III. THE SYSTEM OF SUPPLY T is in the story of battalions advancing in an unbroken wave under a rolling barrage, or the description of the maneuvers of combat groups to outflank deadly machine gun positions, or the I narration of heroic exploits of patrols, that everyone expects to find the dramatic and spectacular incidents of war. But any divisional history which relates nothing more than the actual clashes of Americans and Germans must necessarily be incomplete. A division is more than its infantry, artillery, and numerous auxiliary arms. The trains and other organizations which keep the fighting men supplied with food and water, which replenish the ammunition belt when clips are running short which insure clothing and essential articles of equipment, and which transport the fighting man to the spot where he can fight, are an integral part of the battle machine. The successive steps in getting food and ammunition forward from the point to which it is brought by railway until it is delivered into the hands of the men in the front line companies form a chain which may be designated as the “system of supply.” Nor is the history of the organizations which constitute the links in that chain lacking in situations as tragic, as noteworthy, as humorous as are to be found in the annals of the war. The point at which the Division’s interest in this supply system begins is as far back as the “regulating station,” where the daily pack-trains for divisions at the front are made up and routed. These trains, made up of cars of beef, bread, potatoes, hay, and other articles of rations and forage, were despatched daily to a railhead in the area of the division to which they were assigned, and at this rail- head were unloaded the supplies to be stored in the railhead dump. ON THE ST. MIHIEL FRONT WHEN the 90th Division first went into the line, the regulating station of the 1stArmy was near Is-sur- Tille, a little town north of Dijon, where vast warehouses and shops had been erected and which had become one of the most important points on the American Expeditionary Forces’ lines of communication, which ran from the base ports through Tours up to the American front in Lorraine. The activities of the various units in the Division which moved the food and supplies forward from the railhead dump to the combatant troops were coordinated by the first section of the General Staff (G-1). The next link in the chain was the heads of the services. Lieutenant-Colonel John G. Winters and, later, Lieutenant-Colonel M. A. Rice secured and distributed the ordnance material; while the division quartermaster, Major Albert Feiss, had direct charge of the procurement and distribution of rations and other quartermaster supplies. Major Hubert W. Browder, assistant quartermaster, served as subsistence officer throughout the Division’s battle period. In spite of the frequent changes in railheads, especially during the Meuse-Argonne offensive, not a day passed without rations being issued by the division quartermaster. The first railhead of the 90th Division after entering the line was La Cumejie, about two kilometers east of Manoncourt-en-Woevre, and about thirteen kilometers from the front line. On September 9 the railhead was transferred to Belleville, and the office of the division quartermaster was established at Dieulouard, where the companies of the supply train were also located. While the railhead was at La Cumejie, a little French railway of 60-cm. gauge, running forward from Manoncourt, was extensively used to carry the rations forward to regimental dumps. It required twenty-six cars to transport each day’s rations. The cars were loaded in the afternoon and all trips made at night; but as soon as the preparations for the St. Mihiel offensive got under way it was found necessary to use the 60- cm. railway for transporting heavier materials, such as ammunition and engineering equipment. The carrying forward of rations then devolved exclusively upon the 315th Supply Train. Owing to the shortage of horses and wagons in the infantry regiments, it was necessary to truck the rations as far forward as possible in order to shorten the haul for the regimental trains. On the day of the attack the Division had only 50 per cent of its allowance of animals. Before the attack the distribution points at which the supplies were transferred from the trucks to the regimental wagons were St. Jean for troops on the left of the divisional sector, and Jezainville for organizations in the right sub-sector. The memorable period preceding the attack was one that the drivers of the supply train have particular occasion to remember. The establishment of forward dumps in preparation for the offensive necessitated an unusually heavy traffic over all roads, particularly through the ForLt de Puvenelle, where many of the dumps were located. All hauling was done in the night, without lights, over roads which had been rendered slippery and treacherous by constant rains. In the blackness of the dense woods, with heavy traffic in both directions, many drivers allowed the trucks to get an inch too close to the ditch and were soon capsized. Each morning there were a certain number still stuck in the mud, which the drivers had been unable to extricate before daybreak. The supply train went into the operation handicapped both in trucks and experienced personnel. On September 12 the Division had of its authorized allowance only 65 per cent of serviceable motor-cars, 55 per cent, of serviceable trucks, and 53 per cent of serviceable motorcycles. In preparing for the St. Mihiel drive, every precaution was taken to insure the fighting men hot meals as frequently as the tactical situation allowed them to lay aside the rifle and take up the mess kit. The field trains, loaded with two days’ field rations and one day’s reserve rations, and the rolling kitchens, carrying one day’s field rations, were as near the front line as conditions would warrant when the infantry jumped off, and followed up the advancing battalions as soon as roads could be built across No Man’s Land. Of course, during the first twenty-four hours after the attack was launched at 5 A. M., September 12,the soldiers ate the lunch they carried, and drew on two days’ “iron” rations of hardtack and bacon. In the afternoon of the second day hot food had been got up to the troops of the 357th Infantry, and by that night a roadway had been constructed north from Fey-en-Haye, so that the kitchens of the 358th Infantry were established, on the morning of September 14, at the south edge of Bois de Friere, which had been captured by the 2d Battalion on the previous day. Thanks to better roads in the 180th Brigade sector and the shorter advance on September12, the problem of supplying the men of the 359th and 360th Infantry was not so difficult at the beginning. On September 13 and 14 the distributing point for the 360th Infantry was at Jezainville, and for all other organizations was along the Montauville-Auberge St. Pierre road. On September 15 the supplies were trucked forward to Norroy for the 360th Infantry, to a point near Fey-en-Haye for the 358th and 359th Infantry, and to a point on the road leading northwest of Fey-en-Haye for the 357th Infantry, and were distributed at these points about 5 P. M. daily. The regimental supply companies had moved forward behind the infantry, and, despite the casualties among both the men and the horses, kept the advancing troops abundantly provided with food. But the shortage of horses became so serious that it was decided to withdraw the regimental supply companies to positions back of the Metz highway. Accordingly, the 358th Infantry Supply Company was established in the woods east of Auberge St. Pierre, and the supply companies of the359th and 360th Infantry were billeted at Montauville. However, exception was made of the 357th Infantry, owing to the length of haul that such an arrangement would have made necessary. The supplying of this regiment was particularly difficult in that it was necessary for the trucks of the supply train to make a long detour in order to reach a point near Viéville-en-Haye, where the supply company received the supplies. The route followed was west from Fey-en-Haye through Regniéville into the 78th Division sector, and then into Viéville. The ammunition supply was under the immediate direction of Captain Walter Negley, division munitions officer. Before the attack small-arms ammunition, grenades, and pyrotechnics were hauled from the 1st Corps dump to the division dump in the corner of ForLt de Puvenelle, two kilometers east of Mamey. and four regimental dumps were established further forward. This dump was not moved during the Division’s period of occupancy of the sector, although the artillery ammunition dump for both division and corps was moved forward to a point near Auberge St. Pierre soon after the advance. Before the attack, Company A of the supply train, equipped with light delivery trucks, and the small- arms horse section of the ammunition train were parked in the Puvenelle Woods near the small-arms ammunition dump. The light delivery trucks proved to be particularly valuable, as necessary ammunition or pyrotechnics could be rushed to any point on short notice by this means. The shortage of animals reduced the regimental combat trains to less than 50 per cent of their normal allowance. Owing to the shortage of both horses and combat wagons, the horse section of the ammunition train and the company of light delivery trucks practically took the place of the combat trains.