communist state-bureaucrats unruly coalitions among local elites necessarily and governors. This relived sentiment subse- emerge to organize interests behind local policy. quently helped the opposition to regain power They are unruly, not because they may be main the next election. fia-like, but rather because of the absence of

But apart from “re-membering” functions, clear programs, explicit procedures, the weak- myth-making also served at least three ‘misrec- ness of local democracy and the as yet unstable ognizing’ functions. First, it helped to repress relations between governmental hierarchies. public awareness of the fact that the flooding of This case study of floods, populism and the state Wroclaw was not the consequence of ex-commu- in a Polish city indicates that unruly coalitions nist undeserved leadership, but rather of inad- may be an inevitable region-wide phenomenon equate public attention to governmental organ- associated with the problems of establishing ization and institutions compounded by deep democratic politics in post-communist socie- political rivalry and mistrust expressed in iden- ties. It suggests that their specific form, func- tity politics. Secondly, it took away from view tion, and content will be largely a product of the unhappy insight that still, after ten years of their wider environment. This particular unru- democratization and liberalization in the name ly coalition in Wroclaw decisively helped to of citizenship, state-citizen relations in Poland bring the issue of regional government and are not yet transparent, reliable, or trust-invok- decentralization on the public agenda and facil- ing. And third, it served to celebrate and ‘re- itated a new chance to govern for the two par- member’ Polish popular unity and communitas ties that came out of the ex-opposition move-

(Turner) in a situation of rapidly increasing and ment. It thereby helped to create new chances

EthnologiaEthnologia Europaea Europaea vol. 31: vol. 2; 31: e-journal. 1. 2004. 2004. 72 ISBN 87 635 0136 8

for civic consolidation rather than to mafia-type 19. Cf. Kaczmarek et al. (1997: 207–220). developments. The difference resides in the 20. Cf. Kurcz (1995: 43). 21. Cf. Gevers & Tak 1995. wider political society and its path of extrica- 22. Cf. Korbonski (1992: 257); Mach (1993: 188). tion from the communist past. 23. Cf. Czerwinski (1993: 26); Elias 1987. That these cemeteries were not cleared away was not so much out of respect for the former Jewish popu- Notes lation but because Ferdinand Lassalle as well as

the parents of Edith Stein are buried at the 1. We would like to thank Ewa Ignaczak, Leszek oldest one. The grave of Lassalle was visited by Koczanowicz and Lukasz Nysler for their help to comrades of the GDR and the one of the Stein collect information for this paper. family became a commemorative place for Cath- 2. The Odra river flows from the south to the Baltic olics. Edith Stein converted to Catholicism and sea and the flood also struck parts of north-east became a nun. She died in one of German concen- Germany as the Frankfurt (Oder) area. tration camps and was canonized. 3. Cf. Cebo-Foniol et al. (1997: 115; 120). 24. Cf. Sitek (1997: 38–39). 4. The Warsaw Voice. Polish and Central European Review (27-7-1997: p. 5). 5. Polityka August 22, 1998, no. 44. 6. Cf. Wrzesinski (1997: 12; 16–19). Literature 7. Cf. Wrzesinski (1997: 72; 137). 8. The collective fear for an epidemic was also aired Cebo-Foniol, Malgorzata & Zbigniew Fonok, Ewa ‘from below.’ Despite official announcements to Turczynska, Pawel Rzetecki, Andrzej Witkowski, the contrary, epidemics were rumoured for over Bartosz Golembnik, Jacek Kutla, Tomasz Rzad- a week. Lack of public confidence was also voiced kowski, Mariusz Tkaczyk, Dariusz Wisniewski (eds.) in the suspicion that tap water, as it became 1997: Powodz. Warszawa: Amber. l available again, was in fact poisoned industrial Czerwinski, Janusz 1993: Wroc aw. The Silesian me- water. tropolis on the Odra. Berlin.

9. Kordecki led the defense against a Swedish inva- Davies, Norman 1982: God’s playground. A history of sion (cf. Davies 1982 Vol. I: 452) and is as an Poland. Volume I . The Origins to 1795; Volume II: historical hero known among the people, among 1795 to the Present. New York: Columbia Universi- others, because of the historical novel Potop ty Press. (Flood) of H. Sienkiewicz (1868) prescribed liter- Elias, Norbert 1987: De geschiedenis van Norbert ature in secondary schools. Elias. A.J. Heerma van Vos en A. van Stolk in 10. Cf. Sitek (1997: 43). gesprek met Norbert Elias. Amsterdam: Meulenhof. 11. Until May 3, 1975 the 3-tier administrative divi- Geertz, Clifford 1998: sion counted 22 voivodships (with 5 special- Gevers, Anne & Herman Tak 1995: Herinnering en status cities) and was changed into 49 voivod- oorlog. In: Focaal no. 25: pp. 5–14. ships (and 3 urban agglomerations); 2345 com- Gross, Jan 1992: ‘Poland: From Civil Society to Polit- munes and 814 towns/cities. ical Nation’, in Ivo Banac, ed. Eastern Europe in

12. Interview on Soco financed research with Don Revolution. Ithaca, Cornell U.P. Kalb, June 19, 1998. Handelman, Don 1996: Microhistorical anthropology: 13. About Dutch district water boards, see: Winkler atemporal, retrospective, prospective. In: Kalb, Don, Prins Encyclopedie 1984 (volume 24: 5). Hans Marks & Herman Tak (eds.) Historical an- 14. This is a good example of the generally pedagogic thropology: the unwaged debate. Focaal no. 26/27: citizenship-discourse that CEE governments hold pp. 135–148. before their constituencies. Like his judgement Jakubek, Ewa, Friedrich Petrach, Irene Lipman & about the first victims of the flood Prime Minis- Annika Würthner 1977: Die Deutsche Sozial-Kul- ter Cimoszewicz had to withdraw his remarks turelle Gesellschaft in Niederschlesien. Festschrift about damages because of fierce public protest. zum Jubiläum des 40. Gründungstages 1957–1977. On July 15 the government decided to compen- Wroclaw: DSKG Breslau. sate farmers whose harvests were devastated Jowitt, Ken 1992: New World Disorder. The Leninist

and every household hit by the flood was to get Extinction. Berkeley: California U.P. 2000 zl, an amount that was raised to 3000 zl by Kaczmarek, Michal, Mateusz Golinski, Teresa Kulak the Polish parliament (Sejm) two days later (Cf. & Wlodzimierz Suleja 1997: Wroclaw Dziedzictwo Cebo-Fonoil et al. 1997: 71; 89). Wiekow. Wroclaw: Wydawnictwo Dolnoslaskie. 15. Cf. Cebo-Fonoil et al. (1997: 10; 18–19; 24). Katznelson, Ira 1996: Liberalism’s Crooked Circle. 16. Cf. Cebo-Fonoil et al. (1997: 18, 24; 40; 101). Letters to Adam Michnik. Princeton, Princeton U.P. 17. Cf. Wrzesinski (1993: 70). Korbonski, Andrzej 1992: Poland 1918–1990. In: Held, 18. Cf. Czerwinski (1993: 30); Davies (1982 Vol. II: Joseph (ed.) The Columbia history of Eastern Eu- 489; 513; 526–7); Jakubek et al. 1997; Szarota rope in the 20th century. New York: Columbia Uni- 1969. versity Press (pp. 289–276).

EthnologiaEthnologia Europaea Europaea vol. 31: vol. 2; 31: e-journal. 1. 2004. 2004. ISBN 87 635 0136 8 73

Kurcz, Zbigniew 1995: Mniejszosc Niemiecka w Pols- Sitek, Wojciech 1997: Wspolnota i Zagrozenie. Socjo- ce. Wroclaw: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wroclaw- logiczny Przyczynek do Analizy Krotkotrwalej Wspol- skiego. noty. Wroclaw: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Linz, Juan; Alfred Stepan 1996: Problems of Demo- Wroclawskiego. cratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern Eu- Staniszkis, Jadwiga 1992: The Dynamics of Break- rope, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. through in Eastern Europe. The Polish Experience. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U.P. Berkeley: California U.P. Mach, Zdzislaw 1993: Symbols, conflict, and identity. Szarota, Tomasz 1969: Osadnictwo Miejskie na Dol-

Essays in political anthropology. Albany: State nym Slasku w latach 1945–1948. Warszawa: Osso- University of New York Press. lineum. Niedermüller, Peter, 1999: ‘Rethinking History: Time, Tismaneanu, Vladimir. 1998: Fantasies of Salvation. Past and Nation in Post-Socialism’, In: Focaal, Democracy, Nationalism and Myth in Post-Com- Tijdschrift voor Antropologie , no. 33 munist Europe. Princeton: Princeton U.P. Offe, Claus 1996: Varieties of Transition. The East Verdery, Katherine 1996: What Was Socialism, and European and East German Experience. Cambridge, What Comes Next? Princeton, Princeton U.P. Polity Press. Winkler Prins Encyclopedie (25 volumes) 1979–1984: Schneider, Jane, 1996: ‘Introduction: The Analytical Amsterdam: Elsevier. Strategies of Eric R. Wolf’, in Schneider, Jane; Wrzesinski, Wojciech (ed.) 1997: Wroclawska Kronika Rayna Rapp, Articulating Hidden Histories. Ex- Wielkiej Wody. 10 lipca – 18 sierpnia 1997. Wroclaw: ploring the Influence of Eric R. Wolf l . Berkeley: Instytut Historyczny Uniwersytetu Wroc awskiego. California U.P.

EthnologiaEthnologia Europaea Europaea vol. 31: vol. 2; 31: e-journal. 1. 2004. 2004. 74 ISBN 87 635 0136 8