AND BETWEEN: Fax: 780 Tel: 780 Warner,J. Philip Q.C. Alberta,Edmonton, T5J1V3 2500- Barristers Solicitors and LLP MCKENZIE & BISHOP BETWEEN: Counsel for the Applicants, Sheila Fullowka et al et Fullowka Sheila Applicants, the for Counsel E- mail: [email protected] ROYAL OAK MINES INC. MINES OAK ROYAL BETTGER, BETTGER, OF CANADA, UNION WORKERS ANDGENERAL TRANSPORTATION AEROSPACE, AUTOMOBILE, NATIONAL TERRITORIES, NORTHWEST THE OF COMMISSIONER THE BY REPRESENTED AS TERRITORIES NORTHWEST THE OF GOVERNMENT THE LIMITED, CANADA OF PINKERTON’S ROYAL OAK MINES INC. MINES OAK ROYAL ROWSELL, ROWSELL, DAWN CARLENE VODNOSKI, DOREEN RIGGS, CAROL MAY ELLA PANDEV, JUDIT NEILL, TRACEY HOURIE, SHAUNA DOREEN FULLOWKA, SHEILA BETTGER, BETTGER, OF CANADA, UNION WORKERS ANDGENERAL TRANSPORTATION AEROSPACE, AUTOMOBILE, NATIONAL TERRITORIES, NORTHWEST THE OF COMMISSIONER THE BY REPRESENTED AS TERRITORIES NORTHWEST THE OF GOVERNMENT THE LIMITED, CANADA OF PINKERTON’S (S ______10104- heila Fullowka, Doreen Shauna Hourie, Tracey Neill, Judit Pandev, Ella May Carol Riggs, Riggs, Carol May Ella Pandev, Judit Neill, Tracey Hourie, Shauna Doreen Fullowka, heila -2464 -421 - wler) Sa Lou Bonnie and Russell Karen Rowsell, Dawn Carlene Vodnoski, Doreen 426
103 Ave. -1305 (Pursuant of to Canada) (Pursuant 42ofRules theRule Court Supreme the
KAREN RUSSELL and BONNIE LOU SAWLER LOU BONNIE and RUSSELL KAREN TIMOTHY ALEXANDER ROYAL OAK VENTURES INC. (formerly (formerly INC. OAK VENTURES ROYAL ALEXANDER TIMOTHY TIMOTHY ALEXANDER ROYAL OAK VENTURES INC. (formerly (formerly INC. OAK VENTURES ROYAL ALEXANDER TIMOTHY
(ON APPEAL FROM THE
IN THE SUPREME COURT
FACTUM OF THE APPELLANTS THE APPELLANTS OF FACTUM
NORTHWEST TERRITORIE JAMES O’NEIL JAMES - and and
– – COURT OF APPEAL OF T and
- – Fax: 613 Tel: 613 Patricia J. Wilson 7Y6 K1R ON Ottawa, 1900 Barristers Solicitors and LLP & HARCOURT HOSKIN OSLER, E- Ottawa Agent for Sheila Fullowka et al et Fullowka Sheila for Agent Ottawa mail: pwilso
OF CANADA OF - 340 Albert Street Albert 340 -787 - 235 S) - -2867
1009
Court FileCourt No. 32735
HE HE
Respondents Respondents
(Applicants) (Applicant) Appellants Appellant
235-7234 (613) Telephone: AND TO: E- 409-8289 (780) Telephone: Street 1900–340Albert Edmonton AB T5J3S4 1000,10180–101Street AND TO: TO:
REGISTRAR OF THIS HONOURABLE COURT HONOURABLE THIS OF REGISTRAR John M. Hope, M. Q.C. John Hoskin LLP Harcourt Osler, & James E.Q.C. Redmond, Respondent ofGovernment the Territories ofNorthwest Government the for RespondentSolicitors the E- 424-7116 (780) Fax: (780) 423-7631Tel.: Edmonton, AB T5J3G1 N.W. 101St. 10235 - Tower 2000 Oxford LLP Field D. GibsonPeter ofPinkerton’s Limited Canada for RespondentSolicitors the E- 428-9683 (780) Fax: (780) 428-6036Tel.: Edmonton, AB T5J3V9 Avenue 10060 Jasper Place 2800 Scotia LLP Craig Duncan & James O’Neil Solicitor for th Facsimile: mail: [email protected] mail: [email protected] E- mail: [email protected] (780) 423-2368 (780)
e Appellant Agent to Solicitor for the Appellant Solicitorfor the to Agent Appellant Appellante
E- James O’Neil Facsimile: Patricia J. Wilson 7Y6 ONK1Y Ottawa mail: [email protected] E- Fax: (613) 231-3191 (613) Fax: (613) 232-7171 Tel.: 50O'Connor 300- Street LLP LangMichener 231-3191 (613) Fax: (613) 232-7171 Tel.: 50O'Connor 300- Street LLP LangMichener Northwest Territories Agent for Solicitors for the 6L2 K1P ON Ottawa, JeffreyW. Beedell Limited Pinkerton’s ofRespondent Canada Agent for Solicitors for the 6 K1P ON Ottawa, JeffreyW. Beedell
mail: [email protected] mail: [email protected] (613) 235-2867 (613)
L2
oiiosfrteRsodn for RespondentSolicitors the Chivers Carpenter G. Patrick Nugent Royal Oak Ventures Inc. E- 423-2870 (780) Fax: (780) 423-8580Tel.: Edmonton, AB T5J4K1 N.W.10180 –101St. 1500 Manulife Place Parlee McLaws LLP G.Q.C. McBean, Robert Bet Timothy Alexander for RespondentSolicitors the E- 508-4349 (403) Fax: 50O'Connor 300- Street (403) 693-4300Tel.: AB Calgary, 2507, 10088–102AvenueN.W. MacPherson Leslie Tyerman& 235-3041 (613) Fax: Polsky S. Leonard Automoble, Respondents National Union of Canada WorkersTransportation General and E- Automoble, National Aerospace, for RespondentsSolicitors the 500–30Metcalfe Street E-mail: [email protected] 439-8543 (780) Fax: (780) 439-3611Tel.: Ext: 238 Edmonton, AB T6E 1X5 10426,81Ave N.W. 101 - mail: [email protected] mail: [email protected] T5J 2Z1.
tger Respondent Inc. Respondent OakRoyal Ventures E- Lang Michener LLP LangMichener
Fax: (613) 233-7190 (613) Fax: (613) 233-1146 Tel.: 50O'Connor 1625- Street E- 231-3191 (613) Fax: (613) 232-7171 Tel.: Agent for Solicitors for the Coleen Bauman Sack Goldblatt Mitchell LLP Ottawa, ON K1P 6L2 K1P ON Ottawa, Maclaren Corlett Stephen J. Grace Bettger TimothyRespondent Alexander Agent for Solicitors for the 6L2 K1P ON Ottawa, JeffreyW. Beedell General Workers Unionof Canada Aerospace, Transportation and Agent for Solicitors for the Tel.: (613) 2 5L4 K1P ON Ottawa, mail: [email protected] mail: [email protected] mail: [email protected]
35-5327 35-5327
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PART I OVERVIEW AND STATEMENT OF FACTS………….…… 1
Overview: Nine miners die during a violent strike at a gold mine…………………………………………………. 1
Statement of Facts: • Strikers took violent collective action against replacement workers…………………………………….. 2 • Pinkerton’s assumed responsibility for security and the miners relied on them………………………...... 5 • A violent workplace is an unsafe workplace………….... 6 • There is no ‘corporate veil’ inside an unincorporated union………………………………………………………. 8
PART II STATEMENT OF ISSUES………………………………….….. 10
Issue 1: Intentional wrongdoing does not negate a duty of care owed by those who have assumed responsibility for the safety of others………………………………... 10
Issue 2: It was not an error for Justice Lutz to use common sense to find causation and common language to express his findings…………………………………… 10
Issue 3: The CAW, Bettger and Warren are jointly liable for the deaths of the miners, and the CAW is vicariously liable for Warren’s and Bettger’s torts……………………………………………………. 10
Issue 4: It is an error of law to deny tax gross-up and management fees merely because a worker’s compensation board has a subrogated interest in a claim…………………………………………………… 10
PART III STATEMENT OF ARGUMENT……………………………… 10
Issue 1: Intentional wrongdoing does not negate a duty of care owed by those who have assumed responsibility for the safety of others………………………………... 10 ii
• Pinkerton’s owed the miners a duty of care because it assumed responsibility for security and the miners relied on it……………………...... 13 • The GNWT “dithered when it should have reacted”……………………………………………. 17 • Concluding Remarks On Duty of Care..………… 20
Issue 2: It was not an error for Justice Lutz to use common sense to find causation and common language to express his findings…………………………………… 21
Issue 3: The CAW, Bettger and Warren are jointly liable for the deaths of the miners, and the CAW is vicariously liable for Warren’s and Bettger’s torts……………………………………………………. 26
• The CAW is vicariously liable for Warren’s and Bettger’s torts……………………………………. 27
• The CAW and Bettger joined with Warren in concerted wrongful action………………………... 29
• There were no corporate veils inside the unions……………………………………………… 31
Issue 4: It is an error of law to deny tax gross-up and management fees merely because a worker’s compensation board has a subrogated interest in a claim…………………………………………………… 36
Part IV Submissions on Costs……………………………………………. 38
Part V Orders Sought…………………………………………………… 40
PART VI TABLE OF AUTHORITIES………………………………….
PART VII STATUTORY PROVISIONS…………………………………
Documents Relied Upon
A. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 217 & 217.1…….
B. Contributory Negligence Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, ch. C-18, s. 5…………………………………………………………. iii
C. Fatal Accidents Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c.F-3, s. 4(2) ……………………………………………………………..
D. Mining Safety Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. M-13, section 42…
E. Occupational Health and Safety Act, R.S.O. 1990 c.O.1, s. 25(2)(h)……………………………………………………..
F. Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, section 47………
G. Rule 83 and Schedule B of the Supreme Court of Canada Rules………………………………………………………..
H. Workers’ Compensation Act, RSNWT 1988, c. W-6, section 13(4)(d)……………………………………………..
I. Workmen's Compensation Act, RSNB 1973, c.W-13, s.10 (10)…………………………………………………………. Part I: Overview and Statement of Facts
Overview: Nine miners die during a violent strike at a gold mine
1. During the “most menacing”1 strike in Canadian history at the Giant Mine in Yellowknife, N.W.T., members and officials of the striking union incited, organized, funded and participated in violence aimed at the replacement workers who were working during the strike.2
2. The mine owner (Royal Oak) hired a security firm (Pinkerton’s) to provide security for the replacement workers3 and Royal Oak and Pinkerton’s reassured replacement workers that they were providing adequate security at the Giant Mine.4 The replacement workers relied on Royal Oak and Pinkerton’s and on the Government of the Northwest Territories (“GNWT”) to take reasonable steps to ensure that their workplace was safe.5
3. In an effort to stop production at the Giant Mine, strikers committed innumerable crimes, including setting off a number of explosions.6 Three strikers, including Tim Bettger, scouted a route into the underground of the Giant Mine through an unsecured entrance.7 Using information that Bettger’s group had obtained on their scouting mission, another striker, Roger Warren, entered the underground through that entrance and set an explosive device that killed nine miners.8
4. After a nine month trial comprising 62 witnesses, 1,217 trial exhibits and 12,252 pages of trial transcripts, Justice Arthur M. Lutz awarded judgment against the Respondents Bettger, Pinkerton’s, the GNWT and the CAW union and also against Royal Oak, Warren and two other
1 Reasons for Judgment at Trial (“RFJ”) para. 11 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. I, p. 10) 2 RFJ para. 7 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. I, pp. 7-8) 3 RFJ para. 85 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. I, p. 31) 4 RFJ 744 & 754 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. II, pp. 36 & 39); Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. VII., O’Sullivan evidence pp. 11:23-13:39 (TAB 99-6); Edgeworth v. N.D. Lea, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 206 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. II,TAB 37) 5 RFJ paras. 89 & 713 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. I, p. 32 & Vol. II, p. 26); Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. VII, Fullowka evidence p. 17:6-18 & p. 18:14-22 (TAB 99-10 & 99-9), O’Neil evidence pp. 60:32-61:17 & 62:1-20 (TAB 99-23 & 99- 24); Vol. VIII, Dales evidence p. 45:15-31 (TAB 99-83) 6 RFJ paras. 101 & 278 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. I, pp. 37 & 92); Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. IX, Warren evidence p. 178:28-39 (TAB 99-148) 7 RFJ para. 116 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. I, p. 41); Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. VII, Bettger read-in pp. 5:39-6:18 (TAB 99-3); Vol. IX, Plaintiff Fullowka et al Final Argument p. 203:15-32 (TAB 99-164) 8 RFJ paras. 5, 652 & 971 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. I, p.7 & Vol. II, pps. 8, 5 & 6); Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. IX, Warren evidence pp. 168:30-170:7 (TAB 99-142), Plaintiffs Final Argument pp. 204:45-206:31 (TAB 99-165) 2
strikers. He found the CAW union both directly liable for its own torts and vicariously liable for Bettger’s and Warren’s torts.
5. Royal Oak and the Respondents Pinkerton’s, GNWT, CAW and Bettger appealed. The miners’ families (and James O’Neil) cross-appealed on two legal issues related to damages. Royal Oak settled before the appeal, and remained a party only with respect to cross-claims by the Respondents.
6. The Court of Appeal of the Northwest Territories found that the Respondents did not owe a duty of care to the mineworkers, and dismissed the claims against Pinkerton’s, GNWT, CAW and Bettger. It also found that Justice Lutz had used the “material contribution test” rather than the “but for test” to determine causation, but the Court of Appeal did not review the evidence to see if any of Justice Lutz’s conclusions about causation were appropriately erroneous. The Court of Appeal did not deal with the damages issues.
7. The miners’ families and James O’Neil were granted leave to appeal to this Court on November 27, 2008 with costs payable in any event of the cause. The miners’ families appeal the dismissal of their claims against the Respondents and also appeal the denial of tax gross-up and management fees in the quantification of their damages award by the Trial Judge.
Strikers took violent collective action against replacement workers.
8. On April 18, 1992, Royal Oak and the employees’ bargaining agent, CASAW Local 4, reached a Tentative Agreement,9 but the union membership rejected it,10 and on or about May 11, 1992, voted to strike.11 Royal Oak decided that, in the event of a strike, it would operate the Giant Mine at normal production levels using replacement workers.12
9. The strike at the Giant Mine began at midnight on the night of May 22, 1992.13 By its second day, the strikers had taken control of the west side of the Giant Mine property, and two
9 RFJ para. 38 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. I, p. 18) 10 RFJ para. 41 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. I, pp. 18-19) 11 RFJ para. 46 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. I, p. 20) 12 RFJ para. 47 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. I, p. 20) 13 RFJ para. 72 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. I, p. 28) 3 security guards had had their trucks burnt. On May 26, strikers assumed total control of the property, and used their vehicles to assault and injure security guards.14
10. Royal Oak had originally retained the Cambrian security firm to provide security during the strike, but because of the violence and the injury to its employees, Cambrian withdrew and was replaced by Pinkerton’s.15 By the end of May, there were 52 Pinkerton’s guards on site.16
11. Union leaders announced that there would be no bargaining until the “scabs are removed from the worksite”17 and incited, organized, funded and participated in a “war” against Royal Oak and its replacement workers.18 Hoping to disrupt production at the Giant Mine,19 strikers committed many acts of violence, including assaults, arson, setting off explosions, and participating in a pre-arranged riot at the Giant Mine site that lasted for hours and resulted in injuries.20
12. During the strike, the CAW union was a separate union from the striking CASAW union (at the end of the strike, the CAW and CASAW merged).21 However, the CAW provided money and sent a CAW employee, Harold David, to Yellowknife to “ram the God damned hell out of the scabs”.22 David became the strike coordinator23 and took over the management of the strike from CASAW local officials. David incited strikers to violence, saying that “the only way that anti-replacement worker legislation was achieved in Quebec was through death” and that strikers “should get even with replacement workers underground.”24
14 RFJ para. 78 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. I, p. 29) 15 RFJ para. 85 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. I, p. 31) 16 RFJ paras. 85 & 94 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. I, pp. 31 & 34-35) 17 RFJ para. 202 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. I, pp. 66-67) 18 RFJ para. 282 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. I, p. 93); Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. VIII, Legge evidence pp. 52:24-53:39 (TAB 99-86), Defer evidence p. 97:25-38 (TAB 99-110); Exhibit 746 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part V, Vol. I2, p. 48) TAB 147 19 RFJ para. 7 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. I, pp. 7-8) 20 RFJ paras. 96-108 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. I, pp. 35-39); Exhibit 787 & Exhibit 793 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part V, Vol. XII, pp. 83 & 84) TABS 156 & 157 21 RFJ para. 859 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. II, p. 74); Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. VIII, Mitic read in p. 100:21-35 (TAB 99-112) 22 RFJ para. 888 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. II, pp. 82-83); Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. IX, Smith evidence p. 193:37-41 (TAB 99-157), David evidence pp. 194:43-45 & 195:45-196:1 (TAB 99-158 & 99-159); Vol. VIII, Mitic read-in pp. 56:46-57:3 (TAB 99-88); Exhibit 1205 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part V, Vol. I5, pp. 3-137 at 58-59) TAB 179 23 Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. VIII, Slezak read-in pp. 43:22-44:4 (TAB 99-82); Exhibit 758 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part V, Vol. I2, pp. 74-75) TAB 152 24 RFJ paras. 194 & 889 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. I, p. 64 & Vol. II, p. 83); AX 0049 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part V, Vol. I0, p. 2) TAB 101; Exhibit 747 & Exhibit 750 (Vol. I2, pp. 49-50) TABS 148 & 149; Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. 4
13. On June 29, Bettger and two other strikers (one of whom was a member of the union executive) entered the underground of the Giant Mine through an isolated entrance called “Akaitcho”. While underground, they stole explosives and painted graffiti (e.g., “scabs beware”). At a national union convention, Bettger’s team was praised for its actions.25 Bettger testified that his team was an “advance party” scouting the way for others to follow.26
14. Bettger’s team told Warren what they had found underground. They told him how they had left a plywood cover over the entryway inside the shack at Akaitcho, how they had left the ladders leading down into the underground, how they had originally gone in the wrong direction part way into the underground, and how they had exited the Giant Mine.27
15. Warren noticed that the area around Akaitcho seemed totally abandoned and started to explore it. At first he was sure that Royal Oak and Pinkerton’s would have Akaitcho wired for sound, or that there would be cameras, or trip wires, or motion detectors. He looked for them, but there was nothing.28
16. On one of his visits, Warren climbed into the shack at Akaitcho29 through a window opening that had no glass in it. Inside the shack, he saw the plywood covering the entrance to the underground. He thought that the plywood would be bolted down, but it was loose. He moved it aside, looked down, and saw the ladders. As he left he shook his head – he said it was like hearing Bob Barker saying “Come on down”.30
17. On the night of September 18, 1992, Warren was on picket duty at a union picket shack. He made small talk with other strikers at the picket shack until about 1:00 a.m., then left the group and went to Akaitcho. No-one was around. Warren climbed into the shack at Akaitcho through the window opening that had no glass in it. Warren had never been down Akaitcho
VIII, Hargrove read-in pp. 39:16-40:5 (TAB 99-80) & Vol. IX, p. 190:40-46 (TAB 99-155), David read-in pp. 199:22-200:13 & p. 201:1-4 (TABS 99-161 &99-162) 25 RFJ paras. 116-122 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. I, pp. 41-43) 26 RFJ para. 116 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. I, p. 41); Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. VII, Plaintiff Fullowka et al Opening Statement pp. 5:39-6:18 (TAB 99-3); Vol. IX, Plaintiff Fullowka et al Final Argument p. 203:15-32 (TAB 99-164) 27 Appellants’ Joint Record, Part V, Vol. I3, Warren video discovery evidence AX VW3 TAB 160, Vol. XI, Warren video discovery evidence AX VW2 TAB 108; Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. IX, Brown evidence p. 155:12-33 (TAB 99-135); 28 Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. IX, Warren evidence pp. 162:35-163:11 (TAB 99-140) 29 Exhibit 6 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part V, Vol. I0, pp. 28-36) TAB 103 30 Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. IX, Warren evidence p. 163:13-29 (TAB 99-140) 5
before and he hesitated before climbing down the ladders, but Bettger’s example convinced him that it could be done:31
Q And did you have to get your courage up a bit?
A Oh, definitely, because I am going into unknown territory. I had never been there before. I had never been down that and them ladders looked awfully flimsy but I figured if they carried Tim [Bettger], they would carry me. (AX 0153, Appellants’ Joint Record, Part V, Vol. 10, p.11)
18. Warren climbed down Akaitcho into the underground. He said there was nothing to it. He rigged up his device and left by a different exit, undetected.32 He said he intended to frighten the replacement workers and to cause those in authority to force the replacement workers out of the Giant Mine, thereby preventing operations and bringing the strike closer to resolution.33 However, the strike continued until ultimately resolved by this Court in Royal Oak Mines Inc. v. Canada (Labour Relations Board).34
Pinkerton’s assumed responsibility for security and the miners relied on them
19. Royal Oak retained Pinkerton’s to provide security at the Giant Mine, and Pinkerton’s assumed responsibility for that task:
• Pinkerton’s understood that it had been hired to protect mine personnel;35
• Pinkerton’s understood that workers at the Giant Mine expected Pinkerton’s to provide security;36 and
• Pinkerton’s understood that (in Pinkerton’s own words):
31 RFJ paras. 167-172 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. I, pp. 55-57); Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. IX, Warren evidence pp. 162:35-163:11, 164:1-166:18, 167:38-170:6 (TABS 99-140, 99-141, 99-142); Exhibit AX 0153 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part V, Vol. I0, pp. 3-27 at 10-11) TAB 102 32 Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. IX, Warren evidence 165:46-166:21, 171:24-172:46 (TABS 99-141, 99-143) 33 RFJ para. 171 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. I, p. 56); Warren video discovery evidence AX VW1 at 21:35 TAB 100; Exhibit 41 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part V, Vol. X, pp. 1 & 37), Exhibit 1183 (Vol. XIV & XV, p. 204 & 1) TABS 176/177 34 [1996] 1 S.C.R. 396 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. III, TAB 103) 35 Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. VII, Plaintiff Fullowka et al Opening Statement Shaw read-in pp. 3:39-4:38 (TAB 99-2) 36 RFJ paras. 89 & 713 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. I, p. 32 & Vol. II, p. 26); Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. VII, Fullowka evidence p. 17:6-18 & p. 18:14-22 (TABS 99-9 & 99-10), O’Neil evidence pp. 60:32-61:17 & 62:1-20 (TABS 99-23 & 99-24), Vol. VIII, Dales evidence p. 45:15-31 (TAB 99-83) 6
(a) “Failure to provide adequate security can result in individuals suing for crimes in the workplace (i.e., assault by strikers or would be troublemakers, etc.)….”
(b) “Failure of the company or contract security agency to accept the responsibility for providing an adequate level of security could lay the foundation for lawsuits involving the failure to provide proper security….”
(c) “There is an expectation from employees of both Royal Oak Mines and Pinkerton’s that management professionals will take measures to prevent incidents and injuries particularly when such dangers are foreseeable under circumstances within our knowledge….”37
20. Royal Oak and Pinkerton’s reassured the miners that they were providing adequate security at the Giant Mine, and, because of Pinkerton’s presence, the miners felt safer underground than anywhere else.38
21. Pinkerton’s knew that, to secure the site effectively, they would have to take steps to prevent unauthorized entry to the underground.39 However, though Pinkerton’s knew about Akaitcho, they took virtually no steps to secure it.40 Justice Lutz therefore found Pinkerton’s negligent. He wrote:
[761] Pinkerton's argued that it did not know what the strikers were doing from time to time about the mine site. To a certain extent that may be so; however, the obligation of Pinkerton's was to keep the entrances to the underground blocked from the strikers' access. Pinkerton's failure in this respect to take the level of care alluded to, which would have been reasonable in the circumstances, supra, was its negligence. (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. II, p. 41)
37 Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. IX, Witte evidence p. 153:9-19 (TAB 99-133), Exhibit 838 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part V, Vol. XII, p. 85) TAB 158 38 RFJ paras. 242, 243, 244, 247, 249, 252, 749, 750, 754, 756, 758 and 762 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. I, pp. 78-81 & Vol. II, pp. 38-41); Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. VII, O’Sullivan evidence pp. 11:23-13:30 (TAB 99-6) 39 RFJ para. 242 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. I, p. 78) 40 RFJ para. 756 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. II, pp. 39-40) 7
A violent workplace is an unsafe workplace
22. The miners relied on government mining inspectors, as well as on Pinkerton’s, to take reasonable steps to make sure their workplace was safe. Chris Neill was one of the miners killed in the fatal blast. When asked about an explosion that Bettger had set in the Giant Mine vent shaft before Warren set his blast, Neill’s widow testified as follows:
Q Did you express to him that maybe he shouldn't go back to work, did he ever express that kind of view?
A No, I think at that point, you know, when that stuff was happening it was almost a good thing. It was the same thing as the graffiti underground. So if we heard someone was gaining access or doing any of this, it only meant that it wasn't going to happen again…. So then anytime any of the stuff happened, I actually felt better because I knew that the RCMP would be doing a better job, the security company would cover more bases, the mine would be more aware of what's going on and if they had to put employees in those areas, whatever they had to do. There's Mine Safety Act, there's mine inspectors. I mean, these inspectors were friends of Chris', he knew that – you know, everybody was doing their job, why wouldn't they be, this is a volatile situation. (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. VII, p. 166:19-39) TAB 99-56
23. The GNWT’s inspectors were well aware of the danger to the miners41 and could have ordered Royal Oak to secure Akaitcho42 – they did so immediately after the fatal blast, and Akaitcho was welded shut.43 If the GNWT had ordered Akaitcho secured before the fatal blast, strikers could not have used it to enter the underground and Warren could not have set his device. Warren testified that if the shack at Akaitcho had simply had a cover over its open window, he would not have entered the underground:
41 RFJ 829 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. II, p. 66); Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. VIII, Patterson read-in pp. 63:46-64:17, 65:17-41, 66:8-67:1 (TABS 99-91, 99-92, 99-93) 42 RFJ 260 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. I, p. 85); Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. VIII, Patterson read-in p. 87:27- 39 (TAB 99-103), Vol. IX, Witte evidence p. 154:10-15 (TAB 99-134), Turner evidence p. 158:26-44 (TAB 99-137) 43 RFJ 175 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. I, p. 57); Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. IX, Byberg evidence p. 152:3-8 (TAB 99-132) 8
Q Okay. Sir, you suggested at the end of your testimony the other day with Mr. Champion that had there been something covering the window, you would never have gone inside the house overtop of the Akaitcho shaft, is that what you said?
A I still maintain that to this day.
Q You wouldn't have knocked out a plywood covering?
A No.
Q You wouldn't have used some bolt-cutters to cut through some wire?
A Well for one thing I didn't have any and for another thing that would -- I just wouldn't do it. It's not -- I'm not into B&Es.
Q I see. You wouldn't, you wouldn't break and enter into the mine?
A No. I know it sounds a little off the wall but that's -- I've often thought myself it's pretty ironic but if there would have been a padlock and a piece of screen on that window, you never would have seen me in there. (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. IX, pp. 184:27-185:2) TAB 99-152
24. Justice Lutz accordingly found that “In the case of the GNWT Defendants, had they discharged their statutory obligations, as illustrated in more detail below, alone or together with discharge of their co-Defendants' obligations, Warren would have been deterred.”44
There is no ‘corporate veil’ inside the unincorporated union
25. Warren and the other strikers were members of the Canadian Association of Smelter and Allied Workers (“CASAW”). CASAW was an unincorporated association. At the end of the strike it merged with and became part of the CAW, which is also an unincorporated association.45
44 RFJ para. 663 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. II, pp. 10-11); Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. IX, Warren evidence pp. 184:27-186:6 (TAB 99-152) 45 RFJ para. 859 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. II, p. 74) 9
26. The CASAW National Constitution describes a two-tiered organization, consisting of national institutions and local institutions (the CAW Constitution is similar). The CASAW Constitution:46
• Specifies what national and local officials are to be elected, who is eligible to be elected, and what their duties are;
• Provides for local bylaws and makes them subject to the Constitution and to approval by national officers;
• Provides that locals will collect dues and remit a specified percentage of them to national offices;
• Provides that a union member can be subject to disciplinary procedures, which are generally to be tried at the local level and appealed to the national level; and
• Provides that the National President shall be an ex officio member of all committees “within the union” (pursuant to this provision, CASAW’s national president, Slezak, was a member of the bargaining committee at the Giant Mine before the strike).
27. A person joined CASAW by joining a local. Warren and the other strikers joined CASAW through its local branch in Yellowknife, CASAW Local 4.47
28. The evidence indicated that union members viewed CASAW as a single organization. When asked what union he belonged to, for example, Warren testified:
Q Were you a union member?
A Yeah.
Q What member -- what union was that?
A That would be at that time CASAW. (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. IX, p. 159:25-29) TAB 99-138
46 Exhibit 1005 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part V, Vol. I3, pp. 12-53) TAB 166 47 RFJ paras. 853, 861-867 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. II, pp. 72, 75-76) 10
29. Eight other union members,48 when asked what union they had belonged to, also replied “CASAW”. Nobody replied, “Well actually, I belonged to two different unions – I belonged to CASAW National and I also belonged to CASAW Local 4.”
30. Justice Lutz found that CASAW was a single, multi-tiered organization and that it (and hence the CAW, with which CASAW merged) was directly liable for the torts of union officials and vicariously liable for Warren’s and Bettger’s torts.
31. The Court of Appeal found “Local 4 was a separate legal entity from CASAW National.” The Court of Appeal held that CASAW (and hence the CAW) was not directly liable for the torts of local union officials or vicariously liable for Warren’s torts and Bettger’s torts.49
Part II: Statement of Issues
Issue 1: Intentional wrongdoing does not negate a duty of care owed by those who have assumed responsibility for the safety of others.
Issue 2: It was not an error for Justice Lutz to use common sense to find causation and common language to express his findings.
Issue 3: The CAW, Bettger and Warren are jointly liable for the deaths of the miners, and the CAW is vicariously liable for Warren’s and Bettger’s torts.
Issue 4: It is an error of law to deny tax gross-up and management fees merely because a workers’ compensation board has a subrogated interest in a claim.
Part III: Statement of Argument
Issue 1: Intentional wrongdoing does not negate a duty of care owed by those who have assumed responsibility for the safety of others.
48 Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. VII, Gauthier evidence, pp. 14:46-15:1 (TAB 99-7),Samardzija evidence p. 167:1 (TAB 99-57), O’Neil evidence p. 34:29 (TAB 99-12), Tuma evidence p. 168:16-21 (TAB 99-58), Titterton evidence p. 187:15-22 (TAB 99-64), Vol. VIII, Legge evidence pp. 46:46-47:6 (TAB 99-84), Murray evidence p. 71:14-16 (TAB 99-95) 49 Court of Appeal Memorandum of Judgment (“CAMJ”) para. 143 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. III, p. 155) 11
32. The Court of Appeal found that when security providers are negligent, they cannot be held liable, for to hold them liable would be to hold them responsible for the wrongdoers’ torts. That, the Court of Appeal suggested, is contrary to public policy, because it would undermine the wrongdoers’ own responsibility for their torts.50 Thus, according to the Court of Appeal, security providers are free to be as negligent as they please - their responsibilities dissolve as soon as the contemplated wrongdoing materializes.
33. The Court of Appeal erred. In modern Canadian society, there are instances in which, apprehending a risk of others’ wrongdoing, we rely on those who, also aware of the risk, have assumed the duty of care for our safety. The law recognizes the responsibilities of those who undertake to provide safety and security services, just as it recognizes the responsibilities of virtually everyone else who provides goods or services in modern society. It must do so to deter their negligence, for such negligence undermines public safety and public confidence.
34. There are many cases in which the courts have recognized a responsibility to prevent wrongdoing, for example, Stansbie v. Troman,51 Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd.,52 and Jane Doe v. Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality) Commissioners of Police.53 In the recent case of D.H. v. British Columbia,54 the British Columbia Court of Appeal used the traditional neighbour principle to find that government officials had a duty to exercise their discretionary operational powers in a manner that would protect certain people from the intentional wrongdoing of another.
50 CAMJ para. 78 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. III, pp. 123-125) 51 [1948] 1 All E.R. 599 at 2 (C.A.) (Lexis) (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. IV, TAB 113) 52 [1934] All ER Rep 103 at 5 (C.A.) (Lexis) (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. II, TAB 51) 53 1998 CarswellOnt 3144 (Ct. J. (Gen. Div.)) (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. II, TAB 59); see also Attorney General v. Hartwell, [2004] UKPC 12 (B.V.I.C.A.) (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. I, TAB 6), Williams v. New Brunswick, 1985 CarswellNB 80 (C.A.) (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. IV, TAB 128), Allison v. Rank City Wall Canada Ltd., 1984 CarswellOnt 694 (H.C.J.) (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. I, TAB 2), Q. v. Minto Management Ltd., 1985 CarswellOnt 718 (H.C.J.), aff’d 1986 CarswellOnt 2187 (C.A.) (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. III, TAB 91), McGinty v. Cook, 265 1989 CarswellOnt 1435 (H.C.J.), aff’d 1991 CarswellOnt 824 (C.A.) (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. III, TAB 72), S.(J.) v. Clement, 266 1995 CarswellOnt 1703 (Ct. J. Gen. Div.)) (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. III, TAB 106), Petrovitch v. Callinghams, Ltd., [1969] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 386 (Q.B.) (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. III, TAB 89), Dove v. Banhams Patent Locks Ltd., [1983] 2 All ER 833 (Q.B.) (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. I, TAB 33) and Hosie v. Arbroath Football Club Ltd., 1978, S.L.T. 122 (O.H.) (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. II, TAB 52) 54 2008 BCCA 222 CanLII (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. I, TAB 29) 12
35. In some of these cases, the courts have analyzed the issues in terms of causation55 (or novus actus interveniens).56 In others, they analyzed the issues in terms of the standard of care or the duty of care, for the elements of negligence are not water-tight categories.57 But however they have analyzed the issues, the courts in these cases did not in any way absolve the wrongdoers of their own responsibility. Like Justice Lutz, the courts in these cases simply found the defendants liable for the foreseeable consequences of their own negligence.
36. The Court of Appeal observed, correctly, that the law does not lightly impose a duty on someone to prevent a second person from harming a third: it does not ordinarily require members of the public at large to intercede like vigilantes to prevent wrongdoing. The law generally imposes a duty to prevent wrongdoing only when the person upon whom the duty is imposed has a “special relationship” either to the potential wrongdoer or to the person at risk.58 The Court of Appeal saw no such “special relationship” between the Respondents and the miners. In the eyes of the Court of Appeal, the Respondents (like the public at large) were legal strangers to the miners, and owed them no duty of care.
37. But this Court has explained why the Respondents did owe the miners a duty of care. As this Court stated in Cooper v. Hobart,59 factors relevant to a duty of care include “expectations, representations, reliance, and the property or other interests involved”; in Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse60 this Court listed “a close causal connection, the parties’ expectations and any assumed or imposed obligations.” In Lewis v. British Columbia,61 this Court observed that when someone undertakes a task, she must perform it with reasonable care (in this regard, see too the
55 see Stansbie supra (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. IV, TAB 113) and Haynes v. Harwood, [1934] All ER Rep 103 (C.A.) (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. II, TAB 47) 56 This Court has already decided that novus actus does not apply when the intentional act of a third party is “the very kind of thing” that should have been anticipated and guarded against. See Booth v. St. Catharines (City), 1948 CarswellOnt 118 (S.C.C.) (per Rinfret C.J., Kerwin and Estey JJ.) (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. I, TAB 14); The doctrine was also affirmed by the Ontario Court of Appeal in RenaissanceLeisure Group Inc. v. Frazer 2004 CarswellOnt 3468 at para. 40 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. III, TAB 100) and by the House of Lords in Reeves v. Commissioners of Police [2001] 1 AC 360 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. III, TAB 97). A third party’s act is said to be “novus actus” only when the act intervened between the defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s injury and interrupted the chain of causation, rendering the defendant’s negligence too remote from the plaintiff’s injury 57 See Allen M. Linden & Bruce Feldthusen, Canadian Tort Law (8th ed.) (Markham:Butterworths, 2006), pp. 108-110 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. IV, TAB 129) 58 CAMJ para. 74 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. III, p. 120) 59 2001 SCC 79, in para. 34 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. L, TAB 23) 60 2003 SCC 69 (CanLII) at para. 55 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. III, TAB 83) 61 [1997] S.C.R. 1145 at para. 18 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. II, TAB 63). See also Millette v. Cote, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 595 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. III, TAB 77) and Glenn O’Rourke et al v. Cammie Irvin Schacht, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 53 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. II, TAB 45) 13
Criminal Code section 217).62 And in Childs v. Desormeaux,63 this Court noted that someone in a position to manage risk owes a duty to those who reasonably rely on him.
38. This Court’s decision in Hill v. Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board,64 released a scant ten days before oral argument in the court below, recognized that negligent police investigation could be tortious. That decision is the latest comprehensive review by this Court of duty of care. It contains a strong endorsement of the neighbour principle, quoting its source at paragraph 15 from Donoghue v. Stevenson.65 It reiterated and strengthened the requirement that judge-made policy not negate a duty of care unless proven by cogent evidence produced by the defendant seeking that remedy.66
Pinkerton’s owed the miners a duty of care because it assumed responsibility for security and the miners relied on it.
39. Applying the principles established by this Court, it is clear that Pinkerton’s did owe the miners a duty of care. The duty arose because Pinkerton’s assumed responsibility to protect the miners from the very thing that happened and Pinkerton’s knew that the miners reasonably relied on it to do so. That created a “special relationship” between Pinkerton’s and the miners, a relationship of the kind referred to in Childs;67 it is what distinguished Pinkerton’s from the populace at large.
40. Pinkerton’s assured the miners and other employees that they would be safe if they continued to work during the strike. As Justice Lutz found:
[758] Pinkerton's … began to assure replacement workers of their safety and it assured Royal Oak personnel that their expressed
62 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 217 (Part VII, TAB A). For similar explanations in other jurisdictions, see White v. Jones, 1995 WL 1082613 (HL) (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. IV, TAB 127), Spring v. Guardian Assurance plc, 1994 WL 1062260 (HL) (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. IV, TAB 112), Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd., 1994 WL 1060824 (HL) (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. II, TAB 48) and American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. Physical Harm ss. 39, 42-43 (P.F.D. No. 2, 2005) (WLeC), (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. IV, TAB 130). See also f/n 98. 63 2006 SCC 18, paras. 35 -40 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. I, TAB 20) 64 2007 SCC 41 (CanLii) (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. II, TAB 50) 65 [1932] A.C. 562 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. I, TAB 32) 66 Hill supra @ paras 47, 54, 56 and 57 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. I, TAB 32); for other decisions and a recent academic article about the need to consider the positive aspects of upholding a duty of care, see O’Neil Factum in companion appeal @ para 22, footnote 17; see also O’Neil Factum in companion appeal @ paras 29 and 30 67 supra at para 37, fn 63 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. I, TAB 20) 14
concerns from time to time were in good hands out of pride for the good reputation it wished to portray.68
[714] Pinkerton's and Royal Oak personnel often assuaged each others expressed concerns about security, and the evidence clearly indicated each relied on the other's assurances to the detriment of those affected, as the real truth was not being passed on.
[744] Royal Oak … was in full production… with assurances by it and Pinkerton's to the replacement workers that they were being properly cared for underground…
[1245] The findings of negligence and the law espoused in the Fullowka action, including that relating to directors’ and officers’ liability apply mutatis mutandis, here. The conduct of the Defendants towards the deceased miners in Fullowka and the assurances of safety given them were delivered to O’Neil, particularly those by Byberg. Those very assurances were so robust that, as the strike progressed, they overcame O’Neil’s deeply-held perception that he feared the union wanted someone to die so anti-replacement worker legislation could be given birth. (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. II, pp. 40, 26, 36 & 197)
41. Pinkerton’s knew that Royal Oak was assuring mineworkers that they would be safe because of Pinkerton’s presence at the Giant Mine site, even while Pinkerton’s had concerns that it could not secure the Giant Mine property. Pinkerton’s accepted the risk that the mineworkers would, to their potential detriment, rely on them to take reasonable care to make the Giant Mine safe. Pinkerton’s is liable because it assumed responsibility to protect mineworkers from strike- related violence, and knew that mineworkers would rely on it and act on its assurances without the practical opportunity for independent inquiry, in the absence of any disclaimer of responsibility:69
Many professionals in a wide variety of callings and circumstances assume duties toward persons other than those with whom they have contracted, and are held liable in tort for their proper discharge.
42. The Court of Appeal suggested that (contrary to Justice’s Lutz’s findings) the replacement workers did not really rely on Pinkerton’s. It wrote:
68 see also RFJ 754 & 1254 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. II, pp. 39 & 199) 69 Edgeworth supra at para. 16 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. II, TAB 36) 15
[121] Individuals are entitled to participate in risky activities if they so choose. As these appeals show, this respect for the autonomy of individuals can lead to tragic consequences…. While it was reasonable for the miners to expect that Pinkerton’s would do what it could to mitigate the risks, they must have been aware that there had been incursions into the mine because of the graffiti that had been left. Notwithstanding any assurances of Pinkerton’s and Royal Oak that they were “safe”, they must have realized that they were still exposed to some residual risk. If they believed that they had an unconditional guarantee of safety, that belief was unreasonable. While “expectations, representations and reliance” form a part of the duty analysis, any expectations must be realistic and objectively reasonable. The nine miners could not have reasonably expected that the appellants could guarantee their safety from criminal acts of trespassers. (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. III, p. 146)
43. The passage above states, correctly, that “it was reasonable for the miners to expect that Pinkerton’s would do what it could to mitigate the risks”. Justice Lutz found Pinkerton’s liable, not as a “guarantor”, but because it did not secure Akaitcho, as it could have and as any reasonable security provider would have. The passage suggests that the miners were in as good a position as Pinkerton’s to assess the risks of working at the Giant Mine, but that is not correct – for example, Pinkerton’s knew that Akaitcho had not been secured, while the miners did not know this crucial – and ultimately fatal – fact.
44. The evidence established, and Justice Lutz found, that because of Pinkerton’s presence the miners felt safer underground than anywhere else.70 These issues were canvassed at trial: all the Respondents pled that the miners had voluntarily assumed the risk and were contributorily negligent; by the end of the trial, however, all the Respondents had withdrawn those defences.71
45. Similarly, Pinkerton’s counsel conceded at trial that Pinkerton’s owed the miners a duty of care.72 The Court of Appeal did not accept Pinkerton’s concession, saying “Counsel obviously did not intend to concede liability.”73 But counsel did intend to concede that Pinkerton’s owed the miners a duty of care. Before final argument, Justice Lutz had asked74 all defence counsel to
70 RFJ 269 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. I, p. 88); Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. VII, Vodnoski evidence p. 19:14- 29 (TAB 99-11), Hourie evidence p. 16:23-40 (TAB 99-8), and Tuma evidence p. 171:4-9 (TAB 99-60) 71 RFJ 590 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. I, p. 185) 72 Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. IX, Defendant Pinkerton’s Final Argument p. 211:12-24 (TAB 99-170) 73 CAMJ 104 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. III, pp. 136-137) 74 Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. IX, Direction by the Court p. 202:35-47 (TAB 99-163) 16
consider during a two-week recess which defences they intended to rely on and which they intended to drop. After the recess, at the beginning of final argument, defence counsel one by one stood up and advised Justice Lutz of the defences they intended to drop. First Royal Oak’s counsel stood and acknowledged that Royal Oak conceded that it owed a duty of care,75 and then Pinkerton’s counsel stood and acknowledged that Pinkerton’s conceded that it owed a duty of care.76
46. In the circumstances, it would have been unreasonable for Pinkerton’s counsel to deny that Pinkerton’s owed a duty of care. Pinkerton’s itself had effectively acknowledged it had a legal obligation: before the fatal blast Pinkerton’s had written that “failure to provide adequate security can result in individuals suing for crimes in the workplace (i.e., assault by strikers or would be troublemakers, etc.)….”77
47. The Court of Appeal stated78 that there are no Canadian cases imposing liability specifically on security companies, but it was mistaken: liability had been imposed on a security company in Osman v. 629256 Ontario Ltd..79 More recently, in Correia v. Canac Kitchens,80 the Ontario Court of Appeal found that a security company could owe a duty of careful investigation. Security firms have similarly been held liable for failing to take reasonable steps to protect people from foreseeable harm in Australia81 and the United States of America.82
48. The Court of Appeal found that Pinkerton’s owed no duty of care, but it also found that Pinkerton’s had satisfied the standard of care. It wrote:
[115] While we have concluded that Pinkerton’s owed no duty, in the alternative we are satisfied that it met any standard of care that might be imposed. Pinkerton’s was focussing [sic] all its
75 Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. IX, Defendant Royal Oak’s Final Argument p. 207:33-47 (TAB 99-166) 76 Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. IX, Defendant Pinkerton’s Final Argument pp. 210:43-211:24 (TAB 99-169) & 212:26-32 (TAB 99-171) 77 Exhibit 838 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part V, Vol. I2, pp. 85-93 at 86) TAB 158 78 CAMJ 115 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. III, p. 143) 79 [2005] W.D.F.L. 3359 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. III, TAB 84) 80 2008 ONCA 506 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. 1, TAB 24) 81 Newcastle Entertainment Security Pty Limited v. Simpson, [1999] NSWCA 351 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. III, TAB 81); Collingwood Hotel Pty Ltd. v. O’Reilly, [2007] NSWCA 155 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. I, TAB 22) 82 In Re September 11 Litigation, 280 F.Supp. 2d 279 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. 3, TAB 96); Braun v. Soldiers, 968 F.2d 1110, Harris v. Pizza Hut, 455 So.2d 1364, Silva v. Showcase, 736 F.2d 810, Tarasoff v. The Regents of the University of California, 131 Cal.Rptr. 14, Farwell v. Keaton, 396 Mich. 281 & Liberty National v. Weldon, 267 Ala. 171 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. I, TAB 16) 17
resources on keeping trespassers like Warren out of the mine. Warren, on the other hand, was doing everything he could to circumvent Pinkerton’s efforts. It was essentially a cat and mouse game, and Warren won because of a combination of the limited resources available to Pinkerton’s, Warren’s superior knowledge of the mine, and because he had control of when, where and how he would attempt his intrusion. Warren was not under the control of Pinkerton’s. (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. I, p. 41)
49. The foregoing passage mischaracterizes the facts.83 Warren did not play a “cat and mouse game” with Pinkerton’s, nor did he do “everything he could to circumvent Pinkerton’s efforts.” Warren went to Akaitcho on several occasions and always found it completely abandoned.84 He did not try to enter the underground anywhere other than at Akaitcho. He had never been down Akaitcho before.85 It was not at all difficult for him to enter Akaitcho: he said, “There was nothing to it.”86 Pinkerton’s failed to secure Akaitcho, not because it did not have the resources to secure it, but because it was negligent. Justice Lutz was thoroughly familiar with all the facts (he had personally inspected Akaitcho) and he reasonably found that Pinkerton’s had breached the standard of care. Justice Lutz’s finding is entitled to deference.87
The GNWT “dithered when it should have reacted”88
50. The miners relied not just on Pinkerton’s to make sure the Giant Mine was safe, but also on the GNWT. Chris Neill’s widow testified that Chris knew graffiti had been found in the Giant Mine and knew about earlier explosions set by strikers, but Chris was confident that, with the GNWT’s mining inspectors and others doing their jobs, such events could never happen again.89
51. The Mining Safety Act was clearly passed to protect miners. As Justice Lutz asked: “For whose benefit is the mine safety legislation, if not for those who work underground?”90 The Court of Appeal found, however, that the GNWT did not have a duty to keep the miners safe from all dangers, specifically not dangers related to the strike.
83 Housen v. Nikolaisen, (2002) SCC 33 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. II, TAB 53) 84 Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. IX, Warren evidence pp. 160:42-161:27 9, (TAB 99-139) 85 Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. IX, Warren evidence, p. 183:43-45, (TAB 99-151) 86 Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. IX, Warren evidence, pp. 165:46-166:21, (TAB 99-141) 87 Housen supra (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. II, TAB 53) 88 RFJ para. 828 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. II, p. 66) 89 Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. VII, Neill evidence pp. 164:26-166:7, (TAB 99-56) 90 RFJ para. 798 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. II, p. 55) 18
52. The Court of Appeal misunderstood the structure and intent of Canadian occupational health and safety legislation. It is not possible for legislators to specify all possible workplace hazards (modern workplaces are too multifarious for that).91 Instead, Canadian OHS legislation, including the Northwest Territories’ Mining Safety Act, is intended to create an open-ended framework, within which employers, workers and government officials can identify and mitigate workplace hazards, whatever they might be. Violence in the workplace is a hazard coming within the ambit of such legislation.92
53. The Mining Safety Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. M-13, section 42 (Part VII, TAB D)was explicit about the mine inspectors’ duties:
42(1) An inspector shall …
(b) order the immediate cessation of work in and removal of persons from a mine or portion of a mine that the inspector considers unsafe or require the precautions that the inspector considers necessary to be taken before persons are allowed to return to or continue working in a mine;
(c) exercise such other powers as the inspector may consider necessary for ensuring the health and safety of persons employed in or about a mine….
(e) do all other acts or things that are imposed on an inspector by this Act or the rules or regulations or that are requested of the inspector by the Minister.
43(1) An inspector shall give notice in writing to the manager of the particulars of any matter, thing or practice in, about or concerning the mine that, in the opinion of the inspector, is dangerous, defective or contrary to this Act or the rules and regulations, and require the matter thing or practice to be remedied within the time stated in the notice.
54. These provisions require an inspector to act if he considers a mine or anything concerning it to be unsafe or dangerous: there are no exceptions for strike-related violence.
91 Exhibit 894 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part V, Vol. I2, pp. 94-154 at 128) TAB 159 92 Occupational Health and Safety Act, R.S.O. 1990 c.O.1, s. 25(2)(h) (Part VII, TAB E); Skyjack Inc. v. Hutchinson, [2007] O.L.R.B. Rep. 191 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. IIITAB 107); Martin v. Canada (Attorney General, 2005 FCA 156 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. III,TAB 69); Exhibit 894 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part V, Vol. I2, pp. 95-155 at 110) TAB 159 19
55. The GNWT’s inspectors considered the Giant Mine to be unsafe because of strike violence.93 On May 27, 1992, the acting Chief Mining Inspector (Lloyd Gould), the Director of the Safety Division (Ron McRae) and the Fire Marshall (C. Bell) wrote to their Deputy Minister (John Quirke) advising him of their serious concerns for the safety of persons working in the Giant Mine because of the violence. 94 Quirke told them to write the Minister (Dennis Patterson). Accordingly, Gould sent Minister Patterson a draft Order that would have closed the Giant Mine, saying “the lack of security at the mine site is endangering the occupational health and safety of employees.” Patterson sent a non-committal reply that did not give any support to the proposed Order, failing to exercise his power under s. 42(1)(e) to request Gould to make the Order. Gould concluded that Patterson was a “consummate politician” who was “dancing with me”.95 Gould then spoke, very briefly, with Jeff Gilmour, the Assistant Deputy Minister of Justice. Gilmour said that if Gould made such an Order, “… it would be promptly and successfully appealed,” which Gould took to mean that he did not have the jurisdiction to make such an Order.96
56. In the result, no Order was made and, as the violence continued and escalated throughout the strike, the inspectors and their superiors did nothing. It was only immediately after the fatal blast that the Chief Mining Inspector did issue a closure Order.97 Consequently, Akaitcho was sealed.
57. The statute required the GNWT’s inspectors to act when they considered the Giant Mine to be unsafe, but they did not act. That constituted a breach by omission of a duty to act.98 This statutory breach is evidence of negligence within the GNWT as a whole,99 and on the basis of it and of adverse inferences he drew against the GNWT for failing to call witnesses,100 Justice Lutz found that the GNWT’s Mining Safety Division was “so incompetently operated that negligence
93 RFJ paragraph 807, 811, 822, 825, 828, 833, 835 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. II, pp. 61-62, 64-67); Exhibit 907 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part V, Vol. I3, p. 2) TAB 161 94 Exhibit 762 & Exhibit 763 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part V, Vol. I2, pp. 76-78 & pp. 79-81) TABS 153 & 154; Mining Safety Act, s. 42(1)(b), (c) and (e) (Part VII TAB D) 95 Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. IX, Gould read-in pp. 156:25-157:31, (TAB 99-136) & Vol. VIII, pp. 83:19-85:18, (TAB 99- 101) 96 Exhibits 763 & 764 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part V, Vol. I2, pp. 79-81 & p. 82) TABS 154 & 155; RFJ para. 825 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. II, p. 65) 97 Exhibit 862 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part V, Vol. XII, p. 94) TAB 158a 98 In 2003, Parliament added s 217.1 to the Criminal Code supra (Part VII, TAB A) 99 Canada v Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, [1983] 1 S C R 205; 1983 CanLII 21 (SCC) (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. 1, TAB 18) 100 RFJ 988 & 989 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. II, p. 110) 20 was rampant.”101 Justice Lutz found that the GNWT’s failure to act was due to confusion, uncertainty, fear, passing off obligations and willful blindness.102
58. The Court of Appeal wrote that “the inspectors … were [not] required to use their powers to solve labour relations problems.”103 No one argued that they were required to solve labour problems, nor did Justice Lutz find that they were. The GNWT is liable because it created a department that was incapable of understanding and enforcing its own legislation, as a result of which the miners died.104 The duty of care arises from the miners’ reasonable reliance on the GNWT to exercise their statutory powers and obligations to make sure that they were safe.105
59. The private law duty of care that Justice Lutz found is analogous to that found by the B.C. Court of Appeal in D.H.,106 in which civil servants breached their statutory direction to monitor a sex offender’s compliance with a probation order and the offender molested a young boy.
Concluding Remarks On Duty of Care
60. The Court of Appeal’s “Immediate/Ancillary” tortfeasor issue had not been raised or argued before the Court of Appeal. By not giving advance notice and allowing further argument and/or written submissions, the Court of Appeal fell into error,107 and a fundamental unfairness resulted.108
101 RFJ 836 “This fortifies my view that the entire MSD was so incompetently operated, that negligence was rampant throughout its tenure during the strike. Thus, I find …the nine miners.” & RFJ 839 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. II, pp. 67-68) 102 RFJ 822 & 838 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. II, pp. 64 & 68) 103 CAMJ para. 132 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. III, p. 151) 104 RFJ 826 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. II, p. 65) 105 See Hill, supra (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. II, TAB 50), Sauer v Canada, (2008) CanLII 454 (ONCA), leave to appeal refused July 17, 2008 CanLII 36470 (SCC) (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. III, TAB 104A), Adams v Borrell, 2008 NBCA 62 (CanLII) (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. I, TAB 1), D.H. supra (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. I, TAB 29), and Taylor v Canada, 2007 CanLII 55708 (ON S.C.D.C), affirming 2007 CanLII 36645(Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. IV, TAB 115) 106 Supra, para. 36, f/n 54 107 Dilworth v. Bala (Town), [1955] S.C.R. 284 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. I, TAB 30), Parlee v. College of Psychologists of New Brunswick, 2004 NBCA 42 (CanLII) (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. III, TAB 86), George Golden v. The Queen, [1983] 2 F.C. 599 (Fed. C.A.) (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. II, TAB 43); M.N.P. (next friend) v. Bablitz, 2006 ABCA 245 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. III, TAB 78); Anderson v Alberta Securities Commission, 2008 ABCA 184 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. I, TAB 3), Regina v. Institute of Chartered Accountants of Ontario, [1968] 2 O.R. 691 at 694 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. III, TAB 99); see also Lougheed Enterprises Ltd. v. Armbruster, 1992 CanLII 1742 (BCCA) @ page 8 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. II, TAB 65) 108 Rodaro v. Royal Bank of Canada, 2002 CanLII 41834 (ON C.A.) @ paras 60-62 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. III, TAB 102) 21
61. The neighbour principle played the appropriate prominent part in Justice Lutz’s duty of care analysis.109 This included the policy aspects embedded in the adoption of that principle and in the incremental development of it by this Court through such cases as Cooper. Just as clearly, the neighbour principle played only a superficial part in the Court of Appeal’s analysis.110
62. These Appellants adopt and incorporate herein the submissions as to duty of care under the “Introduction” and “Foreseeability and Proximity” headings contained in the O’Neil Appellant’s Factum.
Issue 2: It was not an error for Justice Lutz to use common sense to find causation and common language to express his findings.
63. As this Court explained in Athey v Leonati:111
[T]he plaintiff must prove that the defendant's tortious conduct caused or contributed to the plaintiff's injury. The causation test is not to be applied too rigidly. Causation need not be determined by scientific precision; … it is "essentially a practical question of fact which can best be answered by ordinary common sense".
64. Justice Lutz concluded that the behavior of each Respondent was causally connected to the fatal blast. In expressing his conclusions, he used common sense and common causal terms:
[651] Warren’s act on September 18 … was a reaction to the negligent acts of other strikers, including Seeton, Shearing, Bettger, Legge and others referenced herein….
[…]
[917] Here, CAW National was driving the "mere members" such as Warren to help see its mission accomplished and thus must be responsible for the said members' acts. …
[…]
[956] Counsel for Bettger further submitted that there was no evidence that Bettger could have influenced Warren. I disagree….
109 RFJ paras 594-602 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. I, pp. 186-190) 110 Donoghue v. Stevenson is mentioned once at CAMJ para 47. “Neighbour” is mentioned 5 times, but all in the context either of what Justice Lutz wrote or when counsel for Pinkerton’s conceded their duty of care before Justice Lutz (which the Court of Appeal rejected) 111 1996 CarswellBC 2296 @ para 16 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. I, TAB 5) 22
[…]
[663] … In the case of the GNWT Defendants, had they discharged their statutory obligations…, Warren would have been deterred.
[…]
[756] … The fact that incursions occurred suggests [Pinkerton’s] failed to properly protect those underground by failing to exercise control at all of the openings.
[…]
[840] The GNWT Defendants said that, even if a duty of care in negligence is presumed, there is no causal link between such activities and the deaths.
[841] Pursuant to the detailed reasons set out above, failing to enforce the Mining Safety Act, supra, materially contributed to the deaths of the nine miners. (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. II, pp. 8, 92, 102, 10-11, 39-40, 68)
65. In the passages above, Justice Lutz clearly found that the negligence and wrongdoing of each Respondent was causally connected to the fatal blast. In some passages he expressed this conclusion by saying that the behavior of each “contributed” to the deaths. Such passages include the following:
[765] …There is no question there was a duty of care owed and breached, as delineated, supra, and I find that the breach materially contributed to the deaths of the nine miners for which Pinkerton’s is responsible.
[841] … Pursuant to the detailed reasons set out above, failing to enforce the Mining Safety Act, supra, materially contributed to the deaths of the nine miners.
[959] … Bettger’s criminal activity and his boasts with others contributed to Warren appreciating that his turn must arrive since the acts of others had not succeeded in meeting the union’s objective of shutting down the mine…. (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. II, pp. 42, 68 & 103)
66. In the foregoing passages, the word “contribution” is used in the same sense as in the Contributory Negligence Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, ch. C-18, s. 5 (Part VII, TAB B), under which 23
the Respondents’ liability was apportioned. “Material” is used to signify something “substantial” or more than “de minimus”.112 Many other courts have used the phrase “materially contributed” in the same way, both before and after this Court’s decision in Resurfice.113 Justice Lutz used the phrase “material contribution test” just once,114 and in a way that many other courts have as well.115
67. The Court of Appeal did not find that Justice Lutz came to any incorrect conclusions about causation. But, on the basis of passages like the foregoing and while ignoring the trial record, the Court of Appeal found, first, that Justice Lutz had used the exception described over three years later by this Court in Resurfice and, second, that the unusual circumstances that would have justified Justice Lutz using that exception were absent.
68. In Resurfice, this Court explained that, in exceptional circumstances, a plaintiff need not prove causation, but need prove only that the defendant breached a duty of care owed to the plaintiff, thereby exposing the plaintiff to risk of injury, and that the plaintiff later suffered that form of injury. As the British Columbia Court of Appeal observed in Sam,116 the exception in Resurfice “is not a test of causation at all; rather it is a rule of law based on policy.”
69. This Court also explained in Resurfice that, absent exceptional circumstances, the appropriate test for causation is the “but for” test because it ensures that a defendant will be held liable only where there is a “substantial connection between the injury and the defendant’s conduct” and will not be held liable when the plaintiff’s injury may be “due to factors unconnected to the defendant and not the fault of anyone.”117 Justice Lutz clearly found that there were substantial causal connections between the Respondents’ conduct and the deaths of the miners. The Court of Appeal’s concern appears narrow and not in the nature of a legal error, namely, that Justice Lutz did not express his findings in the subjunctive mood characteristic of
112 Lynne v. Taylor, 2006 ABCA 12 (CanLII), (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. II, TAB 67), 113 [2007] 1 S.C.R. 33 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. III, TAB 101; See also Cape Breton Development Corporation v. Nova Scotia (Workers' Compensation Appeals Tribunal), 2008, NSCA at paras. 5-14, 21-36 (CanLII) (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. I, TAB 19); Sam v. Wilson, 2007 BCCA 622 (CanLII) (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. III, TAB 104), Hutchings v Dow, 2007 BCCA 148 (CanLII) (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. II, TAB 54), McNaughton v. Ward, 2007 NSCA 81, particularly para. 102 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. III, TAB 74) 114 RFJ para. 961 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. II, p. 103) 115 The single instance in this Court before Resurfice where the phrase “Material Contribution test” was used was in Athey at para 41. But, significantly, what Major J. was there describing was an alternate approach for finding causation. Not the alternate approach for finding liability even when causation was truly impossible to prove as later described in Resurfice. 116 Sam at fn 113 24
the ‘but for’ test. Justice Lutz said, for example, that Pinkerton’s was responsible for the deaths because it “failed to protect the miners by controlling the openings” instead of saying that “if Pinkerton’s had controlled the openings, the deaths would not have occurred.”
70. That Justice Lutz framed his conclusions in the indicative mood is not a valid objection to his causal conclusions.118 Findings about causation need not be expressed using “magical incantations,”119 nor do they require using terminology akin to “a catechism.”120 What matters is that the reasons as expressed are capable of effective appellate review by displaying that the trier of fact was alive to the issues and expressed him or herself plainly enough.121
71. Further, Justice Lutz in one passage did express his findings using the subjunctive mood. He wrote:
[663] … In the case of the GNWT Defendants, had they discharged their statutory obligations, as illustrated in more detail below, alone or with the discharge of their co-Defendants obligations, Warren would have been deterred. (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. II, p. 10)
72. Regarding this portion of paragraph 663, the Court of Appeal wrote:
[202] We do not view this passage as an attempt to apply the ‘but for’ analysis to the GNWT or to any of the other co-defendants. It underscores the concern that the actions of each defendant were viewed cumulatively or collectively rather than individually in determining causation. (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. III, pp. 66-67)
73. Contrary to what the Court of Appeal says, in paragraph 663 Justice Lutz did consider the actions of the GNWT separately. He wrote: “Had [the GNWT] discharged their duties, alone or …, Warren would have been deterred….” In this passage, and generally, Justice Lutz considered each Respondent separately and concluded that each played a role in causing the deaths.
117 Resurfice, para. 23, quoting Snell v. Farrell (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. III, TAB 101) 118 Housen supra (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. II, TAB 53) 119 see also R. v. J.H.S., 2008 SCC 30 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. III, TAB 95) 120 Per: R. v. C.L.Y., 2008 SCC 2 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. III, TAB 92) 121 R. v. H.S.B., 2008 S.C.R. 52 (CanLII), (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. III, TAB 94); R. v. Gagnon, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 621 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. III, TAB 93) 25
74. There are, however, some passages in which Justice Lutz considered actions of the strikers collectively. The CAW and Bettger had argued before Justice Lutz that, although the wrongdoing of the strikers collectively may have resulted in the nine miners’ deaths, no single act of their wrongdoing could be shown to have satisfied the ‘but for’ test. Justice Lutz rightly rejected this argument in the following passages:
[877] … In my opinion, whether it was a single act or a series of progressive acts is of no consequence. Otherwise, when one applies a principled approach to a set of facts in a situation deserving of redress, a proper claim could be defeated, short of appropriating each act. When there is a series of acts, interconnected with the same motivation, as the series of progressive acts were in this instance, the acts can be properly assessed in tandem as connected, then cumulatively.
[954] Counsel for Bettger sought to convince the Court that one must isolate Bettger’s activity that could have influenced Warren to his participation in the graffiti run and satellite dish and vent shaft explosions. On this issue, that cannot be the case; one must consider all of Bettger’s activities. The aberrant behaviour of Bettger in combination with aberrant behaviour of others progressively incited Warren to do his act….
[959] … Bettger’s criminal activity and his boasts with others contributed to Warren appreciating that his turn must arrive since the acts of others had not succeeded in meeting the union’s objective of shutting down the mine…. (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. II, pp. 79, 101 & 102)
75. Justice Lutz correctly applied the law. When a number of defendants all contribute to a cause that, in aggregate, results in injury to a plaintiff, the defendants are all liable to the plaintiff. The defendants are liable even if the injury is “over-determined”, that is, even if the aggregate includes so many wrongful acts that the injury would have occurred even if a single wrongful act were subtracted from the aggregate. This has been recognized for many years and by scores of authorities, including this Court.122
122 Thorpe v. Brumfitt, (1873) 8 Ch. App. 650 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. IV, TAB 119), Blair and Sumner v. Deakin, (1887), The Law Times Vol. LVII., N.S. 522 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. I, TAB 12), Lambton v. Mellish, [1894] 3 Ch. 163 at 166 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. II, TAB 61), Bonnington Castings, Ltd. v. Wardlaw, [1956] 1 AC 613, [1956] 1 All ER 615 (H.L.) (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. I, TAB 13), which was endorsed by this Court in Athey v. Leonati, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 458 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. I, TAB 5); Walker Estate v. York Finch General Hospital, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 647 at para. 87 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. IV, TAB 126), and Richard W. Wright, “Acts and Omissions as Positive and Negative 26
76. Though Justice Lutz did not use the exception described in Resurfice, he would have been justified in using it. In Resurfice, this Court explained that the exception may be used where it is impossible to prove causation due to factors outside the plaintiff’s control, for example, current limits of scientific knowledge.123 This Court gave as an example the situation “where it is impossible to prove what a particular person in the chain of causation would have done had the defendant not committed a negligent act or omission.”
77. The issue before Justice Lutz was what Warren would have done if Bettger and other union defendants had not committed their wrongful acts. When the plaintiffs sought to call a forensic psychiatrist124 to establish the causal connection between Warren’s actions and the actions of Bettger and the other union defendants, the Respondents argued that the issue was not susceptible to scientific proof.125 Justice Lutz accepted their argument, and refused to allow the psychiatrist to testify. However, Roger Warren did testify in person at the trial “in his own defence”. Justice Lutz ultimately concluded using his “robust common sense”126 that the wrongdoing of Bettger and the other strikers influenced Warren. However, Justice Lutz would have been justified in using the exception that this Court was to describe in Resurfice over three years later.
Issue 3: The CAW, Bettger and Warren are jointly liable for the deaths of the miners, and the CAW is vicariously liable for Warren’s and Bettger’s torts.
78. The Court of Appeal observed that Justice Lutz assigned collective responsibility to a number of strikers and union officials.127 In doing so Justice Lutz made no error, for the Court of Appeal’s assertion128 that the law is based on “individual autonomy” is only partly true. Human beings naturally work with one another toward common goals. A strike is an example: “The very nature of a strike … is to influence an employer by joint action which would be ineffective if it
Causes” in Jason W. Neyers, Erika Chamberlain & Stephen O.A. Pitel, eds. “Emerging Issues in Tort Law” (Hart Publishing, 2007) (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. IV, TAB 136) 123 Resurfice, para. 25 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. III, TAB 101) 124 Exhibit 1061 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part V, Vol. I4) TAB 173 125 Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. VIII, Arboleda evidence pp. 106:33-204:17, (TAB 99-117) 126 Snell v. Farrell supra at p. 19 127 CAMJ para. 172 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. III, p. 170) 128 CAMJ para. 78 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. III, p. 123-125) 27
were carried out by an individual.”129 Such collaborative activity differs qualitatively from individual activity.130
79. Like individual activity, collaborative activity sometimes results in injuries – at the Giant Mine, the collaborative attacks on Royal Oak and its replacement workers resulted in the deaths of the miners. In order to deter injuries arising from collaborative activity and to compensate its victims, the law has developed the concepts of artificial persons and joint liability. Joint liability has been subdivided into vicarious liability and ‘concerted action liability,’ both of which apply to the facts of this case.131
The CAW is vicariously liable for Warren’s and Bettger’s torts
80. As this Court has explained, vicarious liability is based on the pre-existing relationship between a tortfeasor and an enterprise. It arises when the tort is closely tied to a risk introduced or enhanced by the enterprise. It is traditionally found where an employee’s tortious act has furthered his employer’s ends or where the tort arises as a result of friction or confrontation inherent in the employer’s enterprise.132
81. The relationship between a union and its members renders a union vicariously liable for torts committed by its members in the course of a strike.133 That is because torts committed by union members in the course of a strike are closely connected with the union enterprise. A striking union tries to exert financial pressure on an employer by limiting the employer’s production and impeding its access to customers and suppliers. Friction and confrontation are inherent in doing so and torts committed by union members often further the union’s ends.
82. As Justice Lutz found134 on the evidence,135 unions can exercise control over their members much as employers can exercise control over their employees: when a union’s
129 Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 at para. 98 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. III, TAB 98) 130 Reference supra at para. 89 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. III, TAB 98), Dunmore v. Ontario, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. I, TAB 34) 131 The Koursk, [1924] P 140 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. IV, TAB 116) 132 Bazley v. Curry, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 534 at para. 22 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. I, TAB 8) 133 Mainland Sawmills v. USW Union Local - 1-3567, 2007 BCSC 1433 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. II, TAB 68), Matusiak v. British Columbia and Yukon Territory Building and Construction Trades Council, [1999] B.C.J. No. 2416 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. III, TAB 71) 134 RFJ 878 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. II, p. 79-80) 28
members misbehave, the union can send them home or can withhold their strike pay. In extreme cases, the union can bring disciplinary proceedings against misbehaving members, which can result in a member losing his job and being removed from the workplace.136 Finding unions vicariously liable for their members’ misconduct can thus deter strike violence.
83. Warren’s tort was closely connected to the strike. On the night he set his device, Warren was on picket duty at a picket shack adjacent to the Giant Mine site where only those designated by the union were allowed.137 He received strike pay for the time he was underground setting his device. His was one of several explosions set off by strikers, one of which (the vent shaft explosion, set by Bettger and a member of the local executive) could have caused 40 deaths.138 Warren set his device, not out of some private grudge against one of the nine miners, but to advance the union’s objective of stopping production at the Giant Mine.139 Justice Lutz therefore reasonably found that the CAW is vicariously liable for Warren’s tort, and his finding is entitled to deference.140
84. The Court of Appeal found that for the CAW to be vicariously liable, Warren would have had to commit his tort “in the scope of some specific duty assigned to [him] on behalf of the union.”141 However, in finding an enterprise vicariously liable, the law does not require that the enterprise have assigned the tortfeasor the duty of performing the specific wrongful act. On the contrary, in almost all cases of vicarious liability for intentional acts (for example, sexual abuse at religious schools), the intentional tort is antithetical to the ends of the enterprise. What is extraordinary about this case is that the union defendants shared Warren’s goal of stopping production by violently attacking replacement workers. The imposition of vicarious liability on the CAW in this instance is therefore particularly appropriate:
[B]ecause we assume that intentional torts do not further employers’ ends, it is only remarkable when the intentional torts
135 Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. IX, Sims evidence pp. 187:14-188:6 (TAB 99-153), 189:14-20 & 189:33-37 (TAB 99- 154), David evidence pp. 197:34-198:2, (TAB 99-160) 136 Speckling v. Local 76 of the Communications, Energy and Paperworkers’ Union of Canada et al., 2005 BCSC 349 (CanLII) (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. IV, TAB 111) 137 Exhibit 1117 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part V, Vol. I4, pp. 200-203) TAB 175 138 Exhibit 907 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part V, Vol. I3, p. 2) TAB 161 139 RFJ para. 171 & 812 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. I, p. 46 & Vol. II, p. 62), Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. IX, Warren evidence p. 174:33-45, (TAB 99-145) 140 E.B. v. Order of the Oblates, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 45 at para. 23 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. II, TAB 35) 141 CAMJ para. 148 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. III, p. 158) 29
do, in fact, further those ends, making imposition of vicarious liability in those instances almost always appropriate142
The CAW and Bettger joined with Warren in concerted wrongful action
85. A distinct category of joint liability (which some call “concerted action liability”) arises when two or more people jointly engage in wrongful activity, or when they jointly act to further a common wrongful goal. Unlike vicarious liability, this kind of joint liability is not based on the pre-existing relationship between parties, but arises when one person assists, incites, induces or participates in another’s tort.143
86. The strikers collaborated in their attacks on Royal Oak and its replacement workers. Some strikers trespassed on Giant Mine property, while others, using union radio equipment, warned them in code of approaching security guards.144 Bettger’s team illegally entered Akaitcho as an “advance party” to scout the way for others to follow,145 and were praised for doing so at a national union convention.146 They told Warren what they had discovered and Bettger’s example, in particular, convinced Warren that it was possible for him to use Akaitcho to enter the underground.147 Warren, Bettger and the CAW acted jointly to further a common, wrongful goal (the intimidation of replacement workers) and Bettger and the CAW assisted, incited, induced and participated in Warren’s tort. Therefore Justice Lutz correctly found that Bettger and the CAW were jointly at fault with Warren:
[917] Here, CAW National was driving the "mere members" such as Warren to help see its mission accomplished and thus must be responsible for the said members' acts. … Warren and Bettger were members acting in furtherance of the union's cause to seek and destroy; in return, strike pay was paid to all strikers….
142 Jacobi v. Griffiths, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 570 per McLachlin J. at para. 15 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. II, TAB 58) 143 The Koursk supra (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. IV, TAB 116), I.C.B.C. v. Vancouver (City), 2000 BCCA 12 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. II, TAB 57); Carty, Hazel, “Joint tortfeasance and assistance liability”, 19 Legal Stud. pp. 489-514 at 489 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. IV, TAB 132); Generale Bank Nederland NV v. Export Credits Guarantee Department [1997] EWCA Civ 2165 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. II, TAB 42); Credit Lyonnais Nederland NV (now known as Generale Bank Nederland N.V.) v. Exports Credits Guarantee Department, [1999] UKHL 9 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. I, TAB 25); Mainland Sawmills v. USW Union Local - 1-3567 supra at paras 167-168, (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. II, TAB 68) 144 RFJ para. 272 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. I, p. 89) 145 Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. VII, Plaintiff Fullowka et al Opening Statement pp. 5:39-6:18 (TAB 99-3) 146 RFJ para. 119 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. I, p. 42); Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. VII, Plaintiff Fullowka et al Opening Statement pp. 1:20-2:9 (TAB 99-1), pp. 7:25-8:33 (TAB 99-4), Vol. VIII, Shearing read-in pp. 61:39-62:6 (TAB 99- 90) 147 RFJ para. 167 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. I, p. 55); Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. IX, Warren evidence p. 173:6-15, (TAB 99-144) & pp. 178:47-179:16, (TAB 99-148) 30
[944] … Bettger’s acts of violence, vandalism and sabotage were thoroughly canvassed in the evidence at trial. The satellite dish explosion and vent shaft blast were but two examples of his conduct in furtherance of the union’s “cause”, both bearing the risk of serious personal injury or death to invitees at Giant (including the nine deceased miners). Furthermore, Bettger knew and encouraged other union members to commit similar acts, thereby increasing the risk to those at Giant….
[949] … Bettger was carrying out the Union’s mandate of destruction against Royal Oak and Pinkerton’s and the replacement and line-crossing workers and … his conduct … created a risk to the very same persons whose lives were lost through Warren’s act.…
[962] … Warren’s act was but an elevated crime in the hierarchy of Criminal Code offences that the strikers were committing virtually daily, no less and no more criminal than the offences that Bettger and Shearing committed and for which they were imprisoned….
[1090] … That so many strikers were so involved satisfies me that each of the unions, their executives including Hargrove, Slezak, Schram, Seeton and Shearing, certain rank and file members including Bettger, and CAW National interlopers such as David, incited and inflamed the members of CASAW Local 4 and must share the blame for this conduct….(Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. II, pp. 92, 98, 100, 103 & 141)
87. The CAW and Bettger owed the miners a duty of care because their attacks foreseeably caused physical harm to the miners.148 The Court of Appeal denied that they owed a duty of care on those grounds, saying that it was Warren’s act alone that caused the deaths.149 But the attacks on the replacement workers were collaborative, and Bettger and the CAW incited and participated in Warren’s tort and contributed to the deaths.
88. The liability of Bettger and the CAW can be justified (as the vicarious liability of a faultless employer is justified) on the grounds of deterrence and compensation. But Bettger and
148 RFJ paras. 878 & 946 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. II, p. 79-80 & 99) 149 CAMJ para. 177 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. III, p. 173) 31
the CAW were not faultless: through their wrongful and negligent incitement, assistance and participation, Bettger and the CAW contributed to the deaths of the miners.150
There were no corporate veils inside the unions151
89. The Court of Appeal found that, while it was possible for CASAW Local 4 to be liable for the misconduct of Warren, CASAW itself (and its successor, CAW-National) could not be liable because “Local 4 was a separate legal entity from CASAW National”. In so holding, the Court of Appeal improperly overturned Justice Lutz’s findings with respect to wrongdoing by national officials and also misunderstood the nature of unions as established by this Court in Berry v. Pulley.152
90. Labour statutes and labour boards do not create unions, do not impose structural requirements on unions and scarcely regulate the internal affairs of unions (they do not even require that unions be democratic).153 Section 3(1) of the Canada Labour Code simply defines “trade union” as:
“trade union” means any organization of employees, or any branch or local thereof, the purposes of which include the regulation of relations between employers and employees…
91. As a group of individuals154 organized to achieve a purpose, a union must determine who its members are and how they will make decisions; that is, a union must have some sort of constitution.155 In Berry, this court established that when a member joins a union, the member and the union agree to abide by the constitution.156 This Court thus established membership and the constitution as the fundamental elements defining and individuating unions. This Court
150 Bazley v. Curry [1999] S.C.R. 534 at para. 34 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. I, TAB 8), Martin v. Martin, (1976) N.B.R. (2d) 178 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. III, TAB 70) 151 For ideological and historical reasons, unions are generally not registered as corporations or societies. 152 [2002] 2 S.C.R. 493 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. I, TAB 9) 153 B.A.C. , Locals 6, 7 & 25 v. Brick and Allied Craft Union of Canada, [2000] O.L.R.B. Rep. 891 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. I, TAB 7), U.F.C.W. v. L.M.L. Foods Inc. [1985] O.L.R.B. Rep. 1252 at para. 25 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. IV, TAB 122), Michael MacNeil, Michael Link & Peter Engelmann, Trade Union Law in Canada, (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 2008) at para. 5-2 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. IV, TAB 135) 154 Famous Players Ltd. v. I.A.T.S.E., Motion Picture Projectionists’ Union, Local 432, [1982] O.L.R.B. Rep. 1011 (O.L.R.B.) (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. II, TAB 38) 155 Berry supra at para. 48 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. I, TAB 9); I.A.T.S.E., Local 822 v. Opera Ghost Productions Inc., [1990] O.L.R.B. Rep. 325 at para 13 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. II, TAB 56) 156 Berry supra at para. 48 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. I, TAB 9) 32
further held that a successful plaintiff suing a union can realize against union assets (as distinct from the individual members’ assets).157
92. Unions are often organized into multi-tiered structures, consisting of local offices and national offices158 (this fact is recognized in the definition of “trade union” above). CASAW and the CAW organized themselves into such multi-tiered structures, as did the union in Berry.159 The members of CASAW and the CAW joined through the local offices, and by doing so became members of both “the national union” and “the local”160 (it was impossible to be a member of the local without being a member of the national).161
93. The Court of Appeal’s finding that “Local 4 was a separate legal entity from CASAW National” conflicts with Berry:
a. If local unions were entities distinct from their national unions, then a joining member would enter into two distinct agreements, first, an agreement with the local to abide by the local constitution, and second, an agreement with the national to abide by the national constitution. But in fact there is only one constitution and the member joins only once.
b. The main purpose for imposing legal status on unions is to enable individuals to recover for liabilities incurred through group action.162 From the early case of Taff Vale163 up until this Court’s recent ruling in Berry v. Pulley, the courts have recognized unions as legal entities in order to allow victims of group action to recover from group assets. If a local were distinct from its national, there
157 Berry supra at para 59 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. I, TAB 9) 158 Michael MacNeil, Michael Link & Peter Engelmann, Trade Union Law in Canada, (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 2008) at para. 5.10 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. IV, TAB 135); H.E.R.E., Local 75 v. Westbury Howard Johnson Hotel, 1994 CarswellOnt 1505 at paras. 8-9 (O.L.R.B.) (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. II, TAB 49) 159 Berry supra at para. 8 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. I, TAB 9) 160 RFJ para. 861 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. II, p. 75); Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. VIII, Mitic read in p. 98:22-37 & p. 99:3-11 (TAB 99-111) 161 Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. VIII, Mitic read-in p. 99:3-11 & 98:18-99:25 (TAB 99-111); Famous Players Ltd. supra at para. 13 (L.R.B) (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. II, TAB 38) 162 Berry supra at para. 22 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. I, TAB 9) 163 The Taff Vale Railway v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants, [1901] 1 Q.B. 170 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. IV, TAB 118) 33
would be two distinct pools of assets, the pool belonging to the local, and the pool belonging to the national. But there is only a single pool of assets – a local union holds ‘its’ assets in trust for the union membership as a whole, not just for the members of the local.164 Liabilities cannot be the responsibility of the local alone, when its assets are held for all members of the national union.165
94. Further, CASAW’s members – including Warren – viewed themselves as belonging to a single union, not as belonging to two distinct unions.166 And when CASAW and the CAW merged at the end of the strike, they prepared a Merger Agreement between the two national unions that determined what would happen to the locals. If CASAW’s locals were legally distinct from CASAW National, privity of contract would prevent the Merger Agreement from affecting the locals’ rights and duties.167
95. The idea that locals are ‘distinct’ from their nationals arises because both national unions and their locals fall under the labour statutes’ definitions of “trade unions,” and generally labour boards can certify as a workplace’s bargaining agent either ‘the local’ or ‘the national’. When there are problems at a workplace, sometimes a plaintiff sues the local, sometimes he sues the national, and sometimes he sues both. As the law evolved, the courts allowed all such actions to proceed. The Court of Appeal reasoned that since a plaintiff can sue a local for the transgressions of local officials, he cannot sue the national for them. The Court of Appeal’s inference is a non sequitur and overlooks the cases where claims were allowed to proceed against both locals and nationals.168 Moreover, the Court of Appeal improperly overturned Justice Lutz’s findings that national officials participated in the wrongdoing.
164 CUPE v. Deveau, 19 N.S.R. (2d) 44 aff’d 19 N.S.R. (2d) 24 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. I, TAB 27); L.C.U.C. v. C.U.P.W., Edmonton Local, [1994] 2 WW.R. 450 at para. 13 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. II, TAB 62) 165 McKendrick v. National Union, 1910, 2 Scots Law Times 215 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. III, TAB 73) 166 Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. VII, Gauthier evidence pp. 14:46-15:1 (TAB 99-7), Samardzija evidence p. 167:1-19 (TAB 99-57), O’Neil evidence p. 34:29 (TAB 99-12), Tuma evidence p. 168:16-21 (TAB 99-58), Titterton evidence p. 187:15-22 (TAB 99-64), Vol. VIII, Legge evidence pp. 46:46-47:6 (TAB 99-84) & Murray evidence p. 71:14-16 (TAB 99-95) 167 Exhibit 1034 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part V, Vol. I3, pp. 54-174 at 86-95) TAB 167 168 Vancouver Machinery Depot Ltd. v. United Steel Workers of America et al.,1948 CarswellBC 51, (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. IV, TAB 124) 34
96. Since national officials often play significant roles in local affairs, there are very few cases169 in which a court has had to decide the narrow question of whether a national union can be liable where only local officials are at fault; generally there is wrongdoing by both national officials and local officials, for all of which the national is found liable.170 And so it is in this case: in this case the national offices of CASAW and the CAW incited, assisted, induced and participated in the violence at the Giant Mine:
a. Slezak was the national president of CASAW. By virtue of CASAW’s constitution, he was a member of “all committees within the union”, including the bargaining committee that negotiated the proposed contract with Royal Oak. Slezak attended bargaining sessions.171 When negotiations broke down and the members went on strike, Slezak trespassed on Royal Oak property, addressed an illegal rally attended by Warren, and incited violence.172 After strikers injured people and damaged property, Slezak refused to negotiate unless they were granted “general amnesty”.173 When Bettger’s team attended a national convention and showed pictures taken during their scouting mission into Akaitcho, Slezak and other members of the executive praised them174 and the delegates passed a resolution requiring all members of CASAW (not just the members of the local) to support the strike, either by picketing or financially.175 CASAW Local 4 had no strike fund – money for strike pay, legal expenses and the like came from
169 McKendrick supra is an exception(Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. III, TAB 73); 170 For example, Procor Ltd. v. U.S.W.A. 1989 CarswellOnt 873 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. III, TAB 90); USWA v. Gaspe Copper Mines Ltd., [1970] S.C.R. 362 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. IV, TAB 123); New Brunswick Electric Power Commission v. I.B.E.W., Local 1733, 16 N.B.R. (2d) 361 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. III, TAB 79), Credit Lyonnais Nederland NV (now known as Generale Bank Nederland N.V.) v. Export Credits Guarantee Department [1999] UKHL 9; ]1999] 2 WLR 540 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. I, TAB 25); Generale Bank Nederland Nv (formerly Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV) v. Export Credits Guarantee Department [1997] EWCA Civ 2165 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. II, TAB 42); Sales, Philip, “The Tort of Conspiracy and Civil Secondary Liability”, Cambridge Law Journal, 49(3), pp. 491-514) (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. IV, TAB 138) 171 Appellants’ Joint Record, Part V, Vol. VIII, Seeton read-ins pp. 88:41-89:40 (TAB 99-104), p. 90:2-22 (TAB 99-105), pp. 90:31- 91:27 (TAB 99-105), pp. 91:31-92:24 (TABS 99-105/106), pp. 92:30-93:27 (TAB 99-106), Vol. VIII, Slezak read-in pp. 95:23- 96:43 (TABS 99-108/109) 172 RFJ 1090 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. II, p. 141); Exhibit 1192 & Exhibit 601 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part V, Vol. XV, p. 2 & Vol. XI, p. 113) TABS 178 & 127; Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. IX, Warren evidence pp. 176:7-177:26 (TAB 99-147) 173 RFJ 202 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. I, p. 66); Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. VIII, Mitic read-in pp. 58:40- 60:44 (TAB 99-89) 174 Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. VIII, Shearing read-ins pp. 61:39-62:6 (TAB 99-90), 88:41-89:40 (TAB 99-104), 94:32- 95:16 (TAB 99-107/108) 175 Exhibit 0754 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part V, Vol. XII, p. 53) TAB 151 35
CASAW’s national offices.176 Thus, even if CASAW National had been a legal entity distinct from CASAW Local 4, the strike would have been a joint enterprise in which it participated along with Local 4, so CASAW National would still be vicariously liable for Warren’s torts: Blackwater v. Plint.177
b. The CAW’s national president (Hargrove) sent Harold David to Yellowknife to “ram the God damned hell out of the scabs”.178 While reporting to the CAW’s representative (Succamore) and with the CAW national offices paying his salary and expenses, David became the strike coordinator and took over the management of the strike from CASAW officials.179 David incited strikers to violence, saying that “the only way that anti-replacement worker legislation was achieved in Quebec was through death” and that strikers “should get even with replacement workers underground.”180 David vetted the strike bulletins, one of which described Vern Fullowka, who was later to be killed in the fatal blast, as:181
New Scab. Our newest scab is Vern Fullowka. This piece of shit was in our union office just yesterday, probably listening to what was being said, so that he could take it to the company today. It’s hard to believe that this piece of bleeding dried flesh was clinging to us until yesterday.
97. The evidence of union wrongdoing was voluminous. After hearing it all and after justifiably drawing adverse inferences against the CAW for failing to call Slezak and other key union witnesses,182 Justice Lutz found that CASAW’s and the CAW’s national officers and employees incited and participated in the attacks against replacement workers:
[1090] … That so many strikers were so involved satisfies me that each of the unions, their executives including Hargrove, Slezak,
176 Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. VIII, Seeton read-in pp. 54:16-55:16 (TAB 99-87) 177 [2005] 3 S.C.R. 3 178 RFJ para. 888 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. II, p. 82-83); Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. IX, Smith evidence p. 193:37-41 (TAB 99-157), David evidence p. 194:43-45 (TAB 99-158) & pp. 195:45- 196:1 (TAB 99-159), Vol. VIII, Mitic read-in pp. 56:46-57:32 (TAB 99-88); Exhibit 1205 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part V, Vol. XV, pp. 3-137 at 58-59) TAB 179 179 Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. VIII, Slezak read-in pp. 43:22-44:4 (TAB 99-82); Exhibit 758 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part V, Vol. XII, p. 74) TAB 152 180 Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. IX, David evidence p. 201:1-4 (TAB 99-162), Vol. VII, Tuma evidence pp. 169:29-170:27 (TAB 99-59) 181 Appellants’ Joint Record, Part IV, Vol. VIII, Seeton read-in p. 86:14-20 (TAB 99-102); Exhibit 910 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part V, Vol. XIII, p. 3) TAB 162 182 RFJ paras. 974, 975 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. II, p. 106) 36
Schram, Seeton and Shearing, certain rank and file members including Bettger, and CAW National interlopers such as David, incited and inflamed the members of CASAW Local 4 and must share the blame for this conduct…. (Appellants’ Join Record, Part II, Vol. II, p. 141)
98. It is well-established that national unions are liable when national officials play significant roles in union wrongdoing.183 Justice Lutz reasonably found that national officers and employees of CASAW and CAW played significant roles in the wrongdoing at Giant. Therefore, quite apart from considerations about the nature and structure of trade unions, Justice Lutz’s finding that the CAW is liable was reasonable and should not have been overturned.
Issue 4: It is an error of law to deny tax gross-up and management fees merely because a workers’ compensation board has a subrogated interest in a claim.
99. In assessing damages, Justice Lutz provisionally assessed the sums of $545,804.00 and $113,580.00, respectively, for Tax Gross Up and Management Fees, but he declined to award those sums to the miners’ families, because the Workers’ Compensation Board of the Northwest Territories has a subrogated interest184 in the families’ claims and is exempt from the payment of income taxes.185
100. Justice Lutz’s decision not to award Tax Gross Up and Management Fees was an error of law. This Court has explained, in a series of cases going back to 1919,186 that subrogation is a matter strictly between the WCB and a plaintiff. When the WCB is subrogated to a plaintiff’s claim, the Board has the right, and indeed the duty,187 to recover from a tortfeasor exactly those damages that the victim could have recovered had there been no subrogation: 188
183 Procor supra (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. III, TAB 90); USWA supra (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. IV, TAB 123) New Brunswick Electric Power supra (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. III, TAB 79), Credit Lyonnais supra (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. I, TAB 25); Generale Bank Nederland Nv supra (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. II, TAB 42); Sales, Philip, “The Tort of Conspiracy and Civil Secondary Liability” supra (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. IV, TAB 138) 184 Under section 12(4) of the Workers’ Compensation Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. W-6 [the “Act”] (Part VII, TAB H) 185 RFJ 1048 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. II, p. 129-131) 186 Hutton v. Toronto Railway Company, (1920) 1 W.W.R. 396 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. II, TAB 55); Snell v. R. [1947] S.C.R. 219 at paras. 17, 36, 40 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. IV, TAB 110) 187 McRae v. Canada (Attorney General), 61 B.C.L.R. (3d) 83 (BCSC) at paras. 35, 38, 42, 43 and 51 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. III, TAB 75) 188 Snell supra at para. 25 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. III, TAB 109); see also The Queen v. P.B. Ready-Mix Concrete & Excavators, (1956) 5 D.L.R. (2d) 268 at 270 (Ex. Ct.) (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. IV, TAB 117); Giovanni Amendola” (The) v. LeVae Estate, [1960] Ex. C.R. 492 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. II, TAB 44); Gaudet v. Canada, 81 A.C.W.S. (3d) 621 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. II, TAB 41); Canada (Attorney General) v. Ahenakew, [1984] S.J. No. 293 (Q.B.) (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. I, TAB 17); Sickel Estate v. Gordy, [2004] S.J. No. 707 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. III, TAB 105); Cole v. British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Board), [2000] B.C.J. No. 2267 at para. 15 (S.C.) (Appellants’ Joint 37
The intention is clearly to preserve in full the cause of action, including damages, against the wrongdoer and to create a legal right in the Board to enforce it in the name of the dependants for the benefit of the compensation fund.
101. Further, workers’ compensation is a type of insurance,189 and under the Fatal Accidents Act,190 insurance is “not to be taken into account” in awarding damages.191 The fact that a plaintiff might have access to insurance is irrelevant, prejudicial and inadmissible.192 The quantum of a plaintiff’s damages is not determined by his insurer’s tax bracket.
102. In Townsend v. Kroppmans193 this Court confirmed194 that the assumptions that the plaintiff will invest the full amount of the award, that the interest on the award will be taxed, and that the plaintiff might have to pay Management Fees, are all notional assumptions, not predictions about what will actually happen to the award. The Trial Judge declined to adjust the award for Tax Gross-up and Management Fees on the basis that “depending on legal fees and costs recovered, the Plaintiffs might recover little or nothing.”195 But this Court ruled that such reasoning is erroneous:
Even if it was demonstrated that legal fees were paid with the future costs award…such a deduction would be irrelevant and inadmissible.196 103. The Defendant Respondents argued that some of the award will go to pay legal fees, so the notional Tax Gross-up and Management Fees are excessive, and the families will be over- compensated. But since some of the award will go to pay legal fees, even if the families receive the notional amounts of Tax Gross-up and Management Fees, the families will be significantly under-compensated.
Authorities Vol. 1, TAB 21); Paneak v. Heli-max, 2005 NUCJ 15 at para. 14, aff’d 2006 NUCA 04 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. III, TAB 85) 189 Pasiechnyk v. Saskatchewan (Workers’ Compensation Board), [1997] S.C.J. No. 74, at para. 24 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. III, TAB 87) 190 R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c.F-3, s. 4(2) (Part VII, TAB C) 191 See also New Brunswick (Workmen’s Compensation Board) v. Shirley Estate, [1978] 30 N.S.R. (2d) 246 at paragraph 33 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. III, TAB 80) 192 Hutton v. Toronto Railway Co., supra (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. II, TAB 55); Snell v. R., supra (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. IV, TAB 110); Gowar v. Hales, [1928] 1 K.B. 191 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. II, TAB 56); Lister v. Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co. Ltd., [1957] A.C. 555 (H.L.) at 576-577 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. II, TAB 64); Eichel v. New York Central Railroad Co., 375 U.S. 253 (1963) (USSC), (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. II, TAB 37) 193 [2004] 1 S.C.R. 315. at paras. 5 and 6 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. IV, TAB 120) 194 Townsend supra at para.21(Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. IV, TAB 120) 195 RFJ para. 1052 (Appellants’ Joint Record, Part II, Vol. II, p. 132) 196 Townsend at para. 23 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. IV, TAB 120) 38
104. The Workers’ Compensation Act, RSNWT 1988, c. W-6 as amended (since repealed) provides that a plaintiff shall recover at least the full amount of the award less the costs of the accident to the Board.197 Any increase in the funds recovered through this appeal will increase, by an equal amount, the funds available to the families; it will not increase the funds retained by the Board.
105. Justice Lutz referred to Daigle and Workers’ Compensation Board (N.B.) v. Cape Breton Crane Rentals Ltd.198 However, Daigle is inconsistent with the prior decisions of this Court. Daigle also conflicts with other cases where courts adjusted the award for Tax Gross-up without regard for the fact that there were subrogated claims.199 Further, the applicable New Brunswick legislation was fundamentally different from that applicable to the present case. Specifically, the New Brunswick Workers’ Compensation Act of the day created not just a right of subrogation, as in the present case, but also, a separate cause of action in right of their Board to sue for and collect the Board’s claims costs.200 Though the New Brunswick Court of Appeal denied Tax Gross Up on the Board’s own distinct claim, it allowed it upon the award of the dependents.
106. Justice Lutz was in error when he followed Daigle.
Part IV: Submissions on Costs
107. This Court has unfettered discretion with respect to costs here and in the courts below.201 These Appellants seek an order awarding solicitor/client costs to the Appellants in this Court, substantial indemnity costs in the Court of Appeal and the restoration of the costs in the trial court, as fixed by the trial judge. This Court granted the Appellants their costs of the applications for leave to appeal in any event of the cause.
108. This appeal follows a lengthy trial in which the Appellants were successful. The appeal to this Court was necessitated after the Court of Appeal found against the Appellants on a point
197 section 13(4)(d) (Part VII, TAB H) 198 (1987) 91 N.B.R. (2d) 189 (C.A.) (Appellants’ Joint Authorities, Vol. I, TAB 28) 199 Foster v. Perry, 2005 BCSC 1214 at paras. 5 & 90 (BCSC) (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. II, TAB 39); Noftall v. Perkins, (1994) N.J. No. 155 at paras. 6 & 17 (Nfld. S.C.T.D.) (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. III, TAB 82); Cudmore v. Tabin,32 Sask. R. 105 (Q.B.) at paras. 1 & 48 to 51 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. I, TAB 26); Tardif v. Wiebe, 1996 CarswellBC 2438 (S.C.) at paras. 30 & 31 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. IV, TAB 114) 200 Workmen's Compensation Act, RSNB 1973, c.W-13, s.10 (10) (Part VII, TAB I) 201 Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, section 47 (Part VII, TAB F) 39
of law as to whether a duty of care was owed to the mineworkers, which point was conceded by Pinkertons. The Appellants should not be required to bear their costs of the appeal to this Court. In the alternative to an award of solicitor–client costs, for these and other reasons, the Appellants seek an order directing the Registrar to assess costs of the Appellants on a substantial indemnity basis, in excess of the costs permitted under Rule 83 and Schedule B of the Supreme Court of Canada Rules (Part VII, TAB G), and an opportunity to make submissions in support of a substantial indemnity costs award in the written submissions described in the paragraph below.
109. In the alternative to an award of solicitor-client costs, or in the event that this Court dismisses this appeal as against some or all of the Respondents, these Appellants seek an order permitting the parties to submit to the Court further written submissions on costs after a decision on the merits of the appeal is rendered, such submissions not to exceed three pages in length (or as this Court may otherwise direct), to address factors affecting the level of, entitlement to, or allocation of costs (e.g., allocation by way of a Sanderson costs order202) as among the parties in this Court or in the courts below, with corresponding leave to the Respondents to file reply submissions, all within such time limits as this Court may direct. Sanderson costs and other factors pertinent to this appeal preclude such costs submissions being made at this time.203
202 Dix v. Canada (Attorney General), 2002 ABQB 768 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. I, TAB 31); Besterman v. Br. Motor Cab Co., [1914] 3 K.B. 181, at 186 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. I, TAB 10) 203 see Miller (Ed) Sales & Rentals Ltd. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., (1998), 216 A.R. 304 at 306 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. III, TAB 76); Trizec Equities Ltd. v. Ellis-Don Management Services Ltd. (1999), 251 A.R. 101 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. IV, TAB 121); LSI Logic Corp. of Canada, Inc. v. Logani [2001] A.J. No. 1751 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. II, TAB 66); Peddle v Ontario [1997] O.J. No.3813 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. III, TAB 88); Robert D. Malen, Assessment vs. Fixing of Costs: Emerging Principles, [2001] 24 Advocates Quarterly 230 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. IV, TAB 137); Dix supra, paras. 34-36 (Appellants’ Joint Authorities Vol. I, TAB 31)
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VOL Para where Footnote 1 cited 1 Adams v.Borrell, 2008 NBCA 62; 297 D.L.R. 158 105 (4th) 400 2 Allison v. Rank City Wall Canada Ltd.,; 29 34 53 C.C.L.T. 50, 1984 CarswellOnt 694 (H.C.J.) 3 Anderson v Alberta Securities Commission, 2008 60 107 ABCA 184 (CanLII) 4 Anns v Merton Borough District Council, [1978] O’Neil Factum O’Neil A.C. 728 (H.L.(E.)) 23 Factum 18 5 Athey v Leonati, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 458, 1996 63, 75 111, 122 CarswellBC 2296 O’Neil Factum O’Neil 112, 115, 117 Factum 103, 105, 106, 107 6 Attorney General v. Hartwell, [2004] UKPC 12 34 53 (B.V.I.C.A.) 7 B.A.C. , Locals 6, 7 & 25 v. Brick and Allied 90 153 Craft Union of Canada, [2000] O.L.R.B. Rep. 891, 2000 CarswellOnt 5627 8 Bazley v. Curry, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 534 80, 88 132, 150 9 Berry v. Pulley, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 493 89, 91, 92 152, 156, 159 10 Besterman v. Br. Motor Cab Co., [1914] 3 K.B. 109 202 181 11 Blackwater v. Plint, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 3 96 177 12 Blair and Sumner v. Deakin, (1887), The Law 75 122 Times Vol. LVII., N.S. 522 13 Bonnington Castings, Ltd. v. Wardlaw, [1956] 1 75 122 AC 613, [1956] 1 All ER 615 (H.L.) 14 Booth v. St. Catharines (City), 1948 CarswellOnt 35 56 118; [1948] S.C.R. 564 (S.C.C.) 15 Bow Valley Husky (Bermuda) Ltd. v. Saint John O’Neil Factum O’Neil Shipbuilding Ltd., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1210 22 Factum 17 ii
16 Braun v. Soldiers, 968 F.2d 1110, Harris v. Pizza 47 82 Hut, 455 So.2d 1364, Silva v. Showcase, 736 F.2d 810, Tarasoff v. The Regents of the University of California, 131 Cal.Rptr. 14, Farwell v. Keaton, 396 Mich. 281 & Liberty National v. Weldon, 267 Ala. 171 17 Canada (Attorney General) v. Ahenakew, [1984] 100 188 S.J. No. 293 (Q.B.); [1984] 3 W.W.R. 442 18 Canada v. Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, [1983] 1 57 99 S.C.R. 205 19 Cape Breton Development Corporation v. Nova 105 198 Scotia (Workers' Compensation Appeals Tribunal) 2008 NSCA 72 (CanLII) 20 Childs v. Desormeaux, 2006 SCC 18, [2006] 1 37, 39 63, 67 S.C.R. 643, 2006 CarswellOnt 2710 21 Cole v. British Columbia (Workers’ 100 188 Compensation Board), 2000 BCSC 1638, [2000] B.C.J. No. 2267 (S.C.) 22 Collingwood Hotel Pty Ltd. v. O’Reilly, [2007] 47 81 NSWCA 155 23 Cooper v. Hobart, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 537 37 59 O’Neil Factum O’Neil 19, 29 Factum 11, 21 24 Correia v. Canac Kitchens, 2008 ONCA 506, 47 80 2008 CarswellOnt 3712 25 Credit Lyonnais Nederland NV (now known as 85 143 Generale Bank Nederland N.V.) v. Export Credits Guarantee Department, [2000] HL 486, [1999] UKHL 9 26 Cudmore v. Tabin, 32 Sask. R. 105 (Q.B.), 1984 105 199 CarswellSask 276 27 C.U.P.E. v. Deveau, 19 N.S.R. (2d) 44 (S.C. 93 164 (T.D.)) 1976 CarswellNS 193; aff’d 19 N.S.R. (2d) 24 (C.A.), 1977 CarswellNS 251 28 Daigle and Workers’ Compensation Board (N.B.) 105, 106 198 v. Cape Breton Crane Rentals Ltd., (1987), 91 N.B.R. (2d) 189 (C.A.), 232 A.P.R. 189 29 D.H. (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia, 34 54 2008 BCCA 222 (CanLII) 30 Dilworth v. Bala (Town), [1955] S.C.R. 284 60 107 31 Dix v. Canada (Attorney General), 2002 ABQB 109 202 768 (CanLII) iii
32 Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562, 1932 19, 23, 24, 30 12 S.C.(H.L.) 31 33 Dove v. Banhams Patent Locks Ltd., [1983] 2 All 34 53 ER 833 (Q.B.), [1983] 1 WLR 1436 34 Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2001] 3 78 130 S.C.R. 1016 VOL II 35 E.B. v. Order of the Oblates, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 45 83 140 36 Edgeworth v. N.D. Lea, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 206 2, 41 4, 69 37 Eichel v. New York Central Railroad Co., 375 101 192 U.S. 253 (1963); 84 S. Ct. 316; 1963 U.S. Lexis 3 38 Famous Players Ltd. v. I.A.T.S.E., Motion Picture 91, 92 154, 161 Projectionists’ Union, Local 432, [1982] O.L.R.B. Rep. 1011 (O.L.R.B.), 1982 CarswellOnt. 1098 39 Foster v. Perry, , 2005 BCSC 1214, [2005] 105 199 B.C.W.L.D. 6024, 2005 CarswellBC 1988 40 Fullowka v. Whitford, [1996] N.W.T.J. No. 95; O’Neil Factum O’Neil 147 D.L.R. (4th) 531 (C.A.) 123 Factum 108 41 Gaudet v. Canada, [1998] F.C.J. No. 151 (T.D.); 100 188 81 A.C.W.S. (3d) 621 42 Generale Bank Nederland Nv (formerly Credit 85 143 Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV) v. Export Credits Guarantee Department [1997] EWCA Civ 2165 43 George Golden v. the Queen, [1983] 2 F.C. 599 60 107 (Fed. C.A.) (Q.L.) 44 Giovanni Amendola” (The) v. LeVae Estate), 100 188 [1960] Ex. C.R. 492 45 Glenn O'Rourke et al v. Cammie Irvin Schacht, 37 61 [1976] 1 S.C.R. 53 46 Gowar v. Hales, [1927] All ER Rep 631 (C.A.); 101 192 [1928] 1 KB 191 47 Haynes v. Harwood [1934] All ER Rep 103 35 55 (C.A.) 48 Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd., [1994] 3 37 62 W.L.R. 761, 1994 WL 1060824 (HL), [1995] 2 AC 145 49 H.E.R.E., Local 75 v. Westbury, [1994] O.L.R.B. 92 158 Rep. 1166, 1994 CarswellOnt 1505 iv
50 Hill v. Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police 38 64 Services Board, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 129 O’Neil Factum O’Neil 22 Factum 17 51 Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd., [1970] 34 52 H.L. (SC.) 1004 52 Hosie v. Arbroath Football Club Ltd., 1978, Scots 34 53 Law Times 122 (O.H.) 53 Housen v. Nikolaisen, (2002) SCC 33 49, 70 83, 87, 118 54 Hutchings v Dow, 2007 BCCA 148 (CanLII) 66 113 55 Hutton v. Toronto Railway Company, [1920] 1 100, 101 186, 192 W.W.R. 396, 1919 CarswellOnt 8 56 I.A.T.S.E., Local 822 v. Opera Ghost Productions 91 155 Inc., [1990] O.L.R.B. Rep. 325 57 I.C.B.C. v. Vancouver (City), 2000 BCCA 12 85 143 (CanLII) 58 Jacobi v. Griffiths, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 570 84 142 59 Jane Doe v. Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality) 34 153 Commissioners of Police, 72 D.L.R. (4th) 580, 1990 CarswellOnt 442 60 Kamloops v Nielsen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 2, 1984 O’Neil Factum O’Neil CanLII 21 (S.C.C.) 22 Factum 17 61 Lambton v. Mellish, 1894] 3 Ch. 163, 1894 L. 75 122 1392 62 L.C.U.C. v. C.U.P.W., Edmonton Local, [1994] 2 93 164 WW.R. 450 63 Lewis v. British Columbia, [1997] S.C.J. No. 109, 37 61 [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1145 64 Lister v. Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co. Ltd., 101 192 [1957] A.C. 555 (H.L.), [1957] 1 All ER 125 65 Lougheed Enterprises Ltd. v Armbruster, 63 60 107 B.C.L.R. (2d) 316, 1992 CanLII 1742 (BCCA) 66 LSI Logic Corp. of Canada, Inc. v. Logani, 2001 109 203 ABQB 968, 2001CarswellAlta 173 67 Lynne v Taylor, 2006 ABCA 12 (CanLII) 66 112
68 Mainland Sawmills Ltd. v. USW Union Local – 1- 81 133 3567, 2007 BCSC 1433 (CanLII) v
VOL III 69 Martin v. Canada (Attorney General), 2005 FCA 52 92 156, 334 N.R. 43, 2005 CarswellNat 1212 70 Martin v. Martin, (1996) 176 N.B.R. (2d) 178, 88 150 447 A.P.R. 178, 1996 CarswellNB 239 71 Matusiak v. British Columbia and Yukon 81 133 Territory Building and Construction Trades Council, [1999] B.C.J. No. 2416, 1999 CarswellBC 2375 72 McGinty v. Cook, 59 D.L.R. (4th) 94, 1989 34 53 CarswellOnt 1435 (H.C.J.), aff’d 79 D.L.R. (4th) 95, 1991 CarswellOnt 824 (C.A.) 73 McKendrick v. National Union of Dock 93, 96 165, 169 Labourers, 1910, 2 Scots Law Times 215 74 McNaughton v. Ward, 2007 NSCA 81 (CanLII) 66 113 75 McRae v. Canada (Attorney General), 61 100 187 B.C.L.R. (3d) 83, 1998 CarswellBC 2298 76 Miller (Ed) Sales & Rentals Ltd. v. Caterpillar 109 203 Tractor Co. (1998), 216 A.R. 304 at 306 77 Millette v. Cote, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 595 37 61 78 M.N.P. (next friend) v. Bablitz, 2006 ABCA 245 60 107 (CanLII) 79 New Brunswick Electric Power Commission v. 96 170 I.B.E.W., Local 1733, 16 N.B.R. (2d) 361, 73 D.L.R. (3d) 94, 1976 CarswellNB 302 80 New Brunswick (Workmen’s Compensation 101 191 Board) v. Shirley Estate, [1978] N.S.J. No. 2, [1978] 30 N.S.R. (2d) 246 81 Newcastle Entertainment Security Pty Limited v. 47 81 Simpson, [1999] NSWCA 351. 82 Noftall v. Perkins, (1994) N.J. No. 155 (Nfld 105 199 T.D.) 83 Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse, 2003 SCC 69 37 60 (CanLII), [2003] 3 S.C.R. 263 84 Osman v. 629256 Ontario Ltd., [2005] W.D.F.L. 47 79 3359, 2005 CarswellOnt 2728 85 Paneak v. Heli-max, 2005 NUCJ 15 (CanLII), 100 188 aff’d 2006 NUCA 04 86 Parlee v. College of Psychologists of New 60 107 Brunswick, 2004 NBCA 42 (CanLII), (2004) 270 N.B.R. (2d) 375 vi
87 Pasiechnyk v. Saskatchewan (Workers’ 101 189 Compensation Board), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 890 88 Peddle (Litigation guardian of). v. Ontario 109 203 (Minister of Transportation), , [1997] O.J. No. 3813, 1997 CarswellOnt 3697 89 Petrovitch v. Callinghams, Ltd., [1969] 2 Lloyd’s 34 53 Rep 386 (Q.B.); 210 EG 1423 90 Procor Ltd. v. U.S.W.A., 71 O.R. (2d) 410, 65 96, 98 170, 183 D.L.R. (4th) 287, 1989 CarswellOnt 873 91 Q. v. Minto Management Ltd., 36 R.P.R. 75; 15 34 53 D.L.R. (4th) 581, 1985 CarswellOnt 718 (H.C.J.), aff’d 34 D.L.R. (4th) 767, 1986 CarswellOnt 2187 (C.A.) 92 R. v. C.L.Y., [2008] 1 S.C.R. 5 70 120 93 R. v. Gagnon, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 621 70 121 94 R. v. H.S.B., 2008 SCC 52 70 121 95 R. v. J.H.S., 2008 SCC 30 70 119 96 Re September 11 Litigation, 280 F.Supp. 2d 279 47 82 97 Reeves v. Commissioners of Police [2000] 1 AC 35 56 360 98 Reference re Public Service Employee Relations 78 129, 130 Act (Alta.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 99 Regina v. Institute of Chartered Accountants of 60 107 Ontario, [1968] O.J. No. 1221, [1968] 2 O.R. 691 100 Renaissance Leisure Group Inc. v. Frazer, 242 35 56 D.L.R. (4th) 229, 2004 CarswellOnt 3468 101 Resurfice Corp. v. Hanke, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 333 66, 76, 69, 77 113, 115, 117 102 Rodaro v. Royal Bank of Canada, 2002 CanLII 60 108 41834 (ON C.A.) 103 Royal Oak Mines Inc. v. Canada (Labour 18 34 Relations Board), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 396 104 Sam v. Wilson, 2007 BCCA 622 (CanLII) 68, 66 116, 113 104A Sauer v. Canada, 2007 ONCA 454 58 105 105 Sickel Estate v. Gordy, [2004] S.J. No. 707, 2004 100 188 SKQB 462 106 S.(J.) v. Clement, 22 O.R. (3d) 495; 122 D.L.R. 34 53 (4th) 449, 1995 CarswellOnt 1703 (Ct. J. Gen. Div.) 107 Skyjack Inc. c/o Linamar Corporation v. Sue 52 92 Hutchinson, Ontario Labour Relations Board 2745-06-HS, [2007] O.L.R.B. Rep. 191, 2007 CarswellOnt 2692 vii
108 Smith v. Leurs, 70 CLR 256, 1945 WL 23632 O’Neil Factum O’Neil (HCA) 26 Factum 20 109 Snell v. Farrell, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 311 69 117 VOL IV 110 Snell v. R., [1947] S.C.R. 219 100, 101 186, 192 111 Speckling v. British Columbia (Labour Relations 82 136 Board), 2007 BCCA 153 112 Spring v. Guardian Assurance plc, [1994] 3 37 62 W.L.R. 354, [1995] 2 AC 296, [1994] 3 All ER 129 113 Stansbie v. Troman, [1948] 2 KB 48, [1948] 1 All 34 51 ER 599 (C.A.) 114 Tardif v. Wiebe, [1996] B.C.W.L.D. 3060, 1996 105 199 CarswellBC 2438 (S.C.) 115 Taylor v. Canada (Attorney General), 2007 58 105 CanLII 55708 (ON S.C.D.C.) 116 The Koursk, [1924] All E.R. 168 (C.A.), [1924] P 79, 85 131, 143 140 117 The Queen v. PB Ready-Mix Concrete, (1956), 5 100 188 D.L.R. (2d) 268 at 270 (Ex. Ct) 118 The Taff Vale Railway v. Amalgamated Society of 93 163 Railway Servants, [1901] A.C. 426, 70 L.J.K.B. 905 (U.K.H.L.) 119 Thorpe v. Brumfitt, 1871 T. 96, (1873) [LR] 8 Ch. 75 122 App. 650, 37 J.P. 742 120 Townsend v. Kroppmans, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 315 102 193, 194, 196 121 Trizec Equities Ltd. v. Ellis-Don Management 109 203 Services Ltd., 1999 ABQB 801 (CanLII), (1999) 251 A.R. 101 122 U.F.C.W. v. L.M.L. Foods Inc. [1985] O.L.R.B. 91 153 Rep. 1252 123 USWA v. Gaspe Copper, [1970] S.C.R. 362 96, 98 170, 183 124 Vancouver Machinery Depot Ltd. v. United Steel 95 168 Workers of America et al, [1948] 2 W.W.R. 325, [1948] 4 D.L.R. 518, 1948 CarswellBC 51 125 Vriend v. Alberta, [1994] AJ No. 272 (Alta. O’Neil Factum O’Neil Q.B.), 152 A.R. 1 (Q.B.) 123 Factum 108 viii
126 Walker Estate v. York Finch General Hospital, 75 122 [2001] 1 S.C.R. 647 127 White v. Jones, [1995] 2 W.L.R. 187, 1995 WL 37 62 1082613 (HL), [1995] 1 All E.R. 691 128 Williams v. New Brunswick, 34 C.C.L.T. 299, 34 53 1985 CarswellNB 80 (C.A.)
TEXTS 129 Allen M. Linden & Bruce Feldthusen, Canadian 35 57 Tort Law (8th ed.) (Markham:Butterworths, 2006), pp. 108-110 130 American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) of 37 62 Torts: Liab. Physical Harm ss. 39, 42-43 (P.F.D. No. 2, 2005) (WLeC) 131 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental O’Neil Factum O’Neil Disorders (4th ed.) (Washington, D.C.: American 55 Factum Psychiatric Association) 42 132 Hazel Carty, "Joint Tortfeasor and Assistance 85 143 Liability" (1999) 19 Legal Stud. 489, p. 489 133 Justice A.M. Linden, “The State of Canadian Tort O’Neil Factum O’Neil Law”, paper delivered to The National Judicial 22 Factum Institute in Ottawa, June 11, 2008 @ pages 16 – 17 24 134 Linden, “Viva Donoghue v. Stevenson” in Burns, O’Neil Factum O’Neil Q.C., P.T. and Lyons, Susan J., eds., Donoghue v. 24 Factum Stevenson and the Modern Law of Negligence: 19 The Paisley Papers (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1991) 135 Michael MacNeil, Michael Link & Peter 90, 92 153, 158 Engelmann, Trade Union Law in Canada, (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 2008) 136 Richard W. Wright, “Acts and Omissions as 75 122 Positive and Negative Causes” in Jason W. Neyers, Erika Chamberlain & Stephen O.A. Pitel, eds. “Emerging Issues in Tort Law” (Hart Publishing, 2007) 137 Robert D. Malen, Assessment vs. Fixing of Costs: 109 203 Emerging Principles, [2001] 24 Advocates Quarterly 230 138 Sales, Philip, “The Tort of Conspiracy and Civil 96 170 Secondary Liability”, Cambridge Law Journal, 49(3), pp. 491-514 ix
139 Sopinka, Lederman and Bryant, The Law of O’Neil Factum O’Neil Evidence in Canada 2d (Toronto: Butterworths) 123 Factum p. 1055 108
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depens
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personne
conjoint
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comme
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Telephone:
Fax:
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P.O.
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presence
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42.
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(regle 83)
Partie 1 — Honoraires du procureur
1. Demande d’autorisation d’appel a) redaction d’une demande d’autorisation d’appel ou d’une demande d’autorisation d’appel incident, ou d’une réponse a l’une de celles-ci Ci) sur dossier présenté par 800 $ écrit (ii) lorsqu’une audience est tenue 1 00 0$ b) si aucune réponse n’est déposée, étude d’une demande 300 $ d’autorisation d’appel ou d’une demande d’autorisation d’appel incident, a la discretion du registraire, jusqu’à c) redaction du premier exemplaire de la demande d’autorisation 1,35- d’appel, de la demande d’autorisation d’appel incident, de la $ réponse ou de la réplique, la page Requête a) redaction d’une requête ou d’une réponse a une requête (i) sur dossier présenté par 300 $ écrit (ii) lorsqu’une audience est tenue 800 $
b) si aucune réponse n’est déposée, étude d’une requête, a la 200 $ discretion du registraire, jusqu’à c) supplement pour la redaction du premier exemplaire de la 1,35-
Copr. © West 2008 No Claim to Orig. Govt. Works
END
A
Partie
4.
3.
DORS/2002-156,
DORS/2002-156,
Ia
4.
ectives
recherche
3.
compris
2.
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discretion
OF
b)
Les
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c) a)
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2
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Débours
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West
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Canada
de
prévus
2008
l’objet
(ii)
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nécessairement
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Les
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Note:
INCLUDING
WORKERS’
Note:
S.N.W.T.
S.N.W.T. S.N.W.T.
S.N.W.T.
S.N.W.T.
S.N.W.T.
S.N.W.T.
S.N.W.T.
S.N.W.T.
S.N.W.T.
S.N.W.T.
S.N.W.T.
S.N.W.T.
S.N.W.T.
S.NW.T.
S.N.W.T.
S.N.W.T. S.N.WT.
S.N.W.T.
S.N.W.T. R.S.N.W.T.
R.S.N.W.T.
R.S.N.W.T.
S.N.W.T.
R.S.N.W.T.
In
section
SI-002-200
In
which
In
came
SI-006-200
sections
In
In
which
In
S1-009-98
In see
In
for
In
see
SI-008-93
In
for
In
force
force
force
force force
force
force
force
force
force
force
transitional
s.3
s.3
transitional
into
2003,c.
2002,c.25
2002,c.24
2000,c.
2000,c.2
2000,c.
came
2000,c.
2000,c.8
1999,c.25
1999,c.2
1998,c.28
came 1998,c.44
1998,c.27
1
3 1997,c.12
1997,c.22
I 1995,c.1
1996,c.9
1994,c.9
1991-1992,c.28
January
January and
998,c.
July
and
996,c.
March
January
3
December
July
January
in
April
July
May
1988,c.8(Supp.)
1988,c.70(Supp.) 1988,c.28(Supp.)
1988,c.W-6
force
COMPENSATION
to
AMENDMENTS
1
1
force
into
s.4
s.4
into
6
7,
18
11
12
11
1,1998;
19,
17
17
8,
which
1
16,
2000,
26,
October
1
of
of
1,
1, force
1,
April
provisions.
1989
force
1,
provisions.
1993;
2003
S.N.W.T.
2001
S.N.W.T.
1996
1999,
1999
9,
1998
except
April 1998,
March
15,
1,2001;
except
2001;
except
15,
s.3
1996,c.17
1991-1992,c.28
31,
2001
MADE
1999
s.2
ACT
BY
Nota
Nota:
MODIFIEE
LOI
L.T.N.-O.
L.T.N.-O.
L.T.N.-O.
L.T.N.-O.
L.T.N.-O.
L.T.N.-O.
L.T.N.-O.
L.T.N.-O.
L.T.N.-O.
L.T.N.-O.
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L.T.N.-O.
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DU
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TR-002-200
L’article
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28,
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art.
2003,
2002,
2002,
2000,
2000,
2000,
2000,
2000,
les
1999,
1999,
1998,
1998,
1998,
1998,
LES
1997,
1997, 1996,
3
1996,
1995,
1994,
199
3
pour
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en
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3
1988,
1988,
dispositions 1988,
3
1988,
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1janvier i
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ACCIDENTS
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dispositions
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ch.
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W-6
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L.T.N.-O.
le
L.T.N.-O.
1989
(Suppl.)
2000,
1999,
15
(Suppl.)
(Suppl.)
31 1996
28
transitoires.
2003
1998;
2001
1993;
2001;
1999
1998
avril
1998,
mars
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sauf
sauf
15
2001
transitoires.
1996,
1999
sauf
199
avril
pour
pour
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pour
ch.
2001;
l’article
les
17,
L’article
3 2
Fax:
Telephone:
Yellowknife
P.O.
5102-50th
Canarctic
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address:
consolidation
Volumes
Clerk Any
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C.P.
5102,
Canarctic
Territoires
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en
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28,
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2003;
2003;
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pas 3(l)e),
constitue
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dans
31
On
les
tdans et
avec:
Nord
peut
Lois
titre
des
pas
les au
subsection
Application
or
employers
against
No
Sat
to
Entitlement
correctional
institutions
Persons
workers
compen
iOn
action
(2)
in
of
an
course
result personal
against
his
determined
compensation,
12.
entitled
person
S.N.W.T. public
to
engaged,
person
alternative
institution
person.
dependants,
spouse, the
otherwise other
compensation
action
(2.01)
which
RIGHTS
or
(2)
(1)
discretion
(6)
her
of
of
dependants
service
is
is
another
(b)
to
(a)
to
No
No
injury
Subsection a
his
Where
an
working
be
found
legal
this
2003,c.18,s.1
be
woman
payable
compensation.
under
by
sentence
an
personal
engaged
applies,
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action
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Act
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not
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OF
or
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(i)
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action
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and the
may
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for
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of
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or
worker
by
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a
insurance. employment, applies,
covered transportation,
operation
ACTION
under
Motor accident
a
a
operation
Motor
a
accident
the
person
the
outside
mode Board.
the
death
all
shall
motor employment,
motor
applies,
or
the
to
employment, of
be
was
was
(2)
in
injury
as
other
or
claims
Corrections
man Board,
arising
purposes
held by
the
Board
lies
does
an
Vehicles
caused to
or
1.
Vehicles
be
this representative
in
not
acting
of
the
as
suffered
is
in
a
the
by
vehicle,
vehicle
be
occurred
occurred
industry AND respect
person,
of
an
brought
referred
by
transportation,
committed
than
the S.N.W.T.
worker,
or
the
an
acting
of
not
for
a
case
for
institution
to
a be
Act,
a
the
employer
out
death
worker
or
industry
in
by case
motor
where
person
compensation
be
apply of
such
Act,
paid
Act,
policy or incarceration
SUBROGATION
unless
Board
the
the by
of
Act
as
of
in
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as
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to
the
or
may
while
is
while worker
the
the
or
or
the
course
defined
to
and
vehicle,
so defined
which
the
1997,c.12,
employer
employed
a
to
or
in
attributable
by
or
if
a
employer Act,
shall,
by
in
by
to
worker,
in
person
recovery
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in
course
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of
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section
is
dependants,
accident
there
any
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other
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correctional
trust
during
which
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to
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respect
the
serving
unless
dependent
otherwise
liability
of
or
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but
while
permit
or
industry
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in
use or
use
in
and
his
may,
for
of
other
are
other
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or
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in
was
Act
was
as
the 28
s.19;
this
the
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of
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or
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to
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by
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in
18
permettre
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travailleur,
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decide
indemnité
12.
art.
admissible
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comme
loi
l’établissement
correctionnels
que
de
Commission
a
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discretion
a
a
travailleur
(2.01)
une
son
pas
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charge,
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(2)
19;
(1)
correction
de
l’incarcération
DROITS
(6)
Ia
des
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emploi,
considérée,
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Ia
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de
de
a
Aucune
b)
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Commission
a)
28,
La
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conditions
en
ne de
a
son
sa
personnes
accident
par
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l’employeur
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industrie
survenu,
de
l’autre
personne
Ia
(ii)
elle
a
ou
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paragraphe
travailleur,
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(i)
en
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charge
D’ACTION
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son représentant
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en
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2003,
Loi,
membre
action
Loi
travailleur
loi,
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bisque
de
homme vertu
l’usage
véhicule
tout
par
mode
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personnes
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impliquant:
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ou
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suivantes:
contre
visée
incarcérée
par
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lesions
sur
transport,
juge
a
sauf
selon
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l’employeurn’etaitpas
pour
par ou
ch.
par
en
son
les
industrie
était
(2)
que
intentée
de
donner
automobile,
automobile,
charge,
ne
les
de
accident
en
ET une
par
de
Ia
l’accident
travaillant
ou
an
une
s’il
Ic Ia
18,
véhicules
représentant
ou
automobile, ailleurs
n’a
peut par
Ic
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personnel
étre
ou agissait
L.T.N.-O.
lorsque
Ia
ne
corporelles
véhicules
Ia
transport
n’agissait
presente
d’une
SUBROGATION
Loi
a
Ia
peine
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décês
Ia
recouvrement art.
cas,
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fonction
police
durée
clans
sa
une
Loi,
se
pas
et
versée
Ia
visée
conduite
étre
a
ailleurs
et être
personne.
charge,
du
11.
sur
mais
l’accident
realise
travailleur
de
conduite
toute
industrie
un
au
Ia
est
droit
pour
selon
résultait
d’une
intentée
au a
l’accident fait
femme
automobiles,
de
d’assurance
loi,
par
rechange
gardée
automobiles
autre
pas
l’extérieur
cours
établissement
legal
1997, a
Commission
publique
survenu,
les
ou
au
sens
personnel
les
son
et
son
l’indemnité
ou,
Ia
travailleur
effet
d’un
peut,
Ic
l’une
demande
au
du
au
personae
sens
lesions présente
services
conjoint
qu’un
de
cas;
ou
travail,
ch.
par
de
d’une
s’il
visé
visée
cours
décês
était
d’un cours
ou
d’une
par
d’un
autre
son
de
tel
de
est
ou
a
Ia aux
les ou
un
un
12,
n’y
de
Ia
Ia
d’application
Champ
a
employeur
Un
contre
poursuite
Aucune
l’indemnité
Droit
établissement
de
dans
incarcérées
Personnes
travailleur
correction
a
un
Un ou
of
subrogation
Effect
Transitional
Restrictions
to
subrogated
Board
adjudication
for
Application
accidents
respecting
Presumptions
workers
employers
liability
Limited
workers
certain
liability
Limited
Board
action
of
for
and
for
representative
the
12, 13.
S.N.W.T. at
comes
accident. under
employer worker
worker
contribution
where the
of
that
or
and plaintiff’s
adjudication
other
this
subsections
worker
insurance. the
subparagraph
amount
any
worker
subparagraph
paragraph
worker
in
legal
the
dependants,
rights
personal
(1)
accident.
(6)
respect
(5)
a
(4)
determination
(3)
section.
(2.3)
(2.2)
policy
accident, (2.1)
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