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Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies Website of the Expert Community of Belarus «Nashe Mnenie» (Our Opinion) 1 BELARUSIAN INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES WEBSITE OF THE EXPERT COMMUNITY OF BELARUS «NASHE MNENIE» (OUR OPINION) BELARUSIAN YEARBOOK 2010 A survey and analysis of developments in the Republic of Belarus in 2010 Minsk, 2011 2 BELARUSIAN YEARBOOK 2010 Compiled and edited by: Anatoly Pankovsky, Valeria Kostyugova Prepress by Stefani Kalinowskaya English version translated by Mark Bence, Volha Hapeyeva, Andrey Kuznetsov, Vladimir Kuznetsov, Tatsiana Tulush English version edited by Max Nuijens Scientific reviewers and consultants: Miroslav Kollar, Institute for Public Affairs, Program Director of the Slovak annual Global Report; Vitaly Silitsky, Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS, Lithuania); Pavel Daneiko, Belarusian Economic Research and Outreach Center (BEROC); Andrey Vardomatsky, NOVAK laboratory; Pyotr Martsev, BISS Board member; Ales Ancipenka, Belaru- sian Collegium; Vladimir Dunaev, Agency of Policy Expertise; Viktor Chernov, independent expert. The yearbook is published with support of The German Marshall Fund of the United States The opinions expressed are those of the authors, and do not necessari- ly represent the opinion of the editorial board. © Belarusian Institute for Strategic ISSN 18224091 Studies 3 CONTENTS EDITORIAL FOREWORD 7 STATE AUTHORITY Pyotr Valuev Presidential Administration and Security Agencies: Before and after the presidential election 10 Inna Romashevskaya Five Hundred-Dollar Government 19 Alexandr Alessin, Andrey Volodkin Cooperation in Arms: Building up new upon old 27 Andrey Kazakevich Parliament: An ornamental element of «law-making» 37 Zmicier Kuhley Local Authorities: Self-government sacrificed to liberalization 45 ELECTION Vladimir Rovdo Presidential Campaign 52 Sergey Nikolyuk Presidential Election: Sociology of electoral stability 63 4 BELARUSIAN YEARBOOK 2010 FOREIGN POLICY Valeria Kostyugova, Anatoly Pankovsky Russian-Belarusian Relations: Ultimate dependence 71 Dzianis Melyantsou Belarus EU: Dialogue anticipating the elections 78 Andrey Fyodorov Belarus U.S.: From dialogue to sanctions 87 Kamil Klysinski Polish-Belarusian Relations: Another crisis 94 Gennady Maksak Belarus Ukraine: New emphases open opportunities 100 Vladimir Dunaev Regional Integration in Eastern Europe 109 Siarhei Bohdan Belarusian Policy in the Developing World in 2010: Cautious money-making 122 SOCIETY Inna Fedotova, Vitaly Belovsky Civil Society: Hyperactivity with a view to future performance 133 5 Yury Chausov Party Theatrics for Political Process 150 Natallia Vasilevich Religious Sphere: In the run-up to the presidential campaign 162 Svetlana Matskevich Belarusian Education: A short-term victory or a long-term loss? 176 Alexandr Gritsanov Science: New goals indicate decline 188 Boris Tasman Sports: Olympic ups and doping downs 194 Nadezhda Yefimova Public Opinion: Yearly dynamics and certain results 203 ECONOMY Dmitry Kruk Macroeconomic Situation: Growth at any cost 216 Alexandr Mukha Belarus Foreign Exchange Market and Banking System 233 Kiryl Hajduk Labor Market and Social Policy: Post-crisis recovery amid presidential election 240 6 BELARUSIAN YEARBOOK 2010 Alyona Rybkina Energy Sector: Rent cuts 250 Maria Akulova Foreign Investments: Not only lure them, but make them work 258 Konstantin Skuratovich Agriculture: Growth amid poverty 267 APPENDIX. BISS Trends reviews 275 AUTHORS 337 7 EDITORIAL FOREWORD The Belarusian Yearbook is a longterm joint project of Belarus’ ex pert community. This publication presents an integral analysis of the state of affairs in essential domains of state and society on an annual basis. The presidential election campaign of 2010 predetermined the developments in almost every segment of social and state life, while the finale of the campaign – the brutal dispersion of the rally in the Independence Square – has already had an impact on all aspects of state life with no exception (including the sectors that have traditionally stayed out of politics – sports, popculture, etc.) Below are the key trends of the year 2010, based on a complex contentanalysis of the Yearbook’s texts: • Decisionmaking authority is concentrated within a progressive ly narrowing group of people who bear no responsibility whatso ever for implementation; • The deteriorating state administration crisis manifested itself in a misalignment of policies pursued by state institutions, primarily due to the widening gap between those making decisions and those responsible for implementation; • The series of successful attempts to fit into the regional political and economic context through modifications of the foreign polit ical paradigm became a trend that was ruined by lateyear devel opments; • Less successful, but not less persistent attempts to overcome the isolation of the state and society were made throughout the year by both sides, but then again, the outcomes of the December 2010 events froze all the positive trends; • Belarus has made a name in the global economic system, mostly as a borrower, and completed the year as a debtor with vague re payment prospects. Contributing to this Yearbook were independent analysts and experts, as well as specialists representing various think tanks, including the Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS), the Institute for Political Studies “Political Sphere”, the Research Center of the Institute for Privatization and Management, the Agency of Humanitarian Technologies – Centre for Social Innovation, NOVAK Axiometrical Research Laboratory, the Independent Institute of Socio Economic and Political Studies (IISEPS), the Belarusian Economic 8 BELARUSIAN YEARBOOK 2010 Research and Outreach Center (BEROC), the Centre for Eastern Studies (Warsaw, Poland), the Polesski Fund of International and Regional Studies (Chernigov, Ukraine), eBelarus Research Center. As a joint effort, the Yearbook is designed to promote public discussions about current transformations in Belarus and development options the country has, and facilitate the work of state functionaries, business managers, members of the diplomatic corps, journalists, politicians and community leaders. Valeria Kostyugova Anatoly Pankovsky Vitaly Silitsky 9 STATE AUTHORITY 10 BELARUSIAN YEARBOOK 2010 PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION AND SECURITY AGENCIES: BEFORE AND AFTER THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION Pyotr Valuev Summary The process of transformation of Belarusian security agencies started after Viktor Sheyman vacated the office of state secretary of the Security Council that also entailed reauthorization and reallocation of duties in other security agencies. As a result, special services and security agencies were actually subordinated to the Presidential Administration, or, to be more exact, to President’s National Security Aide Viktor Lukashenko, the eldest son of the Belarusian president. Control over the strongest and most effective special services is thus concentrated in “one hand.” The changes above, and also the 19 December events and the crackdown on the opposition that followed, interrupted the dialogue with the European Union, which was one step away from recognition of Lukashenko’s Victory (on certain terms) and aiding him financially. Given the substantial disagreements among Belarus and Russia, Alexander Lukashenko faces not easily soluble problems, first of all economic, caused by the lack of resources to keep the present model functioning. Besides, there were other serious problems inside the country, specifically the dropping popularity rating on the threshold of the election, the opposition backed by the West, functionaries uncertain about their future, special services balled in “one fist”, the lack of a consolidating ideological core, and so on. In 2011, Alexander Lukashenko will keep trying to balance between Russia, the West, and home policy vectors. Tendencies: • De jure and/or de facto, security agencies and special services found themselves underfoot of the Presidential Administration, to be more exact, President’s National Security Aide Viktor Lukashenko; • Inconsistency of actions and misunderstanding throughout the past year (including the pre8election period) within the “opposition8Europe8 Lukashenko” triangle resulted in the 19 December events and reprisals that followed, against the background of the frozen dialogue with Europe. Reform called “Viktor Lukashenko” In contemporary Belarus, the hierarchy of governmental agencies is less important than the person who controls it all. The Security Coun cil used to supervise special services before 2008. The Presidential State authority 11 Administration or, as a matter of fact, President’s National Security Aide Viktor Lukashenko, took over control. As a result, the Security Council turned into an advisory board. Although Viktor Lukashenko is a member himself, it did not enable the Council to make any partic ular decisions. Realignment of human resources began in 2008 and gained momentum in the autumn of the same year after Viktor Sheyman resigned his office of secretary general of the Security Council. Viktor Lukashenko controlled security agencies singlehandedly in 2009 and 2010. He certainly made use of advice from more experienced fellows, who had been building up political muscle for years in top floor offices. However, the 2009 and 2010 personnel reshuffles were initiated by Viktor Lukashenko personally. A few scandals surfaced at that time, namely the criminal charges pressed against officers of the State Control Committee’s Financial Investigations Department and highranking KGB officers. Essential changes occurred in
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