‘Religious ’ AND THE DANGERS OF SEMANTIC DISTORTION Frank L. Pasquale

s articles in the Summer 2002 FREE At the outset, I should stress that I am not suggesting that INQUIRY demonstrated, many humanists every use of the term is improper. It is best de scribed as naturalistic—humanists legitimately used by (true) religionists with a humanist bent. whose worldview rejects the transcendent or supernatu- If one defines humanism broadly enough—say, as a preoccu- A 1 ral—continue to call themselves “religious humanists.” To pation with what it is to be , an overriding concern with explore this issue, I re-visited the essay “What Is Humanism?” humanity, or a pan-human ethical or moral commitment— by Frederick Edwords. Edwords, former executive director then some Catholics, Hindus, and Mormons, among others, of the American Humanist Association and current editor of can properly call themselves religious humanists. Similarly, its magazine, The Humanist, has presented this treatment of Unitarian Universalists who subscribe to their own broadly humanism to various groups since 1989.2 His essay offers a humanist principles, but believe that a transcendent force unique opportunity to reconsider the historical emergence of operates in the universe, are religious humanists. [See James contemporary naturalistic humanism, along with some prob- Haught’s article in this issue for more on and agnos- lems that attend its linguistic legacy to the present day.3 ticism within Unitarian .—EDS.] Pantheists with In “What Is Humanism?” Edwords delineates a broad array true dedication to the welfare of all humanity may properly be of what we might call “hyphenated ” that have designated religious humanists. Even teleologists committed arisen since the Renaissance (e.g., classical, modern, secular, to humanist principles, but who believe that an invisible hand etc.). When he gets to “religious humanism,” Edwords touches guides human destiny to a transcendent omega point, qualify. on a problem as old as contemporary humanism itself. In the My concern lies squarely with use of the term religious process, he unwittingly points up some of the unfortunate humanism by naturalistic humanists, which poses serious repercussions that come of stretching pivotal terms like reli- problems with respect to the notions of both religion and gion and religious well beyond their standard meanings. humanism. I will suggest here that religious humanism when applied to naturalistic humanists, is an unfortunate and misleading WHAT IS (RELIGIOUS) HUMANISM? usage. It represents an unsatisfactory “resolution” that was Frederick Edwords is, of course, by no means the only natural- adopted at a historical inflection point in the emergence of istic humanist to use or defend the term religious humanism. contemporary naturalistic humanism. And it represents a It has been in use at least since the early part of the twentieth semantic distortion whose repercussions extend far beyond century, most notably in I (1933). But his the “merely semantic.” In this article I will suggest alternative essay furnishes a unique opportunity to analyze the term, its language that I hope will meet the needs and desires of natu- internal contradictions, and the confusion it produces within ralistic humanists without requiring that they continue to use the context of contemporary naturalistic humanism. inevitably misleading terminology. Edwords demonstrates that for quite some time human- Frank L. Pasquale, Ph.D., is a cultural anthropologist who, ism has been hot verbal real estate. Many people with many following a career in international business and cross-cultural agendas have wanted a piece of this upbeat-sounding word. As training, is doing research and writing on religion, culture, noted, “Humanism is such an old and attrac- humanism, morality, and -state “separation.” He resides tive word and so weighted with favorable meanings that it has in Portland, Oregon. been currently adopted by various groups and persons whose use of it is most questionable.”4 This is obvious from the eight

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hyphenated humanisms which Edwords lists: Renaissance, [R]eligion is a system of communal beliefs and practices rela- Literary, Cultural, Philosophical, Christian, Modern, Secular, tive to supernatural beings.6 and Religious. To these we may add others cited by Lamont, including Academic, Naturalistic, Catholic, Integral, Marxist, I would actually consider this too restrictive, since there and so on. Hot property, indeed! are properly religious systems which admit of transcen- In his essay, Edwords opens discussion of the “religious dent realms or processes, or of supernatural forces, not neatly humanism” problem with his observation that: packaged into discrete “beings.” Closer perhaps, is the Oxford Dictionary and Thesaurus’s primary definition of religion: The most critical irony in dealing with Modern Humanism is the inability of advocates to agree on whether or not this worldview 1. the belief in a superhuman controlling power, esp., in a per- is religious. Those who see it as philosophy are the Secular sonal or , entitled to obedience and worship7 Humanists while those who see it as religion are Religious Humanists. This dispute has been going on since the early years As suggested by Tom Flynn elsewhere in this issue, reli- of this century when the secular and religious traditions con- verged and brought Modern Humanism into existence. gion may be defined as “at minimum a belief in . . . a realm transcending that of ordinary experience.” But, Edwords’s But he goes on to state that: definition does not at all reflect this primary defining attribute of religion—belief in the supernatural or transcendent. Again: Secular and Religious Humanists both share the same world- view and the same basic principles. Religion is that which serves the personal and social needs of a group of people sharing the same philosophical worldview. This is puzzling, since the customary or standard meaning of secular is, for example: In fact, following from this, wouldn’t value system or belief system or culture or association or society (in the sense of a 1. concerned with the affairs of this world; not spiritual nor group of people sharing a particular philosophy) meet his defi- [sic] sacred. nition of religion? Continuing, Edwords states that 2. . . . not concerned with religion nor [sic] religious belief.5 the true substance of religion is the role it plays in the lives of These terms would hardly suggest that secular and “reli- individuals and the life of the community. Doctrines may differ gious humanists” share the same worldview, even if they hold from denomination to denomination, and new doctrines may replace old ones, but the purpose religion serves for PEOPLE some basic principles in common. Edwords seeks to resolve [sic] remains the same. If we define the substance of a thing as the conundrum by noting that: that which is most lasting and universal, then the function of religion is the core of it. It is only in the definition of religion and in the practice of the philosophy that Religious and Secular Humanists effectively By this token, if one defines the most lasting and universal disagree. attribute of “psychiatry” as “that which serves the mental or emotional well-being of people,” then psychiatry is functionally And further on, he elaborates: equivalent to meditation or counseling or psychotherapeutic The definition of religion used by Religious Humanists is a drugs. In the same way, religion becomes anything that serves functional one. Religion is that which serves the personal and “the personal and social needs of a group of people sharing the social needs of a group of people sharing the same philosoph- same philosophical worldview,” like an association or a society, ical worldview. or a culture, or a value or belief system. They’re all functionally indistinguishable from religion as defined by Edwords. Here, more serious concerns arise. While anthropologists All of this leads him to note that: and religion scholars debate precisely where the edges of reli- gion feather into other cultural dimensions, or into philosophy The fact that Humanism can at once be both religious and or nonreligious belief systems, two defining attributes are secular presents a paradox, of course, but not the only such consistently applied to the word religion in standard usage: paradox.

1. Something having to do with a supernatural, spiritual, divine, Is all this truly a paradox, or merely confusion caused by non-material, metaphysical or transcendent dimension of some the distortion and misuse of the word religion for rather special description, and purposes? For it is upon the quicksand of the distorted use of 2. Something having to do with human or practices religion that Edwords erects the semantic house of cards he associated with, or some human involvement or relationship with, that dimension. calls “religious [and yet naturalistic!] humanism.” He does so on behalf of those who reject notions of the supernatural and After noting that “some definitions of religion are too yet still want restrictive” (e.g., “belief in God”) and some “definitions of a basis for moral values, an inspiring set of ideals, methods for dealing with life’s harsher realities, a rationale for living life joy- religion are not helpful largely because they are vague” (e.g., ously, and an overall sense of purpose . . . [as well as] a sense of “worldview”) the Merriam-Webster’s Encyclopedia of World belonging, an institutional setting for the moral education of chil- settles on the following, which, it asserts, “has dren, special holidays shared with like-minded people, a unique received reasonable acceptance by most scholars”: ceremonial life, the performance of ideologically consistent rites of passage (weddings, child welcomings, coming-of-age celebra-

45 http://www.secularhumanism.org fall 2002 tions, funerals, and so forth), an opportunity for affirmation of Partial overlap in belief systems or semantic space is fine. one’s philosophy of life, and a historical context for one’s ideas. But based on everything Edwords has said about “religious humanism” as he is using the term, it isn’t religion and it isn’t Edwords notes in this connection that he really religious. It has some ideas or attributes in common with , and some practices or rituals in common was once asked by a reporter if this functional definition of religion didn’t amount to taking away the substance and having with religion qua religion in its sense. In the final analy- only the superficial trappings. sis, however, is something actually more different from religion than from secular humanism, but distinctly different from both. His reported answer was the perplexing statement quoted earlier that “define[d] the substance of a thing [as that] which WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT MAKE? is most lasting and universal” and so, defined religion solely The forgoing may lead some to ask, “What difference does in terms of its purported function (that is, serving the personal all this really make?” The difference is that by distorting and social needs of its adherents). religion or religious in the ways described here, (naturalistic) Now, I honestly do not care what terms we create or use to “religious humanists” actually aid and abet parties whose pur- denote things, entities, concepts, or phenomena, as long we do poses threaten the rights and aims of naturalistic humanists! so clearly and without ambiguity or contradiction. Edwords’s Confusion within contemporary (naturalistic) humanism purposes—and apparently those of (naturalistic) “religious about whether humanism is religion has contributed to sim- humanists”—have overwhelmed linguistic rigor and so, not ilar confusion, or worse, in the public square. Opponents of surprisingly, given rise to a raft of “paradoxes.” humanism often exploit apparent admissions by naturalistic Apart from poetry, little except confusion is achieved by humanists that contemporary humanism, of whatever stripe, is stretching the meaning or use of words utterly beyond their a “religion” or “religious.” Others argue that secular humanism normal usage, as we see when Edwords ends up declaring that: rests upon a kind of “ in reason,” and so indeed represents an alternative “religious faith.” Since religion denotes belief in . . . Religious Humanism should not be seen as an alternative the supernatural or transcendent, however, this fundamentally faith, but rather as an alternative way of being religious. misrepresents secular, or any form of naturalistic, humanism. Some critics have argued further that “secular humanism” And: or “” are what the Supreme Court has “forced upon the public square” and into public schools. Thus, the The paradoxes don’t end here. Religious Humanism is usually [usually!?] without a god, without a belief in the supernatural, argument continues, since even “secular humanism” is a “reli- without a belief in an , and without a belief in a “higher” gion” of a sort, then there is no such thing as truly achievable source of moral values. government neutrality with respect to religion, and so “true” religions should enjoy the same sponsored presence in public And: schools as those of “secularism” and “secular humanism.” The Supreme Court succumbed to the same dangerous These paradoxical features not only require a unique treat- error when it categorized secular humanism as a “religion” ment of Religious Humanism in the study of world religions, (in a footnote to Torcaso v. Watkins 367 U.S. 488 [1961]). This but also help explain the continuing controversy, both inside and outside the , over whether Humanism was later used by Justice Antonin Scalia to argue for either is religion at all. the inclusion of “creation science” or exclusion of evolutionary theory in the public schools (in Edwards v. Aguilard 482 U.S. We can avoid much of this controversy. If something 578 [1987]). doesn’t exhibit the standard defining attributes of the terms So it is that apparently harmless semantic distortions—dis- religion or religious (at minimum, concern with a supernatural tortions disseminated by naturalistic humanists themselves— or transcendent realm), then it isn’t religion or religious. It’s can threaten us down the road. These examples should serve something else, and should be called something else. to indicate that the debate about “religious humanism” is more Edwords begins to close his exposition by noting that: than merely semantic. Real issues are at stake. At the very least, confusion results; at worst, that confusion can lead to Once we leave the areas of confusion it is possible to explain, in serious negative consequences in social discourse, political straightforward terms, exactly what the Modern Humanist phi- debate, and even jurisprudence and legislation. losophy is about. It is easy to summarize the basic ideas held in common by both Religious and Secular Humanists. WHAT TO DO? This is a philosophy: I know that some may still object that modern humanism emerged, in part, from a Unitarian Universalist religious . . . for people who think for themselves heritage, and so, retained certain aspects of that heritage. . . . focused upon human means for comprehending reality They will point to the many references to “religion” and . . . of reason and science in the pursuit of knowledge . . . of imagination “religious humanism” in Humanist Manifesto I. But on this . . . of compassion basis, one could point out that Christianity emerged from a . . . for the here and now Judaic cultural and religious heritage and has retained certain . . . [which is] realistic obvious aspects of that heritage—for starters, the entire Old . . . [and] in tune with the science of today. Testament. Given that, and following the example set by the

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illegitimate use of religious humanism, we should really call dview, but who differ in experiential emphasis or proclivity. Christianity “Christian Judaism.” Or our non-“Native-Ameri- Celebrant humanists are those who tend to value social cel- can” culture should really be called “European America” and ebratory ritual and inspirality somewhat more than secular our national acronym should be the U.S. of E.A. humanists, who generally tend to de-emphasize or eschew Everything emerges from something prior. But as a newly celebratory ritual and/or inspiral experiences. emergent entity or concept evolves, it exhibits new defining Quite apart from these are true religious humanists—those attributes that make it progressively more distinct from its who believe in a supernatural or transcendent realm, but who “parentage.” Based on such distinctions, we give the new share with naturalistic humanists a concern for human wel- entity or concept a new name to signify its distinctness. If it fare, an ethical commitment to humanity, or any other of the becomes different enough, a hyphenated or adjectivally-modi- central nonreligious principles characteristic of contemporary fied name reflecting its parentage confuses more than it clar- (unhyphenated) humanism. ifies. At this point, it’s best to give the new thing an entirely With these distinctions in place, we will leave religion and new name. I suggest that this is the case with (naturalistic) the religious to the (true) religionist, spirituality and the spir- “religious humanism.” itual to the spiritualist, and yet enable celebrant (and when For those naturalistic humanists who wish to emphasize so inclined, secular) humanists to speak of the earth-bound certain ritual, social, or celebratory experiences that are experience of awe, of inspirality and the inspiral, free from important to them (and which may have been adapted from oxymorons and dangerous semantic distortion. truly religious practices, albeit after rejecting the religious concepts that once underlay them) I would suggest the terms Acknowledgments celebrant humanist and celebrant humanism. My thanks to Tom Flynn and to Dick Mase of the Humanists of Greater Beyond the concern for celebratory ritual, the observa- Portland, Oregon, for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this essay. tions made by Robert M. Price and Malcolm D. Wise in the Summer FREE INQUIRY remind us that there is something else of importance to some naturalistic humanists and surely to most celebrant humanists. It is an experience which some, like Price and Wise, refer to as “numinous,” “divine,” or “spir- itual.”8 But these terms drive us into the same semantic web as does the illegitimate use of religion and religious, since the experience to which we refer actually involves no assumptions of the uncaused-causal divine, the supernatural, transcendent, numinous or the spiritual. It is, rather, a quite human percep- Notes tual, cognitive, affective, and expressive response to life, to 1. For example, see Robert M. Price’s use of the term existence, to sentience itself, and to the grandeur of all that we religious humanism in “Religious and Secular Humanism, know and do not (yet) know of the universe. It is the experience What’s the Difference?” FREE INQUIRY 22, no. 3 (2002): 47–48. 2. Frederick Edwords, “What Is Humanism?” ©1989 by of awe, wonderment, even the sublime, with perhaps a measure Frederick Edwords, published at many locations on the Web of “free-floating gratitude” (though without any specific object including www..org/library/modern/fred_edwords/ of that gratitude). Throw in Wise’s “feeling of interconnected- humanism.html. Since I quote repeatedly from this essay, ness,” if you wish. But it does not transcend the natural world specific citations will not be provided for each quotation. or human psychological and affective experience. 3. This designation follows Corliss Lamont in The Philosophy of Humanism (New York: Frederick Ungar For those naturalistic humanists who wish to express or Publishing Co., 1982 [1949]). There, he states that “[t]he reflect on such experiences, I offer an addition to the “dis-spir- adjective naturalistic shows that Humanism, in its most ited lexicon” that Tom Flynn presented in the Summer FREE accurate philosophical sense, implies a world-view in which INQUIRY. There, he urged secular humanists to leave all refer- Nature is everything, in which there is no supernatural and in which man is an integral part of Nature and not separated ences to “spirituality” behind and offered alternative words from it by any sharp cleavage or discontinuity” (1982: 22). that enable them to do this.9 I would like to suggest that, This term is less ambiguous than to either “contemporary” instead of ruminating on the “mysterium tremendum,” the or “modern” humanism, since true religionists can properly “spiritual,” or “spirituality,” naturalistic humanists refer to refer to themselves as humanists, broadly defined. Lamont the (nonspiritual) sense of awe and to the new words, inspiral endeavored to lay claim to (unhyphenated) humanism for the naturalists, but this is problematic. (IN-spur-uhl) and inspirality (IN-spur-AL-i-tee). With these 4. Lamont, Note 3, 1982, p. 21. terms, all naturalistic humanists (and particularly celebrant 5. The Oxford Dictionary and Thesaurus, American humanists) who gnash teeth about having to leave the “spiritu- Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 1365. al” and “spirituality” at the meeting-room door, but who yearn 6. Merriam-Webster’s Encyclopedia of World Religions (Springfield, Mass.: Merriam-Webster, Inc., 1999), p. 915. for some nontranscendent way of expressing a special sense 7. Oxford Dictionary, Note 5, 1996, p. 1270. or feeling they have when inspired by nature or existence, may 8. Robert M. Price, Note 2, and Malcolm D. Wise, now express this with nary a in sight. “Religion and Spirituality, A Humanist View,” FREE INQUIRY 22, no. 3 (2002): 49. IN SUM . . . 9. Tom Flynn, “When Words Won’t Die: A Dispiriting Proposal,” FREE INQUIRY 22, no. 3 (2002): 50–51. These suggestions leave us with two distinct groups of nat- uralistic humanists who share a common naturalistic worl-

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