ECONOMY OF TOMORROW Fighting corruption in transformation societies Marc Saxer May 2014

n Corruption is the abuse of power. As a symptom of the disparity of rights and opportunities between the powerful and the powerless, corruption is a problem of social justice.

n Corruption, cronyism and clientelism are not only individual moral failures, but symptoms of an outdated political operating system producing social disparity. To remove bottlenecks for social and economic development, the political operating system needs to be upgraded to a legal-rational order with merit-based, impersonal institutions and effective rule of law.

n Fighting corruption means to hold the powerful accountable. This is why the fight against corruption can neither be neutral nor technical, but must be part of the greater struggle between those who benefit from the status quo, and those who seek democratic change.

n This struggle can only be won by the political muscle of a broad societal coalition. Allowing social groups with diverging interests and opposing beliefs to join forces, a common platform is needed which unites the fight against corruption with the struggles for social justice and deeper democratization. In order to do this, the false discursive equation of democracy with corruption needs to be replaced with an anti-corruption narrative firmly rooted in the struggle for deeper democratization.

n The common vision, of a “Legal-rational order as the basis for a Good Society with full capabilities for all”, shows the way out of the transformation conflict. Such a social compromise between those who seek a merit-based order and those who struggle for equal opportunities enables the laying of the social foundation for a new social contract. Table of Content

I. Introduction 1 II. A short history of corruption 1 2.1 Setting the Default: Kinship and reciprocity as evolutionary strategies 2 2.2 Scaling up: patron-client cooperation in agricultural societies 2 2.3 Cultural Embedding: Patrimonial order and Patronage Systems 2 2.4 Fighting decay: “Moral Corruption” as an ethical problem 3 2.5 Increasing effectiveness: the impersonal state 3 2.6 The invention of political corruption: the legal-rationalist political order 4 2.7 Exposing Euro-centricity: Corruption is a universal phenomenon 4 III. The effects of corruption on political and economic development 4 3.1 (Dys)-functional influences of corruption on economic growth? 4 Early Developmentalism 5 The devil’s advocate: Revisionism 5 Investment and Rent Seeking: the emergence of the Washington Consensus 5 Threshold between functionality and dysfunctionality 6 3.2 The impact of corruption on political development 7 Political economy: struggle between emerging and declining classes 7 Institutionalization 9 Corruption and Legitimacy 11 Imagining the state: Corruption narratives in the construction of the political and moral order 12 In the vertigo of change: Transformation drives Corruption 12 Corruption as a catalyst for change 13 Corruption in transformation societies 13 IV. The Politics of (Anti-) Corruption 14 4.1 Handle with Care: The ideological baggage of ‘Global Anti-Corruptionism’ 14 4.2 Corruption in Transformation Conflicts: The case of Thailand 16 Corruption as a transformation catalyst 16 The role of corruption narratives in Thailand’s transformation conflict 17 V. Anti-corruption strategies for transformation societies 24 5.1 Handle with care 25 5.2 Curbing corruption in transformation societies means to finalize the legal-rational order 26 5.3 The fight against corruption must be part of the struggle for democracy 27 MARC SAXER | FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN TRANSFORMATION SOCIETIES

I. Introduction The fight against corruption must fail if the nature of the obstacle is not fully understood. After Few social practices have had such a turbulent decades of research, many questions remain. history as corruption. Outrage over corruption How do patterns of corruption vary in different may well be as old as human civilization itself. environments? Is corruption really on the rise, or From the Sanskrit Samaveda to the Bible, from only the awareness of it? What are its effects on classical Greek philosophers to the teachings of development? And why are anti-corruption efforts Confucius and the Buddha, moral weakness was more successful in some societies than in others? condemned for “corrupting” society. Then again, In order to fight it, one has to understand the feudal myths are full of praise for the loyalty of incentives which induce individuals to participate tribute paying clients and the generousness of in corruption.1 A quick historical review of the patrons sharing spoils. To this day, the practice of shifting perspectives on “corruption” may be a gift giving is an integral part of many cultures. good starting point to put our contemporary beliefs into perspective. Deconstructing ideological biases Today, outrage over corruption is boiling in all and hidden agendas helps to avoid blind spots corners of the world. Anti-corruption movements and political minefields. The role of corruption in are taking to the streets, shaking regimes and Thailand’s conflict can offer important insights. bringing down governments. Although not Finally, lessons will be drawn to make the fight always successful, anti-corruption policies are against corruption in transformation societies being implemented with fervor. The fight against more successful. corruption has made it to the top of the global agenda. II. A short history of corruption

Let it be made clear that corruption, clientelism The notion of political corruption as we commonly and cronyism can indeed undermine sustainable understand it today is by definition ‘modern’, development, democratic consolidation and social because only after the division between public justice. Corrupt officials loot public coffers, distort and private was introduced, the concept of policy making and strangulate private initiative. “abusing public funds for private gains” makes The poison of corruption turns political visions any sense. However favoring kinship, dividing into a two faced rhetoric, justice into double spoils amongst loyal followers, or building regimes standards and bold plans into laughingstocks. The based on personal relationships are older than patronage system turns the potential of future mankind. This indicates that these behaviors fulfill entrepreneurs, scientists and administrators into certain social functions. If corruption fighters seek sleaze. Therefore, any society that seeks to develop to replace these behaviors with less obstructive must purge corruption, clientelism and cronyism. ones, they first need a clear understanding This is a herculean task which can only be achieved which social functions corrupt behaviors fulfill. with enlightened and unwavering leadership In an effort to better understand why humans encouraged by a strong pressure from below. engage in activities such as corruption, nepotism, Even then, corruption, clientelism and cronyism racketeering, bribery, and favoritism, it is helpful can only be curbed, but never fully rooted out. to identify what social functions these behaviors Preventing patrimonialism from creeping back in fulfilled, and how they were perceived in different is a challenge for every new generation. historical periods.

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2.1 Setting the Default: Kinship and based polities. In ancient absolute monarchies, the reciprocity as evolutionary strategies state was considered the property of the king, and all the resources of the country were claimed for Francis Fukuyama defines “patrimonialism” as the glorification of the ruler. Therefore in ancient political recruitment based on the two principles times, corruption meant to steal from the king. of kin selection and reciprocal altruism. Biologists recognize kin selection and reciprocal altruism Medieval feudalism, while still based on the as sources of cooperative behavior. Behaving personal relationship between a patron and a altruistically toward kin in proportion to the client, no longer required kinship. The feudal number of shared makes perfect sense from an was assigned land for “his own use in the manner evolutionary perspective as it is not the survival of of a fief” , with the entitlement to collect “the the individual that matters, but the procreation fat of the land” in the form of tributes from the of those who carry on most of those genes, peasantry. In return for loyalty, the feudal patron i.e. parents and children, brothers and sisters. offered protection. Feudalist rulers emphasized Reciprocal altruism does not depend on genetic their role as ‘paternalistic fathers of the people’. relatedness, but on repeated, direct personal Their ostentatiously lavish lifestyles symbolized interaction. Building relationships of mutual benefit their ability to look after their ‘inferiors’. “Noblesse and mutual trust allows societies to overcome oblige”, the willingness to help the unfortunate problems of collective action and paves the way reflected the code of honor of the ruling for more complex forms of cooperation and : sense of hierarchy and status, camaraderie political order. Since pre-human times, band level between brothers-in-arms, pride, heroism and societies based on kinship and reciprocal altruism paternalism. Aristocratic generosity to cultivate have been the most basic forms of political order, loyalty and brutal coercion to uphold the feudal and the default form of social cooperation that order were two sides of the same coin. Today, the always re-emerges should impersonal institutions sense of entitlement of ruling is an echo of break down. The tendency to favor family and the feudal order. friends is one of the most basic human conditions that linger on as the foundation of sociability. 2.3 Cultural Embedding: Patrimonial Given this default human condition to favor one’s order and Patronage Systems own kin, patrimonialism may at best be curbed, but never fully rooted out. Contemporary patronage networks work upon very similar rules. In exchange for loyalty, patrons 2.2 Scaling up: patron-client cooperation are wise to reward supporters, distribute spoils, in agricultural societies protect clients and favor their own kin. Corruption, clientelism and cronyism, then, are not or Kinship as an organizational principle reaches degenerations, but the very DNA of a patrimonial its limits once populations grow well beyond order. families and neighbors. Agricultural production necessitates professional specialization, while Patrimonial orders are deeply embedded into warfare requires the cooperation of thousands. political and social culture. Olivier de Sardan A new form of societal organization was needed identifies five logics of corruption in African to extend political order beyond the realm of patrimonial cultures: First, the logic of negotiation, everyday direct interaction. Tribal societies started which makes everything negotiable, even the to build monarchies, with steep social hierarchies rules of the game. Second, the culture of gift replacing the egalitarian organization of kinship giving as a show of respect or loyalty, which is

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often hard to distinguish from a bribe. Third the belief system upon which a political system logic of solidarity networks, in which members rests, […] destructive of a particular political cannot refuse to give a favor asked. Fourth, the order. The classic conception of corruption as logic of predatory authority, a direct echo of the a general of the body politic persisted feudal right to extract ‘the fat of the land’. Finally, into modern times, and is central to the the logic of redistributive accumulation, or the political thought of Machiavelli, Montesquieu obligation to provide for the members of your and Rousseau.”12 network. Concerned with moral decay, all of the world’s Many Asian patronage networks work along very religions propose moral compasses for individual similar cultural logics. The imperative to ‘save face’ “good” behavior. From the tale of Noah to the is predominantly motivated by the imperative destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, the Bible to safeguard reputation in lifelong personal imposes horrifying sanctions for moral decay. networks, which being a member of is vital for Seeking an antidote to the corruption of his almost every aspect of life. As the short Thai case society, Confucius developed an educational study in Chapter IV.2 will show, these cultural system that was intended to train government logics are even ingrained into emotions and the officials not only to be wise, but more importantly construction if the Self. In order to understand to be “good”. Buddhists consider corruption as why individuals engage in corruption behaviors, it an unwholesome state of mind contributing to is important to understand the incentive system of an unhealthy society. Greed (lobha, also tanha a patrimonial order. – craving) is one of the three poisons which, accompanied by a lack of moral shame (ahirika) 2.4 Fighting decay: “Moral Corruption” and moral dread (anottappa), may lead to suffering as an ethical problem (dukkha). In other words, an individual who engages in corruption is suffering from a serious In classical philosophy, corruption was not absence of moral insight or wisdom. Corruption a political, but primarily a moral problem. is seen as both a manifestation of previous bad Thucydides, Plato and Aristotle employed the kammic forces as well as generating fresh bad notion of “the corruption of the bad polity” for kamma. If corruption is not rooted out, the cycle situations marked by the decay of the moral and that has haunted relationships and quality of life is political order.11. continually renewed. Thus eliminating corruption, either by suppressing it or by awakening greater “Corruption will often take the form of a morality, is inherently important.13 perversion of legal rules by misinterpretation. Such a perversion, like a breach, challenges 2.5 Increasing effectiveness: the the intended generality of the rule. […] This impersonal state sort of “moral corruption” is what concerned political philosophers in the past. Aristotle, Under the existential pressure of constant warfare, and after him Machiavelli particularly, but state builders throughout history have come to basically Plato in his theory of the “corrupted” realize that patrimonial orders are not effective or “perverted” constitutions […] stressed the enough. In order to extract and use resources point that these regimes instead of being more efficiently, the Qin Chinese, Mameluk, guided by the law (we would say public Ottoman and Western European states replaced interest) were serving the interest of the rulers. patrimonial structures with impersonal, merit- [Corruption is seen as] a disintegration of the based institutions.14 However, patrimonial elites

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do not give up their status, power, and access families, are the basic units. It struggles to describe to resources without a fight and will always try societies with substantial traditional and kinship to reinsert themselves. Where the power of structures, where rigid distinctions between patrimonial elites could not be decidedly broken, politics and administration do not exist.18 In many the modernization of the state fell short, or developing societies, the difference between was rolled back after the modernizing emperor public role and private interest of a state official vanished. is blurred. In fact, traditional codes may require officials to take responsibility for their families and 2.6 The invention of political corruption: provide rewards and employment to them. the legal-rationalist political order Post-colonialist scholars criticize the assumption The notion of political corruption as commonly that all societies are on a transition towards a understood today is an invention of the legal- “modernity” defined by Enlightenment ideas, rational state. It rests on two political innovations, liberal democracy and capitalist economies. the division between ‘public’ and ‘private’, Edward Said exposed how Western scholars and the broad acceptance of rational-legal describe the Global South through the lens of norms of behavior in the public sphere.15 Max “orientalism”, establishing a global hierarchy of Weber famously described how professional developed vs. underdeveloped societies.19 Rose- bureaucracies formalized and regulated the Ackermann pointed out that the association of relationship between citizens and officials.16 corruption with “weak” or “developing” states With roles and duties of the public official clearly systematically overlooks the endemic corruption defined, the dereliction of these duties would be in stable and hegemonic political structures, such considered “corruption”. While in a pre-modern as state and private sectors in core industrialized order “stealing from the sovereign” meant to countries.20 steal from the king, the victim in a modern political order is the people. Hence the emergence of a The transition paradigm needs to be abandoned.21 public sphere devoted to the public interest makes Not all societies move towards a legal-rationalist corruption a ‘crime against the public’. order, and if they do, the development paths may differ greatly from those of Western countries. The scope and depth of corruption varies widely Nevertheless the Modernization theory still has between societies. David Lowell even conceives important insights to offer on how the change of a different kind of problem in ‘developed’ and economic regimes transforms the social fabric of ‘transitional’ societies: society and puts pressure on established political and moral orders.22 “Incidental corruption takes place against a background of established rational-legal III. The effects of corruption on authority: endemic corruption takes place political and economic development where rational-legal authority is not yet predominant.”17 3.1 (Dys)-functional influences of corruption on economic growth 2.7 Exposing Euro-centricity: Corruption is a universal phenomenon The debate over the relationship between political corruption and economic growth has been the The Weberian model presumes an extensive and subject of fierce debates for decades. anonymous society in which individuals, not

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Early Developmentalism “In terms of economic growth, the only thing worse than a society with a rigid, over- Early development scholars were mostly concerned centralized, dishonest bureaucracy is one with the direct impact of corruption on the capacity with a rigid, over-centralized and honest to carry out development projects. A major bureaucracy.”25 concern was the impact of political corruption on investment.23 Government resources may be Bribery was therefore interpreted as the weapon channeled away from development project and of weak but clever entrepreneurs against the into foreign bank accounts. Development Aid omnipotent but reckless Leviathan. Myron Weiner projects may go to waste. Private sector investment asserts that without the flexibility of backshish, decisions may not be guided by economic bureaucratic red tape would strangle economic profitability, but instead by the interests of both activity. Nathaniel Leff touts that every penny public and private decision makers in corrupt saved from the tax collector may be a penny better kickbacks. At the same time, political corruption spent by private entrepreneurs for investment.26 may undercut government revenue and inflows With a view to the socially precarious position of money. Corrupt tax collectors may significantly of ethnic minority entrepreneurs in Southeast distort the amount of taxes paid. Foreign Direct Asia and East Africa, corruption may provide the Investment may be discouraged by the prospect means to overcome discrimination.27 From the of administrative sleaze, delays, and corruption. micro perspective of the individual entrepreneur, corruption may be conducive for economic A second concern was the waste of human growth. resources. Investment and Rent Seeking: the emergence “If the top political of a country of the Washington Consensus consumes its time and energy in trying to get rich by corrupt means, it is unlikely that the In the 1980s, the debate shifted back to the development plans will be fulfilled.”24 corruption skeptics when IMF economist Paolo Mauro linked high levels of corruption with The career choices of young talents may not lower levels of investment, both in terms of lead them to dynamic economic sectors, but to government expenditure for developmental administrative posts with the prospects of graft. aims as well as private sector investment.28 From On the other hand, young talents may be appalled a macro perspective, corrupt ‘lubricants’ work by the prospect of making a living by corruption, as an incentive system which encourages more leading to a brain drain in the underpaid public bureaucratic “toll posts” and in the end encourage administration, or even the entire country. delays in the system as a whole.29

The devil’s advocate: Revisionism Corruption may disrupt the vital function of states in laying the foundations for growth by providing These views were challenged by ‘revisionist’ infrastructure and public goods. Consequentially, scholars. If development is driven by the investments Rose Ackermann linked corruption to the overall of private entrepreneurs and free markets, so the paradigm of good governance: argument went, then everything which unleashes market forces is good for economic development. “Stable states that operate under the rule Huntington pointedly articulated the liberal fear of law have a developmental advantage of the bureaucratic monster: […] Thus since corruption undermines this

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commitment, it undermines state legitimacy Threshold between functionality and and in the process harms the prospects for dysfunctionality growth.”30 More recent research attempts to paint a more The second paradigm shift in the academic balanced picture between the functionalities and discourse on corruption and economic growth dysfunctionalities of corruption for economic came from the ‘rent-seeking’ literature. Rent development.37 Given the economic boom in seeking is capaciously defined as any redistributive countries with endemic corruption, corruption activity which takes up resources.31 By definition, cannot be all out detrimental to economic rent can only occur when the state restricts the growth.38 In the context of transformation, market.32 Rent economies not only occur in corruption may even temporarily play a beneficial the deeply intertwined state-private run sector role in substituting or complementing the of commodities extraction, but similarly by functions of effective institutions. New research monopolies build on exclusive licenses, e.g. in tries to determine the threshold when functionality the telecommunication and media sector. Political turns into dysfunctionality.39 In China with its economists point out that at the root of every deficiency of formal institutions, for instance, “rent economy” lies a patronage system between corrupt networks may provide a framework for rulers and their cronies. Vice versa, by providing transactional security where political risks can be resources for distribution in client networks, rent mediated, temporarily leading to a more efficient seekers stabilize patronage regimes. allocation of resources:

All of these arguments resonated well at the “Corruption in early stages of transformation onset of of financial capitalism and might partly contribute to overcoming the the emergence of neo-liberal ideology. Chapter problems of a hybrid system of order [...] IV.1 will trace how ‘anti-corruptionism’ became However as corruption transforms its quality part of the Washington Consensus and the good from ‘entrepreneurial’ to ‘predatory’, the governance agenda. institution becomes increasingly dysfunctional with respect to economic growth and the However, despite decades of economic efficient allocation of resources.”40 liberalization, systemic corruption persists. A recent comparison of six transformation countries In other words, the relationship between corruption from different world regions concluded that there and economic growth is not merely black or is no direct link between the level of economic white. Under certain conditions, corruption can liberalization and systemic corruption.33 On be functional, while at a later point, it may have the contrary, privatization of state property has dysfunctional influences on economic growth. often created a gold rush for ‘crony capitalists’.34 Deregulation has opened new opportunities In sum, the relationship between political for corruption in the private sector. Corruption corruption and economic growth continues to scandals involving private corporations showed be hotly debated. Assessments on the scope that corruption is not a problem of “overregulated and depth of the negative impact differ widely, states and the absence of markets”.35 Despite and seem to be correlated to the economic all this evidence, “Crony Capitalism” is about development model an author subscribes to. This to make a comeback as part of the neoliberal may imply that corruption literature is not free of struggle to lay the foundations for global financial underlying ideological biases. capitalism.36

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3.2 The impact of corruption on political Mushtaq Khan argues that while corruption is a development key factor in shaping a capitalist political economy, the way how this transformation happens creates Economic innovation changes the fabric of society. the need for corruption to ‘buy off’ groups However, while society is changing quickly, political opposing this process: and moral orders tend to be sticky. Resistance to change stems from declining elites struggling “In many cases, the individuals who succeed to uphold their supremacy as well as individuals in establishing themselves at this critical stage anxious to lose their identity. Structurally speaking, only do so as a result of a great deal of fortune, transition periods are characterized by the co- political connection, some initial wealth and existence of two rival economic, social, political, corruption. None of these characteristics can normative and moral orders. legitimize the large differences in income and wealth that subsequently emerge. If ‘political development’ can be understood Given the inherent unfairness involved in as the growth (or decline) of the capacity of a these processes it has been relatively easy to society’s structures and processes to maintain their organize opposition to these characteristics legitimacy over time, then the key challenge of [...] Opposition has typically been organized by transitional societies is to build political structures members of the emerging groups and processes capable of coping with social who have been left behind [...] Paradoxically, change.41 the opposition of these groups has often resulted in a second set of structural pressures There is little doubt that corruption, clientelism and generating high levels of corruption [...]. The cronyism play an important role in transformation opposition of organized groups has often had processes. But what exactly is the structural impact to be bought off by payoffs [...] to the most of corruption in such an instable and conflict- troublesome or vociferous opponents in an prone transitional period? For decades, scholars attempt to ‘purchase’ support or legitimacy. have debated if corruption works as an obstacle [...] Here the state allocates resources to those or driver of political development. with the greatest ability to create political problems...”43 Political economy: struggle between emerging and declining classes Huntington points to the complex interplay between corruption and . While From a political economy point of view, emerging classes use corruption as a means to transformation processes are not an anonymous smoothen their rise into the political sphere, change of underlying structures, but a fierce corruption works as an anti-inflammatory catalyst, political struggle between winners and losers over preventing the delicate balance of the social the control of the country. hierarchy escalating into (violent) class war:

“The contest over public resources is particularly “Corruption in this sense is a direct product of severe because the early beneficiaries of the rise of new groups with new resources and these contests are winners in a game of class the efforts of these groups to make themselves evolution that is likely to have consequences effective within the political sphere. Corruption for generations to come.”42 may be a means of assimilating new groups into the political system by irregular means because the system has been unable to adapt

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sufficiently fast to provide legitimate and While corruption may be a means for ruling elites acceptable means for this purpose. [...] The to ‘buy off’ emerging classes and opposition new millionaires buy themselves seats in the groups, it also gives those groups access to spheres Senate [...] and thereby become participants which used to be exclusively controlled by these in the political system rather than alienated elites. Accordingly, Nathaniel Leff observes that opponents of it, which might have been the swelling criticism of corruption is often informed case if this opportunity to corrupt the system by the interests of powerful and articulate groups: were denied them. “Graft may be the only institution allowing So also the recently enfranchised masses [...] other interests to achieve articulation and use their new power of the ballot to buy representation in the political process. themselves jobs and favors from the local Therefore, if the ruling elite are to maintain its political machine. There is thus the corruption exclusive control of the bureaucracy, it must of the poor and the corruption of the rich. cut off or control this channel of influence.”47 The one trades political power for money, the other money for political power.”44 Nye points to the particular difficulties of weak states to cope with change. Lacking the means Joseph Nye looks at class conflicts triggered to project power, elites may have to rely on by social change from the perspective of the corruption to be able to govern: newcomers which seek a place at the table: “The capacity of the political structures of “Corruption may help to overcome divisions many new states to cope with change is in a ruling elite that might otherwise result in frequently limited by the weakness of their destructive conflict […by bridging] the gap new institutions and (often despite apparent between groups based on power and those centralization) the fragmentation of power based on wealth. […] For new urban residents, in a country. […] Leaders in such a country a political machine based on corruption may have to rely (in various combinations) on ideal, provide a comprehensible point at which coercive and material incentives to aggregate to relate to government by other than pure enough power to govern. Legal material ethnic or tribal means.”45 incentives may have to be augmented by corrupt ones.”48 In the economic transformation of China, arbitrage processes between the powerful but poor old At the same time, ruling elites may use corruption elites and the rich new elites without any political as a valve to release class pressure for structural influence stabilized the reform process by keeping change. Huntington already pointed to the the old elites ‘on board’: similarities in the functions of corruption, violence and reform. All are encouraged by modernization “Corruption may even be understood as a and are all symptomatic of the weakness of stabilizing element for the reform process political institutions. In some measure, one form as it kept politically the influential old elite, of deviant behavior may substitute for the other: which was now quickly deprived of its and relative ‘wealth’ position, satisfied “Like machine politics or clientelistic politics and prevented it from obstructing the reform in general, corruption provides immediate, movement.”46 specific, and concrete benefits to groups which might otherwise be thoroughly alienated from

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society. Corruption may thus be functional to where the interests of the individual, the the maintenance of a political system in the family, the or the clan predominate. same way that reform is. Corruption itself may In a modernizing polity the weaker and less be a substitute for reform and both corruption accepted the political parties, the greater and reform may be substitutes for revolution. the likelihood of corruption. In countries like Corruption serves to reduce pressure for policy Thailand and Iran where parties have had changes, just as reform serves to reduce class semi-legality at best, corruption on behalf pressure for structural changes.”49 of individual and family interests has been widespread.”51 In sum, the interplay between power, corruption and change is enormously complex. On the one The historical experience of the West also reflects hand, corruption can work as a means to shore up this pattern. a lack of ruling power, to buy off opposition and co-opt emerging classes into the political order “The parties which at first are the leeches and on the other, corruption works as a grapnel on the bureaucracy in the end become the for emerging and excluded classes to gain access bark protecting it from more destructive to the political sphere. locusts of clique and family. Partisanship and corruption, as Henry Ford argued, are really Institutionalization antagonistic principles. Partisanship tends to establish a connection based upon an avowed Huntington interprets corruption as a lack of public obligation, while corruption consults political institutionalization: private and individual interests which secrete themselves from view and avoid accountability. “Corruption is, of course, one measure of the The weakness of party organization is the absence of effective political institutionalization. opportunity of corruption.”52 Public officials lack autonomy and coherence, and subordinate their institutional roles to The emphasis on the systemic function of political exogenous demands. Corruption [...] seems parties helps to understand the paradigm shifts to be most prevalent during the most intense introduced by modernization. From a traditional phases of modernization. The differences perspective, conflicts endanger societal unity. in the level of corruption which may exist Accordingly, competition in electoral democracy between [...] societies [...] in large part reflect is seen as fueling corruption and populism, as their differences in political modernization political parties try to gain or maintain their grip and political development.”50 on the feeding trough. From a modern point of view, open competition under the scrutinizing When societies manage to institutionalize the eyes of the public constrains corruption. More political negotiation process over distribution, the so, a competitive political system leads to need for informal mechanism such as corruption frequent changes of administrations, punishing will wane. Writing in the 1960s, Huntington puts incompetence and corruption, hence effectively his hopes on the emergence of effective political cleaning out the sleaze. The echo of Adam Smith’s parties as the vehicles of all groups to participate invisible hand of the market, aggregating the in the political process: behavior of egoistic individuals into the benefit of the public, cannot be overheard. “Corruption is most prevalent in states which lack effective political parties, in societies

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Given their vital role in patronage systems today, Against the hopes of promoters of liberal political parties in developing countries are seen democracy and free markets, systemic corruption much more critical light.53 This echoes the anger persists in many countries. Hence more recently, and frustration with “political party machines” in the calls of modernization theorists to conclude the United States and Europe at end of the 19th the transition to consolidated democracy have century. Frustration with political corruption gave made a comeback. Christian van Soest concludes rise to a liberal reform movement which sought to that despite the build-up of democratic institutions strengthen impartiality as an anti-dote to political and considerable pressure for good governance, corruption: democratization has not been ‘deep enough’ to decisively influence the level of corruption: “To battle party hegemony and compensate for the weakness of the state, various federal “The level of democratization is the decisive courts tried to exert their influence. Their factor determining the extent of systemic decisions were intended to fulfill a social corruption, clientelism, and – in particular- regulatory function and reaffirm a notion of informal power concentration […] Only the common good. [...] The judges were so systems with strong democratic features disgusted by the incompetence and corruption seem to exert a positive effect on systemic of the politicians that they became champions corruption, clientelism and informal power of business and laisser-faire capitalism. In their concentration. This democratic threshold [...] eyes, it was progress to deny a corrupt political is high.”56 system control over society’s activities.”54 In countries which have not passed this threshold Public distrust of an executive deemed to of democratic maturity, lower repression may lure be partisan gave birth to the independent more actors to enter into corrupt and clientelistic commissions and a strong judiciary. exchanges, therefore decentralizing personal rule. The threshold of democratic maturity is not “The executive recognized that there was a temporal but qualitative. It is not the ‘endurance’ public suspicion that a partisan government of democratic rule (e.g. continuous elections) does could not be trusted to be an impartial not affect the level of systemic corruption, but its agent of the general interest. Aware that this ‘deepness’ – the level of electoral competition, suspicion of partiality amounted to a denial of political rights, and civil rights which makes the legitimacy, the executive actively passed some difference.57 of its responsibilities to independent agencies. Hence as a reaction to rampant political All things considered, corruption is interpreted as corruption, the institutional architecture a lack of political institutionalization by some and of the United States was rebuilt to reflect a as the result of it by others. Some recommend distinction between electoral legitimacy and strengthening the role of political parties, others the legitimacy of impartiality.”55 seek to curb it. Both solutions have proven to be flawed by recent developments. Again, it seems The push for anti-majoritarian to majority rule impossible to analyze the complex interplay tends to be driven by class interests. Alexis de between corruption and institution building Tocqueville’s warning against the ‘Tyranny of without the political and social context. the Majority’ was always popular with elites and middle classes fearful of being at the mercy of the majority population.

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Corruption and Legitimacy Despite its prominence in post-coup rationalizations, Joseph Nye suspects that The relationship between corruption and [corruption] is only a secondary cause in most legitimacy was fiercely debated between cases: ‘Moralists’ and ‘Revisionists’. Moralism is rooted in the Weberian view found in modernization “Perhaps more significant is military leaders’ theory which holds that, corruption by nature, is total distaste for the messiness of politics- detrimental to developing societies.58 ‘Moralists’ whether honest or not- and a tendency to believe that “when legislation and regulation are blame civilian politicians for failures…“63 considered arbitrary in a society, public support ceases to exist and people are no longer willing to Accordingly, Crozier sees “revulsion against live by the rules”.59 As a result, corruption causes civilian incompetence and corruption” as a major the decline of a regime’s legitimacy. cause of coups in several Asian countries.64

This approach was challenged by ‘revisionist’ Huntington also made the observation that scholars in the 1960s, who regarded corruption attitudes towards corruption in transitional as potentially beneficial to state legitimacy. Arnold societies are more influenced by politics and Heidenheimer claimed that: psychology than by facts:

“In the early stages of political-administrative “The initial exposure to modernism tends development ... nepotism, spoils and graft to give rise to unreasonable puritanical may actually promote national unification and standards [...] This escalation in values leads to stability, nation-wide participation in public a denial and rejection of the bargaining and affairs, the formation of a viable party system compromise essential to politics and promotes and bureaucratic accountability to political the identification of politics with corruption. institutions.”60 To the modernizing zealot a politician’s promise to build irrigation ditches for farmers By destroying the legitimacy of the political in a village if he is elected seems to be just as structures, corruption can contribute to instability corrupt as an offer to pay each villager for his and possible national disintegration. It is not clear vote before the election. [...] In the extreme if corruption of the old regime is a primary cause case the antagonism to corruption may take for social revolutions. If corruption causes a loss of the form of the intense fanatical puritanism legitimacy in the eyes of the military, it may be a direct [...] Paradoxically, this fanatical anticorruption cause of instability and national disintegration.61 mentality has ultimate effects similar to those of corruption itself. Both challenge the “Generally speaking, the habitual practice autonomy of politics: one substituting private of bribery and dishonesty tends to pave the goals for public ones and the other replacing way for an authoritarian regime, whose political values with technical ones.”65 disclosures of corrupt practices in the preceding government and whose punitive However, different groups may judge the action against offenders provides a basis for corrosive effect of corruption on the legitimacy its initial acceptance by the articulate strata of of the political order quite differently. In the eyes the population. [...] The elimination of corrupt of “modern” groups such as students or middle practices has also been advanced as the main classes (who have profited from achievement and justification for military takeovers.”62 universalism), the absence of honesty may destroy

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the legitimacy of the system.66 often In the vertigo of change: Transformation attribute sacral value to the government sphere, drives Corruption hence their hostility to the venality that would corrupt it.67 Others may perceive graft as an While political corruption avant la lettre was integral part of the political culture and system of pervasive all over human history, some scholars the ancient regime which they want to destroy.68 argue it becomes a particular problem in times The often idealistic streak which pervades radicals of transition from one political, cultural and and reformers may echo the Jacobins in their organizational structure to another.72 In the seeking after virtue.69 complex interplay between historical path dependencies and transformational pressures for Imagining the state: Corruption narratives change, hegemonic norms and values influence in the construction of the political and moral political and economic development, while the order functional necessities of emerging economies and societies encourage the redefinition of norms and Apart from the structural impact of corruption, values. Changing norms explain why behaviors there are social functions of corruption narratives that were socially accepted or even encouraged for in the construction of social reality and social centuries are suddenly seen as deviant and even struggles. criminal. For Samuel Huntington, the emergence of a new moral order reframes behavior as Corruption and society’s reaction towards ‘corrupt’ which used to be perfectly acceptable in corruption scandals may play a role in the the traditional moral order: construction and reproduction of the normative order. Corruption typically functions as an idiom “Corruption in a modernizing society is thus through which people try to make sense of the in part not so much the result of the deviance political world they inhabit. Anthropologists have of behavior from accepted norms as it is the shown how discourses of corruption not only deviance of norms from established patterns construct ‘proper’ or ‘improper’ moral behavior, of behavior.”73 but have also enabled rural citizens and bureaucrats to imagine the state. Corruption narratives splay However, the widely perceived increase in a fundamental role in the very constitution of corruption is not only due to “re-labeling” of the state and what it can and should do for its behavior, but reflects the ‘normative chaos’ typical citizens.70 Periodic scandals can sometimes lead to for transformation societies. People in positions of the affirmation of general principles about how authority in transformation societies are caught the country should be run. These inquiries may between two value systems74 : not alter what actually happens, but they affirm an ideal condition of unity and justice.71 “The calling into question of old standards, moreover, tends to undermine the legitimacy To exemplify the catalytic and symbolic roles of of all standards. The conflict between modern corruption narratives, Chapter IV will examine the and traditional norms opens opportunities for emergence of global ‘Anti-Corruptionism’, and individuals to act in ways justified by neither.”75 the political conflict in Thailand. Hence the co-existence of normative orders encourages corrupt behavior, or even ‘invents’ it. Simply put: transformation drives corruption.

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Corruption as a catalyst for change Corruption in transformation societies

The relationship, however, goes two ways: Corruption is then located at the breaking corruption also encourages social and political edge between the eroding patrimonial and the change. Political and moral orders are to provide emerging new order. It is at the same time the the foundation of economic life: trust in personal working principle of the patronage system and interactions. From everyday life to complex the lubricant for the social rise of new classes. It business operations, economies only work if the is a ruling technique of coopting new elites into transaction costs between individual agents are the patrimonial order, as well as a subversive not too high. Simply put, whenever we buy a good tactic by emerging classes to gain access to the or use a service, we need to have trust that dozens political field. It reflects the lasting validity of of unexpressed conditions are met; the product patrimonial norms, as well as the normative void must not be hazardous, the service provided with created by the co-existence of rival moral orders. due care, the contract obligations complied. As Corruption helps to conserve the dominance of we cannot verify these basic terms by ourselves the patronage system, and fills the functional for every transaction, we are dependent on public gaps left uncovered by ineffective legal-rational institutions to regulate the behavior of all agents. institutions. Simply put, corruption has a catalytic function in the transformation of the political, For relatively simple agricultural societies, the social and economic order. political system based on personal relationships between feudal lord and loyal tribute was good The exact role of corruption is highly ambivalent. enough. With the emergence of vast industrial Corruption seems to simultaneously slow down societies integrated in global division of labor, and speed up transformation. As the literature individuals can no longer rely on personal discussion has already shown, this ambivalence relationships to provide trust. Corruption and allows for many contradictory readings and sleaze further undermine the performance of interpretations. At the same time, it sees as if patrimonial systems. The failure to satisfy the the ambivalence of corruption mirrors the Janus needs of complex economies and pluralistic faced character of co-existing orders typical for societies erodes the output legitimacy of the transformation societies. Therefore, it may not patrimonial order. come as a surprise that corruption narratives play a central role in the way societies try to make The necessities of modern life change how people sense of the vertigo of change and construct the define their interests, frame their beliefs and struggle over the future order. set their aspirations. No longer dependent on the protection of a personal patron, emerging In sum, the impact of corruption on political classes start to question the necessity of ‘tributes’ development is anything but clear. Corruption in the form of bribes. Citizens are outraged over may help to integrate excluded groups into the corruption and nepotism, and demand clean and polity but it may also upset ethnic balances. effective institutions. In the struggle over the future Corruption seems to both stabilize authoritarian order, the patrimonial social contract is terminated. regimes as well as erode their legitimacy. Additionally corruption may be the lubricant to All things considered, corruption and nepotism ease the political transition; however it may also work as a transformational catalyst, speeding up trigger rollbacks by established elites. In the eyes the decline of patrimonial order, and highlighting of some, corruption reflects the rot of the ancient the need for a legal-rational order. regime, while others equate it to the emergence

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of a capitalist society. By looking at it through International founder Peter Eigen was more the perspective of different schools of thought, comprehensive, adding commitment by leaders, ‘corruption’ serves a variety of social functions, and anti-corruption legislation and enforcement and a affects political development in highly ambiguous wider review of government procedures.78 USAID ways. Nonetheless, there seems to be a consensus advisor Keith Henderson expanded these to an that corruption is particularly damaging to the Eight Point Action Plan, adding ways to improve legitimacy of nascent democracies. government accountability and the transparency of democratic processes, to increase trade, IV. The Politics of (Anti-) Corruption investment and economic growth, to encourage the building of capacity and public confidence Reviewing these historical and academic in governmental institutions while fostering perspectives on corruption, it becomes obvious public respect for rule of law societies.79 From that we are dealing with a multi-faceted and there, it was only a small step to the wider good complex phenomenon influenced by a wide governance agenda of the IMF and World Bank. variety of political, economic and cultural factors. In 1998, then President of the World Bank James In turn these factors will impact the political Wolfensohn declared a “Crusade against the and social development. It consequently comes Cancer of Corruption”80 , while others called for a as no surprise that different schools of thought “World War on Bribery”.81 have come forward with very diverse views on corruption. Where did this sudden prominence of the fight against corruption come from? For once, the Alternately, what views came to dominate the relationship between political corruption and a scholarly field and in turn shape the domestic decline in investment, in particular Foreign Direct and international anti-corruption policies? Here, Investment, became a concern at the onset of the we have to take a deeper look on the political globalization of financial capitalism. Moreover, the economy of the fight against corruption, as well as focus on the deficient relationship between state the (hidden) agenda of those who loudly promote and market introduced by rent-seeking literature anti-corruption policies. resonated well with the emerging neoliberal ideology. If rent-seeking was by definition created 4.1 Handle with Care: The ideological when the state restricted the market, then the baggage of ‘Global Anti-Corruptionism’ solution was seemingly self-evident :82

The fight against corruption has made an “The state’s sphere should be reduced to the astonishing career from obscurity to the top minimum, and bureaucratic control should of the global policy agenda.76 Beginning as an be replaced by market mechanisms wherever American legal standard for businesses, anti- possible.”83 corruption evolved into a global norm as part of good governance agenda. Early anti-corruption Is it only a coincidence that the neoliberal reading strategies limited their focus to the public of rent-seeking sounded like the blueprint of administration, aiming to reduce or remove the the Washington Consensus? Development was opportunities for corruption, raising salaries of civil now almost unanimously understood as driven servants and political leaders, and ensuring a high by free markets unburdened by the restrains degree of policing and supervision.77 The initial Five of kleptocratic bureaucracies, legal red tape, Point Anti-Corruption Program by Transparency inefficient state sectors and greedy tax collectors.

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Corruption was reframed from a secondary corruption and nepotism in developing countries but somewhat useful “lubricant benefitting again: entrepreneurs” into a major spoiler to development. The medicine prescribed by IMF “In the emerging world, the past century and World Bank are subjecting public officials to has been great for rent-seekers […] The the regulatory discipline of the market, to cost- larger problem, though, lies in the emerging consciousness and to entrepreneurial ethics.84 world…”89 In the framework of “good governance” and “accountability”, the fight against corruption was Unsurprisingly, the recipes of the Washington placed at the top of the global political agenda at Consensus are warmed up again: the end of the 1990s. “Governments seeking to make their countries Michel Foucault exposed the ruling technique rich and keep people happy need to make to present policies as ‘above politics’.85 In this markets work better.”90 sense, the postulation of good governance as the epitome of modernity is a powerful In other words, governments need to build the discursive strategy. Stripping away the neutral political infrastructure for market economies and and technocratic language, critics point to the then get out of the way. ideological bias of and vested interests behind the global good governance agenda. Steven Sampson However, the global anti-corruption community puts it bluntly: also promotes an emancipatory, even anti-global- capitalist vision. Steven Sampsom detected this “The “global anti-corruption agenda is not moralist streak in what he calls the “ideology of a reaction to the neoliberal agenda, it is the anti-corruptionism”: neoliberal agenda.”86 “Anti-corruption is not just a set of policy Seen from this perspective, the objective of measures enacted by governments to prevent good governance agenda is to lay the normative bribery and punish nepotism. It is also a moral foundations for the emerging global financial force, reflecting the indignation of ordinary capitalist regime. Accordingly, some have criticized people and among articulate elites that things the good governance agenda as the “new stick to are not right. Anti-corruption entails not beat non-Western governments into compliance only making governments or aid programs with the economic and political agenda of the more effective, but also making people more United States and the dictates of capitalism”.87 honest, raising people’s consciousness to a Others slam the anti-corruption agenda as the new level. Anti-corruption is thus a moral, battering ram to open emerging markets for even religious force […] This is why some global financial capitalism.88 activists within Transparency International, the leading anti-corruption organization, see The global financial crisis gave a new boost to the themselves as ‘integrity ’. Responding anti-corruption agenda. Unable to identify the to unscrupulous transnational forces of internal flaws of capitalism, conservatives blamed immorality and profiteering, the struggle the crisis on the immoral behavior of individuals, against corruption is an effort to restore be it the regulator “sleeping at the switch” or standards that were lost, the standards of the ‘greedy’ investor. Under the label of ‘crony morality and responsibility which connote capitalism’, The Economist conveniently locates what we call ‘community’ […] The fight

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against corruption is thus more than just the In all of these transformation conflicts corruption ‘tactics’ of governments or corporations who narratives play a central role. What is the function want to look good: it is a moral crusade.”91 of corruption discourses in transformation crises? How do the corruption narratives of conflicting One does not have to share these extreme criticisms parties differ? And what are the hidden agendas of the good governance agenda in general, and of anti-corruption bodies and the judiciary? the anti-corruption agenda in particular to see that anti-corruption programs, despite their technocrat Looking into the case of Thailand may offer language, are neither neutral nor innocent. To be some preliminary answers to these questions. perfectly clear, this does not make anti-corruption The protracted conflict in Thailand has at least measures wrong; it simply means one has to be two interrelated dimensions. On the elite actors’ aware of the ideological baggage that comes with level, it is a conflict between two elite factions it. The Washington Consensus heritage makes over the political, social and economic control anti-corruption strategies ill-equipped to deal with of the country. On the structural level, it reflects the political challenges of transformation conflicts. the transition from a patrimonial order and a Therefore, corruption fighters in transformation legal-rational order. What makes the Thai conflict societies need to adapt anti-corruption measures interesting is how the so-called ‘red’ and ‘yellow’ to the conditions of transformation to make them alliances are composed, and which cleavages work. are used to construct two self-referential and hermetically sealed discourse community. In 4.2 Corruption in Transformation order to explain this conflict formation one has to Conflicts: The case of Thailand understand (1) the catalytic function of corruption in political development and (2) the symbolic role The raging transformation conflicts from Egypt to of (anti-)corruption discourses in the construction Turkey, from Ukraine to Venezuela pose a puzzle of the conflict. to the (vulgarized) expectation of democratization theory that middle classes are the main drivers Corruption as a transformation catalyst for democratization.92 Indeed, the middle class protesters in Caracas, Kiev and Istanbul are On a structural level, corruption is endemic in outraged by rampant clientelism, cronyism and Thailand. Thais’ perceive corruption in their country corruption. However, amongst the calls for as relatively high (CPI Score of 35, ranking 102 greater democratization, many anti-democratic out of 177 countries)93. Corruption is an everyday and sometimes even fascist voices can be life issues for Thais. Frequent corruption scandals heard. Protesters deny the legitimacy of elected shake the society and have often been used by the governments and deride their fellow citizens as military to justify its 18 coups. Corruption is closely too uneducated to vote. Some even call for the related to Thailand’s entrenched patronage system end of electoral democracy, and the establishment which still dominates political and economic life of an authoritarian regime. In Egypt, the military behind the facades of democratic institutions. has seized the opportunity to justify their Personal relationships between patrons and authoritarian roll-back as saving the nation. In clients dominate Thai society and culture, to Ukraine, many question the role of fascist militias a point where every member of society has a in the overthrow of an elected government. In distinct lace in social hierarchy. In Thai language, Thailand, anti-government protesters openly different personal pronouns reflect the social call for a coup d’état and the installation of an relationship between speakers, thereby inscribing unelected ‘people’s council’. the social status deep into the construction of the

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Self. Even emotions (kraeng-jai, noi-jai) regulate business” is assumed in every major policy the vital need to keep personal relationship intact initiative. As exemplified by the judicial strike at all cost. The urge to prove one’s loyalty makes down of a much needed infrastructure initiative, it socially and emotionally close to impossible the patrimonial system is no longer capable to refuse a request or turn down a ‘gift’ from a to satisfy the needs of a complex economy. By senior “big man” (phoo-yai). On the other hand, highlighting the fatal flaws of the old system, and it is expected of a patron to share the spoils of nurturing demands for a general overhaul of the corruption within his personal network. Failure to political order, corruption is working as a catalyst do so may result in the withdrawal of goodwill and in the transformation crisis. may end the career of the “too greedy” political entrepreneur, with a sudden raid by the police. The role of corruption narratives in Thailand’s In other words, the distribution of resources and transformation conflict favors in personal networks is not degeneracy, but instead it is the very working mechanism of The Thai case is helpful in understanding how patronage systems. corruption narratives play a major role in structuring transformation conflicts. Again, the Thai conflict This patronage system and the ruling ‘network poses a puzzle for conventional wisdom. Under monarchy’ have come under pressure by the the (obsolete) transition paradigm, societies were emergence of a capitalist economy. In a bit more expected to inevitably and irreversibly develop than one generation, Thailand has become an from personalistic to legal-rational to democratic upper middle income country. The outsourced orders. manufacturing industries are so deeply integrated into the global division of labor that the crippling The transformation conflict in Thailand shows floods of 2011 broke global chains of supply for that such a transition path is by no means entire industries. Millions have been lifted out predetermined, but dependent on the outcome of of and demand equal political rights. a struggle between those who seek to uphold the Changing lifestyles, interests, identities and values status quo, and those who want change. More create a pluralist society.94 Despite all its flaws so, not all of those who work toward a legal- and inefficiencies, an elaborate system of legal- rational order also want further democratization. rational institutions has been built. Disseminated In the Thai conflict, change agents are divided by community radios and social media, Universalist into those who prefer to uphold social stability by discourses on electoral legitimacy, human rights, authoritarian means and those who strive for an the rule of law and good governance are gaining egalitarian society in a democratic order. Even those ground even in the remotest villages. Capitalist who want democracy stress different dimensions elites and new rural and urban middle classes of it, with some promoting accountability and challenge the dominance of the ‘network rule of law and others focusing on elections and monarchy’, and have effectively terminated the majority rule. old social contract. While the patrimonial political, social and moral order is eroding, the struggle To understand how these different visions of the over the future order is raging. future, as well as the political alliances struggling By creating bottle necks and sleaze, promoting for them are constructed, one needs to look into incompetence and inaptitude, corruption, the role of corruption narratives. clientelism and crony capitalism are corroding the output legitimacy of public administration. Public Given the prominence of corruption narratives in awareness of corruption is so high that “monkey the Thai discourse, it is not surprising that a wide

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spectrum of corruption discourses exists. I will people” that poisons society. Accordingly, ‘The limit the analysis to four key discourses, and show Other Within’ is de-humanized100 as “buffalos”101, how they are combined to form the nucleus of “rubbish”102, or “germs infecting the Thai political larger discourse alliances. body”103, and therefore must be “hunted down and exterminated”.104 In order to “root out the Five corruption discourse worlds rotten regime”, the economic base of those Moralistic fear of moral decay in power needs to be “purged”105, including the system of “Parliamentary dictatorship”106 The moralist cosmology is static, so change is which allowed them to attain their positions. perceived as social decay. Unable to decipher the Contrary to the Weberian legal-rational authority underlying economic and social changes, moralists which operates within a framework of laws blame structural problems on individual moral and rules, the charismatic authority of a fascist failure.95 Deeply rooted in the culture of Theravada leader is potentially unlimited. Because of the Buddhism, moralists explain high social status with unmediated relationship between leader and his the moral authority reflecting kamma acquired in people, the leader defines the ‘real will of the prior lives. Hence, corruption by “bad people” people’, or Rousseau’s ‘general will’. Hence the at the top must be seen as a perversion of the fascist vision “understands ‘genuine democracy’ ideal social-moral order. The solution is clear: “bad as an absolute dictatorship, absolutism and people” need to be replaced by “good people” popular sovereignty being fused into a form of whose virtue is assumed due to their membership ‘totalitarian democracy’”.107 Accordingly, protesters in the ‘network monarchy’. “Vile” critics of the simultaneously call for “absolute monarchy” and social order “have no place in decent society”96 ”Absolute Democracy with the King as Head of ; they cannot be “real Thais” and should leave State”. Where the distinction between ‘public’ the country “to live somewhere else”97 . Moralists and ‘private’ as well as ‘state’ and ‘civil society’ is aim for a political system led by “neutral people obliterated108, corruption – defined as the use of of virtue”. With reference to Plato’s “philosopher public means for private gain – does not exist.109 king”, this can be a monarchy administered by loyal technocrats. Legalistic-technocratic institutional engineering

Fascist fear of biological decay The legalist-technocratic discourse understands corruption as a governance problem threatening The fascist discourse eclectically combines economic growth, the rule of law, or democratic terminology and topoi from different ideological legitimacy. The solution is to install institutional sources, ranging from royalism, communism and safeguards, if necessary by imposing them onto historical .98 At its core, fascism is driven society.110 This sense of urgency is sometimes by the fear of societal decay. Looking back to rooted in a Jacobin reformist zeal which strives to the (imagined) Golden Past, the fascist project promote the absolute “Truth”, which needs to be is to regenerate morality and the nation by enforced to save society from decay.111 Legalists transforming human consciousness rather than tend to be concerned with an erosion of the Rule social structures.99 While the elitist social hierarchy of Law. Technocrats are afraid that “populism” is to remain untouched, society needs to be purged could lead to state bankruptcy.112 ‘Yellow’ and from those who corrupt it. Corruption is therefore ‘red’ versions of ‘The Truth’ lead to diverging not only understood as a moral problem, but as political visions, dividing the legalist-technocratic a biological one: it is the very existence of “bad discourse community between two camps.

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Neoliberal faith in the market led by traditional elites (ammaart). Hence corruption is primarily seen as a problem of Neoliberals understand corruption as a problem social justice, especially of double standards in of the inefficient and overstretched state. By the judicial system. The solution is to complete strangulating dynamism of the private sector, the democratization and promote social equality.114 bureaucratic monster is a bottleneck for economic Corruption of elected politicians is dismissed as growth. To unleash the dynamism of competitive leftovers from the feudalist culture. Progressive markets, the private sector needs to be freed from political visions vary, but usually have a strong bureaucratic red tape. To prevent the inefficient emphasis on electoral majority rule in common. allocation of resources due to political motivations, the role of the state needs to be cut back. Under Fear of change the regime of fiscal austerity, the cash strapped state needs to be relieved of some of some of The common thread running through all these its burdens by privatizing the provision of social discourses is fear. Fear of moral decay, fear of the services and infrastructure. poison of bad people, fear of monopolization of power, fear of identity loss, fear of economic Progressives push for change decline, state bankruptcy or state failure, or fear of an ammaart rollback of democracy. What is The ancient regime discourse understands striking is the absence of any positive vision for a corruption as a problem of the “feudal order”113 better future.

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Four functions of corruption narratives The raging middle classes: Mobilizing social pressure In the political conflict, these corruption narratives determine how people see and interpret the social Second, corruption narratives are striking a cord and cultural changes driven by transformation. with social groups, making them the ideal rallying In the Thai conflict, four functions of corruption cry to mobilize mass political support. Corruption discourses can be identified. narratives particularly seem to be at the core of Bangkok’s middle class rage, echoing similar What’s going on? Explaining the world phenomena in transformation conflicts around the world. First, corruption narratives help to explain what is going on. For most people, the complex and The origin of middle class rage lies in a political deeply rooted structural transformations are not formation typical for many flawed democracies. visible or understandable, they need a symbolic In order to win elections with the support of the representation to make these changes tangible rural vote, political entrepreneurs forged alliances and actionable. With its far-reaching political, with local power-brokers. Once elected, local cultural and philosophical implications, corruption politicians tend to bring the feudalistic logic of narratives help to boil down the bigger process of the province into the realm of national politics. social change into a nutshell. Therefore, it seems to Patronage politics dictates that allies have to be be no coincidence that corruption narratives play nurtured, loyalties rewarded, support bought and such a central role in many different transformation clients protected. societies around the world. Corruption narratives explain in simple terms what is at stake in the Seen from the perspective of the middle class, bigger struggle over the political and moral patrons distributing spoils into their personal order. Thus, many transformation conflicts are networks is degeneration back to “primitive being discursively constructed around corruption times” thought to be long gone. Rich kids let of cleavages. the hook after committing crimes fuel a feeling of double standards and endemic nepotism. More In the Thai conflict, the topoi “corruption causes generally, middle classes feel like they are “being social decay” works as rallying cry for those who are robbed” by corrupt politicians, who use their tax wary of change, those who feel that something is revenues to “buy votes” from the “greedy poor”. not right in the new state of capitalism, those who In a more subtle language, the “uneducated are concerned about state failure or bankruptcy, rural masses are easy prey for politicians who and those who seek to reaffirm the traditional promise them everything in an effort to get a order. “Social decay causes corruption”, appeals hold of power”. From this perspective, policies to all who feel the current order violates their delivering to local constituencies are nothing but dignity, those who see the social order as unjust “populism”, or another form of “vote buying” by and those who feel excluded and seek a place at power hungry politicians.”115 The solution is then the table, those who demand equal rights and clear: To suspend the mechanism which allows the those who seek to consolidate democracy. rule of the “corrupt provinces” over the “decent capital” — elections. Most Thais still believe that there can only be one undividable and universal truth. Hence those who This discursive equation of electoral democracy live by it are righteous, and anyone believing in with corruption is crucial to the construction of another truth must be wrong and immoral. the political conflict alongside the dichotomy

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between “reforms” and “elections”.116 In a Platform for discourse alliances narrower sense, it helps to explain the puzzle why in many transformation conflicts, middle classes Third, corruption narratives function as a common seem to act against their presumed class interest. platform for broad and heterogeneous societal Looking at their position in the political economy, coalitions. What is striking about the rival alliances conventional wisdom would assume middle in the Thai conflict is their enormously broad classes should be on the forefront of the struggle political, social and ideological spectrum. In the for a legal-rational and democratic order. Middle ‘yellow’ alliance, royalist aristocrats, Bangkok’s classes gain their social status based on personal conservative middle class, military men and achievement such as success in business, academic Southern farmers march side by side with workers merit, artistic talent or engineering skills. This and former communist insurgents. The ‘red’ should alienate middle classes from the patronage alliance includes capitalist tycoons, progressive system, where social status and mobility largely academics and civil society, police men, peripheral depend on personal relationships. However, middle classes and Northern and North-Eastern in Thailand like in many other transformation “political ” and Bangkok’s “urbanized conflicts, middle classes have forged alliances with villagers”.118 Bringing these alliances together those who seek to uphold the patrimonial order, despite diverging class interests, personal rivalries and hundreds of thousands come out to demand and opposing ideologies needs a strong common the ousting of elected governments. cause. Because of their broad appeal to many different social groups, corruption narratives are Hence, the political posture of established urban ideally placed to work as discursive platforms for middle classes cannot only be explained by their such heterogeneous societal alliances. “Saving the supposed ‘class interest’, but is largely determined nation from moral corruption” is what royalists and by the intermediary role of discourses in defining former communists, military men and workers, interests, identities and visions. The narratives southern farmers and Bangkok’s middle class can equating electoral democracy with corruption agree on, despite all their differences. Whereas (“vote buying”, “populism”, “mafia rule”) “overcoming a corrupt and unjust system” is the superimpose the structural alienation of middle battle cry for the red alliance between capitalist classes from the patrimonial order. Combined tycoons and the poor, academics and taxi drivers, with social fears to be squeezed between “greedy rural farmers and Bangkok’s cosmopolitan poor” and “abusive elites”, the narratives bohème.119 equating elections with corruption mobilize the urban middle classes in their struggle to curb, Formatting the political field suspend or overthrow electoral democracy.117 Finally, corruption discourses structure the political In general, the toxic combination between fear battlefield by framing issues, empowering actors, of social change, the lack of imagination to find but also setting limits to their room for maneuver. a way out of the mess of the political conflict, The discursive juxtaposition of “reform before and the absence of any vision for a better future election” versus “reforms are not democratic” induces people to cling on to what they know, defines the battle lines of the political conflict, and mobilizes the masses to defend their the leaving very little room for compromise. The social order their identities are built upon. yellow discourse rages against the “Villain Thaksin”, cheers for the “Hero Kamnan Suthep” and bemoans the “Great Mass of the People” as the victim of “Thaksin regime”. The red discourse

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despises the “Villain Suthep”, celebrates the (Anti-)Corruption discourses in Thailand’s “Democracy Heroine Yingluck” and points to the conflict “betrayed 20 million voters” as the victims of the “ammaart coup”. Corruption narratives largely Given the centrality of corruption narratives in determine the political solution a speaker has in the construction of the conflict, it comes as no mind. Those who fear corruption as moral decay surprise that allegations of corruption have indeed will seek to strengthen morality. Those who blame been front and center in the political conflict it on “bad people” will aim to “exterminate” this over the past nine years. Elected Prime Ministers “rubbish”. Those who identify it as a problem of Thaksin Shinavatra and Somchai Wongsawat governance will install new laws and institutions, were removed from power on highly controversial and those who see it as the decay of the ancient corruptions allegations. The military coup in 2006 regime will strive to overcome it.120 was partly justified by “widespread corruption and nepotism”.123 Despite ideological, personal and Corruption narratives are also central for the political differences, all Anti-Thaksin street protests construction of the deeper transformation voiced strong grievances over political corruption. conflict. The “all politicians are corrupt” narrative Amidst controversy, a military junta-appointed negatively frames the elected representatives of drafting assembly wrote a new constitution :124 social groups, and erodes the critical resource of trust, in effect undermining the ability of political “Some of the most important provisions, actors from all sides to broker a deal to resolve the however, are the different agencies created current stand-off.121 in the Constitution to oversee the politics of Thailand. Each of these agencies is directed The “vote buying”, “populism” topoi equates at ensuring the allegations of rampant democratic elections with corruption. The Thai corruption which sparked the 2006 coup do Constitutional Courts in its seminal ruling on the not reoccur.”125 constitutional amendment seeking to have a fully elected Senate, used the “Spouse Parliament” Other observers interpret the fight against narrative to equate elections with nepotism, corruption as a pretext to strengthen the electoral arguing that “It is an attempt to draw the Nation minority by anti-majoritarian instruments: back into the canal, as it would bring the Senate back to the state of being an assembly of relatives, “Thaksin’s unprecedented electoral popularity assembly of family members and assembly of among the rural poor and an emerging rural husbands and wives.”122 Consequently many of middle class favoring his populist policies was the “reforms” of the past decade were aimed seen as a threat to the old establishment. at curbing the influence of elected politicians [..] The current constitutional amendment by checking them with “neutral” institutions. struggle is part of the larger ongoing tug More generally, the discursive equation of the of war that started even before the 2006 democratic process of negotiation, compromise, coup between the old establishment aligned and trade-offs between interest groups with with the military, the judiciary, independent “moral corruption” deepens the legitimacy crisis agencies and the opposition party with the of the political system. backing of the conservative urban elite and the old middle class on one side, and the new anti-establishment forces personified by Thaksin and represented by his party with the broad-based support of the rural poor, a

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new middle class and democracy advocates The changing rules of the game explain the on the other. The clashes of the old and new strategic blunders by the shrewd master players forces came to a breaking point with the 2006 of both sides.129 Under the changing rules of coup, with the old establishment reasserting the game, domestic and international opinion, its power. […The 2007 Charter] increased the especially of one’s own supports, matter. Over power of independent state agencies and the the past six months, success or failureof political judiciary, while curbing the power of elected actors were partly determined by their ability to politicians. With increased power, the role of play by the rules of a discursive struggle. the judiciary and independent agencies would become politically dominant under the 2007 In the discursive game of power, legitimacy Constitution.”126 claims are front and center. And indeed, the main strategies of both camps aimed at establishing their In the current stand-off, the political formation own legitimacy, while undermining the legitimacy has so far prevented both sides from using a claims of the other side. The very fact that such militant approach to win this conflict round.127 a fierce struggle over legitimacy claims is raging Despite being under heavy pressure to stage a shows that the “royalist” discourse community has military coup d’état, the military top brass seems lost discourse hegemony. Only a few years back, wary of any direct intervention. The incalculable the network monarchy had the discursive power risks of a “red” insurgency, deserting Isan recruits to explain “what is going on” and “what needs to and defecting “watermelon” (“green outside, red be done about it”. Today, reflecting the increased inside”) officers, international pressure and even political awareness in every corner of country, more criminal prosecution seem to worry the armed and more people openly challenge this authority. forces. Nonetheless, in a country with a history of Consequently, the international media coverage of 18 coups d’état, warning by the military top brass the Constitutional Court ouster of Prime Minster to interfere if substantial bloodshed occurs will almost unanimously echoed the “red” topoi of always be credible enough to deter the government a judicial coup. As long as this conflict round is side from cracking down on the protesters. As fought over rival legitimacy claims, the ‘invisible the tragic track record of more than 20 dead and power’ of discourses is a decisive resource. In a hundreds wounded shows, this does not prevent political formation characterized by the inability to small-scale violent attacks as a tactical instrument, use large-scale force, the royalist loss of discourse nor does it suggest that a changing situation may hegemony accelerated the ongoing shift in the not force the hand of hesitant decision makers to balance of power.130 reconsider a militant approach. In fact, remarks by the Army Chief about a “special option” suggest In sum, in the current political formation, as that the military leadership considers a coup as instable as it may be, discourses play a major a last resort.128 In order to explain the conflict role in constructing the conflict, determining the dynamic over the last six months, though, the strategies of players, and affecting their chances inability to decide this conflict round by a coup or of success or failure. Consequently, corruption a crackdown played an important role because it discourses play a central role in empowering changed the opportunity structures. Simply put, actors, namely the People’s Democratic Reform the battlefield was moved from the backroom Committee (PDRC), the Constitutional Court and strings-pulling of the patronage system into the independent commissions such the National Anti- field of discourses, where different rules apply. Corruption Commission (NACC), while limiting the room for maneuver of the government.131 Interestingly, while none of the pending charges

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directly accused the caretaker government of based, to merit-based institutions. To escape the corruption, in the public discourse these charges trap of a corrupt equilibrium, societies need to were almost exclusively framed as political complete Weber’s modernization program. In corruption.132 In a semiotic reading, corruption other words, societies need to leap forward from allegations thus can be interpreted as empty patrimonialism to a legal-rational order, which signifiers. Politically, by mobilizing hundreds of can satisfy the needs of a complex economy and thousands of protesters over several months, a pluralist society. corruption narratives provide enormous convening power. The United Nations Convention against Corruption reflects a global consensus on what needs to be In sum, as the Thai case has illustrated, corruption done on the technical side: can play a key role in transformation conflicts. On a structural level, it works as an (ambivalent) “An entire chapter of the Convention is catalyst in the transition between a patrimonial dedicated to prevention, with measures and a legal-rational order. In the discourse field, directed at both the public and private sectors. corruption narratives offer explanations for the These include model preventive policies, such anonymous and sometimes frightening forces of as the establishment of anticorruption bodies change, and offer common platforms for broad and enhanced transparency in the financing discourse alliances. Given the vital function of of election campaigns and political parties. corruption in patronage systems, corruption The Convention requires countries to establish narratives are ideally suited to spark middle class criminal and other offences to cover a wide outrage and mobilize mass protests against range of corrupt acts. The Convention goes governments. Finally, anti-corruption bodies beyond previous instruments of its kind, can be useful tools for electoral minorities to criminalizing not only basic forms of corruption strengthen their position. such as bribery and the embezzlement of public funds, but also in trading of influence V. Anti-corruption strategies for and the concealment and laundering of the transformation societies proceeds of corruption. Offences committed in the support of corruption, including Corruption, cronyism and clientelism are social money-laundering and obstructing justice, practices that have had important functions in pre- are also dealt with. Convention offences also modern societies. Today, in the absence of effective deal with the problematic areas of private- modern institutions, they continue to fulfill the sector corruption. Countries are bound by same social functions. With the emergence of the Convention to render specific forms of complex modern economies and pluralist societies mutual legal assistance in gathering and however, these social practices can become transferring evidence for use in court, to obstacles to development, democratization and extradite offenders. Countries agreed on social justice. Misunderstanding corruption as asset-recovery, which is stated explicitly as a an individual moral failure of “bad people”, fundamental principle of the Convention.“133 leads to the wrong therapy, reverting back to the traditional order which works on the basis However, as revealed by the disappointing of distributing spoils within personal networks. track record of many anti-corruption programs, To effectively curb corruption the exact opposite curbing corruption is easier said than done.134 is needed and the governance operating system Technocratic instruments are doomed if they fail must be upgraded, from personal relationship- to take into account the context of the political

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economy, social functions and cultural roots symbolically represent the larger, yet difficult of corruption. Without a proper conceptual to understand struggle between a patrimonial framework, anti-corruption policies may possibly and a legal-rational order. If corruption can do even more harm than good. Particularly in only be curbed by completing the legal- transformation societies anti-corruption strategies rational order, then the fight against corruption need to be embedded into broader strategies means to take sides in the transformation to tackle the broader challenges for political conflict between those who seek to uphold and economic development. Nevertheless given the patrimonial order, and those who the rapidly shifting economic, political and seek democratic change. The fight against cultural opportunity structures of transformation corruption can only be successful as part of societies, fighting corruption would mean hitting the larger struggle for democratization. a moving target. Corruption fighters can easily get embroiled in political conflicts. Given the public 5.1 Handle with care outrage over corruption, as well as the resistance from those who benefit from the status quo, The Washington Consensus disguised its political designing successful anti-corruption strategies is agenda for building the institutional infrastructure a delicate task.135 for a capitalist economy into technical language. This is not to say that the good governance agenda Three lessons learnt may be helpful at the onset is wrong; on the contrary, it is indispensable of the long and cumbersome struggle against to build a legal-rational order. However, these corruption: seemingly technical programs are cloaking stark political choices. Those who believe that only the • Beware the ideological baggage. The fight fire and fury of the capitalist monster can break against corruption is neither neutral nor the chains of traditional feudal orders will follow innocent. To make good governance reforms its advice and let markets run free. Those who work, they have to be stripped off the are fearful of replacing one devil with another conceptual flaws and hidden agendas of the will have to carefully watch how the institutional Washington Consensus. cage is constructed. Hence, it is important to understand that anti-corruption programs are • Beware the social functions of corruption. always political. In the absence of functioning legal-rational institutions, corruption often fills the gap in Anti-corruption strategies unaware of political fulfilling crucial social functions. Hence, the and discursive minefields can easily be entangled fight against corruption can only succeed if in political conflicts, or end up doing someone it does not simply build institutional facades, else’s bidding: but seeks to lay the political, social and cultural foundations necessary to make the “Anti-corruption is not innocent. Insofar as legal-rational system work. Similarly anti- anti-corruption is one tool for controlling corruption strategies need to be more than resources and maintaining control over institutional engineering, and contribute to others, we should expect that even the most the renegotiation of the social contract. unscrupulous regimes and leaders will develop anti-corruption agencies and strategies to • Beware the role of corruption narratives. In please donors and obtain funds […] One many transformation conflicts, corruption should assume that anti-corruption agencies discourses play a central role because they can themselves be corrupt, just as we find

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those organs fighting what is called ‘organized ironic twist, the moralistic discourse of corruption crime’ can themselves be linked to organized as individual moral failure (“bad people”) in effect crime. Anti-corruption is not innocent.”136 reaffirming the exact same patronage system which functions by distributing spoils into personal As shown in the case of Thailand, corruption networks.138 narratives play a major role in the construction of the conflict, while anti-corruption bodies are In short, anti-corruption policies which are being used by elite minorities to defend privilege unaware of ideological biases and hidden agendas and status against the will of the electoral majority. may end up creating facade institutions, and can Technical anti-corruption programs are in danger do more harm than good. of confusing form with substance: 5.2 Curbing corruption in transformation “People [...] mistake the outward forms of societies means to finalize the legal- the rule of law for its substance. Thus, for rational order example, “checks and balances” is taken to be a hallmark of a strong rule-of-law society, Over the last decade, the recommended since the branches of government check anti-corruption policy mix has been largely the behavior of one another. But the mere consolidated. However, success stories remain existence of a formal check is not the same scarce. Corruption fighters have understood that thing as strong democratic governance. given the vast variety of corruption syndromes in Courts can be used to frustrate collective countries with contrasting contexts, there cannot action, [...] prolonged judicial appeals can bog be any blueprints for reform: down critical infrastructure projects, or can be used to protect the interest of the elites “This reformers must have political strategies as against the will of the government. Thus the well as good ideas for corruption control-; and form of separated powers periodically fails to as for the latter, what might seem to be a good correspond necessarily to the substance of a reform idea in country A may well be impossible in law-abiding society.”137 B, irrelevant in C and downright harmful in D.”139

Caution is also recommended with the Curbing endemic corruption in transformation understanding of corruption as a moral problem. countries, in particular, seems to require a different Corruption is indeed a moral problem to the approach from fighting incidental corruption in extent that it erodes the normative barriers established legal-rational polities. and impersonal institutions erected to hold the powerful accountable. Without these barriers, “The procedural approach to reducing humans will revert to the default mode of the problem of corruption in rational-legal governance: building trust based on personal systems is now well-established. But the large relationships. Moral outrage over corruption can problems associated with endemic corruption also be a powerful driver for reform, or at least occur where tensions exist between different work as a social cleansing process with the effect of types of social relationship which are assumed reaffirming ‘what is right and wrong’. If corruption by traditional and modern forms of ruling.“140 means the abuse of power by unconstrained ruling elites, however, then calls to strengthen morality The over-reliance of anti-corruption policies on by ethical self-restraint, education or awareness procedural means has been attributed to a flawed campaigns seem ill equipped for the task. In an understanding of the nature of corruption:

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“Existing Anti-Corruption Programs fail institutional facades, anti-corruption strategies because they conceptualize corruption as need to identify the social functions corrupt a principal-agent problem, when in fact, in behaviors fulfill, and replace them with less situations of systemic corruption, it is actually obstructive, yet functionally equivalent social a collective action problem. […] On the basis practices and institutions. of this [flawed] understanding of corruption, anti-corruption programs have taken the form In transformation societies, the struggle against of institutional reforms aimed at increasing corruption must be understood as part and parcel oversight by principals and reducing the of the larger challenge of building the political, opportunities and incentives of the agents legal and moral order necessary to satisfy the for corruption: reducing the discretion needs of a complex economy and pluralist society. of bureaucrats, improving their salaries, To overcome transformation crisis, society needs improving transparency and information flows, to make an ultimate choice between going etc. […] Corruption is more accurately viewed “backward” to the old order or “forward” as a collective action problem: although in towards modernization. the long-term everyone would benefit from a corruption-free environment, in the short- While the path towards modernization may widely term no-one has immediate incentives to vary from one society to another and the resulting change their behavior. As one respondent says “modern state” may look decidedly different ‘It is that feeling that if I don’t take it, it is between one culture and another, building a going to be taken by somebody else’. In this Universalist legal-rational order is only possible kind of context, society is trapped in a corrupt way of curbing corruption. Building a legal- equilibrium where no one has an incentive to rational state is not “Westernization in disguise”, change, and there a few reasons to expect any but the finalization of a process which started with change.”141 the emergence of a capitalist economy, is driven by social changes, and is being articulated in the To overcome the “corrupt equilibrium” that has political demands and aspirations of emerging been holding many transformation societies classes. In other words, the problems triggered hostage, anti-corruption strategies need to by the rationalist re-organization of the economy go well beyond the procedural measures. have to be tackled by a rational re-organization Procedural measures are insufficient to break of the political order. This re-organization goes the pertinacious patronage structures and are well beyond the institutional architecture and the incapable of facilitating the necessary changes legal framework and must include a redefinition in the normative foundations and the mindsets of norms and values, organizational and political of citizens. By definition, transformation crisis cultures, collective identities and legitimizing occur in the transition between an eroding but ideologies. still powerful patrimonial order and an emerging, but yet to be effective legal-rational order. As Curbing corruption in transformation societies long as new governance institutions are not yet means to finalize the transition to a legal-rational effective, the rule of law incomplete and the clash order with effective, merit-based, impersonal between traditional and new values and norms institutions. However, institutions are only strong ongoing, there is still room and even a need if they are recognized and accepted by all sides. for patrimonial modes of social organization. If one side imposes rules onto the other, they This is why transformation crises offer a fertile will be resisted. The “fruit of the poisonous breeding ground for corruption. To avoid creating tree” of imposed rules, no matter how well

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crafted, severely damages the legitimacy of anti- This is where the core political challenge of the corruption institutions, and spoils their ability to fight against corruption lies. Most political, tackle politically sensitive cases of corruption. Put social and economic elites owe their position differently, it is not only the design of the legal- to the patrimonial order. Beneficiaries from the rational order which matters, but the way it comes patronage system are not limited to traditional into being. Only an inclusive and participatory feudalist elites; emerging capitalist elites also have process of renegotiation of the social contract can a stake in it. There must not be any illusions that lay the social foundations for the legal-rational the fight against corruption, as part of the larger order. project of building a legal-rational order, will face stiff resistance from this status quo alliance. 5.3 The fight against corruption must be part of the struggle for democracy In other words, the fight against corruption takes Transitions from patrimonial to legal-rational place right in the middle of a transformation orders are neither natural nor technocratic. They conflict between those who seek to uphold the can only be the outcome of a protracted political traditional order, and those who struggle to change struggle over the future order: it. Deeply entrenched in the political economy, the social order and the hegemonic ideology, these “Corruption cannot be properly studied elites are a powerful political force. How can the outside the context of capitalist accumulation powerful and wealthy be brought within limits, to and the political contests that it faces from be made answerable to others?143 To make things other emerging classes in the surrounding even more challenging, the case of Thailand has social milieu. [...] This approach raises shown how anti-corruption bodies can be used as fundamental problems for policy approaches tools to defend elite interests, and anti-corruption to corruption. The public face of corruption narratives are instrumental to build broad societal is clearly unacceptable and in the long run it alliances struggling to uphold the status quo. So if may destroy the limited legitimacy of some a large part of society opposes the idea of change, developing country states. On the other how can the legal-rational order indispensable for hand, the visible face of corruption is often curbing corruption come into being? an integral part of processes of accumulation and social compromise that are no less ugly in This is why the fight against corruption cannot themselves... [...] The patterns of corruption be neutral, but is part and parcel of the larger are [...] determined by the distribution of struggle for democratic emancipation and social power between the state, capitalists and justice: intermediate classes. The economic (as opposed to moral) problem is not corruption “It may be utopian to believe that the per se but the political structures that generate transition to capitalism can be entirely just. growth-retarding corruption.”142 Yet unless the transition process is widely perceived to be just, it is difficult for it to be Anti-corruption is at the heart of the construction organized in a legally regulated way in an open of a political and normative order fit to serve the polity. External pressure to tackle corruption needs of a complex economy and pluralist society. may help development only if such pressure Simply put, it means to effectively change the contributes to the legitimization of the rules of the game for everyone, including the rich processes through which capitalism is being and powerful. created. On the other hand, it is very likely that anti-corruption strategies may sometimes

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make the problem of organizing internal corruption. […Deep democratization’s] four political stability more difficult during the key tasks involve increasing pluralism, opening processes of capitalist transition that could in up safe political and economic space, reform turn prolong instability and the perpetuation activism, and maintaining accountability.”146 of underdevelopment.”144 Deep democratization aims to overcome social Hence, Johnston places the fight against corruption conflict not by moral appeals, but by political into the struggle for deeper democratization: settlements:

“Corruption will continue […] until those with “In extensively corrupt societies deep a stake in ending it are able to oppose it in democratization is unlikely to attain ways that cannot be ignored. […] Even the best breakthroughs in political morality or anything anti-corruption ideas need strong political and like fully open, rational government. It social foundations- the support of people and can (though by no means must) culminate groups with lasting reasons, and the ability, to in settlements and accommodations that defend themselves politically against abuses by institutionalize accountability and limits on others […] Lasting corruption control is more power.”147 likely to succeed as a part, and outcome, of deep democratization. ‘Deep democratization’ Fighting corruption means to empower the does not mean that democracy itself, or people to stand up to the rich and powerful. To processes like competitive lections, will control achieve this herculean task, Johnston does not corruption […] Deep democratization is a put his hopes on morality, but on more profane continuing process of building workable rules motivations of self-interest: and accountability by bringing more voices and interests into the governing process. It is ‘deep’ “Those sorts of political energy are not easily in a double sense: it draws force from many sustained solely through appeals to virtue; levels of society, reflecting the lasting interests the defense of one’s own interests – property, of the humblest as well as the elites; and it rights personal safety, the chance to earn extends deep into the institutions and processes a living- is a more lasting motivation when of government, making those interests a factor it comes to confronting the wealthy and in policy making and implementation, not just powerful.”148 slogans at election time.”145 However, given the political, economic, ideological Contrary to traditionalist fears that conflict drives and coercive power of the entrenched patrimonial social decay, or reactionary concerns that electoral elites, individuals struggling to defend their rights competition encourages corruption, it is the very and interests are fighting an uphill battle. The epic noise and contestation of a pluralist society which struggle over the political order can only be won helps to check corruption: by the political muscle of a broad societal change coalition. “The clash of interests and values; contestation over the acceptable sources and uses of Given the heterogeneous and often divergent wealth and power, and over accountability; interests of social groups, such a broad societal and the disputes over the nature and coalition needs a common discursive platform significance of rights are of the essence in on which actors can join forces. How that can deep democratization and […] in checking be done can be learned from one of the most

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successful coalition builders in the global fight “[Anti-corruption] can also constitute a against corruption, Transparency International political platform for ambitious politicians and (TI). The success of TI is rooted in its ability ex-military officers who want to ‘clean up’ to mobilize players with a common mission, government. Anti-corruption is invariably part despite the obvious varying differences of of most military coups.”151 interests between them. To effectively isolate or shame corrupt politicians or unaccountable If the fight against corruption can only be won institutions into better governance, a vast by installing a legal-rational order, it must not be coalition of international donor organizations, carried by a reactionary alliance, but by a coalition the international business community and local struggling for democratic change. Consequently, politicians has to be brought ‘on board’.149 The corruption fighters need to forge alliances with global anti-corruption community is an impressive those who seek a politically democratic, socially example of how alliances between politically, just and symbolically pluralist order.152 socially and ideologically diverse groups can be formed on the basis of a common cause. To form a discursive platform for a ‘Grand Rainbow Coalition for Democratic Change’, democracy and “The anti-corruption community […] is anti-corruption narratives need to be combined.153 now so extensive that it includes groups normally at odds with each other: grassroots The history of democratization suggests the themes activists pursuing social justice, enlightened around which such a narrative could be build. In corporations who believe ethics is good Europe, temporary coalitions between middle business, neoliberal governments who class and were instrumental to end see corruption as a brake on trade, and aristocratic rule. Their common vision bridging international aid organizations who want vast differences of interests and culture was a their donor funds to be more effective […] social order which allowed social rise based on In the world of anti-corruption, diverse personal achievement, as opposed to aristocratic actors normally at odds with each other can heredity.154 Equal opportunities for all, combined come together in the same moral crusade. with effective rule of law protecting the minority The movement against corruption is one of from the electoral majority was the formula many the few platforms which can bring virtually could agree on. Social democratic compromises all of us together. After all, who can be for between all classes finally ended decades or even corruption?”150 centuries of social conflict. At the heart of the new social contract was the promise that society The case of Thailand, on the other hand, should be would provide full capabilities for all, empowering seen as a warning that anti-corruption movements everyone to ‘make it’ based on talent, hard work, are not necessarily democratic. Conflicts over and merit. This dynamic and egalitarian social the right way to curb corruption may even split order was radically different from patrimonial the democratic camp by pitting those who order with their static social hierarchies and prioritize the rule of law against those who focus personal relationship based governance systems. on electoral majority rule. The appeal of anti- By combining the quest for a legal-rational order corruption platforms to authoritarian players, to with the struggle for social justice and political be sure, is a global phenomenon: emancipation, the social democratic compromise provided the social foundation for political and economic development, and decades of social stability.

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In today’s transformation societies, the key making process. An escalating transformation challenge for political and economic development conflict can even result in the total breakdown of is the renegotiation of the social contract to lay the the political system and violent conflict. Hence, in social foundation for a democratic legal-rational order to allow the implementation of effective anti- order. To marginalize extremists, and win the corruption policies, the fight against corruption struggle against those who benefit from the status needs to be purged of “hidden agendas” by firmly quo, those who seek to fight corruption and those and unmistakably embedding it into the struggle who want social justice need to join forces in a for deeper democratization. broad societal Grand Rainbow Coalition. In order to allow social groups with diverging interests and In order to unite the fight against corruption and the opposing beliefs to come together, a common struggle for deeper democratization, corruption platform is needed which unites the fight against needs to be redefined from an individual moral corruption with the struggles for social justice and failure into a collective problem of social justice. deeper democratization. Again, Transparency International has taken the lead by reframing the anti-corruption agenda as Building a strong political center for a social the common struggle for social justice and the democracy, however, can only work if it is rule of law: supported by the middle classes. Therefore, it is indispensable to bring the raging middle classes “Popular movements do not distinguish back into the democratic flock. As shown above, between anti-corruption or human rights the political attitude of middle classes is less based in their demand for social justice and the on interest, but framed by narratives which equate rule of law. Policymakers need to follow electoral democracy with corruption. Therefore, a suit by breaking down the conceptual and new corruption narrative is needed which reframes institutional barriers and better synergizing how society at large, and the middle classes in anti-corruption and human rights efforts.“155 particular think and talk about corruption. Combining the struggles for social justice, the rule If corruption means the abuse of power, then of law and deeper democratization is a winning fighting corruption means to empower people formula which offers a way out of deadlock of to defend their rights and interests against the transformation conflicts. A social compromise powerful and wealthy. In other words, to fight between those who seek a merit-based order corruption, more democracy, not less, is needed. and those who struggle for equal opportunities enables the laying of a social foundation for a new Deepening democratization in the provinces will social contract. The common vision of a “Legal- help reconcile the middle class with elections. rational order as the basis for a Good Society Deeper democratization will help to strengthen with full capabilities for all” helps to transcend the rule of law, making political parties more fears and conflict by opening a new path into the responsive and elected leaders more accountable. future.156

In order to effectively curb corruption, checks and balances, limits and controls of powerful are needed. However, the false equation between democracy and corruption nurtures mistrust over “ultimate motives” of corruption fighters, fueling ideological proxy battles and paralyzing the policy

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is the Resident Director of Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Thailand and founding member of the Asian-European ‘Economy of Tomorrow’ project.