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4 Effects of affective ambiguity on regulation through

5 labeling

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8 Miyu Matsuguma1*, Mariko Shirai2, Makoto Miyatani1¶, Takashi Nakao1¶

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11 1 Graduate School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Hiroshima University, Hiroshima,

12 Japan

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14 2 Department of Psychology, Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan

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17 * Corresponding author

18 E-mail: [email protected] (MM)

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20 Abstract

21 Putting feelings into words, called affect labeling, has been shown to attenuate

22 emotional responses. However, labeling ambiguous emotional states may reduce the emotion

23 regulation effect because it is difficult to categorize such feelings. Conversely, it may prove

24 more effective by reducing feelings of uncertainty. The current study aimed to investigate how

25 affect labeling in affective ambiguity influences emotion regulation effects on the subjective

26 intensity of feelings, skin conductance level, and skin conductance response. Participants were

27 asked to rate the intensity of their feelings after being presented with images of clear facial

28 expressions for the prototypical condition and morphed facial expressions for the ambiguous

29 condition. In addition, participants assigned to the labeling group selected the emotion word

30 that best matched their own feelings during the stimulus presentation. As a result, affect labeling

31 increased skin conductance responses during presentation only in the prototypical condition,

32 suggesting the possibility of different effects according to affective ambiguity. However, both

33 subjective and physiological responses did not decline, contrary to previous research. We

34 discuss the consequences and the experimental characteristics, and propose a direction for

35 future research.

36

37 Introduction

38 When people experience negative , they often try to reduce or control the

39 harmful effects by avoiding thoughts about their feelings or by talking about their feelings to

40 someone else. The attempt to influence emotions in our selves or others is called emotion

41 regulation [1]. Various emotion regulation strategies have been the subject of past research,

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42 such as reappraisal, suppression, or distraction [2, 3]. More recently, there has been growing

43 research on putting feelings into words, called affect labeling, as an incidental emotion

44 regulation strategy [4]. Affect labeling is central to , and previous research

45 demonstrates that talking or writing about emotions is effective for improving physical and

46 mental health [5].

47 Researchers have studied various forms of affect labeling and have revealed its effects.

48 One study showed that choosing the semantically appropriate word to describe a negative

49 emotional image, such as “crying” or “bomb”, resulted in lower self-reported distress, compared

50 to passive watching [4]. Furthermore, verbalizing emotional experiences (e.g., “I do feel

51 something”) relative to verbalizing facts (e.g., “I do see someone”) decreased skin conductance

52 responses (SCRs) [6]. Moreover, when tasked with selecting the appropriate label from

53 “pleasant,” “unpleasant,” or “neutral,” test participants’ SCRs showed more reduction during

54 objective labeling of the stimuli than subjective labeling of their own emotional states [7].

55 However, the labels semantically relevant to stimuli such as “bomb” refer to image contents

56 instead of emotions, and the labels “something” or “unpleasant” are vague when considering

57 the names of emotions that people usually use (e.g., “angry” or “sad”).

58 One of the most common ways of affect labeling in research is to select the specific

59 emotion word that is congruent with the participant’s own feelings, or the emotion contained in

60 the stimulus, from a list of options. A neuroimaging study indicated that affect labeling a target

61 stimulus increased activity in the right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, thereby diminishing

62 activity in the [8], which is the core region of driving emotion responses [9]. Another

63 experiment using aversive stimuli showed similar neural consequences when participants chose

64 the emotion word that best matched their own emotion and revealed a reduction in self-reported

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65 distress [10]. Additionally, selecting the name of the emotion diminished the physical symptoms,

66 as well as the self-reported experience of emotion reported after viewing an unpleasant picture

67 [11].

68 In contrast, affect labeling in the manner of self-generating the label did not immediately

69 downregulate the emotion. Subjective emotional intensity and SCR did not decline when

70 participants self-generated labels to match their own emotions [12], and occasionally, subjective

71 responses increased [13]. One study showed that arachnophobes in the affect labeling group,

72 who were tasked with creating sentences using negative words, did not differ from the exposure-

73 only group for immediate change in self-reported and SCR [14]. These results suggest that

74 choice labeling (i.e. choosing a label from a list of options) is more effective than self-

75 generating the label for diminishing emotional responses. This may be because choice labeling

76 is far easier than trying to self-generate the label [15].

77 However, it can be difficult for people to categorize ambiguous emotions and to select

78 the label which properly represents their feelings. Some emotion theories [16, 17] postulate the

79 prototype theory [18] in the categorization of emotions; which proposes that categorical

80 judgments are made based on resemblance to the prototypes that represent the clearest cases of

81 category membership. Thus, it is easy to categorize prototypical affective states, but it is

82 difficult to categorize ambiguous states that are distant from the prototype (i.e. that do not have

83 enough common attributes of the category or have more attributes in common with members of

84 contrasting categories). Furthermore, the selected label may not exactly match the internal state

85 in such ambiguous conditions. For these reasons, emotion regulation effects of affect labeling

86 could be less for ambiguous feelings.

87 On the other hand, emotion words play a role in transforming ambiguous affective

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88 sensations into experiences of certain discrete emotions, and reduction of uncertainty is thought

89 to be one of the ways in which affect labeling operates emotion regulation [15, 19, 20]. In this

90 regard, labeling ambiguous states is more effective than prototypical states because of the

91 reduction of its greater uncertainty. Thus, remains unclear how affective ambiguity influences

92 the emotion regulation effects of affect labeling.

93 The current study aimed to investigate the influence of affective ambiguity on the emotion

94 regulation effects of affect labeling in terms of subjective affective experiences and

95 physiological responses. For physiological responses, we measured skin conductance levels

96 (SCLs) and SCRs as indicators of sympathetic nervous system activity. SCL is a measure of

97 relatively long-term tonic , and SCR refers to phasic activation [21].

98 Choice labeling was adopted as the labeling method, which has been shown in previous studies

99 to have immediate effects on emotion regulation [4, 10]. In addition, to manipulate the

100 ambiguity of the affective states, we used facial images as stimuli which were specifically

101 designed to evoke ambiguous emotions by morphing them. However, it is of concern that facial

102 images do not produce meaningful levels of subjective distress [4]. Therefore, to evoke stronger

103 feelings, we instructed participants to emulate the same affective state as expressed by the

104 model. We expected that a reduction would be observed in both the subjective and physiological

105 responses in prototypical conditions. However, the effect for ambiguous conditions was

106 exploratively examined because it was unclear whether labeling ambiguous states was more or

107 less effective due to the difficulty of categorization and the reduction of uncertainty.

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109 Materials and methods

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110 Participants

111 The sample comprised 49 undergraduate students (19 male, 29 female, 1 other);

112 ranging in age from 18 to 23 years (M = 20.08, SD = 1.07). The experimental protocol was

113 approved by the Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Psychology at Doshisha University. Written

114 informed consent was obtained from each participant prior to the experiment. All participants

115 received a bookstore gift card valued at 1,000 Japanese yen (approximately $10) for their

116 participation.

117 Design

118 The independent variables consisted of labeling (two levels: view and labeling) as a

119 between-subject factor and ambiguity (two levels: prototypical and ambiguous) as a within-

120 subject factor. Participants were randomly assigned to either the view (N = 24) or labeling (N

121 = 25) group and completed the task in both prototypical and ambiguous conditions. Dependent

122 variables included the subjective intensity ratings, skin conductance levels (SCLs), and skin

123 conductance responses (SCRs).

124 Stimuli

125 Images were taken from the facial expression database [22]. We selected 12 frontal

126 face images of four Japanese models (two male, two female) depicting three different

127 expressions; namely with closed mouth, disgust with closed mouth, and . To create

128 intermediate facial expressions between anger-disgust, anger-sadness, and disgust-sadness, we

129 morphed the original images by two expressions of each model using computer morphing

130 software (Sqirlz Morph ver.2.1, Xiberpix). For the prototypical condition, 12 original images

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131 were used, and 12 morphed images were used for the ambiguous condition.

132 Task

133 The stimuli were presented using software (SuperLab ver.5.0, Cedrus) on a computer

134 (dynabook RX73, TOSHIBA).

135 Participants were instructed to emulate the same affective state as the model expressed

136 when a facial image was presented. Each trial began with the instruction being displayed on the

137 screen for 10 seconds, followed by a facial stimulus which was presented for eight seconds.

138 During the view trials, only a facial image was presented. During the labeling trials, participants

139 were asked to select the most appropriate label for their own affective experience from three

140 emotion words (anger, disgust, and sadness), which appeared below the stimulus. The reaction

141 time for each choice was recorded during the labeling trials. After each image presentation,

142 regardless of the condition, participants rated the intensity of their affective experience. The

143 next trial immediately followed the intensity rating. Fig 1 below depicts an example of each

144 trial.

145 All participants initially completed 24 view trials in two blocks (12 prototypical, 12

146 ambiguous) to establish the baseline. Subsequently, for the test phase, participants in the view

147 group performed the view trials again, while those in the labeling group performed twenty-four

148 labeling trials. The trials in each block were presented in a randomized order, and the order of

149 the blocks was counterbalanced across participants.

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150

151 Fig 1. An example of each trial. The figure shows an example of view and labeling trials. First,

152 the instruction appeared on the screen for 10 seconds. Then, a facial expression image was

153 presented for eight seconds. In this phase, during the labeling trials, participants chose the label

154 that was best matched to their affective experience. At the end of a trial, participants rated the

155 intensity of their affective experience.

156 Self-report measure

157 After each image presentation, participants were asked to rate the intensity of their

158 feelings on a scale from 1 (extremely weak) to 9 (extremely intense).

159 Physiological measures

160 We recorded SCLs and SCRs continuously during the experiment (in µSiemens). These

161 were recorded using a constant-voltage device maintained at 0.5 V (DA2, Vega Systems), with

162 two disposable electrodes (TEAC, PPS-EDA) attached to the index and middle fingers of the

163 participant’s non-dominant hand. Signals were sampled using a digital converter system

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164 (MP150, BIOPAC Systems) set at 500 Hz and recorded on a computer (dynabook R734/M,

165 TOSHIBA).

166 Procedure

167 Participants sat comfortably on a chair in a shielded room. After agreeing to take part

168 in the experiment, electrodes were attached to the participant’s fingers, and the participants

169 were asked to try to remain still. Prior to the main baseline experimental trials, participants

170 completed a practice view trial to become familiar with the task. The facial stimuli used in the

171 practice trial were different from those used in the experimental trials. The experimenter

172 confirmed that they understood the requirements and initiated the baseline trials. Participants

173 in the view group were instructed to complete the task once again, while those in the labeling

174 group performed another practice trial (labeling trial). After a break, participants started the

175 main trials in the test phase. Once all trials had been completed, the attached electrodes were

176 removed.

177 Skin conductance data analysis

178 Due to equipment malfunction, five individuals (one from the view group, four in the

179 labeling group) were removed from the analysis. We analyzed the mean SCL and the SCR peak-

180 to-peak amplitude for the eight second stimulus presentation using AcqKnowledge software

181 (AcqKnowledge ver. 4.4, BIOPAC Systems).

182 Statistical analyses

183 We calculated the average reaction times recorded from the presentation of the stimulus

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184 to the choice of label in the labeling trials, and conducted paired t-test with prototypical and

185 ambiguous conditions. One individual was excluded from the analysis due to recording trouble;

186 therefore 24 participants in the labeling group were included in this analysis.

187 Skin conductance data were standardized on a within-subject basis to eliminate between-

188 subjects variability. In both self-report and physiological data, we calculated the change score

189 for each stimulus by subtracting the baseline score from the test. The baseline and change scores

190 were averaged, respectively, by condition. Then, they were statistically analyzed using a two-

191 way repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) in SPSS with labeling and ambiguity.

192 A p-value < .05 indicated statistical significance.

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194 Results

195 Choice reaction times

196 To confirm whether we could manipulate the affective ambiguity, the choice reaction

197 times were analyzed using a paired t-test. The reaction time was longer on ambiguous trials (M

198 = 6428 ms) than in the prototypical (M = 5759 ms) trials (t(23) = −2.323, p = .029).

199 Self-report data

200 Fig 2 shows subjective intensity ratings in the respective labeling and ambiguity

201 conditions during the baseline and test phase. First, we analyzed baseline scores to confirm that

202 there were no differences between conditions at baseline. Results of a two-way ANOVA

203 revealed a significant main effect of ambiguity (F(1, 47) = 16.640, p = .000), indicating that

204 the scores in the prototypical condition were higher than in the ambiguous condition. The main

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205 effect of labeling (F(1, 47) = 1.203, p = .278) and the interaction between labeling and

206 ambiguity (F(1, 47) = .147, p = .703) were not significant.

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208 Fig 2. Subjective intensity ratings by the respective conditions. The figure shows subjective

209 intensity ratings according to phase (baseline and test), affective ambiguity (prototypical and

210 ambiguous), and the presence of labeling (view or labeling). The error bars represent standard

211 error.

212 Next, we analyzed change scores to compare the magnitude of the change caused by

213 labeling. A two-way ANOVA was conducted to assess the effect of labeling and ambiguity on

214 the change scores of subjective intensity ratings. There were no significant main effects of

215 labeling (F(1, 47) = .028, p = .868) or ambiguity (F(1, 47) = .259, p = .614), and no

216 interaction between labeling and ambiguity (F(1, 47) = .865, p = .357).

217 Skin conductance levels

218 Fig 3 shows standardized SCLs by the respective conditions during the baseline and test

219 phase. First, we analyzed baseline scores using a two-way ANOVA, and no significant

220 differences were found between the conditions (the main effect of labeling: F(1, 42) = 1.216,

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221 p = .277; the main effect of ambiguity: F(1, 42) = .351, p = .557; the interaction between

222 labeling and ambiguity: F(1, 42) = .001, p = .978).

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224 Fig 3. Standardized SCLs by the respective conditions. The figure shows standardized SCLs

225 according to phase (baseline and test), affective ambiguity (prototypical and ambiguous), and

226 the presence of labeling (view or labeling). The error bars represent standard error.

227 Then, a two-way ANOVA was conducted to assess the effect of labeling and ambiguity

228 on the change scores of SCLs. None of the main effects of labeling (F(1, 42) = 1.211, p

229 = .277), or of ambiguity (F(1, 42) = .027, p = .869), and the interaction between labeling

230 and ambiguity (F(1, 42) = 1.333, p = .255) were significant.

231 Skin conductance responses

232 Fig 4 shows standardized SCRs by the respective conditions during the baseline and test

233 phase. A two-way ANOVA test on baseline scores indicated no differences between the

234 conditions (the main effect of labeling: F(1, 42) = 2.272, p = .139; the main effect of

235 ambiguity: F(1, 42) = .067, p = .797; the interaction between labeling and ambiguity: F(1,

236 42) = 2.154, p = .150).

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238 Fig 4. Standardized SCRs by the respective conditions. The figure shows standardized SCRs

239 according to phase (baseline and test), affective ambiguity (prototypical and ambiguous), and

240 the presence of labeling (view or labeling). The error bars represent standard error.

241 A two-way ANOVA was conducted to assess the effect of labeling and ambiguity on the

242 change scores of SCRs. There was a marginally significant interaction between labeling and

243 ambiguity (F(1, 42) = 3.997, p = .053), but not on the main effect of labeling (F(1, 42) =

244 2.270, p = .139) nor ambiguity (F(1, 42) = .015, p = .904). Post hoc analyses revealed that,

245 under prototypical conditions, the change scores of SCRs in the labeling group were

246 significantly higher than in the view group (F(1, 84) = 5.868, p = .018). No other simple

247 main effects were significant (the simple main effect of labeling under ambiguous conditions:

248 F(1, 84) = .005, p = .945; ambiguity at view group: F(1, 42) = 1.754, p = .193; ambiguity

249 at labeling group: F(1, 42) = 2.237, p = .142).

250

251 Discussion

252 The current study examined how affective ambiguity influences the emotion regulation

253 effects of affect labeling on subjective intensity of feelings, SCL, and SCR. The data indicated

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254 that none of the emotion responses were attenuated through affect labeling, regardless of

255 affective ambiguity. Moreover, affect labeling heightened SCRs in prototypical conditions.

256 The choice reaction time was longer in the ambiguous condition than in the prototypical

257 condition. The prototype theory supposes that the categorical judgment is faster for more

258 prototypical objects [18]. Therefore, manipulation of affective ambiguity was successful in the

259 present study.

260 Affect labeling did not decrease self-reported affective experience, contrary to the

261 findings of previous studies that found emotion regulation effects with choice labeling [10]. A

262 possible reason for this finding is that requiring the participants to emulate the affective state

263 of the stimulus may have made it difficult for participants to psychologically distance

264 themselves from their feelings. Analyzing feelings from a self-distanced perspective has been

265 indicated to reduce negative feelings [23]. Choice labeling may allow individuals to more easily

266 distance themselves from their feelings because it does not require scrutinizing their internal

267 states. However, this was not observed in the present study, possibly due to the requirements of

268 the task in which participants consciously enter an affective state. Another consideration is that

269 the question “How intense are your feelings?” could be interpreted in multiple ways. For

270 instance, some participants may have rated the intensity of ambiguous feelings, whereas others

271 may have rated the intensity of a specific emotion they had identified. These differences may

272 have influenced the variability of the direction or magnitude of the change among individuals.

273 The instruction requiring the participants to emulate the affective state may also have

274 influenced the result of physiological responses, which did not show response reduction. A

275 previous study indicated that as the duration of exposure to stimuli increased, SCRs increased

276 when participants labeled their own affective state, while SCRs decreased when they labeled

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277 the stimuli [7]. This result suggests the possibility that affect labeling, which requires

278 individuals to be more conscious of their own feelings, does not show an emotion regulation

279 effect.

280 A remarkable finding is that affect labeling resulted in greater SCRs only in the

281 prototypical condition. The congruency between the affective state and the label may have

282 contributed to the result. In the prototypical condition, participants were able to select the label

283 that was congruent with their affective state, and thus their feelings could be identified by the

284 label. Previous research has indicated that individuals’ awareness of their affective state

285 produces a stress response consistent with cognition [24]. Therefore, it is assumed that

286 identifying the affective state and thereby experiencing more specific emotion s resulted in

287 increased SCRs as a stress response. Conversely, in the ambiguous condition, the participant’s

288 feelings could not be definitively identified because the selected label was not fully congruent

289 with their affective state. As a result, participants may not have experienced any specific

290 emotions, and no change in SCRs occurred. Since this is still one possibility, further research

291 should investigate the impact of the degree of congruence between the affective state and the

292 selected label on the emotion regulation effect.

293 In contrast, SCLs did not show such a difference between conditions. SCL is a measure

294 of the relatively long-term activity of the sympathetic nervous system, while SCR refers to

295 phasic activation [21]. Hence, the results of the present study suggest that the increased

296 sympathetic nervous system activity caused by affect labeling is a momentary response. In

297 addition, a prior study has shown that participants who talked about their emotional reaction to

298 a stressful stimulus showed lower arousal of the autonomic nervous system when they viewed

299 the same stimulus for a second time 48 hours later, whereas they exhibited more arousal when

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300 exposed to the stimulus for the second time shortly after talking [25]. These results suggest

301 that the effect of affect labeling on autonomic responses is not constant. For future research,

302 measuring the concept multiple times or observing the changes over time can be helpful in

303 gaining a deeper understanding of the emotion regulation effect through affect labeling.

304 The finding that SCRs increased only in the prototypical condition suggests that the effect

305 of affect labeling differs according to affective ambiguity. This implies that the efficacy of

306 affect labeling or its benefits may vary with the situation. For example, in a complex situation

307 where individuals experience multiple feelings, minimal labeling can be more beneficial than

308 exhaustive labeling with more specific emotion words [26]. Furthermore, the findings form the

309 basis for future studies by implying that the effect of affect labeling depends on personality

310 traits. It is difficult to identify or verbalize ambiguous affective states, which seem to overlap

311 with some personality traits like alexithymia, referring to a condition where individuals

312 experience difficulty in identifying and describing their own emotions [27]. Therefore,

313 investigating the effect of affect labeling on ambiguous feelings, and exploring which method

314 is more effective for emotion regulation, might be applied to intervention for individuals with

315 alexithymia. In addition, future research should be carried out to investigate personality factors

316 and what manner of affect labeling is effective for each individual.

317 There are some limitations to the present study. First, it should be noted that the intensity

318 of the evoked feelings differed between the prototypical and ambiguous conditions, indicating

319 higher subjective ratings at baseline in the prototypical condition. Previous research suggests

320 that the emotion regulation effect of affect labeling differed depending on the intensity or degree

321 of arousal caused by the evocative stimuli [4, 13]. Thus, we need to use stimuli which have

322 different levels of ambiguity but equal intensity to properly compare the effect of affective

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323 ambiguity.

324 Second, it is undeniable that the affect labeling or intensity ratings could have been based

325 on the presented facial expression rather than on the participant’s own feelings, if participants

326 did not really try to engage in the task. Finally, the way to induce affective states had less

327 ecological validity. We used images of facial expressions to manipulate affective ambiguity, but

328 future research should attempt other methods to evoke ambiguous affective states more naturally.

329 For instance, vignettes eliciting multiple emotions at once could be usable [26].

330 It is still unclear whether affect labeling would increase or decrease emotion responses

331 in prototypical or ambiguous affective states. Unlike previous studies, the current study showed

332 a partial increment of SCRs and no reduction in any measures through affect labeling. However,

333 labeling that requires participants to be less conscious of their internal states or from a long-

334 term perspective might be able to diminish emotion responses in keeping with prior research.

335 Further studies are necessary to precisely reveal the effect of affect labeling.

336 In conclusion, the current study suggests that affective ambiguity influences the emotion

337 regulation effect of affect labeling, although no reduction could be observed. This study has

338 significance in proposing the direction of future research. That is, further research could

339 examine the effect of affect labeling on ambiguous feelings using other ways of affective

340 induction, over an extended period of time. Furthermore, various manners of labeling should be

341 employed and the degree of feeling-label congruence should be carefully considered to develop

342 a deeper understanding on the topic.

343

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413 Supporting information

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414 S1 Data for Analysis. Reaction time, intensity rating, SCL, and SCR for each participant.

415

21