Issue 2 (4), 2016
CHALLENGES CHALLENGES GERMANY multilateral NATIONAL
MINORITY
INITIATIVES
JOINT JOINT perspectives ROMANIA STRATEGIC PARTNERS culture TREATY LATVIA TURKEY RELATIONS
FOREIGN POLICY SECURITYSCORECARDS
TRADE Ukraine NEIGHBOURS
B i l atMOLDOVA e raSLOVAKIA l
CANADA USA AGREEMENTS
• BILATERAL RELATIONS • FOREIGN POLICY OF UKRAINE • NEIGHBOURS, PARTNERS AND PERSPECTIVES UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 1
BOARD OF ADVISERS
Issue 2 (4), 2016 Dr. Dimitar Bechev (Bulgaria, Research fellow, London School of Economics and Social Science)
Dr. Iulian Chifu (Romania, Director of the Bilateral Relations Conflict Analysis and Early Warning Center) Dr. Igor Koval (Ukraine, Rector of Odessa National University by I.I. Mechnikov) Editors Dr. Hanna Shelest Dr. Sergey Minasyan (Armenia, Deputy Director Dr. Mykola Kapitonenko at the Caucasus Institute)
Stephan Meuser (Germany, Director of the Publisher: Representation of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation Published by NGO “Promotion of Intercultural in Romania) Cooperation” (Ukraine), Centre of International Studies (Ukraine), James Nixey (United Kingdom, Head of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, the the Representation of the Friedrich Ebert Royal Institute of International Affairs) with the financial support of Foundation in Ukraine and International Renaissance Foundation (Ukraine). Dr. Róbert Ondrejcsák (Slovakia, Director of STRATPOL-Strategic Policy Institute)
academic/analytical journal in English H.E., Dr. Oleg Shamshur (Ukraine, Ambassador UA: Ukraine Analytica is the first Ukrainian on International Relations, Politics and Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine to Economics. The journal is aimed for experts, France) diplomats, academics, students interested in the international relations and Ukraine in Dr. Stephan De Spiegeleire (The Netherlands, particular. Director Defence Transformation at The Hague Center for Strategic Studies)
Contacts: Ivanna Klympush-Tsintsadze (Ukraine, Vice- website: http://ukraine-analytica.org/ Prime Minister on European and Euroatlantic e-mail: [email protected] Integration of Ukraine) Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/ ukraineanalytica Dr. Dimitris Triantaphyllou (Greece, Director Twitter: https://twitter.com/UA_Analytica of the Center for International and European Studies, Kadir Has University (Turkey))
The views and opinions expressed in Dr. Asle Toje (Norway, Research Director at the articles are those of the authors and do not Norwegian Nobel Institute)
Analytica or its editors and Board of Advisors necessarily reflect the position of UA: Ukraine
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS
TO TURN HISTORICAL CONNECTIONS INTO POWERFUL, PRAGMATIC AND MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL PARTNERSHIP...... 3 Interview with H.E. Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine to Canada Andriy Shevchenko
WE HAVE EXPERIENCE THAT MIGHT BE OF INTEREST TO UKRAINE...... 5 Interview with H.E. Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Latvia to Ukraine Juris Poikāns
“UKRAINIAN PRISM: FOREIGN POLICY 2015”: OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF UKRAINE’S FOREIGN POLICY...... 8
THE 2016 U.S. ELECTIONS AND THE CRISIS OVER UKRAINE...... 15 Volodymyr Dubovyk
UKRAINE AND TURKEY IN A NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: BRINGING CREDIBILITY TO STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP...... 23 Yevgeniya Gaber
COMMON SENSE IN KAZAKHSTAN AND UKRAINE RELATIONS: INCENTIVES AND OPPORTUNITIES...... 34 Anna Gussarova
UKRAINE-MOLDOVA: COMPLICATED BUT PROMISING RELATIONS...... 41 Sergiy Gerasymchuk
UKRAINIAN DIASPORIC COMMUNITY IN GERMANY: MAIN CHARACTERISTICS AND ITS ENGAGEMENT FOR ITS HOME COUNTRY...... 49 Ljudmyla Melnyk, Magdalena Patalong, Richard Steinberg
REBIRTH OF UKRAINIAN-ROMANIAN FRIENDSHIP: NEW OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES ...... 58 Reghina Dimitrisina
SLOVAKIA AND UKRAINE: EASTERN PARTNERS...... 65 Aaron T. Walter
2 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 TO TURN HISTORICAL CONNECTIONS INTO POWERFUL, PRAGMATIC AND MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL PARTNERSHIP
Interview with H.E. Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Ukraine to Canada Andriy Shevchenko
What Is, in Your Opinion, The Main of communication, legal framework, and a Indicator Of The Level And Success In ‘win-win’ approach to the issue. However, Bilateral Relations? once again it is an ability to react to new challenges that is essential. Charles Darwin might help us with that. As he said, it is the animals that adjust to In Which Spheres Cooperation Between changes the best, which survive. Therefore Ukraine And Canada Is The Most Meaningful? Canadian uniforms and boots for Ukrainian soldiers, satellite «images of the war zone, Canadian thatWe areI call privileged ‘proactive toempathy’. have a very healthy officers, training Ukrainians on and beneficial cooperation. It is something the ground etc. – all of that timely Firstly, it is defense & security cooperation. and much appreciated assistance came as quickly as possible in Eastern Europe, which has been suffering fromWe work Russian together imperialistic to provide hostilities. more security This to have good relations between nations cooperation includes training of Ukrainian means to be mutually responsive to needs and challenges of the partner. support for the new Ukrainian National Police,officers information by Canadians exchange under etc. UNFIER,It is a One good example of successful cooperation is Canada’s response to the Russian aggression in the Crimea and Donbas. Canadian uniforms warmutually against beneficial Russia. process, as Ukraine can and boots for Ukrainian soldiers, satellite share its experience in fighting the hybrid Secondly, it is a state building. An impressive training Ukrainians on the ground etc. – all of part of the 45 million technical assistance thatimages timely of theand warmuch zone, appreciated Canadian assistance officers, package, assigned by Canada to Ukraine in came as quickly as possible. Canada was also one of the drivers of the international governmental and civil society institutions sanctions against Russia. This made Canada inthe Ukraine. 2016-17 fiscal year, will go to strengthen a leader of the international coalition in support of Ukraine. And this is exactly what Thirdly, it is trade & investment. None of you expect to receive from a good partner. we have, however, we do have to recognize This ‘responsiveness’, of course, requires successfulus can be cooperation satisfied with between the low businesses, volumes appropriate tools, such as good channels especially in IT or agriculture.
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 3 Are There Any Questions In The What Are The Main Challenges In The Ukrainian-Canadian Bilateral Relations, Embassy Work? Where Their Opinions Are Completely Opposite? among the partners. There is feasible The only one I can think of is the visa frustrationOur big challenge with no is toprogress fight ‘Ukraine on the fatigue’ Minsk agreements and a slow pace of reforms in have never heard ‘no’ from our Canadian Ukraine. partners;free-regime we betweendo not see the much countries. progress We either. Our visa-free dialogue with the EU, This requires very thoughtful and creative which is getting closer to a happy-end, efforts in explaining both our challenges should serve as an inspiring example. and successes. Canada’s political class has a decent understanding of the Russian Politics, Security, Economics Or aggression. Now we need to make sure Humanitarian Issues − What Are Your that Canada understands how we are Priorities For Future Development In modernizing the country The Bilateral Relations? When Countries Traditionally Have My top-3 will be the following: security, Very Close And Warm Relations – Is trade and education. It A Challenge Or A Benefit For The Ambassador? In terms of security, Ukraine can and should For me it is a great and priceless asset means a lot more cooperation in diverse and a huge responsibility. My long-term be a Western foothold in the region. That challenge is to convert our warm cultural crime, and countering money laundering. and historical connections into a powerful, fields: defense, fighting international
pragmatic and mutually beneficial cooperateWe also have with to Canada learn fromand other the Russian NATO partnership. We are on the way. partners,hybrid warfare breathing in Ukraine.life into Wethe hopeidea toof Andriy Shevchenko − Prior to the diplomatic launching an excellence center, which will appointment, Mr. Shevchenko had accomplished an help to consolidate hybrid war knowledge. outstanding career in politics and media. He is also well known in Ukraine as a civil activist and a human rights Regarding trade, my big hopes are with defender. A seasoned journalist, he was one of the the Free Trade Agreement that will be founders of Ukrainian 5th Channel, the first 24/7 news signed shortly and which will eventually channel in Ukraine, and a leader of the journalists’ eliminate 98% of the tariffs. This should movement against censorship. In 2005, he received the give businesses on both sides of the Atlantic good chances to rediscover Press Freedom Award from ‘Reporters without Borders’ Ukrainian-Canadian opportunities. (Vienna). After that, Mr. Shevchenko won seats in the Ukrainian Parliament 3 times (in 2006, 2007, and 2012). In 2006-12, he served as the Chairman of the already have some promising projects Free Speech Committee; in 2012-14, he served as the ofEducation cooperation is another in this greatsphere, hope. and We I 1st Deputy Chairman of the Human Rights Committee. He was a Yale World Fellow (2008), a Draper Hills cooperation between the leading academic Fellow at Stanford (2009), and a John Smith Fellow in believe we can greatly benefit from closer institutions. the UK (2013)
4 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 WE HAVE EXPERIENCE THAT MIGHT BE OF INTEREST TO UKRAINE
Interview with H.E. Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Latvia to Ukraine Juris Poikāns
What Is, In Your Opinion, The Main Indicator Of The Level And Success In We are traditional supporters Bilateral Relations? of Ukraine’s European «integration efforts, and view Latvia and Ukraine are traditional this choice of Ukraine as its natural choice supported by the society orpartners historical and disagreements. friends in various This makes fields. ourWe dorelationship not have free any of open any difficultprejudice issues and allows us to constantly build additional bridges of common understanding. It is equally important that both our countries supportersfinding a peaceful of settlementUkraine’s for theEuropean conflict are sparing no efforts in searching for integrationin the East efforts, of Ukraine. and view We are this traditional choice of new ways of enlarging and deepening our Ukraine as its natural choice supported by ties. How to measure the level and success in bilateral relations? There is no clear of a visa free regime for short time travels methodology but I would measure them by tothe the society. Schengen We want zone to as see soon the as introduction possible. whether we have succeeded in making our traditional ties even deeper and stronger. economic ties, a gradual increase in our mutual trade in 2016 should be noted that the President of Latvia sendsIn the fielda strong of signal regarding the In the field of political co-operation, it recovery of the economic situation in to Ukraine in October 2015. The then Prime Ukraine. Our brands such as “Olainfarm”, MinisterR.Vējonis of paid Ukraine one ofA.Yatsenuk his first foreign visited tripsRiga in November 2015. During this visit the are well known beyond Latvian borders prime ministers of two states unveiled a and“Grindex”, have earned “Dzintars”, the reputation “Latvijas of balzāms” quality monument to the famous Ukrainian writer among Ukrainian customers. The largest T.Shevchenko. The Minister of Foreign of telecommunications “Lattelecom” is the annual Kyiv Security Forum in April developingenterprise ofa thestrategy Baltic on States connecting in the fieldour 2016.Affairs These of Latvia facts E.Rinkevičs show the deep took level part inof countries closer together. Moreover, we engagement on a political level. In the should not forget that the national carrier international arena, Latvia has constantly expressed its unequivocal support for the between the two capitals for more than restoration of the territorial integrity and twenty“Air Baltic” years. has been offering flight services sovereignty of Ukraine by condemning the illegal annexation of the Crimea. In addition, In addition, this year we have witnessed the Government of Latvia supports the the development of co-operation in other efforts of the Ukrainian Government in
fields as well. The minister of agriculture of UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 5 Latvia has just attended the exhibition Agro How Much Do Latvian Membership 2016 in the framework of which he met In The EU And Ukrainian European his Ukrainian counterpart. The ministers Aspirations Influence Their Bilateral of transportation met in the margins of Relations? the Conference in Leipzig. Exchanges in the realms of culture and education were It makes our co-operation and mutual also visible. For example, a modern art exhibition of the Nordic – Baltic countries experience that has been accumulated was high on Kyiv’s cultural agenda for two duringunderstanding the accession even process closer. to We the haveEU, months from March to May. which might be of interest to Ukraine. By signing the Association Agreement In Which Spheres Is Cooperation between Ukraine and the EU, Ukraine will between Ukraine and Latvia the Most need to undertake huge efforts in reforming Meaningful? its legislation and implementing it. Latvia
our relations. Obviously, political ties ofcan agriculture, be there to decentralization support. We have and so the far We have no impediments for developing implemented different projects in the field expecting a visit of the President of Ukraine from the Ministry of Agriculture is working toare Latvia and in will 2017. remain The tradition important. of meetings We are currentlyfight against in Kyiv corruption. to advise A the special Minister expert on between three Baltic prime ministers and the projects of mutual interest. Ukraine will be continued. Economic ties due to traditional contacts will be high on Not being a member of the EU, Ukraine, the agenda as well. Agriculture including however, is a part of the larger European process. Thus issues such as migration crisis or the British vote on the EU are equally offorestry transportation, and fishing the resources development caught theof important for both states, which make it theattention corridor of thebetween governments. North Inand the South, field essential to look for possible solutions. the Baltic and the Black Seas, provides an opportunity for new transport arteries. What Are The Main Challenges In The Two latest educational exhibitions in Embassy Work? Kyiv attracted the interests of various Latvian universities. Ukrainian students are currently making one of the biggest such type of relations, which exist between groups of foreign students in Latvia. Our LatviaWhen youand have Ukraine, an active you and usually busy agendaface two in problems – capacities and time. Latvia’s solid. Exchanges of experience between diplomatic missions are usually relatively thecontacts militaries in the ofmilitary two states field aretake strong place and on small and that demands additional efforts a regular basis. Culture remains a uniting in meeting all set targets. During summer bridge between the two nations through season, for example, we witness a steep participation in different cultural festivals, increase in visa applications, which puts concerts and exhibitions. It should also be additional pressure on our consular section. stressed that our physicians have helped You will always want to achieve more but participants of ATO to recover in our hospitals and receive medical assistance. goals. it is important to define realistic aims and
6 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 When Countries Traditionally Have Very Close And Warm Relations – Is Juris Poikāns is a career diplomat, who started his It A Challenge Or A Benefit For The career at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia in Ambassador? 1996. He has previously served as Head of Division of Baltic and Nordic countries, Deputy Director of First Bilateral Relations Department, Deputy Head of Mission positive agenda, it allows you to work in at the Embassy of the Republic of Latvia to the Republic aIt positive is more direction of a benefit. as well. When However, you have any a of Belarus, Counsellor, Ambassador Extraordinary previous Ambassador usually sets high and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Latvia to the standards, which you want to achieve and even surpass. That makes your work a bit Republic of Slovenia, Bosnia – Herzegovina and Kosovo, harder and challenging but you always and Ambassador for the Eastern Partnership at the know that there is a reward in feeling that MFA of Latvia. He has additional education at Oxford you have been able to build another stone University Foreign Service Programme, Foreign Service in the traditionally friendly ties between Academy, Islamabad, Pakistan, diplomatic course, Latvia and Ukraine. and George C.Marshall European Centre for Security Studies, Garmisch – Partenkirchen, Germany.
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 7 “UKRAINIAN PRISM: FOREIGN POLICY 2015”: OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF UKRAINE’S FOREIGN POLICY1
The idea to present a systemic quantitative especially foreign policy NGOs have clearly analysis of Ukraine’s foreign policy voiced out their will to be active members stemmed from the sense of renewal, of agenda setting in Ukraine. spurred by the Revolution of Dignity achievements. The revolutionary call for In the view of all this, the authors of the deep reforms in every sphere of public “Ukrainian Prism: Foreign Policy 2015”
systemic assessment and analysis of the The politicians finally reached present(Scorecards) state of report art with firmly regular believe follow-ups that a consensus on Ukraine’s external is a requirement to launch a new Ukrainian «orientation, engraving the absence foreign policy in a renewed state. To this of alternative to the European and Euroatlantic integration as the paper “Ukrainian Prism: Foreign Policy main foreign policy guideline 2015”end, the came first up. issue It was of thecreated annual by analyticalthe team of the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism” with participation of independent policy seeking to lay the foundations for new experts and in partnership with the Ukraine, built on the democratic principles Regional Representation of the Friedrich of governance, concerned the country’s Ebert Foundation in Ukraine. Scorecards foreign affairs as well. The politicians in the implementation of the foreign policy of external orientation, engraving the conceptualized and quantified the progress absencefinally reachedof alternative consensus to the European on Ukraine’s and Euroatlantic integration as the main foreign thatUkraine need in 2015more according attention, to correctionsfive indicators, or policy guideline. Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine evenidentified radical success change and of failure approaches. stories, issuesSome has reintroduced the parliamentary- recommendations for policy makers were presidential form of government in the prepared. Henceforward, such an annual Constitution of Ukraine; hence the balance ranking of foreign policy of Ukraine directions of powers between the state bodies shifted will provide experts and practitioners with towards the parliament, which demands a relevant, dynamic, and general picture of reconsideration, as foreign policy becomes foreign policy achievements. the matter not only for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or Administration of the Methodology President, but also for Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs and other In the course of searching for inspiration institutions. Finally, the civil society and and its own methodology development,
1 Brief prepared by Nadiia Koval based on the “Ukrainian Prism: Foreign Policy 2015”. 2016. Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. Accessed at http://prismua.org/en/scorecards/
8 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 the working group of “Ukrainian Prism” 2. Institutional cooperation measures carefully studied the experience of foreign effectiveness of cooperation and coordination between Ukrainian state assessment. At the end of the day, the priority institutions that should carry out foreign wasanalytical given centres to the inprojects the field of of the foreign European policy Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)2 and the foreign policy. Czech Association for International Affairs policy tasks and their influence on (Asociace pro mezinárodní otázky, AMO)3. 3. Strategic vision measures the strategic However, as a result of methodological or long-term vision of the Ukrainian consultations, Ukrainian Prism elaborated foreign policy priorities in a particular its own methodology adjusting it to direction. Ukrainian realities. 4. Activities describe the pace and The research methodology of Ukraine’s foreign policy takes into account actual regarding a particular direction during foreign policy situation, advantages thestrengths year. of specific action steps and disadvantages of the constitutional division of powers, established political 5. Results and achievements are being assessed as well. of international relations, documents of strategicand institutional and operational practices nature in the in fieldthe sphere of foreign policy and security, expert and academic knowledge on optimal models minimumEach of five score key indicatorsand 5 points is assessed is the highest using of foreign service, as well as priorities possiblea five-point score. system, Each point where in the 1 point assessment is the materials. Although, methodologically the is linked to the presence or absence of a timeframereflected inis the year relevant 2015, mass taking media into certainof a relevant condition direction and aby database a specific was indicator set for account that it is a “zero year” and a starting each indicator. The score for a country or point to build a dynamic foreign policy, direction is calculated by means of indicators documents that were adopted in 2014 in a range from A (the highest possible score) to E (the lowest one). policy documents, strategic documents, etc.)(official were policyalso taken statements, into account. manifestos, Thematically, “Ukrainian Prism” analysts have chosen 31 directions of Ukraine’s foreign policy. The choice of directions was guided foreign policy include: by the key Ukrainian foreign policy directions Thus, five indicators to assess Ukrainian as presented at the Analytical report to the 1. Political interest or involvement– “State of the Union” address of the President the indicator that assesses overall to the Parliament in 2015 and include: engagement of the whole Ukrainian political class into a given direction of • relations with the key partners (the the foreign police, its place on the list of USA, Canada, China, Poland, Romania, priorities and its presence in the public the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and political discourse. Turkey);
2 The European Foreign Policy Scorecard. 2016. European Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed at http://www. ecfr.eu/scorecard 3 Agenda for Czech Foreign Policy. 2016. Czech Association for International Affairs. Accessed at http://www.amo. cz/en/agenda-for-czech-foreign-policy/
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 9 • European integration (the EU, Eastern in the key areas of foreign policy, the Partnership, Visegrad Four, the interest of political parties to developing a Baltic States, the European Energy full-featured block of political or election Community); programs and formulating a detailed part on foreign policy of the Coalition Agreement • the Russian Federation; was very low. The average level of political interest/engagement in the foreign policy • Regional cooperation (the Black Sea issues was graded with “C+”.
the CIS, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa);Region, Asia-Pacific Region, Middle East, Strong links between domestic and foreign policy agenda • International organizations (the UN, «contributed to a significantly Council of Europe, OSCE, NATO); increased level of cooperation between the MFA, the Administration • Multilateral initiatives (international of the President and the security, non-proliferation, climate Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine change, human rights);
• Economic diplomacy; The traditional division of competence in institutional • Public diplomacy. cooperation in 2015. However, in the war- situation,the foreign the policyrole of definedthe National Security Thus, What about Results? forms of inter-institutional cooperation Indicator-wise, the engagement and wereand Defenceestablished Council in the increased. strategic Specific areas, political interest of most domestic policy particularly in the context of creating the implementation mechanism for the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement and the needactors toin containforeign policythe Russian issues wasaggression. defined Association Agenda, which were updated Theby the discourse armed was conflict largely in theinformed East and by the in 2015. Some forms of interdepartmental approval of the European integration and institutional cooperation were stipulated the Euro-Atlantic security initiatives as key by the Program of the Cabinet of Ministers priorities of the Ukrainian foreign policy. In of Ukraine in 2015, activity plans of relevant the context of credit and reform obligations, ministries to implement the government the connection between internal and program, the Coalition Agreement and external policy increased substantially and the Strategy for Sustainable Development economic diplomacy came to the fore. There “Ukraine 2020” and some MFA regulatory was an especially active political interest of documents on coordination of central key players to Ukraine’s relations with the executive authorities. European Union, Poland, France, Germany, Canada, the United States, the Council of Strong links between domestic and foreign Europe, NATO, and OSCE. At the same time, the engagement into regional cooperation, increased level of cooperation between the MFA,policy the agenda Administration contributed ofto athe significantly President Latin America, and Sub-Saharan Africa, was and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in the minimal.especially Furthermore, in Asia-Pacific, despite Middle the activity East, institutional context of the National Reform of particular members of parliament and Council, the establishment of working their associations (e.g. “Eurooptimists”) groups on reforms, the institutionalization
10 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 of economic and public diplomacy (e.g. the from a strategic partner to an aggressor Department of Public Diplomacy in the state, recognized a long-term character of MFA), and the information policy (project the Russian threat and the need for Ukraine of the State target program on promoting to move towards NATO and EU membership Ukraine’s interests abroad and branding of as the basis for national security. the country in 2016-2018). For certain directions, bilateral documents The active position of some MPs who acted of medium- and short-term nature were as heads of the Verhovna Rada committees adopted (Declaration of Heads of the State and participated in the parliamentary of Ukraine and France, the Action Plan delegations to the parliamentary assemblies for Ukraine for 2015-2017 in Council of of the Council of Europe, the OSCE, and Europe, etc.). The EU-Ukraine Association NATO in coordination of activities with Agreement was implemented according the executive foreign policy structures, to the Action Plan on the Association especially with the MFA, brought positive Agreement Implementation for 2014-2017. results in promoting Ukrainian interests The Strategy on Sustainable Development and consolidated positive cooperation practices in relations with certain states: action plan of the Cabinet of Ministers on its in 2015, inter-parliamentary groups were implementation“Ukraine − 2020” in 2015 and thealso correspondingpaid attention established not only with the EU countries to certain directions and instruments of (Germany, Poland, France, etc.), but also foreign policy. in other regions (Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Chile). The relevant committee of the However, most geographic and thematic Verkhovna Rada and delegations to the directions of Ukraine’s foreign policy are international organizations (permanent not legislated in such documents, thus they delegation to the Council of Europe, NATO have no long-term strategy. At the national PA, etc.) worked actively. level, there was no comprehensive vision of the foreign policy priorities for the medium term perspective in a form of a systematic and competition, which led to ineffective document, which could be the basis for implementationAt the same time, of there certain were directionsalso conflicts of developing most geographic and thematic foreign policy. An important shortcoming directions of Ukraine’s foreign policy. Such problem in this context presented situation harms Ukraine’s cooperation considerable delays in the appointment with the key countries, weakens regional of ambassadors to many countries and cooperation and implementation of international organizations. The average multilateral initiatives. level of institutional cooperation was graded at “B -”. Despite being prioritized in the Strategy
As to the strategic vision, in 2014-2015 2020”, the diplomatic reform was also not Ukraine updated a number of strategic legislatedfor Sustainable in a single Development systematic “Ukraine document − documents in the areas of foreign policy, security, and defence. In 2014, changes of the reform. Thus, the average level of were introduced to the Law of Ukraine “On strategicthat would vision define was thegraded direction “C+”. and task the Foundations of Internal and Foreign Policy” and in 2015, a new National Security Activities during 2015 were quite intense. Strategy of Ukraine and Military Doctrine of The main directions of the foreign policy Ukraine were adopted. These documents predictably focused on resolving the radically changed the perception of Russia
conflict with Russia (the Normandy format UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 11 and the Minsk process, cooperation with into force of the EU-Ukraine Deep and the OSCE, the UN, bilateral relations with Comprehensive Free Trade Area since the United States, Germany, and France). January 2016. Moreover, in late 2015 the The positive dynamics of political dialogue European Commission issued a positive at the highest level, along with the presence of joint economic and energy projects, and the Action Plan on visa liberalization, which participation in joint multilateral initiatives gavefinal 6thUkraine report a onperspective the implementation of obtaining of a visa-free regime with the EU in 2016. activity of Ukraine in relations with the At the key partners’ level, Ukraine had a UK,allowed Canada, recording Poland, significant and the foreignBaltic States.policy successful year in relations with Canada, Cooperation with NATO became much more active and the visit of the President amount of humanitarian, technical and to Israel was an important milestone in Poland and the Baltic states. A significant bilateral relations. (EU, Germany, Japan, etc.). The election ofmacro-financial Ukraine as a assistancenon-permanent was obtainedmember Strengthening of economic initiatives of the UN Security Council in October (meetings of intergovernmental commis- 2015 became a success in the context of cooperation with international cooperation, business forums, investment organizations; and cooperation with the forumssions on and economic economic and conferences) scientific-technical is worth noting as well. The measures on informa- on reducing Ukraine’s dependence on tion policy and public diplomacy were RussianVisegrad gas countries due to had reverse a significant from Hungary, impact actively introduced, and the MFA presence Poland, and Slovakia. in social networks increased. However, despite the fact that the existing However, in 2015 Ukraine’s participation in European sanctions on Russia were the regional security initiatives (e.g. “5+2” preserved, they were not stiffened. In the talks on Transnistria), its participation in security policy, there was also a failure peacekeeping operations, anti-piracy, and to obtain the status of a special US ally tasks within BLACKSEAFOR weakened. outside NATO, ensuring allies’ agreement Cooperation with the OSCE is actually in principle to supply lethal weapons limited to the Ukrainian issues only and is and peacekeepers of the UN or the EU to passive in other directions. The relations within the CIS were frozen and are gradually transforming into bilateral relations with progressDonbas, forcingon the Russia occupied to fulfil Crimea its part issue of certain countries. Relations with China, andthe Minsk getting agreements, clearer commitment achieving significant of the India and Pakistan slowed down and the European partners on the future prospects policy on non-proliferation of nuclear of the European integration of Ukraine. The weapons and climate change was weak and unconvincing. The average level of activities with the course of Ukrainian internal was graded “B -”. trends of Western allies’ dissatisfaction
As for the results of 2015 Ukrainian foreign Inreforms terms intensified. of economic diplomacy, we would policy, the greatest success was achieved like to mention the agreement on signing in the European direction, where Ukraine managed, despite Russian pressure, to 2016, initialling of the FTA with Canada the FTA with Israel in the first half of Agreement and the provisional entry issue with Turkey. However, despite the ensure the ratification of the EU Association and the intensification of the talks on this
12 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 course to foreign policy economization and
and business forums, the objective especiallyWith the aimconcerning of having building better resultsa political and economicsignificant situation efforts inshowed terms further of investment decline dialoguea more efficientwith its foreign key policypartners activity, and in foreign trade, foreign investment and so international organizations, the central on. At the same time, it was managed to bodies of the executive power need to avoid default by restructuring the external focus on reform implementation, which debt. The average level of foreign policy is envisaged by the series of bilateral effectiveness can be graded “B-”. documents between Ukraine and the EU, the USA, IMF and Energy Community. The overall arithmetic measures the value of success of Ukraine’s 2015 foreign policy Ukraine has to demonstrate more at 3.6 points that corresponds to the rating leadership ambitions within the region “B -”. of the Eastern Partnership, to be precise, regarding forming a joint agenda for Recommendations Eastern Partnership countries, which signed the EU Association Agreements The main recommendation of the experts (Georgia, Moldova) and creating a common is the need to elaborate a single document– economic space in the medium-term “Priorities of the Foreign Policy of Ukraine perspective. Ukraine should support the towards 2020”, with the help of expert initiatives regarding the search for the community. Nowadays Ukraine does formats of regional development and not have a united strategic document cooperation, which are proposed by the that would determine the key directions neighbouring countries. This can be said of foreign policy in the medium-term regarding wider cooperation within the perspective, its aim, mission and resources frames of the Visegrad Group as well as regarding new projects with a wider regional perspective. In this context, it The main recommendation would be appropriate to develop regional of the experts is the need to «elaborate a single document– CIS, Eastern Partnership region, Black Sea “Priorities of the Foreign Policy region,strategies and (Asia Latin Pacific, America) Middle East,that Africa,would of Ukraine towards 2020”, with provide for a complex vision of Ukrainian the help of expert community interests in the regions and mechanisms of their implementation.
necessary to the implementation of Even though, to a greater extent, the Ukrainian interests on the international situation in the sphere of economic development and trade in Ukraine depends of the abovementioned medium-term on inner political changes in the country and strategicarena. With document, the aim ofits the development systematic hasvision to the success of reforming the economy, from include public consultations for the project the point of view of economic diplomacy, discussion, for example, in specialized 2016 needs to see a better concentration academic institutions, during events with of efforts in order to promote the interests the participation of experts from the state of Ukrainian producers of the determined and non-governmental analytical centres prioritized spheres on world markets. The both in Ukraine and abroad. implementation of the policy supporting exporters has to be done by adopting a
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 13 National export strategy and creating an situation in our country. 2016 can see export-credit agency. an attempt of conceptualizing the vision of which institutional form of expert Expert diplomacy is a key feature of diplomacy can be used in building the countries interested in the development of system of foreign relations. a wide spectrum of instruments promoting their interests abroad. The existence of The new social and political reality can discussion formats, which work with the be considered as a reference point in representativesaffiliated analytical of centresexpert orcommunity expert- establishing a democratic system of foreign of other countries can become a solid relations and diplomatic service, oriented instrument for better understanding the toward national interests.
14 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 THE 2016 U.S. ELECTIONS AND THE CRISIS OVER UKRAINE
Dr. Volodymyr Dubovyk Director, Center for International Studies, Odessa National University
2016 is the U.S. presidential elections year. In the meantime, Ukraine is still going through its tests of war effort, reforms and fight against corruption. The U.S. assistance to Ukraine is critical; Washington recognizes Russian aggression against Ukraine as a major challenge to the established international order. However, it does not mean that the crisis over Ukraine is looming large on the agenda of the elections. The foreign policy, as usual, is taking a backseat when it comes to the domestic concerns in the election debates. Neither the crisis over Ukraine, nor even the unravelling situation in the broader Middle East (including the Syrian crisis) are rated high in the list of priorities this election year. As for suggestions as to what the U.S. role with regard to the crisis over Ukraine should be, the responses vary from staying out of it and reconciling with V. Putin to taking a tougher stance on Moscow. The nominee from the Republican Party D. Trump sticks to the distancing, isolationist tune. The Democratic Party nominee H. Clinton advocates a more forceful approach and tough line dealing with Russia. However, while it is hard to predict what policies D. Trump will pursue if elected, with H. Clinton, as a new president, there is a high probability of her following the policies of the current administration.
The year 2016 is an election year in the protests took place. The acute political United States. Every elections seem to be a crisis, then complemented by an external watershed event in the American politicum, aggression against Ukraine by the Russian
might become a really decisive moment, over Ukraine” with many international perhaps,a defining both moment. for the However, American this domestic time it actorsfederation taking created their roles a full-fledged in it. All of “crisis this was coupled by the dire situation in the Ukrainian economy, which was hit hard by Neither the crisis over Ukraine, nor endemic corruption and consequences of even the unravelling situation in the de-facto annexation of the Crimea and «the broader Middle East (including some segments of the Donbas region, as the Syrian crisis) are rated high in the well as by the price of war in the east of the list of priorities this election year country. As Ukraine is struggling through these manifold tests, it has also embarked on a journey towards ambitious reforms. In and foreign policies. Ukraine, in the meantime, has been living in extraordinary the introduction of reforms – the United and very much strained times ever since the Statesall of this is seen– war, as fight a vital against partner. corruption Even now, and late 2013, when the so-called Euromaidan when the U.S. often appears as a reluctant
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 15 superpower, unwilling global power, there challenge that the country is facing these is much it could do to assist Ukraine. The days it was expected that the rest of the election year is a logical point to assess world should be attuned to the Ukrainian what place the crisis over Ukraine has in the troubles on a 24/7 basis and be glued to context of American political life. know what happens in this country and around it. This is far, as bitter as it comes In this piece we will look at the following: across, from how things really stand. People the role of the foreign policy in the 2016 US around the globe, people in the U.S. (and elections, the role of the crisis over Ukraine by people we mean broad public, political in 2016 elections, including the positions elites, media, etc.) do not see events in and of the candidates on the crisis over Ukraine around Ukraine through the same prism, the same magnifying glass as we do here potential president with regards to the U.S. policyand, finally, towards what Ukraine we canand expectthe crisis from over a someone ought to do something to help it. Ukraine,in Ukraine. refer When to certain we often (what iterate appears that to us) obligations and commitments (Refrain It often comes as a surprise to an from the threat or use of force against uninformed onlooker that foreign policy Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, Refrain rarely makes it big in the U.S. presidential from the use of nuclear arms against elections. Given the amount of power and
and considering how much people outside theBelarus, part Kazakhstanof particular and actors, Ukraine) including − say, the to ofinfluence the U.S. that wonder the U.S. about wields its internationalin the world, U.S.,the Budapest this is often memorandum not how they of see 1994 it. − on policies, one would expect that this domain take a dominant place in the election years. The primaries campaign of 2016 had its But it does not. Being the citizens of a share of moments when foreign policy superpower, potential voters are primarily related issues were brought up. However, focused on issues of social, economic, and it did not happen too often, and when domestic nature. Jobs, taxes, immigration it did, there was no exclusive focusing matter more than foreign entanglements. on the crisis over Ukraine. Other issues This year is no exception. In fact, the last factored in, including, but not limited, to time when foreign policy issues mattered the situation in the broader Middle East,
– R. Reagan contest in 1980. Considering thatrather since significantly 1980 we witnessed was back the in upheaval J. Carter Palestinespecifically knot, in Syria,Afghanistan, unravelling the end of of post- the and then demise of the “cold war”, the CubanQaddafi isolation, Libya, Irana growing nuclear assertiveness deal, Israel/ of emergence of the bipolar world with an outsize American role in it, the events of the rise of the Islamic fundamentalism 9/11, a bunch of pretty long U.S. military throughoutChina in the aAsia-Pacific number areaof regions. and globally, The engagements abroad, the fact that foreign situation in and around Ukraine was policy still failed to register among the frequently mentioned but only among pivotal issues in the number of presidential other foreign policy priorities and concerns election campaigns is rather amazing, but for the United States, and not necessarily that is how it was. as its top priority. The crisis over Ukraine is most typically listed among many various Most of the people in Ukraine also live in upheavals in today’s world with which the a very much Ukraine-centric world if you United States would have to deal in one or look at interests, concerns, attitudes, fears, another manner. This manner might vary and expectations. Given the extraordinary from the principled, protracted and close
16 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 engagement (H. Clinton calls for US military chose to embrace it. From the outset of the support for Ukraine1) to distancing from campaign, moderate republicans appeared the problem, ignoring it and/or solving it out of fashion and did not stand much of a by some sort of a magic stick (D. Trump has chance. The previous elections of 2008 and no Ukraine policy yet 2). 2012 were naturally seen by Republicans
Another thing that one can notice is that the reason of failing to present a candidate whoas unsuccessful could be an ones, appealing specifically and unifying due to (not to mention full speeches) on the foreign force. By that account, obviously now (even policythere were as such. very In fewmost significant cases only statements fragments if Republicans come to ultimately win the of candidates’ remarks would touch upon foreign policy and, quite frequently, only when prompted by a particular question thispresidency), will come the to affect party the will foreign find itself policy in if a from the audience. Certainly, there were state of unprecedented division. Whether segments in election debates within both House is an open question. parties that were dedicated to the foreign a Republican candidate is to take the White policy, but here is the point: the candidates As it comes to the positions of the Republican candidates, there was a that was a required theme. It is quite noticeable divergence of their views on striking,had to address in our thisview, field that exactlyeven the because most the crisis over Ukraine and the required course of action for the U.S. with regard realm of foreign policy, Hillary Rodham to that crisis. There was a visible strain of Clintonexperienced did not and feel qualified a need candidateto have a majorin the one traditional Republican view, which had coherent speech on the subject until June its suspicions of Russia and its intentions 2nd, 20163. all along and which saw the Ukrainian case, also, through the prism of the values The Republican Party position of the American international policy, that should, in their minds, include a strong, The Republican Party has had a long forceful policy of “democracy promotion”. and highly calamitous election season. The Russian onslaught on Ukraine through It initially registered a huge number of such a prism appeared not only as a certain contenders, many of whom were in the geopolitical or regional security challenge position of a front-runner at some point. but also as a civilizational one. The United The attempt to make GOP a party of a States in such a view emerged not only “big tent” (to include various views and as an ultimate legitimate guardian and platforms) and modernize the party failed protector of the world order under Russian utterly. The certain faction is running with attack, but also as a leading “force of good” a ball, and the one that is hated by the establishment of the party, which, however, found no leverage to prevent that faction Therethat should were presideseveral inRepublican a fight with contenders “evil”. from triumphing and, therefore, ultimately for the nomination who subscribed to the
1 Hillary Clinton calls for US military support for Ukraine. UA Today. 22.01.2015. Accessed at: http://uatoday.tv/ politics/hilary-clinton-suggests-us-military-support-for-ukraine-404369.html 2 http://www.dw.com/en/donald-trump-foreign-policy-adviser-trump-has-no-ukraine-policy-yet/a-19280416 3 ReadDonald Hillary Trump Clinton’s foreign Speech policy adviser:on Donald Trump Trump has and no NationalUkraine policy Security yet / / Time. Deutsche 02.06.2016. Welle. 25.05.2016. Accessed at: Accessed http://time. at: com/4355797/hillary-clinton-donald-trump-foreign-policy-speech-transcript/
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 17 above-mentioned view. Among them, the of an exercise in rhetoric, a competition as most notable were the governor of Ohio John to whose criticism of V. Putin’s behaviour Kasich, former CEO of “Hewlett Packard” Carly would be the loudest one. Also, perhaps, Fiorina, a senator from Texas Ted Cruz and a this endeavour was instrumental in senator from Florida Marco Rubio. They had building up credentials in the foreign policy some differences regarding the details but all background which could be of use in the shared the view that the Russian President V. Putin’s aggressive policies was something case of M. Rubio). that constitutes a major blow against the future political battles (definitely true in established world order and international law, puts America’s allies and partners, its from Kentucky Rand Paul, who, to his interests in the region in a position of harm, credit,A specific stayed stand true was to takenhis long-expressed by a senator and deserves a strong, forceful American libertarian convictions. A libertarian response4. Over a period of time senator M. view on both domestic and international Rubio emerged as, perhaps, the most audible matters has always had a strong presence voice in this grouping. in American discourse. It cuts across both
This line of thought is nothing new, of to a lot of independents. In foreign policy, it course, and is present not just in the ranks of manifestspolitical parties itself as and a sort appeals of soft most isolationism. definitely the Republican Party. However, Republicans In other words, it does not call for a total were most active in peddling this view. This withdrawal of the United States from the opinion is, also, often associated with the international arena (people like R. Paul neoconservative program on foreign policy. surely realize that this would be nonsense) At the same time, it should be mentioned, that but, instead, calls to lower a number and the neocons are frequently mischaracterized depth of American foreign entanglements. and actually do not have a single party This certainly includes the US foreign military deployments, the take that would be currently very popular among many homeland. We can also recall those Americans on any side of the isle. “neocons” in the G. W. Bush administration with(R. Cheney, V. Putin, D. when Rumsfeld, it served P. Wolfowitz), their interests, and Rand Paul’s father, Ron Paul was one of eventhey cooperateddespite a quitegrowing fine forevidence a lengthy of time an authoritarian drive in Moscow. time. He, once a member of the House ofthe Representatives, libertarian flag-bearers and, also, for quiteone of a One other thing that, perhaps, needs the presidential hopefuls, brought the mentioning, was an apparent lack of ideas libertarian position to its extreme. He was on what else could be done (in addition known, among other things, as an utmost to the steps taken by the B. Obama sceptic when it comes to any sort of the U.S. administration) to better control V. Putin involvement with Ukraine. Back in times and help Ukraine. Aside from a call to arm Ukraine with lethal weapons (which was “Orange Revolution”, he claimed that the U.S. shared by many in Democratic camp, as wasof the behind “first” it Maidanand launched (2004), investigations a so-called there was little on offer5. It became a sort into how much funds had been invested
4 Franklin D. Kramer. A Real Response to Russia / US News. 24.03.2014. Accessed at: http://www.usnews.com/ opinion/blogs/world-report/2014/03/24/how-the-us-and-nato-should-respond-to-russias-crimea-invasion 5
FACT SHEET: U.S. Assistance to Ukraine / White House. 07.12.2015. Accessed at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/ the-press-office/2015/12/07/fact-sheet-us-assistance-ukraine 18 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 in carrying out this revolution6. Naturally, there could be a multiple choice of how Moscow. These days Ron Paul Institute for youWhen see it it comes from the to theU.S.: crisis as a overdirect Ukraine threat Peacehe was and identified Prosperity as has a useful become person a major by to the U.S. interests, as an indirect threat outlet of the pro-Putin propaganda in the to the U.S. interests and as a non-threat. United States. His son Rand is much more careful and restrained in his statements. and three. Moreover, when it comes to He has been an overall critic of V. Putin’s D. Trump fluctuates between options two moves against Ukraine, but, at the same time, questioned how closely involved the notwhat our Washington problem7. He should repeats do aboutthat Ukraine it, his U.S. should be in helping Ukraine and on isresponse in Europe would and, most therefore, often be Europeans − nothing, whether the Russian actions are really should deal with this issue by themselves8. damaging American interests.
Much of the above-mentioned approach has When it comes to the crisis been incorporated by another candidate– over Ukraine there could be a Donald Trump, whose campaign has «multiple choice of how you see become, among other things, an operation it from the U.S.: as a direct threat to the U.S. interests, as an indirect views. He has never outlined any sort threat to the U.S. interests and as ofthat a coherent is heavily stand influenced on neither by libertarian domestic a non-threat. D. Trump fluctuates nor foreign policy. This remains true between options two and three paradoxically even now when he has emerged as an apparent nominee of the Republican Party. His campaign has been All this is in the face of reality where of a limitless populism and demagoguery, Europeans show inadequate capacity constant effort in avoiding real questions and willingness to deal with it. The major and not providing real answers. D. Trump, mechanism to provide collective security as his election motto states, aspires to make of American allies in Europe – NATO – has “America great again”. This does not include, also come under D. Trump’s attacks. He though, any sort of active role for the U.S. says that NATO is obsolete and useless, and at the international arena. He, perhaps, costs Americans too much9. Finally, when believes in American exceptionalism, but it comes to his view on V. Putin, D. Trump stops short of admiring the strong Russian (and in fact destroying many things that leader and promises that he would be able trulyis fine make with America keeping great). it for He America postulates only 10. Here, like with any other question, he does not existing problem in the world. provideto get alongany explanation with him justof what fine does he that America should not have a fix for any
6 Ingmar Bredies, Andreas Umland, Valentin Yakushik. Aspects of the orange revolution. The content and Dynamics of the Ukrainian Presidential Elections, 2007 p. 222 7 Donald Trump: Ukraine Crisis Is Problem of Europe, Not US / Sputnik, 17.08.2015. Accessed at: http://sputni- knews.com/us/20150817/1025818360.html 8 Trump says Germany should deal with Russian invasion of Ukraine / UA Today. 15.08.2015. Accessed at: http:// uatoday.tv/politics/trump-says-germany-should-deal-with-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-475633.html 9 Trump: NATO Is Obsolete and Expensive, “Doesn’t Have The Right Countries In It For Terrorism” / RealClearPol- itics.com. 27.03.2016. Accessed at: http://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2016/03/27/trump_europe_is_not_ safe_lots_of_the_free_world_has_become_weak.html 10 at: http://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-goes-his-own-way-with-vladimir-putin-1463172396 Damian Paletta. Donald Trump Goes His Own Way With Vladimir Putin / Wall Street Journal. 13.05.2016. Accessed
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 19 expenses, and what might be a formula to state of New York, the Secretary of State getmean to this by “gettingoutcome. along fine” and at what HillaryA former Rodham first lady, Clinton a senator and a fromsenator the from Vermont Bernard Sanders quickly There is no way to predict what D. Trump established themselves as the only real will do if elected president. This is the candidates for the nomination within their scariest thing about him, in fact. He has party. Originally, it looked like H. Clinton would have the nomination “signed, sealed and delivered” for her, but then the “ghosts” justbeen one constantly short interview. flip-flopping, He is changing “tabula of 2008 re-emerged in this year’s campaign. his positions on the fly, often within Back then, of course, her nomination was foreign policy. Normally, there is a solid torpedoed by the current president B. amountrasa”, specificallyof continuity when between it comessuccessive to Obama. This time, even though B. Sanders administrations. For example, despite the appeared as a formidable contender, it expectations of “Obama revolution” in the became clear, in a due time, that H. Clinton foreign policy back in 2008, nothing of is going to weather the storm and steer herself to an eventual nomination. As for is no way of knowing. One might have B. Sanders, the foreign policy domain does not register among his strong feats and his placedthe sort some took hopes place. Withon him D. Trump,assembling there a very few crossovers into this sphere only respectable team, the one that would offset proved this. Now that H. Clinton emerged his lack of knowledge and ill temperament, as the nominee from her party all eyes are but so far, he is being avoided by each and naturally directed at her. weight within his own party. Things might There is no shortage of public statements changeevery seasoned eventually or experiencedwith a Republican figure of by H. Clinton on the subject of the crisis over establishment very reluctantly and slowly Ukraine. There is no ambiguity about her embracing D. Trump as their candidate. view: she is a consistent critic of V. Putin’s actions vis-à-vis Ukraine and a proponent of Democratic Party strong American support for Ukraine11. The political arena anywhere could sometimes As for the Democrats, their formal position be a place for opportunism, situational is actually presented by Barack Obama as a sitting president and a leader of the party. He no exception. However, there is no reason speaks in the name of all Democrats and any tostands believe and that flip-flopping, H. Clinton’s of public course. stand U.S. on is other members of the party are not going to the crisis over Ukraine is any different from undermine his position unless something her actual inclinations or internal views of really extraordinary happens. However, her campaign. In other words, there is no apparently, B. Obama is a lame duck already ground to question her sincerity. not standing on the ballot this year. This means, as we continue to monitor statements Now, much was made of the “reset” and moves of the current administration, policies that B. Obama administration that all eyes in terms of the prospects are on the Democratic presidential hopefuls. term. H. Clinton, of course, was a public entertained towards Russia in its first
11
Ben Schreckinger. Clinton urges more financial, military aid to Ukraine / Politico. 21.01.2015. Accessed at: http:// www.politico.com/story/2015/01/hillary-clinton-ukraine-aid-military-financial-114462 20 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 face of “reset” as then the Secretary of negativism came to dominate the U.S.- State. The architects of “reset” are now Russian relations. The administration of often blamed (with a reason, in our view) B. Obama came up with a series of strong for misreading Moscow, sending wrong moves to challenge V. Putin’s aggression signals to the Russian counterparts, and support Ukraine. It seems that there is displaying some degree of weakness12. not much difference in how B. Obama and However, as far as it can be discerned, H. H. Clinton see the crisis over Ukraine. She is Clinton was never among those architects more prone to more vocal denouncements and, most probably, simply felt that she needs to implement this idea since it was of her calibre to compare him to “Hitler”13, forof V. instance.Putin, being (However, one of the then, first politiciansagain, B. Obama is a current president and she is on When it comes to the crisis campaign trail, so hence the difference in over Ukraine there could be a rhetoric. Also, B. Obama was always very «multiple choice of how you see careful in choosing words for his public it from the U.S.: as a direct threat statements, so no surprises.) to the U.S. interests, as an indirect threat to the U.S. interests and as a non-threat. D. Trump fluctuates H. Clinton does not offer any additional between options two and three actionsWhen it comesto what to theB. essenceObama of has the policies,already put in place. She might appear as more sympathetic to the idea of sending lethal decided so by the president and his inner weapons to Ukraine, but there could be no
meaningful tests of her loyalty. The foreign if elected. She tends to lean towards a more policycircle. of This this being, administration in fact, one was of never, the first in “hawkish”confidence factionthat she of wouldthe Democratic actually do Party this fact, driven by the Department of State. than the president. At several occasions she There is no credible information, either, was close to appear as critical of B. Obama’s about her being critical of “reset” or being inherent caution, particularly when reluctant in implementing it either, as this uttering that “not doing stupid stuff” hardly administration is quite non-transparent, 14. She and B. Obama is still a sitting president has distanced herself from that saying since, of H. Clinton’s party, so understandably willingqualifies to as show a foreign her respectpolicy doctrine to the sitting we are not hearing any evidence of her president. In any case, that statement had disagreeing with him on the issue. nothing to do with the crisis over Ukraine and was aimed, primarily, at the president’s Even previously to the Russian aggression policy in the wider Middle East. against Ukraine, “reset” planners had admitted that it did not work. After a short So, we might predict with a certain interim period since “reset” was gone, the
confidence that H. Clinton’s policy, if she is
12 opinion/op-ed/hc-op-wire-krauthammer-putin-exploits-obama-weakness-0828-20150827-story.html 13 Putin Exploits Obama’s Weak Responses / Hartford Courant. 28.08.2015. Accessed at: http://www.courant.com/ at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2014/03/05/hillary-clinton-says-putins-action- are-like-what-hitler-did-back-in-the-30sHillary Clinton says Putin’s action are like / what Hitler did back in the 30’s / Washington Post. 05.03.2014. Accessed 14 Caitlin Macneal. Clinton Knocks Obama’s ‘Don’t Do Stupid Stuff’ Foreign Policy Approach / Talking Points Memo. 10.08.2014. Accessed at: http://talkingpointsmemo.com/livewire/hillary-clinton-obama-foreign-policy
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 21 elected the next president, will be natural that she is not going to entertain the easing continuation of the current policy of the of that pressure until Russia complies with B. Obama administration. There might demands of the international community be some shifts in details, but no major and alters its aggression on Ukraine. changes. She might come up with some new initiatives, but not of the scale that would be in position to dramatically alter Volodymyr Dubovyk has been working at the Odessa Moscow’s course of action. This, perhaps, I. Mechnikov National University since 1992. He is an runs contrary to some unreasonably high Associate Professor at the Department of International and, in our view, unrealistic expectations Relations since 1996 and has acted as a Director of the in Ukraine about her being ready to employ Center for International Studies since 1999. Among his some radical new methods of challenging teaching and research interests are U.S. foreign policy, V. Putin. Our best hope would be for H. U.S. − Ukraine relations, Black Sea regional security, Clinton to sustain the pressure on Russia at foreign policy of Ukraine. Dr. Dubovyk is a Fulbright its current level, not to substantially elevate Scholar 2016/2017. that pressure. At the same time, we believe
22 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 UKRAINE AND TURKEY IN A NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: BRINGING CREDIBILITY TO STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP Dr. Yevgeniya Gaber Embassy of Ukraine in the Republic of Turkey
Obviously, in the last couple of years the difficulties of making the way through the regional turmoil and facing new challenges brought about a completely new background with the embedded unique opportunities for further deepening of strategic partnership between Ukraine and Turkey. The question is, however, whether the intensification of bilateral cooperation is a temporary phenomenon that will end up in nothing, once the Russian threat ceases to exist, or this is a tendency that will reveal itself even more as the countries explore the momentum of crisis to create a new, solid basis for their future relations.
Introduction Ukraine’s foreign policy agenda or moved to the top of the headlines in its media Since the establishment of strategic outlets, and vice versa. There has also been partnership between Ukraine and Turkey this traditional and deep-rooted conviction back in 2011, both countries have gone a in the expert circles that two countries long way in their efforts to implement an have failed to overcome limitations in the decision-making processes and to make years ago. Some of the goals, like introducing the best use of the existing opportunities, theambitious visa free bilateral regime agenda and declared creating five a often referring to these relations as “having mechanism of the High-Level Strategic high potential but low voltage”1. Some Council for regular political consultations between the Heads of the State, have been successfully realised. Others, such staying entrapped in the bipolar narrative analytics tended to blame official Kyiv for as reaching 10 billion dollars of bilateral trade turnover and signing the Free Trade leaving the Southern vector without of its East-or-West2 foreign policy dilemma, Agreement (FTA) are yet to be achieved. proper attention . The others pointed out the “Russian constant” in the Turkish- However, for some reason, until very recently, Turkey has rarely dominated impact on its results.3 Ukrainian equation that had a significant
1 usak.org.tr/tr/usak-analizleri/avrupa-birligi/turkiye-ukrayna-iliskileri-yuksek-potansiyel-dusuk-voltaj 2 Habibe Özdal. Türkiye-Ukrayna İlişkileri: Yüksek Potansiyel, Düşük Voltaj / USAK, 24 January 2011 // http://www. http://www.eurointegration.com.ua/rus/articles/2016/04/13/7047681/ 3 Марина Воротнюк. Украина и Турция – (не)случайное партнерство / Украинская правда, 13 апреля 2016 //
Владимир Кравченко. Украина – Турция: союз «ситуативный», а не стратегический / Зеркало недели, 11 марта 2016 г. // http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/ukraina-turciya-soyuz-situativnyy-a-ne-strategicheskiy-_.html UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 23 The situation has dramatically changed with the Russian illegal annexation of the admits only a strict and accurate language Crimea, military aggression in the Eastern dialogue, the field of economic relations Ukraine and, most recently, the incident partner is Turkey, a country that has made with a downing of a Russian jet on the of figures. This is especially the case if your Turkish-Syrian border. Only within the foreign policy strategy. economic pragmatism as a part of its official Ukraine Petro Poroshenko visited Turkey A general overview of the Ukrainian- twice,first five with months other high-levelof 2016, the visits President including of Turkish economic cooperation over the last 8 years brings about a rather dull picture
Ukraine and Turkey have been and the economic stagnation Ukraine has in close cooperation within the experienced– due to the ever 2008 since, global the financialtrade turnover crisis «framework of the multilateral between the countries has shown more international organisations, negative than positive dynamics with a slight spending joint efforts for the de- sign of recovery in late 2015. This makes occupation of the Crimea, protecting the expectations of reaching 20 bln USD of rights of the Ukrainian citizens, trade by 2020 a way too optimistic, if not an including Crimean Tatars unrealistic goal. However, market conditions
about tendencies. And herein one can see a Turkey’s Prime-Minister, Minister of muchare not more only favourable about figures, conjuncture. they are also Defence, Minister of Culture and Tourism, Head of the Council of Higher Education On one hand, a lot of small and middle- and numerous economic and military sized Turkish enterprises slowed down Turkish delegations visiting Ukraine on their activities or had to leave the Ukrainian different occasions, as well as regular visits market in the last 2 years due to the economic crisis and the loss of considerable parts of territories with well-developed industrial Apparently,of the Ukrainian today’s top officials bilateral to Turkey. political and touristic infrastructure. On the other, dialogue between two countries has reached an unprecedented level. At the same time, Ukraine and Turkey have by big companies and large corporations, small firms have been gradually replaced been in close cooperation within the framework of the multilateral international the unstable crisis-prone environment. As a which were much better fitted to working in organisations, spending joint efforts for the result, the number of Turkish companies de-occupation of the Crimea, protecting involved in doing business in Ukraine has rights of the Ukrainian citizens, including decreased, however, Turkish investments Crimean Tatars, in the occupied territories to Ukrainian economy have acquired a more sustainable, well-institutionalized in Donbas region of Ukraine. structure. The spheres, in which the Turkish and implementing the cease-fire agreement companies are most active in Ukraine now, Boosting Economic Cooperation: have also undergone considerable changes. Turning Challenges into Opportunities Contrary to the traditional focus on textile industry and retail sales, today they include Economy is the best litmus test to determine such strategic sectors as construction, a real state of affairs in any bilateral relations. telecommunication, aviation, defence and airspace technologies, IT, engineering, visits can create an illusion of active political logistics, energy, transportation etc. While heated discussions and high-level
24 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 investments to the Ukrainian economy has was won by a Turkish company “Turkcell”, reached two bln USD.6 whichThe first is nowlot for one 3G of mobile the three license biggest in Ukraine mobile operators in the country. This victory of a Turkish company in the state tender has not Ukraine and sanctions against Turkey, the only resulted in more than 3 billion UAH of With the Russian aggression against Turkish investments to Ukrainian economy, inability to preserve economic ties with the but was referred by Turkcell management traditionalongoing military partners conflicts like Libya in the orMiddle Syria East, and as a “sign of deep trust and high importance losing their major foreign markets in the attached to Ukraine” by Turkish investors.4 region, both countries have started searching for the new alternative ways to reinvigorate by the Ukrainian President P.Poroshenko in economy and trade. In this respect, there hisWith welcome a new waveaddress of privatizationto the leading declared Turkish is much room left for boosting Ukrainian- Turkish cooperation. The economies Turkey on 9-10 March 2016, Turkish of both countries are, to a big extent, companiesbusinessmen have during recently his officialbeen exploring visit to complementary to each other and create a new opportunities provided by the future privatization of seaports, coalmines joint projects. Turkey’s successful structural and other strategically important state perfect background for mutually beneficial enterprises in Ukraine. that have ensured country’s quick economic reforms in economic and financial spheres At the moment, Ukraine’s biggest stadium, the international terminal of the Boryspil The economies of both Airport, hundreds of kilometres of highways, countries are, to a big extent, a number of high-tech business centres «complementary to each other and create a perfect background for have been built by Turkish construction mutually beneficial joint projects companies.and five-star Most hotels recently, all overa leading the countryTurkish constructor “Onur Insaat” has successfully presented to the Kyiv Mayor V.Klichko the growth in early 2000’s and its unique completed restoration works in the city’s experience of creating organized industrial central Taras Shevchenko boulevard5 while zones are thoroughly examined in Ukraine. another Turkish company “Limak“ has On the other hand, the increasing number of won a tender for building metro in Dnepr Ukrainian-Turkish business associations and bilateral industrial, business and investment construction of the country’s biggest wind forums proves that Ukrainian market powercity and station. “Güriş Enerji” has already started is placed high among Turkey’s foreign economy priorities, considerably revised According to some experts’ estimations, after Moscow’s offensives. Turkish contractors have so far completed In the light of the recent developments bln USD while the amount of direct Turkish with Russia, both countries seek closer projects in Ukraine totalling more than five
4 turkcell.com.tr/turkcellden-3g-yatirimiyla-turkiye-–-ukrayna-stratejik-isbirligine-buyuk-katki-bulten_7538.html 5 Turkcell’den 3G Yatırımıyla Türkiye – Ukrayna Stratejik İşbirliğine Büyük Katkı, 21 March 2015 // http://medya. ukrturk.net/taras-sevcenko-bulvarinda-insaat-tamamlandi-turk-sirketine-klitcikodan-ozel-tesekkur/ 6 Taras Şevçenko Bulvarı’nda inşaat tamamlandı, Türk şirketine Klitçko’dan özel teşekkür, 6 June 2016 // http://- livan.org/4861/ukraynada-pazara-girmek-icin-dogru-zaman-burak-pehlivan-para-dergisi-roportaji/ Burak Pehlivan. Ukrayna’da pazara girmek için doğru zaman / Para Dergisi, 25 Mayıs 2016 // http://burakpeh
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 25 cooperation with Europe. On January 1, tariff regime for the agricultural goods in 2016, Ukraine’s Deep and Comprehensive bilateral trade), this time Kyiv and Ankara Free Trade Zone with the EU entered into full force. At the same time, Ankara has proceed with the agreement. recently been involved in the negotiation seem to have firm will and determination to process with Brussels to revise and expand Diversification of Energy Partners as a the scope of the Turkey-EU Customs Key to National Security Union that has not seen any changes since mid-1990’s and hardly corresponds to The collapse in bilateral relations with the demands of the day. According to the the Russian Federation has unfolded Turkish then-Minister of Economy Mustafa existing imbalance in Ankara’s traditional relations with Moscow and the high level complete the revision of the Customs Union of dependency on Russia in almost all AgreementElitaş’s statements, with the EU Turkey by the isend going of 2017 to by including ten new sectors, such as energy, in energy resources and energy suppliers tourism, communication, contracting hadstrategic for spheres.a long time The lackbeen of diversificationRussia’s most business, agricultural products, service valuable leverage in dealing with both trade, public purchases, environment, taxes and transportation within the dependency on Russian gas had enabled framework of the revised deal.7 Though Moscowofficial Kyiv to andapply Ankara. politically The heavy motivated energy in a short-term perspective the problems approach to forming its price policies and of transitional period will likely bring about some complaints, in a more distant future developing cooperation within the andsignificantly gas markets. limited Energy countries’ blackmailing abilities has to European legislative framework can prove traditionallybenefit from theremained positive one trends of the on Kremlin’s global oil major tools in shaping its foreign policy
ofbeneficial national in termseconomies, of opening transferring new horizons to Russia waged against Ukraine in winter of modernfor collaboration, technologies, increasing improving the efficiency the 2005/2006.towards Ukraine The sincesame thepattern first “gaswas war”later competitive ability of national products. used in relation to Turkey when a Russian monopolist Gazprom rejected a request In this context, the negotiations on the Free from the Turkish state-owned company Trade Agreement between Ukraine and Turkey have been restarted after a long during 2008/2009 and 2011/2012 winter interval. The 10th meeting of the Turkey- seasons.Botaş to supply additional volumes of gas Ukraine Intergovernmental Trade and Economic Cooperation that took place in Paying a high price for these lessons, Kyiv in May 2016 gave a new impetus to this both countries realized too well that process8. However, there are still serious transportation routes is a key factor to their mutually acceptable compromise on the energydiversification and, on ofa broader energy scale, sources national and problems to be resolved (first of all, reaching
7 2016 // http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-moves-to-expand-customs-union-with-eu.aspx?Page- ID=238&NID=93670&NewsCatID=345Erdinç Çelikkan. Turkey Moves to Expand Customs Union with the EU / Hürriyet Daily News, 11 January 8 - iskilere-yeni-boyut-kazandiracak/571952Ali Cura. Milli Savunma Bakanı Yılmaz: Anlaşma İki Ülke Arasındaki İlişkilere Yeni Boyut Kazandıracak / Anadolu Ajansı, 13 May 2016 // http://aa.com.tr/tr/politika/milli-savunma-bakani-yilmaz-anlasma-iki-ulke-arasindaki-il
26 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 security. Ukraine has solved this problem gas in Ukraine. This will not only help by steep decrease of gas consumption decrease Ankara’s dependency on Moscow and gradual substitution of Russian gas by the European supplies. Since January conjuncture on the energy market, allowing 1, 2016, Ukraine has not received a single Turkeybut also tocreate sell aits more gas profitablereserves to economic Europe cubic meter of gas from Russia. After the when market conditions are favourable, or recent crisis in relations with Moscow, to use them for domestic consumption once Ankara has also started its own search for or if the situation changes for the worse.11 alternative energy sources and suppliers. In this situation, with any single supplier In February 2016, Turkish Energy and deprived of a possibility to use gas blackmail Natural Resources Minister Berat Albayrak as an instrument of political pressure or announced an updated “road map” for intimidation, both Kyiv and Ankara, as well the energy sector, which is based on the as the other players on the energy market, concepts of “security of supply, alternative energy resources, resource variety, new economic, instead of geostrategic, increasing storage capacities”. According to frameworkwould gain for significant energy cooperation. benefits from this Albayrak, dependency on a single country must be dropped to at most 50 percent by Science, Technology and Industry: Three the end of 2019.9 One of the key problems Pillars of Long-Term Cooperation for Turkey’s energy security now is the
Despite Ankara’s plans to build new storage plants projects and Turkey’s joining a capacitieslack of sufficient in central gas Turkey, storage they facilities. are too globalWith the community realization of of“nuclear the nuclear states”, power the small to cope with its needs. national energy strategy will get yet another
Considering this background, Ukraine has constructed in Turkey will be exploited on recently come up with an offer to provide areading. build-own-operate Though the model, first Ankara NPP’s is to well be storage facilities, for Turkey’s use. At the educational opportunities for preparing its moment,its own gas the infrastructure, capacities of firstthe gasof all, storages its gas aware of the necessity to create sufficient Sending Turkish students abroad can be approximately 33-34 bcm. At least half of aown good high-qualified solution for specialiststhe moment, in thebut field.it is themin the can Western be provided Ukraine for areTurkey’s estimated needs 10 as. important to be sure that similar nuclear Though the use of Ukrainian facilities for research institutions are formed on the storing Russian gas now seems problematic basis of Turkish universities in the future. from the legal point of view and would So far, the only foreign University that has the TANAP pipeline is put into exploitation Moscow Engineering Physics Institute Ankaradefinitely can arouse easily Moscow’s arrange protests, storing once (MEPhI)been defined with for300 these undergraduate purposes wasTurkish the Azerbaijani (and, potentially, Turkmen) students enrolled under the provisions of
9 Minimizing Dependency Priority, Says Turkish Energy Minister / Daily Sabah, 09 February 2016 // http://www. dailysabah.com/money/2016/02/10/minimizing-dependency-priority-says-turkish-energy-minister-1455047251 10 - nergyterminal.com/news.php?newsid=8349240 11 InterviewMurat Temizer. of Ukrainian Ukraine Envoy Offers to Gas Ankara Storage Sergiy Facilities Korsunsky for Turkey’s for Anadolu Use / Agency,Anadolu 17 Ajansı, May 201616 May // 2016http://turkey.mfa. // http://aae gov.ua/en/embassy/ambassador/interviews/4525-intervju-posla-ukrajini-v-turechchini-sergija-korsunsyko- go-stosovno-spivrobitnictva-mizh-ukrajinoju-ta-turechchinoju-u-sferi-jenergetiki-informacijne-agenstvo-anado- lu-ukraine-offers-gas-storage-facilties-for-turkeys-use
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 27 the Akkuyu NPP contract. However, it is providing grants and scholarships for not clear if the education will be endured students on bilateral basis, etc.14 At the after the quick deterioration of bilateral moment, there are ongoing negotiations relations and Rosatom management’s plans on the issue with Kyiv, Odesa and Lviv to sell 49% of its shares in the Akkuyu Joint Polytechnics, Kyiv T.Shevchenko University, Stock Company12. National Aviation University and a number of others. Long before that, Ukraine had come up with a suggestion to provide education for This agreement comes at a time when two Turkish students in Ukrainian universities and to share its experience in such spheres decision to engage in joint cooperation on as creating regulatory environment, aviationcountries and have space officially technologies. announced According their elaborating safety and security measures, to the provisions of the agreement signed introducing early warning and crisis during the recent visit of the Turkish then- 13 management mechanisms, etc. The Minister of National Defence Ismet Yilmaz unique experience of dealing with the to Ukraine in May 2016, Turkey will work consequences of the Chernobyl tragedy to produce a TAN-158 model passenger and operating 15 Russian reactors at four plane and a cargo plane based on respective models of the Ukrainian aircraft interest of the Turkish side. After a long manufacturing company Antonov.15 The intervaldifferent in NPP’s bilateral have contacts, roused the significant Head of projects of regional jet construction and the Turkish Council for Higher Education aircraft engine manufacturing in aviation Prof. Y.Sarac has recently visited Kyiv to discuss in details the opportunities for go parallel with cooperation in other areas collaboration in the sphere of education, of defence industry. Ukraine possesses including nuclear technologies. unique technologies in construction of tanks and armoured personnel carriers, So far, the sides have agreed to sign a some of which have been acknowledged Memorandum of understanding that would as the best national army technology create a framework for further cooperation projects. Apart from this, Ukraine has started negotiations on the possibilities such strategically important and mutually of cooperation with Turkey regarding in education and scientific research in modernizing Ukrainian armoured aviation and space technologies. These vehicles, particularly equipping them with willbeneficial include areas,staff and as students’ nuclear exchange energy, the electron-optical devices produced programs, issuing double diplomas by by the leading Turkish defence company partner Ukrainian and Turkish universities, “Aselsan”.16
12 Russian Company Puts 49% of Turkey’s First Nuclear Plant on Sale / Hurriyet Daily News, 27 April 2016 // http://
aspx?pageID=238&nID=98394&NewsCatID=348 13 www.hurriyetdailynews.com/russian-company-puts-49-percent-of-turkeys-first-nuclear-plant-on-sale-report.
14 Sultan Çoğalan. Ukrayna’dan Türkiye’ye nükleer enerji için işbirliği teklifi. Anadolu Ajansı, 9 February, 2016 // tr/web/guest/yok-baskani-sarac-in-ukrayna-temaslarihttp://aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/ukraynadan-turkiyeye-nukleer-enerji-icin-isbirligi-teklifi/518399 15 TurkeyYÖK’ten and Ukrayna Ukraine ile SignNükleer Joint ve Plane Uçak Manufacturing / Uzay Teknolojileri Project Alanlarında // Daily Sabah, İşbirliği. May – 15, 24 2016.May 2016 http://www.dailysabah. http://www.yok.gov. com/money/2016/05/16/turkey-and-ukraine-sign-joint-plane-manufacturing-project# 16 Birol Tekince. Ukraine and Turkey: Strategic Relations, Plenty of Cooperation Opportunities // MSI Turkey Defence Review, January 2016.
28 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 Taking into consideration the technological bilateral and multilateral military and naval and intellectual potential, as well as long exercises, like the Black Sea Harmony, Sea and successful story of the Ukrainian Breeze, Sea Shield, BLACKSEAFOR and space and defence industry enterprises’ PASSEX, to name just a few. However, when participation in the international projects, the existing regional organizations turned Ukraine has a potential to become one of the most important partners of Turkey of the “hybrid” wars of the XXI century, in the aerospace. Both countries regard whichout to require be inefficient quick underreaction, the operational conditions high-tech spheres of space rocket industry decision-making process, Ukraine and andscientific military-industrial and technical complex cooperation as crucial in the Turkeymobility have and similarly considerable adopted flexibilitya new vision in for further development of their strategic of the security arrangements in the Black partnership, with the prospects to jointly sea basin. In fact, the new security threats enter the global market with a full cycle and increased militarization of the region in of space-related services starting with the aftermath of Russia’s illegal annexation design and construction of satellites and of the Crimea and its intervention in Syria other aerospace equipment and up to their have revealed considerable breaches in the launch into orbit.
To be precise, cooperation of Ankara and Particularly, since last year Kyiv in defence sector is not something new. Ukraine and Turkey have However, it is only now that these sporadic «remarkably intensified contacts have been complemented by the their naval partnership endeavours to build a strategic industrial alliance that would include joint projects across a variety of military, technological national security strategies of both Ukraine and defence areas. and Turkey. However, in a curious way, these developments have brought about a growing Military and Security Cooperation: awareness of their own strengths and, for Working for Peace, Preparing for War focus on bilateral forms of cooperation as a A sweeping deterioration of the regional centralthe first part time of ever,a new made security Ankara architecture and Kyiv security environment and return of emerging in the Black sea region. the “hard” power instruments back on the agenda have paved the way to a During his recent visit to Turkey in January breakthrough in a military cooperation 2016, Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Pavlo between the countries. Since mid-1990’s, Klimkin stressed in the interview for the Ukraine and Turkey have been working local newspaper that Ukraine is open to within the framework of multilateral military cooperation with Turkey in the mechanisms called to strengthen security Black Sea and “any kind of security and measures and contribute to stability in defence cooperation between Kyiv and the Black Sea region. Over the years both Ankara is possible”.17 The Turkish side countries have been jointly participating seems more than happy to welcome such in international peacekeeping operations, rapprochement. Experts pay attention that
17 // http://www.dailysabah.com/diplomacy/2016/02/01/ukraine-open-to-military-cooperation-with-turkey-in- black-sea-ukrainian-fm-saysYusuf Selman İnanç. Ukraine Open to Military Cooperation with Turkey in Black Sea / Daily Sabah, 31 January 2016
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 29 Moscow’s repeated violations of Turkish year in favour of “continuous rotational” airspace, countries’ divergent positions presence in the Black Sea basin instead in Syria campaign, Turkish shoot-down of of establishing new bases in the Eastern Russian jet, and the Kremlin’s economic Europe21, the Alliance’s enhanced role in sanctions and threats of retaliation have the region is regarded as a key to effective not only spoiled its relations with Ankara, Russia’s deterrence and long-term regional but also contributed to deepening security stability. Ukraine has repeatedly voiced cooperation of Turkey with Georgia and, its readiness to contribute to all kinds of especially, Ukraine.18 possible naval exercises, joint trainings, maritime patrol and humanitarian Particularly, since last year Ukraine and operations that might be carried out in the Black Sea within the NATO framework naval partnership. In March 2016, during theTurkey Ukrainian have remarkably President intensifiedP.Poroshenko’s their partners in this regard. and has got a firm support of its Turkish Sagaidachniy” frigate and “Balta” vessel Romania has recently come up with a new launchedofficial visit joint to navalTurkey, exercise Ukrainian with “Hetmana couple initiative to increase NATO’s presence of Turkish ships in the Sea of Marmara after in the Black Sea basin by creating a
accept onboard Turkish humanitarian aid Russia’s increasing military involvement forthey the had Ukrainian visited army. naval19 base in Gölcük to inpermanent the region alliance22. The fleet general in order problem to counter with this initiative is the restrictions of the Less than a month later, Turkey’s “Salih 1936 Montreux Convention, prohibiting Reis” frigate and “Bartin” corvette vessels warships of countries not littoral to the were reported to practice with Ukrainian Black Sea from spending more than 21 Navy tactical manoeuvring, cargo transfer days at a time there. To solve the issue, the and signal communication at an exercise course in the Black Sea, following a visit by the Black Sea littoral countries, namely Bulgaria,regular flotilla Romania might and include Turkey ships whereas from of Odessa. Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence other NATO members’ vessels might stay commentedTurkish naval the officials drill as to “another Ukraine’s step port in citythe in the Black Sea basin on a rotating basis. During his recent visit to Romania in April two countries, which aims to strengthen 2016, President P.Poroshenko stressed stabilitydeepening and of securitycooperation in the of region”.the fleets20 of the that under the conditions of the lasting Russian aggression Ukraine, though not At the same time, though NATO Defence a NATO member, is willing to join the Ministers have already decided earlier this
flotilla in case such a decision is approved
18 John Herbst. Estranged From Russia, Turkey and Ukraine Join Forces / Newsweek, 15 April 2016 // http://europe. newsweek.com/estranged-russia-turkey-and-ukraine-join-forces-447473 19 V Odessu posle uspeshnogo vipolneniya zadach u beregov Turtsii vernulsya otryad korabley VMS Ukraini / UNIAN, 13 March 2016 // http://www.unian.net/society/1288560-v-odessu-posle-uspeshnogo-vyipolneniya-zad- ach-u-beregov-turtsii-vernulsya-otryad-korabley-vms-ukrainyi-fotoreportaj.html 20 Damien Sharkov. Ukraine and Turkey Launch Black Sea Naval Drill Amid Russia Tensions / Newsweek, 7 April 2016 // http://europe.newsweek.com/ukraine-and-turkey-launch-black-sea-naval-drill-amidst-russia-tensions-444882 21 Andrew Rettman. U.S. and Germany Say Poland ‘No’ on NATO Base / Euobserver, 16 April 2016 // https://euob- server.com/foreign/133084 22 Joshua Kucera. Romania Pushing for Permanent NATO Presence in Black Sea / Eurasia.net, 17 January 2016 // http://www.eurasianet.org/node/76866
30 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 by the Alliance.23 If this happens, NATO’s the dominance of the military and defence framework might become an additional issues in bilateral relations. However, it is platform for deepening Ukrainian-Turkish important to remember that winning over naval cooperation and exerting joint efforts the hearts of Turkish people should become to restore peace and stability in the Black a key consideration for any state that Sea region. wants to achieve a durable and sustainable partnership with Turkey. Generally true On a larger scale, the General Staffs of the for all countries, this is especially the case Ukrainian and Turkish Armed Forces have when the Ankara’s approach to establishing recently signed a “road map” for military foreign partnerships is concerned – it is not cooperation that envisages direction and only about making a “strategic” choice, but scope of military cooperation between two countries until 2020, a year, which has been “trustworthy” partners with a clear and set as a deadline for the wide-scale reform transparentrather about set preferring of values and “confident” goals. That and is process in the Ukrainian Army. Among other why public diplomacy, close interpersonal things, it focuses on strategic planning, ties, humanitarian cooperation and military education and training of troops, consultative and advisory assistance, such spheres as culture, education and cooperation between the respective tourismpopularization play an ofimportant a country’s role in profile creating in branches of the Armed Forces, information favourable atmosphere that enables the sharing, etc.24 In fact, this document is a development of other, strategic dimensions detailed implementation plan of practical of bilateral relations. measures on military cooperation, aimed both at strengthening bilateral ties and In the current situation, when the recent getting Turkish support in preparing crisis in relations with Russia has shattered Ukrainian Army in accordance with NATO Turkish-Russian relations and the general standards. Interestingly, the experience aggravation of the security environment of military and technical collaboration in the region has led to a substantial between Ukraine and Turkey has become downfall in Ankara’s overall trade and one of the most vivid examples of how the tourism turnover, ironically Ukraine and countries can turn security threats existing Turkey have got unique opportunities to in their regional environment into major boost their touristic ties and transform opportunities for speeding up the pace of their traditional security-focused strategic bilateral cooperation, with the results that agenda into a more balanced intersocietal are likely to have impacts for the whole dialogue. The positive images of the region. countries in the nations’ public opinion and the absence of unresolved problems or Recreating Missing Parts of the Picture, historical burden of deep-rooted hostilities or Why Humanitarian Dimension in bilateral relations have created a Matters solid basis for close social ties while the introduction of the visa free regime in 2012 The return of security concerns to the top has facilitated mutual travel and tourism. Most recently, a principal agreement has of the regional agenda naturally predefines
23 Ukraine and Romania Stand for Establishment of Flotilla under NATO Auspices to Enhance Security in Black Sea Region. April 21, 2016 // http://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/ukrayina-ta-rumuniya-vistupayut-za-stvorenn-
24 Ukraine and Turkey Ink Military Cooperation Road Map, 17 May 2016 // http://24today.net/open/663932 ya-flotiliyi-pid-37013
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 31 been reached to increase the term of an are likely to preserve sustainability in the uninterrupted stay for Ukrainians in Turkey future, creating solid social and economic and Turks in Ukraine up to 90 days25. basis for the implementation of agreements Despite the overall negative dynamics in reached on a high political level. regional tourism, the amount of Ukrainian tourists visiting Turkey has shown a 57% Concluding Remarks
As the long international practice of strategic andincrease presumably in the firsthigh fivelevel months of terror of threats 2016. partnerships has proved, a key to successful haveWhile made the Turkey unstable one regional of the least environment desirable and effective bilateral cooperation is not touristic destinations for Israeli, German, in inventing new partnership models but British and other European tourists and the number of Russian tourists has plunged with real content. The non-conventional more than 96% after the jet crisis26, threatsrather of in the filling modern the “hybrid” existing warfare frameworks have Ukrainians, much less sensitive to potential revealed new unexplored opportunities security threats, have chosen Turkey as to bring more credibility and tangibility their favourite touristic destination after to the traditional Ukrainian-Turkish the Russian occupation of the Crimea. strategic partnership and paved way for
During his recent visit to Kyiv in March In today’s regional turmoil, shared security 2016, Turkish Minister of Tourism and concernsthe diversification create a of common bilateral cooperation.footing that Culture Mahir Unal said Ankara was expecting a record number of about 1 attention paid to the current strategic mln of Ukrainian tourists this year.27 environmentkeeps the partners and immediate together. steps With taken much The goal seems quite achievable. At the to mitigate the direct impacts of Russian moment, Turkey is the number one foreign aggressive policies in the Black Sea region, destination for Ukrainians with its national deepening strategic partnership between Ukraine and Turkey possesses necessary the biggest foreign airline company in political, military and diplomatic potential Ukraineflag carrier, (Ukraine Turkish Airlinesrates second (THY), beingafter to become a cornerstone of the new regional security structure. served by THY outside Turkey). Together withGermany the other with theairlines, largest there number are now of flights more Of course, there is still a long way to go. A way, which is neither straight nor simple, seven different cities of Ukraine28. During and hides its own risks and obstacles. thanthe summer 100 regular season, flights this number from Istanbul becomes to The asymmetry of bilateral trade balance and a righteous desire to protect the most Antalya, Dalaman and other touristic sensitive sectors of national economies from destinationseven higher in with Turkey. the charterThese flightsdynamics to strong foreign competition cause serious
25
26 NumberTürkiye ile of UkraynaRussian Tourists vizesiz kalış Visiting süresini Antalya 90 günePlunges çıkarıyor 96 Percent / NTV, / Hürriyet23 May 2016 Daily // News, http://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/ 07 June 2016 // http:// www.hurriyetdailynews.com/number-of-russian-tourists-visiting-antalya-plunges-96-percent-.aspx?pageturkiye-ile-ukrayna-vizesiz-kalis-suresini-90-gune-cikariyor,nyVESX4xx0m7nI0muBmW6w?_ref=infinite - ID=517&nID=100183&NewsCatID=349 27 Turkey Eyes One Million Tourists From Ukraine / Anadolu Agency, 30 March 2016 // http://aa.com.tr/en/turkey/ turkey-eyes-one-million-tourists-from-ukraine-/546564 28 - lar-en-cok-turkiye-ye-ucuyor/141974/ Ukraynalılar En Çok Türkiye’ye Uçuyor / QHA, 13 Ocak 2016 // http://qha.com.ua/tr/turizm/ukraynali
32 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 military exercises, exchanging information of goods that should be eligible to the free and experience in countering terrorism, tradecontradictions regime and regarding complicate the signing classification of the and signing the free trade agreement and Agreement. In the military and defence memorandum in the educational sphere. spheres, positions of the third parties Though this cooperation has obviously got still have a considerable impact on the a new strong impetus for development regional state of play and the countries after both countries’ relations with Russia will, obviously, face a strong opposition of experienced a serious blow, it would be major stakeholders that will counter the wrong to regard it as a reactive measure emergence of a new strategic alliance in to the Russian policies in the region. the Black Sea region, which includes three The projects recently launched between NATO countries, Ukraine and potentially Ukraine and Turkey are aimed at a long- – Georgia and Azerbaijan. Finally, the term perspective and are unlikely to developments of domestic political agenda cease to exist with the occasional changes create additional risks of destabilization the current crisis has become a trigger inand the strong countries influence and ofmake the externalthem focus forces on forin therapid international development conjuncture. of the Ukrainian- While resolving their internal problems, often Turkish strategic cooperation in new at the expense of boosting partnership directions, these relations have gone a relations and developing international way too far to be called a “situational” or cooperation. “tactical” alliance. On the contrary, over the last several years Ankara and Kyiv have succeeded in making a huge step forward, many years, Ankara and Kyiv seem both moving from hollow political declarations readyHowever, and probablywilling to forexert the enough first effort time to in to a more pragmatic, result-oriented and overcome these limitations and develop multifaceted partnership. the narrow politically and security-focused strategic agenda that has traditionally dominated their relationship into a full- Dr. Yevgeniya Gaber is a Political Officer at the Embassy of Ukraine in the Republic of Turkey. She jointfledged projects and comprehensivein different areas partnership where has previously held a position of Associated Professor thebased countries on long-term share common and well-specified and mutual in Turkish Studies at the International Relations interests. Today, the range of projects on the bilateral agenda varies widely from creating Department of Odessa National Mechnikov University. joint enterprises in defence and space She has authored numerous publications, including industries to common use of gas pipeline book chapters and monographs, covering issues of infrastructure, cooperation in nuclear Turkey’s foreign policy and security in the Black Sea energy sphere, conducting joint naval and region.
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 33 COMMON SENSE IN KAZAKHSTAN AND UKRAINE RELATIONS: INCENTIVES AND OPPORTUNITIES
Anna Gussarova Director, Central Asia Institute for Strategic Studies (Kazakhstan)
Despite the negative impact that the Ukrainian Crisis has had on bilateral relations with Astana, in terms of mutual trade, it has become a reference point to enhance cooperation in different areas, including aviation industry, infrastructure, fuel and energy complex, agriculture and tourism. Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko’s official visit to Astana in October, 2015 outlined prospects and mutual benefits for Kazakhstan-Ukraine relations against the backdrop of the ‘Russian factor’.
Public Opinion on Ukraine’s Crisis: appeared that 61% of the respondents Undivided but Supportive approved of the Russian position, 23% could not answer the question, and only The situation in Ukraine has become a kind of 5% supported the Ukrainian position. If we marker that outlined different approaches to the prospects of regional integration under public opinion, it turned out that out of the aegis of Russia. There are three positions thoselook closer who at thereceived sources, information which influenced from in the region with regard to Russia: i) centrist Kazakh media, 54% actually approved of (traditional), ii) extreme (the concept of Russia, 20% disapproved, and 26% were not able to answer. However, if respondents iii) sceptical (weakening position in Central received information from the Russian Asia‘Russian and World’the probability and the Greatof inter-state Russia), and media, 84% of them approved actions of inter-ethnic escalation). the Russian Federation, and only 4% did not support them. It is quite clear that the According to the National Poll (‘Strategy’ position broadcast by the Russian sources Public Fund, 2014)1, the vast majority did not imply any nuances and opinions. of Kazakhstan population (85%) was If we consider the situation regarding the informed about the deteriorated Russian- support of the Ukrainian side, among those Ukrainian relations. In 2014, 56% of the who received information from the Kazakh respondents were tracking daily news on national press − 29% were undecided, this topic. As a result, based on the answers and 66% disapproved of the Ukrainian to such questions as “Are you aware of side. Russian media audience is almost unequivocal: 80% did not approve of the prefer to watch?’, ‘How do you evaluate position of Ukraine. As for the Internet the events?,positions ‘Whichof Russia TV channelsand Ukraine?’, do you it audience, 48% still approved of the position
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86% казахстанцев волнует развитие российско-украинского конфликта // http://www.diapazon.kz/kazakh stan/kaz-politics/60278-86-kazahstancev-volnuet-razvitie-rossiysko-ukrainskogo-konflikta.html 34 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 of Russia, while 35% could not answer as a warning to other post-Soviet states, the question. Among those respondents including Kazakhstan and other Central Asian republics. The Russian President approved of the Russian position, 39% did Vladimir Putin’s comments that “before notwho approve, watch and and read31% Westernwere undecided press, 2 31%. 1991 Kazakhs had never had statehood,” just reinforced the phobias and fears that If we consider the sources of information that Russia could do something to Kazakhstan contributed to the choice, Kazakh media have what it had done to Ukraine4. Moreover, helped to develop a more balanced view and after the Land protests, Kazakhstan understanding of the situation. The audience President Nursultan Nazarbayev of national press tried increasingly to advocate mentioned, “The people of Kazakhstan do not want Ukrainian scenario in Kazakhstan”, promote reconciliation of the parties − 54%, so he warned those, who might bring about detachment from the conflict (60%), to and to support Ukrainian territorial integrity those events, that they will be severely (60%) with only 40% of those who believed punished5. It is quite obvious that rather that it was necessary to support Russia. The frequent comments in mass media about audience of the Russian media considered it Ukraine as an example of a ‘country of necessary for Kazakhstan to take the side of mass riots’ seems to be one more proof of the Russian Federation (46%). how certain media are seriously infected by the Kremlin propaganda. Yuri Lazebnyk, Thus, it is quite obvious, how actively Charge d’Affaires of Ukraine in Kazakhstan, propaganda was working. Even more, post-Crimean Russia has introduced has clearly stated such kind of propaganda the discourse of war in terms of hybrid in an interview to Azattyk, Kazakh Edition 6 information provocation and propaganda. of Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty . A recent case with the interpretation of ‘Eurasia First Channel’ TV program3 on Despite such kind of support for Land protests in Kazakhstan (TV hosts tried Russia in a different public survey, the to prove that people were paid 50-150 USD government acted in a more pro-Ukrainian for participation in the protests throughout and impartially neutral way. In 2015, the country) and disinformation on paid Kazakhstan was among those, who refused ambulance in Kazakhstan by 2017 was the to support the Russian idea to terminate Commonwealth of the Independent States and hybrid war in Kazakhstan and Central (CIS) Free Trade Zone Agreement with Asiafirst after example the Ukrainian of Russian-style crisis. propaganda Ukraine. Moreover, Astana has promptly chosen the tactics of a ‘mediator’ between In February 2014, when Russia annexed Kyiv and Moscow as well as Moscow and the Crimea, this move was interpreted the European Union member-states.
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3 Kazakhstan:Казахстанцы State об Украине, TV Hatchet России Job Sparks и интеграции. Indignation Интервью // http://www.eurasianet.org/node/78791 с Гульмирой Илеуовой, президентом ОФ ЦСПИ «Стратегия» // http://www.nomad.su/?a=10-201404250025 4 Putz C. Kazakhstan Deftly Balances Relations with Ukraine and Russia // http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/ka- zakhstan-deftly-balances-relations-with-ukraine-and-russia/ 5 kz/1120984-nazarbaev-predupredil-tekh-kto-khochet-p.html 6 Назарбаев предупредил тех, кто хочет повторения украинского сценария в Казахстане // https://www.nur.- skikh-vlastey/27723403.html Риторика Ак Орды об «украинских» беспорядках // http://rus.azattyq.org/a/ukrainskie-strashiki-kazakhstan
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 35 Humanitarian assistance to eastern regions in the country. Kazakhstan National Security of Ukraine received lively public interest Committee interpreted Aktobe attacks as a in Kazakhstan. On January 10, 2015, there part of a coup d’etat under Tohtar Tuleshev leadership, a very controversial personality to representatives of Ukraine EMERCOM in with deep expertise and experience at the thewas zonean official of the transfer antiterrorist of humanitarian operation aid in Center for Terrorist Threat Analysis of the city of Severodonetsk, Luhansk region. ‘Nur Otan’ ruling party, several journalists’ The event was attended by the leaders of unions, Cossack organizations of Kazakhstan the Luhansk Regional State Administration, (Advisor of the Supreme Ataman) and the State Service for Emergency Situations Shymkent Beer Company. of Ukraine and representatives of international organizations. In addition, on The Crimea’s annexation has resulted in April 28, 2015, Kazakhstan has allocated 1 numerous fears and myths predominantly applying to the same scenario within project at Chernobyl nuclear power plant7. Kazakhstan northern and eastern territories, mln euro of financial assistance for ‘Shelter’ which used to be Russian-speaking Later in 2015, Kazakhstani courts have ethnic majorities. Obviously, such kind of begun to initiate criminal proceedings parallels may seem quite logical (Budapest Memorandum violation) while in reality it is in Donbass and returned home. Two men still quite impossible to imagine same actions (fromagainst western those who and went northern to fight cities) for militia were taken place in Kazakhstan. At the same admitted guilty for involvement in armed time, it should be accepted that the Crimea has become a marker for Astana to revise 1, Criminal Code of Kazakhstan) on the its national security strategy and defence territoryconflicts andof a foreignhostilities state (Article and sentenced 162-1, part to capabilities (70% of the army weapons are 8. to be upgraded in the upcoming years10).
Itthree is also and worth five years mentioning of imprisonment that according In 2014, Kazakhstan’s President Nazarbayev spoke in favour of a peaceful settlement among the three largest ethnic groups in of the situation in Ukraine, preserving the Kazakhstanto the official (1, 64% statistics, of total Ukrainians population) are country’s sovereignty, while adding that after Russians and Uzbeks. he had been sympathetic to the Russian position, aimed at protecting the rights of Current State of Bilateral Relations the national minorities in Ukraine, as well as the interests and national security11. Recent land protests and militant attacks in According to Kazakhstan’s Foreign Ministry, Aktobe Astana perceived the referendum in the mainly perceived by the government as an Crimea as the free expression of the will of attempt, Westernto implement Kazakhstan, ‘Ukrainian in 2016 scenario’ were its population. At the same time, Kazakhstan
7 Kazakhstan Embassy to Ukraine and Moldova //http://kazembassy.com.ua/show/3550.html 8 - gions/20150427/7926802.html#ixzz4A9Qgk5aK 9 ThreeВоевавшего killed in на attacks стороне on ДНРKazakh казахстанца army base приговорили and gun shops к // 3 годамhttps://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/ в Атырау // http://newskaz.ru/re jun/05/three-killed-attacks-kazakh-army-base-gun-shops-aktobe 10 news/2016/05/06/newsid_111444 11 Назарбаев: В ближайшие годы будет обновлено не менее 70% всего вооружения армии // http://forbes.kz/- sya-o-situatsii-na-ukraine-252486/ Назарбаев высказался о ситуации на Украине // https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/nazarbaev-vyiskazal
36 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 abstained from voting on the UN General • Parties to establish Kazakhstan-Ukraine Assembly resolution on the Crimea in 2014 Business Council to enhance mutual along with other 92 member states. Later trade; Kazakhstan’s Counsellor received a protest note from the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign • Joint projects in aircraft construction, mechanical engineering and aerospace bilateral strategic partnership between the areas, particularly ‘Antonov’ serial twoAffairs, states which12. reflected the concerns over production in Kazakhstan, participation in the Ukrainian projects such as ‘Dnepr’ and ‘Zenith’, and shared purchase of Ukrainian crisis, political cooperation ‘Kosmotras’, Russian-Ukrainian space betweenIn spite Astana of certain and Kyiv difficulties tends to afterincrease. the company13; Kazakhstan’s President Nazarbayev was acting as a mediator within Minsk Group • Ukrainian enterprises, in particular negotiations and the OSCE activity in the ‘Novokramatorsky Machine-Building huge potential in Inter-parliamentary mechanical engineering and supply of collaborationregion. Official and visits Joint aside, Commission there is stillfor equipmentPlant’ CJSC, for participation metallurgical in plants; the field of Economic Cooperation. Since 2013, there are special working groups within two respective • Cooperation in nuclear energy sector in Parliaments for interaction with each other. the framework of ‘UKRTVS’, a Ukrainian- Kazakh-Russian enterprise, to produce During Ukrainian President Petro nuclear fuel. Poroshenko’s visit to Astana in 2015, Action
Joint statement of the Heads of the States of the main priorities of the Kazakhstan- werePlan forsigned, 2015-2017 which included (Roadmap a −number 5) and of a UkraineWhile economic relations, cooperation the 12th Meeting remains of onethe Joint Intergovernmental Commission on Economic Cooperation outlined several •specific ‘Kazakhstan’s areas of cooperation: aviation industry’ LLP’ issues of future prospects, including agreed with ‘Ukrspetsexport’ to establish a transit route through the Southern a service centre for aviation equipment Caucasus and Aktau port with Ilyichevsk of Ukrainian production on the basis of − Poti ferry, comprehensive cooperation Astana Aviation Technical Centre; Kazakhstan uranium and coal to Ukraine’s • ‘National Agency for Export and market,in energy space field, industry, including high-tech supply joint of Investment KAZNEX INVEST’ JSC and ‘Tatra-Yug’ LLC are to build tram tracks of aviation, machinery and agriculture. and to adjust the supply of Ukrainian ventures and service centres in the fields tramcars; At the same time, geopolitical situation and the global economic crisis have had • ‘Astana EXPO-2017’ JSC gained support a negative impact on mutual trade. By of ‘Monaco Ukraine Group’ to attract the end of 2015, foreign trade turnover tourists from Ukraine at EXPO-2017; between Kazakhstan and Ukraine,
12 - sii_rk_po_kryimu_mid_ukrainyi_vruchil_notu_kazahstanu/ 13 UkraineИз-за позиции Embassy РК to по the Крыму Republic МИД of УкраиныKazakhstan вручил // http://kazakhstan.mfa.gov.ua/ru/ukraine-kz/trade ноту Казахстану // http://forbes.kz/process/iz-za_pozit
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 37 according to the State Revenue Committee equipment − 31.4%, chemicals and related under the Ministry of Finance of the industries − 9.2%, products with a plant Republic of Kazakhstan14, reached 2 and animal origin − 27,3%, wood and 003.5 million USD while decreased timber − 4.9%, and construction goods − by 30.5% in comparison to the same 2%. Electricity generation systems (9.8%), period of 2014. The export volume of pipes for oil and gas pipelines (9,8 %), Kazakhstan production amounted to 1 food products (6.9%), paper, wallpaper 176.4 million USD and overall decreased and wall covering made of paper (2.6%), by 29.7%, compared to the same period and carbon (2.2%) dominate in import in 2014. Import of Ukrainian production from Ukraine. The structure of import to Kazakhstan reached 827.1 million USD also consists of medicines, dairy products, and drastically decreased by 31.5% in doors, windows, sugar, and alcohol. comparison to the same period of 201415. Moreover, Ukraine exports corn, vegetable oils and fats, vegetables, graphite, bricks, The main items of Kazakhstan export to liquid pumps, and pottery17. Ukraine include fuel and energy products (93.4%). Kazakhstan in return imports Opportunities for Further Cooperation Ukrainian equipment and devices (33%), and Lessons Learnt food (20%), and metal products (15%), etc. Currently there are 539 joint ventures: As economic cooperation is perceived as 415 are registered in Ukraine, while 124 − the main priority in bilateral relations, in Kazakhstan. it is quite necessary to focus on joint ventures and to enhance foreign trade Export from Kazakhstan to Ukraine turnover, which drastically decreased includes mineral commodities − 92.9%, due to the Ukrainian crisis, Russian- metals and corresponding products − Ukraine relations and contradictions 4,6%, machinery and equipment − 0.5%, within Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) chemicals and related industries − 0.3%, products with a plant and animal origin − accused EEU member states of systematic 1.4%, etc. At the same time, main export and WTO. For example, in 2016 Ukraine commodities of the Republic of Kazakhstan (Art. 2 (Determination of Dumping), Art. to Ukraine are natural gas (74%), coal coke 3violation (Determination of the WTO of rulesDamage) and regulationsand Art. 5 (6%), crude oil (4.8%), and all kinds of (Initiation and Subsequent Investigation) sulphur (5.3%). Kazakhstan also exports of Article VI of GATT 199418) in the and garments to Ukraine16. courseof the WTOof anti-dumping, Agreement onanti-subsidiary Application tobacco products, mineral fertilizers, fish and special protection investigations, Import from Ukraine to Kazakhstan requiring termination of such malpractice. includes metals − 18.1%, machines and According to the Ministry of Economic
14 State Revenue Committee under Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Kazakhstan //http://kgd.gov.kz/en 15 Kazakhstan Embassy to Ukraine and Moldova //http://kazembassy.com.ua/show/3550.html 16
17 Украина, Россия и Казахстан: как менялись экономические отношения в этом треугольнике и как изменятся в 2016 году? // http://kazdata.kz/04/2016-01-export-import-ukraine-kazakhstan-russia.html 18 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 //https://www. wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/19-adp_01_e.htmЧто Казахстан и Украина продают друг другу // http://lsm.kz/chto-kazahstan-i-ukraina-prodayut-drug-drugu
38 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 Development and Trade of Ukraine19, such and ‘Ukrmashstroy’, League of Machine kind of violations have led to legally and Builders and Employers of Ukraine and economically unreasonable restrictions on launched a project on constructing access of the Ukrainian goods to the markets agricultural machinery in Akmola region. of the EEU member states (including Belarus, which has an observer status in Conclusion ferrosilicon manganese and steel pipes of Apart from the economic cooperation, Ukrainianthe WTO).This origin. particularly concerns rods, which is quite obviously needed and requested by Astana and Kyiv, there is a huge As for bilateral economic cooperation, gap and lack of other kind of interaction interaction between regional business e.g. in culture and education, between communities seems to be a good starting expert and academia communities, regular point. There is a need to boost economic political dialogue (except for constant cooperation within the Chambers of presidential phone talks), etc. Despite such Commerce of two countries. E.g. in kind-hearted emotions and feelings of March 2015, two delegations of South- Kazakhstan society, academia, and expert Kazakhstan region paid a visit to Ukraine. community that were demonstrated after As a result, three agreements were signed, the Crimea and Donbass, there is still an including: informational gap of what is going on in Ukraine, how the country is trying to start 1) Administration (Akimat) of Southern over, what actions and steps Ukrainian Kazakhstan region and Administration political leadership undertake in order of Zhytomyr, to strategically re-assess the past several years of bilateral relations with Russia 2) Administration (Akimat) of Southern and what independent foreign policy Kazakhstan region and ‘Ukrmashstroy’, and economic ties mean in terms of League of Machine Builders and participation in integration projects. Employers of Ukraine20, and
3) Roadmap for joint engineering Kazakhstan is ‘a window to Asia’ production on coupler release for a for Ukraine and Ukraine is ‘a tractor plant in South Kazakhstan «window to Europe’ for Kazakhstan region.
Later on, in July 2015 businessmen from Northern Kazakhstan region paid Kazakhstan President Nursultan a visit to Ukraine in order to enhance NazarbayevThe upcoming to Kyiv, official expected visit in of 2016, the cooperation in agriculture. The parties would rather focus on overcoming signed several Memoranda of cooperation between the enterprises of Kazakhstan difficulties in economic cooperation, mainly aimed at finding new supply routes
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Detail?lang=uk-UA&id=c6cf85d4-b8de-4042-96e0-58bfabf9f7bd&title=UkrainaVimagaVidKrainuchasnitsvraУкраїна вимагає від країн-учасниць Євразійського економічного Союзу припинити систематично - ziiskogoEkonomichnogoSoiuzuPripinitiSistematichnoPorushuvatiNormiSotPidChasProvedenniaAntidempingoпорушувати норми СОТ під час проведення антидемпінгових розслідувань // http://www.me.gov.ua/News/- vikhRozsliduvan 20 Kazakhstan-Ukraine Relation //http://www.mfa.kz/index.php/en/foreign-policy/kazakhstan-s-relations/kazakh- stan-cis-cooperation/16-materials-english/6124-kazakhstan-ukraine-relations
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 39 of goods to Kazakhstan particularly due both Information and Communications to the Russian sanctions on Turkey and Strategy and National Security Strategy. Ukraine for transit. At the same time, according to the Ukraine’s President Petro international arena and recession in 2016, Poroshenko, “There is a huge potential theWith Kremlin intentions is no longer for capable leadership of strategic on for bilateral relations as Kazakhstan is ‘a foresight within the EEU, CSTO and Russia- window to Asia’ for Ukraine and Ukraine EU-US dialogue, which means that it is high is ‘a window to Europe’ for Kazakhstan.21” time to discuss the challenges and learn the lessons by its Central Asian partners. There is a need and demand to discuss the
rules and regulations within the anti-crisis Anna Gussarova is a Senior Research Fellow at the planissues to ofminimize Eurasian the integrationrisks, associated and WTOwith Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Russian economy, sanctions regimes the Republic of Kazakhstan; Director at Central Asia and global energy market, which has direct Institute for Strategic Studies and Senior Lecturer impact on the economies of EEU (fall at German-Kazakh University. She graduated with a turnover, pressure on national currencies), major in American Studies and holds a master’s degree and their relations with Russia (trade wars, in Central Asia Security Studies. She is an alumnus of etc.). the European George C. Marshall Center for Security It is obvious that Kremlin substitutes Studies (Garmisch-Partenkirchen), Asia Pacific Center the agenda with the ‘great geopolitical for Security Studies (Honolulu), Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Institute (Moscow). She has more than 30 academic articles, as well as 100 behaviourwar’ of Russia of the with Russian the West. political It is clearly and media articles and comments on security issues. She was militaryrecorded establishment, in official statementswhich resulted and awarded with a special National Anniversary Medal in militarization of Russian politics and ‘20 years of the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan’ strategy. Meanwhile, each crisis Russia for contribution to the social harmony in the country is somehow involved in negatively affect and unity of the people of Kazakhstan, promotion of Kazakhstan and Central Asian states. If the Kazakhstan experience of peace and harmony abroad situation with Turkey (warplane incident, and development of mutually beneficial and friendly tradecase of and Ukraine tourism was notwars, a final and indicator, sanctions) the relations between the people of Kazakhstan and other has become a challenge for Kazakhstan nationals as well as with the Certificate of Honor from and Turkmenistan in terms of strategic the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic partnership with Ankara. ‘Cold war’ of Kazakhstan. paradigm will dominate in Russia within
21 Poroshenko: Kazakhstan is a ‘window to Asia’ for Ukraine, while Ukraine is a ‘window to Europe’ for Kazakhstan // http://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-politics/1895612-poroshenko-kazakhstan-is-window-to-asia-for-ukraine- while-ukraine-is-window-to-europe-for-kazakhstan.html
40 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 UKRAINE-MOLDOVA: COMPLICATED BUT PROMISING RELATIONS
Sergiy Gerasymchuk Strategic and Security Studies Group Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”
The article touches issues of Ukraine-Moldova relations and considers pros and cons of the realism-oriented and liberalism/constructivism- oriented approaches in the bilateral relations. The author argues that liberal constructivist approach will result in win-win results whereas the realism-oriented approach can be counterproductive and thus a task of the civil society is to invigorate governments to make joint efforts grounded on common values instead of behaving using the perspective of rational egoism.
For the Ukrainian government the border demarcation etc. These existing relations between the Republic of Moldova issues are harmful for the relations and in and Ukraine have quite often been the middle-term perspective might have overshadowed by relations of Ukraine with a “spill over effect” – deterioration of the bigger players e.g. the United States, the EU and Russia. Quite regularly Moldova European integration, misunderstanding was perceived by the Ukrainian experts relations in the field of joint efforts for the settlement, economic tensions and joint regional developments and too weak to participationin the process in of the the regional Transnistrian projects. conflict shapeand officials the agenda as a state of the too bilateral tiny to relations.influence In relations with Chisinau, Kyiv often Secondly, there are too many similarities in perceived itself as a regional power able Ukrainian and Moldovan politics: they are to impose its own agenda and to be rather both corrupted and the system of justice a mentor and custodian than an equal neighbour. between pro-European political parties inis underdeveloped.Moldova give ground In addition, for increased fights However, such an approach is false due to a ratings of the revanchist political powers number of reasons. and discredit the idea of the European integration itself, and it might become a First, despite Moldova’s small size, relatively case for Ukrainian pro-Europeans as well. Thus, better understanding of Moldova in the region, Moldovan government is gives some clues for understanding Ukraine aweak tough economy negotiator, and arguably often guided little influence by the and vice versa. rational egoist approach. Therefore, a number of issues in the bilateral relations of Thirdly, Moldova for more than 20 years Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova remain has faced a challenge of separatism inspired unresolved, e.g. long lasting property issues by the Russian Federation in Transnistria related to resorts inherited from the USSR (which has about 450 km of border with and a hydroelectric station, an issue of the Ukraine, not controlled by Moldovan
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 41 authorities). Moreover, Moscow still keeps Bilateral tensions military forces in the separatist region of Transnistria and prevents any attempts of There are a few issues that have caused peaceful resolution of the Transnistrian tensions in the bilateral relations. One of the illustrations is border dispute. Despite the the Moldovan authorities hooked and agreements reached back in the 1990s on makingfrozen conflict.any decisions Hence, without the Kremlin negotiating keeps the exchange of a territory near the village with the Transnistrian separatist leadership of Giurgiulesti, according to which Moldova remains a complicated task for Chisinau. gained a status of the littoral state and The Russian Federation clearly stated that received a possibility to build up a transport it does not want to lose Moldova from hub on the site, Ukraine in exchange has not its sphere of interests and instead of the received the jurisdiction over the land near European perspective, it promotes another Palanka village, although it was a part of the destination for integration – the Customs deal. Ukraine had to agree to a compromise Union. Russian authorities manipulate according to which the road near Palanka Moldova’s dependence on gas supplies remains Ukrainian property on the territory of the Republic of Moldova. Moreover, Moldova is making any progress in relations Ukraine is facing a problem of access to withand efficiently the EU. Moreover,use this leverage Moscow each is quitetime some of the Dnistrovska Hydro-electric good in manipulating sentiments of the power plant, which since the Soviet times Russian-speaking population and suggests has some of its technical buildings on the Moldovan side of the border. (Geographical as an alternative for further integration information was the key source for setting the idea of “russkiy mir” (Russian World), and administering the state borders. learned by Moldova in the Transnistrian However, in this case it did not guarantee with the Western world. Therefore, lessons avoiding misunderstandings and tensions Russian manipulation with public opinion between the states. The delimitation of the inconflict Moldova as well in this as regardlessons can coming be of immensefrom the Ukrainian-Moldovan border was grounded importance for Ukrainians. on the outdated topographical maps with the scale 1:50000 and 1:10000, on which Moreover, it is fair to assume that Moldova the Hydro-electric plant built in 1985 was is a sort of a “shooting range” for a hybrid not marked at all.) warfare for the Kremlin where Moscow is testing methods of discrediting its Another issue that causes concerns of the Ukrainian side is a problem of imposing customs duties to the Ukrainian products, orientedopponents, forces, invigorating undermining conflicts Moldovan and in particular to dairy products, meat and statehood.fights between Therefore, pro-Russian better understanding and patriotic- cement. The problem is caused by the of Russian methods alongside with testing fact that the volume of Ukrainian export remedies in Moldova can be helpful for to Moldova after its reorientation from preventing and counterweighing similar the Russian market has reached 9,3% of scenarios in Ukraine. its import in 2015 including 12% of the dairy products (following only Romania and Russia and leaving behind Germany, understanding these factors and to have China and Turkey). The outcomes were betterIn order understanding to fill the of the existing possible gap future in protests of the local Moldovan producers, developments in the bilateral relations who requested the Ministry of the Economy it makes sense to take a look at all the of the Republic of Moldova to hold anti- mentioned issues in detail. dumping investigation since prices for
42 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 the products imported from Ukraine Such an initiative would result in connect- were much lower than prices suggested ing Moldova with the Odessa port bypassing by the local producers1 (that has become the Transnistrian secessionist region, un- controlled by the government of Moldova. of the Ukrainian hryvna and possibility to However, if relations between the countries avoidpossible VAT due taxation to the significantfor foreign devaluation companies deteriorate, the project can be suspended. in the Republic of Moldova). In response, the Republic of Moldova imposed customs The same is true regarding the implementa- duties and quotas until the end of 2016. tion of the Black Sea Highway Ring initiative. The customs duty is increased by10−20%2 According to the previously reached agree- and therefore Ukraine, which believes ments, some segments of the Highway are to be built in order to connect Ukraine, Roma- and CIS Free trade agreement, is planning nia and Moldova. The initial idea was to con- toMoldovan bring the measures issue to the violate consideration the WTO ofrules the nect Odessa and Bucharest by two branches of the highway: via Reni-Giurgiulesti-Galati and via Chisinau and Ungheni4. Like in the Besides,WTO and toUkraine impose reciprocityis wary measures.regarding previous case, in case the relations between Moldova’s current negotiations with Russia Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova deteri- on lifting Russian sanctions to Moldovan orate, the project can be suspended (in par- products. Kyiv suspects that the visit of ticular Giurgiulesti segment). representative of the Russian president There are high chances that the future of onRogozin Transnistria, − Russian planned Vice-PM forand Julythe Special20163 these initiatives and the Ukrainian role and the expected task-list for eliminating in their implementation may be used by restrictions on the Moldovan goods export Ukraine as arguments to change Moldovan for the Russian market might include some positions and to persuade Moldova to concessions that Ukraine will have to pay for and thus the outcome can be further an approach, both countries are behaving deterioration of the bilateral relations realisticallyfulfil its commitments. in the international By applying politics such between Ukraine and Moldova. though. However, if the negotiations on sensitive issues continue within the realism One of the initiatives that is under in ques- tion is launching a railway connecting lack of trust between the governments, Ukraine and Moldova bypassing Transnis- apattern decreased they willlevel definitely of cooperation result in and the tria. The launch of this initiative was expect- ed in summer 2016, including a plan to build integration, and the lack of solidarity in the railway segment Berezyne-Besarabka negotiationscooperation inregarding the field the of theTransnistrian European and the repair of Artsyz-Berezyne segment.
conflict settlement.
1 - cessed at: http://agravery.com/uk/posts/show/ukrainski-virobniki-masomolocki-zagrozuut-virobnikam-u-mol- dovi-slusarУкраїнські виробники м’ясомолочки загрожують виробникам у Молдові — Слусар / Agravery. 20.01.2016 Ac 2 ukranews.com/ua/news/425528-moldova-vvela-myta-na-import-m-yasa-moloka-i-cementu-z-ukrainy 3 RussiaМолдова open ввела to economical мита на імпорт cooperation м’яса, afterмолока Rogozin і цементу visits з Moldova України / / Moldova.org. Ukranews. 28.04.2016. 05.07.2016. Accessed Accessed at: at: http:// http://www.moldova.org/en/russia-open-economical-cooperation-rogozin-visits-moldova/ 4
route_320427.htmlUkraine, Romania, Moldova finalyze Black Sea ring highway route / Ukrinform. 18.04.2014. Accessed at: http:// www.ukrinform.net/rubric-economics/1650817-ukraine_moldova_romania_finalize_black_sea_ring_highway_
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 43 The key catalyser for the mass protests in if they applied liberal and constructivist the Republic of Moldova was the Moldovan patterns.Both countries Liberal would understanding definitely benefit of morethe banks theft money affair, which happened relations between Ukraine and Moldova back in 2014, when Unibank, Banca de would result in a win-win approach Economii and Banca Sociala got from whereas a constructivist approach would the National Bank of Moldova the loan also provide the added value of common of about one billion dollars – which was identity which is rooted in similar for both later transferred to offshore accounts countries understanding of the European through complex transactions whereas the banks went bankrupt5. In February the leadership of both countries has to come 2015, a group of civil society activists tointegration understanding and Westernthat they values.are “in the Basically, same declared the Manifest of Civic platform boat”, to develop the perception of each “Truth and Dignity” in which it blamed the other grounded on the common values/ common goal approaches, to implement the “one billion affair” and for imitation of joint strategies in interacting with the third thegovernmental implementation officials of inthe being reforms involved in the in parties acting in the region, etc. country.
Therefore, what is needed for the the demands of the Platform explicitly, the resolution of the issues in the relations Although none of the EU officials supported betweenimprovement Kyiv ofand the Chisinaurelations isand switching efficient the idea of European integration process. from realist to liberal and constructivist Theinitial leaders idea of ofthe the protests Platform was beneficialoften voiced for agenda setting and understanding that the same concerns regarding developments
cooperating on bilateral issues if such Furthermore, the activities of the Platform cooperationtwo nations willis grounded benefit muchon the more common from resultedin Moldova in investigation that the EU of officialsthe “one shared. billion values and friendly relations. affair” and even led to the arrest of the former prime minister of the Republic of Moldova Risky similarities in political behaviour Vlad Filat. However, simultaneously with and wrongly perceived messages of the Western powers Moldova, the protests of the Platform gave impetussome impact for the on development fighting corruption of another in Current political turmoil in the Republic sort of protests. Other political forces that of Moldova alongside with activities of the Moldovan well-known oligarch protest mood of the electorate were on the and politician Vlad Plahotniuc aimed at pro-Russiantried to get benefits side of thefrom political social unrest spectrum: and the Red Block, Socialist party headed by similarities of the political systems in Igor Dodon and “Partidului Nostru” – the Moldova“stabilizing” and theUkraine. state, The reflect key numeroussimilarity party headed by Renato Usatii joined the is that frequent street protests in Moldova protests. and a high level of the protest potential in Ukraine are rooted in the weak and corrupt All three players started to combine their state institutions.
efforts in organizing the protests. Whereas
5 Vanishing act: how global auditor failed to spot theft of 15% of Moldova’s wealth / The Guardian. 01.07.2015. Accessed at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/01/global-auditor-moldova-wealth-fran- chise-grant-thornton-banks-embezzle
44 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 the Platform reached a certain victory seems to be understandable from the perspective of realism. However, looking in the opinion of protestors, was only deeper into the problem we can discover declaringin its fight European with the values government,6, pro-Russian which, forces reached their goal in compromising the disappointment of many Moldovans. the idea of European integration itself. some negative outcomes. The first one is the opposition and the government as geopolitical,They do not butperceive rather the the conflict one related between to Whereas the key demand of the protestors corruption that threatens democracy. If the was that the corrupted officials should pro-European.leave, many of these officials happened to lose the credit of trust of Moldovan people. be, at least declaratively, pro-Western and West does not recognize this fact, it may Under such circumstances, the steps of Another negative impact is the fact that were designed in a pragmatic way. Since in Moldova can be wrongly perceived in the West (the United States in particular) Ukraine.the message The ofUkrainian Western powerspoliticians delivered might early elections, which would most probably assume that if just declaring yourself pro- resultWestern in gainingpowers thewere majority not in offavour the seats of the in European works in the Republic of Moldova, the parliament by the pro-Russian forces, the same pattern might be applicable for they allegedly agreed on the proposal of Mr. Ukraine. That would cause the declarative Plahotniuc to stabilize the political situation pro-European policy supplemented though by appointing the government totally controlled by him and his political force. A few days before Moldova’s parliament Finally,with the thesignificant belief lackthat of Moldova reforms. should nominated Plahotniuc’s alleged proxy choose the lesser evil, which is Plahotniuc, if Pavel Filip to the prime minister’s position, shared by the Ukrainian expert community Victoria Nuland, a top-ranking US State and civil society, would undermine its close ties with the civil society of the Republic of the capital of neighbouring Romania, Moldova. During the days of the Revolution Department official, visited Bucharest, of Dignity in Ukraine, the civil society in supporting the current government, which Moldova sincerely supported Ukrainian waswhere dominated she declared by Plahotniuc’s that Washington Democratic was counterparts and expressed their solidarity. Party7. The key reason for such a decision If the Ukrainian civil society leaders do not arguably was the desire to preserve the support their Moldovan counterparts these government, which is at least declaratively days, that will cause damage for solidarity pro-European and thus appears to be of civil society per se in the region. less evil than the possible pro-Russian alternative. (It is noteworthy that the Containing these challenges is possible by Ukrainian government did not release any sound statement on the developments in communities of Ukraine and Moldova neighbouring Moldova). andintensified joint efforts dialogue aimed between at ensuring the expert the civil society’s function of a democracy Such approach of the United States
watchdog. Besides, the West also has to
6 md/Platforma_Civica_DA.pdf 7 PiotrManifestul Oleksy. Platformei Moldova. CiviceValues Demnitate and geopolitics Și Adevăr / New (DA). Eastern 24.02.2015. Europe. Accessed 17.05.2016. at: http://www.demnitate-adevar.Accessed at: http://neweastern- europe.eu/articles-and-commentary/1996-moldova-values-and-geopolitics
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 45 contribute to the further development Russia also illegally recruits the soldiers of civil society movements and their in the Transnistrian region, which is de- jure a territory of Moldova, whereas the force that would create an alternative to the conscripts are Moldovan passport holders9. existing,transformation often corrupted into the influential and compromised political That does create the problem of violated “pro-European” forces in both Ukraine international norms, de-facto demonstrates and Moldova. The respective policies have Russian sovereignty over the region, and to be implemented promptly; otherwise, may potentially cause the situation when the existing “lesser evil” will be soon Moldovan citizens (passport holders of the substituted by revanchist powers that will neutral state) will be indirectly involved in result in the failure of European ideas in the military clashes with the third countries.
On 10 April 2016, the Ukrainian media the region and the decline of the Western also published information that alongside Transnistrianinfluence. edge of the bilateral pretext of alleged inspection of troops at the relations and the challenges it causes Transnistrianwith other Russianterritory, the officers, general under colonel the of Obviously, the current crisis in the the Russian Army Aleksandr Lentsov arrived to Moldova10. He is known for participation Republic of Moldova has some impact on in operations in Chechnya, Syria and the the developments in the Transnistrian East of Ukraine. Although the details of his settlement as well. Transnistria is assignment are not clear, his appearance in extensively using “destabilization” and the Moldova is nevertheless a worrying sign. “Romanian threat” discourse to consolidate its society. Since 1990-s the authorities of On the other hand, Russia is pushing for the the breakaway region have been exploiting acceptance of its interests as the founding the thesis about unstable Moldova and the stone for the continuation of the 5+2 “Romanian tanks” to prove the necessity of being “independent from Moldova” and settlement. According to the diplomatic expecting support from Moscow. sources,negotiations the Kremlin on the is Transnistrian considering support conflict of a special status for Transnistria within Meanwhile, Moscow is actively playing Moldova’s borders. The respective changes both with the sentiments of Transnistrian in the rhetoric of Russia are believed to voters and with a geopolitical situation in be a result of the efforts of the German the region. For example, on 31 March 2016, Chairmanship at the OSCE as well as the Russia held the drills for the Operative Group desire of Russia to improve its relations of the Russian military forces in Transnistria, with the EU. However, if it is again guided although Moldova is constantly demanding by the principles of liberalism and to withdraw Russian troops from the constructivism in the bilateral relations, Transnistrian region and the respective Ukraine will support a decision that would declaration was made by the Moldovan be acceptable for the Republic of Moldova, authorities on the same day8. but in case the realist approach prevails,
8 at: http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2016/04/1/7104160/ 9 MoldovaМолдова Asks вызвала Russia’s посла Army РФ To из-за Stop информации Recruiting Its о Citizens наборе /военных Newsweek. / Украинская 22.06.2016. правда. Accessed 1.04.2016. at: http://europe. Accessed newsweek.com/moldova-asks-russia-separatist-army-stop-recruiting-citizens-473155?rm=eu 10 at: http://prismua.org/en/dangerous-example/ A dangerous example: Moldova being split between Russia and the West / Ukrainian Prism. 28.04.2016. Accessed
46 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 Ukraine is likely to be very cautious, in the country. It exploits its soft power to gain case concessions made by Moldova would control of assets and public opinion support. undermine the interests of Ukraine. Russian media, which is widely common in Moldova (that’s another similarity to preservation of the existing format of 5+2 Ukraine), serves as an instrument for First, Ukraine will definitely insist on the occurred in the direct neighbourhood of propaganda. Ukrainetalks, since and thethus conflict its solution in Transnistria with the wider dissemination of the Russia’s official consideration of the Ukrainian interests Russia’s illegal annexation of the Crimea belongs to the priorities of the Ukrainian caused challenges to the inviolability of state government. Besides, if there is a lack of borders, while the hybrid war tactics seen trust between the governments of Ukraine in eastern Ukraine – arguably an explicit and the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine may expression of the Russian revolutionary play a card of the Ukrainian minority in expansionism – together with the Kremlin’s Transnistria and bargain with the other policy of promoting “controlled chaos” in parties of negotiations on those issues. the region, makes the stakes even higher for Therefore, it does matter if Kyiv and the Republic of Moldova. Chisinau work together on solving the issues emerging in the bilateral relations. If Even in the unlikely case, when the EU and each party plays its own game, that would pro-European forces win the battle over make the relations much more complicated the majority in Moldovan parliament and and it is a task for the civil society to over the personality of the new Moldovan invigorate the governments to act in the president, the Russian Federation will still friendly and good neighbourly manner. have its leverage to interfere in order to keep the Republic of Moldova in its orbit. Approbation of the Russian methods in Moldova Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin back in 2013 openly declared Notwithstanding the fact that Russia, and that: “Moldova’s train en route to Europe the EU likewise, did not interfere into would lose its cars”11. The growing tensions the Moldovan domestic affairs directly, between pro-Russian population and the arguably the key challenge for Moldova is so-called “unionists” – supporters of the re- union of Moldova with Romania, also cause vulnerability of the Republic of Moldova, Moldovansrooted in Russian are not foreign even Slavs, policy, the specifically heritage its “Russian World” concept (although Russian interference in the domestic affairs impact on the self-identity of many people of ofand the give republic. formal justification to additional Moldovaof Sovietization and Russia and exploits Russification this fact leftas long its as there are pro-Soviet sentiments among Therefore, Russia will continue to question the population of Moldova). The Kremlin the European choice of Moldova. The considers Moldova (alongside with Ukraine) scenario that is being applied to Moldova to be an integral part of its geopolitical and should be perceived as an approbation of cultural space, and thus invests a great deal its methods. In case any of them or their combination are effective in regaining in preserving and increasing its influence in
11 org.ua/eng/public/1176.html Repercussions of the Ukraine Crisis for Moldova / Institute of World Policy. 16. 07.2014. Accessed at: http://iwp.
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 47 control over Moldovan establishment, both Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova. Russia will spread the same strategies to a Furthermore, the relative failures of the wider range of countries including Ukraine political elites to deliver appropriate – some steps in this direction are already visible in Ukraine and many further ones integration cause the obstacles for the can be forecasted both in Ukraine and other Europeanresults in thepath field of both of reforms countries. and European vulnerable countries. The leadership of both countries has the Regrettably, even the EU membership can choice whether to look for solutions jointly hardly prevent the threat of the Russian or to approach them from a position of expansionism if the membership is not national egoism. Although the latter looks accompanied with reforms in the political like the easiest way, it can create deeper divisions between Ukraine and Moldova policies in the sensitive territories with that would be harmful for both states and highsphere, secessionist fighting potential. corruption, and efficient that only Russia – the main troublemaker in
subject of close cooperation between the Thethe region challenging – can benefittask for from. both the political governmentsTherefore, these of Ukraine very fields and shouldMoldova be and the elites and civil society (in a broad sense) their European partners. The exchange of both countries is to put aside their of information on the Russian hybrid diversities and elaborate a solidarity- operations, consolidated approach in oriented approach for the solution of counteracting Russian initiatives violating existing problems. the interests of any of the countries in the region, a constructivist approach to the At the same time, the challenging task for bilateral relations based on the common values, goals and identity can be the also for the European Union) is to keep main tool for counterweighing challenges athe value-based West (mainly approach for the Unitedprevailing States over but produced by Russia. At the same time, realist approaches. Otherwise, the civil realism-oriented rational egoism of the countries can be counterproductive and the allies and both Europe and the US may lose task for the civil society of both countries theirsociety traditional will be ally disappointed in the region. in Western is to channel the respective messages to the governments of both countries.
To conclude with, although big players Sergiy Gerasymchuk – Board member at Strategic matter in international politics, bilateral and Security Studies Group and Board member at the relations between neighbours also remain Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism”. As an expert, important – in particular, when the countries Sergiy cooperated with Peace Research Institute have similar features and thus common Frankfurt, ICDS (Estonia), ICDT (Hungary), as well of Moldova and Ukraine, these relations are as Uppsala (Sweden), Lublin (Poland) and Giessen complicatedsolutions may and be rottenof mutual due benefit.to the heritage In case (Germany) Universities. Sergiy holds MA in Political of the Soviet past, unresolved issues in the Science from Kyiv-Mohyla Academy (Ukraine) and borders, dangerous activities of Russia in graduated from the Estonian School of Diplomacy.
48 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 UKRAINIAN DIASPORIC COMMUNITY IN GERMANY: MAIN CHARACTERISTICS AND ITS ENGAGEMENT FOR ITS HOME COUNTRY
Ljudmyla Melnyk, Magdalena Patalong, Richard Steinberg Institut für Europäische Politik, Berlin
During Euromaidan and its aftermath, the Ukrainian community in Germany experienced the emergence of new non-state actors: civically engaged Ukrainians, forming a new diasporic community. Based on the research project “#EngageEUkraine – Engagement of Ukrainians in Poland and Germany”, the paper examines selected aspects of the study. By asking if the diasporic community could act as a new homogenous non-state actor, the analysis shows that such potential exists: with their activities, the diasporic community does not only indirectly contribute to the democratization of Ukraine, but at the same time acts as a cultural bridge between German and Ukrainian societies, thereby potentially contributing to the improvement of relations between both states. Therefore, its support should also be of interest to Ukrainian government.
The Euromaidan protests in 2013 and 2014 Focusing on this question, this paper gives in Kiev can be regarded as an initial trigger an overview of the history of Ukrainian for the formation and engagement of a civil diaspora in Germany since 1945 up to the society not only within Ukraine but also emergence of new Ukrainian non-state in Ukrainian communities in Germany. actors since November 2013, forming a new In addition, the annexation of the Crimea diasporic community. From a historical and by the Russian Federation and the war in empirical perspective the paper explains Eastern Ukraine raised a common feeling, a how and why the evolution of the “old sense of belonging to Ukrainian community, Ukrainian diaspora” has led to a “white spot” which led to the support of Ukraine in a in the mental map of Germans concerning vast number of diasporic activities, from Ukraine and Ukrainian matters and asks political demonstrations and cultural events to military and humanitarian aid. this gap. In order to answer the question This tendency was further increased by whether this the diasporicdiasporic communitycommunity can fillbe the interconnectedness of Ukrainians in viewed as a new homogenous non-state different parts and regions of the globalised actor, this paper will focus on the content and development of its engagement as well as on information about the developments in connecting factors within the community. It Ukraineworld. Thehas resulted constant, in immediatestrong ties between flow of will also analyse the two main forms of its the “homeland” and its diaspora. This raises engagement: humanitarian aid in Ukraine the question whether and how the Ukrainian on one side and cultural and informative diaspora can contribute to the stabilization activities in Germany on the other side.1 and democratization of Ukraine. Thereby, the paper gives an overview of
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 49 For this purpose, 88 structured interviews, concludes with policy recommendations for 44 in each country, were conducted. The Ukrainianthe potential government influence in on order both to states. support It interviewees were Ukrainians who are and strengthen Ukrainian diaspora. civically engaged either individually, in formal organisations, or in non-formalised Research Project und Design initiatives. Besides civic engaged interviewees, a group of “experts” was This paper stems from a larger research interviewed, consisting of people who are project “#EngageEUkraine – Engagement of well informed about Ukrainian diaspora in Ukrainians in Poland and Germany” that was these two countries. In order to guarantee conducted in 2015 and 2016 by the Institut a high degree of heterogeneity in terms für Europäische Politik (IEP), Berlin, and the of age, gender, place of activity etc., and to include people from the whole range and funded by the German Polish Science Foundation.Institute of PublicThe results Affairs of (IPA), the Warsawproject research.of civic engagement,To control thethe firstcriterion selection of were published in May 2016.2 The joined heterogeneity,of interviewees the was following identified interviews in a were desk project of IPA and IEP dealt with the civic conducted in waves, using the snowball engagement of Ukrainians living in Germany system to identify further interviewees. and in Poland. The main objectives of the project were: The interviews were transcribed and analysed following Mayring’s (2003) qualitative content analysis using the structure of Ukrainians’ engagement as software “f4transkript” and “f4analyse”. The 1. Mapping the fields, intensity and well as its potential contribution to the initial code system was systematically and process of democratization in Ukraine; inductively extended during the process of coding. 2. Exploring how Ukrainian diaspora has Main facts about Ukrainians in Germany in Ukraine since November 2013; been influenced by recent developments 3. Providing recommendations on how of Germany, there were around 128.000 public and private actors on the EU level UkrainiansAccording to with the FederalUkrainian Statistical citizenship Office as well as in Poland, Germany and Ukraine living in Germany in 2014.4 Therefore, can support Ukrainian civic engagement comparing the numbers of Ukrainians in both countries to indirectly support the process of democratization in Ukraine.3 growth can be observed. The largest groups of 1995 (30.000) and 2014, significant
1 At the beginning of the Ukrainian engagement in Germany in the end of 2013/beginning of 2014, solidarity demonstrations were playing a major role. Nevertheless, in the following we will concentrate on engagement that was mainly pursued during the interview phase (August-November 2015) and still remains important, in order to analyse the potential long-term effects of the engagement of the diasporic community. 2 published in May 2016. 3 Melnyk/Patalong/Plottka/SteinbergKatrin Böttger/Agnieszka Lada (Eds.): (2016): “#EngageEUkraine How the Ukrainian – Engagement Diasporic der Community Ukrainer inin PolenGermany und ContributesDeutschland”, to EU’s Policy in its Home Country, p. 3. 4 - ble at: https://www.destatis.de/DE/Publikationen/StatistischesJahrbuch/StatistischesJahrbuch2015.pdf?__blob=- FederalpublicationFile Statistical [27.03.2016] Office Germany (2015): Statistisches Jahrbuch. Deutschland und Internationales 2015. Accessi
50 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 of Ukrainians are found in North Rhine- The inhabitants organized many cultural, educational, social and political activities. 5 In order to protect the rights of Ukrainians TheWestphalia main reasons (28.000), to move in Bavaria to Germany (24.000) are and to coordinate the life in DP camps, familyand in (18.810), Baden-Wuerttemberg education (5.830) (14.000). and work (4.550).6 Ukrainian Emigration13 was created in the official Central Representation of the Due to historical circumstances, Southern institutions, medical assistance was also Germany can be regarded as a center provided1945. In by addition institutions to official like the international Ukrainian of the Ukrainian diaspora. About three recognized but worked as an independent body.Red 14 Cross, Furthermore, which a was lot of not educational officially million7 Around Ukrainians 2.3 million were driven Ukrainians to Western were institutions such as kindergartens, primary Europedeported during as forced and afterlabourers the Second to Germany. World8 and secondary schools and institutions War.After the end of the war, many Ukrainians of higher education were established, returned home either voluntarily or were for example the Ukrainian Higher School forcibly repatriated to the Soviet Union. of Economics (Munich), the Ukrainian A small part of them remained in German Free Academy of Science (Augsburg) or and Austrian camps for Displaced Persons the Ukrainian Free University (Munich). (DPs), with an estimated number of However, with the migration of most 140.000 Ukrainians living in German DP Ukrainians to other western countries in camps in 1947.9 By autumn 194510, 50 the end of the 1940s and in the beginning percent of Ukrainian refugees remained in of the 1950s, many institutions of higher the US Zone (mainly in Bavaria), 25 percent education also moved to other countries. in the British Zone and 5 percent in the The only exception is the Ukrainian Free 11 At the end University, which still exists in Munich of 1951, only around 22.000 Ukrainians today. French Zone of West Germany. majority migrated to other western countries.remained 12 in The West DP Germanycamps were whilst both the a Ukrainian DPs, including many scientists, political and social asylum for Ukrainians. writersWith the and emigration journalists, of the majorityshort period of the of
5 - - id=5180E542575D4996027CEF8379A13ED3.tomcat_GO_1_2?operation=abruftabelleBearbeiten&levelindexFederal Statistical Office Germany (2016): Ausländer: Bundesländer, Stichtag, Geschlecht, Ländergruppi - erungen/Staatsangehörigkeit.=2&levelid=1463484116805&auswahloperation=abruftabelleAuspraegungAuswaehlen&auswahlverzeichnis=ord Accessible at: https://www-genesis.destatis.de/genesis/online/data;jsession - nungsstruktur&auswahlziel=werteabruf&selectionname=12521-0021&auswahltext=%23SSTAAG6-ST166&num-
6 bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Broschueren/2016/migrationsbericht_2014_de.pdf?__blob=publicamer=5&variable=3&name=STAAG6&werteabruf=Werteabruf [27.03.2016] - FederaltionFile Office[27.03.2016] for Migration and Refugees Germany (2016): Migrationsbericht 2014. Accessible at: https://www. 7 8 Dyczok, Marta (2000): The Grand Alliance and Ukrainian Refugees. New York., p. 18. Kubijovyč, Volodymyr (1984): Encyclopedia of Ukraine. Toronto, p. 822. 9 -
10 FirstJacobmeyer, statistical Wolfgang data on (1985):Ukrainians Vom living Zwangsarbeiter in Germany zum can onlyheimatlosen be found Ausländer for the year – die 1945. ‚Displaced Persons‘ in West deutschland 1945–1951. Göttingen, p. 271. 11 Dyczok (2000): The Grand Alliance and Ukrainian Refugees, p. 76–77. 12 13 In Ukrainian: „Centralne Predstavnyctvo Ukrajinskoji Emihraciji“ Marunjak, Volodymyr (1985): Ukrajinska Emihracija v Nimeččyni i Avstriji po druhij svitovij vijni. Munich, p. 116. 14 Dyczok (2000): The Grand Alliance and Ukrainian Refugees, p. 70.
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 51 Germany as a center of Ukrainian cultural particular Soviet republics in order not to complicate the relations with the Soviet The consequence of this development Union. Consequently, Ukraine, for many and scientific life in Western Europe ended. years, became a “white spot” in the German institutions in Germany but also a lack society. This perception remained after ofwas bilateral not only institutional a lack of Ukrainian platforms. scientific Thus, the collapse of the Soviet Union, leading to Ukrainians neither participated directly Ukraine still being frequently regarded as a in the public debate about Ukraine in Germany nor did they comment on other historical events from a Ukrainian point Ukrainianpart of the Russiandiasporic sphere communityof influence. in of view after early 1950s. Along with Germany – the rise of a new non-state the general post-war circumstances in actor? Germany, this lack of Ukrainian perspective and Ukrainian players in the German public sphere led to a certain “invisibility” many Germans regarding Ukrainian matters of Ukrainians and Ukrainian matters. This stillWhile exists this “white today, spot” this on“gap” the mentalmight mapslowly of effect was further enhanced by the fact that Ukraine was not an independent state and emergence of a possible new non-state actor, the Soviet Union was mostly perceived as thebe filledUkrainian in. This diasporic mainly community. results from This the community includes a considerable number of Ukrainians living in Germany who are not Within the framework of the a part of the “old diaspora”16, as described Ostpolitik, it was not in the above, and who can be characterized by «main interest of the West a high level of interconnectedness with German government to get involved other Ukrainians both on a national and with particular Soviet republics international levels. This group mainly in order not to complicate the consists of labour migrants, students and relations with the Soviet Union Jewish Ukrainians17 who came to Germany in the last decade as well as (German) spouses of Ukrainians. During the interviews, it a homogenous political actor. The policies became clear that many of them do not pursued by the German government, consider themselves as part of Ukrainian particularly the so-called Ostpolitik (new diaspora. Instead, they rather see themselves as Ukrainians living abroad for a certain time
andEastern Eastern policy) Europe, of Willy could Brandt be regarded that aimed as willingness to integrate into the German anat easingadditional tensions factor between for this West“invisibility”. Germany15 society,or indefinitely. and are Quitecharacterized often they by showlow levels high of interconnectedness amongst each other and low civic engagement with regard to GermanWithin thegovernment framework to get of theinvolved Ostpolitik, with Ukrainian issues before Euromaidan. it was not in the main interest of the West
15 Kappeler, Andreas (2001): Die Ukraine in der deutschsprachigen Historiographie. In (Hrsg.): Jordan, Peter et al.: Ukraine: Geographie – Ethnische Struktur, Geschichte – Sprache und Literatur, Kultur – Politik – Bildung –
16 Wirtschaft – Recht. Frankfurt/M., Berlin, Berlin, Bruxelles, New York, Oxford, Wien, p. 216. UkrainiansIn the context in Germany”.of this paper the “old diaspora” is defined as a rather homogenous group of people of Ukrainian 17 Sincedecent the lining collapse in Germany of the Soviet in the Union first, second Jewish orpersons third generation. and persons Further of Jewish explained heritage in are the accepted section “Main to migrate facts toabout
Germany as so called quota refugees (Kontingentflüchtlinge). 52 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 As the events of Euromaidan in Kyiv led joint events. Furthermore, the interviews to mobilization and manifestation of a revealed that a major factor uniting the civil society within Ukraine, a similar members of the diasporic community development can be observed in Germany. and their different forms of engagement Euromaidan was the initial trigger for are common values as a group. Especially, networking among Ukrainians in Germany “Euromaidan values” or “European values” and for their engagement leading to the as listed in art. 2 of the Treaty on European emergence of a diasporic community. The Union (TEU), i.e. human dignity, freedom, perceived necessity to help and a growing democracy, equality, the rule of law and sense of belonging to a Ukrainian group in respect for human rights, were named. For Germany motivated many to take part in the interviewees, this overlap also creates a solidarity protests and common activities. constant link to Euromaidan in Kyiv and the civil society in Ukraine. emergence of a new diasporic community, theWhereas annexation Euromaidan of the Crimea triggered and the war the in Ukraine were additional drivers for the institutionalization of the engagement formation and civic engagement of this ofWith Ukrainians regard to in the Germany, variety anda stabilized ongoing new community. In late 2013 and early diasporic community has the potential to 2014, a plethora of political initiatives was function as a non-state actor in the long term. started, which since then have experienced To date, we can observe the mobilization of a continuous change concerning intensity, new individual actors starting to establish a organization, goals and means. The homogenous community. This becomes not interviews showed that many engagements only evident in their transnational activities are undergoing a process of further with Ukrainian civil society, but also in their institutionalization and professionalization interaction with the German society, thus since their formation. acting as an intercultural link between Ukrainians and Germans. Recently, bilateral The use of social media considerably activities between Ukrainians and Germans facilitated this process not only as a tool to have gained in importance. As such joint initiate protests and common activities but activities are increasingly initiated by also as a means to establish new contacts the German side, it can be assumed that and to extend personal networks. Besides social media, another factor that played visible in Germany. The next section will a decisive role for networking among elaborateUkrainians on finallythe two are main becoming forms of morecivic members of the diasporic community was engagement – humanitarian aid in Ukraine the Church. Before Euromaidan, the Church and engagement in Germany – and their (especially the Greek-Catholic Church) provided the only platform for Ukrainians in Germany to meet, discuss and share ideas. Thepotential engagement internal and externalof the influence.diasporic This exchange became even more important community during Euromaidan. Furthermore, the process of networking was actively promoted by Ukrainians themselves, Ukrainian diasporic initiatives, which e.g. by holding so-called “Stammtische” emergedStarting in in Germany, November were 2013, mainly the focusing first (regular’s tables). Additionally, since 2014, on political protest and information the Ukrainian embassy and the consulate generals in Germany have been increasingly Not only did the engagement during this focused on connecting Ukrainians in timeactivities focus (e.g. on showing Euromaidan solidarity Wache with Berlin). the Germany, e.g. through the organization of protests in Kiev, but many informative
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 53 initiatives were aimed at the German of democratization in Ukraine.18 At the public as well. The interviewees describe same time, there is a risk that the reduction of reform pressure will only have positive on Euromaidan and the following effects in the short term. In the long run, warthat alongin Eastern with the Ukraine first violent many incidents of the reversed consequences could occur, with formerly political initiatives broadened the continuous support of the diasporic their range of activities – now mainly community leading to the omission of focusing on activities aimed at Ukraine, needed reforms.19 e.g. humanitarian aid for Ukrainians suffering from the outcomes of the war The indirect stabilization of Ukraine in Eastern Ukraine or military support is not the only process contributing to for the Ukrainian army. At the same time, democratization. To provide humanitarian with the manifestation of the situation in aid, Ukrainian activists in Germany often Ukraine, cultural and informative activities cooperate with civil society in Ukraine. The in Germany are gaining importance again interviewees pointed out that this does with the intention to explain Ukraine and not only serve as a control mechanism Ukrainian matters to the German public, to ensure that donations reach their recipients, but is also crucial to receive mental map of Germans. information from Ukraine. Furthermore, thus trying to fill in the “white spot” on the the members of the diasporic community The engagement in Ukraine sharing European values as described in the section before, strictly insist upon Humanitarian and military aid plays a major these values in their activities and in their role in the engagement of the diasporic cooperation with Ukrainian partners. community. The main activities include For example, engagement is structured supplying hospitals and social institutions in a democratic way, as decision-making like orphanages with equipment and drugs, is often based on discussions where the support of families and the bereaved everyone can participate. Furthermore, the of soldiers and displaced persons and – at interviewees follow rules of transparency
Ukraine – the provision of equipment expenses public and publishing reports forthe the beginning Ukrainian of army, the conflict such as in uniforms Eastern onin theirtheir activities,activities e.g.– not by only making to gain financial trust and protective vests. This engagement from German partners, but also to support was deemed necessary as the state itself, the underlying normative concept. This suffering from the consequences of the war in the East and the economic crisis, in Ukraine – interviewees describe that theyalso influencesare not only their making work sure with that partners their Therefore, the diasporic community partners are reliable, but also expect indirectlydid not seem contributed fit to provide to the these stabilization services. transparency from their side. In the long of the Ukrainian government, especially term, the advocacy of democratic norms and the demand that partners in Ukraine potentially, by reducing reform pressure in adjust to these norms can considerably in the beginning of the conflict – which
some fields, could also support the process influence civil society in Ukraine, leading
18 Melnyk/Patalong/Plottka/Steinberg (2016): How the Ukrainian Diasporic Community in Germany Contributes to EU’s Policy in its Home Country, p. 9. 19 Ibid. p. 9.
54 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 to the democratization of Ukraine from the this perception, activists are organizing bottom up.20 different events to promote Ukrainian culture and history. The engagement in Germany Another problem perceived by the diasporic community is the indifference of activities in Germany aim at the support many Germans regarding the engagement andWhile stabilization an important of civil part society of the in Ukrainian Ukraine, of Ukrainians. Even though Euromaidan, therefore indirectly contributing to the the annexation of the Crimea and the democratization of the country, the trend war in Eastern Ukraine were present in of activists to refocus on cultural and German media over a long period of time informative activities in Germany can be and Germans supported humanitarian aid observed. These are not only addressing to Ukraine, many interviewees described the members of the diasporic community, a lack of support for the activities of the but also the German society – to close diasporic community. This became also the gap between the German society and apparent in the low interconnectedness Ukrainians and to counter their limited between the diasporic community and visibility, as interviewees often highlighted. other German actors, e.g. civil society, This gap is of historical origin as described media and political institutions. This in the historical overview. For example, problem does not only result from the active Ukrainians feel that Euromaidan missing or critical perception of Ukrainian was incorrectly perceived by the German engagement in the German society, but society as it was often equalized with a also from a lacking platform for joint right wing movement in the German public initiatives. Only few German institutions debate. They actively tried to change this view, e.g. by translating Ukrainian news into German, using their slogans in German Ukrainians feel that Euromaidan during numerous demonstrations and was incorrectly perceived by the the organization of informative events to «German society as it was often explain that the Euromaidan was not about equalized with a right wing movement nationalism but about European values. in the German public debate
At the same time, the interviewees expressed the feeling that Ukrainian culture have been working with Ukrainians actors and history is often associated with the within the country itself or in Germany. Russian one. This seems to be mainly due The few organizations mentioned by the to the historical perception of Ukraine as interviewees most often only organize being merely a “post-soviet” state, which annual conferences or hold round tables, but remains a part of the Russian sphere of are not pursuing long-term activities, e.g. in capacity building in Ukraine, where skills and Russia enhance this understanding and intercultural competence of Ukrainians ofinfluence. Ukraine The as close well links as betweenthe large Germany impact living in Germany could contribute as of Russian propaganda in Germany, as the interviewees describe. To counter the “Kiev Dialogue”, bilateral initiatives well. With only some exceptions like
20 Melnyk/Patalong/Plottka/Steinberg (2016): How the Ukrainian Diasporic Community in Germany Contributes to EU’s Policy in its Home Country, p. 8.
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 55 like the Ukrainian-German Historical activists are working in German projects Commission, the UKRAINE Network or that aim at capacity building in Ukraine. the UkraineLab-Forum were founded Thus, they are not only contributing their only after Euromaidan, mainly providing expertise but also serve as a bridge between a platform for networking. Despite these the German and Ukrainian civil society initiatives, the overall cooperation between through their intercultural competence. German and Ukrainian civic actors remains limited. Overall, the attempts of Ukrainians diasporic community indeed can predominantly lacking long-term success. be perceived as a new non-state Nevertheless,to find access towith the their German engagement public are «actor acting as an intercultural the diasporic community actively tries link between Ukrainians and Germans
Ukraine, which – in the long-term – has to influence the German perception of These trends show that the diasporic spot” in the German mental map, but also community indeed can be perceived the potential not only to fill in the “white as a new non-state actor acting as an between Germany and Ukraine. intercultural link between Ukrainians and positively influence bilateral relations Germans. Conclusion Recommendations Ukrainians are looking back on the mixed Due to the diasporic community’s potential, it becomes apparent that its support should processhistory inof Germany. institutionalizing While after its theactivities, World also of interest to Ukrainian government theWar emigration II the Ukrainian of the majority diaspora of wasUkrainians in the – not only as a contributor to stabilization interrupted this development. Ukrainians and transformation of the state but also as became an invisible community, a „white a bridge between Ukrainian and German spot“ on the mental map of the German societies. public. Euromaidan led to the emergence of a new group: the diasporic community. • Therefore, Ukrainian government should Characterized by a high interconnectedness support the diasporic community by amongst its members and common setting up a Ukrainian cultural institute European democratic values, this group has in Germany. Ukrainians in Germany often the potential to act as a new non-state actor complain about the lack of a “Ukrainian if the process of institutionalization and House”. Such a “Ukrainian House” professionalization of their engagement could not only provide a platform for continues. To estimate this potential, two networking and space for joint activities, but would also strengthen both the The analysis showed that the activities visibility of Ukrainian culture and the havemain the fields potential of engagement to support were the process analyzed. of diaspora in Germany – thus supporting democratization of Ukraine in the long term the diasporic engagement both in – both through the indirect stabilization Ukraine and in Germany. of the Ukrainian government and the diffusion of norms in the cooperation with • Ukrainian government should also invest in the establishment and support reduced reform pressure. At the same time, of bilateral forums – both between the theUkrainian diasporic civic communityactors − besides in Germany the risk of is a diasporic community and German civic experiencing a new trend: more and more actors as well as between the diasporic
56 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 community and Ukrainian civil society. First, bilateral forums between Ukrainian Ljudmyla Melnyk works as a Research Associate at diasporic and German civic actors would the Institut für Europäische Politik. Since 2015–2016 she has been a part of the project team “Ukrainians in foster their interconnectedness. The Poland and Germany – Civic and Political Engagement, engagement of Ukrainians, often still Expectations and Courses of Actions” supported by lacking institutionalized structures, the German Polish Science Foundation. Currently, she could gain expertise and resources is the leader of the project “Strengthening Ukrainian from the cooperation with German Think Tanks: institutional capacity building and organizations and initiatives, thus empowering cooperation with partners from the EU” contributing to the formalization and supported by the German Federal Foreign Office. Her professionalization of their activities. research focuses on civil society, the language situation This, in turn, could lead to the extension in Ukraine, intercultural communication and German- of their engagement, both in Germany Ukrainian relations. and Ukraine. Second, the engagement of Magdalena Patalong works as a Research Assistant the diasporic community might gain in at the Institut für Europäische Politik. From 2015 to credibility and visibility when working 2016 she was a part of the project team “Ukrainians in in joint projects with established Poland and Germany – Civic and Political Engagement, German actors and organizations. Expectations and Courses of Actions”, supported by the German Polish Science Foundation, and is now part • The Ukrainian government should also of the project team “Strengthening Ukrainian Think foster bilateral platforms between the Tanks: institutional capacity building and empowering diasporic community and civic actors cooperation with partners from the EU” supported by in Ukraine. Especially the latter would the German Federal Foreign Office. She is currently studying East European Studies at the Free University, interconnectedness and exchange Berlin. considerably profit from extensive Richard Steinberg works as a Research Associate at between both groups, as they could the Institut für Europäische Politik. He studied history learn from the experiences of diasporic and social sciences at the Humboldt-University of activists and thus professionalize Berlin, the Université de Toulouse II – Le Mirail and the and extend their activities in Ukraine. University of Erfurt. From 2015 to 2016 he was a part Furthermore, the above mentioned of the project “Ukrainians in Poland and Germany– mechanism of norm diffusion could Civic and Political Engagement, Expectations and take place when actors from both states Courses of Actions” supported by the German Polish cooperate – thus leading to the bottom- Science Foundation. Richard Steinberg is an alumnus up democratization of Ukraine in the of the Foundation of German Business and was Junior long term. Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (2010).
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 57 REBIRTH OF UKRAINIAN-ROMANIAN FRIENDSHIP: NEW OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES
Reghina Dimitrisina, MA Babeș-Bolyai University (Romania)
This research paper aims to provide a complete analysis of Ukrainian- Romanian relations after 2004. Here, challenges that Romania and Ukraine have faced will be highlighted. Namely, their territorial dispute and the status of the Romanian minority in the Western part of Ukraine. Furthermore, a detailed analysis of the relations between the states after 2014 will be provided. In order to do so, public discourse and political statements made by the Presidents of both countries will be used. This can be considered an efficient theoretical instrument to better comprehend the relations between the states. To end with, after giving an overview of the perplexing relationship in the context of Russian aggression, we would like to outline the opportunities to rebuild trust between Ukraine and Romania that we have today.
Introduction issue of protecting Romanian minority in the country’s biggest neighbour and the It is well known that Ukraine and Romania condemnation of the Ribbentrop-Molotov are neighbouring European states, sharing Pact. Despite that, the credit for positive similar historical background, national progress in bilateral relations should be transition and possessing common cultural given partly to the prospects of Euro-Atlantic heritage. Ideally, these two countries are integration. As part of the accession process, supposed to have strong ties and fruitful Romania had to have basic treaties with all its diplomatic communication. However, neighbours. As a result, in June 1997 Romania exactly like two neighbours living next to and Ukraine signed the Treaty on Good each other, Ukraine and Romania are facing Neighbourliness and Cooperation. Two years many challenges. later, in May 1999, President Constantinescu
It is worth mentioning that immediately after Romanian Revolution, the relations Ukraine.paid an official1 It could visit have to Ukraine, been a promising which was start the between The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist infirst Ukrainian-Romanian official visit of a Romanian relations. President However, to Republic (USSR) and Romania were also things went a different way. tense. According to Irina Angelescu, the fall of the Soviet Union brought territorial From January 2005 until February 2010 disputes to the forefront, as well as the
the President of Ukraine was a pro-Western
1 I. Angelescu, New Eastern Perspectives? A Critical Analysis of Romania’s Relations with Moldova, Ukraine and the Black Sea Region, “New Perspectives”, Vol.19, No.2, pp.133-134.
58 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 optimistic period in Ukrainian-Romanian the uncertain focus of the Ukrainian foreign relations. However, everything changed policy,politician Ukraine − Viktor and Yushchenko.Romania had Because a distant of in the priorities of Ukrainian-Romanian relationship. cooperation with the newly elected Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych There have been many initiatives and in February 2010. Many political analysts projects regarding the cooperation of the agree that Yanukovych’s presidential term two countries, but these projects were never was a damaging one for Ukrainian foreign conducted properly. For instance, in 2006 policy and especially for relations with President Yushchenko met his counterpart neighbours. President Basescu in Bucharest, in order to discuss Ukrainian- Romanian relations in the economic and political spheres, as well Ukraine and Romania had to solve the long dispute presidential commission, which aimed at «regarding the maritime solvingas forming the most a mixed challenging Ukrainian issues − Romanian between delimitation in the Black Sea the two states. Among other matters, two Presidents also focused on trans-border cooperation.2 Vladlen Makoukh and Artem Filipenko The next visible step in Ukrainian-Romanian cooperation was made in 2009, when perfectly at that moment in the context President Yushchenko held phone talks ofdescribed constructing Ukrainian a −new Romanian foreign relations policy with President Basescu. This time, Ukraine strategy. Particularly, they claim that and Romania had to solve the long dispute after adopting the Law of Ukraine „On regarding the maritime delimitation in the the Principles of Domestic and Foreign Black Sea. Policy” (July 1, 2010), which claimed Ukraine’s policy of non-alignment, the According to UNIAN, Ukrainian Information issue of joining NATO was removed from Ukrainian foreign policy agenda, while and Romania accepted the decision of the cooperation on Ukraine’s implementation InternationalAgency, both leadersCourt of affirmed Justice onthat maritime Ukraine of Euro-Atlantic integration was halted. delimitation of Ukrainian-Romanian Signing the Ukrainian-Russian agreement border in the Black Sea, approved on on prolongation of the Russian Black Sea February 3.3 a fruitful discussion, taking into account 2010) caused a negative reaction from the the fact that Weboth can parts conclude recognized that it their was Romanianfleet’s location side. inIn theparticular, Crimea (AprilPresident 21, responsibility regarding this matter. Traian Basescu said in October 2010 that „the fact of Russia’s prolongation of All these steps made by both parties were a promising beginning of a new does not suit Romania”. A similar position agreement on basing its fleet in Sevastopol
2 President Viktor Yushchenko and his Romanian counterpart Traian Basescu discuss economic cooperation,
www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ukrnews/363471president_viktor_ yushchenko_and_his_ romanian_ cou nterpart_tra- ian_basescu_discuss_economic_cooperation_continental_shelf_delimitation_and_construction_of_danube___black_continental shelf delimitation and construction of Danube − Black Sea Shipping Canal, “UKRINFORM”, [http:// sea_shipping_canal_76567.html access: 13 May 2016]. 3 Yushchenko holds phone talks with Basescu, “UNIAN”, 6 February 2009, [http://www.unian.info/world/188177- yushchenko-holds-phone-talks-with-basescu.html access: 13 May 2016].
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 59 was repeatedly expressed by Romanian have opened a window of opportunity for politicians and experts.4 improving Romanian-Ukrainian relations. In this sense, our neighbouring country, It is a well-known fact that Viktor Yanukovych Romania, can be seen as an example of the was a pro-Russian politician and his close ties EU accession. with the Russian Federation caused major distancing from Romania. As stated in his In terms of policy and strategy, it is worth BBC channel5, Viktor Yanukovych’s mentioning that in 2014 preparations for closest ties and support have always come the launch of one of the biggest projects fromprofile mainly on Russian-speaking eastern and aiming to improve Romanian-Ukrainian southern Ukraine. Mr. Yanukovych tried hard to shed the image of being “Moscow’s man” started to work on a joint project entitled The and when he became president, he pointedly Jointcooperation Operational were Program finished. Romania-Ukraine The countries 2014-2020 6. This project Brussels, rather than to Moscow. However, focuses on four objectives, envisaged by made his first foreign trip as president to European Neighborhood, financed by the Instrument EU (ENI): he argued that free trade ties with the EU wouldwith Ukraine’s jeopardize finances Ukraine’s in a existing parlous state,trade 1. Support for education, research, with Russia. The EU refused his demand for technological development and substantial compensation. innovation;
Taking into account a pro-Russian foreign 2. Promotion of local culture and policy distancing the country from its preservation of historical heritage; integration with the EU, and a halting partnership with NATO, Ukraine “has put on 3. Improvement of accessibility to the hold” bilateral cooperation with Romania. regions, development of transport and As a result, all the initiatives and projects communication networks and systems; developed by Viktor Yushchenko and his team regarding Ukrainian-Romanian cooperation were erased from the Ukrainian and security; foreign policy agenda. 4. Common challenges in the field of safety The Joint Operational Program Romania- The next stage of Ukrainian-Romanian Ukraine 2014-2020 contributes to the relations started in 2014, and this was a achievement of the overall ENI objective year of drastic changes for Ukraine. The of “progress towards an area of shared Euromaidan or Revolution of Dignity shifted prosperity and good neighbourliness the political course of the country and the between Member states and their vector of its foreign policy. In 2014, Ukraine neighbours”. As we can see, the instruments of the EU offer opportunities for further Membership. Current events in Ukraine cooperation between Ukraine and Romania. officially started to pursue NATO and EU
4 V. Makoukh, A. Filipenko, Ukraine-Romania: issues and challenges of bilateral relations, [available at http://www.
5 news/world-europe-25182830,umk.ro/images/documente/publicatii/Buletin222/makoukh_filipenko.pdf access: 13 May 2016]. access: 13 May 2016]. 6 RomaniaProfile: Ukraine’s Joint Operational ousted President Programme Viktor Romania Yanukovych, – Ukraine “BBC 2014-2020, Europe”, 28 “Managing February Authority2014, [http://www.bbc.com/ Ministry of Regional Development and Public Administration”, [available at http://www.ro-ua-md.net/wp-content/up- loads/2016/01/0-Romania-Ukraine-JOP-approved.pdf access: 13 May 2016].
60 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 Meanwhile, some drastic changes in communities in Ukraine and Ukrainian Ukrainian internal policy were made as well. communities in Romania: After Revolution of Dignity, Ukrainians chose “We agreed that Romanian minority in businessman, Petro Poroshenko. The Ukraine and Ukrainian minority in Romania newlya new president,elected President a well-known of Ukraine pro-Western made a should become a positive factor which has few important announcements regarding to help us in order to maintain an excellent Ukrainian-Romanian relations, stressing the neighbourly relationship. We would like to importance of bilateral cooperation. see a positive outcome from our collaboration in the near future. Moreover, we would like to underline that one of the most important November 2014 when Klaus Iohannis points on Romanian-Ukrainian agenda will becameParticularly, the President the first of stepRomania. was According made in be the rebirth of political dialogue between to the President’s press service, Petro our countries and Romanian support for the Poroshenko congratulated Klaus Iohannis solution finding process in the conflict in the with a victory during the presidential Eastern part of Ukraine.”8 support of sovereignty and territorial It is important to mention that these state- integrityelections, of and Ukraine. also thankedBesides, forPoroshenko the firm ments are not on paper only. In a very short also said he hoped for good-neighbouring time, these declarations became a real poli- relations with Romania: “Romania was the cy. Two Presidents met on April 21, 2016 in Bucharest. During this Presidential meeting, Agreement between Ukraine and the EU, Klaus Iohannis and Petro Poroshenko signed andfirst itscountry, support which of our ratified European the Associationintegration a protocol on the relaunch of the Romani- aspirations is very important,” he said an-Ukrainian presidential joint committee. and invited Romanian President to visit Ukraine. For his part, Iohannis returned Iohannis asserted that this protocol allows thanks to the Ukraine’s Head of state for his congratulations and assured of backing agenda: Ukraine on its way to Europe.7 taking steps to solve old files on the bilateral “The committee will be an instrument of Very soon we saw that President’s imprinting the political will and the necessary statements were put into action. On March impulse to solve the issues on the bilateral agenda, allowing us to fully capitalize the cooperation potential that exists between our for17 2015,Ukraine’s Klaus getting Iohannis closer paid to an the official European visit countries. Therefore, we will be able to make Union.to Kiev Iohannis where heannounced voiced his back firm then support that steps forward to resolve some files that have he agreed with Poroshenko on two countries been on the bilateral agenda for a long time, enhancing the visibility of Romanian one of which is the Bystroe Channel.” 9
7 Poroshenko hopes neighborly relations with Romania to be developed in the future, “Interfax-Ukraine”, 25 Novem- ber 2014, [http://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/236069.html, access: 13 May 2016]. 8 Iohannis, vizita in Ucraina in contextul tensiunilor cu Rusia. Romania si Germania, tratament medical pentru soldatii raniti (Iohannis, visit to Ukraine in the context of tensions with Russia. Romania and Germany, treatment for soldiers), “ProTV”, 17 March 2015, [http://stirileprotv.ro/stiri/politic/klaus-iohannis-merge-in-ucraina-in-con- textul-tensiunilor-dintre-rusia-si-nato-cu-cine-se-va-intalni.html access: 14 May 2016]. 9 Presidents Iohannis, Poroshenko sign Protocol on Romanian-Ukrainian joint committee’s relaunch, “Nineoclock”, 21 April 2016, [http://www.nineoclock.ro/presidents-iohannis-poroshenko-sign-protocol-on-romanian-ukraini- an-joint-committees-relaunch/ access: 14 May 2016].
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 61 Romania’s President pointed out that it is Romania in enhancing and developing intended to intensify cooperation between bilateral relations. Petro Poroshenko urged the two countries both in the cultural and the Romanian Parliament to provide expert assistance in the harmonization of national that the Romanian Cultural Institute (ICR) legislation with the EU legislation in the willthe educationalstart to operate field, as and soon expressed as possible hope framework of the European integration of in Kiev, alongside its branch of Chernivtsi. Ukraine. The President of the Chamber of Iohannis said that talks with his Ukrainian Deputies of Romania called Ukraine’s path counterpart also focused on better to the EU a path to the welfare of Ukrainians. He also expressed full support for Ukraine’s the progress of the infrastructure projects territorial integrity and condemned Russian andenforcement the opening of the of border new bordertraffic agreement, crossings. aggression against Ukraine.11 Iohannis said that such measures have a strong impact upon the life quality of the Another important discussion was held citizens of the two countries and upon the between President Poroshenko and the tightening of connections among them. In this respect, a fast opening of the Romanian consulate in Solotvino is very important. The toPrime develop Minister the opportunities of Romania Dacianrelated Cioloșto the Head of state also said the bilateral economic functioningduring the officialof the visit.free trade The partiesarea between agreed relations should be fostered.10 Ukraine and the EU. The President noted the importance of the experience of Romanian companies in entering the EU In terms of analysing political market and attracting foreign investments statements, we can underline that in the national economy. The parties «words like cooperation, political discussed a series of bilateral issues, dialogue, contribution, intensification, particularly their cooperation in agriculture, collaboration were used several mechanical engineering and transport. times in both Presidents’ statements. This is a clear sign of a new stage the enhancement of transport connection in Romanian-Ukrainian relations betweenBoth parties Ukraine noted a significantand Romania. progress The in interlocutors also urged airlines to establish
Petro Poroshenko on his side made some the two countries. In addition, the parties very important announcements as well. discusseddirect regular the flights importance between of the developing capitals of According to the President of Ukraine’s transport connection in the Danube Delta, website, Petro Poroshenko held negotiations particularly the construction of new bridges. with the President of the Chamber of Deputies Following the meeting, the parties agreed of Romania Valeriu Zgonea. The parties to accelerate the signature of documents discussed the role of the parliamentary necessary for natural gas supplies from groups of friendship of Ukraine and Romania to Ukraine.12
10 Ibidem. 11 President of Ukraine meets with President of Chamber of Deputies of Romania: Parliamentary dialogue plays im-
president.gov.ua/en/news/parlamentskij-dialog-vidigraye-vazhlivu-rol-u-zmicnenni-dvos-37018 access: 14 May 2016].portant role in enhancing bilateral relations, “President of Ukraine. Official website”, 21 April 2016, [http://www. 12 - - na-i-rumuniya-mayut-velikij-potencial-dlya-rozvitku-ek-37016Petro Poroshenko meets with Dacian Cioloș: Ukraine and Romania access: have 16 great May potential 2016]. to develop economic co operation, “President of Ukraine. Official website”, 21 April 2016, [http://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/ukrayi
62 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 In terms of analysing political statements, distrust has been broken, and this paves we can underline that words like the way for the development of Ukrainian- cooperation, political dialogue, contribution, Romanian cooperation.”13
several times in both Presidents’ statements. Ukrainian Revolution and the war in the Thisintensification, is a clear collaborationsign of a new were stage used in Eastern part of the country pushed forward Romanian-Ukrainian relations. The context the collaboration of its neighbours in foreign policy. In the situation of crisis, it of the collaboration process between the was clear that Ukraine needs active support countries.of the speeches indicates the intensification and strengthened cooperation with the border countries. Political analysts from both sides agreed that this situation gave In his opinion, Bucharest tries the green light to the “rebirth” of Romanian- to counter-balance Russian Ukrainian friendship. «influence by bringing Ukraine closer in terms of social exchange As we can see, Jan Mus highlighted in his research paper the fact that Romanian approach to the Ukrainian crisis transforms Another challenge for bilateral relations into active diplomacy. In his opinion, was the annexation of the Crimea and Bucharest tries to counter-balance Russian Russian aggression in the Eastern part of Ukraine. These events were mentioned by of social exchange. The Ukrainian crisis and many political analysts as a sign of the end itsinfluence consequences by bringing resulted Ukraine in closerstrengthening in terms of the “cold era” in Ukrainian-Romanian pro-European elements and anti-Russian relations. As an illustration, Tomasz attitude among Romanian elites. It has also had a stimulating effect on Romanian foreign analysis for The Centre for Eastern Studies policy.14 Dąborowski and Tadeusz Iwański in their Another political analyst, Olexandra “The(OSW) main stated cause the forfollowing: this change is the two Zasmorzhuk, in her article for UNIAN stated sides’ concurrent perception of risks in the that today the twenty-year stagnation Black Sea region since Russia’s annexation period in the relationship between the of the Crimea. Another impetus to this two countries has ended. Romania joined thaw is the change in the domestic political the countries that condemned Russian situation in both countries: the strong pro- aggression against Ukraine and expressed Western course of the new authorities in its support. The dialogue and the opinions Kyiv, and Klaus Iohannis’s assumption of exchange has begun. Hopefully, it is only the Romanian presidency in December going to develop. 2014. Although there is still a catalogue of unresolved issues, a long-time barrier of
13 - ing-through-distrust-relations-between-romania-and-ukraine,T. Dąborowski, T. Iwański, Breaking through distrust in relations access: between 16 MayRomania 2016]. and Ukraine, “The Centre for 14 J.Eastern Mus, Before Studies the (OSW)”, Curtain 27 fall April in the 2016, Balkans. [http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2016-04-27/break The Ukrainian crisis from the Peripheral Perspective, 2014. Crisis in
15 O. Zasmorzhuk, A New Friend of Ukraine, “UNIAN”, 16 April 2015, [http://www.unian.info/politics/1067966-a- new-friend-of-ukraine.html,Ukraine. Perspectives, Reflections, access: ASLAN 30 May Publishing 2016]. House: December 2015, p.215.
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 63 Conclusions will continue to achieve new levels of trust between the two nations.
the past and many thought that these Ukraine and Romania had difficulties in their disputes and a common ground for Reghina Dimitrisina is a postgraduate in Political furthercountries cooperation. are unable Recent to find events, solutions which to Communication at Babes-Bolyai University from Cluj- took place in 2014-2015 showed a road to Napoca, Romania. She joined a Master programme rediscover the potential for both countries. in Political Communication at the College of Political, At this moment, Klaus Iohannis and Petro Administrative, and Communication Sciences and holds Poroshenko are very proactive in this regard; a Bachelor degree (BA) in International Relations and and it looks like the path of mutual distrust European Studies. During her Bachelor studies, she had was left behind. outstanding academic results and her hard work was rewarded with the Romanian Government Scholarship. Today, it is crucial to remember and She continues to write and publish excellent book to highlight the importance of a good neighbourly partnership between the reviews and scientific papers in Romania and Ukraine countries. Especially when we have a perfect as well. Her recent research project on “Comparative opportunity to do so in the present context of Analysis of the Electoral Campaigns of Vladimir political and economic situation. It is time to Putin in 2000, 2004 and 2012” was published and reload Ukrainian-Romanian friendship and presented at the International Students’ Conference on hopefully, the good start of this collaboration Communication in Romania.
64 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 SLOVAKIA AND UKRAINE: EASTERN PARTNERS
Dr. Aaron T. Walter University of Ss.Cyril & Methodius in Trnava, Trnava, Slovakia
Slovakia and Ukraine are geographic neighbors, which have independently sought a path for integration with the rest of Europe and strategic partnerships. While Slovakia successfully integrated joining the European Union, the Eurozone, and NATO, Ukraine is still involved in the process. The main research questions the author covers in the article are the relations Ukraine has had with the Slovak Republic since 2014, with the illegal annexation of the Crimea by Russia, and continued unrest in the Donbas region following. What, if any, regional cooperation exists between the two nations? And how much Slovakia aids Ukraine?
Introduction Empire. After the partition of Poland and conquest of the Khanate, Ukraine had been There is a similar story to Slovakia and ruled until 1918 by both Tsarist Russia and Ukraine. Their individual histories have the Hapsburg Empire. After the Revolution some similar threads, yet the outcomes for of 1917, Ukraine was ravaged by civil each in the late twentieth and early twenty- war, emerging to become a founding
nations spent most of their history ruled byfirst someone century else. are For very centuries, different. Slovakia Both known then as Upper Hungary was ruled While their individual stories from Budapest. Then it was a piece of the continue to share the common «link of post-communist nations years as a part of Czechoslovakia that most navigating the political and economic peopleHapsburg remember, Empire. though It is the admittedly seventy-five this waves of new times and trends, the union was a troubled one from the start, outcomes have proven different
Prague, while many Czechs saw Slovakia with Slovaks chafing at being ‘ruled’ from Ukraine for centuries was divided and ruledas a poor by threeneighbour external and financialpowers1: burden.Poland Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, Ukraine (and for a period of time, this included becamerepublic independent of the Soviet and Union. Slovakia When became the the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth), independent on 1 January 1993 with Russia, and the Crimean Khanate; a the peaceful split of the ‘Czechoslovak successor to the Mongolian Golden Horde, nation’; a fragile construct according to a and Turkic vassal state of the Ottoman sociologist Olga Gyárfášová.
1 An extraordinary good book on Ukrainian history, Anna Reid’s Borderland: A Journey through the History of Ukraine is recommended though the authoritative history of Ukraine written in English arguable remains Ukraine: A History by Orest Subtelney.
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 65 The transition to a market economy has economy and meet criteria necessary produced different results for Slovakia for ascension to the European Union. A prolonged crisis started in November 2013, continue to share the common link of post- continued with the Russian annexation communistand Ukraine. nations While navigating their individual the political stories of the Crimea and further aggression in and economic waves of new times and Donetsk and Luhansk. The result has been trends, the outcomes have proven different. economy and undetermined timetable for mid-1990s by the early 2000s, due to a pro- Ukrainefurther negative to join the influence European on Union. the Ukrainian While Slovakia initially struggled in the Slovakia underwent the necessary reforms Nevertheless, Ukraine has continued positive toWestern join the government, European andUnion visionary and NATO leaders, in relations with members of the European 2004 and met the criteria necessary to adopt the euro in 2009. Moreover, since the mid- and Slovakia have regional cooperation in the 2000s Slovakia has seen foreign investors formUnion of in a spiteshared of gas these pipeline, difficulties. with Slovakia Ukraine such as Samsung and Deutsche Telekom assisting Ukraine in its broader relations and major international corporations such with the E.U. Since 2014, Slovakia has been as Volkswagen and Kia make Slovakia home a supporter of various peace initiatives to due to the nations low labour costs, well- end the violence in the Donbass region. trained labour force, and membership in the To understand Slovak diplomacy with its Schengen area that has no border controls eastern neighbour, it is best to describe it within post-ascension priorities. 2, French and German andcompanies passport taking checks. advantage While of Ukraine low wages can Slovak Foreign Policy towards Ukraine boastand high-skilled of significant workers, FDI and international Slovak foreign policy within the last twenty parts maker, investing in 2015 (with the promisefirms such of as hiring Japan’s up Fujikura, to 3,000 an Ukrainians), automobile Ascension and Post-Ascension, where in it is not a part of Schengen and does have theyears former can be membership defined in two in periods:the EU Pre-and border and custom controls. the instruments. The Slovak Republic’s Moreover, economically, Ukraine has not keyNATO challenge were the is goalsto take and advantage in the latter of the − been as fortunate as Slovakia. Ukraine membership in both and utilize as tools in its suffered eight years of recession in its efforts foreign policy advancing national interests. to transition to a market economy and when using Brussels rather than the respective These tools may be efficient enough, if crash.GDP growth This fact, was along significantly with rampant increased, political it post-accession priorities of Slovak foreign corruptionwas nearly wipedand politicalout in the unrest 2008 financialfurther policy,individual3 capitals. Therefore, defined as stymied efforts to transition the Ukrainian the Western Balkans and Ukraine have been evaluated as significant topics
2 see Robert Kirchner, Vitaliy Kravchuk, Julian Ries. Policy Paper Series [PP/02/2015]. “Foreign Direct Investment in Ukraine: Past, Present, and Future” Available at: http://www.beratergruppe-ukraine.de/wordpress/wp-content/ uploads/2014/06/PP_02_2015_en.pdf 3 of Slovakia’s foreign policy after entering NATO and EU by Prime Minister Mikuláš Dzurinda at the Evaluation conferenceRelations with of Slovak Ukraine Republic’s and countries foreign of policy the Western in March Balkans 2004. wereSee: “Appearance publicly defined of Prime for the Minister first time of Slovakas priorities Mikuláš Dzurinda“, in: Brezáni, Peter (ed) Foreign policy of Slovakia after NATO and EU accession. Starting points and strat- egies. 2003. Research Centre of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, Bratislava 2004, pp. 11-17.
66 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 for the foreign policy since they hold rather obvious characteristics: the Action plan with the European Union andoffer having bilateral had support the Slovak in fulfillingEmbassy goals in Kyiv of 1. Each is a priority interest for both the as the contact embassy for NATO since European Union and NATO 2007. However, a positive public opinion towards Ukraine and positive indicators 2. Slovakia has its own vital interest in these with the Slovak government are not enough areas. for a long-term strategic vision. Moreover, continuity was lacking between the Dzurinda Regarding its relations with Ukraine, for (1998-2006) and Fico (2006-present) example, Slovak foreign policy uses NATO governments, which resulted in the absence and the European Union as instruments, of meaningful convergence between while also Slovakia may assume some of the Ukraine, the European Union and NATO. responsibilities of NATO and the European Efforts made have been ruined by the Fico’s Union towards Ukraine. In truth, there government following the 2009 gas crisis. are not many issues in the foreign policy in which the interests of Slovakia and the by the Prime Minister Robert Fico to support EU and NATO4 coincide as closely as they RussiaWhat is in most the Russian-Ukrainiantelling is the unilateral gas decisiondispute, were promulgated priorities of the Slovak accuse Ukraine of being the actor at fault Republic’s foreign policy in March 2004 by and hold it responsible for the disruption then Prime Minister, Mikuláš Dzurinda. of supplies, and most importantly a stated intent to re-evaluate support for Ukraine in The positive reputation of Slovak diplomacy its aspirations to join the European Union. during the Dzurinda’s era produced results The answer to this is simple: economic superior quality in Slovak foreign policy since cooperation. This cooperation remains the 1999,for the with Western some Balkans examples that such represent as Minister the reason to maintain positive relations with of Foreign Affairs, Eduard Kukan’s successful Moscow. Gas deliveries come from Russia. diplomatic mission 1999−2001 as a special Nuclear fuel for Slovakia’s Russian-built representative of the UN Secretary General nuclear power plants come from Russia and for the Balkans in the post-war years; support by the Dzurinda’s government of accession remains procured by Russian manufactures. negotiations between the European Union Yet,a significant a contradictory part of and its defenceat times equipment confusing shift started after the Euromaidan protests. success as a special representative of the EUand High Croatia Representative in 2004; and CFSP Miroslav Janier Lajčák’s Solana In 2014, Slovakia started supplying gas to in the Montenegro referendum in March 2006, allowing for the peaceful division of advocating a softer approach towards Russia, Montenegro from Serbia. explainedUkraine through by Gazprom reverse announcing gas flow, ‘Turkish despite Stream’ project, which would radically Unfortunately, the second half of Slovakia’s shift Russian gas away from Ukraine and post-ascension period lacks vision towards Slovakia thus depriving Bratislava the Ukraine. It remains this way despite the lucrative transit fee. Slovakia was listed as efforts by the Slovak Republic in 2005 to a ‘friendly pragmatist’ in European Council
4 - eign policy of Slovakia after NATO and EU accession. Starting points and strategies. Research Centre of the Slovak SeeForeign Lukáč, Policy Pavol, Association, Tomáš Strážay, Bratislava „Regional 2004. responsibility of Slovakia“, in: Duleba, Alexander a Pavol Lukáč (ed) For
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 67 for Foreign Relations’ 2007 power audit of well as Putin’s threats.” The European Union the EU member states relations with Russia, is seeking a common policy towards Russia,” and was listed on the European Foreign said Bútora. “This issue has been discussed in various European forums. So there has been areas of the European Union’s relationship a certain surpassing of mutual relations on withPolicy Russia scorecard by 2015. as a leader5 Since in the two start out of fivethe Fico’s part, which could be at the expense of Ukrainian crisis, the Slovak government has a common European policy.”7 pursued a somewhat confusing course of characterized as a post-Atlantic Age, those diplomacy. What may be decidedly unconcerned by the Russian The Slovak government and its prime belligerencenations on in NATO’s Ukraine. eastern flank appear minister in particular continue to publicly In truth, the Ukrainian crisis exposes a against Russia. An explanation of this is bothoppose a security further and sector-specific political calculus sanctions for Slovakia; fear of counter-sanctions from fractured Visegrad Group making it difficult the Ukrainian crisis exposes a making process by the prime minister. For fractured Visegrad Group making the Kremlin, and a very selfish decision- Fico, the former communist party member «it difficult for both the EU and NATO and Putin, the former KGB agent it is about to adopt a unified response to Moscow strong interpersonal relations and loyalty 6. More to the point, Martin Bútora, Slovakia’s former ambassador to the(Walter, US, does 2016) not think Fico’s actions can be taken so lightly. According to Bútora, Fico is response to Moscow.8 Robert Fico’s visits ideologically closer to the political regime tofor Moscow both the (JuneEU and 2015), NATO his to adoptpublicly a unified stated in Russia than to the democracies of the opposition to sanctions − because they hurt national interests − the sooner removed, limited, as well as the freedom of assembly the better − indicates a perception that is andWest. many “At present, more freedoms press freedom that are in typical Russia inis different from Poland and other European allies. Moreover, for Fico, while his personal had an issue with the fact that Fico openly preference arguably is Putin’s Russia, the defendedWestern democracies,” Russian demands said Bútora.at a time He when also economic considerations for Slovakia also relations with Russia are being reassessed drive foreign policy calculations. Edward in the EU and NATO because of the tense Lucas, senior editor at The Economist relations between Russia and Estonia as and author of The New Cold War: Putin’s
5 According to the ECFR, these are supporting the strong line of the European Commission’s Directorate General for
6 - peanTrade Studies, on compliance Europe issuesunder withStress: Moscow The End and of fora Common pushing Dream?for the diversification 12–14 June 2016. of gas University supplies ofaway Tartu, from Estonia. Russia 7 L.The Lesná. author Fico presented Finds Common a paper Cause along witha similar Putin theme “The Slovakat the first Spectator”, Annual 14 Tartu May Conference 2007, [http://spectator.sme. on Russia and East Euro
8 In July 2009, a group of former politicians and leading intellectuals from Central and Eastern Europe, including the sk/c/20005088/fico-finds-common-cause-with-putin.html. Access 20 May 2016]. - gion’s “transatlantic orientation” for granted.The writers warned the region could cease to be a “pro-Atlantic voice withinVisegrad the countries, EU” under wrote pressure an open from letter a “revisionist” to U.S. President Russia Barackthat is “pursuingObama, warning a 19th-century Washington agenda not withto take 21st-centu the re - ry tactics.”Russia “uses overt and covert means of economic warfare, ranging from energy blockades and politically motivated investments to bribery and media manipulation in order to advance its interests and to challenge the transatlantic orientation of Central and Eastern Europe,” the letter stated.
68 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 Russia and the Threat to the West, agrees. prevails and Slovakia has begun to diversify “Poland is taking a tremendous lead as the its defense, economy, and energy away from unquestioned leader of the ex-Communist Russian sources11. This may indicate for world,” Lucas says. “Elsewhere, it is a very different picture. Slovakia seems to have form of sympathy to Ukraine. In 2015, it taken, initially, a kind of almost pro-Putin appearedsome observers that Fico the arrival,took a finally,page from of some the line or, at least, anti-sanction…” The Slovak Dzurinda playbook, dispatching a veteran newspaper Nezavisle Novini criticized Fico, claiming softening the sanctions would be a victory for the Russian President Vladimir diplomat and then Foreign Minister Lajčák Putin. Rationally speaking, some observers theto Ukraine. amount Withinof €10,000 his diplomatic for the children´s mission, neuro-surgicalLajčák offered Ukrainecenter in a Kiev,symbolic almost check three in that Slovakia, and Fico, as a prime minister, tons of predominantly medical material for facesare right i.e. belonging to point outto the the European difficult balance Union, military surgeons and the Health Ministry, worth €50,000. The total value of Slovak trade with Russia9. Fico has criticized development aid to Ukraine in 2014 was theyet ‘hypocrisy’ maintaining in economic several EU benefits nations from for approximately €750,000, while in public example France selling naval ships to remarks it was accentuated that the Slovak Government wants to see a stable, a pipeline from Russia to Austria. As Grigorij democratic and prosperous Ukraine, though Meseznikov,Russia, and westerna co-founder firms signingof the aInstitute deal on admittedly painful, yet necessary reforms for Public Affairs, an independent Slovak think tank, explains, “[Fico] He comes from both stabilization and growth. Moreover, Slovakiamust take has place publicly first stated as prerequisites its willingness for resonance in Slovak society, that simply to help Ukraine with its expertise in the the idea, and it seems to be finding some transformation process, which in turn important than strategic considerations.”10 will help in the agreement on political theThis questionis a risk of one’sgiven own the benefit potential is more of association and economic integration undermining Slovakia’s position within the between the EU and Ukraine leading to European Union, especially on the eve of it assuming the rotating presidency in the the Association Agreement.12 In addition to second half of 2016. Slovakia’s own political eventualassisting ratificationUkraine in andits ownimplementation pre-ascension of and security interests and a growing process, the biggest area of cooperation awareness of this risk have allowed for some remains within energy security. change. An adjustment has taken place as Bratislava has seen the potential liability Slovakia supports Ukraine with gas. In doing so, Slovakia has become an important ally. remains, the arch of national self-interest In September 2014, an upgraded pipeline of its closeness to Russia. While skepticism
9 Slovakia PM condemned for pro-Russian stance, opposition to EU sanctions, “Ukraine Today”, 24, February 2015, [http://uatoday.tv/politics/slovakia-pm-condemned-for-pro-russian-stance-opposition-to-eu-sanctions-411462. html. Access 20 May 2016]. 10 Slovakia nurtures special ties to Russia, despite EU sanctions. “EurActiv”, 23 May 2014, [http://www.euractiv.com/ section/europe-s-east/news/slovakia-nurtures-special-ties-to-russia-despite-eu-sanctions/ Access 20 May 2016]. 11 J. Kobzova, Slovakia Changes Course on Russia, “European Council Foreign Relations”, 9 March 2015, [http://www. ecfr.eu/article/commentary_slovakia_changes_course_on_russia311312 Access 20 May 2016]. 12 expertise, 12 September 2014 [https://www.mzv.sk/web/kyjev-en/news/-/asset_publisher/olsKsIdtEfpB/content/ lajcak-ukraine-looks-toward-reforms-slovakia-is-ready-to-help-with-its-expertise-/10182The Embassy of the Slovak Republic in Kiev. Lajčák: Ukraine looks toward reforms; Slovakia Access is ready 20 to May help 2016]. with its
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 69 connection between Slovakia’s Vojany most apathetic. Perhaps business interests power station and Uzhgorod in western took precedence; a fear that hawkish Ukraine began operating. This had an rhetoric towards the Kremlin would hurt immediate effect of reducing Moscow’s Slovak business, but for the prime minister, Robert Fico to state that he would not “make Ukraine had, because of Slovakia, a better vain gestures for [the sake of] gestures”13 energyability tonegotiating influence position Kyiv. More with to Russia the point, on a indicated the unwillingness to anger Russia temporary natural gas deal in October 2015 over an issue like Ukraine. This position is in and a three-month deal reached in early stark contrast to his predecessors. Domestic April 2016. Slovakia has the largest capacity critics, such as the former Prime Minister, and is a loyal supplier, despite Moscow’s Mikuláš Dzurinda, called Prime Minister Fico’s foreign policy timid in an interview Slovakia’s willingness to go beyond Russian with daily newspaper Sme. This timidity objectionswarnings thatis a piece reverse of this flows contradictory are illegal. may come from a personal decision to be shift. For a while, such a move by Slovakia closer to Russia despite the structural and institutional integration Slovakia has with its foreign policy. the European Union. It is also contradicted confirms that its energy interest determined by public opinion polling14 indicating that Slovakia and Ukraine; Slovakia and the majority of Slovaks believe that Ukraine Russia should decide its future independently and that Russia has no right to interfere. Furthermore, the poll revealed that Slovaks and then supported separatist groups in the felt their country should help Ukraine on its DonbasWhen Russia region, illegally what is annexedarguably theconsidered Crimea an invasion with Russian weapons and So, while Prime Minister Fico may criticize troops, the lack of condemnation from the thedifficult sanctions road toand prosperity publicly andstate democracy. his view prime ministers of Slovakia and the Czech that the Ukrainian situation is a ‘duel’ Republic was most unfortunate and ironic. between the United States and Russia,15 More to the point, their responses did not Slovakia nevertheless operates within the integration mechanisms established by into account of their own countries’ history. its European partners. Other integration match the significance of the events, taking mechanisms that Slovakia can effectively use In 1968, Russian troops, then operating as the to help Ukraine are in gaining membership Soviet Army invaded former Czechoslovakia. to Central European Free Trade Agreement Therefore, it is with certain ambivalence (CEFTA). CEFTA membership is widely that Slovakia has been cautious in its considered an intermediary step to the EU public remarks. For Slovaks, many of whom accession and would help Ukraine with its are from the Prague Spring generation, trade liberalization. and whose country borders Ukraine, the rhetoric from politicians and the prime Slovakia and Ukraine also cooperate through minister’s public comments have proven the European Neighborhood program. This
13 Czech and Slovak views on Ukraine: More timid than the Poles, “The Economist”, 6 May, 2014. [http://www.econo- mist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2014/03/czech-and-slovak-views-ukraine Access 20 May 2016]. 14 Ako to vnimame slovaci na strange ukrajincov (How are Ukrainians Perceived by Slovaks), 24, June 2014, [http:// www.ivo.sk/7467/sk/aktuality/ako-to-vnimame-slovaci-na-strane-ukrajincov Access 20 May 2016]. 15 Fico vojenska zakladna odmietnutie SR (Fico would refuse military base in Slovakia), 7 September 2014. [http://
www.teraz.sk/slovensko/fico-vojenska-zakladna-odmietnutie-sr/97092-clanok.html Access 20 May 2016]. 70 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 partnership is an instrument for a deeper this year, Slovakia can assist in diplomacy social and economic cooperation between the regions of Ukraine and the EU member satisfactory end to the crisis. states. There is in particular, the Hungary between Russia and Ukraine; finding a People to people contacts and increased Neighborhood Partnership Instrument Cross-border− Slovakia − RomaniaCooperation − Ukraine program European that was reconstruction and re-opening of the implemented in 2007-2013, serving a wide pedestrianborder efficiency crossing are ‘Mali supported Selmentsi-Vel’ke by the range of possibilities from economic and Slemence’, which connects Ukraine and social development and increasing border Slovakia. The checkpoint was constructed under the Cross Border Cooperation Program entitled “European Neighborhood Energyefficiency cooperation to people to ispeople regularly cooperation. referred and Partnership” as a part of the larger to in public remarks by top politicians, as project, “Modernization and reconstruction a point made by then Prime Minister of of the crossing points on the Slovak- Ukraine Arseniy Yatsenhuk meeting Prime Ukrainian border17.” Additionally, in Minister Robert Fico, and referencing the Michalovce, another cross border project reverse gas supply from Slovakia to Ukraine is on, supporting tourism and information that helped Ukraine during the winter Ukraine and Zemplin in Slovakia. Finally, by the memorandum on cooperation in scholarsflows between have pursued the regions bilateral of Uzhhorodevents, such in months. Such public remarks are confirmed as the 2014 conference in Košice sponsored renewable energy within the framework of by the Carpathian Foundation and the energyfields of energycooperation efficiency,16. At energy the same saving, time, and Slovak Foreign Policy Association where the current developments in Ukraine, expected of Russian gas supplies to Europe, since trends, and the threats of future cooperation fortyeconomically, percent Slovakiagoes through enjoys Slovakia the benefits via for national and local stakeholders were Ukraine and thus gives Slovakia a decisive examined. Moreover, Slovakia’s Minister role. Additionally, as explained in the above section, Robert Fico is outspoken in his European Strategy Annual Meeting, speaking view that trade ties and imports are more onLajčákis energy was security present issues. at the 11th Yalta important than punishing the Kremlin. Membership in NATO is a badge of honor There is still an awkward division of loyalties for the Eastern European states. Slovakia within European member states and a clear obtained it in 2004 and Ukraine similarly disagreement over how to respond to Russia. seeks membership. It is an issue that For Slovakia, with its strategic geopolitical position, it remains the European Union’s for deeper cooperation between Ukraine and best placed member nation to assure that NATOSlovakia took can place help and Ukraine new standardswith. While for talks the gas supplies continue, and perhaps more Ukrainian Army were set out at the NATO- importantly, by assuming the E.U. presidency
Ukraine Summit held in Wales in 2014,
16 - ation.htmlUkraine, Slovakia Access sign20 May a memorandum 2016]. on energy efficiency cooperation. “Victor News”, 11 September 2015 17 A[http://en.vnews.agency/news/world/13014-ukraine-slovakia-sign-a-memorandum-on-energy-efficiency-cooper new border crossing point was opened between Ukraine and Slovakia, “Uzhgorod.In”, 26 September 2014 [http://uzhgorod.in/en/in_pictures/2014/a_new_border_crossing_point_was_opened_between_ukraine_and_slo- vakia Access 20 May 2016].
UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016 71 Strategically, both Slovakia and Ukraine may The security situation changed after the continue to cooperate in developing their Russiansince then aggression significant in events Donbas. have Thus, occurred. there roles as key transport routes for energy is a renewed urgency to cooperate with the a closer coordination of the policies of the membership in NATO and mechanisms of tworesources countries from thein this East areato the allows West. Likewise, a better ascensionAlliance since to the the European summer ofUnion 2014. are While in utilization of their strategic geographic progress, that places additional pressure on the foreign policy that Ukraine continues to supplies and since 2014, decreased one- hold with Russia, but also the relations that sidedlocations, dependency. enhanced diversification of energy Slovakia and Russia have, which go beyond history. Regional cooperation exists between the two nations and Slovakia continues to aid This may be the reason why several weeks Ukraine as it pursues integration with the after Slovak diplomats were unsuccessful bilateral cooperation and assisted in building sanctions list, the Slovak Foreign Minister, West. Cross-border cooperation improved Miroslavin keeping Lajcak key met Russian without officials fanfare off with the the Russian deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Moreover,mutual trust personal and confidence. political factors indicate Rogozin. that Slovakia often has contradictory rhetoric acting an as agent for the EU in its relations Conclusion with Ukraine and with Russia. However, the process of European and transatlantic Slovakia has a delicate balancing act. A integration as well as the creation of new geopolitical alliances in the Euro-Atlantic that includes Ukraine and Russia. Bound by and Eurasian space point to certain commitmentschannel between and theideals, West Slovakia, and the despite East realities; geographic proximity, historical, occasional contradictions, continues the cultural and linguistic similarity, common principle of solidarity in Europe. And as national interests and foreign policy the European Union continues its cautious orientations create a strong cooperation progress towards common identity, despite between Ukraine and Slovakia. Therefore, the identity crisis, which followed 2007 Slovakia remains the best EU member enlargement and 2009-2010 Greek bail- nation because of its strategic geopolitical outs, as well as 2015 migration crisis, position to assure energy security, and Slovakia is uniquely positioned to aid both perhaps more importantly, by assuming its fellow member-states and its neighbour the E.U. presidency this year, Slovakia can to the East. assist in diplomacy between Russia and
the crisis. accession period, Slovakia showed that Ukraine thus finding a satisfactory end to withinWith its foreign success relations, in the first it could half beof thean active post- and relevant actor. Since 2004, while an Dr. Aaron T. Walter is an Assistant Professor of argument can be made that a lack of vision European Studies at the Faculty of Social Sciences persists, Slovakia’s domestic construct and at the University of Ss. Cyril & Methodius in Trnava, foreign affairs with Russia and Ukraine, may Slovakia, and adjunct professor of International be used effectively for the argument that the Relations at Masaryk University in Brno, Czech European Union offers more than a bond of Republic. Additionally, he is an international editor for economic advantages. the Slovak Journal of Political Science.
72 UA: Ukraine Analytica · 2 (4), 2016
Issue 2 (4), 2016