features 1 The Concept Of A Decisive And The Key Takeaways For The Singapore Armed Forces by LTC Tan Wee Heng, Melvyn

Abstract:

The essay argues that a decisive battle, that is, a battle that allows for a swift and decisive victory, does not, in itself, decide the outcome of but, it can provide the operational advantage over the adversaries to accelerate the end of the war. This is illustrated through Commanding General Ulysses S. Grant’s strategies in the American Civil War. In addition, decisive are no longer confined to the traditional battle space and are not solely dependent on the use of hard power, as illustrated by the Battle of Fallujah. The author concludes that in order to astutely apply the concept of decisive battles in its strategies, the Singapore Armed Forces needs to be clear on our nation’s concept of victory, continue honing our information operations capability and ensure that our professional education syllabi are designed to groom military professionals who can think, reflect and analyse.

Keywords: ; Victory; Art of War; Strategy; Power

INTRODUCTION as it seems. Often times, we tend to embrace the

A rapid battlefield victory has traditionally been idea of decisive battle as the key towards achieving the aim of conventional operational warfare. From a decisive victory. This relationship is valid but in the German army in 1914, with its objective of a our application, we tend to be overly simplistic and six-week victory over France, through the German neglect to consider the contextual factors. Today, we in Two (WWII) to Israel’s Six Day are increasingly operating in a politically kaleidoscopic War against Egypt in 1967, the goal of these military strategic environment where the value of hard power operations has been to achieve a rapid operational is no longer absolute and the strategic narrative is victory. This need to achieve a quick victory of proving its utility as an effective means of warfare. annihilation is made even more critical to countries Unless we start distilling and embracing the essence that lack where, because of their of the decisive battle in reality, its full potential will size, any operational defeat would automatically have not be realised and the goal of achieving a swift and the gravest strategic consequences for the country.1 decisive victory will be impeded. Singapore is one example and this need to achieve “a DECONSTRUCTING THE IDEAL DECISIVE BATTLE swift and decisive victory” is explicitly spelt out in the mission statement of the Singapore Armed Forces Our misconception of the decisive battle largely (SAF).2 However, the ways and means of achieving a stems from a misinterpretation of the Clausewitzian swift and decisive victory is not as straightforward paradigm of war. Clausewitz, in his seminal work On

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War, started by defining war as “a duel on a larger Another fallacy that we have often fallen prey to, is scale” and as “an act of force to compel our enemy the belief that decisive battles will end the war and to do our will.”3 He goes on to emphasise the need result in lasting peace. However, as Clausewitz puts to exert the “maximum use of force” and added that it, “in war, the result is never final…even the ultimate “since time began, only great victories have paved outcome of war is not always to be regarded as final.”6 the way for great results.”4 By beginning with this The Battle of Austerlitz has often been cited as the perspective, Clausewitz had created an impression quintessential example of the ideal decisive battle that the results in battle decide the outcome of where, despite being numerically weaker, Napoleon war. More specifically, he highlighted that the use and his Grande Armee of France annihilated the larger of overwhelming force was the most Russian and Austrian armies and brought the War of effective way to compel the enemy into submission the Third Coalition to a rapid end.7 However, if it is and win the war. Up to this point, a superficial read true that decisive battles can produce permanent of Clausewitz will result in two misconceptions. outcomes, then results of the Battle of Austerlitz First, decisive battle will produce rapid and decisive should have prevented the War of the Fourth and Fifth strategic results and second, decisive battle can create Coalition from happening. Unfortunately, it did not permanent outcomes. This over-simplistic mindset and Napoleon would go on to be defeated. History misses the forest for the trees and clearly ignores the would go on to repeat itself when “Israel’s stunning complexities and uncertainties associated with war, success in 1967 turned to dust in the blood bath of a point that Clausewitz made in subsequent sections 1973, so too did Saddam Hussein’s launching of the of his book. In actual fact, Clausewitz’s intent by Iraqi armies in 1980 [which] result[ed] in needless beginning with framing war in its ideal form was to slaughter—and decided nothing.”8 bring out the uncertainties in reality. This was clearly

emphasised by Clausewitz when he duly noted that In summary, by closely studying Clausewitz, as we “move from the abstract to the real world…the there are two key takeaways. First, in reality, war whole thing looks quite different.”5 is complex and uncertain. There are just too many different factors affecting “the outcome of a battle, This need to achieve a quick victory campaign, or series of campaigns that can rarely all of annihilation is made even more favor a quick [and decisive] result.”9 Second, war critical to countries that lack strategic is an interactive affair between emotional living depth where, because of their size, any forces. Therefore, outcomes are never permanent and governments must “never assume that its country’s operational defeat would automatically fate, its whole existence, hangs on the outcome of have the gravest strategic consequences a single battle, no matter how decisive.”10 Outcomes for the country. are just “transitory evil from which a remedy may still be found…at some later date.”11 However, this is not In reality, decisive battles do not decide the to say that the concept of decisive battle is a fallacy. outcome of war and, more specifically, results in More accurately speaking, decisive battles do exist in the battlefield do not produce permanent outcomes. reality but in a different form and substance.

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Napoleon and his Grande Armee at the decisive battle of Waterloo.

DECISIVE BATTLE IN REALITY providing the Union with the operational advantage in achieving the overall objective of conquering In reality, decisive battles do not decide the Vicksburg. Similarly, the Battle of Midway in 1942 did outcome of war but they allow military forces to not rapidly bring about the end of WWII but, it did gain a marked operational advantage over their allow the (US) Forces in the Pacifi c to adversaries and help accelerate the end of war. This gain an operational advantage over the Japanese and value of decisive battle was duly noted by Clausewitz signalled the turning point of the war in favour of the when he highlighted that “we regard a great battle as Allied Forces.15 a decisive factor in the outcome of a war or campaign, but not necessarily as the only one.”12 Simply put, a decisive battle in reality is not about “decision In reality, decisive battles do not in battle” but “advantage in war.”13 This can be decide the outcome of war and, more illustrated through Commanding General Ulysess S. specifi cally, results in the battlefi eld Grant’s strategies in the American Civil War. Unlike General Robert Edward Lee of the Confederates, do not produce permanent outcomes. Commanding General Grant “entertained no illusions Another fallacy that we have often about being able to destroy enemy armies in a single fallen prey to, is the belief that decisive battle” and viewed “battles as means rather than as battles will end the war and result in ends.”14 This was evident in the Vicksburg Campaign lasting peace. of 1862-1863 where the Union fought fi ve battles enroute to Vicksburg but none of these battles were In addition, decisive battles are no longer confi ned considered to be decisive in Commanding General to the traditional battle space (air, land and sea) and Grant’s strategy. Instead, these battles, such as the are not restricted to the use of physical force. With Battle of Port Gibson, were considered critical in the introduction of cyber confl ict as one of the new

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domains of warfare, the idea of using computers as higher level of transparency and memories of the a viable means of decisive battle is picking up pace past.”18 Zbignew Brzezinski once termed this modern in recent times. One such idea is the Acupuncture phenomenon as the “global political awakening” War, a term first coined in a 1997 People’s Liberation and warned that “for the first time in history almost Army Defence University publication, describing a all of humanity is politically activated, politically paralysing massive cyber-attack designed to make the conscious and politically interactive.”19 Emile Simpson “first battle the last battle.”16 The growing influence of takes Brzezinski’s point further by describing how information technology in warfare has also expanded this “global political awakening” has changed the the battle space and seeded the idea that combat in strategic environment where 21st century combat is the 21st century has transited from a ‘battle of wills’ now taking place in a “fragmented [and] politically to a ‘battle of ideas’. The US experience in Operation kaleidoscopic battle space.”20 This challenges our Enduring Freedom (OEF) best exemplifies this point. traditional understanding of war and directly impacts In 2004, the US military leadership believed that the value of the decisive battle. occupying and winning the Battle of Fallujah would Traditionally, war has often been understood be decisive, but they quickly discovered that the as a polarised contest. This can be seen through insurgents did not interpret the battle in the same Clausewitz’s definition of war where he defines war way. US forces sought to annihilate Al Qaeda in as “a duel on a larger scale” and uses the analogy of Fallujah, yet quickly found that through social media a pair of wrestlers to emphasise the idea of polarity and the internet, alternative ideas had already spread in war.21 The concept of polarity is important in the throughout the region which brought thousands of traditional understanding of war because it clearly foreign fighters to Al Qaeda’s cause. While Fallujah identifies a winner and a loser as the decisive battle was a tactical victory, it was “just the opening salvo” provides the means for a nation to accomplish its of a brutal war of ideas.17 In sum, decisive battles are strategic objective and gain a decisive victory. For not confined to the realms of the traditional battle example, in WWII, there were no questions about space and ‘wielding the hammer’ is no longer the who the winners and losers were. However, the same best means to achieve decisive victories. The value cannot be said about the Vietnam War, the Korean and characteristics of decisive battles in reality is War or, more recently, OEF. This is because in a attributed to three contextual factors: the increasing politically kaleidoscopic environment, war takes place politically kaleidoscopic environment, the reducing in a fragmented environment where there are no clear value of hard power and the growing utility of polarities, no clearly opposing objectives and, as a strategic narratives. result, no mutually exclusive outcomes.22 In other THE INCREASING POLITICALLY KALEIDOSCOPIC words, results in decisive battles are not as significant STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT at the strategic level as originally thought. The strategic environment has changed. The The situation is further compounded by the effects contemporary strategic environment is characterised of globalisation where it “catalyses the importance of by “rising mass passions fuelled by various forces— strategic audience who are external to one’s state or economic success, national pride, higher levels the enemy’s state.”23 The emergence of this group of of education, greater access to information with

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strategic audience who is not aligned to either side of and with 8.5 million made homeless, the will of the war further blurs the defi nition of winning or losing, Japanese hardly cracked.25 This fi nding was captured reduces the value of hard power and emphasises the in the 1944 MacArthur study which noted that “the need for a coherent strategic narrative. Japanese were too adaptable and inured to hardship to be affected by bombing.”26 Post war assessment THE REDUCING VALUE OF HARD POWER done by the US Strategic Bombing Survey also War in the Clausewitzian paradigm assumes that concurred with the fi ndings from the aforementioned the adversary has a low tolerance for casualties. To study where it also highlighted that, despite the exploit the opponent’s casualty adverse mentality, Japanese public confi dence declining from 81% Clausewitz calls for the “maximum use of force” to 32% after Le May’s incendiary attacks in 1945, in order to compel the enemy into submission.24 the “people’s morale never cracked, and faith, stoicism Unfortunately, such an assumption neglects to and apathy enabled them to endure the horrors consider other motivational forces that might impel suffered at the hands of the US Army Air Forces 27 the enemy to accept a high casualty rate. Nationalism (USAAF).” Clearly, the effectiveness of hard power is one such motivational force and the Japanese and to force the opponent into submission had declined the Viet Congs are examples of such adversaries. and history would repeat itself again in Vietnam 20 years later. During the later stages of WWII, the Japanese were Despite multiple aerial bombardment operations subjected to incendiary attacks by the Allied Forces against the Viet Cong, the military might of the US did to little effect. Despite being hit across 66 cities, not affect the morale of the Viet Cong to the extent of resulting in the deaths of 330,000 Japanese civilians Wikipedia

A Japanese woman and her child outside their bombed home in Ebisu, Tokyo.

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forcing them into complete submission. Between 1965 strategic narrative instead of renewing blind faith on and 1972, there were several key aerial bombardment military hardware. operations executed by the US against the Viet Cong. THE GROWING EMPHASIS ON THE STRATEGIC These include Operation Rolling Thunder, Operation NARRATIVE Linebacker I and Operation Linebacker II. The North Vietnamese were asymmetrically disadvantaged but The world is progressing towards being an yet, they were able to put up a credible resistance to information society—one in which the production, diffusion and consumption of information dominates nullify the effectiveness of US airpower. The futility the cultural, economic and political spheres of life of US hard power in Vietnam is best summed up by a in the country.30 This progression is one reason why conversation between Colonel (COL) Harry Summers Rupert Smith in his seminal work, The Utility of Force, and a North Vietnamese officer. As COL Summers argues that there is a paradigm shift in war—a shift commented, “the US had won all the battles,” to from an 'inter-state industrial war' to 'war amongst which the North Vietnamese replied, “that may be so, the people.'31 Simpson further crystallises Smith’s but it is also irrelevant.”28 Decisive battles executed argument by using the juxtaposing analogies of through the use of hard power no longer guarantee a boxing match versus a street fight to distil the military outcomes that will deliver a conclusive difference between 'inter-state industrial war'and political result. 'war amongst the people.' By using these analogies, Simpson’s point is that, unlike in a boxing match Additionally, the Clausewitzian notion that the (inter-state war) where there is an independent use of force is the best way to compel our enemy judge to hand out a mutually accepted verdict to to do our will is also being challenged. The goal the boxers, there is no neutral judge in a street of the traditional decisive battle is to use an fight (war amongst the people) and the audience overwhelming offensive force, create a tremendous are judges in their own right.32 As Simpson puts it, amount of physical destruction and coerce the “War is not a single, fixed, interpretive construct adversary into submission. However, the terms because audiences can understand war in their own of the 1973 Paris Peace Accord were based on the way.”33 Therefore, 'war amongst the people' is more terms jointly negotiated and agreed between then about a battle of ideas through the exploitation US National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger and of the strategic narrative rather than a battle of North Vietnamese Politburo member, Le Duc Tho, and wills executed through the destructive nature of not solely dictated by the US. It is also noteworthy physical force. to highlight that subsequent US attempts to include additional terms into the Paris Peace Accord were Strategic narrative is the explanation of actions.34 futile.29 In other words, despite inflicting a huge In essence, strategic narrative attempts to explain the amount of physical destruction unto North Vietnam, ‘why’ behind the ‘what’ and is designed to persuade the Vietnam War did not end solely on US terms. people of something. This need for a coherent set can no longer be won through the application of pure of strategic narrative is especially emphasised in military force. As we transit into a different paradigm the contemporary strategic environment where the of war, there needs to be a better exploitation of the strategic audience is highly fragmented, politically

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conscious, highly educated, inter-connected and and political victories ever.”36 In the Clausewitzian has greater access to information at a much faster paradigm, war is complex, uncertain and transient. pace. As a result, physical actions tend to matter less This notion cannot be more true today. to a confl ict’s outcome than how those actions are THE THREE TAKEAWAYS FOR THE SAF: being perceived.35 More specifi cally, from a military Takeaway #1: Our concept of victory must be clear perspective, there is now an added dimension to the concept of ‘means and effects’. Any military action Based on the discussion above, there are three takeaways for the SAF. First, we must be clear about will create an effect but it cannot be assumed that the effect will be interpreted the same across the our concept of victory. To reiterate, decisive battles strategic audience. This is because amongst the provide the operational advantage but they do not strategic audience, there are many divergent actors decide the outcome of war. Therefore, we must avoid with various objectives which may be confl icting. equating operational military success to victory For example, the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war has been that can serve the country’s strategic interests. In considered to be a war of competing narratives. The the words of former Under Secretary of Defense for lack of consonance between strategic narratives from Policy, Dr. Fred Ikle, we must avoid a situation where both sides has gone to the extent where the winner we become blinded by our own military success to the or loser cannot be easily identifi ed. To the Hezbollah, extent where “the means become ends.“37 To do so, we they cited their survival and endurance against massive Israeli attacks as reasons to claim a divine victory. To must remain grounded in the value proposition of the the Israelis, they boasted its airpower achievements military to the larger scheme of things. The military and declared the war to be Israel’s “greatest military is a tool of statecraft and, in war, our objective is to MINDEF

The motto of the Singapore Armoured Regiment is Swift and Decisive. Pictured is a Singapore Army Bionix fi ghting vehicle.

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establish military conditions to facilitate a political apart.”41 To that end, we must strive to ensure that our solution.38 Hence, borrowing J.B Bartholomees’ strategic narratives are calibrated and consistent in definition, our concept of victory should be described order to convince. Key to this would be to constantly as “a positive assessment of the post-war political stay abreast with societal changes, both domestic situation in terms of achievement and decisiveness and international. that is acknowledged, sustainable, and resolves underlying political issues.”39 Takeaway #3: Our Professional Military Education (PME) syllabi must continue to be academically On a related note, we must also be aware that rigorous victory is a matter of perception and is not “a Finally, we need to broaden the perspectives of 40 fact or condition.” This is an important takeaway our military commanders to avoid parochialism and because the implication is that victory will be rigidity. War is an art not a science. In designing defined based on the effects, and not the effort. The strategies, we must avoid falling into the trap situation is further complicated by the contemporary of believing that there is a winning formula or a kaleidoscopic strategic environment. In response to scientific model that can be applied to unravel the this, when designing our military strategies, we need complexities of war. Specifically, when applying the to go deeper and consider the following: (a) who concept of the decisive battle to achieve a swift and are the strategic audience, (b) who are our target decisive victory, we need to be contextual, objective strategic audience and finally, (c) how the created and apply sound judgment. On this, Clausewitz effects will be perceived by these target strategic encouraged the development of a rigorous military audience. To that end, it is important for us to exploit education programme—syllabi that not only the strategic narrative and shape public opinion. breeds inquisitive and analytical minds but also equip commanders with knowledge, especially on Takeaway #2: Our information operations capability .42 To that end, we should review the must remain responsive, calibrated and nuanced curriculum of all our Officer PME programmes and Second, we must ensure that our information ensure that each syllabus is designed to meet the operations capability remain responsive, targeted spirit of military education—think critically, reflect and nuanced. This way, we are in a better position objectively and analyse deeply. In other words, we to exploit the strategic narratives to our favour. must not confuse training for education. This is not something new and the effectiveness of strategic narratives in shaping public opinion to one’s Decisive battles do not decide the benefit has been played out many times in history. outcome of war but, when used correctly, From the hailing of Sultan Suleiman as a national they can provide the operational hero despite his failed attempt to take Vienna in 1529 to the conflicting interpretations of US intentions advantage to win the war. in its invasion of Iraq in 2003. The challenge for CONCLUSION the strategic narrative today is “to consider how a In conclusion, achieving a swift and decisive narrative can gain purchase on audiences whose victory is an attainable goal but we must avoid having political persuasions vary widely, without coming a simplistic understanding and application of its key

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component—the decisive battle. Decisive battles Means More A Than Just Getting There Quickly.” Armed do not decide the outcome of war but, when used Forces Journal International, October 2000: 60-64. correctly, they can provide the operational advantage Kanwal, Gurmeet, China’s New War Concepts for 21st to win the war. Also, given the contextual factors, Century Battlefields, Institute of Peace and Conflict decisive battles are no longer confined to the Studies, July 2007, No. 48 traditional battle-space and are not solely dependent Keegan, John, The Second World War, New York: on the use of hard power. In order to astutely apply Penguin, 2005 the concept of decisive battles in our strategies, the Lipsman, Samuel, Stephen Weiss, et al., The False Peace: SAF needs to be clear about our concept of victory, 1972–74, Boston: Boston Publishing , 1985 continue honing our information operations capability McChrystal, Stanley. My Share of the Task: A Memoir New and ensure that our professional military education York: Penguin Publishing Group, 2013 syllabi are designed to groom military professionals Mission of the Ministry of Defence and the Singapore who can think, reflect and analyse.  Armed Forces, http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/about_ us/mission.html

Murray, Williamson. Napoleon’s Flawed Legacy, MHQ: The BIBLIOGRAPHY Quarterly Journal of Military History, Autumn 1989

Bartholomees, J.B., A Theory of Victory, J.B. Bartholomees Peter Paret, The Cognitive Challenge of War: Prussia 1806, ed., US Army War College Guide to National Security Princeton University Press, 2009 Issues Vol 1: Theory of War and Strategy, 3rd Edition Simpson, Emile, War from the Ground up: Twenty-first

Brzezinski, Zbignew, The Global Political Awakening, 16 Century Combat as Politics, Hurst & Co, 2012 December 2008. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/16/opini Smith, Rupert, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the on/16ihtYEbrzezinski.1.18730411.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 Modern World, Knopf, 2005

Castells Manuel and Gustavo Cardoso ed. The Network Summers Jr. H.G, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Society: From Knowledge to Policy, Washington D.C: Center Vietnam War, California: Presidio, 1982 for Transatlantic Relations, 2005 Zakaria, Fareed, The Post American World, N.Y: W.W Norton Citino, Robert M. Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm: The Evolution & Company, 2012 of Operational Warfare. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2004 ENDNOTES Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. New Jersey, Princeton 1. Citino, Robert M. Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm: The Evolution University Press, 1989 of Operational Warfare, (Larence, KS: University of Kansas, 2004), p.153 Clodfelter, Mark. Beneficial Bombing. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2010 2. Mission statement of the Ministry of Defence and the Singapore Armed Forces. http://www.mindef.gov.sg/ Conrad C. Crane, American Airpower Strategy in Korea imindef/about_us/mission.html. Accessed on 15 Feb 2015 1950-1953, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2000 3. Clausewitz, Carl von. On War, Edited and translated by Ikle, Fred. Every War must End, N.Y: Columbia University Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (New Jersey, Princeton Press, 1991 University Press, 1989), p.75. Jones, James L., GEN. “What’s in a Word? Expeditionary 4. Ibid, p.260.

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5. Ibid, p.78. 23. Ibid, p.69.

6. Ibid, p.80. 24. Ibid, p.75.

7. Peter Paret, The Cognitive Challenge of War: Prussia 25. Clodfelter, Mark, Beneficial Bombing, (Lincoln, NE: 1806, (Princeton University Press, 2009), p.131. University of Nebraska Press, 2010), p.2.

8. Murray, Williamson, Napoleon’s Flawed Legacy (1989), 26. Conrad C. Crane, American Airpower Strategy in Korea 1950-1953, (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History, 2000), p.13. Autumn, p.101. 27. Clodfelter, Mark, Beneficial Bombing, (Lincoln, NE: 9. Jones, James L., GEN. “What’s in a Word? Expeditionary University of Nebraska Press, 2010), p.232. Means More A Than Just Getting There Quickly.” (Armed Forces Journal International, 2000), 60-64, p.613. 28. Summers Jr. H.G, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, (California: Presidio, 1982), p.1. 10. Clausewitz, Carl von. On War, Edited and translated by 29. Lipsman, Samuel, Stephen Weiss, et al., The False Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (New Jersey, Princeton Peace: 1972–74, (Boston: Boston Publishing Company, University Press, 1989), p.483. 1985), p.21. 11. Ibid, p.80. 30. Castells Manuel and Gustavo Cardoso ed, The Network 12. Ibid, p.260. Society: From Knowledge to Policy, (Washington D.C: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2005), p.15 . 13. Ibid. 31. Smith, Rupert, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the 14. Ibid, p.142. Modern World, (Knopf, 2005), p.5.

15. Keegan, John, The Second World War, (New York: Penguin, 32. Simpson, Emile, War from the Ground up: Twenty-first 2005), p.275. Century Combat as Politics, (Hurst & Co, 2012), p.68.

16. Kanwal, Gurmeet, China’s New War Concepts for 21st 33. Ibid. Century Battlefields, (Institute of Peace and Conflict 34. Ibid, p.179 Studies, 2007) , No. 48, p.4. 35. Ibid. 17. McChrystal, Stanley, My Share of the Task: A Memoir, 36. Ibid. (New York: Penguin Publishing Group, 2013), p.145. 37. Ikle, Fred, Every War must End, (N.Y: Columbia University 18. Zakaria, Fareed, The Post American World, (N.Y: W.W Press, 1991), p.13 Norton & Company, 2012), p.36. 38. Simpson, Emile, War from the Ground up: Twenty-first 19. Brzezinski, Zbignew, The Global Political Awakening, Century Combat as Politics, (Hurst & Co, 2012), p.1 16 December 2008. http://www.nytimes. com/2008/12/16/opinion/16iht-YEbrzezinski.1.18730411. 39. Bartholomees, J.B., A Theory of Victory, J.B. Bartholomees ed., US Army War College Guide to National html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. Accessed on 18 Feb 2015. Security Issues Vol 1: Theory of War and Strategy, 3rd 20. Simpson, Emile, War from the Ground up: Twenty-first Edition, p.89 Century Combat as Politics, (Hurst & Co, 2012), p.5. 40. Ibid, p80. 21. Clausewitz, Carl von. On War, Edited and translated by 41. Simpson, Emile, War from the Ground up: Twenty-first Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (New Jersey, Princeton Century Combat as Politics, (Hurst & Co, 2012), p.181 University Press, 1989), p.75. 42. Clausewitz, Carl von. On War, Edited and translated by 22. Simpson, Emile, War from the Ground up: Twenty-first Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (New Jersey, Princeton Century Combat as Politics, (Hurst & Co, 2012), p.10. University Press, 1989), p.141

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LTC Tan Wee Heng, Melvyn is currently the Commanding Offi cer of 207 SQN. An Air Warfare Offi cer (Command, Control & Communications) by vocation, he attended the USAF Air Command and Course in 2012. LTC Melvyn holds a Bachelor of Arts from the National University of Singapore and a Masters of Military Operational Art and Science from the USAF Air University.

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