ENOUGH FOOD FOR EVERYONE IF: CAMPAIGN EVALUATION Steve Tibbett and Chris Stalker (The Advocacy Hub) Commissioned by the Enough Food for Everyone IF campaign CONTENTS
Glossary 01 3. Findings and analysis 16 4. Lessons and 52 Acknowledgements 01 3.1. Campaign purpose 18 recommendations and objectives Summary 02 4.1. Lessons and recommendations 54 Purpose 18 for future coalition campaigns 1. Evaluation parameters, 06 Objectives and outcomes sought 19 Policy and strategy lessons 54 structure and organisation and recommendations 3.2. Outcomes and Background to the evaluation 08 achievements assessed 22 Structure, management and 55 campaign culture: lessons and Purpose, objectives and scope 08 Overall analysis 22 recommendations Approach and methodology 08 Policy and political outcomes 23 Mobilisation, messaging and 56 Management of the evaluation 09 Internal and other communications: lessons This report 10 outcomes assessed 26 and recommendations Outcomes: the nations 30 Campaign formation 58 recommendations 2. Introduction 12 3.3. Strategies and tactics 30 Strategies and tactics deployed 30 2.1. Campaign background 14 and basics Effectiveness of strategies 30 Annexes 60 and tactics Genesis and establishment 14 Annex 1: Campaign organogram 62 3.4. Structure, organisation 41 Campaign activities and structure 14 Annex 2: Measures of success 64 and management 2.2. Campaign context 15 Annex 3: IF campaign monitoring log 66 Overall structure 41 External context 15 Annex 4: Informal policy assessment 73 Management, organisation 42 (in relation to the G8 period Sector context 15 and decision-making of the campaign) 3.5. Other aspects: value for 48 money, gender and learning Resource availability, allocation 48 and value for money Gender 50 Learning 50 01 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
GLOSSARY
• BOAG – British Overseas Aid Group: This report is the main output of an ActionAid, Christian Aid, CAFOD, independent evaluation which was Save the Children and Oxfam • Communications – meaning commissioned by the IF campaign the way in which messages were communicated and the and conducted by two independent related discipline. consultants, Steve Tibbett and Chris Stalker. • Make Poverty History – The Make Poverty History campaign • OECD – Organisation for Economic The authors would like to thank Bond – Cooperation and Development in particular Amy Stones and Livia Da • OC – The Organising Committee (of the campaign) Silva Campello - for all their help through • PAG – The Policy and Advocacy collecting the monitoring data and in Working Group • The nations - refers to Northern Ireland, supporting the evaluation process. Thanks Scotland and Wales. are also due to the IF campaign MEL / • The New Alliance – The New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, an Organising Committee, interviewees and initiative launched at the 2012 G8, focused on private sector investment focus group participants and others who in production and innovation. fed into the writing process and provided comments and guidance. The authors were helped by Martin Clark, a consultant who undertook some interviews and commented on drafts.
This report was produced under the auspices of For more information on learnings from the IF Front cover photo: the IF Campaign Monitoring, Evaluation & Learning campaign: bond.org.uk/campaigningeffectiveness “Enough Food for Everyone IF: Spot the George” (MEL) Committee: London, March 2013 Credit: Matt Crossick / PA Wire If you have any questions please get in touch: Amanda Baker, The Vegan Society [email protected] Back cover photo: Amy Stones, Bond Muslim IF youth event: Muslim organisations involved Ben Niblett, Tearfund in the IF campaign gathered in Trafalgar Square in Farah Nazeer, Bond London to create an iconic image - the word IF spelt Rob Saunders, Oxfam GB out using prayer mats, beneath Nelson’s Column. Tom Burke, Y Care International Credit: Rooful Ali 02 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
SUMMARY
The Enough Food for Everyone IF In particular, the campaign was good The Nutrition for Growth summit secured campaign (referred to in this report as at adapting to changing policy and commitments of US$500 million a year the ‘IF campaign’) was launched in political opportunities including allowing between 2013 and 2020 to tackle January 2013 and was an attempt to an increase in ambition in the measures malnutrition, producing a headline figure make progress towards ending global of success set for policy change in key of US$4.15 billion. The level of pledges is hunger. It was designed around three areas (for example the changing context widely viewed as very positive. However ‘key moments’: the campaign launch, on the tax agenda). The campaign also the expansion of the New Alliance for Food the UK government budget and the had a well-connected, targeted, and Security and Nutrition was considered by G8 summit. These key moments were expert lobbying arm which has set high some to be a retrograde step. defined by campaigning activities - both standards for coalition lobbying. It was Securing a continued commitment by online and offline - reaching a climax adept at times at capturing the synergies the UK government in the budget to in June in the run up to the G8. between strategic media, policy and spending 0.7% of gross national income The IF campaign’s main policy asks as advocacy work. The sector’s excellent on aid is a key success of the campaign, outlined by its launch report covered four assets in the form of political and media and a prominent policy outcome. This main policy ‘baskets’: tax, transparency, contacts were harnessed by IF to good outcome was tempered by the lack of aid and land, aimed at the UK effect and the campaign had a strong legislation to enshrine a commitment to government, and its chairship of the G8. commitment to innovation and the future spending at that level. The campaign operated UK-wide, with testing of new strategies and activities, particularly on the digital side. It seems that ‘land’ was overall a less distinct campaigns in Scotland, Northern notable area of policy progress. However Ireland and Wales. Undertaken during a This report must be read with this context there is a view that the campaign has time of economic austerity and waning in mind and the relative success of key laid the groundwork for future action interest in and support for development aspects of the campaign should be held on land and biofuels. There is some issues, it was an attempt to shore up against the difficult external context. evidence that reasonable progress the development sector’s influence, was also made on UK government protect political support for international commitments to increased transparency. development and revitalise the sector’s Outcomes and progress On climate finance there was little activist and campaigns’ supporter The overall assessment of the outcomes progress beyond the reiteration of base, as well as achieve policy change of the campaign is broadly positive. previous commitments. in key areas. Many objectives have been met, there Politically, the campaign can be seen The campaign achieved key areas has been progress on others and others as comparatively successful in the of policy progress and a high level have been missed. sense that it has raised international of political access, as well increased Policy and political development issues up the UK campaigning capacity in the sector. government agenda for the period of The policy outcomes of the campaign, It helpfully built on a number of key the campaign and managed to capture compared to the measures of success learnings from other campaigns as well a significant portion of the G8 agenda, set, were very good overall, especially on as drawing on the considerable expertise as well as significant political and media tax, but also on nutrition funding pledges of coalition members and their staff. attention in the run up to the G8. and aid commitments. Policy advances on tax are described as excellent, especially the commitments on the OECD Convention and UK government commitments. Many of these outcomes far exceeded initial expectations. 03 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
SUMMARY
Progress in a number of areas can Sector capacity The key agreed objectives of the show a meaningful contribution from The campaign has helped re-energise IF campaign centred on specific the IF campaign. In particular, the the development sector’s existing policy progress and building massive nutrition and tax elements of the campaigner-activist base, and has public support for action. The specific campaign outcomes show strong levels increased campaigns capacity more objectives and success measures set on of contribution. In some areas, the generally. There is also a strong indication mass mobilisation and increased public extent of the campaign’s contribution is that, in a professional sense, sectoral awareness and public engagement questioned by some assessments both capacity has significantly increased. were highly ambitious. inside and outside the campaign. The campaign model and process The policy baskets of the campaign were Mobilisation of formation hasn’t helped sector trust technically of a high quality and content and over time as the political opportunity In areas related to supporter and public as whole but trust between some grew the policy asks evolved upwards in mobilisation, and public understanding organisations is markedly higher than ambition. However the policy platform of the structural causes of poverty and before the campaign and overall the was somewhat complex and disjointed, hunger, the overall assessment is less analysis is that although progress on which was sometimes challenging in terms positive. The campaign did not achieve trust levels is variable, on balance of messaging and communications. The many of the mobilisation targets it set itself, there is an improvement. Scottish and Welsh wings of the campaign although arguably, some of these were Indicators of increased depth of support had additional specific policy asks aimed unrealistic from the start and made more in the sector showed progress. These at their legislatures. difficult because of the short timelines. included: the number of people taking The campaign operated in a linked but multiple online actions throughout the separate way in the nations - Scotland, campaign; organisations reporting an increase in the depth of support of their Effectiveness of strategies Wales and Northern Ireland - where and tactics campaigns supported the main campaigners throughout the IF campaign UK campaign calls. These national and organisations reporting increased The campaign employed a skilful mix campaigns developed their own identity capacity to campaign on any issue. of media stunts, lobbying and digital and momentum and there are specific Public understanding tactics, plus a significant mobilisation, outcomes that can be attributed to to produce an appearance of mass According to opinion polling conducted them, or to which they have contributed. mobilisation that helped enable access on behalf of IF, the campaign did not to and action by government. The Media coverage bring about the changes it sought in campaign retained the mobilisation The campaign had good levels of the UK public’s understanding of the threat of previous campaigns and most media coverage, particularly around structural causes of hunger. However the accept that it did enough to protect and in the run up to the G8. Of IF media campaign highlighted the issue of tax the sector’s position as one of the UK’s coverage, 90% was either favourable or which has led to improved recognition top campaign mobilisers. However the emphatically favourable in sentiment. amongst the media and politicians lack of mobilisation on the scale of Policy change underpinned 69% of about a key structural cause of hunger. previous coalition campaign efforts is the coverage. In total there were 3,325 acknowledged as a risk going forward. separate pieces of coverage. Objectives and purpose The campaign employed a ‘loose- tight’ strategy. The three main moments IF campaign coalition members involved tightly controlled activities with identified a number of the campaign’s looser periods in-between filled with important purposes and goals, of organisations adding their own activity which protecting the political space for to keep up momentum. In the main, international development was vital for this didn’t work as well as expected. many. Overall (and this is understandable given the range of organisations involved and their expectations) there wasn’t an agreed overarching theory of change for the campaign. 04 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
SUMMARY
In terms of the brand, the campaign The media group managed collectively There were a number of key successes name was not popular either inside or to attain lots of - almost exclusively with engaging celebrities who drove outside the campaign, although neither positive – coverage for the campaign much of the social and traditional was it universally unpopular. The look- and its aims. There is also evidence of media coverage. However the coalition and-feel design elements of the brand good and strengthened relationships with had arguably underestimated the received a more mixed reception. One some journalists. Despite these successes growing competition amongst charities reason that the brand struggled was there were some frustrations in terms of for celebrity endorsement and the because the policy platform and hunger disconnection between media work, campaign messages were complex and overlay were complex to get across. the overall strategy and the Organising difficult to break down into manageable The limited marketing budget also Committee (OC). calls for support. Other areas that had contributed to this. The digital work generated a significant challenges included the private sector The success of the campaign’s stunts volume of engagement. Overall traffic strategy which suffered from a lack of is a key area of achievement. The Big analysis measured 2.25 million views agreed approach from the beginning IF rally in London was recognised as a of pages on the IF website, with social at senior levels in the coalition and the crucially important moment of public media exposure calculated at 165,718 ‘lifestyle’ campaign actions which came engagement and mobilisation in support mentions of IF, and a total of over 3.4 late and didn’t in the end make up a key of the campaign. The event was in million interactions with IF across all social part of the campaign. keeping with the rest of the campaign media channels. Overall, the digital work in terms of numbers of supporters within the sector was innovative, well engaged, lower than some previous respected and was noticed by some Structure, organisation campaigns, but understandable in the external opinion formers. However there and management context. The ‘elephant in the room’ stunt were issues with wider engagement and The structure of the IF campaign was felt to be effective in the sense that the extent to which this strategy ‘broke worked reasonably well in general terms, it had been noticed by senior figures in through’ and reached a wider audience. delivering a major workload in a complex the government. Much of the IF offline supporter environment and for an ambitious The lobbying element of IF is another mobilisation could be attributed to the campaign. However the structure was area that comes in for widespread efforts of the faith organisations. The also widely thought to be highly complex, praise, both internally and externally. Faith Working Group was, in this sense, too vertically oriented and to lack clarity From government, there was a strong a good example of devolving decision- of process at times on sign-off, decision- sense of technical competence from the making authority and releasing creative making and leadership. campaign lobbying outfit. A core group energy which has built trust. The Schools The Board in general terms was found within the large Policy and Advocacy and Youth Working Group was another to have worked well and was useful for Working Group worked very effectively good example of successful devolved internal organisational commitment and together. In terms of positioning, the decision-making. alignment among key members of the ‘insider’ political strategy employed was coalition. The OC was relatively healthy as generally supported, although closeness a decision-making forum and had mainly to government was questioned by a good functional working relationships; minority. The IF campaign had a good however it was strained at times by profile and reasonably wide-ranging differences, mainly on policy aspects support in parliament. and sometimes on political strategy. Although the OC was experienced and skilled in key areas, it was chosen according to organisational representation and, overall, members had a relative lack of communications expertise, digital and media capability and understanding of mass public campaigning, branding and advertising processes. 05 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
SUMMARY
The campaigns in Scotland, Northern In terms of planning, most elements While these commitments can’t be Ireland and Wales - were up and running were delivered on time despite, entirely attributed to the IF campaign, soon after the campaign plans were significant pressures of time and working many of the commitments are unlikely announced. The campaign facilitated in a large coalition. However, plans to have happened as quickly, robustly the nations moderately well, partly suffered from not being fully and widely or publically without the IF campaign through budget allocations and partly understood by the wider coalition at advocacy and associated public through allowing a degree of flexibility in key times. This was in part reportedly pressure. This therefore indicates a terms of messaging, communications because of a lack of information flow high-level of return on investment and policy asks, especially later on in but also because some decisions and and represents good value for money. the campaign. Representatives of the plans were delayed or re-considered. nations were not formal members of In general internal communication the OC although they did engage with about campaign activities was Lessons and recommendations the group. The central campaign could reasonably good; however some felt for future coalition campaigns have done more to include the nations there was a lack of information at a • Coalition strategy should be informed in decision-making and by providing or strategic level, particularly from the OC. allowing a range of bespoke materials. by power analysis and exploration of At the end of the campaign, a common and competing theories The wider coalition (those organisations that process was set up for supporters to of change. did not have staff chairing working groups sign up to continue campaigning • Campaigns’ policy asks should follow or in other decision-making positions) were with one of the campaign’s many mainly positive about their involvement in political opportunity and be further member organisations. Technically, informed by communication needs. the campaign. However, they generally the mechanism worked well but many felt that their experience of the campaign felt that there was too long a gap • The structure and management model would have been improved by more between the activity around the G8 of future coalition campaigns should opportunities to feed into and understand and the follow-up process. balance empowerment and control, key campaign decisions. The assembly reflect expertise and diversity, and meetings (regular meetings that all Resource availability, allocation facilitate action. coalition members were invited to) were and value for money • Campaigns should seek to ensure described as useful, well-timed and well- The financial input by donors and a holistic and integrated view of organised, but lacking in opportunities to coalition members along with in-kind communications, strongly linked to feed into decision-making. contributions has led to a number of purpose and change objectives. In the planning stage it was decided important outcomes both in terms of A full list of recommendations is provided that IF was going to be a UK campaign funding and policy changes. These at the end of this report in section 4. and therefore no significant strategy include over $4 billion of global nutrition was brought forward to enable or urge funding commitments; the realisation of key partners to contact their counterparts the commitment to spend 0.7% of UK in other G8 capitals. This may have been gross national income on international a missed opportunity, although some development and policies endorsed support activity did take place in some by the UK government and the G8 capitals. There were efforts by some to that increase the overall likelihood bring southern perspectives and voices of more available resources for into the campaign, although these international development. were limited. 06 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
The ‘George Osbornes’ stunt, London, March 2013. Credit: Andrew Aitchison
EVALUATION parameters, structure & organisation 07 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
EVALUATION PARAMETERS, STRUCTURE & ORGANISATION
Background to the evaluation Objectives Approach and methodology This evaluation is a planned The key objectives for the project were: In formative evaluations, campaigns part of a suite of wider work • to assess the extent to which the are typically assessed during their on monitoring, evaluation and campaign has achieved its objectives development or implementation to provide information about how best to learning (MEL). It was led by the • to assess changes that can be revise and modify for improvement. For MEL Working Group which is attributed to the campaign and this evaluation this was done primarily integrated into the IF campaign changes that were contributed to by by ‘accompanying’ the planning and and the coalition structure, and the campaign implementation processes in order to led by Bond. The MEL work • to assess coalition ways of working observe coalition dynamics, campaign predates the campaign launch and identify lessons for future coalition culture and decision-making processes. and has a number of scheduled campaign efforts Interviews • to assess the strategic effectiveness interventions and outputs, of A number of methods and tools were of the campaign and identify lessons which this report is a central focus. used in the evaluation. The ‘mainstay’ for the future and consider the of the qualitative research approach The evaluation process is split into campaign’s value for money three parts: was the semi-structured interview. This was Scope used with all of types of stakeholders, both 1. Production of the main evaluation internal and external to the campaign. of the campaign (of which this report Following on from the purpose and is the key output). objectives the evaluation’s approach All comments were gathered on a non- is both a summative and formative attributable basis in order to encourage 2. Presenting the learnings from (see below). people to contribute their views with the evaluation to the sector. Given the number of existing MEL maximum candour. For this reason, we 3. Planning for and production of a processes already in place, the have preserved the anonymity of the broader package of resources to evaluation seeks to be overarching and interviewees (as is good practice help embed learning in the sector. holistic, but also complementary to in evaluations of this type). existing processes and to incorporate The method of selection of interviewees and draw on the other monitoring and is partly a qualitative one. The selection Purpose, objectives and scope evaluation data. The campaign set itself was a collaborative process, between Purpose a number of measures of success,2 which the MEL Working Group, the OC and the evaluation has used as a guide in the consultant team. The consultants The twin key purposes of this assessing the campaign’s attainments. prepared a set of selection criteria evaluation were: The evaluation does not focus on for guiding this process, attempting • to assess the IF campaign against assessing individual members’ a balance between the research the objectives it set itself contributions to the IF campaign, effectiveness of data quality and the • to learn lessons for future campaign nor is this report a review of individual principle of participation. NGO coalition efforts1 members. The aim is to focus on any higher, strategic-level change to which the IF campaign has contributed. The evaluation did not in itself focus on the formation period of the coalition, which was covered in a separate internal report that is drawn on in this report and its recommendations.3 08 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
EVALUATION PARAMETERS, STRUCTURE & ORGANISATION
Interviewees by category Focus group discussions Additional data sources Internal Another key method of creating the In addition to the data sets created by evidence base was through four focus the evaluation, the evaluation draws on group discussions. Participants were additional evidence from inside and OC members 7 selected on the basis of their particular outside the campaign. These sources knowledge areas of the campaign. include the following categories: The attendance of the focus groups 5 Board members 3 • The campaign monitoring data varied from three to seven, with a total of 18 participants. The four groups were • IF surveys covering both the member Working group chairs 6 defined as follows: organisations of the coalition and campaign activists • The nations (Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) • Other informal and internal evaluations Others 16 and reviews, such as those done by • Working group chairs (those not already working groups on the interview list were invited) • External evaluations like the external External • ‘Key moments’ (people who were media evaluation closely involved in planning and • Tracking research into public opinion Private sector/celebrity 6 delivering the ‘key moments’ of the campaign) trends on public perceptions of agents poverty and hunger, in partnership with • A sample of IF member organisation Research Now, led by Oxfam GB Bellwethers/academics/ 3 staff (people who were involved but journalists not represented on the OC, as working • Research and analysis led by David Hudson at University College Government/government 4 group chairs or the Board) London on (a) social media and advisors Accompaniment (b) network dynamics Civil society/donors 9 The purpose of the accompanied • Strategies, reports and online elements element of the evaluation is that it of the campaign were also assessed allows the evaluators to experience Activists/local organisers 2 and fed into the data collection and deepen their understanding of the and analysis campaign in ‘real time’ and first hand, rather than just retrospectively, through Total interviewees 554 interviews and monitoring data etc. Management of the evaluation The evaluation team attended and The independent evaluation team observed some key strategic and (consisting of Chris Stalker and Steve delivery meetings over the final stages Tibbett from the Advocacy Hub6) of the campaign, such as the meetings managed and carried out the key of the OC, the assembly, the Policy and evaluation tasks. They were assisted on Advocacy Working Group, the Media data collection by another consultant: Working Group and the Board. Martin Clark. The evaluation team was managed by Bond, and the work was overseen by the MEL Working Group/ OC committee (consisting of the Campaign’s MEL Working Group plus select members of the OC), endorsed by the Board and overseen by the OC. 09 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
EVALUATION PARAMETERS, STRUCTURE & ORGANISATION
This report Report structure The report is structured as follows:
Section 1. S e c t i o n 2 . S e c t i o n 3 . Section 4. Evaluation, Introduction Findings and Lessons and parameters, • Campaign background analysis recommendations structure and and basics • Purpose and objectives • Some learnings and organisation • Campaign context • Outcomes and lessons to repeat • Background achievements assessed • Policy and strategy • Purpose, objectives • Strategies and tactics • Structure and and scope • Structure, organisation management • Approach and and management • Mobilisation messaging methodology • Other aspects and communications • Management of the evaluation
Narrative data presentation When a particular view is expressed in the form of a quotation, this is because Data in this report comes from a wide it represents either a majority view, variety of sources, as noted above. All or a significant view that illustrates assertions made are derived from this a sufficiently representative view. data which has been generated either Occasionally quotations are used to by the evaluation team, other external illustrate minority views. Where this is the evaluations and reports (in the form case, it is noted as such. of academic studies or consultancies employed by the campaign), or Limitations internal data (in the form of informal The data collected for the campaign evaluations, survey and other monitoring is highly complex and reflects the data) produced by the campaign breadth and depth of the IF campaign, itself and its member organisations. the monitoring thereof and other The quotations used come from a data it has generated. That said, the mixture of interviewees, focus groups data collection was constrained by a and other evaluations. relatively limited number of external The term ‘internal’ (or insider) is used to decision-maker (government) inputs describe interviewees from either focus available to the evaluation.7 groups or interviews. The term ‘external’ is used to categorise interviewees who were not formally part of the campaign. 10 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation “ From government, there was a strong sense of technical competence from the campaign lobbying outfit. ” 11 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
100 school children hand in their IF messages to David Cameron. London, June 2013. Credit: Mikael Buck for UNICEF
INTRODUCTION 12 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
INTRODUCTION
2.1. Campaign background In April 2012, the first campaign Policy change objectives were structured and basics assembly took place with a wide around four key ‘baskets’ or areas: group of invited participants. In total • Basket 1. Investment (aid and climate Genesis and establishment8 112 participants registered to attend finance): By meeting existing promises, Major international development from 76 organisations. The next months provide more and better finance for organisations had, over a number of were taken up with the development sustainable small-scale agriculture and years, discussed forming a new major of working groups and policy details. IF child nutrition coalition. This would follow on from other campaigns were also organised in the • Basket 2. Land: Ensuring fair and major coalitions such as Make Poverty nations: Scotland, Northern Ireland sustainable use of land so it contributes History and Jubilee 2000, but with and Wales. to food security, and growth and different emphasis and framing. One Campaign activities and structure development which benefits influence was a paper published in 2011 The Enough Food for Everyone IF poor people that had encouraged, and outlined campaign was launched on 23 January options for, future sector campaigning.9 • Basket 3. Tax: Enabling poor countries 2013 and was designed around three to raise revenue to invest in tackling Informal discussions first started in mid- ‘key moments’: the launch, the budget hunger and food insecurity 2011 between the five BOAG agencies. (on 20 March 2013) and the G8 (on 17-18 Food and hunger was the frontrunner for June 2013). These key moments were • Basket 4. Transparency: Improving the campaign’s messaging and its policy defined by campaigning activities – both transparency to ensure the use of agenda. Part of the conversation at the online and offline - reaching a climax land and natural resources benefits initial stage was about the intention to in June in the run up to the G8. A fourth poor people and support sustainable, focus the campaign around an attempt moment was planned in the autumn but equitable growth. Helping ensure to fundamentally ‘reframe’ the public not specified, and was later dropped citizens in developing countries can discourse on - and understanding of - (for reasons which are returned to later hold their governments to account the ‘structural causes’ of poverty. in this report). for use of revenues through increased fiscal transparency11 The period of BOAG negotiations were (as Campaign objectives: described in the Formation Evaluation) The coalition was structured around a • Specific policy progress to achieve 12 viewed by many as protracted, but by central Organising Committee (the OC), a sustainable food system and 13 the end of 2011 the subject matter was reporting to a Board, and responsible tackle hunger mostly agreed and the policy platform for a number of working groups which of aid, tax and land - as well as the • To build massive public support for in turn were tasked with delivering the key target of the UK chairing of the G8 action to achieve these goals by key elements of the campaign. The - was largely decided. The discussion deepening understanding of poverty campaign was underpinned by the IF widened out to other groups - Bond, and development, the environment, assembly for members14 of the coalition ONE, Comic Relief, Tearfund, Friends of and the need for structural change which allowed wider dissemination the Earth, RSPB and WWF-UK (although and discussion. The campaign the last three eventually decided not to organagram is shown in Annex 3. join the campaign because there was not a strong enough fit in terms of the policy platform and the framing of the campaign from a communications point of view10) and then to wider civil society. This wider coalition-building process took quite a long time. 13 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
INTRODUCTION
2.2 Campaign context This report must be read with this Sector context context in mind and the relative Allied to this external context, in recent External context success of key aspects of the years the NGO sector has arguably been campaign should be held against The IF campaign in the UK was less revered as a campaigning force for the difficult external context. undertaken during a time of economic change than it had been in the early austerity and a reported waning of The campaign coalition had been 2000s. This was partly as a consequence public interest in - and political support aware of these constraints and of the external environment but also for – international development issues. challenges. However some aspects because the sector has seen a splintering In addition, many parts of the media of the political environment seemed of issue selection and divergent models of had become more sceptical (and more favourable, at least in the short change emerging, as well as an increase sometimes critical) of the international term. Early discussions with government in more accessible technologically-driven development agenda, and specifically revealed the Prime Minister was looking models of campaigning.17 The sector’s about levels of government spending on for issues on which to hang the G8 15 advocacy abilities have also been hit by aid and the efficacy of this spending. agenda, to bolster a public image of falling income in the current economic In turn, the public has become markedly supporting international development climate. Finally, the previous challenges more sceptical of both aid, and of and demonstrate international of joint campaigning had also, for some, politics and politicians. leadership. David Cameron’s Davos been a hindrance to further collaboration. speech on 24 January 2013 revealed Partly as a consequence of this, there Rapidly growing online-based his interest in making the ‘three T’s’ of was also a general perception in the campaigns groups such as Avaaz, transparency, tax and trade the focus of sector that there was less interest in change.org and 38 degrees, as well his chairship of the G8. In particular he parliament and across government. as less formally structured, radical signalled his willingness to make tax a key Although they had at senior levels campaigning movements such issue: “We want to use the G8 to drive a confirmed their commitment to as UK Uncut and Occupy have more serious debate on tax evasion international development and in come forward to challenge the and tax avoidance.”16 particular aid, the Coalition government campaigning orthodoxy.18 - and especially the Conservatives Media debates on tax, led by many Finding Frames19 a project initiated who were in charge of key areas of civil society groups, trade unions, by Oxfam, and supported by DFID, government - were not, historically, parliamentarians and activists - including sought to find ways to transform both renowned for their prioritisation of the some of those involved in the IF the way that the UK public think about issue. The campaign context was campaign – had also grown both before international development, and also sometimes held in comparison to that of and during the period of the campaign about the values that underpin the way the Make Poverty History campaign and which meant that the political context NGOs frame their public interventions Jubilee 2000, both of which operated on tax had become more amenable. and campaign messages. at a time when those at the top of the Aid, and in particular nutrition funding, then Labour government were perceived to which the Prime Minister had an This internal context made coming as more wholeheartedly committed to established commitment, was also together as a campaign coalition more international development. indicated as an area in which progress likely to be laboured and protracted. could be made. The fact that the difficulties were overcome is an indication of the efforts of the campaign’s architects and key protagonists.
14 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
The ‘Elephant in the Room Stunt’, which George Osborne responded to on Twitter. London, May 2013. Credit: Julius Honnor/Bond
FINDINGS & ANALYSIS 15 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
FINDINGS & ANALYSIS
3.1. Campaign purpose • To revitalise and reinvigorate the sector’s In general, there was wide agreement and objectives activist and campaigns supporter base on many of the elements of the purpose • To work together as a sector and but not the balance or hierarchy of This section examines the overall purpose revitalise the professional campaigning purpose, nor a sufficiently shared analysis and specific objectives of the campaign capacity of the sector of the implications and risks of the lack by looking at the level of agreement, of these. The lack of clarity of purpose, hierarchy, achievability and consistency • To reframe the public/media narrative at the beginning and throughout the of objectives. on poverty and hunger in order to campaign would come to have an reframe the debate Members of the IF campaign coalition impact on - and somewhat delay - the identified a number of important In reality these purposes were – management and execution of the purposes and goals for the campaign. to varying degrees - all important to campaign, though not to the extent of For many, protecting the political space different actors within the coalition compromising key policy gains. One for international development was a key and for some more than one was external informant said: “The negotiations purpose. Overall, and understandably fundamental. Staff changes within [to get the policy baskets agreed] were given the range of organisations and organisations also led to a further a necessary evil to get the agreement to consequent expectations involved, there variance of views about the purpose. work together”. wasn’t an agreed overarching theory of For many, particularly those located Importantly, although public mobilisation change for the campaign. centrally in the larger organisations, at scale in order to demonstrate public however, the purpose around protecting Purpose concern for development was a core the space for international development objective of the campaign, it was The IF campaign had a number of key was - or least became - the key purpose not widely described internally as purposes, overall goals and objectives, of the campaign.20 a core purpose. outlined in several documents and “There was a lot of political division strategies, but also elucidated by key One crucial consequence (and cause) and media attacks on international actors in the campaign. It is possible to of this lack of common purpose was that development so coming together discern at least five purposes that were there wasn’t an agreed overarching theory was important”, said one insider. held by coalition members: of how change could happen. It seems For another: that different member organisations, and • To achieve policy change on aid, the people within them, had different “[The purpose was to] make sure that tax, transparency and land ideas, expectations and analyses about, development remained part of the • To let the government - and other key for example, the extent to which supporter public and political agenda [as the] actors such as the media - recognise mobilisation and public engagement context posed many risks. It was about that the sector is ‘still here’ and remains might influence the policy and political putting development at the top of the muscular, in order in particular to process. As one key external interviewee agenda. The context wouldn’t have protect the international development reflected “There was not strategic naturally allowed this and we had to space in general, and the aid budget alignment on how change happens. try and engage people”. in particular, against attacks, and The policy sweep brought the coalition also to maintain commitment from together... it was not led by analysis government for 0.7% of national about what will bring change”. income to be spent on aid However, this lack of alignment is notable in other large scale coalitions and understandable in the context of over 200 organisations with different backgrounds and views of how change happens and may also be seen in a positive light in terms of bringing together different views toward the same policy end. 16 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
FINDINGS & ANALYSIS
‘Framing’ and the structural causes Objectives and outcomes sought In addition to these indicators, some Working Groups and individual events In addition, for some, the key purpose The main ‘core’ objectives of this and ‘moments’ had their own individual was to educate and inform the UK public campaign as outlined in the Joint key performance indicators. about the structural causes of poverty, Campaign 2013 Measures of Success through an ambitious reframing of the April 2013 were: Hierarchy of and levels of debate (as discussed above). However • Specific policy progress to achieve agreement on objectives most agree this was not in the end the a sustainable food system and In general, amongst interviewees these key purpose. Nevertheless, it remained tackle hunger objectives were in large part agreed a key objective for some in the form by interviewees to be important and of ensuring the existence of the policy • To build massive public support for relevant campaign objectives, given debates and interventions on tax, land, action to achieve these goals by the evolving external agenda. Most and for some climate finance. In this deepening understanding of poverty respondents, certainly at a senior sense the ‘structural causes’ purpose and development, the environment, level, gave support to the two ‘core’ became, de facto, less about educating and the need for structural change objectives. However among these and the wider public and reframing the The same document also outlines the other objectives outlined in the measures debate per se, and more about key measures of success. The main of success there wasn’t an apparent ensuring that the campaign remained elements of this were that: hierarchy of objectives. Objectives were more than one aimed at increasing • Policy aims were achieved often pursued so that different interests development finance in various ways. This could coexist in order to ensure a is understandable, but on reflection may • Support for international development broad coalition and functional working have contributed to weakening the focus. and the environment increased relationships, especially among the among the UK public The issue of ‘public understanding larger agencies. of structural causes of hunger’ was • A better understanding was reached The operational activation of a hierarchy tracked in a robust series of opinion poll among a sector of the public of the was also shaped by the external research surveys undertaken by Oxfam in structural causes of food insecurity environment, for instance, “The way the partnership with Research Now, the results and hunger and of the impacts on media focused on tax made it hard to of which are further discussed below. the natural world caused by food talk about anything else [in the end]. It production and consumption Some externals were particularly keen to wasn’t in our control”. point to the lack of re-framing ambition in • The UK public is mobilised the campaign compared to the way they and engaged had understood it would present itself. • The sector and movement is One external civil society campaigner strengthened with improved new noted that “the ‘Frames’ stuff seemed capabilities to work post campaign to be nowhere... an austerity framing would have been good... it would have • Global support for campaign 21 been better to connect south and north aims achieved poverty”. However some internals made the counter point that the structural causes elements were a strong strand of the campaign, particularly in the form of the centrality of the work on tax. 17 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
FINDINGS & ANALYSIS
The policy ‘baskets’ De facto, the campaign internal and There were also a series of Wales-specific external communications tended to policy objectives.24 That the Welsh The stated main policy asks of shorten these policy areas to “aid, land, government: the campaign, as outlined by the tax and transparency”. In reality however, campaign’s launch report22 covered four • Can help tackle global hunger by the campaign prioritised specific policies main policy ‘baskets’ aimed at the UK maintaining its support for the Wales for around tax, nutrition funding and 0.7% government, and its chairship of the G8. Africa programme and by introducing as key areas that were seen as having These were described as follows: a strong and binding Sustainable support both within the coalition and Development Bill that will commit Wales • Funding to tackle nutrition and in areas where there was adequate to seriously fight climate change. hunger, including by investing in small- political opportunity to make progress. scale farmers, nutrition and climate • Should ensure that it supports fair trade, Scottish and Welsh asks adaptation, through commitments in tax transparency and environmental these areas at the G8 but also, crucially The Scottish wing of the campaign had sustainability and that these principles for the campaign, by the UK meeting five Scottish-specific policy asks which, are at the heart of public procurement its commitments to spend 0.7% of gross broadly, shadowed the UK campaign’s decisions. Private companies, charities, national income on aid by 2013, and policy baskets. These were: community groups and individuals in to legally enshrine this commitment. • The Climate Justice Fund should Wales should scrutinise what they buy and how they buy, to help protect the • Enabling countries to raise tax revenue match the International Development world’s poorest people. to tackle hunger by changing UK Fund by 2016. rules on tax and by the G8 increasing • Procurement legislation should include • Help protect land rights and improve the international tax transparency. fair trade, tax and environmental criteria. food security of people in developing countries and enshrine these objectives • Ensuring the fair and sustainable use of • The Scottish government should host a in the Wales for Africa programme, and land by improving governance of large- Global Land Hearing to discuss lessons the Wales Food Strategy. scale land acquisitions and ending from Scotland which could inform the support for damaging biofuels policies. implementation of the 2012 Voluntary • Press for the abolition of the EU’s de facto biofuels mandate, and ensure • Leading the world to be more Guidelines on land tenure. that the true scale of carbon emissions transparent about tackling hunger by • There should be greater investment associated with biofuels is accounted strengthening corporate accountability for Global Citizenship Education. for in its measurement of Wales’ requirements, improving governance, ecological footprint. transparency and accountability in • Transparent annual reporting should land agreements, and increasing capture Scotland’s impact on • Renew commitment to Education budget transparency in support of developing countries with the Scottish for Sustainable Development and Open Government Partnership.23 government delivering a more Global Citizenship. coordinated response. • Welsh MEPs to press for the abolition of the EU’s de facto biofuels mandate, which is driving up food prices, causing land grabs, and harming the environment. 18 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
FINDINGS & ANALYSIS
Coherence of the policy A related issue is that the policy It is understood that the mobilisation baskets (areas) platform was not sufficiently coherent objectives were drafted by the There is a strong and near-unanimous with the core hunger message and Communications and Public finding that the policy baskets of the campaign overlay. The campaign Engagement Working Groups based, campaign – while technically of a high message was about hunger but the according to one OC member, on quality and content - were too complex, policy mix included issues that didn’t a combination of their collective disjointed and too plentiful. This was easily correspond with that. One internal experience of mobilising at scale, the a challenge not only in terms of expression of this was: “Hunger wouldn’t level of ambition the coalition had for messaging and communications naturally focus on tax. Roads, access to the campaign and some consideration for public mobilisation, but also market, finance, seeds, yes... we were of how the growing use of social media for the media, social media and kind of fudging it.” Many external views may increase reach. The OC and Board communications in general. This echoed this. signed off these targets, however the complexity presented a challenge for Achievability process and thinking was not clearly briefing journalists, creative agencies and communicated to, or understood by, the Overall, the ambition of objectives was most supporter-facing communications. wider coalition and they were considered set high for a campaign that was always very ambitious by many respondents. Although the policy baskets were planned to be a short-term intensive burst There was also a common and strongly challenging, there is a sense that this of energy, capacity, resources and action. expressed internal perspective that these was logical and understandable given This matched the scale of ambition of the objectives were ultimately incompatible the lack of a unifying common narrative key partners and the hope to build on the with the core campaign messages and a focused agenda: “Policy baskets success of previous large scale coalition which were quite complex and difficult were retro-fitted into the campaign. campaigns. In particular the objectives to communicate. One said, “the They were good policy objectives, but on public and supporter mobilisation were public engagement objectives were didn’t go together. They were needed considered to be highly ambitious as mismatched with talking about aid and for the coming together of BOAGs, so were the objectives on public awareness development [and the structural causes].” [in that sense] they were pragmatic”, and engagement. said one internal. This is further witnessed There was, however, not a particularly This was especially relevant to the by comments in February 2013 when strong sense that the high ambition of following ‘measures of success’ (which the campaign was discussed at the these targets particularly affected morale are captured amongst other measures assembly meeting, where there were of coalition staff in these areas, although in Annex 2): mixed feelings about the number of there were some comments that the policies: “People also have concerns • Raised awareness of the campaign mobilisation objective on ‘endorsers’ was about the policy asks. Some feel that amongst 15-20 million of the UK public difficult to build confidence on. there is too much in the mix, and as ‘onlookers’/ number of UK adults who others feel that there are still some asks will have heightened awareness of the missing...”25 There was also a feeling campaign’s issue and watch our event/s that some of the policy platforms didn’t • Engaged 3-5 million of the UK’s fit that well with the campaign’s G8 public as ‘endorsers’ /number of UK focus and that they weren’t designed or adults who will take action in support chosen on that basis. One explanation of the campaign is that they were partly set as a way to resolve the question of prioritising different • Public understanding: at least 500,000 coalition aims and were intended to members of the UK public have better force the coalition to think beyond what understanding of the structural causes policy changes were or could be aimed of food insecurity and hunger and their mainly at the G8. commitment to tackling global poverty issues increases 19 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
FINDINGS & ANALYSIS
Consistency vs. evolving objectives Set against this, there is a plausible 3.2. Outcomes and argument that while increasing the Over time, and as the political achievements assessed ambition for the policy asks according opportunity evolved - in particular the to political ambition was sensible, to Overall analysis growing political space opening up on downgrade other success indicators tax avoidance and evasion through the The overall assessment of the outcomes would in itself have reduced morale work of parliamentary committees and of the campaign is broadly positive. and disempowered campaigners related media coverage - the campaign An analysis of the overall measures endeavouring to deliver on public policy asks increased in ambition. This of success and the monitoring data engagement and supporter mobilisation was useful for the campaign, especially provided by the campaign, along at a critical time (with the likelihood in lobbying terms. One voice close to with feedback from external and being that this downgrade would have the conversation with the UK government internal interviews and focus groups happened sometime in the spring). said: “Tax was a massive struggle but and other data sources, indicates that [David] Cameron’s Davos speech Throughout this period there remained, the campaign has met many of its made people in the campaign and despite significant efforts, limited time for objectives, made progress on some the OC realise the political feasibility ongoing review or space for reflection others and also missed some. [of it], which meant less reluctance... and limited capacity for adaptation Overall, there is a strong viewpoint We got way beyond where we thought of strategy and activities. “We were so within the campaign that the policy we would. [The Policy and Advocacy focused on the next thing... the energy outcomes of the campaign, compared Working Group] led a process to keep went into creative campaigning and to the measures of success set, were increasing our position, to include crown planning and delivering the next activity... very good, especially on tax, but also dependences [for example]... it pays and, to an extent the servicing of on nutrition funding pledges and aid to ratchet up”. supporters”, said one internal interviewee. commitments. Some external views were This is understandable in the context of However the mobilisation objectives less convinced of this but were arguably such a complex and relatively short term weren’t revised downwards despite some unaware of the objectives set. and moments-focused campaign. assessments that they were unlikely to In addition, in other key areas, notably be reached. This was discussed in the Moreover, there is also a sense that - the campaigning confidence and OC in March 2013 and occasionally as the campaign went on - the actual capacity of the sector, there is also an at other times: “Looking at the original ambition in terms of mobilisation changed assessment that the campaign has project plan, we have achieved so slowly but palpably and became focused been a qualified success. much of what we set out to do. The more on servicing existing or ‘core’ more ambitious targets have not supporters. One supporting internal view One internal view was: “There were been met – perhaps they were a little was that, because of the time pressures really good policy outcomes on aid and too ambitious”.26 There were some involved, the mobilisation of existing tax, good steps [forward]. It felt like we comments that these indicators were supporters was the “starting point but got it on the agenda of the UK informed or influenced by what Make became the end point... the mass public government. The campaign created Poverty History had achieved rather got downgraded. I was sold a concept a phenomenal momentum and loads than a sober assessment of the external that this was the new Make Poverty History, of media. There is a sense of ‘together context, available time and resources and that it would be mainstream. [But it] we are much stronger’ ... the sector is and the potential resonance of became something that only cared stronger and renewed”. campaign messages. about political or current supporter In areas related to supporter and public audiences.” A probable cause of this mobilisation, and public understanding is that the campaign lacked sufficient of the structural causes of poverty and lead-in times and good planning for hunger, the overall assessment is less public engagement and break-through positive. The campaign did not achieve into new supporter recruitment. As a many of the mobilisation targets it set consequence many coalition member itself, although some of these were international NGOs felt they had to put arguably unrealistic from the start. energy into mobilising existing supporters to ensure good profile and visibility at the key moments. 20 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
FINDINGS & ANALYSIS
The implication of this may be that The monitoring data gathered for this Policy progress the international NGO sector can no area indicates that over 500 MPs and Overall longer assume it carries a credible Lords, across all major political parties, There wasn’t an official, detailed, policy threat of representing substantial public contacted the Treasury in support of the IF verdict. Instead there is a patchwork of mobilisation in favour of international campaign which arguably shows a large internal and external-facing, formal and development and poverty eradication. degree of parliamentary knowledge of informal takes on the policy verdict. This Communicating this ‘threat’ to policy and support for the campaign’s aims. leaves the campaign without a clear makers will need to be used with care This is also supported by an independent reference point for the future. The lack of in the future. Future campaigns will also survey of MPs carried out during the IF detailed verdict was not – according to need to consider whether a longer campaign which found that: informed internal views – a consequence running and more sustained set of • 6% of MPs mentioned the IF campaign of controversy as the verdict elements messages to reframe the debate on aid as an ‘effective’ lobbying campaign were apparently agreed quickly and development would be a useful (unprompted) because a lot of preparation went into and realistic response. • 6% of MPs directly linked IF to the issue the scenario forecasting. Policy and political outcomes of ‘global tax avoidance’ (unprompted) However, the chair of the Policy and Political traction and cross-party support • When prompted, 74% of MPs say they Advocacy Working Group did produce a useful and important assessment. This Politically, the campaign was are ‘definitely’ or ‘probably’ aware of overall ‘top-line’ policy assessment, based comparatively successful. It has raised the IF campaign on the Gold, Silver, Bronze standards international development issues up • When prompted, 47% of MPs say they that the campaign set itself is outlined the UK government agenda, at least 27 support the IF campaign in the table in Annex 4. The general for the period of the campaign and feeling of the campaign was that the it managed to capture a significant The IF campaign was in the top 10 policy outcomes, from the budget, the portion of the G8 agenda and significant effective lobbying campaigns of 2013, nutrition summit and at the G8 were, political media attention around the G8. according to a report from nfpSynergy. though not perfect, a very good result. The protection and expansion of the There was also a strong sense – perhaps More downbeat pronouncements at the perceived political consensus – or because of the strength of previous time of the G828 belied a more positive at least political majority – in favour mobilisations and campaigns, especially assessment emerging over time from the of aid and promoting international Make Poverty History – of the power of campaign itself. the campaign to get good access development was widely claimed as Tax to the top levels of government and a success both inside and outside the open doors for lobbying and detailed campaign. However, those inside tended Policy advances on tax are widely proposals that NGOs working alone to highlight it more readily, whereas described as excellent commitments, would have been unlikely to get. those externally tended to downplay its especially the commitments on the “We had a good relationship with significance as closer to ‘protecting the OECD Convention and UK government government. They were terrified about status quo’. One internal interviewee said: commitments, with outcomes far what we might do and respected what “Carving out political space – building exceeding initial expectations. Tax was we asked them to do... like the elephant and protecting the cross party consensus not strongly integrated as a priority at in the room [stunt]... they asked what the – the campaign helped to do this”. the campaign’s inception and outset, campaign wanted. They had respect and was not originally thought to be an for us”, said one informed internal area where much progress could be respondent. A significant stream of made, but in the end four out of the ten constituency lobbying, with almost points of the Lough Erne Declaration 300 MPs lobbied, supported this at were about tax and the campaign had the local level. contributed to a changed public and political narrative on tax havens. 21 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
FINDINGS & ANALYSIS
Questions remain over what these This outcome was tempered by the However, the summit’s value was policies will mean in the long run and lack of legislation to enshrine the 0.7% questioned by some who felt that it how they will be translated into action. commitment in law. Although there was a more mixed picture, as several There is an implication that sustained was a press statement at the time of of the campaign asks were not met. action and pressure by civil society will the Queen’s speech on 8 May 2013 on In particular the expansion of the New be required. It should be noted that the lack of legislation, this element was Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, there is a strong history in recent years not highlighted in subsequent IF public which was a contentious issue within the of international NGOs conducting statements. This was a contentious campaign, was considered by some to research, developing policy and running issue for some in the campaign related be a retrograde step. The response to campaigns on tax. to ongoing debates about political this aspect of the summit was “heavily The assessment by the chair of the Policy positioning. negotiated and difficult discussions [led and Advocacy Working Group, as noted Nutrition to a] holding line”. above, was that the overall tax outcomes The Nutrition for Growth: Beating Hunger Climate finance were a mix of gold and bronze results through Business and Science summit, The G8 reaffirmed the commitment but that they were judged by a standard co-hosted by the governments of the UK made at successive United Nations which far exceeded the initial policy and Brazil, and the Children’s Investment Framework Convention on Climate aims on tax. Independent assessments Fund Foundation (CIFF) on 8 June in Change (UNFCCC) conferences to of the tax policy piece were also central London pledged substantial sums provide US$100 billion a year of climate broadly positive about what had been for nutrition interventions. The summit finance by 2020, helping developing achieved. Development commentators secured commitments of US$500 million countries adapt to climate change and Owen Barder and Alex Cobham had a year between 2013 and 2020 to tackle 29 mitigate their emissions, but did little to praised most of the outcomes on tax malnutrition, producing a headline speed up progress of finding the money. at Lough Erne, while Richard Murphy figure of US$4.15 billion33 over the period. This was perhaps as good as could be of Tax Research UK called it “a turning Although some of the detailed policy hoped for at a G8 summit. point”30 for tax justice, and Kevin Watkins, areas that the campaign hoped to see Land Director of the ODI called it “a reasonable referenced and addressed were not 31 package”. delivered by the summit, most of those It seems that land was overall a less Aid who were keen to see nutrition outcomes notable area of progress, policy-wise, were very positive about the overall results. as recognised in IF materials. However Securing a continued commitment by there is a view that the campaign has the UK government in the budget to One coalition member respondent laid the groundwork for future action on spend 0.7% of gross national income stated that the events on nutrition “were land and biofuels. Land grabbing was on aid is showcased as a key success undoubtedly of a very significant scale recognised in debates including at the of the campaign, and a prominent and [have] built a momentum,” while pre-G8 Open for Growth event and DFID policy outcome. The commitment was another said “we were involved in the has recognised that biofuel production made, and so the outcome has been nutrition summit – we thought that was is a problem for food security. Land also successfully achieved, and indeed is very successful – large amounts of made it into the Lough Erne declaration, now likely to be a sustained political money were pledged. The whole thing although despite a detectable increase commitment for the lifetime of this was a great success.” in DFID capacity for research and policy parliament until 2015 and through to 32 analysis on biofuels, across the board, the next general election. firm commitments and clear policies are lacking. There is a common feeling, especially among internals that because of effective advocacy work, land now has a firmer political platform: “Land was nowhere but now it has a voice, an entry point”, said one. 22 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
FINDINGS & ANALYSIS
Transparency One key aspect for which the campaign One informed view from government There is some evidence that reasonable has claimed success was the Nutrition was: “[in terms of the IF contribution] at progress was also made on UK Summit and pledges made at it. There is a high level, it played a significant part government commitments to increase a view from both wider civil society and in pushing us to a good package but transparency at the G8.34 This can to government that the event wouldn’t have [there were] also some very specific parts some extent be traced back to the happened in the way that it did without of the package where the campaign effectiveness of the targeted policy the campaign and that it has acted as had attribution. For example, [getting] dialogue by IF coalition members a catalyst for future momentum and the overseas territories to sign up”. (and others) in the run up to the G8. action by states. There are, however, Another informed civil society view was This seems to have contributed to some questions over whether the summit that the new external opportunities commitments including the launch would have gone ahead in some form that built on longer term work helped of the G8 Open Data Charter (as well anyway, and over the contribution of a ensure credibility: “the G8 outcome was as transparency sections of tax and range of other organisations and studies good ... tax has been bubbling and land); support for work in the African that were not, formally at least, part of the campaign was able to capitalise Union’s Land Policy Initiative and the campaign. on that and the work that Christian Aid strengthening the EITI (Extractives Industry One informed external view was: “The was doing.” From those close to the Transparency Initiative). The OGP (Open Nutrition for Growth Summit is definitely lobbying effort there was acceptance of Government Partnership) also provided attributed to civil society, but that the fortunate zeitgeist: “[we would have “a great hook on beneficial ownership predates the IF campaign. NGOs have struggled] without Starbucks-Amazon- and also mentioned land,” as one set the agenda and [it probably had Google narrative. Tax was eighth on the coalition member stated. Again these a] bigger footprint because of the G8 agenda – then became top three commitments will need to be monitored campaign”. Another said: “ ... on the if not top one”. and pursued by international NGOs to nutrition stuff, IF may have had some On the commitment to provide 0.7% ensure they aren’t just ‘summit rhetoric’ impact ... but there have been a whole in aid, there are indications from both and don’t slip down the political agenda. range of organisations that have had inside and outside government that Policy progress: attribution and something to do with this”. the campaign – while not able to claim attribution of a long running contribution of the campaign35 On tax at the G8, again, the fact that tax was on the agenda may not have campaign to secure this target – Progress in a number of areas can show been due solely to the campaign (as certainly contributed to the final stages of a meaningful contribution from the IF many point out, the public appetite delivery and ensure that no backsliding campaign. In particular, the nutrition and and political context were increasingly happened at the last minute. tax elements of the campaign outcomes conducive for change), but the way One internal view was: “There have show strong levels of contribution. In some that it played out, the emphasis on been 40 years of campaigning. But it areas attribution is claimed, though it is developing countries and the level of did create space and pushed them questioned by voices both inside and ambition can be traced in substantial the final mile. [It] would have been outside the campaign. part to the role of the campaign and, easier for the government to backtrack in particular, the lobbying undertaken without the campaign”. It is of course under its auspices. important to reflect here too that there has been a long history of the NGO sector campaigning on much of the IF policy agenda; on tax and transparency, on food and nutrition. This has helped to keep these issues on the political agenda, to some extent, but the IF campaign acted as an important accelerator, capitalising on members’ existing agendas, opportunities, expertise and capacities. 23 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
FINDINGS & ANALYSIS
There was, however, a feeling both inside Internal and other Again however, the tracking opinion poll and outside the coalition, that while the ‘outcomes’ assessed research is instructive, strongly indicating campaign did make some impact on that coverage of key campaign There are a number of internal and the promise being kept, it has slightly messages in traditional media cannot external-facing outcomes and overplayed the role of the mobilisation always provide the breakthrough achievements. The monitoring data elements of the campaign. In this moments. “(NGOs need) greater clarity collected by the campaign – as shown regard, there were comments that some of what can be achieved through old in Annex 3 - helps with an assessment things were attributed to the campaign media – it reached targets but not the of many of these, set against the but were actually more rightly attributed public”. The high level of coverage was campaign’s success measures. to the overall lobbying strategy, for not recognised by many interviewees - example the existence and substance Breadth of support especially externals – who felt that the of the nutrition summit, as well as the Media campaign fell well short of Make Poverty long history of civil society campaigning. The campaign had good coverage, History levels of coverage. In fact this perception was a feature of particularly around and in the run up to The ‘structural causes’ many external interviews and featured the G8. The IF campaign commissioned Although the campaign in the end didn’t in interviews and focus groups with the a media agency, Precise, to examine set out explicitly to reframe the public wider coalition (that is, those not close to the quality of the media coverage in discourse on poverty, development decision-making). One external view was: line with the measures of success and and hunger as some had originally “They secured 0.7% which was great but monitoring log requirement on “Quality/ envisaged,37 this early aim had been some of... the congratulations were a content of coverage of IF”. bit too much”. translated into key success measures The report36 found that over 90% of IF around the structural causes of poverty. One critical external civil society media coverage was either favourable According to the tracking opinion explanation of the way that such or emphatically favourable in sentiment, poll research carried out by Oxfam in campaigns tend to describe their role and that policy change led 69% of association with Research Now,38 the in producing outcomes was: “one of the coverage. In total there were 3,325 campaign did not bring about changes the problems that NGOs face is that separate pieces of coverage, almost in the UK public’s understanding of the we need to have victories once in a three times the stated target for the structural causes of hunger. The findings while – we tend to go for small victories campaign. Food, hunger and nutrition concluded that: “the campaign did not ... there is a tactical question ... about – along with tax, trade and economic bring about a significant decrease in the value of small changes versus the justice - were the key campaign issues number [of people] wrongly identifying longer term. International NGO’s haven’t discussed by the mainstream media. The causes of hunger”.39 managed to frame the long term report says that “Aid was the leading key However some in the campaign narrative”. This is explained by those message, whereas transparency was the are keen to point to the fact that the closer to the centre of the campaign by most fully conveyed across mainstream campaign increasingly highlighted the emphasising the need to explain and media. ‘Aid’ was a leading message in issue of tax, and also to some degree promote to supporters their role and broadcasts from the BBC”. that their participation and action has land grabs. This has led to improved made a difference. It was also important The internal “IF Media Working Group recognition among the media, for the choreography of the campaign Evaluation” looked at campaign KPI’s for politicians and core supporters, about – especially, because of the timing, in coverage for the three ‘key moments’ and some of the key structural causes of the case of 0.7% - to show progress was found almost all were met. These were hunger and poverty. being made and inspire further action. quantitative measures. The report says: “Tax and nutrition were issues that both worked well. Tax coverage built on the zeitgeist in the media landscape and we were able to link our campaign issues to existing outrage about UK tax dodging.” 24 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
FINDINGS & ANALYSIS
‘Endorsers’ The ‘depth’ of support, measured by Many of those, when asked about the According to results shown in the the number of people taking multiple campaign’s successes in interviews, monitoring framework, actions and sign online actions throughout the campaign, survey, internal evaluations or focus ups were far lower than expected. For was indicated as a successful area groups, highlighted the’ ‘Big Moments’, instance, in the category of ‘endorsers’ on the Monitoring Framework, which stunts and the media coverage around the total number endorsing the reported that 15% of the people signed these. These were a means to an end campaign – measured by online actions up with campaign had taken two or but were considered crucially important 40 taken, offline actions taken and number more actions. In the Coalition Data delivery mechanisms that raised the of wristbands purchasers - was 343,617, Survey 33% of organisations reported visibility of the campaign and put some set against a total target of 3-5 million. an increase in the depth of support pressure on decision-makers and in The online sign-ups on the IF website throughout the IF campaign, while, particular the UK government. The most reached 101,058, while wristband band according to the Coalition Feedback frequently mentioned event was the Big purchasing figures reached 95,000 (and Survey, more than 50% of respondents IF Hyde park event which (although not the total number of offline actions taken said that the campaign has increased without its critics, explored below) was wa s 147,559). their organisation’s capacity to considered to be a watershed moment campaign on any issue. in the campaign. The stunts included the Impact on the sector (to campaign Related to this is the impact of working ‘elephant in the room’, ‘Osborne masks’, effectively together in the future) together as a sector and demonstrating and ‘longboats in Northern Ireland’. Capacity aspects and amplifying the campaigning These were repeatedly referenced as strength of the NGO sector. This relates successful, creative and innovative, well One key area of progress is that the managed and influential. campaign can be said to have re- to the point above about protecting energised the international development the political space. There is evidence This was a benefit of working together sector’s existing campaigner-activist across the surveys of supporters and for some respondents: “Creativity and base, and increased campaigns the coalition, and the interviews and budget for media stunts e.g. George capacity more generally, defined in the focus groups that those involved in the Osborne and flotilla – only in coalition Coalition Surveys as “skills, knowledge campaign feel more confident both can you do this and be that successful,” and confidence”. about their sector relationships (see said one internal. Another said: “IF section 2.5 below) and the sector as improved knowledge and engagement. The campaign actions - according whole. One internal interviewee said “the We felt even more empowered to speak to the supporter survey carried out in sector is in a bit better state now”. out being part of the IF campaign”. October 2013 - were largely supported While another praised the organisational by existing campaigners. When asked achievements: “The George Osborne whether they had been involved in stunts and Big IF rally [were] amazing campaigns about poverty and/or world despite short lead times... good hunger before the IF campaign, 77% numbers”. However some said the responded “yes”. 57% had heard about campaign largely failed to equip activists the campaign from an organisation to mobilise others and supporters to talk they support/receive updates from, to their friends, families and colleagues. suggesting that many were already core supporters of the sector. 96% said that they would be “quite likely” or “very likely” to “support a similar campaign in the future”, suggesting no lack of appetite for taking future action. 25 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
FINDINGS & ANALYSIS
There is a strong indication that, in a Coalition Feedback Survey (September 2013) professional sense, the capacity of the sector has been increased by “How much has your organisation’s capacity to campaign (on any the IF campaign. There is evidence issue) increased as a result of your involvement in the IF campaign?” – supported by the coalition survey (see below) - of a more confident development sector in campaigning terms and that the UK international NGO sector remains among the most effective campaigning sector in the UK if not globally. 9% Overall numbers of new supporters that 1% the organisations involved have gained 15% through the period outpaced the agreed measures of success, which, according 3% to the monitoring framework, achieved a 38% increase compared to a 20% target (although over 90% of this increase is accounted for by six organisations).41 One comment from a smaller NGO was: “We are more likely [to come together in future]. We need a break but we have learned that we can do it more effectively. Hopefully we won’t leave it another 43% eight years. [We don’t want to lose] the institutional memory, the things that worked 29% well and things that didn’t. We formed good relationships and it will be easier to pick up the phone”. Another said: “Cross collaborative working was good... [IF] built relationships amongst organisations like in the Faith Working Group and the Youth Working Group... bringing younger people and groups together”.
A significant increase in capacity A slight decrease in capacity A slight increase in capacity A significant decrease in capacity No change Not sure 26 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
FINDINGS & ANALYSIS
Trust aspects One working group member said: “We Unintended consequences have said we want to keep meeting on Good practice in network theory One important but largely unintended an informal basis. [There is] real openness indicates that a key element in building consequence of the effective lobbying and honesty in the meetings. It is good the trust and confidence that underpins and advocacy was that the campaign for celebrities to know that we work effective collective advocacy is that policy dialogue helped opened together... it’s a good thing for agents members have confidence in decision- up relevant spaces for others in civil to understand”. One typical comment making processes. In the early stages of society with a technical competence that reflects the sometimes strained most coalitions, these are often relatively to occupy. This was commented on by relationships at the top of the campaign centralised, but with all members having some external stakeholders who noted was: “The campaign ended well [at a say, and as trust increases, it becomes that, for example, Global Witness and the G8] but this is caveated by the fact possible to move towards ‘distributed Transparency International provided that there are some organisations and leadership,’ through which several technical assistance and contributed to people we wouldn’t want to work with partners take delegated responsibility some critical thinking on the EITI before [so closely] again”. for decisions in specialist areas of work.42 and after the G8. Another mentioned In high-performing networks, collective At the wider level, moving beyond the the Publish What You Pay coalition’s work confidence in the basis of unity and coalition members, and toward wider on Canada, US and EU legislation on trust in each other can release levels civil society there are clear signs that extractives transparency. of energy and impact that far exceed large scale and closely controlled Another consequence of the campaign, those of individual organisations, creating campaigns like IF, Make Poverty History partly intended perhaps by some a collective surge based on relatively and Jubilee 2000 might struggle in the participants in the campaign, was the few participants’ actual work.43 Because medium term. Organisations seem to increased interest of some larger NGOs of the time-limited nature of the IF be moving further apart both in political who have now started working on tax campaign these initial stages of forming strategy and theory of change terms, as issues. The issue is now more firmly on the relationships never really matured well as in terms of a splintering of subject international development civil society beyond that first stage and trust and matter and issue focus, size and political agenda as well as in the media and on confidence was predicated, to a large positioning. Many commentators expect the political agenda. extent, on existing good relationships. there to be more frequent, looser but Set against these positive developments, Some respondents argued that the ‘top less ambitious mobilisations in future, there is also a feeling from some outside down’ campaign and formation model perhaps in the form of coalitions on more the campaign that IF successfully set the hasn’t helped sector trust as whole but narrowly defined issues coupled with political - and to some extent media - trust between some organisations is organisational structures that are more agenda on development and therefore markedly higher. Overall the analysis is horizontal. One civil society watcher dominated the development ‘space’ that although it is variable, on balance said: “The middle ground has shrunk... for the period of the campaign. While trust has improved. Those organisations it was an uneasy coalition... it was 2005 this was part of the campaign’s success, further from the centre of the campaign hangover. The future may well be single the consequence was that those who seem to remain keener to work together issue campaigns”. A challenge for future weren’t involved, or felt they could not again. There was also reported increased international NGO coalitions will be that be part of it or formally join, struggled at mutual trust and networking within Wales, change is more likely to come through times to deal with attempting to get their Scotland and Northern Ireland. sharper focus, a single overarching narrative and networks that organise own messages across to government horizontally and vertically.44 and in the media in the run up to the G8. 27 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
FINDINGS & ANALYSIS
Outcomes: the nations In mobilisation terms, across Wales, Strategies and tactics employed Northern Ireland and Scotland, there is a Although the Scottish, Welsh and The different strategies and tactics sense that the campaign both enhanced Northern Ireland campaigns supported employed by the campaign were mutual trust and confidence and the main UK campaign calls, the numerous, interconnecting and grew networking potential within the NGOs and campaigns in the nations cleverly over time. The key ways in which the gave a welcome focus to local activists, developed their own identity and campaign attempted to influence and perhaps through being able to operate momentum and there are specific achieve its objectives was by: within a different, more conducive policy outcomes that can be attributed to and political devolved space. One view • mobilising supporters and the wider them, or to which they have contributed. from Wales was: “It was good to have a public to take action 45 In Scotland in particular, key outcomes story to tell the Welsh public - the major • mobilising key sections of supporters on areas specifically targeted by the organisations began to work together and the public through multipliers – campaign were highlighted as: more.” In Northern Ireland there was faith groups, diaspora groups, youth • A doubling of the Climate Justice Fund46 political interest from the Northern Ireland groups, etc. legislative Assembly, “that was due to • Influencing the terms of the breadth of the coalition” and a feeling • through the mainstream media, using Procurement Reform Bill published that IF has “strengthened the movement news and PR (celebrity-driven coverage) in October 2013, on support for fair in Northern Ireland... public awareness • through social media, especially Twitter and ethical trading and promotion of the issues … nearly • through lobbying (in Whitehall and • Greater investment for development every church in Northern Ireland has an in Parliament), including the ‘pre- education in the form of new IF banner on.” A motion at the Northern lobbying’, and through policy analysis core funding for six Development Ireland legislative Assembly was passed Education Centres in global citizenship in June in support of IF aims.49 • through stunts and events 47 education Effectiveness of strategies and tactics There was a strong sense amongst The strategies employed interviewees that these outcomes can 3.3. Strategies and tactics be attributed to, at least in part, the This section looks at the effectiveness The campaign used media stunts, Scottish IF campaign. One interviewee of the campaign’s key strategies lobbying and digital strategies, plus a with in-depth knowledge of the and tactics. significant public mobilisation, which campaign and Scottish politics said: “on together were effective in terms of Overall, the campaign employed a skilful producing the appearance of a climate justice [fund] and development mix of media stunts, lobbying and digital education centre funding, I don’t think mass mobilisation and in retaining the tactics, plus a significant mobilisation, mobilisation threat associated with the they would have happened without to produce an appearance of mass 48 sector. However, it lacked the scale of the IF campaign”. The campaign also mobilisation that helped enable access pushed cross-government coherence previous efforts and this is a risk going to and action by government. The forward. One internal interviewee and tax issues, both of which reportedly campaign retained the mobilisation were raised up the political agenda. commentated: “It didn’t catch the eye threat of previous campaigns and most of the public as much as Make Poverty accept that it did enough to protect History, but I still think we pulled it off. [We the sector’s position as one of the UK’s were] disciplined, we got people to Hyde top campaign mobilisers. However the Park, the government was impressed, but lack of mobilisation on the scale of not overly so”. previous coalition campaign efforts is acknowledged as a risk going forward. 28 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
FINDINGS & ANALYSIS
Some painted an alternative There were also a few comments in The choreography of the campaign was hypothetical picture. One internal said: interviews and focus groups questioning not helped by what many regarded as “If they had started (only) three months the degree to which some agencies periodic online-offline disjointedness. earlier, it would have peaked at the really put their organisational weight The offline and online elements did not January launch and probably had more behind the campaign at key moments, always support each other as well as public break-through by the time of the and especially, at the looser times. they might. “IF did some great things G8.” The lack of lead-in time to plan and Organisational commitment, especially digitally and online but the two [offline build capacity was identified by other in the first three months, was described and online] weren’t integrated. Digital respondents from smaller organisations by more than one respondent as wasn’t there at the top table... If we as having a negative impact on their ‘patchy’, although the momentum were more joined up then we could ability to deliver in good time, particularly picked up – as one would expect and have looked even bigger”. In Supporters for some identified constituencies. hope – in later periods. This challenge in Survey, some promoted the view that In terms of the key tactics and strategies maintaining campaign momentum was “the campaign suffered from too much used, analysis of the overall strategy particularly problematic for the purposes online and not enough attention to the for the campaign is complicated by of building public support around the offline” (a view which is also reflected the fact that it changed in emphasis core campaign narrative. in some interviews with faith groups, throughout the period of the campaign. Related to this was a tendency to repeat particularly with older demographics and The ambition - as witnessed by the what had been done in the past. The de the ability to reach offline audiences Measures of Success document and the facto campaign strategy was, at times through churches for example). IF Strategy - was to mobilise significantly of uncertainty and disagreement, more In terms of power analysis, a short written large sections of the UK public to backward looking than it might have been. version of which was detailed in the IF produce a movement capable of “Make Poverty History always sat over IF – Strategy, the assessment was limited: driving significant policy change. it was most people’s frame of reference”. “Although some policy progress is One finding that emerged strongly is Set against this was the significant possible, overall the likelihood of major that the ‘loose-tight’ strategy that the investment in digital campaigning, policy progress on the structural causes coalition employed didn’t work as well which was a distinct area of innovation. of food poverty during the campaign is as expected. The idea was that three It is also notable that – in terms of some limited, but there are clear victories to be main moments would produce tightly key areas such as the marketing budget – won in terms of putting these issues firmly controlled coalition activities with looser the campaign had less to spend than on the global agenda and building periods in between. These would be Make Poverty History and so, arguably, strong public awareness as a foundation filled with organisations adding their own less freedom to take big risks. for subsequent policy victories.” activity in order to keep momentum Mobilisation up. It appears that this model worked The campaign had an ambitious and well in Scotland where opportunities for intricate mobilisation-engagement influencing a national agenda were taken model on which targets and measures up by the Scottish IF Campaign. In the of success were based, as shown below. UK-wide campaign in practice, however, while the tighter controlled parts were mainly successful, the ‘looser’ periods acted like vacuums, with inadequate activities and momentum. Moreover, this direction and campaign momentum was inclined to push those implementing the campaign towards the big moments, partly as a consequence of late planning and delayed decision-making. 29 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
FINDINGS & ANALYSIS
IF Campaign Engagement Outcome Model The ambition
Advocate Enlisting, Galvanising, 450,000 - 500,000 Recruiting, Evangelising
Activist Socially proven support & “sit forward” engagement. 1.5 - 2 million Emotionally invested
Endorser Buy and wear campaign identifier. 3.5 - 5 million Not proactively ‘sneezing’
Aware ‘Keeping and eye on this’; 7 - 10 million aware without prompting
Onlooker Mass reach - the ‘public cloud’; 15 - 20 million aware when prompted 30 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
FINDINGS & ANALYSIS
An analysis of the effectiveness of the Another issue frequently mentioned For some the mobilisation never mobilisation elements of the campaign as an explanation for low levels of fully appeared in the expected way. suggests starting with a conceptual wider public support was the external According to one respondent, a split into two main groups: the core context, which with a strong emphasis decision-making politician in Scotland supporters of the development sector, on austerity and anti-aid sentiment was said to have commented to the many of whom were engaged by the was not ideal for capturing the public campaign that he was waiting for a campaign and took action, and the imagination, although some felt that a mass mobilisation which never really wider public, who were not engaged stronger effort to link austerity here with materialised. Many also felt (in particular in large numbers and the mobilisation poverty in the south could have been those not central to decision-making) numbers were low (see comments made. This perspective was illustrative that by June a certain amount of energy above). Aside from some over ambitious of a challenge to the predominant for mobilisation had been generated, target-setting discussed above on the orthodoxy that public mobilisation is a only for it to have been allowed to mass mobilisation front, the large scale pre-requisite in an international NGO quickly dissipate. One interesting point mobilisation was limited in its success. coalition campaign. A deeper analysis made by a small but significant number One of the main ongoing methods of of the rationale for mobilisation and its of interviewees was that the purpose of mass mobilisation was online actions, contribution to policy objectives needed mobilisations – especially large scale and there is sense that the relationship to be in place. mobilisation towards the end of large between this and decision-makers wasn’t Externally and internally there was a campaign such as IF – is more relevant sufficiently strong or plausibly thought strong view that the campaign did to the future than the current campaign, through. However, the experience in the not amount to a movement but had in the sense that the mobilisation in the nations was different and, in general, captured an appetite amongst existing current period will to some extent affect much more positive, to the extent supporters to take part in something big. politicians’ belief in the threat of the that mobilisation played an important Furthermore, most member organisations extent of mobilisation next time around. influencing role. were used to a broadcast model of The IF ‘brand’ There is a common view that the campaigning not a bottom-up model The campaign brand was subject to chosen mass offline ‘action’ of showing of campaigning. “It felt like re-energising contention from the planning stages of support for the campaign by wearing more than movement building ... it the campaign. Two creative agencies a wristband didn’t work well, either as was too focused on big moments ... had pitched branding ideas. The a sign of wider public commitment to doesn’t feel [like a movement] from an ‘winning’ brand was felt to embody campaign objectives or as a contribution external perspective”. This sentiment the brief best and was agreed by the to intended campaign revenue. “We got was supported by some of the internal OC. The final outcome was a generally the wrong product”, said one internal. evaluations done by working groups unloved element of the campaign, Another respondent questioned why some of which also referenced although many accepted that it was a such a product was repeated from Make the framing and communications challenging brief and that the creative Poverty History and described as “no challenges in relation to mobilisation. work was largely technically well longer cool ... too childish”. It was also For instance the Supporter Journey executed. One internal sad: “The idea of suggested that better ideas could have Working Group evaluation found that: using food to talk about loads of issues been developed with more time and “The framing ... under the hunger banner makes sense. But when the agency had some of the ideas from the working might not have rung true, the campaign came back they were struggling to put groups been used. became one about ‘tax justice and everything into a simple catchphrase ... hunger’, and there was little explicit The ‘IF’ bit was usable but the whole title material actually about hunger, as a was too long”. result the campaign was a bit hollow, which made it harder to mobilise”. 31 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
FINDINGS & ANALYSIS
In terms of the brand elements, the Another reason that the brand suffered The Big IFs campaign name was not popular was that the marketing budget behind The Big IF London moment was either inside or outside the campaign, it was very limited and inadequate, recognised as crucially important although neither was it universally (despite requests from those working on in terms of living up to the ‘implied unpopular. The name itself had multiple marketing within the campaign). The threat’ of public engagement and challenges. It was felt to be too long but marketing strategy therefore relied on mobilisation in support of the campaign, also not explanatory enough. It didn’t organisations using the brand which based on previous mobilisations by have an in-built call action as Make some felt was not taken up sufficiently by the international development sector. Poverty History did, and it didn’t work well coalition members to develop significant Although much of the work had been with social media or with the mainstream brand recognition. done by the time of the rally the feeling media. One typical internal comment In general terms, although well executed, was that if it had ending up being a was: “It didn’t work at all. It was a bad many of communications aspects of flop it would have affected the ability decision from the beginning, it was a the campaign struggled to ‘punch to deliver quite so much, especially at big challenge”. through’ and – in the same way as the G8. “It wouldn’t have been so easy The look-and-feel design elements of the the brand – had to grapple with the without it, [the] feedback was people felt brand received a more mixed reception, complexity of the message. Among the it had been important in government” but are still somewhat negatively viewed exceptions to this were the campaign while one government insider said: “The both internally and externally. Those promotional films, which had mostly Big IF definitely was noticed”. who felt they understood what it was positive comments and reflections by There was a feeling amongst some civil trying to do were sympathetic. “I broadly those that saw them. One informed society groups that the event was in liked the logo [it was] fresh, engaging” external respondent said: “There were keeping with the rest of the campaign said one. Another who was close to the some excellent assets created that aren’t in terms of the numbers of supporters brand decision-making pointed out that [likely to be] dated - such as ‘aid what engaged. However, the lack of mass the brief, context and policy platform it is good for’ – which are popular and scale and the lower turn out than made the brand hard to get right and useable”. An internal said: “the films and previous campaigns was noted, but even harder to build: “It was better than messaging explained it very well but also understandable given the context. people think. The campaign played well [ultimately] I don’t think it was as visible”. “Getting 45,000 people in Hyde Park with a warm audience... and the kids’ Stunts and moments [shows] there is still a real interest ... films... the brand positioning was better The success, and - to a large extent - a reservoir of public interest but they than Make Poverty History. The brand didn’t get out beyond the base”, said was never going to come through that the effectiveness of the campaign’s stunts represent another area of one external commentator with good strongly because we were always going knowledge of the sector. to lead with a policy issue... the brand is agreement among the data sources only as good as the things and tools that for this evaluation. For instance, the final According to a survey of people at the you put behind it”. coalition-wide survey asked people what rally in Hyde Park, 39% of respondents their “favourite thing” about the campaign said they heard about the event through One reason that the brand struggled was and many mentioned or highlighted an organisation. 67% said they strongly was, therefore, because the policy the stunts, moments and, in particular, agreed that they were attending in platform and hunger overlay were the Big IF. Feedback from government order to “pressure politicians to make themselves multifaceted and the tends to confirm the importance of these things change” and 60% said they were layers of messages and complexity to moments and stunts. One government there “to raise public awareness” [about get across made the mechanics of insider said: “All stunts make a difference, international development issues]. the brand challenging. One internal ministers are watching”. comment was: “The brand, on aid and food, was quite difficult and had too many lenses”. 32 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
FINDINGS & ANALYSIS
Another attendee reflected a small Although the media stunts at the G8 From government, there was a strong minority opinion that the content of the probably came too late to have a big sense of technical competence from rally was not what it could have been. impact on campaign outcomes, the the campaign lobbying outfit. “They “The rally was a missed opportunity to coalition managed to get good media were very professional... there were some [educate]. The rally speeches were a coverage at the G8 itself, arguably issues where we agreed and some bit samey and underestimated the keeping leaders on their toes. One where we disagreed... on the whole the knowledge of the rally [attendees]”. internal informant said: “I am [proud of] people knew their stuff very well and Although some commentators liked the the wall-to-wall media coverage during were technically competent – more ‘spinning flowers’ element of the rally, the G8, [especially] the boat stunts. We aware of the wider issues and complexity others felt it was quite expensive and worked well with a bored media.” ... sometimes with NGOs they don’t not particularly effective. Government relations/Policy have any sense of context.” Although, at times, the relationship did get strained: “A The church service and other initiatives and Advocacy Working Group that ran alongside the rally garnered couple of times it felt like things that we The lobbying element of IF is another strong praise from some of those said [privately] were being used against area that comes in for widespread involved from the faith sector. Most that us in public messaging”. praise, both internally and externally. commented were complimentary about Positioning Although the Policy and Advocacy the organisation and content of the Big IF The ‘insider’ political strategy was a Working Group was large, cumbersome event in Belfast. calculated choice that most people and had challenges, a small core group The boats stunt, the ‘elephant in the (internally and externally) were generally within it reportedly worked very effectively room’ and George Osborne masks supportive of. There was a strong together. It was described as a “slick sense that this part of the strategy The ‘elephant in the room’ stunt was felt machine”. One member of the group was deliberate, bespoke and valid. to be particularly impactful because said: “We built an amazing lobbying “Organisations that had been more it was noticed by government and machinery very quickly. We strategised outsider, went more insider. Things were led the Chancellor to tweet about the together and pushed organisations from going on at G20 and OECD which campaign, showing that the message the first IF meeting”. Another insider also meant it was a good time to push for tax had “gone right to the top”. The recognised the importance of the pre- on the inside”, said one OC member. Chancellor said in his tweet: “Powerful campaign lobbying that helped shape #elephantintheroom campaign. Have and set the agenda for the campaign, There was a significant minority group put tax evasion and helping developing the government and, by turn, the G8: of others who were more circumspect countries on agenda at #G7 this “It wasn’t all a foregone conclusion and and many were at the limits of their weekend”. Although this stunt had little it was done brilliantly well and managed comfort zones: “I feel torn about talking media coverage it managed to get the well. The work with No 10, the DFID to government very early. That’s a tricky attention of the chancellor and his staff. leveraging [key prominent people] balance when you’re trying to mobilise... The George Osborne masks stunt as well, was a huge achievement... but we were critical and balanced and achieved a good range of picture the pre-lobbying also worked well”. we weren’t hugely flattering”. coverage in the media on Budget day Overall, the lobbying, government However, from some inside and many as part of the Budget moment. However relations and political engagement outside the coalition, there are questions some felt that the coverage lacked depth was agile enough in itself to respond to arising from the campaign as to and links to the intended policy asks. changes in the external environment, whether it was sufficiently challenging to coupled with an ability to play to government. One outsider commented: coalition members’ key competencies “Cameron needed to put in some and areas of expertise although at times spadework. He didn’t start to focus on this suffered from an unclear primary the summit until two weeks before. Blair focus (0.7%, tax, transparency, nutrition) and Brown were more committed... [in at key stages. that sense] they gave Cameron an easy ride... they worried about being over critical and pulled their punches”. 33 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
FINDINGS & ANALYSIS
Another said: “budget day was the low Parliament Media point saying only positive things ... they The IF campaign had a good profile and As outlined above, the London-based [the campaign] almost overplayed wide support in parliament, as outlined media group managed collectively their hand ... [on the other hand] the G8 above. Figures from NFP Synergy Charity to attain lots of - almost exclusively response by IF was stronger and better Parliamentary Monitor50 suggest that the positive – coverage for the campaign than I expected [which] was down to actions taken by MPs in support of the and its aims. There is also evidence of the fact that government had promised campaign were considerably higher good and strengthened relationships [more than they delivered] and therefore than in an average year. According to with some journalists, according to the outcome was a disappointment”. interviewees 50-60 MPs tweeted during interviewees. One external viewpoint was: However another outsider had a different the Twitter day of action where the “In the Media [Working Group] they were viewpoint, reflecting some interpretations campaign asked MP’s to tweet about really good ... managed to get to the that the public positioning was, in fact, IF. One said: “It was such a public way point where anyone who was vaguely quite negative and anti-business at and easy to lend their voice and showed interested in these issues would have times: “When you looked beyond the Cameron and Greening that we had noticed what went on”. rhetoric, the report and positions were traction in parliament as well. We learned Media was identified by the campaign much clearer and well-articulated. how you could use these techniques with as a key intermediary for getting the Detailed policy for the G8 was well pulled MPs... [there was] lots of cool learning”. together but the public media-facing campaign messages both to supporters piece was more negative.” One respondent close to the and to government. It was also a key area parliamentary work said that it wasn’t identified in the measures of success and One informed insider felt that the always easy to get meetings with MPs, IF strategy documents as a campaign campaign had got the balance of but that “when we did it was effective. target in itself.51 This arguably gave media ‘good cop/ bad cop’ right. “We achieved MPs did what we asked”. Constituency coverage a higher status in the campaign a good balance between maintaining lobbying of MPs was also a strong strand that might have been the case if it had not a diplomatic position with government, of the lobby effort. been a specific objective. while still able to put the spotlight on failings (through the ‘elephant in the There was a feeling amongst some A separate media group was established room’ stunt... or [by piling on] the pressure executing the parliamentary work that in Scotland comprising seven to eight for delivery in line with our political while the Policy and Advocacy Working media professionals that operated strategy like our response to the PM’s Group was concentrating on a higher autonomously of the London media letter to UK [tax] havens or IF’s open letter level of lobbying, and the Parliamentary group. The strategy was aimed at to the PM raising concerns about the Group was only allowed to contact engaging with the distinctiveness of lack of ambition ahead of the Nutrition backbenchers, there was a slice of the Scottish media and the output for Growth event). This insider also noted: parliament - junior ministers and shadow was a reasonable proportion of the “It is worth recognising that the interest ministers - that weren’t targeted as IF campaign’s total media coverage. in the campaign from government much as they might have been and Similar groups existed in Wales and was because we were threatening to consequently “fell between two stalls”. Northern Ireland. recreate Make Poverty History – hence DFID and other lobbying targets had us straight through the door to present the new campaign as soon as they heard about it.” 34 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
FINDINGS & ANALYSIS
Despite these successes there were For a campaign of this size and Digital some frustrations. In some ways, ambition, there were too few policy There is a broadly positive digital the media work was disconnected ‘products’ to ensure good quality media evaluation commission by the Digital from the overall strategy and OC, coverage, with policy depth. Some Working Group (conducted by The Small and arguably suffered from a lack of NGOs produced policy reports but Axe). It is clear that this work generated formal representation on the OC. The they were too infrequent to keep the significant volume with overall traffic media group certainly felt that the media interested. There were comments analysis measured at 2.25 million views campaign was not always listening to that the media work was too celebrity of pages on the IF website, with social their needs and concerns, sometimes focused, but it is clear that the group felt media exposure calculated at 165,718 misunderstood what it needed, and acute demands from the centre for it to mentions of IF, and a total of over 3.4 was stuck in an older model of how use celebrities. The enduring shortage of million interactions with IF across all to get media coverage. There was a policy and news-led stories generated by social media channels, with an analysis feeling amongst some that the media the coalition also meant that PR-based of demographics being a slightly older work needed to be situated within a media work, using celebrities, was the audience than anticipated and more clear overarching communications main viable choice. females (65%) than males (35%).53 strategy, and that messages couldn’t Media ‘purdah’ be sufficiently tailored to a modern- Overall, the digital engagement within day media reality. The sign-off process The campaign had agreed that at the sector was innovative, well respected was also a common complaint from key times members would subsume and was noticed by some external the media groups, as well as what was all organisational designations under opinion formers. However there were perceived by some as over-sensitivity the IF brand in terms of media work. issues with wider engagement and about the policy message and risk- This ‘purdah’ was an aspiration that all the extent to which this strategy ‘broke aversion. One informed internal said: spokespeople were to be described through’ and reached a wider audience. as IF spokespeople. Although good “They were on transmit mode: an old- The external analysis commissioned by the practice, in theory this seemed to have fashioned, broadcast model. Media Digital Working Group found that although rather a chilling effect on coverage at work is now about understanding what content was imaginative, engaging and these times. Many members considered the public care about and tailoring your well-shared (such as the ‘What has aid it a necessary discipline; lots were also message to that”. ever done for anyone’ YouTube film), inhibited from taking the initiative. There momentum was lost in the quieter times In addition the media effort struggled were strong suggestions that some between the campaign peaks. This led with the same issues as other public- organisations broke the purdah rules. to lower levels of engagement and fewer facing elements of the campaign like Smaller organisations strove to follow repeat actions than might have been the complexity of the message, delays purdah rules but also struggled with the seen if the campaign didn’t have such in planning and inadequate thinking complexity of them and the application dips in momentum. about pacing and playing to current of them under different scenarios. media interest. The Media Working Group Overall, however, smaller organisations The IF digital strategy had three internal evaluation recognised this: probably benefited from the purdah rules interlinked objectives: to broaden “The messaging was confusing ... There in the sense that if they hadn’t existed awareness, to deepen engagement seemed a disregard by OC for building on then larger organisations would doubtless and to demonstrate impact54. It was existing public opinion or media zeitgeist... developed relatively quickly in order to 52 have dominated the coverage. over-reliance on our existing supporters.” support the wider campaign objectives around public understanding of causes of poverty. The three interlinked objectives represent a logical structure and a helpful framework to assess the contribution of digital activities to the campaign’s objectives. 35 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
FINDINGS & ANALYSIS
The internet search trends over the six- According to research on IF Twitter ‘Rallying Cries’ and celebrity month period January to June indicate activity undertaken by UCL, the overall endorsement were two of the most peaks over time that are strongly correlated IF Twitter profile consisted of 101,842 useful types of social media posts (in to media stories about tax evasion and overwhelmingly positive tweets, mainly terms of numbers of favouriting, likes, avoidance (the work of Margaret Hodge’s of general nature (that is, not topic retweets and comments). In particular, Select Committee, Starbucks, Amazon, specific but supportive of IF generally), the ‘Rallying Cries’ (such as “1 in 8 people Google and Jimmy Carr). This coverage and little of which could be described go hungry in the world. Imagine #IF we prompted wider public interest in and as a ‘public conversation’ and mostly could be generation to end this. Join support for, tax reforms and helped build ‘isolated tweets’. Tax was the key issue us 8 Jun, Hyde Park [link]”) appeared on the history and credibility of NGO and in issue-specific tweets and although to generate deeper engagement civil society campaigning in this policy aid was quite prominent, it featured (sharing and retweeting rather than area for many years. mainly around the budget. Land was simply ‘liking’ or ‘favouriting’), while lower profile but more evenly spread. celebrity endorsement generated slightly Unsurprisingly perhaps, Tweets came shallower engagement but in higher mostly in spikes which tended to follow numbers. There were particular problems the campaign moments in the way that mentioned by interviewees around the media and mobilisation activity did.55 use of #IF, which apparently didn’t work well on Twitter as it was too generic. One comment in the focus groups was that some older people found social media difficult to access, and that this campaign was difficult to access without some knowledge and ability of social media.
40,000 38,450
35,000
30,000
25,000
20,000 18,842
15,000 13,139 11,928
10,000 9,432
5,000 5,108 2,130 681 839 379
0 Jan 2013 Feb 2013 Mar 2013 Apr 2013 May 2013 Jun 2013 Jul 2013 Aug 2013 Sep 2013 Oct 2013 36 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
FINDINGS & ANALYSIS
There was a strong opinion amongst However, in terms of its effectiveness in Celebrity recruitment also sometimes some of those at the centre that this the political sphere there is feedback suffered from the fact that agents didn’t campaign should promote digital that the digital presence worked, in know the IF brand and campaign. engagement more than previous particular during the key moments of the Celebrities, like many outsiders, found campaigns and that digital should be budget campaigning and around the it quite complex and difficult to break a key and prominent strategy. However G8. One internal close to government down into manageable calls for support there were problems with delivery: said: “The digital stuff helped ... the online like some other campaigns. This was “Everything came far too late” was a mobilisation, Justine Greening said so”. a broader campaign issue rather than common refrain. One outsider said it was “really powerful something that was celebrity specific: The website split respondents’ views, on the launch, every development “They understood the top line but as with some externals expressing positive organisation was tweeting”. There was soon as you started to get into the assessments. However, most internal some evidence that the conversation steps that need to be taken it got a bit respondents were disappointed with online was notably quiet outside of the key complicated. It wasn’t easy to talk about the final outcome and usability of the influencing moments. One government the issues. We tried to break it down – but website. The website could have worked insider said: “[Special Advisers] watch there was no quick and easy way to give better to give people their next step after Twitter closely, there was less than we people the background”, said one insider. taking action, and made it easier to thought there might have been... it Although not explicitly vocalised, the issue find out about the campaign in depth. makes you question how much the of tax could have made some celebrities There was good content on the site but it public at large seized the agenda”. nervous about the potential for having their was not always easy to find, and putting Celebrity own tax affairs in the public and media up new content could take some time, spotlight and thus may have represented a The IF campaign did have a number of though this reportedly improved later blockage to some getting involved. key successes with engaging celebrities, in the campaign. One blunt view was: who drove much of the social and Some interviewees, survey respondents “the website was ... hard to use ... There traditional media coverage. The Big IF and focus group participants were were two main purposes - to make it Hyde Park event was particularly noted uncomfortable with the disproportionate easy to explore the issues and take the for the success of getting celebrities to level of focus on celebrities in the hand raiser action – it failed on both. The attend and speak. campaign and some also referenced website ‘visualiser’ was the expensive bit Finding Frames in this regard. The However, the coalition had arguably and didn’t work well”. Another was: “The celebrities aspect of NGO campaigning underestimated the growing competition main website idea was social: ‘IF Live’, has a history of being a contested amongst charities for celebrities’ time but because there weren’t that many strategy within the sector, for example and endorsements. This was felt keenly people it tended to look sparse and its level of importance within a change in the attempt to recruit. “It is a crowded wasn’t great for older people”. theory, and the IF campaign coalition market – more than ever. Even small Social media worked well in the main was no different in trying to balance charities [have celebrity coordinators] as a strategy for getting the attention diverse views among its members. The and artists have to be really considered of political insiders and campaign overall feeling in this group was that about who to support and that they don’t professionals, although it didn’t have an the celebrity strategy was somewhat support too many different charities... ‘organic life’ in the sense of stimulating disconnected to - and ill-fitted with - the their support needs to have integrity.”56 public conversations about the overall strategy for the campaign which campaign and its issues. was laden with complex messaging and had a policy focus. 37 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
FINDINGS & ANALYSIS
Diaspora Faith Youth and schools The IF campaign’s links with diaspora Much of the IF offline supporter Youth and schools were another good organisations significantly exceeded mobilisation could be attributed to the example of devolving decision-making previous efforts by the sector to involve efforts of the faith organisations. The Faith authority to help release creative diaspora organisations in an inclusive Working Group was in this sense a good energy. In general the group worked well and meaningful way. Once established, example of devolved decision-making together. As part of the IF campaign a the Diaspora Working Group developed authority and releasing creative energy number of schools visited No.10 to deliver a strategy to reach out to Black and which has built trust and may stay together, a ‘plate petition’ to the Prime Minister. Minority Ethnic media, it delivered in fact the Faith Campaigners Group has The plates included messages from the training to diaspora organisations aiming been established and is due to reconvene children and young people on how we to hold a space for a collective diaspora at a meeting in January 2014. could ensure there is enough food for voice to be heard on campaign issues, The church service before the Big IF rally everyone. This element of the campaign help explain the campaign’s added was a particular success. It was well was well respected and considered to value and break down understandable attended but also contributed in part have a high impact for a relatively low negative perceptions. Twenty diaspora to successfully swelling numbers at the investment of resources. organisations joined and collectively rally itself. In Northern Ireland, the church There was a general concern that planned and delivered a range of service was a reportedly significant opportunities to involve youth were supporting campaign activities. moment of unity across the churches not really exploited and some felt the However there were challenges to and as such had an impact beyond the materials were “too dry” and that not all overcome. Two particular concerns campaign. There were also strong efforts the good ideas from the Youth Working emerged that were well articulated to reach out to a wider range of faith Group were taken on board and that during the evaluation research. Firstly, groups than previous coalition campaigns there was a lack of young voices on that policy asks could not be taken to However, there were many challenges other groups. The Youth Working Group broader communities as initially had in relation to campaign supporter Evaluation notes that: “As the Youth been presented, and secondly and mobilisation, not least lead-in times and Working Group we sometimes felt quite perhaps more importantly, that the the finite duration of the IF campaign separate to the main campaign.” lack of southern voices at the heart of per se. There was a sense – as was the Private sector the campaign led to questions with case in other areas of the campaign The organisations involved in the regards to framing. In one expression: - that more early planning, a greater IF campaign have a diversity of “[it seemed to be] an old fashioned buy in from faith groups and a clearer approaches to the private sector. The view of development”. theory of change that was explicit about private sector strategy suffered from Nevertheless, there is now an ongoing how mobilisation would contribute to a lack of agreed approach from the programme of work that has been the campaign’s objectives, would have beginning at senior levels in the coalition. inspired by IF campaign coalition been helpful. One informed external The Private Sector Working Group self- processes, which some say has acted commentator said: “There was a need evaluation states: “The internal structure as a catalyst to seriously address to articulate where we can add value of the campaign... did not set a broad perceptions of marginalisation of the but also about how faith leaders can and coherent strategy for multinational diaspora community within the sector. add value. [I] would have brought us in corporations or the wider private sector”. Sufficient appetite apparently exists to earlier on ... the churches have a long In addition, tax as an issue proved consider how to sustain partnerships and lead in time”. Another said: “There could somewhat problematic for the strategy maintain momentum and in October have been more engagement with faith- as it was seen by some companies an international NGO roundtable on based youth [groups]”. as anti-corporate. Companies were diaspora helped to identify “two to three involved too late, and were not really part project areas of future collaboration”. of the discussion. Evidence points to a reinvigoration of Diaspora for Development (plus a motion passed at Bond AGM in November). 38 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
FINDINGS & ANALYSIS
One external voice contended: “The Overall structure Coalition spread and range biggest issue was that it was quite business- The overall coalition and campaign The campaign had, by the close, 213 negative ... [there was] not much positive structure and organisation allowed member organisations, mainly from about the role of business ... we were just the campaign to function moderately international development backgrounds, asked to endorse, it was all or nothing. well. The structure57 of the coalition was but also many faith and diaspora There were too many asks and it didn’t designed in an attempt to balance the organisations and social enterprises. correlate back. Tax doesn’t link to food perceived need for control and direction The degree to which the coalition security ... It is quite nice to involve others in with enablement. According to the managed to reflect a wide and diverse the co-creation of the campaign. It felt like coalition Organising Principles document, constituency of support was varied. we were a bit of an afterthought. There was the campaign coalition agreed to: There was a good spread from the a general feeling (amongst businesses that “operate under an ‘Empowered Network international development sector, but had been approached) of the need to Model’ that seeks to strike the balance less diversity from other areas of civil come to us earlier.” between empowering members and society. Many interviewees felt that the Lifestyle providing effective working.”58 coalition would have been stronger The ‘lifestyle’ campaign actions – Besides being widely thought of as too with more environmental organisations change and actions that people could complex, vertically oriented and lacking and trade unions, for instance, as had make in their own lifestyles to play their in clear processes, the structure was also been originally intended at inception. part in the campaign – were considered said to have sometimes constrained However, there was success reaching a potentially important element for creativity and operational activity. It beyond development groups to some engagement at the early stage of was hierarchical and ‘top down’ and food groups and particular success in planning. The elements – consisting ‘command and control’ were the reaching Muslim and Jewish faith groups. of guides to Fairtrade and sustainable phrases commonly used to describe the The campaign was also felt by some eating practices - came late and feeling that too much power was held to be limited in its ability to make visible didn’t in the end make up a key part at the higher levels of the campaign, the existing breadth and diversity of the of the campaign. One coalition survey particularly at the OC. However, the coalition. This is possibly due to a number respondent said: “The lifestyle element necessity for clear messages and of factors including the relative power of the campaign was too late and a discipline, together with the length of the and resources of the larger organisations missed opportunity to reach the public”. campaign and diversity of the coalition, and the finite time available to build The Lifestyle Working Group did not explain this tendency to some degree. a movement for change. Some produce an informal internal evaluation. Some OC members concurred with this organisations signed up for IF but that analysis. One said: “Bit too top down. didn’t necessarily translate into delivery We could have found a better balance”. or engagement. There were also a 3.4. Structure, organisation Another said: “We created another number of comments in the working and management organisation in its own right and that group evaluations that working groups would like to have worked together Overall, the structure and management [conflicted] with [one’s] own organisation. There was a massive bureaucracy, [it more amongst themselves to harness of the IF campaign worked reasonably potential synergies and common well, delivering a major workload in wasn’t quite] ‘command and control’... but there are better models... We agenda but that the coalition structure a complex environment and for an limited such opportunities. ambitious campaign. However the could have had a looser coalition”. structure was also widely thought to be complex, too vertical and lacking clear processes at times on sign-off, decision- making and leadership. 39 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
FINDINGS & ANALYSIS
Management, organisation The Organising Committee, Board, However the dynamic was strained at and decision-making Working Groups relationships times by differences, mainly on policy aspects and sometimes on political There is a strong sentiment within the The Board strategy. At times strategic and political campaign at all levels that recognition The Board, whose role was one of differences arose but these were mainly is needed of extraordinary hard work oversight and campaign governance, dealt with in a way that - although quite of key people, organisations and in general terms was found to have difficult and time consuming at times - volunteers in the campaign. During the worked well and was useful for internal was not destabilising to the coalition as a main period of the campaign many organisational commitment and whole. The dynamic in the OC was that worked long hours, and most had their alignment among key members of the power was skewed towards the larger own organisational commitments to coalition. One OC member said: “[Having organisations and at times one or two fit in around the campaign. One said: the Board meant] we got buy in from organisations were particularly forceful “People worked incredibly hard and long bosses. It was a good way of involving in their arguments. The power dynamic hours. There was ... personal sacrifice”. CEOs and built coherence amongst the and membership of the OC also Overall, the campaign was mostly organisations themselves [internally, stemmed from the formation process, managed and organised to a functional across functions] and beyond BOAG”. which meant that the campaign’s level and - though tensions occurred There is a strong case to be made for founders were centrally located in power and limitations of management and the quality of leadership that CEOs structures. Groups who joined later had organisation arose - the key aspects provided for the IF campaign within the less of a voice. and outputs of the campaign continued Board and at their respective NGOs, The relationships between the OC and to be delivered. although the inclination to sometimes some working groups was regarded as One issue that frequently arose in internal represent their individual organisations less well-designed. The degree to which interviews and focus groups was the at coalition meetings, rather than the relationship was strained depended feeling that chairs of working groups consider the interests of the campaign - to a degree - on whether a working should have been given more power, as a collective priority was a perceived group had representation on the OC. status and operational independence. weakness. For example, the Board was Most working groups felt that they should This, it was felt, would have allowed more sometimes asked to act as an arbiter have representation of some kind on the activity and innovation. One said: “A when problems lower down the coalition OC. Given the number of working groups flowering of creativity happened when were escalated. this would not have been sustainable power was devolved”. There were also An additional challenge was the space but perhaps reflects the fact that those some signs of a centralising tendency, that the Board and the OC occupied, without representation felt disempowered which, some speculated, came from relative to strategic governance and or disconnected from the power source the early policy negotiations and the operational delivery. It seemed to some of the OC. Working groups without a line campaign formation stage. that at times that they “bumped into into the OC were, however, described The proliferation of working groups each other” as both sought to make as “more functional” and generally worked against the smaller organisations decisions on strategies and activities. performed better. who struggled to attend the relevant The Organising Committee (OC) meetings and deliver needed capacity. One internal commentator said: The OC itself was relatively healthy as “Elements worked well but then it grew so a decision-making forum and had huge that [it] become unmanageable, mainly good functional working when it got so big. There were too many relationships. One OC member said: working groups, too many meetings. You “It mainly worked well together... it was had to be quite ruthless about what you well chaired and effective”. could go to. This [meetings culture] is partly cultural in the sector.” 40 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
FINDINGS & ANALYSIS
One key interlocutor said: “Working Decision-making and ‘sign-off’ One decision-making process that groups had a quite difficult [working The closely related sign-off and decision- lacked clarity and transparency was ‘the relationship with the OC]. OC making processes came up recurrently Journey’. During the lead up to the G8 responsibilities on each area could across the data set collected for this the campaign would travel across the have been better organised. Heads evaluation. Many of those outside the country after the Big IF rally in London. of working groups should have met at campaign’s decision-making structures The decision-making process to cancel operational strategic planning level ... we were unclear about where sign-off was this aspect of campaign was not clear could have done with a week-by-week located and many described decisions to all, and some organisations were communications calendar”. Another being reopened repeatedly. One focus dismayed about this, having invested OC member admitted: “OC was never groups participant said: “One challenge time in planning it. However others say downward facing. The working group was that groups didn’t know where it was simply due to budget constraints chairs [system] was too complicated ... decision-making happened and where and point to the decision as an example it wasn’t clear who was doing what”. The sign-off was located.” For example on of effective cost control decision-making. G8 Leadership Working Group attracted communications: “Some things fell Ultimately, many felt that the deficiency comments about its relationship to the between responsibilities, people weren’t of trust between some members of OC and in particular clarity of set up, given access to decisions and there was the coalition was in part to blame for decision-making and sign off. Those that sometimes a vacuum”. the lack of clear decision-making and commented on the OC relationship with This sign-off complexity, some said, lengthy sign-off processes. There is the nations also described a disconnect a sense, however, that over time the at times. led to a chilling effect based on a perception of bureaucracy and lack of coalition in general, and the OC in Another common observation about nimbleness of campaign management particular, became more disciplined at the way that the OC was constituted and delivery. The impact was that decision-making and sign-off, as trust related to the balance of skills and internal timelines were compromised and confidence was built. representation of functions. Core which was described by one interviewee The OC reacted early to head off members of the OC were chosen as “disruptive and stressful”. criticisms of the sign-off processes by on the basis of their organisational 59 There was also a strong sense that instituting the Agile Sign-Off Group . This affiliation rather than through an attempt group also had challenges and in some to build a suite of complementary decisions that had been made were sometimes undone. Also, related to this, instance took long periods to sign-off expertise. In particular, while the OC lines and outputs, while at other times it had much relevant experience, it had was a belief that sometimes the process for reaching decisions was opaque and reportedly worked reasonably well. The (and suffered from) a relative lack of group was said to have improved its communications expertise, digital and ad hoc. At times a long process was set up which frustrated people who wanted decision-making over time and the final media capability, understanding of mass sign-off of the media statement at the public campaigning and knowledge to act. At other times there seemed to be snap decisions, with very little G8 was, some said, testament to a slow of branding and advertising processes. building of common understanding. There was also quite a significant staff process. One person close to the policy turnover on the OC. and advocacy work said: “Sometimes overkill of process and other times were none”. Another view was that the culture of some working group meetings was more about information sharing than decision-making. 41 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
FINDINGS & ANALYSIS
Policy and Advocacy Working When the group worked well it did deliver The campaign facilitated the nations, Group (PAG) and inspire a good range of activity: partly through budget allocations The Policy and Advocacy Working Group mobilising 45,000 people for Hyde Park; and partly through allowing a degree was the key gatekeeper of both policy 550 letters and correspondence with of flexibility in terms of messaging, lines and government relations. By and MPs; high levels of innovative supporter communications and policy asks, large it successfully delivered on these activism across the country and specific especially later on in the campaign. areas. There was a view however that working group events such as IF Fast and Representatives of the nations were the group was both very large and had the diaspora events. not members of the OC although they too wide a brief. Some felt that splitting Nevertheless, these strong, imaginative periodically fed into the OC by invitation Policy and Advocacy Working Group into campaigning actions came despite a and received OC emails. its policy and advocacy components number of key challenges. In particular, However staff delivering the campaign would have been a better structure, so that there wasn’t sufficient lead-in time in the nations unanimously felt that the that each could more clearly fulfil its role. for public engagement staff within central campaign could have done But there were also warnings about the member organisations to build resources more to include them in decision-making dangers of over-compensating for these and capacity or to prioritise the work. and should have provided or allowed different views. One person close to the This meant there wasn’t a clearly a range of bespoke materials. One key group’s work said: “The PAG was full of communicable role for supporters about campaigner said: “It felt very driven by people who didn’t do the work ... I’m not how they might make a difference. “It London, it felt like we were on the fringe. sure we should have split PAG. But we felt like we were taking them (campaigns More money was available this time should have had a lead on policy and a supporters) for granted... and that’s a (compared to Make Poverty History) lead on advocacy – plus an overall lead. huge risk” as one interviewee stated. but it still felt like we got the crumbs off We can’t talk to government without The nations the London table. [In the end] it did go closely cooperating [with policy people]”. broadly well. We pulled it out of the fire a Campaigns in the nations – Scotland, Public Engagement Working Group bit. There was no attempt to undermine us Northern Ireland and Wales - were but we might have had a champion on One working group that, at times, up and running soon after the the OC that was the voice of the nations... struggled to be effective was the Public campaign plans were announced. The this is a key learning for future”. Engagement Working Group, which campaigns capitalised on the devolved had the Supporter Journey, Creative opportunities opening up in the nations Activity and Campaign Moment groups, and were successful in their own right among others, as part of its wide brief. The (see section 2.2) as well as multipliers group struggled with its large mandate of the central campaign aims and and became more functional when it messages. The campaign provided had a more focused decision-making an opportunity for organisations in the structure. One close to the group said: nations to engage their respective “It didn’t work ... [it had] too many groups officials, journalists and politicians, which and ended up being a talking shop. We was a major benefit of the campaign. tried to reconstitute it but didn’t have a In Scotland and Wales, many campaign mandate to get on with it. [There] should members were directly related or have been toolkit for people – [they] got federated to English counterparts, their act together at the end in a smaller whereas in Northern Ireland many of group. The lessons [learned were that] you the members were not. needed a smaller group of individuals and better project management”. 42 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
FINDINGS & ANALYSIS
Another interviewee emphasised Finally, it should be noted that the IF The assembly meetings were described the increasingly custom-built needs campaign legacy for development as useful, well timed and well organised. that campaigns need to have under campaigning in Northern Ireland The meetings inclined to be more about devolution. “We are acutely aware was considerable. The united church the sharing of information rather than a [that] for campaigns to be successful service in Enniskillen brought together more horizontal, facilitated approach in Scotland a campaign has to have senior church leaders across several to decision-making. As one member Scottish-specific policy asks and a denominations in a highly unusual way, reflected: “[It provided the] illusion of Scottish feel and identity and be and the peaceful, family-friendly Belfast participation”, while another claimed nuanced in a Scottish fashion. It’s OK Big IF on 15 June had an impact both in that “there was an insufficient tolerance to push the UK-wide aspects but [you terms of relationships and experience60. of dissent and discussion.” However, need to] also recognise and include The wider coalition and the assembly meetings were useful as Scottish specific asks.” Another said: a platform for exchanging ideas and assembly meetings “Lack of input [from the nations] into the in terms of hearing from the OC and strategy was not malicious but just not The wider coalition (that is, those working groups. organisations – often smaller - not considered. ... There should be a filter at The role of Bond overall some stage that said: ‘have you thought chairing working groups or in other about the impact on the nations?’ You decision-making positions in the Bond represented the cornerstone shouldn’t talk about a UK campaign but campaign) were mainly positive about of the internal communication and a ‘four-nation’ approach... There was their involvement in the campaign. organisation of the campaign, not an understanding of the Welsh and In particular, the latter period of the especially in terms of providing ongoing Scottish perspectives and politics. Media campaign was regarded by many as a communication to the wider coalition. in Scotland is focused on the Scottish time when the campaign’s increasingly The closest thing the campaign had parliament. This doesn’t cross the mind of impressive performance and impact was to an organisational centre or hub,61 people [in London] and so we ended up something that they were glad to be part Bond led on some of the key grants for in defensive position.” of. In addition, the principle of solidarity the campaign as well as organising and collaboration was appreciated by the assembly, internal communications Many in the nations also felt that the many, perhaps because it felt important and the monitoring, evaluation and campaign should have continued in to come together in the current social, learning aspects of the campaign. Staff more than name at least until the official economic and political context. One members also chaired the Board and end date of 17 October. At one point consequence of this was the sense in participated in many working groups. there were discussions that the campaign which the IF campaign helped build One of the wider coalition staff members would shut down earlier but there was a the campaigning capacity of its reflected the general view of wider perceived lack of clarity of the rationale smaller members. members. “Bond was pretty good [they for this. This was reportedly problematic had a] difficult role but they were crucial”. in the Scottish context in particular: “The However, despite these positive aspects message had already gone out. This it is also apparent that the vertical risked undermining the reputation of the decision-making model had issues. campaign with Scottish politicians.” Firstly, more transparency on decision- making was needed and secondly, more space for opportunities to influence strategy, tactics and activities should have been created. 43 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
FINDINGS & ANALYSIS
International aspects The global south Planning G8 capitals activity There were efforts by some to discuss The leading organisations within the bringing significant southern perspectives It was decided early on in the planning campaign had, by the end of 2012, a and voices into the campaign. These stage that the campaign was going discussed and agreed set of interlinked were limited, and certainly no major to be a UK campaign, based on the and separate plans covering activities international campaign was ignited logic that at the outset of the campaign and built around the three key ‘moments’ in the south, in part because of the it was already too late to create a of the campaign launch, the 2013 decision early on to limit the campaign 62 genuinely international coalition that Budget, the G8 and its build up. Most to the UK. During the campaign’s was not imposed from the UK. Also, it elements were delivered on time despite planning stages it was decided that the is arguable that the G8 is no longer an significant pressures of time and working efficacy and practicalities of a significant important enough decision-making in a large coalition. southern based element meant it was body around which to form a global However, plans suffered from not being something that would either have to be campaign. This meant that at early fully understood by important groups done comprehensively or not at all. stages in the campaign planning no at key times. This was in part reportedly significant strategy was brought forward However those who wanted a greater because of a lack of information flow but to enable or urge key partners to contact southern perspective and felt that a also because decision and plans were their counterparts in other G8 capitals. bigger southern element would have frequently delayed or re-considered. As However there is a strong submission in the added value to the campaign, felt that mentioned above, planning suffered evidence collected that many disagreed the degree of southern participation also from the ‘loose-tight’ model. Early with this or changed their mind at a later was too limited. It was also noted that stages of the campaign planning had date about the need for a clearer and a southern perspective is not just about been disrupted to some degree by the more robust international strategy. speakers from the global south at IF delays in agreeing the policy platform events, but that southern voices should Some activity did take place, for and finalising the coalition membership be centrally involved in shaping the example the French-British government and framing of the campaign. campaign - its policy asks and its framing event on Transparency for Development An additional but understandable in particular - from the outset. (21 May 2013) and the Land Summit limitation was that there seems to have in Germany (June 2013). However, Commensurate with the above, there been insufficient appetite and capacity feedback from government suggests seems to have been little involvement to reflect on the plans and strategies that while this was helpful as far as it went, by the country programmes of the and the extent to which objectives were there is a clear feeling that a bigger member international NGOs, in the likely to be reached. It would have been and more vigorous advocacy strategy south. This aspect was not built into the useful to integrate a series of planning would have enabled further and quicker campaign but may have therefore review phases into the planning at the progress to have been made at the G8, carried a risk of shallow representation outset and consider how expert opinion in particular on tax and transparency. The and accountability in terms of presenting within the campaign coalition could need for pressure in the G8 capitals – for the campaign to decision makers. inform these discussions and potential example, in Berlin, Paris and Washington - The campaign would also have had adaptation. However there were key is described by some both internally and an impact in various countries in the moments for reflection built in, including externally (including in government) as a south, which was mentioned as another OC away days and a mid-term review. missed opportunity for an international reason for building wider representation, campaign. Although most internal views ownership and participation. argued that there was not enough time to build the appropriate capacity and infrastructure to effectively deliver this. 44 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
FINDINGS & ANALYSIS
Internal communications Transition The ‘fourth moment’ In general, the campaign had reasonably One of clearest lessons that came out The original campaign plan was to have good levels of internal communication of the Make Poverty History experience a fourth moment in the autumn to end about what was happening and what was that supporters were allowed to the campaign on a high note. There was had happened – in terms of outputs ‘fall off a cliff’; in other words, their a widespread commitment led by those and activities – emanating mainly from energy, momentum and - in some organisations pushing for the nutrition/ Bond. Many respondents spoke highly of cases - names were not captured by food element to be more visible, to Bond’s role in this regard. This was highly the sector for the future. To ensure this strongly link some campaigning action dependent on a very small number of didn’t happen, the IF campaign set up a to International Day for the Eradication of key people. Overall the need for greater supporter transition process for supporters Poverty on Thursday 17 October 2013. capacity in the form of more dedicated to sign up for campaigning in one of the While those close the centre of power in resources at a centralised level was a many campaigning organisations that the campaign accepted the rationale common request. were members of IF. behind the decision to not have this For some in the wider coalition there was The mechanism was well designed and ‘fourth moment’ - essentially that there too much information and this made technically worked well. However many wasn’t a meaningful political opportunity it difficult to know what to focus on. This felt that the gap between the activity beyond the summer to justify sustained was a consequence of the campaign’s around the G8 and follow-up process and significant campaign activity - lack of focus and an attempt to deliver in the autumn was too long and that there were views that this might be a high number of activities in a relatively the energy and momentum was not detrimental to supporters’ understanding short period of time. captured. This finding was corroborated of the campaign trajectory. National Some in the wider coalition and among by the conversion rate of fewer than campaigners also wanted to see the working group chairs felt that there 10% of non-affiliated new supporters in campaign continue and many felt that 63 was a lack of information at a strategic the supporter transition process. “It was after the G8 ended the signs of the level, particularly from the OC. More meant to transition [better] but we didn’t campaign closing and moving to a detail not just about the decisions taken, learn the lesson of Make Poverty History”, transition phase were premature. but the rationale for them and their said one close to the operational aspects likely external effect, would have been of transition. Another said: “There is an widely appreciated. argument for the transition starting sooner. A better exit strategy was needed.” It was also suggested that the internal communications were designed/ More widely, there was a feeling in the suitable for larger organisations with coalition that not only had the supporter significant resources and it was a transition process itself not kept up the struggle for smaller organisations or those momentum but the idea that, and with a more peripheral engagement possible implications of, a brand like IF to keep up with the emails and who being built up and then abandoned would have benefitted from targeted was an inconsistent strategy: “Not sure communications and a “if you can only enough thinking went to how you build do one thing...” approach. a brand and then ditch it”, was one typical comment. 45 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
FINDINGS & ANALYSIS
3.5. Other aspects: Value for There was a good logical correlation However, there were some legitimate money, gender and learning between the income and size of concerns at the higher levels of the international NGOs and the expectation coalition about the campaign’s lack This section looks at other aspects of the placed upon them in terms of financial of financial controls. This manifested campaign including assessing value for contribution to the campaign. In addition itself in two ways, firstly on the income money and levels of resourcing, gender to making a contribution to direct costs, side, in terms of the unrealistic ambition and learning. the understanding was that organisations of generating income within a tight Resource availability, allocation were expected to allocate up to 50% economic context, for example through and value for money64 of their campaigns’ team time in order the difficulties in securing wristband to try and provide sufficient resources, distribution: “Suppliers etc. get asked Overall, the financial input by donors human, financial and political to meet more than they used to so we had to and coalition members along with in- campaign objectives. spend more money [on] things than [we] kind contributions has led to a number Nevertheless, the commitment of staff used to”. And secondly with regard to of important outcomes both in terms of campaign expenditure: “It wasn’t always funding and policy changes. Evaluation time to the campaign seemed to be variable across the coalition, especially clear whether the decisions about what strongly indicates a high-level of return on to invest money in and when [had been] investment and good value for money. between the ‘moments’. A significant burden of work fell on too few people made at the appropriate level.” Contributions to the campaign came and this created difficulties both in One reason for this is that the lack of a from individuals, church groups, local terms of delivery and expectations: coherent, focused change theory meant organisations, international NGOs, “The workload didn’t always appear to that in the end many strategies, activities cooperatives and foundations. The be shared as well as it might,” one key and campaign tools were implemented. total funding envelope supplemented informant reflected. Indeed it has been difficult to identify by the in-kind staff time of the coalition In addition, it may be important to reflect very many campaign activities membership was comparable with other between January and June that were previous large scale campaigns, such as on whether organisational commitment throughout the campaign and not just not implemented, based on an open Make Poverty History. The general feeling discussion and informed decision – at amongst interviewees was that most at the key moments, was sufficient to reach the ambitious objectives: “I’m glad OC or working group levels – through a activities that needed to happen, or were robust analysis of assumed effectiveness planned to, were given a reasonable we were ambitious, but we were too ambitious. [In the end] resources didn’t or value for money. One notable budget. However the spending on exception is the Journey (see below). marketing and advertising was reportedly match ambition. That’s not just about lower than, for instance, that of the Make money but organisational priorities, Poverty History campaign. it’s about staff time and resource”. IF campaign coalition members asserted that they “were mindful throughout that donated funds should be used shrewdly to secure the biggest impact and best results in line with our joint aims”. 46 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
FINDINGS & ANALYSIS
An assessment of value for money in One interviewee from the coalition For example, one spending decision that advocacy can be usefully informed said: “For us it’s about the outcome for was questioned by quite a number of by looking at the relationship between children ... there is no certain way of participants as overly costly, especially inputs and outputs as an assessment measuring that but the four billion dollars in terms of human resources, was the of ‘efficiency’. The assumptions in the pledge was certainly worth it ... feels like ‘spinning flowers’ activity at the Hyde relationship between outputs and exceptionally good value, and good Park event. The flowers were expensive outcomes as advocacy ‘effectiveness’ value for money in terms of outcomes and the activity became particularly mean the campaign can in conceptual achieved. We might have had 0.7% time-consuming and seemed to take terms be retrospectively assessed using but there would have been all sorts of a lot of key staff’s capacity at a crucial outcomes against inputs as a proxy for caveats and it might not have been as time. The added value to the campaign ‘value for money’. sustainable. The extra aid and the extra was judged by some to be likely to be On this basis, the financial input along pledges ... all the financial pledges are a minimal. However, other aspects of the with in-kind input has led - according to bonus.” While another said “The coalition campaign that were too expensive analysis supported here - to a number itself – the combined weight and brand - given the budget envelope – such as of important outcomes both in terms of is worth more than the sum of its parts”. the Journey – were cancelled. One area funding and policy changes, including However at the next level down, in that some internal interviewees and over $4 billion of global nutrition funding terms of the detail of how value was focus group participants were keen to commitments; a commitment to assessed in the campaign and a sense look at in terms of value for money and spending 0.7% of UK national income of what constituted value in terms of the future endowment for building capacity on development and policies endorsed measures of success and the line-by- was the lack of strategic investment in by the UK government and the G8 – on line spend set against certain activities local campaigning and activism. One tax for instance – that make the greater and their contribution to outcomes, the said: “If they had one more [thing they resources availability for development picture is less convincing. While the OC could have done] it would be to build a more likely. While relatively few of had strategic oversight of the budget movement to carry on by itself ... more these commitments can be entirely and resource allocation, there was not money should have been invested in attributed to the IF campaign’, many always full discussion on whether funding local campaigning, which would have of the commitments are unlikely to decisions followed strategic, operational been better value for money”. have happened as quickly, robustly and tactical imperatives with full Fundraising or publically as they have without the knowledge of those accountable. Fundraising responsibility was only loosely IF campaign’s advocacy and related owned by working groups, apart from public pressure. This strongly indicates a the Fundraising Working Group. This high-level of return on investment and meant that there was a disconnect represents good value for money. between working groups and the Furthermore, there is, anecdotally, Fundraising Working Group in terms of an support amongst the public, and in understanding of specific project plans, particular backing amongst supporters communicating donor engagement of the sector, for organisations to work plans (held by the Fundraising Working together and cooperate and collaborate Group) and ascertaining if working more, especially on campaigns. This is groups had potential donor contacts supported by the Supporters Survey, in who could be approached for funding. which many respondents talked about the importance and effectiveness of coalition campaigns in general, and the IF campaign specifically. 47 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
FINDINGS & ANALYSIS
Timing was also a big issue. The group Learning In addition to this was a commitment was only fully formed five months before to sharing – and acting upon - the Learning in the campaign the start of the campaign. The most learning from other coalition campaigns, successful fundraising came from donor The overall purpose of the monitoring, especially Make Poverty History and engagement led by members of the OC evaluation and learning (MEL) Jubilee 2000. This programme of which started more than a year before component of the IF campaign was MEL work had logical content and the campaign started and secured a to ensure that the campaign was excellent intent and generated significant grant for the campaign. monitored and evaluated properly significant monitoring and campaign and that the lessons identified in these Gender management information (for example, processes – and earlier international the evaluators were presented with over The evaluation interviews included NGO coalition campaigns - were learnt 1,000 pages of monitoring information, some enquiries on gender although by the broader sector. The objectives of mostly quantitative). this was not supported by enquiries this work were: The campaign had thought about the in the survey or elsewhere in the data • To monitor the campaign as it ran MEL process. This included: sets. Most interviewees who were asked against its measures of success for • A mid-campaign internal evaluation about gender aspects of the campaign communication to the coalition and seemed surprised by the questions to feed into this evaluation • A scorecard, which summarised but most agreed it could have come progress against measures of success, • To commission and manage the out a bit more in the messaging of the was regularly shared with the Board, process of an external evaluation which campaign, as well as through some of OC and at assembly meetings the policy messages. Typical comments will amalgamate all monitoring data were: “It would have been an interesting and conduct further consultation to • An OC ‘away day’ in April that reviewed angle [but it] wasn’t a communications establish our achievements (outcomes progress to date and in which proposals priority” and “It wasn’t [highlighted] and impact) and explore the reasons for course corrections were made but it could have pushed more about for our successes and lack thereof women... in the simpler messaging”. where relevant In terms of decision-making, when • To take steps to ensure that the enquiries were made about the gender wider campaigning sector learns balance, one comment was: “There were the lessons from the evaluation and probably a few really key men ... who monitoring processes were the top dogs but also [some strong women]. Maybe right at the top we could have done with more [women]”. 48 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
FINDINGS & ANALYSIS
However, it seems that despite this, there For the wider coalition, as tends to Among the ideas presented were that was an insufficient formal, systematic be the case for those listed above, it findings and lessons from previous process of integration of this learning seems that their main forum - the IF campaigns presented “in person” into the work of the OC and key working campaign assemblies - tended to be work best as part of a more bespoke groups. A consequence of this was that inclined towards a culture of ‘update campaigning capacity needs feedback loops and accountability and celebrate’, rather than ‘reflect and assessment. Also there was a desire mechanisms were not always in place, learn’ and these were possibly missed amongst some to engender a more mainly due to an understandable lack opportunities for acting as a wider spot- continuous process, including coming of time. check on progress and inviting coalition together soon to develop the next The space for reflection and adjustment members into a safe space to critique initiative from the ground up. One of campaign strategy – in particular on strategies and activities. comment was: “As many versions of the public engagement objectives – were Embedding learning from product as possible: serious report, a often squeezed and there was limited the evaluation summary, bullet point version, popular time and interest in this because of a version, 10 key recommendations … We The campaign formation, development should insist that through the different preoccupation with operational delivery. and discussions indicate that an A systematic approach was never channels – each of the major agencies ongoing campaigning capacity building should have their own session to digest it”. established and therefore the process for programme for the international NGO sharing learning and adapting strategies sector is required. This evaluation and its The work on embedding learning and tactics was rather limited. findings and recommendations are a will be a key area for Bond and To compound this, it seems there was key component. Through further testing member organisations, in particular very little evidence of sharing of good and discussion the priority capacity those international NGOs at the heart practice in coalition campaigning, even building elements could be drawn of the IF campaign - and indeed from the larger NGOs who have a strong out. For example, the governance other campaign coalitions on the history and considerable experience of campaign coalitions, the role of environment, health, trade, tax, food and in working in campaigning coalitions, CEOs in campaigns, the importance so forth - to take forward as a key aspect networks and alliances (the Global of understanding of power dynamics, of the ongoing MEL work and campaign Campaign for Education, Global Health political education programmes, how to legacy resources. networks, various General Election inter- maximise social media and digital, etc. agency ‘campaigns’, etc.) 49 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
The IF campaign launch at Cardiff Castle, Wales. January 2013. Credit: Glenn Edwards
LESSONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 50 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
LESSONS & RECOMMENDATIONS
The IF campaign has been the latest 4.1. Lessons and Coalition strategy should be in a string of large-scale development recommendations for future informed by power analysis and coalition campaigns aimed at coalition campaigns exploration of common and mobilising large sections of the public competing theories of change. and aimed at bringing about policy Policy and strategy lessons and change. Campaigning and advocacy recommendations Recommendation 1. coalitions are popular with the public and politicians, but it is important that The IF campaign has managed to This campaign was in part based specific lessons are taken forward by achieve key areas of policy progress on an analysis of external political key actors and shared with wider civil and high level political access, as well opportunity, in particular the UK chairing society groups to ensure future coalitions as increased campaigning capacity of the G8 in 2013. However, the need perform to the best of their ability. in the sector. The campaign helpfully for a broader analysis was not always builds on a number of key learnings given primacy in the ongoing strategy The lessons and recommendations for from other campaigns and draws on process and discussions, which at times future coalitions stemming from IF are the considerable expertise of coalition seemed more driven by the need to limited by two key factors: members and their staff. broker compromise. A sober assessment • The degree to which the findings and In particular, the campaign was good of political and policy opportunities, learnings from the campaign are at adapting to changing policy and married with an honest appraisal of replicable or likely to be replicable in political opportunities including allowing coalition potential, should drive the future coalition campaign an increase in ambition in the measures of purpose and objectives of major coalition campaigns in future. • How similar to the IF campaign any success set for policy change in key areas future campaign is likely to be in terms (especially on the changing context on Recommendation 2. the tax agenda). Future coalitions should of structure, ambition, scope and target Differences around defining the main commit to examining the possibilities of These recommendations will underpin purpose and key objectives of the upgrading (or downgrading) policy success future resources for sector learning campaign derived from the different, and measures and targets as appropriate as outlined by the campaign and at times competing, theories of change responses to the changing external policy taken forward by Bond, their member operating across the coalition. While and political context. The campaign also organisations and other IF campaign recognising the fundamental challenges had a well-connected and targeted, very coalition members. It is important that and complexity of doing this while building professional and technically competent these lessons and recommendations are broad, diverse coalitions, it nevertheless lobbying arm – in Whitehall, Westminster taken forward by key groups – including merited more fundamental exploration, and constituencies - which has set high internally within the major international leading - ideally - to more strategic standards for coalition lobbying. NGOs - and not left exclusively to clarity of purpose as well as a deeper networks to deliver. The campaign was adept at times understanding of the consequences of the at capturing the synergies between differing theories of change. strategic media, policy and advocacy Recommendation 3. work. The sector already has excellent assets in the form of political and It is very useful for coalition campaigns, media contacts, which the IF campaign as the IF campaign did, to have key harnessed to good effect, through measures of success in place that help key coalition members rightly putting inform and guide both strategies and organisational interests to one side tactics. It is important that measures of in favour of the campaign. Future success are realistically set, prioritised, with campaigns should consider whether clear assumptions, linked to a clear theory this potentially powerful combination is of change, and further supplemented the key method for bringing about the by audience and supporter research change sought by the campaign. and insights. Such measures should be reformed or recalibrated as necessary at key points for reflection, based on an assessment of monitoring data and ongoing power analysis. 51 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
LESSONS & RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendation 4. Recommendation 7. Recommendation 8. In a coalition campaign which targets Future coalitions should carefully As recognised in the formation similar international institutions, groups consider whether policy and advocacy assessment, the start of the campaign of states or global bodies, consider (government relations) should be closely suffered from a model of leadership undertaking a more comprehensive tied together in one group or structure or and management and a campaign international strategy working more whether a looser model of cooperation culture which was perceived as too comprehensively in the key, targeted, between these two disciplines should ‘top-down’. Although there are mitigating influential capital cities to utilise coalition be employed. circumstances for this – the time members’ organisational reach to apply Structure, management and available, diversity and the need for international pressure in support of the disciplined communications to support campaign culture lessons policy changes sought, taking into the lobby effort - coalitions tend to work account the need for adequate time, and recommendations best when members and staff at all resources and openness to genuine When the sector comes together in levels feel empowered to take action, partnership that this would require. coalitions such as IF, the process and understand the strategic imperatives Recommendation 5. activity often helps increase professional and play a meaningful part in decision- campaigns capacity which is particularly making. While elements of leadership Coalition diversity was strong in important for smaller and medium sized and control may be necessary in some areas, notably the faith and NGOs. The sharing of expertise and large and diverse coalitions, future diaspora organisations and there was mutual understanding and learning campaign coalitions should consider a good range of sizes of organisations. that this offers is something that future a flatter management structure and This indicated the appetite present coalition campaigns should prioritise. a more diffuse and empowered for cooperation, partnerships and In the meantime the synergies and operational decision-making, with clearer campaign coalitions. However, the ability connections made at a professional opportunities for the wider coalition to to achieve ambitious public mobilisation level should be fostered and supported understand the rationale of and, at times objectives was compromised by the lack by organisations large and small. feed into, strategic decision-making. of participation of most environmental organisations and mass membership The campaign has allowed creativity Recommendation 9. organisations such as trade unions. to flourish in key areas such as schools The ‘loose-tight’ strategy – coming Future coalitions should consider and youth and has had a meaningful together in a disciplined way for short strategies to include these groups at an and more inclusive engagement periods in the campaign followed by earlier stage in order to achieve buy in with diaspora groups. Future coalition periods of freer, individual action – did and increase scope and diversity and campaigns should build on these not work well in the IF campaign and increase options for mobilisation and linkages and further encourage led to periods of lost momentum. While greater potential political influence. innovation and creativity. such a strategy could work, it would need a clearer and more robust set of Policy asks should follow political The structure and management commitments by individuals and groups opportunity and be further informed model of future coalition of partners and a more empowering by communication needs rather campaigns should balance campaign culture to ensure activity than following political compromise empowerment and control, continued during the looser periods. reflect expertise and diversity, and facilitate action Recommendation 6. The IF campaign’s policy baskets lacked prioritisation and coherence. Future coalition campaigns should consider the consistency of policies, their interconnectedness, the number of asks and their achievability, their complexity, and their relevance to the overall framing of the campaign. 52 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
LESSONS & RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendation 10. Recommendation 13. Recommendation 16. The core campaign management A larger core team providing dedicated There should be a credible and open team should reflect the appropriate capacity would have provided a clearer assessment of corporate partnerships balance of complementary skills campaign ‘hub’ which would have which should be conducted early on to deliver a coalition campaign. This assisted this campaign in managing and in the campaign planning stages. The does not need to be at the expense of organising key aspects of campaign strategy for corporate partnerships should balanced organisational representation, delivery on time and with less impact be fully aligned with the objectives since this can be achieved via a on the coalition members. Future and central strategy for the campaign. campaign governance structure and/ campaigns should consider employing This would require a risk assessment of or strengthened more formal assembly a core team to coordinate aspects of how the campaign’s objectives and structure. The functional operational the campaign delivery, in ways which effectiveness could be compromised decision-making aspects of the support and do not undermine the (as well as how the corporate relationship campaign would have benefited from collective spirit of shared delivery by could be affected). greater representation of key working campaign partners. Recommendation 17. groups on the central coordination Recommendation 14. function of the campaign. Future coalitions should consider The timing of the campaign also needs embedding fundraising into other key Recommendation 11. to engage key groups such as faith working groups, and consider assigning a One aspect of the model employed that groups, private sector bodies and representative from a fundraising working resulted in challenges was the campaign diaspora organisations earlier on, so group to other working groups to support sign-off processes, which, although they as to maximise the potential of their on fundraising. In the run up to future improved as the campaign went along, participation. Such partners should be coalitions, fundraisers in key agencies caused frustration and delay. Tighter, involved in the conception and planning could form an informal working group lighter and clearer sign-off processes of coalition campaign as far as possible. as campaign plans are starting to be should be planned for future coalition Recommendation 15. discussed and initiate conversations with campaigns, with opportunities to reflect key donors to ensure that there is time to on the efficacy of the process and adjust Moreover, one of the key positive get donors interested in the campaign. as necessary. legacies of the IF campaign has been the appetite and commitment Mobilisation, messaging and Recommendation 12. for greater cooperation among communications lessons The campaign planning was delayed communities of interest, for example and recommendations by various elements and disagreements, strengthening groupings for the The campaign had a strong including in the early stages of longer-term work on tax and diaspora commitment to innovation and the the campaign. Campaigns of this participation, among others. Resources testing of new strategies and activities, magnitude need longer timelines in and capacity should be put in place to particularly on the digital side. Coalitions order to maximise the potential of support and maintain the momentum are often a key way in which the the delivered elements and minimise for this. boundaries of these new campaigning organisational impacts on both large techniques can be tested and this is and small organisations. especially important for smaller and medium sized NGOs. The IF campaign tested important elements in this regard. 53 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
LESSONS & RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendation 20. Recommendation 22. Campaigns should seek to ensure a holistic and integrated view of Partly as a result of the context, the IF Southern voices were present in the communications, strongly linked to campaign didn’t manage to mobilise campaign at key times but sporadically. purpose and change objectives large sections of the UK public in the Future campaigns should ensure that way that Make Poverty History or Jubilee more prominent southern perspectives Recommendation 18. 2000 did. In some ways the ability are included in the campaign message of the IF campaign to command delivery and in shaping the campaign If a reframing of discourse is sought, government airtime and help set the and ensuring that it has some rootedness it will be important in future coalition agenda of the G8 rested partly on the in and connectedness to campaigning campaigns to ensure a stronger historical reputation and ‘implied threat’ and campaigners in the global theory of change where there is of the sector as a top mobiliser. The south, drawing on field experience a complementary, integrated IF campaign managed to maintain and the emerging ‘one programme relationship between mobilisation, some of that threat but possibly not all approaches’ that many international communications and messaging of it. The implication of this could be NGOs are adopting. contributing to policy and political that the international NGO sector may Recommendation 23. objectives. A stronger rationale for no longer be able to assume it carries investing in (or deciding not to invest in) a plausible threat of representing A UK-wide coalition will tend to work better large-scale resources aimed at mass substantial public mobilisation in favour if there is serious acknowledgement from mobilisation and awareness-raising is of international development and global the start that the political, campaigning, implied by this. poverty eradication. Communicating this NGO and media landscapes are Recommendation 19. ‘threat’ to policy makers will need to be fundamentally different in the various UK nations. To avoid being too London- The IF campaign recognised that used with care in the future. Considering the increasing importance of online centric in future campaigns, it should be supporters needed to be taken more clearly recognised that UK-wide on a journey. However, supporter campaigning, the sector should seek to further build campaigning in various campaigns have particular and specific engagement, energy and mobilisation communications needs in Scotland, built to a peak in June and then the ways include through further capacity building programmes. Future campaigns Northern Ireland and Wales, and that momentum created by the campaign a separate set of locally conducted dissipated quickly, despite efforts via will also need to consider whether a longer running, more sustained set of analyses and a devolved set of resources the supporter transition plan to ensure should be in place from the start. that supporters didn’t ‘fall off a cliff’. messages used to reframe the debate Future campaigns must ensure that on aid and development would be a momentum is captured in a more useful and realistic response. strategic way and that the gap between Recommendation 21. the ‘high point’ of the campaign and Despite strong efforts to present the any transitional stage is less drawn campaign and its policy baskets in out, and more seamlessly captured. interesting and comprehensible ways, A clearer exit strategy is needed to the policy platform of the campaign deal with the heightened interest of lacked coherence and was hard to parliamentarians, ministers, the media communicate. The process to decide on and other key decision-makers and policy asks should contain a professional opinion-formers. assessment from a communications point of view, to ensure that the public- facing elements of the campaign can be communicated effectively. 54 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
LESSONS & RECOMMENDATIONS
Campaign formation Recommendation 26. Recommendation 28. 65 recommendations There is a general acceptance of the Such a leadership process would also need for an appropriate and sensible need to have a degree of porousness These principles are not hard-and- leadership group to emerge when in terms of information sharing and fast rules. One key lesson from all necessary. This would imply a small clarity of process, to include clear previous campaigns is that rule- group, with clarity of purpose and a timelines and decision-making points. bound over-engineered solutions are confluence of aims. This is likely, at While it is accepted that some informal likely to be ignored or circumvented. least in the medium term, to include discussions will always happen, the BOAG agencies (especially in a large- point at which they move towards more Recommendation 24. scale coalition) but should not preclude formal discussions, with meetings and other groups with key competencies, agendas is the point at which such It is apparent that the particular mobilisation abilities, access to processes might be triggered. This lessons that each new coalition information or skills and international campaign has suffered from not having campaign brings are not always connections, as well as relevant networks a clear inception-planning timeline. A agreed upon, owned or shared and and alliances. major coalition must start discussions, often not systematically harvested and negotiations and planning earlier and reintegrated. It is important therefore Recommendation 27. be more disciplined about timelines and that lessons from previous efforts Another key learning is that clearer decision-making points. should be more formally harvested communications at an early stage and reintroduced at the beginning of from the core inception group to a Recommendation 29. fresh deliberations. broader group of organisations would The breadth of the coalition should follow Recommendation 25. have helped allay tensions and the campaign proposition and purpose. reservations later on. More and wider If the campaign is proposed to be about There is a sense that the existing sector informal sectoral discussions could broadening links with other sectors and infrastructure of meetings and groups have happened without significantly changing the framing of an idea, then did not work, either for those who were jeopardising the central negotiations. discussions with the key relevant parties participating in these meetings or groups This communication must be balanced should be in place from the beginning. or those who wanted to design a bespoke against the need to retain a sensible campaign and build a new coalition. measure of control over the process. In The lesson is that sector infrastructure is this regard, the presence of a trusted difficult to design in a way that would fit all interlocutor, an ‘honest broker’ - most situations. ‘Heavy lifting-style’ infrastructure, likely a senior Bond member of staff, that could facilitate the building of a mandated by the sector - in key coalition at scale, would be inappropriate meetings, as a two-way conduit for the and potentially expensive. Therefore more rest of the sector would have helped flexible sector infrastructure should allay early tensions and build trust. be built, which can radically scale up For many organisations, a dialogue or down according to circumstances, with government at an early stage is opportunity and interest. However, both inevitable and desirable. Again, while this infrastructure could be built in actors need to ensure that intelligence accordance with wider sector wishes, it is fed back and shared, and that any would take an explicit agreement with assurances given are limited within a BOAG agencies to make it work. given mandate. 55 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation “ Flexible sector infrastructure should be built, which can radically scale up or down according to circumstances, opportunity and interest. ” 56 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
The ‘G8 leaders’ on boats stunt, near Enniskillen. June 2013. Credit: Andrew Aitchison
ANNEXES 57 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
ANNEXES
Annex 1: Campaign organogram
Board
Organising Committee
Agile Communications Communications Private Sector Steering Group Sign-off Group
Media Celebrities Public Engagement Digital
Supporter Journey Creative Activity Lifestyle Group Group
Youth & Schools Diaspora Faith
Monthly Assembly Meetings – open to all current & prospective member organisations 58 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
ANNEXES
Agile Sign-off Group
Monitoring, Policy & Fundraising Evaluation & International Advocacy Learning
Data Parliamentary
Scotland Campaign Moments 1. Launch 2. Budget 3. G8 Wales
Northern Ireland 59 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
ANNEXES
Annex 2: Measures of success 2. Support increased among UK 3. Better understanding among a sector public for international development of the public of the structural causes of Joint Campaign 2013 Measures and the environment food insecurity and hunger and of the of Success April 2013 i. Increased media coverage/prevalence impacts on the natural world caused by The Objectives of the Joint Campaign of development and environment food production and consumption on Food and Hunger are: process and progress stories i. Politicians talk about structural • Specific policy progress to achieve a ii. Breadth of support increased including issues not just aid sustainable food system and tackle the engagement of new un-reached ii. Increased media coverage hunger supporters of structural causes of hunger, • To build massive public support for o Raised awareness of the campaign malnutrition and environmental action to achieve these goals by among 15-20 million of the UK public degradation deepening understanding of poverty as ‘onlookers’/ no. of UK adults who iii. Depth of support increased / no. and development, the environment, will have heightened awareness of of people moving up the and the need for structural change the campaign’s issues and watch engagement pyramid Key measures of success our event/s iv. Shifts in discourse and increased 1. Policy aims achieved o Engaged 3-5 million of the UK’s salience for our issues i. Specific policy goals (and/or progress public as ‘endorsers’ / no. of UK v. Public understanding: At least 500,000 towards them) based on agreed adults who will take action in support members of the UK public have better OC measures of what progress of the campaign understanding of the structural causes looks like (including UK government o Engaged 500,000 from the above of food insecurity and hunger and commitment to spend 0.7% of GNI on total as ‘advocates’ of the campaign their commitment to tackling global aid by 2013 delivered and legislation (those using personal networks, poverty issues increases. that this target level is maintained post- recruit public to join with data-driven 2013 secured). relationship with coalition and at ii. Cross party support sustained and built least one member) on with an identifiable critical mass of iii. New supporters recruited to MPs actively supporting and promoting our organisations international development iv. Public awareness and media coverage at the level of Make Poverty History (87%) 60 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
ANNEXES
4. UK public mobilised and engaged 5. Sector and movement strengthened 6. Global support for campaign i. Number of direct actions taken and with new capabilities to work post aims achieved type of activity campaign improved i. Involvement of non-UK national and ii. Deeper public engagement i. Number and diversity of organisations international NGOs and networks evidenced by supporters able to involved in the campaign (formal ii. Southern participation in the campaign membership and informal support), activate more ‘assets’ across voice, iii. Strong participation in the Global Day relationships, creative ability, expertise their levels of action and satisfaction from participation (eg, with joint of Action to show solidarity for the and material resource with a focus cause in target countries on creating more depth amongst our activities / levels of information sharing existing supporter base. /decision-making etc.) iii. Coalition members engage with the ii. Organisations from the membership lifestyle ask area of work and as a report that involvement in the joint result, campaign endorsers show their campaign/partnership has strengthened support for lifestyle change their ability to undertake campaigning and/or public engagement including in existing/new alliance(s) iii. The underlying national civil society campaigning platform on development is stronger and working together continues post joint campaign with ongoing strategy and resource sharing 61 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
ANNEXES
Annex 3: IF campaign monitoring log 66
Target Indicator Means of Baseline End of Final result verification campaign target
1. Policy aims achieved
Specific policy Evidence that Analysis of public From Policy Further detail 0.7% (but no goals achieved our aspirations positions of MPs and Advocacy in Policy and legislation). are achieved (including PQs, Working Group Advocacy Changing votes, input into Working Group government debates etc.) documents rhetoric and items on the G8 agenda Cross party/ Continued support Analysis of public Attendees at Increased Over 500 MPs/ MP support for development positions of MPs launch event positivity on Lords contacted from the 3 main (including PQs, our issues the Treasury political parties votes, input into debates etc.)
2. Support increased among UK public for international development
Media coverage Increased media Quantity of 0 Make Poverty 3,325 pieces coverage/ media coverage History levels - of coverage prevalence of 1,203 articles development and progress Quality/content of N/A N/A 89% of coverage stories, structural coverage of IF as is favourable issues and the assessed through IF campaign an external media evaluation Assessment of N/A N/A Data not the broader available development coverage throughout the life of IF
Breadth of support
Onlookers No. of UK adults Tracker panel 67.6 million Reduction 200,000 with a better [No. of times from baseline less people understanding of onlookers name mentioned non- structural causes non-structural structural issues as of food insecurity issues as cause cause of hunger and hunger of hunger] between launch and March. 62 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
ANNEXES
Target Indicator Means of Baseline End of campaign Final result verification target
Endorsers No. of UK adults Online (1) 0 1 million 101,058 who take action Sign-ups on [TOTAL 3-5 million] in support of IF website the campaign
Online (2) 18,318 Sign-ups to IF (through member organisations)
Offline (1) 0 1-2 million 95,000 Wristband [TOTAL 3-5 million] purchasing figures
Offline (2) 0 1-2 million 147,559 No. of offline [TOTAL 3-5 million] actions taken
Advocates Online IF Twitter analysis 0 500,000 99,000 No. of people tweeting
Offline (1) Individual 34,633 No. of people organisational requesting for records more materials (postcards etc.)
Offline (2) Individual 11,5 3 5 No. of attendees organisational at IF events records (training etc.)
Qualitative Case study N/A 30 stories 18 case studies evidence examples gathered of supporters able (from individual to activate more organisations) ‘assets’ across voice, relationships, creative ability, expertise and material resources with a focus on creating more depth amongst our existing supporter base 63 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
ANNEXES
Annex 3: IF campaign monitoring log 66
Target Indicator Means of Baseline End of Final result verification campaign target
New supporters % increase Member 20% increase on 38% in supporters submission of baseline of member figures organisations
Conversion rate of Member 0 Undefined Under 10% ‘neutral supporters’ submission of figures
Public awareness
Brand awareness % of the general Tracker panel [% 0 87% 10.5% of people public that that of UK public aware were aware of IF say they are of IF and % of UK (unprompted) aware of the IF public aware of campaign the content of IF]
3. Better understanding of the structural causes of food insecurity and hunger
Political voices
Politicians talk Evidence of Analysis of public Based on analysis Shift towards Data not about structural changes in positions of MPs of key documents a focus on available problems not focus from aid to (PQs, votes, input structural issues just aid structural issues into debates etc.)
Media coverage Increased On over 65% of the of structural issues media coverage IF media coverage of structural the campaign’s causes of hunger, key messages are malnutrition and fully conveyed, environmental increasing the degradation media coverage of structural causes of hunger. Depth of support No. of people Database and 0 Approximately increased taking multiple survey question 20K (15%) of the online actions supporters took throughout the multiple online campaign actions. 33% of organisations report an increase in the depth of support throughout the IF campaign 64 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
ANNEXES
Target Indicator Means of Baseline End of Final result verification campaign target
Shifts in discourse Discourse N/A Data not and increased analysis available salience of our issues
4. UK public mobilised and engaged
Public action
Reach of No. of people No. of email 0 500,000 1 million launch event reached by recipients communication launch event communications Reach of No. of people at No. of event 0 5,000 3,000+ launch events launch event(s) attendees enabled to be multipliers of the campaign Pre-Budget Online Database 0 100,000 25,820 actions No. of emails to MPs
Offline (1) Database 18,364 No. of people registered to lobby their MP Offline (2) Mailroom of the 1,423 No. of letters Treasury reports sent to George Osborne (by public) Pre-G8 actions No. of actions Online 0 500,000 4,117 taken calling No. of online tax for action by actions taken world leaders
Attendees at No. of people No. of people 0 100,000 48,000 crowd public event attending public at the Big IFs estimate re. G8 G8 event (London + Belfast) (amalgamated London and Belfast) 65 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
ANNEXES
Annex 3: IF campaign monitoring log 66
Target Indicator Means of Baseline End of Final result verification campaign target
Lifestyle changes
Coalition No. of Lifestyle Working 0 9 organisations engages with organisations Group records the lifestyle work requesting lifestyle resources
Supporters Reach of digital No. of views of Page views on Above average 128 visits engage with the FT14 work (no. of lifestyle page 22/2/13 was 29 lifestyle work people reached on 25/2/13 through twitter and Facebook on 25 Feb)
No. of hits on Google analytics 0 4,366 lifestyle ask page on IF website
5. Sector and movement strengthened with new capabilities to work post campaign improved
Number and diversity of organisations involved in the campaign
No. of coalition No. of formal Formal 0 150 213 members members of membership lists the campaign Diversity Representation Desk research N/A All groups covered All groups were (geography, faith, of different covered size, type etc.) focus areas in membership in addition to the four key policy areas and lifestyle ask (Themes: gender, youth, diaspora, faith, unions, environment) 66 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
ANNEXES
Target Indicator Means of Baseline End of Final result verification campaign target
Representation Working group N/A 50%+ small 19% of small and engagement email lists member orgs member of different size Assembly have a rep on a organisations have organisations in attendance lists Working group a representative the campaign 75%+ small in a Working member orgs group. 32% of attend more than small members half of assemblies have attended at least one London/ national assembly. Representation Coalition All regions All regions were of different Records covered covered. 76% of nations (England the coalition is [including London based in England. and non-London], 7% based in N. Ireland, Scotland, 8% in NI Scotland, Wales) and 8% in Wales Strengthened No. of members Survey N/A Min 50% report 53% campaigning/ reporting an increased public support increase in ability of member capacity to organisations campaign No. of Survey 0 As many as At least 20 organisations who possible organisations were are campaigning campaigning for for the first the first time time in IF No. of Survey 0 As many as At least 12 organisations possible organisations were who are coalition campaigning in campaigning for a coalition for the the first time in IF first time No. of members Survey 0 100% of those 87% of those reporting an not new to not new to appetite for future campaigning campaigning campaigning 50%+ for those and 80% of those and coalition campaigning for campaigning for campaigning the first time the first time stated that they were likely to continue campaigning beyond IF 67 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
ANNEXES
Annex 3: IF campaign monitoring log 66
Target Indicator Means of Baseline End of Final result verification campaign target
UK civil society No. of members Survey 0 70% with an 80% campaigning reporting a) an appetite to platform appetite for continue joint strengthened continued working working (and working together b) plans together to do so c) already continues) doing so and d) the opportunity to do so
6. Global support for campaign aims achieved
Involvement of No. of target Campaign 0 10 key countries + Activity in 18 non-UK national countries holding records some developing countries, and international an IF event on the countries including 8 of the NGOs and Global Day 10 key countries networks of Action Southern No. of southern Coalition 0 Not defined Data not available participation in voices present at records and final the campaign IF events evaluation 68 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
ANNEXES
Annex 4: Informal Policy Assessment (in relation to the G8 period of the campaign) By Chair of the Policy and Advocacy Working Group
Area Gold Silver Bronze What we got
Nutrition US$1 billion 2015-2020 US$1 billion by 2019 Anything between GOLD for the UK, EU from donors; (same for the UK) US$500 million to US$1 GOLD (same for the UK) Brazil hosts 2016 billion by 2019 (same Brazil hosts 2016 Summit for the UK) pledging Summit
Land Land Transparency Process for LTI Partnerships agreed BRONZE Initiative (LTI) agreed Partnerships agreed Partnerships formed Ambition to put house G8 puts own house in order in order
Tax registries registries registries Public 69 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
FOOTNOTES
1 The evaluators remain particularly keen to emphasise 12 The purpose of the OC was described in the strategy 20 Internal IF document the “tool for internal learning” aspect of this evaluation. as: “To steer the campaign through to success and 21 Internal IF document It aims to build on ongoing discussions with members be responsible to the Board for the strategy and all of the IF Coalition around the building of strategic and operational activities and decisions”. 22 Enough Food for Everyone IF campaign, January operational capacity for future campaigning and 2013, “The Need for UK Action on Global Hunger”, The IF 13 The purpose of the Board was described in the advocacy work that the UK international NGO sector ‘policy report’, http://enoughfoodif.org/sites/default/files/ strategy as: “To agree the highest level strategy and collectively undertakes. IF _ policy _ report.PDF direction of the campaign” 2 See Annex 2. 23 An international organisation seeking strong 14 The purpose of the assembly meetings was commitments from governments to promote 3 Steve Tibbett, October 2013, IF campaign Coalition described in the strategy as: “To engage with wider transparency, increase civic participation, fight Formation Evaluation (internal document). membership in discussions around campaign direction corruption, and harness new technologies to make and strategy”. 4 One internal was a member of two categories. government more open, effective, and accountable. 15 See, for instance, Alex Glennie, Will Straw and Leni 5 These were set against the parameters set down by 24 Internal IF document. Wild, June 2012, “Understanding public attitudes to aid the campaigns measures of success, captured by the and development” and Bond’s recent work on public 25 Internal IF document. IF campaign coalition members and centrally by Bond support for development: http://www.bond.org.uk/ and coordinated overall by Bond, under the auspices 26 Internal IF document advocacy/public-support of the MEL/OC Committee. 27 nfp Synergy, May 2013, “Charity Parliamentary 16 David Cameron, 24 January, 2013, “Prime Minister 6 See theadvocacyhub.org Monitor”, as quoted in IF campaign, undated, David Cameron’s speech to the World Economic Forum “Parliamentary Working Group Evaluation of G8 7 Due mainly to diary constraints. in Davos” (https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/ Strategy”. prime-minister-david-camerons-speech-to-the-world- 8 This is adapted from an Internal IF document. economic-forum-in-davos) 28 See, for instance, Larry Elliot, 18 June 2013, “G8 9 Brendan Cox, 2011, “Campaigning for International summit: tax campaigners condemn David Cameron’s 17 See, for instance, Duncan Geere, 23 June 2011, Justice: Learning Lessons (1991-2011); Where Next? 10-point ‘wish list’”. “Clicktivism’s assault on dictators, politics and NGOs”, (2011-2015), Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, http:// Wired.co.uk 29 Owen Barder and Alex Cobham, June 19, 2013, www.bond.org.uk/data/files/Campaigning _ for _ “How did the G-8 do on financial secrecy and tax?”, International _ Justice _ Brendan _ Cox _ May _ 2011.pdf 18 See, for instance, Jim Coe, 2013, “Painted Ships, on www.owen.org the move” http://www.coeandkingham.org.uk/author/ 10 The reasons for this were assessed further in the jim/ 30 Richard Murphy, 2013, “Why the Lough Erne G8 Formation Evaluation. was a turning point – An academic’s perspective” 19 http://findingframes.org/Finding%20Frames%20 11 Internal IF document. http://www.taxresearch.org.uk Bond%20Report%202011%20Executive%20 Summary%20DRAFT.pdf 70 | Enough Food for Everyone IF: Campaign Evaluation
FOOTNOTES
31 Kevin Watkins, 19 June 2013, “G8 on tax: More a first 41 IF campaign, October 2013, “Supporter Data, 52 Internal IF document step than a giant leap”, ODI Website. October Update” 53 Internal IF document 32 There was discussion in the OC and PAG in the run 42 Indeed this seems to be emergent in the next phase 54 Internal IF document to the budget over the degree to which the aid of the IF campaign as a legacy. commitment was tangibly at risk. 55 David Hudson, Niheer Dasandi, Jennifer van 43 See for instance: S. Taschereau and J. Bolger, 2007, Heerde-Hudson and Yannis Theocharis, 2013, 33 Nutrition for Growth, undated, “Nutrition for Growth “Networks and capacity”, (Discussion Paper 58C) ‘Capturing #IF’, Paper presented to the Development Commitments: Executive Summary”, Gov.uk website 44 Here: http://www.iisd.org/networks/gov/ and Studies Association Annual Conference, University of 34 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ here: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/ Birmingham, International Development Department, uploads/attachment _ data/file/206013/G8 _ nov/29/old-style-politics- 16 November 2013 factsheet _ transparency.pdf collapse-like-berlin-wall-westminster 56 See: The University of Manchester, 9 November 2011, 35 Here ‘attribution’ refers to the ways in which changes 45 There was a comprehensive internal evaluation Research shows declining power of celebrity backing in policy and practice were wholly driven by the of the Scottish arm of the IF campaign. for good causes”, Press Release on research by Dr campaign while contribution refers to the extent that Daniel Brockington. 46 BBC News Online, 9 October, 2013, “Aid offered the campaign contributed to changes in policy and by Scottish government for climate change harm”, 57 An organogram of the main structure of the practice. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland- coalition is provided in Annex 1. 36 Internal IF document politics-24454878 58 Internal IF document 37 The ‘Coalition Formation’ report outlines early 47 Scottish Government, October 16, 2013, “Next 59 The Agile Sign Off Group was a small group discussions around the original intention of some of generation of Global Citizens”, http://news.scotland.gov. of OC representatives responsible for signing off the campaign’s instigators to reframe the hunger uk/News/Next-generation-of-Global-Citizens-51f.aspx uncontroversial or urgent pieces of work. narrative and push the sector further towards a set of 48 The evaluation scope did not include interviews with recommendations in: Andrew Darnton with Martin Kirk 60 http://enoughfoodif.org/g8/northern-ireland Scottish government representatives. January, 2011, “Finding Frames: New ways to engage 61 David Hudson, 2013, ‘Background Paper to the IF the UK public in global poverty”, Bond, Oxfam, DFID. 49 Northern Ireland Assembly, 25 June 2013, “Order Coalition Survey: Collaboration Section’, Mimeo, 2 Paper, Reference: OP 148/11-15, Session: 2012/2013”, 38 The research is not collected in one report, but rather December 2013, London: UCL. http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/Assembly-Business/Order- in a series of PowerPoint presentations. Papers/25-June-2013/ 62 From analysis in the Formation report. 39 Tracker panel - IF campaign in-house research in 50 nfpSynergy Charity Parliamentary Monitor, April/May 63 See Annex 3. association with Research Now. 2013 64 For more information on campaign costs please 40 Numbers from the Supporters Survey, 51 For instance in the Measures of Success: “3. see the IF website: http://enoughfoodif.org/about- Internal IF document. Increased media coverage of structural causes of campaign/if-campaign-how-it-happened hunger, malnutrition and environmental degradation” 65 These recommendations and lessons harvested from the Formation Evaluation are relevant to the overall recommendations here. 66 This is table adapted from the IF Monitoring Log