Profile of Internal Displacement : Georgia

PROFILE OF INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT : GEORGIA

Compilation of the information available in the Global IDP Database of the Norwegian Refugee Council

(as of 18 July, 2002)

Also available at http://www.idpproject.org

Users of this document are welcome to credit the Global IDP Database for the collection of information.

The opinions expressed here are those of the sources and are not necessarily shared by the Global IDP Project or NRC

Norwegian Refugee Council/Global IDP Project Chemin Moïse Duboule, 59 1209 Geneva - Switzerland Tel: + 41 22 799 07 00 Fax: + 41 22 799 07 01 E-mail : [email protected]

CONTENTS

CONTENTS 1

PROFILE SUMMARY 6

CAUSES AND BACKGROUND OF DISPLACEMENT 9

GENERAL BACKGROUND 9 BASIC FACTS ON GEORGIA (1995) 9 ETHNIC DIVISIONS IN ABKHAZIA DURING THE SOVIET ERA (1920-1989) 9 THE SEVERE ECONOMIC BREAKDOWN SERIOUSLY AFFECTS THE CAPACITY OF THE STATE TO CARE FOR THE MOST VULNERABLE (2000) 11 GOVERNMENT OF GEORGIA REQUESTS INTERNATIONAL FOOD AID AS A RESULT OF A SEVERE DROUGHT IN EASTERN GEORGIA (2000) 12 PRESIDENT SHEVARDNADZE FORCED TO SACK THE ENTIRE GOVERNMENT FOLLOWING PROTESTS AGAINST CORRUPTION (NOVEMBER 2001) 13 DISPLACEMENT IN ABKHAZIA 13 SIX YEARS OF ON-AND-OFF WAR (1992-1998) 13 DISPLACEMENT AND "ETHNIC CLEANSING" (1992-1999) 14 INTERNATIONAL PEACE EFFORTS (1993-2002) 17 ARMED TENSIONS BETWEEN THE ABKHAZIAN AND GEORGIAN SIDES (2001-2002) 19 THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION: A MAJOR ACTOR IN THE ABKHAZ CONFLICT (2001) 20 ARMENIA EXPRESSES CONCERN OVER THREAT AGAINST ARMENIAN MINORITY IN ABKHAZIA (2001) 21 DISPLACEMENT IN SOUTH OSSETIA 22 BACKGROUND AND UPDATE ON THE CONFLICT /IDP SITUATION IN THE SECESSIONIST REGION OF SOUTH OSSETIA (1922-2002) 22 OTHER GEORGIAN REGIONS 23 NEED FOR DISPLACEMENT PREVENTION IN OTHER GEORGIAN REGIONS (2000) 23

POPULATION PROFILE AND FIGURES 25

TOTAL FIGURES 25 TOTAL INTERNALLY DISPLACED POPULATION: 264,000 PERSONS ACCORDING TO THE GOVERNMENT (JANUARY 2002) 25 TOTAL INTERNALLY DISPLACED POPULATION: 272 101 PERSONS ACCORDING TO THE GOVERNMENT (JANUARY 2001) 25 BETWEEN 240.000 AND 300.000 IDPS IN GEORGIA SINCE 1993 (1993-1999) 27

IN 1999, USCR REPORTS APPROXIMATELY 280,000 IDPS IN GEORGIA, SOME 10,000 OF THEM DISPLACED FROM SOUTH OSSETIA AND THE REST FROM ABKHAZIA 27 NRC SURVEY CHALLENGES THE OFFICIAL INFORMATION ON NUMBERS OF IDPS ORIGINATING FROM THE GALI REGION (ABKHAZIA) (1997) 28 DISAGGREGATED FIGURES 28 DEMOGRAPHIC STRUCTURE OF THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED POPULATION DIFFERS NOTICEABLY FROM THE REST OF THE POPULATION (2000) 28 THE NUMBER AND ETHNIC ORIGIN OF THOSE WHO HAVE FLED ABKHAZIA, HAVE REMAINED OR HAVE RETURNED IS A HIGHLY CONTROVERSIAL POLITICAL ISSUE BETWEEN ABKHAZIA AND GEORGIA (2000) 29 DISTRIBUTION OF THE DISPLACED BY TYPE OF ACCOMMODATION (NOVEMBER 1999) 30 DISPLACEMENT OF GEORGIANS (1992-1997) 31 DISPLACEMENT OF RUSSIANS, ARMENIANS AND GREEKS (1992-1993) 32

PATTERNS OF DISPLACEMENT 33

GENERAL PATTERN 33 DISPLACEMENT PATTERNS LEAD TO A CONCENTRATION OF IDPS IN A NUMBER OF GEORGIAN CITIES (1997) 33 DISPLACEMENT OF ABKHAZ POPULATION (1992-1999) 33

PHYSICAL SECURITY & FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT 35

GENERAL 35 RETURNEES TO THE GALI DISTRICT CONTINUE TO BE EXPOSED TO INSECURITY (2000-2002) 35 LARGE NUMBERS OF MINES CONSTITUTE A THREAT IN AREAS OF DISPLACEMENT AND RETURN (2000-2001) 37 RETURNEES TO SOUTH OSSETIA REMAIN EXPOSED TO HARASSMENT AND VIOLENCE (2000-2001) 38

SUBSISTENCE NEEDS (HEALTH NUTRITION AND SHELTER) 40

HEALTH CARE 40 DIFFICULT ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE FOR THE DISPLACED AGGRAVATES EFFECTS OF POOR LIVING CONDITIONS (2000) 40 FIELD SURVEY BY SAVE THE CHILDREN IN WESTERN GEORGIA HIGHLIGHTS HEALTH NEEDS OF THE DISPLACED (2000) 41 FIELD SURVEYS REVEAL PSYCHO-SOCIAL TRAUMA OF DISPLACED WOMEN AND MEN (1995-2000) 42 RIGHT TO HEALTHCARE - LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND IMPLEMENTATION (REVIEW BY THE GEORGIAN YOUNG LAWYERS' ASSOCIATION) (1999) 43 SHELTER 45 IDP COLLECTIVE CENTRES HIT BY EARTHQUAKE IN TBILISI (APRIL 2002) 45 PRECARIOUS HOUSING CONDITIONS OF THE DISPLACED (2000) 46 COLLECTIVE SHELTERS IN WESTERN GEORGIA NEED MAJOR REPAIRS (2000) 48 SHELTER NEEDS IN SOUTH OSSETIA: A PREREQUISITE FOR RETURN (2000-2001) 49 GEORGIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCIATION REVIEWS THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICES PERTAINING TO THE RIGHT TO HOUSING OF THE DISPLACED (1999) 49

THE SITUATION OF UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN AND ELDERLY IDPS (1999) 51

ACCESS TO EDUCATION 52

GENERAL 52 ISSUE OF LANGUAGE OF EDUCATION IN ABKHAZIA: A DECISIVE FACTOR ON RETURN (2000-2002) 52 DISPLACED CHILDREN FACE DIFFICULT CONDITIONS AT SCHOOLS (2000) 53

ISSUES OF SELF-RELIANCE AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 56

ISSUES OF SELF-RELIANCE 56 EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES OF THE DISPLACED ARE CONSTRAINED BY THE DIFFICULT ECONOMIC SITUATION (2000) 56 DISPLACED FAMILIES ARE MORE AFFECTED BY UNEMPLOYMENT AND RELY MAINLY ON THE IDP BENEFITS GRANTED BY THE STATE (2000) 57 MANY BARRIERS TO THE AGRICULTURAL SUSTAINABILITY OF THE DISPLACED POPULATION (2000) 58 POOR ECONOMIC SITUATION IN SOUTH OSSETIA HAMPERS LARGE-SCALE RETURN OF THE DISPLACED (2000-2001) 61 STATE POLICY TO SUPPORT THE SELF-RELIANCE CAPACITY OF THE DISPLACED: A REVIEW BY THE GEORGIAN YOUNG LAWYER ASSOCIATION (1999) 61 PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 63 IDPS STAGE DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST NATIONAL AUTHORITIES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS (2001-2002) 63 POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED: CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK NEEDS TO BE REFORMED (2000) 64 PARALLEL STRUCTURES OF GOVERNANCE FUNCTION AS AN ASSISTANCE NETWORK FOR THE DISPLACED FROM ABKHAZIA (2001) 67 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: INTERNALLY DISPLACED WERE ABLE TO VOTE IN THE DISTRICT OF THEIR TEMPORARY RESIDENCE (9 APRIL 2000) 68 DISPLACED PERSONS UNDER PRESSURE NOT TO DEMAND THEIR RIGHT TO VOTE (2000) 69 MARGINAL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF DISPLACED WOMEN (2000) 69

DOCUMENTATION NEEDS AND CITIZENSHIP 71

GENERAL 71 MANY IDPS HAVE LOST THEIR PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION DOCUMENTS (1999) 71

ISSUES OF FAMILY UNITY, IDENTITY AND CULTURE 72

GENERAL 72 FATE OF GEORGIAN AND ABKHAZ MISSING PERSONS WHO DISAPPEARED DURING THE CONFLICT IN ABKHAZIA STILL UNKNOWN (2000) 72 CHANGING GENDER ROLE: DISPLACED WOMEN BECOME THE MAIN HOUSEHOLD INCOM E EARNERS (2000) 72

PROPERTY ISSUES 76

GENERAL 76 ACT ON THE RESTITUTION PROCESS FOR PROPERTIES OF OSSETIANS IN GEORGIA STILL UNDER DISCUSSION (2000-2001) 76 RIGHT TO HOUSING IN GEORGIA - ADVANCES IN THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK (1999) 77 DISCRIMINATORY IMPLEM ENTATION OF HOUSING CODES COULD IMPEDE IDP RETURN TO ABKHAZIA (1999) 78 CONFLICT BETWEEN IDP STATUS AND PROPERTY RIGHTS (1999) 79 INTERNATIONAL STUDY PROPOSES CONCRETE LEGAL AND POLITICAL MEASURES TO RESOLVE THE HOUSING AND PROPERTY ISSUE IN GEORGIA (1998) 79

PATTERNS OF RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT 82

PROSPECTS OF RETURN 82 RETURN MOVEMENTS TO T HE GALI DISTRICT IN SOUTHERN ABKHAZIA (2000-2001) 82 RETURNEES FACE DIFFICULT HUMANITARIAN CONDITIONS AND INSECURITY (2001) 83 INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS HAVE BEEN MANDATED TO ASSIST IN CREATING CONDITIONS FOR RETURN (2000-2001) 84 MORE RETURN MOVEMENTS TO THE GALI DISTRICT DURING 2000 85 JOINT ASSESSMENT MISSION TO THE GALI DISTRICT EVALUATE CONDITIONS FOR THE RETURN OF THE DISPLACED (NOVEMBER 2000) 86 INTERNATIONAL HUMANIT ARIAN AGENCIES ARE RELUCTANT TO UNDERT AKE PROGRAMMES THAT MAY ENCOURAGE T HE RETURN OF DISPLACED PERSONS TO UNSAFE AREAS (2000) 87 SEASONAL NATURE OF RETURN TO THE GALI DISTRICT (2000) 88 SOME INTERNALLY DISPLACED HAVE OPTED FOR RESETTLEMENT (2000) 89 UN SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE CONDUCTS BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS ON KEY ISSUES, INCLUDING THE RETURN OF DISPLACED PERSONS TO ABKHAZIA (2000) 90 DE FACTO ABKHAZ AUTHORITIES TAKE UNILATERAL INITIATIVE TO PROMOTE RETURN TO THE GALI REGION (JANUARY 1999) 91 UP DATE ON FIGURES, PATTERNS AND CONDITIONS OF RETURN TO THE GALI REGION (ABKHAZIA) (1999) 91 RETURN TO SOUTH OSSETIA: OBSTACLES REMAIN IN PLACE (1999-2001) 92 PASSED RETURN EXPERIENCES 93 UNHCR 1994 RETURN PLAN FAILS (1995) 93

HUMANITARIAN ACCESS 95

GENERAL 95 SECURITY CONSTRAINTS AFFECTS DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, PARTICULARLY IN WESTERN GEORGIA (2001) 95

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES 98

NATIONAL RESPONSE 98 GEORGIAN GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE IDP SITUATION - LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND BASIC POLICY (1992-2000) 98

GOVERNMENT ACCEPTANCE AND SUPPORT OF CHECHEN REFUGEES TRIGGERS DISCONTENT AMONG GEORGIAN IDPS (2000) 100 INTERNATIONAL RESPONS E 101 COUNCIL OF EUROPE EXPRESSES CONCERNS ABOUT THE SITUATION OF DISPLACED PERSONS (2002) 101 GERMAN GOVERNMENT FUNDS TELECOMMUNICATION REHABILITATION PROGRAMME BETWEEN ABKHAZIA AND GEORGIA PROPER (2001-2002) 102 THE GEORGIAN GOVERNMENT AND UN AGENCIES DEVELOPED A "NEW APPROACH" TO THE ASSISTANCE OF THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED (2000-2002) 103 WINTER HEATING ASSISTANCE: USAID INCREASED ITS SUPPORT IN 2001 104 INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE IN ABKHAZIA ADDRESS NEED S OF THE VULNERABLE (2001) 104 INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY REDUCES ITS ASSISTANCE IN SOUTH OSSETIA (2001) 105 UNOMIG: CONTRIBUTION TO THE RETURN OF THE DISPLACED TO THE GALI DISTRICT (1993- 2002) 106 UNHCR: LIMITED SUPPORT TO RETURNEES (2002) 107 WFP: LIFE-SAVING SUPPORT AND REHABILITATION ACTIVITIES (1999-2002) 108 IFRC ACTIVITIES IN 2001: HIGHLIGHTS ON IDP-RELATED ACTIVITIES 110 ICRC STRENGTHENS ITS ASSISTANCE TO IDPS IN WESTERN GEORGIA (2002) 112 UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: FIELD PRESENCE IN ABKHAZIA (2000-2002) 113 UN REPRESENTATIVE ON INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS DIALOGUES WITH AUTHORITIES IN GEORGIA (MAY 2000) 115 NGOS 116 INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL NGOS PROVIDE PROTECTION AND ASSISTANCE TO IDPS IN GEORGIA (2001) 117 STRONG MOBILIZATION OF DISPLACED WOMEN IN THE CIVIL SOCIETY (2000) 117 LEGAL AID: INITIATIVES TAKEN BY LOCAL NGOS (1999-2002) 118 ASSESSMENT OF THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO IDP NEEDS IN GEORGIA 119 RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE UN REPRESENTATIVE ON IDPS (2000) 119 WORLD BANK STUDY: IDPS LIKELY TO FACE LOWER RISK OF EXTREME POVERTY THAN THE POPULATION AT LARGE (1999) 121 INCREASED ATTENTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IS NEEDED TO GUARANTEE SUSTAINED INVOLVEMENT OF GEORGIAN LOCAL CIVIL SOCIETY IN IDP ISSUES (1999) 123 SOCIO-POLITICAL IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT TO IDPS IN GEORGIA (1997) 125 REFERENCE TO THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT 126 KNOWN REFERENCES TO THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES (AS OF NOVEMBER 2001) 126 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 129

LIST OF SOURCES USED 130

PROFILE SUMMARY

The overwhelming majority of internally displaced people in Georgia originate from Abkhazia from where they were forced to flee in 1992-1993. According to government estimates, as many as 252,000 persons remain internally displaced from Abkhazia as of April 2002 (UNHCR June 2002). In addition to these IDPs from Abkhazia, another group of 12,000 persons have been displaced in the country as a result of the conflict which took place in South Ossetia from 1991-1992 (USCR 2002). In both situations, the number of internally displaced persons has remained stable for most of the past decade, with only low level of return movements being registered in South Ossetia and the Gali district of Abkhazia. There are no prospects for a large-scale return in the near future as tensions remain vivid in the security zone between the Abkhaz and the Georgian parties and the reluctance of the South-Ossetian and Georgian sides to implement the right of the displaced to return.

Background to the conflict in Abkhazia

According to the 1989 Soviet census, ethnic Georgians made up 45 percent of the pre-war population of the autonomous republic of Abkazia in the northwest of Georgia. Ethnic Abkhazi represented 17 percent of the population, hardly more than Armenians and Russians (14 percent each). A declaration of sovereignty by a partial Abkhaz and Georgian forces triggered the confrontation between Abkhaz and Georgian forces. Thirteen months of war and ethnic violence with reports of murders, destruction, looting and evictions forced the entire ethnic Georgian population to leave abkhazia and to settle in neighbouring disctricts under Georgian control (Dale 1997).

In 1994, the Georgian and Abkhaz sides signed an agreement in Moscow on the separation of forces monitored by a CIS peacekeeping force and the UN Military Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). A Quadripartite Agreement on Voluntary Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons was also signed by the Abkhaz and Georgian side, the Russian Federation and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (OCHA 15 March 2001, Abkhazia).

However, violence in 1998 resulted in the renewed displacement of about 30,000 persons who had returned to the Gali district, eastern Abkhazia (UN OCHA 15 March 2001). Since then, the displaced population has remained in Georgia proper without any perspective for return in the near future. Political dialogue under the auspices of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General has not resulted in any agreement between the two parties regarding the future status of Abkhazia within Georgia. The Abkhaz authorities have rejected any discussion on the political status of Abkhazia as they consider the issue settled since Abkhazia's unilateral declaration of independence in 1999 (UN SC 19 April 2002).

Limited return to the Gali district

The Abkhaz authorities however have accepted the return of ethnic Georgians to the Gali disctrict since 1999. Between 30,000 and 60,000 persons have returned to their homes, mainly on a seasonal basis. Most return to their area of displacement on the Georgian side after the harvest seasons, while a small portion remain in their houses, with a very low level of assistance and protection. The majority of the returnees are still registered as displaced in Georgia proper (ICRC May 2001, p.7). The use of the Georgian language in Gali district schools has been one obstacle to a durable return, but Abkhaz authorities have recently shown signs of flexibility regarding the matter (UN SC 19 April 2002). The main difficulty comes from the persisting insecurity in the Gali district, mainly as a result of banditry and confrontations between Abkhaz forces and uncontrolled Georgian groups. Tensions have risen again recently between Abkhazia and Georgia proper, when armed clashes between Azeri security forces and Georgian armed groups were reported in the Kodory Valley, north of the security zone between Abkhazia and Georgia. This situation has

so far prevented humanitarian agencies and the UN peacekeeping forces from providing adequate assistance and protection to the returnees (UN SC 19 April 2002 & 18 January 2002).

Protracted displacement in Georgia proper

The vast majority of the displaced population has remained unable to return to their homes of origin elsewhere in Abkhazia and has been dependent on State assistance. The 1996 Displaced Persons Act and additional government decrees entitle the displaced to social aid, especially in the form of a monthly stipen which is far below the cost of the minimum food basket and has not been paid regurlarly. Most of the displaced live in private accommodation, mainly with host families, but there have been reports of evictions. About 45 percent of the displaced live in collective centres, mainly in former hotels, sanatoriums or hospitals, with often one room per family. Unemployment rate among the displaced population is twice to three times higher than for the local population (IFRC November 2000). The displaced need support and training to adapt to the new employment practices in the market economy, especially in urban areas where 72 percent of the displaced have now settled. In rural areas, displaced people partly rely on land plots provided by the State for temporary use but the land provided is often of poor quality and too distant from places of stay (UN CHR 25 January 2001). Differences between the local population and the displaced persons are apparently smaller in respect of health and education (IFRC November 2000).

The difficult economic conditions explain only partially the persisting precarious situation of the displaced. The Georgian authorities have been reluctant to facilitate the durable resettlement of the displaced in Georgia proper and have considered return as the only solution. Abkhaz political structures in exile have also discouraged the displaced from accepting any normalisation of their status, in particular regarding their right to vote, which would allegedly endanger their right to return. The displaced have been denied the right to vote at all in local elections unless they register as local resident and thereby renounce to their status of internally displaced person (UN CHR 25 January 2001). The possession of land also makes IDPs lose their status and the benefits attached to it (GYLA 1999, p. 7).

Dwindling support from the international donor community, however, has obliged the Georgian authorities to move away from direct assistance and to enhance the self-reliance capacity of the displaced. With the support of the international community, the government launched the "New Approach" to IDP assistance in Georgia in 1999, based on the recognition that the displaced have the right to be treated equally and enjoy the same socio-economic rights as all Georgian citizens. The adoption of this policy has resulted in the creation of a self-reliance fund with preliminary pledges of over US$1 million for the funding of innovative projects that contribute to the self-sufficiency of the displaced (UN CHR 25 January 2001, Bagshaw September 2001). Two rounds of grants competition have been completed as of May 2002 (UN OCHA 10 May 2002).

Little progress on return in South Ossetia

Although of a smaller scale, internal displacement from and within South Ossetia (also referred to as the Tskhinvali region) has not proved easier to solve. The war in 1991-1992 displaced up to 30,000 ethnic Georgians from the area and pushed 37,000 ethnic Ossetians to North Ossetia in the Russian Federation (OSI 1995). With the facilitation of the OSCE and UNHCR, an agreement was reached in 1997 regarding the return of refugees and displaced persons. Since then, authorities in South Ossetia and in Georgia have done little to facilitate the return of ethnic Georgians to South Ossetia or ethnic Ossets to Georgia proper (U.S. DOS February 2001). The poor economy in South Ossetia and lack of will to enforce property rights in South Ossetia or elsewhere in Georgia explain the insignificant level of return movements so far (USCR 2002). The absence of political commitment to return has discouraged donors from supporting development and transitional assistance programmes, while funding for humanitarian assistance has decreased (UNHCR June 2002).

The international response

The international community has invested considerable efforts to address the political and humanitarian challenges resulting from the Abkhaz onflicts. Insecurity in Abkhazia has prevented UN observer mission to undertake more patrolling in the areas of return while the CIS peacekeeping forces have been accused of passivity in the face of violence against ethnic Georgian Returnees (IHF 28 May 2002). The work of international agencies such as UNHCR, ICRC, the UN Office of Human Rights and other international NGOs have been also hampered by the insecurity in the area (UNSC 19 April 2002). In line with the "New Approach" policy, international agencies have initiated a transition from humanitarian assistance to integration and development, through shelter rehabilitation, community capacity building, training, support to income-generating activities (UNHCR November 2001). On account of the persistence of basic humanitarian needs among the displaced population in western Georgia, the ICRC renewed a large assistance programme, covering food, water and shelter habitat needs in 2002. It targets 20,000 of the most vulnerable IDPs and residents in this area (ICRC April 2002).

(Updated July 2002)

CAUSES AND BACKGROUND OF DISPLACEMENT

General Background

Basic facts on Georgia (1995)

· Georgia is multiethnic state made up of 68.8 percent Georgians, 9 percent Armenians, 7.4 persent Russians, 5.1 percent Azerbaijanis, 3.2 percent Ossetians, 1.9 percent Greeks, and 1.7 percent Abkhazians. · Two regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, have taken up arms to gain independence from Georgia · A Russian-dominated peacekeeping force and a UN international military observation force (UNOMIG) are trying to prevent the resuption of armed conflict

"The former Soviet republic of Georgia is a country spanning some 26,911 square miles in the Transcaucasus region to the south of the towering Caucasus mountain range. In 1989 the population of Georgia, which then included the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, stood at 5,443,359. The ethnic composition of the republic is situated between Russia to the north, Turkey and Armenia to the south, and Azerbaijan to the southeast is a mosaic depicting its rich and turbulent history. The Black Sea provides Georgia’s economic and cultural gateway to the West. Significantly, the Abkhaz region occupies half of this spectacular and fertile coastline.

The ethnic composition of pre-war Georgia was 68.8 percent Georgian (including several regional subgroups speaking distinct languages in addition to Georgian, e.g. Mengrelians, Gurians, Svanetians); 9 percent Armenian; 7.4 percent Russian; 5.1 percent Azerbaijani; 3.2 percent Ossetian; 1.9 percent Greek; and 1.7 percent Abkhazian. Most of the population is of the Christian faith (followers of the Georgian Orthodox church) but Islam is professed by the people of Ajaria in southwestern Georgia, by Azerbaijanis in southeastern Georgia, and by the small population of Kurds.

In the northwestern corner of Georgia lie the 3,300 square miles of snow-capped mountains and subtropical coastline that form the territory of Abkhazia. Prior to the war, the total population of Abkhazia was roughly 537,000, with just under 100,000 people of ethnic Abkhaz origin. Historically, the Abkhaz people allied themselves with the Russian-speaking population (notably Russians and Armenians). Together, these groups comprised roughly half of the region’s population. Ethnic Georgians comprised some 46 percent of the population.[…]

The status of Abkhazia is still the subject of negotiation between the warring parties [Georgian and Abkhaz forces], with participation from the Russian Federation and the United Nations. In November 1994, the Supreme Soviet of Abkhazia adopted a constitution declaring Abkhazia an independent state, but the UN Security Council has reaffirmed its commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Georgia. Meanwhile, a CIS peacekeeping force (PKF), comprised mostly of Russians, and a 136- member international military observation force from the United Nations have helped to prevent the resumption of full-scale fighting since the agreement on a cease-fire and separation of forces was signed in Moscow on May 14, 1994."(Open Society Institute, 1995, pp.14-15)

Ethnic divisions in Abkhazia during the Soviet era (1920-1989)

· According to the 1989 Soviet census, ethnic Abkhaz make up 17.8 per cent of the total population of Abkhazia · Changing Soviet policies have influenced the ethnic and national consciousness of the population in Abkhazia · In the 1930s, the Soviet Union favored Georgianization policies, but in the 1970s affirmative action policies in favor of the Abkhaz population was instituted · Cities and regions were formally multi-ethnic but on a village level populations were ethnically concentrated

"The Abkhaz Autonomous Republic is named for the Abkhaz people, but the prewar population of Abkhazia was quite mixed. According to the 1989 Soviet census, ethnic Abkhaz were 17.8 per cent of the total population of 525,000 people, while Georgians were 45.7 per cent, Armenians 14.6 per cent, and Russians 14.3 per cent. The picture is more complicated however, since these demographic proportions varied throughout the period of Soviet rule, as the Georgian and Russian populations increased proportionally at the expense of the Abkhaz. Nevertheless, throughout thetwentieth century the population has been multi-ethnic.

Throughout the period of Soviet power, this multi-ethnic population was the target of vacillating Soviet nationalities policies that assigned access to power and resources in accordance with official nationality. After enjoying in the 1920s the status of Unionrepublic, attached by treaty to the Transcaucasian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic, Abkhazia was joined to Georgia in 1931. Beginning in the 1930s, Soviet Georgianization policies closed Abkhaz language schools, changed place names, and guaranteed Georgians key official positions. Following the Second World War, Lavrentii Beria orchestrated resettlement of Georgians into Abkhazia to work in agriculture and the expanding industry, changing the ethnic balance of the population. But in 1978, in response to protests, Soviet authorities instituted "Abkhazization" affirmative action policies that reinstated Abkhaz language instruction and assigned official positions to people of Abkhaz nationality. These policies, with the privileges they conferred or rescinded, were applied to each citizen according to his or her official nationality, a fixed designation inscribed into the passport of every citizen over 16 years of age. Thus, changing Soviet policies over time concretized the idea of nationality for all residents of Abkhazia as an issue associated with competition for advantage.

In addition to official policies, patterns of daily life also worked to shape the ethnic consciousness of the prewar population. Almost all cities and regions were formally multinational. Residents still remaining in Tkvarcheli, for example, proclaim with pride that over fifty nationalities lived in that city of 22,000 people. Sukhumi’s role as the designated economic and political centre for all of Abkhazia guaranteed integration at the republican level. Enterprises and state farms needed support from Sukhumi in order to function, and individuals made trips to Sukhumi since it was by far the best place to find many goods and services. At the household level, mixed marriages, particularly Georgian-Abkhaz, were common, and in a culture that emphasized strong ties with extended family members, for many this meant frequent inter-ethnic interaction in their own homes.

Nevertheless, at the level of village life, there was a strong tendency toward nationally compact populations. In some cases this applied to whole villages. In Ochamchire district, for example, the villages Labra and Atara Armianskaia were primarily Armenian-populated, Mokva was primarily Russian, and Kochara was primarily Georgian. In other cases, for example the Georgian population of Dranda, members of one nationality lived compactly within a larger village or town. Furthermore, agricultural and economic organization especially in the countryside tended to coincide with village boundaries. Thus to the extent that nationalities lived compactly, they also tended to be organized economically by nationality. The 500 prewar households of the Armenian town of Shaumianovka, for example, constituted the workforce for a tea and tobacco state farm. And the neighbouring villages Tskenis -Tskali, with a largely Abkhaz population, and mostly Georgian Kochara, had shared a collective farm. But in late Soviet days they separated, forming two more o r less mono-ethnic agricultural enterprises.

Thus, Soviet authority institutionalized both macro integration through Sukhumi’s economic position, and micro differentiation through employment and residence patterns, creating a patchwork patterned prewar population. Personal level interaction modified this, but the zero sum game of the cultural politics of official nationalities policies worked to reify national difference."(Dale, 1997, sects.2.1-4.2)

The severe economic breakdown seriously affects the capacity of the State to care for the most vulnerable (2000)

· During the 90s, Georgia has undergone de-industrialization and a severe decline in agriculture, which has resulted in an increase in unemployment (22 percent nationally and 35 percent in urban areas) and poverty · Georgia has one of the lowest per capita GDPs among the CIS countries, lower than that of many developing countries · The ability of households to purchase food has decreased over the years as incomes have declined by about 40 percent compared to 1990 levels while prices have increased as a result of inflation · The major social safety net for the poor is the Social Welfare Programme, which provides allowances to elderly pensioners, invalids and IDP but the Government has been unable to pay social benefits on a regular basis · Changes in food consumptions patterns have been noted, with households shifting away from nutritious to less nutritious

"Georgia’s main economic activities are strongly linked to Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, which account for about 44 percent of trade (Economic Trends, 1999). Thus, the Russian rouble crisis of 1998 resulted in a large trade deficit and economic crisis for Georgia. The industrial base is technologically old, environmentally damaging and unable to become competitive to maintain its market share. Georgia has undergone de-industrialization, which has resulted in an increase in unemployment. The 1996 industrial output was only 14 percent of the 1989 levels. In 1998, only 46 percent of official registered industries were operating (UNDP, 1999). Foreign investments have remained low, as Georgia is considered very unstable.

Agriculture accounts for 30 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) and provides up to 50 percent of the income for both rural and urban households. This sector has undergone a rapid decline, producing about half of 1990 levels (UNDP, 1999). Many years of neglecting the irrigation and drainage systems have led to water logging, marshing of land, salinization, soil erosion and a decline in agricultural productivity. Rehabilitating the water systems will be necessary for improving the agricultural sector and the food security of rural households. As is the case with other sectors, most of the assets in agriculture belonged to the State at the time of independence and therefore required privatization. By April 1998, only 26 percent of the land was privatized; the lack of land ownership is closely related to poverty.

The official per capita GDP of US$700 in 1999 is only about 40 percent of 1990 levels (UNDP, 1999) and is considered by informed observers to be too high. Georgia has one of the lowest per capita GDPs among the CIS countries, lower than that of many developing countries. Government revenue generation is low and weak. The tax collection system is poor, generating only 10 percent of GDP, and suffers from rampant corruption. In 1999, the Government was only able to finance 37 percent of its own budget with about 40 percent financed by the Bretton Woods Institutions (UNDP, 1999).

Georgia’s population of 4-5 million requires about 815,000 tons of cereal annually, of which 650,000 is wheat. In 1999, wheat production was 280,000 tons, which is far below the requirement (FAO, 1999). By FAO classification, Georgia is a low-income, food-deficit country (LIFDC). However, no food shortages

exist in rural or urban markets, as imported food is available. For most people the issue is access to food. Prices and household income are the major determinants of food security at the household level. The ability of households to purchase food has decreased over the years as incomes have declined by about 40 percent compared to 1990 levels; at the same time, prices have increased as a result of inflation. In 1997, the cost of the minimum monthly food basket of about 2,500 calories per person was about 102 Lari (US$50) while the average income was about 50 Lari (US$25). About 50 percent of the population have incomes below the cost of the food basket (UNDP, 1999).

The ability of households to purchase food has been negatively affected by major macroeconomic shocks and ethnic conflicts. The unemployment rate is about 22 percent nationally and 35 percent in urban areas (UNDP, 1999). There is a growing incidence of highly skilled personnel having to accept employment far below their qualifications and skills. A large proportion of women, such as college graduates, are not able to find employment and have had to work in markets that are considered unsafe and sometimes controlled by criminals. Older workers are even more disadvantaged as they face age discrimination.

The ability of rural households to increase production and income has been eroded due to declining agricultural productivity. Yields for cereals and traditional export crops are low, following years of neglecting the irrigation and drainage systems, as was mentioned above. Ageing and unmaintained citrus plantations and vineyards have contributed to the poor quality and low yields of these export crops. Many farmers have no access to credit and lack technical knowledge for efficient agricultural production. Members of poorer households lack equipment and tools and work long hours in sub-zero temperatures without appropriate clothing and shoes.

The major social safety net for the poor is the Social Welfare Programme, which provides allowances to elderly pensioners, invalids and IDPs. The pension system has collapsed as a result of the economic decline. The Government is trying to improve the targeting of the vulnerable population, but has nevertheless been unable to pay them social benefits on a regular basis. By 1999, pensioners were owed up to six months of pension benefits (UNDP, 1999). The monthly pensions of an average of 12 Lari (US$6) have become even more irregular, leaving many elderly people with no income to pay for food or heat.

Levels of chronic malnutrition or stunting are above the expected incidence of 2-3 percent. The 1999 UNICEF survey shows stunting levels of 11.7 percent for children under 5. Some regions, such as Kakheti, Kvemo Kartli and Samtshkhe-Javakheti have an incidence of stunting of over 15 percent. Changes in food consumptions patterns have been noted, with households shifting away from nutritious to less nutritious foods. If these changes are not contained, malnutrition is likely to increase." (WFP 26 April 2000, paras. 2- 9)

Government of Georgia requests international food aid as a result of a severe drought in eastern Georgia (2000)

"The low level of rainfall in eastern Georgia during the spring and summer of 2000 has negatively affected the wheat and sunflower harvests. In response to an appeal by President Shevardnadze, a joint mission of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the World Food Programme visited the area in early August and concluded that the 2000 cereal production was 44 per cent below the average of the past five years. As a result, food aid to the most affected population in six regions of eastern Georgia - some 700,000 persons - will be required for eight months, at an approximate cost of $ 50 million. In addition, the Mission noted that subsistence farmers will not have the capacity to purchase the winter wheat seeds and related agricultural inputs, diesel fuel, pesticide and fertilizers required for the next planting season, the cost of which is estimated at some $15 million." (UNSC 25 October 2000, para. 26)

See also UN OCHA Special Update on the drought in eastern Georgia, 22 November 2000 [Internet]

President Shevardnadze forced to sack the entire government following protests against corruption (November 2001)

· President confirmed that he would not resign or dissolve parliament

Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze says he will not resign or dissolve parliament and says he hopes the political crisis that prompted him to fire the Cabinet on 1 November will soon subside.

Shevardnadze said his first priority is to form a new cabinet and name someone to the new post of prime minister.

Shevardnadze was speaking as protestors continued to demand his resignation and new parliamentary elections. But Shevardnadze said the constitution does not envisage early parliamentary elections. And he said he will not resign. [...] Georgia was plunged into political crisis last week after a bungled police raid on Rustavi 2, the country's leading independent television station, which was frequently reported on government corruption.

That incident on 30 October brought to the forefront tensions that have been brewing in the country for months, with many people angry at corruption and economic hardship. In the wake of initial protests, Shevardnadze accepted Security Minister Vakhtang Kutateladze's resignation. But demonstrators continued to demand that Interior Minister Kakha Targamadze and Prosecutor General Giya Maparashvili step down, too.

Shevardnadze sacked the entire government on 1 November, in his words, 'for the sake of Georgia and its stability'". (RFE/RL 5 November 2001)

Displacement in Abkhazia

Six years of on-and-off war (1992-1998)

· Armed conflict between Georgia and the secessionist province of Abkhazia broke out in August of 1992 · Fighting was resumed several times, most recently in May of 1998

"[T]he conflict began as a war of laws during the Soviet collapse, capped in July 1992 by a declaration of sovereignty by a partial Abkhaz Supreme Soviet, in turn quickly annulled by the Georgian Government. Some weeks later Georgian troops were ordered into Abkhazia, purportedly to secure transportation and communication lines. Whatever the intentions of the Georgian forces, on 14 August in Ochamchire district south of Sukhumi, Georgian and Abkhaz troops exchanged fire. The same day, Georgian troops entered Sukhumi, and Abkhaz leader Vladislav Ardzinba declared full mobilization. As Georgian troops occupied Sukhumi, the Abkhaz Government fled north to Gudauta, its base for the rest of the war, and the Gumista river just north of Sukhumi became the major front line. Just over one year later, Abkhaz forces took back Sukhumi and pushed Georgian forces back across the Inguri river and out of Abkhazia, an effective Abkhaz victory.

[…]Though the war had an identifiable front line and produced an eventual victor, the fighting was far from orderly. The very first days witnessed not a planned assault but rather random widespread violence in the city of Sukhumi and to the south. Inaddition to the Gumista front line, the war was also fought in patches in Ochamchire, whose villages had high prewar concentrations of Abkhaz. Lines of battle formed between villages of predominantly Abkhaz or Armenian, and Georgian population. To the east, ethnic Swans defended the Kodori river valley against the Abkhaz, while Abkhaz and many others were effectively blockaded in the mountain city of Tkvarcheli.

[…]The patchwork population and the scattered conduct of the fighting combined to produce a war that was effectively highly localized and highly personal. The story of one informant, a woman from Reka, is a representative illustration. Reka, a village of mixed but primarily Abkhaz population in Ochamchire district, is located a few kilometres up the road from the village Okhurei, which had a largely Swan and Mingrelian population. Throughout Soviet times, the two villages shared one citrus fruit collective farm, and most residents of the two villages worked there. Perhaps not surprisingly, there was a great deal of contact and intermarriage between the two villages. This informant’s father is Abkhaz, and her mother Mingrelian, so in keeping with accepted patrilinealism she considers herself Abkhaz. But she also considers herself to be from Okhurei, where her mother’s family lived. Most members of hermother’s family fought on the Georgian side during the war along the front line that ran between the villages. Those relatives are all now displaced and living in Tbilisi, while she stays in her husband’s home in Reka, with portraits on the wall of her husband’s Abkhaz brothers who were killed in the war. For this informant and many others, the war was not a political battle for sovereignty, but a highly personal, bloody contest among neighbours and family members."(Dale, 1997, sects.2.1-4.2)

"In May this year [1998] an increasingly tense situation in the Gali district finally exploded into the worst fighting seen in Abkhazia since the end of the war. An attack by Georgian guerillas on a group of Abkhazian militia in the village of Repi on 18 May 1998 was the catalyst for a large-scale Abkhazian response against an increase in such actions, sparking hostilities which also, for a while, drew in troops from Georgia's Interior and Defence Ministries. Although hostilities subsided after a cease-fire agreement was reached on 25 May, by the time the fighting had died down over 200 people were estimated to have been killed and most of the Georgian population, said to number some 30 to 40,000 people, had once more fled across to the Georgian side of the Inguri river border. Many left after what has been described as the systematic torching of their villages, in which an estimated 1,400 houses were destroyed." (AI, 1998, p.14)

Displacement and "ethnic cleansing" (1992-1999)

· Both the Georgians and the Abkhaz population consider themselves victims of ethnically directed violence

"One approach to [the question of 'ethnic cleansing'] would be to seek to determine whether there existed on either side at the highest levels a clearly formulated intention to eradicate an ethnic group. But such an intention might have existed without manifesting itself in any way during the war, while at the same time, even without a clear policy, wartime practices might be ethnically directed. In fact, the ways that people individually experienced the war, and their subjective understandings of what happened, far more directly determine future behaviour and thus the chances for a lasting settlement on the ground, than the existence or not of some official policy formulation. Therefore, the approach of this essay is to base the analysis on personal accounts of wartime experience by Georgian IDPs and current residents of Abkhazia. While over time personal understandings of what happened may be reworked and revised through ongoing conversations with others, these new collective understandings play a critical role in the search for a lasting settlement."(Dale, 1997, sects.2.1-4.2)

Abkhaz population

Abkhaz population fled ethnically based threats of violence Georgians reportedly burned down Abkhaz homes during the war Abkhaz leadership argues that anti-Abkhaz ethnic violence was intentional and planned

"Many accounts suggest that Abkhaz migration during the war was prompted by the threat of personal violence against the civilian Abkhaz population for reasons of ethnicity. In Sukhumi, certainly much thievery was perpetrated for its own sake, for economic gain. But residents relate that would-be perpetrators often first asked the nationality of the intended victim. Further, many accounts suggest that the best defence for Abkhaz was to seek shelter with Georgian friends. Georgian friends at first could turn away thieves by saying the Abkhaz in their flat were relatives, but several months into the war even this ploy ceased to work.

Among those who fled from their homes in Sukhumi, many knew immediately, through friends and acquaintances, that Georgians had moved into their flats. A young woman now living in Adziubja relates that she previously lived in her own flat in Sukhumi, but it was taken over during the war by Georgians, who apparently stole everything when they left, since nothing of any value remains. While in fact it is not necessarily the Georgian occupants who later looted the flat, this story pattern in which Georgians are blamed, is quite widespread.[…]

Among those who lived in the countryside, many understand that Georgians intentionally burned down Abkhaz homes during the war. An Abkhaz man in Adziubja relates that Georgians intentionally destroyed 32 of 35 Abkhaz homes in upper Adziubja, and also the local Abkhaz language school. And a Mingrelian woman in the market in Ochamchire tells how Georgians burned down Abkhaz homes in her own village and others nearby, in Ochamchire district.

Theft and property destruction were not the only apparent threats. Both Natella Akaba’s parliamentary Committee on Human Rights, and Otar Kakalia’s former NGO, Askarial, have publicized information about many cases of physical threat, torture, and murder directed against ethnic Abkhaz civilians. All of these practices, to the extent they occurred, certainly constitute ethnically directed violence, even it if it was not centralized and coordinated, and the belief that such violence took place is widespread among Abkhaz. Much Abkhaz migration during the war can be attributed to fear of ethnic violence, and at least some postwar migration is attributable to intentional destruction of Abkhaz homes.

In addition, much of the Abkhaz leadership argues that anti-Abkhaz ethnic violence was intentional and planned. In evidence many point to the thorough destruction of the Abkhaz State Archives in the first days of the war, and the Abkhaz State Security Service produces what it claims is a Georgian military map left behind during the war, indicating plans for the complete annihilation of Abkhaz villages in Ochamchire district. This official Abkhaz rhetoric of ethnic violence may serve to frame popular beliefs, but it is not the only source. Instead, local level experiences during the war also work directly to generate wide spread popular understanding of wartime violence."(Dale, 1997, sects.2.1-4.2)

Georgians Many displaced Georgians state that they left because their lives were in danger because they were Georgian Destruction of property and looting reported to be ethnically directed towards Georgian homes in the Gali district UN source describes the violence in Abkhazia as "ethnic cleansing"

"In order to assess whether Georgian migration out of Abkhazia was ethnically driven it is necessary to consider two key parts to the claim of ethnic cleansing: that people were driven out by the threat of physical violence, and that Georgian homes and property were destroyed during and after the war to make return less likely.

Almost all displaced Georgians state clearly that they left because their lives were in danger precisely because they were Georgian. As evidence they recite stories of atrocities committed by Abkhaz forces against civilians during the war. Some of the stories are highly personal. For example a displaced Georgian in the market in Zugdidi, who is from Gali district, tells how Abkhaz forces killed her husband, and then killed her parents for good measure 'just because they were Georgian'. Another woman now living in Zugdidi tells how Abkhaz forces came to their home in Pitsundaand gave them a choice: either take an Abkhaz surname and fight on the Abkhaz side, or leave your home now. An older Georgian returnee to Gali district tells how after the war he witnessed Abkhaz approach a Georgian peasant neighbour and ask his surname. Hearing it was Mingrelian they proceeded to burn him. The role a victim’s surname plays in these stories gives the violence a distinctly ethnic character. […] In order to substantiate that Georgian mass migration was forced by ethnic violence, do we need to document that all displaced people were personally threatened at gunpoint, forced to hear of the horrors that would soon be practiced on their bodies, and given a choice whether to stay or not? Or, is it sufficient to ascertain that some unquestionably ethnically directed atrocities did take place, that people had reasonable opportunities to hear the tellings and retellings of these events, and that they fled in fear on this basis?

Concerning the second element of Georgian forced migration, many or most displaced Georgians say that their homes have been destroyed, or are now occupied by others. This knowledge comes through friends or even distant acquaintances, whom they have asked to check on the fate of their homes. In the market in Zugdidi, five displaced people say their houses in Gali district were burned after the war had ended. Armenians still living in Abkhazia note that Georgian homes in Dranda were intentionally attacked, and Abkhaz say the same thing about Georgian homes in Tamysh. Even Abkhaz authorities in Ochamchire city note that in the first days after the Abkhaz took back Sukhumi and then returned to Ochamchire, it was very difficult to control looting of the homes of people who had fled. Looting may be an exercise primarily for economic gain, but when people of a given official nationality are disproportionately selected as victims, the crimes take on an ethnic character.

Georgian authorities at all levels, like Abkhaz officials, tend to draw together the various accounts of violence and label it 'ethnic cleansing'. One head of administration from Gali district, in a conversation in Zugdidi, recited a list of murders and lootings directed against Georgians in Gali district since the war, and asked, 'Is this not genocide?' The Vice Mayor of Zugdidi agrees, noting that 5,000 Georgian houses were burned intentionally by the Abkhaz. The Kutaisi representative of the Abkhaz Council of Ministers in exile, echoing the words of Tamaz Nadareishvili and Zurab Erkvania, states that what happened after the war in Abkhazia was 'ethnic cleansing and genocide'. And he adds the personal account of his brother, who after returning to his village Otobaia in lower Gali district was attacked by the Abkhaz police and left paralyzed as a result." (Dale, 1997, sects.2.1-4.2)

"Locked into constant interaction with one another, IDPs tell and retell one another stories of their wartime experiences. One result is the move from individual experiences of violence in which they, the victims, happened to be Georgian, to a sea of stories of ethnic violence in which all the victims are Georgian and all the perpetrators Abkhaz. Here, prolonged displacement works to create a compelling and widely shared narrative of ethnic cleansing."(Dale, 1997, sect.5.3)

"Even if it is accepted that application of the label 'ethnic cleansing' to the violence enacted upon either the Abkhaz or the Georgians would require demonstrating the existence of a concerted policy on the part of the leadership, what happened in practice may be much more important than what may or may not have been intended by some political entrepreneurs. The de facto conduct of this highly local war was superlatively ethnic in character. The best evidence is less the absolute horror of some observers’ accounts than the fact that ethnicity is the primary trait of each key player in each of the accounts. Whatever role ethnicity per se may have played in producing the conflict, it has become the primary category with which people on the ground narrate and comprehend the war’s violence. In practical terms, much of the Abkhaz population, and most of the Georgian population, have been displaced; property throughout Abkhazia has been destroyed, narrowing significantly the options for reconstruction and return in the near future; and among all former

residents of Abkhazia the belief prevails that the best term for characterizing what happened to them is "ethnic cleansing".(Dale, 1997, sects.2.1-4.2)

This conclusion was echoed by the UN Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Mr. A. Eide:"[In Abkhazia] the challenge to the territorial integrity of Georgia has been accompanied by processes of ethnic cleansing" (Commission on Human Rights, 6 July 1994, para. 31)

International peace efforts (1993-2002)

· An agreement on ceasefire and the separation of forces was signed in Moscow in 1994 · The parties agreed to the deployment of a peacekeeping force of the Commonwealth of Independent States to monitor the compliance with the agreement · The United Nations Military Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) also monitors the agreement · A Coordination Council under UN chairmanship was created in 1997 to facilitate the dialogue between the parties on key issues, including IDPs and refugees · In November 2000, a Joint Assessment Mission led by the United Nations evaluated conditions for the safe, secure and dignified return of refugees and IDPs · UN paper on the distribution of competences between Tbilisi and Sukhumi was rejected as irrelevant by Abkhaz party (December 2001) · Coordination Council continues to meet, except working group II on refugees and displaced persons

"The war in Abkhazia in 1992 and 1993 lead to the displacement of over 300,000 persons and the devastation of this once thriving agricultural center and tourist destination sandwiched between the Black Sea and the Caucasus mountains. In 1994, the Georgian and Abkhaz sides, under the auspices of the United Nations (UN) and with the facilitation of the Russian Federation, signed the Moscow Agreement on the separation of forces, bringing two years of fighting to a halt. The Commonwealth of Independent States Peace Keeping Force (CISPKF), and the United Nations Military Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) monitor the agreement.

A Quadripartite Agreement on Voluntary Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons was also signed in 1994 by the Abkhaz and Georgian sides and the Russian Federation and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). However this agreement produced only a low level of official return of IDPs to Gali. By 1996 and 1997, an increasing number of spontaneous returnees drew the support and assistance of international organizations.

In 1997, negotiations resumed in Geneva leading to the establishment of the Coordination Council, chaired by the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) to Georgia, with the participation of the Georgian and Abkhaz sides, the Russian Federation, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the Group of Friends of the Secretary Ge neral consisting of France, Germany, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Russian Federation. The Coordination Council has three working groups: 1) On Security and the Non-Resumption of Hostilities; 2) On IDPs and Refugees; 3) On Social and Economic Issues.

In 1998, within the framework of the working group on social and economic issues, the UN led a Needs Assessment Mission (NAM) to Abkhazia. On 19 February 1998, four UN Military Observers (UNMOs) were kidnapped in western Georgia during the Mission. Despite this incident, the Mission continued and was able to identify short- and medium-term needs in the primary production and social sectors. In

addition, the Mission reviewed food security issues, landmines, facilities for post-trauma counseling and continuing humanitarian needs.

In the spring of 1998, the situation in Gali and western Georgia deteriorated. From 12 March to 29 April, a prolonged protest on the Georgian controlled side of the Inguri River Bridge closed the only legal entry point into Abkhazia to vehicle traffic. The blockade severely impaired the movement of humanitarian aid workers and the delivery of assistance to civilians in need, as have a number of similar subsequent protest.

In May 1998, fighting broke out in Gali resulting in the displacement of approximately 30,000 persons, many of whom were returnees receiving assistance from international organizations and were displaced for a second time. Many homes built or rehabilitated by UNHCR to support returnees were destroyed. Since the events of May 1998, security in the Gali region has remained a serious concern. The safety and dignity of returnees has not yet been guaranteed and international humanitarian organizations have not resumed regular assistance programs in areas of return.

In November 2000, a Joint Assessment Mission led by the United Nations, with the participation of OSCE, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the OSCE Office for the High Commissioner on National Minorities, the Council of Europe, and the European Commission. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and UNHCR sent observers. The purpose of the mission was to evaluate conditions for the safe, secure and dignified return of refugees and IDPs to the region.

Despite recent positive developments including the reinvigoration of the Coordination Council process under the chairmanship of SRSG Dieter Boden, the resumption of the work of Working Group I under the leadership of UNOMIG's Chief Military Observer (CMO), Maj. Gen. Anis Ahmed Bajwa, and the recent meeting of Working Group III under the chairmanship of the United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator, Mr. Marco Borsotti, a solution to the regions political status remains elusive." (UN OCHA 15 March 2001)

"The Coordinating Council, under the chairmanship of my Special Representative, continued to address key issues of the peace process. The twelfth session of the Council was held on 23 January 2001 at Sukhumi. Meanwhile, the sides continue to use Working Group I and III of the Council to expand their direct bilateral contacts on security and economic issues, respectively. Efforts are also under way, with support from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), to revive Working Group II, on refugees and internally displaced persons. In April, however, owing to a serious deterioration in the relations between the parties […], the Abkhaz side withdrew its agreement to participate in the session of the Coordinating Council that had been scheduled for this month." (UNSC 24 April 2001, para. 8)

"A significant step forward was taken in mid -December [2001] when my Special Representative, in consultation with the Group of Friends of the Secretary-General, was able to finalize the paper on 'Basic Principles for the Distribution of Competences between Tbilisi and Sukhumi'. More than two years after the adoption of Security Council resolution 1255 (1999) of 30 July 1999, mandating my Special Representative to submit proposals for the consideration of the parties on the distribution of constitutional competences between Tbilisi and Sukhumi as part of a comprehensive settlement, there is now a text and a letter of transmittal that have the full support of all members of the Group of Friends. They are to be presented to the parties as a basis for meaningful negotiations on the future status of Abkhazia within the State of Georgia." (UN SC 18 January 2002, para. 3)

"During his visits to Sukhumi, Mr. Boden and representatives of the Group of Friends attempted to have the Abkhaz side agree to start negotiations on the basis of the paper on the distribution of competences. These attempts failed. The Abkhaz leadership consistently refused to accept the paper, claiming that Abkhazia's status had already been determined through its unilateral proclamation of independence (see S/1999/1087, para. 7). It also considered that the prevailing political climate, and in particular the unresolved security issue in the upper Kodori Valley, was not conducive to discussing substantive political aspects of the conflict.

In the absence of a regular dialogue between the parties, tensions continues in the political arena. Each accused the other of harbouring terrorists and promoting terrorist activities. Such mutual accusations found reflection in the inflammatory statements by political movements and parties in the media. Some statements on the Georgian side even implied the possibility of a military option.

Efforts to bring about negotiations aimed at achieving a comprehensive settlement would be helped by a more substantive exchange between the two sides in the framework of the Coordinating Council, which was established as a mechanism for regular contacts, but has not met since January 2001. Recent meetings of the Council's Working Group I on security matters, on 29 March, and Working Group III on socio- economic matters, on 8 April, underscored the value of the Coordinating Council structure." (UN SC 19 April 2002, paras. 4-6)

See also RFE/RL "Georgian-Abkhaz group discusses conditions for return and displaced persons", 26 June 2002 [Internet]. Detailed conclusions met at the meeting of the Working Group III on 26 June 2002 are also available on the Civil Georgia website [Internet]

See also RFE/RL "Secretary-General appoints Heidi Tagliavini of Switzerland as Special Representative for Georgia, Head of UNOMIG", 23 May 2002 [Internet]

For a comprehensive overview of the peace initiatives relating to the conflict in Abkhazia, consult "A Question of Sovereignty - The Georgia-Abkhazia Peace Process", Jonathan Cohen Ed., Accord Issue 7, 1999 [Internet]

Armed tensions between the Abkhazian and Georgian sides (2001-2002)

· Kodori Valley was the scene of clashes between Abkhaz and Georgian forces or armed groups in October 2001 · No movements of population have been reported · Georgia introduced military troops in the upper part the Valley in violation to the 1994 Moscow Agreement · Abkhaz and Georgian parties agreed to monitor the withdrawal of Georgian troops through UNOMIG-CIS patrolling (April 2002) · In the Gali sector, criminal and paramilitary activity continued to highlight lack of effective law enforcement in the area

"Following the clashes in the Kodori Valley in October 2001, Georgia introduced regular military troops in the upper Kodori Valley, in violation of the Moscow Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces (see S/2002/88, para. 5). In order to remove this major source of tension and distrust and to return to full compliance with the Moscow Agreement, UNOMIC continued to seek the withdrawal of the Georgian military from the upper Kodori Valley

Following the 17 January 2002 protocol (see S/2002/88, para. 5), General Bajwa, together with the Georgian Minister of Defence, General David Tevzadve, visited the upper Kodori Valley. This was the first time that a UNOMIG representative had had access to that part of the valley since the hostage-taking incident in December 2000 (see S/2001/59, para. 17). They travelled by Georgian helicopter. Because of the possible presence of irregulars armed with surface-to-air missiles. UNOMIG helicopters do not fly to the Kodori Valley. It will be recalled in this connection that a UNOMIG helicopter was shot down by such a missile in October 2001. In addition, landmines continue to be a problem in the area. The Georgian side agreed to remove newly laid mines in the valley when UNOMIG requires access. […]

The first joint UNOMIG/CIS patrol [under an protocol signed by the Georgian and Abkhaz parties on 2 April 2002] took place on 8 and 9 April. It received indications from the authorities in the upper valley that the Georgian side was in the process of withdrawing its regular troops.

On 12 April the CIS peacekeeping force, without prior notification to UNOMIG, deployed 79 troops and heavy equipment by helicopter to Ajara in the upper Kodori Valley. […] On 13 April President Shevardnadze and President Putin discussed the issue by telephone. The CIS peacekeeping force began its withdrawal from the upper valley on the same day and completed it on 14 April. CIS commanders reported that in Ajara their troops had been encircled by armed individuals equipped with heavy mortars, among them regular Georgian troops as well as armed irregulars. Georgia denied any presence of its regular troops." (UN SC 19 April 2002, paras. 8-13)

"UNOMIG continued its regular daily patrolling in the Gali and Zugdidi sectors. In addition, responding to complaints about the possible presence of illegal armed groups, special UNOMIG patrols were undertaken on a number of occasions to Gali, Gumurishi, Tqvarcheli and Akarmara. No evidence of such groups was found.

In the Gali sector, criminal and paramilitary activity continued to be the main security concern. In a serious incident on 14 March, the CIS peacekeeping force apprehended two Georgians after an exchange of fire near Primorsk and handed them over to the local Abkhaz authorities. This led to the retaliatory abduction on 18 March of four members of the CIS peacekeeping force. After lengthy negotiations, the four were exchanged for the two Georgians detained on 14 March. On 6 April two checkpoints of the CIS peacekeeping force came under fire and a truck was ambushed; there were no casualties.

In early March an armed robbery of a UNOMIG patrol, during which shots were fired, served as a reminder of the lack of effective law enforcement in the lower Gali region. […]

On 27 March a series of explosions occurred in the Abkhaz Ochamchira district, with one person killed and several others seriously wounded. The incidents took place outside of, but in close proximity to, the restricted weapons zone." (UN SC 19 April 2002, paras. 14-17)

"[T]he impact of the recent clashes and tensions in Abkhazia on the civilian population has been limited. There were reportedly several civilian casualties in villages in lower Kodori valley and surrounding Gulripsh district, but no significant population movements have been reported from Abkhazia. Unconfirmed reports suggest that a small number of persons have temporarily relocated from the Upper Kodori Valley to Mestia and Zugdidi. The United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia, UNHCR, OCHA, and ICRC are all closely monitoring events and thus far there have been no reports of significant population movements from Gali district." (UN OCHA 6 November 2001)

For more details on the armed clashes in the Kodori Valley in October 2001, see the Report by the UN Secretary-General concerning the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, S/2001/1008, 24 October 2001 [Internet]

See also "Who attacked Abkhazia and why?" in: RFE/RL Caucasus Report Volume 4, number 34, 12 October 2001 [Internet]

See also RFE/RL, "Georgian, Abkhaz talks fail to reach agreement", 9 May 2002 [Internet]

The Russian Federation: a major actor in the Abkhaz conflict (2001)

· The Russian Federation extend is support to Abkhazia · The presence of Russian peacekeeping forces has been an issue of discussion

· The Russian Federation is also reluctant to close down its other military bases in Georgia · The presence of Chechen refugees in the Pankisi valley is an additional source of tension

"In 2001 the Russian Federation continued to extend moral, political, financial and military support to Abkhazia. It openly showed its support to Abkhaz secessionists during the UN sponsored negotiations, and hindered the publication of the document on the status of Abkhazia, prepared by the Group of States Friends of Georgia. […] Several large demonstrations of IDPs were held in Georgia, demanding the withdrawal of Russian peacekeeping troops from the conflict zone and possible deployment of Ukrainian or any other troops under the UN mandate (Ukraine has officially agreed to this possibility).

In October, the Parliament of Georgia decided not to extend the mandate to Russian peacekeeping troops. Russia reacted by stating that the withdrawal of Russian troops would lead to unpredictable results for peace and stability for all the Transcaucasus region. In February 2002, however, the Georgian Government prolonged the mandate of the Russian peacekeeping forces until 30 June 2002.

Apart of peacekeeping troops in Abkhazia, Russia had two military bases on Georgian territory. The OSCE summit in Istanbul decided that Russia should withdraw its troops but Russia failed to do so. Apparently in retaliation of Georgia’s insistence for the withdrawal of Russian troops, Russia imposed a one-sided visa requirement for all Georgian citizens in the beginning of 2001, however, it excluded the res -idents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. As Georgia was unable to control its borders between Russia and Abkhazia, and between Russia and South Ossetia, many people interpreted the imposition of a visa requirement as a virtual annexation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia to Russia.

In addition, Georgians who have been living in Russia for years (numbering over 900,000), including refugees from Abkhazia, were obliged to apply for Russian visas or could be considered illegal residents in Russia. They were under the threat of arbitrary detention, police brutality, deportation, and other human rights violations. In its letter of 31 January to President Putin, the IHF criticized strongly the new discriminatory Russian visa requirements for Georgian citizens. Russian authorities continued the practice of granting Russian citizenship to persons living in Abkhazia. […] The total number of Chechen refugees in Georgia was approximately 7,000 at the end of 2001. They mainly lived in eight villages of Pankisi gorge with families of the local Kist population which is ethnically related with Chechens. […] In the last years, many businessmen who have been kidnapped in Georgia have been brought to Pankisi gorge and held there, and the location was also a centre of drug trafficking, in both of which some Georgian officials were believed to be in-volved. However, Georgian authorities accused Chechen refugees of involvement in criminal acts and therefore demanded for their deportation to Russia. Russia, again, accused Georgia of sheltering Chechen criminals and in this way – plus citing the international ant-terrorist campaign – tried to justify its bombing the territory of de-manding Georgia to accept the deployment of Russian Special Forces in Georgia." (IHF 28 May 2002, pp. 142-143)

Armenia expresses concern over threat against Armenian minority in Abkhazia (2001)

"Galust Sahakian, who heads the Armenian parliament's largest faction, Miasnutiun, said on 11 October in Yerevan that the Armenian government should take unspecified steps to protect the Armenian community in Abkhazia, RFE/RL's Yerevan bureau reported. Several Armenians were reported killed in the village of Giorgievskoe on 3 October, and 14 more died during a raid late on 8 October on the village of Naa. On 10 October, Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian expressed concern at those killings, warning against any attempt to damage relations between Armenia and Georgia. Armenian Revolutionary Federation -

Dashnaktsutiun faction leader Aghvan Vartanian advocated on 11 October sending a fact-finding mission to Abkhazia." (RFE/RL 12 October 2001)

Displacement in South Ossetia

Background and update on the conflict/IDP situation in the secessionist region of South Ossetia (1922-2002)

· Full-scale war between Georgia and the secesssionist region of South Ossetia broke out in 1992, leading to flows of IDPs and refugees · A mixed CIS peacekeeping force of Russian, Ossetians and Georgians has been installed · A 17-person OSCE observer mission was initiated in October 1993 · The Joint Control Commission (JCC) supports confidence building and serves as a mechanism for the sides to address issues of mutual concern · No progress has been reported during 2001

"With the political stalemate, security crisis, and failure of repatriation in Abkhazia, it is instructive to consider as well the secessionist region of South Ossetia, where the conflict between the Georgian government and the local minority is still unresolved. The Ossetians are descendants of Iranian speaking tribes who settled on the northern and southern faces of the Caucasus mountain range in the 4th century. In the north, Ossetians were incorporated into the Russian Federation and became the Autonomous Republic of North Ossetia in 1936 (under Russian jurisdiction).

The Ossetians on the southern slope were incorporated into Georgia, with the status of Autonomous Oblast (district) of South Ossetia in 1922. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ossetians’ bid for increased cultural and political independence from Georgia spiralled into full-scale war in 1992, during which the South Ossetians received crucial support from their kin in North Ossetia.

Thousands of civilians on both sides fled the fighting. Ethnic Ossetians mainly fled north to the Russian Federation, while ethnic Georgians sought refuge with relatives further south in the Gori region and the capital. According to UNHCR, at the end of 1995, there were 30,000 IDPs from South Ossetia in Georgia and 37,000 South Ossetians across the border in the Russian republic of North Ossetia. "(OSI, 1995, pp.36- 37)

"As early as the summer of 1992 an attempt was being made to seek an amicable solution to the conflict and to establish an end to hostilities. A cease-fire agreement was signed, leaving the authorities of the former oblast in control of Tskhinvali, Java, Znauri and parts of Akalgori, and the central government in control of Akalgori and several isolated ethnic Georgian villages. Peacekeeping forces from the region were deployed. The peacekeeping forces consist of a joint Russian, Ossetian and Georgian force known as the JPKF.

In 1992, a mission from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), now known as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), was requested by the Georgian and South Ossetian sides to help mediate the conflict and promote a peaceful resolution. With the facilitation of the OSCE, a Georgian-Ossetian conflict settlement machinery has evolved. The conflict settlement machinery has two principal components: political negotiations of Georgian and South Ossetian plenipotentiary delegations with the participation of Russia, North Ossetia, and the OSCE; and the Joint Control Commission (JCC) which supports confidence building and serves as a mechanism for the sides to address issues of mutual concern while leaving the issue of the region's political status to the political negotiators.

The JCC has three principal working groups: 1) On Military and Security Issues; 2) On Economic Issues; 3) On Refugees and IDPs. All four parties (Georgia, Russia, North Ossetia and South Ossetia) and the OSCE are represented on the JCC Working Groups. In addition the JPKF is a participant on the working group on Military and Security Issues and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is a participant on the working group on refugees and IDPs." (UN OCHA 15 March 2001)

On 22 September 2001, a Joint Control Commission meeting (JCC) under the auspices of the OSCE over power-sharing in South-Ossetia did not result in any breakthrough. No significant progress on return of refugees and IDPs has been witnessed." (UNHCR November 2001, p. 181)

"The election of a new self-declared 'president' in South Ossetia in December 2001 did not contribute to the conflict resolution process. Due to the unresolved political disputes and the harsh economic situation prevailing in the returnee areas, many ethnic Osset refugees remained hesitant to return to South Ossetia." (UNHCR June 2002, p. 384)

Other Georgian regions

Need for displacement prevention in other Georgian regions (2000)

· Reports of ethnic tensions in southern Georgia between Armenian and Georgian communities (Djavakheti and Tsalka region)

Region of Djavakheti "Ethnic Tensions Flare Up Again In Southern Georgia. Two incidents this month in the predominantly Armenian-populated region of Djavakheti in southern Georgia have spotlighted the latent animosity between the regions Armenian and Georgian communities. And recent ill-considered moves by the Georgian authorities may exacerbate those tensions.

On 1 June (the religious festival of St. Nino, who converted the Georgians to Christianity in the fourth century A.D.) fighting broke out in the district of Ninotsminda, apparently between local Armenian residents and Georgian pilgrims and clergy. Then on 12 June, Armenians from Ninotsminda who were returning from a visit to Armenia clashed with Georgian border guards at a border post.

Georgia's National Security Council has created a special commission to clarify the circumstances of that latter incident. But at the same time, the Georgian presidential representative in Djavakheti, Gigla Baramidze, has risked further alienating the region's Armenian population by warning that all local officials who do not acquire spoken and written fluency in Georgian within the next three years will be dismissed. Baramidze's appointment of an Armenian alleged to be engaged in smuggling to head the Akhalkalaki local administration has compounded the anger of the Armenian population, many of whom risk losing their jobs when the Russian military base in Akhalkalaki is closed." (RFE/RL 23 June 2000) Copyright (c) 2000 RFE/RL, Inc. All rights reserved.

Region of Tsalka "Nor is Djavakheti the only potential ethnic flashpoint in southern Georgia. Tensions between Georgians and Armenians exist also in the Tsalka region which borders on Akhalkalaki to the north east. Until recently, the majority of Tsalka's 25,000 population were Greeks, with Armenians the second largest ethnic group and Georgians comprising only approximately 10 percent of the total population. (At the time of the 1989 Soviet census, there were some 100,000 Greeks in Georgia. That figure has now sunk to 50,000 partly as a result of the exodus of 15,000 Pontic Greeks from Abkhazia during the 192-1993 war. Last year, the

Greek government adopted legislation simplifying the naturalization process for Greek immigrants from the former USSR.)

The outmigration of Greeks from Tsalka has left empty many houses that the Georgian government intended to appropriate and auction off, regional governor Levan Mamaladze said last August. But some members of the local population (whether the remaining Greeks or the Armenians is not clear), apparently oppose those plans: "Alia" on 20 June quoted Mamaladze as accusing unidentified "provocateurs" from preventing an influx of Georgians to Tsalka. Earlier in June, Nationalist Party of Georgia leader Zaza Vashakmadze warned that the situation in Tsalka is comparable to that in Abkhazia in the late 1980s. He claimed that the Georgian minority are deprived of Georgian-language education for their children, and are under pressure to leave the region. (Liz Fuller)" (RFE/RL 23 June 2000) Copyright (c) 2000 RFE/RL, Inc. All rights reserved.

POPULATION PROFILE AND FIGURES

Total figures

Total internally displaced population: 264,000 persons according to the government (January 2002)

· Some 12,000 IDPs originate from South Ossetia, according to the government · The rest of the IDP population are ethnic Georgians displaced from Abkhazia

"Of the 252,352 IDPs registered by the Ministry of Refugees and Accommodation as being displaced as a result of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict in 1992-93, some 107,000 are in Samegrelo, 86,000 in Tbilisi and 32,000 in Imereti. "(UNHCR June 2002, p. 384)

Persons of Concern to UNHCR (Government statistics) Total in Country Per cent Female Percent under 18 Georgia (IDPs) [note] 264,000 55 26

Note: includes some 250,000 IDPs and returnees from the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. As estimated 40,000 IPDs have returned spontaneously to Gali District. Also includes some 7,000 IDPs and refugees from the Georgian-Osset conflict. In 2001, 425 refugees and IDPs returned to their places of origin in South Ossetia and Georgia proper. (UNHCR June 2002, p. 383)

"[M]ore than 264,000 persons remained internally displaced in Georgia at year's end. The overwhelming majority (about 252,200) were ethnic Georgians displaced from Abkhazia, of whom 80 820 (32 percent) originated from Gali and about 52,000 (21 percent) from Sukhumi. Another 12,000 persons remained displaced from South Ossetia.

About 41 percent of Georgia's displaced population (107,629 persons) lived in the Samegrelo region adjacent to Abkhazia. Large numbers of displaced persons also settled in Tbilisi (89,629 persons, or 34 percent), and Imereti (32,433 persons or 12 percent). About half of the displaced population lived in collective centers and half in private accommodation. The government reported to significant new displacement during the year." (USCR 2002, pp. 213-214)

See also government's figures for IDPs by district as of 1 March 2002 [Internal link]

Total internally displaced population: 272 101 persons according to the Government (January 2001)

· 96% of the displaced are ethnic Georgian displaced as a result of the conflict in Abkhazia · 7,000 persons remain displaced as a result of the conflict in South Ossetia · The Samegrelo region hosts 42 % of the displaced, followed by Tbilisi (32,5%) and the Imereti region (12 %) · In absence of registration, there are an estimated caseload of 7,000 ethnic Georgian IDP in Georgia proper and 1,000 ethnic Osset IDP in South Ossetia

· IFRC estimate for the total IDP population is 20% lower than governmental figures (November 2000)

Age groups: 0-4 5-17 18-59 60 + Total Total 9 410 63 337 15 2709 46 645 272 101 Female 4 524 31 957 85 595 28 525 150 601 Male 4 886 31 380 67 114 18 120 121 500

Ajaria 7,946 Guria 587 Imereti 33,234 Kakheti 1,294 Kvemo Kvartli 11,185 Shida Kartli 9,364 Mtskheta-Mtianeti 1,292 Racha-Lechkhumi 1,364 Samegrelo 114,178 Samtskhe-Javakheti 2,977 Tbilisi 88,680

(UNHCR 26 January 2001)

For more detailed statistics by municipality, gender and age group, see "IDP Demographic Statistics" in Assistance Georgia, January 2001 [Internet]

"According to government as well as NGO figures, there are in Georgia today, some 280,000 internally displaced persons who have been uprooted as a result of armed conflict, out of a population of just 5 million. This displacement is actually the result of two separate armed conflict in different regions of the country: in Abkhazia and in South Ossetia (also referred to as Tskhinvali region). The overwhelming majority of these internally displaced persons, some 266,000, are ethnic Georgians from Abkhazia, while the remainder were displaced by the conflict in South Ossetia.

In addition, the Government reports that some 20,000 persons were internally displaced as a result of natural disasters, in particular, floods, earthquake and landslides, which occurred in the Svanetia and Ajara regions between 1987 and 1989. Though little mention was made during the mission of this group of internally displaced persons, their plight was highlighted by the President and by the Minister for Refugees and Accommodation, who both called for international assistance in providing shelter assistance required to facilitate durable solutions." (UNHCHR 25 January 2001, paras. 11-12)

*"It should be noted that figures for displacement associated with the Georgian-Osset conflict are estimates on account of the fact that there has never been an effective registration of the displaced. Today, estimates of the remaining internally displaced and refugee population remain vague, with conflicting figures offered by both sides. UNHCR estimates that there remain roughly 6,000 out of the 10,000 ethnic Georgian internally displaced persons in Georgia proper; 1,000 out of the 10,000 ethnic Osset internally displaced persons in South Ossetia; and 23,500 Osset refugees in North Ossetia and the North Caucasus." (UNHCHR 25 January 2001, para. 21)

"According to the records of the Ministry of Refugees and Accommodation (MRA) in November 1999, IDPs in Georgia are divided into approximately 49,570 households in private accommodation and 39,764 in collective centres (former sanatoria, hotels, tourist camps, hostels etc.). The total number of IDPs, according to the Ministry, is 272,000, with an average household size of just over 3,04 persons, However, according to the [IFRC] survey, 20 per cent of the IDPs addresses were non-existing or wrong. If we deduct 20 per cent households equally from both types of accommodation and apply the survey figures of average household size (3.38 persons per household in private accommodation, 3,51 in collective centres) the total number of IDP households would be approximately 40,000 in private accommodation and 32,000 in collective centres, a total of 245,700 persons. They are scattered throughout Georgia, with heavy concentrations, however, in the Tbilisi and Samegrelo-Imereti areas in western Georgia." (IFRC November 2000, p. 71)

Between 240.000 and 300.000 IDPs in Georgia since 1993 (1993-1999)

Year Number of IDPs Source 1998 (end of) 280.000 USCR 1999 1998 (beginning of) 240.000 USCR 1999 1997 275.000 USCR 1998 1996 272.359 Georgian Ministry of Refugees and Accommodation 1996 1995 280.000 USCR 1996 1994 260.000 USCR 1995 1993 300.000 USCR 1999

In 1999, USCR reports approximately 280,000 IDPs in Georgia, some 10,000 of them displaced from South Ossetia and the rest from Abkhazia

· Almost half of the IDPs live in the Samegrelo region, adjacent to Abkhazia · Over half of them (56.5%) are staying with relatives and friends, whereas the rest are staying in hotels, rest houses and other state institutions

"There were […] about 280,000 internally displaced persons in Georgia at year's end (1999). The overwhelming majority (266,000) were ethnic Georgians displaced from Abkhazia, about one third from the Gali district. The rest - about 14,000 persons - were displaced from South Ossetia. Of these, about 10,000 ethnic Georgians displaced from South Ossetia lived in government-controlled areas and about 4,000 persons remained displaced within South Ossetia. About two percent of Abkhazia's displaced were ethnic Jews, Ukrainians, Greeks, Abkhaz, Armenians, or Russians.

Some 42 percent of Georgia's displaced population lived in the Samegrelo region adjacent to Abkhazia, followed by Tbilisi (31 percent), and the Imereti region (13 percent). No significant new displacement or returns took place during the year." (USCR 2000, pp. 239)

"At the end of 1998, about 280,000people were internally displaced in Georgia. The overwhelming majority (96 percent) were ethnic Georgians displaced from Abkhazia, about one-third from the Gali district. The rest‹about14, 000 persons‹were displaced from South Ossetia. Of these, about 10,000 ethnic Georgians displaced from South Ossetia lived in government-controlled areas and about 4,000 persons

remained displaced within South Ossetia. About 2 percent of Abkhazia's and South Ossetia's displaced were ethnic Jews, Ukrainians, Greeks, Abkhaz, Armenians, or Russians.

Almost half of Georgia's displaced population lived in the Samegrelo region adjacent to Abkhazia, followed by Tbilisi (31 percent), and the Imereti region (13 percent). In May, renewed fighting in the Gali district of Abkhazia displaced another 40,000 persons, most of whom fled to the Samegrelo region". (USCR 1999, "Country Report Georgia")

"The IDPs have been resettled all over Georgia. The majority (123,538 persons, 42.6% of the total) are concentrated in the regions of Samegrelo (Mingrelia) neighbouring with Abkhazia; 26.7% (74,692 persons) live in the capital, Tbilisi, and the others live in the cities of Kutaisi, Rustavi, Batumi, Gori and Tskaltubo. Over half of them (56.5%) are staying with relatives and friends, whereas the rest are staying in hotels, rest houses and other state institutions." (IOM, Country Profile Georgia (web page), "Flows of internally displaced persons")

"The total number of refugee children and children of displaced persons registered in Georgia is 71,091, including 1,042 aged under 12 months, 22,000between 12 months and 6 years and 51,067 between 6 and 16 years. Of these children, 444 are full orphans. Georgian children account for the majority (73,706), but there are also Russians (140), Armenians (82), Abkhazians (32), Greeks (31) and others. Children of refugees and displaced persons enjoy the same guarantees in respect of medical services as other children living in Georgia." (UN CRC 1998, para. 273)

NRC survey challenges the official information on numbers of IDPs originating from the Gali region (Abkhazia) (1997)

· NRC survey indicates that only 12,74% of IDPs originate from the Gali region · Partial return to Gali and emigration flows to neighboring CIS countries complicate accurate monitoring

"[T]he vast majority, 34 % of respondent families originate from Sokhumi, next come Ochamchire – 18.73%, Gulribshi – 14.47%, while those originated from Gali make up 12.74% as opposed to the official information claiming that the majority of Abkhazia population originates from Gali region. (Ministry of Refugees and Accommodation's data of 23 December 1996 suggest that 23,309 IDP families originate from Gali region, 19,596 from Sokhumi, 11,222 from Ochamchire, 10,782 from Gulripshi, 7,313 from Gagra, 2,046 from Gudauta). The reason behind this discrepancy might be a partial repatriation of IDPs to Gali, where according to official sources, about 300 households returned during the year of 1994. According to unofficial information, during the years of 1995-1996, and the spring of 1997 the population of the village of Chuburkhinji in Gali region with an estimated number of 6,414 individuals (Ministry of Refugees and Accommodation data) who fled during the conflict, has returned to its place of origin. The fact that many IDPs left for Russia or other CIS countries, and consequently are not registered with the Ministry of Refugees and Accommodation of Georgia should be taken into consideration as well." (NRC 1997, p.16)

Disaggregated figures

Demographic structure of the internally displaced population differs noticeably from the rest of the population (2000)

· Households in the general population tend to be more multi-generational, according to a survey conducted by Save the Children in three region of western Georgia · The number of single parents is greater among displaced families than in the general population and they have a higher percentage of members between 5 and 19 years of age · The divorce rate among the displaced (1.8%) is much higher than in the general population (0.9%)

"On 2 June 2000, Save the Children (SC) at the offices of the Institute of Polling and Marketing (IPM) presented an overview of selected differences between IDPs and general households in three regions of western Georgia (Guria, Imereti and Samegrelo). The presentation was based on a survey conducted in February 2000 by SC as part of the Georgia Assistance Initiative (GAI) -- a programme funded by the US Agency for International Development (USAID). […] Research of the demographic structure of IDPs and the general population showed that a greater percentage of households in the general population tend to be more multi-generational and have more multi-couple arrangements than IDP households living in collective centers. The number of single parents are greater among IDP families than in the general population and they have a higher percentage of members between 5 and 19 years of age than households in the general population. There are two times more IDP individuals who are divorced than in the general population." (UNOCHA 10 June 2000)

More detailed results of the SC survey are available on the website "AssistanceGeorgia" [Internet: http://www.assistancegeorgia.org.ge/]. See in particular:

· Age Structure of All Household Members in the General Population and IDPs Living in Communal Facilities in Guria, Imereti and Samegrelo [Internet]

· Composition of Households in the General Population and IDPs Living In Communal Facilities in Guria, Imereti and Samegrelo [Internet]

· Marital Status of Adults (18 yrs and older) in Households in the General Population And IDPs Living in Communal Facilities in Guria, Imereti and Samegrelo [Internet]

The number and ethnic origin of those who have fled Abkhazia, have remained or have returned is a highly controversial political issue between Abkhazia and Georgia (2000)

· The number of internally displaced willing to return to Abkhazia and to the Gali region varies from only 60,000 to some 130,000 · Authorities and other local institutions have no interest in reporting a decline in the number of IDPs under their care, as this would expose them to a reduction of funds allocated to them

"Like the number of victims of the conflict in Abkhazia (in addition to civilians killed - twice as many as participants in uniform? - some 8,000 Abkhazian soldiers and 13,000 Georgian soldiers or paramilitary fighters? Two committees are co-operating regularly on both sides to locate more than 1,000 missing persons, according to Mr Avtandil Ioseliani, Chairman of the relevant Georgian committee), the number and ethnic origin of those who have fled Abkhazia, have remained or have returned is a highly controversial political issue. According to Georgian estimates (cf., eg, UN doc. E/CN.4/1997/132, p. 34), the population of Abkhazia has declined (from 535,000 in 1992 to some 146,000 in 1997), in particular following the mass exodus in the course of the period of ethnic violence, by nearly 390,000 persons, in general of ethnic origin other than Abkhazian, including more than 200,000 Georgians. According to other figures (provided in part by the OSCE), the population in Abkhazia now stands at some 225,000 persons

(315,000 according to the Abkhazian authorities!), with some 80 to 90,000 Abkhazians (in the past about 18% of the local population), or 35 to 40% of the total. In any case, the '300,000 persons displaced' from Abkhazia - and from South Ossetia! - who are said to have gone to the rest of Georgia seem very 'volatile' (some 100,000 of them are said to have settled there definitively or to have left for other countries?), so that the exact number (173,000 from Abkhazia and 10,000 from South Ossetia?) of those currently entitled to and having obtained the status of internally displaced person ('IDP') is not known (this was confirmed in the 1999 Report of the Georgian Ombudsman […]). Nor does there seem to be a clear approximation on how many IDPs who would now like to return to Abkhazia and would be willing to settle in the Gali region (some 130,000 or only 60,000?). To cite an example, more than 50,000 IDPs were said to have returned de facto to Gali, but were driven out again following a renewed explosion of ethnic violence in May 1998; nevertheless, since then, some 40,000 persons (according to the estimates of several international observers) have again returned clandestinely and even resettled in Gali for all or at least part of the year. In short, as in the case of the Meskhetians […], there is considerable uncertainty about the actual number of persons prepared to return to Gali immediately; yet reliable data are essential, for example if it is decided to negotiate the return of IDPs from Abkhazia "in stages".

(ii) A rather convincing explanation for this disturbing lack of reliable official figures can be found by analysing more closely not only the political stakes, but also the consequences of granting IDP status: this status automatically entitles the person who has obtained it, by law at any rate, to a whole set of privileges and advantages as well as certain allowances in kind and subsidies, including 12 (or 18?) lari (about US$ 6) in cash monthly (the minimum monthly wage in the civil services in Georgia is about US$ 10). It is thus understandable that those judged eligible for this status have no interest in relinquishing it as long as they remain under Georgian jurisdiction, and both the civil services and non-official bodies have no interest either in reporting a decline in the number of IDPs under their care, because they would then face what would be a virtually automatic reduction in their funds, which are calculated according to the number of IDPs they are looking after. This is all the more valid in that the total 'funds allocated for refugees' in the national Budget is said to have increased considerably and even doubled this year (some 100 million lari?), and what was a policy of temporary assistance has now become a policy of economic and social development whose aim is to prevent the IDPs from increasingly becoming second class citizens during the long wait to be able to return home." (Council of Europe, Commissioner for Human Rights 13 July 2000, III - Refugees and displaced persons wishing to return to their place of origin)

Distribution of the displaced by type of accommodation (November 1999)

· 72 percent of the displaced live in urban areas · 55 percent of the displaced live in private accommodation

Kak Tbili Shji K Samtk Ajar Guri Same ImEr Total Tot eti si da v he a a grelo eti No. al Kart e Javak % li m heti o K a rt li Total 362 22,97 2,62 2 928 2,32 178 29,51 9,886 71,46 100

8 8 , 1 5 7 6 7 1 Urban 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Private 55 13,86 611 1 105 441 62 8,280 1,177 26,04 36 accommodati 2 , 2 on 4 5 0 Communal 190 9,115 770 8 731 1,72 0 4,651 7,418 25,43 36 centres 3 0 2 5 Total urban 246 22,97 1,38 2 836 2,16 62 12,93 8,595 51,47 72 8 2 , 1 1 4 2 8 5 Rural 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Private 89 0 979 3 87 102 97 10,86 1,057 13,61 19 accommodati 4 2 4 on 1 Communal 28 0 267 4 5 58 20 5,722 234 6,379 9 centres 6 Total Rural 117 0 1,24 3 92 160 117 16,58 1,290 19,99 28 6 8 4 3 6

(Imereti contains Racha Lechkujmi and Kvemo Svaneti regions; Shida Karti contains Mtskheta Mtianeti) * The figures of the Ministry of Refugees and Accommodation less 20 per cent.

"Of the approximately 72,000 IDP households, 50,000, (over 70 per cent of the total) are concentrated in just five out of the possible 36 cells: namely in private and collective accommodation in Tbilisi (32 per cent), in private accommodation in urban and rural Samegrelo (27 per cent) and in collective centres in urban Imereti (10 per cent). However, the remaining, more scattered, groups are of considerable interest, if only because they tend to receive less public attention […]." (IFRC November 2000, p. 71)

Displacement of Georgians (1992-1997)

· The majority of Georgians were forced to flee the province of Abkhazia · Some Georgians, such as members of mixed marriages, children of mixed marriages, or older people, never left their homes

"The conflict moved several different populations, in diverse ways. In most cases, the general contours of migration are far less contested than the numbers of people involved, and claims concerning the magnitude of displacement have become effective political weapons.

Certainly the largest group affected by the war are ethnic Georgians, the vast majority of whom have left Abkhazia and have settled in other parts of Georgia. The Georgian Ministry for Refugees claimed in March 1997 that there were 268,072 displaced persons from Abkhazia in Georgia. The Abkhaz argue in turn that

there were 239,900 Georgians in Abkhazia in 1989, according to the Soviet census. They claim that some never left Abkhazia, many others have repatriated already, and still others fled to Russia not Georgia. There are thus at most 140-150,000 displaced people still waiting to be repatriated in Georgia. Since a number of Georgians did indeed stay behind, it is difficult to see how the Georgian Government can substantiate its figures. However, without passing judgement on this issue, it is possible to describe the contours of Georgian migration. From cities, the vast majority of the Georgian population has gone. In towns that had quite small Georgian populations, like Verkhniaia Eshera above Sukhumi, and Labra below it, literally all the Georgians have left. In other places, when residents note that Georgians have remained, it often transpires that these "Georgians" are children of mixed marriages who self-identify as Abkhaz or some other nationality.

However, a number of Georgians never left Abkhazia, even during the fighting. Members of mixed marriages stayed, particularly if the husband was Abkhaz. Many older people stayed, particularly if they had no close relatives to help them flee or to take them into their homes in a safer place. Neighbours, in Nizhnaia Eshera, Tkvarcheli, Ochamchire and Kutol among other places, emphasize that these Georgians can stay with impunity precisely because they did not fight on the Georgian side. In other cases, Georgians who were long-term residents of a village considered it home and quite naturally not only stayed during the war, but also helped the Abkhazas they were able. […]

Those who stayed are certainly not representative of the Georgian population as a whole. The conditions under which they stayed show one way in which Georgians and Abkhaz have continued to live together. But the ominous implication is that without the full loyalty they demonstrated during the war these Georgians would not be welcome."(Dale, 1997, sects.2.1-4.2)

Displacement of Russians, Armenians and Greeks (1992-1993)

· Abkhazia’s large Russian and Armenian population looked for protection in Russia while most Greeks were repatriated to Greece.

"Caught in the middle of the madness were members of other official nationalities. In the earliest days of the war, Greece arranged an orderly and thorough evacuation for Abkhazia’s Greek population of about 15,000 people. Many of these long-term residents of Abkhazia have found it difficult to adjust and some have attempted to return home.

Abkhazia’s Russian and Armenian populations, each about 75,000 strong, were not temporary visitors who could simply return "home" when the fighting began. Most Armenians could trace their Abkhaz roots to the beginning of the century, and many came as a direct result of persecution in 1915. By the start of the war, Armenians in Abkhazia were Soviet cultural constructs, speaking Russian and even Turkish, living in compact Armenian villages but in a multinational society, with few or no ties to Soviet Armenia. When the war began, Armenians found themselves directly in the line of fire, but "returning" to Armenia was a nonsensical option. Instead, the most natural option for many, especially women and children, was to flee to friends or distant relatives in Russia until the end of the war. In a frequent pattern, many young people stayed on in Russia, studying or earning money to send remittances back to Abkhazia.

Abkhaz Russians, despite cultural affinity with the Russian Federation, were also longtime residents. Like the Armenians, many Russians who had the necessary personal ties left their homes for Russia for the duration of the war, and many, particularly young people, have stayed on in Russia to work or study. In this way, the war scattered members of some nationalities and in some cases removed them altogether."(Dale, 1997, sects.2.1-4.2)

PATTERNS OF DISPLACEMENT

General pattern

Displacement patterns lead to a concentration of IDPs in a number of Georgian cities (1997)

· Flight from Abkhazia generally chaotic causing breakup of villages · IDPs concentrated to the towns of Tbilisi, Kutaisi and Zugdidi · Zugdidi (Georgia) has a large IDP population from the adjacent Gali district (Abkhazia) and Kutaisi (Georgia) has a high concentration from the Ochamchire district (Abkhazia) · Forty to fifty percent of the IDP population lives in collective centers

"The displaced in Georgia are compactly settled in several senses. Not only have they almost all stayed in Georgia, there are particularly large IDP populations in Tbilisi, Kutaisi and Zugdidi. In addition, within the districts where they have settled, they tend to live in clearly bounded spaces in close proximity to one another. This is particularly true for the 40-50 per cent of the IDP population living in collective centres, rather than in the private flats of friends or relatives. Collective centres include empty administrative buildings, schools, kindergartens, hotels, and tourist camps, among other buildings. In Zugdidi, just across the border from Abkhazia and therefore the easiest safe place to reach, the proportion in such centres is higher, with about two-thirds of the displaced settled in collective centres.

Flight from Abkhazia was chaotic, and whole villages seldom made the journey and settled together. Instead, the IDP residents of most collective centres come from various districts of Abkhazia and were not acquainted before the war. Nevertheless, some patterns are clear. Zugdidi has a disproportionately large IDP population from the adjacent Gali district. And Kutaisi has a high concentration from Ochamchire district, primarily because transportation between the two places was made available during the war, and because the word went out among IDPs that Kutaisi, while farther away, had a lot of living space available.[…]

Thus the patterns of settlement of IDPs throughout Georgia work to create a relatively bounded and identifiable population."(Dale, 1997, sect.5.1)

Displacement of Abkhaz population (1992-1999)

· Complicated and multidirectional displacement of Abkhazians took place within the province of Abkhazia · In order to gain access to food-producing land, many families have left the economically devastated urban areas · Many Abkhaz returned home after the war, but others entered a phase of more permanent dislocation, due to the destruction of housing and economic infrastruc ture.

"Unlike Georgians, Russians and Armenians, most Abkhaz did not leave the territory of Abkhazia. But Abkhaz experienced substantial internal displacement both during and after the war. As sources on all sides report, in Sukhumi the first days of the war were accompanied by looting and physical violence

against the local population. While Abkhaz authorities retreated to Gudauta, Abkhaz who were not engaged infighting left Sukhumi for Gagra or Gudauta to the north for the duration of the war. Similarly, Abkhaz residents of villages to the south found themselves in the middle of confused criss-crossing front lines. Some also fled north, while others sought safety to the east in Tkvarcheli. But as the war progressed, Georgians effected a blockade against that mountainous city, and local residents as well as the newly displaced sought in turn to flee from Tkvarcheli. Indeed, it was the downing by Georgian forces in December 1992 of a Russian Mi-8 helicopter evacuating women and children from that city that raised the level of general malevolence in the war and catalyzed more concerted Russian military intervention on the Abkhaz side.

After the war ended, many Abkhaz returned home, but many others entered a phase of more permanent dislocation, due to the destruction of both living space and economic infrastructure. Some Georgian authorities claim that all of post-war Abkhazia is simply depopulated. This is true in some places, for example in industrial Tkvarcheli, whose prewar population of 22,000 has been reduced to about 8,000 due to the complete collapse of industry and communication and transportation networks. But in other cases the claims are exaggerated, for example Georgian Presidential Adviser Irakli Machavariani’s statement that the present population of Ochamchire district is only about 3,000 people, when more than twice that number live in Ochamchire city alone.

Instead, postwar Abkhaz migration is complicated and multidirectional. Where homes in villages have been destroyed, Abkhaz have migrated either into the cities, or into former Georgian houses and flats in other villages. Even in villages with limited destruction, many youths have left their family homes to seek an income of some kind in Abkhaz cities or even in Russia, from where they send back remittances. Meanwhile, many other families have left economically devastated urban areas with no access to food- producing land, for the countryside. Thus many city dwellers have rapidly "ruralized". This pattern stands in sharp contrast, for example, to the displaced Azeris in Azerbaijan from Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding Armenian-occupied regions of Azerbaijan, two-thirds of whom were rural before displacement and two-thirds of whom now live in urban areas. On the other hand the pattern is similar to the choice faced by many Armenian refugees fleeing Azerbaijan. Given the devastation brought about by the earthquake in 1988 and the Soviet collapse, Armenia did not have the resources to resettle all of the hundreds of thousands of refugees in urban settings. Many faced a choice between accepting a new rural life and migrating further to some other country. […]

The key characteristic of most postwar Abkhaz migration is its partial and unfinished nature. Most of the pragmatic solutions Abkhaz have found in order to survive in the postwar setting involve subsistence agriculture, not sustainable incomes, and temporarily occupied housing, not reconstruction." (Dale, 1997, sects.2.1-4.2)

PHYSICAL SECURITY & FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

General

Returnees to the Gali district continue to be exposed to insecurity (2000-2002)

· Endemic lawlessness in the zone of conflict between Abkhazia and Georgia continue to pose a major threat to the security of returnees in the Gali district · Reports of human rights violations in Abkhazia include harassment on ethnic and religious grounds, violations of fair trial standards, and arbitrary and illegal detentions · UNOMIG also reports violations of the 1994 Moscow agreement by the Abkhaz forces on a ceasefire and separation of forces · There have been reports of armed robberies, primarily in the Gali security zone, exchanges of fire across the ceasefire line, ambushes and mine accidents · Violent incidents are connected with organized crime with deliberate efforts to destabilize the Gali district · Crime rates escalate particularly during the harvest seasons · International Helsinki Federation reports persecution of ethnic Georgians by Abkhaz militia with occasional support from the Russian peacekeeping forces (2001) · UNOMIG has limited its patrolling to daytime only (2001-2002)

January – April 2002 "The human rights situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, showed few signs of improvement. Law enforcement mechanisms remained too weak to properly administer justice and halt violations of basic human rights, particularly in the security zone. In this context, the undefined and insecure status of spontaneous returnees to the Gali district is of major concern." (UN SC 19 April 2002, para. 27)

"The mission continued to give high priority to the security of UNOMIG personnel. It maintains the concept of limited patrolling, i.e., patrolling during the daytime only, by two-man protected vehicles at all times and using main roads connecting populated areas. It has also suspended helicopter patrols in the sectors, with the exception of necessary administrative flights, which take a designated route over the Black Sea." (UN SC 19 April 2002, para. 20)

Report by the International Helsinki Federation (2001 events) "In 2001, Abkhaz militia continued to kill and suppress the small number of Georgians still remaining in the Gali region of Abkhazia on a daily basis. The atrocities were obviously carried out in order to change the existing ethnic makeup. For the same reason, the secessionist Abkhaz Government refused the organised return of Georgian IDP unless Abkhazia's full independence from Georgia was internally recognised. " (IHF 28 May 2002, p. 142)

The few IDPs who returned spontaneously at their own risk came under the constant threat of death and had no effective protection. Russian peacekeeping troops deployed in the region were not able or not willing to provide any protection for the Georgian population and showed support for the Abkhaz side. There were many well-documented cases in which Russian peacekeepers took part in killing and raiding the peaceful Georgian population. " (IHF 28 May 2002, p. 142)

October 2001-January 2002 "As in the past, crime has escalated in the Gali district with the beginning of the mandarin harvest. This has highlighted again the weekness of law enforcement in the area. Abductions also continued on both sides of the ceasefire line. Direct negotiations between Georgian and Abkhaz local authorities resulted in exchanges, on 15 and 31 December, of four Abkhaz and two bodies against the bodies of five Georgians. However, the Abkhaz side still holds at least four civilians and five fighters taken prisoner during the hostilities in the Kodori Valley. No confirmed information is available about the number held on the Georgian side." (UN SC 18 January 2002, para. 11)

The human rights situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, remained difficult. The situation was particularly serious in the Gali district, where a high level of criminality and violence prevailed. […] Violation of the right to freedom of speech has been of serious concern, in particular a harassment campaign against the editor of the weekly Nuzhnaya Gazeta and members of her family, who were stalked with demands to leave Abkhazia. The investigation into the assassination, on 15 August 2000, of Zurab Achba, a legal assisant at the human rights office, remains inconclusive despite appeals by my Special Representative to the local law enforcement agencies. (UN SC 18 January 2002, para 22)

July-October 2001 "There was little evidence of an improvement in the field of human rights in Abkhazia, Georgia. Widespread organized crime, lack of effective law enforcement and continuing stalemate regarding the language policy in schools ni the predominantly Georgian-speaking Gali district affected the return of displaced persons and remaind of major concern to the United Nations Human Rights Office. Reports of human rights violations included harassment on ethnic and religious grounds, violations of fair trial standards, and arbitrary and illegal detentions. Law enforcement agencies failed to conduct prompt, impartial and full investigation and prosecution. During the review period, the human rights office handled individual complaints, and monitored court sessions and detention facilities in police stations because of increasing concerns about inhuman treatment or health conditions of detainees." (UN SC 24 October 2001, para. 37)

April-July 2001 "Criminality and lawlessness continue to be a major destabilizing factors of the conflict zone, putting in jeopardy the overall security situation. Complaints have repeatedly been lodged by the local population in both sectors about terrorizing and intimidation by armed group. Although the crime rate remains high, some improvement in the security climate is noticeable and may be attributed to the initiative of the Abkhaz militia to conduct more effective patrols in the lower Gali area. During the reporting period, there were 9 shooting incidents, 21 killings, 10 abductions, 5 mine blasts and 45 robberies.

The situation deteriorated on 6 May, when an Abkhaz customs officer was stopped while driving a vehicle and subsequently taken to the Georgian side of the ceasefire line by five or six armed men. After preliminary unofficial negotiations, a meeting facilitated by UNOMIG and chaired by the Chief Military Observer was held on 11 May at the main bridge over the Inguri River, which led to the signing of a protocol. The Georgian side committed itself to consider the evidence gathered by the Abkhaz authorities on three Georgian nationals suspected of murder and other serious crimes (see S/20001/401, para. 20), so as to decide whether to institute criminal proceedings against them. It was also agreed that UNOMIG would verify the implementation of the protocol and that it would render assistance to the sides in this regard. Immediately after the meeting, the exchange of hostages took place on the Inguri bridge. […] Repeated violations of the Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces of 14 May 1994 and restrictions on the freedom of movement of UNOMIG give rise to concern. One such violation occurred in June in the course of the NATO/Partnership for Peace military exercise 'Cooperative Partner 2001', hosted by the Georgian armed forces and conducted at the Kulevi military manoeuvre area, south of the UNOMIG area of responsibility. On that occasion, Georgian armoured personnel carriers and helicopters were observed operating in the restricted weapons zone and the Mission's freedom of movement was restricted in the Kulevi area. In another instance, on 23 June, two Abkhaz armoured vehicles entered the restricted

weapons zone from Ochamchira during a military exercise. In another violation of the ceasefire agreement by the Georgian side, on 7 July an armoured personnel carrier was seen in the security zone. Protests were lodged with the sides for all violations, and official replies are expected." (UNSC 19 July 2001, paras. 13- 16)

January-April 2001 "The overall situation in the conflict zone, in particular in the Gali region, remained volatile. During the reporting period, there were 45 shooting incidents, 12 killings, 9 abductions, 8 mine blasts, and 40 robberies. None of these incidents, however, directly targeted UNOMIG personnel." (UN SC 24 April 2001, para. 16)

November 2000- January 2001 "The general situation in the conflict zone during the reporting period remained mostly calm but very volatile, despite emerging indications of stability generated by improvements in the security network and stricter adherence by the parties to security arrangements adopted earlier.

Criminality and partisan activities continued to be a major destabilizing factor affecting the overall situation. Local inhabitants, particularly in the Gali sector, repeatedly complained about the presence of armed groups, which terrorize and intimidate the population. Despite increased patrols by the Abkhaz militia and the formation of additional village guards, the situation remained tense. Furthermore, Abkhaz militia, as well as CIS peacekeepers themselves, often became targets of armed attacks. UNOMIG continued to urge the Georgian and Abkhaz sides to increase their efforts at curbing criminality and to cooperate in good faith using the means provided by the Coordinating Council mechanism." (UNSC 18 January 2001, paras. 13-14)

April-July 2000 "Endemic crime throughout the area remains a serious problem. Organized crime, particularly smuggling across the ceasefire line, is growing in scope and profitability, and there are indications that it is reaching into institutions on both sides. The criminals are ruthless, and most violent incidents in the conflict zone are products of power struggles or revenge among various groups. Some persons claiming to be associated with the Abkhaz government-in -exile continue to make efforts to destabilize the situation in the Gali district, and the blurring of their quasi-political motives with criminal violence is a further threat to stability in the zone of conflict. UNOMIG continues to encourage the two sides to improve their ability to impose law and order and to cooperate with each other." (UNSC 17 July 2000, para. 16)

Large numbers of mines constitute a threat in areas of displacement and return (2000- 2001)

· Landmines still used in the Abkhazia region and along the Russian-Georgian border · 51 people were killed or injured by landmines or unexploded ordnance during first half of 2001

"Key developments since May 2000: There continued to be reports of armed groups from Georgia laying antipersonnel mines in the Abkhazia region. Georgia has said the government has 'neither tacitly nor openly supported Georgian partisans in their use of antipersonnel mines.' Georgia acknowledges that it laid antivehicle mines (but not antipersonnel) on the Chechen sector of Georgia-Russia border, then subsequently cleared them. Georgia states that Russian forces have mined the Russian-Georgian border near the villages of Shatili and Omalo. The Georgian military began an inventory of its stockpiled mines, which was to be completed at the end of May 2001. In September-November 2000, the U.S. conducted humanitarian demining training of Georgian, Armenian, and Azerbaijani soldiers at a military base in Georgia. The ICBL Georgian Committee reports that between January and the end of June 2001, 51 people were killed or injured by landmines and unexploded ordnance." (Landmine Monitor 2001, Georgia)

The majority of landmines are located near the Inguri River separating Georgia and Abkhazia.[20] Outside of the Abkhazia, mines pose dangers to civilians in Georgia mainly in areas near the border with Abkhazia and near Russian military bases, which have been mined. There are also minefields on the Chechen, Ingush, and Dagestani sectors of the Russian-Georgian border. On 27 October 2000, two Georgian border guards were killed and one wounded when they ran over a landmine on the Ingush sector of Russian-Georgian border.[21] (Landmine Monitor 2001, Georgia)

"There is no official information on the number of people killed or injured by landmines in Georgia. According to the Head of the Science and Technical Research Department of the Georgian Army General Staff, Colonel Tavadze, about 70% of casualties during the war were landmine victims. Subsequently, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs disputed that number, stating in a letter to the ICBL Georgian Committee that the 'information that 70% of people killed or injured within the military activities are the landmine victims is very far from truth and requires more accuracy.' The Ministry, however, did not offer more accurate information.

Pursuant to an order in April 2001, the Ministry of Labor, Health and Social Affairs is creating a 'single data base where along with other affairs all mine victims [have] been registered.' The database will be housed at the Disaster and Emergency Medicine Center. The Ministry noted, 'Recently in Zugdidi and Gali Regions there [has] been [an] increase in the number of landmine victims. The most alarming is the case in Saberioni village of Gali Region when five children were blown up by the mine.'

Landmine incidents were reported in the media during 2000. Four people were killed and one injured, including an incident in which the brother of the Minister of Defense and another person were killed when their vehicle hit a mine and exploded. The ICBL Georgian Committee reports that between January and the end of June 2001, there were 51 new landmine/UXO casualties. Twenty-two people, including one child, were killed and 29 people, including ten children, were injured. The Head of the Zugdidi National Hospital, the main health facility in the border region with Abkhazia, reported treating eight mine victims, six of whom were men, between January and 7 June 2001." (Landmine Monitor 2001, Georgia)

Returnees to South Ossetia remain exposed to harassment and violence (2000-2001)

· UNHCR presence, in the form of regular patrols, is widely regarded as a major contribution to the security of the returnees · Problems of criminality and lawlessness should be addressed

"With respect to security conditions, though active hostilities have long since ended and the ceasefire continues to hold, security incidents of a criminal nature pose risks to returnees, the local population and international personnel. Ethnically targeted incidents of harassment and violence were reported and are a particular risk in ethnically mixed villages, to which return has begun. The presence of UNHCR in the region (since 1997) was widely regarded, by returnee communities, the local population, the authorities and international personnel alike, as having made a major contribution to the security of returnees and the population at large, as well as to a general climate of reconciliation and confidence-building. A particularly important aspect of the UNHCR protective presence has been the regular patrols undertaken throughout the region by its Mobile Team Unit, which monitors protection conditions, investigates and mediates security and other incidents or problems suffered by returnees and collects information on conditions in areas of return, which is then shared with persons contemplating return. Especially now that return to ethnically mixed communities has begun, the contribution that these patrols make to supporting a stable security environment for returnees and peaceful coexistence among ethnic communities divided by the conflict is critical. In addition, there is also a need for the local authorities to take measures to restore law and order so as to address the problems of criminality and lawlessness which prevail." (UNCHR 25 January 2001, para. 97)

"The security situation from a military point of view remains calm and quiet. The JPFK [Peacekeeping force] monitors the ceasefire and also maintains a rapid reaction force, which has proven itself capable of responding quickly to threats to the peace and defusing tense situations. The OSCE observes the work of the JPFK.

The Georgian and South Ossetian sides have achieved substantial agreements on joint action against criminality. A Joint Law Enforcement Coordination Body was formed in Feb. 2000 with the JPKF, South Ossetians, and local Georgian law enforcement authorities participating. Criminality remains a problem however, in part due to attempts to control the lucrative trade in goods shipped between the Russian Federation and Georgia proper via South Ossetia.

The JPKF in cooperation with the local authorities has begun a campaign on voluntary handover of illegally kept weapons. Thus far hundreds of small arms as well as munitions, grenades, landmines, and one 100mm gun have been collected." (UN OCHA 15 March 2001)

SUBSISTENCE NEEDS (HEALTH NUTRITION AND SHELTER)

Health care

Difficult access to health care for the displaced aggravates effects of poor living conditions (2000)

· Proportions of illness and modes of treatment are similar for the IDPs and the local population · They remain however more susceptible to certain problems, such as physical disabilities · 1998 nutritional survey among displaced children show high rate of chronic malnutrition · Parallel health structures specifically for the internally displaced may not necessarily provide better services in many cases

"About the same proportions of illness were reported by the three categories of households [Local population, IDPs in collective accommodation, IDPs in private accommodation]. Their mode of treatment is also similar. Self-treatment and absence of treatment altogether are common response, usually for financial reasons. The implied neglect of some forms of chronic illness could be serious in the longer term. Intensive health (including nutrition) education could be a cost-effective remedy for all groups of the population.

Reproductive health is similar for IDPs in collective centres (no data are available for IDPs in private accommodation) and the general population. IDP women's fertility rate is lower, as is the abortion rate. IDP make slightly greater use of public health institutions for pre-natal care and delivery, but the differences are small.

Although no nutritional data were collected in the survey, material from other studies indicated a tendency for a slightly higher degree of stunting (height for a given age) among IDP children than children in the local population." (IFRC November 2000, p. 8)

"In the area of health also, internally displaced persons, in common with the local population, face a number of problems in terms of ailments and of access to health services. Iodine deficiency disorders, for instance, are a common problem throughout Georgia and, indeed, much of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). A 1996 survey of 30,000 schoolchildren, commissioned by UNICEF found iodine deficiency in 64 per cent of the surveyed population. Severe iodine deficiency in utero causes severe mental retardation or cretinism. Consumption of iodized salt is considered the most effective way of ensuring an adequate intake of iodine. Yet an IFRC survey found that most households, internally displaced and local alike, used salt that either was not iodized or contained an inadequate quantity of iodine.

However, in addition to sharing many health problems common to the general population, internally displaced persons are also more susceptible to certain types of problems resulting from their displacement and the circumstances leading to it. Most notably, the Save the Children Fund Survey found that physical disability was more prevalent in internally displaced persons’ households than in the local population. Injuries suffered during conflict and flight provide a partial explanation for this discrepancy. But the survey also suggests that little or no access to health-care services during the conflict and soon afterward, low household income to pay for health care, medicines and treatment, and poor living conditions also are factors which have resulted in a higher rate of physical limitation among internally displaced children.

Regarding nutritional status, a 1998 IFRC survey of internally displaced children in western Georgia found that, although the prevalence of acute malnutrition was low, there was a high rate of chronic malnutrition, manifested by stunted growth. A diet of poor quality, that is one particularly low in biological protein and micronutrients even though it may have an adequate energy content, accounts for these results.

With respect to access to health services, surveys by the Government and international NGOs have shown that a low percentage of internally displaced persons and of locals report receiving medical treatment for illness or disability, even when their condition is serious, the main reason being cost. Although health care is supposed to be provided free of charge to all citizens, in practice payment is required. In part, payment is required because the doctors and nurses frequently do not receive their full salary from the State. The issue of free access to health care thus is closely linked to the budgetary problems faced by the central Government.

In some regions, health clinics specifically for the internally displaced have been established as part of a larger programme of parallel public services offered by the Government in Exile, using funds channelled to it from the central Government. The extent to which such parallel structures impede internally displaced persons from having access to the regular system of public services appeared, from the answers of the displaced, to vary. For the most part, such impediments appeared to derive not so much from institutionalized discrimination - the law recognizes the equality of all citizens to have access to the health services for instance - as from the practical problems of physical proximity to the public services and the ability to pay for them. In some cases, it was suggested that the health clinics set up specifically for the displaced provided them with better services, in particular as they were free of charge, than were available to the local population." (UN CHR 25 January 2001, paras. 49-53)

Field survey by Save the Children in western Georgia highlights health needs of the displaced (2000)

· SCF survey reveals that limited access to healthcare services during and after the war and poor living conditions have resulted in a slightly higher rate of physical limitations among displaced children

"On 2 June, Save the Children (SC) at the offices of the Institute of Polling and Marketing (IPM) presented an overview of selected differences between IDPs and general households in three regions of western Georgia (Guria, Imereti and Samegrelo). The presentation was based on a survey conducted in February 2000 by SC as part of the Georgia Assistance Initiative (GAI) -- a programme funded by the US Agency for International Development (USAID)." (UN OCHA 10 June 2000)

"Health sector results show that IDPs are slightly more than twice as likely to have a physical disability as households in the general population. There appears to be a slight decrease in the frequency of respiratory and cardiovascular illnesses from 1996 to 2000." (UN OCHA 10 June 2000)

More detailed information from the GAI review can be found on the "Assistance Georgia" website [Internet: http://www.assistancegeorgia.org.ge]. See in particular:

Chronic Diseases Among Household Members in the General Population and IDPs Living in Communal Facilities in Guria, Imereti and Samegrelo [Internet]

Health Care Expenditures in Previous Three Months (Nov. 1999 – Jan. 2000) by Households in the General Population Living in Samegrelo, Imereti and Guria [Internet]

Health Care Expenditures in Previous Three Months (Nov. 1999 – Jan. 2000) Reported by IDPs Living in Communal Facilities in Samegrelo and Imereti [Internet]

See also other reports posted on Assistance Georgia website:

"Children with Irreversible Physical Limitations in West Georgia", Save the Children, September 2000 [Internet]

"Rapid Appraisal of Healthcare, in Guria, Imereti and Samegrelo regions of West Georgia", Save the Children, July 2000 [Internet]

"Reproductive health survey, Georgia", preliminary report printed by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), June 2000 [Internet]

"Health Status and Health Care Services in Guria, Imereti and Samegrelo Regions of West Georgia", [Internet]

"Population's Health Needs in Western Georgia: Guria, Imereti and Samegrelo", Report prepared by George Gotsadze MD., Ph.D. Nino Nanitashvili MD., MPH., February 2000 [Internet]

Field surveys reveal psycho-social trauma of displaced women and men (1995-2000)

· Internally displaced persons living in communal centres have been more exposed to depression than the rest of the local population · Psychosocial trauma tend to increase with age and to affect primarily women and single heads of households · Other surveys show that men have also been affected by displacement and have been less successful than women to adapt their new environment

"For the evaluation of social-emotional depression of both IDPs and the local population a scale was used from the Centre for the Epidemiological Study of Depression. Results showed that regardless of gender or marital status, IDPs in communal facilities have higher depression scores that the general population. In general, females, widows and divorced individuals are more depressed. Depression increases with age among IDPs thus the oldest IDPs tend to be the most depressed. In the general population the oldest and the youngest are more depressed that the middle -age population, with the lowest depression score at age 27 and increasing age." (UN OCHA 10 June 2000)

More detailed information from the GAI review can be found on the "Assistance Georgia" website [Internet: http://www.assistancegeorgia.org.ge]. See in particular:

"Psychological Distress and Depression Among Households in the General Population in Guria, Imereti and Samegrelo and IDPs Living in Communal Facilities in Imereti and Samegrelo", GIA Survey Report, February 2000 [Internet]

"Various forms of psychosocial stress have long plagued Georgian internally displaced women and their families on a nearly epidemic scale. A 1995 Oxfam study rigorously examined 653 displaced women and children residing in collective centers in Tbilisi and other regions of Georgia. Its team of psychiatric

specialists concluded that over 86 percent of adults suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder and its various resulting symptoms, including heart and cardiovascular diseases (21 percent), chronic migraines and long-lasting sleep disorders (51 percent), and severe depression (22 percent). Twenty-one percent of displaced women surveyed by USAID had been clinically diagnosed with a form of neurosis (Kharashvili 1995, 24–29; Zurikashvili 2000, 7).

Causes for psychosocial stress were both conflict- and postconflict-related. Substantial numbers of women surveyed by Oxfam were traumatized by the loss of their homes and property (91 percent), by bombings (82 per-cent), and by the loss of close family members during the conflict (34 percent), among many other factors. The continuing period of displacement, arduous living conditions, and deepening economic troubles has added to the stress disorders of people living in collective centers. In a 1997 examination of 219 internally displaced families, a Georgian nongovernmental organization (NGO), Foundation for the Development of Human Resources, concluded that conflict-related psychological and psychosomatic complaints among the internally displaced had decreased over the previous two years. Stress-related health problems and depression were now more attributable to factors related to the postdisplacement environment and the strains of everyday life. Many families increasingly believed themselves to be victimized, feeling ostracized and segregated by local populations unhappy with their continued presence and with the Georgian government’s perceived lack of interest in their plight (FDHR 1997, 20-21; Kharashvili 1995, 24–29; Zurikashvili 2000, 7).

In addition to the heavy toll on the psychological and physical health of women, the trauma of displacement has also affected the psychological well-being of men in profound ways. Put simply, women have been much more successful at adapting to the difficult conditions and strains of every day life in the IDP community. As humanitarian aid has dwindled, many displaced women have worked tirelessly and relentlessly to provide desperately needed income and provisions for their families through petty street trade and other menial labor. Many men, meanwhile, have largely been unwilling to trade and to find other menial methods of generating income, instead spending much time idle and loitering in housing centers. In a 1996 study of the internally displaced, the Foundation for the Development of Human Resources noted that men were much more fixed on re-turning to their past lives and were 'paralyzed' by the problems of the present day. Their lives were often characterized by escapism, by 'empty and routine time-passing,' and by a growing pattern of alcoholism. Any hope they had was held out for the 'magic rod' of outside help (FDHR 1996, 7).

Most displaced women interviewed by the CDIE team indicated that their husbands and other men were 'double traumatized' by the conflict and its aftermath. On the one hand, many displaced men felt personally responsible for losing the war and abandoning their homes and former lives, their families forced into exile and destitution simply through their inability to win the war. On the other hand, men have felt unable to fulfill their traditional role as leaders of their families. Worse, many were deeply ashamed that women had become more creative at finding alternative sources of income, however paltry, through trading and other ventures. Displaced men tended to shun income-generating donor programming such as microcredit out of this growing sense of shame. NGO and donor officials have indicated that up to three quarters of internally displaced persons participating in income-generating programming have been women. Not surprisingly, these same officials increasingly agreed that programs should concentrate on the problem of displaced men." (Buck September 2000, pp. 6-7)

See also "Socio-Emotional depression among respondents in households in the general population and IDPs living in communal facilities", Save the Children, February 2000 [Internet]

Right to healthcare - legal framework and implementation (review by the Georgian Young Lawyers' Association) (1999)

· The economic and financial crisis has severely affected the access to health care for the most vulnerable in the population, including the displaced persons · According to the 1996 Law on internally displaced persons, the displaced are granted free access to health care by the State · The health insurance granted by the State to the internally displaced persons covers an insufficient number of medical treatments · Internally displaced persons lack information on how to enforce their right to free health care

"General overview […] There is no doubt, that healthcare is the most expensive field in every country. Taking into account present economic situation, today Georgia can only dream of exercise of its citizens' right to healthcare at international standards, despite the fact, that this is provided in Article 37 of Georgian Constitution. The whole healthcare system of Georgia is facing serious problems. First of all we are talking about diminution of the degree of population’s security due to shift to new (market economy) type of relationships. The scarce state budget can not provide any considerable benefits to the most vulnerable part of the population. To this adds the fact, that at law level the state has taken certain commitments in healthcare, first of all towards IDPs, but in fact again due to lack of finances the state is unable to fulfil these commitments and this creates alarming situation.

Legal base

Reforms undergoing in healthcare system have direct influence on IDPs as socially most vulnerable part of population. The process of privatization of healthcare units is begun. For the purposes of retention of medical personnel, such units are often directly sold to the employees. The reform is begun in the field of medical education too.

Laws are issued on medical insurance ( April 18, 1997), on health protection (December 10, 1997). In the sphere of healthcare more than 70 normative acts are issued by different organs, also in the sphere of insurance more than 60 legislative acts are in force. Unfortunately none of these acts pays special attention to IDPs. These acts not only at law level but even at level of individual acts, do not regulate problems of IDPs healthcare and medical insurance.

The normative material is very vague. According to Article 5 of the Law on Internally Displaced Persons respective state authorities

'. . . Shall provide them with free medical aid. Cost of treatment at state-funded medical institutions shall be compensated by the state according to the established standards and rates and pursuant to applicable procedures.'

This can not be considered as responsibility of the state for healthcare of IDPs. Each IDP should be granted a free medical insurance policy, which would entitle them to adequate medical treatment in any medical institution. Refusal of a medical institution to provide such treatment shall be punished by applicable laws. As to the costs of treatment, those shall be paid from a special fund, which should be strictly controlled in order to ensure cooperation and confidence in the policy on part of different organizations.

Another provision of the same law states: '. . . shall provide free medications to the handicapped, old, children and families lacking breadwinner.' The same problem of - who? in what circumstances? by which procedure? Without especially designed state program and respective fund this provision is a mere fiction.

Financing and sources

As we have mentioned above, legislation guarantees healthcare insurance policies for IDPs. Because of limited capacities of the state budget the policies are nothing more than just a paper. According to the budget of 1998 the targeted transfer allocated for Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia amounted 4, 820,000 GEL, in which the share of healthcare was extremely small. Unfortunately the IDPs are not adequately provided even with those “papers” due to irresponsibility of respective organs.

Actual situation

Even taking into account terrible situation in the country as a whole, the sphere of healthcare of IDPs does not stand any critics. During the questioning we often came across cases when the IDPs were not informed about their rights. As a rule they have general idea about the fact that they are entitled to free insurance policies, but in case of existence of such a policy they don’t know where to go and whom to address with it, besides they do not have hope that they will achieve anything in case if they ask for medical treatment.

Terms of validity of a policy should be separately mentioned. Majority of interrogated IDPs who happened to use the policies, are not happy with the scale of insurance covered by policies. Medical tests only twice a year, vaccination, and first aid is not a proof of the state’s serious attitude. The cases requiring serious medical interference as a rule are not considered by the policy and the IDPs have to find the necessary financial sources themselves. The needed amounts representing astronomical numbers for them.

Besides the interrogated IDPs complain about frequent violations of service procedure. There were cases, when the IDPs holding policies were refused the medical treatment on the grounds that the budget would not be able to recover the costs of treatment and thus, to insure itself, the medical institution asked the patient to request the money from the state budget in advance and to put it on the organization’s account, after which they would provide the treatment.

Pensioners, handicapped and families lacking breadwinners are in the most difficult situation. According to law they are entitled to more financial aid than other IDPs, but these amounts are delayed for months while IDPs falling in this category practically depend only on these minimal payments provided to them by the state.

Fortunately, international relief agencies operating in Georgia, often provide IDPs with free medications, thus somewhat improving their situation. Although the aid that is not directly passed to IDPs by donor organizations often does not reach IDPs, though one may later find its substance for sale at markets and shops.

Conclusions and recommendations

A state program for guaranteeing healthcare for IDPs must be designed after careful consideration of all the details, determining roles and responsibilities of all possible state organizations. Discovered violations require adequate reaction. Due to existing situation it would probably be better if the funds foreseen in the state budget get in the special fund, which will be under international control. The process of distribution of medications through humanitarian aid, should also be subjected to better control." (GYLA 1999, pp. 14-17)

Shelter

IDP collective centres hit by earthquake in Tbilisi (April 2002)

"An earthquake measuring 4.8 on the Richer scale and MSK 6-7 intensity occurred in Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia, on Thursday 25 April 2002. Thousands of buildings, mainly in the older part of the city were

seriously damaged or completely destroyed. Among the damaged and destroyed buildings were some of the collective centres where many internally displaced people live.

There are five IDP collective centres that are damaged beyond repair, and 14 more are significantly damaged. Some relief and financial assistance has been received from the German, Turkish, Russia and Israeli governments." (UNICEF 29 May 2002)

Precarious housing conditions of the displaced (2000)

· Average living space for IDPs is substantially lower than for the local population · Collective centres consist mainly of former hotels, sanatoriums and hospitals · Only a small portion of the displaced persons have the financial means to establish themselves independently · There have been reports of eviction of internally displaced persons from host families · Displaced are fearful that moving to alternative, more comfortable accommodation would undermine their ultimate aim of return · This apprehension could in part be attributed to outside influence

"If IDPs are not obviously disadvantaged in respect of health and education, housing is for many of them a major concern in respect of overcrowding, access to facilities, such as toilets or kitchens, and the condition of their accommodation. Conditions are especially bad in collective centres in which half the IDPs continue to live seven or eight years after their displacement. Average living space is 8 sq.m. per person (compared with 18 sq.m. for the local population), only one third have unshared access to a kitchen, one fifth to bathrooms/showers, two fifths to toilets. Fifteen per cent deplore broken windows, almost 30 per cent a leaking roof." (IFRC November 2000, p. 8)

"As is often the case, in the initial period of displacement, large numbers of displaced people found emergency shelter in public buildings such as schools. Seven to nine years on, however, approximately 40 per cent of the displaced, numbering some 112,000 persons, remain in collective centres (defined as residences accommodating 10 or more internally displaced persons). Following efforts undertaken several years ago to move the displaced out of schools, with a view both to providing more suitable accommodation and to ending the disruption this created for the educational system, the collective centres in which the internally displaced currently reside consist mostly of former hotels, sanatoriums and hospitals. The Representative was informed of one case of 100 families living in a former factory. The mission visited collective centres in Tshkinvali (South Ossetia) and in Tskhaltubo and Ingiri, where internally displaced persons have been living for some seven to nine years.

Sixty per cent of internally displaced persons live in private accommodation. Though some internally displaced persons have the financial means to establish themselves independently, most of those in private accommodation are staying with host families, who frequently are relatives or former acquaintances. The continued hospitality of host families is noteworthy, especially given the difficult economic conditions facing the population of Georgia as a whole. This generosity, however, is beginning to show signs of strain: reportedly, the eviction of internally displaced persons from host families is occurring. This suggests the need to ensure that host families receive support in shouldering the added burden of having taken internally displaced persons into their homes, several years ago now.

Although the mission did not visit internally displaced persons residing in private accommodation, where of course the conditions would vary depending on the situation of the host family, the prevailing view is that they are in a better situation than those in collective centres, where conditions are considered to be

much worse. A survey comparing the shelter conditions of internally displaced persons in private accommodation versus those in collective centres was being undertaken in 2000.

A number of problems were common to the various collective centres visited by the mission. These problems largely stem from the fact that the buildings serving as collective centres were never designed for communal living. Even in hotels or sanatoriums, the rooms where entire families now live were intended for the temporary stay of one or two people. Conditions are cramped and overcrowded: on average, the general population has almost five times more living space than internally displaced persons living in collective centres. In hospitals, internally displaced families are crowded into empty rooms, surrounded by sick people in adjacent rooms.

In terms of structural conditions, a 1999 survey of 757 collective centres throughout Georgia, except Abkhazia and South Ossetia, classified approximately half of the buildings as being in very poor or poor condition and a third as being in need of minor repair. Roofing, sewerage and glazing were determined as being in urgent need of repair in order to winterize the shelters and contain disease. Electrical systems also were highlighted as a priority for repair. Water systems, not designed with a capacity for the number of people now using them, have been strained and also require repair. Former hotels housing the displaced have largely been gutted of their facilities and furniture.

Conditions in rural areas were reported to be even worse than in the towns and cities. The Representative was told of one case of 100 families living in a former gravel factory in very dusty conditions and with no windows. Furthermore, it was noted that this example was illustrative of conditions in outlying regions, to which, apparently, little attention and assistance had been devoted.

As to how to address these conditions, internally displaced persons often pointed out to the Representative that they would be prepared to undertake the repair work themselves, if only they could be provided with the material and tools required. Some assistance had begun to be provided to improve basic services. For instance, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) had a programme to improve sanitary facilities, but significant work still needs to be done for the collective centres to approach adequate shelter conditions.

Given these inadequate conditions, the question inevitably arises of relocating the displaced to alternative, more appropriate, accommodation. The reaction of internally displaced persons from Abkhazia to this proposition was most revealing. Consistently, they replied without hesitation that they would prefer to remain where they were, until such time as they could return home. It thus became apparent that the displaced were fearful that moving to alternative, more comfortable accommodation would somehow undermine their ultimate aim of return. This apprehension is deep-seated, apparently having emerged as a problem early into the displacement crisis, when efforts were being undertaken to move internally displaced persons out of local schools with a view both to improving their shelter conditions and enabling educational services to resume. For the displaced, who held fast to the hope of returning within a matter of days or weeks, the move to alternative accommodation gave a certain permanence to their situation that proved very difficult to accept.

To be sure, as indicated by the comments of the displaced in collective centres, there is clear interest in effecting improvements to their current living conditions. Yet, an immense psychological barrier clearly stands in the way of doing so by means of relocation to alternative accommodation. It was suggested by some observers that this apprehension could in part be attributed to outside influence, coming from representatives of political groups, themselves displaced, who are bent on the return of the displaced and on the regaining of territory over which control was lost during the conflict. Indeed, this could help explain the consistency of the response among various groups of displaced persons, and the categorical manner in which it was so quickly offered. The pressure that these political forces exert extends also to the central Government, having an influence on its policies for responding to the plight of the displaced. (UNCHR 25 January 2001, paras. 25-33)

*See also "Tbilisi struggles to house displaced Georgians", Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 24 July 2001 [Internet]

Collective shelters in western Georgia need major repairs (2000)

· More than 85 percent of such people live in “collective” or public housing provided by the Georgian government · Survey conducted by Save the Children in 2000 shows that the general population has on average almost 5 times more living space than the displaced living in collective centres

"While the Georgian conflicts themselves were relatively short in duration, the misery of internally displaced women and their families has only grown in the decade since the fighting largely ceased. Much of the distress can be attributed to the deteriorating living conditions endured by the vast majority of displaced persons. Today, more than 85 percent of such people live in 'collective' or public housing provided by the Georgian government, according to UNDP*. These collective centers consist of Soviet-era hotels, hospitals, schools, factories, and other buildings roughly converted into 'temporary' living centers.

Though conditions vary, most of the 3,600 collective centers throughout the country can barely be considered adequate housing. A 1995 Norwegian Refugee Council fact-finding mission pointed to the overcrowded nature of the centers, averaging 3.2 people per room; similarly, collective centers visited by the CDIE team averaged four persons to a room. Cooking spaces and toilets are usually shared, and sanitary conditions are often dismal. In one center visited by the CDIE team—a converted steel and cement storage facility near the city of Zugdidi— the plumbing system had broken down completely, causing the basement to be filled with open sewage. As a result, 82 families were crammed into windowless rooms on the two top floors desperate to avoid the stench. Unsurprisingly, environmentally based disease rates among the internally displaced have increased dramatically through the years, particularly cases of tuberculosis and hepatitis (Boutroue and Jones 1997, 15; NRC 1995; UNDP 1998, 18).

Gender roles were clearly delineated in prewar Georgian society; whereas men were traditional heads of the family, making the critical decisions involving family and livelihood matters, women ran the households. Put simply, women were in charge of maintaining family order, health, and welfare, with particular attention to their children. Since moving into collective centers, lack of space, decrepit living arrangements, growing rates of poverty have all made for particularly stressful times for displaced women. A 1997 survey by the Norwegian Refugee Council concluded that 51 percent of the IDP households consistently lacked adequate clothing, and 70 percent were without enough food. (UNDP 1998)

*Immediately following the conflict, most internally displaced peoples lived in private housing, usually with 'host' families consisting of family members or friends. The Norwegian Refugee Council estimated that 84 percent of such people lived with host families and in private housing between 1991 and 1994. After 1995, however, many IDP families moved into public housing as the generosity of their host families began to wane and the likelihood of repatriation shrank to very low levels. In addition, almost all 'second- wave' Abkhazian internally displaced persons were housed in public shelters in 1998 (MacFarlane, Minear, and Shenfield 1996; Norwegian Refugee Council 1995)." (Buck September 2000, pp. 5-6)

The general population has on average, almost 5 times more living space than IDPs living in collective centres. The respondents' evaluation of shelter conditions was almost similar in both populations. IDPs and

the general population feel there is a need for major repairs to the overall structure, roofs and windows of dwellings." (UN OCHA 10 June 2000)

More detailed information from the GAI review can be found on the "Assistance Georgia" website [Internet: http://www.assistancegeorgia.org.ge]. See in particular:

"Evaluation of Quality of Housing/Shelter Conditions by Households in the General Population in Guria, Imereti and Samegrelo" [Internet]

"Households in the General Population & IDPs Living in Communal Facilities in Guria, Imereti and Samegrelo That Use Wood As the Primary Fuel for Heating" [Internet]

See also "Consolidated report on IDP settlement issue", a report by the UN Association of Georgia (2000) [Internet]

Shelter needs in South Ossetia: a prerequisite for return (2000-2001)

· More than 1,000 shelters for returnees have been repaired by UNHCR since 1997 · UNHCR and NGOs have recently reduced their programmes due to the low level of return

"In addition to protection and physical security, repair and restitution of property is another prerequisite for return. Support for the repair or reconstruction of war-damaged shelter is the other main component of the UNHCR programme in the region. More than a thousand shelters for returning refugees and internally displaced persons as well as other vulnerable families, have been repaired or rehabilitated since 1997." (UNCHR 25 January 2001, para. 98)

"UNHCR and NRC have scaled back their shelter rehabilitation programs due to the low level of return. It is urgent to identify an organization whose mandate and mission allow it to focus on the rehabilitation of the shelter and accommodation of vulnerable segments of the community regardless of their status. In addition, there are several priority communal sites, such as the Main Republican Hospital and the Elderly Home, which require urgent renovation." (UN OCHA 15 March 2001)

Georgian Young Lawyers Association reviews the legal framework and practices pertaining to the right to housing of the displaced (1999)

· Authorities in Abkhazia may block the return of the displaced to Abkhazia on the basis of the 1983 Housing Code, still in force in Abkhazia, which provides that the right to housing is lost if the residents do not exercise this right during 6 months (Art. 69) · So far, the Georgian government has shown little interest in rising the issue of restitution of the properties of the displaced · The displaced who have been provided with temporary shelter from the Georgian State cannot be evicted if not provided with an adequate shelter or in absence of return to their homes · The displaced persons who register as a permanent resident in Georgia, through the acquisition of a private accommodation, lose their IDP status according to the 1996 Law on Internally Displaced Persons (Art. 6, para. 2) and the benefit connected to the status · There have been reports of evictions of displaced persons illegally occupying public or private properties

"1. Right to Housing

1.1 General overview - Georgia like other post-communist countries inherited quite heavy burden in connection with the legal base for right to housing. The Socialist regime as a rule guaranteed the right to housing to everyone. The general policy in this direction is reflected in a slogan popular in those days 'Not a single homeless among us'. For objectivity purposes it should be noted, that the Soviet reality was quite close to this slogan, though it was exercised as far as it was allowed by absence of private property. In other words everybody had a shelter (state-owened flat) with the right to housing (live in) and with the priority to inherit this right, but the state remained the owner of the flat. Since 1992 after radical change of economic formation (recognition of private property), the process of privatization of state property began in the country, which first of all affected the housing fund. Unfortunately at that time the country had “managed” to get involved in armed conflicts and internal migration of the population received a catastrophic character. Because some of the regions were practically emptied of the main part of the population, the government stopped the process of privatization in these regions in order not to prevent just and equal privatization process after return of the population to the places of their original residence.

1.2 Legal base - The main problem lies with the difference between the legislation acting on the territory of present residence of IDPs and the legislation acting De Facto on the territory of their original residence. Georgian jurisdiction practically is not acting on the territory of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region, accordingly the issue of putting the legislation acting there in compliance with new Georgian legislation is out of control. While monitoring the situation we approached several problems, which we shall try to analyze bellow.

The '6 months' rule - 1983 Housing Code, Article 69 provides that the right to housing is lost if the residents do not exercise this right during 6 months. Among the reasons justifying being unable to exercise this right that are listed there, of course “being displaced” is not mentioned. Although the Housing Code was terminated by adoption of a new Civil Code, on those territories where the government jurisdiction is not in force, still the old Housing Code is in force. And there is no prospect that it will be actually terminated, as far as it represents good means for preventing returning of IDPs. The local authorities may base their rejection on recovery of IDPs right to housing on the grounds that they have left the place of residence for longer than 6 months. Even for an amateur it is obvious that we are facing not a legislative defect (juridically the Housing Code does not exist any longer neither in Abkhazia nor in Tskhinvali region) but rather a problem of actual enforcement of legislation on certain territory.

The issue of restitution of IDPs’ property - Political aspect of its regulation is almost as far from reality as the legislative aspect - At the government level there is no evident movement in the direction of creation of appropriate legal base. By the initiative of UNHCR and direct participation of GYLA the works for creation of such base are being performed, but the government’s interest towards this issue equals zero. What is the reason for this? Any question concerning the issue of IDPs’ returning, is very sensitive and unpopular, thus everyone is reluctant to rising this issue.

Situation on the territory of “Georgia proper” - Here we come across three categories of persons:

- Those who were provided by the state with temporary dwellings. This was mainly done at the expense of housing and nonresidential (hotels, rest houses, sans, kindergartens, buildings under construction) fund still remaining in the state’s property. Their right not to be evicted - without being provided with an adequate dwelling or returning - is guaranteed by the acts issued by the president.

- Those who were sheltered by their relatives. The state can not offer them anything, even at the law level. - Those who have acquired a house (flat) in private property, The state not only does not assist them, but it artificially restrains them by establishing in the law on “Internally Displaced Persons” [Article 6, paragraphe 2, section 3] a barrier to acquiring a permanent dwelling and registering there, by connecting this to loss of the status of IDP. This is a serious defect of Georgian legislation, especially since abolishment of so called record (propisca) institute, which related the housing right to dwelling to record.

Regarding legislative acts at lower levels of government and self-government, there is no relevant document, except such acts, when the population itself invaded inactive sites and then addressed the appropriate organs of authority with request to legitimate the act. In monitoring we shall come across such facts and consequently legislative acts (mainly of non-normative character). […]

Actual situation- The questioning of IDPs revealed several problems: The right to protection from eviction is not effective for everyone. There were registered cases when the secret privatization of buildings inhabited by IDPs took place. For example in Tskneti, where approximately 5000 IDPs are settled more than 10 sites were privatized without notification of IDPs. After leak of information and alarm the process was stopped. - Those who were given shelter by their relatives face serious economic and psychosocial problems: “a guest” for indefinite period of time is a heavy burden for the host as well as for himself or herself. - Those who can afford buying a house (apartment) at the place of new settlement (Georgian Constitution provides the opportunity to choose the place of residence of one’s choice), are afraid that they will be deprived of their status of IDP and either refrain from buying a house or manage to do it secretly. -Legislative acts, concerning issues of housing of IDPs, are extremely superficial, do not establish any concrete measures, terms of their performance and thus, provides executive organs with the opportunity to interpret the acts in their own way. - It was very often a case that the IDPs discovered some administrative building more or less appropriate for living, settled there and then the state Post Factum temporarily legitimated their housing right on such space or simply without issuing any legal act did not restrict IDPs from living at such places. Another problem is added to this: during the time span state bodies rent the space, inhabited by IDPs, to different organizations and the controversy rises about who is entitled to this space.

- The situation is more complex when IDPs without permission invade apartments in someone’s private property. Here we are talking about the apartments that are not actively used by their owners and are locked, or the buildings that would 'turn out to be' already privatized. Several cases have been registered, when IDPs were evicted from such apartments." (GYLA 1999, pp. 6-10)

The situation of unaccompanied children and elderly IDPs (1999)

· Orphan IDPs often taken care of by relatives · Old people are attended in communal IDP shelters

"Children without persons accompanying - there are orphan children but they have persons to take care of them. Grand parents or relatives are taking care of them. The refugees socium has found mechanisms of additional protection. This is visible especially in respect of children. There are no vagrants among refugee children almost. No cases of giving away children for adoption, all the children are living with their relations and neighbors.

The same could be said about old people. They are under protection at the centers of mass living of refugees. They are in a very poor situation being aided by strangers for such a long period of time. "(The Horizonti Foundation, 29 January 1999, sect.9)

ACCESS TO EDUCATION

General

Issue of language of education in Abkhazia: a decisive factor on return (2000-2002)

· Prohibition on instruction in Georgian in elementary education deters durable return of displaced ethnic Georgians · Abkhaz authorities have shown readiness to reach compromise on the use of the Georgian language in Gali district schools · The government of Georgia claims that the Abkhaz "authorities" have closed 122 Georgian schools in Abkhazia since 1992

"Another factor influencing the seasonal nature of return is the issue of education, in particular the language of instruction. According to the curriculum developed by the de facto Abkhaz 'Ministry of Education', elementary education, from grades one to five, is provided only in Russian. This is true even in what are designated as Georgian language (as opposed to Russian or mixed Russian/Georgian) schools. Though instruction is provided in the Georgian language from grade six onwards, the prohibition on instruction in Georgian in elementary education was pointed out as being a powerful deterrent to durable return of displaced ethnic Georgians as it threatens to impede the possibility for higher education elsewhere in Georgia. Though some language and cultural instruction is provided on the margins of the core material, Georgian history reportedly is not taught at all.

Principle 23 of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement affirms that the authorities concerned should ensure that internally displaced persons receive education which respects their cultural identity, language and religion. Furthermore, the Convention on the Rights of the Child recognizes, in article 29.1 (c), that a child’s education shall be directed, inter alia, to the development of 'his or her own cultural identity, language and values'. General reference was made to the content of these provisions when the Representative raised the issue of language of education policy with the de facto 'President' of Abkhazia. The Secretary-General subsequently reported to the Security Council that there have been 'signs that the Abkhaz authorities are taking a more pragmatic and flexible view on the use of the Georgian language in Gali district schools', pointing out that '[s]uch issues, relating to the education of children, are significant for the decision-making by displaced families considering a return to their former homes'." (UN CHR 25 January 2001, para. 80)

"The ethnic Georgian population in the Gali district continued to be denied the right to education in its native tongue, although elective courses in the Georgian language have recently been initiated in one of the Gali schools. The heads of the Education Departments of the two sides met on 11 March and 8 April to overcome the current obstacles. They agreed on a follow-up meeting, scheduled for 22 April for further discussions on this matter." (UN SC 19 April 2002, para. 27)

"On of the three working group subordinate to the Coordinating Council established under the UN aegis in November 1997 to discuss issues relating to the Abkhaz conflict (see RFE/RL Newsline, 20 November 1997) met in Tbilisi on 25 June, Caucasus Press reported. The working group on socioeconomic issues discussed ways of attracting investments to rebuild Abkhazia's infrastructure, restoration of the energy systems in Sukhumi and Zugdidi, and providing education for the children of Georgian displaced persons who return to Abkhazia's southernmost Gali Raion." (RFE/RL 26 June 2002)

The issue of teaching in native language in the Gali district schools has also been discussed by the working group. See "Protocol of the meeting – Working Group III meeting held on 25 June 2002 in Tbilisi" [Internet]

"In spite of numerous statements made by the Abkhazian side that they are committed to a peaceful solution of the conflict and recognize the right of refugees and displaced persons to return, it flagrantly violates the human rights of even the small number of those who have returned to Abkhazia. The most painful blow for this population was the decision to ban the teaching of the Georgian language, literature and history.

In 1992/93 there were in Abkhazia 122 Georgian, 49 Abkhazian, 49 Armenian, 24 Russian and 62 mixed schools with 82,000 pupils, amo ng them 35,000 Georgians.

In 1993 in the Gali region there were 58 Georgian schools, with 14,000 pupils and 1,800 qualified teachers. Last year there were 34 schools working with 4,514 pupils and 288 of them received Georgian certificates.

Today officially there is no single Georgian school. As to the mentioned 34 Georgian schools in the Gali district, they are working in clandestine circumstances and pupils and teachers are risking their lives every day."(UN CHR 21 October 1997)

Displaced children face difficult conditions at schools (2000)

· Enrollment figures at all levels of education are similar for IDPs and the local population, according to IFRC field survey (November 2000) · School enrollment of displaced children is high throughout the country but a high number of them actually do not visit schools, especially in the Zugdidi area · Displaced children have been exempted from paying school fees but clothing and educational materials remain an obstacle to many · The only substantial assistance has been provided to the Tskhinvali region where UNHCR has been supporting the rehabilitation of schools and the distribution of text books · Regions have different approaches, ranging from to the total integration of the displaced children into the regular system to the creation of a separate education system · Experience in Zugdidi, where most displaced children visit separate schools run by displaced teachers, shows increasing isolation of the displaced children

"Contrary to widespread belief, enrolment figures at all three levels of education (kindergarten, primary/secondary and higher) are similar for IDPs and the local population. Nor is there much evidence of segregation. Most children attend mixed schools (of IDPs and locals) and mixed classes within schools. Attendance also is reported as fairly regular (in the spring and summer months; it may be worse in the winter). Surprinsingly, also, almost as many IDPs as locals continue their studies from the age of 18 years, most of them at university." (IFRC November 2000, p. 8)

"From general figures the most interesting is that of enrollment: from 1 to 3 percent of children do not belong to any school at all. They usually assist their parents in trade by selling cigarettes or roasted sunflower seeds. The only fact that most of IDP children are enrolled in primary and/or secondary education does not mean that they actually have access to them. Number of absentees grows with time reaching in some regions (especially Zugdidi region). This problem is, basically, caused by the fact of impossibility by IDP parents to provide educational materials and decent clothing for their children who are otherwise shy to attend classes. Some children do not go to school due to missed years.

In past, government as well as some international organizations (e.g. UNICEF) has provided assistance in distributing school materials but these programs have been cancelled now. Furthermore, old books could not be used as official program requirement has been changing recently almost every year. The only assistance that IDPs receive is that government has freed them from any fee related to education in schools. In Ajara IDP students receive 50% discount in private universities as well.

Apart of this, UMCOR intended to distribute clothing in Zugdidi region though IDPs are unaware of this assistance program as nobody has been a recipient or knows such person. Besides, number of absentees grows in winter due to lack of heating in schools.

The only substantial assistance comes to Tskhinvali region -UNHCR puts big effort in rehabilitating old schools in conflict areas (villages Kheiti, Tamarasheni, Ksuisi). Children receive free books there as well.

As to the education process itself, it should be noticed that no special programs are designed for IDP children and they follow the program approved by the Ministry of education of Georgia. Only several children in Gori region study at private school and receive alternative education. IDP students attend same universities as others. Even affiliations transferred from conflict zones (from Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region) do educate not only IDPs but also non-IDP youth.

Education process of IDP children in school is either together with locals or separately. Different regions have different approaches in this direction from having no separate school (in Gori region) through allowing only several (one in Ajara and just few in Imereti serving 10-12% of IDP children) to having mostly separate education system (in Samegrelo).

Our study has indicated that most problems with integration of IDP children exist in Samegrelo, which employs separate school system for them. While tension and embarrassment is less in Imereti and almost not existent in Ajara and Shida Kartli. The letter region has introduced special post in the Department of Education of the region dealing with special education methodology used with regards to IDP children.

In Zugdidi, where most IDP children study at separate schools, faculties consist of IDP teachers. This increases isolation and aggravates psychological environment in schools - teachers extrapolate their attitudes, feelings and problems onto children who bear gigantic pressure coming from homes, schools and local population. Frequently children are exposed to harassment from non-IDP population including local children. This problem is most expressed, again, in Samegrelo and has been overcome in other regions.

Managing free time of children stays as acute problem despite several projects implemented by international and non-governmental organizations. These projects include additional classes in foreign languages, computer skills, different sports, music, dancing, etc. Following organizations are involved in projects related to engaging IDP children in creative learning process and free-time activities: Red Cross Federation (in Zugdidi has organized group of 20 children to visit US), SIDL and Business Incubator (in Zugdidi organized computer servicing of IDPs), Atinati (in Zugdidi has organized foreign language courses, "Youth House" for rehabilitation of IDP and local children, 13 educational courses free of charge), IRC (in Zugdidi and Kutaisi has organized counseling in schools), International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent (in Samegrelo has implemented Civic Development Program with 7 centers in Zugdidi, Senaki, Chkhorotsku, Khobi, Jvari and Pot i), USIA and Zugdidi Regional Chamber of Commerce (in Zugdidi are planning to form group of 10 leaders of local NGOs to send for 3-5-week practice to US), Charity center "Aphkhazeti" (in Samegrelo and Imereti implements project for development of youth with 8 clubs for 17-years old IDP children to learn English, Computer skills, leadership, etc to train further their fellows), Youth organization "Davitiani" (in Kutaisi organizes free groups for children in business, foreign languages, computer skills, arts and science), UNAG (in Kutaisi has organized "Children's Forum" engaging some 40 IDP children), DRC (in Imereti has financed Karate Do Federation to train 15 IDP children for 1 year), Foundation "Favoriti" (in Batumi together with USAID has organized youth development club to learn English, computer skills, conflictology to communicate with Abkhaz counterparts; also they send 5 children a year to G. Mason University together with Abkhaz children; they

have established Sunday school and Debate Club, send children to summer camp in Likani, organized different courses with some 150 children participating in them).

Despite this substantial list of activities most of IDP children are ostracized from participation in them simply because of lack of funding. Much more needs to be done. The most vulnerable group still is that of IDP children who are frequently placed under pressure coming from their homes, schools, and neighborhoods. Name "IDP" has become a shameful label for them." (UNA 2000)

See also "Monitoring of Legal and Actual Status of Internally Displaced Persons in Georgia", section 2 on Education (pp. 10-14), report by the Georgian Young Lawyer Association [Internal link]

ISSUES OF SELF-RELIANCE AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

Issues of self-reliance

Employment opportunities of the displaced are constrained by the difficult economic situation (2000)

· Internally displaced could benefit from training on new employment practices in the market economy · Other useful programmes include vocational training, support to small business development and micro-credit · Young women sometime turn to prostitution to earn sufficient income to move out of the collective centres

"In addition to limited access to land and ownership of livestock, the IFRC survey also found that local households were five times more likely than internally displaced persons to own a car, van or truck. As the IFRC point out, this is an important difference as a car, van or truck can be put to productive use and thus become a source of income.

As to employment opportunities for the displaced, these are constrained by the general economic situation of the country as a whole: national unemployment stands at a rate of 26 per cent. Even so, it was pointed out that internally displaced persons could benefit from skills training as well as training to familiarize them with new employment practices that have been introduced with the shift to a market economy – a transition which has largely occurred during their period of displacement and unemployment. The food-for-work programmes operated by the World Food Programme provide a means both for meeting food needs and re- engaging displaced persons in productive employment. Another important initiative is the vocational training programme run by the International Rescue Committee (IRC) in Zugdidi, which the Representative visited. The programme provides training in languages, computer skills and trades such as carpentry. Furthermore, once participants have completed the training, they are assisted in making contacts with prospective employers.

In some cases, employers may be internally displaced persons themselves. For instance, the mission visited a tea enterprise owned by an internally displaced person who had relocated his business from Sukhumi, Abkhazia, to Tskhaltubo in Imereti region. Special efforts were made by the owner to hire internally displaced persons, who accounted for 80 per cent of the workforce in the factory and 50 per cent of field labourers. Moreover, they were provided with bus transportation from the communal centres, which were some distance away, to and from the enterprise.

New business development also is needed. Important support for this purpose is provided by the business incubator programme run by the IRC in Zugdidi, alongside the IRC vocational training programme noted above. The programme provides physical space for fostering small business, with a resource centre and access to business services, expertise and advice, as well as a credit programme. Though neither the business incubator nor the training programme is specifically targeted to internally displaced persons, they are actively encouraged to participate and information about the programme is disseminated in the collective centres. In addition, among the criteria for businesses to be accepted into the programme is a commitment to hire a certain percentage of internally displaced persons. Another component of the programme is a micro -credit scheme, of which internally displaced persons constitute an estimated 65 per cent of the beneficiaries.

Ensuring that small business development support and micro-credit opportunities reach internally displaced women, as well as men, is essential. In the absence of such alternatives , the problem of young women turning to prostitution to earn sufficient income to move out of the collective centres was noted. Both in Tbilisi and in the regions, the delegation met with members of women’s organizations active in promoting business opportunities for internally displaced women. For example, small business development is one focus of activities of the NGO 'Sokhumi', formed in 1997 by and for professional internally displaced women, which now has a membership of over 100. Such women’s organizations and their goals - skills training, business development and credit support for women - merit strong support." (UN CHR 25 January 2001, paras. 44-48)

Displaced families are more affected by unemployment and rely mainly on the IDP benefits granted by the State (2000)

· Unemployment rate among the displaced population is twice to three times higher as for the local population · A sure sign of poverty is the higher expenditure on food of IDPs, and especially those in collective centres · Some vulnerable groups, such as households with no earner, are more commonly represented among the displaced than in the rest of the population · IDP benefits contribute on average to most of the budget of displaced families

"Employment, income, and housing are the principal concerns. The employment figures suggest that IDPs, and especially those living in collective centres, are severely handicapped as regards employment in comparison with the local population. The unemployment rate of IDPs in private accommodation is twice as high as that of the local population, that of IDPs in collective centres is three times as high. Wage employment, which is the principal source of household income for the average urban household is, similarly, higher in the local population than among IDPs in private accommodation, and almost twice as high as for IDPs in collective centres.

Incomes (from all sources) are correspondingly higher for the local population. What matters for policy purposes is not total income, but income before government assistance. From the information available it is probable that incomes of the local population exceed those of IDPs in private accommodation by about a third and are about those of IDPs in collective centres. The effect of government assistance is to reduce this gap, bringing IDPs in private accommodation close to equality with the local population as regards income, but still leaving IDPs in collective centres with substantially lower incomes.

The difference between the three groups is substantiated by the higher expenditure on food of IDPs, and especially those in collective centres, as a percentage of total consumption expenditure,a sure sign of poverty. The much greater possession among local households of durables, such as television sets or washing machines, points in the same direction.

There is widespread economic insecurity among the local population as well as IDPs. It is of note that most IDPs are reluctant to borrow money, in most cases for the reason that they believe they cannot pay it back. It is a reflection of their misery that most of those who borrow, do so to buy food. Indeed, the reported incomes in all sections of the population are dismally low. Even if allowance is made for underreporting of income and comsumption expenditure (used as a substitute for income) it is likely that the great majority of both IDPs and the local population are below the Government's informal poverty line." (IFRC November 2000, pp. 7-8)

"The survey also found that some vulnerable groups, such as households with no earner, are more commonly represented among IDPs and particularly by those living in collective centres. Whereas households consisting of the elderly (who receive an abysmally low pension) are more commonly found in the local population. Since IDPs constitute only six percent of the population, the local population evidently contains more vulnerable households in absolute terms than the IDP community. The survey points to a selectivity in polices, focusing on the areas where IDPs are more vulnerable such as employment and housing." (IFRC 2 November 2000)

See also World Bank Report, "Georgia: Poverty Update", 10 January 2002 [Internet]

See also documents from the survey conducted by Save the Children in western Georgia, February 2000:

· The Amount of Monthly and Yearly Transfers (in USD) to Households in the General Population and IDPs Living in Communal Facilities in Samegrelo, Imereti and Guria, February 2000 [Internet]

· Worst Districts in Western Georgia for Micro & Small Business, February 2000 [Internet]

· Comparison of The Structure of Monthly Income for Households in the General Population and IDP Families Living in Communal Facilities in Imereti and Samegrelo, February 2000 [Internet]

· The Structure of Monthly Income for IDP Families Living in Communal Facilities in Imereti and Samegrelo in January 2000, February 2000 [Internet]

See also "Cumulative Report on IDP employment issue", UN Association of Georgia, 2000 [Internet]

Many barriers to the agricultural sustainability of the displaced population (2000)

· Under Georgian Law, an internally displaced person is not entitled to own land without losing the status of internally displaced person and the benefits that it entails · 1996 Law on Internally Displaced Persons provides for the allocation of land plots to the displaced for temporary use · Internally displaced persons have pointed to problems of corruption · Only 9 percent of the internally displaced persons own livestock, whereas this figure is 47 per cent for local households · Internally displaced persons concentrate the use of their assets on simply meeting their subsistence needs and cannot rarely generate extra income · The agricultural cooperative programme run by Action Against Hunger (AAH) provides a good example of how to create income-generating opportunities

"To be sure, the difficult economic conditions in the country, in large part associated with the sudden transition towards a market economy and the disruption of this process by conflict, mean that employment and income-generating opportunities remain rather limited. This is true for the general population as well as the internally displaced. Indeed, a Save the Children Fund (SCF) survey found that the internally displaced and the general population reported an approximately equal amount of median monetized income during the survey period (January 2000). However, the general population reported considerably higher levels of non-monetized sources of income than the internally displaced.

Access to land is the primary determinant of this discrepancy. The World Bank, in a report on poverty and income distribution in Georgia, singled out land ownership as the most important factor affecting poverty in

rural areas, noting that 'landless households have a higher poverty risk and depth of poverty than households who own more than one hectare'. Under Georgian law, however, an internally displaced person is not entitled to own land without registering as a permanent resident in the place of refuge and potentially (the law is not clear on this) losing the status of internally displaced person and the benefits that this entails. Internally displaced persons reportedly fear that they would then lose their right to return. This fear is of course unfounded, for as citizens they would retain their right to freedom of movement and choice of residence. It was suggested that this mistaken assumption may have been cultivated by elements of the political leadership that are bent on return and concerned that ties to the land will literally ground the displaced in their present location and diminish their interest in return. For these reasons, those internally displaced persons who have the means to purchase land or residential property reportedly tend to do so secretly, outside of the normal legal processes.

As many displaced nonetheless still lack the financial means to purchase land, they should at least be given the opportunity to lease or otherwise have access to plots of land. According to the Law on Internally Displaced Persons, local authorities are obliged to provide internally displaced persons with plots of land for temporary use. Some regional authorities affirmed that they had indeed provided displaced persons with the possibility of using plots of land on a temporary basis. However, internally displaced persons have pointed to problems of corruption, noting that if they did not pay 'extra expenses' when requesting plots of land, they either did not receive it or received land of such poor quality and so far from their accommodation that it would not be worthwhile to use it.

Working on the land is where the skills of many of the internally displaced lie, as large numbers of them were engaged in agricultural activity prior to their displacement. Resuming such activity would enable internally displaced persons to grow food to feed their families and, with any surplus, to generate income to meet other needs and generally improve the economic situation of the household.

As with the issue of access to land, the World Bank has found that ownership of livestock reduces the risk of poverty in a rural household. By livestock is meant a range of different types of animals, such as pigs, cows and chickens. A recent survey by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) found that whereas 47 per cent of local households owned livestock, for internally displaced persons this figure was only 9 per cent. When calculated in terms of an odds ratio, local households were almost nine times more likely than internally d isplaced persons to own livestock.

Given their limited access to land and low rate of livestock ownership, internally displaced persons must concentrate their use of these assets on simply meeting their subsistence needs. All those internally displaced persons surveyed who own livestock or have some access to land reported using it entirely for their own household consumption. Support clearly is needed not only for ensuring food security but also creating income-generating opportunities from agricultural p roduction.

The agricultural cooperative programme run by Action Against Hunger (AAH) provides a good example of how to do so. In the village of Tsaishi, outside of Zugdidi, the mission had the opportunity to visit two of eight cooperatives sponsored by AAH in the Samegrelo region. The cooperatives have a membership of 800 persons (100 in each), of whom 60 per cent are internally displaced persons and 40 per cent are members of the local population, all selected on the basis of vulnerability. In order to provide support to women heads of household in particular, women are to comprise a minimum of 25 per cent of the beneficiaries. The objectives of the programme are to provide food security by ensuring the availability of staple food for the beneficiaries and, once this goal is met, to support income-generating agricultural activities through the sale of surplus production from farming and animal husbandry. Financial and material support provided by AAH is progressively to be reduced, while the contribution of the beneficiaries is to increase, with a view to reaching full sustainability by the end of the third year. State land is leased from the local authorities by AAH which, though paying for the lease in the first year, expects participants to do so beginning in the second year, using profits made from production in the first. Another aim of the programme, thus, is to facilitate the beneficiaries’ legal access to land, through AAH transferring to them responsibility for the lease, which is for a period of five years.

Notwithstanding this time frame, AAH noted that most of the internally displaced persons participating in the programme still plan to return home. Indeed this intention was expressly stated by the internally displaced with whom the delegation met at the cooperative sites. It thus appears that when it comes to issues of self-sufficiency and income -generation, there is not the psychological barrier that arises when relocation out of collective centres (where most of the cooperative participants live) is discussed. People appear to have a longer-term vision or perhaps have come to grips with the reality of not being able to return safely in the immediate future and the need to lead productive lives in the interim.

The AAH cooperative programme clearly is working to the benefit of the internally displaced and could advantageously be expanded and replicated. It was thus a matter of concern that, at the time of the mission, funding for the AAH programme from the European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO) was expected to be dramatically decreased. This programme and others like it merit strong support. They are critical to bridging the 'relief to development gap' and enabling the displaced and others who have been dependent on humanitarian assistance for several years to resume productive lives." (UN CHR 25 January 2001, paras. 35-43)

"According to Law on IDPs, IDPs should be provided with plots of land and they should have the right of temporary users in these plots. This is obligation of local authorities. During questioning cases have been discovered when IDPs directly pointed on corruption: while requesting the plot of land if they did not pay "extra expenses" they either did not receive land (because limited land fund), or received it but of such a poor quality and so far from places of their settlement, that there was no sense in using the land. Besides the general responsibility of providing lands to IDPs, there is no program designed for assistance during cultivation of land. While it is impossible to cultivate the land without necessary equipment." (GYLA 1999, pp. 19-20)

See also

Summary of baseline data for selected target communities in three regions of West Georgia: Imereti, Guria and Samegrelo, UMCOR, CAP Agricultural Assessment Team, Kutaisi, 31 May 2000 [Internet: http://www.assistancegeorgia.org.ge/common/categories/agreculture/acpsurvey.pdf]

Rapid Appraisal of Agriculture in Guria, Imereti and Samegrelo Regions of West Georgia, Save the Children, July 2000 [Internet]

Household and Small Commercial Agriculture in Guria, Imereti and Samegrelo as of January 2000, Save the Children, 17 August 2000 [Internet]

Reports from the Georgia Assistance Initiative (Save the Children Survey in western Georgia, February 2000):

· Agriculture Production in 1999 by Households in the General Population and IDPs living in Communal Centres in West Georgia [Internet]

· Amount of Potatoes Grown by Urban and Rural Households in the General Population by District in Samegrelo, Imereti and Guria [Internet]

· Ownership of Poultry by Households in the General Population and IDPs living in Communal Facilities in Guria, Imereti and Samegrelo [Internet]

· Ownership of Cows by Households in the General Population and IDPs Living in Communal Facilities in Guria, Imereti and Samegrelo [Internet]

· Amount of Land Used by Households in the General Population and IDPs living in Communal Facilities by District, in Guria, Imereti and Samegrelo [Internet] and [Internet]

· Percentage of Households in the General Population and IDPs Living in Communal Facilities That do not have Land to Produce Food [Internet]

Poor economic situation in South Ossetia hampers large-scale return of the displaced (2000-2001)

· The situation of the displaced, returnees and the local population is extremely difficult · Returnees stay only in their houses during the cultivating season and go back to Georgia proper during the winter months · Displaced persons of working age remain in Georgia proper or North Ossetia, where economic and employment opportunities are comparatively better · There is a need to support the general economic development of the region

"In the Soviet Period the region's mines, factories, and farms supplied raw materials to markets across the Soviet Union and the mountainous regions of Java were dotted with resorts and tourist bases. The collapse of the Soviet economy, however, coupled with the impact of the conflict, has produced a grim economic climate. As such, the situation for IDPs, returnees and large segment of the domicile population is poor and rather desperate. The lack of potential for improvement in the immediate future is a crucial factor in the low number of returnees." (UN OCHA 15 March 2001)

"Though the number of returns to South Ossetia is, as noted above, much greater than to Georgia proper, it must be said that, for many returnees to South Ossetia, return is only semi -permanent. As an indication of the semi-permanent nature of return, it was estimated that about 50 per cent of rehabilitated houses in the region are unoccupied for a significant part of the year, usually during the winter months outside of the cultivating season and when the weather is warmer in other parts of Georgia. The poor economic situation in the region relative to that in Georgia proper and North Ossetia is the primary factor for this seasonal population movement. In general, and certainly with respect to those who remain permanently, most of the returnees coming from outside of South Ossetia are pensioners and elderly persons, whereas displaced persons of working age remain in Georgia proper or North Ossetia, where economic and employment opportunities, though still limited, are comparatively better (it was suggested that the living standard in South Ossetia is about half of what it is elsewhere in Georgia). UNHCR has observed that more sustainable return has occurred since it began providing returnees with agricultural inputs.

There is also a need to support the general economic development of the region. Though Tskhinvali was said to have previously been an industrial centre, there was little evidence of this as a result of the destruction of infrastructure and industry that had resulted from the war. To be sure, reconstruction has begun: the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), for instance, noted that it had invested over 2 million dollars in development projects over the past two years, especially in infrastructure. However, UNDP-funded development projects in the region were scheduled to end and there is no expectation of further funding in the future. Sustained reconstruction and development assistance is required. The delegation’s chance encounter with a delegation of parliamentarians and business leaders from a donor country, who had come to dialogue with the authorities on the issue of development investment in the region, was a hopeful sign." (UNCHR 25 January 2001, paras. 102-103)

State policy to support the self-reliance capacity of the displaced: a review by the Georgian Young Lawyer Association (1999)

· Internally displaced persons are entitled to a small monthly financial assistance by the State which is often distributed with delay · Other forms of assistance include positive discrimination on the labour market, allocation of land plots, and free and partially free access to various service benefits · The Government is considering enforcing a ban on free street trade, which represents a major source of income for the displaced · The increasing transfer of public services to the private sector reduces the right of the displaced to a free access to these services to almost nothing

"Legal base

· Financial aid - The Law on Internally Displaced Persons and Annual Budget Law establish monthly financial aid to IDPs amounting on average 2 - 3 US Dollar equivalent in GEL(?!). At times the state tries to increase this amount. In 1998 Budget Law it is stated that ' Amounts of financial aid and other payments provided to population (including IDPs) by the government for social security purposes shall be increased by 10 % per first and third quarters of 1998'. · Employment - The same legislation subjects IDPs to so called positive discrimination (affirmative action), which in case of staff reduction at public organizations gives them a priority. · Tax benefits - are not provided. · Agricultural land - According to Law on Internally Displaced Persons IDPs must be provided with plots of land in the right of temporary user. · Service benefits - According to different legislative acts IDPs holding such status, and individuals holding the status handicapped, invalid, or veterans of war are eligible to different kinds of benefits. For example, while using public transport, telephone communication network, electricity supply, while treatment in public sanatoriums or while taking Identity Cards etc, law completely or partially exempts them from the fees.

Financing and sources

Here again we have to repeat ourselves and say, that the state takes on much more responsibilities and obligations than it can actually afford financially. Thus in the most of cases there is big difference between “wishes” expressed in laws and real capabilities. Besides there is another interesting moment. Often the state’s obligation to provide benefits covers only services in public sector, in which the services are very limited and some of them are completely in private sector, thus often the law becomes meaningless.

Actual situation

Financial aid - monthly financial aid established by law is too small to be considered as an effective assistance from the state. To this add delays in distribution of aid. Allocated money often is not distributed in time, while if IDP does not take the money in three months running, he loses it. We also have to mention here periodical and one-time aid provided by government mainly in winter periods. Such aid often takes the form of distribution of products and heating fuel. However, while questioning the IDPs the respondents often mentioned cases when their information about one-time aid did not coincide with the picture of aid received in fact. Naturally, there is a question: where does such aid disappear?

Employment - as we have mentioned IDPs are subjected to so called positive discrimination. Situation with IDPs’ employment is critical. The state is practically unable to create jobs, while positive discrimination does not include private sector, thus better qualified people are accepted to work. However, the state does not do anything about re-qualification of IDPs. Majority of IDPs search for jobs themselves without expecting anything from the state. The most widespread kind of activity is trade. This particularly concerns IDPs living in urban areas, where market-like trading sites and streets are full of IDPs. There were many cases when IDPs collectively manifested against the government, when it decided to prohibit trade in

streets. The state’s intention to prohibit “markets” in their existing form is very logical. Because with respect to control of income generated there or from hygienic security purposes the situation at such markets is out of control. Although it was taken into account that outdoor trade is practically the only source of income for IDPs (and not only for them) and making of the final decision on this issue has been postponed several times nobody knows till when. The problem is very sensitive and requires serious approach.

Tax benefits - taxation system of the country is not completely established yet and the Tax Code is under the process of permanent changes. Article 10 of the Tax Code established conditions for the exemption from VAT, namely, according to Paragraph 1 of the Article the services rendered for the care of the sick, invalids and the very old shall be exempted from VAT. On May 1, 1998 the following phrase was added to the paragraph (w) :' and the services rendered to refugees and IDPs in Collective Housing Centers', though this amendment survived only until December 30, 1998. Thus tax benefits provided to IDPs two years ago do not exist any longer.

Agricultural land - According to Law on IDPs , IDPs should be provided with plots of land and they should have the right of temporary users in these plots. This is obligation of local authorities. During questioning cases have been discovered when IDPs directly pointed on corruption: while requesting the plot of land if they did not pay 'extra expenses' they either did not receive land (because of limited land fund), or received it but of such a poor quality and so far from places of their settlement, that there was no sense in using the land. Besides the general responsibility of providing lands to IDPs, there is no program designed for assistance during cultivation of land. While it is impossible to cultivate the land without necessary equipment.

Service benefits - those spheres of services in which the state as if provides benefits to IDPs in fact have long been privatized and are no longer in public sector. In Tbilisi IDP can use his right to free transportation if travelling by underground, in other towns however there is no underground and other transport is regulated by (private) market. Situation is the same in respect with communication, medical treatment and other spheres, which (if not already) are privatized and get in private sector. Thus benefits mentioned above are nothing else but mere fiction.

Conclusions and recommendations

The problem of timely distribution of monthly financial aid must be regulated in a better way;

Provisions of law, establishing that IDPs, not having taken financial aid running for some period of time, lose their right to that money, must be abolished.

An effective program for re-qualification and increasing the level of qualification of IDPs must be designed. This will allow them be compatible at the labor market. "(GYLA 1999, pp. 17-20)

Public participation

IDPs stage demonstrations against national authorities and international organisations (2001-2002)

· IDPs in the Zugdidi sector protest against failure of national and international authorities to restore return-conducive conditions · They also demand the timely payment of their benefits by the Georgian authorities · Freedom of movement of UNOMIG personel has been occasionally restricted by demonstrators

· Protests by IDPs in Tbilisi have also been reported

"In the Zugdidi sector, UNOMIG patrols were on occasion confronted with demonstrations by internally displaced persons, who are becoming increasingly critical of the Georgian central authorities, as well as of the CIS peacekeeping force and international organizations, because of their perceived incapacity to achieve progress in creating conditions for return. In one incident a patrol vehicle was hit by a stone, and in another a patrol was temporarily encircled and had equipment stolen from it before being allowed to proceed.

UNOMIG's freedom of movement was restricted for a total of three weeks in January and February when internally displaced persons blocked the major ceasefire line crossing points. In response, UNOMIG had to temporarily introduce restrictions on patrolling in th Zugdidi sector." (UN SC 19 April 2002, paras. 18-19)

"Popular demonstrations are a feature of the region, primarily by the politicised of disaffected local population or IDPs demanding improvement of their social-economic condition, timely payment of benefits, and progress in negotiations on return and settlement. On 30 September 2001, for example, the bridge along the Inguri river was blocked by approximately 150 locals blaming local authorities for neglect of their poor living conditions. There were also several cases of denial of freedom of movement to UNOMIG escorts. The protesters were not hostile, but wanted the patrol to contact the authorities so that the unpaid benefits, allowances and salaries would be distributed." (UN OCHA 9 November 2001)

Reports of demonstrations by IDPs in Tbilisi:

UN Association of Georgia, "Georgia: IDPs demand Abkhazia status determination", 20 June 2002 [Internet]

RFE/RL, "Displaced persons threaten to renounce Georgian citizenship", 28 March 2002 [Internet]

Political participation of the internally displaced: current legal frame work needs to be reformed (2000)

· In parliamentary elections, internally displaced persons may vote for the nationwide or proportional list only and not for the representative to Parliament from the district in which they are “temporarily” residing · Provision is made instead to extend the mandates of the eight deputies from Abkhazia until such a time as elections can be held there, while the two South Ossetian seats remain vacant · Internally displaced are concerned that by voting for the local candidate they would be accepting the de facto territorial situation and would thereby relinquish their right to return · In accordance with the “Law of Georgia on Elections of Local Representative Bodies”, internally displaced persons do not have the right to vote at all in local elections · A review of the electoral legislation was due to be undertaken by the OSCE during the course of 2000 · Impact of new legislation on local elections and and local self-government adopted in 2001 on IDPs' political rights has not been assessed

"It has been observed that '[w]ith its recent experience of war and anarchy, it may be surprising that Georgia has emerged as stable and as democratic as it is now. Most political institutions, including the government and leading political parties, explicitly acknowledge and support democratic values and rights. By the standards of the region democracy works well in practice.'67 However, there is still much to be done: '[d]emocracy remains a vaguely understood notion for many in power and for much of the

population' - not least among them, the 280,000 persons who remain internally displaced following still unresolved internal conflicts in the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.68 In parliamentary and local elections which have taken place since the entry into force of the 1995 Constitution, the internally displaced in Georgia have experienced a rather different and limited notion of democracy and political participation compared to their non-displaced compatriots; moreover, it is a discrepancy which is enshrined in national legislation.

Parliamentary elections were held in Georgia in October 1999. Pursuant to the relevant constitutional provisions, the Parliament is elected by a mixed election system whereby 150 seats are allocated proportionally through nationwide party lists and the remaining 85 seats through single-seat constituencies on the basis of free, universal, equal and direct suffrage.69 The constitutional provisions are elaborated upon more fully in the 1995 'Organic Law of Georgia on Parliamentary Elections,' Article 33(1) of which provides that: 'Forcefully displaced persons shall be included in the voter’s lists according to their present places of residence. A separate list shall be compiled for displaced persons and they shall not participate in the majority elections held in single-mandate districts.' Thus, internally displaced persons may vote for the nationwide or proportional list only and not for the representative to Parliament from the district in which they are 'temporarily' residing. Provision is made instead to extend the mandates of the eight deputies from Abkhazia until such a time as elections can be held there, while the two South Ossetian seats remain vacant.70

The Government maintains that its position on voting rights for internally displaced persons accords with the wishes of the internally displaced.71 Indeed, there are genuine concerns among some of the internally displaced that by voting for the local candidate they would be accepting the de facto territorial situation and would thereby relinquish their right to return to their homes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.72 Such fears, which are not dispelled by the Government for political reasons, are of course flawed: the right to return to one’s place of origin and the right to vote at the local level for the person who can work to influence one’s current conditions are not mutually exclusive. There is no reasonable or objective reason why the internally displaced should not vote for the representative of the area in which they are “temporarily” residing and at the same time not maintain the right to return, when the necessary conditions are achieved.

The position of the internally displaced in Georgia vis-à-vis political participation has been the subject of only limited scrutiny by ODIHR. In its report on the 1995 parliamentary elections (in which the same legal provisions applied as during the 1999 elections), ODIHR’s concerns were essentially of a practical nature: that the presence of large numbers of internally dis placed persons at polling stations might impede the effective operation of some polling stations. It reported that during the election '[m]ost [internally displaced persons] knew their rights under the law” though in some cases “quarrels broke out when those not familiar with the voting provisions demanded the [majoritarian] ballot. For the most part the process was orderly as the [internally displaced] were known to the officials in the new areas in which they are resident.'73 There was no comment on the nature of the law itself. This may be explained by the fact that until 1996, ODIHR’s observation activities worked on the basis that election observation was a 'one-day event' with little analysis of pre-election events.74 Although the Budapest Summit in December 1994 broadened ODIHR’s mandate to encompass a longer-term approach and take into account the entire election cycle, including the registration of voters and candidates, campaigning, the role of the media, voting, counting, declaration of results and instalment into office of those elected,75 it was not until 1996 that the office was provided with the requisite financial and human resources to implement this new approach.

Nonetheless, in the case of Georgia, there is still need for improvement in the implementation of the new approach vis-à-vis voting by the internally displaced. In a press statement on the 1998 local elections which were held in accordance with the “Law of Georgia on Elections of Local Representative Bodies” and under which internally displaced persons do not have the right to vote at all,76 OSCE only went as far as to suggest the need to review the 'principles on the voting of temporary residents.'77 ODIHR’s report on the 1999 parliamentary elections showed a welcome improvement in its stance on the issue, noting that the 'partial participation of [internally displaced persons] in the electoral process raises questions in terms of equality of rights.'78 Reference was made also to the relevant provisions of the Guiding Principles on

Internal Displacement. However, while the report contains a section of quite specific recommendations, none explicitly address the question of equality of rights for the internally displaced, except in so far as stating that the 'legal framework for elections in Georgia should be reviewed comprehensively in order to address the concerns outlined in this report.'79 A review of the electoral legislation was due to be undertaken by ODIHR during the course of 2000, so as to improve the electoral framework and follow up on its recommendations.80 To date, the review has not yet begun.

Political participation by the internally displaced in Georgia was one of a number of issues discussed at a regional workshop on internal displacement in the South Caucasus, co-sponsored by ODIHR, the Brookings Institution Project on Internal Displacement and the Norwegian Refugee Council.81 NGO participants drew attention to the problem and a representative of the Government, while conceding that the policy may need revision, sought to explain the reasoning behind it, noting that under the old propiska system a person is tied to their place of permanent residence. Moreover, if the Government were to extend to an internally displaced person the full rights to which they are entitled back in their place of residence it would effectively legitimise 'ethnic cleansing.' As follow-up to the workshop, ODIHR and the Brookings Project plan to support a programme whereby NGOs in Georgia, as well as Armenia and Azerbaijan, will review existing national laws and practices, including in regard to political participation, in terms of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and make appropriate recommendations for reform." (Bagshaw September 2000, pp. 17-20)

Endnotes: 67 UNDP, Human Development Report: Georgia 1998 (1999) 19. 68 See UNHCR, 1998 Global Report: Achievements and Impact (June 1999) 418. This figure includes also 40,000 persons who were displaced by the resumption of hostilities in Gali (Abkhazia) in May 1998. Of these 280,000, 96 percent originated from Abkhazia, while the remainder were ethnic Georgians from South Ossetia. 69 Art. 49(1), Constitution of the Republic of Georgia. 70 Chapter IX of the 1995 Election Law, concerning “Transitional Provisions for the 1999 Parliamentary Elections” provides in Art. 59: “Before the complete restoration of the jurisdiction of Abkhazia and before the necessary conditions are created for the elections of members of the Parliament of Georgia: (a) Citizens elected from Abkhazia as a result of the 1992 elections who are members of the Parliament of Georgia by the time of the enforcement of this Law, shall have their mandate as members of Parliament extended. As soon as elections for Parliament are held in the single mandate districts of Abkhazia and the authority of those members are acknowledged, the mandate of a Member of Parliament who had extended authority shall be terminated.” 71 See OSCE/ODIHR, Brookings Institution Project on Internal Displacement and Norwegian Refugee Council, Regional Workshop on Internal Displacement in the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia) May 10-12, 2000. Summary Report (June 2000). [Internet] 72 As ODIHR’s final report on the 1999 Parliamentary Elections notes, “[r]epresentatives from the Citizens Union of Georgia [the ruling party], stated that IDPs prefer not to vote in the single-member ballot as to do so would mean that they have taken permanent residence. This in turn would mean loss of state benefits and a mistaken belief that they have relinquished their rights to return to their homes in Abkhazia or South Ossetia.” OSCE/ODIHR, Georgia: Parliamentary Elections, 31 October and 14 November 1999. Final Report (7 February 2000) [Internet] 16. Of course, the extent to which the CUG speaks on behalf of the internally displaced may be open to question. 73 OSCE/ODIHR Report on the Georgian Elections of 5 November 1995 (17 November 1995) 5-6. 74 See ODIHR, The ODIHR Election Observation Handbook (April 1999). 75 Ibid. See also section VIII of the CSCE “Budapest Document–Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era” (1994). 76 Pursuant to Art. 36, internally displaced persons from Abkhazia and South Ossetia shall not participate in the first local governments elections. 77 OSCE Mission to Georgia, Press Statement on Local Elections 15 November 1998 (17 November 1998). 78 OSCE/ODIHR, note 72 above, at 16. 79 Ibid., at 91.

80 A description of the project may be viewed at: www.osce.org/odihr/cal2000_ea.htm#p14 81 See note 71 above. (Bagshaw September 2000, pp. 17-20)

On 21 December 2000, the Constitutional Court of Georgia issued a decision rejecting claims that the national legislation violates the right of the internally displaced to participate in elections. See translation of the decision (unofficial translation provided by the Georgian Young Lawyers Association) [Internal link]

On 2 August 2001, meeting in extra-plenary session, the Georgian parliament finally adopted in the second and final reading the law on local self-government and local elections. It also passed amendments to the law on elections. Effects of this new legislation on political rights of the displaced have not been assessed yet. See RFE/RL: "Two Down, One to Go", in Caucasus Report, Volume 4, Number 29, 13 August 2001 [Internet]

See also Monitoring of Legal and Actual Status of Internally Displaced Persons in Georgia, Section 5 "Political Rights", Georgian Young Lawyers Association, Tbilisi 1999 [Internal link]

Parallel structures of governance function as an assistance network for the displaced from Abkhazia (2001)

· The creation of a government-in-exile has allowed many displaced to keep their jobs · The Supreme Council, which was the highest legislative body in the AR of Abkhazia before the war, was reconstructed in 1995 · The government-in-exile's hard-line stance on Abkhazia has been an obstacle to many peace initiatives

"After the Georgian population fled Abkhazia in the autumn of 1993, they restored the Georgian segment of executive power from Abkhazia to create a virtual government-in -exile with the intent of making it easier for people to trace relatives, find accommodations, benefit from humanitarian assistance and otherwise cope with their displacement. Each ministry or department of the central Georgian government allowed its counterpart from the AR of Abkhazia to use its facilities to register staff who had worked before the war for the same organisation in Abkhazia.

By retaining these structures of government, some of the displaced were able to continue to work, not just in the government bureaucracy, but also as teachers, doctors and other specialists. For example, the exiled Ministry of Public Health provided the displaced population with qualified medical assistance and distributed medicines among the most vulnerable persons. The creation of two polyclinics for the displaced in Tbilisi and several others in other areas, including Zugdidi and Kutaisi, allowed the disabled, newborn, pregnant women and elderly among the displaced population to be registered for special assistance. Although these polyclinics are not well equipped, they do have qualified professional personnel on staff.

Administrative structures from Abkhazia were also revived, so a displaced person who lost identity documents during the flight could apply for new documents to the municipality of his/her city in exile. The displaced also have their own military commissariat, tax authorities, police force and many other institutions and agencies.

The Supreme Council, which was the highest legislative body in the AR of Abkhazia before the war, was reconstructed in 1995 following a decision by the Georgian Parliament. According to an election law adopted shortly before the war, the Abkhazian minority in Abkhazia had a special quota for representation in the Supreme Council. Representing 17.8 per cent of Abkhazia, they had 28 seats in the Supreme Council; Georgians, who represented 45,6 per cent of the population, held 26 seats. Eleven more deputies

represented Abkhazia's other ethnic communities. The reconstructed Supreme council consist of 24 deputies.

Both the Abkhazian Council of Ministers and the Supreme Council of the AR of Abkhazia in exile say they represent the displaced in Georgia, and the official Georgian government recognises them as representatives of the displaced community. Yet both bodies maintain a radical position regarding the conflict-resolution process, a position that is not shared by a large part of the displaced community. The government-in-exile's hard-line stance on Abkhazia has been an obstacle to many peace initiatives developed in Georgia proper and by the displaced population itself." (Kharashvili 2001, pp. 234-235)

2000 Presidential elections: Internally displaced were able to vote in the district of their temporary residence (9 April 2000)

· The Zugdidi Election Commission established polling stations for residents of Gali District · Mobile ballot boxes were also located close to the main bridge over the Inguri River, which separates Abkhazia from the rest of Georgia · Numbers of registered internally displaced according to UNHCR and the Georgian authorities varie

"Voter Lists and Civil Registers

[Precinct Election Commissions] are mandated to compile voter lists and post them publicly no later than 30 days before the election. Central and local authorities assist in the compilation of the lists. Citizens permanently residing on the territory of a given precinct and internally displaced persons (IDPs) currently living there are registered in the precinct. IDPs appear on a separate voter list." (OSCE 9 June 2000, sect. IV)

"Internally Displaced Persons

The conflicts in Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia and Abkhazia produced approximately 198,000 internally displaced (IDP) voters. The largest concentrations are in Tbilisi and Samegrelo Region, particularly Zugdidi District. Regrettably, elections could not be held in Abkhazia and parts of Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia, but IDPs were able to vote in the Districts of their temporary residence. In addition, the Zugdidi DEC established polling stations for residents of Gali District. Also, mobile ballot boxes were located close to the main bridge over the Inguri River, which separates Abkhazia from the rest of Georgia.

Displaying and Amending Voter Lists

Technical and organisational delays prevented a significant number of PECs from displaying the voter lists on time. Where voter lists were publicly displayed, they were not compiled according to uniform criteria across the country.

Observers noted that, in some districts the number of registered voters varied substantially for different elections. Also, registered IDP numbers according to UNHCR and the Georgian authorities varied.

The Georgian authorities should take immediate measures to improve the registration procedures before the municipal elections scheduled for the fall of 2001. The issuance of new identification documents to citizens should be finalised before these elections in order to create reliable data for the compilation of voter lists." (OSCE 9 June 2000, sect. IV)

Displaced persons under pressure not to demand their right to vote (2000)

· Abkhaz political structures in exile have an interest in discouraging internally displaced from voting · IDPs should be explained that exercise their right to political participation does not negate their right to return

"It was also suggested that the issue of political participation by the displaced has been manipulated by political forces bent on the return of the population and regain of territorial control over Abkhazia. Specifically, it was widely alleged that they have pressured internally displaced persons to refrain from demanding their right to vote by suggesting that in so doing the displaced will somehow lose their right to return. It thus is important not only to amend the electoral law but also to counter this misinformation by explaining to internally displaced persons that exercising their right to full political participation in the areas where they currently reside in no way negates their right to return.

Moreover, the representatives from Abkhazia, whose mandate continue to be extended indefinitely, also have an interest in discouraging internally displaced persons from voting in order to maintain their own positions. Their legitimacy, however, is beginning to be questioned by internally displaced persons. However, because the displaced often depend upon the parallel system of services provided by the Government in Exile, they may feel compelled to refrain from openly expressing discontent with the current arrangement and demanding their right to vote for local and regional representatives. The reality is much more complex that the suggestion that internally displaced persons are simply apathetic in pressing for their right to full political participation.

Local NGOs pointed out that they had proposed that internally displaced persons at least be able to elect new representatives, but the Government had refused. The most appropriate corrective measure, however, would be for the legislation on electoral participation to be revised to enable internally displaced persons to participate in the election of local and regional representatives for the areas in which they currently reside. As note above, a number of senior government officials at the national and regional level conceded that the current policy on political participation by the displaced required reform." (UN CHR 25 January 2001, paras. 67-69)

Marginal political participation of displaced women (2000)

· Internally displaced women are not associated to the political process of posconflict Georgia and the privatization · Absence of political mobilization and lack of knowledge about rights make programmes educating women about their rights, in particular in rural areas, indispensable

"Internally displaced women remain very much disconnected from the political processes of postconflict Georgia. As in the broader Georgian and Caucasian political world, there are disproportionately few women in position of power. No women had central roles in the political run-up to the wars in Abkhazia and South Ossetia; likewise, no women currently participate in the ongoing political negotiations between the Georgian and separatist Abkhaz governments. Almost universally, the handful of displaced women currently in positions to power at both the national and local levels are former communist elites with little interest in advancing women's rights - displaced or otherwise.

The main representative institution for the IDP community from Abkhazia continues to be the 'Government of the Abkhaz Autonomous Republic in exile,' composed of the same unelected Georgian-Abkhaz party officials in power at the start of the war, though new residing in Tbilisi as a de facto shadow cabinet to the separatist Abkhaz government. Women interviewed by the CDIE team expressed almost universal disgust

with the institution. They perceived it to be genuinely uninterested in and out of touch with issues and concerns of displaced people. Complaints about the government-in-exile typically revolved around nepotism and corruption (Zurikashvili 2000, 4).

Segregation from local communities and a lack of permanent residence has had adverse effects on the political rights of displaced women. In its report to the UN Development Program, the Gender Development Association (an indigenous women’s group) notes that participation of displaced women in local elections and in privatization processes has been impeded by restrictive regulations and laws unmodified in the aftermath of people settling in collective centers and with host families (GDA 1999, 68). Many respondents in the survey voiced deep frustration with a lack of any kind of representation from local officials. Women were particularly concerned with the glaring absence of representation by the displaced in the privatization processes taking part throughout western Georgia. Those who confronted local officials about privatization issues were met with weak arguments and vague promises (Zurikashvili 2000, 4).

Most displaced women interviewed were much more interested in everyday economic and psychosocial issues confronting their families and communities than they were in political questions. Political mobilization and motivation were rare, if not nonexistent. No survey respondents were members of political parties. Most felt betrayed and abandoned by President Shevardnadze’s government, which was blamed by many for losing the war and abandoning displaced persons in their times of deepest need. Local officials, as mentioned above, tended to be distrusted. Individual leaders in the displaced-women community who have taken their concerns to local and government officials have tended to be striving in two general directions. First, leaders press officials regarding the immediate everyday needs of displaced communities. Second, they are concerned with improving and speeding the negotiation and repatriation processes with the Abkhaz government, with the ultimate goal of returning home and taking up their 'real' lives once again. Displaced women were often unaware of their rights. Of the 105 displaced women questioned in the survey, only 5 knew of their basic human rights under the UN Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. Of those five, two leaders of women's organizations and three had recently graduated from university. The Georgian government has recently passed laws defending the rights of women, mothers, and children, but as several displaced women leaders stressed, most displaced women remained ignorant of the laws and their legal consequences. Several displaced women's organizations have dedicated efforts and programs to educating women about their rights, in particular women residing in rural and remote regions of the country (Zurikashvili 2000, 4)" (Buck September 2000, pp. 9-10)(

See also case studies on the Koka Farmers' Union: "Cooperative boosts self-respect of displaced Georgian women", Center for Development Information and Evaluation, USAID (July 2000) [pdf][Internet]

See also "Willingness to participate voluntarily in community affairs", SCF survey, February-June 2000 [Internet]

DOCUMENTATION NEEDS AND CITIZENSHIP

General

Many IDPs have lost their personal identification documents (1999)

· Identification documents cumbersome to renew · IDPs hesitant to give up their Soviet passports

"Personal identification is a serious problem in the regions of Georgia. Many of the refugees have lost their documents in the conflict zone and it is very complicated to renew them. There are cases when a person addresses corresponding instances several times but in vain, as he/she is asked to pay or submit a document (e. g. birth certificate) and he/she has none and has to live without any document. Often, these persons have problems with the police."[…]

The refugees do not want to give up their soviet passports as permanent residence is not written in the identification cards and the soviet passports are the only documents for them to prove their permanent residence when they return to Abkhazia. Therefore, the refugees from Abkhazia have refused to give up their passports. And, it has been decided to give the refugees new idetification cards and enable them to keep their soviet passports at a time. Besides they have certificates of refugees issued by the Ministry of refugees and accommodation. These certificates are often changed and this entails many technical complications."(The Horizonti Foundation, 29 January 1999, sect.3)

"Ninety-nine percent [of IDPs] claim to be registered with the Ministry of Refugees and Accommodation of Georgia, and posess respective cards. Only 1% of the [IDP] respondents reported to have no IDP card." (NRC 1997, p.17)

ISSUES OF FAMILY UNITY, IDENTITY AND CULTURE

General

Fate of Georgian and Abkhaz missing persons who disappeared during the conflict in Abkhazia still unknown (2000)

"Georgian and Abkhaz commissions on missing person reported that the fate of over 1,000 Georgians and several hundred Abkhaz who disappeared as a result of the war in Abkhazia still is unknown. No progress was made in determining their whereabouts. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) cooperated in the effort through its Red Cross message system. Georgian partisan groups active in Abkhazia periodically took hostages, usually to exchange for captured compatriots. The Government has claimed consistently that it was unable to control them and asserted that the partisans in reality are bandits numbering no more than 20 to 30 individuals." (U.S. DOS 25 February 2000, sect. 1a)

Changing gender role: displaced women become the main household income earners (2000)

· 72% of the displaced women were fully employed before the conflict while more that 60% of them were currently formally jobless in 1999 · They have however adapted much more readily to their new situation as displaced persons than have men and have become the main source of income in most displaced families · Displaced women in urban areas are engaged in trade but are reluctant to register their activities with the government out of fear that existing humanitarian aid would not be distributed to “working” women and their families · In western Georgia, women make up the vast majority of the seasonal agricultural work force on tea plantations and in corn farming · Increasing numbers of Zugdidi-based displaced women have also begun to cross the border into the Gali region of Abkhazia to tend to family farms abandoned during the conflict · Displaced women seeking basic loans to begin or expand their trading have turned to donor microcredit programs · Women are still expected to perform traditional household duties of feeding and caring for their children, even after long and difficult days trading on street corners and in market places

"As in all intrastate conflicts, the forced displacement had major economic effects on the many thousands of internally displaced women who fled Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Prewar Georgia had been one of the wealthier republics in the former Soviet Union, benefiting in particular from its agriculture-intensive position as the breadbasket of the USSR. Abkhazia itself had long had the reputation as the richest region within Georgia, with its highly fertile lands accounting for much of Georgia’s agricultural output and its strikingly beautiful Black Sea coastline attracting multitudes of tourists from through-out the Soviet Union.

Most of the Georgian women who fled the region left relatively prosperous lives behind them. Many were trained professionals who had worked as teachers, economists, and in manufacturing and healthcare, among other trades. Seventy-two percent of displaced women surveyed had been fully employed before the

outbreak of war. Over 21 percent of displaced women, meanwhile, had completed higher education degrees, while 31 per-cent had finished vocational or professional schooling (Zurikashvili 2000, 5, 8).

In the years since the displacement, internally displaced women and men have struggled under the massive weight of poverty and unemployment. According to unofficial statistics, 75 percent of displaced families earn less than half the monthly subsistence income level, set by the Georgian government at $35 per family member (Zurikashvili 1998, 8). Unsurprisingly, physical displacement has been accompanied by widespread professional displacement. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the Norwegian Refugee Council concluded in 1998 that upwards of 64 percent of internally displaced persons were jobless (GDA 1999, 69). The CDIE survey confirmed that formal employment was one of the most acute and unsolved issues for displaced women, increasingly demoralized by almost a decade of epidemic -level rates of joblessness. Of women questioned in the survey, 68 percent were without work as of late 1999 (Zurikashvili 2000, 7–8).

Faced with such difficult living conditions, many internally displaced Georgian women have quietly taken the lead in providing basic income and food for their families. They have adapted much more readily to the extreme stresses of the life of displaced persons than have men. They have begun to alter the long-standing tradition of men as main earners and providers for the family.

According to a 1998 survey organized by the Women’s Study Center of Tbilisi State University, women have come to be the main sources of income in 72 percent of Georgian displaced families. Displaced women have left their shelters and homes by the thousands throughout Georgia to squeeze out meager livings through unofficial trade and agriculture. In larger cities such as Tbilisi, they have become the backbone for much of the unofficial or gray-market trade that has flourished in recent years. They sell products in crowded bazaars, on street corners, in subway stations, peddling everything from sunflower seeds to imported electronics. Some women have opened street kiosks selling basic foodstuffs, cigarettes, and alcohol, to name a few of the items offered. The vast majority of the trading remains unofficial; 75 percent of the women questioned in the 1998 survey had refused to register their activities with the government (Zurikashvili 1998, 8).

Trading activity was rarely considered “work” by the women themselves. Indeed, many women interviewed considered themselves unemployed even as they spent long hours laboring on streets and in markets. Others would simply not admit to their trading, even when sacks of produce were clearly visible in their living quarters. Reasons for the silence range from basic shame to the common fear that existing humanitarian aid would not be distributed to “working” women and their families. Women traders, often skilled and educated professionals or farmers during their previous lives in Abkhazia, equated trading with basic survival and were rarely proud of their activities. The large majority made barely enough to make ends meet. One women surveyed spoke for many when she said, “We all consider ourselves unemployed, as all we can earn is the money for our daily bread” (Zurikashvili 2000, 8).

Koka Koka was the most unlikely of business ventures, made up of 22 women and 8 men from the Gali region of Abkhazia increasingly fed up with their growing misery and inability of the Georgian government to help them. Although most of the women members were professionals and knew little about farming or trading before the war, their experiences with the group have provided great psychological as well as material help

Major obstacles exist for displaced women who hope to transform trading from a method of survival into a formal venture. The 1998 survey found that 94 percent of displaced women who traded were strongly dissatisfied with business conditions. Corruption, extortion, and stifling tax levels were all cited as major impediments. Of those questioned, 93 percent claimed to have paid “tributes” to the police, local administrations, and tax collectors (Zurikashvili 1998, 8).

As in cities, displaced women have become increasingly active in rural areas, providing needed food and income for their families and altering traditional gender roles along the way. In western Georgia, women make up the vast majority of the seasonal agricultural work force on tea plantations and in corn farming. One group of Zugdidi-based displaced women formed a small cooperative association, called Koka, that produced basic agricultural goods including fruits and milk products on donated farmland. Food was produced both for members’ families and for trading in the marketplace (see box).

Increasing numbers of Zugdidi-based displaced women have also begun to cross the border and brave the short trip into the Gali region of Abkhazia to tend to family farms abandoned during the conflict. Known as pendulum migrants, these women grow vegetables, fruits, and nuts both for their own family and for trading in markets. They travel to Akhazia early in the morning, often bribing Russian peacekeepers guarding the border, and return very late the same day. Though Abkhaz authorities have tolerated “pendulum migration,” these displaced Georgian women work and travel in constant fear of Abkhaz reprisal.

Georgian men rarely risk the journey, so sure are they of military reprisal. From a gender perspective, this phenomenon represents yet another economic change attributable to the conflict as women have taken over the farming responsibilities reserved for men before the war. As with trading, many displaced families have come to rely on women to deliver income and food necessary for survival (Zurikashvili 2000, 8).

Donors have begun to recognize the value of internally displaced women traders as they have moved away from humanitarian assistance toward more development or “self-reliance” programming in recent years. Specifically, many desperately poor women who seek basic loans to begin or expand their trading have turned to donor microcredit programs for financing. The Foundation for International Community Assistance (FINCA), a USAID-funded international NGO, offers innovative group lending. It consists of small low-interest short-term loans starting at $100 to groups of traders without the need for collateral. Since most displaced persons have very little in the way of valuable possessions that could be put up as collateral, this system has quickly evolved into a critical method for assetless people to receive loans (Georgian banks customarily require collateral worth at least twice the amount of the loan). Recipients receive the money in small groups, usually no larger than seven people. Each member pledges solidarity with the group and promises to pay back as a group.

Though the program was not designed exclusively for women, 75 percent of FINCA’s 4,500 clients are women, and well over 70 percent of those women are from displaced families based in the Tbilisi region. The Norwegian Refugee Council has partnered with an indigenous Georgian women’s organization, Women in Business, to create a revolving fund of microcredit for women’s ventures. They have the aim of eventually transforming the fund into a credit union. In addition to trading, the fund’s successfully funded enterprises have included laundry services and bakeries. Generally, FINCA and Norwegian Refugee Council microcredit lending has been successful. Only 1 percent of FINCA's first time "group-clients" have defaulted on loans. That represents a mere $ 14,000 of the $3.1 million invested.

The role of displaced women as leading family income earners has not led to a growing sense of empowerment within the family or IDP communities in general. On the contrary, gender roles have remained clearly delineated. Women are still expected to perform traditional household duties of feeding and caring for their children, even after long and difficult days trading on street corners and in market places. Men spend much of their time in and around the household, as observed by the CDIE team, but they do little to help in chores traditionally reserved for women in Georgian society. As many surveyed women stressed, time is always in critical demand. On an average day, respondents spent seven hours working outside the home and eight caring for their children. This double burden of both caring and providing for their families has left little time for rest and has logically contributed to growing levels of stress diagnosed in displaced women (Zurikashvili 2000, 9)." (Buck September 2000, pp. 7-9)

You can also consult following documents:

Stable Instability of the Displaced People in Western Georgia: a Food-security and Gender Survey after Five Years, Jose Luis Vivero Pol, in: Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol. 12, No. 4, 1999, pp. 349-366 (Oxford) "Cooperative boosts self-respect of displaced Georgian women", USAID, July 2000 [Internet]

See also " Field surveys reveal psycho-social trauma of displaced women and men (1995-2000)" [Internal link]

PROPERTY ISSUES

General

Act on the restitution process for properties of Ossetians in Georgia still under discussion (2000-2001)

· Local authorities in Georgia have not enforced the property rights of returnees · The introduction of a legal framework for the solution of property issues is one condition to be fulfilled upon the accession the Council of Europe · International organisations have commissioned an independent expert to comment on the draft legislation prepared by the Government · UNHCR provides shelter assistance to temporary occupiers evicted upon court decisions

"As early as September 1998, the Council of Europe, together with the OSCE and the UNHCR organised a round table in Tbilisi on ownership issues following the 1990-1994 conflicts, which concluded with concrete recommendations. However, no follow-up was given until very recently. A draft Law on Restoration and Protection of Housing and Property Rights of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons was presented by President Shevardnadze to the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Mrs Benita Ferrero- Waldner, during her visit to Georgia from 1 to 3 May 2000. The Georgian Government requested the international community's opinion on the draft. The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the Council of Europe contracted an expert mainly to assess its compliance with the European Convention on Human Rights and its consistency with international best practice in dealing with mass population displacements. The expert prepared an opinion, which has been presented to the Georgian authorities. A seminar should be organised shortly on this matter in Strasbourg, focusing on property issues arising from the conflicts and the possibility for Georgia to ratify the First Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights." (COE 7 September 2001, para. 155)

"A major obstacle to the return of ethnic Osset internally displaced persons in South Ossetia and refugees in North Ossetia to the areas of their pre-war residence in Georgia proper is the issue of property restitution. Local officials in Georgia proper reportedly have resisted removing illegal squatters, sometimes internally displaced persons themselves, from the homes of ethnic Ossets. Furthermore, it is reported that legal claims by returnees to their homes and property are usually denied and even when they are successful in obtaining a judicial eviction order, it is frequently not implemented by local officials.

UNHCR and its partners provide legal and social counselling to affected families. Above all, however, legislative reform is required. The introduction of legislative and administrative measures to permit the restitution of ownership and tenancy rights or the payment of compensation for property lost by people forced to abandon their homes during both the Abkhaz and Georgian-Osset conflicts is among the conditions to be fulfilled by the Government of Georgia upon the accession of Georgia to the Council of Europe. UNHCR, together with the Council of Europe and the OSCE, has commissioned an independent expert to comment on the draft legislation prepared by the Government. Analysis of the extent to which this and other legislation relevant to the needs of internally displaced persons in Georgia accords with the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement is currently being carried out by the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association, with the support of the Brookings Institution project on internal displacement and OSCE/ODIHR." (UNCHR 25 January 2001, paras. 100-101)

"Intensive work is under way on the restitution act, which will define the procedure for the returning of illegally confiscated property to refugees and displaced persons. The act will initia lly cover the property of Ossetians who left Georgia as a result of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict. It will not cover Abkhazia and South Ossetia until they are returned to the de facto jurisdiction o Georgia." (UN CESCR 28 March 2000, para. 37)

"UNHCR plans to consolidate the return of some 5,500 returnees to South Ossetia by supporting self- reliance programmes delivered through local NGOs. In addition, the homes of potential returnees will be identified and damage will be assessed for subsequent rehabilitation. One crucial issue is the return of property to returnees. UNHCR will continue to advocate amendments to Georgian property restitution legislation in order to ensure fair treatment of returnees." (UNHCR December 2000, p. 216)

"In an attempt to reinstate property ownership, 29 cases passed through the courts, which, without exception, ruled in favour of the original owner. These few court cases went a long way towards removing a notable obstacle to return. After the court rulings, UNHCR found temporary shelter for the secondary occupier." (UNHCR June 2001, p. 358)

See also "IDPs from Tskhinvali Region should be guaranteed adequate participation in decision-making" in: Refugee Special, Issue 1 [Internet]

Right to housing in Georgia - advances in the legal framework (1999)

· The property rights of as many as 60-80.000 persons could have been violated. · Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association asked to draft bill regulating property restitution and housing issues related to the Georgian-Ossetian conflict. · Clear-cut cases could be determined by a Special Committee on housing rights

"Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association (GYLA) drafts the bill that regulates the property restitution and housing issues of the victims of the Georgian-Ossetian conflict. Judging from conflict details and the legal character of the restitution problem itself it certainly is one of the extremely complicated issues. In this case we talk about 60-80 thousands of persons, or about 20thousand families the property rights of which could have been violated. Inconsistency of the past and present legislation connected with the property rights and other issues prevents these rights from being restored. Usually these cases should be dealt with by court, but the huge volume of the work and the peculiar character of the issue would complicate the settlement of the subject in this manner. As the Georgian legislation prohibits establishment of the special courts, when elaborating the draft, or more precisely the restitution mechanism we talked about the establishment of the special committee.

The duties of this committee would be to settle relatively easy cases though simplified procedures. These cases may include the ones where the property ownership documents exist, the witnesses are present and so on. The experience of formation of such committees exists, for example in Bosnia-Herzogovina. The committee, naturally, can not solve more complicated legal issues, as for instance, when there is the property sales contract, but one side maintains that the contract was made under threat. Of course these issues remain in the competence of civil courts.

Particular problems are connected with the committee staffing and legislative framework issues. As for the staff the option foreseeing participation of 3 Georg ian and 3 Ossetian representatives was discussed. But the division of votes could have stalled the work of the committee and to avoid this GYLA considered it possible to involve the representatives of international organizations in its activities. As for the way of accepting the draft, it is our opinion that if the Georgian Parliament passes the law without the advance agreement, it would complicate its implementation and participation of the Ossetian side. Also there exists

the idea of implementing the foreseen activities based on the bilateral agreement. There are two options here - perhaps this agreement could have the general, declaratory character and it would only state the fact of the committee being formed, leaving the determination of the specific procedures for the committee itself. In this case the question on functionality of the developed procedures arises. According to the second option the bilateral agreement would contain the procedure details from the very beginning. This would prolong the negotiation process. Though by mid-November the Association plans the conference on this and other issues related to the restitution. The participants of this conference would be foreign experts, governmental and non-governmental organizations, and representatives of the Ossetian side.

As for the real dates of passing the bill or agreement, Mr. Burduli hopes that it is possible to reach the agreement on the legal form by the end of this year, and the restitution mechanism can become functional from the next year already." (UNA, November 1999)

Discriminatory implementation of housing codes could impede IDP return to Abkhazia (1999)

· IDPs absent for more than six months sometimes lose their right to housing in Abkhazia · Minorities are particularly at risk of violations of their rights to housing, and frequently suffer harassment when trying to ensure that right · A solution to the housing issue considered fundamental for safe and lasting return to take place

"Both inside the security and restricted weapons zones and in the rest of Abkhazia, abuses of property rights continue to be a cause for concern. This will become more acute in a wide-scale return to Abkhazia; however, such abuses are currently pervasive in many larger villages in the territory. The housing code of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic from 1983 is still in effect in Abkhazia. The de facto parliament of Abkhazia has only partially updated this legislation to reflect the current situation, passing a "Law on Rental" in September 1994 and "Regulations on the Means to Allot Residential and Immovable Property from the State Housing Fund to Persons and on the Payment of Expenditures for its Maintenance and Repairs" in February 1997. The housing code generally covers all state-owned buildings (including kolkhozes and "builders’ cooperatives") and private property. All citizens are guaranteed the right to housing in article 2.1 of the 1997 Regulations. Article 69 of the 1983 Housing Code prohibits absences of more than six months – with certain exceptions such as working abroad or illness – unless extended by a court. Article 2.5 of the supplementary February 1997 Regulations, states that only persons constantly residing on the territory of Abkhazia have the right to acquire state housing and that exceptions to this can only be decided by the de facto Cabinet of Ministers. [Footnote: The term in Russian xxxxxxx xxxxxxx can be translated either as permanently, constantly or continuously residing, each of which has a different legal meaning in its application.] The application of this article is not further defined. Thus, persons who fled Abkhazia during the conflict, or those who have spent lengthy periods with relatives in Georgia proper or Russia, for example, may no longer have the right to continue living in their apartment, nor are they guaranteed housing elsewhere if their apartment has been reassigned.

The imprecise nature of the term constantly residing leads to discriminatory implementation in practice. HROAG is aware of 11 cases in which members of minority groups such as Russians, Georgians and Greeks, have complained that their apartment was illegally given to an Abkhaz family by the city housing authorities – even as they are residing within it. HROAG has received several complaints that the defendants (and sometimes even their lawyers) are harassed by the judge presiding the case or the prosecutors. One woman alleged that she was shot at in her apartment after a positive decision by the judge. The human rights office is aware of three positive decisions in the Sukhumi city court and Gagra administration; however, enforcement has been slow. While the complaints brought before the UN office cannot be considered exhaustive and completely representative, they do indicate a certain trend in which

the laws are applied to the detriment of minorities. This may be in part due to the pre-eminence of de facto authorities, which negatively affects minorities by marginalizing their role and position. Moreover, there have been five reports of houses with Georgian/Mingrelian residents, being occupied by Abkhaz militia groups or de facto Abkhaz customs groups in the villages of Chlou, Dikhazurga, Gagra, Gali and Gumurishi. The owner’s reception towards the new inhabitants is mixed; nonetheless, there is no legal basis for this occupation.[…]

[…] in order to ensure a safe and lasting return to both the Gali region and Abkhazia as a whole, housing issues must be resolved. Minorities are particularly at risk of violations to their rights to housing, and frequently suffer harassment when trying to ensure their right to housing."(Samuel, 1999, p.5-6)

See also the 20 March 2002 resolution of the Parliament of Georgia "On the unlawful misappropriation of state property and refugees and internally displaced persons' private property in Abkhazia" [Internet]

Conflict between IDP status and property rights (1999)

· Displaced persons lose their IDP status upon the acquisition of immovable property and registration as permanent resident there

"Situation on the territory of Ge orgia proper Here we come across three categories of persons:

Those who were provided by the state with temporary dwellings. This was mainly done at the expense of housing and nonresidentials (hotels, rest houses, sans, kindergartens, buildings under construction) fund still remaining in the state's property. Their right not to be evicted – without being provided with an adequate dwelling or returning – is guaranteed by the acts issued by the president-

Those who were sheltered by their relatives. The state can not offer them anything, even at the law level.

Those who have acquired a house (flat) in private property, The state not only does not assist them, but it artificially restrains them by establishing in the law on 'Internally Displaced Persons' [Article 6, paragraph 2, section 3] a barrier to acquiring a permanent dwelling and registering there, by connecting this to loss of the status of IDP. This is a serious defect of Georgian legislation, especially since abolishment of so called record (propiska) institute, which related the housing right to dwelling to record." (GYLA 1999, p. 7)

International study proposes concrete legal and political measures to resolve the housing and property issue in Georgia (1998)

· Proposals include the issuance of a Presidential Decree on the Right to Return, the adoption of a Restitution Law and the creation of a Housing and Property Claims Commission

"[An independent 1998 study commissioned by UNHCR] recommends that a multi-pronged strategy, grounded firmly in the rule of law, will stand the best chance of ensuring full respect for the housing rights and property rights of all affected persons and thus facilitate the large-scale exercise of the right to return. The study emphasizes that both the rights of refugees and IDPs and the rights of the secondary occupants must be fully secured throughout the process of return and beyond, and that the housing rights of all affected persons are guaranteed such that no person becomes homeless in the process.

It is recommended that several key measures be adopted to provide the legal framework required to redress past injustices, increase confidence sufficiently to allow large-scale return and to build a solid basis for national reconstruction and reconciliation. These measures include: […] 1. The Presidential Decree on the Right to Return should officially proclaim the right of refugees and IDPs to voluntarily return to their original homes, in an environment of equality, full protection of human rights and clear guarantees of safety and security. The Decree should form the first part of the return process. It should be declaratory in nature, forming a consolidated official pronouncement recognizing the basic nature of the rights associated with return. The decree should reiterate past pronouncements and instill confidence in the returnees that they will be afforded the full spectrum of rights enjoyed throughout Georgian society, including and to return to their original homes, the right to freedom of movement and to choose one’s residence and the right to register in their areas of origin.

2. The second element of a comprehensive return package envisages the adoption of a Housing and Property Restitution Law clearly and precisely outlining the legal position of affected refugees, IDPs and secondary occupants with respect to all aspects of their housing and property rights. This study recommends that the new legislation ensure the right of refugees and IDPs to the restitution of their original homes should they wish to reclaim them. If a returnee does wish to return to their original home, in accordance with the law and a subsequent finding by the envisaged housing and property claims commission, the law should require the State to facilitate such return and to fully ensure the full protection of the housing rights of secondary occupants.

In cases where returnees do not wish to return to their original homes, the law should oblige the State to secure adequate housing for them in such manner that no detriment is suffered vis-a-vis their original housing situation, and which ensures the right of refugees and IDPs (should they choose to invoke it) to the ownership of a dwelling; a right they would have enjoyed had they not been forced by circumstances beyond their control to flee.

The law should enable all affected persons to present formal claims to the HPCC for adjudication within a limited time period.

This study argues that cash compensation should be generally avoided except in instances concerning compensation for past human rights violations or lost movable property. If compensation is to be paid at all, the law should delineate when, in what form, to whom and in what manner compensation should be provided.

Any financial compensation which is provided should come from the State budget of Georgia and should not be provided by the international community. Funds could, however, be allocated by the international community to assist in the establishment of the HPCC or towards the overall implementation of the new law.

The new law should also adequately address the reconstruction and rehabilitation of damaged housing in rural areas and develop the necessary mechanisms required to ensure that refugees and IDPs returning to rural areas will have access to housing which complies with international standards of adequacy. Equally, the law should ensure the existence of adequate safeguards to protect against homelessness and other possible housing rights violations.

3. Finally, this paper recommends, within the framework of the housing and property restitution law, that a fully independent and impartial, three-person Housing and Property Claims Commission (HPCC) be established to examine any housing or property claims put forth by refugees, IDPs or secondary occupants regarding these questions. The HPCC should be vested with the powers required to determine the housing and property rights of the claimants and thus guarantee every returnee the right to an effective remedy and the right to have his or her case heard on an individual basis.

The commission will fill a significant procedural and administrative gap and prevent the potentially serious overloading of the judicial system with related complaints which could, in turn, substantially delay the overall return process. The HPCC (which should be overseen and monitored by UNHCR and the OSCE) will be required by law to protect all persons against homelessness or other detriment with respect to their housing and living conditions. Decisions of the HPCC should be legally binding. The right to appeal any decision of the HPCC to the Supreme Court of Georgia should also be guaranteed.

The implementation of these recommendations are designed to facilitate the large-scale return of all remaining refugees and IDPs linked to the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict and thus assist in increasing regional stability and the further emergence and strengthening of the rule of law in Georgia. Although the specific modalities of the housing and property situation in Georgia are, of course, unique, each of the recommendations made in this study are consistent with international human rights law, including the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the European Social Charter, and have been or are being successfully implemented by other countries confronting similar challenges and possessing similar legal obligations."(Scott Leckie, 7 July 1998, sect. "Executive Summary")

PATTERNS OF RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT

Prospects of return

Return movements to the Gali district in southern Abkhazia (2000-2001)

· About 40,000 internally displaced persons have returned to the Gali district but have not settled there permanently · The human rights situations of the returnees have however remained very precarious · The majority of the returnees are still registered as displaced in Georgia proper · Insecurity in the area may have resulted in fewer of return movements of IDPs in 2001

"The southern Abkazian region of Gali, which borders the frontline, continues to be the scene of sporadic fighting and uncontrolled violence between partisan factions increasingly involved in criminal activities. It is home to most of the 30-60,000 IDPs stranded today in Zugdidi and the surrounding region. In view of the volatile conditions and in the absence of any agreement regarding their return, IDPs have been afraid to return permanently to the Gali region. They tend to go back to their villages only during the summer months to cultivate their land, and spend winters in western Georgia in spite of the difficulties there." (ICRC May 2001, p. 7)

"The situation in Abkhazia remains unstable, and discussion between the Georgian Government and the Abkhaz side have unfortunately not resulted in any security guarantees permitting UNHCR to promote voluntarily repatriation. An estimated 40,000 IDPs have returned spontaneously to Abkhazia, mainly to the Gali district. Contrary to previous years, when the number of persons returning to the areas fluctuated with the planting and harvesting seasons, the present number intend to stay during the winter, security permitting." (UNHCR December 2000, pp. 215-216)

"Gali district in particular with an estimated 30,000-50,000 returnees poses additional challenges for those who wish to get an accurate estimate of the number of IDPs currently in Georgia. The majority of the returnees to Gali district are still registered in Georgia proper as IDPs. The reasoning for this is twofold: 1) IDPs are supposed to receive monthly financial assistance in the form of an IDP allowance (approximately 5 dollars per month"; 2) Many returnees to Gali would like to retain their temporary accommodation in Zugdidi or elsewhere in case the security situation deteriorates and they are again displaced. " (UN OCHA 6 November 2001)

"Another return movement occurred in 2000, involving an estimated 60,000 persons, but their situation appeared to be tenuous, and this population remained registered as displaced persons. Some returned to the Gali area to plant and harvest their crops, but not to live. The lack of a political settlement and ongoing instability deterred the displaced from returning to their homes in 2001. On October 8, a UNOMIG (UN Observer Mission in Georgia) helicopter was shot down over the Kodori Gorge, killing nine. UNHCR suspended all activities in the Abkhazia region, and had not resumed its operations by year's end (2001)." (USCR 2002, pp. 213-214)

See also RFE/RL "UNHCR representative holds talks with Abkhaz leadership as displaced persons call for expediting settlement", 21 September 2000 [Internet]

Returnees face difficult humanitarian conditions and insecurity (2001)

· Humanitarian situation in Abkhazia remains serious for the vulnerable segments of the population · Lack of education and health care facilities compels returnees to commute to places of previous displacement · Violations of the right to life, physical and personal security and property rights continue to be reported · Language of instruction in Abkhazia remains an issue of concern · UN Secretary-General urges both parties to facilitate safe and dignified return of the displaced

"During the reporting period, the humanitarian situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, remained serious. International humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organizations continued to address the acute food and medical needs of vulnerable segments of the population and to conduct mine clearance and small- scale rehabilitation activities.

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) initiated community-based rehabilitation of 14 schools requiring urgent attention in the upper and lower Gali regions. UNHCR plans to expand its assistance programme to other schools. This followed a needs assessment conducted by UNHCR staff, who visited 29 schools in the Gali region and found that they lacked heating, water and sanitary facilities, and that they were running without adequate teaching aids and furniture. Despite such deplorable conditions, the schools were attended by close to 4,000 pupils in the school year 2000/2001. UNHCR further noted that, owing to the lack of appropriate health-care facilities and medicines in the Gali region, returnees were often compelled to commute to places of previous displacement for treatment. Accordingly, the rehabilitation of selected dispensaries and water purification systems will also be considered this year. The UNHCR programme is focused on the Upper Gali region; operations in lower Gali are restricted to three places only." (UN CHR 19 July 2001, paras. 23-24)

"During the period under review there were no indications of improvement in the field of human rights. The major issues of concern to the United Nations Human Rights Office in Abkhazia, Georgia, remain violations of the right to life, the right to physical integrity and the right to liberty and security of persons. The office reported new cases of apartment evictions and violations of the right to property. In addition, complaints were lodged about continuing persecutions on religious grounds. The number of abductions, with or without demands for ransom, has markedly increased, which again raises the issue of the inadequacies of Abkhaz law enforcement structures to deal effectively with such incidents.

As documented by the joint assessment mission (see S/2001/59, annex II), the human rights situation remains particularly precarious in the Gali region. There has been no change in the language policy in schools with predominantly Georgian-speaking students: the Georgian language is taught only for a limited number of hours and Russian has been instituted as the language of instruction in the first six grades (from 7 to 13 years)." (UNSC 19 July 2001, paras. 27-28)

Recommendations by the UN Secretary-General (24 October 2001) "Regretably, there has again been no progress on the issue of facilitating the safe, secure and dignified return of refugees and internally displaced persons to their places of previous residence. Meanwhile, the spontaneous resettlement of internally displaced persons to the Gali district has continued under precarious conditions. I call upon both sides to resume work on this matter on the basis of existing agreements, including the Quadripartite Agreement on Voluntary Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons, signed on 4 April 1994. In addition, the implementation of the recommendations set forth in the report of the Joint Assessment Mission to the Gali district of November 2000 (see S/2001/59, annex II) is more pressing than ever. Both sides should immediately take up these matters in a cooperative spirit." (UN SC 24 October 2001, para. 43)

International organisations have been mandated to assist in creating conditions for return (2000-2001)

· Insecurity obliges UN Observer Mission (UNOMIG) to limit its patrols in return areas to daylight hours · The passivity of the CIS Peacekeeping Force in the face of physical attacks against returning internally displaced persons has been a cause for concern · The United Nations Human Rights Office in Abkhazia, Georgia (HROAG) is expressly mandated to contribute to the safe and dignified return of the displaced · The Human Rights Office has undertaken to facilitate preparation of an Abkhaz version of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

"The Security Council, which regularly reviews the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, has repeatedly affirmed the imprescriptible right of refugees and internally displaced persons to return in safety and dignity to their previous places of permanent residence. A number of international and regional mechanisms deployed to the region have expressed responsibilities to assist in creating the conditions conducive to return. The United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), consisting of unarmed military observers charged primarily with monitoring and verifying implementation of a 1994 ceasefire agreement, is, 'by its presence in the area, to contribute to the safe and orderly return of refugees and displaced persons'. UNOMIG explained that it does so primarily through regular patrols throughout the region, meeting with community leaders and reporting violations to local law enforcement officials for response. UNOMIG also used to maintain team bases in a number of outlying villages. However, the deterioration in the security condition led to the termination of semi-permanent presence in isolated areas. As a result, its patrolling activities now are limited to pre-planned visits in daylight hours. Local and international NGOs in Abkhazia both noted that it would be useful for UNOMIG to undertake patrols in lower Gali more frequently.

The Commonwealth of Independent States Peacekeeping Force (CISPKF), composed of Russian troops, with which UNOMIG is to cooperate in observing the ceasefire, was also established with the expectation that 'its presence should promote the safe return of refugees and displaced persons, especially to the Gali district' [Moscow Agreement of 14 May 1994, Protocol concerning the peacekeeping force of the CIS]. The mandate of CISPKF refers to 'facilitating the return to their former places of permanent residence, in conditions of safety and dignity, of persons who left the conflict zone and the implementation of other provisions of the Quadripartite Agreement on the voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons of 4 April 1994' and 'ensuring compliance with the norms of international law and human rights'. The passivity of CISPKF in the face of physical attacks against returning internally displaced persons, however, has been a cause for concern in the past. Although the Representative did not have the opportunity to meet with officials of CISPKF to discuss how the Force presently carries out its protection functions, UNOMIG and other United Nations officials pointed out that CISPKF is currently playing a crucial role in combating the widespread criminality and lawlessness which is a main source of violence in the Gali district.

The United Nations Human Rights Office in Abkhazia, Georgia (HROAG) established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1077 (1996) as a component of UNOMIG in cooperation with OSCE is also expressly mandated to contribute to the safe and dignified return of refugees and internally displaced persons. Relevant in this regard is the monitoring by HROAG of the human rights situation in the region, bringing cases of violations to the attention of the de facto authorities. Many of the cases raised were reported to relate to property rights, in particular to the restitution of homes and property of the displaced, which may be occupied by militia, and to harassment on ethnic grounds.

Though a number of international and regional mechanisms thus have specific mandates to support the safe and dignified return of internally displaced persons to Abkhazia, primary responsibility for the creation of the necessary security conditions for return of course rests with the authorities. The Abkhaz authorities with

whom the Representative met readily acknowledged that they had certain obligations to ensure security and, in reference to the events of May 1998, that their armed forces had committed 'a number of grave mistakes' in the past. They suggested that now the problem of insecurity stems not so much from politically motivated violence but, rather, is largely one of general lawlessness and criminality. Yet both at the central and local levels, the Abkhaz authorities have failed to take measures to address this situation of insecurity and thus bear responsibility for its persistence which, it must be said, appears to be in their interest in that it impedes the safe return of ethnic Georgians. It is incumbent upon the central and local Abkhaz authorities to establish law and order and, in particular, to address the issue of impunity, by investigating and responding to security incidents and prosecuting perpetrators.

The work of HROAG in providing human rights training to law enforcement officials makes a contribution to this end. The Human Rights Office has undertaken to facilitate preparation of an Abkhaz version of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and to integrate it into its training programmes for law enforcement officials." (UN CHR 25 January 2001, paras. 84-88)

See the full text of the Moscow Quadripartite Agreement, 4 April 1994 [Internal link]

A critical view on the role of the CIS peacekeeping forces "Back in their home region, the returnees live in constant danger. While the Abkhaz militia continues to harass and kill ethnic Georgian inhabitants, the Russian peacekeeping troops deployed in the area do not provide any effective protection. In fact, there are many well-documented cases in which peacekeepers participated in raids against ethnic Georgian civilians. Most regretably, the Russian government continues to contribute to the poor human rights situation in the area by supporting the self-proclaimed regime morally, politically and financially. It seems a prolonged state of instability in Abkhazia lies in the interest of Russia, as it justifies its military presence and involvement in the region. Attempts of the Georgian government to change or broaden the composition of the peacekeeping troops, as a means to improve the protection of the non-combatant citizens in the self-proclaimed republic, have also met with severe resistance from the part of Russia. (IHF September 2001, p. 36)

More return movements to the Gali district during 2000

· An estimated 40,000 internally displaced persons have returned during 2000, mainly to the Gali district and intend to stay there during the winter, security permitting · The human rights situations of the returnees have however remained very precarious, with reports of violations of the right to life and personal liberty · It was expected that the start of the academic year in September would bring migrants back across the ceasefire line to the Zugdidi area · The more flexible view of the Abkhaz authorities on the use of the Georgian language in Gali district schools may have encouraged returnees to stay · Up to 8,000 internally displaced in Zugdidi return regularly to the Gali district where they find additional sources of revenue during the harvest season · The authorities' failure to deliver humanitarian assistance to the displaced in Western Georgia may aim to maintain international political pressure on the Abkhazian authorities

"The human rights situation of returnees in the Gali district remains precarious. Several violations of the right to life and physical integrity, as well as the right to liberty and security of the person, were registered. The presence of illegal armed groups remained a matter of great concern." (UNSC 18 January 2000, para. 23)

"At the peak of the hazelnut harvest season, tens of thousands of spontaneous returnees to the Gali district were in full-time residence in the area despite precarious security and living conditions. The start of the academic year in September usually brings migrants, primarily women and children, back across the ceasefire line to the Zugdidi area; the magnitude of this migration in 2000 will depend on the extent which Gali district schools are able to find the resources to open, and on whether the Abkhaz side musters the requisite political will to resolve the problem of the language of education in the schools." (UN SC 25 October 2000, para. 16)

"The spring and summer seasons have brought local residents displaced from the Gali district back to farm their land; some village heads of administration report that up to 80 per cent of the pre-war population has returned. There are indications that funding for schools in the Gali district has increased slightly, including a written allocation of funds in the Georgian budget. There are also signs that the Abkhaz authorities are taking a more pragmatic and flexible view on the use of the Georgian language in Gali district schools attended by Mingrelian children. Such issues relating to the education of children are significant for the decisions of displaced families considering a return to their former homes." (UNSC 17 July 2000, para. 17)

See also RFE/RL "UNHCR representative holds talks with Abkhaz leadership as displaced persons call for expediting settlement", 21 September 2000 [Internet]

Report of the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights (13 July 2000) "To survive, [IDPs in Zugdidi], who live in frightful poverty, depend entirely on family support, ie other courageous family members who infiltrate the Abkhazian border region of Gali at night or with the help of 'gifts' to work for a few days or longer in order to make a living and pick up and bring back to Zugdidi whatever they can find for their families. It is said that 7 to 8,000 illegal workers (including mo re than one quarter of the IDPs registered in Zugdidi) leave and return every week! The 'cruel' question here of course has yet to receive an official answer: whether not only the electricity is in the process of being 'cut', but also food and financial aid to the IDPs near and along the border on the Georgian side in order to prompt them to return sporadically to Abkhazia and to try to ensure their material survival there and thus maintain international political pressure on the Abkhazian authorities. This is the actual opinion of many officials whom we met, who spoke of "attempts to instrumentalise the Georgian IDPs", but I can neither confirm nor invalidate this hypothesis without additional reliable facts on the subject." (Council of Europe 13 July 2000, III - Refugees and displaced persons wishing to return to their place of origin)

See also "Where IDPs Would Want to Live If There is no Resolution to the Abkhazeti Situation in the Next Three Years", GAI Survey [Internet]

Joint assessment mission to the Gali district evaluate conditions for the return of the displaced (November 2000)

· The mission led by the head of the UN Human Rights Office included experts from other UN agencies and the Council of Europe · The mission recommended the UN to explore the opening in Gali city of a human rights branch office and to contribute to improving law enforcement in the area · The mission also reviewed the issues of the language of instruction in Gali district schools

· Abkhazian and Georgian sides have agreed to discuss practical implementation of the mission's recommendations (2001)

"Under the aegis of the United Nations, a joint assessment mission led by the head of the United Nations human rights office was carried out in the Gali district between 20 and 24 November, in close cooperation with OSCE and with the participation of experts from, inter alia, the United Nations Development Programme, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Council of Europe. The purpose of the mission was to evaluate conditions for the safe, secure and dignified return of refugees and internally displaced persons to the district. The mission, in its preliminary findings (see annex II), recommended that my Special Representative explore the opening in Gali city of a branch office of the United Nations human rights office; consider with the two sides how to improve law enforcement training and further integration of the local population in the law enforcement structures; seek broader cooperation between the law enforcement organs of both sides; and assist in finding a non-discriminatory solution to the question of the language of instruction in Gali district schools. On 27 and 28 November, at the invitation of the OSCE Chairperson-in- Office, my Special Representative attended the OSCE Ministerial Meeting in Vienna to inform participants about the mission." (UN SC 18 January 2001, para. 8)

For the preliminary finding of the joint mission, see annex II of the Secretary-General's report [Internet]

"As a follow-up to the Joint Assessment Mission to the Gali district, conducted in November 2000, on 24 September the Georgian and Abkhaz representatives and participants of the Mission explored ways for the practical implementation of recommendations set forth in the Joint Assessment Mission Report (see S/2001/59, annex II) and agreed to a number of recommendations for the Coordinating Council. The meeting gave specific attention to progress in the return of displaced persons to the Gali district, human rights, public security and language of instruction. The issue of the language of instruction in the Gali district was also taken up during a visit to the Gali region on 20 September by the Georgian and Abkhaz Ministers of Education, who agreed to continue their efforts to find a mutually acceptable solution." (UN SC 24 October 2001, para. 24)

International humanitarian agencies are reluctant to undertake programmes that may encourage the return of displaced persons to unsafe areas (2000)

· Concerns about the security and financial shortages prevent UNHCR from providing reintegration assistance to returnees in the Gali district · UNHCR however is planning to resume protection-monitoring activities in the accessible parts of the security zone

"UNHCR activities are frequently undertaken in collaboration with the SRSG, UNOMIG, 'Friends of Georgia' and other partners on sharing information and protection monitoring to devise a cautious and coherent approach to supporting return. As a consequence, carefully considering the precarious security situation in Gali, UNHCR assumed a measured intervention in assisting the spontaneously return population without jeopardising the peace process. Provisions included hygiene parcels, school kits and building materials to repair schools and community centres. Security is of paramount concern to UNHCR when considering redeployment into Gali District and beyond. Significant funds, beyond the current budget, to cover staff security and operations is a pre-requisite for an enhanced operation that meets the acute needs in Gali District (where it is reported that as many as 40,000 people have spontaneously returned without security and political guarantees)." (UNHCR September 2001, pp. 210-211)

"UNHCR remains ready to provide reintegration assistance to returnees in the security zone should the Abkhaz and Georgian sides agree on and implement towards tangibly improving the security situation further to the security arrangements already established the Coordinating Council framework. However, for

time being, criminality and sporadic paramilitary activities continue to raise concerns about the safety of sizeable population that has already returned spontaneously despite the security threats, and of United Nations civilian personnel. There are continuing consultations by UNHCR with the two sides, initiated request of my Special Representative, to explore conditions for a constructive meeting of Working Group II on refugees and internally displaced persons, which could help address this situation. In addition to security concerns, the current financial situation of UNHCR makes it difficult to ensure an adequate deployment of staff in the zone of conflict. However, efforts are being made for a limited resumption of protection- monitoring activities by UNHCR staff in accessible parts of the security zone." (UN SC 18 January 2001, para. 21)

"In the Gali region, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Halo Trust, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Médecins sans frontières France continue to undertake humanitarian activities. These activities, however, are limited because of security concerns, in particular the activities of criminal organizations. In addition, humanitarian agencies are reluctant to undertake programmes that may encourage the return of displaced persons to unsafe areas. Efforts by the Georgian and Abkhaz sides continue to implement the concrete measures for the improvement of the security climate agreed on during the bilateral meetings of 3 February (See S/2000/345, paras. 6, 16 and 18) and 3 May 2000 […]." (UN SC 17 July 2000, para. 23)

See also "Where IDPs Would Want to Live If There is no Resolution to the Abkhazeti Situation in the Next Three Years", GAI Survey [Internet]

Seasonal nature of return to the Gali district (2000)

· Hazelnut crops draw displaced persons back to Abkhazia for the harvest in the summer · Another factor influencing the seasonal nature of return is the issue of education · The 'seasonal returnees' often go back and forth between Georgia proper and their home areas several times a season · Movement back to Georgia proper also corresponds to times when internally displaced persons are scheduled to receive humanitarian assistance in Georgian proper

"There is indeed a clear seasonal pattern to return, connected with the cultivating season and taking advantage of the fertile land in the Gali district. Hazelnuts are one of the more lucrative crops, drawing displaced persons back to Abkhazia for the harvest in the summer who then return to Georgia proper for the fall and winter months. It was noted that, in the absence of access to land or to adequate opportunities for employment and income-generation in Georgian proper, economic desperation is a driving force in the decision of the displaced to return, if only temporarily.

Another factor influencing the seasonal nature of return is the issue of education, in particular the language of instruction. According to the curriculum developed by the de facto Abkhaz 'Ministry of Education', elementary education, from grades one to five, is provided only in Russian. This is true even in what are designated as Georgian language (as opposed to Russian or mixed Russian/Georgian) schools. Though instruction is provided in the Georgian language from grade six onwards, the prohibition on instruction in Georgian in elementary education was pointed out as being a powerful deterrent to durable return of displaced ethnic Georgians as it threatens to impede the possibility for higher education elsewhere in Georgia. Though some language and cultural instruction is provided on the margins of the core material, Georgian history reportedly is not taught at all. […] It should be noted that the 'seasonal' nature of the return relates to the general timing of return as opposed to its duration. The 'seasonal returnees' often go back and forth between Georgia proper and their home areas several times a season. International observers noted that there is regular traffic of internally displaced

persons, especially across the bridge near Zugdidi that connects southern Gali with Georgia proper. In the case of persons whose homes are in southernmost Gali (it was said that some displaced could see their homes across the Inguri river), the actual period of return may be as little as a few hours. Typically, it is several days of weeks, with displaced persons then going back to Georgia proper, in particular once they have harvested produce to sell. Movement back to Georgia proper have also been noted to correspond to times when internally displaced persons are scheduled to receive humanitarian assistance, which in Abkhazia, where the activities of international humanitarian organizations are limited, is inadequate to meet the actual needs of the population there." (UNCHR 25 January 2000, paras. 79-82)

Some internally displaced have opted for resettlement (2000)

· Ossets have often opted to resettle in South out of fear for their safety · Persons who participated in the hostilities, or have relatives who did, consider themselves to be at particular risk of reprisals should they return

"While the right of displaced persons to return to their previous areas of permanent residence must be ensured, it is also imperative that return not be viewed as the only possible durable solution for the displaced, who also have a right to resettle voluntarily in another part of the country. Although government policy, especially with regard to ethnic Georgians displaced from Abkhazia, appears to have been powerfully guided by the political priority placed on return of the displaced, resettlement in other parts of the country also must be supported for those internally displaced persons who desire it. The Guiding Principles, to which Georgian government officials responded so positively, affirm that the authorities have a duty and responsibility to establish conditions, as well as provide the means, which allow internally displaced persons to return voluntarily to their homes or places of habitual residence or to resettle voluntarily in another part of the country.

Already, and despite the overriding emphasis on return, it is beginning to be recognized that certain internally displaced persons are unlikely to want to return, out of fear for their safety. The case, noted above, of the Osset man who had opted to resettle in South Ossetia rather than return to his previous residence in government-controlled Georgia, where he feared his safety could not be guaranteed, is one example. Persons who participated in the hostilities, or have relatives who did, consider themselves to be at particular risk of reprisals should they return and thus are likely to prefer resettlement.

An IRC pilot project is providing shelter construction assistance (roofing material, paint, windows, etc.) to some 30 families displaced from Abkhazia who have indicated that they will not return. An additional criterion for participation in the programme is that the prospective beneficiaries own land - a condition which, as detailed above, requires registering as a permanent resident in the area concerned and, under existing legislation, losing one’s status as an internally displaced person and the benefits that this entails." (UN CHR 25 January 2001, paras. 105-107)

UN Special Re presentative conducts bilateral consultations on key issues, including the return of displaced persons to Abkhazia (2000)

· Disagreement persists between the two sides to finalize a draft protocol on the return of refugees to the Gali (August 2000)

"During the reporting period, my Special Representative, in cooperation with the Russian Federation as facilitator, the members of the group of Friends of the Secretary-General for Georgia and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), continued his efforts in pursuit of a comprehensive political settlement of the conflict in Abkhazia. He worked on the issue of the future political status of Abkhazia within the State of Georgia, the improvement of the security situation, the return of refugees to the Gali district as a first step towards the return of all refugees, the economic rehabilitation of Abkhazia and confidence-building. As a result, the Coordinating Council mechanism was improved and the network of security arrangements in the Mission’s area of responsibility was strengthened. […] The eleventh session of the Coordinating Council of the Georgian and Abkhaz sides was held on 24 October in Tbilisi under the chairmanship of my Special Representative. The session confirmed the reactivation of the Council’s Working Group I on security matters, whose recommendations were adopted. The Working Group subsequently met in its sixth session on 13 December in Sukhumi […]. After an interruption of almost three years, Working Group III on social and economic questions held its third session on 5 December in Tbilisi. Agreement was reached on a number of specific projects aimed at rehabilitating the communications systems in the zone of conflict and adjacent areas. These projects will be submitted for consideration to the Coordinating Council at its twelfth session. Efforts to convene Working Group II on refugees are continuing. (UN SC 18 January 2001, paras 3-6)

"On 6 and 7 August 2000 in Tbilisi, and again on 20 August in Sukhumi, my Special Representative chaired consultations between the Georgian Minister for Special Affairs, Malkhaz Kakabadze and Anri Jergenia, the personal representative of Abkhaz leader Vladislav Ardzinba, on the basis of the Protocol signed on 11 July 2000 at the tenth session of the Coordinating Council of the Georgian and Abkhaz sides in Sukhumi (see S/2000/697, para. 8). The Protocol called upon the two sides to finalize the draft protocol on the return of refugees to the Gali district and measures for economic rehabilitation and the draft Agreement on peace and guarantees for the prevention of hostilities. Although the Georgian side put forward new versions of both draft documents, which have been on the negotiating table in some form since June 1998, disagreement between the two sides persisted. The consultations also included broader discussions of central aspects of a comprehensive political settlement. During the visit to Tblisi, President Shevardnadze received Mr. Jergenia and both sides gave assurances of their commitment to resolve the outstanding issues constructively and exclusively through peaceful means.

On the basis of the Protocol, both sides submitted to my Special Representative proposals concerning further work in the field of confidence-building measures, with a v iew to preparing for the third Meeting on Confidence-building Measures to be convened in Yalta at the end of November 2000, at the invitation of the Government of Ukraine." (UN SC 25 October 2000, paras. 4-6)

See also " Joint assessment mission to the Gali district evaluates conditions for the return of the displaced (November 2000)" [Internal link]

De facto Abkhaz authorities take unilateral initiative to promote return to the Gali region (January 1999)

· Possible economic interests behind the Abkhaz unilateral return initiative · Returnees must be approved and registered by the Abkhaz Authorities · The objective may be to keep the level of return to the amount necessary to cultivate crops in order to maintain the current ethnic balance

"The de facto president of Abkhazia declared in January 1999 a unilateral return of IDPs to the Gali region beginning on 1 March 1999. Several analysts have suggested that economic reasons contributed to this sudden policy as the Gali region is primarily agricultural and people were needed to plant and then harvest the crops. However, neither the de jure Georgian authorities nor the international community supported the call for a return as the de facto Abkhaz authorities refused security guarantees for the returnees. Furthermo re, returnees must be approved and registered by the "Commission on the Return of Refugees and the Economic and Social Rehabilitation of the Gali Region." The IDP Committee is able to accept or refuse an individual’s application to return, with little opportunity to appeal. Refusal to return is reportedly determined by the person’s activities during the conflict, which is based on records left behind by the retreating Georgian military and authorities. Persons accused of participation in the conflict are detained and then delivered to the Military Tribunal in Ochamchira for investigation and trial."[…]

"The document checks and the inability to thoroughly investigate and arrest Abkhazian and Georgian criminal gang members clearly intimidate the local population in the Gali district, which is primarily Mingrelian/Georgian. The consequences of such policies effectively limit the number of IDPs willing to permanently return to the Gali region. It is the opinion of the author that these policies are directed to minimize the number of Mingrelian/Georgian returnees to only the amount necessary to cultivate crops in order to maintain the current ethnic balance – a complete return would significantly tip the population balance in favor of Georgians/Mingrelians. A representative of the European Community Humanitarian Office recently stated at a conference that ECHO estimates 150,000 persons to be residing in Abkhazia, although the figures are open to some dispute. Thus, the balance between ethnic Abkhazians and ethnic Georgians is roughly equal." (Kathleen 1999, p.2-4)

Up date on figures, patterns and conditions of return to the Gali region (Abkhazia) (1999)

· De facto Abkhaz authorities allegedly exaggerate number of Georgian returnees in Gali · Some IDPs return gradually to tend crops and look after property · Environment of general insecurity impede stable return of IDPs

"Despite the lack of security, an estimated 17,000 of those expelled in May [1999] returned again to Gali soon after the fighting abated. Although some internally displaced persons from Gali reportedly traveled back and forth between their property in Gali and Georgia proper during 1999, no significant returns took place." (USCR 2000, p. 239)

"The de facto Abkhaz authorities report that 35,000 IDPs have registered in the Gali region between 1 March and 1 October 1999. In June, only 4000 IDPs had been registered according to local press reports. They also estimate that there are a further 25,000 returnees who remain unregistered as of 1 October. [Footnote: "UNOMIG has obtained data from the CIS peace-keeping force stationed at the Inguri Main Bridge – the only official crossing point – and other unofficial crossing points which indicate that the

number of people entering into Abkhazia is not high enough to generate the numbers of returnees claimed by the de facto Abkhaz authorities.] IDPs initially returned to the Gali region on a temporary basis. Typically, older male heads of the household, and perhaps a couple of male relatives, would be the first to cross the cease-fire line. IDPs usually stated that personal security was one of their greatest concerns during the early spring period, and typically came only for short periods of time (the farther away from the ceasefire line, the longer these initial periods were) before going back to the Zugdidi side of the cease-fire line. The situation remained very fluid – IDPs were returning to the Gali region and then departing to the Zugdidi region only to return again. Once they deemed the situation safe enough, they would send for other family members, eventually bringing the women and children members closer to summer. Gradually, the periods of time spent in Abkhazia have grown longer, although still very fluid.[…]

In spite of predictions that there would be a widespread departure of returnees for the Zugdidi side of the cease-fire line with the onset of winter, most prefer to remain in Abkhazia. Returnees were (and still are) concerned about four issues: 1) their living conditions as many buildings are not habitable; 2) they would no longer be able to even minimally support themselves after the harvest; 3) the language of instruction in schools would not be in Georgian; and 4) their security situation. However, when interviewed, the returnees state that conditions are no better on the Georgian side; at least they can be marginally self-sufficient in their homes. The returnees still live in a state of fear and uncertainty, but their attachment to their land bears a greater significance in the decision to remain.[…]

While most returnees to the Gali region currently prefer to remain there throughout the winter, any deterioration of the situation will likely cause them to depart again for the Georgian side of the cease-fire line. Harassment by law enforcement officials (usually militia men), as well as the lack investigations and criminal proceedings against perpetrators, generates an environment of fear and instability, which has the potential to escalate and contribute once more to displacement."(Samuel, 1999, p.2-6)

Return to South Ossetia: obstacles remain in place (1999-2001)

· Both the Georgian and South Ossetian sides created obstacles to the return of refugees and displaced persons to South Ossetia or to Georgia · Some returnees in South Ossetia went back to their previous places of displacement during 2001

"The 1992 ethnic conflict in South Ossetia also created tens of thousands of IDP's and refugees. Ethnic Georgians from South Ossetia fled to Georgia proper and Ossetians from South Ossetia and other Georgian regions fled to Russia. In 1997 the UNHCR began a program to return IDP's and refugees to their homes. Both sides created obstacles that slowed the return. There were about 24,000 Ossetian refugees living in North Ossetia, Russia. To date about 370 Ossetian families from Russia have returned, the majority to South Ossetia. The South Ossetian separatists continued to obstruct the repatriation of ethnic Georgians to South Ossetia, although approximately 200 families returned. For political reasons, South Ossetia continued to press for the return of all Ossetian refugees to South Ossetia rather than to their original homes in other Georgian regions. In 1997 the Government publicly recognized the right of Ossetian refugees to return to their homes in Georgia but took little action to facilitate their return. Persistent opposition by Georgian authorities, especially at the local level, over the return of illegally occupied homes has prevented the organized return of Ossetian refugees to Georgia proper. During the year, approximately 13 Ossetian refugee families returned to South Ossetia, 11 Ossetian refugees returned to Georgia proper, and 32 Georgian IDP families returned to South Ossetia. Since the outbreak of hostilities in the Chechnya region of Russia in September 1999, the Government has registered approximately 7,000 refugees from that region. Most were women and children and settled in the Pankisi Gorge." (U.S. DOS February 2001, sect. 2d)

"Of 425 persons who returned in 2001, 141 Osset refugees returned from North Ossetia (Russian Federation) to South Ossetia and 284 IDPs returned from Georgia proper to their homes in South Ossetia." (UNHCR July 2002, p, 383)

"During the year [2001], South Ossetia separatists did little to support the return of internally displaced ethnic Georgians to South Ossetia, and no progress was made either toward resolving the underlying conflict of restoring the property rights of displaced persons. Consequently, not only did few ethnic Georgians return to South Ossetia during the year, but some displaced people who had previously returned to their homes held again in 2001 to their previous places of temporary refuge.

The Georgian government, in turn, did not implement proactive measures to help ethnic Ossetians return to their homes in other areas of Georgia. Local officials generally did not evict illegal squatters who had taken over apartments of ethnic Ossetian refugees and displaced persons." (USCR 2002, p. 214)

Passed return experiences

UNHCR 1994 return plan fails (1995)

· Abkhaz representatives paid only lip-service to UNHCR’s return plan · UNHCR moved ahead despite reports on violence against Georgian returnees in Abkhazia · Abkhaz "authorities" sought to implement the plan in a discriminatory manner · The UNHCR plan was designed for the return of 80.000 IDPs, but only 311 people finally opted to repatriate under the plan

"From the outset, the Abkhaz government has officially supported the UNHCR-supervised repatriation plan as defined in the Quadripartite Agreement on the Voluntary Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons signed in Moscow on April 4, 1994, by Abkhazia, Georgia, Russia and the UNHCR.

In practice, however, official support for the repatriation plan was consistently contradicted by the statements and actions of Abkhaz representatives both in Sukhumi and the Gali region. International NGOs report that in preliminary meetings in Sukhumi in May 1994, Abkhaz officials, notably Deputy Prime Minister Enver Kanba, expressed open hostility toward ethnic Georgians. Officials in the Gali region did the same. While fighting continued around Gali, there were almost daily reports of violent attacks on ethnic Georgians who had tried to return from Gali to check on their homes and gardens. The Abkhaz authorities attributed these deaths to landmines and bandits, taking no responsibility for the ethnic targeting that was in fact taking place.(OSI 1995, pp.19-20)

"The plan endorsed in April 1994 by Abkhazia, Georgia, Russia and the UNHCR called for the repatriation of the displaced population in stages, starting with some 80,000 people who fled the Gali region in southeastern Abkhazia as defeated Georgian troops retreated in September 1993. Most of these people abandoned their homes before Abkhaz troops reached the region, seeking refuge with the local population in and around the Georgian town of Zugdidi across the Inguri river. Non governmental organizations working in Sukhumi believe that about 30,000 have already returned to the Gali region.

According to the UNHCR plan, some 80,000 IDPs were to be repatriated before the end of October 1994. The plan included, among other features, a computerized inventory of all potential returnees; provision of materials to the returnees for reconstruction of homes; a media campaign to inform and prepare the populations on both sides of the border; and a controversial prior review process whereby Abkhaz authorities reserved the right to screen potential returnees, excluding anyone who had taken up arms on the

Georgian side (the majority of able-bodied men), or who intended to take up arms in the future. Abkhaz authorities later extended the exclusion criteria to persons having sent money out of Abkhazia. By autumn 1994, the NGO community believed Abkhaz officials had compiled a list of 14,000 to 25,000 Georgians not permitted to return to their homes.

Critics of the UNHCR repatriation program, including the NGO community in Tbilisi, faulted the plan for its hasty preparation, particularly for ignoring some of the refugee organization’s own standard procedures in assessing community attitudes on both sides of the border before promoting a mass repatriation. Following are the main criticisms of the plan cited by leading NGOs working in Georgia:

An exclusionary clause included in the Quadripartite Agreement allows authorities to exclude former Georgian combatants from repatriating to their Abkhaz homes. But it also casts a wide net over all men of fighting age, excluding them for past as well as possible future activity; moreover, the time-frame for the screening process is open-ended, allowing the authorities to assess someone at any time. While the women and children related to excluded men would be allowed to return, critics point to the destabilizing effect of long-term family separation, and the massing of a restive male exile population on the Zugdidi side of the border.

The UNHCR headquarters staff in Geneva was aware of this program, and delegations were dispatched to Georgia to perform assessments. Geneva also deployed one of the most experienced field officers from its ex-Yugoslavia program to run the operation from Zugdidi. To the NGOs in Georgia it seemed inconceivable that the headquarters would proceed with a $4 million plan without considering the physical risks to the returnees and the potential for the program to end in disaster. By September 1994, many NGOs were even more adamantly opposed to proceeding under the terms of the plan, citing the above criticisms and underscoring the UN’s own weekly reports of rampant criminality in Abkhazia and daily assaults, abductions, rapes and house-burnings in the Gali region when Georgians tried to return from Zugdidi.

Despite repeated appeals by the groups that were to serve as implementing partners in the repatriation plan, UNHCR did not sufficiently survey either the displaced population in Georgia or the resident population in Abkhazia into which the IDPs would have to be reintegrated. While thousands trickled home on their own, only 311 people finally opted to repatriate under the UNHCR plan."(Open Society Institute 1995, pp.27-31)

Since then, UNHCR has taken a more cautious stand on the issue of return: "The adoption of two essential protocols concerning the return of IDPs and the rehabilitation of Abkhazia, is still awaited. In March [1999], the Abkhaz side unilaterally initiated the registration and repatriation of IDPs in Gali district. It is estimated that the current population in Gali region is around 30,000. However, the sustainability of return is questionable since there are still no security guarantees from either side." (UNHCR 1999, Mid-Year Progress Report-Georgia)

See the full text of the Moscow Quadripartite Agreement on Voluntary Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons, Signed on 4 April 1994 [Internal link]

HUMANITARIAN ACCESS

General

Security constraints affects delivery of humanitarian assistance, particularly in western Georgia (2001)

· Both UN Observer Mission and the CIS Peacekeeping Force have been the victims of criminality or partisan attacks in the Gali district · Common criminality against international agencies includes robbery and threats · UNOMIG patrols have been held by groups of protesting IDPs in the Samegrelo province · The presence of landmines in the buffer zone constitute a serious threat · Criminally motivated kidnappings have regularly affected local residents and foreigners · Security conditions for international workers in Tbilisi have deteriorated recently

Gali district "In most of Abkhazia the security situation has generally been calm and stable. The two exceptions are the Kodori Valley and the Gali district.

In Gali, criminality and sporadic paramilitary activities continue to raise concerns about the safety of the sizeable population that has already returned spontaneously and the safety of humanitarian aid workers. The CISPKF and UNOMIG regularly conduct patrols in the Restricted Weapons Zone and the Security Zone to monitor the Moscow Agreement. The CISPKF and UNOMIG have themselves been victims of the criminality and/or partisan attacks. In June 2000 a UNOMIG patrol in lower Gali was fired upon by masked men with automatic weapons. As recently as December 2000, two United Nations Military Observers were kidnapped and held hostage for three days in the Kodori Valley. In January of 2001 there was a remote controlled mine attack against the CISPKF. The local law enforcement authorities in both Georgia and Abkhazia seem unable to deal with the problem effectively.

The killing of Mr. Zurab Achba, a consultant working with the United Nations Human Rights Office (HROAG), in Sukhumi on 15 August 2000 remains unsolved." (UN OCHA 15 March 2001, Abkhazia)

"During the reporting period [July-October 2001], international humanitarian agencies and non- governemental organizations (NGOs) continued programmes to meet the acute needs of the most vulnerable in Abkhazia, Georgia. However, due to the fighting in the Kodori Valley area and the volatile situation in Gali, many NGOs suspended their activities after 8 October [2001]" (UN SC 24 October 2001, para. 32)

"Imereti The security situation in Imereti is calm and stable. Nevertheless, the frequency of criminality in the region, particularly in its capital, Kutaisi, appears to be increasing. Burglaries of international organizations' offices and their staff members' houses have become more common.

Samegrelo The security situation in Samegrelo is monitored by the United Nations Military Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), which is mandated by the UN Security Council to monitor a security zone, as well as

a restricted weapons zone, straddling the boundary between Samegrelo and Abkhazia. According to UNOMIG, the security situation in Samegrelo is calm but unstable.

The situation is rendering unstable primarily as a result of two factors. Occasional tit for tat exchanges between Georgian Partisans and Abkhaz Militia continue to occur. On 26 January 2001, for example, an antitank, guided missile was launched from the Abkhaz side of the Inguri. In addition, popular demonstrations are a feature of the region, primarily by politicized or disaffected IDPs for timely payment of benefits, and progress in negotiations or return and resettlement. On 21 November 2000, for example, a UNOMIG patrol was held by a group of protesting IDPs for 90 minutes in the village of Mujava. The protesters were not hostile, but wanted the patrol contact the authorities so that the benefits, allowances and salaries not paid would be distributed.

Also affecting the region is apparent increase in smuggling related criminal activity due to the relative dearth of law enforcement and civil authority in neighboring Gali. The rate of crimes reported to UNOMIG has increased significantly, particularly since the beginning of 2001. Car thefts and burglaries are common crimes." (UN OCHA 15 March 2001, Samegrelo/Imereti)

ICRC report "Hostage-taking is not a recent phenomenon, but endemic to the Caucasus region. Criminally motivated kidnappings have regularly affected local residents and foreigners, notably in the frontline region between Georgia and Abkhazia, where UNOM IG observers have been targeted a number of times.

In recent months, the situation has also tensed up in Tbilisi. Two Spanish businessmen have been detained since December 2000, when they were abducted on the road from Tbilisi airport, allegedly by armed groups operating in Pankisi.

The number of bomb alerts affecting local institutions, embassies and humanitarian agencies have risen sharply and foreigners regularly fall victim to brutal attacks, sometimes even in broad daylight. The only apparent purpose of such criminal acts is to generate panics." (ICRC May 2001, p. 10)

Security conditions faced by the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (May-October 2001)

"Levels of crime and lawlessness remained high in the zone of conflict, creating an overall sense of insecurity and uncertainty among the local population. Local law enforcement agencies were unable to control crime in the conflict zone. Numerous incidents were reported in both the Gali and Zugdidi sectors. However, the rate was higher on the Abkhaz-controlled side of the ceasefire line, especially in lower Gali. Insome areas on the Abkhaz-controlled side of the ceasefire line, joint patrolling by Abkhaz militia, local residents and the CIS peacekeeping force helped to reduce the level of lawlessness. Similarly, on the Georgian side of the ceasefire line, joint patrolling by Georgian police, local residents and the CIS peacekeeping force led to a reduction in criminal incidents. UNOMIG security officers conducted regular patrols to reduce the risk of security incidents and closely liaised with the Zugdidi police and Gali militia.

In the Gali sector, four residences of local United Nations employees were robbed and four more robbery attempts took place. UNOMIG patrols in the Gali sector received threats from the Abkhaz military and militia posts. Abkhaz authorities in Sukhumi took measures to stop such threats.

28. In the Zugdidi sector, the houses of three UNOMIG local employees were robbed. Four protest demonstrations by internally displaced persons and locals who established roadblocks impeded UNOMIG movement and patrolling activities. The Georgian local authorities, however, took swift action to disband the demonstrations and remove the obstacles on the road.

The arrival of seven new mine-protected vehicles is expected to significantly improve the security of the military observers while on patrol." (UN SC paras. 26-29)

"The security and safety of UNOMIG personnel remains an issue of high priority to the Mission. During the period under review, three instances of break-ins at residences of UNOMIG personnel were reported and two attempted break-ins were thwarted. Early in July, two local UNOMIG employees were attacked and severely beaten by a group of intoxicated men while returning home in Gali town. In response to these security threats, UNOMIG security officers and local enforcement agencies have stepped up their patrolling activities in the vicinity of houses occupied by UNOMIG personnel, and their security systems have also been upgraded. In addition, the threat of mines continues to be of great concern. UNOMIG relies on the assistance of the HALO Trust to dispose of the mines.

On 9 July, in response to an enquiry by my Special Representative, the Georgian Minister for Special Assignments, Malkhaz Kakabadze, stated that the Georgian law enforcement agencies had initiated a criminal case against two individuals suspected of involvement in the hostage-taking of United Nations observers and that measures were under way to arrest other people involved in the incidents.

In violation of the Moscow Agreement, there is a disturbing tendency by the two sides to restrict the movement of UNOMIG personnel, thereby hindering the ability of the Mission to fulfil its mandate. One such serious instance of obstruction by the Abkhaz authorities occurred on 30 April, when Abkhaz military personnel aimed a grenade launcher at a UNOMIG helicopter circling an Abkhaz observation post. When a UNOMIG team leader later visited the post, the soldiers confirmed that they had indeed aimed weapons towards the helicopter and that they had fired once in the air with a light weapon. A formal protest was lodged with the de facto Abkhaz Minister of Defense, who assured UNOMIG of his determination to take appropriate action. On 14 June, the Georgian side prevented UNOMIG military observers from entering a part of the restricted weapons zone. One day later, UNOMIG was also advised against conducting helicopter flights over parts of its area of responsibility because of the NATO military exercises. After a protest by UNOMIG, the situation was rectified." (UNSC 19 July 2001, paras. 17-19)

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES

National Response

Georgian government response to the IDP situation - legal framework and basic policy (1992-2000)

· The Minister for Refugees and Accommodation acts as the government focal point for issues of internal displacement · IDP legislation from 1996 establishes economic and social safeguards for displaced people · Several Government decrees complement the Displaced Persons Act from 1996 · The Displaced Persons Act fails to include victims of natural disasters (aprx. 40,000 IDPs) · No major effort to integrate or resettle IDPs - government policy focussed on return · Reports of demonstrations of displaced demanding payment of their overdue allowances, especially in western Georgia

Structures: "To be sure, there exists a certain solidarity between the Government and the internally displaced, at least the ethnic Georgians who constitute the majority of the displaced, which can be attributed in particular to shared ethnic kinship. Accordingly, and unlike in many cases of internal displacement, the displaced are not associated with the 'enemy', nor are they subject to attacks on their physical security on that basis. The Government readily acknowledged the problem of internal displacement and invited the international community to assist it in meeting the emergency needs of the displaced.

Years on, the Government continues to give emphasis to the plight of the internally dis placed. The Minister for Refugees and Accommodation, who acts as the government focal point for issues of internal displacement, pointed out that 15 per cent of the State budget is devoted to providing internally displaced persons with assistance to meet their basic needs. And yet, given the current conditions of deprivation in which the displaced find themselves and the delays of months on end in the payment of their subsidy, questions arise as to the diversion of funds. It was difficult, for instance, to obtain a clear answer to the question whether all funds for displaced persons from Abhazia were channelled through the Abkhaz Government in Exile, which, in addition to describing the humanitarian activities that it undertakes through the system of paralle l structures, also informed the mission delegation in considerable detail of the defence capabilities that it maintains." (UN CHR 25 January 2001, paras. 109-110)

National legislation: "[Georgia] passed a Displaced Persons Act on 28 June 1996, defining the status of displaced persons in Georgia, offering them legal, economic and social safeguards and protecting their interests. Under the Act, displaced persons are offered the following kinds of social security:

- the right to use State transport free of charge to travel and move their effects to their temporary abode when they leave the conflict zone;

- the right to reside in their temporary abodes and use communal services free of charge;

- free care at State medical institutions;

- State financial and concomitant assistance.

Displaced persons have been given food aid in the form of a variety of products: 11,777,016 kg in 1995, 8,461,287 kg in 1996 and 2,291,335 kg in 1997 (first quarter). Displaced persons receive 8.5 lari per month. The State pays 1.3 lari per person per month to displaced persons housed in the private sector.

One-off financial aid of between 50 and 200 lari is payable upon application to displaced pensioners needing serious care and to the neediest cases. Additionally, when a displaced person returns to his or her permanent home (once the reasons for having to leave it no longer obtain), the State will undertake to rehabilitate all his or her property. (UN CESCR 23 September 1998, paras.108-111)

Government decrees: "Since 1992 the Government of Georgia has enacted several legal acts regarding to amelioration of IDP's social and economic living conditions.

According to decree #952,adopted on 25 September 1992 by the Government of the Republic of Georgia, the special fund is created in order to help IDPs at the Ministry of Labor, Social Security and Demography of the Republic of Georgia. The material and financial resources available to the Fund are to be spend for following reasons:

Emergency one time money contribution to IDPs; Measures taken for amelioration of living conditions at the places of temporary settlement; One time money contribution (to each family member according to minimal rate of wages); Opening of low rate cradit line according to funds available in case of emergency;

According to # 764 Presidential Decree of 28 December 1997 on Amelioration of Social Protection of IDPs and Additional Measure to be Taken for Winter Period the special Governmental commission shall supervise the meetings of ministers and other high ranking officials with IDPs.

According to the same Decree all ministries and governmental bodies are obliged.

To distribute pensions in time; To accommodate proper number of beds in the centers of towns and regions for medical treatment of IDPs on expense of the Ministry of Health; To supply insurance policies and other means of medical support according to programs undertaken for socially extremely helpless IDPs; To organize missions of teams, of doctors, to different regions of Georgia in order to check health conditions of IDPs. To supply IDPs with information regarding to humanitarian assistance provided by international organizations: To proper propositions until the end of April 1998 regarding to money compensation for IDPs.

The IDPs are entitled to use public transport with low tariffs;

The pupil IDPs are entitled to study free of charge until third grade in secondary schools.

According to Presidential Decree # 764 the pupils of 1st grade are entitled to receive textbooks free of charge." (UNA, Refuge, "Some remarks on Francis Deng [sic] Report", First Issue (4th), May 1999)

Comment on the law: "In Georgia the law on "Forcefully Displaced Persons - The Fled" uses term "the Fled" for classification of these individuals and defines it as being "forcefully displaced". Although the same definition "forcefully displaced" is not being used in the law "On Refugees" which causes confusion in everyday and official communication where the term "Forcefully Displaced Person" is used to define "Internally Displaced

Person" which is generally incorrect according to international norms and is the result of copying the Russian term of FDP - Forcefully Displaced Person. The law on "Forcefully Displaced Persons" has one additional serious flaw - in difference with internationally accepted norms it fails to include ecological migrants and thus leaves, at least theoretically, unprotected the victims of natural disasters that presently include up to 40 thousand persons displaced in Georgia in 1987-1991-1992."(UNA, Refuge, "Some remarks for understanding the essence of the forced migration", Third Issue (6th), November 1999)

Comment on the policy: "The government's policy towards IDPs is based on the assumption that they will return to Abkhazia and North Ossetia one day. Thus, no major effort is undertaken to assist these people in settling down elsewhere in Georgia and integrating them into local communities. Since negotiations over Abkhazia’s political status reached a deadlock with the government in Tbilisi insisting on maintaining Georgia’s territorial integrity and the Abkhazians striving for full independence, the prospects for a return of Georgian IDPs to Abkhazia look bleak. This was again demonstrated by the recent resumption of hostilities in Gali district." (WFP, 1999, para.12)

See also "Monitoring of Legal and Actual Status of Internally Displaced Persons in Georgia", Georgian Young Lawyers' Association, 1999 [Internal link]

See also "IDPs stage demonstrations against national authorities and international organizations (2001- 2002)" [Internal link]

Government acceptance and support of Chechen refugees triggers discontent among Georgian IDPs (2000)

· The Georgian government provides refugees from Chechnya with an allowance of 12 GAL per month (the equivalent of US$6) · Government aid to Chechen refugees likely to arouse the ire of Georgia's internally displaced persons from Abkhazia · Patience within the IDP community is reaching the breaking point. IDPs could resort to violence in an attempt to settle the Abkhazia question.

"According to local news reports, the flow of refugees from the embattled Chechnya region of Russia into neighboring Georgia is abating. A few of the over 5,000 refugees who have fled to Georgia in recent months are even returning home, the Georgian news agency Prime-News has reported.

The Georgian government aims to provide refugees from Chechnya with an allowance of 12 GAL per month (the equivalent of US$6), pending the approval of the state budget in February. However, there are potentially severe side effects to such an aid effort. Even such minimal assistance could cause discontent among hard-pressed Georgians. Most are struggling to carve out an existence amidst bleak economic conditions, and are experiencing significant delays in the payment of salaries and pensions.

More importantly, government aid to Chechen refugees would likely arouse the ire of Georgia's more than 200,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Abkhazia. The majority of IDPs live in dire circumstances, with little hope for an improvement in circumstance. A political solution to the conflict, one that would permit IDPs to return to their homes, seemingly remains as elusive as ever.

There are indications that patience within the IDP community is reaching the breaking point. The longer the war in Chechnya lasts, the greater the temptation for some IDPs, along with Georgian nationalists, to resort to violence in an attempt to settle the Abkhazia question.

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Among the dangerous indicators is the formation of a "Committee for the Liberation of Abkhazia." According to a report in the Georgia Times, the committee, which was formedon Jan. 1, advocates the resumption of military action to regain control of Abkhazia ifnegotiations do not make significant progress in the near future. Russia's action in Chechnya could be used as justification for the use of violent methods to achieve political aims.

Some politicians in Georgia have stated that a renewal of hostilities might be the only meansto achieve a breakthrough. For example, in his recent interview with Caucasus Press, the Chairman of the Supreme Council of Abkhaz Autonomous Republic in exile (sitting in Tbilisi), Tamaz Nadareishvili said; "Taking into consideration that we have a similar approach to the use of force for returning the lost territories as Putin has, and the situation in Chechnya proves it, we will insist on a similar approach to be used in respect of Abkhazia." (Murvanidez Mitchell 2000, "Eurasia Insight: A New Year, but Old Problems With Georgian-Russian Relations")

International response

Council of Europe expresses concerns about the situation of displaced persons (2002)

· The Parliamentary Assembly urges Georgian to refrain from instrumental use of the displaced population for political aims · Support should be given to the integration of IDPs and refugees in host communities · Donor States should also ensure that humanitarian aid is not phased out before it is replaced by development assistance

Resolution adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly, 27 June 2002 "The Assembly therefore recommends that the Committee of Ministers: i. urge the member states of the Council of Europe: a. to continue providing humanitarian aid to the countries in the region, and to ensure that it will not be phased out before it is replaced by development assistance; b. to contribute generously to the funding of the programmes and projects relating to housing, education and job-creation for refugees and IDPs; c. to give their financial and technical support as well as their expertise to the elaboration of vocational training schemes, in particular for women and young people; d. to offer necessary expertise and man-power for de-mining of the region. ii. urge the three republics concerned: a. to continue their sincere efforts aimed at peaceful settlements of the conflicts in the area with a view to return of all refugees and displaced persons who wish so to their places of origin; b. to refrain from instrumental use of refugees and displaced persons for political aims;

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c. to elaborate and implement, in cooperation with the international community, overall strategies for durable solutions; d. to provide refugees and IDPs with comprehensive and clear information on their rights and choice between return and integration; e. to provide every refugee with a possibility of integration, and to take measures facilitating this process; f. to review domestic law with a view to amending all provisions which could jeopardise the process of integration; g. to seek international funding for the implementation of concrete projects in the field of housing and income -generating activities for refugees and internally displaced; h. to ensure access to health care and transparency and exercise better control over the distribution of the international aid and medicaments. […] v. urge the Georgian authorities: a. to refrain from any hasty repatriation of the Chechen refugees before the security conditions in Chechnya allow for safe returns in dignity; b. to grant the right to vote in national and local elections to the displaced Georgian citizens avoiding changes of their status and right of return to home areas; c. to ensure the access of the displaced population to land under the same conditions as the local population; d. to adopt and implement the law on the return of Meshketian Turks in compliance with the commitment undertaken by Georgia upon its accession to the Council of Europe; e. to enforce the property rights of potential returnees of Osset origin." (COE 27 June 2002)

See also the report prepared by the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography for the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Report on the situation of refugees and displaced persons in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, 4 June 2002 [Internet]

See also Recommendation 1305 (1996) on the humanitarian situation of the displaced persons in Georgia, adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly on 24 September 1996 [Internet]

German government funds telecommunication rehabilitation programme between Abkhazia and Georgia proper (2001-2002)

· The programme will serve displaced persons and returnees on both sides of the ceasefire line

"In November [2001], the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the German Government, in the presence of my Special Representative, signed an agreement whereby UNDP will implement, as part of the peace process, a telecommunications rehabilitation programme. This programme will serve displaced persons and returnees on both sides of the ceasefire line, extend links to Sukhumi and connect Tbilisi and the upper Kodori Valley. The Georgian and Abkhaz sides jointly identified the programme needs under the auspices of Working Group III of the Coordinating Council, which deals with socio-economic issues. The initial grant contribution from the German Government is $150,000." (UN SC 18 January 2002, para. 21)

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"Phase I of the telecommunication rehabilitation programme, financed by the German Government and implemented by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) under the auspices of Working Group III of the Coordinating Council, on socio-economic matters, was completed (see S/2002/88, para. 21). One of the concrete outputs was the restablishment of the reception of Georgian television channels in the upper Kodori Valley. The second phase is expected to begin in early spring." (UN SC 19 April 2002, para. 26)

The Georgian government and UN agencies developed a "New Approach" to the assistance of the internally displaced (2000-2002)

· The New Approach will also enable the displaced to reintegrate into society when they will eventually return to their homes · A self-reliance pilot fund with preliminary pledges of over US$ 1 million has been created for the funding of innovative projects that contribute to the self-sufficiency of the displaced · Two rounds of competition have been completed as of May 2002

"In addition to increasing vulnerability inside Abkhazia, Georgia, the conflict also left tens of thousands of internally displaced persons elsewhere in Georgia in a precarious condition, in effect locking them out of the benefits that could accrue to them from participation in longer-term development initiatives. In order to address this issue, the Government of Georgia, the United Nations Development Programme, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the World Bank, and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs have developed a New Approach to assistance to internally displaced persons, which recognizes the right of all persons to return to their homes in secure conditions. However, in the absence of those conditions, the new approach also recognizes the right of internally displaced persons to be treated in the same manner as all Georgian citizens and favours giving them the opportunity to build skills and a level of self-reliance that will enable them to reintegrate into society when they will eventually return to their homes. President Shevardnadze has recently established a commission, chaired by the State Minister, to facilitate the elaboration of the new approach in conjunction with United Nations agencies and the World Bank. It is encouraging that Member States, the World Bank and United Nations Agencies have made preliminary pledges of over US$ 1 million to the Self-Reliance Pilot Fund established by the partners in the new approach to catalyse financing for innovative projects that contribute to the self-sufficiency of internally displaced persons." (UNSC 24 April 2000, para. 24)

"The second round of the Georgia Self-Reliance Fund (GSRF) grants competition has been completed. Four NGOs were approved by the Steering Committee: Accion Contra el Hambre (ACH), Charity Humanitarian Center 'Abkhazeti' (CHCA), Counterpart International and Lazarus. The actual implementation of projects is anticipated to be launched in June 2002. One proposal remains under consideration." (UN OCHA 10 May 2002)

For more information see following documents by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs:

"The Georgia Self Reliance Fund: Announcement for the second round of the New Approach to IDP assistance", 6 June 2001 [Internet]

"The Georgia Self Reliance Fund announces the completion of the Fund's First Grant Competition", 27 April 2001 [Internet]

"Georgia: New Approach to IDP Assistance", 1 October 2000 [Internet]

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"Georgia Self Reliance Fund seeking proposals for small-scale pilot programs", 1 October 2000 [Internet]

See also the presentation of the New Approach by Mr. Brian Keane, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), in Refugee #7, 2000 (15), a bi-monthly newsletter published by the United Nations Association of Georgia [Internet]

For more information, consult Assistance Georgia, a web site initiated by the Save the Children's Georgian Assistance Initiative (GAI) which provides information in support of humanitarian and development aid activities in Georgia [Internet: http://www.assistancegeorgia.org.ge]

Winter Heating Assistance: USAID increased its support in 2001

· Donations from the US government and international oil company doubled the level of funding for the winter assistance programme · The programme pays electricity bills during the winter months to about 300,000 vulnerable households, including 116,000 IDPs

"The U.S. Government, through the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), increased its funding commitment for the 2001 Georgia Winter Heating Assistance Program (GWHAP) from $5 million to $9.1 million. BP, the international petroleum company leading the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi- Ceyhan crude oil and the Shah Deniz gas pipelines, also donated one million dollars to GWHAP. With BP's donation, the total amount of funding for GWHAP during this past winter was $10.1 million, doubling the level of assistance of the previous winter season.

The final size of the program will depend in part on the payment by large industrial commercial users of their electricity bills. PA Consulting is assisting the Georgian government to enforce large commercial users to pay their bills, thus increasing the cash flow into the energy sector for the purchase of electricity.

GWHAP assisted the most vulnerable segments of Georgia's population and socially critical institutions by paying for electricity during the months of December 2001 through March 2002. Approximately 180,000 eligible households and 116,000 internally displaced persons living in collective centers benefited from this program. Additionally, nearly 300 maternity homes, hospitals, orphanages, schools, and kindergartens were also assisted.

Beneficiaries were selected by a computerized database, which was developed based on a comprehensive survey of the Georgian population and records available from the Ministry of Labor, Health, and Social Welfare. The database calculates a vulnerability rating for each household based on answers to survey questions concerning living conditions." (UN OCHA 28 June 2002)

International assistance in Abkhazia address needs of the vulnerable (2001)

· Volatile situation in the Gali district have obliged several international agencies to suspend activities in remote and dangerous areas · UNOMIG is preparing a a proposal for limited relief projects in these areas (October 2001)

"During the reporting period [July-October 2001], international humanitarian agencies and non- governmental organizations (NGOs) continued programmes to meet the acute needs of the most vulnerable in Abkhazia, Georgia. However, due to the fighting in the Kodori Valley area and the volatile situation in Gali, many NGOs suspended their activities after 8 October.

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The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) expanded its school rehabilitation programme to 22 schools in the Gali district, 12 in upper Gali and 10 in lower Gali, as well as three schools in Ochamchira district on a “self-help” basis. UNHCR provided material and village communities contributed their labour. However, UNHCR still could not operate in more remote and dangerous areas, such as Primorsk, where humanitarian needs were particularly urgent and only UNOMIG patrols had access. My Special Representative is preparing a proposal for limited relief projects in such areas, where the need is great but humanitarian agencies cannot operate, to be implemented with funds provided to UNOMIG.

United Nations Volunteers resumed programmes to develop the capacity of local NGOs.

The International Committee of the Red Cross continued to distribute food to vulnerable parts of the population and worked on rehabilitating the water and sanitation systems in Sukhumi and Ochamchira. Médecins sans frontières expanded its tuberculosis treatment and health access programme with mobile teams. The British HALO Trust’s mine clearance and mine awareness operations continued from three operational bases in Sukhumi, Ochamchira and Gali.

International non-governmental organizations continued to be hampered by restrictions on border crossings between Abkhazia, Georgia, and the Russian Federation at the Psou River. This complicated the provision of assistance and the planning of emergency evacuations (see S/2001/713, para. 26)." (UN SC 24 October 2001, paras. 32-36)

International community reduces its assistance in South Ossetia (2001)

· In the absence of programs to stimulate the economy, the local population will remain dependent on humanitarian assistance for which, funding is decreasing · UNHCR closed down two field offices in the area in 2001

"During the early phases of the conflict, international humanitarian agencies addressed the emergency needs of the population. Later from 1996-1999 the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) addressed confidence building and development needs through a US$2 million project designed to rehabilitate essential components of the region's infrastructure. The UNDP project relied on an innovative system of joint technical groups with representatives from the Georgian and South Ossetian sides that identified and approved projects by consensus. Similarly in 1998, the European Union (EU) issued a budget line to facilitate the normalization of relations between the two sides and has allocated several million dollars for the rehabilitation of the regions infrastructure including the electricity and gas distribution networks and the railway line. Notwithstanding the achievements of the EU and UNDP programs, much rehabilitation and development work remains. [...] Due to the low level of return, UNHCR and its implementing partners (including the Norwegian Refugee Council, (NRC)) have scaled back their presence in the region. There is a consensus amongst actors on the ground (UNHCR, OSCE, OCHA) that properly designed development and transitional assistance programs would spur confidence building, support and encourage return, and promote rapprochement at the political level. There is a need therefore, to raise awareness amongst donors to encourage appropriate assistance. In addition, in the absence of programs to stimulate the economy, the domicile population will remain dependent on humanitarian assistance for which, funding is decreasing. Mercy Corps International (MCI) which is administering the US Agency for International Development (USAID) funded Georgia Community Mobilization Initiative in Eastern Georgia has expressed its interest in including the region in its programming, but not before the Fall of 2001." (UN OCHA 15 March 2001)

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"Since 1997, UNHCR has facilitated the return to South Ossetia and Georgia proper of 1,270 families (some 6,350 persons) out of a displaced population of sixty thousand. This disappointing result led UNHCR, in 2001, to reduce its staff and terminate its field presence in Gori and Tskhinvali." (UNHCR June 2002, p. 384)

"The presence of UNHCR in the region (since 1997) was widely regarded, by returnee communities, the local population, the authorities and international personnel alike, as having made a major contribution to the security of returnees and the population at large, a well as the a general climate of reconciliation and confidence building." (COE 4 June 2002, para. 84)

UNOMIG: contribution to the return of the displaced to the Gali district (1993-2002)

· UNOMIG was originally established in August 1993 to verify compliance with the 1993 ceasefire agreement · From 1994, UNOMIG's mandate includes the monitoring of the security zone between Abkhazia and Georgia proper and the withdrawal of Georgian troops from the Kodori Valley · UNOMIG has also been requested to contribute, by its presence in the area, to conditions conducive to the safe and orderly return of refugees and displaced persons · As a result of the precarious conditions in the Gali district, the Mission explores the possibilities for increasing humanitarian aid

"UNOMIG was originally established on 24 August 1993 by Security Council resolution 858 (1993) to verify compliance with the 27 July 1993 ceasefire agreement between the Government of Georgia and the Abkhaz authorities in Georgia with special attention to the situation in the city of Sukhumi; to investigate reports of ceasefire violations and to attempt to resolve such incidents with the parties involved; and to report to the Secretary-General on the implementation of its mandate, including, in particular, violations of the ceasefire agreement. The authorized strength of the Mission was 88 military observers.

After UNOMIG's original mandate had been invalidated by the resumed fighting in Abkhazia in September 1993, the Mission was given an interim mandate, by Security Council resolution 881 (1993) of 4 November 1993, to maintain contacts with both sides to the conflict and with Russian military contingent, and to monitor and report on the situation, with particular reference to developments relevant to United Nations efforts to promote a comprehensive political settlement. Following the signing, in May 1994, by the Georgian and Abkhaz sides of the Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces, the Security Council, by its resolution 937 (1994) of 27 July 1994, authorized the increase in UNOMIG's strength to up to 136 military observers and decided that the mandate of an expanded Mission shall be as follows:

· To mo nitor and verify the implementation by the parties of the Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces signed in Moscow on 14 May 1994; · To observe the operation of the peacekeeping force of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) within the framework of the implementation of the Agreement; · To verify, through observation and patrolling, that troops of the parties do not remain in or re-enter the security zone and that heavy military equipment does not remain or is not reintroduced in the security zone or the restricted weapons zone; · To monitor the storage areas for heavy military equipment withdrawn from the security zone and the restricted weapons zone in cooperation with the CIS peacekeeping force as appropriate; · To monitor the withdrawal of troops of the Republic of Georgia from the Kodori Valley to places beyond the boundaries of Abkhazia, Republic of Georgia; · To patrol regularly the Kodori Valley;

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· To investigate, at the request of either party or the CIS peacekeeping force or on its own initiative, reported or alleged violations of the Agreement and to attempt to resolve or contribute to the resolution of such incidents; · To report regularly to the Secretary-General within its mandate, in particular on the implementation of the Agreement, any violations and their investigation by UNOMIG, as well as other relevant developments; · To maintain close contacts with both parties to the conflict and to cooperate with the CIS peacekeeping force and, by its presence in the area, to contribute to conditions conducive to the safe and orderly return of refugees and displaced persons.

A United Nations office for the protection and promotion of human rights in Abkhazia, Georgia, was established on 10 December 1996 in accordance with Security Council resolution 1077 (1996) of 22 October 1996.It is jointly staffed by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The Human Rights Office forms part of UNOMIG and reports to the High Commissioner for Human Rights through the Head of Mission of UNOMIG.

Most recently the mandate of UNOMIG was extended until 31 July 2002 by Security Council resolution 1393 (2002) of 31 January 2002." (UNDPI 2002)

"Efforts are under way to maintain and improve the quality of support for UNOMIG and to enable the Mission to carry out quick impact projects and infrastructure repairs in the future. " (UN SC 19 April 2002, para. 29)

See also "Returnees to the Gali district continue to be exposed to insecurity (2000-2001)" [Internal link]

UNHCR: limited support to returnees (2002)

· UNHCR assistance in South-Ossetia will be reduced · In 2001, UNHCR restarted carefully measured interventions to assist the returned population in the Gali district · More substantial assistance within the area will be developed only when the political situation has improved · Together with UNDP and the World Bank, UNHCR has been working to the smooth transition from humanitarian aid to more sustainable development for IDPs

(UNHCR November 2001, p. 180)

"In South Ossetia, given the prevailing operational environment and very minor returnee movements, UNHCR’s direct involvement will be reduced in 2002 and covered from Tbilisi. Support and assistance

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provisions will include limited return packages, shelter repairs, counselling and legal representations court when returnees present their case for the return of property in their places of origin.

In 2001, based on the recommendations of the Joint Assessment Mission to Gali District, and in view of the acute needs and precarious security in the District, UNHCR restarted carefully measured interventions to assist the spontaneously returned population with minor school repairs, household items, materials such as seeds, as well as protection monitoring. It is intended that such interventions should not concentrate solely on Gali but that they must also benefit the Sukhumi area. This approach will be undertaken with due cautious and will be regularly reassessed. Activities will be undertaken in consultation and collaboration with the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Georgia, the 'Friends of Georgia' and other partners, in order to devise measured and coherent interventions. More substantial assistance within the area will be developed only when the political situation has improved. If the October 2001 events in the Kodori Gorge result in a major population out-flow from Abkhazia, UNHCR might extend assistance to the Zugdidi area following an assessment of needs.

Since 1999, UNHCR has been actively participating in the Brooking Process that promotes a collaborative approach amongst UNHCR, UNDP and the World Bank. In Georgia, it aims at the smooth transition from humanitarian aid to more sustainable development for IDPs in what is, in effect, a frozen con-flict. UNHCR was instrumental in this process and provided support to the “New Approach” and the implementa-tion of the Georgian Self Reliance Fund for the Development of IDPs (GSRF), through financial and technical support, participation in project selection and monitoring, and lobbying for additional donations from other sources. In 2002, UNHCR will also maintain its efforts and advocate for the realisation of the rights of IDPs as citizens of Georgia through the New Approach and GSRF." (UNHCR November 2001, pp. 182- 183)

"The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) continued its small-scale humanitarian operation in Abkhazia, Georgia. The rehabilitation work in 24 schools (22 in the Gali region and 2 in the Ochamchira region), which was started in the second half of 2001, has been completed in most of the sites ona 'self-help' basis. This means that the material for the rehabilitation work was provided by UNHCR, while the rehabilitation wo rk itself was done by the local population under the supervision of a school committee composed of parents and teachers. In cooperation with the local authorities, UNHCR has begun to identify and assess other schools, in Gali and beyond, in need of basic rehabilitation in 2002." (UN SC 19 April 2002, para. 25)

WFP: life-saving support and rehabilitation activities (1999-2002)

· WFP has been in Georgia since 1993, providing food relief to IDPs and other vulnerable groups affected by economic crisis and civil conflicts · During 1999-2000, WFP provided commodities to an average of 100,000 people through food- for-work activities to build self-reliance · It also provided life-saving support to 12,000 of the most vulnerable and elderly pensioners in institutions and 70,000 IDPs during the winter · For 2000-2002, WFP plans to provide relief to the most vulnerable and unprotected groups with no other support system than the Government · WFP will also target the rehabilitation works of major agricultural infrastructure, involving other vulnerable households such as the landless and IDPs where necessary · WFP social rehabilitation programme will target remote, isolated food-insecure areas with a poor social infrastructure, benefiting rural people with limited or no access to land

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Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) 6122.01 "Relief and recovery assistance for vulnerable groups" (1 July 2000 - 30 June 2002) "WFP Assistance to date WFP has been in Georgia since 1993, providing food relief to IDPs and other vulnerable groups affected by economic crisis and civil conflicts. In 1997, WFP began implementing FFW activities to contribute towards the improvement of household food security for the rural population. Between May 1997 and July 1999, WFP distributed 18,400 tons of food to 73,800 food-insecure households and supported 188 FFW projects. FFW activities helped put back into production 11,700 ha of tea plantations, improved irrigation for 29,100 ha of land and cleared drainage for up to 4,870 ha of land, thereby enhancing the income-earning opportunities of rural households. Other activities included rehabilitation of feeder roads, bridges, schools and water supply systems as well as some reforestation. WFP is currently implementing a PRRO that began in July 1999 and is to end in June 2000. The objective of the PRRO is to contribute to the improvement of food security among vulnerable groups and increase opportunities for beneficiaries to become self-reliant. The current PRRO is providing 15,444 tons of commodities to an average of 100,000 people through FFW to build self-reliance, and 2,746 tons to provide life-saving support to 12,000 of the most vulnerable and elderly pensioners in institutions and 70,000 IDPs during the winter." (WFP 26 April 2000, para. 17)

"Implementation plan Objectives and goals · The overall goal of this PRRO will be to continue moving towards a more comprehensive and sustainable recovery approach with the following objectives:

Short-term objective · provide relief to the most vulnerable and unprotected groups with no other support system than the Government—orphans, the disabled, single elderly pensioners in institutions, IDPs and Chechen refugees. Medium-term objectives · enhance the capacity of small-scale farmers to increase agricultural production and food security through agricultural rehabilitation and skills training; · restore self-sufficiency and social cohesion among different ethnic groups through collaboration in economic activities and the creation of an improved social infrastructure for all; · assist women to gain access to economic agricultural assets which shall lead to higher food security within their families; · provide leadership and management skills for women for effective decision-making at the community level; and · create ownership of the development process within the communities. (WFP 26 April 2000, para. 25)

Beneficiaries of FFW Activities A total of 432,000 people will benefit from FFW activities over a period of two years. This figure is calculated on the basis of an average of 18,000 FFW participants per month, for 22 days. The duration of FFW activities is of an average duration of 4 months. Hence, the calculation is as follows: 18,000 workers x 3 times per year x 4 family members x 2 (two-year duration of PRRO).

Agriculture Vulnerable groups with the greatest potential for long-term economic recovery in the rural context are those with access to land. WFP will therefore target the rehabilitation works of major agricultural infrastructure such as drainage and irrigation systems, land protection and cash-crop plantations that benefit small farmers. This will have an immediate impact on their capacity to increase agricultural production and will lead to greater food security within their families and within the communities. In cases where additional labour may be needed towards these rehabilitation activities, WFP will give priority to other vulnerable households such as the landless and IDPs. Women will constitute at least 70 percent of direct beneficiaries in the rehabilitation of the cash crop programme.

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Social rehabilitation Communities targeted for the social rehabilitation programme will be remote, isolated food-insecure areas with a poor social infrastructure. Participants for these FFW rehabilitation activities will be rural people with limited or no access to land, single-headed households, large families, and IDPs if included in these categories. In all activities where it is culturally appropriate for women to participate, they will at least constitute 50 percent of FFW participants. In all cases, women and their families will be the main beneficiaries of the infrastructure rehabilitated." (WFP 26 April 2000, para. 37-39)

IFRC activities in 2001: highlights on IDP-related activities

· The IFRC has continued community development activities in 30 IDP collective centres · Emergency Rehabilitation of Collective Centres Accommodating Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) has been undertaken with funds from USAID · Mobile Technical Teams based in South Ossetia (Tskhinvali) and West Georgia (Zugdidi) require additional funding to resume their activities · The IFRC provides basic health care for 56,000 IDPs accommodated in Collective Centres in Samegrelo

"Community Development for IDPs in Collective Accommodation project funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has continued encouraging the IDP community of 30 collective centres (approximately 49,000 beneficiaries) to help itself by promoting socialization within the collective centres, motivating the beneficiary IDPs to take a more active part in their future and become less dependent on humanitarian assistance via relevant, productive training and kitchen garden supplies. Under the Kitchen Garden component, procurement of seeds, pesticides/fertilizers and agricultural equipment for Spring planting was carried out based on the results of the survey carried out among IDP families by the Federation. A standard agricultural package has been distributed to 4,985 kitchen garden holders; other beneficiaries (1,973 IDP households) have been provided with irrigation pipes, metal fence and metal bucket according to their request. There are currently 6,949 families who are cultivating approximately 556 ha. of land around the collective centres.

Under the Skills Development component, the educational process including courses in English language, computer, massage, hairdressing and cosmetology, as well as driving and accounting, has progressed satisfactorily for 347 IDPs living in collective centres. The Federation has continued monitoring of loans given to beneficiaries within the Income Generation component. There are currently three projects, which are continuing with varying degrees of repayment. Under the Social Activities’ component, an unused room in Kazreti IDP collective centre was rehabilitated as a community room. Rehabilitation was carried out by volunteers living in the collective centre. Other community rooms, 30 in total, have continued to serve as centres for information, educational and recreational activities, and as meeting halls, nurseries and kindergartens. IDP communities have been encouraged to organise sports, cultural and other communal activities in conformity with the specific conditions of their areas. Thus, for example, with the support of a local NGO, a library was established in a collective centre in Bagebi. Another such library for IDPs is planned to be opened in Tskneti. In Tskaltubo-1 and Tskaltubo-2 centres a seminar on RC/RC Movement, its history and the fundamental principles was conducted by the Regional Dissemination Coordinator. The seminar was attended by 65 IDPs. A number of IDPs from Kvemo Kartli (Rustavi, Gardabani and Marneuli) participated in an arm-wrestling competition organized by the Arm-wrestling Federation of Kvemo Kartli Region. Also, a drawing competition was held among IDP children. Winners were awarded with small presents. Over the reported period, the Federation has carried out a community participatory

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appraisal among its beneficiaries. Results are being analysed and will be used as the basis for future planning. The preliminary analysis indicate a high interest of IDPs in gender related issues and basic health care. Consultations will be held with the Federation health department to coordinate workshops and internships on healthy lifestyles, reproductive health education and first aid.

Under the Emergency Rehabilitation of Collective Centres Accommodating Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) project funded by USAID, construction assessment has been carried out by the Federation in cooperation with the Ministry of Refugees and Accommodation of Georgia (MoRA) to select 27 medium or large IDP collective centres which are most urgently requiring repair in order to remedy significantly substandard living conditions as per the Sphere Project’s minimum standards for shelter. The scope of work and bill of quantities have then been prepared for each of these collective centres specifying work according to priorities, volume of works, timetable and budget for each site. Repair works have been detailed by the Federation construction team in consultation with MoRA and the IDP committee representatives in the building. Following Federation standard procedures, a tender was launched and three general contractors were identified to carry out the repair work. To date, rehabilitation of 12 out of 27 sites, has been completed. The work is progressing satisfactorily on another seven centres, thanks to a Swiss Government contribution. Rehabilitation work includes: improving insulation through roofing repair; replacement of windows and doors; adequate and safe electrical installations; and improvement of hygiene and sanitation facilities. At the same time, Community Development Coordinators have been organising community mobilisation meetings with IDPs. In the course of the discussions, IDPs have been prioritizing their concerns and identified their contribution to the project. The percentage of the IDP contribution varies from 8 to 20% and includes mainly skilled workmanship and general labour on site. The community participation will be further promoted in order to develop sense of ownership among the beneficiaries, which ultimately will have a more positive effect on maintenance and preservation of the implemented work. […] This quarter marked the end of the Mobile Technical Teams (MTTs) operation supported by the US BPRM. During the reported period, the MTTs based in South Ossetia (Tskhinvali) and West Georgia (Zugdidi and Senaki) provided assistance to 102 IDP families in small collective centres and private accommodation, lone elderly, and other vulnerable groups in the form of minor construction and repairs. Additional funding is required to allow these teams to resume their activities, while the team in Ajara has continued its operation with financial support of the British Red Cross. Making 3-4 interventions per day, the team assisted 168 families in this quarter. Priority was given to destitute households headed by elderly people, female headed households with young children, lone elderly and disabled people without family support. […] The project of Basic Health Care for IDPs Accommodated in Collective Centres in Samegrelo funded by the Netherlands Government through the Netherlands Red Cross, has continued to provide assistance to approximately 56,000 IDPs accommodated in collective centres in West Georgia by provision of medicines and medical supplies based on morbidity data and drug consumption; developing the current surveillance system so that there is a comprehensive registration system and a reliable record of the morbidity and mortality experienced by the population; conducting a series of technical workshops for the medical personnel (doctors, nurses, health educators) addressing rational drug use, prevalent health problems and ways of meeting the needs identified; providing health education and health promotion activities for the community at large; ensuring an appropriate Maternal and Child Health programme, and including reproductive health activities and antenatal care. The total number of consultations during the reported period was 8,524 including 1,220 for children aged 0-4 years, 1,373 for children aged 6-16 years and 5,931 for people aged over 16 years. The monthly tutorials for staff at polyclinics were attended by 68 doctors. The subjects covered were diagnosis and treatment of ishemic heart disease, stroke, upper and lower respiratory system diseases and acute abdominal conditions. (IFRC 7 September 2001, pp. 13-15)

See also IFRC annual report for the Caucasus, May 2002 [Internet]

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ICRC strengthens its assistance to IDPs in western Georgia (2002)

· 20,000 destitute IDPs in Western Georgian will be assisted in 2002 with food rations · ICRC also ensures food security of 20,000 vulnerable people in Abkhazia · Facilities of IDP polyclinics in Zugdidi and Sukhumi have received significant support · ICRC has also provided surgical assistance to referral hospitals · Sanitation projects have been initiated in IDP communal centre in Zugdidi · ICRC also conducts a land mine awareness programmes and assist the victicms

Assistance

Food Security

The ICRC has performed in June-July 2001 a comprehensive evaluation of the needs of the most vulnerable Internally Displaced Persons and residents in Western Georgia. The survey showed that a large number of vulnerable persons still have major urgent needs not covered by any humanitarian assistance. Therefore, the ICRC is launching in 2002 a humanitarian program in Western Georgia covering food, health and water- habitat needs of the 20.000 most destitute people among IDPs and residents. In December 2001 and in the beginning of January 2002, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in full co-operation with the Ministry of Health, Labour and Social Affairs and the Ministry of Refugees and Accommodation has distributed 115,000 daily rations to 11,500 beneficiaries, previously recognised most vulnerable people (IDPs and residents), in Western Georgia (in the town of Zugdidi and its districts, Tsalenjikha district and the town of Martvili).

In Abkhazia, the ICRC ensures food security for 19,430 destitute and vulnerable people through five different assistance programmes. […]

Medical Assistance

The facilities of the Internally Displaced People's (IDPs) polyclinic in Zugdidi as well as two polyclinics in Sukhumi, all supported by the ICRC, were not appropriate for providing quality medical services. In 2000, the ICRC rehabilitated and equipped one new polyclinic for the IDPs in Zugdidi and another one in Sukhumi in co-operation with the Hellenic Red Cross. These two new polyclinics are fully functional. The medical assistance for the IDP's polyclinic in Sukhumi was handed over, at the end of 2000, to the Medecins Sans Frontieres, while the ICRC continues to assist the IDP's polyclinic in Zugdidi.

Surgical Assistance

In order to guarantee access to emergency surgery, including for war related victims, the ICRC supports with surgical supplies four referral hospitals: Zugdidi Republican Hospital in Samegrelo Region, Sukhumi Republican Hospital, Agudzera and Tkvarcheli hospitals in Abkhazia. In addition, Darcheli and Jvari hospitals in Samegrelo Region as well as Gali and Ochamchira hospitals in Abkhazia are supported with the first aid surgical supplies. […]

Water-Habitat and Sanitation Assistance

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For the Tuberculosis (TB) programme in prisons, sanitation works and rehabilitation of buildings have started three years ago and are still on going. This included: Ÿ Major rehabilitation and sanitation works in the TB Hospital Colony in Ksani 9: rehabilitation and construction of buildings, water and sewage system repairs, laboratory construction and equipment, X-ray and surgical rooms rehabilitation, etc. Ÿ Rehabilitation and equipment of a surgical room and a new laboratory in the Central Penitentiary Hospital in Tbilisi. Ÿ Water and sanitation works in Rustavi, Sagarejo and Geguti colonies.

In Western Georgia and Abkhazia, different water and sanitation projects have started in June 2001: rehabilitation of town public toilet facilities as well as toilet blocks in the most critical IDP communal centre in Zugdidi, and emergency interventions for the rehabilitation of the sewage and water supply system in Sukhumi town.

Ad hoc Relief Assistance

Ad hoc food and non-food relief assistance activities have been carried out in Western Georgia since January 2001. They address urgent humanitarian needs of vulnerable populations not covered by governmental structures nor other organisations. As an example, in February 2001 the ICRC organised the distribution of 7,000 blankets in the Pankisi Valley for refugees and resident host families, while in the late October 2001 the ICRC shipped 27 tons of assistance to the local population living in Kodori Valley.

Land Mines and Orthopaedic Centres

In Georgia mines have been planted throughout the conflict areas. Despite the cessation of hostilities, land mines continue to kill and cause severe injuries. One of the fundamental roles of the ICRC is to promote the respect for international humanitarian law, which, among other regulations, prohibits the indiscriminate use of land mines. With mine awareness included to the mine action activities of the HALO Trust, the ICRC provided support to the ongoing mine awareness activities in carrying out the training for the responsible field officers. The aim was to look at the sustainability of information and advice within affected communities. The role of the community in the mine awareness program was the primary focus of the training activities. A strategy has been developed for realizing the continuation of information and advice in affected communities through the training of community volunteers and the use of the child to child approach. A separate plan of action focusing on the use of media and materials was envisaged for the IDP community of Western Georgia. In parallel, the ICRC endeavours to assist victims of mine incidents by providing surgical assistance and setting up orthopaedic centres in order to treat and rehabilitate those who have been disabled, thus allowing them to lead an active life again. (ICRC April 2002)

See also "Georgia: food distributions begin in western Georgia", ICRC news, 13 June 2002 [Internet]

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights: Field presence in Abkhazia (2000-2002)

· The Human Rights Office in Abkhazia (Georgia) (HROAG) is part of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia · HROAG mandate is to promote respect for human rights, protect the human rights of the population of Abkhazia, contribute to a safe and dignified return of displaced persons and to report on human rights developments · Monitoring of the human rights situation is carried out through HROAG's city office in Sukhumi and through regular visits of the HROAG staff to the area along the cease-fire line

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· The establishment of a branch office in Gali is still pending, but was recommended in the preliminary findings of a international assessment mission in November 2000 · According to the Abkhaz leader, the question of the opening in Gali of a new human rights office to enable the displaced to return to this region, will be favourably considered (June 2000)

"Terms of reference/legal authority

The Office was established on 10 December 1996 following Security Council Resolution 1077 (1996) of 22 October 1996. The Office is jointly staffed by OHCHR and the Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE), each providing two international staff in accordance with a Memorandum of Understanding signed between the two organizations on 25 April 1997, and mandated by Security Council resolution 1077 (1996). The Human Rights Office forms part of, and is funded by the Department of Peace Keeping Operations' United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), under the authority of the Head of Mission of UNOMIG. The Human Rights Office reports to the High Commissioner for Human Rights, through the Head of Mission of UNOMIG.

Functions/mandate

The mandate of the Human Rights Office is to promote respect for human rights, protect the human rights of the population of Abkhazia, Georgia, in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, contribute to a safe and dignified return of refugees and internally displaced persons, and to report on human rights developments (S/1996/284 of 15 April 1996). The programme of the Office includes human rights monitoring and technical cooperation. The Human Rights Office in Abkhazia, Georgia, aims to strengthen capacities and infrastructures to promote human rights and democracy under the rule of law in the framework of a project of technical cooperation for the entire state of Georgia. The project was funded by the UN Voluntary Fund for Technical Cooperation.

The objectives of the project are:

· Providing access to UN human rights information and capacity development in human rights for authorities and institutions of higher learning; · Development of the legal community's capacity to teach human rights in the administration of justice; · Human rights capacity development for NGOs and mass media to strengthen civil society.

These objectives will be accomplished primarily through 'training trainers'. Teaching materials will be developed, refined and tested locally, and published in sufficient quantities for future long-term local use. UN human rights reference materials will be distributed to establish permanent human rights depository libraries. Activities planned under the project include the translation of the International Bill of Human Rights into the Abkhaz language; training courses on UN human rights teaching in higher education; establishment of two human rights depository libraries; training courses on teaching in the area of administration of justice; training courses on human rights and capacity development for NGOs mass media; scholarships for officials, educators, NGO and mass media representatives for further in-depth study of human rights.

In addition, the Human Rights Office carries out monitoring of human rights in order to help create a situation of rule of law to promote and protect human rights in Abkhazia, Georgia, and to support the return of internally displaced persons under safe and dignified conditions. Monitoring done by the Office includes analysis of the development of the legal system and key institutions for the protection and promotion of human rights.

Main activities

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Monitoring of the human rights situation is carried out through HROAG's city office and through regular visits of the HROAG staff to the area along the cease-fire line. The office addresses the competent authorities in order to redress the violations as it is deemed appropriate. […] Meetings are held with the authorities in Tbilisi, and regular meetings are held with the de facto authorities in Abkhazia, Georgia, related to the human rights situation in the region.

Regular HR training sessions are provided for the groups of newly arrived UN military observers. (UNHCHR 2000)

Update on the HROAG in Georgia "The United Nations Human Rights Office in Abkhazia, Georgia, continued to advise the local population, monitor selected court trials, and visit places of pre-trial detention. It also assisted with building the capacity of local non-governmental organizations and raising awareness of human rights among the local population. In the absence of the consent of the two sides for establishing a branch human rights office in Gali town, the staff members of the main office visit the Gali district regularly in order to cover the most basic needs in that area." (UNSC 19 April 2002, para. 28)"

See also "Joint assessment mission to the Gali district evaluate conditions for the return of the displaced (November 2000)" [Internal link]

UN Representative on internally displaced persons dialogues with authorities in Georgia (May 2000)

· The Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, Dr. Francis Deng, undertook an official visit to Georgia from 13 to 17 May 2000 · The programme included visits to Abkhazia where the Representative also met with the de facto authorities · The Representative expressed its support to the "New Approach" policy whose aim is to improve the current conditions of the displaced · The Representative recommended the authorities to ensure for the internally displaced equitable access to social services and the right to fully participate in public affairs

"At the invitation of the Government of Georgia, the Representative of the United Nations Secretary- General on Internally Displaced Persons, Dr. Francis Deng, undertook an official visit to Georgia from 13 to 17 May. The mission of the Representative followed his participation in a workshop on internal displacement in the South Caucasus, held in Tbilisi from 10 to 12 May, which was co-sponsored by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe / Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), the Brookings Institution Project on Internal Displacement (of which the Representative is Co-Director) and the Norwegian Refugee Council.

The objectives of the Representative's official mission were to study the situation of internal displacement in the country and to dialogue with the Government, international agencies, non-governmental organizations and other relevant actors towards ensuring effective responses to the current conditions of the more than 250,000 internally displaced persons in Georgia.

In Tbilisi, the Representative was received by His Excellency of the Republic, Eduard Shevardnadze, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Refugees and Accommodation, the Deputy Speaker of the Parliament and the Chairman of the Abkhaz Government in Exile. He also met with representatives of United Nations and other international humanitarian, human rights and development agencies, the donor and diplomatic community, the Friends of the Secretary-General on Georgia and civil society. The

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programme included visits to Tskhinvali, Tskhaltubo, Kutaisi, Tsaishi, Zugdidi, Ingiri and Sukhumi, in the course of which meetings were held with local authorities, international agencies and non-governmental organizations, representatives of civil society and internally displaced persons themselves. In Tskhinvali and Sukhumi, the Representative also met with the de facto authorities in the regions and, in Sukhumi, with the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia. […] Over the course of the mission, the Representative has concluded that with several years having passed since the emergency phase of the displacement crises, the challenge now is one of assisting the internally displaced to rebuild their lives in dignity in a humane transition from relief to development and in accordance with the full range of their rights as citizens. This means a return to normal conditions of life in terms of decent accommodation, education, health care and psychosocial assistance, access to land, gainful means of employment and income-generation and equitable participation in public affairs. Indeed, internally displaced persons with whom the Representative met expressed a strong desire to become self- reliant and contribute to society. In so doing they stand to improve not only their own conditions but to become agents for the development of the country as a whole. Moreover, building the capacity of the displaced now means that they will be better prepared to return, as many indicated they wished to do, and engage in the reconstruction of their areas of origin. The right of the internally displaced to voluntary return to their homes in safety and dignity, which has been consistently articulated by the international community, re mains uncompromised.

Improving the current conditions of the displaced while continuing to support their right to return in safety and dignity is the thrust of the 'New Approach' to internal displacement in Georgia that has been developed by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Bank and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and endorsed by the Government. The Representative is encouraged by the commitment of the Government and the international community towards ensuring a rapid and effective implementation of the New Approach, including through the convening of coordinating mechanisms and the mobilization of resources. Recognizing the critical role of civil society in Georgia in promoting better conditions for the internally displaced, the Representative welcomes the emphasis in the New Approach on partnership with local non- governmental organizations and encourages their active involvement.

The Representative is also encouraged by the commitment of the authorities to ensure realisation of the full rights of the internally displaced as citizens in compliance with international standards. In this connection, particular attention must be paid to ensuring for the internally displaced equitable access to social services, including education and health care, access to land, opportunities for income-generation and the right to fully participate in the civil and political decision-making processes that affect their lives.

Notwithstanding the importance of progress on assistance and response to the plight of the internally displaced, it must be underscored that the root causes of internal displacement in Georgia are inherently political in nature and call for the intensification of efforts towards a peaceful resolution of the conflicts.

The Representative will elaborate upon the findings of his mission in a report which will be presented to the Commission on Human Rights at its next session and made publicly available. He will also share the findings of the mission with the Secretary-General and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee, which is composed of the main international humanitarian and development agencies and non-governmental organizations, and of which he is a member." (UN 17 May 2000)

See the full text of the report presented the UN Commission on Human Rights, at its 57th sesssion (2001) [Internet]

NGOs

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International and national NGOs provide protection and assistance to IDPs in Georgia (2001)

Information on NGO activities on behalf of internally displaced persons in Georgian can be found in the UN OCHA Georgia Information Bulletin:

Period 21-31 October 2001 [Internet] Period 1-10 October 2001 [Internet] Period 21-30 September 2001 [Internet] Period 11-20 September 2001 [Internet] Period 01-10 September 2001 [Internet] Period 21-31 August 2001 [Internet] Period 11-20 August 2001 [Internet] Period 01-10 August 2001 [Internet] Period 21-31 July 2001 [Internet]

Older bulletins can be found in Reliefweb [Internet]

You can also consult Assistance Georgian, a web site initiated by the Save the Children's Georgian Assistance Initiative (GAI) which provides information in support of humanitarian and development aid activities in Georgia [Internet: http://www.assistancegeorgia.org.ge]

Strong mobilization of displaced women in the civil society (2000)

· Increasing numbers of women’s organizations concentrating on internally displaced person have been founded in recent years · Many organizations have evolved into advocacy organizations for displaced people on a national level · Other organizations have been effective partners for donors both in providing humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable displaced persons and for developing microcredit and small and medium-size enterprise programs · Those organizations however see others as rivals, especially in the context of competing for donor funding · NGO programming itself tends to be almost entirely donor driven, and few NGOs have sought or been able to find alternative sources of funding

"Displaced women have increasingly made a difference in one sector: civil society. Increasing numbers of women’s organizations concentrating on internally displaced persons and issues pertaining to them have been founded in recent years, paralleling a general flourishing of civil society throughout post-Soviet and postconflict Georgia. In cities and regions throughout the country, displaced women have begun to mobilize to take charge and find solutions to pressing economic and social is sues burdening their communities. Many organizations have evolved into advocacy organizations for displaced people on a national level. They have helped bring the government, donor, and even general public’s attention to issues such as collective center degradation and psychosocial trauma. Other organizations have been effective partners for donors both in providing humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable displaced persons and for developing microcredit and small and medium-size enterprise programs. Still more groups first developed as small, community-based organizations of women desperate to improve conditions for their families.

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Despite the growing number of success stories among organizations for internally displaced women, the sector overall is affected by various limitations. A relatively small number of women’s organizations is concerned with issues concerning displaced women. Those organizations considered successful often see others as rivals, especially in the context of competing for donor funding. Little networking with one another is encouraged. NGO programming itself tends to be almost entirely donor driven, and few NGOs have sought or been able to find alternative sources of funding. Despite these limitations, displaced- women’s organizations have continued to push forward to address critical social issues such as deteriorating health and living conditions as well as the growing importance of microcredit and training for women in the market place. Local non-governmental organizations and community-based organizations with strong community links will remain valuable partners for donors as they shift their efforts away from humanitarian assistance and more toward development-oriented programming. Support for activities of displaced-women’s organization remains strong within displaced communities. NGO activity is now a firmly established part of social life within the displaced-persons community." (Buck September 2000, p. 10)

See also USAID Research Paper "Aftermath: Women's Organizations in Postconflict Georgia", September 2000 [Internet]

For more information on NGO activities in Georgia, consult Assistance Georgia, a web site initiated by the Save the Children's Georgian Assistance Initiative (GAI) which provides information in support of humanitarian and development aid activities in Georgia [Internet: http://www.assistancegeorgia.org.ge]

Legal aid: Initiatives taken by local NGOs (1999-2002)

· Georgian Young Lawyers' Association (GYLA) provides individual IDPs with legal aid · NGO-run "Legal Counceling Center" has been opened in Gali in June 2002

"GYLA [Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association] is one of the most developed and influential NGOs in Georgia. Refugees and IDPs are among the various target groups the Association works with and the activities connected with them are mainly carried out in cooperation with UNHCR. GYLA/UNHCR IDP and Refugee Legal Assistance Project is being carried out for the second year already. It's main objective is to work on legal problems of the refugees and IDPs through participation of NGOs."(UNA, November 1999)

"The 'Association of young lawyers' carried out the program 'Legal aid to refugees and displaced persons' with support of the UNHCR in 1998. The program had several trends: telephone and personal consultations for refugees and displaced persons. concentration and interpretation of the laws related to refugees and displaced persons; a brochure was issued as a result. (Issues of registration, revision of the laws about refugees, legal acts, orders of the President, issues of land renting).

The 'Association of young lawyers' served the refugees with telephone consultations, provided them with the brochures in Zugdidi through its department there. Their activity has visible results as the refugees try to make use of their rights. But, some instances ignored their rights as the law was not attached to the information in the brochure. And, the 'Association' had to elaborate it and attach the corresponding laws. They produced Georgian and Russian computer versions."(The Horizonti Foundation, 29 January 1999, sect.3)

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"The Legal Counseling Center started its activities in Gali on 9 June 2002. This is a pilot project of the 'Human Rights and Civil Society' local NGO based in Sukhumi, that has been quite active in human rights promotion.

The Center will deliver legal service for the local population in Gali district, which suffers from high criminality, poor law enforcement and lack of lawyers. Nine lawyers are already working in two weekly shifts, and the office is open daily. UNOMIG and the Human Rights Office in Abkhazia, Georgia, see the opening as a step forward to reestablishing the Gali juridical structures by developing advocates assigned to assist the defense." (UN OCHA 28 June 2002)

Assessment of the national and international response to IDP needs in Georgia

Recommendations by the UN Representative on IDPs (2000)

· These recommendations were formulated following the Representative's visit to Georgia in May 2000 · The Representative appeals on all relevant actors to acknowledge the vulnerability of the internally displaced · While the right to return in safety and dignity should be uphold, the right of internally displaced persons to pursue alternatives to return should also be recognized

"The Commission of Human Rights, as well as the General Assembly, has invited Governments of countries to which the Representative has undertaken an official mission to give due consideration to his recommendations and suggestions and to make available information on measures taken thereon. The Representative looks forward to further cooperation with all those involved in implementing the following recommendations, intended for the Government of Georgia, other authorities, the international community and local NGOs, towards enhancing response to the plight of internally displaced persons on Georgia.

(i) Acknowledge the vulnerability and special needs of the internally displaced and their rights to protection, assistance, reintegration and development aid. The findings of the Representative's mission challenge the prevailing impression that internally displaced persons in Georgia are a privileged group, by identifying a number of particular problems and disadvantages that the face. International organizations, NGOs and government authorities should make known their special needs and take steps to address them.

(ii) Disseminate and promote the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, especially in local languages. Dissemination of the Principles to internally displaced persons is critical, as a means of countering the politically motivated misinformation concerning their rights that is being propagated. Translation of the Principles into local languages, in particular Abkhaz and Osset, would be important in this regard. The Principles also should be promoted among the authorities, agencies and NGOs and among local communities, so as to sensitize the population at large to the particular plight of internally displaced persons.

(iii) The Government should design national policies and legislation, and international and local programmes in accordance with the Guiding Principles. The Government's positive response to the Principles should be reflected in national legislation and policy. Among the initiatives which should facilitate this is the study of Georgian legislation relating to internally displaced persons to be undertaken by the Georgian Young Lawyers' Association, with the support of the Brookings Institution project on internal displacement and OSCE/ODIHR.

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(iv) The Governme nt should ensure the full rights of internally displaced persons as citizens. Though this recommendation is implicit in the previous recommendation, it merits express statement and the undertaking of specific measures, in particular with regard with equitable access to public services such as education and health, access to land, opportunities for income -generation and the right of internally displaced persons to participate fully in the civil and political decision-making processes that affect their lives. Legislation governing land ownership and entitlement to vote in elections needs to be revised so as to respect the rights of the internally displaced. the Government is encouraged to seek assistance from OHCHR, in the context of its technical cooperation and advisory services programme, to support initiatives to promote and protect the rights of internally displaced persons.

(v) Improve the living conditions of displaced persons. The Government, the international community and civil society should work together to improve the current living conditions of the displaced, especially those in collective centres. In particular, efforts should be made to encourage the relocation of internally displaced persons, especially those living in hospitals and dilapidated hotels, so that their lives and those of their children can be improved.

(vi) The Government should ensure payment of the stipend to which internally displaced persons are entitled. The 12 lari monthly stipend to which internally displaced persons are entitled is certainly not sufficient for their survival but it is critical. Moreover, it is provided for by law. At the time of the mission, internally displaced persons had not received this stipend for six month.

(vii) Support comprehensive and countrywi de efforts to improve the current conditions of internally displaced persons. Too much of the humanitarian focus is on certain groups and areas, to the neglect of others. Support programmes, such as the New Approach, should seek to become more comprehensive, encompassing internally displaced persons from the Georgian-Osset conflict, as well as those displaced by conflict in Abkhazia, and targeting rural as well as urban areas. in particular, they should be based on an objective assessment of vulnerability, and there should be rapid disbursement of funds from the international community and prompt implementation of projects to improve the lives of the displaced, especially in terms of their living conditions, opportunities for income -generation and access to land.

(viii) Given special attention to the particular needs of women and women-headed households. Skills training, business development and credit support initiatives targeting internally displaced women are required, as is strengthened support for organizations of internally displaced women. Towards ensuring that projects undertaken as part of the New Approach address the particular needs of women and women headed-households, as well as involve women in the planning and implementation, a gender component should be introduced as criteria for funding by the Georgia Self-Reliance Fund.

(ix) Support programmes to address psychosocial needs. The high incidence of mental health problems among the internally displaced and the impact that these have on the pursuit of possibilities to improve their living conditions and on the preservation of the family unit call for comprehensive programmes addressing psychosocial needs, and paying special attention to those of internally displaced children.

(x) Uphold the right of internally displaced persons to return in safety and dignity. The emphasis in the New Approach on improving the current conditions of internally displaced persons must in no way be misconstrued as abandoning the right to return, which is imprescriptible and must continue to be advocated and actively pursued by the Government, local NGOs and civil society, and the international community.

(xi) End obstructions to the right to return in safety and dignity. The national and de facto authorities must take concrete measures to ensure respect of this right and create the conditions for its realization. The Abkhaz authorities in particular are called upon to cease the laying of mines as a deterrent to return, to support de-mining efforts in areas of return, to make concerted efforts to establish law and order in areas of return and to revise, in accordance with international standards, the language of instruction policy in Georgian schools, which also works to obstruct return. The Government of Georgia is called upon to ensure

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a fair and transparent process for property restitution or compensation and, together with the Government in Exile, to make concerted efforts to stem the incursion of armed partisan groups into the security zone established as part of the cease-fire agreement regarding the conflict in Abkhazia. The authorities in South Ossetia also are called upon to establish effective mechanisms of law and order and, in particular, to prevent ethnically motivated violence, prosecuting and punishing perpetrators when this does occur.

(xii) Recognize the right of internally displaced persons to pursue alternatives to return, that is resettlement in another part of the country. Given the politicization of the plight of internally displaced persons in Georgia, it is essential to ensure that the overriding emphasis on return, which indeed appears to be the preferred option of many of the displaced, does not come at the expense of alternative durable solutions, specifically resettlement, to which internally dis placed persons are also entitled.

(xiii) Support those supporting the displaced. This support must take a number of forms. Host families who have generously taken in internally displaced persons but may also be suffering poor socioeconomic conditions require support in shouldering this extra burden. Human rights and humanitarian personnel, local as well as international, must be able to operate with unrestricted access to populations in need and have their safety assured. Moreover, the important work of local NGOs with the internally displaced must be supported and strengthened, in particular outside of the capital and in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, especially as civil society is one of Georgia’s greatest assets and NGOs can make an important contribution to depoliticizing the plight of the displaced. Special attention should be given to supporting the active involvement of local NGOs and civil society in the implementation of the New Approach.

(xiv) Intensify efforts to resolve the conflicts. While undertaking measures to improve the current conditions of the displaced, durable solutions to their plight of course require that the root causes of their displacement, which are inherently political in nature, be effectively addressed. Though conflict negotiation processes have been in place for both conflicts for several years now, there is a need for intensification by all parties of efforts towards a peaceful resolution of the conflicts causing displacement. The Government of the Russian Federation has a particularly important role to play in facilitating the resolution of both conflicts, especially that in Abkhazia.

(xv) Advance planning for post-conflict reconstruction. Following a peace agreement, a comprehensive post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation programme that addresses the particular needs of returnees as well as of the local population will be required as an essential component of a durable peace. Advance planning for this by the Government and other authorities, in cooperation with the international community, is important for ensuring a smooth transition to peace, and to support the return and reintegration of displaced persons.

(xvi) Support efforts promoting peaceful co-existence. Even in the event of political agreements ending the conflicts, the legacy of bitterness left by the ethnic conflicts must also be addressed and overcome in order to ensure the safe and durable return and reintegration of displaced persons into their pre-war communities. A number of initiatives to this end have begun, but local NGOs, on both sides of the Abkhaz conflict in particular, noted the need for more concerted efforts to enable dialogue and establish other links between the civilian population caught up in the conflicts. The Government, de facto authorities and the international community should also invest in these grassroots peace-building initiatives." (UNCHR 25 January 2001)

World Bank study: IDPs likely to face lower risk of extreme poverty than the population at large (1999)

· IDPs receive a large share of State and international humanitarian assistance · Need to improve the targeting of assistance to most vulnerable IDPs

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· Important to ensure equitable distribution of assistance in order to avoid tension between IDPs and other citizens

[State benefits received by IDPs]

"In 1996 a UNHCR-sponsored survey registered 282 000 people as IDPs. Contrary to commonly held perceptions, the analysis of the SDS household survey suggests that IDPs that have resettled on their own or have integrated themselves into local communities (the refugee population that does not remain institutionalized) face a lower risk of poverty than the average Georgian household (4 percent of them are poor as opposed to 10 percent of the total population). And they face the lowest risk of extreme poverty of almost any population group. The surveys show, moreover, that one out of four refugees families have left the country.

The fact that IDPs face a relatively lower risk of being poor contrasts sharply with the fact that they receive a large share of State and humanitarian assistance. The IDP program is one of Georgia's largest safety net programs, ranking second only to old age and invalidity pensions. In 1997, Republican budget expenditures for this program to taled some 53 million lari; the planned allocation for 1998 was 62 million lari. The program comprises a diversity of cash and non-cash benefits (Table 3). The major component is the monthly stipend of 11 lari per refugee for those IDPs living in hotels or Government institutions; and of 12 lari pre refugee for families living in their own accommodations or with other families. In addition, for each of the 160,000 IDPs that have settled on their own, the budget transfers 1.8 lari per month directly to Sakernergo to pay for their electricity; another 3.8 lari per refugee are transferred for each of the 124,000 IDPs estimated to be living in hotels or refugee centers. An additional 7 lari per person per month is paid to those families that have resettled on their own to cover housing costs and other utilities. IDPs also receive public transit subsidies, including free subway tickets for those living in Tbilisi, and passes for ground transports such as buses. The Ministry of Refugees and Accommodation maintains a special assistance fund for the destitute. In addition to benefits paid out through the Ministry of Refugees, IDPs who are also old- age or invalidity pensioners receive a 20 percent pension supplement. IDPs also receive free education and are exempt of fees. And the Basic Benefit Package of health care services provided free to the population has integrated in its calculation free health services for 140,000 IDPs in 1998. The costs of these free or subsidized education and health services are born by the Ministries of Education and Health respectively. Not counted in the budget is the value of the rent of the buildings occupied for free by the IDPs, but that would be probably high, especially in the case of hotels in city centers.

IDPs have also benefited from a large proportion of the humanitarian assistance in food, medical, and other aid provided by governmental and non-governmental organizations to Georgia. Although the magnitude of humanitarian assistance has decreased since 1994, it remains substantial. Total humanitarian assistance received between April, 1994 and March, 1995 was estimated at US$62.7 million: between April, 1995 and May, 1996 at US$60.4 million; and between June, 1996 and May, 1997 at US$30.6 million. In 1996, some 800,000 beneficiaries received humanitarian assistance; in 1997, beneficiaries amounted to 340,000 people (a large fraction were IDPs)

Table 3. IDP program 1997 and 1998 (In million lari)

Category 1997

Monthly benefit 34.9 Utilities for people housed by the state 12.4 Free metro fare (Tbilisi) 3.0 Ground transport 0.6 Special repairs of dwellings 1.5 Special assistance fund for destitute families and children 0.2 Interest paid for banking service 0.3

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Total 52.9

Not included: value of free education; BBP.

[Need to improve targeting of assistance to IDPs]

IDP benefits are high in comparison with family allowances, unemployment benefits and even pensions. Not including benefits in kind, in 1998 an IDP family of four would receive a monthly cash benefit of 38.8 lari per month, above the average budgetary monthly wage of 35 lari. In contrast, a non-IDP family of four would normally not be eligible to receive any state support since eligibility for the family allowance has been limited to legally single pensioners. If the non-IDP family were to comprise a pensioner or an unemployed person, they would be eligible for a pension of 11.8 lari or an unemployment benefit of 13 lari- still well below the level of IDP benefits. Even if IDP benefits are not by themselves sufficient to lift a family completely out of poverty, they still provide non negligible support in comparison to that received by other Georgians. Moreover, IDPs are eligible for benefits regardless of other income or asset ownership. And as discussed above, in many cases, IDPs are better off than other groups of the population.

The contrast between benefits received by IDPs and those received by other, often more needy, families highlights the need to improve the targeting of assistance to IDPs' to limit eligibility only to those who truly need it. This is important from a social equity point of view. It also is pressing because of the open-ended character of the IDP program. In the absence of a solution to the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, there is no clear horizon for the phasing out of the IDP program; the burden on the state's meager resources could continue indefinitely. Mechanisms of self-targeting could be usefully employed to select the most needy. Linking payment of the monthly stipend to participation in public works, for example, could serve to weed out those with alternative, more lucrative sources of income from work. This could function as a self-contained program or as part of a broader public works scheme designed to target resources to those able to work. Alternatively, registration requirements could be increased significantly, so as to impose a sufficiently high cost on recipients, to again weed out those who do not truly need the benefit.

In addition to improving the targeting of cash benefits to IDPs, in-kind benefits should be phased out. Most of the burden of financing these benefits is born by providers of the services, or by other users. The government should assess carefully the cost of maintaining them, and if these in-kind benefits to IDPs are to be kept, the budget should fully cover the costs.

The authorities should continue their efforts to integrate remaining IDPs housed in institutions into local communities, as the evidence from the household survey suggests that once this happens, IDPs are able on their own to dramatically improve their living conditions. This integration is made difficult by the awkward legal status of many IDPs.

The collapse of transfers to poor groups of the population is correlated with the fact that the Government has given priority to protecting the level of transfers to IDPs. In the current context, this may ultimately create tensions between IDPs and other members of Georgian society. And it does raise questions of equity and allocation of resources. Some of these choices may need to be re evaluated. It is also urgent that the status of IDP be clarified, and that they benefit from the same ownership rights than any other citizen of Georgia."(WB May 27, 1999, paras.136-143)

Increased attention of the international organizations is needed to guarantee sustained involvement of Georgian local civil society in IDP issues (1999)

· International donors and national institutions are based in Tbilisi while much of the IDP problematic takes place in the regions.

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· National NGOs in the regions have important experience and knowledge of the issues but lack sustained support. · Georgian state sector needs to be convinced of the complementarity between local/regional NGOs and local authorities · Local NGOs need more information on the activities and mandates of international organizations

"In January-August 1999 the United Nations Association of Georgia in cooperation with UNHCR NGO Fund implemented the assessment project. The aim of the program was to evaluate the potential of the non- governmental organizations in various regions of Georgia to deal with IDP and migration-related issues and facilitate recommendations for enhancement of their role. The program was carried out in Tbilisi, Kutaisi, Zugdidi and Gori and also involved the NGOs dealing with the issues of Meskhetians.

The rationale behind the program was quite simple. It is obvious that the main offices of both international and official organizations participating in decision-making on IDP and migration-re lated issues are located in the capital. Hence the main non-governmental partners of these organizations are also Tbilisi-based. On the other hand the whole humanitarian aspect of IDP problems lies within the regions. As the situation in the regions of Georgia in terms of social environment varies considerably, the program was geared towards on-the-spot observation and analysis of the existent civil potential.

Interviews, meetings and the roundtables organized in framework of the program allowed us to identify several issues that necessitate closer attention of the international donors.

First of all, the assessment has demonstrated that the civil potential in all of the regions exists notwithstanding the problems of the social or legal character. NGOs have sufficient experience of operation and their leaders possess quite good vision of the issue at hand and their role. The main threat for civil involvement in this field is the sustainability of NGO effort. The assessment showed that that the main partners of international organizations possess the scope of activities wider than just IDP or migration- related issues. The Share of the direct assistance to the NGOs based in the regions and having the narrow scope of activities is minimal. This picture could be quite disturbing if we will take into account the possible decrease in international assistance.

If and when this will finally happen we could be observing the picture of the wider-scope organizations more or less easily shifting their priorities and the local lower-profile organizations being left without any serious foundation for continuation of activities.

The option of shifting the policies for avoiding this scenarios should, in our opinion be considered at this very stage. The shift could involve - at one hand devoting more attention to local, problem oriented non- governmental organizations and on the other encouraging current partners of international donors(wider scope NGOs) to share their experience with local partners. This would help to form the strong group of local NGOs with certain credibility to international donors and, at the same time, to use the lobbying and policy-development potential of bigger NGOs drawing on a strong constituency of the regional partners.

The second process that demands closer attention of the international organizations is recognition of NGO role in this particular field. As it was noted numerous times the CIS Conference process connoted in itself the active role of civil sector and this occurred not by chance but taking into account primarily social, humanitarian nature of the problems of IDP and migration. It is now necessary to translate this vision to the Georgian state sector, to accent that it is exactly the complementarity of the mandates of international, official and non-governmental organizations that allows for efficient solutions. As a declaration this idea was maybe already heard but the necessity is to translate these declarations in specific policies foreseeing joint activities and cooperation in planning and implementation. Special attention in this sense should be devoted to the cooperation among local NGOs and the local governance.

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The analysis has showed that the lack of information on activities and the mandate of various international and official organizations remains the problem for NGOs. It is we think possible to solve this problem in a good partnership spirit. The international or non-governmental organizations best represented in given region could take on the role of the resource centers and thus create the diversified pools of information. This also would in part alleviate the problem of transparency frequently causing the frustration and the feeling of being sidelined from general processes on behalf of the regional NGOs."(UNA, November 1999)

Socio-political impact of international support to IDPs in Georgia (1997)

· Displacement is not neutral - the work of international organizations is read, interpreted and used by political elites on both sides · Humanitarian intervention must be "depolitic ized", while acknowledging that ethnically-directed violence took place · International humanitarian assistance can isolate an IDP population and make integration more difficult

"When international organizations enter the picture, they face a bitter dilemma between the desire to return the displaced immediately, which may be problematic politically or may produce violence at the local level, and the desire to provide immediate humanitarian assistance to IDPs while they are still displaced. The critical lesson from the Georgian case is that displacement itself is not neutral. It is not merely uncomfortable and undesirable, it also works actively to construct new realities, which in turn constrain the options for lasting, if not formal juridical, solutions. In this context, any humanitarian assistance that works to bound communities, by providing housing, for example, or schools for IDPs, or income generation projects that do not reach outside the IDP population, also contribute toward isolating a population and providing a closed forum in which individual wartime accounts easily merge to form shared narratives of ethnic violence.

Should organizations simply refuse to intervene? Or alternatively, should they insist on immediate repatriation whatever its consequences? Neither of these options is desirable. Constructive steps in the interim might include income generation projects that are both transferable after repatriation, and explicitly include members of the local population as partners or buyers; psychological rehabilitation, especially for children for whom war and its consequences have been the only reality, to reframe and provide an outlet for experienced and remembered violence; in short, measures that work in both the material and ideational realms to create open-ended, not bounded, possibilities. The primary lesson of this first challenge is thus that displacement in itself is not neutral, that the decision to implement stopgap measures while waiting for repatriation is also a proactive decision to allow and even facilitate the construction of a new, mobilized population.

The Challenge of Intervention

The interventions of international organizations become part of the causal chain not only at the local level, among IDPs, but also at the elite political level. In the Georgian case, in which IDP repatriation has been a central issue for political resolution since the beginning, the work of international organizations is read, interpreted and used by political elites on both sides, whatever the organizations’ stated intentions.

The Georgian Ministry for Refugees states that it has documented every IDP case in Georgia, and the results, which include the name of every IDP with place of origin and place of current residence, can be found in its huge database. Organizations have at times drawn on this information to plan projects. Unfortunately, however, Georgian authorities have tended to exaggerate the extent of the displacement problem, in order to emphasize both the magnitude of the Abkhaz officials’ ongoing violation of the human rights of the displaced, and the need in light of the enormity of the problem for concerted and possibly

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forceful Georgian intervention. When international organizations draw on these sources, Georgian officials cast this as affirmation that the figures are correct, and further, that the corresponding political claims made on the basis of these numbers are justified. Furthermore, Georgian officials argue, the failure of international organizations to date to repatriate the displaced is not a reflection of moderation in the face of political difficulties, but rather a deliberate unwillingness to recognize a clear case of ethnic cleansing. Thus, non-action by international organizations is not neutral, but subject to free interpretation.

Abkhaz officials on the other hand, have long claimed that international organizations, particularly UNHCR, have as their sole purpose to return all of the displaced to Abkhazia, with no concern for the social, economic or political consequences. Human rights activist Natella Akaba notes, "everyone knows the UN has a specific agenda", and Foreign Minister Shamba warns that UNHCR has the "wrong approach", because allowing a mass return would "bring about another war".

The on-going Regional Conference on migration processes in the CIS, a joint dialogue among international organizations, governments and NGOs begun in May 1996, has stressed the de-coupling of humanitarian and political issues and the need to assert that humanitarian concerns are issues in their own right. The goal is to depoliticize humanitarian intervention. The problem in the Georgian case is not simply the failure ofauthorities on both sides to understand, but rather their wilful manipulation of international intervention to serve political ends.

The most stubborn challenge, however, remains: how to acknowledge that brutal ethnically-directed violence took place, while claiming the right to address practical humanitarian concerns rather than pass ultimate judgement."(Dale, 1997, sect.8.1-8.2)

Reference to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

Known references to the Guiding Principles (as of November 2001)

· Reference to the Guiding Principles in the national legislation · Other References to the Guiding Principles (in chronologic al order) · Availability of the Guiding Principles in local languages · Training on the Guiding Principles (in chronological order)

Reference to the Guiding Principles in the national legislation

None

Other References to the Guiding Principles (in chronological order)

Review of national legal framework: Analysis of the extent to which national legislation relevant to the needs of internally displaced persons in Georgia accords with the Guiding Principles is being carried out by the Georgian Young Lawyers Association, with the support of the Brookings Institution project on internal displacement and OSCE/ODIHR. Source: National/local NGOs Date: 2000/2001 Documents: · OSCE, Implementation Calendar of ODIHR projects, 14 September 2001 [Internet]

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Large dissemination of the Guiding Principles: During his visit to Georgia, the Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, Dr. Francis Deng, observed that the Guiding Principles had been received most positively and were actively being promoted as a useful tool for protecting the rights of the internally displaced persons. The UN Representative on IDPs was pleased to find that the Principles were well known among government officials, local NGOs and representative of the international community and broadly accepted as a useful basis for dialogue about the situation of the internally displaced in Georgia. The Minister for Foreign Affairs suggested that the GP "should acquire, step by step, an obligatory character." (UN CHR 25 January 2001, para. ) Sources: Georgian government, national/local NGOs, regional organisation, academic institution Date: 2000 Documents: · Report of the Representative of the UN Secretary-General on IDPs to the Commission of Human Rights, Profiles in displacement: Georgia, 17 January 2001 (see § 6) [Internet]

Regional workshop on internal displacement: To promote more effective solutions to the plight of internally displaced persons in the South Caucasus, a high level gathering was convened on May 10-12, 2000 in Tbilisi, Georgia at the invitation of the Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, Dr. Francis M. Deng. Participants included officials of the Governments of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia responsible for displaced populations; NGOs, academic institutions and displaced communities from the three countries; representatives of regional organizations, international organizations, and international NGOs; and international experts. Workshop participants welcomed the GP as a useful restatement of hard international law as well as an instrument providing clear guidance in cases where existing international law contains grey areas. Sources: Georgian government, national/local NGOs Date: 10-12 May 2000 Documents: · Summary report of the Regional Workshop on Internal Displacement in the South Caucasus, 3 July 2000 [Internet]

Initiative by national NGOs: A group of NGOs at the regional workshop on internal displacement in the South Caucasus (May 2000) made a series of proposals. These included the intention to develop a common framework for disseminating and promoting the Guiding Principles in the South Caucasus; the translation of the GP into local languages and in a format best suited to target groups; the initiation of regional consultations on issues relating to the internally displaced; the creation of country-specific monitoring mechanisms based on the GP to assess the region's displacement situations; the opening of a dialogue among governments, NGOs and international organizations about the issues raised and their potential policy implications. Sources: National/local NGOs Date: 10-12 May 2000 Documents: · Summary report of the Regional Workshop on Internal Displacement in the South Caucasus, 3 July 2000 (see annex I) [Internet]

Availability of the Guiding Principles in local languages

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The Guiding Principles have been translated into the Georgian language by the Georgian Young Lawyers' Association (GYLA), with the support of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and published by OCHA in the form of a booklet that is being disseminated throughout the country. Date: 2000 Documents: · GP in Georgian [Internet]

During the visit of the Representative of the UN Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons to Georgia, the United Nations Human Rights Office in Abkhazia, Georgia, agreed to facilitate the translation of the GP into the Abkhaz language, in the context of its programme for translating and disseminating international human rights standards and principles. Date: 2000 Documents: · Report of the Representative of the UN Secretary-General on IDPs to the Commission of Human Rights, Profiles in displacement: Georgia, 17 January 2001 (see § 7) [Internet]

Training on the Guiding Principles

NRC training workshop: The Global IDP Project of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) together with NRC Georgia held a training workshop on the Guiding Principles in Borjomi, Georgia. The workshop was part of a global NRC effort to disseminate and explain the Guiding Principles to representatives of governments, NGOs, the UN agencies and the displaced themselves, in order to ensure better protection and assistance to internally displaced persons. Participants in the NRC workshop were selected from local NGOs and authorities in the Kutaisi and Zugdidi regions, where many of the IDPs currently reside. Many of them were so called "community mobilizers" working directly with the displaced population on rights awareness and self-help issues. Sources: Local/national NGOs, local and national authorities Date: 13-15 November 2000 Documents: · Report of the Workshop on the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, Borjomi, Georgia, 13-15 November 2000 [Internal link]

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACH Accion Contra el Hambre AI Amnesty International CDIE Center for Development Information and Evaluation CIS Commonwealth of Independent States DRC Danish Refugee Council FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation FFW Food for Work FINCA Foundation for International Community Assistance HRW Human Rights Watch GRCS Georgian Red Cross Society GSRF Georgian Self-Reliance Fund GYLA Georgian Young Lawyers' Association HROAG Human Rights Office in Abkhazia, Georgia ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross IFRC International Federation of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent Societies IOM International Organization for Migration IRC International Rescue Committe NRC Norwegian Refugee Council ODIHR Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights OSI Open Society Institute OSCE Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe OXFAM Oxford Committee for Famine Relief PRRO Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation SCF Save the Children Fund UMCOR United Methodist Committee on Relief UNAG United Nations Association of Georgia UNCHR United Nations Commission on Human Rights UNCESCR United Nations Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights UNCRC United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child UNDPI United Nations Department of Public Information UNDHA United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNHRC United Nations Human Rights Committee UNOMIG United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia UNOCHA United Nations Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs UNSG United Nations Secretary General UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNA United Nations Association of Georgia USCR United States Committee for Refugees USAID United States Agency for International Development WB World Bank WFP World Food Programme

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LIST OF SOURCES USED (alphabetical order)

Amnesty International (AI), August 1998, Georgia - Summary of Amnesty International’s Concerns, AI Index: EUR 56/02/98 Internet : http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/aipub/1998/SUM/45600298.htm , accessed 10 January 2000

Bagshaw, Simon, 30 September 2000, Internally Displaced Persons and Political Participation: the OSCE Region, An Occasional Paper (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution Project on Internal Displacement) Internet : http://www.brook.edu/fp/projects/idp/articles/200009.htm , accessed 12 October 2000

Buck, Thomas, September 2000, Aftermath: Effects of Conflict on Internally Displaced Women in Georgia, Working Paper No. 310, (Washington: Center for Development Information and Evaluation, U.S. Agency for International Development) Internet : http://www.dec.org/pdf_docs/PNACJ947.pdf , accessed 29 January 2001

Council of Europe (COE), Commissioner for Human Rights, 13 July 2000, Report by Mr. Alvaro Gil-Robles Commissioner for Human Rights to the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on the Visit to Georgia

Council of Europe (COE), Parliamentary Assembly, 27 June 2002, Situation of refugees and displaced persons in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, Recommendation 1570 (2002) Internet : http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=http%3A%2F%2Fassembly.coe.int%2FDocument s%2FAdoptedText%2Fta02%2FEREC1570.htm , accessed 18 July 2002

Council of Europe (COE), Parliamentary Assembly, Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography, 4 June 2002, Situation of refugees and displaced persons in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, Doc. 9480 Internet : http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=http%3A%2F%2Fassembly.coe.int%2FDocument s%2FWorkingDocs%2FDoc02%2FEDOC9480.htm , accessed 2 July 2002

Council of Europe (COE), Parliamentary Assembly, Committee on the Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe, 13 September 2001, Honouring of Obligations and Commitments by Georgia, Doc. 9191 Internet : http://www.eorsi.hu/nemzetkozi/?et-024 , accessed 17 July 2002

Dale, Catherine, August 1997, The Dynamics and Challenges of Ethnic Cleansing: The Georgia-Abkhazia Case

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Internet : http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi- bin/texis/vtx/rsd/+awwBmehFJ69wwwwnwwwwwwwtFqrHndGtowcFqo- uPPyER0MFmqDFme26btqt2IygZf3zme4xwwwwwwwGFqmH0ZBFqtFHE207/rsddocv iew.html , accessed 8 April 2002

Georgian Young Lawyers' Association (GYLA), 1999, Monitoring of Legal and Actual Status of Internally Displaced Persons in Georgia, (Tbilissi)

Government of Georgia, 20 March 2002, Resolution of the Parliament of Georgia "On the unlawful misappropriation of state property and refugees and internally displaced persons' private property in Abkhazia" Internet : http://wwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/4463e6defb cfc5b4c1256b8700401f39?OpenDocument , accessed 12 July 2002

Government of Georgia, 31 March 2002, Number of Registered IDPs in Georgia by Region, Information for 1 March 2002

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 13 June 2002, "Georgia: food distribution begin in western Georgia", ICRC news 02/24 Internet : http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/5B3JSB?OpenDocument&style=custo_fi nal , accessed 18 July 2002

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 30 April 2002, The ICRC in Georgia Internet : http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/5AEERT?OpenDocument&style=custo_f inal , accessed 13 July 2002

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), May 2001, ICRC special report - Georgia: Paradise lost Internet : http://wwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/863dedd2a4 68f0d2c1256a87003a8782?OpenDocument , accessed 19 October 2001

International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC), 2 November 2000, The Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia: Humanitarian Assistance - Appeal No, 01.31/2000, Situation Report No. 3 Internet : http://www.ifrc.org/cgi/pdf_appeals.pl?emerg00/01310003.pdf , accessed 29 January 2001

International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC), 30 November 2000, Internally Displaced Persons: A Socio-Economic Survey, Georgia

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International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC), 31 May 2002, Annual Report - The Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia Internet : http://www.ifrc.org/cgi/pdf_appeals.pl?annual01/015801annrep.pdf , accessed 14 June 2002

International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC), 7 September 2001, The Caucaus: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Programme Update No. 3; Period covered: April-June, 2001 Internet : http://www.ifrc.org/cgi/pdf_appeals.pl?emerg01/01580103.pdf , accessed 19 October 2001

International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF), 2001, Statements of the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights to the OSCE Implementation Meeting on Human Dimension Issues, Warsaw, 17-27 September 2001 Internet : http://www.ihf- hr.org/reports/osce01/Interventions/Final%20OSCE%20Interventions.pdf , accessed 19 October 2001

International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF), 28 May 2002, Human Rights in the OSCE Region: The Balkans, The Caucasus, Europe, Central Asia and North America, Report 2002 (events 2001): Georgia Internet : http://www.ihf-hr.org/reports/AR2002/2_Country%20Issues/Georgia.pdf , accessed 18 July 2002

International Organization for Migration, 2000, Country Profile Georgia , Flows of internally displaced persons (web page)

Kharashvili, Julia, 2001, "Georgia: Coping by Organising. Displaced Georgians from Abkhazia" in: Caught Between Borders - Response Strategies of the Internally Displaced, Ed. Marc Vincent and Birgitte Refslund Sorensen (London: Pluto Press)

Landmine Monitor Core Group, August 2001, Landmine Monitor Report 2001, Toward a Mine-Free World Internet : http://www.icbl.org/lm/2001/report/ , accessed 19 October 2001

Leckie, Scott, 7 July 1998, Housing and Property Restitution Issues in the Context of Return to and within Georgia: an International Legal Perspective

Murvanidez Mitchell, Marina, 31 January 2000, Eurasia Insight: A New Year, but Old Problems With Georgian-Russian Relations Internet : http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/14d8c3184fb4 ad8f8525687b0059e4e6?OpenDocument , accessed 8 February 2000

Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), 1997, Survey on Internally Displaced People in Georgia - Living Conditions and Future Options of IDPs from Abkhazia

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Office of the United Nations Resident Coordinator in Georgia, 26 June 2002, Protocol of the meeting - Working Group III meeting held on 25 June 2002 in Tbilisi Internet : http://www.civil.ge/WG_III_N.pdf , accessed 11 July 2002

Open Society Institute, June 1995, Repatriation in Georgia Internet : http://www.soros.org/fmp2/html/georgia.htm , accessed 10 January 2000

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), 9 June 2000, Republic of Georgia, Presidential Elections, 9 April 2000, Final Report, (Warsaw) Internet : http://web.archive.org/web/20010210230141/www.osce.org/odihr/election/geo00-1- final.htm , accessed 29 January 2001

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