EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES – JOURNAL ON EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE OF THE WESTERN vVolOL.. 4,4, nNoO. .2 2 (7),(7), ppOC 151-160,TOBER 201 2October 2012

AttitudeAttitude ofof SocialistSocialist Sl Slovenia/ovenia/ YugoslaviaYugoslavia ttoo EEmergencemergence ooff EuropeanEuropean InIntegrationtegration PProcessesrocesses 1

Andrej Vrčon1

ABSTRACT This paper aims to examine the historical development of relations between the Europe- an Community and Slovenia/, while exploring the extent to which ideological

Slovenia/Yugoslavia with the emerging European integration processes. The paper pre- sents the development of Yugoslavia’s – and later Slovenia’s – path toward European in- tegration. It is clear that this path was heavily paved by economic motives, as the former Y ort to avoid reliance on the . In this respect, Slovenia’s example is unique due to the role it played, as the most developed republic of the former Yugoslavia, in planting the seeds of closer relations between the EEC and Yugoslavia in the 1970s and 80s.

KEYWORDS: European Integration, Slovenia, Yugoslavia, History, EEC, Economic Cooperation

INTRODUCTION2 resurgence in Western Europe. At the same time, the Soviet Union had lit- As a part of Yugoslavia, Slovenia found itself on the eastern side of the Iron Curtain. Following the dispute between Stalin and Tito (Informbiro) in June 1948, Yugoslavia retained the socialist order internally but attempted

1 CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESS: Andrej Vrčon, PhD Candidate, Faculty of Humanities, University of Primorska, and Acting director of Centre for European Perspective, Grajska cesta 1, 1234 Loka pri Men- gšu, Slovenia, e-mail: andrej. [email protected]. ISSN 1855-7694 © 2012 European Perspectives, UDK: 327 (4)

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2 toIntroduct realign iitson outward stance by adopting the role of an “outsider”, espe- cially in the framework of the Non-Aligned Movement (e.g. Pirjevec, 2011, 318-320,After the 390-396, end of 438-445,World War 670-673; II, US financial Jakovina, aid 2011). enabled The a conflictingnew economic na- tureresurgence of nurturing in Western the socialist Europe. system At the internallysame time, whilst the S ovietreaching Union out had to thelit- tleWest difficulty and its completelyin bringing different Eastern setEuropean of political countries ideals under proved its control.an obsta As- acle part to Yugoslaviaof Yugoslavia, in conducting Slovenia found its foreign itself policyon the andeastern resulted side inof constantthe Iron Curtain.fluctuations Following in cooperation the dispute with between the West. S talinYet despite and Tito the (Informbiro) difficulties, inthe Junepresence 1948, of Yugoslavia a mutual interestretained and the desiresocialist for order progress internally in relations but attempted enabled todisputes realign and its disagreementsoutward stance to by be adopting forgotten the quickly. role of Moreover, an “outsider”, due espe-to its ciallydevelopment in the framework concept based of the on Non- rapidAligned industrialisation, Movement (e.g.Yugoslavia Pirjevec, became 2011, 318-320,dependent 390-396, on financial 438-445, and 670-673;technical Jakovina,assistance 2011). from theThe West.conflicting As a result na- tureit was of forced nurturing to increase the socialist trade systemwith the internally West. What whilst is more,reaching in spiteout to of the its Westideological and its doubts, completely it could different not afford set ofto ignorepolitical the ideals European proved integration an obsta- cleprocesses to Yugoslavia that were in underwayconducting in its its foreign key trade policy partners and resulted(see Bogetić, in constant 2000). fluctuations in cooperation with the West. Yet despite the difficulties, the presence of a mutual interest and desire for progress in relations enabled disputesEmErGEnc andE of disagreements EuropEan int EGtoration be forgotten and idE oloquickly.Gical Moreover, oBstaclEs dueto to its developmentYuGoslav participation concept based on rapid industrialisation, Yugoslavia became dependent on financial and technical assistance from the West. As a result itIn was the earlyforced 1950s, to increase Yugoslavia’s trade withinterest the in West. building What closer is more, military in spite and of eco its- ideologicalnomic ties with doubts, the Westit could stemmed not afford primarily to ignore from the its inabilityEuropean to integrationfind other processesmeans of resistingthat were the underway pressure in from its key the tradeSoviet partners Union and (see its Bogetić, satellites. 2000). The complete suspension of economic ties with these countries pushed Yugo- slavia to the brink of economic collapse. Emergence of european integration and ideological obstacles to TheYugosl breakav pawithrt icStalinismipation and the introduction of a more flexible foreign policy became lasting political objectives, as Yugoslavia never returned under the So- vietIn the Union’s early wing.1950s, Self-governing Yugoslavia’s interest socialism in wasbuilding put forth closer as militarythe centrepiece and eco- of Partynomic ideology ties with following the West the stemmed Sixth Congress primarily of fromthe Communist its inability Party to find of Yugo other- slavia.means The of resisting Communist the pressureLeague of from Yugoslavia the Soviet would Union pursue and this its goal satellites. for the Thenext 40complete years (Režek, suspension 2005: 40-43).of economic With these ties withreforms these the countriesYugoslav socialistpushed regimeYugo- shedslavia elements to the brink of strict of economicStalinism, whilecollapse. by no means becoming democratic.

InThe economic break with policy, Stalinism the political and the leadershipintroduction would of a remainmore flexible committed foreign to onepolicy of becamethe focal lasting points political of Stalinism objectives, – the myth as Yugoslavia of rapid industrialnever returned develop un- mentder the – Sino- spite viet ofUnion’s its decision wing. Stoelf-governing distance itself socialism from the was ideology. put forth as the centrepiece of Party ideology following the Sixth Congress of the Com- munist Party of Yugo- slavia. The Communist League of Yugoslavia would Western aid was frequently used without regard to commitments given in pursue this goal for the next 40 years (Režek, 2005: 40-43). With these return to form a comprehensive investment programme as a means of im- plementing2 This article is partthe of goal the doctoral of establishing study, which awas self-sufficient partly co-financed economyby the European with Union emphasis through onthe Europeanthe heavy Social and Fund. military Co-financing industries. is carried Thisout within development the framework conceptof the Operational relied Proon- gramme for Human Resources Development for the period 2007-2013, 1st development priority »Promoting entrepreneurship and adaptability«. 142152 attitudE of socialist slovEnia/YuGoslavia to EmErGEncE of EuropEan intEGration procEssEs importsreforms ofthe equipment Yugoslav socialistfrom West regime which shed were elements financed of bystrict Western Stalinism, loans andwhile subsidies. by no means As a becomingresult Yugoslavia democratic. soon found itself in a position where it was forced to disregard its commitment to autarchy and export to the WestIn economic to obtain policy, foreign the currency. political Yugoslav leadership economic would policiesremain werecommitted therefore to inone constant of the focal collision points between of Stalinism the revolutionary – the myth of ideals rapid and industrial the imperatives develop- ofment development – in spite of (Bogetić, its decision 2000: to 273).distance This itself collision from the hindered ideology. cooperation and the conclusion of economic agreements with the West. As a result the YugoslavWestern aidleadership was frequently on one usedhand withoutclosely monitoredregard to commitments the emergence given of Eu in- ropeanreturn to integration form a comprehensive processes, while investment on the other programme refraining as a from means officially of im- commentingplementing the on goal the of Schuman establishing Declaration a self-sufficient (of May economy1950) and with the subseemphasis- quenton the creation heavy and of themilitary European industries. Coal and This Steel development Community concept (April 1951).relied on imports of equipment from West which were financed by Western loans Itand was subsidies. not until A Mays a result 1959 Yugoslaviathat Edvard soon Kardelj found assessed itself inin aan position article forwhere the Borbait was newspaperforced to disregard the establishment its commitment of the European to autarchy Economic and export Communi to the- tyWest (March to obtain 1957) foreign as a positive currency. development, Yugoslav economic while adding policies that were the thereforecommu- nityin constant should havecollision been between founded the on revolutionarya “socialist programme”(Sirc, ideals and the imperatives 2010: 168). Criticismof development of Stalinism (Bogetić, also 2000: encouraged 273). This debate collision on the divisionhindered of cooperation Party and stateand the authority. conclusion This of notioneconomic resonated agreements loudly with at the the SixthWest. ACongresss a result of thethe CommunistYugoslav leadership Party of onYugoslavia one hand taking closely place monitored in November the emergence 1950 in Zagreb. of Eu- Atropean the Congress integration the processes, Communist while Party on ofthe Yugoslavia other refraining renamed from itself officially to the Communistcommenting League on the of S chumanYugoslavia. Declaration The new (ofname May was 1950) supposed and theto symbol subse-- isequent the creation relinquishing of the ofEuropean the Leninist Coal concept and Steel of Community a central communist (April 1951). party. The Communists were to leave key offices and become merely “ideological guides”It was not whose until roleMay would 1959 that be toEdvard steer theKardelj political assessed and inideological an article educafor the- tionBorba of newspaper the masses. the The establishment bureaucratism, of the statism European and centralismEconomic Communi-of the Soviet modelty (March would 1957) be abandonedas a positive in development, favour of a proper while democratic adding that system the commu- which wouldnity should speed have up thebeen total founded withering on a “socialistaway of the programme”( State and theSirc, transition 2010: 168). to RealCriticism Communism of Stalinism (Režek, also 2005:encouraged 45-47). debate on the division of Party and state authority. This notion resonated loudly at the Sixth Congress of the TheCommunist Congress Party represented of Yugoslavia a radical taking break placewith Stalinismin November whilst 1950 enshrining in Zagreb. Self- GoverningAt the Congress Socialism the Communistas the fundamental Party ofgoal Yugoslavia that the Communist renamed itself League to the of YugoslaviaCommunist would League pursue of Yugoslavia. over the next The 40 new years. name A significantwas supposed part to of symbol- the de- liberationsise the relinquishing at the Congress of the wasLeninist dedicated concept to foreign of a central policy, communist which had party. been thrownThe Communists into disarray wereby the to Yugoslav-Sovietleave key offices dispute and and become the unresolved merely “ideological issue of Trieste.guides” Thesewhose openrole issueswould necessitated be to steer a theredefinition political andof relations ideological with educa-the West. tion of the masses. The bureaucratism, statism and centralism of theS oviet model would be abandoned in favour of a proper democratic system which In the foreign policy part of his address, the Secretary General of the Central would speed up the total withering away of the State and the transition to Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia stressed Real Communism (Režek, 2005: 45-47). that Yugoslav engagement in the world would be based on a principle of full equality and non-interference in internal affairs, whereby he made a special The Congress represented a radical break with Stalinism whilst enshrining point of highlighting the good relations with and Greece. Self- Governing Socialism as the fundamental goal that the Communist

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TheLeague political of Yugoslavia leadership would was pursueconcerned over that the nextYugoslavia 40 years. could A significantnot remain neutralpart of thein the de- event liberations of a Soviet at the attack, Congress which was is dedicatedwhy European to foreign military policy, in- tegrationwhich had processes been thrown were viewedinto disarray as a potential by the alternativeYugoslav-S (Režek,oviet dispute 2005: 47).and the unresolved issue of Trieste. These open issues necessitated a redefini- Duetion ofto relationsthe Soviet with threat the great West. emphasis was placed on examining the pos- sibilities for Yugoslavia's inclusion in Western defence systems. Neverthe- less,In the full foreign integration policy inpart NATO of his remainedaddress, the out S ecretaryof reach, General as this would of the Centralrequire YugoslaviaCommittee toof fundamentallythe Communist change Party ofits Yugoslavia political order, Josip Brozwhich Tito was stressed out of thethat question Yugoslav for engagement the Communist in the world Party. would Furthermore, be based the on aUS principle believed of that full Yugoslaviaequality and should non-interference serve as an in example internal for affairs, other wherebycountries he ofmade the Easterna special Blocpoint on of howhighlighting to loosen the relations good relations with the with Soviet Turkey Union and and Greece. that it could not perform this role as a member of NATO. European integration processes wereThe raisedpolitical as leadershipa possible alternativewas concerned to NATO. that Yugoslavia could not remain neutral in the event of a Soviet attack, which is why European military in- Integration early 1952 processes the prevailing were viewed view as wasa potential in favour alternative of a military (Režek, alliance 2005: 47).be- tween NATO, Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia. Negotiations ran until Febru- aryDue 1953, to the when Soviet an threat Agreement great emphasis of Friendship was placed and Cooperation on examining was the signed pos- betweensibilities Greece,for Yugoslavia’s Turkey andinclusion Yugoslavia in Western (Miloševič, defence 2007). systems. Neverthe- less, full integration in NATO remained out of reach, as this would require Yugoslavia to fundamentally change its political order, which was out of Due to mounting global tensions (the start of the Korean War), the US the question for the Communist Party. Furthermore, the US believed that demanded that Germany be rearmed. Faced with these demands French Yugoslavia should serve as an example for other countries of the Eastern Prime Minister René Pleven proposed on 27 May 1952 the creation of the Bloc on how to loosen relations with the Soviet Union and that it could not European Defence Community (EDC) following the example of the ECSC. perform this role as a member of NATO. European integration processes The purpose of this initiative was to establish a pan-European defence were raised as a possible alternative to NATO. force that would represent an alternative to West Germany’s membership of NATO. After signing an Annex to the on 28 February 1953, In early 1952 the prevailing view was in favour of a military alliance be- Yugoslavia was prepared to join such an initiative on tactical grounds re- tween NATO, Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia. Negotiations ran until Febru- lated primarily to unresolved issue of Trieste, since Italy was opposed to ary 1953, when an Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation was signed expanded inclusion of Yugoslavia in defence agreements with the West between Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia (Miloševič, 2007). (Dinian, 1999: 26; Pirjevec, 1995:196-201). But the French initiative would eventually fail, as it was rejected by the French Parliament during ratifica- Due to mounting global tensions (the start of the Korean War), the US tion. Subsequently the focus of defence integration shifted to the Western demanded that Germany be rearmed. Faced with these demands French European Union (WEU). Prime Minister René Pleven proposed on 27 May 1952 the creation of the European Defence Community (EDC) following the example of the The international situation would go on to improve as a consequence of the ECSC. The purpose of this initiative was to establish a pan-European de- conclusion of the Annex to the Balkan Pact on 28 February 1953 and the fence force that would represent an alternative to West Germany’s member- signing of the London Memorandum on 5 October 1954. Furthermore, the ship of NATO. After signing an Annex to the Balkan Pact on 28 February subsequent normalisation of diplomatic and trade ties with the Soviet Un- 1953, Yugoslavia was prepared to join such an initiative on tactical grounds ion presented Yugoslavia with new possibilities in relation to its inclusion re- lated primarily to unresolved issue of Trieste, since Italy was opposed in European defence integration (Pirjevec 1995:198). In its official declara- to expanded inclusion of Yugoslavia in defence agreements with the West tions the Yugoslav political leadership began to support European integra- (Dinian, 1999: 26; Pirjevec, 1995:196-201). But the French initiative would

144154 attitudE of socialist slovEnia/YuGoslavia to EmErGEncE of EuropEan intEGration procEssEs tioneventually that would fail, as not it bewas based rejected on military by the French integration Parliament of Western during Europe ratifica- but rathertion. S ubsequentlyon the surpassing the focus of the of bloc defence divisions integration in Europe. shifted to the Western European Union (WEU). WesternThe international countries situationheld a dominant would go position on to improve in Yugoslavia's as a consequence external ofeco the- nomicconclusion relations. of the In A nnexthe early to the 1960s, Balkan Yugoslav Pact on economic 28 February development 1953 and wasthe basedsigning predominantly of the London on Memorandum assistance from on 5 the October US and 1954. other Furthermore, Western coun the- triessubsequent (see Jakovina, normalisation 2002). ofThe diplomatic primary andpurpose trade ofties this with assistance the Soviet was Un- not toion promote presented economic Yugoslavia ties with but tonew provide possibilities for Yugoslav in relation autonomy to its inclusionfrom the Easternin European Bloc. defence America integration and Britain (Pirjevec believed 1995:198). that economic In its official consolidation declara- whichtions the would Yugoslav enable political the political leadership survival began of tothe support regime Europeanof Josip Broz integra- Tito andtion thatan improvement would not be inbased the onstandard military of integration life of Yugoslav of Western citizens Europe was butes- sential.rather on As the the surpassing biggest creditors, of the bloc the Americansdivisions in also Europe. sought to establish ties between Yugoslavia and the European Cooperation Administration (ECA) andWestern the Organizationcountries held for a dominantEuropean Economicposition in Cooperation Yugoslavia’s external(OEEC). eco-The Yugoslavnomic relations. authorities In the meanwhile early 1960s, pursued Yugoslav their economicideological development goal of promot was- ingbased cooperation predominantly with Non-Alignedon assistance countriesfrom the UinS anand effort other to Western maintain coun- eco- nomictries (see independence. Jakovina, 2002). Nevertheless, The primary trade purposewith these of countriesthis assistance did not was grow not asto expectedpromote economicand remained ties fairlybut to modest provide (KPR for Yugoslav 1-3-b/31; autonomy Lampe 1996: from 268) the Eastern Bloc. America and Britain believed that economic consolidation Allwhich the wouldwhile the enable role theof the political European survival Economic of the Community regime of Josip (EEC) Broz grew. Tito It wasand notan basedimprovement solely on in growing the standard trade but of also life on of industrialYugoslav andcitizens technical was coes-- operationsential. As and the closerbiggest financial creditors, ties, the Awhichmericans significantly also sought affected to establish external ties con- ditionsbetween for Yugoslavia economic and cooperation. the European The Cooperation members of theAdministration EEC represented (ECA an) increasinglyand the Organization important formarket European for Yugoslav Economic products, Cooperation ranging (OEEC).from agricul The- turalYugoslav produce authorities to industrial meanwhile goods. pursuedThe EEC their countries ideological were becoming goal of promot- increas- inglying cooperation important foreignwith Non- tradeAligned partners countries for Yugoslavia. in an effort Yugoslavia to maintain registered eco- steadynomic growthindependence. in trade Nevertheless, with the EEC trade countries, with these primarily countries with didItaly not and grow the Federalas expected Republic and remainedof Germany. fairly But modest as a result (KPR of this 1-3-b/31; exchange Lampe Yugoslavia 1996: 268)built a trade deficit with Western European countries. The biggest problem was theAll thestructure while theof the role deficit, of the Europeanstemming Economicfrom the factCommunity that imports (EEC) were grew. made It upwas mostly not based of industrial solely on growing products, trade whereas but also exports on industrial consisted and of technical agricultural co- operation and closer financial ties, which significantly affected external con- produce, textiles and raw materials (CEC PIGD: 1973: 4). ditions for economic cooperation. The members of the EEC represented an increasingly important market for Yugoslav products, ranging from agricul- Due to a growing dependency on the Western European market, the im- tural produce to industrial goods. The EEC countries were becoming increas- plementation of a Common Agricultural Policy in the EEC and common ingly important foreign trade partners for Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia registered external tariffs in 1962 represented a serious threat to Yugoslav exports and steady growth in trade with the EEC countries, primarily with Italy and the the economy as a whole. In order to neutralise the negative effects of such Federal Republic of Germany. But as a result of this exchange Yugoslavia built policies, Yugoslavia established its first contacts with the EEC. In January a trade deficit with Western European countries. The biggest problem was 1965 talks were launched at an expert level aimed at finding agreement on the structure of the deficit, stemming from the fact that imports were made common solutions for boosting Yugoslav exports, especially in cattle and up mostly of industrial products, whereas exports consisted of agricultural beef exports to the six member countries (CEC SG, 1970: 1). produce, textiles and raw materials (CEC PIGD: 1973: 4).

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TheDue torecognition a growing ofdependency the EEC as on a subjectthe Western of international European market, law and the the im- ac- creditationplementation of ofthe a missionCommon to Athegricultural EEC in 1968 Policy created in the the EEC basic and conditions common forexternal launching tariffs official in 1962 traderepresented talks. a Theserious negotiations threat to ranYugoslav from exportsOctober and 1968 tothe February economy 1970 as a andwhole. concluded In order with to neutralise the first tradethe negative agreement. effects The of suchYugo- slavpolicies, delegation Yugoslavia was establishedheaded by Tomaits first Granfil, contacts whereas with the the EEC. EEC In delegationJanuary was1965 led talks by wereJean Francoislaunched Deniau at an expert (CEC level IM, 1970:aimed 1). at finding agreement on common solutions for boosting Yugoslav exports, especially in cattle and Thisbeef exportswas the tofirst the sixconcluded member agreement countries based(CEC SonG, the 1970: principle 1). of a common trade policy. Implemented in early 1970, it would run for three years. The agreementThe recognition was of aof non-preferential the EEC as a subject nature ofbased international on the common law and recogni the ac-- tioncreditation of a trade of the system mission with to the the greatestEEC in 1968benefits. created Given the thatbasic the conditions previous bilateralfor launching agreements official between trade talks.Yugoslavia The andnegotiations the other ranmembers from Octobercontained 1968 significantto February 1970differences and concluded in the import-exportwith the first traderegimes, agreement. whereby theThe differYugo-- encesslav delegation were greatest was headedin respect by Tomato the Granfil,removal ofwhereas quantitative the EEC restrictions, delegation thewas newled by agreement Jean Francois incorporated Deniau (CECthe principle IM, 1970: of 1).the highest degree of lib- eralisation achieved in the bilateral agreements (Vukadinovič R. 1997:65). This was the first concluded agreement based on the principle of a common Britishtrade policy. sources Implemented labelled the in agreement early 1970, as itthe would most run important for three treaty years. since The theagreement assistance was programmeof a non-preferential given to natureYugoslavia based following on the common the Informbiro recogni- dispute.tion of a It trade was viewedsystem aswith especially the greatest important benefits. in terms Given of thatefforts the to previous reduce thebilateral Yugoslav agreements balance between of payments Yugoslavia deficit, and as the it otherenabled members the export contained of ag- riculturalsignificant and differences animal products in the toimport-export key Yugoslav regimes, trade partners: whereby Italythe differ-and Germany.ences were The greatest agreement in respect was anto importantthe removal sign of ofquantitative the improving restrictions, relations betweenthe new agreementthe Federal incorporated Republic of theGermany principle and of Yugoslaviathe highest and degree served of lib- to solidifyeralisation ties achieved between inYugoslavia the bilateral and agreements the West (TNA (Vukadinovič FCO 30/586). R. 1997:65). British sources labelled the agreement as the most important treaty since A new agreement was concluded in June 1973 for a five-year period. The the assistance programme given to Yugoslavia following the Informbiro agreement reaffirmed Yugoslavia’s status as a state with the greatest benefits dispute. It was viewed as especially important in terms of efforts to reduce in relation to customs, duties and other trade-related taxes. Yugoslav prod- the Yugoslav balance of payments deficit, as it enabled the export of ag- ucts from young cattle were raised as a special issue in the talks on the new ricultural and animal products to key Yugoslav trade partners: Italy and agreement and were eventually subject to a special import-export regime. Germany. The agreement was an important sign of the improving relations A specialised standing committee was established between Yugoslavia and between the Federal Republic of Germany and Yugoslavia and served to the EEC with the primary task of overseeing the implementation of the solidify ties between Yugoslavia and the West (TNA FCO 30/586). agreement. The committee was also able to propose new means of promot- ing bilateral trade. The proposals were important primarily in the removal A new agreement was concluded in June 1973 for a five-year period. The of various trade barriers. For the first time the agreement also dealt with agreement reaffirmed Yugoslavia’s status as a state with the greatest benefits the issue of Yugoslav workers in EEC countries (CEC PIDG, 100/1975:4). in relation to customs, duties and other trade-related taxes. Yugoslav prod- ucts from young cattle were raised as a special issue in the talks on the new Both agreements promoted and trade liberalisation and were particularly agreement and were eventually subject to a special import-export regime. important due to the harmonisation of a common external tariff for Yugo- A specialised standing committee was established between Yugoslavia and slav agricultural products While the agreements represented an important the EEC with the primary task of overseeing the implementation of the

146156 attitudE of socialist slovEnia/YuGoslavia to EmErGEncE of EuropEan intEGration procEssEs boostagreement. to trade The for committee Yugoslavia, was it soonalso ablebecame to propose evident newthat themeans biggest of promot- chal- lengeing bilateral of the tradetrade. deficit The proposalswas structural were importantin nature. Yugoslavia'sprimarily in exportsthe removal con- tinuedof various to consisttrade barriers. primarily For of theagricultural first time products the agreement and textiles, also dealtwith inwith- dustrialthe issue products of Yugoslav ranked workers third. in The EEC economiccountries (CECcrisis onlyPIDG, served 100/1975:4). to worsen this trend. Furthermore, the EEC introduced quotas for sensitive products inBoth 1974. agreements A restriction promoted on the and import trade ofliberalisation beef and beef and products were particularly had sig- nificantimportant effects due to theon Yugoslavharmonisation trade. of The a commonresult was external a persistent tariff drop for inYugo- trade betweenslav agricultural the EEC products and Yugoslavia While the (CEC agreements IM, 109/1977:2). represented an important boost to trade for Yugoslavia, it soon became evident that the biggest chal- Thelenge enlargementof the trade deficit of the wasEEC structural to Great inBritain, nature. Ireland Yugoslavia’s and exportsDenmark con- (in Januarytinued to 1973) consist represented primarily aof new agricultural blow to productsYugoslav andtrade. textiles, Failed withdomes in-- ticdustrial economic products reforms ranked also third. contributed The economic to a drop crisis in trade only toserved the developed to worsen marketsthis trend. of Furthermore,Western Europe. the SearchingEEC introduced for a way quotas to balance for sensitive trade, productsthe EEC andin 1974. Yugoslavia A restriction adopted on on the 2 import December of beef 1976 and a jointbeef productsdeclaration had called sig- nifthe- “Belgradeicant effects Statement” on Yugoslav that trade.expanded The cooperation result was ato persistent the area ofdrop financial in trade cooperationbetween the andEEC the and advancement Yugoslavia (CEC of joint IM, investments 109/1977:2). and projects and the promotion of Yugoslav goods in the EEC. The enlargement of the EEC to Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark (in TheJanuary Belgrade 1973) Statementrepresented was a newthe foundation blow to Yugoslav for a new trade. round Failed of talks domes- last- ingtic economic from 1978 reforms to 1980, also when contributed the Cooperation to a drop Agreement in trade to was the signed. developed The agreementmarkets of wasWestern signed Europe. on 2 AprilSearching 1980 forand a becameway to balance a part of trade, the Mediterthe EEC- raneanand Yugoslavia Agreement adopted of the on EEC. 2 December Dealing with1976 industrial,a joint declaration technological called andthe scientific“Belgrade Scooperationtatement” that and expandedagricultural, cooperation transport toand the social area issues, of financial in ad- ditioncooperation to trade, and the the agreement advancement carried of joint great investments significance. and It projects also included and the a financialpromotion protocol of Yugoslav valued goods at 200 in themillion EEC. ECU (Dinian, 1999:82-90; CEC EI, 94/1988: 2-3). The Belgrade Statement was the foundation for a new round of talks last- ing from 1978 to 1980, when the Cooperation Agreement was signed. The In spite of obtaining such a favourable agreement, Yugoslavia’s trade deficit agreement was signed on 2 April 1980 and became a part of the Mediter- continued to increase, something Yugoslavia blamed on EEC protection- ranean Agreement of the EEC. Dealing with industrial, technological and ism. A fresh blow to Yugoslav trade came with the expansion of the EEC scientific cooperation and agricultural, transport and social issues, in ad- to Greece (January 1981) and Spain and Portugal (January 1986), whose dition to trade, the agreement carried great significance. It also included a export structure was in many ways similar to that of Yugoslavia. financial protocol valued at 200 million ECU (Dinian, 1999:82-90; CEC EI, 94/1988: 2-3). attitudE of socialist slovEnia to EmErGEncE of EuropEan intEGration In spite of obtaining such a favourable agreement, Yugoslavia’s trade deficit procEssEs continued to increase, something Yugoslavia blamed on EEC protection- Asism. the A mostfresh developed blow to Yugoslav and western-most trade came republic with the in Yugoslavia,expansion Sloveniaof the EEC at- tributedto Greece special (January importance 1981) andto European Spain and integration Portugal and (January regional 1986), cooperation. whose Inexport the early structure 1970s was this inposition many receivedways similar an important to that of boost Yugoslavia. with the arrival of the liberal Chairman of the Executive Council of Slovenia Stane Kavčič, who

157147 andrEJ vrčon emphasisedAttitude of the soc importanceialist sloven of iaSlovenia's to emergence integration of euro withp eWesternan integr andat iCentralon Europeprocesses for the achievement of »optimal economics of labour, whose power and value we will have to test on the international market and in international economicAs the most currents«(Repe developed and 1999:31-51;Repe western-most &Prinčič, republic in2009: Yugoslavia, 73-80). Slovenia at- tributed special importance to European integration and regional coop- Theeration. first In ideas the early of a closer 1970s »quadrilateral”this position received cooperation an important between Italy, boost Austria,with Switzerlandthe arrival of and the Western liberal Germany,Chairman which of the would Executive subsequently Council includeof Slovenia Yu- goslavia,Stane Kavčič, emerged who inemphasised December the 1971, importance when Austrian of Slovenia’s Chancellor integration Dr. Bruno with KreiskyWestern spoke and Central of the possibility Europe for for the such achievement cooperation of in »optimal an interview economics with a Zagreb-basedof labour, whose television power andstation value (TNA we willFCO have 33/1281). to test At on the the time internation the con- ditionsal market for and such in cooperation international were economic not yet ripe,currents«(Repe but this would 1999:31-51;Repe change with a drop&Prinčič, in tensions 2009: 73-80). in Europe and the signing of the Helsinki Final Act on Se- curity and Cooperation in Europe in August 1975. Following the signing of theThe Osimo first ideasAgreements of a closer in November»quadrilateral” 1975, cooperation a new chapter between in relations Italy, Austria, with Italy,Switzerland a founding and Westernmember Germany,of the EEC, which was opened.would subsequently On 20 November include 1978, Yu- thegoslavia, Alps-Adriatic emerged Workingin December Community 1971, when was A establishedustrian Chancellor as a means Dr. Brunoof for- malisingKreisky spoke regional of the cooperation possibility in for culture, such cooperation science, transport in an interview and tourism. with a Zagreb-based television station (TNA FCO 33/1281). At the time the con- ditions for such cooperation were not yet ripe, but this would change with a The community brought together Slovenia, Croatia, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, drop in tensions in Europe and the signing of the Helsinki Final Act on Se- Veneto, Carinthia, Upper Austria, Styria, whereas Lombardy, Trentino-Al- curity and Cooperation in Europe in August 1975. Following the signing of to Adige, Bavaria and Hungarian provinces of Gyor-Sopron, Vas, Somogy, the Osimo Agreements in November 1975, a new chapter in relations with Zala and Varvidek joined later (Bufon, 2011: 197). Italy, a founding member of the EEC, was opened. On 20 November 1978, the Alps-Adriatic Working Community was established as a means of for- The community aimed to develop economic, social and cultural multilat- malising regional cooperation in culture, science, transport and tourism. eral cooperation among regions which had been linked in the past but saw their ties forcefully broken up after World War II. This form of regional The community brought togetherS lovenia, Croatia, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, cooperation also represented a modern approach to tackling national is- Veneto, Carinthia, Upper Austria, Styria, whereas Lombardy, Trentino-Al- sues and the protection of ethnic minorities, adapted to the new reality in to Adige, Bavaria and Hungarian provinces of Gyor-Sopron, Vas, Somogy, international relations (Bucarelli, 2008:78-79). Zala and Varvidek joined later (Bufon, 2011: 197). In its name and structure, the Alps-Adriatic Working Community in The community aimed to develop economic, social and cultural multilat- many ways mirrored the Working Community of Alpine Countries, which eral cooperation among regions which had been linked in the past but saw brought together the Italian regions of Lombardy, Trentino-South Tyrol, their ties forcefully broken up after World War II. This form of regional Austria’s provinces of Salzburg, Tyrol and Vorarlberg and the Swiss canton cooperation also represented a modern approach to tackling national is- of Graubuenden. All until the 1990s the community represented the only sues and the protection of ethnic minorities, adapted to the new reality in Euro-region surpassing the set divisions to East and West and as such played international relations (Bucarelli, 2008:78-79). a broader geopolitical role in promoting integration (Bufon,2011:197). In its name and structure, the Alps-Adriatic Working Community in Itmany was waysalso mirroredat this time the thatWorking Slovenia Community began advancing of Alpine itsCountries, policy of which run- ningbrought from together the “poor the club”Italian and regions moving of closerLombardy, to rich Trentino- Europe.S Byouth bringing Tyrol, togetherAustria’s provincesSlovenia, Friuli-Veneziaof Salzburg, Tyrol Giulia, and VorarlbergCroatia, Carinthia, and the SUpperwiss canton Aus-

148158 attitudE of socialist slovEnia/YuGoslavia to EmErGEncE of EuropEan intEGration procEssEs tria,of Graubuenden. Styria and Veneto, All until the the working 1990s communitythe community began represented a wave of theregional only bridge-buildingEuro-region surpassing in the economy, the set divisions environment, to East culture,and West tourism and as suchand minor played- itya broader protection. geopolitical The importance role in promoting of this form integration of cooperation (Bufon,2011:197). would later re- flect in Slovenia's efforts to gain independence. It was also at this time that Slovenia began advancing its policy of run- ning from the “poor club” and moving closer to rich Europe. By bringing ctogetheronclusion Slovenia, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Croatia, Carinthia, Upper Aus- tria, Styria and Veneto, the working community began a wave of regional Highbridge-building national indebtedness in the economy, and environment,politically motivated culture, investmentstourism and createdminor- anity inefficientprotection. The and importancehighly bureaucratised of this form economy. of cooperation The death would of laterlong-time re- Yugoslavflect in Slovenia’s leader Josip efforts Broz to Titogain inindependence. the spring of 1980 only further exposed the political and economic differences between the republics and the feder- ation. At the same time Yugoslav policies to European integration processes becameConclus anion increasingly important issue. The orthodox dogmatic political line refused to allow for any possibility of joining the EEC, instead pro- motingHigh national functional indebtedness cooperation and without politically integration. motivated On investments the other createdside an increasingan inefficient number and ofhighly political bureaucratised leaders and economy.economists The from death Slovenia of long-time and CroatiaYugoslav began leader calling Josip forBroz closer Tito cooperationin the spring with of 1980 the EEC, only withfurther some exposed going asthe far political as saying and Yugoslavia economic shoulddifferences ask to between become the a full-fledged republics and member. the feder- ation. At the same time Yugoslav policies to European integration processes Inbecame addition an increasinglyto the first protocol,important Yugoslavia issue. The went orthodox on to sign dogmatic two additional political financialline refused protocols to allow to for the any Cooperation possibility Agreementof joining thewith EEC, the EEC.instead The pro- sec- ondmoting protocol, functional running cooperation from 1985 without to 1990, integration. was valued On at the550 othermillion side ECU an andincreasing was intended number primarily of political for leadersinfrastructure and economists development. from The Slovenia third andpro- tocolCroatia for began the period calling fromfor closer 1991 cooperation to 1995, valued with theat 870 EEC, million with some ECU, going was brokenas far as off saying in Yugoslaviamid-1991. In should this time ask toYugoslavia become aalso full-fledged became a recipientmember. of PHARE fund and the federal government launched exploratory talks for signingIn addition an Accession to the first Agreement protocol, (Vukadinovič,Yugoslavia went 1997:71). on to sign This two represented additional thefinancial peak ofprotocols relations to between the Cooperation the Socialist Agreement Yugoslavia with andthe EEC.the European The sec- Community.ond protocol, Followingrunning from its disintegration, 1985 to 1990, wasYugoslavia valued atlost 550 the million status ECUof a specialand was and intended privileged primarily EEC neighbouring for infrastructure country. development. The third pro- tocol for the period from 1991 to 1995, valued at 870 million ECU, was Irrespectivebroken off in of themid-1991. development In this of time relations Yugoslavia with the also European became Communitya recipient of precedingPHARE fund its disintegration,and the federal it governmentcan be concluded launched that exploratory these were tootalks little for toosigning late anto changeAccession the Aflowgreement of events, (Vukadinovič, as Yugoslavia 1997:71). was essentially This represented doomed tothe fail peak with of the relations rise of thebetween violent the policies Socialist of SlobodanYugoslavia Milošević. and the European Community. Following its disintegration, Yugoslavia lost the status of a special and privileged EEC neighbouring country.

Irrespective of the development of relations with the European Community preceding its disintegration, it can be concluded that these were too little too late to change the flow of events, as Yugoslavia was essentially doomed to fail with the rise of the violent policies of Slobodan Milošević. 159149 andrEJ vrčon

SliostURCES of a Abbrevnd REFEREiationsnCES

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