National Resilience Proceedings.Pdf

Proceedings of the conference on National Resilience: Opportunities and Challenges in a Changing Security Environment May 9-10 2018, Budapest, Hungary

Editor: Peter A. Kiss, HDF GS Scientific Research Centre

Published by the Hungarian Defence Forces General Staff Scientific Research Centre address: 1055 Budapest, Balaton utca 7-11, Hungary webpage: http://www.hvktkh.hm.gov.hu email: hvk.tkhvhm.gov.hu phone: +36 1 474 1668

ISBN 978-615-5585-11-1

The conference and the publication of this volume were made possible by the support of NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division and the Hungarian Atlantic Council.

The opinions expressed in the presentations at the conference, and in the papers included in these proceedings reflect those of the individual speakers, and are not the official positions of the Government of Hungary, the Hungarian Defence Forces, or the Governments of the Speakers’ home states.

Reproduction of this document, either in its entirety or in part, is authorized, provided the source is acknowledged, and the authors are properly credited.

Table of contents

FOREWORD ...... 1 OPENING ADDRESS ...... 3 Major General István Szabó From Baseline Resilience to National Resilience ...... 3 KEYNOTE ADDRESS ...... 7 Hasit Thankey Resilience and Civil Preparedness in a Changing Security Environment: A NATO Perspective ...... 7 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...... 15 PAPERS ...... 27 Peter Balogh Building and Challenging Resilience: The Role of Social Resources and Social Context ...... 29 Hugo Blom Commercial Sector Risk Management: Supporting National and NATO Resilience Strategies ...... 57 Philip N. Brown A Mainstay of Resilience: Stakeholder Consultation and Collaboration ...... 73 Daniel Cohen The Use of Cyberwarfare in Influence Operations: cyber perception warfare ...... 91 Gábor Csehi Resilience plans in the health sector ...... 113 Meir Elran Societal Resilience as a Complementary Strategy to Counter Terrorism: The Israeli Experience ...... 135 Pavel Fnasek National Resilience: Opportunities and Challenges in a Changing Security Environment ...... 155 Szabolcs Hullán The nuclear emergency response system - the source of the good practice ...... 163 László Juhász Civil Preparedness and Defence Administration ...... 173 László Lukács and –Zsuzsanna Balogh Protection of Critical Infrastructure Facilities against Bombing Attacks ...... 183 Gábor Németh Visegrad4 Border Security Command Post Exercise “Joint Efforts 2017” ...... 205 Zoltán Somodi The Effect of Non-NATO Military Equipment on Resilience ...... 215 Jonáš Syrovátka How to make elections resilient against disinformation ...... 233

Zsolt Szabó Can a "Cyber Jihad" be Prevented? - Targeted Attack on the Public Sector ...... 255 Péter Szegedi Resilience, Vulnerability and the Organisational Knowledge ...... 275 Attila Géza Takács and Peter A. Kiss Territorial Defence Forces: a key element of Hungary’s resilience in postmodern war ...... 295 Zoltán Tóth Civil-Military Medical Interface — a Topic for Concept Development & Experimentation ...... 319

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FOREWORD

The purpose of the National Resilience: Opportunities and Challenges in a Changing Security Environment conference was to improve general understanding of the interdependencies among the various stakeholders, help establish communities of interest and identify proposals that contribute to building resilience. By bringing together military and police, other government departments, and the private sector, the conference also supported NATO’s seven baseline requirements for resilience. The event was intended to complement and reinforce the work already underway by North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In particular, it built on, and developed further, the achievements of ACT NATO’s Interdependency in Resilience conference held in Norfolk, VA, in May 2017.

OPENING ADDRESS

Major General István Szabó From Baseline Resilience to National Resilience

Ladies and gentlemen,

Good morning and welcome to the international conference on national resilience. In an essay published in the summer of 1989 the American political scientist Francis Fukuyama predicted the end of history: the ultimate triumph of liberal democracy over all other ideologies. It was a convincing argument in the last decade of the 20th century – and one that many of us wanted to believe. First the absolutism of kings and emperors, then bolshevism and fascism, and eventually the updated versions of Marxism all ended up as comprehensive failures. In contrast, liberal democracy, with its fine balance of liberty, equality and social justice was on the march. The triumph of Western ideas was clear for all to see. Even Russia and China, the great fortresses of Communism were crumbling. Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost was taking the Soviet Union into uncharted territory of social and economic upheaval and political crisis. Although China under Deng Xiaoping did not embrace political reform, it did abandon Mao’s economic policies. As now we know with our perfect hindsight, Fukuyama’s prediction did not come to pass after all, because the marketplace of ideas does not tolerate a monopoly, at least not for long. Extreme nationalism, violent religious fundamentalism, visions of imperial grandeur, refurbished versions of fascism and Marxism, as well as some truly crackpot doctrines and ideologies continue to inspire millions, and are available for those who are dissatisfied with the current state of the world, and seek ways to change it. This makes for a world that is far more complex than the Cold War era was. 3

I am not suggesting that the years of the Cold War were all that simple – far from it. The events and trends of the world were determined by the interactions of many factors, and we had no control over many of them. Nevertheless, we could analyze them, draw reasonable conclusions, and make well-founded decisions. Also, the specter of war concentrated the mind of decision makers, and just about every nation in Europe developed robust plans to handle, and recover from, most emergencies. Today there are so many interacting factors that it is impossible to comprehend all the possible outcomes. Decisions have to be made based on imperfect information, which can lead to surprise and failure. But we were seduced by Fukuyama’s vision, and have allowed our ability to resist, and recover from, a potential surprise or shock to athrophy. NATO’s top decision makers have recognized that in this uncertain and rapidly changing strategic environment military capabilities alone are not enough for credible deterrence and defense. They must be complemented and supported by such critical non-military capabilities as continuity of government, continuity of essential services, and secure civilian infrastructure to support and sustain military operations. Accordingly, at the Warsaw summit in in July 2016 the heads of state and government made a commitment to enhance the Alliance’s ability to maintain and protect critical civilian capabilities. Although this is primarily a national responsibility, NATO has taken some positive steps to show the way. It surveyed the state of civil preparedness in the member states, issued guidelines on the basic capabilities that resilience entails, and keeps emphasizing the importance of the subject. And that is why I am particularly happy to see that NATO’s views on civil preparedness will be represented not only in Dr Thankey’s keynote address, but in some of the presentations as well. By way of setting things into motion Allied Command Transformation held a conference on resilience in Norfolk a year ago.

One of the key themes, or perhaps I should say the key theme of that conference was interdependence. This is probably the most important concept we in the armed forces must grasp, when it comes to resilience. Hungarian soldiers are accustomed to support civilian authorities in cases of natural and man-made emergencies. When floods threaten the riverbank communities, soldiers are there to strengthen the dikes. When drinking water gets polluted, our engineers deploy mobile water purification plants to provide drinking water to the affected communities. When the national borders are systematically violated, soldiers are deployed in support of the border police forces. We must realize, however, that such activities constitute only one small area of, and really contribute only a little to, national resilience. NATO’s seven baseline capabilities also address only the issue of reliable host nation support to military operations. However important these are, they constitute only a subset of national resilience. In my view a truly resilient society must have a common vision of resilience, one that unifies soldiers, civil servants, academics, the private sector and the general public, and cuts across career concerns, economic interests, and political convictions. To achieve that we must reach outside of the traditional walls of our professions and engage more with a large spectrum of actors. This conference will help us start down that path: the organizers managed to attract a broad spectrum of specialists, from military and police officers through social scientists and medical professionals to energy specialists and the representatives of trade and industry. George S. Patton, one of America’s most colorful generals once said that if everyone is thinking alike, then somebody isn’t thinking. Now, Patton may have been a controversial figure, but on this issue he was certainly correct. However, with such a variegated field of international subject matter experts from eight

5 nations and three continents I seriously doubt that we have to worry about General Patton’s warning. The presentations today and tomorrow are going to cover just about every one of the seven baseline capabilities. That implies, of course, that rather than addressing the various subject areas in detail, only certain aspects of each will be addressed. What I hope to see in the future is a series of further interdisciplinary conferences that focus more narrowly, but in greater depth on one or two areas of national resilience. And this brings me to my final point. In my opinion the resources and effort that go into organizing a conference are justified only if there are some tangible results at the end. The conferences organized by the General Staff’s Scientific Research Center always generate a set of conclusions and recommendations. They are a three-four page summary of the commonly held views of the participants, and they are developed through debate and discussion partly in the panels, and partly during the last part of the second day, in plenary session. I urge you all to take part in these discussions and make your view known, in order to assist policy makers both in Hungary and within the Alliance. In closing I would like to thank NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division and the Hungarian Atlantic Council for their generous support to this conference. So, ladies and gentlemen, I look forward to the upcoming discussions on this critical theme, and encourage you to share your insights, through candid and lively exchanges. That is how we can reach significant conclusions. Thank you for your attention.

KEYNOTE ADDRESS

Hasit Thankey Resilience and Civil Preparedness in a Changing Security Environment: A NATO Perspective

Good morning. I would like to thank the Hungarian General Staff Scientific Research Centre for the invitation and for allowing me to lead off this discussion on national resilience. I appreciate the opportunity to participate in this conversation. I am very happy to be in Budapest – it being my first time in this beautiful city – to present a NATO perspective on this important and increasingly high profile issue. It represents an important aspect of the Alliance’s adaptation to a changing strategic environment. At NATO, I am head of the Civil Preparedness section in the Operations Division of the International Staff. Since I began my position only 3 months ago, we have seen a marked increase in Allied interest on Civil Preparedness and resilience, which goes hand in hand with a growing concern about what is rather imperfectly referred to as “hybrid warfare.” As the name implies, my team’s core responsibility is to help Allies – as well as partners in certain circumstances – improve their civil preparedness alongside their military capabilities. First and foremost, because we are NATO, this is to ensure that Allied military forces can at all times be supported with civilian resources and infrastructure. Second – and this is the part most relevant to our discussion today – civil preparedness is about reducing nations’ vulnerabilities and improving their resilience to the full range of threats, with an increasing focus on those which deliberately aim for “soft” civilian targets, such as critical infrastructure or the civilian population itself.

From its very inception NATO has been concerned with building resilience and addressing vulnerabilities that could affect national defence or mutual assistance. Under Article 3 of the Washington Treaty, all Allies are obligated to “develop and maintain the capacity to resist armed attack.” The implication here is that readiness and resilience is not just the concern of individual nations, but also a collective concern. Allies should support each other’s efforts in meeting these responsibilities including through NATO as an organisation. To this end, in the Cold War era, extensive civilian crisis management structures were in place at NATO and in Allied nations to ensure resilience and readiness to withstand attack. After the Cold War ended, the policy, strategy, structures and processes that maintained this enormous effort were re-examined. The aforementioned structures and capabilities were dramatically scaled back, both in Allied nations and in NATO’s civilian and military structures, and NATO considered other political and military challenges. In 2014, with Russia’s actions in Ukraine, Allies began a process of adapting to a new set of security challenges, marked by a resurgent interest in strategy and political-military thinking about collective defence. The importance of the Alliance’s adaptation was first highlighted at the Wales Summit in 2014 and then again in 2016 at the Warsaw Summit, where Allies decided to strengthen NATO’s deterrence and defence posture and to endorse a Commitment to Enhance Resilience. On resilience, Allies pledged to achieve “agreed requirements” for national resilience in seven critical sectors. And I would like to take a few moments to look at what these agreed requirements are and how nations are going about implementing them. These seven baseline requirements, as they are referred to at NATO HQ, outline the critical civilian functions that underpin our

8 ability to defend ourselves. They also represent the level of resilience that each Ally has agreed that they should be expected to meet so that the core functions of continuity of government, continuity of essential services to the population and civil support to the military are at all times maintained - even under the most demanding circumstances and in the most demanding scenarios. First, Allied governments need to plan effectively for continuity of government. In a NATO context, this baseline requirement is aimed at safeguarding Allied governments’ ability to make decisions, to communicate those decisions, and to enforce them at all times and under all circumstances, especially during catastrophic events. To achieve this baseline requirement, Allies need to have in place national continuity plans to ensure mitigation measures for essential communications, and alternatives for the provision of critical services and for the establishment of secure crisis management centres. Allies also have to ensure that critical staff members are trained, systems are tested, and the continuity plans are exercised at regular intervals. Next, Allies need to ensure resilient energy supplies, that is to say energy systems that can withstand disruptions. This has obvious relevance to the Baltic Sea region, where energy infrastructure is particularly vulnerable to physical attack. This baseline requirement foresees the identification of critical supply chains and interdependencies, in particular cross-border interconnections, identification of alternative supply options, identified robust and sustainable back-up plans, training and exercising, cyber security, and prioritisation arrangements. Third, Allies also need to deal effectively with large population movements – both to ensure stability when faced with a sudden influx of people, and to ensure coordination and deconfliction with

9 possible military deployments to avoid gridlock in strategic transport nodes. The NATO requirement is for Allies to have an integrated civil military plan to handle a mass influx of people exceeding 2% of a nation’s total population. This plan would need to take into account basic human needs including health care, food, water, shelter, security and transportation. While many large movements of people come about as a result of natural disasters, migration flows due to various factors – including armed conflict – need to be taken into account. Fourth, our food and water resources need to be resilient against disruption or sabotage that might lead to contamination and harm the population. This baseline requirement recommends a tried and tested system to monitor and detect contamination of food and water sources, as well as the development of contingency plans to foresee alternative sources of food and water when necessary. Fifth, Allies must have the ability to deal with mass casualties. This includes deconfliction of civilian and military demands on the national health systems, up-to-date inventories of civil and military capabilities, integrated warning and reporting systems to alert the population, and contingency plans for shifting surge capacities to ensure that national responses are swift and coordinated. The sixth baseline requirement is to ensure security and availability of key national civil communications networks. In this age of cyber, such networks can easily become the target of hybrid attack or other types of sabotage that aims to disable governmental systems or disrupt other vital social or economic functions. The vulnerability of modern civil communications systems could lead to service disruptions which might then impact other civil sectors like banking, energy, transportation and food and water supplies. They could also disrupt networks that are essential to support military operations, particularly logistics, which rely on

10 civilian and commercial supply chains whose communications are generally not protected. The requirement is for Allied nations to have robust, sustainable redundancy capacity and restoration options, as well as priority access to civil communications networks for government and military purposes responses in crisis situations. And, of course, there is a need for robust cyber security. The last but certainly not least baseline requirement is for secure transportation systems and infrastructure. Any event or crisis that requires a NATO response also requires resilient transportation systems that can facilitate rapid movement of NATO forces across Alliance territory. Civilian services must also be able to rely on robust transport networks, even in times of crisis. Under this baseline requirement, work is underway at NATO to ensure that Allies’ are simplifying their procedures for the movement of NATO troops, that Allies protect critical transportation infrastructure, that they make provisions to be able to deny transportation networks to an adversary as a defensive measure, and that they put in place war risk insurance and indemnification mechanisms to ensure that commercial providers can continue to provide transportation assets in times of tension or conflict. I should reiterate the point here – it’s something I alluded to earlier – that the seven baseline areas are inextricably linked. If one area is impacted, another area may suffer as a result, creating cascading effects. For example, a mass influx of people would have serious effects on other critical sectors, such as transport, food and water, as well as on military posture and preparedness. To support Allies in achieving the baseline requirements, NATO has established a range of modest but useful support tools. We have established a Resilience Advisory Support Team – a team of pre- identified resilience experts to provide, upon request, tailored support to Allies in improving their resilience. This team could also

11 be available at the request of partner nations, subject to Allied agreement. We have also updated our planning and exercising to ensure that military planning is complemented by civilian crisis response planning, and that these are exercised together regularly. We also continue to offer training to our member nations in various aspects of resilience, including train-the-trainer courses for CBRN first response. These baselines are where the Alliance is focusing its efforts, and which provide a meaningful platform upon which to measure progress on a regular basis. As this conference proceeds, I’ll be interested in your views on these but more so on how you see resilience and how it matters to the institutions, organizations or populations that you serve. To conclude, I’m not going to pretend that building resilience is a panacea against the strategic challenges we are facing. It is a component of NATO’s adaptation, which takes into account not just the ‘below the threshold’ threat of hybrid but up to and including more conventional military threats. NATO’s enhanced forward presence in the Baltic States and Poland is one example of a more robust approach needed to deter and, if necessary, defend against an armed attack. In this way, Forward Presence is not designed to address hybrid warfare itself, but is rather a strategic tool that seeks to impose costs and increase the effort required to coerce, intimidate or attack an Ally, as well as compel an adversary to commit to and take responsibility for escalation. Equally, the important deterrent effect of building resilience should be recognized and further explored. In the here and now, resilience can increase the cost of malign behaviour with a view to mitigating its impact and impose political or other costs on a potential adversary – which can ultimately help prevent such activity in the first place. Building resilience against hybrid threats

12 helps build a longer term advantage too. While today Russia gets a lot of attention in Europe, 10 or 20 years from now these tactics may be regularly used by other actors. In this, NATO, along with the European Union, can have a role – and both memberships agree that resilience is the cornerstone of preparedness against hybrid warfare. Building resilience presents great opportunities for cooperation between the two institutions. We don’t claim to have all the answers or all the right tools and expertise on this, and we are still building our relationship with EU institutions which are also adjusting to this new environment. Working together will be crucial in the interests of our collective membership.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The presentations at the conference, and the papers published in this volume reflect the views of individual speakers. The conclusions presented in this section go one step further: they were developed in panel discussions and in a plenary session, and reflect the collective understanding of the participants and an engaged audience. They are recommended to the attention of decision makers. The sequence in which the conclusions are presented here does not imply an order of importance. They should be examined against NATO and national documents to determine their relevance to the existing plans, policies and practice.

The role of the state in crisis management

The sum of the resilience efforts of individuals, communities, businesses, or public agencies does not equal the overall societal or national resilience. To achieve the latter the various initiatives, plans and measures must be coordinated and combined. Furthermore, since the baseline capabilities are closely interlinked, and failure in one area may quickly cascade into other areas and lead to additional failures, resilience must be developed in a holistic manner. This implies coordination and oversight by central authorities, as well as incentive and regulative measures to ensure the needed cooperation in developing national resilience capabilities. There was a disagreement on how best to achieve this goal: One view was that the government needed more flexibility in addressing crisis situations, and this could be better attained by a robust regulative coercive system, that will grant the authorities more extended freedom of action to deal with a severe crisis.

 The opposite view (held by the majority) was that the state already has sufficient power to manage crises. What is needed, however, is a more precise definition of interagency relationships, which will clarify all aspects of authority, responsibility, and accountability, in the three phases of a crisis management (before, during, and following the crisis). These must be attended to meticulously and fully, and in advance.

 Another proposal might be that each state will decide what should be the level of control it exercises in accordance with its own values on one hand and with reference to the level and severity of the expected disruption on the other hand.

 In Hungary the Defence Administration system maintains permanent liaison between the armed forces and the civilian sector, which ensures governmental influence on the other sectors and agencies. Its planning and coordinating role (assisted by the territorial defense forces) contributes to local and regional resilience. Beyond the general context of the state, there is room for specific state agencies to contribute to the national resilience in and before wide-scale disruptions. This is true primarily in regard to national social services, such as education, public health and welfare, which are commonly geared to provide their professional capacities in normal times. These state agencies need to be recruited to take their share in national preparedness for disruptions and to be adequately ready for emergencies. The major challenge here is not only to mobilize these public organizations to do the utmost to be prepared, but also to collaborate and to synchronize their efforts among their own respective units and among the various government ministries. It is expected that each state will construct a designated agency, in accordance with its own organizational culture and political setting, to lead and integrate the state activities before, during and after disruptions. The role of the armed forces The armed forces are necessarily a part of the state’s response system. They are expected to contribute according to their capabilities and limitations. Once the government defines the required end-state and designates the lead agency to deal with the crisis, cooperation among all actors is essential in all fields, from training and education programs to planning and execution. Although creating, maintaining and enhancing national resilience is

18 not among the armed forces’ primary tasks, they can play a useful role in preventing state dysfunction, for several reasons:  The military is usually the largest, most resourceful agency in any country that is ready to engage in large-scale operations, including in novel circumstances.  As the symbol of the nation’s strength and protector of its territory and sovereignty, they can be perceived domestically as a stabilizing factor.  They are commonly prepared, experienced and disciplined in operating in high-risk environments, based on worst-case scenarios.  They have the capacities for collecting, analyzing and disseminating information. On the other hand, in many cases the military is not sufficiently prepared to participate in domestic civilian operations and to collaborate effectively with the civilian organizations designated to operate in a civilian environment. It takes a lot of practice and training to reach the necessary level of expertise to be effective in such a sensitive post-disaster situation, particularly as it affects weak populations in physical and psychological peril. Based on the above, the national armed forces can serve as an auxiliary force for the state response agencies, if there is a clear definition and guidance of what it can and should do in collaboration with the civilian agencies. This is a challenging issue, which has to be handled cautiously.

The role of the private sector In some countries there are a few companies, whose performance has a huge impact on the GDP and consequently on the critical infrastructure. These should be analyzed, and if warranted, they should be categorized as essential elements of national resilience. Then plans should be developed to protect them.

Profit-oriented corporations see the advantage in developing resilience within the limits of their own business activities, but are reluctant to step beyond those limits and cooperate with other businesses or government entities for the same purpose. This is especially so if it means the expenditure of additional funds or the allocation of additional resources. From a national perspective it is imperative to mobilize the private sector for a concerted effort in the realm of enhancing emergency preparedness in general and in resilience in particular. This is not a trivial matter. It calls not only for understanding the merits of such a process, but mostly to ensure that the joint effort is carefully defined, meticulously planned and effectively implemented. A primary component here should be cooperation and coordination not only between the business community and the central – and local – governments, but also between the various companies that are frequently competitors in the market place. This implies that the government must employ a carefully balanced set of incentive and coercive / regulative measures, in order to motivate the private sector to actively and continuously participate in the development of national resilience. The private sector might find good reasons to join this effort, such as to promote its standing in the public eye, to enhance its own readiness for emergency situations, to bolster its connections with the government and possibly also to learn lessons from the military crisis-management tools and methods. This endeavor is promising and possible, if handled with the necessary sensitivity by the government and the military.

The role of the international community Resilience should be enhanced and readily maintained primarily at the local level. Resilience is a layered concept, somewhat like an onion, applicable from the individual, through local and national to the international level. However, calamities are often

20 taking place beyond a certain community or locality and have severe wider consequences on the national level. International interdependency becomes increasingly a central theme, augmented by universal communication of the “global village”. A major disruption in one country might well have perilous implications for other countries, close and distant. Hence, there is a growing need for further collaboration on the international scene, which necessitate prior exchange of ideas, establishment of ‘common language,’ joint planning and exercises, and setting shared mechanisms for effective mutual assistance in emergencies. There is a standing controversy over the present contribution of the international organizations, such as the United Nations and the European Union to the individual states in their efforts to improve their resilience and preparedness to expected and novel disruptions. There is no doubt that much more can and should be done in this field. Some countries can tend to their emergency needs, while many more are far from prepared and have to rely on international aid. However, resilience is a layered concept, somewhat like an onion, from the individual, through local and national levels to the international level. It has a different meaning at each level. In particular, there is discrepancy between the UN’s definition of resilience on the one hand, and the NATO and national definitions on the other hand. Also, as experience has shown, when foreign assistance is granted, it is in many cases less efficient and far from helpful from the point of view of the recipients. Furthermore, NATO views resilience as primarily a national responsibility, and expects the member states to develop their baseline capabilities. Placing to much reliance on international organizations would be contrary to that purpose. While it is agreed that it is the primary responsibility of governments to enhance resilience, there is a room for international

21 cooperation, especially for the sake of the less developed nations, particularly those that face high-magnitude calamities. NATO and the military forces of the member nations can have a particularly significant role in planning capacity building of resiliency in specific baseline capacity areas, such as communications (especially in the cyber realm), medical and transportation critical infrastructure, and the management of large-scale population movements in cases of unplanned migration or evacuation of civilians from disrupted areas. What is unclear, however, is how NATO could influence planning and capacity building for the energy and food and water requirements as these seem to be well outside of the scope of NATO’s and the national military forces’ area of expertise and responsibility.

Training and exercises The definition of resilience differs from the measures employed to achieve successful resolution of a crisis or mitigate its negative impact. In this context, the plans to enhance baseline capabilities, contingency plans to meet various emergencies, operational plans to meet violent extremist or hybrid challenges must be validated through training and exercises. Otherwise their flaws will not be exposed until it is too late, and the emergency is already occurring. Resilience must also be included in NATO exercises by developing scenarios that focus on the non-military aspects of society, and “exercising to failure” in these areas. The training and the exercises must involve not only military forces, but industry, civilian agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations as well, in order to successfully mitigate the negative impact of crises. This is particularly important in the areas of transportation and sustainment, since most crises will negatively affect lines of communication. Although ambitious, this promises to be the best

22 way to highlight the importance of resilience planning to decision makers. Training and exercises will have a positive effect on resilience beyond the obvious immediate benefit. Some of the skills learned and the experience gained in preparation for one type of emergency is directly applicable in other emergencies. Also, the mental processes involved in preparing to meet one emergency scenario enhances the ability (both individual and team) to handle with confidence other, unforeseen emergencies as well.

Lead agency and phases of a crisis Determining the type of crisis, recognizing its main characteristics, and defining the desired end-state and designating the appropriate lead agency for its resolution are crucially important government tasks. The lead agency’s responsibilities and limits of authority, as well as the resources available for it must be made clear. A complex crisis may require a different lead agency in the various phases (before, during, and recovery) of its resolution. In such cases the command and control relationships in each phase, as well as the transfer of authority must be clear for all involved (including those receiving assistance). The experience of the United States is instructive in this context. In a crisis the first responders are the local authorities and the agencies they control. In some cases these do not have sufficient capacity to cope with the magnitude of the crisis, but state and federal agencies can step in only after it becomes clear that the local agencies are unable to cope. This prolongs the negative impact of the crisis on the public by expanding the “arc of pain.” In some cases laws had to be changed to mitigate this negative impact of federalism.

In the strongly centralized European countries the US experience may not be entirely relevant, but it certainly merits study, as a source of valuable lessons.

The societal impact of resilience Developing resilience measures may not be as costly as defensive measures are, but it still requires the allocation of funds. It is important to note that resilience-related public investments measures may well have social benefits and opportunities, such as stronger national cohesion, community resolve and higher prospects of growth. Since these also contribute to resilience, a virtuous cycle can be created. This may be particularly important today, when a response must be found to postmodern conflict’s insidious challenges to national identity, to the subversion of hybrid opponents, and to the extremist ideologies of the far left, the far right, and violent religious radicalism. In this context the territorial defense forces that are currently being raised in Hungary may serve as a valuable example. By being part of the local community, they will put national defense onto a whole-of-society footing, and they will serve as a societal vaccine against extremist and hybrid challenges, as well as various other crises. By emphasizing from the very beginning their role in emergency management and by preparing them for these missions, they would contribute to the promotion of resilience in the local and national level.

The energy sector In order to meet the baseline requirement for resilience in energy supply, closer, deeper and more extensive relationships and partnerships are needed among public, government and private agencies in the energy sector.

Both NATO and the national governments must provide guidance to actors in the energy sector. In particular, standard regulations are needed across the energy sector. Continuity of business protection requirements in the energy sector must also be analyzed, planning factors that address the effects of natural disasters must be developed, and risk management must be incorporated into planning. Also, a movement to a “need to share” attitude in the energy sector is needed.

Potential Resilience on the national level is a complex capability that underpins the sovereignty, stability and sustainability of the state, as well as the welfare and security of its citizens. Its long-term sustainment depends on a number of societal factors:  Social potential: demographics, culture, values and attitudes, social cohesion, commitment, and level of education.  Economic potential: industrial base, robust agriculture, redistribution system, finance.  Military potential and preparedness, which cannot exist without the other two. Resilience based on these factors allows a nation to better respond to threats in general, and to severe disruptions of civilian routine in particular.

PAPERS

Participants in the conference included scholars, practicioners, government officials and managers in the private sector. Consequently, highly theoretical, scholarly presentations alternated with those addressing the practical aspects of resilience, for example reports on the details of exercises, or suggested best practices based on the recollections of personal experience. Therefore, not every paper included in the following section conforms to the standards generally expected of scientific literature as far as referencing sources is concerned. Nevertheless, the organizers of the conference feel that these papers are at least as important as the theoretical ones. They encourage the reader to consult all of them with the same interest.

Peter Balogh

Building and Challenging Resilience: The Role of Social Resources and Social Context

Abstract The paper addresses the relevance of the social context and the importance of societal resources regarding resilience. First a conceptual framework is outlined to introduce the issue of vulnerabilities and resilience, and to comprehend resilience capacity from a social perspective and understand how social resources and social circumstances might play an important role as the source of resilience potential. In this context I offer an approach based on some basic consequences of strategic game theory that differentiates between two forms of resilience – a (1) formalized or institutionalized one and the type of (2) socially embedded resilience. A case study is presented next, to empirically shed light on resilience when challenged under real circumstances by investigating the situation that emerged during and after the migrant/refugee crisis in Hungary. The methodological background of the empirical research includes various – primarily online – data sources, in the course of data analysis social network analysis and descriptive statistical methods were applied. Consequently in this overview the rather complex issue is reconstructed as it appeared in the public through the online media sources. The case study implies a noteworthy capacity of the institutions, authorities and social sphere of the country to respond to the challenge and foster resilience, however the two, conceptually distinguished form of resilience seem to unfold parallel in time but in opposite directions, resulting in a less robust resilience.

Finally the research problems and the empirical results of the paper are summarized and it is acknowledged that the different and complex resources of a society might be utilized in a challenging situation. However in the absence of a common perception, in a dominantly polarized social context it might be rather complicated to achieve an effective and inclusive pattern of resilience – that might even lead to further vulnerability.

Resilience and vulnerability When a society is challenged by external influences, it needs to cope with the potential effects of the events and avoid the appearance of vulnerabilities. Robustness of a system is an attribute that refers to the capacity of the organization to resist external challenges. Without that its structure and dynamics are substantially changed. In the cases when the effects of the external challenge cannot be avoided, a different mechanism comes into play: the process of resilience does not prevent, but rather works with the impacts. This covers the capability to absorb, incorporate and even utilize the external effects, and in this way preserving the structure without essential qualitative transformations. Considering the societal sphere further, a special type of resilience can be distinguished: cultural resilience is interpreted as the capability of a community to maintain its identity while employing new, practical knowledge and skills.1 In the case of economic or social systems resilience includes the foresight capability of the community, the capacity to elaborate integrative plans and scenarios about the cooperation of the sectors of environment, economy and society and

1 Bulla, M. “Sokféleség és sérülékenység. A resilience képesség társadalmi interpretálása.” In Tamás, P – Bulla, M. (eds.), Sebezhetőség és adaptáció. A resiliencia esélyei. Budapest: MTA Szociológiai Kutatóintézet, 2011, 19-31. 30 to investigate and analyse the possible interactions in order to minimize vulnerabilities and improve the potential consequences.2 Vulnerability is obviously a key aspect when dealing with resilience.3 It could be said that there should be an opposite relationship between the two, and vulnerability also has a significant – however less investigated – social dimension.4 As some scholars argue that vulnerability could be perceived as a multi-dimensional phenomenon where social factors can play an important role is several aspects. Vulnerability comes – at least partially – from social inequalities; the differences among the members of the community facing the challenge have an essential role when vulnerabilities emerge. Furthermore, the social context or structure becomes also essential as it “includes community experience with hazards, and community ability to respond to, cope with, recover from, and adapt to hazards”5 and also covers a specific perception of risks.6 Apparently it might be useful to apply a twofold interpretation of resilience from an analytical perspective. In this sense the main aspect of resilience could be the capacity to withstand and overcome a challenge. In accordance with the whole-of-society approach this capacity is relevant on different levels of societal life. It can be investigated as individual readiness and willingness to act and react, it surely has to do a lot with institutional resources, furthermore the characteristics of the societies on a macro or collective level might be also relevant. The other dimension of resilience is highly connected to flexibility and adaptability. This is the capacity – of the community

2 Bulla. “Sokféleség és sérülékenység.” 24. 3 See e.g. Young, O. R. – Berkhout, F. – Gallopinc, G. C. – Janssen, M. A. – Ostrom, E. – van der Leeuw, S. “The globalization of socio-ecological systems: An agenda for scientific research.” Global Environmental Change 16/3. 2006. 304-316. 4 Cutter, S. L. – Boruff, B. J. – Shirley, W. L. “Social Vulnerability to Environmental Hazards.” Social Science Quarterly 84/2. 2003. 242-261. 5 Cutter – Boruff – Shirley. “Social Vulnerability to Environmental Hazards.”243. 6 Cutter – Boruff – Shirley. “Social Vulnerability to Environmental Hazards.”244. 31 facing the challenge – to become more, emerge stronger after the challenge. The successful management and solving of a crisis can largely contribute to the society as a whole. However these latter positive effects might be less easy to achieve.

Resilience from a social perspective From an action theory based sociological perspective7 it might be fruitful to understand and study resilience as a collective capacity8 of a society, similar to public goods9 and – certain aspects of – social capital.10 In this field of interdependent actions and decisions in a collective entity two kind of difficulties emerge: how to ensure the personal contribution supposing rational actors with a lack of motivation – that is, with a temptation to free-ride and desertion – to invest in public resources.11 This is the problem of cooperation (table 1.).

7 See e.g. Szakadát I. Cselekvéselmélet dióhéjban: Játék, elmélet, módszer, tan – Weber: újratöltve. Budapest: Typotex, 2008., Szántó Z. “A társadalomtudományi magyarázat szintjei: módszertani individualizmus és a racionális cselekvés típusai.” In Szántó Z. (ed.), Analitikus szemléletmódok a modern társadalomtudományban. Budapest: Helikon Kiadó, 2006, 9-34. 8 It is also the second theme outlined by NATO to consider resilience as a capacity. “Building resilience – Collaborative proposals to help nations and partners.” NATO. 2017. June. http://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/events/2017/resilience/resilience- wp.pdf, last accessed: 2018. 06. 25.; 5-6. 9 Olson, M. A kollektív cselekvés logikája. Közjavak és csoportelmélet. Budapest: Osiris Kiadó, 1997. 10 Putnam, R. D. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000. 11 Hardin. “A kollektív cselekvés mint megegyezéses, N szereplős fogolydilemma.” 32

Alters (n=9)

Ego Cooperation Desertion

Cooperation 1; 1 -0.8; 0.2

Desertion 1.8; 0.8 0; 0

Table 1. The collective action paradox interpreted as a strategic game12

The other challenge is to explore and elaborate the different equivalent alternatives of action, and then – if it is considered necessary – to choose and realize one commonly, uniformly.13

12 In this interpretation of the collective action paradox (Olson 1997) a small group – including only ten members – wishes to create a public good that would double the resources of the (members of) the group (one unit each). The model investigates the action strategy and preferences of the actors in this specific situation where the members all know that if the collective action succeeds, no one could be excluded from the public good. However in this arrangement rational actors do not have sufficient motivation to invest into the collective interest and make efforts to facilitate the realization of the group objective. The matrix includes the net benefit values of one member of the group and the other ones and illustrates that the dominant strategy of the individual member (ego) is to refuse to cooperate as the available net benefits are in this option higher irrespectively what the other ones choose to do. And as all the members of the group could be investigated as ego characterized with the dominant strategy of desertion, the group – of rational actors – fails to achieve the collective good. Table based on Hardin, R. “A kollektív cselekvés mint megegyezéses, N szereplős fogolydilemma.” In Csontos, L. (ed.), A racionális döntések elmélete. Budapest, Osiris Kiadó – Láthatatlan Kollégium, 1998, 191-207. 13 Ullmann-Margalit, E. “Koordinációs normák.” In Csontos, L. (ed.), A racionális döntések elmélete. Budapest: Osiris Kiadó – Láthatatlan Kollégium, 1998, 161-190. 33

Generally this process of coordination (table 2.) results in one single alternative.

A1 A2 A3 A4

A1 1; 1 0; 0 0; 0 0; 0

A2 0; 0 1; 1 0; 0 0; 0

A3 0; 0 0; 0 1; 1 0; 0

A4 0; 0 0; 0 0; 0 1; 1

Table 2. The problem of coordination14

14 The challenge of coordination is illustrated here as the necessity to mutually choose and realize one from the several different alternatives (A1, ..., A4). The difficulty emerges from the fact that all the alternatives are suitable to reach the objective of the actors but only in the case when their decisions are harmonized. Accordingly in a coordination problem there are some equilibrium points of the combination of action and where coordination succeeds, however in much several cases – depending on the number of alternatives – the unmatched combination of preferences prevent the actors to find an efficient solution. Table created bythe authors, based on Ullmann-Margalit, “Koordinációs normák.” 164-165. 34

Both cooperation15 and coordination16 problems can be overcome with generally two types of solutions. One way is the elaboration and imposition of formalized regulations from the outside, by centralized institutions.17 The other possibility is that the actors themselves create their own norms and rules of action – this is the area of informal and decentralized mechanisms.18 Based on these considerations two different types or mechanisms of resilience could be distinguished conceptually (table 3.). Resilience capacity can be ensured by a formal institution that

15 In the field of cooperation the essential solution can be the introduction of selective incentives. The specific characteristic of these incentives is that they can be applied selectively and accordingly in the case of those members of the society who do not – or have a temptation not to – take part in the collective action. There can be distinguished two different forms of selective incentives: the negative type induces some kind of penalty on the passive ones, while positive selective incentives recompense the efforts of those who take part in the realization of the commons interest. Furthermore in the case of small communities an additional dimension emerges: social selective incentives – both positive and negative – rely dominantly on the value of belonging to a group. In this way a community might refuse the group membership of the inactive ones or might give additional recognition – and in certain cases influence – for those members who actively participate in the joint action (Olson 1997). From a slightly different perspective the disentanglement of the cooperation paradox could emerge from two sources: centralized solutions are external ones that rely on the regulation of a social institution. Decentralised solutions in turn are embedded in the group: tit for tat strategy refers to a practice when the actor cooperates at the initial decision and continues to do so until the other one confirms the partnership by cooperation. In this process further resources might occur to strengthen cooperation: social capital and social embeddedness could emerge to ensure a supportive social context for cooperation. Szántó, Z. – Orbán, A. “A társadalmi tőke koncepciója.” In Szántó (ed.). Analitikus szemléletmódok a modern társadalomtudományban. 137-158. 16 In the case of newly emerged coordination problems formal norms or institutions with a proper authority can provide the solution, and in an iterative situation where a community faces a coordination challenge several times, a solution invented by the members of the group and proved to be effective, becomes a convention or informal norm (Ullmann-Margalit 1998: 168-175). 17 On the role of institutions see: Elster, J. A társadalom fogaskerekei. Budapest: Osiris Kiadó, 1997. 18 Szántó – Orbán. “A társadalmi tőke koncepciója.” 35 has the proper authorization and corresponding potential to provide the necessary infrastructure. Central coordination becomes crucial in this case to effectively ensure appropriate selective incentives – particularly different sanctions – to facilitate cooperation. This – rather ideal-typical – form of resilience could be titled as formalized or institutionalized one. If resilience capacity evolves from the deeper societal background, different mechanisms and patterns of action could be dominant. In this case of a socially embedded type of resilience the role of informal cooperative norms proves to be essential and the initiations are highly embedded into the decentralized structure of communities. This could be described as the – typically temporary and spontaneous – process when the whole of the society gets involved with its different resources, norms and expectations.19

Cooperation

Coordination centralized decentralized

formalized / formal institutionalized – resilience socially embedded informal – resilience

Table 3. Different forms of resilience20

19 Obviously these forms can be distinguished only conceptually, in practical terms and under real conditions there can be a more-or-less (rather than an either-or) kind of relation between these different mechanisms. 20 Table created by the author. 36

The extraordinary collective resources of social capital,21 socially embedded relations22 and trust23 evidently play a crucial role in the case of the latter aspect of resilience, however these resources could be treated as generally important ones. Social capital facilitates individual goal attainment, cooperation and collective action, social networks create the crucial source for macro-level integration and socially embedded structure, furthermore social activity and institutional trust enhance and strengthen community development and collaboration24. Accordingly, it might be assumed that a remarkable and effective resilience capacity could (only) be reached if all of the resources and potential are incorporated and utilized. That is, both the centrally organized and the informal, socially embedded mechanisms function together in a way that they complement and reinforce each other and this creates an integrated pattern.25

21 Bourdieu, P. “Gazdasági tőke, kulturális tőke, társadalmi tőke.” In Lengyel Gy. – Szántó Z. (eds.). Gazdaságszociológia. Budapest: Aula Kiadó, 2006, 132-146.; Coleman, J. S. „A társadalmi tőke az emberi tőke termelésében.” In Lengyel – Szántó (eds.). Gazdaságszociológia. 109-131. 22 Granovetter, M. “A gyenge kötések ereje. A hálózatelmélet felülvizsgálata.” In Angelusz, R. – Tardos, R. (eds.), Társadalmak rejtett hálózata, Budapest: Magyar Közvéleménykutató Intézet, 1991., Granovetter, M. “A gazdasági intézmények társadalmi megformálása: a beágyazottság problémája.” In Lengyel – Szántó (eds.). Gazdaságszociológia. 32-47. 23 On social capital as a collective resource or trust see e.g. Fukuyama, F. Bizalom. A társadalmi erények és a jólét megteremtése. Budapest: Európa Könyvkiadó, 1997. and Putnam. Bowling Alone. 24 Putnam. Bowling Alone. 25 Obviously it is not likely – and perhaps not even necessary – that the two different forms of resilience have equal influence in an actual situation: one of them might become dominant and the other might supplement and integrate the efforts of the former one while the society tries to cope with the challenge. Similarly to the operation pattern of the correction mechanisms of exit and voice as described by Hirschman, A. O. Kivonulás, tiltakozás, hűség. Hogyan reagálnak vállalatok, szervezetek és államok hanyatlására az érintettek? Budapest: Osiris Kiadó, 1995. 37

In order to empirically study the assumption about the key factors of resilience outlined above I introduce a case study in the next section.

Case study I carried out an investigation of the refugee or migrant crisis in Hungary – a challenging event with notable consequences. My primary objective was to explore how this challenge become reflected and presented to the public, so in this case study I applied small-scale media content analysis26 based on two online media news webpages.27 I collected relevant articles and reports from this period and assembled a complex dataset of the thematic labels and keywords.28 I used this data to map the pattern of connectedness between issues and topics.29 It should be noted that this media image of the crisis should not be considered to be methodologically representative but rather explorative and indicative.30 Besides the

26 The investigated period of the data collection covers 2015 and 2016. 27 It is a common feature of the investigated news webpages that both of them have a fairly high position in the domestic online news competition: based on a report from 2017 autumn they were among the three most attended ones as their monthly data of the number of visitors ranges between 2.3 and 2.8 million, and a similarly high ranking for mobile phone users could be measured. Furthermore a kind of balance can be assured of the different profile and even opposing approaches and attitudes that characterize the two online news sources by investigating their content in a joint database. 28 From the two webpages a total number of 127 articles were assembled and edited into the unified database including a total number of 74 thematic labels and keywords. 29 This approach of small-scale media content analysis can be regarded as a methodological combination of quantitative content analysis and social network analysis. See e.g. Vicsek, L. Fókuszcsoport. Elméleti megfontolások és gyakorlati alkalmazás. Budapest: Osiris Kiadó, 2006. and Vedres, B. “Milyen fogalmi környezetben jelent meg az Investel a magyar sajtóban? Fogalomháló-elemzés.” In Szántó, Z. – Vedres, B. (eds.), Kapcsolathálók, szervezeti kultúra, pénzügyi teljesítmény. Szervezetszociológiai tanulmányok a magyar távközlésfejlesztés finanszírozásáról. Budapest: Aula Kiadó, 2002, 309-320. 30 Snowball sampling method was applied. 38 online media analysis I also applied certain desk research methods: secondary analysis of public opinion research data,31 and review of related publications and research reports.32 The conceptual network of the media representation about the refugee or migrant crisis consists of a total of 74 thematic labels and keywords (graph 1.). The words and expressions concentrated in the centre of this structure33 reflect the main issue: the presence of a great number of refugees, migrants and asylum seekers, who gained great visibility in a short period of time – especially in certain parts of the country (in the southern region and at railway stations). This initiated the challenge, and due to the lack of common EU-level regulations and effective policies to manage it, various and irrespective initiatives and attempts emerged.34

31 Data source: TÁRKI Social Research Institute 32 Bernát, A. “Hosts In Hostility: The New Forms of Solidarity and The Role of Volunteer and Civilian Organisations in the Migration Crisis in Hungary.” In Simonovits, B. – Bernát, A. (eds.), The Social Aspects of the 2015 Migration Crisis in Hungary. Budapest: TÁRKI Social Research Institute, 2016: 72-100.; Bernát, A. – Kertész, A. – Tóth, F. M. “Solidarity Reloaded: Volunteer and Civilian Organizations during the Migration Crisis in Hungary.” Szociológiai Szemle 26/4. 2016. 29-52.; Rácz, A. “Magyar Honvédség társadalmi megítélése a 2016-os Mikrocenzus és a Dél-Alföld határmenti kutatásainak tükrében.” Társadalom és Honvédelem Konferencia conference presentation, Budapest, 2017. November 8- 9.; Sik, E. „The Socio-Demographic Basis of Xenophobia in Contemporary Hungary.” In Simonovits – Bernát. The Social Aspects of the 2015 Migration Crisis in Hungary. 41-47.; Tóth, F. M. – Kertész, A. “Beyond the Humanitarian Miracle – Volunteers’ Role During the Refugee Crisis.” In Simonovits – Bernát. The Social Aspects of the 2015 Migration Crisis in Hungary. 101-119. 33 “migrant”, “migration”, “immigration”, “refugee(s)”, “refugee crisis” 34 Bernát. “Hosts In Hostility.” 39

Graph 1. The conceptual network of the refugee/migrant crisis35

Around the centre topic of the crisis the conceptual map seems to be divided into two, at least partially separate and thematically different parts. One could be recognized as the conceptual field virtually exploring the realization of a formalized or institutionalized form of adaptation process. With the words and expressions of “border,” “border closure” and “fence” in its centre, this sub-graph – complemented with its overall context – implies a centrally coordinated, top-down pattern incorporating a wide range of

35 Graph created by the author. 40 institutions and participants36 and including references to the political sphere.37 The other, seemingly separate segment unfolds around the topic of civil initiatives and organizations with a context of related activities.38 Here we might encounter the socially embedded form of resilience characterized by a focus on locality, a bottom-up pattern of development, voluntary groups without an experienced formal staff and with the intent to bring help for asylum seekers to safely reach their destination and provide relief for the migrants on their travel.39 So at this point we might conclude that the different – even opposing – forms and mechanisms of adaptive processes could be empirically explored. On the one hand an institutionalized type characterised by top-down, formal organizations and legal authorities, and on the other hand an essentially different, bottom- up, spontaneous form of social reaction. However this would be a greatly oversimplified conclusion, as the overall picture proves to be more complex. Partly because certain similarities can be explored between the two sections. In the case of the conceptual network segment illustrating the formalized or institutionalized type of resilience the mechanism of bottom-up organizing pattern can also be observed. Although it is less visible, two different examples can be brought. Volunteer solidarity groups emerged with the intent to provide symbolic and practical support for the personnel and servicemen

36 Including police officers and military personnel. 37 The political embeddeness can be illustrated by the presence of governmental actors, ministries and ministers, political parties and politicians – both from the government and the opposition. 38 For example providing help, charity activities, voluntarism. 39 Bernát. “Hosts In Hostility.” 41 stationed at the southern border of the country40. This implies that solidarity does not emerge exclusively towards the refugees and asylum seekers. On the other hand, social resources could have also been utilized in the opposite direction – as the example of the symbolic activities of the Betyársereg (the “Outlaw Army”) demonstrates. This community consists of the bottom-up network of “clans”41 around the country led by one person (graph 2.) and the movement declares itself as a national patriot movement with the objectives to defend the culture and the sovereignty of the country. The outlaws published in this context several visual messages on their internet webpage42 in the period of the refugee or migrant crisis and according to some online media reports43 some members of the clans travelled to the southern border area of Hungary to find and clash with migrants.

40 As demonstrated in a conference presentation based on field work research carried out at the Southern border area of Hungary. See Rácz. “Magyar Honvédség társadalmi megítélése a 2016-os Mikrocenzus és a Dél-Alföld határmenti kutatásainak tükrében.” 41 The Betyársereg designated its local chapters as “clans.” 42 Some examples can be found at http://betyarsereg.hu/allitsuk-meg-europa- iszlamizalodasat/; http://betyarsereg.hu/a-betyarsereg-uzenete-megvedjuk- eletterunk/; http://betyarsereg.hu/a-betyarsereg-uzenete-nem-adjuk- szulofoldunk/; http://betyarsereg.hu/a-nap-kepe-futnak-a-migransok-ha- megjonnek-a-betyarok/; and http://betyarsereg.hu/a-betyarsereg-uzenete- keszulj-a-faji-haborura-2/ 43 “Berágott Toroczkaira a Betyársereg a menekültvadászat miatt.” Index.hu, 2015.07.13., Belföld. (https://index.hu/belfold/2015/07/13/beragott_a_betyarsereg_toroczkaira/) 42

Graph 2. Network of the clans of Betyársereg (“Outlaw Army”)44

On the other hand it could also be stated that the other segment of activities – dominated by the socially embedded mechanism of local volunteerism – incorporates certain formalized patterns as well. According to research results45 a wide range of stakeholders could be found here, including established charity organizations (for

44 The graph displays the network of the clans on county level: the clans that are organized in the same county are also linked to each other. Graph created by the author. 45 Bernát. “Hosts In Hostility.” 43 example the ones linked to traditional churches, or the Red Cross and the Maltese Charity Service) and international organizations (for example the United Nations Refugee Agency), as well as established NGOs that operate in the field of migration and refugee issues. These organizations have a more experienced staff, a more diverse and more professional experience and could provide various services (for example legal aid).46 So these formal organizations complemented the activities of the volunteer grassroots and effectively cooperated with them. In this context it raised a particular attention that some of these grassroots, NGOs and established charity organizations obtained financial support and grants both from domestic and foreign supporting organizations (graph 3.). However this issue points towards the final similarity or common feature of the refugee or migrant crisis: the influence of short-term political interests. The significant political interest can easily be understood if we take into consideration how much the Hungarian society is divided in this context. Based on longitudinal public opinion data47 we can explore an intense growing of polarization in the attitudes towards asylum seekers already since the EU-accession of Hungary (figure 1.). This trend could generate an unfavourable social context for adaptability and for a whole-of-society approach of resilience, especially if further processes strengthened this dividedness

46 Bernát. “Hosts In Hostility.” 47 The source of longitudinal data is TÁRKI Social Research Institute, published in Sik, E. “The Socio-Demographic Basis of Xenophobia in Contemporary Hungary.” 44

Graph 3. A segment from the financing network of the Hungarian civil sector48

48 Graph created by the author. This sub-graph is a small fragment of a much more complex graph mapping the financing network of the Hungarian civil sector as described in a previous analysis (Balogh, P. “Gray Zone Activities – with a Focus on the Social Domain.” In Kiss, A. P. (ed.), Conflicts in the Gray Zone: A Challenge to Adapt. Conference Proceedings. Budapest: Hungarian Defence Forces General Staff Scientific Research Centre, 15-36. (28-33.). 45

Figure 1. Polarization of attitudes towards asylum seekers in Hungary49

In accordance with this logic political parties and actors proved to be a significant component of the processes in both segments of the conceptual network (graph 1: highlighted with square nodes). Furthermore the importance of political embeddedness of the issue could also be demonstrated by the volunteers’ multiple motivational structure as it incorporates – according to some qualitative research results50 – political motives, in addition to altruism and affectedness (table 4.).

49 Created by the author, based on data of TÁRKI Social Research Institute. 50 Bernát – Kertész – Tóth. “Solidarity Reloaded.”; Tóth – Kertész. “Beyond the Humanitarian Miracle.” 46

Motivational Altruistic Political Involvement structures motivation motivation

Main Duty, Solidarity Outrage emotions sadness Operative tasks, Donation, Fieldwork: coordinating Type of background Interpreting, groups, work work. If needed: medical aid communication field work with officials Table 4. Motivational structures of volunteers51

Closing remarks The research results introduced in the case study illustrated that resilience might be considered as a rather complex and rich, collective capacity of a society. Various sources of resilience and particular mechanisms to build and activate adaptive processes can be distinguished. In the case of a well-established state possessing the appropriate economic background and institutional structure, the necessary resources to overcome a challenge can be effectively provided. In the case of a society accumulating a high level of self- organizing capacity and trust with an active civil sector of socially embedded networks, flexibility and adaptability with various resources can be reached. When these sources and mechanisms of resilience capacity get balanced and interconnected, the positive outcomes can complement each other and the favourable consequences may multiple. So it is obvious – and desirable – that a society facing a challenge attempts to successfully activate, mobilize and utilize every portion of resources in order to efficiently adapt

51 Table created by the author, based on Bernát – Kertész – Tóth. “Solidarity Reloaded.” and Tóth – Kertész. “Beyond the Humanitarian Miracle 2016: 115.) 47 and overcome the crisis. Providing that, there is a mutual understanding and consensus about the essential objectives.52 As the resilience process might be weakened, narrowed and shortened due to the lack of an adequate management or an integrative approach: when failing to harmonize the fundamental purposes and the methods and practises to realize them, resilience capacity could be hindered. We might notice here a pattern similar to the rather general mechanism called the Matthew-effect.53 That is, countries with high level of integration and trust have a remarkable chance to emerge stronger from a crisis. However, under fragmented and polarized conditions resilience capacity can only be limited, and divergent or contrary adaption processes without a conceptual coordination might even lead to further undesirable consequences, disintegration and vulnerability54 – a favourable context for hybrid threats and unconventional warfare.55 Consequently in order to better comprehend the process of effectively planning resilience capacity it

52 A key challenge of democratic social institutions is actually to harmonize several divergent interests and coordinate the joint realization of the emerging common objective. Elster. A társadalom fogaskerekei. 150-159). 53 It is a general assumption about the reinforcement and growth of social inequalities – the wealthy ones acquire even more, the poor ones become even more needy – described first in the field of science in Merton, R. K. “The Matthew Effect in Science. The reward and communication systems of science are considered.” Science 159/3810. 1968. 56-63., illustrated through a parable in Matthew 13,12. 54 That is, in this sense the resilience process itself might become counterproductive (Elster. A társadalom fogaskerekei. 100-101, 155) or dysfunctional (Merton, R. K. Társadalomelmélet és társadalmi struktúra. Budapest: Osiris Kiadó, 2002: 132, 144-145). 55 Threats and challenges that operate below the traditional level of armed conflicts however prove to be rather effective by utilizing the polarization and tension of a society and targeting primarily the human domain. See e.g. Oskarsson, K. “The Effectiveness of DIMEFIL Instruments of Power in the Gray Zone.” OPEN Publications 1/2. 2017. 1-16.; Votel, J. L. – Cleveland, Ch. T. – Connett, Ch. T. – Irwin, W. “Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone” JFQ 80/1, 2016. 101-109. 48 might be fruitful to – again – differentiate between the two distinct aspects of resilience: (1) the capacity of a community to withstand and overcome a challenge, and (2) to emerge stronger after the challenge. I will refer to these aspects as (1) the criterion of success56 and (2) the requirement of integrativeness.57 Regarding these dimensions there could be elaborated four different cases of the outcomes58 depending on how the actual process of resilience could fulfil the twofold requirements (table 5.). Obviously the case when resilience both successful and integrative is (outcome[O]1) could be regarded as the most desirable one. That is, when resilience appears with its maximum complexity, as the society utilized all of its particular resources in a balanced and properly organized manner. However, the actions and measures to cope with a challenge might be successful without the participation of all the possible actors (O2). In this case resilience process could prove to be dominantly exclusive – it might be refused or prevented for others to take part in the adaptation and utilize their particular skills and capabilities. A further option (O3) reflects the situation when the society fails to overcome the actual challenge, nevertheless there could even be some positive outcome as the community can be forged and due to the common unfavourable impacts of the crisis a sense of togetherness might emerge.

56 In this approach a resilience process can be regarded successful if it managed to withstand and overcome the challenge. 57 It refers to the capability of a resilience process to effectively harmonize and interconnect the complex resources and different initiatives of the society so that it can become more, emerge stronger after the challenge. 58 Conceptually the case when resilience is neither successful nor integrative (O4) represents the failure of the adaptive process, accordingly this case will not be interpreted in details. 49

capacity to emerge stronger

not integrative integrative

capacity to successful O1 O2 withstand and overcome not successful O3 (O4) challenge

Table 5. Possible outcomes of resilience.59

Certainly the major and primary necessity is to overcome a challenge – i.e. to be successful in this context – however, it may not be the most fruitful approach to neglect the aspect of integrativeness (figure 2.). Because from a wider perspective this latter function could ensure an essential gain – the ability to build on a stronger and more cohesive community that might face a future crisis or threat in a more prepared and more confident manner.

Figure 2. Neutral (a), positive (b) and negative (c) scenarios of adaptation process60

59 Table created by the author. 60 The figure displays the change of the integration level of a society – starting from the same point – in time assuming that after the first challenge two further threats 50

The authorities of a society that fail to take into consideration this kind of inclusive approach of planning resilience could waste some of the extraordinarily complex resources and abilities, and risk the society as a whole to become more vulnerable. A country with debate and controversy about the strategy to follow and actions to take to become resilient is needed to face a less favourably social context which can result in a negative scenario of adaptive perspectives. However if a country is able and willing to undertake the difficulties and extensive tasks to properly coordinate and harmonize all the different segments of the society’s resilience capacity and apply an inclusive approach, it could rely on the additional advantages of a cohesive and integrated community. So those who wish to increase resilience might consider investing in the society itself, as resilience is deeply embedded in, and highly dependent on, the actual social circumstances.

About the author Peter Balogh is as an assistant professor at the University of Szeged, Department of Sociology. He conducted quantitative research on the negative effects of social capital, exploring the global cooperative network of terrorist organizations. His research interest is the social aspects of conflicts and the role of social resources and cooperation in security issues. He can be contacted at: [email protected].

appear. The different scenarios illustrate – compared to the neutral one (a) – the distinct trends regarding the integration level of the society. In every cases the resilience process proves to be successful, but in the case of the negative scenario (c) a decreasing trend emerges due to the lack of integrativeness. Contrary to the positive scenario (b), when the society successfully overcomes all the challenges and reinforces its cohesion by reproducing and increasing its integration. Graph created by the author. 51

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Hugo Blom

Commercial Sector Risk Management: Supporting National and NATO Resilience Strategies

Proximities Risk Consultancy is based in The Netherlands and works across a number of security domains, including asset security risk management, travel safety, corporate espionage and cyber vulnerability. The company is active in 21 nations and works with more than 60 partners. The company analyses the security risk exposure of its clients, provides training and instruction, management and coordination as well as an auditing service. Based on this institutional experience, this paper discusses the role risk consultancy companies can play in supporting national and international resilience activities. After an introduction, this paper will discuss three main topics: 1. Information exchange as key-enabler for private enterprise to support civil preparedness; 2. Information gathering and sharing by private enterprise as key- enablers for military planners; 3. The role of NATO, supported by private enterprise, as a linking pin between national and regional resilience frameworks.

Introduction - the changing security environment Over the past few years, doing business has become more complex. Globalisation has changed the structure and pace of corporate life; the saturation of traditional markets is taking companies to more risky places and the shift towards a knowledge economy is eroding the importance of ‘place’ in the business world. At the same time, security risks have become more complex, too. Many of the threats are asymmetric and networked, making them more difficult to manage. There is also greater appreciation of the interdependence between a company’s risk portfolio and the way it does business: certain types of behaviour can enhance or undermine 57 an organisation’s ‘licence to operate’. Hence, new protocols have been developed such as the UN’s Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights (VPSHR) and security has gained a higher profile in the corporate world as companies look for new ways to manage these new security risks.

What are the consequences for business in general? As a result of the changing security environment, private enterprises:  Recognize that the general threat is up. Cyber, migration, terrorism, criminality and political instability (e.g. due to BREXIT, a looming global US trade war and Russia’s activities in Ukraine) contribute to a complex, dynamic and unstable world which they find difficult to predict and operate in;  Are more aware that asset and personal security is an issue that can no longer be ignored: IS attacks have taken place close to home (e.g. UK, France, Belgium) and companies are forced to work in emerging markets which often have a volatile security environment;  Must comply with ever increasing security regulations which are set by their home nation or the nation they operate in;  Realize that they have a security-related duty of care towards their employees and their environment and that ignorance of risks is no longer an acceptable excuse, especially in the light of a seemingly ever-increasing suing-culture;  Have a decreasing risk appetite as they realize that their brand is easily affected because word can spread quickly through social media and because “internet does not forget”;  Although they obviously don’t like this, are accepting security related costs; and

 Accept that sizeable cultural differences exist between nations in which they operate, which can affect their security posture.

Role of risk consultancy companies in building resilience for business For many businesses, dealing with security is a new domain with which they have little affinity. Hence, they often turn to risk consultancy companies for advice. Most of these companies have ex- military staff working for them. Interestingly, this has increased the understanding that military and business planning activities are actually very much alike, despite the fact that these processes were developed under different circumstances and with different goals in mind. For example, whereas the Operational Planning Process (OPP) of military planners is phased into Mission analysis, Response options / COA development, a Command decision before pre- deployment and deployment of the military unit, business managers think in terms of Lead, developing the Opportunity Options, the Final Investment Decision, the deal, the set-up and finally full execution of business operations. (See Figure 1.)

Figure 1. Business planning model. Source: Proximities Risk Consultancy, Leusden. The Netherlands.

Similarities between military and private security planning activities For developing business resilience to security incidents, a comparison to military J-planning functions may also be made. Table 1. shows how. Because security activities are generally outsourced to often former military security professionals, an ever-closer civil-military partnership is being crafted between a growing number of companies.

Military Private enterprise functional counterpart Function J1 Must be aware of the compliance of staff with established Personnel security training standards, and must monitor this J2 Has an increasing need for security-related intelligence (geo- Intelligence strategic, local, physical and personal) for the determination of its security posture. Big data is collected through 24/7 scraping of the internet, corroborating information through local consultants and building threat profiles and analysing trends J3 Is required to be 24/7 aware of the security risks to its assets Operations and staff that are abroad, and gains this information through tracking and geo-fencing of moving assets and staff J4 Is required to think how it can build and support its assets Logistics under austere circumstances securely and at significant distance from home J5 Must consider security as a planning factor when they Plans develop their opportunity (security by design) J6 Must ensure that they can be in contact with their staff at all Communications times, including through tracking devices, and that staff that is abroad receives relevant security information that might affect their behaviour J7 Must devote more effort to security exercises and training as Training well as Emergency Response Planning and Business Continuity Planning J8 Must factor security costs in at the start of developing an Finance opportunity as these will otherwise directly impact their profit margin Table 1. Comparison of military and business planning functions

Information exchange as key-enabler for private enterprise to support civil preparedness Civil preparedness means that basic government functions can continue during emergencies or disasters in peacetime or in periods of crisis. For this, NATO has developed its “Seven Baselines of Resilience” concept.1 NATO recognizes that Governments will be dependent on private enterprise to achieve this.2 Hence, this means that private enterprise must be ready, able and willing to provide support activities related to civil preparedness. The key to the building of any (strategic level) resilience structure between public and private enterprise, whether for military or civilian purposes, must be based on shared goals, good communications and correct information flow. To make this successful, regular engagement between all partners, appropriate technical arrangements and the assurance that capabilities are fit for purpose and well-managed are critical success factors. It should be noted, however, that business will always strive to keep momentum and that if momentum is lost, it can quickly lose interest. Once the above is assured, the potential for support becomes obvious. The private sector is able to support most efforts that are mentioned in NATO’s seven baselines (or “sectors”). Most of the effort mentioned in the baselines are already mostly, even fully managed by private enterprise. For example, resilient supply chain / transport systems are already run by large companies, such as UPS

1 The seven baseline requirements, which apply to the entire crisis spectrum, are: 1. assured continuity of government and critical government services; 2. resilient energy supplies; 3. ability to deal effectively with the uncontrolled movement of people; 4. resilient food and water resources; 5. ability to deal with mass casualties; 6. resilient communications systems; 7. resilient transportation systems. 2 NATO document “Civil Preparedness” dated 07 June 2018 – see: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49158.htm 61 and DHL. Similarly, secure energy supplies are often regulated by Government but are run by energy companies and their sub- contractors. Hence, most of the large pieces of a resilience baseline structure are already in place. What seems to be missing in nations are efficient information exchange and coordination structures within and between the various resilience sectors. One way of overcoming this might be to develop a formal information exchange mechanism as outlined below:

The Magic round-about for information exchange Because information exchange is key to success, the key challenge is to manage the large number of players that are involved across the baselines, especially in large and heavily populated nations. One way in which this might be resolved is by bringing key players from each baseline sector together who appoint a key-lead who is able to speak, coordinate and interact with the Government on their behalf. In so doing, one might argue that an information “Magic Roundabout” is created, not unlike the UK traffic sign depicted on the next page. Companies that are not yet part of their own baseline sector network but would be able to contribute might be enticed to join the network through a Government “Seal of Resilience” (SoR) which they can use for their branding. This SoR establishes that the company supports critical government functions at times of crisis and is part of the national resilience network. The seal also identifies that the company operates under Government oversight and therefore meets minimum recognized Government standards.

Figure 2. The Magic Roundabout road sign at Hemel Hempstead, UK. Source: author’s drawing.

Information gathering/sharing by private enterprise as key-enabler for NATO military planners Despite recent global geo-political changes, military operations might still take place away (perhaps at significant distance) from Alliance territory (so-called out-of-area operations). Military organizations should therefore continue preparing for this. Risk consultancy companies are ideally suited to provide some, but not all, types of support. Potential areas of cooperation are in the field of intelligence gathering, big data analysis for RSOM and information sharing through classified / protected portals. However, this will necessitate some measure of mutual trust. Potential areas of cooperation are discussed below.

Intelligence gathering Countries and communities around the world are becoming more connected. Travel is more affordable and accessible, and businesses are operating on a global scale, irrespective of their size. Technology and new transport options also contribute to the accessibility of different locations and are helping our world becoming smaller. New opportunities are increasingly found in remote and sometimes austere environments where local intelligence analysis regarding security environment become a more important factor to consider. Hence, over the past decade, a number of companies have commenced providing intelligence services to their clients. Many these employ former military intelligence analysts and operate, sometimes extensive, global networks of local consultants. A major advantage of these networks is that they are unhindered by political restraint. No “no boots on the ground” -policy exists and they can report and analyse at speed and without constraint. Consequently, the situational awareness of these companies is extensive, and they are able to make security predictions with some confidence. Military planners would benefit from the support of these companies that understand military thinking and approach. This is especially so during the (pre-) mission analysis phase of the OPP when “covert” planning might be essential, for example because the political decision-making process is still taking place. Obviously, military planners cannot and should not take the intelligence updates, which can include commercial information on companies that are able to provide 3rd Party Logistics Services, from these companies at face value. All information received must be corroborated through other channels. In addition, some practicable obstacles must be overcome such as the NATO-adage of the “need- to-know” principle. However, this obstacle can be overcome through security checks on the companies’ staff and the signing of Non-

Disclosure Agreements (NDA). NATO should also recognize that business has a major stake in keeping intelligence safe. Not doing this would negatively impact their operations and might have (severe) consequences for their branding.

Information sharing through classified portals Over the past few years, a number of civilian alliance organisations have set up security exchange information systems. These are built on the premise that whilst members might be competitors in the market they operate in, they should not compete when it comes to the security and safety of their staff and assets. An example of this is the Oil Companies International Maritime Forum (OCIMF) where competing oil companies discuss security topics freely. Another example is the members-only Company Security Officers Alliance (CSOA)3. This alliance operates a web-based portal in which security information is exchanged between (maritime) companies and provides analysis tools which can drive statistics about crime, including cyber. Reports can be made anonymously, and it has been found that this opportunity has driven reporting up by up to 30%. The CSOA also encourages vessels that enter ports in high-risk areas to report on their findings after the port visit as this provides a good system of indicators and warnings of whether the security situation is improving or deteriorating. Joining (anonymously) an organization such as the CSOA may therefore be useful to military planners as well as the information provided may prove to be a “weather vane” for a changing security environment, for example in nation bordering a military conflict.

3 See website CSO-Alliance: https://www.csoalliance.com 65

Big Data Analytics Big data analytics is the process of examining large and varied data sets, i.e. big data, to uncover hidden patterns, unknown correlations, trends, preferences and other useful information that can help organizations make more-informed business decisions. Private companies increasingly make use of the deliverables of these systems, especially in logistics where the number of variables that require analysis as well as the interdependency between them are very significant. These systems provide an even better means of Just-In-Time (JIT) planning and can also help deliver other goals such as CO2 reduction. Big data analytics, which is becoming more freely available, is able to support not only military operations, for example in planning the hugely complex RSOM process, but also support national resilience initiatives as they allow for complex planning procedures and tracking of people, assets and equipment, especially at times of crisis.

The role of NATO as key-enabler of national resilience frameworks Fundamental to NATO’s deterrence and defence posture is a resilient alliance. A recent NATO study has shown that in many nations there is a lack of awareness and understanding of the additional demands that major scale NATO operations will place on nations’ critical infrastructure in times of crisis or conflict, particularly in a collective defence scenario. Hence, the current (concept) vision for NATO is “to be able to sustain successful operations by preparing for, absorbing, recovering and adapting to surprise or strategic shock, through harmonized and resilient structures, systems and processes, enabled by persistent collaboration across civil, military and private

66 stakeholders”. The key question therefore is what role NATO could take for supporting their need to achieve a certified national resilience.

The Maslow pyramid of needs as a basis for NATO’s role in building national resilience The Maslow hierarchy of needs4 is a well-known theory that states that people are motivated to achieve certain needs and that some needs take precedence over others. Our most basic need is for physical survival, and this will be the first thing which motivates our behaviour. Once that level is fulfilled the next level up is what motivates us, and so on.

Figure 4. Maslow societal and alliance resilience hierarchies of need. Drawn by the author.

Based on this theorem, it is postulated that the Maslow pyramid may also be applied to NATO’s resilience concept.

4 Abraham Maslow, “A Theory of Human Motivation”, Psychological Review, 1943

Before a nation can achieve resilience self-actualization (the highest level), it would have to take a step-by-step approach whereby NATO could act as a guide to take it through each step. At the first (lowest) level, NATO would need to ensure that the national governance and critical infrastructure of a nation is commensurate with NATO resilience policy (i.e., for resilience purposes, that there are clear lines of governance, TORs for involved government departments and staff exist, oversight on critical infrastructure has been arranged and standards for measuring national resilience have been set). At the second level, NATO could examine how and with whom (i.e. which companies and other business stakeholders) the national government collaborates. The Magic Roundabout, as described before, may serve as a template by which NATO could map relevant parties and judge their involvement. At the third level, NATO could participate or even run national training events, utilizing a NATO-developed standard scenario which might be developed by the Joint Warfare Centre in Stavanger, Norway. Such a scenario might be a spin-off from other training scenarios such as SOROTAN and include political, military, economic, social, information and infrastructure parameters. Training events could take the form of workshops, vignettes or a table top exercise. At the fourth level, NATO could organize regional (live) training events and incorporate regional cooperation and collaboration as part of the aims and objectives of the exercise (see next paragraph for more detail). Finally, once a nation has passed the “4 levels of need”, it is accredited with being a “Country of Resilience Excellence – CORE). And, whilst the nation continues to operate at this level, NATO moves on to the next nation that requires support in achieving CORE.

Role of NATO and national resilience initiatives: a return towards former regional structures? Beyond a national information exchange structure5 it seems that nations do not (yet) cooperate extensively when it comes to civil preparedness. Instead, they seem to be developing national, rather than international resilience plans. NATO’s objective, through its International Staff (IS) and Allied Command of Transformation (ACT) is to lead and coordinate this process across the Alliance. This makes sense because NATO, as a military crisis organization, can set standards and relay best practices to its member states. That said, some caution is required. States that are geographically far apart will likely not have a real interest in each other. Why would The Netherlands involve itself with Hungary (and vice versa) when it is building its national resilience programme: Germany and Austria lie between the two nations and the Port of Trieste rather than the port of Rotterdam would likely be utilized for supporting the complex Hungarian supply-chain. Also, any support (e.g. support in treating mass casualties, transport and safeguarding energy supplies) would logically come from a nation with which it shares a border, and not from a nation that lies much further away. Hence, there is a case to be made for NATO to consider returning to the Cold War regional coordination structure (e.g. AFCENT, AFSOUTH, AFNORTH), whereby bordering nations support each other in preparing for crisis management. The Netherlands would coordinate its resilience efforts through the former AFCENT with Germany, UK, Belgium and Luxemburg (BENELUX), whilst Hungary would coordinate with its direct neighbours.6 That said, NATO should enable cooperation at the regional level so, through

5 not verified by the author 6 it is noted that not all of these bordering states are full NATO-members 69 the NATO structure, The Netherlands would still support Hungary, but indirectly.

Conclusion This paper sought to find potential synergies of business with (military) Governmental organizations regarding civil preparedness as a contributor to national resilience as well as military operations and the role NATO could play. The conclusions are:  In an insecure world it is increasingly clear that military and business development planners work in very similar ways and, consequently, that synergies exist. Consequently, there are a number of ways in which military, civil government and private enterprise can cooperate and work together;  The main challenge for private enterprise – civil – military cooperation is that (secure) information exchange must be well-organized and protected and that a basis of mutual trust is established;  Information exchange can be achieved through a “Magic Roundabout”-concept whereby each of the 7 baseline resilience sectors collaborates with Government through an elected spokesperson;  Companies who are not yet part of their national (7) baseline sector network but who would be able to contribute to this might be enticed by a Government “Seal of Resilience” (SoR), which they can use for branding purposes;  For purely military planning purposes during out-of-area operations, as a first step, collaboration can take place w.r.t. intelligence gathering/exchange and “weather-vaning;”  Big data analytics, which is becoming more freely available is able to support military operations, for example in planning hugely complex RSOM process;

 NATO could support individual nations and regions in helping them to achieve their 7 baselines of resilience, thereby certifying nations that have reached “self-actualization” as a CORE-nation, a.k.a. a Country Of Resilience Excellence; and  NATO could consider adopting a regional approach for collaboration between bordering nations as supposed to an Alliance-wide approach.

About the author Hugo Blom is a former officer of the Royal Netherlands Navy. Throughout his career he has held leadership roles in (multi)- national and commercial organisations covering: operational security, operational logistics, auditing, project management, integrated business planning, human resources and concept development. His consultancy firm is providing maritime risk advisory services on operational and strategic risks to their people, assets and operations.

Philip N. Brown

A Mainstay of Resilience: Stakeholder Consultation and Collaboration

Abstract Civil security professionals continuously evaluate their environment and reflect on the factors that influence their capability to plan and impact the safety and well-being of their area of responsibility. Natural and man-made disasters require emergency management and disaster preparedness professionals’ attention before, during, and after the event – with an emphasis on BEFORE the event. Conversations create working space for evaluating and confirming planning assumptions; defining requirements for real- world and pre-cursor training events; and introducing newly implemented techniques, processes, and procedures. To that end, an ability to think about the future requires an interest and an ability to engage in serious and meaningful conversations among government, public, and private sector leadership. The purpose of this paper is to provide food-for-thought to encourage a dialogue from these diverse and complementary sectors. It will address a method and methodology to engage in the dialogue, definitions of resilience, and introduce questions that leadership across the academic and practitioner community should ask, examine, debate, and resource in advance of a critical and perhaps life-threatening or life-changing events. As a result, an opportunity is created to broadly share data, learn from experts from across the international community, and connect at a human level to improve resilience postures.

Prelude Frank Harris smiled and enjoyed the view of the mountains as he entered the bright sunshine that filled his office. The calendar showed it was September 28, 2020, and nine years to the day that he and two of his closest friends from college decided to start their own company. The stack of Wall Street Journal and Financial Times newspapers, Barron’s magazines, and offerings from the European Business Press on his desk clearly demonstrated to visitors that his position in the company, Vice President of Finance and Analysis, focused his talents on numbers and statistics to guide the organization’s path toward growth and success. He reclined in his nicely appointed, and of course very organized, office to reflect on the journey of the past nine years. His second sip of coffee and his thoughts were interrupted by a phone call from the front office. His close friend and CEO, PJ Marsh, wanted to talk over a few ideas in PJ’s office. After exchanging congratulations on the anniversary, PJ got right to his point. He was concerned that they were not paying enough attention to world, national, and local events which could stagnate growth – the time had arrived for newer thinking and approaches to move to the next level. PJ’s solution was to ask Frank to assume more and different responsibility and turn his talents to running a team to focus on resilience. PJ sat straight-forward in his chair and said, “Frank, we’ve always been straight with each other regarding our goals and dreams and I’m concerned about our future. We need to incorporate resilience thinking to ensure the next phases of our expansion or we will slide. Your reports definitely indicate we need a change. I know you love your statistics and spreadsheets but the company needs your leadership. What do you need to take on this challenge?” After a few deep breaths, Frank responded, “I am committed to our company’s success but I am not a creative guy and I have no idea what you mean by resilience or resilience thinking. I’ll certainly take on the challenge, my staff can easily handle the

74 financial and analytical work; but I’ll need help to develop resilience and resilience thinking habits and to know how to lead and work with others. So, let me research the topic and I’ll get back with you with a framework to both protect our current and future positions. What do you think about giving me two months to develop the plan?” PJ smiled and said “Consider it done. Let’s get started.”

Introduction These fictitious characters in this imaginary scenario may be portraying a very real conversation in organizations of all sizes and markets throughout the private/corporate sector, public sector, and government worlds. Opportunities exist, if of course they are viewed as opportunities, to employ tools, skills, and processes to move forward in successful ways because today’s settings change. The purpose of this paper is to conduct an initial exploration within the world of resilience thinking through the eyes, plans, and constructs of Designing for Growth: A Design Thinking Tool Kit for Managers1 and The Design of Business: Why Design Thinking is the Next Competitive Advantage.2 It will then connect these offerings with ideas and questions to promote discovery, collaboration, and communication across myriad stakeholders to take Frank Harris through this developmental challenge and help him take his company to that next level. The intent of this paper is to conduct an initial investigation; it is critical to note this is not an exhaustive examination as other paths are available. That said, this path examines a means to initiate consultation and coordination between notable parties. Civil security professionals continuously evaluate their environment and reflect on the factors that influence their capability

1 Liedtka, J. and Ogilvie, T. Designing for growth: A design thinking tool kit for managers. New York: Columbia Business School Publishing, 2011. 2 Martin, R. The Design of Business: Why design thinking is the next competitive advantage. Boston: Harvard Business Press, 2009. 75 to plan and impact the safety and well-being of their area of responsibility. Natural and man-made disasters require emergency management and disaster preparedness professionals’ attention before, during, and after the event – with an emphasis on BEFORE the event. Conversations create working space for evaluating and confirming planning assumptions; defining requirements for real- world and pre-cursor training events; and introducing newly implemented techniques, processes, and procedures. To that end, an ability to think about the future requires an interest and an ability to engage in serious and meaningful conversations among government, public, and private sector leadership. The purpose of this paper is to provide food-for-thought and encourage a dialogue among these diverse and complementary sectors. It will address definitions of resilience and introduce ten questions that leadership across the academic and practitioner community should ask, examine, debate, and resource in advance of a critical and perhaps life-threatening or life-changing events. As a result, an opportunity is created to broadly share data, learn from experts from across the international community, and connect at a human level to improve resilience postures. Before exploring any specifics of resilience thinking, it is important to address the concerns of every Frank Harris that is not a creative individual and/or lacks any idea of available frameworks to include resilience thinking into their world. Liedtka and Ogilvie suggest a notion that design thinking is a “… mysterious no-man’s land where only the brave (and the brilliant) dare tread.”3 However, fortunately for Frank, the same authors add that an analytical and statistical background may likely be more of a help than a hindrance since “… design thinking is a systematic approach to problem solving.”4 This latter comment presents an opportunity to relax and

3 Liedtka and Ogilvie. Designing for growth. p. 3. 4 Liedtka and Ogilvie. Designing for growth. p. 4. 76 prepare for an exposure to the facets of design thinking in a manner where learning may occur. In addition, it presents a chance to view design thinking as an integrated method for considering different approaches to situations and challenges. The next section starts the conversation about the characteristics of design thinking.

Characteristics of Design Thinking First, and likely foremost, it all “… starts with … the ability to create a future.”5 This includes external stakeholders of the organizations offerings and perhaps critically it includes the stakeholders within the organization that will move their company forward. It is important to include both because each requires the other; and the ability to create a future demands having an ability to create an action plan to get there. Similarly, it requires a recognizable and potentially repeatable process. But what makes design thinking different and appropriate to impacting resilience thinking? This process starts with Richard Buchanan’s (the former Dean of Carnegie Mellon’s School of Design) declaration that “great design … occurs at intersection of constraint, contingency, and possibility.”6 The point emphasized by Liedtka and Ogilvie is that business starts at the point of constraint but creating starts at the point of possibility. The difference and appropriateness of this point is that business views a challenge from a perspective of what cannot occur, in my view a negative position or worldview, while a resilience thinker is unbounded and possesses a freedom of thought to explore through a positive position or worldview. This initial outlook may very well provide the essence of generating an environment for success. However, more than being in a good mood is necessary. Attaining an ability to conduct resilience thinking demands action, not just thinking or talking about execution. Further, it builds

5 Liedtka and Ogilvie. Designing for growth. p. 4. 6 Liedtka and Ogilvie. Designing for growth. p. 7. 77 expectations for an authentic experience, certainly an essential requirement to create a future for myriad stakeholders. In addition, and most important to Frank Harris, this arena “… is tailored to dealing with uncertainty, and business’ obsession with analysis is best suited for a stable and predictable world.”7 This stability in business propels action into other sectors, specifically public and governmental, to interweave resilience throughout. A noteworthy advantage here is to visualize and discuss a process; because Frank needs a process he can trust when dealing with the newness of resilience thinking through a design lens.8 This may represent a sizeable hurdle for Frank and will be addressed later in the discussion on a framework individuals use to develop resilience thinking skills. Ultimately, an initial question to set the stage for resilience thinking and to return to a capstone question for moving through this process is to ask – is somebody’s life better?9 This process allows Frank to grasp the design part of the process and permits him to work toward visualizing the thinking portion through the lens of Roger Martin. Martin suggests this visualization requires knowing how to look at the marketplace in a new way. The design thinker must ask if what is seen is right, but more importantly to see what is missing. This is analogous to looking at a list and concentrating on what is not there until the real issue emerges. Likely this is a challenge for an analytically trained manager but he must think about a recalibration to “… look at small differences, rather than big similarities …”10 in order to recognize space for something novel or original. Movement forward on resilience thinking and action can take place here

7 Liedtka and Ogilvie. Designing for growth. p. 14. 8 Liedtka and Ogilvie. Designing for growth. 9 Liedtka and Ogilvie. Designing for growth. 10 Martin. The Design of Business. p. 38. 78

“There are multiple ways to play the role of chief [resilience] thinker; the key is to do it.”11 Tim Brown, from IDEO, clarifies a meaning of ‘it’ as “… a discipline that uses … sensibility and methods to match people’s needs with what is technologically feasible and what a viable business strategy can convert into … value and … opportunity.”12 However, Martin clearly states that this is not business as usual and calls out the need for a different type of organization, a different type of leader, and a different type of individual. Fundamental to a new type of individual is to determine (find?) and leverage three pillars to support a design thinker. These include one’s stance, tools, and experiences.13 A design thinker’s stance includes one’s view of the world and one’s role in that world. It is a position that requires an ability to look for balance between the analytical and the creative thinker with a willingness to advance knowledge.14 More specifically, “the design thinker has a stance that seeks the unknown, embraces the possibility of surprise, and is comfortable with wading into complexity not knowing what is on the other side.”15 Tools or models used to understand that world and how one employs them to organize their thinking, can include observation, imagination, and configuration. The first two interact well the stance for a design thinker with configuration describing how individual items, ideas, activities, and events fit into a larger business system.16 Finally, experiences consist of what has built/developed or is building/developing one’s skills over time.17 A design thinker must be both a master of the domain in

11 Martin. The Design of Business. p. 137. 12 Brown, Tim. “Design Thinking.” Harvard Business Review. June 2008. 84-95, as quoted by Martin. The Design of Business. p. 62. 13 Martin. The Design of Business. 14 Martin. The Design of Business. 15 Martin. The Design of Business. p. 159. 16 Martin. The Design of Business. 17 Martin. The Design of Business. 79 which they operate and willing to push forward to seek originality. Ultimately, these three pillars inform and affect each other in a linear and circular manner. Stance guides and informs the selection of tools, which guide and inform exposure to and acquisition of experience, which guide and inform additional/new tools, while tools then guide and inform stance.18 The overall effect that occurs is that each builds and changes the others to allow a design thinker to operate in original and previously unexplored territory. These pillars can support a resilience thinker but the challenge rests squarely on where to begin when presented with examining what could be and knowing what is important since it all may be new. “With so much unknown … anything omitted might turn out to be a key to unlocking the mystery.”19 Ultimately, increasing awareness and appreciation of this type of thinking is very interesting; however, developing a method to get there is compelling.

Definitions of Resilience Each contributor, each collaborator, each participant must clarify their worldview to establish the foundation for meaningful dialogue. The successful conversation’s framework rests on the bedrock of appreciation of every delegate’s starting point. Agreement is a goal, however, the conversation centers on the journey – not the destination of full agreement. The following example definitions of resilience in Table 1 below offer examples to consider. As mentioned above, each contain nuance based on the author, to include this author; however, consistency benefits each discussant while listening at the level of appreciation and comprehension presents the secret sauce for interaction in the

18 Martin. The Design of Business. 19 Martin. The Design of Business. p. 34. 80 collaboration space. This includes conversations held vertically and horizontally with appropriate stake holders. A Path to Resilience Consultation – Method to Set the Stage The significance of working through a method and associated questions to stimulate conversation is to answer a fundamental inquiry with respect to path that Frank Harris faces – does he want to lead resilience thinkers as a Chief Resilience Officer or be a resilience thinker? The best response for the company may be “yes and yes” to provide the most significant benefits to the organization and to meet the CEO’s requirements. Essentially, a two-phased process may offer near and longer term assistance as the characteristics mentioned above require time to embrace these changes. Additionally, a two-phased approach may allow Frank to get himself, his team, and the broad number of stakeholders ‘there’ quickly and efficiently. Many models exist to assist individuals in their developmental journey and the use of one over another depends on the people involved, specifically one’s comfort level, knowledge base, and interpretation of the situation since this journey will be very personal. Nevertheless, for the limited purposes of this paper, the Goal, Reality, Options, Will (GROW) model20 provides a platform to discuss aspects and action plan development for both near and long term engagement. The GROW model’s phases and the questions asked during each are shown in Table 2 below with modification in the far-right column through the addition of further questions developed by the author.

20 Wilson, C. “Tools of the trade.” Training Journal, 2010. 70-71. and Wilson, C. “Tools of the trade.” Training Journal, 2011. 68-69.

RESILIENCE “… involves the ability of systems to restart quickly after a hazard has struck, and to ‘adapt existing resources and skills to new systems and operating conditions’”21 “… is the ability of an actor to cope with or adapt to hazard and stress. It is a product of the degree of planned preparation undertaken in the light of a potential hazard, and of spontaneous or premeditated adjustments made in response to felt hazard, including relief and rescue”22 “…is the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganize while undergoing change so as to retain or enhance effective function, structure, identity and feedback”23 “… is the ability to absorb, and sensibly respond to … attack.”24 “… is the capacity of an individual, community or system to adapt in order to sustain an acceptable level of function, structure, and identity”25 “…is communities and individuals harnessing local resources and expertise to help themselves in an emergency, in a way that complements the response of the emergency services.” “… is the ability to resist and recover easily and quickly from shocks and stresses, combining civilian, economic, commercial and military factors. Resilience is achieved by enhancing preparedness within the public and private sectors, supported and amplified by military capability and capacity.”26 “… is the ability to perform the tasks an individual or organization is assigned to accomplish, or needs to accomplish, with the fewest surprises, during and after an event.”27 Table 1. Example Definitions of Resilience

21 Cannon, Terry. Reducing People’s Vulnerability to Natural Hazards: Communities and Resilience. Research Paper No. 2008/34. Tokyo: U.N. University – World Institute for Development Economics Research, April 2008. p. 109. 22 Cannon. Reducing People’s Vulnerability to Natural Hazards. p. 110. 23 Evans, Alex; Jones, Bruce; and Steven, David. Confronting the Long Crisis of Globalization: Risk, Resilience and International Order. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Center on International Cooperation; January 26, 2010. p. 25. 24 Mueller, John and Stewart, Mark G. Terror, Security, and Money: Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of Homeland Security. Oxford University Press: New York, 2011. p. 95. 25 Strategic National Framework on Community Resilience (March 2011), London: United Kingdom’s Cabinet Office. p. 3. http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/Strategic- National-Framework-on-Community-Resilience_0.pdf; 16 Feb 18. p. 3. 26 Collaborative Resilience Concept Proposal, 2018, Norfolk: NATO Supreme Allied Command Transformation, 2018. p. 2. 27 Developed for this paper by the author. 82

The first step of any stakeholder consultation, even before a discussion of what model could be or should be used, is the development of a connection between the individuals involved. The scope of this paper does not permit an examination of this stage or how it may or may not connect with the development of design thinking. However, in this scenario, it would be important for the individuals engaged in the resilience conversation to appreciate the environment in which all participants reside. More specifically, it is critical to note that there is only so much one should try to accomplish during a stakeholder consultation. There should be time devoted in this initial conversation to confirm the need to concentrate on one or two items and what best serves the overall group. That allows those involved to look at what questions are best asked and what activities should be performed to satisfy the overarching goal. The next step is to examine the transition to the next phases in this collaboration. With respect to the questions in the Goal phase, the discussion above regarding being a leader of resilience initiatives and a resilience thinker himself present a broad enough scope and scale for this project. The discussion in this phase centers on relationships and how to connect with Frank’s new contacts through conversation. Frank’s initial collaboration set is the members within his organization, and possibly in his business sector, so connecting immediately is crucial. This may also allow for practicing skills that open his aperture to proto-typing his future relationships as the lead of a broader resilience conversation. Moreover, emphasis on his perception of design thinking and his ability to recognize the contributions that resilience thinkers make to the success of the organization are critical to his movement into this arena. Further, it

83 kick starts a habit pattern for direct action. This action leads to the Reality phase.

basic questions questions for deep examination phases asked in each of resilience phase  What do you  How much planning and want? distributed information is enough to Goal  Where do you inform without scaring the public? want to go?  What is needed? Desired?  What can be afforded?  What is happening  What organizations define risk? now?  What is the risk if “it” is too  What are the Reality expensive? impacts?  Are we totally distracted from the  What is in the resilience conversation until way? something happens?  Who should do what?  How should this thinking be driven – top down, bottom up, coalition?  What could you  Is everyone equal? do?  Is there a need for similar or Options  Is there anything different national and local else? strategies?  What is the role of an education- training-exercise cycle?  What is the role of social media?  What will you do?  What is the national and local  When? resolve to move forward? Will  Where?  Who is the champion?  How?  Who is the spokesperson? Table 2. The GROW Model (Modified): A Path to Resilience Collaboration (Source: Wilson. “Tools of the trade.” 2010 and 2011., modified by the author)

The questions to examine in this phase offer an opportunity for that first real interaction with Frank’s new team and those engaged in this resilience collaboration. Frank’s ability to see processes unfold and connect ideas will serve him well in this phase as he interacts with the team and publically recognizes the importance of their work. Further, he can clearly demonstrate his ability to get along with them by appreciating the differences from where he came, empathize with his new colleagues through communication (listening first and then speaking), and demonstrating his willingness to stretch to new areas and arenas.28 He can further demonstrate his emersion into his new role through the questions in the Options phase. The answers to the questions in the Options phase examine his stance and perspectives as they align or diverge from those with whom he engages. In addition, he can define the future for the team and his place with them. In this manner, Frank can work within his organization and wider group to make in-stride decisions about constructs and ideas that require refinement or launch. It also allows him to be seen as an appropriate and engaged leader of the organization. This finally takes him to the Will phase. This phase centers on questions for the development of the specifics of an action plan. The first step would be to ensure his organization that he will champion their cause and processes by maintaining his visibility at the corporate levels. Then he either needs to serve as the champion on a larger stage or recruit the right individual to serve in this role. The champion is more than just a member of the new team; it is the individual who demonstrates commitment to be the strongest advocate. He also needs to demonstrate a willingness to continue learning from the team by

28 Martin. The Design of Business. 85 acknowledging how much of resilience and resilience thinking is unknown to him. Self and team education need to be part of his action plan to allow him to move from the initial phase of leader of resilience thinkers to the stronger position of resilience thinker and leader. Ultimately, it comes down to leadership and people will follow good and compassionate leaders.

Additional Considerations The additional considerations developed by the author, and shown in the table on the next page, focus on personal relationships and the need to prepare for consultation and collaboration. No event is the same as previously experienced as landscape, people, environments change. One must embrace the idea that “nothing new ever happened before” and re-start their preparation activities. Table 3 offers specific areas for consideration to use before and during these preparation activities.

Conclusion The complexity of personnel, environments, and projects in the 21st century demands agility from those in leadership positions across the spectrum of agencies. Leadership, and design and resilience thinking are contact sports and require human interaction. As a result, the Frank Harris of every organization must discover how to connect with those who have accumulated uncommon wisdom in various and varied arenas, gain their trust and confidence, and move themselves and the organization toward a desired future that incorporates resilience thinking and activities. The method and methodology discussed may help Frank step up to the challenge and realize that “When people are working on a creative project, they’re happy. When a team can come together around a creative cause or a

86 knotty problem, they want to come to work every day.”29 This translates to those projects focused on resilience. Frank may ultimately long for the quiet reflections of a corner office overlooking grand vistas; however, his experiences gained through exposure to design and resilience thinking should pay dividends for him, and his colleagues across the range of agencies and institutions, and the citizens they serve, regardless of any future task.

QUESTIONS / COMMENTS FOR CONSIDERATION DEEP EXAMINATION OF RESILIENCE • Know your partners and their business • Avoid over reliance on national level Macro to Micro • Avoid over reliance on recovery versus Resilience preparation • High impact events; low impact events; events with and without disease vectors Effects of Complexity on • Effects are widespread Response Efforts • Who is the first to get what? National / International • Refined, robust, exercised? Response Frameworks Coordination for • For what duration? 72 hours? 96 hours? Response and Unity of Weeks? Months? Years? Effort • What organizational construct Authorities, • Who can do what, with whom, and when? Responsibilities, and • What are the financial Expectations considerations/availability of resources? • Takes the personal touch – this is a human to human interaction Value of Partnerships • Avoid business cards at the incident scene • This is where trust is initiated, developed, and maintained Table 3. Additional Considerations for Resilience Consultation and Collaboration

29 John Maeda, Rhode Island School of Design, personal communication, cited in Martin. The Design of Business. p. 132. 87

About the author Dr. Phil Brown is the Deputy of the Joint Resources and Readiness Division within the Training and Exercise Directorate at North American Aerospace Defense Command and United States Northern Command. Dr. Brown leads and supervises a portfolio of Resources, Modeling & Simulation, and Lessons Learned capabilities. His experiences include 30 years in the United States Air Force and eight years as a defense contractor prior to joining government civil service in 2009. He earned his Doctorate of Management from Colorado Technical University, Colorado, USA, with current research interests in executive coaching, organizational culture and change, Arctic policy, and resilience.

Sources Brown, Tim. “Design Thinking.” Harvard Business Review. June 2008. 84-95. Cannon, Terry. Reducing People’s Vulnerability to Natural Hazards: Communities and Resilience. Research Paper No. 2008/34. Tokyo: U.N. University – World Institute for Development Economics Research, April 2008. Collaborative Resilience Concept Proposal, 2018, Norfolk: NATO Supreme Allied Command Transformation, 2018. Evans, Alex; Jones, Bruce; and Steven, David. Confronting the Long Crisis of Globalization: Risk, Resilience and International Order. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Center on International Cooperation; January 26, 2010 Liedtka, J. and Ogilvie, T. Designing for growth: A design thinking tool kit for managers. New York: Columbia Business School Publishing, 2011.

Maeda, John. Rhode Island School of Design, personal communication, cited in Martin, R. The Design of Business. p. 132. Martin, R. The Design of Business: Why design thinking is the next competitive advantage. Boston: Harvard Business Press, 2009. Mueller, John and Stewart, Mark G. Terror, Security, and Money: Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of Homeland Security. Oxford University Press: New York, 2011. Strategic National Framework on Community Resilience (March 2011), London. United Kingdom’s Cabinet Office, http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/St rategic-National-Framework-on-Community-Resilience_0.pdf; 16 Feb 18 Wilson, C. “Tools of the trade.” Training Journal, 2010. 70-71.

Daniel Cohen

The Use of Cyberwarfare in Influence Operations: cyber perception warfare

Foreword In the world of cybersecurity, collaborative efforts are difficult, even in areas where the common interest is indisputable. It is even more difficult to collaborate in the fight against ideological terrorism, especially when this terrorism is perpetrated by cyberattack. This has led to the state of uncertainty that exists today with regards to cyberattacks. Information has been manipulated for political purposes throughout the history of mankind. However, revolutionary technological advances since the creation of the internet - and the subsequent participation of both state and non-state actors in cyberwarfare - present new possibilities and allow for additional components that did not previously exist. Today both state and non- state actors use cyberspace in general - and social media in particular - as a tool to effect social and political change and to shape perception.1 In the 2016 U.S. presidential elections, and immediately thereafter in France, a new age was marshalled in the field of cyber warfare. The heads of major U.S. intelligence agencies signed a joint declaration notifying the public they were confident that Russian operatives had meddled in the recent elections. According to their assessment, it was very likely these actors had operated under the direction of a state sponsored organization. Their technique was

1 Continuous activity in the sphere of consciousness allows the reduction and/or disruption of the legitimacy of enemy activity, with the potential to foil or disrupt their offense initiatives. 91 simple: for example, they hacked into the DNC computer network (as well as Hillary Clinton’s personal computer), ultimately leaking thousands of documents (allegedly) retrieved from these databases; this included several documents pointing to Clinton’s health issues and suspicion of corruption. We now know that most of these incriminating documents were fake. Nonetheless, in the heat of the elections, they landed on fertile ground and had an impact on voters. This article examines the effect of cyber on the perceptual dimension, illustrating the new world in which we live. It leads us to the conclusion that national resilience must be prepared not only for conventional cyber threats, but for unconventional cyber interference aimed at shaping public perception. A comparison of countries active in the field of Influence Operations2 (IO) points to stark differences in their use of power via an array of methods and tools. These include the mobilization of intelligence resources, psychological warfare, public diplomacy, political and legal channels and cyberwarfare.3 When countries do not assign clear boundaries or constraints on cyberspace activity or social media platforms, integrating the use of technology in the for real-world influence via the internet constitutes a powerful tool in

2 Influence Operations, also known as Information Operations and warfare, includes the collection of tactical information about an adversary as well as the dissemination of propaganda in pursuit of a competitive advantage over an opponent. In the U.S., the more common definition to explain these phenomena is Information Operations (IO). See for example: The RAND Corporation definition for Information Operations: https://www.rand.org/topics/information-operations.html 3 A study by the University of Oxford found 28 countries operating in the sphere of influence on social media, investing hundreds of millions of dollars and with operating systems employing thousands. See: Bradshaw, Samantha and Howard, Philip. “Troops, Trolls and Troublemakers: A Global Inventory of Organized Social Media Manipulation.” Working paper no. 2017.12, University of Oxford, 2017; www.comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/89/2017/07/Troops- Trolls-and-Troublemakers.pdf 92

Information Warfare (IW).4 The use of this weapon will hereinafter be referred to as cyber perception warfare. The dimension of influencing perception discussed in this paper is the manner that subjective reality is perceived (pursuant to worldviews) by a variety of groups examining information regarding physical occurrences. Perceptions of reality are impacted by the reporting authorities and by the uncontrollable affiliations between different target audiences. Consequently, proposed definition of cyber perception warfare is “operations between two or more players, where one side disrupts the computerized and electromagnetic information environment that the opponent relies upon, and which is comprised of both human and technological sources. With this action, the initiator disrupts the opponent’s ability to direct objective content to its target audience, to properly grasp reality and to establish effective defensive action capability.” In this manner, the instigator grants itself an advantage in the overall campaign and neutralizes or disrupts the target’s capacity to carry out a response. The need to conceptualize this type of activity as distinct from more ‘traditional’ operations (such as psychological warfare) lies in the fact that key features of cyberspace activity include targeting opponents anonymously (without directly identifying the attacker as responsible for the attack) and at times autonomously (disseminating information through botnets, distributed-denial-of- service attacks, etc.). Operations conducted online facilitate a decentralization of information, offering a significant capacity for online distribution to either a focused or a broad target audience. The internet has shifted the traditional model of information dissemination via the media and government entities to the dispersal of information by individuals and small groups, who (at times)

4 Information Warfare is the strategic and tactical use of information to gain an advantage. 93 operate without a clear hierarchal model, and are mostly lacking rules, regulation or government enforcement.

Toolbox for shaping perception in cyberspace In cyberspace, we see how the internet and social media have had a deep impact on human behavior. Our online and offline lives have melded into one single entity. The ‘traditional’ hierarchal centralization model of information has been replaced by a decentralized model where information rapidly traverses physical and national borders with no laws restricting its flow. Cyberspace has substantially narrowed the geophysical dimensions of our environment, with both technological and perceptual changes caused by present-day computer networks. When browsing the internet, the nervous system’s reaction emanating from the user’s body and incoming information from the internet reach the user’s consciousness simultaneously.5 The internet allows users to concurrently exist both “everywhere and nowhere.”6 Our smartphones’ internet connection has made every form of information and communication almost continuously accessible, regardless of our physical location. The architecture of the internet enables the creation and distribution of information using a personalization model. In other words, information is made accessible to individual users or to groups through engagement tools according to segmentation by behavior, geography, fields of interest, needs, wants and desires. In such a reality, where barriers between the physical and cyber worlds are eliminated, the combination of emotions with online content can

5 Avi Rosen, “Compressing Space and Time in Cyberspace Art.” PhD diss., Tel Aviv University, 2009, http://www.sipl.technion.ac.il/~avi/tsc/avi_rosen_ TSC.pdf 6 Roy Ascott, "From Appearance to Apparition: Communications and Consciousness in the Cybersphere.” Leonardo Electronic Almanac 1, no. 2 (1993): 3- 9 94 potentially influence consciousness to create a sense of fear, uncertainty and doubt among target audiences.7 In this context, we introduce a term borrowed from the business world: Fear, Uncertainty, Doubt (FUD). This marketing technique is implemented by various companies to dissuade clients from purchasing products sold by their competitors. Companies utilizing the FUD technique publicize information on competing products that may trigger a sense of fear, uncertainty and doubt regarding the products. In doing so, companies dissuade potential clients from purchasing them. FUD techniques are not limited to the business world, and they are also implemented to shape public opinion for political purposes. In political disputes between two or more nations, FUD is used to undercut the legitimacy and credibility of the other side’s claims by sowing negative feelings towards them. Any type of communication can serve as the basis for one entity’s influence upon another. When one party delivers information to the other, the recipient chooses how it reacts. At times, the entity delivering a message hopes to frame the other party’s actions, directing them to act according to their own aspirations, or to stop them from acting against them. Since incoming information affects actions, one of the actors may strive to impact the other’s actions by distribution of information. Information lies at the core of the process of managing communications with the opposing side. As such, the key to implementation of this process is Information Warfare or Information Operations. These two terms express the collective steps taken by the initiator to influence the type and quantity of the information exposed to the adversary. When the initiator disrupts the information environment that the adversary relies upon, which

7 See for example: “Fear, Uncertainty and Doubt.” Changing Minds.org, accessed October 1, 2017; http://changingminds.org/disciplines/sales/articles/fud.htm. 95 is comprised of both human and technological sources, they disrupt their capacity to accurately grasp reality and to establish effective counteractions. In this manner, the initiator grants itself an advantage in the overall conflict, and can use IW to make substantial gains or even to decisively tip the scales to win the campaign. In order to avoid a parallel response by their opponent, IW also incorporates a component of defense - the instigator of the influence operations activates the defense capabilities of its databases.8 Influence operations are usually identified with technological capabilities from the world of computers, but in effect, each of its operations that combines elements of trickery and deceit (such as delivering false declarations to the media) would be considered an act of IW.9 Accurate and quality information are important components in forging the path of action for any individual or organization. However, it is not the only component: the recipient decides how to act (or not to act) not only based on the presented facts, but also based on how these facts are interpreted; emotional reactions have a considerable impact on shaping final response. Consequently, strategic communication is also used to evoke certain emotional reactions, which lead to desired responses. Influence operation is a catchall phrase for any action intended to galvanize a target audience – an individual, a prominent group, or a broad audience – to accept approaches and to adopt decisions that mesh with the interests of the instigators of the operation. At the core of influence operation lie the actions that impact the cognitive and psychological perceptions of the target audience. These actions

8 Blaise Cronin and Holly Crawford, “Information Warfare: Its Application in Military and Civilian Contexts.” The Information Society 15, no.4 (1999): 258. 9 Robin Brown, “Information Operations, Public Diplomacy & Spin: The United States & the Politics of Perception Management.” Journal of Information Warfare 1, no.3 (2002): 41. 96 can be executed through various means: military, economic, political and others.10 Psychological warfare is a broad term for directing the emotional aspect of strategic communication. When specific information involving psychological components is delivered to a defined target audience, this audience experiences a shift in its emotions and outlook.11 As a result, there is a shift in the target audience’s behavior, tarnishing its ability to reach the goals it has set for itself.12 Messages used in psychological warfare may include promises, threats, asserting conditions for the conclusion of fighting or of surrender, encouraging defection and so forth.13 All information has the potential to evoke an emotional response in those exposed to it, especially if this information comes from war zones. Nevertheless, not all dissemination of this type of information is considered psychological warfare. An operation is only seen as an act of psychological warfare if it is performed with premeditation, and with the intent to psychologically affect the other side. Psychological warfare operations can be executed in both times of war and peace, and are referred to as psychological operations. There are several distinct types of such operations. For example, tactical psychological operations mounted against fighters on the opposing side differ from consolidation psychological operations,

10 Eric V. Larson, Richard E. Darilek, Daniel Gibran, Brian Nichiporuk, Amy Richardson, Lowell H. Schwartz and Cathryn Quantic Thurston, Foundations of Effective Influence Operations: A Framework for Enhancing Army Capabilities (California: RAND Cooperation, 2009), 2-4. 11 Clay Wilson, Information Operations, Electronic Warfare, and Cyberwar: Capabilities and Related Policy Issues (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 2007), 3. 12 Alfred Vasilescu, “Evolution of Pathological Communication’s Military Domains, from Propaganda to Information Operations.” Scientific Research and Education in the Air Force Volume 2011, 282. 13 OPNAV Instruction 3434.1: Psychological Operations. Washington Navy Yard: Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1997,1–2; http://www.iwar.org.uk/psyops/resources/us/3434_1.pdf 97 which are directed towards civilians on the opposing side.14 They differ in timing, are directed towards a defined target audience and are meant to evoke certain emotions in their target audience. One such type of a cyber-warfare operation with a psychological impact is Computer Network Influence (CNI). In contrast with attacks launched against standard computer networks, CNI is designed to create the sense of a momentous strike without actually executing one. CNI attacks are meant to instill a sense of insecurity and a lack of control, compromising sovereignty with an inability to safeguard a normative way of life. Examples of such attacks include crippling government sites, sending damaging messages to civilians and shutting down media sites for limited stretches of time.15 Cyberattacks not only instill a sense of insecurity, they also attempt to disrupt the opponent’s information environment by striking their cyber information infrastructure. These activities are mounted against computer systems designed to impact the target population’s access, behavior and decision-making processes by controlling information distributed through these systems. This category of attacks includes distributed denial-of-service attacks (crashing a particular site by flooding it with information, or DDoS attacks16), exposing the classified/personal details of an organization or of individuals by publishing confidential documents (doxing), hacking into information systems, as well as more sophisticated and strategic attacks on critical infrastructure core operational systems.17

14 Ibid. 15 Ofer Assaf & Gabi Siboni, Guidelines for a National Cyber Strategy, Memorandum No. 153. Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, 2016, 18-19. 16 “Definition- distributed denial-of-service attack (DDoS).” TechTarget, accessed October 1, 2017; http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/distributed-denial-of-service- attack 17 Pascal Brangetto and Matthijs A. Veenedaal, Influence Cyber Operations: The Use of Cyberattacks in Support of Influence Operations (Tallinn: NATO Cooperative Cyber 98

Case study: U.S. cyber perception warfare against ISIS This chapter analyzes a case study that combines a influence operations, psychological warfare and cyber warfare units, case that occurred within the context of disparate military campaign to counter terrorism threats. The U.S. government’s imperative to fight organizations such as ISIS and al-Qaeda in the spheres of perception and intelligence stems from these organizations’ increasing capacity to act via social media networks. They have successfully utilized social media to target and enlist potential recruits by leveraging a massive number of websites and social media profiles appealing to young people across the globe; some of these sites have even used service providers situated in the U.S. As they expand their activity to the dark web, their capabilities are expected to become even more sophisticated in the future.18 The fight against this trend relies upon a network of organizations – military, government and private – addressing various aspects of strategic communications in general and IW in particular.

The incorporation of IO in the campaign One of the main entities organizing IO against ISIS is CENTCOM, operating out of the MacDill Air Force base in Tampa, FL. CENTCOM’s Digital Engagement Team (DET) of 11 professionals makes its presence known in various forums identified

Defence Centre for Excellence, 8th International Conference on Cyber Conflict, 2016): 117, 121–122, 124. 18 Dan Verton, “Pentagon Gets Authority to Fight Online ISIS Propaganda.” Meritalk, November 30, 2015; https://www.meritalk.com/articles/pentagon-gets-authority-to-fight-online-isis- propaganda/ 99 with ISIS.19 According to CENTCOM, their content is viewed by some 100,000 people a week.20 WebOps, CENTCOM’s psychological warfare department, has a staff of 120. According to the DoD, WebOps raisons d'être are: 1) to disrupt adversary propaganda; 2) to expose adversaries’ hypocrisies and crimes through engagements with at-risk target audiences; and, 3) to mobilize the adversaries’ opponents to more effectively combat the adversary.21 For example, WebOps has targeted ISIS defectors who provide testimony that could subvert messages that ISIS wants to disseminate. According to several such accounts, these defectors state that they had joined ISIS to fight the Syrian regime and infidels, but in practice they found themselves fighting Muslims (and opposition groups) like themselves.22 Alongside messaging aimed at undermining the opponent’s credibility, the unit also works to forge an affinity between their target audiences and Western values. Accordingly,, the unit’s messages evolved from oppositional to those aimed at creating dialogue and sparking intrigue. The premise is that sharing facts about the West sparks the target audience’s curiosity, ultimately instilling Western attitudes.23 The mobilization of ISIS detractors is

19 Natalie Johnson, "Centcom’s Anti-ISIS Propaganda Team Has Fewer Than a Dozen Members.” The Washington Free Beacon, July 6, 2016; http://freebeacon.com/nationalsecurity/centcoms-anti-isis-propaganda-team- fewer-dozen-members/ 20 Peter Cary, The Pentagon and Independent Media–an Update, (Washington: CIMA- Center for International Media Assistance, 2015), 10. https://www.cima.ned.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/CIMA-The- Pentagon-and-Independent-Media-Update.pdf 21 https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/827761/centcom-counters- isil-propaganda 22 Karen Parrish. “Centcom Counters ISIL Propaganda.” US Department of Defense, July 6 2016. https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/827761/centcom-counters- isil-propaganda/ 23 Cary, The Pentagon and Independent Media–an Update, 10. 100 performed in cyberspace, with teams search for several key phrases common to ISIS opposition members. The WebOps group includes an assessment unit whose role is to evaluate the effectiveness of the unit’s operations.24 In addition to these efforts, the U.S. Army uses ISIS social media posts to its own advantage. For example, a post shared by an ISIS fighter included photos of ISIS command headquarters. The Air Force was able to identify its location and demolished it within 24 hours.25 Another facet of U.S. military operations is destroying ISIS’s communications infrastructure on the ground.26 On the state level, there is robust activity by government departments and agencies including the State Department, the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The State Department’s Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC) operated from 2011 to 2016, after which it was replaced by the Global Engagement Center (GEC). These two organizations have operated online by delivering messages (to U.S. residents and to foreign countries) aimed at preempting the recruitment of civilians to ISIS. To this end, these organizations have distributed two types of information. The first is identical to information used by CENTCOM, including a series of messages (mostly acquired by defectors) attempting to undermine

24 Parrish, "Centcom Counters ISIL Propaganda.” 25 Michael Hoffman, “U.S. Air Force Targets and Destroys ISIS HQ Building Using Social Media.” Defensetech, June 3, 2015; http://www.defensetech.org/2015/06/03/us-air-force-targets-and-destroys- isis-hq-building-using-social-media/ 26 Lynne O’Donnell, “U.S Airstrikes Have Destroyed an Islamic State- Operated Radio Station in a Remote Part OF Eastern Afghanistan.” U.S.News, February 2, 2016; http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2016-02-02/airstrikes-in- eastern-afghanistan-destroy-is-radio-station 101 the esteem and credibility of ISIS.27 The second type addresses those contemplating joining ISIS on a more personal level. This type of messaging requires potential recruits to consider the ramifications of such an undertaking on their family, community and life.28 The most notable difference between the operations of these two organizations is the source of their messages. When the CSCC was operational, messages were shared via the U.S. government’s Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube accounts.29 In 2015, the State Department decided to use a no logo strategy. Under this approach, messages were not posted under its own profile, rather they were shared them through a network of entities and individuals not identified with the U.S. government - including foreign governments and moderate Muslim communities - critical of ISIS’s potential supporters.30 This decision was taken because these organizations and individuals are better able to reach those target audiences that the U.S. government is trying to impact. As such the GEC, in contrast with the CSCC, serves as the focal point of a global network that coordinates technical and conceptual messaging.31 From a strategic standpoint, the Office for Community Partnerships (OCP), formed in September 2015, heads operations at

27 Kristina Wong, “How the U.S. is working to defeat ISIS online.” The Hill, June 25, 2016; http://thehill.com/policy/defense/284826-how-the-us-is-seeking-to-defeat-isis- online 28 Patrick Tucker, “Meet the Navy SEAL Leading the Fight Against ISIS Messaging.” Defense One, June 9, 2016; http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2016/06/navy-seal-isis- messaging/128938 29 Asawim Suebsaege, "The State Department Is Actively Trolling Terrorists on Twitter.” MotherJones, March 5, 2014; http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/02/state-department-cscc-troll- terrorists-twitter-think-again-turn-away 30 Cary, The Pentagon and Independent Media–an Update, 9. 31 Patrick Tucker, “Meet the Navy SEAL Leading the Fight Against ISIS Messaging.” 102 the DHS. The mission of the OCP is to prevent the radicalization of U.S. citizens by fostering government relationships with a myriad of communities dispersed throughout the U.S.32 The OCP was founded under the belief that the way to lessen the appeal to radical ideas is through reinforcement of alternative messaging promoting tolerance and peace.33 The OCP provides substantive support to communities interested in running programs to prevent radicalization from within. In May 2016, the OCP announced its appropriation of $10 million in grants for communities to develop programs for promoting tolerant messaging to counter violence.34 Another team charged with DHS operations is the Countering Violent Extremism Task Force (CVE) founded in early 2016. The task force has a broader, more comprehensive role: it develops a variety of intervention programs to counter extremism; it synchronizes collaboration between ten federal outfits (the Justice Department, the FBI and others) for the execution of the programs; it directs operations with participating extra-governmental entities; and, it manages research and feedback mechanisms on efforts being conducted in the field.35

32 Jeh Johnson. "Statement by Secretary Jeh C. Johnson on DHS’s New Office for Community Partnerships.” U.S Department of Homeland Security, September 28, 2015; https://www.dhs.gov/news/2015/09/28/statement-secretary-jeh-c-johnson- dhs%E2%80%99s-new-office-community-partnerships 33 Michael A. Brown and Christopher Paul, “Inciting Peace.” RAND Cooperation, March 30, 2016; http://www.rand.org/blog/2016/03/inciting-peace.html 34 George Selim, "OCP and CVE Task Force Welcome President Obama's Top Homeland Security Advisor.” U.S Department of Homeland Security, May 6, 2016; https://www.dhs.gov/blog/2016/05/06/ocp-and-cve-task-force-welcome- president-obamas-top-homeland-security-advisor 35 George Selim. "Written Testimony of DHS Office for Community Partnerships Director George Selim for a Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations hearing titled 'ISIS Online: Countering Terrorist Radicalization & Recruitment On the Internet & Social Media'.” U.S Department of Homeland Security, July 6, 2016; 103

In the cyberspace war against ISIS, the DHS is involved in several initiatives. One such initiative is a competition encouraging talented university teams to create new media campaigns underlining messages of positivity and tolerance. Thousands of students across the globe take part in this competition, which is heavily funded by Facebook. In parallel, the task force seeks to strengthen ties with a variety of tech companies with the goal of helping the task force establish a working cyberspace strategy that can be used by other government agencies. To this end, U.S. government officials met with tech executives in New York (in November 2015) and in San Francisco (in January 2016).36

Activating cyber warfare in the campaign In April 2016, the U.S. Cyber Command mounted an attack against ISIS’s computer network. The attack objective was to strike ISIS’s command and control capabilities, disrupting its ability to carry out logistical operations within the organization such as recruiting new operatives, paying its fighters and issuing orders.37 The most well-known, sophisticated attack carried out by U.S. forces was the disruption of pro-ISIS propaganda by the NSA and the U.S. Cyber Command in Operation Glowing Symphony. In this operation, executed during 2016, U.S. cyber units obtained the passwords and access codes of ISIS operatives, later using them to block access to internet assets and to delete content used for propaganda and recruitment. The operation was deemed a success, but this success was fleeting as ISIS moved to more secure servers.

https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/07/06/written-testimony-ocp-senate- homeland-security-and-governmental-affairs-permanent 36 Ibid. 37 David E. Sanger, “U.S. Cyberattacks Target ISIS in a New Line of Combat.” The New York Times, April 24, 2016; http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/25/us/politics/us-directs-cyberweapons- at-isis-for-first-time.html?_r=2 104

The Cyber Command has also launched integration operations with forces on the ground. These have included locking detected operatives out of their accounts, forcing them to use less secure tools and exposing their position to facilitate drone attacks.38 In late 2016, the Cyber Command hacked into the accounts of ISIS propaganda specialists, changed their passwords and deleted propaganda content including video recorded in the battlefield.39 Other than technical damage, these operations inflict psychological damage as well: when ISIS leaders and operatives realize their activity is not secure, their sense of confidence is undermined. Operations have also included placing various ‘implants’ in ISIS’s networks to study the habits of its operatives.40 Activity is seen both in the disruption of operative command and control, and in actions carried out against ISIS’s media network designed to recruit terrorists. These operations spark two points of contention within the U.S. government. The first relates to the effectiveness of these cyberattacks, posing the question of whether U.S. cyber operations have truly succeeded in disrupting the enemy’s web activity. While the Cyber Command and the DoD have deemed these operations a success, former intelligence officials (speaking on condition of anonymity) question their success. The reason for this debate lies in the definition of successful cyber operations: while the DoD and the

38 David E.Sanger and Eric Schmidt, "U.S. Cyberweapons, Used Against Iran and North Korea, Are a Disappointment Against ISIS.” The New York Times, June 12, 2017; https://mobile-nytimes- com.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/mobile.nytimes.com/2017/06/12/world/middlee ast/isis-cyber.amp.html 39 Ellen Nakashima, "U.S. Military Cyber Operation to Attack ISIS Last Year Sparked Heated Debate Over Alerting Allies.” The Washington Post, May 9, 2017; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-military-cyber- operation-to-attack-isis-last-year-sparked-heated-debate-over-alerting- allies/2017/05/08/93a120a2-30d5-11e7-9dec- 764dc781686f_story.html?utm_term=.30d3d00d99fb 40 Sanger, “U.S. Cyberattacks Target ISIS in a New Line of Combat.” 105

Cyber Command define success as a temporary disruption of enemy activity, intelligence experts look for the infliction of long-term damage, which they claim is hard to achieve in these operations. For example, these intelligence experts state that ISIS activity can be partly restored or transferred to other servers, rendering the impact of these operations null and void.41 Another point of contention relates to the impact of this type of warfare on the relationship between the U.S. and its allies. Some ISIS servers are located in countries that are allies of the U.S. As such, actions against these servers are, in effect, offensive operations conducted in ally territory. For this reason, the U.S. government continuously debates whether it should alert its allies before mounting these operations. The FBI, the CIA and the State Department claim that such operations, launched without advance coordination, could impair counterterrorism and intelligence collaboration between the countries. On the other hand, the DoD claims that alerting states in advance of cyber operations could lead to the leaking of sensitive details, potentially hindering success.42

Summary An effective information warfare campaign features cooperation between social media, intelligence and cyber units to amplify the tactical and strategical impact of military and political influence. The internet and social media have become highly instrumental in impacting social behavior, serving as key tools in influencing public perception and shaping our consciousness. In conflicts between countries - when one nation disrupts the information environment that its opponent depends upon – it is disrupting the enemy’s ability to accurately grasp reality and establish an effective response. In this

41 Nakashima, "U.S. Military Cyber Operation to Attack ISIS Last Year Sparked Heated Debate Over Alerting Allies." 42 Ibid. 106 manner, the aggressor grants itself an advantage in the overall campaign. It delegitimizes the enemy, undercutting its credibility by sowing negative feelings, doubt, uncertainty and fear among the public perception; alternately, it can create positive feelings towards the aggressor. This also undermines the credibility of legitimate, relatively objective moderators such as the media, academia and content experts. The architecture of the internet facilitates the creation and distribution of information through a ‘personalization’ model, whereby information is made accessible to individuals or groups through categorized engagement based on behavior, geography, interest, need, desire and passion. This enables social media IO to exploit algorithms that provide increased exposure to a narrative designed to disrupt the opposition’s information environment. When such an operation is conducted - along with offensive cyber operations to disrupt the opponent’s communications - the synergy between cyber and IO amplifies the aggressor’s capacity, offering a new array of capabilities to target the adversary’s digital information systems; this includes information leaks, blackmail and information deletion to disrupt the supply chain. In the digital age, military and political organizations seeking to attain their goals must develop cyber capabilities to allow for timely change and flexibility, adapting their messaging to the relevant target audience and developing offensive cyber capabilities to influence their opponent. To meet operational objectives within the context of this type of warfare, it is necessary to conduct campaigns integrating proactive cyber warfare activity and IO tools. To succeed, these organizations must assemble a range of capabilities that includes the development of dedicated cyber warfare tools tailored to the digital world in general and social media in particular.

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About the author Daniel Cohen is a Senior Researcher at Tel Aviv University. In addition, he is a Director of Research and Strategy at the Abba Eban Institute for International Diplomacy at the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) in Herzliya. He also serves as a consultant/expert on CVE in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). His research fields include: cyber security, cyber terrorism, strategic cyber weapons, and the use of web & social media for Influence operations.

Sources Ascott, Roy. “From Appearance to Apparition: Communications and Consciousness in the Cybersphere.” Leonardo Electronic Almanac. 1, no. 2 (1993). Assaf, Ofer & Siboni, Gabi. Guidelines for a National Cyber Strategy. Memorandum No. 153. Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, 2016. Bradshaw, Samantha and Howard, Philip. “Troops, Trolls and Troublemakers: A Global Inventory of Organized Social Media Manipulation.” Working paper no. 2017.12, University of Oxford, 2017; http://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp- content/uploads/sites/89/2017/07/Troops-Trolls-and- Troublemakers.pdf Brangetto, Pascal and Veenedaal, Matthijs A. Influence Cyber Operations: The Use of Cyberattacks in Support of Influence Operations. Tallinn: NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre for Excellence, 8th International Conference on Cyber Conflict, 2016. Brown, Michael A. and Paul, Christopher. Inciting Peace. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, March 30, 2016; http://www.rand.org/blog/2016/03/inciting-peace.html

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Brown, Robin. “Information Operations, Public Diplomacy & Spin: The United States & the Politics of Perception Management.” Journal of Information Warfare. 1, no.3 (2002): 41. Cary, Peter. The Pentagon and Independent Media–an Update. Washington: CIMA- Center for International Media Assistance, 2015. https://www.cima.ned.org/wp- content/uploads/2015/11/CIMA-The-Pentagon-and-Independent- Media-Update.pdf Cronin, Blaise and Crawford, Holly. “Information Warfare: Its Application in Military and Civilian Contexts.” The Information Society 15, no.4 (1999): 258. “Definition – distributed denial-of-service attack (DDoS).” TechTarget. http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/distributed- denial-of-service-attack “Fear, Uncertainty and Doubt.” Changing Minds.org, accessed October 1, 2017; http://changingminds.org/disciplines/sales/articles/fud.htm. Hoffman, Michael. “U.S. Air Force Targets and Destroys ISIS HQ Building Using Social Media.” Defensetech, June 3, 2015; http://www.defensetech.org/2015/06/03/us-air-force-targets- and-destroys-isis-hq-building-using-social-media/ Johnson, Jeh. "Statement by Secretary Jeh C. Johnson on DHS’s New Office for Community Partnerships." U.S Department of Homeland Security, September 28, 2015; https://www.dhs.gov/news/2015/09/28/statement-secretary-jeh- c-johnson-dhs%E2%80%99s-new-office-community-partnerships Johnson, Natalie. “Centcom’s Anti-ISIS Propaganda Team Has Fewer Than a Dozen Members.” The Washington Free Beacon, July 6,

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2016; http://freebeacon.com/nationalsecurity/centcoms-anti-isis- propaganda-team-fewer-dozen-members/ Larson, Eric V. – Darilek, Richard E. – Gibran, Daniel – Nichiporuk, Brian – Richardson, Amy – Schwartz, Lowell H. and Thurston, Cathryn Quantic. Foundations of Effective Influence Operations: A Framework for Enhancing Army Capabilities. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2009). Nakashima, Ellen. “U.S. Military Cyber Operation to Attack ISIS Last Year Sparked Heated Debate Over Alerting Allies.” The Washington Post, May 9, 2017; https://www.washingtonpost .com/world/national-security/us-military-cyber-operation-to- attack-isis-last-year-sparked-heated-debate-over-alerting- allies/2017/05/08/93a120a2-30d5-11e7-9dec- 764dc781686f_story.html?utm_term=.30d3d00d99fb O’Donnell, Lynne. “U.S Airstrikes Have Destroyed an Islamic State- Operated Radio Station in a Remote Part OF Eastern Afghanistan.” U.S.News, February 2, 2016; http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2016-02- 02/airstrikes-in-eastern-afghanistan-destroy-is-radio-station OPNAV Instruction 3434.1: Psychological Operations. Washington Navy Yard: Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1997, http://www.iwar.org.uk/psyops/resources/us/3434_1.pdf Parrish, Karen. “Centcom Counters ISIL Propaganda.” US Department of Defense, July 6 2016. https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/827761/centco m-counters-isil-propaganda/ Rosen, Avi. “Compressing Space and Time in Cyberspace Art.” PhD diss., Tel Aviv University, 2009, http://www.sipl.technion.ac.il/~avi/tsc/avi_rosen_ TSC.pdf 110

Sanger, David E. “U.S. Cyberattacks Target ISIS in a New Line of Combat.” The New York Times, April 24, 2016; http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/25/us/politics/us-directs- cyberweapons-at-isis-for-first-time.html?_r=2 Sanger, David E. and Schmidt, Eric. “U.S. Cyberweapons, Used Against Iran and North Korea, Are a Disappointment Against ISIS.” The New York Times, June 12, 2017; https://mobile-nytimes- com.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/mobile.nytimes.com/2017/06/12/w orld/middleeast/isis-cyber.amp.html Selim, George. “OCP and CVE Task Force Welcome President Obama's Top Homeland Security Advisor.” U.S Department of Homeland Security, May 6, 2016; https://www.dhs.gov/blog/2016/05/06/ocp-and-cve-task-force- welcome-president-obamas-top-homeland-security-advisor Selim, George. “Written Testimony of DHS Office for Community Partnerships Director George Selim for a Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations hearing titled 'ISIS Online: Countering Terrorist Radicalization & Recruitment On the Internet & Social Media'.” U.S Department of Homeland Security, July 6, 2016; https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/07/06/written- testimony-ocp-senate-homeland-security-and-governmental- affairs-permanent Suebsaege, Asawim. “The State Department Is Actively Trolling Terrorists on Twitter.” MotherJones, March 5, 2014; http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/02/state- department-cscc-troll-terrorists-twitter-think-again-turn-away Tucker, Patrick. “Meet the Navy SEAL Leading the Fight Against ISIS Messaging.” Defense One, June 9, 2016;

111 http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2016/06/navy-seal-isis- messaging/128938 Vasilescu, Alfred. “Evolution of Pathological Communication’s Military Domains, from Propaganda to Information Operations.” Scientific Research and Education in the Air Force Volume 2011, 282. Verton, Dan. “Pentagon Gets Authority to Fight Online ISIS Propaganda.” Meritalk, November 30, 2015; https://www.meritalk.com/articles/pentagon-gets-authority-to- fight-online-isis-propaganda/ Wilson, Clay. Information Operations, Electronic Warfare, and Cyberwar: Capabilities and Related Policy Issues. Washington: Congressional Research Service, 2007. Wong, Kristina. “How the U.S. is working to defeat ISIS online.” The Hill, June 25, 2016; http://thehill.com/policy/defense/284826- how-the-us-is-seeking-to-defeat-isis-online

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Gábor Csehi

Resilience plans in the health sector

Introduction In today's security environment, there are only a few conflicts, challenges, and problems that directly or indirectly do not affect health and our health security. Think about natural challenges (like earthquake, flood, tsunami, large forest fire). Civilizational problems, traffic accidents, railroad disasters, chemical disasters (such as the red sludge catastrophe in Hungary in 2010),1 other industrial catastrophes. Terrorism and wars are also generating a lot of casualties. The challenges posed by infectious diseases, epidemics, also pose a very serious challenge to healthcare systems. Think about the ebola epidemic that was ramping in 2013-2016 in West Africa.2 All these casualties have to be treated at the right level. Pair that fact with NATO’s concept of Host Nation Support, and the importance of national resilience for the Alliance becomes clear. National resilience is the basis of collective defense, since we are not only consumers of security but we also producers of it. The purpose

1 Kátai-Urbán, Lajos – Cséplı, Zoltán. “Disaster in the Ajka Red Sludge Reservoir 04 October 2010.” Conference presentation, Sixth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents. The Hague, 8-10 November 2010. https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/documents/2010/teia/presenta tions/5-1Conference_UNECE_Hungary_red_mud_disaster_CD.pdf and Kovács, Péter. “Lessons learned from past accidents at tailing management facilities in the UNECE region.” Conference presentation. 15th Anniversary International Forum for Industrial Safety, Saint Petersburg 30 May – 2 June 2017. https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/documents/2017/TEIA/GCE_2 _June_2017/1_Peter_Kovacs_TMF_accidents.pdf Date of access: 06.12.2018. 2 For more detail see: “Ebola outbreak in West Africa (2013-2016).” European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. https://ecdc.europa.eu/en/ebola- and-marburg-fevers/threats-and-outbreaks/ebola-outbreak 113 of NATO’s Host Nation Support concept is to provide effective support to NATO military activities and to achieve efficiencies and economies of scale through the best use of a host nation’s available resources.3 Host Nation Support is based on national resilience, and it is the foundation of supporting military operations and the continuity of military operations. For all these reasons, since military operations may involve a large number of casualties, NATO's sixth basic requirement is a fully understandable, legitimate expectation. The capacity to treat mass casualties is part of national resilience.4 It is no accident that NATO's basic resilience requirements are related to health care, or that the sixth requirement addresses the existence of a healthcare provider directly.5 But what are these requirements? The seven baseline requirements to be assessed are: 1) assured continuity of government and critical government services; 2) resilient energy supplies; 3) ability to deal effectively with the uncontrolled movement of people; 4) resilient food and water resources; 5) ability to deal with mass casualties; 6) resilient communications systems; and finally 7) resilient transportation systems.

3 “Host Nation Support (HNS) request instructions.” APAN. https://wss.apan.org/s/NTCC/HNS/default.aspx Date of access: 06.12.2018. 4 Guidance to National Authorities for Planning for Incidents Involving Catastrophic Mass Casualties; AC/98-D(2018)0002 5 “Resilience: a core element of collective defence.” NATO Review Magazine. https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2016/also-in-2016/nato-defence-cyber- resilience/en/index.htm Date of access: 2018.04.29 114

These seven areas cover the entire crisis spectrum, from an evolving hybrid threat all the way up to the most demanding scenarios envisaged by Alliance planners.6

How can the capacity to deal with mass causalities be developed? The need for the treatment of mass casualties was particularly apparent in the Napoleonic wars and later in the Crimean War. The Crimean War brought many innovations to the care of the injured, and during the First and Second World Wars there were also serious, defining innovations in the treatment of injuries. Based on experience acquired in the Second World War, a new branch of healthcare was born. Health care is no longer just a medical, medical- professional issue, but also logistic one in many respects. The logistic challenge is the movement of injured persons, the medical personnel, the tools, instruments and equipment, all to the appropriate locations. The World Health Organization has also recognized the need to prepare for mass injuries. In September 2006, Global Consultation on Mass Casualty Management was held in Geneva at WHO headquarters. As a result of these meetings the WHO published its definitive guidance in 2007.7 The purpose of this document is to help policy makers, decision makers and emergency managers at all levels, especially at community level, to overcome the gaps in health system preparedness for managing mass casualty incidents. The document stipulates that the focus must be on planning and preparation.

6 “Resilience and Article 3.” NATO, 06.25.2018. https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/topics_132722.htm Date of access: 06.29.2018. 7 Mass Casualty Management Systems: Strategies and guidelines for building health sector capacity. Geneva: World Health Organisation, 2007. http://www.who.int/hac/techguidance/tools/mcm_guidelines_en.pdf, Date of access: 04.29.2018. 115

There had already been plans to treat a large number of casualties in Hungary: after World War II, the civilian and military health organizations were prepared to provide treatment to both civilian and military causalities in the terrible conditions of the emerging conflict. It was called disaster medicine in the domestic literature. Following the end of the bipolar world order, health care planning turned from field hospitals in support of national defense towards providing care facilities to the victims of natural disasters.8 Due to the improving public health situation – in my view, mistakenly – epidemiological capacities have also regressed. For example, the quarantine capability has virtually ceased to exist for a while. This posed a serious risk in case of a possible epidemic outbreak. From a certain point of view, as the treatment of mass causalities has become logistical issue, planning processes have become more important. Making proper plans is essential to ensure preparation. That is why health care provider preparation plans are being drawn up under the Minister's guidance, in accordance with the relevant legislation.9 In Hungary, the first open guidance on planning was released in 1982,10 and the first law on the subject was passed in 2000.11 The domestic planning environment provided, however, many changes were needed to meet the changed environmental challenges.

8 Major, László (ed.). A katasztrófa-felszámolás egészségügyi alapjai. Budapest: Semmelweis Kiadó és Multimédia Stúdió, 2010. 9 Ministry of Human Resources decree 43/2014. (VIII. 19.) on the required content of the health crisis situation plans of health institutions. http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=171359.350642 10 Ministry of Health directive 11/1982. (Eü. K. 8.) on preparing disaster plans by treatment and preventive institutions. 11 Ministry of Health decree29/2000. (X. 30.) on the required content of health institutions’ disaster plans. http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=48681.251927 116

A Changing Attitude At the end of 201312, a change of attitude occurred in Hungary: preparations for defense were once again a priority, as a result of the changing security environment. Also, the public health epidemics bodies, headed by World Health Organization, have moved global solutions to increasingly robust footing. This was the time when the standards of the International Health Regulations were really taking effect in the member states.13 At the same time, natural disasters have become increasingly destructive (e.g. the 2013 Danube flood).14 The earlier plan review was replaced by a more modern and holistic approach. The planning system was radically reorganized and transformed in 2015.15 It was not only necessary to plan for additional supply and treatment tasks, but also to maintain operations. Based on a legal authorization, the healthcare providers responsible for maintaining care are identified. These hospitals have the capacity to treat a large number of victims according to the sixth requirement. They are capable of serving the general population, the armed and the law enforcement forces of Hungary at the same time, and are also crucial for health security. Unless these providers are identified in advance,

12 See the changes to Act CLIV of 1997 on Healthcare and Govt. decree 521/2013. (XII.30.) on health crisis management 13 “Strengthening health security by implementing the International Health Regulations (2005).” World Health Organization. http://www.who.int/ihr/en/, Date of access: 06.29.2018. 14 “Folyamatos a védekezés, az árvíz elleni védelem.” Hungarian Ministry of Interior, 06.08.2013. http://www.katasztrofavedelem.hu/index2.php?pageid=szervezet_hirek&hirid =1924 and “Az országos műszaki irányító törzs közleménye, 2013.06.04. 12:00 óra.” Hungarian Ministry of Interior, 08.04.2013. https://www.vizugy.hu/index.php?module=content&programelemid=1&id=69 5, Date of access: 04.29.2018. 15 See Decree 43/2014. (VIII. 19.) EMMI of the Minister of Human Capacities on the requirements of health care crisis plans for health care institutions. This regulations came into force in 2015. 117 health care cannot be provided at the right quality, quantity and level. Identifying the critical service providers is also important because the resolution of a crisis situation depends in part on the country’s healthcare capacity, its maintenance, protection, and its intervention methods.

The Identification Report The Identification Report16 is the basic document in which a health care organization presents the data, facts and documents about itself, on the basis of risk analysis and sectoral and horizontal criteria. On the basis of this document the competent authorities can responsibly decide whether the particular component under consideration is a nationally (or Europe-wide) vital element or not. Identification and designation has a triple goal: to prepare organizations to deliver efficient performance, to meet the sixth basic requirement, and to enhance their security. Risk analysis is part of the identification process. Its purpose is to figure out what factors are likely to jeopardize the functioning of the institution and reduce its effectiveness. It estimates the elements that threatens the operation of the given service provider, hinder it and render its operations more difficult. This is perhaps one of the most difficult tasks, as this basically requires the analysis of a working system so that the current operating regime is to be applied to an operational model of an extraordinary event. In addition to the risk analysis, the institution's detailed capacities and the package of measures that maintain its operation have to be presented. In the identification report a number of aspects have to be considered, such as: - What is scale and distribution of the existing capacity?

16 Act CLXVI of 2012 on the identification, designation and protection of vital systems and facilities, Government Decree 246/2015. (IX.8.) on the identification, designation and protection of health systems and facilities. 118

- What is the number of the services provided annually? - Where is the nearest institution, where appropriate, capable of assuming overflow tasks? - Is there any professional (health care) interest that requires the continuous provision of capabilities? For modeling the distance to other mission-capable institutions, a number of computational methodologies were given to reporters by the Ministry of Health, which took into account road conditions and the maximum speed level. The goal was to estimate the existence or absence of alternatives. Compliance with the horizontal criteria established in the Identification Report has to be shown also. These are the attributes of the structure and constituent elements of the installation, as well as those aspects that account for the loss of human life, economic and social impacts, health and environmental consequences, the built environment and vital system sectoral classifications. For example, in case of the institution’s failure what would be the human loss, the economic impact, social impact, political impact and environmental impact criteria. The risk analysis matrix in Figure 1. is an excellent visual representation of the likelihood of incidents and their resolution (successful or otherwise). However, if the matrix is filled in without sufficiently attention to detail, some of the challenges may not be sufficiently accounted for. The comparability of the reports is also questionable, since the definition of frequency or the probability of occurrence are not necessarily a uniform. It is therefore necessary to clarify the matrix evaluation.

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low medium high

very rare GREEN AMBER

rare GREEN AMBER AMBER

often GREEN AMBER RED

Occurrence of incident Occurrence very AMBER RED RED often

Probability of success

Figure 1. Risk analysis matrix17

When examining the above, it is also necessary to show whether the given risk could be mitigated or not. The probability of the occurrence of the consequences and their severity are relevant for tolerability. To handle vulnerabilities, it is necessary to present a system of general protection measures, such as: - existing security / safety / business continuity plans and measures; - remote monitoring system, storage capacities, alarm chains, etc. for public healthcare reserves; - information system, existing logical, physical and administrative protection, based on the principle of closed, continuous and risk-proportionate protection. This process has been going on for about a year at the time of writing, and it is still ongoing in the case of some institutions. Based on about 100 Identification Reports, the Minister of Health has

17 Figure created by the author. 120 already designated certain hospitals, laboratories, pharmaceutical wholesalers and other healthcare institutions as crucial for maintaining the healthcare system. These institutions are also called critical infrastructure. Based on the analysis of Identification Reports, a list of identified risks was compiled. Although the size and capacity of the appointed 50 organizations are all different, the challenges and problems that are being encountered are very similar: public utilities disruption, IT protection, drug and medical supply problems. It is important to note that – due to centralized guidance – the institutions have not reported the risks arising from financing problems or manpower shortage. There are several methods for analyzing and presenting the risks the institutions are facing. The number of times a particular risk factor is mentioned in the reports indicates the severity the reporters assigned to them.

Category One Risks The following risks were mentioned in at least 70 percent of the reports: - Power supply problem – 97%, - Gas supply problem – 83%, - Water supply problem – 92%, - Laundry service – 71%, - Termination of food services – 71,5%, - Technical error – 80%, - Broken pipelines and plumbing – 71%, - Explosion and fire – 79%, It’s obvious that the loss of the elements of traditional infrastructure is one of the most commonly feared risks. It is mentioned by almost every institution and treated as a grave threat. The technical error problem is a summary category. Those

121 institutions used this expression that had a relatively large number of technical failures and had an autonomous technical staff with its own management, or outsourced the resolution of technical issues to an entrepreneurial contractor. Defining the problem at the same time, it was important to consider the maintenance standards and modern equipment in a particular institution. It has become obvious that where maintenance was regular, the problem was less serious than where the equipment was no longer considered to be sufficiently maintained. It is clear, therefore, that the exposure of healthcare providers to public utilities is very high. The high demand of modern medical devices for electricity and other utilities is a serious risk factor. Alternative sources (spare power supply, independent water source, etc.) were unable to keep up with the pace of capacity development. In many institutions, some departments (for example Intensive Care Unit, Emergency Department) are provided with alternative sources for utilities, but alternatives to the whole institution is either not fully solved, or is virtually impossible. Exposure is exacerbated by the interdependence of certain utilities. For example, in the case of a power supply problem, the gas supply also stops, since the automatic security devices do not get electricity, even if the plant has its own storage capacity. A simple electricity break may also cause food, heating, hot and cold water supply failure. It is therefore important to launch programs that reduce this type of exposure. In the case of fire protection, the protection of structures of different ages and different technical conditions may be a problem. As insurance systems stretch across the old parts of the building, the exposure of real estate with new, more advanced equipment is much higher.

Category Two Risks

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The problems mentioned in 45-59 percent of the reports constitute the second category of risks, as follows: - Access control system failure (47%), - Disinfection / sterilization system failure (51%), - External attack (49%), - Telecommunication system problems (53%), - Problems in the IT system (45%). The risks were mentioned in this category are those which should have received a much higher percentage, with particular regard to IT and telecommunication systems. These factors are generally not considered by the institutions as sufficiently serious challenges. I will address the possible reasons later. I find it very interesting that attacks on IT systems is not reported as a problem. However, the reports did not provide information on the availability of the IT systems’ capacity (number of workstations, software environment, firewalls and other defensive measures, etc.). One of the areas that needs serious development is the protection of telecommunications and IT systems, since it is not sufficiently robust at this time. International examples (Great Britain 201718) and the domestic case(s) 19 show that we cannot be safe either in the Hungarian or in the British health system. Access control systems, disinfection systems, and external attack as risk factors have been highlighted in the original guidance, and this is also the reason for their relatively high score. However, the depth of the problem is not sufficiently reflected in the individual

18 “Zsarolóvírus: az egészségügy is veszélyben.” medicalonline 05.18.2017. http://medicalonline.hu/informatika/cikk/zsarolovirus__az_egeszsegugy_is_v eszelyben Date of access: 06.29.2018. 19 “Itt az első magyar kórházi zsarolóvírus.” index, 04.08.2016. https://index.hu/tech/2016/04/08/itt_az_elso_magyar_korhazi_zsarolovirus/ Date of access: 06.29.2018. 123 reports, and in the suggestions for solutions their consequences are overstated.

Category Three Risks In this category, problems were mentioned in 21 – 44 percent of the reports. - Accident at the heliport, - Oxygen tank explosion, - Heating system failure, - Ionizing radiation-related disorder, - Elevator failure. Introducing a subcategory of institution-specific risks is appropriate when discussing these problems. These are not characteristic of all institutions because not all of them have a heliport or radiation agents, for example. The risks of heating system and elevator failure derive from the operations and existing technical conditions of the institutions. I have already mentioned the technical level of maintenance and technical equipment devices. With regard to lifts, it is important to note that the need for human resources needed to operate them can be planned, but in the current defense plans they are very likely to be provided. Designing alternative patient handling solutions should be a serious challenge. Healthcare providers struggling with a manpower shortage do not have the capacity to reallocate resources into moving patients. However, the domestic legal environment provides for the use of external assistance. This can be planned for, but in many cases the plans are outdated and inadequate. At the same time, as I mentioned earlier, mass casualty care is a logistical question, so this

124 inadequacy is unacceptable.20 Lack of planning is a direct consequence of the lack of preparation.

Category Four Risks These problems were mentioned less than 20 percent of the reports. - Failure of medical devices, - Medication supply problem. In this last category, the risk level of the listed problems is relatively low. The reason for this may be similar to the low risk rating of the IT and telecommunications systems failure: insufficient security awareness. In my opinion, the institutions did not conduct sufficiently deep analyses of these risks, partly due to the insufficiently high level of security awareness and the lack of proper process analysis. Although there are serious plans and abilities to replace medical devices from a central state reserve21, where we can find different type of field hospitals and any other health equipment, medicines and other materials. In my view, this solution is cost-effective, but may not guarantee the maximum level of resilience.

Solution – Resilience Plans Designated institutions should prepare a resilience plan, a so- called Operator Safety Plan, approved by the designating authority – the Minister of Human Resources. In the case of the most important institutions, there is a deadline by which the operator of the vital constituent element should develop the Resilience Plan (RP) that

20 Ministry of Interior decree 55/1997. (X. 21.) on the rules for organizing, managing, supplying and employment of civil defense organizations based on civil defense obligations. 21 Ministry of Human Capacities decree 1/2016. (I. 13.) on the management rules of the National Health Stockpile 125 must be sent to the authority after completion. The RP shall cover the vital constituent elements and shall show the following for each:22 a) the organization, equipment and security measures that ensure the protection of the elements, b) it is necessary, in accordance with the different risk and threat levels, to lay down the provisional measures which are necessary to ensure protection, c) procedures for existing or emerging security solutions for protection. The RP may be replaced by a previously prepared security document that includes the elements of items (a) to (c) and the substitution was made by the authority in the designating decision.23 In the RP, the vital constituent elements should be subdivided and the following should be shown for each:24 a) the activities of the designated critical systems and facilities, b) the risk factors identified in the identification report, c) the relevant risks, dangers, hazards, d) assessment, categorization, analysis, evaluation, e) measures and procedures based on different risk and hazard analyses to ensure the continuity of the facility's operation, f) the organization, equipment and security measures that ensure the protection of the elements, g) the provisional measures necessary to ensure protection, h) procedures relating to existing or emerging security solutions for protection, i) the rules governing the handling and follow-up of changes.

22 Article 6, paragraphs (2) and (3) of Act CLXVI of 2012 on the identification, designation and protection of vital systems and facilities (abbreviated as Lrtv.) http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=155940.346184 23 Lrtv. 6. § (4) 24 Lrtv. 6. § (2) and (3) 126

The RP may be replaced by a previously prepared security document that includes the content elements under points a) to i) and the substitution was made by the authority in the designating decision. 25 The following additional items are required for the vital constituent elements of hospitals, taking into account the obligations set out in the emergency services provider's health service plan: a) substitution or alternative sources of public utilities, b) to provide the necessary essential services, c) food, d) substitution of medicines, medical consumables, blood and blood products, e) communications tasks, f) waste and hazardous waste management, g) prevention of IT failure. The last is one of the most problematic points of resilience. There are three reasons for this weakness: the condition of the equipment, human-resource problems and shortage of funds. As I mentioned earlier, hospitals already have had plans for a long time to ensure mass supply, mass treatment. However, these plans do not fully cover all aspects of CBRN events. So far, 52 plans have been adopted, the preparation or adoption was approximately one year. The planning process was facilitated by a guidance. Laboratories must pay special attention in their Resilience Plan to handling microbiological, biological material, or toxin outbreaks, the registration of entry, and the prevention of entry by unauthorized persons.

25 Lrtv. 6. § (4) 127

Pharmaceutical wholesalers must ensure the adequacy of drug delivery plans, in order to ensure the necessary essential supplies, alternative logistics plan (available vehicles), a plan for remedies for medicines and a communication plan. When the designated critical component or facility is supported by an electronic information system or the designated critical element itself is considered to be an electronic information system: a) the role and function of the electronic information system, b) the results of the security classification of the electronic information system pursuant to the Act L of 2013 on Electronic Information Security of State and Municipal Bodies, as set out in the IT Security Code; and c) List the list of logical, physical and administrative security measures set out in the IT Security Code to protect the electronic information system (subject to the principles of vulnerability, confidentiality and availability). The institution and its personnel must be prepared to provide professional health care, even if an unexpected, detrimental, adverse event occurs during operation. It should be able to perform this task even under difficult and obstructive circumstances, and be prepared to plan to prevent and solve them.

Liaison Officers Each designated institution has the obligation to employ a person responsible for maintaining the RP, coordinating tasks, and liaising with other institutions and the authorities. The designated person must also attend certain training programs. The training will ensure that the liaison person is properly informed about the regulatory environment. Training programs are practice-oriented, focus on real problems and solutions; they are organized by the authorities, which.

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Further steps In order for the Resilience Plan to achieve the desired effect – to serve as a reliable guide in case of mass casualties in any situation – a number of additional measures are necessary

Increasing Security The first, and perhaps the most important task that can be deduced from the analysis of plans is the need to enhance security awareness. The plans have virtually no provision for workers to be trained in this area. There are no national comprehensive programs in this regard either. Security consciousness, however, would be particularly important in cyber defense. Recent cyber-attacks should be a sufficient warning that such attention is long overdue.

Continuous Monitoring According to the relevant rules plans are reviewed every three years. Increasing the frequency of reviews is obviously a matter of resources, but institutional self-evaluation is random at best. It is particularly important to make the audit of the matrix evaluation and the IT / cyber security plans more systematic and more regular.

Exercises Lack of training plans is also a systemic problem. There is little or no comprehensive practice, so ongoing monitoring and development of existing plans is not guaranteed either. Organizing exercises is essential, if the country is to be able to handle mass casualties. Practice at all levels (local, regional, national) must be realized. It is important to do not only theoretical (table-top) exercises, but also realistic field training exercises, because these are the only reliable way to explore some deficiencies and evaluate the

129 existing skills.26 Exercises are also a good way to practice new processes.

Interagency Plans There is also a lack of joint planning at inter-agency or national level. Continuing planning and development is a top priority. Good plans are crutches during the actions.

Closing Remarks National resilience in the field of mass casualties is a priority. This is not just the expectation of NATO, but also the expectation and in the interest of all citizens, as challenges and mass casualties can happen at any time. If, during such an event, the country cannot handle the injured well, it will lead to a serious crisis of public confidence. In my opinion, the decision makers and policy makers have a duty to prepare the domestic health care system properly, to create, maintain and develop skills. The significance of the planning system detailed above shows that the Hungarian health industry was able to react to the new challenges, and change focus as required by the changing circumstances. The next step is to develop and systematically practice and monitor the plans.

About the Author Gábor Csehi is in charge of the Security, IT and Documentary Department of the Ministry of Human Capacities. He is a public administration professional, and a specialist in crisis management and critical infrastructure protection, PhD student of the National University of Public Service. His research field is the health security and civil-military cooperation.

26 See for example: Complexity in urban Crisis Management – Amsterdam’s response to the Bijlmer air disaster; Uriel Rosenthal and co. 1994 James & James Ltd, England 130

Sources Kátai-Urbán, Lajos – Cséplı, Zoltán. “Disaster in the Ajka Red Sludge Reservoir 04 October 2010.” Conference presentation, Sixth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents. The Hague, 8-10 November 2010. https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/documents/2010/ teia/presentations/5- 1Conference_UNECE_Hungary_red_mud_disaster_CD.pdf. Kovács, Péter. “Lessons learned from past accidents at tailing management facilities in the UNECE region.” Conference presentation. 15th Anniversary International Forum for Industrial Safety, Saint Petersburg 30 May – 2 June 2017. https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/documents/2017/ TEIA/GCE_2_June_2017/1_Peter_Kovacs_TMF_accidents.pdf. “Ebola outbreak in West Africa (2013-2016).” European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. https://ecdc.europa.eu/en/ebola- and-marburg-fevers/threats-and-outbreaks/ebola-outbreak. “Host Nation Support (HNS) request instructions.” APAN. https://wss.apan.org/s/NTCC/HNS/default.aspx. Guidance to National Authorities for Planning for Incidents Involving Catastrophic Mass Casualties; AC/98-D(2018)0002, NATO CEPC. “Resilience: a core element of collective defence.” NATO Review Magazine. https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2016/also-in- 2016/nato-defence-cyber-resilience/en/index.htm. “Resilience and Article 3.” NATO, 06.25.2018. https://www.nato.int/cps/ic/natohq/topics_132722.htm. Mass Casualty Management Systems: Strategies and guidelines for building health sector capacity. Geneva: World Health Organisation, 2007.

131 http://www.who.int/hac/techguidance/tools/mcm_guidelines_e n.pdf. Major, László (ed.). A katasztrófa-felszámolás egészségügyi alapjai. Budapest: Semmelweis Kiadó és Multimédia Stúdió, 2010. Ministry of Human Resources decree 43/2014. (VIII. 19.) on the required content of the health crisis situation plans of health institutions. http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=171359.350642. Ministry of Health directive 11/1982. (Eü. K. 8.) on preparing disaster plans by treatment and preventive institutions. Ministry of Health decree 29/2000. (X. 30.) on the required content of health institutions’ disaster plans. http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=48681.251927. “Strengthening health security by implementing the International Health Regulations (2005).” World Health Organization. http://www.who.int/ihr/en/. “Folyamatos a védekezés, az árvíz elleni védelem.” Hungarian Ministry of Interior, 06.08.2013. http://www.katasztrofavedelem.hu/index2.php?pageid=szerveze t_hirek&hirid=1924. “Az országos műszaki irányító törzs közleménye, 2013.06.04. 12:00 óra.” Hungarian Ministry of Interior, 08.04.2013. https://www.vizugy.hu/index.php?module=content&programele mid=1&id=695. “Zsarolóvírus: az egészségügy is veszélyben.” medicalonline 05.18.2017. http://medicalonline.hu/informatika/cikk/zsarolovirus__az_eges zsegugy_is_veszelyben. “Itt az első magyar kórházi zsarolóvírus.” index, 04.08.2016. https://index.hu/tech/2016/04/08/itt_az_elso_magyar_korhazi_z sarolovirus/.

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Ministry of Interior decree 55/1997. (X. 21.) on the rules for organizing, managing, supplying and employment of civil defense organizations based on civil defense obligations. Act CLXVI of 2012 on the identification, designation and protection of vital systems and facilities http://njt.hu/cgi_bin/njt_doc.cgi?docid=155940.346184.

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Meir Elran

Societal Resilience as a Complementary Strategy to Counter Terrorism: The Israeli Experience

Generic characteristics of resilience The essence of the resilience concept is far from being new. The famous Chinese philosopher Confucius already submitted in the fifth century BC that “Our greatest glory is not in never falling, but in rising every time we fall”.1 The term resilience itself was apparently first introduced in Latin in the seventeenth century to present participle of resilīre, to spring back, or rebound.2 In modern days resilience has been used in a variety of disciplines, from material engineering3 to psychology4, and from ecology5 to economics6. In all fields resilience referred to the capacity of systems to flexibly contain disruptions, to manage the inevitable consequential degradation that necessarily follows them and to bounce back in a manner that will at least sustain the core functions and values of the system7.

1 https://www.forbes.com/quotes/1913/ 2 http://www.dictionary.com/browse/resilience 3 Holling, C. S. “Engineering resilience versus ecological resilience.” Engineering within ecological constraints,1996. 31. 4 Luthar, S. S., Cicchetti, D., & Becker, B. “The construct of resilience: A critical evaluation and guidelines for future work.” Child development, 2000. 71(3), 543-562. 5 Berkes, F., Folke, C., & Colding, J. (Eds.). Linking social and ecological systems: management practices and social mechanisms for building resilience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.; Holling, C. S. “The resilience of terrestrial ecosystems: local surprise and global change.” Sustainable development of the biosphere, 1986. 14, 292-317. 6 Simmie, J., & Martin, R. “The economic resilience of regions: towards an evolutionary approach.” Cambridge journal of regions, economy and society, 2010. 3(1), 27-43. 7 Norris, F. H., Stevens, S. P., Pfefferbaum, B., Wyche, K. F., & Pfefferbaum, R. L. “Community resilience as a metaphor, theory, set of capacities, and strategy for 135

Following the unprecedented characteristics of the terrorist attack of 9/11,8 the prolonged adverse ramifications of Katrina (2005)9 and other large scale disasters, resilience has become a central theme in the diverse fields of consequence management. However, as resilience assumed prominence in the global discourse in the last fifteen years it has become a generally vague household name for many different notions, which has often eroded its strategic practical meaning as a blueprint for proactive and effective response to natural and manmade calamities. In fact, in many countries there is a tendency of decision makers, on the national and mostly local level, to belittle or to invest meagerly in disasters management in general and in emergency preparedness in particular.10 In cases where allocations of resources are more pronounces, mostly following prior major disruptions took a heavy toll, they are commonly directed to domains, mostly physically tangible, which are designed to resist the occurrence of the disruption altogether, or to mitigate its damage. This is a universal historical phenomenon. Since ancient times people believed that either there is not much they can do to protect themselves from perturbations, or that they should resort to building huge shelters to defend their communities from either natural

disaster readiness.” American journal of community psychology, 2008. 41(1-2), 127- 150. 8 Bonanno, G. A. “Loss, trauma, and human resilience: have we underestimated the human capacity to thrive after extremely aversive events?” American psychologist, 2004. 59(1), 20. 9 Metzl, E. S. “The role of creative thinking in resilience after hurricane Katrina.” Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts, 2009. 3(2), 112.; Laska, S., and Morrow, B. H. “Social vulnerabilities and Hurricane Katrina: an unnatural disaster in New Orleans.” Marine technology society journal, 2006. 40(4), 16-26. 10 McConnell, A., & Drennan, L. “Mission impossible? Planning and preparing for crisis.” Journal of Contingencies and Crisis management, 2006. 14(2), 59-70. Ahrens, J., & Rudolph, P. M. “The importance of governance in risk reduction and disaster management.” Journal of contingencies and crisis management, 2006. 14(4), 207-220. 136 disturbances (e.g levees11 or walls12) or manmade threats (e.g The Great China Wall). Whereas in numerous occasions these resistance measures were found to be helpful, in many other occurrences they failed to provide the necessary response, and in fact created the comforting feeling of safety, which in turn furthered people from thinking what will happen if the resistance strategy fails. This is exactly where the resilience strategy should be introduced: To provide a framework of response to the disruptions that could not have been prevented or mitigated by the resistance measures, and to enable the shocked systems to survive and possibly revive. Indeed, as mankind realizes that disruptions do happen, despite high expenses for prevention, that they become more costly, and that they appear in novel shapes and magnitude, the need for a complementary strategy becomes more profoundly recognized. Resilience is perceived to be a generic notion, applicable to the individual, communal, economic, infrastructure and national level. Commonly speaking it relates to the “capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganize, while undergoing changes, so as to still retain essentially the same function, structure, identity and feedbacks”.13 Several important traits pertaining to this classic definition should be highlighted: a) the emphasis on its relevance to any system, as well as to other related systems, which applies resilience to interdependent complex systems;14 b) it is usually proposed that the process of containing the shock should be applied

11 Burby, R. J. “Hurricane Katrina and the paradoxes of government disaster policy: Bringing about wise governmental decisions for hazardous areas.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 2006. 604(1), 171-191. 12 Mori, N., Takahashi, T., Yasuda, T., & Yanagisawa, H. “Survey of 2011 Tohoku earthquake tsunami inundation and run‐up.” Geophysical research letters, 2011. 38(7). 13 Walker, B., Holling, C. S., Carpenter, S., & Kinzig, A. “Resilience, adaptability and transformability in social–ecological systems.” Ecology and society, 2004. 9(2). 14 Folke, C. “Resilience: The emergence of a perspective for social–ecological systems analyses.” Global environmental change, 2006. 16(3), 253-267. 137 flexibly, to enable coping with the severity of the shock and to avoid fragmentation of the disrupted system;15 c) resilience allows, and in fact anticipates, changes in the affected system, as part of the pre- recovery stage of bouncing back, as long as the core values and essential functionalities of the system prevail. In fact, such changes are bound to become not only important for the survival of the system under stress, but also for its growth pursuant to the disruption.16 A few other notes are in order to conclude this chapter on the generic characteristic of systemic resilience. Firstly, it is suggested that resilience is never a given trait. It can and it should be enhanced continuously, so as to allow it to be in its highest level possibly when disaster occurs. Secondly, resilience is supposed to be a central feature of the necessary preparedness stage, which needs to be planned and managed in accordance with the nature of the relevant threat. Namely, a careful management of the preparedness process needs to take into account the possible extreme expression of the risk, on one hand, and the special attributes of the system under discussion, on the other hand. Thirdly, it is needed to explore the specific components which can contribute to the enhancement of resilience of the system under consideration. Different components are vital for different systems’ resilience: Social capital,17 leadership and trust18 will be crucial for community resilience; redundancy and

15 Bonanno, G. A., Pat-Horenczyk, R., & Noll, J. “Coping flexibility and trauma: The Perceived Ability to Cope with Trauma (PACT) scale.” Psychological Trauma: Theory, Research, Practice, and Policy, 2011. 3(2), 117. 16 Kose, M. A., & Prasad, E. S. Emerging markets: Resilience and growth amid global turmoil. Washington D C: Brookings Institution Press, 2011. 17 Aldrich, D. P. Building resilience: Social capital in post-disaster recovery. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012. 18Longstaff, P. H., & Yang, S. U. “Communication management and trust: their role in building resilience to “surprises” such as natural disasters, pandemic flu, and terrorism.” Ecology and Society, 2008. 13(1), 3. 138 resourcefulness19 will be decisive for infrastructure resilience. Fourthly, the issue of measuring the level of system’s resilience has been found to be challenging,20 mostly because of the complexity of the diverse systems, and especially when heterogeneous communities are being examined. It is commonly easier to gauge resilience following the disruption rather than to evaluate it before the shock occurred, which is often needed for the purpose of promoting adequate means of preparedness. Regularly the level of resilience is explored on the basis of surveys, but it is expected to be more accurate if measured on the basis of the system’s actual conduct, before and mostly following the disturbance.21 One proposed model of measuring resilience following disruptions is through monitoring the changes22 in the system, based on three benchmarks: a) the downward trajectory of its functionality consequent to the disruption; b) the duration it takes the system to start bouncing back; and c) the level of functionality it reaches in its upward trajectory. In general it can be proposed that a system that bounces back more rapidly to a higher level of functionality, and even beyond the threshold of its conduct prior to the disruptive event - typified as “bouncing forward” - would be rated as a very resilient system.23

19 Cutter, S. L., Barnes, L., Berry, M., Burton, C., Evans, E., Tate, E., & Webb, J. “A place-based model for understanding community resilience to natural disasters.” Global environmental change, 2008. 18(4), 598-606. 20 Carpenter, S., Walker, B., Anderies, J. M., & Abel, N. “From metaphor to measurement: resilience of what to what?” Ecosystems, 2001. 4(8), 765-781. 21 Henry, D., & Ramirez-Marquez, J. E. “Generic metrics and quantitative approaches for system resilience as a function of time.” Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 2012. 99, 114-122. 22 Kimhi, S. “Levels of Resilience: A Critical Review.” Resiliency: Enhancing Coping with Crisis and Terrorism, 2015. 119, 49. 23 Elran, M. “Societal Resilience: From Theory to Policy and Practice.” In Resilience and Risk. Dordrecht: Springer, 2017. 301-311. 139

The Israeli experience Israel faces two major hazards that challenge its national resilience: the natural one relates to the expected major earthquake, which happens in Israel once in every century (the last severe one occurred in 1927);24 the man-made one is the continuous conflict with its Arab neighbors in general and the protracted threat of terrorism, which has been going on for more than one hundred and thirty years, in particular.25 It might be of interest that the natural hazard, which is expected to cause a large number of fatalities (estimated at ca. 750026) and unprecedented property damage does not receive the necessary government and public attention and allocations to adequately prepare for.27 This might be an intriguing subject for further study. However, because of its history of continuous wars, Israel has adopted a culture that accentuates security, which has dominated the public sphere and focused the attention on hostile actions and on terrorism in particular.

24 Arieh, E., & Rabinowitz, N. “Probabilistic assessment of earthquake hazard in Israel.” Tectonophysics, 1989. 167(2-4), 223-233. ; Zohar, M., Salamon, A., & Rubin, R. “Earthquake damage history in Israel and its close surrounding-evaluation of spatial and temporal patterns.” Tectonophysics, 2017. 696, 1-13. Adler, J., & Eldar, R. “Recommendations for earthquake preparedness in Israel.” Harefuah, 2001. 140(9), 877-82. 25 Cole, L. A. Terror: How Israel Has Coped and What America Can Learn. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007.; Waxman, D. “Living with terror, not living in terror: the impact of chronic terrorism on Israeli society.” Perspectives on Terrorism, 2011. 5(5-6). 26 Levi, T., Tavron, B., Katz, O., Amit, R., Segal, D., Hamiel, Y.,& Salamon, A. “Earthquake loss estimation in Israel using the new HAZUS-MH software: preliminary implementation.” Geological Survey of Israel, Jerusalem: Ministry of National Infrastructures, 2010. 27 Shenhar, G., Radomislensky, I., Rozenfeld, M., & Peleg, K. “The impact of a national earthquake campaign on public preparedness: 2011 campaign in Israel as a case study.” Disaster medicine and public health preparedness, 2015. 9(2), 138-144. 140

Terrorism has been defined in a large variety of ways.28 The way it will be defined here is as an ideologically-rooted and maliciously motivated act of violence, directed at civilians, as the weaker link of the national chain, so as to frighten the public, to cause chaos and to demoralize the systemic routine, in order to pressure the leadership to succumb to the political demands of the perpetrators. The most important part of this definition is the focus on the civilian sector. And indeed, also in the Israeli scene, terror has been directed, almost invariably, throughout decades, against civilians. What has changed with the years are the means and ways terrorism has been manifested. Without expanding here on the history of terrorism in Israel, suffice it to note the interesting change in the modalities of terrorism in the last twenty years. Whereas during the four years of the intensive Second Palestinian Intifada (2000-2004)29 the main and most effective terrorist weapon was the suicide bombers30 (128 in number, which caused the death of 485 Israeli civilians),31 the present most often used are the high trajectory weapons.32 The concept is similar: To terrorize the civilian population in the most profound way possible, by whatever available means, so as to threaten its stable routine by mayhem and to use the public angst as a leverage to bring about a change in the Israeli government’s policy.

28 Schmid, A. P. (Ed.). The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research. Milton Park: Taylor & Francis, 2011. Jongman, A. J. Political terrorism: A new guide to actors, authors, concepts, data bases, theories, and literature. Abingdon: Routledge, 2017 Ganor, B. “Defining terrorism: Is one man's terrorist another man's freedom fighter?” Police Practice and Research, 2002. 3(4), 287-304. 29 Smith, C. D. Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict: A history with documents. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 30 Pape, R. A. “The strategic logic of suicide terrorism.” American political science review, (2003). 97(3), 343-361. 31 Moghadam, A. “Palestinian suicide terrorism in the second intifada: Motivations and organizational aspects.” Studies in conflict and terrorism, 2003. 26(2), 65-92. 32 Johnson, D. E. Military capabilities for hybrid war: Insights from the Israel Defense Forces in Lebanon and Gaza. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2014. 141

Throughout its different stages the Israeli response to the terrorist challenge has been typified by the resistance strategy. This strategy has been manifested by two major factors: The most prevalent one has been the military offensives, from large scale ones (e.g the First Lebanon War of 1982,33 or in the second phase of the Second Intifada, from March 2002 onwards34) to targeted precise attacks (against leading terrorists35 or terrorist infrastructure). Israel has also invested, quite reluctantly, but recently more than ever before, in the sphere of physical defense, manifested in diverse means, ranging from constructing robust barriers (the fence / wall in the West Bank36 and in Gaza37) to the most sophisticated active defense anti rockets system, Known as the Iron Dome.38 As suggested in the previous chapter, these resistance measures do not characterize uniquely an Israeli response to the terrorist challenge. They typically represent the known human priority to response to any challenge, natural or manmade, by resistance measures. In fact, these response mechanisms represent a normal effort to minimize and mitigate the risks of terrorist actions, and are also designed to

33 Schiff, Z. E., & Ya'Ari, E. Israel's Lebanon war. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985. 34 Morag, N. “Measuring success in coping with terrorism: the Israeli case.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 2005. 28(4), 307-320. 35 Byman, D. “Do targeted killings work?” Foreign Affairs, March-April 2006. 95- 111. 36 Wastl-Walter, D. Borders, fences and walls: State of insecurity?. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd, 2014.; http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/background-and-overview-of-israel-s- security-fence 37 Kershner, Isabel. “Israel’s Getting a New Wall, This One With a Twist.” New York Times, August 10 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/10/world/middleeast/israels-getting-a- new-wall-this-one-with-a-twist.html 38 https://www.haaretz.com/misc/tags/iron-dome-1.5598933 142 enhance a deterrence posture vis-à-vis the perpetrators.39 The major issue with these measures is that they cannot provide total prevention of terrorist attacks and their consequent effects, both in inflicting physical and psychological damage. If the resistance measures can in fact decrease the magnitude and level of terrorism, it still has the capacity to impact the civilian population in a stressful manner which might turn to be challenging, especially if future terrorist attacks will assume a significantly higher level of risk. This calls for a complementary strategy that will ensure, as much as possible, the fastest route for recovery of the affected systems, following severe disruptions. In Israel, there is a growing comprehension that countering terrorism is not only manifested by preventing the specific acts of harassment, which remains the primary goal, but also to build the necessary mechanism that will limit, and if possible eliminate, any residual negative ramifications of the terrorist attacks, physical and psychological, even if they are tangibly successful. This is a profound mission, based on the understanding of the essence of terrorism, which, as suggested, is designed not so much to inflict human losses, but to disrupt the system as a whole by demoralizing it psychologically, socially and politically. To stand up against this strategic terrorist purpose, societal resilience has to be built and maintained constantly and skillfully40. Ever since the 1970’s, when communities were repeatedly harassed in the northern part of Israel by Palestinian terrorists from Southern Lebanon, initial moves have been taken by professional to

39 Sandler, T., & Siqueira, K. “Global terrorism: deterrence versus pre‐emption.” Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, (2006). 39(4), 1370- 1387. 40 Elran, M. “Societal Resilience, How Communities succeed Despite Terrorism,” Foreign Affairs, March 23 2017. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/israel/2017-03-23/societal-resilience- israel 143 strengthen the social capacity of the targeted localities to stand up to the psycho-social traumatic challenges.41 Since then, Terrorism against Israel has changed its modus operandi several times, but its main motivation, purpose and focus on demoralizing the civilian population did not change. The traumatic terrorist attacks of the Second Intifada (2000-2004)42 and the Second Lebanon War (2006)43 helped to build the experience of the civilians on the Israeli side, supplemented by academic rigorous studies which together advanced the professional understanding of how to enhance societal resilience of communities that are challenged by terror. The main lessons learnt by academics and practitioners in Israel from the protracted terrorist attacks and responses of the targeted civilian communities can be summarized as follows:  Societal resilience can and should be enhanced in advance, as a critical component of the preparedness of the communities for major disruptions of terror. The more the community is aware of the risks and prepares itself for the eventualities of terrorist attack, the less it will be affected by it and the more resilient it will be to facilitate swift bouncing back following the occurrence.  The most important component to build societal resilience is by enhancing the social capital44 of the community. It is commonly agreed that a collectively active community is a more resilient

41 Bodas, M., Ben-Gershon, B., Rubinstein, Z., Bergman-Levy, T., & Peleg, K. “The evolution of the emergency mental health system in Israel-from the 1980’s until today.” Israel journal of health policy research, 2015. 4(1), 25. 42 Hoffman, Y. S., Diamond, G. M., & Lipsitz, J. D. “The challenge of estimating PTSD prevalence in the context of ongoing trauma: the example of Israel during the Second Intifada.” Journal of anxiety disorders, 2011. 25(6), 788-793.; Kimhi, S. “Levels of resilience: Associations among individual, community, and national resilience.” Journal of health psychology, 2016. 21(2), 164-170.. 43 Nuwayhid, I., Zurayk, H., Yamout, R., & Cortas, C. S. “Summer 2006 war on Lebanon: A lesson in community resilience.” Global public health, 2011. 6(5), 505- 519. 44 Aldrich, D. P., & Meyer, M. A. “Social capital and community resilience.” American Behavioral Scientist. 2015, 59(2). 254-269. 144

community. Social interaction, cohesiveness, voluntary activities, and public engagement in the community’s affairs, all enhance its level of resilience.  Local inclusive leadership is a paramount force in the overall effort to build and maintain community resilience. Leaders are judged by their contribution to the community’s growth mostly in normal times, but also by their capacity to prepare the people for times of adversity. The other side of the coin of leadership is the trust bestowed on them by their constituency, if they indeed succeed in leading the community at large to stand up to perils. It has been found that communities that have adopted these basic principles proved to be more resilient when disruptions happened. Perhaps the best example in this context are the Israeli communities located in direct proximity to the Gaza Strip, which became in the last decade a central scene of protracted terrorism by the Hamas government against Israel, mostly by launching mortars and rockets, supplemented by offensive tunnels. Despite the social and economic differences between the communities there,45 empirical studies have shown that all the localities in the region have made a meaningful progress in their capacities to bounce back following terrorist attacks.46 In fact, it has been substantiated that through the process of learning from past experience, all communities presented a higher level of social resilience in the last large scale Hamas terrorist offensive of 2014.47 As a result, a meaningful growth can be seen in these communities, despite the

45 Stein, N. R., Schorr, Y., Krantz, L., Dickstein, B. D., Solomon, Z., Horesh, D., & Litz, B. T. “The differential impact of terrorism on two Israeli communities.” American journal of orthopsychiatry, 2013. 83(4), 528-535. 46 Elran, M., Israeli, Z., Padan, C., & Altshuler, A. “Social Resilience in the Jewish Communities around the Gaza Strip Envelope during and after Operation Protective Edge.” Military and Strategic Affairs, 2015. 7(2), 5-31. 47 Padan, C., Elran, M. Communities in “Otef Aza” as a Test Case for Societal Resilience (2006-2016), INSS Memorandum, 2018, (forthcoming). 145 perilous situation, mostly as a consequence of the convergence of local social strength and governmental economic assistance.

Conclusions and recommendations Israel has found itself to be – for more than a century – subject to continuous wars and enduring terrorism. It hence was bound to place the notion of security at the top of its national priority. Whereas in the first half of its seventy years of independence the most severe threat to its security emerged from the Arab states and their armed forces, more recently the nature of the threat changed completely: It is now posed primarily by non-state entities, like Hezbollah, Hamas and other terrorist organizations, which direct their hostile acts of violence at the civilian population. This is the most prominent part of the terrorist strategy, which is directed purposefully at the civilians, as the weaker link of the national chain, searching to demoralize it through chaos and fear, in order to bring pressure on the leadership to succumb to the political demands of the perpetrators. This has become the most aggravating threat to Israel’s security, which challenges its leaders and military planners to provide the best response to the emerging national hazard. As could have been expected, the backbone of the Israeli response strategy to the terrorist challenge has been based on the lessons and practices of the traditional military to military warfare, in which Israel was rather successful. Decades of military experience have carved deep rooted narratives and principles which emerged from past victories and failures. Prominent among these were the creeds of offense (rather than defense), of rapid transfer of the engagement deep into the territory of the adversary, of movement and maneuvering, of short wars and consequently decisive victories. Alas, the current wars appear to be completely different in nature. The old principles do not

146 apply in full.48 It is now, to a large extent, on both sides, a conflict between civilians, carried out also by military means. Consequently, the civilian home front in Israel has turned out to be the more sensitive arena, where offensive maneuvering and precise fire power can achieve mostly a degree of temporary deterrence, sufficient only to prolong the intervals between wars. The prominence of the civilian front has changed the rules of engagement in many ways. Israel found itself in need to augment its defensive capacities far beyond the investments favored by the military. Israel has become a country surrounded by robust barriers and a powerful active defense system against rockets and missiles. However, as thick as the defense system might be, it will never provide hermetic protection, as walls will never be high enough to stop penetration by dedicated perpetrators. In short, the strategy of resistance, which was the pillar of wars in the military front is found to be insufficient in wars in the civilian fronts. Another strategy must be introduced, to fit the new circumstances and to provide the necessary responses of protracted war of attrition conducted against civilians. The paper proposes that a new adequate balance has to be constructed between the inevitable extrusive resistance strategy and that of the resilience strategy. The first will necessarily remain prominent and highly costly. But the latter will have to grow in significance and in cost, if Israel wishes to ensure the security, the stability and the growth of its civilians even if they are often attacked by terrorists. Until now, only the years of severe attacks, mostly by suicide bombers, during the Second Intifada, came closer to pose a real challenge to the resiliency of the Israeli society. Throughout the other periods, despite continuous attempts, terrorism was not able to make a meaningful difference and to pose a real danger to the

48 Freilich, C. D. “Israel's counter-terrorism policy: how effective?” Terrorism and political violence, 2017. 29(2), 359-376. 147

Israeli people. But looking ahead, one should not count on the adversaries not to pose a higher level of threat. It is the responsibility of the government and the people at large to invest the necessary means so as to build the level of resilience that will match the higher level of terrorist threat. Israel has the knowledge and the experience how to enhance its social resilience. It is now mostly a matter of appreciating the yields of the resilience investments and to further implement the recognized principles in the field. In this context Israel can serve as an international laboratory for exercising societal resilience in different countries, not only those who are facing terrorist or other manmade risks, but also those who are challenged by natural calamities. The principles of resilience are universal, can be applied globally by societies of diverse characters and values. Resilience has become a buzzword on the international arena, but its actual implementation has so far been quite limited. There is a need to learn from the constructive experience of countries, like Israel, where resilience has been successfully implemented, and to adopt them elsewhere, in accordance with the different challenges and characteristics of each society.

About the author BG (ret.) Dr. Meir Elran is a senior researcher with the Institute for National Security Studies at the Tel Aviv University, and head of the Homeland Security Program. His main academic research interest is societal resilience. Elran is presently teaching at the University of Chicago and serving as a visiting scholar with the Chicago Project on Security and threat.

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2011 campaign in Israel as a case study.” Disaster medicine and public health preparedness, 2015. 9(2), 138-144. Simmie, J., & Martin, R. “The economic resilience of regions: towards an evolutionary approach.” Cambridge journal of regions, economy and society, 2010. 3(1), 27-43. Smith, C. D. Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict: A history with documents. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. Stein, N. R., Schorr, Y., Krantz, L., Dickstein, B. D., Solomon, Z., Horesh, D., & Litz, B. T. “The differential impact of terrorism on two Israeli communities.” American journal of orthopsychiatry, 2013. 83(4), 528-535. Walker, B., Holling, C. S., Carpenter, S., & Kinzig, A. “Resilience, adaptability and transformability in social–ecological systems.” Ecology and society, 2004. 9(2). Wastl-Walter, D. Borders, fences and walls: State of insecurity?. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd, 2014. Waxman, D. “Living with terror, not living in terror: the impact of chronic terrorism on Israeli society.” Perspectives on Terrorism, 2011. 5(5-6). Zohar, M., Salamon, A., & Rubin, R. “Earthquake damage history in Israel and its close surrounding-evaluation of spatial and temporal patterns.” Tectonophysics, 2017. 696, 1-13.

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Pavel Fnasek

National Resilience: Opportunities and Challenges in a Changing Security Environment

Abstract: The theme of this paper is critical energy infrastructure protection and resilience in the current security environment. It covers five subjects. First, it explains what the NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence is and what it does. Second, it explains how NATO defines critical energy infrastructure. Third, it presents NATO’s approach to protecting critical energy infrastructure. Fourth, some case studies highlight some of the main findings of the Centre’s research into the topic of infrastructure protection and resilience. Finally, it offers a few lessons learned that our Centre has identified as being of particular value when it comes to keeping critical energy infrastructure safe.

One point must be made clear at the outset. Energy and energy infrastructure management are, in many ways, technical issues. However, they are also issues that firmly belong to the social sciences, for the simple reason that decisions about energy are made by humans. The reader is therefore reminded that there is no single truth when it comes to understanding the world of energy; there is no single, ideal model for protecting critical energy infrastructure. Instead, there are competing explanations, some more convincing, others less. The NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence in Vilnius, Lithuania is one of 25 Centres of Excellence that exist within NATO. Each Centre specialises in one subject area, for example here in Budapest there is a Centre of Excellence for military medicine. The

155 focus in Vilnius is on energy security. Currently, the Centre has 12 countries as full members, they are both NATO Nations and Partners, and Lithuania is the founding country and the host nation. The mission of the Centre is to assist NATO bodies, Nations and Partners with three main tasks: 1. Raising awareness of energy developments with security implications; 2. Developing NATO’s competence in supporting the protection of critical energy infrastructure and enhancing resiliency; 3. Improving the energy efficiency of military forces. It is also important to note what the Centre cannot do. It cannot tell NATO or its Members what to do; it cannot give orders to anyone. All it can do is to offer advice and share the expertise and knowledge of its staff. Although NATO has a centre of excellence covering one important aspect of critical infrastructure, it does not have its own, officially approved definition of what critical infrastructure actually is. The staff of the Vilnius COE usually relies on the definition of NATO’s largest member, the United States. The US defines critical infrastructure as “…systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.” This definition actually has a legal force: it comes from the US Patriot Act of 2001. The definition basically says only those systems and assets without which a country cannot function, whose failure would devastate security, public health or safety, should be considered critical. The definition therefore sets a very high standard for infrastructure – it needs to be vital and, at the same time, devastating in its impact if taken out of service – to be critical. As a result,

156 relatively few systems and assets will meet the high standards of this definition and will be considered truly critical. This definition provides a strategic perspective, one that examines the issue from the point of view of an entire country. When the level of analysis is changed to a tactical, or regional perspective, the difference becomes clear. A simple example can illustrate this point. A village of 500 inhabitants somewhere in the Czech Republic receives its electricity supply from the national grid through a single cable that runs to the village. For that village, that cable represents critical energy infrastructure. If it is disabled, it will have a debilitating impact on the life of that village. However, from the strategic perspective of the country, whether the cable works or not, whether the village has electricity or not, is irrelevant. A single cable providing electricity to a single village simply does not qualify as critical energy infrastructure of national importance. It is also important to note how the definition of what is critical, and what is not, may change with changing circumstances. For example, consider the difference between peacetime and wartime for a country with just one large refinery, which supplies fuel to the domestic market but mostly exports it through a terminal on the country’s coast. In peacetime, that refinery will in all likelihood be considered critical infrastructure because the country depends on it for fuel and also because it earns a lot of money through exports. But does the refinery deserve to be considered critical in wartime? What if an aggressor has imposed a naval blockade on your country, which means that 80 percent of the refinery’s production has lost access to customers? What if, as a result of the war, the domestic economy is plunged into recession, with fuel consumption down by half? What if the armed forces, fighting hard against the enemy, only need the equivalent of 4 percent of the refinery’s production? Will that refinery still be of critical importance? Or is it rather the roads and

157 railways that connect to neighbouring countries that have not been overrun by the aggressor that will become critical for energy needs? Once an understanding is reached on what is critical for a country, the obvious question is how to protect it. There are basically two approaches. One approach is trying to accomplish a mission impossible and protect the ENTIRE critical infrastructure against ALL possible attacks, against ALL accidents caused by careless operators, against ALL malfunctions of the system caused by a technical fault and against ALL natural disasters. This is likely to fail. The alternative is to choose a mission possible, which consists of three steps: 1. Minimise the likelihood of an attack, accident or disaster, while at the same time 2. Prepare for such an eventuality anyway, and, crucially, 3. Focus on mitigating the consequences of such an event. The Vilnius Centre of Excellence also believes that when it comes to protection of critical infrastructure, the focus should be on the resilience of the entire system, not on that of the individual assets. Resilience in this context mean the ability to survive an attack, minimise the damage and recover quickly. When the focus is on the resilience of the system, the key question is NOT “which part of the critical infrastructure is the most important on its own”. Rather, the key question is “which part of the critical infrastructure is the most important for the functioning of the system.” This approach gives priority to investments that make the system better able to absorb the impact of an attack without losing the capacity to function. There are three lessons to remember in this respect: 1. The attacker will be limited by his own capabilities and by the defender’s protective measures; there are no unlimited attacks everywhere, all the time;

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2. The defender’s actions to improve his system by hardening it, by creating redundancies, will be limited by his budget and other practical considerations; 3. The defender’s focus should be on maximizing the system’s performance, even after the loss of some of its components. A few practical case studies will demonstrate the importance of energy infrastructure. Note, that the discussion is not focused on “critical energy infrastructure.” The reason for it is quite simple. With the exception of major wars, when basically everything is destroyed, whether it is critical or not, there is not a single example of a deliberate, successful attack against critical energy infrastructure on the strategic, or country, level. In other words, no attacker has ever succeeded in carrying out an attack that would have devastated a country’s energy system and, by doing so, brought that country to its knees. Instead, there are numerous examples of tactical-level attacks, which impacted only the operator of the system, most often a commercial company, or just one region in a country. One such example can be found in Ukraine. In December 2015, three electricity distribution companies there suffered a cyber-attack. It involved an external intrusion into the operation of the grid monitoring and control systems, which in turn caused telecontrol equipment to fail. The result was a blackout that impacted up to 250.000 customers, who were left without electricity for one to three and a half hours. The objective of the attack was, allegedly, to weaken Ukrainians’ support for their own government, supposedly because people will not support a government that cannot ensure reliable supplies of electricity. This attack can be assessed as a tactical success but a strategic failure. It succeeded at the tactical level because the perpetrators were able to get inside the systems and disable them. But it failed at the strategic level because it impacted too few people and was resolved too quickly to have significantly affected the functioning of the Ukrainian state.

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Many people, the staff of the NATO Centre included, tend to focus almost exclusively on intentional attacks, where a clearly identified aggressor wants to harm the targeted country. However, the reality is that the vast majority of failures of energy infrastructure are caused by human incompetence and natural phenomena, such as storms, not by a deliberate human action. The quarter of a million people in Ukraine left without electricity for less than four hours that in the example above were lucky compared to the half a million people left without power for up to 24 hours in October 2017 in Germany, the Czech Republic and Poland after a storm hit the region and brought down power lines. Of course, these numbers are almost ridiculously small compared to some other outages, of which just one will suffice as an example: in July 2012 in India, 620 million people were left without power for more than 24 hours after the national grid became overwhelmed with demand and shut down. There was no aggressor; there was just bad management. It is fair question to ask about the role of military forces in all of this. It is much more likely that members of the armed forces will be asked to deal with the consequences of natural disasters or human incompetence than with responding to a deliberate attack against energy infrastructure by an aggressor of one sort or another. The reason is quite simple, even if it is a repetition of what has already been said above: human incompetence and Mother Nature pose a greater risk than aggressors do. For the most part, critical energy infrastructure in NATO Countries is well protected and quite resilient. There are several reasons for this. First, most NATO members have an adequate legal framework for the management of this issue. Second, the majority of critical infrastructure is in the hands of commercial companies and they have proved very effective at protecting their own property. Third, both public and private authorities have become quite skilful at responding to various problems. Just one figure will illustrate this:

160 according to Lithuanian authorities, there were some 120 cyberattacks on the country’s energy system in 2017. Yet, there have been zero problems with energy supply there last year. Energy Security Centre of Excellence has identified some lessons learned that as being of particular relevance for critical energy infrastructure protection. First, a good division of labor and good coordination are essential. This is true both when preparing for a possible attack or accident and when actually dealing with one. Identifying in advance the individuals and organizations responsible for particular tasks eliminates both a duplication of effort and the risk that something crucial will be overlooked or missed. Second, it is essential to determine in advance which functions of the system are essential and which ones are not. Failure to do this and trying to protect everything, will result in failure. To have any chance of success, the focus must be on the resilience of those parts of the system that preserve its core functions. Third, information verification and sharing are important, especially during a crisis, when the critical infrastructure is under attack. This means both that the information received about the nature and extent of the attack must be verified, and that the corrective actions must be explained to the domestic and international audience. The final lesson is that preparation is worth doing. Whether it involves a high-level conference such as this one, or a simulation exercise at the tactical-level between operators of energy infrastructure and public authorities, preparation simply pays off.

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Szabolcs Hullán

The nuclear emergency response system - the source of the good practice

The Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority (HAEA) embodies the guarantee of the peaceful and safe use of atomic energy for Hungarian society (and indirectly for the citizens of the neighboring countries). It is the responsibility of the HAEA to guarantee safety, complying with international standards and recommendations, and adhering to, and complying with, the national standards. The HAEA is independent from all organizations involved in development and technical support of nuclear energy, which is a fundamental requirement for the national and international organizations. The responsibility of the authority is to supervise safety and protected applications, prepare regulations in accordance with the results of science and technology, to make the licensee observe the requirements of the law, to ensure the conditions provided by the Hungarian Parliament and Government, and to establish and operate a competent and effective regulatory body within the legal framework. Security, safety and safeguards can have several meanings in the energy sector. Security of the energy supply; protection or security (physical protection) and peaceful uses (i.e. the user is not building nuclear weapons) are various aspects of security. The safeguards are measures that guarantee that the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Nuclear protection, (physical protection) security means protection against deliberate human action. The protection against the harmful effects of the ionizing radiation is called nuclear safety – the protection of the environment, as well as people (both the general public and

163 employees) and all living things from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation.

The tasks of the authority The main tasks of HAEA are licensing, assessment, inspection and enforcement. Licensing is one of the most responsible areas for the authority's activity. The license is always based on a safety analysis to demonstrate the guarantee of nuclear safety, and relevant regulatory requirements and special requirements are taken into account. ‐ Inspection takes places during the realization of the activity; it reveals the facts and circumstances of the activities and, it gives opportunity for intervention in the implementation phase. ‐ The authority performs the assessment typically during an activity or a process, so the conclusions are drawn subsequent to the completion of the activity. ‐ Licensing, inspection and assessment are not fully separate activities: they may and frequently must supplement each other for the appropriate oversight of a certain case. ‐ Enforcement means imposing fines or withdrawal of license, and this is the ultimate possibility to enforce the legal requirements and regulatory point of view. A further task of the Authority is to take part in the nuclear emergency response and preparedness system and operate an Emergency Response Organization. According to the Atomic Energy Act and the relevant Governmental Decree1 several tasks belong to HAEA in the field of nuclear emergency preparedness and response.

1 Act CXVI of 1996 on Atomic Energy and Govt. Decree 167/2010. (V.11.) on national nuclear emergency preparedness and response. 164

The Hungarian Nuclear Emergency Response and Preparedness System (NERS) The national nuclear emergency response system takes care of preparations to respond to radiological and nuclear events occurring in the course of peaceful use of atomic energy. NERS is responsible for the mitigation and reduction of the consequences of any incidents. The NERS operates in normal or, in some cases, in higher operational states, which can be readiness, alert, emergency and recovery operation. The normal state ensures the preparation for incidents. The readiness operation state is the sum of radiation protection activities applied in incidents that do not exceed the emergency threshold.2 It covers incidents that occur in a foreign country (in a nearby nuclear facility) and cause a radioactive release or the risk of release is high, or an exposure occurred in Hungary, but the emergency threshold is not exceeded, and the risk of radioactive release is high. The operational state can be changed from the normal state for example if an incident occurs in a facility that uses radioactive materials, such as exposure in a hospital. In the emergency operations state, protective actions must be introduced, in order to decrease the resident population’s exposure or risk of exposure to radiation. The NERS is the totality of central, ministerial, territorial and local level organizations and bodies concerned in the prevention, mitigation of consequences and elimination of event causing unplanned radiation exposure to the public.3 The governmental coordination body tasked with disaster management-related decision support to the government directs the

2 Govt. Decree 487/2015. (XII.31.) on ionization radiation; Govt. Decree 489/2015. (XII.31) on the monitoring of the environmental radiation situation and levels of radioactivity in Hungary. 3 Govt. Decree 489/2015. 165

NERS. The operational state of the NERS can be changed by the Minister of Interior, who is responsible for disaster management. The head of HAEA can initiate this change with the head of the professional disaster management organization. NERS is responsible for supporting the decision making of the governmental coordination body in the field of protective actions as well.

Ministries Participating in the NERS Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Human Capacities, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of National Economy, Ministry of National Development, Ministry of Rural Development are represented at the ministerial level in the NERS. The Minister of the Interior is the chair of the Coordination of Disaster Management.

Independent Administrative Bodies and Ministry Departments The following independent regulatory organizations, national law enforcement organizations and ministry departments also participate in the NERS: the Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority, the National Directorate General for Disaster Management, the National Food Chain Safety Office, the National Office of the Chief Medical Officer, the Hungarian Defence Forces, the Hungarian Police Headquarters, the National Tax and Customs Office, the General Directorate of Water Management, and Pest County Government Office (as national environmental protection authority).

Regional and Local Participation Local defence committees coordinate the response at the regional level and inform the public in the region. Town mayors

166 coordinate the response within their jurisdictions, and other local organizations supports NERS decision making. In accordance with the recommendations of the International Atomic Energy Agency4 Hungary has issued the National Emergency Response Plan in 2002. In 2017 the third edition was issued. The goal of the National Nuclear Emergency Response Plan is to summarize all those requirements and tasks that have importance in achieving basic goals in off-site response to a nuclear emergency due to the use of atomic energy, and affecting the territory of Hungary. The Hungarian NERP provides a framework and guidance to prepare the central, departmental, regional, local and facility emergency response plans and preparedness. HAEA ERO (see next section) is involved in the NERP approval sequence.

Operation of the HAEA Emergency Response Organization - as a good practice HAEA operates an Emergency Response Organization (ERO) that maintains close liaison with the NERS (see the organizational diagram, Figure 1.) ERO is a contact point both to the international organizations and to the nuclear facilities. It is also a competent authority, based on Hungary’s EU membership and the international conventions on early notification and assistance in the case of nuclear emergency. ERO is responsible for the assessment of the nuclear and radiological conditions during an emergency. HAEA experts operate the Centre for Emergency Response, Training and Analysis (CERTA), and this is the operational location for the ERO. It is designed for monitoring and analysing the nuclear and radiological emergency and for supporting the decision making

4 Method for the Development of Emergency Response Preparedness for Nuclear or Radiological Accidents. IAEA-TECDOC-953. Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1997. 167 process by making simulations and nuclear / radiological assessment. ERO’s Nuclear group is responsible for the nuclear analyses, the Radiological group is responsible for the radiological analyses and the national radiological monitoring systems while the Management group is responsible for the coordination and the approval of the subordinated groups’ reports. The Crisis Manager, as the final approval authority, is responsible for all documents formulated and dispatched by the ERO. The Emergency Officer on Duty is the contact point with external organizations, and he supports the work of the ERO. The Site Inspector on Duty delegated to the emergency organization of the Hungarian Electricity Works (Magyar Villamos Művek – MVM) at the nuclear power plant in Paks collects the on-site information. One of the tasks of the HAEA Nuclear Safety Inspector on Duty is to receive the nuclear and radiological event notifications from locations within Hungary. He is on standby around the clock to receive fax or phone notifications. The notifications of nuclear emergencies from abroad, on the other hand, are received by the Emergency Inspector on Duty. The two duty officers are equipped with smart phones, via which they can send and receive fax and email messages and initiate phone calls. The Nuclear Safety Officer on Duty records the incoming reports, and takes appropriate action under his own authority in the less significant incidents (which occur more frequently), while in an emergency informs the Crisis Manager on Duty. Subsequent to the decision on alerting of the HAEA ERO due to an exercise or real emergency, the notification goes through the organization according to the pre-established alert-chain.

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Figure1: The structure of the ERO operated by HAEA

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International cooperation The purpose of international co-operation is to improve the efficiency of the regulatory instruments and the effectiveness of the activity by exchanging experiences and understanding international conventions, codes, safety requirements, recommendations, guides, training courses and international good practice. The legal framework of international cooperation in the field of nuclear emergency response is provided by the conventions on early notification and mutual assistance in case of a nuclear or radiological emergency, which were established under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Euratom directive on the community regulations concerning early information exchange in radiological emergencies.5 According to the international requirements for the receipt of early notifications and to dispatch such notification in a timely manner in case of domestic emergencies, the HAEA operates its competent authority duty system on a 0-24 basis. There is international cooperation on nuclear emergency management.6 Based on this convention IAEA’s Unified System for Information Exchange in Incidents and Emergencies (USIE) system is used for the early notification, and the RANET system is used for mutual assistance in the case of nuclear or radiological emergency. Hungary concluded bilateral agreements with Austria, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Germany, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine and Serbia to notify each other of nuclear or radiological emergencies in the early phase of such situations and assist each other should such a request be received. The bilateral cooperation agreements provide good opportunities to share experiences,

5 Method for the Development of Emergency Response Preparedness. 6 Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident. Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1986. and Convention on Assistance in the case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1986.

170 organize joint exercises and elaborate the framework of joint activities. In the framework of RESPEC (Radiological Emergency Support Project for the European Commission) HAEA has become a supporting organization, delegating experts, who analyse radiological events in the radiation protection section in radiological or nuclear emergency situations. The HAEA ERO won RESPEC tenders three times to perform support tasks. HAEA was activated and supported European Commission successfully during the Fukushima Daiichi Accident in 2011.

About the Author Szabolcs Hullán graduated as a mechanical engineer at the Budapest University of Technology and Economics, and has spent his entire professional career in the nuclear energy field. He worked as a technician at a nuclear power station, served in various mid- level management positions, and since 2014 he has been the deputy director-general for nuclear safety at the Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority.

Sources Act CXVI of 1996 on Atomic Energy Govt. Decree 167/2010. (V.11.) on national nuclear emergency preparedness and response Govt. Decree 487/2015. (XII.31.) on ionization radiation Govt. Decree 489/2015. (XII.31) on the monitoring of the environmental radiation situation and levels of radioactivity in Hungary Method for the Development of Emergency Response Preparedness for Nuclear or Radiological Accidents. IAEA-TECDOC-953. Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1997.

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Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident. Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1986. Convention on Assistance in the case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1986.

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László Juhász

Civil Preparedness and Defence Administration

Abstract

Resilience and Civil Preparedness are hot topics in NATO. The heads of states reached consensus at the Warsaw Summit in 2016 that the Alliance would strengthen its resilience through development of national Civil Preparedness.1 To achieve this the Allies accepted the seven baseline requirements which contribute to common understanding of this topic. This paper shows how Hungary is implementing measures to meet the requirements of the Civil Preparedness, and what the conditions and results of the initial assessments were. It also lays out the next steps both in the short and mid-term to move forward, offers an overview of the defence administration in Hungary and explains why it is a key factor in achieving success in Civil Preparedness.

Understanding Civil Preparedness In order to fully understand the task, some obvious questions must be answered regarding Civil Preparedness: what is it; why do NATO and member states need it; what are the tasks and responsibilities of the various involved organisations; what is the sequence of tasks related to Civil Preparedness, and finally, how long it will last in the future?

1 “Commitment to enhance resilience Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw, 8-9 July 2016” North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 2016. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133180.htm?selectedLocale =en, accessed on 10 04 2018 173

NATO has identified the following seven baseline resilience requirements for Civil Preparedness: ‐ assured continuity of government and critical government services; ‐ resilient energy supplies; ‐ ability to deal effectively with the uncontrolled movement of people; ‐ resilient food and water resources; ‐ ability to deal with mass casualties, ‐ resilient communication systems; ‐ resilient transportation systems.

By studying resilience and Civil Preparedness, we may conclude that the terminology of these two subjects are often not clearly distinguished. Regarding the difference between them, the personal view of this author is that Civil Preparedness is the way to achieve a resilient society, and accomplishment of the above requirements helps to organise and focus efforts of the governmental and private sectors aimed at resilience. The topics of resilience and Civil Preparedness are, of course, not entirely new. Hungary is not an exemption: as part of the Warsaw Pact, it had detailed plans for the armed forces and civil defence, as well as for the preparation of the war-time economy in circumstances of wide use of weapons of mass destruction. Much the same was true of the NATO nations during the Cold War. In the early 90-s, there was a major change in defence policy environment, political and economic system. There was also an evolution in the way of thinking, starting from the coalition environment through the “we are alone” status, participation in the Partnership for Peace, and accession to NATO. NATO membership gave a new feeling of safety. At the same time, the “picture of enemy” became blurry which resulted in loss of focus for detailed

174 defence planning, including civil protection. Not only in Hungary but also in other NATO countries, the society had started to “forget” the feeling of danger. Priorities of civil emergency planning had moved toward managing emergencies. The case in Central Europe was even more difficult: as the security situation and political system had changed, the major privatisation led to a shrinking state owned economy, which in turn heavily affected the maintenance of the capacities of the defence sector. Now NATO’s seven baseline requirements imply that a certain shift in focus is necessary again, from managing emergencies to preparing societies to be resilient. The Ukrainian crisis created a new situation. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO Secretary General at the time, as well as other public figures and commentators called it “a wake-up call” for NATO.2 The challenges of Russia’s hybrid operations induced a change in the way of thinking in NATO and also in the member states. All of them recognised the danger of hybrid warfare and accepted that new dimensions must be included in defence planning. However, there was some diversity among NATO member states, depending on their current geopolitical situation. Hybrid warfare as a manifestation of conflicting interests requires new approach both from the armed forces, government administration and civil society. That is why NATO’s seven baseline requirements for Civil Preparedness have been structured to help member states find

2 See for example “Ukraine crisis 'wake up call' for Nato, says Rasmussen.” BBC, June 3 2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-europe-27690320/ukraine- crisis-wake-up-call-for-nato-says-rasmussen; Diehl, Jackson. “Ukraine’s Wake- Up Call for NATO.” Washington Post. April 27 2014.; “Ukraine's retreat from Crimea is a wake-up call for Nato.” The Telegraph. March 25 2014. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/10722670/U kraines-retreat-from-Crimea-is-a-wake-up-call-for-Nato.html; “NATO: Russia- Ukraine a 'wake-up call' for defense.” CNBC, July 3 2014. https://www.cnbc.com/2014/07/03/nato-russia-ukraine-a-wake-up-call-for- defense.html 175 solutions for the challenges that are far more difficult than just the development or expansion of the armed forces.

Role of the Defence Administration in Civil Preparedness Under the umbrella of the defence administration system in Hungary, a measurable success in institutional development of the comprehensive (whole of government) approach has been achieved, which includes close and coordinated cooperation among civilian sector, military organisations and law enforcement agencies. For the civilian sector, The Comprehensive Approach further contributes to better understand and acknowledge the importance of defence planning. This organised framework for Comprehensive Approach in Hungary creates the conditions for the accomplishment of tasks generated by the Civil Preparedness requirements. In order to answer the third question of what are the tasks and responsibilities of the various involved organisations in Civil Preparedness, we need to look at the current situation of the defence administration in Hungary. As part of the overall public administration system, defence administration covers a number of areas of the defence sector, such as civil defence, disaster management, preparation for war time economy, public supply and homeland defence administration. The latter directly deals with the coordination of the defence issues among governmental organisations and the public sector. Organisationally, in accordance with the existing legal framework,3 an advisory, decision preparatory governmental board called Interdepartmental Homeland Defence Administration

3 Government Decision No. 1525/2013. (VIII. 12.) on establishing the Interdepartmental Homeland Defence Administration Coordinating Working Group, on its organization and functions

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Coordinating Working Group (herewith referred to as: Working Group) has been established in Hungary. The Working Group is led by the head of the Defence Administration Department of the Ministry of Defence. Members of the Working Group are senior subject matter experts and/or mid-level leaders from other ministries, governmental and non-governmental organisations involved in defence issues. Because of its composition, members of the working group can be called upon short notice and is requested to contribute to solve any defence matters. Of course, the participation of ministries and law enforcement agencies is of utmost importance, so the core of the Working Group consists of representatives of these institutions. The Working Group proved its important role during the Ukrainian crisis. Within the framework of the Hungarian National System, the Working Group elaborated proposals for introduction of crisis management measures and conducted interdepartmental coordination of their implementation. The baseline requirements can only be achieved through the synergistic efforts of both governmental institutions and all other non-governmental organisations involved in homeland defence. Ultimately, these efforts are to be coordinated by the Government but while the adaptation of the NATO Comprehensive Approach concept in Hungary was initiated by the Ministry of Defence, this would not be the case for the Civil Preparedness: this new project cannot be dealt with by the Working Group alone. In accordance with the Hungarian national law,4 the Ministry of Interior is the lead agency for cooperation with NATO’s Civil Emergency Planning Committee (CEPC). Directed by law, the

4 Government Decree 152/2014. (VI. 6.) on the task and authority of members of the government; Government Decision 1966/2017. (XII. 19.) on liaison with the NATO Civil Emergency Planning Committee (as modified); Government Decision 2270/2005. (XII. 6.) on coordination of civil emergency planning tasks (as modified). 177

Ministry of Interior accomplishes this coordination in mandatory cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence. In practice, it is the National Directorate General for Disaster Management in Hungary, which has primary contact with NATO in the area of Civil Emergency Planning. Currently, this model of cooperation applies to all aspects of Civil Defence (civil protection and disaster management) including Civil Preparedness, as far as the CEPC is managing and coordinating related issues throughout NATO. When considering the finer detail involved in building Civil Preparedness and meeting the baseline requirements, it has become clear that all involved organisations need a new approach to adapt themselves for Civil Preparedness. Closer than ever cooperation is required between the three ministries. As the implementation of the seven baseline requirements of civil emergency planning are becoming more and more complicated and interlinked with the Armed Forces, it may become necessary to review the information sharing and coordination model, and devise a new one. Consequently, the existing legal framework may also need to be reviewed and, if necessary, modified, or even a new legal framework may have to be created. Although the seven baseline requirements are not directly dedicated to the armed defence, the coordination between civilian and military plans, procedures and measures is inevitable. The Ministry of Defence acquired a lot of experience in governmental coordination in the area of home defence issues, so these lessons can be used also for planning for Civilian Preparedness. There is an additional important factor that gives the Ministry of Defence a unique role in Civil Preparedness: it is the lead agency for compilation of the periodical NATO Defence Planning Capability Survey (DPCS). This implies that there must be an organisation within the MOD that would be responsible for the

178 collection and collation of the responses to the survey questionnaire. As the ministry’s Defence Administration Department has adequate experience in working with the civilian component of the defence administration, this department provides a platform for the direct cooperation with the Ministry of Interior in preparing of the DPCS. Looking at the interrelated areas of the military and civilian planning, the question may arise whether all aspects of civil emergency planning, including Civil Preparedness, is fully covered by the NATO model of cooperation in the area of civil issues? With regard to the ongoing and expected projects, the specific roles of the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defence in Civil Preparedness should most likely be further refined and the cooperation deepened.

Assessment of the current state of Civil Preparedness The initial assessment of the current state of the baseline requirements in Hungary was carried out by providing narrative answers to the latest NATO DPCS questionnaire. The assessment was conducted through systematic work of the affected sectors coordinated by the Ministry of Interior with close cooperation with the Ministry of Defence. The input for the assessment came from several sources and activities. First, some Civil Preparedness issues were discussed during the annual adaptation of the NATO Crisis Management Manual, and in cooperation with the governmental organisations, mainly ministries and law enforcement agencies, Hungary included Civil Preparedness topics into its national manual. Then, the NATO Crisis Management Exercise CMX 17 became an important driving factor in studying resilience matters. Hungary traditionally participates very actively in CMXs. This was the case again during the last exercise, which provided an excellent opportunity and platform to

179 test related crisis management procedures and measures. During the exercise, the governmental Working Group addressed a number of Civil Preparedness subjects among others, as they were included in the objectives of the exercise. However, it was the DPCS questionnaire itself that served as the main source of the assessment. The assessment process identified a number of areas in which Hungary had strong resilience and, at the same time identified other topics where more progress had to be made. The results of the initial assessment made it clear that the requirements identified by NATO follow a certain logic, but the Hungarian legal and public administration systems follow another logic. NATO treats certain broad areas in a unified fashion, while in Hungary they may come under the purview of disparate authorities. For example providing drinking water to the public is a local government function, therefore coordination is the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior. Bottled water, on the other hand, is considered a food item, and therefore the responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture. Thus, for the national implementation of Civil Preparedness, there is a need to find the responsible ministries or departments and, if necessary, to identify required ministerial, departmental or governmental capabilities and tasks, which correspond to the baseline requirements. As already mentioned, for the short term it is crucial to check the existing legal framework, identify responsible governmental organisations (with respect to the latest modification of the governmental structure), improve some problematic areas already identified with NATO, start systematic elaboration on the detailed NATO requirements, further test selected existing procedures in CMX 19 planning, and also further improve the national handbook. A further consideration is information security: some of the NATO requirements are related to national sensitive data that are classified, and therefore require appropriate safeguards.

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In the mid- and long-term, it is necessary to firmly embed Civil Preparedness in the whole of government approach by implementing the NATO resilience requirements and accomplishing relevant tasks in accordance with the allied and national interests, and within the potential of the national economy. It is also essential to further deepen the cooperation among civilian sectors, military organisations and law enforcement agencies within the framework of the defence administration.

Conclusion It might seem self-explanatory, but it is still important to realise and accept that the perception of danger is different for each member of the Alliance. Consequently, the Civil Preparedness cannot be uniformalised for all of them, as geopolitical, economic etc. circumstances are different and military plans also differ. Civil Preparedness requires new way of thinking without turning back to the paradigm of the cold war era. It is the firm opinion of this author that a resilient society does not mean a militarised one, and the cold war era should not return again. The tasks and responsibilities of the governmental players are to be clearly identified. The legal framework may also need to be adapted. Civil Preparedness will be a success only with a whole of government approach, with close cooperation of civil and military authorities within the framework of defence administration.

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László Lukács and –Zsuzsanna Balogh

Protection of Critical Infrastructure Facilities against Bombing Attacks

Abstract Currently, the biggest security challenge is terrorism. The Latin term originally means “great fear” or “dread.” Terror attacks can happen anytime, anywhere and by various ways – using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) is one of the most “popular” methods. Civilians and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) support the counter-terrorism work of officials, security experts and first responders by their awareness campaigns, sharing information and calling for resilience world-wide. Because of the multiple unknown factors, hardening potential targets is a key defensive measure. The facilities at risk are analyzed to reduce the probability of a bombing attack. Any element of critical infrastructure network, public places/buildings attended by crowd and/or VIPs are potential targets. This paper summarizes the characteristics of offense and some possible ways of defense. Keywords: terror, explosive, defense, infrastructure

Introduction A study published in 2012 proposes the following question: “The 19th century can be defined as the era of the revolutions and the 20th as the era of world wars. Is the 21st century going to go down in history as the era of the explosive terrorist attacks?”1 Today, six years later, daily news confirm, rather than refute this assessment. Every

1 Lukács László. “Épületek elleni robbantásos cselekmények jellemzői. “Műszaki Katonai Közlöny, XXII. Special edition, 2012. pp. 4-13. 183 state has to respond and react to the challenges appearing in its security environment. It is necessary to improve and reinforce the resistance capabilities of society, in order to find the appropriate answers to the threat in this new age. This study investigates possible actions against terrorist attacks conducted with explosives. Explosives are probably the most terrifying substance in most eyes. Its “bad name” comes from those who - for centuries - saw its potetnial for massive destruction only. For about 300 years following the discovery of gunpowder in 700 C.E. in China, it was only used for dazzling fireworks. Although it was known in Europe since the 1300s and used in great quantities in wars, the first industrial use of gunpowder was delayed until 1627, when a Tyrolean blaster named Gaspar Weindl used it in the Selmecbanya mines in Hungary. After that explosives were used to build roads in mountain ranges previously thought to be impassable. Raw materials, that previously were really hard or imposible to mine, have appeared on market in large quantity and for a low price; they served as vital commodities for the incredible technical developments in the industrial revolution.2 Despite this, explosives are known only as a source of destruction and tragedy in the minds of millions of people. Besides its official military application, the gunpowder and other explosives introduced in the 19th and 20th centuries were used for analog explosions in attacks considered by history as terrorist operations. In 1568 Veit Wulff von Senftenberg’s book “About all kinds of offensive and defensive weapons”3 shows in detail the remote controlled and

2 Lukács László. “Kis aknatörténelem.” Nemzetvédelmi Egyetemi Közlemények 6./3. 2002. pp. 15-57. and Lukács László. Szemelvények a magyar robbantástechnika fejlődéstörténetéből. Budapest: Dialóg Campus, 2017. 10-13. 3 Original title: Von allerlei Kriegsgewerh und Geschütz 184 timer operated mines with gunpowder, self timers, letter bombs and torpedo-like explosives.4 The “explosive crate” he created was the origin of the military booby traps,5 bombs,6 and the home made explosive device that became known as IED among professionals. The boxes filled with explosives was triggered by springs upon opening or timers ensuring explosion after a certain preset time. As an interesting sidenote it should be mentioned that the sketch of such device can be found in the notes on Leonardo da Vinci dated back to 1519. The best known early example of a political attack with explosives was the London Gunpowder Plot. On November 5 1605, a conspiracy to carry out an attack using an explosive charge was revealed in England. Catholic conspirators, led by Robert Catesby, a Warwickshire squire, smuggled 1632 kg of gunpowder into the basement of the Parliament, planning to blow up the protestant king James I. The plot failed due to a traitor, and the culprits – including Guy Fawkes who was found with the explosives – were charged and executed in accordance with the laws of the period. Today we see a development in attacks carried out by explosives like never before. While between 1605 and 1950 about 3000 attacks or attempted attacks with explosives were recorded (not counting the actions of wars and guerrilla attacks),7 the Global Terrorism

4 Revill, James. Improvised Explosive Devices – The Paradigmatic Weapon of New Wars. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. p. 4. 5 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, Protocol II on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices. Geneva: United Nations. May 3, 1996. p. 23. https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0811.pdf. Accessed 14 January 2018. 6 Révai Nagylexikon, XV. Budapest : Révai Rt., 1922. p. 541. 7 Hunyadi F., Lukács L., and Mueller O. A robbantások elleni védekezés feladatai (Az épületek védelme robbantásos akciók ellen). Budapest: BME Mérnöktovábbképző Intézet, 1993. 5. 185

Database (further more: GTD) reported 448008 such attacks between 1970 and 2007. This means about a thousand attacks each year during this period. Another set of data shows an even more frightening tendency: 52 percent of terrorist attacks carried out between 2005 and 2010 (altogether 10 thousand, that is 2 thousand per year) were done so using explosives.9 Against whom, what kind of locations, with what kind of substances and methods are these attacks carried out? The following chapters sum up the challenges in the changing security environment, and the possibile defensive measures.

Characteristics of explosive attacks – a new menace In the past when planning an attack, the perpetrator would select eplosives for two reasons: - the high possibility of succeful attack, and - personal appearance can be avoided (less chance of being caught). The world has changed in this regard also. Suicide attackers used to be associated with the Assassins10 and the Japanese kamikaze pilots of WWII. These days most of the attacks with explosives are carried out by suicide bombers. Figure 1. shows how their number changed during the years, dramatically after 2000. The website of the Tel Aviv University, The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) shows declining numbers of suicide attacks, but at the same time the locations of potential crime scenes are widened, attacks can happen anywhere.11 According to another

8 http://www.start.umd.edu/datarivers/vis/GtdExplorer.swf. Accessed 14 January 2018. 9 “Keeping Your Family Safe During a Terrorist Attack.” https://www.safety.com/family-safety- terrorist-attacks/#gref. Accessed 14 January 2018. 10 Suicide worriors of Islamic sect founded by Hasan ibn al-Sabban in 1090. 11 Mendelboim A. and Schwitzer Y. Report on Suicide Attacks in 2017: Fewer Attacks, More Women Bombers. Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, 186

INSS study, since 1980s the highest number of suicide bombings occurred in 2016: in 469 attacks carried out by 800 terrorists 5650 people lost their lives.12

Figure 1. Number of world-wide suicide bombing between 1981- 200913

Are we prepared to defend ourselves against this kind of attack? To get the answer first we should examine where we can expect terrorist attacks. First we must take into consideration that the aim of the perpetrators is not always to kill. The Latin term of terror originally means “great fear” or “dread,” and the terrorist’s purpose

2018. http://www.inss.org.il/publication/report-suicide-attacks-2017-fewer- attacks-women/. Accessed 14 January 2018. 12 Schwitzer Y., Mendelboim A. and Rosner Y. Suicide Attacks in 2016: The Highest Number of Fatalities. Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies. http://www.inss.org.il/publication/suicide-attacks-2016-highest-number- fatalities/. Accessed 14 January 2018. 13 Merari, A., Diamant, I., Bibi, A., Broshi, Y., Zakin, G. “Personality Characteristics of „Self Martyrs“/“Suicide Bombers“ and organizers of Suicide Attacks.” Terrorism and Political Violence. December, 2009., http://www.scribd.com/doc/46767174/Terrorism-and-Political-Violence (15 February 2012). Accessed 14 January 2018. 187 is to generate fear in the population by violent acts that serve as a warning of bigger threats to come. That is why the targets are selected for the exceptional attention they are likely to get.

Figure 2. Number of suicide attacks between 2013-201714

The nature of the target and the purpose of the attacker clearly define the way the attack will be carried out.15 For example, if the target is a particular individual, the explosive charge is small and concealed in an object the person often uses (e.g. his car), or will likely handle (parcel or letter). For a general demoralizing effect small charges are concealed in crowded places of intense traffic. Reporting the threat to the authorities in advance, in order to get the media to show the closure of the area, the search for the device etc.

14 Mendelboim A. and Schwitzer Y. Report on Suicide Attacks in 2017: Fewer Attacks, More Women Bombers. Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, 2018. http://www.inss.org.il/publication/report-suicide-attacks-2017-fewer- attacks-women/. Accessed 14 January 2018. 15 Lukács László. “Robbantásos merényletek elkövetésének lehetősége Magyarországon.” Hadtudomány. 1994/3. pp. 82-90. 188 heightens the demoralizing effect. Often it is not even necessary to set off the charges, because the number of visitors attending a public place, a holiday resort or a hotel can easily decline by demonstration of threat alone. If the purpose is revenge, the scene can be same as above, but serious damage and mass casualties are intended, both by the detonation of the main charge and by the wounding effect of secondary fragments (flying rubble of collapsing buildings, broken windows etc.). The explosive charge can range from the few kilos in a suicide bomber vest to a few hundred kilos in a vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED). Prevention of this kind of attack is the hardest and the wide publicity of the horrifying damages helps the attackers in their recruitment work. The targets could be buildings with high security profile: consulates, embassies; airports; hotels; symbolic buildings. They could also be special events with mass attendance, such as international conferences; commercials fairs, expos; big sports events; festivals, exhibitions. Or they could be VIPs, high officials, politicians, or celebrities.16 Evidently, threat levels are different for each potential target. Not all diplomatic representations are subject to the same level of threat and exhibitions, sports events or holiday resorts should not automatically be considered as dangerous places to visit.

Why do we help terrorists? It may seem somewhat of a digression in a paper on the technical aspects of the defense against one type of terrorist attack, but the subject of western society providing the terrorists a powerful weapon against itself must be addressed here briefly. It seems incomprehensible that the western nations spend millions of dollars

16 Lukács. “Robbantásos merényletek elkövetésének lehetősége Magyarországon.” 189 on developing new equipment to counter terrorist attacks or at least reduce their consequences, yet at the same time they exacerbate the problem by giving the terrorists extensive (and free) propaganda opportunities through the sensationalism of mass media outlets. As the novelist Frederic Forsyth noted, “For terrorism, the Internet and cyberspace have become must-have propaganda weapons. Every atrocity that can be broadcast on the news is good; every atrocity that can be seen by millions of Muslim youths in seventy countries is gold dust. This is where the recruits come from — actually seeing it happen and lusting to imitate.”17 The public will accept – almost – unconditionally what it sees and hears in the mass media. A good example of the power of media is the fear of flying. It is the safest way of traveling: according to the International Air Transport Association (IATA) in 2016 all together 268 people died in accidents worldwide, while transporting 3.7 billion travelers on over 40 million commercial flights.18 Yet it is perceived as dangerous, because news about airplane accidents are delivered to every living room immediately. This is not an easy question since the freedom of the press is one of the most important democratic vlues, and a part of daily life. However, the same media are responsible for providing the terrorists the international exposure they seek. This suggests to the organizations that they are on the right track in trying to intimidate the targeted societies, and encourages new recuits to join them. As always, the golden mean would be a balanced, objective correspondence but who can decide what can be published? Social media represent a similar probplem, although the solution may come earlier here, than in the mass media. In December of 2016 the top leadership of Facebook, Google, Microsoft and Twitter

17 Forsyth, Frederic. The Afghan. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 2006. p. 284. 18 IATA Annual Review 2017. Montreal: International Aair Transport Association, 2018. p. 18. 190 announced that new technology will be introduced to identify and to filter out terrorism- and hate-related content. This technology also allows identification of those who share such content by their digital fingerprints. In the summer of 2017 YouTube started a campaign against videos that show violence or bomb making techniques. In their report in August only 8% of these contents have been identified automatically by the artificial intelligence while by the end of the year that rate was 83%. The European Commission recognized the achievements, but found the process too slow wanted to accelerate the elimination of contents with terror propaganda from social media. It set a goal of 1-2 hours deletion time. To support that effort legal guidelines are being drafted at the time of writing.19

Technical solutions against blast attacks Based on the characteristics of the offense we can define the methods of defense. The first step, of course, is to identify the threat level. This is a complex task that depends on the political situation of the country and region, the religious or other identity influence, other inner interests and dependencies that could lead to agression, and on the motives of possible attackers. There are mathematical methods to estimate the risk.20 To make an assessment we need to know plenty of data and follow all those circumstances that could

19 “Interneten toborzott merénylők – Európai Bizottság: Gyorsabbá kell tenni az illegális tartalmak eltávolítását.” http://www.jogiforum.hu/hirek/38683. Accessed 14 January 2018. 20 Balogh Zsuzsanna and Hanka László. “Terrorista robbantás elleni épületvédelem valószínűség számítással.” Műszaki Katonai Közlöny on-line, XXII. TÁMOP Special edition, 2012. pp. 57-72.; Balogh Zsuzsanna and Hanka László. “Bayes-analízis a kockázatelemzésben, diszkrét valószínűség eloszlások alkalmazása.” Repüléstudományi Közlemények. XXV. 2013/2. pp. 232-244.; Hanka László. “Kockázat becslése numerikus módszerekkel a MATLAB alkalmazásával, folytonos eloszlások diszkretizálása.” Műszaki Katonai Közlöny on-line. XXII. 3. 2012. pp. 55-69. 191 change them e.g. if a VIP visits a low security level resort or conference hall that requires additional security measures to be taken in the building itself. Countering terrorist bombing attacks is a complex task. There are plenty of protective measures against reconnaissance and against the delivery of explosives, from hardening the structural elements of buildings to installing mechanical protection equipment. The equally important reconnaissance and surveillance activity and administrative measures are not discussed in this paper. The explosives can be hidden in any parcel, object and even if it cannot be initiated it is more complicated and takes time to evacuate the building. That is why the early discovery of these materials are so important. There are many tools of technical protection of buildings with which explosive materials can be detected in order to keep it outside. For this reason, we have to focus on the entrance of the facilities. For scanning there are proper equipment like:  letter bomb detectors,  parcel bomb detectors,  vehicle and container screening equipment,  body scanners,  special explosive detectors. The X-ray known from airports show not only the content of packages but also possibly dangerous explosives inside based on two physical characteristics (density and effective nuclear charge) of the material. Manufacturers offer this type of device not only for aviation transport but also for public places with smaller traffic. The HI-SCAN 6040C X-ray by Smiths Heimann is recommended especially for checkpoints of jails, embassies, banks and hotels. It can differentiate between organic and inorganic materials, filtering out the drugs, explosives and other hazardous items.

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Metal detectors alone are not sufficient for scanning individuals at the entrance to a sensitive area: they are ineffective in the age of ceramic blade knives and 3D printed plastic guns. The breakthrough in body scanning was the millimeter wave technology that works in the millimeter spectrum of the electromagnetic rays. It replicates not just the contour of the person standing in front of it but also the items within his clothes. Opponents have questioned the health effect of the equipment because they believed that it is based on the same principle as an X- ray machine but in fact, it has no ionized or radioactive emission. The appearance of suicide bombers demanded the development of high-performance detectors for drugs and explosives (mostly used at airports) and also the small size detectors for hazardous materials.21 This way the liquid explosives can be discovered as well. In case of a building with high security demand the main task is to block the high-spped approach of vehicles loaded with explosives. This can be achieved by increasing the standoff distance from the building, in order to reduce the effets of an outside detonation. However, this is not enough by itself. In 1998 in the bombing attack on the US Embassy in Nairobi, even though the truck was parked outside, the damage of the detonation was devastating.22 There is standard formula to calculate the required standoff distance, but for easy use the Department of the Treasury Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms issued the chart below. It helps to estimate the safe distance from the suspicious vehicle based on their size and the possible explosive charge placed inside them. The information was developed with data from a vehicle bomb research program.

21 See also https://zandz.hu/termekkategoria/veszelyes-anyag-detektalas/ 22 Lukács László and Balogh Zsuzsanna. “Bombatámadás az USA nagykövetség ellen – Nairobi, 1998. augusztus 07.” Műszaki Katonai Közlöny. XXIII. 2. 2013. pp. 159-178. 193

Figure 3. Safe stand-off distance in case of VBIED explosion.23

Prevention – the foundation of protection Since terrorism targets the general public, the question of how the public can learn about the dangers, the consequences of an explosive attack, and the optimal drills is an important one. In Hungary unfortunately even those few results of researches that have been published lately are not generally, and often not even by the experts. There are examples of foreign brochures and guidance that summarize the answers to the real threats. One of the best is the US Department of Defense publication UFC-4-010-01, DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings.24

23 “Arson and Explosives Incidents Report – Vehicle Bomb Explosion Hazard and Evacuation Distance Table.” Washington DC: Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 1997. 24 Also see DoD Anti-Ram Vehicle Barrier List. Omaha: US Army Corps of Engineers, Protective Design Center. September 2017. 194

And the United States also offers an example of initiative and self-organization. On May 3, 2012 sixty-nine members of the U.S. House of Representatives sent a letter to President Obama calling for a unified U.S. strategy and international action against IEDs. The letter called on the President to work with Congress and global governments to address critical gaps in the humanitarian response to IEDs, to strengthen the application of the rule of law, and to eliminate serious deficiencies in public-private information sharing. Those who signed felt that IEDs are a threat not only in combat zones, but also in the homeland. As there was no reply from the White House for over six months, Robert Morris (a retired US Army colonel) felt that steps must be taken to draw attention to this threat and he established his own organization and launched the Global Campaign against IEDs.25 Military approaches emphasize responses that train the force, neutralize the device, and attack the network. In contrast the Global Campaign initiative relied on a comprehensive approach, analyzing various aspects (societal, human, economic etc.) of the problem, and involved both the military and civilian spheres. One of the Campaign’s goals was to neutralize the IED networks; another element was the fact-based information campaign through various communication technologies (education, social media). It used the media the same way just the perpetrators did, to warn people, highlighting the campaign’s actions and consequences. Social media, and its associated wisdom of the crowd, was a critical enabler to involve people. The third and last element was applying international rule of law to IED incidents. This was to emphasize that

https://pdc.usace.army.mil/library/BarrierCertification. Accessed 14 January 2018. 25 Although the organization has not been active for some time now, the authors still feel it is a good example of grassroots organization to respond to a serious security challenge. 195 using IEDs is a crime, regardless of the political background and motivation of the attackers. The “If You See Something, Say Something™” campaign26 is to raise public awareness of the indicators of terrorism and terrorism- related crime. This motivates people to share responsibility about their own security by reporting to authorities all suspicious signs or activities. 27 The public transport system is only one element of the critical infrastructure network. The rest (e.g. power grid, bank system, pipelines, etc.) can also be targeted by both physical and cyber attacks. Since these system elements are closely interconnected, one cascade effect of a successful attack can edamage an extended network. The call for cooperation in the framework of “Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience Month” came from the President of the United States in his Proclamation.28 During this dedicated month, November 2014, he asked for all participants to recommit strengthening and protecting these important assets. In the course of this collaborative work information sharing is very important but in our information technology-dependent world this should be done with extra precaution otherwise a hacker might easily access valuable data to plan a cyber or physical strike against the network. One power supply company involves customers in its asset protection activities by distributing flyers asking for active participation in the Neighborhood Watch program. They explain

26 The campaign was originally implemented by the New York City Metropolitan Transportation Authority and is licensed to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as a nationwide campaign. 27 http://www.campaignagainstieds.org/. Accessed 14 January 2018. 28 Presidential Proclamation -- Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience Month, 2014. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/10/31/presidential- proclamation-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience. Accessed 14 January 2018. 196 seven signs of terrorism that can indicate an incident. Additionally, the flyer educates the public on what details are important when a customer reports his/her observation of suspicious activity. Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) there are several offices helping each other’s work in the protection of critical infrastructure. The Infrastructure Protection Office not only assesses the vulnerability and risks to the elements but also assists owners and operators to manage and reduce them. On the 20th anniversary of the first attack aganinst World Trade Center29 a Presidential Policy Directive of C-IED was issued. The Office for Bombing Prevention (OBP) leads the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) efforts to implement all those steps included in this document. Their mission is to protect life and critical infrastructure by building capabilities e.g. they offer awareness training, detection courses and threat management workshops from a few hours up to few-days-long for security personnel and first responders.30 The training program of the Energetic Materials Research and Testing Center (EMRTC) of Western New Mexico University is also funded by DHS and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). After the WTC incident mentioned above, the EMRTC was called to conduct a study on the IED caused explosion. Since then the Center conducts training for first responders that teaches them how to respond to suicide bombing attacks. Of course, responders’ first priority is to help and care for injured people, but they should

29 On February 26, 1993, a truck with a 1,336 pounds (606 kg) urea nitrate– hydrogen gas enhanced device was detonated below the North Tower of the World Trade Centre in New York City. It failed to bring down both towers but it still killed six people and injured more than a thousand. It caused serious damage in the building structure opening a 98 ft. (30 m) wide hole through four sublevels of concrete. 30 http://www.dhs.gov/office-infrastructure-protection. Accessed 14 January 2018. 197 preserve evidence, understand the effect of explosion on structures for their own safety and know how to identify a secondary device and defeat it. The more than 500,000 graduates since the beginning of the program received lectures in class rooms, in labs and field training as well. The prevention of suicide bombing course also teaches how to formulate policies, response plans and identify equipment for detection.31 In NATO the Explosive Ordnance Disposla Centre of Excellence (EOD CoE) provides trainingfor eligible personnel from NATO/PfP countries on homemade explosive materials (HME) and their effects. The students are also instructed on how to react in case of an HME related incident scene, how to report it, and what the appropriate safety procedures are. The COE leadership also identified a gap in their training program and started a project to train staff on how to manage incidents in which chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) materials were involved – a realistic threat if perpetrators use a dirty bomb.32 In Hungary the National Defense University (ZMNE) used to have classes on defense against terrorist blast attacks but the successor institute, the National University of Public Service has cancelled them. Today only Óbuda University has offers similar lectures within the safety and security engineering education at BSc and MSc level. 33 Although no terrorist bombing attack has been carried out in Hungary, those experts who are responsible for security and safety of buildings, facilities and human life should possess the basic

31 Joseph J. Kolb. „Preparing for the inevitable: New Mexico University prepares first responders for bombing incidents.” Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International. Vol. 19, No.3. Fall Issue, 2013. pp. 55-57 32 https://www.eodcoe.org/en/courses (12 June 2015) 33 http://bgk.uni- obuda.hu/hu/kepzeseink/tovabbkepzesek/robbantastechnikai-szakember-es- szakmernok-szakiranyu-tovabbkepzesi-szak#. Accessed 14 January 2018. 198 knowledge. They must know how to react in case of emergency, what the phenomenon of explosion is, what the features of explosion effects to buildings are. Their awareness is the key to the successful defense.

Summary

This paper addressed explosives as the synonym of destruction, devastation. However, without it (and its application in mining ores and minerals) our life would be inconceivable:34  during his lifetime an average person uses approx. 1100 t minerals;  to each meter of highway 33 tons of raw materials are needed;  to build one meter of a bridge 85 tons of raw materials are used;  to construct a general family house 440 tons of raw materials are required  to produce one PC 32 different components are necessary. Citing a previous article about mines: “the objects are never guilty but the hand that grabs them and the mind that controls the hand”35 – that is true for the explosives as well.

About the authors Professor László Lukács, CSc is a retired Colonel of the Hungarian Defence Forces. He has been researching and teaching explosives- and mine warfare-related subjects at higher military education institutions since 1979. He is an associate researcher of the HDF General Staff Scientific Research Centre and consultant at the

34 Bohus G., Drótos L., Gácsi J. and Lóránt M. (eds.) Bányászati gyűjtemény tárlatvezető füzet. Miskolc: MIKEROBB Kft. s.a., pp. 26-27. 35 Lukács László. “Aknahelyzet Horvátországban és Bosznia-Hercegovinában.” Új Honvédségi Szemle. 1999/1. pp. 37-49. 199

Doctoral Schools of the National University of Public Service and the Óbuda University. E-mail: [email protected]. Dr Zsuzsanna Balogh, Phd, is a Lieutenant Colonel of the Hungarian Defence Forces. She is consultant at the Doctoral Schools of Military Engineering of the National University of Public Service. E-mail: [email protected].

References “Arson and Explosives Incidents Report – Vehicle Bomb Explosion Hazard and Evacuation Distance Table.” Washington DC: Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 1997. Balogh, Zsuzsanna and Hanka, László. “Bayes-analízis a kockázatelemzésben, diszkrét valószínűség eloszlások alkalmazása.” Repüléstudományi Közlemények. XXV. 2013/2. pp. 232- 244. Balogh, Zsuzsanna and Hanka, László. “Terrorista robbantás elleni épületvédelem valószínűség számítással.” Műszaki Katonai Közlöny on-line, XXII. TÁMOP Special edition, 2012. pp. 57-72. Balogh, Zsuzsanna. “Az USA védelmi minisztérium által kiadott, épületek minimálisan kialakítandó terrorizmus elleni védelmének szabványa – egységes létesítményi előírások.” Műszaki Katonai Közlöny, XXIII. 2. 2013. pp. 47-63. Bohus G., Drótos L., Gácsi J. and Lóránt M. (eds.) Bányászati gyűjtemény tárlatvezető füzet. Miskolc: MIKEROBB Kft. s.a. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects, Protocol II on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices. Geneva: United Nations. May 3, 1996. p. 23.

200 https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0811.pdf. Accessed 14 January 2018. DoD Anti-Ram Vehicle Barrier List. Omaha: US Army Corps of Engineers, Protective Design Center. September 2017. https://pdc.usace.army.mil/library/BarrierCertification. Accessed 14 January 2018. Forsyth, Frederic. The Afghan. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 2006. p. 284. Hanka, László. “Kockázat becslése numerikus módszerekkel a MATLAB alkalmazásával, folytonos eloszlások diszkretizálása.” Műszaki Katonai Közlöny on-line. XXII. 3. 2012. pp. 55-69. http://www.campaignagainstieds.org/. Accessed 14 January 2018. http://www.dhs.gov/office-infrastructure-protection. Accessed 14 January 2018. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press- office/2014/10/31/presidential-proclamation-critical- infrastructure-security-and-resilience. Accessed 14 January 2018. “Interneten toborzott merénylők – Európai Bizottság: Gyorsabbá kell tenni az illegális tartalmak eltávolítását.” http://www.jogiforum.hu/hirek/38683. Accessed 14 January 2018. Hunyadi, F. – Lukács L. – Mueller O. A robbantások elleni védekezés feladatai (Az épületek védelme robbantásos akciók ellen). Budapest: BME Mérnöktovábbképző Intézet, 1993. IATA Annual Review 2017. Montreal: International Aair Transport Association, 2018. Joseph J. Kolb. „Preparing for the inevitable: New Mexico University prepares first responders for bombing incidents.” Journal of Counterterrorism & Homeland Security International. Vol. 19, No.3. Fall Issue, 2013. pp. 55-57 201

“Keeping Your Family Safe During a Terrorist Attack.” https://www.safety.com/family-safety-terrorist-attacks/#gref. Accessed 14 January 2018. Lukács, László and Balogh Zsuzsanna. “Bombatámadás az USA nagykövetség ellen –Nairobi, 1998. augusztus 07.” Műszaki Katonai Közlöny. XXIII. 2. 2013. pp. 159-178. Lukács, László. “Aknahelyzet Horvátországban és Bosznia- Hercegovinában.” Új Honvédségi Szemle. 1999/1. pp. 37-49. Lukács, László. “Épületek elleni robbantásos cselekmények jellemzői.” Műszaki Katonai Közlöny. XXII. Special edition, 2012. pp. 4-13. Lukács, László. “Kis aknatörténelem.” Nemzetvédelmi Egyetemi Közlemények. 6./3. 2002. pp. 15-57. Lukács, László. “Robbantásos merényletek elkövetésének lehetősége Magyarországon.” Hadtudomány. 1994/3. pp. 82-90. Lukács, László. Szemelvények a magyar robbantástechnika fejlődéstörténetéből. Budapest: Dialóg Campus, 2017. 29-37. http://akfi-dl.uni- nke.hu/szakmai_kiadvanyok/index.php?search=/ISBN%20978- 615-5680-35-9. Accessed 14 January 2018. Mendelboim, A. and Schwitzer, Y. Report on Suicide Attacks in 2017: Fewer Attacks, More Women Bombers. Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, 2018. http://www.inss.org.il/publication/report- suicide-attacks-2017-fewer-attacks-women/. Accessed 14 January 2018. Merari, A. – Diamant, I. – Bibi, A. – Broshi, Y. – Zakin, G. “Personality Characteristics of „Self Martyrs“/“Suicide Bombers“ and organizers of Suicide Attacks.” Terrorism and Political Violence. December, 2009.,

202 http://www.scribd.com/doc/46767174/Terrorism-and-Political- Violence (15 February 2012). Accessed 14 January 2018. Óbuda University webpage. http://bgk.uni- obuda.hu/hu/kepzeseink/tovabbkepzesek/robbantastechnikai- szakember-es-szakmernok-szakiranyu-tovabbkepzesi-szak#. Accessed 14 January 2018. Révai Nagylexikon, XV. Budapest : Révai Rt., 1922. p. 541. Revill, James. Improvised Explosive Devices – The Paradigmatic Weapon of New Wars. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. p. 4. Schwitzer Y., Mendelboim A. and Rosner Y. Suicide Attacks in 2016: The Highest Number of Fatalities. Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies. http://www.inss.org.il/publication/suicide- attacks-2016-highest-number-fatalities/. Accessed 14 January 2018. Shuriye, A., O. and Faris, W, F. (ed.): Contributions of Early Muslim Scientists to Engineering Scienses and Related Studies. Kuala Lumpur: International Islamic University Press, 2011. p. 36.

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Gábor Németh

Visegrad4 Border Security Command Post Exercise “Joint Efforts 2017”

Introduction When we speak about national resilience, it is generally the military capability that is in focus. However, the role of the national law enforcement agencies is also relevant in this area. The current global security challenges – such as terrorism, organised crime, smuggling of drugs, weapons and goods, trafficking in human beings, illegal migration – do not only affect Hungary but also the countries of the Visegrad Cooperation (hereinafter V4) and other EU Member States as well. To prevent, react and give proper responses to such security challenges the national law enforcement agencies have to be prepared and ready to take actions based on Hungary’s National Security Strategy.1 Due to its membership in the EU, FRONTEX, UN, OSCE and NATO, Hungary has certain border control obligations towards its neighbours and allies. In the course of fulfilling the obligations arising from bilateral or multilateral international agreements, it is more and more common that foreign border police professionals carry out their duties in Hungary and Hungarian border police professionals serve abroad. The V4 Joint Efforts Border Security Command Post Exercise also falls into this category. The exercise was held 11-17 November 2017 at the premises of the Hungarian Police Education and Training Centre (hereinafter PETC) in Csopak, Hungary, upon Hungarian initiative. The aim of this exercise was to put participants into a conflict scenario

1 Adopted by the 1035/2012. (II. 21.) Government Decree on “Hungary’s National Security Strategy” 205 modelling a mass migration crisis and other public security related challenges. The participants had to maintain control of the state border, as well as maintain public order and security in a fictional ‘third country,’ the ‘Republic of Thresholdland’ (hereinafter RTHL). Assigned members of the Polish Border Guard, Czech, Slovak and Hungarian Police forces took part in the exercise. In addition to incorporating organizational, managerial and cooperation tasks on the national level, the exercise also implied the practical execution of operational cooperation among border security agencies of the V4 countries. The exercise aims fully met the criteria laid down by the V4 foreign ministers in 2013.2

Exercise Rationale and Design The idea to organise a joint law enforcement exercise as a Hungarian initiative came up in late 2016 when high ranking HU police officials visited the European Police Service Training (EUPST) exercise in Vicenza, Italy.3 Preparations started in early 2017. The necessity of international law enforcement exercises is unquestionable. Crimes do not stop at the state borders, and organised crime activities have regional and global effects. The drug trafficking, weapon smuggling, illegal migration, trafficking in human beings are real long term threats for the European Union and its member states. These global challenges require comprehensive approach, proper coordination, cooperation and collaboration, and joint response from responsible agencies. The Polish Border guard and the Czech and Slovak Police services were invited to take part in the exercise. The national leaders of these law enforcement agencies accepted the invitation and gave

2 For a More Effective and Stronger Common Security and Defence Policy (Bratislava, April 18, 2013) 3 Hungary is not part of the EUPST project, but regularly send officers to its activities. 206 positive answers concerning their participation in the command post exercise. The external evaluation team of the exercise consisted of two officers, one from the Bavarian Police and one from the Border Police Faculty of the Hungarian National University of Public Service (hereinafter NUPS). Hungarian Police was represented by officers from the Rapid Response and Special Police Services (hereinafter RRSPS), and from the regional border police departments which are deployed at the Hungarian external borders, and one cadet from the Border Police Faculty of NUPS. We also had guest officers through the Erasmus Program from Lower Saxony, Germany. The Hungarian Defence Forces supported the exercise with one exercise planning officer from the Peace Support and Training Centre and one cartographer officer from the Geo- information Service. The Geo-information Service also provided all the necessary hard copy and digital maps used on the exercise. The Military Police Centre sent an officer who served as a member of the exercise control unit. Altogether more than 50 participants took part in the exercise. The main training audience was the V4 Police Battalion4 HQ staff and the others were acting as members of Main Events List and Main Incidents Lists (hereinafter MELMIL). The MELMIL represented the Mission HQ, the higher command. The grey cell acted on the tactical level but only the Polish, Czech, Slovak and Hungarian company commanders and their deputies, Intelligence and Crime officers, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Water Canon, and Fire and Gas Support officers were present, the other positions on tactical level

4 The Visegrad Four Police Battalion was a virtual joint law enforcement unit, created for the duration of the exercise. Exercise personnel were assigned to play the roles of the battalion commander, command staff, company commanders and certain specialist positions. In late 2018 or early 2019 the V4 countries will discuss developing the concept further. Should the battalion be raised sometime in the future, it would be a strictly temporary organization that could help handle a serious migration crisis either in the V4 countries, or in another affected country. 207 were virtual ones. According to the EU Civilian Crisis Management practise, we mostly used English military terminology during the exercise.5 Prior to the exercise all participants were assigned to the appropriate billets based on their pervious professional experience and current ranks, as indicated in their CV-s. The exercise was a virtual command post exercise and there were no boots on the ground. The main aim was to practise the operational planning activity, organize and manage wide scale of border and public security operations. The overall objective of the exercise was preparation for multinational cooperation and coordination within the V4 law enforcement agencies, in order to manage a mass migration crisis, according to the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) framework, in the territory of a fictitious country6 The organisers of the exercise - having a wide range of international crisis management experience – created a realistic environment as much as possible. The exercise was a 52 hour-long, day and night exercise and the participants had to react on all incidents as if they were acting in real life. A three-day “induction” training was held before the exercise. In this training our colleagues from the various national agencies received general information on the aim of the exercise, as well as theoretical lessons on operational planning activity: how operations-related information should be analysed, how large-scale border and public security operations, handling mass-migration and effective security for Temporary Refugee Holding Camps should be planned, organized and managed. Also the training was a good opportunity for team building: the law enforcement officers from different countries who had never worked together before had the chance to get to know each other and familiarize themselves with their future tasks and challenges.

5 http://www.entriforccm.eu/resources/incontrol.html 6 https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp_en 208

Figure 1. Organizational structure of the Visegrad Four Police Battalion

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Fig. 2. Structure of the Visegrad Four Police Battalion headquarters.

The IT unit of the RRSPS build up reliable intranet, phone, mobile phone and radio network for the virtual exercise. The workstations of the various units were set up in several buildings. This physical separation added to the realism of the exercise.

General overview of border and public security situation in RTHL Before the exercise, the organizers provided the relevant operational information for the participants about the fictional country and the ongoing crisis. According to the scenario the V4 police battalion was deployed in a fictional war-torn country 210

(RTHL), located on the main route of illegal migration from the Middle East and North-Africa to the European Union. The local law enforcement and security forces are not able to maintain peace and public order reliably, and the EU decided to launch a crisis management mission in the country in 2010. The fictional country was placed on a real map segment of Hungary (Veszpém County) using real paper and digital maps with a fictional borderline and settlements. According to the scenario, the borderline is 109 Kms long with the neighbouring Negligentia, the main transit country of illegal migration, located to the South-East of RTHL. The common border consists of a 75 km long land border and a 34 km long blue border on the South Sea, where the cargo ships and ferries carry the bulk of commercial traffic. RTHL is getting EU help to improve the security situation along its border with Negligentia, because the local gangs are handling the illegal drug trafficking and THB. The gangs are based on ethnic and family relations. The members of the crime gangs are mostly former militants. The participants had received all of the relevant background information 2 weeks prior the exercise electronically and they had ample time to familiarize themselves with the current situation in RTHL.

Conducting the exercise During the Command Post Exercise, the Exercise Control Unit and the Situation Centre created almost 100 different incidents to which the battalion HQ staff had to make the appropriate response. The battalion commander and his staff needed to analyse all information coming from the MELMIL and from the subordinate units. They had to plan, organize and manage all border security and public order and security operations conducted by the “virtual battalion” (the battalion was a virtual unit, only the command staff

211 existed physically - the main aim was to enhance the operational planning capacity on multinational level). Some of the major incidents the participants had to handle: ‐ A small boat discharged 200 illegal migrants in an RTHL harbour. Three of the migrants fell into the water. The task was to plan, organize and manage the search and rescue operation on the shore and on the water, and at the same time manage the collection and registration of a large numbers of migrants as well. ‐ Later, information was received about a couple of hundred migrants gathering at the Negligentian side of the border, trying to enter RTHL by force. The local police tried but was not able to prevent the illegal crossing (in spite of a high number of casualties among the migrants). The task was to plan, organize and manage the CRC activity and rescue operation. ‐ In another case, information was received about violent local extremist groups gathering near a temporary refugee camp, trying to enter by force to provoke a clash with its residents. The residents of the camp were ready to fight back. The task was to plan, organize and manage CRC activity. Handling the situations and giving proper responses to different incidents required high quality teamwork, coordination, cooperation and collaboration between the different elements of HQ level. The proper information flow between the HQ and MELMIL and between the HQ and tactical level was also crucial. The various HQ elements analysed the received information, organized and managed specific operations, had to make the appropriate response (e.g. to send reinforcements, special units, organize and manage an evacuation, organize and manage logistical support, maintain communication with local and international stakeholders, etc.).

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On the second day of the exercise, an open day was organized. The representatives of the embassies of the participating countries (consuls, attachés), journalists and the commanders of HU police units had the opportunity to visit the exercise and gain first-hand experience about the event. They could visit the different elements of the exercise and had the chance to monitor the ongoing operational planning activity.

Lessons learned and the way forward This was the first such exercise in the history of V4 cooperation - also in the history of the Hungarian National Police. Apart from some imperfections, the exercise was a real success. It was a great opportunity to learn from each other, share our knowledge, and enhance the interoperability between our forces. Surprisingly, the officers coming from different countries with different professional background could cope with the emerging problems and solve them effectively. By the end of the exercise, real team cohesion was visible. However, in order to enhance the effectiveness of exercises in the future, further improvements are necessary. During the exercise, we as the organizers paid insufficient attention to operational planning- related logistical issues. Due to the wide scale of incidents, the Polish police offered to participate in the next exercise, in addition to the polish border guard. During the induction training prior to the exercise, only HU trainers delivered presentations – an international training team should be created to conduct this training the next time. For the next exercise “boots on the ground” – small units performing exercise tasks in the field – should also be considered. Such exercises can significantly improve the operational effectiveness of national and international law enforcement services

213 and enhance national and regional resilience against global security challenges according to the Treaty of The European Union article 42.7

About the author Major Gabor Nemeth is a Hungarian Police officer. He served in various national law enforcement positions and acquired considerable international law enforcement experience as well. At present he is a staff officer at the Hungarian Police Education and Training Centre. He holds a Masters Degree in law enforcement management, conferred by the Hungarian Police Academy.

7https://eurlex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2012.326.0 1.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ:C:2012:326:TOC#C_2012326EN.01001301 214

Zoltán Somodi

The Effect of Non-NATO Military Equipment on Resilience

The question of resilience gained more relevance for NATO after the Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. In the discourse it is mainly referred to as part of the Alliance’s deterrence capability in the context of the various levels of conflicts, ranging from nuclear to cyber threat. NATO is concerned by the relatively large proportion of non-NATO (mostly Russian) military equipment used by the Allies. The reason for this concern is that this equipment, and more accurately its sustainment can become a risk in the event of an escalating conflict with Russia, and this could impact the resilience of those countries that operate such equipment. To be able to determine what effect non-NATO military equipment has on a country’s resilience, first we need to establish a working definition of resilience, because depending on our definition, the effect can be quite different.

What is resilience? The definition of resilience depends on the profile of the organization, community, or the individual who is concerned by some aspect of this wide topic. For our purposes it is useful to look at the discourse in NATO and the European Union, and the research conducted among the population of democratic societies. These opinions and viewpoints will give us a good framework to determine the effect of non-NATO military hardware on our nation’s resilience level. Without conducting a proper methodological discourse analysis, we can still briefly summarize our thoughts when we come across

215 the term resilience. Most of the risks and threats that cross our mind emerge from the natural environment, some others are caused by human activity. Most of them are accompanied by some kind of cataclysmic event or massive human and property loss, others are not so spectacular. They can be acute or chronic in nature, taking so much time to develop their effects that the victims barely realize that something negative is happening to them. Our thoughts on the solutions, the counterstrategies, actions and reactions to these negative influences and catastrophic events can also be described by words that are commonly used in the discourse of resilience. Most terms are reactive in nature, focusing on the mitigation of effects and how to return to our normal way of life before the disturbance occurred, and perhaps on how can we become better prepared for the next similar disturbance. Essentially resilience is becoming a hard target, a well-built, tough, sturdy punching bag. The most important part would be to prevent or avoid at least some of the effects that are not inevitable, and to learn, thereby improving our system by implementing necessary changes. It is less emphasized, but to be resilient also means to manage these changes efficiently and professionally. This way of thinking is somewhat marginal in the discourse of resilience. The reason might be that in the interdisciplinary approach, resilience is usually some kind of response to an inevitable event.

EU The EU is focusing mostly on the humanitarian side of the resilience spectrum. Enhancing the resilience of the neighboring regions is central to the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and a cornerstone of security strategy. However, in my opinion, resilience should not be looked at as a strategy, because a strategy cannot be detached from the threat, and resilience in the face of certain types of threats might not mean resilience in other cases. According to the

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EU definition, “resilience is the ability of an individual, a household, a community, a country or a region to withstand, cope, adapt, and quickly recover from stresses and shocks such as violence, conflict, drought and other natural disasters without compromising long- term development.”1 The EU discourse also focuses more on the reactions, but at least on the level of declaration, it also aims at prevention and improving early warning systems. The EU seems to abandon the conventional, military side of resilience and entirely focuses on human security, relying on the conventional security measures provided by NATO.

NATO NATO is assuming as much responsibility of European security as possible, establishing a supplementary relationship with the EU in the field of resilience. The requirement to increase resilience became central after the Crimean crisis; in its essence it was a reactionary position, a necessity to reinvigorate old and not very well-maintained reflexes. These pre-planned and rehearsed measures were designed to prepare the population and national institutions to the anticipated military conflict between the two ideological blocks of the Cold War. NATO’s resilience definition, as shown in the Warsaw Summit press release, also realizes the basic foundation of resilience: norms and values. The foundation of our resilience lies in our shared commitment to the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. By taking the necessary steps today to enhance our resilience, we

1 “Building Resilience: The EU's approach”. European Commission. 2016. http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/thematic/resilience_e n.pdf. Accessed on 15 April 2018. 217 reaffirm our unwavering commitment to defend our populations and our territory against any threat, and to uphold these values.2 NATO focuses on cyber defense, hybrid threats, and civil- military readiness as the primary segments of national resilience. Cyber space is of great concern as it interconnects the entire planet, making it possible for anybody to attack any electronic target from anywhere at any time. Therefore, every important part of the national infrastructure must be secured at all times, because an attacker can choose the time and location, or a vulnerability within the system to strike against. NATO is putting a great effort into improving its intelligence-sharing and early warning processes in order to better detect hybrid warfare activities. It is developing an early warning system that can trigger a number of crisis-response options. Rapid identification of a hybrid attack and speedy decision- making are essential to block escalation. Civil-military readiness is about NATO’s ability to fully implement its Readiness Action Plan for the reinforcement and defense of Allies with the support of the host nations. NATO members have to adapt to the new security environment and revive the planning procedures that existed during the Cold War. Resilience has not been forgotten in the civil and private sectors; NATO just needs to work out how to add its own capabilities and contribution to improve the resilience of allied nations.3 NATO’s focus is on hybrid threats and Russian aggression that necessitates the current structures and mechanisms to be readjusted

2 “Commitment to enhance resilience Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw, 8-9 July 2016” North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 2016. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133180.htm?selectedLocale =en, accessed on 10 04 2018 3 Shea, J. „Resilience: a core element of collective defence”. NATO Review. 2016. https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2016/Also-in-2016/nato-defence-cyber- resilience/EN/index.htm. Accessed on 15 April 2018. 218 after over 30 years of relative peace. An estimated 90 percent of NATO logistics are now contracted out to the private sector. When a state actor is involved with its armed forces, the problem is NATO’s. However, before that, if it cripples a nation’s energy grid, financial services, transport networks and communications, NATO needs civil and private stakeholders to be able to identify the threat, build a common operating picture and start acting on it.4 To sum up NATO’s approach to resilience: it is rather instrumental, focuses much more on military power than on other aspects, even as it claims and attempts to be comprehensive and all- encompassing.5 The two sides of the same coin, deterrence and resilience work together as a shield and a sword. In a way the idea looks similar to missile defense – the capacity to negate the effects of an offensive act would be comparable to having an equal level of offensive force. The emphasis is still on military solutions and resilience is understood as a supporting effort.6

Psychological-political aspects While earlier discussions were centered on external threats, and the territorial defenses within the framework of national security, scholars have recently shifted their focus more towards the political– psychological aspects of national security. Traumatic events relevant to the study of national resilience include natural disasters such as

4 Cole, J. “NATO: Towards a New Resilience Alliance”. RUSI. 01 June 2017. https://rusi.org/commentary/nato-towards-new-resilience-alliance. Accessed on 15 April 2018. 5 Shea. „Resilience.” 6 Lasconjarias, G. „Deterrence through Resilience: NATO, the Nations and the Challenges of Being Prepared”. ETH Zürich. 09 June 2017. http://www.css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital- library/articles/article.html/ac42738e-f524-462a-bb16-18e5eba459ef/pdf. Accessed on 15 April 2018. 219 forest fires, earthquakes, or hurricanes and man-made catastrophes like war and terror attacks.7 Resilience is interpreted as a “consequence of successful individual adjustment and the ability to function efficiently following traumatic events”. Psychologists define resilience as a way to overcome adversities through adjustment after a disturbance or stress. In other words, after witnessing or surviving a traumatic event, “resilient individuals bounce back quickly or do not develop psychological distress at all.” Resilience at the national level could also be defined as a “process of adjusting to and absorbing the adversity or change dictated by an external threat.”8 However, as Friedland suggests, the definition of resilience at the national level should also be supplemented by the requirement of preserving society’s core values and institutions.9 According to these lines of thought, national resilience should be measured along political–psychological attitudes, societal values and trust in leadership.10 This “definition of national resilience is the ability of a society or population to withstand adversities and crises in diverse realms by implementing changes and adaptations without harming the society’s core values and institutions.”11 It is also beneficial to evaluate what individual members of democratic societies think about national resilience. The discourse analysis conducted among Americans and Israelis showed that both nations’

7 Canetti, D.; Waismel-Manor, I.; Cohen, N.; Rapaport, C. „What Does National Resilience Mean in a Democracy? Evidence from the United States and Israel”. Armed Forces and Society. July 2014 Vol. 40 issue: 3, 504-520 http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0095327X12466828. Accessed on 15 April 2018. 2-3. 8 Canetti et al. „What Does National Resilience Mean in a Democracy?” 3. 9 Friedland, N. „Introduction - The ‘‘Elusive’’ Concept of Social Resilience”. In Arian, Asher et al. (eds), The Concept of Social Resilience. Haifa. The Technion. Samuel Neaman Institute. 2006. 10 Canetti et al. „What Does National Resilience Mean in a Democracyy?” 4. 11Canetti et al. „What Does National Resilience Mean in a Democracy? 4. 220 definition of resilience included the importance of national unity, overcoming threats, and remaining patriotic – pointing to shared norms and values.12 An arguably missing point from all these previously presented definitions of resilience is its relation to demographics. All resilience definitions talk about “bouncing back”, or sometimes “bouncing forward”13, which means even better sustainability. We might ask, how can a nation consider itself to be bouncing back after a cataclysmic event resulting in large-scale loss of life and property, when it is unable to even sustain its peacetime population? A modern society, with the living standards, healthcare, life expectancy, etc. of the developed world, needs a fertility rate of 2.1 as the absolute minimum to have a stagnating population. Add to this the cataclysmic events associated with the definition of resilience and the loss in lives as the result, and even that might be somewhat too little. Depending on which definition from the above mentioned ones we find closest to our own, the influence of military equipment on our resilience concept will also be different.

Elements of resilience Turning back to our original topic, the seven baseline requirements of NATO are a useful framework to evaluate the effect of military equipment on national resilience. 1) assured continuity of government and critical government services; 2) resilient energy supplies; 3) ability to deal effectively with the uncontrolled movement of people;

12Canetti et al. „What Does National Resilience Mean in a Democracy? 10. 13 Parmak, M. „National resilience in multinational societies”. ResearchGate. 20 May 2015. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/276978617_National_resilience_in_ multinational_societies. Accessed on 15 April 2018. 9. 221

4) resilient food and water resources; 5) ability to deal with mass casualties; 6) resilient communications systems; and finally 7) resilient transportation systems. These seven areas apply to the entire crisis spectrum, from an evolving hybrid threat all the way up to the most demanding scenarios envisaged by Alliance planners.14 In NATO’s renewed understanding, resilience is interconnected with deterrence,15 in the entire spectrum of conflicts, ranging from nuclear and WMD threats, to conventional and hybrid conflicts, to attacks on values and social and economic model. Military equipment has a partial effect on some of these requirements, but this effect is still mainly related to transportation and other sustainment fields. The points where military equipment might have some role are 3) dealing with uncontrolled movements of people, 5) dealing with mass casualties, and 7) resilient transportation systems. The most important pieces of equipment are transport helicopters, because they have a multi-faceted utility in civilian use and disaster relief alongside with their military role.

Role of the military in national resilience The military, with its short notice reaction ability and access to special equipment, can have an important role in disaster relief and in meeting some of baseline resilience requirements, alongside other national infrastructure, institutions and inventory.16 However, the military’s role in resilience depends on our definition of resilience. As we observed, in NATOs instrumental resilience concept, the

14 Shea. „Resilience.” 15 Lasconjarias. „Deterrence through Resilience.” 16 Panda, A. and Amaratunga, D. „Making Cities Resilient To Disasters: “New” Ten Essentials”. In Domingo, N. and Wilkinson S. (eds), 6th International Conference on Building Resilience. Auckland. Massey University and The University of Auckland. 2016. 128. 222 question is more ‘how can the resilience of the civilian population contribute to military success’, and not so much ‘how the military can contribute to national resilience.’ To counter the new challenges of hybrid threat, cyber-attacks, terrorism and other hazards, a conventional response might not be sufficient, so a whole-of-society approach is necessary.17 Connecting the concepts of deterrence and resilience, NATO must be prepared for three different levels of conflict, nuclear and WMD, conventional state-to-state conflict, and hybrid threats, or measures short of war. The responsibility to face these attacks on values and society ultimately rests on the individual nations. Their military forces and the systems operated in them have some degree of contribution to resilience in all of these levels of conflict. However, only a minority of publications highlight the higher importance of the psychological and political aspects of resilience, for example preserving the defensive spirit, and keeping core societal values.18 NATO places the greatest emphasis on civil preparedness, the availability of national infrastructure and services in order to support military operations.

Non-NATO military hardware in NATO After discussing definitions of resilience and potential roles of military forces in enhancing a country’s national resilience, the focus now shifts to the non-NATO made military equipment of NATO countries. There is a substantial amount of non-NATO weapon systems operated by NATO armies. This large category consists of systems produced by neutral countries, and ex-Soviet era hardware still used in the former Warsaw Pact countries. Although NATO is more concerned by its members using the military technologies of its adversary, Russia, weapon systems originating from neutral

17 Lasconjarias. „Deterrence through Resilience.” 3. 18 Lasconjarias. „Deterrence through Resilience.” 5. 223 countries should also fall in a separate category. Technological and logistical support are regulated by inter-state agreements and contracts, but in the event of a military conflict, this level of obligation is not the same as being a NATO ally. The following chart (Figure 1.) shows the size of NATO militaries in 2017, in thousands. To be able to judge the effect and influence of non-NATO military hardware, we need to look at the individual NATO armies’ size, and the percentage of such equipment in their arsenal. This is not an entirely exact procedure to do, because a country might have the majority of its artillery from NATO sources, but all of its 10 aircraft are Russian made. But how do we compare the importance of one item to the other, especially when we want to judge their relation to national resilience? Therefore, after taking into consideration the size of NATO militaries, the second chart (Figure 2.) shows the military equipment of NATO member states (only in Europe, since non-European NATO members do not operate any non-NATO equipment), grouped into land and air systems, and into the most important sub-categories. The blocks are shaded as follows: white if there is no military equipment from a non-NATO source within that category; black where it is more than 50 percent Russian made; dark grey where it is less than 50 percent Russian made; medium grey where more than 50 percent is made in a neutral country, and light grey where less than 50 percent made in a neutral country. The final graphics is a map, showing European NATO members’ armies, represented by a circle, which is proportionally sized according to the manpower (and not strength or other subjectively defined attribute) shown in the first chart. The circles are also shaded, the darkest circles are where more than 50 percent of the equipment blocks in figure 2. are of Russian origin, etc. Turkey is a white circle, because the amount of Russian made equipment is

224 negligible compared to the whole. This is the least objective part, given the problem of comparing different systems.

Figure 1. Number of military personnel in NATO countries in 2017 (in thousands). 19

19 Statista. „Number of military personnel in NATO countries in 2017 (in thousands)”. Statista. 2017. https://www.statista.com/statistics/584286/number-of-military-personnel-in- nato-countries/. Accessed on 15 April 2018. 225

Country Equipment type Land Air MBT IFV APC Arty AT AD FW RW AD Albania Belgium Bulgaria Croatia Czech Republic Denmark Estonia France Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Italy Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Montenegro Netherlands Norway Poland Portugal Romania Slovakia Slovenia Spain Turkey UK Legend: MBT: Main Battle Tank IFV: Infantry Fighting No non-NATO equipment APC: Armored Personnel Neutral equipment <50% Arty: Artillery Neutral equipment >50% AT: Anti-Tank Russian equipment <50% AD: Air Defense Russian equipment >50% FW: Fixed Wing RW: Rotary Wing Figure 2 –Non-NATO military equipment in NATO armies20

20 The Military Balance 2017. London: Routledge. 2017. 62-182. Modified by the author. 226

Figure 3. European NATO members’ military forces and equipment. Circles are proportional to manpower. Colors represent proportion of non-NATO equipment.

The charts and graphics do not include equipment produced under license, because their production and sustainment is less dependent on Russia, the necessary infrastructure is within NATO’s reach. Small arms are also not included. They have a marginal influence on national resilience, and their production, maintenance, and ammunition acquisition is not as restricted as in the case of more technologically advanced and complicated systems. These graphics provide us with a visual representation of the size of the problem, how much non-NATO military equipment permeates NATO armies and what the presence of this equipment can mean in the context of collective resilience.

227

Effects of non-NATO military hardware on resilience The 2016 Warsaw Summit clearly expressed NATO’s concern with Russian made equipment as follows: We will enhance resilience by continuing to invest in robust, flexible, and interoperable military capabilities in accordance with NATO’s Level of Ambition and in line with our pledge on defense investment made at our Summit in Wales. We will protect our military supply chains and are working to address, as appropriate, existing dependencies on Russian-sourced legacy military equipment through national efforts and multinational cooperation.21 After showing several different approaches to resilience and the presence of non-NATO military hardware within NATO armies, we can conclude that the effect of this equipment on our national resilience depends mostly on what we think of resilience in the first place. If we consider military conflicts to be central to our definition of resilience, then the status of our military and the weapon systems it operates and sustains will be of high importance. If we put our focus on society, then it is less important, its influence is restricted to have an effect on transportation, treating mass casualties and disaster relief. If we think about resilience along psychological and political lines, then the military has only a very remote secondary effect, which is related to trust in government services and organizations. NATO focuses on military aspects. In this field, the highest risk originating from the presence of non-NATO hardware arises in the event of a conventional, or a hybrid war (the differentiation is largely a constructed one). In both cases, the military will have a share in the national strategy. In case of disaster relief efforts, where the military

21 „Commitment to enhance resilience.”

228 has a supportive role, their effectiveness can suffer from sustainment difficulties related to the originator country, depending on the actual political relationships to that particular country. In general, sustainment is the most problematic part of operating non-NATO weapon systems. The overall conditions and obsoleteness of the equipment is a separate problem, probably bigger than its origins. This does not mean that NATO allies operating non-NATO military equipment would not have problems on the battlefield in a conventional or hybrid conflict, but this problem would not necessarily belong to the concept, or field, of national resilience. If we have to name one type of equipment that has the biggest impact on national resilience, this should be transport helicopters because of their versatile utilization in a wide range of civilian-7related and disaster-relief activities. Such sophisticated technology is also the most reliant on the support of the originator. Within the field of sustainment, the supply of spare parts and maintenance carry the most risk because of the dependency on a non-NATO supplier. Russia typically has a role in spare parts supply even in licensed production and maintenance contracts, but there are other companies and industrial facilities able to provide sustainment for such technologies, for example LOM Praha, offering full spectrum services, or WZL in Poland carrying out modernization and overhauls.

Conclusions As the previously mentioned quotation from the Warsaw Summit document showed, the Alliance is determined to increase its resilience through strengthening it within each individual nation. For NATO, the primary way to reach this end is building “robust,

229 flexible, and interoperable military capabilities”, 22 which also includes decreasing dependency on Russian military equipment. The necessity to replace these systems coincides with the increasingly outspoken demands from the United States to all allies to increase their defense spending to 2 percent of the GDP. It seems to be reasonable to spend the increased budget on replacing the obsolete and non-NATO technologies. This is what Hungary plans to do in its currently running Zrínyi 2026 program. In the shorter term, an intermediate solution could be to increase the cooperation among those ex-Warsaw Pact countries that have industrial capacities and infrastructure to produce, overhaul or maintain such military equipment. These strategies require economical calculations and political decisions, which will certainly not only be guided by considerations about national resilience. Nevertheless, since the Warsaw Summit, it might increasingly be taken into account.

About the Author Major Zoltán Somodi is a researcher at the HDF Research Center. He graduated from the Zrínyi Miklós National Defence University and was commissioned as a mechanized infantry officer. He obtained his Master’s in Middle East and Central Asia security policy at St Andrews University. In the course of his career he served five rotations in expeditionary operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan. His research interest is political Islam and its European aspects.

Sources “Building Resilience: The EU's approach.” European Commission. 2016.

22 „Commitment to enhance resilience.” 230 http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/themati c/resilience_en.pdf. Accessed on 15 April 2018. Canetti, D.; Waismel-Manor, I.; Cohen, N.; Rapaport, C. “What Does National Resilience Mean in a Democracy? Evidence from the United States and Israel”. Armed Forces and Society. July 2014 Vol. 40 issue: 3, 504-520 http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0095327X12466828. Accessed on 15 April 2018. 2-3. Cole, J. “NATO: Towards a New Resilience Alliance”. RUSI. 01 June 2017. https://rusi.org/commentary/nato-towards-new-resilience- alliance. Accessed on 15 April 2018. “Commitment to enhance resilience Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw, 8-9 July 2016” North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 2016. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133180.htm?s electedLocale=en, accessed on 10 04 2018 Friedland, N. “Introduction - The ‘‘Elusive’’ Concept of Social Resilience”. In Arian, Asher et al. (eds), The Concept of Social Resilience. Haifa. The Technion. Samuel Neaman Institute. 2006. https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2016/Also-in-2016/nato- defence-cyber-resilience/EN/index.htm. Accessed on 15 April 2018. Lasconjarias, G. “Deterrence through Resilience: NATO, the Nations and the Challenges of Being Prepared”. ETHZürich. 09 June 2017. http://www.css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital- library/articles/article.html/ac42738e-f524-462a-bb16- 18e5eba459ef/pdf. Accessed on 15 April 2018. Panda, A. and Amaratunga, D. “Making Cities Resilient To Disasters: “New” Ten Essentials”. In Domingo, N. and Wilkinson S. (eds), 6th International Conference on Building Resilience. 231

Auckland. Massey University and The University of Auckland. 2016. 128. Parmak, M. “National resilience in multinational societies”. ResearchGate. 20 May 2015. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/276978617_National_r esilience_in_multinational_societies. Accessed on 15 April 2018. 9. Shea, J. “Resilience: a core element of collective defence”. NATO Review. 2016. Statista. “Number of military personnel in NATO countries in 2017 (in thousands)”. Statista. 2017. https://www.statista.com/statistics/584286/number-of-military- personnel-in-nato-countries/. Accessed on 15 April 2018. The Military Balance 2017. London: Routledge. 2017. 62-182.

232

Jonáš Syrovátka

How to make elections resilient against disinformation

Introduction The concept of free and fair elections is the foundation of the democratic political system. This procedure requires not only transparent, easily understood, and acknowledged rules, but also has to be (in all its phases) perceived as legitimate by the general public. Because when citizens start to lose trust in the procedure of transferring powers within the political system, they will also lose trust in the system as such. And the political system that is not able to generate public trust is likely doomed to collapse. Therefore it is not an overstatement if the elections are identified as part of the critical “infrastructure,” i.e. a strategic asset of the utmost significance for the proper functioning of the state. For these reasons democratic elections have to be perceived not only as a major political event, but also as a security-related issue. In the Czech context, such understanding is reflected in the fact that the elections fall within the competences of the Ministry of Interior, and also under the scrutiny of various state bodies that are responsible for security.1 In recent years, disinformation has emerged as one of the often- discussed threats to democratic elections.2 In this regard, it is possible to draw upon various examples from the United States of America, France, or Italy, in which disinformation aimed to discredit

1 For example police forces control the voting rooms, and the National Cyber and Information Security Agency supervise cyberspace throughout the course of the elections. 2 In this text, disinformation is understood as the deliberate spread of false news with the aim to influence the electoral decisions of the voters. 233 not only various candidates but also the process as such.3 The damaging consequences of this unfair practice must not be underestimated. Disinformation aims to undermine trust within society by attacking various individuals, social groups, state institutions and the mainstream media.4 In such a climate, the state institutions have to be extremely careful when dealing with this phenomenon. The reason is that an overdose of, and thoughtless interference by, the state into the information space—especially before the elections—might be harmful, because the public might get the impression that state institutions are in fact trying to meddle in the elections. Such a perception might again have an accumulative effect, resulting in the decrease of trust in the election process, and fuel another wave of disinformation. Therefore civil society, the media, and candidates themselves should also play a vital role in tackling this threat. This text presents the experiences gained from two projects conducted by the Prague Security Studies Institute, focusing up the analysis of disinformation campaigns prior to the Czech Parliamentary elections in October 2017, and the Presidential elections in January 2018.5 The findings and recommendations from

3 Jackson, D. “Issue brief: how disinformation impacts politics and publics“. National Endowment for Democracy. 29. 5. 2018. https://www.ned.org/issue- brief-how-disinformation-impacts-politics-and- publics/?_cldee=c3lyb3ZhdGthQHBzc2kuY3o%3D&recipientid=contact- 830d88adcd47e81180f1005056a456ce- ba964a1a8d484d8c88a72e93abb82037&esid=cb09c0c0-0d6f-e811-80f1- 005056a456ce, Date accessed: 20. 6. 2018 4 The term mainstream media describes the established newspapers, TV channels or news websites that influence a large number of people, reflect and at the same time also shape prevailing currents of thought, while maintaining the norms of journalist ethics with transparent ownership structure. 5 Syrovátka, J. ”České volby v éře dezinfromací: Parlamentní volby 2017”. PSSI. 30. 10. 2017. http://www.pssi.cz/russia-s-influence-activities-in- cee/volby/parliamentaryelection2017/detail, Date accessed 20. 6. 2018; Syrovátka, J. and Hroch, J. “České volby v éře dezinformací: Prezidentské volby 234 these projects are presented in four chapters. First the context of the Czech elections and the shape of the information space are introduced. Second, the text explains the methodology of researchers and points out its strengths and limitations. Third, there is a comparison of two cases from the Czech elections looking at the harmful impact of disinformation, and how it can be effectively mitigated. Fourth, the phenomenon of disinformation is presented in the broader context of the information space and includes recommendations for other actors, such as journalists and candidates.

The Czech elections and the media landscape The Czech Republic is a parliamentary democracy with two chambers: the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. The powers of these chambers are unequal; the Chamber of Deputies may, for example, overrule a veto of the Senate relatively easily. Therefore, the Parliamentary elections, held every four years, represent a major political event. But, due to the continuing erosion of the party system established after 1989, and the strengthening of newly emerging (populist or, in some cases, even extremist) parties and movements, the elections in October 2017 were particularly important for the further development of the Czech political landscape. In the end, the populist movement “ANO” lead by billionaire Andrej Babiš won the elections with a significant margin. At the moment, it is important to note that the Chamber of Deputies is fragmented (there are representatives from seven parties which is the highest number in Czech history) and a ruling government still has not been established. Even though according to the constitution the president should be a rather ceremonial figure, people who have held this office

2018”. PSSI. 1. 2. 2018. http://www.pssi.cz/russia-s-influence-activities-in- cee/volby/presidentialelection2018/detail, Date accessed 20. 6. 2018 235 usually have typically had a strong though informal influence due to historical reasons and context. The authority of the presidential post was strengthened even more in 2013, when the president began to be chosen not by the Parliament, but by two rounds of a popular vote. The Presidential elections in January 2018 were characteristic for sharpened rhetoric which contributed to the strengthening of divisions within society. This was due not only to the fact that the incumbent president, Miloš Zeman, running for re-election was and remains a very controversial figure (regarding his statements attacking journalists for example), but also to the fact that the popular vote of the presidential post is still a quite new and unvarnished element of Czech political life. In the end, President Zeman was re-elected. Due to the high level of tension in society caused by various reasons, including a highly polarized discussion about migration, and the presence of populists and extremist candidates, the Czech Parliamentary and Presidential Elections presented a fairly fertile ground for various kinds of disinformation. In retrospect, it is fair to say that the debate about the influence of disinformation on Czech society started much earlier: in 2015 in connection with Ukrainian crisis.6 Moreover, this debate was not limited only to the expert community, but also involved general public. It was cited on numerous occasions that the main source of disinformation in the Czech information space comes from approximately sixty platforms (mostly various websites, Facebook pages and groups, or YouTube

6 Kovanda, O. “Hybridní válka? Buďme s tím označením opatrní, radí experti”. iDNES. 18. 1. 2018. ttps://zpravy.idnes.cz/hybridni-valka-rozhovor-eberle- daniel-rusko-fme-/zpr_nato.aspx?c=A180118_094512_zpr_nato_inc, Date accessed: 20. 6. 2018 236 channels).78 Aside from the occasional spreading of disinformation, these platforms publish various articles, usually pursuing narratives undermining Western democracies and ideals. Platforms spreading disinformation are often closely connected to a group of extremist individuals who are gaining access to the space for their radical statements. Even though such platforms have a certain base of followers, their outreach is limited because there is quite a significant gap between the “alternative” and mainstream media sources.9 However, there were cases when the mainstream media republished disinformation that originally appeared on alternative sources. For example, in 2014, even mainstream media outlets mentioned the conspiracy theory according to which demonstrations against President Zeman were organized and paid for by the U.S. Embassy.10 Nowadays, such reporting happens rarely, if at all. Alternative media sources are usually closely interconnected, and content which is first published on one of them usually spreads quickly to the others. This circulation of information underlines the fact that only a small percentage of content from alternative media is original. Rather, the majority of content from these platforms is republished and only slightly modified, coming from other alternative media

7 The most up-to-date list of those platforms can be found on the website, Konspiratori.sk. 8 Unlike in Western countries, Twitter is not very important for the spread of disinformation in the Czech context. 9 Even though using the term alternative media to describe platforms spreading disinformation is not entirely correct, the author decided to use it in this text. Aside from the practical reasons, it also illustrates the fact that those platforms are aiming to construct a fictional reality which opposes the mainstream media coverage, as could be seen in the reporting on the poisoning of Sergei Skripal. Syrovátka, J. “Skripal: The Two Faces of the Czech Media Space”. Visegrad Insight. 18. 5. 2018. http://visegradinsight.eu/skripal-the-two-faces-of-the-czech-media-space/, Date accessed: 20. 6. 2018 10 “Kde se vzaly ČERVENÉ KARTY pro Zemana? ČTYŘI TEORIE”. TVNova. 20. 11. 2014. http://tn.nova.cz/clanek/kde-se-vzala-cervena-karta-pro-zemana-z- ambasady-usa.html. Date accessed 20. 6. 2018 237 outlets, blogs, or even mainstream news sources. In summary, these alternative platforms may have mobilized a limited group of voters themselves before the elections took place. Such ambition by alternative media outlets was clearly visible before both the observed elections, since a number of articles were accompanied by candidate endorsements. However, the outreach and impact of such recommendations should not be overestimated.11 The situation changes when there is an influencer (such as a politician, a respected expert figure, or other famous people with various backgrounds) who is able to transmit the disinformation or narrative from the alternative to the mainstream media. In this respect, research shows that the involvement of influential persons or institutions which have access to mainstream media and their own group of followers, significantly accelerates the spread of messages overall, disinformation included.12 Throughout the course of the elections, the most important source of information was the candidates themselves. In the Czech Parliamentary as well as Presidential Elections, there were parties or candidates known to be endorsed on alternative media sources and occasionally contributed to spreading the narratives which appeared on these platforms.13

11 Krejčí, K. “Kdo nás dezinformuje?”. Evropské hodnoty. 27. 9. 2017. http://www.evropskehodnoty.cz/vyzkum/kdonasdezinformuje/, Date accessed: 20. 6. 2018; Wierzejski, A. et al. “Information warfare in the Internet”. StopFake.org. 1. 7. 2017. https://www.stopfake.org/en/information-warfare-in- the-internet-exposing-and-countering-pro-kremlin-disinformation-in-the-cee- countries/, Date accessed: 20. 6. 2018. 12 Lottan, G. and Gaffney, D. “Breaking Bin Laden: Visualizing The Power Of A Single Tweet”. SocialFlow. 6. 5. 2011. http://www.socialflow.com/breaking-bin-laden-visualizing-the-power-of-a- single/, Date accesed: 20. 6. 2018; Vis, F. “How Does False Information Spread Online?”. SocialScienceSpace. 16. 4. 2014. https://www.socialsciencespace.com/2014/04/how-does-false-information- spread-online/, Date accessed: 20. 6. 2018. 13 Specifically, it is possible to name the extreme left-wing Communist Party, whose members were often involved in the spread of Russian propaganda concerning the conflict in Ukraine, the right-wing extreme party SPD, which 238

The parties and selected candidates were sometimes taking advantage of this, and one might assume that similar techniques were be used to improve their election results. Therefore, the vigilance of state agencies, NGOs, and the general public was very much in place before both elections.

Research methodology The research methodology for these projects was developed in such a way as to respect the aforementioned specifics of the Czech media landscape, and to address the weakest points of the elections with regard to disinformation. Within the project framework, PSSI observed the overall flow of information connected with the topic of elections on the most prominent platforms known to be spreading disinformation.14 The prominence of the analysed platforms was deduced based on the following factors:  they are largely popular on Facebook (in the Czech context this means more than 10 000 followers) and are successful in spreading their content to other alternative media;  they are occasionally involved in creating or spreading disinformation;  they produced their own original content.

During the election campaign (approximately two months before the elections) every article which was published on the analysed platforms, and mentioned at least one of the candidates (primarily for the presidential office) was thoroughly collected. These articles were subsequently evaluated according to various

fueled and utilized fear caused by the migration crisis in 2015, and incumbent president Miloš Zeman, who previously tolerated disinformation aiming to discredit his opponent during the Presidential Elections in 2013. 14 Before the Parliamentary Elections eleven platforms were analysed, and six before the Presidential Elections. 239 criteria, such as the topic of the article, genre of the article,15 the sentiment towards the mentioned candidate (or candidates), and the article’s popularity on Facebook. This assessment allowed us to identify to what extent the particular platform is interested in the topic of the elections, which topics are prevailing on analysed platforms, and also which candidates are most supported, and which are criticized. The spread of articles containing disinformation was also analysed with the use of the ICT monitoring tool >versus<, developed by the International Republic Institute. Therefore it was possible to evaluate how successful various disinformation cases were in penetrating the information space. It was also possible to identify various transmitters which brought them from alternative media to the mainstream space. The chosen methodology had its downsides that should be explained and addressed. Even though selected platforms represented the most likely primary sources of disinformation in the Czech information space, it was not possible to exclude the possibility that disinformation connected with elections also appeared on other, less prominent platforms. By focusing only on the alternative media, it was not possible for the research to identify disinformation created by other actors of the information space (such as extremists, bloggers, or various Facebook sites or internet forums). However this obstacle was partially overcome due to the fact that the observed platforms also re-publish content from other alternative media or like-minded sources (such as blogs or Facebook profiles of extremists). Another shortcoming of the methodology lies in the fact that by focusing solely on the articles connected directly with the election campaign, it was not possible to track other narratives or disinformation campaigns that were spread by alternative media websites, and might eventually support some of

15 The following genres were distinguished: news, commentary, interview, political statement, and disinformation. 240 the candidates. In the Czech context, this would mostly concern the issue of migration that was heavily used by extremist candidates. Another, rather unexpected obstacle appeared before Presidential Elections, when the chain mails became an important instrument for spreading disinformation, and it was not possible to assess their influence within the project’s framework. Despite these shortcomings, the chosen methodology was able to generate reliable data about the ways in which the prominent alternative media sources reported on the elections, and indicated to what extent disinformation shaped the public debate. Nevertheless it is important to note that the methodology is suited for the Czech information space where there is still a visible division between the mainstream and alternative media outlets. In addition, television still holds an important role in general news consumption in the Czech Republic.16 In other information environments where the line between mainstream and alternative media is increasingly becoming blurred, (and so the term alternative becomes meaningless) or some mainstream media outlets are engaged in the spread of disinformation, it would not be possible to use the proposed research methodology.

Lithium vs. Soros Our research identified two cases that can serve as a good example of the worst and best case scenarios when it comes to elections and disinformation. The so-called “lithium affair,” which was initially spread only on alternative media sources, erupted before the Parliamentary Elections in October 2017, and to a certain extent influenced the results. The speculation over the involvement of billionaire, George Soros, appeared before the Presidential

16 “Nejdůležitější zdroj informací Čechů? Pořád televizní zprávy”. Mediahub. 22. 7. 2015. https://mediahub.cz/media/525355-nejdulezitejsi-zdroj-informaci- cechu-porad-televizni-zpravy, Date accesed: 21. 6. 2018 241

Elections in January 2018, but were quickly debunked and so this story only played a marginal role. By comparing these two examples, it is possible to illustrate that the timely identification and debunking of disinformation might significantly foster the resilience of the information space before elections. One of the most surprising topics of the campaign in late 2017 before the Parliamentary Elections was the supposedly large stockpiles of lithium in Czech Republic. The debate about possible mining of yet untouched stockpiles of lithium has not been limited to the expert community, but actually started on alternative media outlets. This metal was presented as a magical solution for all kinds of problems with the local economy, and the factor that will significantly increase the living standard of Czech citizens. This positive outlook was usually accompanied by warnings suggesting that politicians and business elites might try to steal the revenues from the lithium for themselves. This topic was mentioned by various platforms, but its most vocal promoter was the notorious website known for spreading disinformation, Aeronet.17 Three weeks before the elections, the Minister of Industry and Trade, Jiří Havlíček, member of the Social Democratic Party, signed a harmless memorandum about the exploration of possible lithium deposits with Australian mining company Europeum Metals Holding.18 This event was utilized by Aeronet who presented this memorandum as a theft of national treasure in broad daylight. According to its interpretation, the corrupt Social Democrats were bribed by the Australian company that is now entitled to obtain a license for

17 “Aeronet.cz: ozvěny kremlu v ČR”. Neovlivní. 23. 6. 2015. http://neovlivni.cz/aeronet-cz-rusky-vliv-cr/. Date accesed: 21. 6. 2018 18 Souček, O. “Stát podepsal memorandum s australskými těžaři. Zajistí, že se lithium bude zpracovávat v Česku”. IHNED. 3. 10. 2017. https://archiv.ihned.cz/c1-65900260-stat-podepsal-memorandum-s- australskymi-tezari-zajisti-ze-se-lithium-bude-zpracovavat-v-cesku. Date accesed: 21. 6. 2018 242 mining. The anonymous author also tried to make the story more appealing by comparing the lithium affair to some of the cases of stolen state property that occurred in the 1990s during the privatization period after the breakup of the Communist regime.19 This story quickly spread across various alternative media sites, social media platforms, and was also utilized in the campaign by several extremist (including the above mentioned Communist Party and SPD). However this disinformation really entered the media mainstream at the moment when it was picked-up by the movement ANO, and became a topic of a special meeting of the Chamber of Deputies. The leader of ANO, Andrej Babiš, repeatedly accused the Social Democrats of plotting a scheme that will lead to the stealing of lithium stockpiles.20 In this respect, the mainstream media failed to quickly uncover the origin of the story, and focused only on the occurring debate.21 On the other hand, the Social Democrats were not able to explain the situation which had an influence on the final election results. According to the internal documents of the Social

19 “Megatunel za 3 biliony korun pouhých 17 dní před volbami do sněmovny? Australští těžaři na poslední chvíli dostali od ministra průmyslu bianco šek na privatizaci těžby lithia pod Cínovcem! Český stát si za lithiový národní poklad řekl jenom o vytvoření nekvalifikovaných pracovních míst!”. Aeronet. 4. 10. 2017. https://aeronet.cz/news/megatunel-za-3-biliony-korun-pouhych-17-dni-pred- volbami-do-snemovny-australsti-tezari-na-posledni-chvili-dostali-od-ministra- prumyslu-bianco-sek-na-privatizaci-tezby-lithia-pod-cinovcem-cesky-stat/. Date accessed: 21. 6. 2018 20 Kopecký, J. and Leinert, O. “Bojuje se o lithium. Babiš mluví o krádeži ČSSD, Zaorálek to odmítl”. IDNES. 6. 10. 2017. https://zpravy.idnes.cz/boj-politiku-o-lithium-mimoradna-schuze-f07- /domaci.aspx?c=A171006_124357_domaci_kop. Date accessed: 21. 6. 2018 21 The first article pointing out the origin of the story was published on 11 November, more than two weeks after the elections. Ehl, M. “Střed Evropy Martina Ehla: Aféra lithium - z proruských serverů až do sněmovny”. IHNED. 15. 11. 2017. https://archiv.ihned.cz/c1-65955890-stred-evropy-martina-ehla-afera-lithium- se-zrodila-na-konspiracnim-proruskem-serveru-pres-babise-se-dostala-do- snemovny-a-zrejme-ovlivnila-volby. Date accessed: 21. 6. 2018 243

Democrats, the “lithium affair” resulted in a loss of 3 percent of votes which were collected by the ANO movement in an effort to target the same group of voters.22 After the elections, this topic promptly disappeared from the public sphere of debate. Therefore, the “lithium affair” represents a good example of the possible malicious influence of disinformation on democratic elections. The “lithium affair” contributed to the already tense atmosphere before the Presidential Elections. It was generally expected that disinformation campaigns may play a role during these elections. Not only had disinformation already influenced the elections in 2013 (when it was suggested that the ancestors of one of the leading candidates collaborated with Nazi Germany during World War II), but also the first false story—accusing one of the leading candidates of collaborating with the communist secret police—had already appeared in June 2017, just six months before the elections.23 Another disinformation campaign, according to which the opponents of Miloš Zeman were financed by George Soros, appeared in December 2017 on the website Aeronet.24 Even though the narrative about the

22 Šafaříková, K. “poslední váhající voliče vehnalo do náruče ano lithium”. RESPEKT. 26. 10. 2017. https://www.respekt.cz/politika/posledni-vahajici-volice-vehnalo-do-naruce- ano-lithium. Date accesed: 21. 6. 2018 23 Lidovky. “Na prezidentské kandidáty už se lije ‚špína‘. Hanopisy útočí na Horáčka i Drahoše”. Lidovky. 23. 8. 2017. https://www.lidovky.cz/na- prezidentske-adepty-uz-se-lije-spina-drahose-vini-ze-spoluprace-s-stb-1ay- /zpravy-domov.aspx?c=A170722_182441_ln_domov_ELE, Date accessed: 21. 6. 2018 24 “Víme první! George Soros v utajení navštívil Prahu a otevřel si účet v UniCredit Bank! V polovině října převedl na svoji neziskovku Open Society v Londýně přes 18 miliard dolarů! Účet v UniCredit si otevřel i Karel Schwarzenberg! Chystá se kreditní linka pro prezidentské kandidáty proti Zemanovi? Anebo jde o přípravu na přesun Středoevropské univerzity do Prahy?”. Aeronet. 8. 12. 2017. https://aeronet.cz/news/vime-prvni-george-soros-v-utajeni-navstivil-prahu-a- otevrel-si-ucet-v-unicredit-bank-v-polovine-rijna-prevedl-na-svoji-neziskovku- open-society-v-londyne-pres-18-miliard-dolaru-ucet-v-unicredit/. Date accessed: 21. 6. 2018 244 malicious influence of George Soros on domestic politics was not truly established in the Czech Republic, this disinformation still had the potential (through combining with for example the issue of migration) to develop into a viral message that could shape the debate before the elections. Therefore—based on our warning—this disinformation was debunked by the daily news, Hospodářské noviny, several days after it was first published.25 The article was widely shared on social media, including by presidential candidates. Disinformation about the interference of George Soros into the elections then practically disappeared from the information space and was brought up again only occasionally by various extremists (e. g. by leading member of Communist Party Josef Skála). Therefore, there is no reason to believe that it had a serious impact on the results of the elections. Moreover, it is possible to see that timely early warnings may mitigate, or even completely suppress, the impact of disinformation on the course of elections. By comparing those two cases it is possible to illustrate that disinformation firstly appearing on marginal platforms may have a serious impact on the course of the elections. The decisive factor is when the argument is retaken by influential transmitters who are able to push it into the mainstream media space. Therefore this

25 Ehl, M. and Dragoun R. “Proruský dezinformační server Aeronet se snaží ovlivnit prezidentské volby. Tvrdí, že Zemanovy soupeře sponzorují Soros a Schwarzenberg”. IHNED. 12. 12. 2017. https://archiv.ihned.cz/c1-65987380-prorusky-server-se-snazi-ovlivnit- prezidentske-volby. Date accessed: 21. 6. 2018 Jackson, D. “Issue brief: how disinformation impacts politics and publics“. National Endowment for Democracy. 29. 5. 2018. https://www.ned.org/issue- brief-how-disinformation-impacts-politics-and- publics/?_cldee=c3lyb3ZhdGthQHBzc2kuY3o%3D&recipientid=contact- 830d88adcd47e81180f1005056a456ce- ba964a1a8d484d8c88a72e93abb82037&esid=cb09c0c0-0d6f-e811-80f1- 005056a456ce, Date accessed: 20. 6. 2018 245 element of spreading disinformation deserves serious attention from the civil society and the media before elections. As a result of these findings, it is fair to say that it is vital to build relationships between the expert community (universities, think- tanks or independent researchers) and journalists to fight disinformation aiming to influence the election process. State institutions that are tasked to deal with disinformation, should be rather reserved in the course of election campaign for above mentioned reasons (excluding the extreme cases when the whole credibility of the process is endangered).26

Disinformation in a broader context Even though such disinformation as the “lithium affair” or the funding of George Soros of some candidates usually receive the most media attention, it should be understood that these individual cases represent the exception rather than the rule. Our research findings show that disinformation campaigns were present only in 1 percent of the texts included in the research sample; other genres clearly prevailed. In fact, a significant number of articles published on the analysed platforms were factionally correct. That does not mean though, that they were non-biased. On the contrary, it was possible to see non-critical commentaries about certain candidates, attempts to frame events in a specific way (for example through the use of manipulative titles or pictures), selective reporting or direct voting recommendation. Given the prevalence of these rather subtle manipulation techniques it is possible to argue that they had stronger impact on the voting decision of their readers rather than

26 The Czech Centrum against Terrorism and Hybrid Threats acted in that manner before both elections, when it de-bunked only one disinformation campaign which misinterpreted the course of election process. Metnar, L. “Prohlášení ministra vnitra k volbě prezidenta”. MV ČR. 12. 1. 2018. http://www.mvcr.cz/clanek/prohlaseni-ministra-vnitra-k-volbe- prezidenta.aspx. Date accesed: 21. 6. 2018 246 pure disinformation campaigns. Therefore to label the analysed platforms simply as disinformation is misleading. Instead, it should be concluded that some of these platforms are politically engaged, and thus they tried to support their favorite candidate, or seek to meet the likely political preferences of their readers. It should also be understood that such behavior is not that different from other partisan media or interest groups aiming to influence the election results. In this context, it is possible to see that the problem of resilience in the information space prior to the elections does not only fit for the security realm. Another important layer is the proper civic education and media literacy. Citizens have to be able to distinguish between genuine news sources providing non-biased news, and partisan information supporting a particular candidate or ideology. This applies not only to the hyperpartisan alternative media, but also to the information space in general. In this regard, journalists play an indispensable role as well. Only when they comply to the high standards of professional and ethic behavior it is possible to maintain the gap between non-biased media and partisan (or alternative) sources. The blurring of this division is a significantly more serious problem than the spread of disinformation. This is especially relevant at the time of the elections and specifically regarding the example of the debate preceding the second round of the Presidential Elections 2018. According to the opinion polls, these debates played a major role in the decision making of undecided voters. The problem was that the first debate—conducted on the private television channel TV Prima—was poorly moderated, focused on the manipulatively-framed, socially divisive issues of minor importance, and accompanied by a shouting public, creating the atmosphere of football match.27 This ambition to turn an issue of

27 “Rada obdržela jedenáct stížností na duel prezidentských kandidátů na Primě”. Echo24. 25. 1. 2018. 247 major importance such as the elections into a show is consequently more harmful for the integrity of the election process and social cohesion than disinformation produced by various marginal platforms. Therefore the push for higher standards within the media shall be included in the measures adopted to strengthen the information resilience of the election process. The second important actor that should be mentioned while speaking about the resilience of the election process, are the candidates themselves. Not only should they distance themselves from the use of disinformation in their campaigns (and if they do not do so they should be held accountable), but also they should be very careful while publicly commenting on such issues. Since they are still in the centre of the media's attention, they are also the influencing the perception of the public about such an event. And so, if they start to put too much emphasis on the role of disinformation in the elections without having concrete proof, they are actually contributing to the undermining of the whole election process. Ironically, this may be the actual goal of those who are really spreading disinformation. There were also candidates in the Czech elections who attributed their defeat mainly to the influence of disinformation, without respecting the fact that the reality (as it was mentioned above) was much more complicated.28 These baseless claims only increased the partisan thinking and the strengthening of

https://echo24.cz/a/SaBzF/rada-obdrzela-jedenact-stiznosti-na-duel- prezidentskych-kandidatu-na-prime. Date accessed: 21. 6. 2018 28 Kabátová, Š. “Drahošovi utekli hlavně ti voliči, kteří chtějí Babiše za premiéra, říká sociolog Prokop”. Lidovky. 28. 1. 2018. https://www.lidovky.cz/drahosovi-utekli-hlavne-ti-volici-kteri-chteji-babise-za- premiera-rika-sociolog-g0j-/zpravy- domov.aspx?c=A180127_211930_ln_domov_sk, Date accessed: 21. 6. 2018 Kopecký, J. and Leinert, O. “Bojuje se o lithium. Babiš mluví o krádeži ČSSD, Zaorálek to odmítl”. IDNES. 6. 10. 2017. https://zpravy.idnes.cz/boj-politiku-o-lithium-mimoradna-schuze-f07- /domaci.aspx?c=A171006_124357_domaci_kop. Date accessed: 21. 6. 2018 248 the echo chambers that happened to be common in the Czech polity, and so did more harm than good for the quality of democracy in the country. The fact that disinformation represents only small part of the content of the alternative media implies that they are not playing the major role in shaping of electoral behavior. More important factors are the framed messages, partisan reporting, or the non-professional approach of the mainstream media. Therefore, such attempts at improving the resilience of elections should not be limited only to debunking of disinformation. Other—non-security—measures should be applied such as promoting media literacy, insisting on high-quality journalism, or the non-biased coverage of election processes.

Conclusion The complexity of resilience requires the involvement of various actors in a variety of areas of the election process. Since the state, other institutions, and society can hardly be separated from each other, it is important to understand that if one particular actor fails to behave responsibly, the resilience of the whole system might be at stake. There is only a few other occasions during which the democratic society would be more vulnerable than the elections. Strong social tensions produced by this process represents a great opportunity for domestic or foreign actors who intend to undermine the democratic institutions and processes of the state. The contemporary widespread and non-regulated information space is a perfect playground for those who are aiming to manipulate the public through disinformation campaigns, manipulative framing, and a biased interpretation of reality or other means. Therefore, state institutions, journalists, the expert community, and politicians themselves should dedicate serious attention to the resilience of the election process in various spheres, including the information one.

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The presented research contributes to the raising of resilience of the Czech elections by mapping the coverage of platforms known to be spreading disinformation. By informing the candidates and journalists about the reporting of the alternative media and warning against the appearing disinformation, it was possible to prevent such campaigns from leaving the echo chamber of the alternative media, and enter the mainstream. The comparison of the impact of the so- called “lithium affair” and speculation over the financial involvement of George Soros in the campaigns, show that these techniques might have a serious impact on the spread of false stories. Therefore, countries with a similar media landscape should pay close attention, as they aim to increase the resilience of their elections. However, this approach tackles only part of the problem, because disinformation aiming to discredit various candidates was rather marginal. The framed messages, biased reporting and other practices represent an equal challenge to the information resilience of the elections. De-bunking of disinformation is an important tool, but equal attention should be dedicated to the education of the population, the cultivation of the public debate, and maintaining the gap between unbiased news coverage and partisan media content. These tasks should concern all the actors engaged in the election process, politicians, journalists, private companies, and last but not least, voters. Otherwise, the failure of one of these factors might discredit the whole election process. And from that, there is only a small step to the undermining of the democratic system as such.

About the author Jonáš Syrovátka is a Project Coordinator at Prague Security Studies Institute, working primarily on projects concerning Russian influence activities in the Czech Republic. He leads the project

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„Czech election in the ear of disinformation” focused on the impact of disinformation on the elections.

Sources “Aeronet.cz: ozvěny kremlu v ČR”. Neovlivní. 23. 6. 2015. http://neovlivni.cz/aeronet-cz-rusky-vliv-cr/. Ehl, M. “Střed Evropy Martina Ehla: Aféra lithium - z proruských serverů až do sněmovny”. IHNED. 15. 11. 2017. https://archiv.ihned.cz/c1-65955890-stred-evropy-martina-ehla- afera-lithium-se-zrodila-na-konspiracnim-proruskem-serveru-pres- babise-se-dostala-do-snemovny-a-zrejme-ovlivnila-volby Ehl, M. and Dragoun R. “Proruský dezinformační server Aeronet se snaží ovlivnit prezidentské volby. Tvrdí, že Zemanovy soupeře sponzorují Soros a Schwarzenberg”. IHNED. 12. 12. 2017. https://archiv.ihned.cz/c1-65987380-prorusky-server-se-snazi- ovlivnit-prezidentske-volby Echo24. “Rada obdržela jedenáct stížností na duel prezidentských kandidátů na Primě”. Echo24. 25. 1. 2018. https://echo24.cz/a/SaBzF/rada-obdrzela-jedenact-stiznosti-na- duel-prezidentskych-kandidatu-na-prime Jackson, D. “Issue brief: how disinformation impacts politics and publics“. National Endowment for Democracy. 29. 5. 2018. https://www.ned.org/issue-brief-how-disinformation-impacts- politics-and-publics/?_cldee=c3lyb3ZhdGthQHBzc2kuY3o percent3D&recipientid=contact- 830d88adcd47e81180f1005056a456ce- ba964a1a8d484d8c88a72e93abb82037&esid=cb09c0c0-0d6f-e811- 80f1-005056a456ce

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Kabátová, Š. “Drahošovi utekli hlavně ti voliči, kteří chtějí Babiše za premiéra, říká sociolog Prokop”. Lidovky. 28. 1. 2018. https://www.lidovky.cz/drahosovi-utekli-hlavne-ti-volici-kteri- chteji-babise-za-premiera-rika-sociolog-g0j-/zpravy- domov.aspx?c=A180127_211930_ln_domov_sk Kopecký, J. and Leinert, O. “Bojuje se o lithium. Babiš mluví o krádeži ČSSD, Zaorálek to odmítl”. IDNES. 6. 10. 2017. https://zpravy.idnes.cz/boj-politiku-o-lithium-mimoradna- schuze-f07-/domaci.aspx?c=A171006_124357_domaci_kop Kovanda, O. “Hybridní válka? Buďme s tím označením opatrní, radí experti”. iDNES. 18. 1. 2018. https://zpravy.idnes.cz/hybridni- valka-rozhovor-eberle-daniel-rusko-fme- /zpr_nato.aspx?c=A180118_094512_zpr_nato_inc Krejčí, K. “Kdo nás dezinformuje?”. Evropské hodnoty. 27. 9. 2017. http://www.evropskehodnoty.cz/vyzkum/kdonasdezinformuje/ Lidovky. “Na prezidentské kandidáty už se lije ‚špína‘. Hanopisy útočí na Horáčka i Drahoše”. Lidovky. 23. 8. 2017. https://www.lidovky.cz/na-prezidentske-adepty-uz-se-lije-spina- drahose-vini-ze-spoluprace-s-stb-1ay-/zpravy- domov.aspx?c=A170722_182441_ln_domov_ELE, Lottan, G. and Gaffney, D. “Breaking Bin Laden: Visualizing The Power Of A Single Tweet”. SocialFlow. 6. 5. 2011. http://www.socialflow.com/breaking-bin-laden-visualizing-the- power-of-a-single/ “Megatunel za 3 biliony korun pouhých 17 dní před volbami do sněmovny? Australští těžaři na poslední chvíli dostali od ministra průmyslu bianco šek na privatizaci těžby lithia pod Cínovcem! Český stát si za lithiový národní poklad řekl jenom o vytvoření nekvalifikovaných pracovních míst!”. Aeronet. 4. 10. 2017. https://aeronet.cz/news/megatunel-za-3-biliony-korun-pouhych- 252

17-dni-pred-volbami-do-snemovny-australsti-tezari-na-posledni- chvili-dostali-od-ministra-prumyslu-bianco-sek-na-privatizaci- tezby-lithia-pod-cinovcem-cesky-stat/ Metnar, L. “Prohlášení ministra vnitra k volbě prezidenta”. MV ČR. 12. 1. 2018. http://www.mvcr.cz/clanek/prohlaseni-ministra- vnitra-k-volbe-prezidenta.aspx “Nejdůležitější zdroj informací Čechů? Pořád televizní zprávy”. Mediahub. 22. 7. 2015. https://mediahub.cz/media/525355- nejdulezitejsi-zdroj-informaci-cechu-porad-televizni-zpravy Souček, O. “Stát podepsal memorandum s australskými těžaři. Zajistí, že se lithium bude zpracovávat v Česku”. IHNED. 3. 10. 2017. https://archiv.ihned.cz/c1-65900260-stat-podepsal-memorandum- s-australskymi-tezari-zajisti-ze-se-lithium-bude-zpracovavat-v- cesku Syrovátka, J. ”České volby v éře dezinfromací: Parlamentní volby 2017”. PSSI. 30. 10. 2017. http://www.pssi.cz/russia-s-influence- activities-in-cee/volby/parliamentaryelection2017/detail Syrovátka, J. “Skripal: The Two Faces of the Czech Media Space”. Visegrad Insight. 18. 5. 2018. http://visegradinsight.eu/skripal-the- two-faces-of-the-czech-media-space/ Syrovátka, J. and Hroch, J. “České volby v éře dezinformací: Prezidentské volby 2018”. PSSI. 1. 2. 2018. http://www.pssi.cz/russia-s-influence-activities-in- cee/volby/presidentialelection2018/detail Šafaříková, K. “poslední váhající voliče vehnalo do náruče ano lithium”. RESPEKT. 26. 10. 2017. https://www.respekt.cz/politika/posledni-vahajici-volice- vehnalo-do-naruce-ano-lithium

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“Kde se vzaly ČERVENÉ KARTY pro Zemana? ČTYŘI TEORIE”. TVNova. 20. 11. 2014. http://tn.nova.cz/clanek/kde-se-vzala- cervena-karta-pro-zemana-z-ambasady-usa.html. Date accessed 20. 6. 2018 Vis, F. “How Does False Information Spread Online?”. SocialScienceSpace. 16. 4. 2014. https://www.socialsciencespace.com/2014/04/how-does-false- information-spread-online/ “Víme první! George Soros v utajení navštívil Prahu a otevřel si účet v UniCredit Bank! V polovině října převedl na svoji neziskovku Open Society v Londýně přes 18 miliard dolarů! Účet v UniCredit si otevřel i Karel Schwarzenberg! Chystá se kreditní linka pro prezidentské kandidáty proti Zemanovi? Anebo jde o přípravu na přesun Středoevropské univerzity do Prahy?”. Aeronet. 8. 12. 2017. https://aeronet.cz/news/vime-prvni-george- soros-v-utajeni-navstivil-prahu-a-otevrel-si-ucet-v-unicredit-bank- v-polovine-rijna-prevedl-na-svoji-neziskovku-open-society-v- londyne-pres-18-miliard-dolaru-ucet-v-unicredit/. Wierzejski, A. et al. “Information warfare in the Internet”. StopFake.org. 1. 7. 2017. https://www.stopfake.org/en/information-warfare-in-the- internet-exposing-and-countering-pro-kremlin-disinformation-in- the-cee-countries/

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Zsolt Szabó

Can a "Cyber Jihad" be Prevented? - Targeted Attack on the Public Sector

Vision: "The cyber jihad would be launched with the attack of Al-Qaeda, and the destruction of the World Trade Center would seem to be a game of childbearing, destroying the billion dollar fortunes, paralyzing the Internet, which is so dependent on the West, launching floods, stopping and destroying power plants, nuclear power plants. It's a great deal of information that is going to be lost."1 Reality: "The efforts of 74 countries have been affected by the criminals' wave of attacks on Friday, which began with the collapse of the British healthcare system, and has been devastated only by a software malware developed by the US Secret Service (NSA), which has paralyzed computers in 99 countries. WannaCry and other similar malicious programs will release the blocked computer in exchange for $ 300. (...) The projections suggest that further threats are to be expected, and that it is even more justified to strengthen the protection of our electronic information systems."2

Introduction The United States of America and the European Union Member States are vulnerable to the complexity of electronic information systems. State operations (e-democracy and e-governance) and various services (e-government) cannot be performed without them.

1 Russinovich, Mark. Zero Day: A Novel. New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2011. pp. 1- 350. 2 “Massive ransomware cyber-attack hits nearly 100 countries around the world.” The Guardian, May 12 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/may/12/global-cyber-attack- ransomware-nsa-uk-nhs 255

Both modern economic systems and society require this infrastructure, these assets and services, therefore they must be protected. The information in their operation and the data they manage are significant assets. Hungary also has infrastructure assets that are necessary in everyday life – from the economy through politics to the lives of ordinary people. There are critical information infrastructures everywhere, for example power system management, banking and financial computer networks, wired and mobile communications, and health information systems. Everyone knows that these systems are vulnerable. However, no definite steps are taken to achieve their complex protection. If the information infrastructure is attacked, there may be a "cyber jihad", an information disaster that can disrupt our lives. Based on the above, it is imperative that the security awareness of the leaders, and employees of public organizations be increased and that they prepare for the recognition of emergencies.

Cyberterrorism There is no universal agreement on the definition of terrorism.3 The concept of terrorism can generally be defined as a strategy for the use or threat of violence aimed at enforcing specific political, ideological and religious purposes through fear-inducing action.4 Society and its members can be threatened and kept in fear in several ways. Today’s information societies can be most affected through the information systems that ensure their uninterrupted operation, and considering that nowadays all infrastructures are supported by information subsystems, the above is especially true. Cyberterrorism

3 “Definition of terrorism by country in OECD countries.“ International E-Platform on Terrorism Risk Insurance. OECD 2018. https://www.oecd.org/daf/fin/insurance/TerrorismDefinition-Table.pdf (07/07/2018). 4 Townshend, Charles. Terrorism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. pp. 1-184. 256 does not yet have an established definition generally accepted by information technology, but the literature uses the definitions by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)5 and by security expert Kevin Coleman. According to the FBI: "premeditated, politically motivated attack against information, computer systems, computer programs and data which results in violence against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents."6 Coleman, however, defines it as: "The premeditated use of disruptive activities, or the threat thereof, against computers and/or networks, with the intention to cause harm or further social, ideological, religious, political or similar objectives or to intimidate any person in furtherance of such objectives."7 Up-to-date information technology and mass media contributes a lot to the forming of modern forms of terrorism, which can affect people at an international scale. Modern information technology spreads in today’s societies at a hitherto unknown rate and can provide us with an enormous amount of information. In the information society, free access and use of information is of paramount importance and ensures the operation of society. If, however, the infrastructures supported by this information technology are damaged, their operation becomes limited and this greatly affects society. This has been recognised by terrorist organisations and so these organisations have made considerable efforts to be continuously present in the information dimension and be able to affect the life of society by conscious activity. Terrorist groups exploit the possibilities offered by this technology to a greater and greater extent. Using these technologies they can obtain the

5 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI): https://www.fbi.gov/ 6 Manap, Nazura Abdul – Tehrani, Pardis Moslemzadeh. “Cyber Terrorism: Issues in its Interpretation and Enforcement.” International Journal of Information and Electronics Engineering, Vol. 2, No. 3, May 2012, pp. 410. 7 Coleman, Kevin. “Cyber Terrorism.” Directions Magazine. October 11 2003. https://www.directionsmag.com/article/3655 (10/07/2018). 257 information they need and transmit it to their target population faster and more effectively. The Internet provides an excellent infrastructure for terrorist organisations to build and maintain their network, and to spread their ideology because no institution controls the Internet exclusively – and due to its decentralised nature, it is a very safe communication platform. The extent terrorism exploits this form of communication is well illustrated by the number of terrorist sites: in 19988 12 sites, between 20039 and 2005 4,800 sites, while in 2014 more than 9,800 terrorist sites10 operated on the Internet and their number is likely to grow.11 Cyberspace perhaps shows this vulnerability best, as it connects the whole planet in real time. This makes it possible for anybody to attack a digitally operated target from anywhere any time. This greatly complicates the task of defenders because they do not usually know in advance what is going to be attacked and from where. Therefore, the defender has to attempt to protect all important parts of the economic or military infrastructure all the time, while the attacker can choose the target at will. In the age of the Internet of things and the Internet of everything, more and more of the infrastructure necessary for our normal lives is automated, controlled remotely or integrated into larger networks. The globalisation of networks and the integration of physical infrastructure into a virtual world, for example, storing data in clouds, has certainly brought increased efficiency and caused

8 “Terror on the Internet.” https://www.newamerica.org/oti/events/terror-on- the-internet/(14/07/2017). 9 In 2003: 2,650 terrorist websites. Weimann, Gabriel. “WWW.Terror.Net: How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet.” United States Institute of Peace Special Report. March 2004. 10 Weimann, Gabriel. “When New Terrorism Met the New Media.” Presentation, http://docplayer.net/4145450-When-new-terrorism-met-the-new-media-dr- gabriel-weimann.html 11 Weimann, Gabriel. Terror in Cyberspace: The Next Generation. New York: Columbia University Press, 2015. 258 savings. But it has also greatly increased the consequences of a successful attack and the number of key points that attackers can exploit.12 Terrorism by the end of the 20th century has taken a completely new form. On the one hand, the goal of "traditional" terrorism is only destruction; on the other hand, as computers and the Internet spread globally, a new kind of terrorism, cyberterrorism emerged. Dennis C. Blair, the former United States Director of National Intelligence (DNI)13 underlined in his report that "the growing connectivity between information systems, the Internet, and other infrastructures creates opportunities for attackers to disrupt telecommunications, electrical power, energy pipelines, refineries, financial networks, and other critical infrastructures. Over the past several years we have seen cyber-attacks against critical infrastructures abroad, and many of our own infrastructures are as vulnerable as their foreign counterparts."14 He believes cyberattacks against these networks can disrupt the proper working of a state for weeks. The office estimates that the annual cost of cybercrime in the USA is 42 billion dollars and 140 billion dollars worldwide. The European Union (EU) is of the same opinion, too; its newest directive states that "there is evidence of increasingly dangerous, recurring and comprehensive attacks directed at the Member States or against information systems that

12 Peirano, Marta. “Vida digital: WannaCry Siete cosas que aprendimos por las malas en las últimas 48 horas.” El Diario – opinión y blogs, May 14 2017. https://www.eldiario.es/zonacritica/cosas-queaprendimos-malas-ultimas- horas_6_643295677.html (11/07/2018). 13 United States Director of National Intelligence (DNI): https://www.dni.gov/index.php 14 Dennis, Blair C. Annual Treat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committe on Intelligence. Washington DC: US Senate, 2009. p. 38. https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/20090212_test imony.pdf (13/07/2018). 259 are often of key importance to certain public and private tasks."15 Based on the above, experts think that cyberterrorism is one of the most dangerous crimes of the 21st century.

The Effects of Cyberattacks The Internet is not only used by criminals keeping pace with modern technology and software pirates for illegal purposes, but by terrorist organizations as well, which intend to spread their propaganda and/or plan attacks against civilian targets. The police and other agencies try to find malicious elements but at the moment a large number of essential systems are not protected well enough or defenceless against terrorist attacks. In connection with large-scale illegal immigration burdening Europe, many Hungarian and foreign security experts and political scientists have emphasized the increase of terrorist threats. Many have named ISIS as a concrete threat. The history of the Islamic State (ISIS) dates back to little more than ten years.16 The organisation is very brutal (it has posted many "beheading videos") and considers spreading Islamic teaching its mission. ISIS grew out of Al-Qaeda, especially Al-Qaeda’s right wing. Al-Qaeda boasted of committing the 2001 New York attack, and the subsequent London and Madrid attacks as well. When the emir of the Iraqi Al-Qaeda, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, died in an air raid in 2006, competition started for the leadership of the terrorist group. In 2010, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took over the leadership of the remains of the Iraqi Al-Qaeda. He immediately changed the name of

15 Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32017L0541&from=HU (13/07/2018). 16 Shamieh, Luna –Zoltán, Szenes: The Rise of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). AARMS Vol. 14, No. 4 (2015) pp. 363–378. https://www.uni-nke.hu/document/uni-nke-hu/aarms-2015-4- shamieh.original.pdf (14/07/2017). 260 the group to Iraqi Islamic State and intended to differentiate his group from Al-Qaeda.17 He also attacked Shiite targets to further elevate the conflict between Sunnis and Shiites. However, he needed money, and the Syrian war came in handy. When the creation of the caliphate was announced in June 2014, two days before the Ramadan, the infrastructure necessary for the operation of the state had been available for a long time. The fact that ISIS intended to escalate the conflict between the Sunnis and the Shiites, and used the Syrian war to get money showed how highly organised ISIS is and how elaborated its diplomatic and war strategy is.18 ISIS started a propaganda war with the help of 21st century mass media, especially the Internet: they conduct a global recruiting campaign and spread fear. ISIS does not only organise traditional terrorist attacks, but also try to cause as much damage as possible on the Internet. Most cyberattacks launched by Islamic hackers were “defacing” attacks: the attackers somehow accessed the files in the root directory of the server or the settings controlling the name server, and modified them. This way, if anyone typed in the address of the website, they were redirected to the message of the jihadists. So far radical Islamic hackers have not caused substantial damage but they have threatened that they will launch a “cyber jihad” against critical infrastructures.19 September 11 2001 was a turning

17 Besenyő, János – Prantner, Zoltán – Speidl, Bianka – Vogel, Dávid. Iszlám Állam Terrorizmus 2.0. Történet, ideológia, propaganda. Budapest: Kossuth Kiadó. 2016. 18 Krizbai, Diána Daniella. “Az Iszlám Állam néven ismertté vált terrorszervezet "propagandagépezete". Hadtudomány (online), 2015. 25 (E-edition). pp. 285-295. DOI 10.17047/HADTUD.2015.25.E.285. http://real.mtak.hu/31158/1/24_KRIZBAI_DIANA_DANIELLA.pdf (14/07/2018). 19 Heffelfinger, Christopher. “The Risks Posed by Jihadist Hackers.” CTC Sentinel. July 2013, Volume 6, Issue 7. pp. 1-28. https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2013/08/CTCSentinel-Vol6Iss71.pdf (18/07/2018); Rudner, Martin. “Cyber-Threats to Critical National Infrastructure: An intelligence Challenge.” International Journal of Intelligence and 261 point in the history of terrorism and before that little attention was paid to the IT background of terrorist actions. However, various computer networks play an increasingly important role in our daily lives and their disruption can lead to more and more serious consequences. Cyberattacks are an increasing threat to the world.20 They can affect our daily lives and strike sectors we would not think of. In an extreme scenario, terrorists might take control of a whole power network, which would have dire consequences. The "holy war" of the ISIS against Western countries has become increasingly frightening as nowadays Europe is flooded by illegal immigrants. In this flood of people, it is impossible to filter out dangerous individuals, terrorists, or those who are in connection with terrorist organisations. In its 2018/11 analysis, the Center for Strategic and Defense Studies of the National University of Public Service21 analyses the connection between immigration and terrorism in the European Union. The study states that the numerous terrorist attacks against Western countries were not carried out by terrorists directly connected to ISIS but people who were radicalized by terrorist propaganda. The analysis points out that about two- thirds of European terrorist attacks were carried out by so-called home-grown terrorists, born and/or brought up in Europe. The majority of terrorist attacks can still be connected to second- generation immigrants.22

CounterIntelligence Volume 26, 2013 - Issue 3. pp. 453-481. Published online: 20 May 2013. https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2013.780552 (17/07/2018) 20 Szabó, Zsolt. “The protection of pension payment systems, as crucial infrastructure.” Bánki Reports. 2018(2). pp. 27-32. http://bk.bgk.uni- obuda.hu/index.php/BK/article/view/5 (15/07/2018). 21 Center for Strategic and Defense Studies: https://svkk.uni-nke.hu/csds-in- english/about-the-center-for-strategic-and-defense-studies 22 Ambrus, Andrea. “A tömeges migráció és az iszlamista terrorizmus közti kapcsolat az Európai Unióban.” Stratégiai Védelmi Kutatóközpont Elemzések. 2018/11. pp. 1-19. 262

Considering the propaganda warfare of ISIS and the effect of immigration, an efficient defence against Islamic, jihadist organisations by the USA and EU member states requires the use of 21st century mass media, especially the Internet, as well. Special attention should be paid to the websites and community sites of ISIS and other terrorist organisations and their well-known soldiers. People who are recurring readers, who comment, like and share and promote the content of these sites, should also be paid special attention. The fight against ISIS demands even more cooperation between national and international institutions. ISIS and all other terrorist or criminal organisations have to be made to believe that Europe and the Western world are unified and show a united front against all individuals or organisations threatening their societies, citizens or culture.

Cyber Resilience Iran prepared an extensive cyberattack against the critical infrastructures of the United States and Europe, NBC News23 reported quoting several high-ranking US officials. The sources, who did not wish to be named, said that in spite of the preparatory work, there is no evidence that an attack would be launched in the near future. We only pay attention to the increasing number of cyberattacks in the news if our systems are attacked. Many people imagine terrorists as armed with conventional weapons, as they attack a building or blow up a train. They did not think of terrorists as people stealing our data or making our lives miserable invisibly.

https://svkk.uni-nke.hu/document/svkk-uni-nke-hu- 1506332684763/SVKK_Elemzések_2018_11_A%20tömeges%20migráció%20és%2 0az%20iszlamista%20terrorizmus%20közti%20kapcsolat%20az%20Európai%20U nióban_(Ambrus%20A.).pdf (15/07/2018). 23 „Iran has laid the groundwork for extensive cyberattacks on U.S., say officials.” https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/iran-has-laid-groundwork- extensive-cyberattacks-u-s-say-officials-n893081 263

Terrorists now have sophisticated and complex tools available to nearly everybody, thanks to the rapid development of computers. For this reason, anything can be attacked anytime and from anywhere over the Internet. Cyberattacks pose an increasing threat to the world. They can affect our everyday lives and strike sectors we would not dream could be attacked. A whole power grid might be taken over by terrorists, which could cripple an economy; only cooperating alliances and countries with reinforced security systems can fight such a threat effectively. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) experiences 200 million incidents on its networks each day and about 200 more serious attacks every month. This is what Allies are experiencing as the "new normal" level. NATO’s first task has been to improve the protection of its networks by giving extra resources and capabilities to the NATO Cyber Incident Response Capability (NCIRC)24 so that cyberattacks can be detected earlier and responded to faster. Two Rapid Response teams have been set up to help Allies and handle incidents affecting NATO. NATO has now introduced capability targets into the NATO defence planning process to help Allies improve their cyber resilience and devised a new memorandum of understanding between NATO and individual Allies. It is to establish secure connectivity, share information and make arrangements for crisis management. A number of Allies are developing capabilities such as a malware information-sharing platform, training and education, and systems configuration for effective decision-making. The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (NATO CCD COE)25 in Tallinn, Estonia has helped NATO organize annual exercises to improve the skills of

24 NATO Communications and Information Agency: https://www.ncia.nato.int/Our-Work/Pages/Cyber-Security.aspx 25 NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (NATO CCD COE): https://ccdcoe.org/ 264 cyber operators. They use a cyber range transferred to NATO by Estonia. NATO’s partners can also help improve the Alliance’s overall resilience. Hybrid operations have been directed against not only Ukraine26 but many other partners. Their experiences and the lessons learned can help NATO better understand hybrid tactics. More information-sharing and early warning can help NATO identify attacks that start in a partner country but quickly spread to NATO territory. On the other hand, NATO’s experience and expertise can help partners improve their own cyber resilience. The NATO CCD COE is one of the NATO Centres of Excellence, located in Tallinn, Estonia. The Centre was established on 14 May 2008, it received full accreditation by NATO and attained the status of International Military Organisation on 28 October 2008. NATO CCD COE is an International Military Organisation with a mission to enhance the capability, cooperation and information sharing within NATO, among its member nations and partners in cyber defence by virtue of education, research and development, lessons learned and consultation. The centre has also other responsibilities which include: contribution to the development of Cyber Defence Center practices and standards with NATO, contribution to the development of NATO security policies related to cyber defence, its definition of scope and the responsibility of the military in cyber defence, carrying out cyber defence-focused training, awareness campaigns, workshops, and courses, and developing and conducting cyber defence-focused exercises. NATO’s cyber protection is based on comprehensive prevention principles, cyber resilience and avoiding parallel systems. Prevention and resilience are especially important; however hard we try, there are still threats we have to defend ourselves against. The best protection against these attacks is to improve our level of

26 FBI seeks to thwart cyber-attack on Ukraine: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-44236845 265 preparation, and reduce the risk of dysfunction and its consequences. Flexible repair and reaction are most important because this helps minimize the consequences of an attack and fast recovery. It requires a holistic view on resilience, both within national governments, across governments and the private sector, between NATO and the European Union, and with partner countries beyond NATO.27 The NATO and European Union (EU) organisations have difference resilience but a joined-up approach based on the coordination of responses is essential to a successful response. Currently NATO is holding talks with the EU on enhanced cooperation in four areas: civil-military planning; cyber defence; information-sharing; and analysis and coordinated strategic communication. One early result is a technical arrangement between the NATO NCIRC and the EU Computer Emergency Response Team (EU CERT)28 for the exchange of information, achieved in early February29. The aim is to harmonise procedures and support each other in a comprehensive response. The goal is to identify pragmatic, flexible approaches that could be included in a joint declaration by NATO and the EU. NATO and the EU are also developing compatible ‘playbooks’ to ensure that they participate more in each other’s activities, for example exercises and training. It is also

27 Meyer-Minnemann, Lorenz. “Resilience and Alliance Security: The Warsaw Commitment to Enhance Resilience.” In Forward Resilience: Protecting Society in an Interconnected World Working Paper Series. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 2016. https://archive.transatlanticrelations.org/wp- content/uploads/2016/12/resilience-forward-book-meyer-minnemann-final.pdf (16/07/2018). 28 EU Computer Emergency Response Team (EU CERT): https://cert.europa.eu/cert/filteredition/en/CERT-LatestNews.html 29 EU and NATO increase information sharing on cyber incidents: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/5254/eu-and- nato-increase-information-sharing-cyber-incidents_en 266 important that NATO and the EU work together to solve other resilience problems that are not the result of deliberate attacks. Resilience at the national level is a complex capability that ensures the sovereignty of the state, and the welfare and security of its citizens. Its long-term sustainment depends on a number of factors: • Social potential: demographics, moral compass and attitude, social cohesion, patriotism, commitment, education. • Economic potential: industrial base, robust agriculture, redistribution system, finance. • Military potential, which cannot exist without the other two. Resilience based on these factors allows a nation to respond to threats without the immediate use of armed force.30 It is essential for Europe to have a public sector which contributes to the growth of the European economy, provides a high- level service to everyone and strengthens democratic processes. The target of attacks is basically data, which is surrounded by system elements and handled by processes. Cyber threats threaten data and the processes handling it through system elements. Usually three types of malware are used: "scareware"; ransomware or viruses that steal data for financial gain; and government level activity, spying, cyberwarfare.31 Threats directed towards a particular target (individual or organisation) are called Targeted Attacks. As opposed to a computer virus, such malware does not spread to as many computers as possible, but only infiltrates the devices of the selected target. Targeted attacks usually use a combination of simpler forms of attack, such as web attack, attack through mail, attacking a system etc. This requires considerable expertise because the attack must be

30 “Resilience: a core element of collective defence.” NATO Review, 2016. https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2016/also-in-2016/nato-defence-cyber- resilience/en/index.htm (16/07/2018). 31 Russinovich. Zero Day. 267 undetectable, and also systems targeted this way are usually better protected.32 Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) are attacks that require a very high level of expertise. They are performed by trained professionals, usually employed by intelligence services or criminal organisations. They have a clearly defined target – a system or branch or they are designed to obtain certain information or data.33 APT attacks differ from conventional cyberattacks in the selection of the target, the length of attack and the period of "dormancy". APT attacks are typically directed against the financial and the business sector, but sometimes they are or suspected to be politically motivated. It is also alarming that the number of attacks against medical data is increasing. Nowadays a considerable percentage of IT attacks can be experienced at the application level. Among applications, those accessible through the web are most attacked. Now this mostly affects individual portal engines but some tools can already be downloaded that can detect the vulnerabilities of web services. A centralized e-government system offers considerably better IT security, but without continuous development, they are also in danger. As mentioned earlier, extreme Islamic hackers mostly attack websites; for this reason, e-government portals are threatened too – they should be better protected by their operators. Special attention is paid to the protection of government electronic infrastructure in the USA and the EU.34 But as the global ransomware attacks taught us, we can never rest on our laurels because they can be repeated anytime.

32 Szabó. “The protection of pension payment systems, as crucial infrastructure.” 33 Rot, Artur – Olszewski, Boguslaw. Advanced persistent threats: Behind the scenes. Position papers of the Federated Conference on Computer Science and Information Systems. DOI: 10.15439/2017F488. ACSIS, 2017. Vol. 12. pp. 113-117. 34 Global Terrorism Index 2017. Measuring and understanding the impact of terrorism. Sydney: The Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP), 2017. http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/11/Global-Terrorism-Index- 2017.pdf (30/07/2018). 268

Conclusions There can be no modern and efficient public administration without widely accessible electronic services and satisfied users using them regularly. E-government decreases the cost of all participants and increases their competitiveness, so its introduction provides advantages for both society and the economy. The disruption or destruction of any electronic information system or service can affect a large number of citizens, and the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the data managed by these systems are of paramount importance. Increasingly, the computer networks of large international corporations, government agencies, financial corporations and critical infrastructures are attacked. We live in an age in which more and more people use highly sophisticated technologies and social, economic or military assets have become ‘securitized’ or vulnerable to disruption – temporary or longer term – from an outside or even inside attacker. In a globalised world, which is also more confrontational and complex, resilience will remain very important for Allies, requiring constant adaptation to new threats. Cyber security and the threats to cyberspace (and abilities of terrorists) have become top priorities. People with malicious intentions, exploiting vulnerabilities, seek to limit and undermine the functioning of the components of the information society to reach their ideological, religious, financial, or even military goals. International cooperation is essential to fight cybercrime and cyberterrorism. Everything shows that IT systems are getting more and more widely used not only in our everyday lives, but also in armies. In the conflicts of the coming years, the attack of hostile countries, not only their military, but also their civilian network, electronic information

269 management systems and critical information elements will play an increasingly important role.

About the author Zsolt Szabó is a second-year doctoral student at the Doctoral School on Safety and Security Sciences at Óbuda University. His research topic is the effects of global ageing on retirement security. Within security sciences it includes security policy and economic policy, behavioral economics and information security of public organizations. He can be reached at [email protected].

Sources Ambrus, Andrea. “A tömeges migráció és az iszlamista terrorizmus közti kapcsolat az Európai Unióban.” Stratégiai Védelmi Kutatóközpont Elemzések 2018/11. pp. 1-19. https://svkk.uni- nke.hu/document/svkk-uni-nke-hu- 1506332684763/SVKK_Elemzések_2018_11_A%20tömeges%20migr áció%20és%20az%20iszlamista%20terrorizmus%20közti%20kapcsol at%20az%20Európai%20Unióban_(Ambrus%20A.).pdf Besenyő, János – Prantner, Zoltán – Speidl, Bianka – Vogel, Dávid. Iszlám Állam Terrorizmus 2.0. Történet, ideológia, propaganda. Budapest: Kossuth Kiadó. 2016. Coleman, Kevin. “Cyber Terrorism.” Directions Magazine. October 11 2003. https://www.directionsmag.com/article/3655 “Definition of terrorism by country in OECD countries.“ International E-Platform on Terrorism Risk Insurance. OECD 2018. https://www.oecd.org/daf/fin/insurance/TerrorismDefinition- Table.pdf Dennis, Blair C. Annual Treat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committe on Intelligence. Washington DC: US Senate,

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2009.https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimo nies/20090212_testimony.pdf Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on combating terrorism and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32017L0541&from=HU Global Terrorism Index 2017. Measuring and understanding the impact of terrorism. Sydney: The Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP), 2017. http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/11/Global- Terrorism-Index-2017.pdf Heffelfinger, Christopher. “The Risks Posed by Jihadist Hackers.” CTC Sentinel. July 2013, Volume 6, Issue 7. pp. 1-28. https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2013/08/CTCSentinel- Vol6Iss71.pdf Krizbai, Diána Daniella. “Az Iszlám Állam néven ismertté vált terrorszervezet "propagandagépezete". Hadtudomány (online), 2015. 25 (E-edition). pp. 285-295. DOI 10.17047/HADTUD.2015.25.E.285. http://real.mtak.hu/31158/1/24_KRIZBAI_DIANA_DANIELLA. pdf (14/07/2018). Manap, Nazura Abdul – Tehrani, Pardis Moslemzadeh. “Cyber Terrorism: Issues in its Interpretation and Enforcement.” International Journal of Information and Electronics Engineering, Vol. 2, No. 3, May 2012, pp. 410. Meyer-Minnemann, Lorenz. “Resilience and Alliance Security: The Warsaw Commitment to Enhance Resilience.” In Forward Resilience: Protecting Society in an Interconnected World Working Paper Series. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 2016. pp. 1-6. https://archive.transatlanticrelations.org/wp-

271 content/uploads/2016/12/resilience-forward-book-meyer- minnemann-final.pdf Peirano, Marta. “Vida digital: WannaCry Siete cosas que aprendimos por las malas en las últimas 48 horas.” El Diario – opinión y blogs, May 14 2017. https://www.eldiario.es/zonacritica/cosas-queaprendimos-malas- ultimas-horas_6_643295677.html “Resilience: a core element of collective defence.” NATO Review, 2016. https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2016/also-in- 2016/nato-defence-cyber-resilience/en/index.htm Rot, Artur – Olszewski, Boguslaw. Advanced persistent threats: Behind the scenes. Position papers of the Federated Conference on Computer Science and Information Systems. DOI: 10.15439/2017F488. ACSIS, 2017. Vol. 12. pp. 113-117. Rudner, Martin. “Cyber-Threats to Critical National Infrastructure: An intelligence Challenge.” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence Volume 26, 2013 - Issue 3. pp. 453-481. Published online: 20 May 2013. https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2013.780552 Russinovich, Mark. Zero Day: A Novel. New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2011. Shamieh, Luna –Zoltán, Szenes: The Rise of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). AARMS Vol. 14, No. 4 (2015) pp. 363–378. https://www.uni-nke.hu/document/uni-nke-hu/aarms-2015-4- shamieh.original.pdf Szabó, Zsolt. “The protection of pension payment systems, as crucial infrastructure.” Bánki Reports. 2018(2). pp. 27-32. http://bk.bgk.uni-obuda.hu/index.php/BK/article/view/5

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“Terror on the Internet.” https://www.newamerica.org/oti/events/terror-on-the-internet/ Townshend, Charles. Terrorism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. pp. 1-184. Weimann, Gabriel. Terror in Cyberspace: The Next Generation. New York: Columbia University Press, 2015. Weimann, Gabriel. “When New Terrorism Met the New Media.” Presentation, http://docplayer.net/4145450-When-new-terrorism- met-the-new-media-dr-gabriel-weimann.html Weimann, Gabriel. “WWW.Terror.Net: How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet.” United States Institute of Peace Special Report. March 2004.

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Péter Szegedi

Resilience, Vulnerability and the Organisational Knowledge

The journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step.1

Technological development has created the basic conditions for the emergence of global networks of state and non-state participants as well as private individuals. When describing our modern, global environment, we have to mention also characteristics like insecurity, competition and networking. Governments, organisations such as NATO and other institutions have to adapt their operations to the management of environmental risks, concentrate on the apt development of their co-workers responsible for the realisation of their strategies, supporting the defence of their alliances and societies against crises as well as their survival. Resilience as a social competence cannot be imagined without the enduring, even constant connection of the civilian (state and private) and military sectors. The improvement of citizen safety is a continuous and conscious process based on the qualitative cooperation of state and non-state participants. Public service culture builds on individual thinking and behaviour patterns too. This power is the knowledge of the community, effecting the whole of the society. If it is not properly regulated, overthought, developed and trained, certain events may easily surmount it and make both organisations and societies unserviceable.

1 Lao Tzu. “Quotes” https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/21535-the-journey-of- a-thousand-miles-begins-with-a-single; accessed on 03 05 2018. 275

Introduction “Of course we can hardly have any idea about what future may bring us, and even with the most thorough preparation it is impossible to be certain that everything will happen as expected. But if we prepare for the foreseeable changes in time, we shall have more energy left for the handling of those events that have really remained unexpected.”2 Societies and organizations, like individuals, have come through a number of difficulties and crises to get to their present state. It is a prerequisite of their existence to provide for certain physical, relational and cognitive features and a sufficient level of harmony in their coexistence. Processes of adaptation and resilience form those individual and organisational capabilities that can insure the suitable management of critical events in their internal and external environments, and this way also the successful realisation of their visions for the wished future. Such consciously maintained capabilities offer a chance also for the creation and practice of pre-emptive solutions, as well as the on-spot recognition and execution of solutions. Whenever facing some difficulty on either an individual or social level, one of the first questions to ask is “what can I do and what can’t?” We use our knowledge and experience whenever trying to make decisions for the systemization and optimisation of our information about the problem situation. Personal experience, factual knowledge, behavioural patterns, schemes and memes of our socially determined thinking such as our relationship to critical thinking, creativity, logic, analysis, verification, evaluation etc. may help us avoid following illogicalities, unreal imaginations, as well as to decide for or against methodologies to be adapted. Organisational vulnerability defines what environmental changes can have how much negative effect on its resources and

2 Gruhl M. A keljfeljancsi-stratégia. Krízishelyzetek legyőzése, Budapest-Pécs Dialóg Campus Kiadó, 2013. 86. 276 other operational conditions. It covers the organisation’s levels of resiliency and coping capacity, that is, its capability to prevent and lessen damages and losses, maintaining key functions and dealing with changes and effects also while working for reconstruction.3

NATO and resilience From the 2000s, resilience as one of the premises of western defence strategies is prevalent. Its growing importance mirrors the significance of reacting capabilities of member states to unexpected or extreme actions and events. Meeting such challenges requires adaptation, i.e. an organisational culture that is able to recognise the role of non-state participants in the maintenance of safety, security and survival chances. 4 When NATO was founded in 1949, its main objective was the territorial defence of the member states. It was only in 1956 that new concepts of complex defence and the necessity of political, economic, scientific and technological cooperation and consultation emerged.5 In 2014 the Wales Summit introduced resilience as a key element of collective defence in the NATO terminology: „NATO’s approach to deter, defend and remain resilient to violent, disruptive, or military

3 Ferencz Z. “A katasztrófák társadalmi hatásainak értékelése – a rezíliencia esélye” Honvédelem és társadalom conference Budapest Nov. 08-09 2017; Morris, V. R. “Understanding Nonlinear Science, Dynamical Systems and Resilience” Small Wars Journal, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/enabling-smart-city-resilience-through- center-of-gravity-analysis, accessed on 14 04 2018. 4 Szenes Z. “Meglepetések nélkül. A varsói NATO csúcs értékelése” Biztonságpolitika Biztonságpolitikai Szakportál 2016. 08. 07. http://biztonsagpolitika.hu/kiemelt/meglepetesek-nelkul-a-varsoi-nato-csucs- ertekelese, accessed on 14 04 2018 5 The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington DC April 4. 1949. https://www.nato.int/cps/ie/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm accessed on 23 02 2016. 277 activities has continued to evolve since the 2014 Wales Summit as part of NATO’s long-term adaptation.”6 Today’s threats target also key social processes, social networks and their interdependence. Catastrophes and terrorism do not respect borders. NATO uses also the services and capacities of civilian organizations and their networks to support military ones. The defence and functionability of key infrastructures depends heavily on the quality and quantity of cooperation between a number of participants.7 NATO integrates also civilian capacities in military operations so that the long-term interoperability of trustful and mutually advantageous partnerships may persistently facilitate the common assessment, planning and action among all the situational risks, opportunities and threats.8 In 2016 the Warsaw NATO Summit stated: “We are today making a commitment to continue to enhance our resilience against the full spectrum of threats, including hybrid threats, from any direction. Resilience is an essential basis for credible deterrence and defence and effective fulfilment of the Alliance’s core tasks.”9

6 “Building Resilience Collaborative proposals to help nations and partners.” 2017. June. Supreme Allied Command Transformation and City of Norfolk, http://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/events/2017/resilience/resilience- wp.pdf, accessed on 07 04 2017. 2. 7 Prior. T. “NATO: Pushing Boundaries for Resilience” CSS Analyses in Security Policy. Sep 2017. http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special- interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSSAnalyse213-EN.pdf, accessed 14 04 2018. 8 “Building Resilience Collaborative proposals to help nations and partners.” June 2017. Supreme Allied Command Transformation and City of Norfolk, http://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/events/2017/resilience/resilience- wp.pdf, accessed on 14 04 2018. 9 Prior. “NATO: Pushing Boundaries for Resilience.”; “Commitment to enhance resilience Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw, 8-9 July 2016” North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 2016 https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133180.htm?selectedLocale =en, accessed on10 04 2018. 278

Defence and even prevention may be successful if all participants understand and respect the availability of resources according to priorities. Organisations and institutions trying to meet complex expectations must show cooperativeness in order to ensure that participants and other concerned parties may play their own important roles and utilise their resources of capabilities, technology and knowledge in the permanently changing execution of their common operations. To enable the creation of sustainable development and to become a sustainable society, at present it is most important to rationally analyse our present, unsustainable social processes, to understand and accept the necessity of change, and that it is unavoidable to adapt the approach and principles of sustainable development in our social and economic programs.10 Those in possession of the necessary capabilities will have to work together in various networks on the basis of their professional know-how as well as shared visions, strategies, principles etc. in ways that ensure both the target-oriented solution of the necessary tasks and create, maintain and develop real-time actions including the immediate reallocation of necessary resources. Cooperating institutions have to develop new ways to coordinate their collaboration, to clear mutual needs, wants and expectations, to set up — temporary and permanent — links, processes or operations, and reorganize everything if need be. In plain English, we need new, more dynamic project-management approaches in our inter-organizational co- operations. To reach it, human resources management will have to do a lot in order to develop the loyalty and competence of personnel, as well as an organizational knowledge enabling target-oriented, agile operations in the improvement of organizational resilience.

10 Bulla M. “Sokféleség és sérülékenység: A reziliencia képesség társadalmi interpretálása.” In Tamás, Pál and Bulla, Miklós (eds.). Sebezhetőség és adaptáció: A reziliencia esélyei. Budapest: MTA Szociológiai Kutatóintézet, 2011. pp. 19-32. 279

NATO member countries in the course of their crisis management operations, will have to put more emphasis on their trying to understand the complexities of their environment(s), finding solutions to a more flexible mobilisation of resources, developing the involvement of relevant (private and public) sectors of our societies and create a social understanding of shared responsibilities. There is a lot to improve in the field of social perception of risks as well as that of the diversity of the parties involved. When trying to understand the necessary risk management processes, it is necessary to pay attention to a number of areas of concern, such as:11  the advantages and limitations of various methods of risk and vulnerability analysis,  local and regional peculiarities of political processes involved in strategy formation and decision-making,  environmental frameworks and limitations, including, laws and regulations, ongoing economic etc. programmes, diverse interests, etc.,  defence issues.  forecasting and alarm systems,  emergency management,  crisis management and reconstruction,  information feedback, organizational learning and development.

Resilience and public service Our states and their public administration systems, and politics provide working and operational environments for our organizations. They provide us with tasks, regulate, coordinate and

11 Pomázi I. “A modern társadalmak sérülékenysége (sebezhetősége).” In Tamás and Bulla (eds.). Sebezhetőség és adaptáció. A reziliencia esélyei”pp. 33-50. 280 facilitate their execution, keep us on payroll. Their impact on our day-to-day workings is fundamental. Both as private individuals, citizens, and public service officials we are part of their hierarchies and networks. We operate their processes, form their strategies, help identify their purposes and objectives, execute them – we are the actors as well as those who have to endure them. Central, regional and local organizations support us, help us survive environmental changes by concentrating societal efforts on their assessment, coordination and management.12 The state and its institutions provide us with a supersystem for working for common objectives, so that we can keep in hand the concentration and utilization of resources without limiting individual choices more than necessary. Institutions of the state are in constant coexistence with other social factors. They not only try to mutually make the best use of each others capacities, but also influence each other.13 Their differing aspects, perspectives, interests, points of view together help us assess the contextual complexity of our environments, the situations in which we have to plan, operate and succeed. Variety even in the interpretation of shared values may show us, how differentiated our societies and their organizations are, despite the fact that all of them are determined basically by two key factors: (1) individuals with their knowledge, capabilities, connections, and (2) the communication keeping them and their activities together, that takes place within culturally determined frameworks.14 A third important factor can be the resilience of these two.

12 Gáspár M., Göndör A., Tevanné dr. Südi A. Mindenki fontos! A helyi közösségi önkormányzás esélyei, a közmenedzsment új irányai. Budafok-Tétény Budapest XXII. District government, 2011. 13 Klein B., Klein S. A szervezet lelke. Budapest: Edge 2000 Kiadó, 2012. 719. - 748.; Klein S. “Vezetés– és szervezetpszichológia”. Budapest: Edge 2000 Kft, 2004. 481. - 485. 14 Kovács Z. Kovács Z. “Kultúrák versengése a globalizáció korszakában A nemzeti kultúra jellemzőinek és összefüggéseinek vizsgálata a Trompenaars– modell alapján.” PhD thesis, Pannon University, Veszprém, 2006., 285. 281

Labour markets, however, can provide public organizations with only a limited choice of prospective personnel. Also, the organizational budgets for hiring are also usually strictly limited. Quantitative limitations, together with the changing complexity of both objectives, institutions and environments enforce the emergence of dynamic and agile learning organizations, the re- definition of leadership,15 management and decision-making, the utilisation of up-to-date solutions both in technology and in organizational methods, and improved focusing on better determined targets.16 It is probably unavoidable that such a combination of complexity and permanent change cause difficulties in hierarchic, centralized organizations. They have neither the time, nor the resources, nor the experience of utilizing “trial-an-error” research processes effectively. These organizations are programmed for solve identified, well- structured problems by following standardized procedures that require meticulous execution and proficiency. They are created and maintained to provide and use standards. In a world, however, where survival and success may depend on rapid change, openness to creative solutions, and differences, such organizations do face problems when they have to face new situations, new problems, new perspectives, new alternatives. The hierarchy, the standards, the acquired (and partially antiquated) knowledge will become a burden, unless they intentionally look for and adapt organizational solutions to compensate them. Their daily survival and success

http://phd.okm.gov.hu/disszertaciok/ertekezesek/2007/de_3603.pdf, accessed on 20 01 2011. 30. 15 Horváth L., Koronváry P. “Thoughts on the tasks of 21st century management and leadership theory” AARMS 2007 6:(3) 339-347. 16 Gáspár et al. Mindenki fontos! 39- 41. 282 depends on their capability to adapt.17 There is no resilience without change. To create the necessary constructive, creative atmosphere, constant support and participation of the senior and top leaders of the organization is of utmost importance. Participation is based on willingness – the participants essentially do what they want to, what they are really interested in. Open and emphatic organizational support for initiative must mean also that management actively facilitates these processes. Those who wish to or are interested in doing something are actively endorsed by every possible means to decide, get involved, find each other, and do it. Management by facilitation must become part of the education and training the organization’s new generation of leaders. The essence of organizational networking brings about the necessity of reassessing “standard”, “best” and “optimal” solutions and procedures. The new shared experience will pile up new, yet unconventional perspectives and ideas. Cooperation may utilize capabilities of the partner organizations that they themselves have not been able to make use of. Opening windows to each other will help them see both problems and possible solutions, the others and themselves, the environment and the network in a new, more complex way. Strategic cooperation between the network members can make it possible for them to learn from each other — benchmarking and other solutions for knowledge exchange will help the members adapt more rapidly to the changing environment. Furthermore, such networks may improve the social “embeddedness” and acceptance of our organizations by developing a common understanding of the participants, and through them, our societies, about the whats, hows and whys of our work. Improving

17 Harford T. Az alkalmazkodás logikája. Miért kezdődik a siker mindig kudarccal? Budapest: HVG Kiadó Zrt., 2011. 40.; Gruhl. A keljfeljancsi-stratégia. 283 social acceptance will enable us to find new partners, to widen and improve our cooperation.18 Organizational development in such an operation is not a single project or programme, rather an ongoing effort of the whole of the participants to improve the system of cooperation. It involves structured and managed processes as well as unstructured or semi- structured, facilitated ones. They all aim at the strengthening of the impact of the participants on each other, the improvement of interfaces between member organizations, the standardisation and improvement of common operations etc. It changes participants, processes and their targeted outputs, the “product” alike. Ensuring the continuity of operations therefore is a challenge for decision- makers, managers, and, to tell the truth, everybody. Even the adaptation of newer and newer generations of information processes technology requires an ongoing training and re-training of human resources. People, more than ever, will be the source of organizational and networking success – not only their time and work, but also their knowledge, experience, ideas, creativity and attitudes will be in the focus of attention, whenever the sources of the improvement of organizational results, the “competitive edge” of the organization have to be discussed.19 Organizational (and also societal) resilience involves all the internal forces that enable the organization and its members to avoid threats, manage risks and crises, and minimize the effects of catastrophes. Proactivity and the necessary capabilities and capacities to do so require ongoing learning, collecting hands-on experience, and the integration of new knowledge into the company culture. The agile and proactive improvement of organizational resilience will not take over the role of crisis and emergency

18 Bulla. “Sokféleség és sérülékenység.” 19 Harford. Az alkalmazkodás logikája. 34. 284 management, but it concentrates on the improvement of those organizational features without which they cannot succeed. The improvement and utilization of internal knowledge and energy reserves needs special efforts to identify “subconscious”, “unintentional”, “non-regulated” factors as well as the ways to understand, to use and to manage them. This knowledge has to appear in all documents of the organization and has to be available for its members. What is more, we have to find the most “comfortable” and least “troublesome” ways to plant it into our thinking. Spreading, improving and developing such an “endogenic” knowledge in the society (and in public administration organizations) is a new, complex task for the 21st century states and other organizations.

Resilience and knowledge management When thinking about situations that have their own peculiar dynamics where tasks are unknown or (at least partially) not forecastable, such as crisis escalation, productive thinking and action is necessary. Standards, rigid norms and categories in many cases will neither help to follow the complexities of the problem, nor to develop an understanding of individual opportunities.20 Old patterns of thinking will lead us to some sort of a cul-de-sac; new ways, strategies and tactics, new solutions have to be identified. Creativity may help find solutions for critical situations. However, creativity itself is based on internalized rational, analytic experience – without existing elements of knowledge, it is impossible to identify analogies or work out any sort of innovative re-grouping of available resources and efforts.21 The fight for survival is present in the whole spectrum of organizational life. Any weakness in some area will eventually have

20 Gruhl. A keljfeljancsi-stratégia. 47. 21 Gruhl. A keljfeljancsi-stratégia. 47. 285 an effect of the results of the common effort. It is therefore necessary to intentionally look for, find and develop those components in our organizations that are capable of adding to its planning and analytical processes, improve their adaptive functions, and help prepare for unforeseeable crises and the reconstruction of organizational functioning. Knowledge is linked to the individual or group that has created it. Organizational development can give us the clue to how to spread it effectively and efficiently. The agile search of new ideas, their implementation under controlled (and therefore survivable) circumstances, the active collection of feedback is necessary to continuously learn from our own mistakes.22 Unlearning old routines, getting rid of antiquated habits is as important a part of organizational learning as the acquisition of new knowledge. The ever-changing environment makes it unavoidable to constantly revise our purposes, plans and procedures. Traditions are important, but they cannot function as contemporary operational standards. Temporary solutions seem to become the norm, as they help continuous adaptation without creating the false feeling of finding a final answer. Rationality and flexibility have to go hand in hand. Instead of permanent stability, our plans have to focus on temporary equilibria. Controlling chaos may be a challenging aim – any form of order can be only temporary and partial. In fact, in many cases any effort to create stability and order may only add to the chaotic behaviour of our systems. Even temporary equilibria can be reached only if we have a proper understanding of our organizations and their behaviour. Even the results of proper self-analysis, even the elements of our reality considered along the broadest possible dimensions considered, even our perspectives of the wide horizon of possibilities may be linked to the present so strongly that they

22 Harford. Az alkalmazkodás logikája. 34. 286 determine our visions of the future and hinder us in setting up meaningful strategies.23 The management in a “permanently chaotic” environment therefore raises also methodological questions concerning managerial research and analysis.24 Organizational development, innovation, and behaviour all depend on their managers’ knowledge, experience, value judgements, role assessment etc. as much as on their other quantitative or qualitative characteristics or on their dependence on their environment. In resilient organizations it can be expected, and even demanded, that their managers do NOT follow the thinking of autocratic leaders who keep away potential rivals, don’t accept their co-workers as competent individuals etc.25 The new managerial attitude must include also the tolerance for erring. While standardized operations try to minimize, and therefore even punish divergences from the prescribed procedures or norms, learning organizations have to learn how to support (controlled) errors as a most important source of new data, information and knowledge.26 Effective allocation of resources and professionalization ensuring that organizational investments can and will create new value are still important parts of our efforts, but on their own, they are insufficient. The execution of a good plan in a changing environment may sometimes lead to catastrophic situations. More is needed to ensure long-term success.27 Traditional answers to the question what may constitute this needed “more” do include partial

23 Gáspár T. Strategia Sapiens Egy stratégiai fejlesztési modell gondolati vázlata. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó Zrt. 2012., 47. 24 Harford. Az alkalmazkodás logikája. 25 Benkő T. “Gondolatok az ideális parancsnokról.” Hadtudomány, 2008/3-4. 101. http://www.mhtt.eu/hadtudomany/2008/3_4/091-103.pdf accessed on 14 04 2018. 26 Gruhl. A keljfeljancsi-stratégia. 95. 27 When we are running in the wrong direction there is no sense in increasing the speed. http://www.vicamica99.eoldal.hu/cikkek/angol-idezetek/ accessed on 14 04 2018. 287 truths. Ongoing professional research and evaluation, a deeper understanding and utilization of various elements of our organizational “heritage,” well-defined circles of autonomy, regulations providing a framework for decision-making rather than binding recipes for execution, intensively facilitated communication to spread explicit and tacit knowledge alike, networking, integrated and comprehensive approach to organizational problem-solving and decision-making — all of these suggestions are relevant, and they may also result in partial improvement if we recognize their common prerequisite: the acceptance of, trust in, and facilitation for professional individuality, including, but not limited to, autonomy and accountability at work.28 In our century, resiliency cannot exist without continuous checking and updating of organizational knowledge. “Givens” may not only become outdated, but they also may easily turn into enemies of innovative thinking. Training can never end, but it is also avoidable that it became routine. Resilience can be improved by multiplying information inputs by the manifold utilization of individual and group perspectives, facilitating individual, social and organizational efforts adding value to the common results, and proper communication of feedback and results disseminating new knowledge throughout the organization. The complexity of our objectives, organizations, professions etc. brings with itself that to find the right solutions, decision-makers have to build on (professionally and otherwise) a number of multiprofessional teams providing the necessary know-how from within as well as outside the organization. To manage such teams

28 Tomka J. A megosztott tudás hatalom. Budapest: Harmat Kiadó, 2009.; Koronváry P. Szegedi P. “Thoughts on Technological Diversity and Knowledge Management in Centralised Organizations”. AARMS 2018. 17/1. 13-21. https://folyoiratok.uni-nke.hu/document/nkeszolgaltato-uni-nke- hu/Thoughts%20on%20Technological%20Diversity_AARMS_2018_01.pdf, accessed on 21 05 2018. 288 without unnecessarily limiting them in their work AND without compromising our operative functions is a major managerial and organizational challenge in our century.29

“Learning is like rowing up a river: unless you move ahead, it will drift you backwards.” (Chinese saying)

Summary Analysing the sources of resilience — that is, the actual and possible sources of threats and weaknesses — is never enough to avoid or manage crises. A deep understanding of the risks and challenges is necessary, but in the focus one should put the stress on aimed solutions. Such a perspective will open new perspectives on our real tasks bringing about more advantageous situations and reaching higher levels of organizational resilience by refocusing and activizing managerial thinking, organizational processes in general, and defence mechanisms in particular. Abstractions of the reality are subjective – they depend upon individual competencies as well as organizational involvement. People register those features of the environment stronger that seem to support their presuppositions.30 Any knowledgeable concept for the management of organizational resilience will require parts and processes for strengthening and targeting individual and organizational creativity.31 Limiting the waste of inputs on the application of solutions of low efficiency and effectiveness just because they are deeply imbedded in the organizational culture is of

29 Harford. Az alkalmazkodás logikája. 52. 30 Gruhl. A keljfeljancsi-stratégia. 42. 31 Koronváry P. “A kreativitás rendszere:Tisztelgés Kenneth E. Boulding előtt” Nemzetvédelmi Egyetemi Közlemények 2005 9 (2) 244-262.; Koronváry P. Rendszertan: elektronikus bevezető jegyzet a ZMNE hallgatói és a helyi önkormányzatok vezetői számára Budapest: Zrínyi Miklós Nemzetvédelmi Egyetem 2009. 47-85. 289 absolute necessity. Creative, up-to-date, novel solutions acquired and adapted through the knowledge management system of a learning organization may have such an effect. More experience, even more versatile individual experience professionally collected and made use of throughout of the organizational development processes may also be part of the recipe for building more resilient organizations. New interpretations of organizational management and leadership32 will definitely have a role in reforming and improving our organizations. Such “new” mechanisms may help decision-making positively value differences of opinion, attitudes and aspects of stakeholder groups and provide solutions for creating better strategic and operative plans under the leadership of better informed, more responsible and more interested managers.33 Resiliency is not only about having tangible and intangible assets. It is much more than that. Resiliency is the result of a flow of agile and proactive actions and activities, formal and informal, in an organization that is able to maintain a set of frameworks solid enough to keep and collect people, knowledge and values together for the purpose of enabling everybody in a positive mood for working in creative and innovative operations.

About the author Dr. Péter Szegedi is a Lieutenant Colonel of the Hungarian Defence Forces. He served in various teaching and administrative positions at the National University of Public Service and in the Defense Staff’s Training and Education Directorate, Education

32 Hülvely L. Koronváry P. “Some Thoughts on 21st Century Challenges of Management Education and Practice” Hadtudományi Szemle 5/3-4. 2012. 190-195. 33 Koronváry P. ”Kicsoda a vezető? Gondolatok a vezetői felelősségről” Hadmérnök 9/3. 2014. 290-295. http://hadmernok.hu/143_24_koronvary_2.pdf accessed on 14 04 2018 290

Branch. Since 2017 he has served as a researcher in the Defense Staff’s Scientific Research Centre.

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Szenes Z. “Meglepetések nélkül. A varsói NATO csúcs értékelése” Biztonságpolitika Biztonságpolitikai Szakportál 2016. 08. 07. http://biztonsagpolitika.hu/kiemelt/meglepetesek-nelkul-a- varsoi-nato-csucs-ertekelese

Tomka J. A megosztott tudás hatalom. Budapest: Harmat Kiadó, 2009.

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The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington DC April 4. 1949. https://www.nato.int/cps/ie/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm

When we are running in the wrong direction there is no sense in increasing the speed. http://www.vicamica99.eoldal.hu/cikkek/angol-idezetek/

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Attila Géza Takács and Peter A. Kiss

Territorial Defence Forces: a key element of Hungary’s resilience in postmodern war

Abstract: Since the end of the Cold War, significant social, technical and technological developments took place until present days which effected armed conflicts i.e. the use of force. At the end of the Cold War only one power with global capacities remained, and a reorganisation of regional power relations commenced. Non-state actors have appeared as belligerents in some theaters, andt the significant disparities in military capabilities resulted in asymmetric conflicts. Military capabilities that belong to different generations of war are combined in novel ways, leading to hybrid warfare. The characteristics of postmodern war represent a fundametal change compared to the eralier forms of warfare, and the transformation continues. The Hungarian Defence Forces are raising territorial defense volunteer reserve units as one possible answer a constituted government can make to these challenges.

Keywords: Postmodern War, Non-state Actor, Islamic State, Critical Infrastructure, Information Technology, Nuclear Power, Cyberspace

Introduction Between the end of the Cold War and today significant social, technical and technological developments have taken place. They have also affected the use of force in the Clausewitzian sense. At the end of the Cold War only one power remained with global capacities. However, in the multipolar world the invigoration of the earlier two poles is perceptible again. The traditional alliance of the USA and the EU and the cooperation of China and the Russian 295

Federation represent global capacities. Amongst the BRIC countries1 economic growth exceeds average trends due to petroleum and natural gas extraction in Russia, to industrial production in China, to agriculture in Brazil, and to software development and basic research in India. Arms procurement has changed: parallel to the development of the traditional arsenal (including weapons of mass destruction), the new achievements of science expanded the means of warfare. The use of force also appeared in cyberspace, and opened new dimensions both in the course of conflicts and crises, and in their management. The new weapons and capabilities that evolved as a result of technological development further enhanced the military tools available to politics. However, not all could pursue these accelerated and highly expensive developments. Thus, several generations of weapons and warfighting methods have been present in recent armed conflicts. Due to the social and economic differences of the belligerents significant asymmetry characterizes most armed conflicts, and in some cases the military capabilities belonging to different generations of warfare were combined in novel ways, leading to hybrid warfare. In addition to its economic impact, globalization has also brought societal changes, as information technology and the media have had a direct influence on society, and indirectly on politics – and the politics of conflict. International organisations maintain their presence in the theatres of war even during the most intense combat phase, in order to steer the conflict in the direction of consolidation

1 The acronym stands for Brazil, Russia, India and China, the four most rapidly developing economies between 2001 and 2009. It was coined by Jim O’Neill (former chairman of Goldman Sachs Asset Management), according to the Financial Times encyclopedia. http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=bric, Retrieved on January 03 2016 296 as soon as possible. Some non-governmental organisations take part in the consolidation of the crisis, while others validate the will of a certain interest-group in the theatre. This is not new at all, only the scale of participation has changed, compared to earlier periods. Globalization has also affected the actors of the conflicts. Modern wars were fought by nation states or their smaller or larger alliances. Today such non-state belligerents as the Islamic State, Hezbollah or Hamas participate in, and often dominate, armed conflict. The formation of this new type of belligerent became possible in the chaos created by the Arab Spring, the wave of enlightenment and revolution of the Muslim peoples, the repeated political and social collapse of the obsolete state administration systems.

I. The aim of war is unchanged In today’s constantly changing world the question arises whether the works of the great military thinkers and the basic principles of military science are still applicable. Can they be used in the contemporary information-based social environment in the age strategic terrorism, nuclear weapons and electronic instruments of destruction? In this chapter we are seeking the answer whether complex interconnections drawn in the book On War by Carl von Clausewitz are valid today and whether the wars fought since the publication of the book confirm the principles he drafted as regards the aim of war. Every war has a dual purpose: a political and a military that must be in accordance with eachother. It is politics that define the final aim and the limitations which in turn also shows the nature of the war while the military aim defines what has to be destroyed so that the enemy cannot successfully fight the war. One characteristic of current wars is that either the participants in a given war have divergent political and military objectives, or they are not clear about

297 their own objectives, or they are ready to modify their objectives. See e.g. Syria. Let us examine this in more detail.

The political and military aims of war are closely connected with eachother “No one starts a war – or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so – without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. The former is its political purpose; the latter its operational objective. This is the governing principle which will set its course, prescribe the scale of means and effort which is required, and make its influence felt through down to the smallest operational detail.”2 As the above quotation emphasizes, Clausewitz means the political and military aim of war. Thinking it through thoroughly, this is entirely logical and relevant also today, even in the war on terrorism.

There are limited and total wars “In this the belligerent is again driven to adopt a middle course. He would act on the principle of using no greater force and setting himself no greater military aim, than would be sufficient for the achievement of his political purpose.”3 Limited war does not aim for totality either in its objectives or in its intensity, as some condition or capability is lacking. In those wars where the aim is unlimited victory, the military forces of the enemy must be defeated, his territory must be invaded and the will of its population for further resistance must be crushed. Let us remember World War II, the genocide in Rwanda or the wars in Chechenia, where the endeavors for independence were suppressed by the elimination of the male generation throughout centuries.

2 Clausewitz. Carl von. On War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993. p. 700. 3 Clausewitz. On War. p. 707 298

A belligerent can be a state with all the state’s resources and military forces at its disposal, but not necessarily with the support of the nation; or it can be a nation, with all the state and national resources and the whole population mobilized.4 Today non-state organisations, and sometimes even individuals may also become belligerents if they manage to acquire warlike capabilities one way or another. The islamic State, for example, did not become a real state, but was far more than a conventional terrorist organisation, since it possessed some of the capabilities and fulfilled many of the functions of a state both on the ground and in the virtual space. In summary it can be said that the circumstances that affect the way a war is fought have changed. The concrete examples conform only to the particular historical period in which they took place. However, so far no one was able to refute the philosophical abstractions, thus its validity must be accepted. The method of fighting a war and the manifestation of the use of force have changed, but nature of war has remained constant until today. In summary it can be said that the circumstances that affect the way a war is fought have changed. The concrete examples conform only to the particular historical period in which they took place. However, so far no one was able to refute the philosophical abstractions, thus its validity must be accepted. The method of fighting a war and the manifestation of the use of force have changed, but nature of war has remained constant until today.

II. What has changed in postmodern war? Due to the complexity of contemporary wars it is difficult to determine and categorize when events cross the threshold of war, when a civil war turns into an interstate conflict. The political and

4 “…in 1793, a force appeared that beggared all imagination. Suddenly, war again became the business of the people − a people of thirty millions,…” Clausewitz. On War. 715. 299 military aims of the war may also change during a protracted conflict. As a result the belligerents may change, they may become temporary allies, then turn against each other again, as it has happened for instance in Syria.

1) War is one of the decisive aspects of social existence, and affects a growing proportion of the population. World War I affected 30 percent of the population of the belligerents, World War II – 60 percent, while contemporary wars involve 80 percent in combat operations, and affect the will of the population directly and through the media. A part of the civilian population remains in the conflict zone during the quickly forming conflicts, creating a new segment of warfare, the “Human Terrain” where the main objective is influencing social the consciousness. However, the victims may also become belligerents. 2) Information technology is already accessible for everyone, and it is altering the behaviour of the individual, the community, and sometimes that of society. The Y and Z generations already have a different way of thinking than previous age groups. The religious-cultural separation within a country result in the formation of parallel societies which spreads over the virtual space as well and (parallel) virtual social groups may be formed. The power of the states failed in the countries of the Arab Spring because they did not sense the social processes that took place in the cyberspace. Information technology has also became the key element in the critical infrastructure. 3) The creation of cyberspace opened the dimension of a new theatre of war. The military command systems are being transformed, and are operating faster. Real time situational awareness is already a basic requirement for the military decision-makers. The military development concept of the “digital soldier” is more and more replaced by robotic

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technology. Through the employment of robots society’s low tolerance for casualties can be overcome. There are neither funerals nor disabled veterans for society to face. It facilitates the expansion of limited war to total war. The increasing use of precision weapons decreases collateral damage, and targets on the target list can be serviced from a great distance. The proportion of ground forces deployed on the battlefield can be decreased, and the battlefield continues to empty. The military use of the results of space research is unavoidable. Communication, navigation and the control of weapon systems takes place via satellites. Potential theatres of war can be expanded in space without limits. 4) Economic inequalities continue to grow, while the Eurasian continent might take over the role of the Western (Euro-Atlantic) hegemony. China, India and Russia may become the major actors of the future. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Initiative indicates that the integration is expanding in both the economic and military fields. Other countries including India and Pakistan that are already present as observers, may gain membership in the near future. 5) The global growth of population is accelerating. According to the forecasts there will be 9.6 billion people living on Earth5 by 2050, which significantly exceeds the planet’s carrying capacity. Supplying the food and energy requirements supplies of the growing population causes problems already and contributes to the development of conflicts. Mass migrations can be predicted from the effects of environmental change. The ever more urbanized population (50 percent of the world’s population lives

5 “Global population forecast.” http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2015/08/daily-chart-growth- areas 301

in cities today) is becoming a target of warfare, since the media and the cyberspace (internet) make it accessible in mass. 6) The post-Cold War global and regional military imbalance determined the development of a competitive environment. Is there a Cold Peace6 or an undeclared war taking place in the world? The normalization of international relationships that had started after the Cold War has came to a halt. In this renewed rivalry between and competition between states, alliances and ideologies, some states (and most non-state actors) cannot keep pace with the acceleration of technological development. This results in the coexistence of various generations of weapons systems and ways of war in the conflicts. Their combination means the perpetuation of hybrid warfare and asymmetry. 7) The role of the media is enhanced, creating “strategic corporals” out of simple soldiers. Should one of the thousands of soldiers make a mistake in combat in front of the cameras of the TV crews, it would affect society directly, creating a strategic problem. Everyone can be informed of anything newsworthy within a few minutes. 8) The reappearance of non-state actors as belligerents is a recent phenomenon. There are more and more private armies and private military companies (PMCs) present in the theatres of war. Some of them can be used in combat operations, especially when political barriers have to be overcome. The presence and the role of the non-state belligerent may increase in the prosecution of protracted conflicts. To summarize, the characteristics of war have changed. The new technological achievements have been put into the service of war. Information operations are now combined with special operations,

6 Julian Lindely French: NATO-Russia and the New Cold Peace / http://lindleyfrench.blogspot.hu/2014/03/nato-russia-and-new-cold- peace.html Retrieved on 11 02 2014 302 and are in turn supported by the conventional warfare components (air, ground, and naval forces). This is the characteristic of joint operations, only such a combination has not been seen hitherto. Thus, new warfighting method could be observed in Libya and East Ukraine. According to certain researchers it is the so called “nonlinear” war, in which the opponents are not states but global economic interest groups getting engaged in armed conflict. However, in my view it is most similar to Liddel Hart’s Indirect Approach whereby the enemy is being weakened until it is not capable of military resistance anymore.

III. The new method of warfare The age of postmodern wars is characterised by a high degree of political division. The economic power relationships have been transformed, the balance of military power was upset, global problems have an ever larger effect on the various regions. The process of acceleration can be sensed in every segment of social existence. Increasing uncertainty enhanced the concept of security in its broadest sense, including military security. Increasing the self defence capabilities of the countries gained priority as a consequence of the global realignment of powers and the series of crises (e.g. migration). The vulnerability of the globally and regionally interlinked, and closely coupled the critical infrastructure was recognised. The European air control system oversees 30,000 flights per day which has a significant economic effect. The navigation system has a global effect on state actors, the industrial sector and the population as well. Beyond these, it also represents a security risk, since it is also the basis of the military applications. This is significant, because, as General De Gaulle7

7 Uhalt, Alfred R. Jr. “De Gaulle: Enigma in the Western Alliance?” Air University Review, March-April 1967 303 stated, political independence does not exist without military independence. The energy supply systems also extends beyond Europe’s borders and has a significant effect on the economy and the energy demand of the population. Due to these and several other factors, defence expenditure rose in general. The state monopoly of the legal use of armed force (legitimate violence) between the belligerents  which became a guarantee of state sovereignity after the 1648 Peace of Westphalia  has come to an end with the increasingly frequent appearance of non-state actors. The best example for this is the war against the íislamic State, but as a result of globalisation, military capabilities may come into the possession of ”anyone” in the future. In the course of strategic threat analysis more attention must be paid to the non-state belligerents, because they may threaten the very existence of the state. It cannot be ruled out that the countries supporting terrorism use these organisations in order to achieve their own political objectives. Due to the high level technology of postmodern wars, economic burdens grew further. A belligerent is not capabale of launching a war relying solely on his own resources any more. All this means that defence economy became decentralised8. In the case of state belligerents it is manifested in the preference of the coalition operations. The small states are not capable of stockpiling the large quantities of munitions neccessary for a fast-paced post-modern conflict. Israel for instance shipped ammunition and missiles from the USA by air for her 34 day war against Hezbollah in 2006. Since the non-state belligerents do not possess their own infrastructure, they recruit combattants and procure weapons and financial support

(http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1967/mar- apr/uhalt.html) 8 Kaldor, Mary. “In Defence of New Wars.” Stability. http://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.at/ 304 through their global networks. The decentralised war economy carries the risk of a belligerent undertaking an armed conflict that largely exceeds his economic capacity. As a consequence, a limited war can easily escalate into a total war. Syria, where the Assad regime is fighting a war since March 2011, is a good example for this. It is capable of controlling the coastal strip of the area of the country. However, due to the Iranian and Russian financial support9 and indirectly, the intervention of the Western international coalition against the Islamic State, it is not compelled to give up on the war as a political instrument. The control requirements of complex weapon systems led to the development of network-centric warfare, which allows for long distance strikes, and destruction in the full depth of the enemy territory, as if playing a video game. This has a negative effect on the moral restraint of the soldiers, as they do not face the result of destruction directly. Since the use of cyberspace pervades all areas of social existence, expanding the war into the cyberspace is possible. Attacking and overloading the communication systems, and fraudulent data acquisition are well known concepts. Money transfers can be halted for days by attacking the financial systems of certain countries. Thus, serious damage can be caused without combat operations. Influencing the social consciousness by information operations is an everyday event by now. In preparation for the Ukrainian crisis Russia targeted various social groups of the European countries, in and strove to win them over her own politics. The far right party of Marie Le Pen gained such an advantage in the first round of the French election campaign with Russian support that the victory of the far right could be avoided but with the coalition of all the other

9 Stott M. – Nakhoul, S. “Syria expects more financial aid from Russia, Iran.” Reuters, 24 April 2013, at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/24/us- syria-crisis-economy-idUSBRE93N0QA20130424 305 parties. As indicated by this example as well, social consciousness can be easily influenced into an unfavourable direction by the manipulation of actual politics (anti-migrationism). It is hard for the society to accept war casualties, therefore politics aim for the minimum human losses. Non-state belligerents take advantage of this by making videos that intentionally cross the tolerance threshold of society. Public beheadings, mass executions, or showing child soldiers and victims fall in this category. Their aim is to fan the emotions, the rage, the temper and turn them against the ruling government and to decrease or divide the social support for the military intervention. No government can launch and sustain an armed conflict without society’s acceptance of the necessary economic and personal sacrifice. As the climate of social opinion can already be changed easily and fast, the rapid conclusion of wars gained priority. Normally, the result of a rapid intervention is the development of a lasting crisis, which favors arms trade primrily. Thus, there are also direct economic interests behind war. The greatest contemporary source of conflicts is the tendency of religious and identity based separation. It usually starts out as a civil war and than it escalates. Nevertheless, it is always being realised with some kind of external support. South Ossetia, Kurdistan and Syria among others are examples of identity war.10 It can also be brought into correlation with the influencing, derangement or eventually, the alignement of the common sense. Weapons of mass destruction are still present in the arsenals, and their possession ensures global power in certain cases. Currently

10 Lind, Michael. “The Age of Identity Wars.” The Smart Set. http://thesmartset.com/the-age-of-identity-wars/ Retrieved on: 01 06 2016 306 there are approximately 22,30011 of nuclear warheads in the eight countries possessing them. The modernisation of these weapons suggests that this type of threat shall exist in the future as well. The combination of conventional forces and new capabilities might cause further surprises. The connection of the cyberspace with the physical space (terrain, air space, seas, space) put combat operations into a brand new context. Warfare can easily spread over the cosmic space in light of the current pace of development. It seems rather utopistic yet. However, no one thought that the revolution in Libya could be organised in three days with the application of Facebook. When space research gets into the the phase when it is capabale of producing devices suitable for military strikes, the special operations soldier will target the laser beam arriving from a satellite to the chosen object with his laser mirror. The ability to extend war in the cosmic space increases the risk of the deployment of nuclear weapons. Based on the above, it can be stated that the factors determining the characteristics of war are economic performance, the applied weapon systems, social development, public administration and the demographic components, all of which has gone through significant changes in the past 25-30 years.12 It can be accepted as a fact that the aim of postmodern (post Cold War) wars have not changed, but their characteristics did – fundamentally so. This derives from the changes of all factors, and the transformation continues. The use of force expanded to cyberspace and new combinations are becoming possible with the conventional forces. The events of the physical and virtual space affect each other in the course of operations in postmodern war - they are interlocked. In order to

11 Kristensen, Hans. “Status of World Nuclear Forces.” Nuclear Darkness. http://www.nucleardarkness.org/globalnucleararsenal/statusofworldnuclearfo rces/ Retrieved on: 01 06 2016 12 Szendy, István. Hadelmélet és katonai műveletek. Budapest: National University of Public SErvice, 2014. 307 win, both have to be dominated. The state monopoly of the use of force ceased. Non-state actors might come to possess warfare capabilities, the identification of the enemy is not unequivocal. Postmodern war is strongly technology oriented in all domains, which increases the resource-requirements of operations. As a consequence, war bears asymmetric and hybrid characteristics. The defence economy has become decentralised as a consequence of globalisation, which contributes to the prolongation of crises as well as the sustainment of conflicts that largely exceed the capabilities of the belligerents. The transformation of the theatre abolished the front lines, and combat operations expand into the rear areas. The opposing forces conduct operations at a greater distance from one another. Combat operations run at a high tempo, and take place in a dynamically changing environment. In an asymmetric conflict the population is the primary military target. In the multipolar world order, Europe is attractive due to its developed economy but, relative weakness in terms of military force. Thus it became an ideal target of postmodern wars.

IV. Hungary’s First Encounter wih Postmodern Conflict Although the Hungarian Defence Forces (HDF) have participated in expeditionary operations in the Balkans and Western and Central Asia since the 1990s, their operations did not affect Hungary or its people directly. The phenomenon of the new type of conflict impacted on Hungary for the first time in 2015, in the context of mass migration from the Middle East, West Asia and North Africa. The massive flow of migrants affected every country in the western Balkans. To cite the example of Slovenia, the total personnel strength of the Slovenian police and armed forces are about the same as the number of migrants arriving on the border in a single day during the peak period. If the flow of migrants through the country

308 had been blocked for only a few days, the whole administrative system of the Slovenian state would have collapsed. I do not wish to speculate, but this risk exists even today. There were days in 2015, when over 10,000 people arrived at the Hungarian-Serbian (and later the Hungarian-Croatian) border and crossed into Hungary through the “green border,” away from the regular highway and rail crossing points. The border police and the immigration authorities – both organized for routine border traffic – were overwhelmed. Human trafficking networks, quick to recognize opportunities for profit, immediately started operating. To handle the obvious potential societal, economic and security risks, Operation Common Will (Közös Akarat művelet) was launched. The operation had a threefold mission: handle the crisis situation that mass migration caused in Hungary’s affected counties; prevent illegal border crossings, and build and control a security fence along the affected sectors of the border. The expected end state also had three components: a halt to illegal border crossings in mass, due to the temporary border security fence and continuous presence of the security forces; reduction of human trafficking to minimum, and control of the entry of migrants into the Schengen area in accordance with the applicable laws and regulations. In order to execute the operation, police reinforcements (including elite anti-terrorist police commandos) were rushed to the southern border, and the HDF were tasked to support the police. As a result of the authorities’ decisive actions the massive flow of migrants changed direction away from the Hungarian border. Although at the time the Hungarian government was severely criticized in several international (as well as domestic) forums, the fact remains that the measures it took, and the operations of its police and military forces were in line with the provisions of national and European Union border control regulations. Operation Common

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Will is still ongoing, and there is no way to tell how long it will have to continue. The operation showed that the HDF were neither trained, nor equipped, nor organized for internal security or border security tasks. Their deployment on a mission they were not designed for required some serious improvisation in command and control, task organization, and training. The operation also highlighted the fact that the HDF did not have adequate reserves to surge personnel on unplanned missions, as needed. In spite of these shortcomings the HDF have performed creditably. An unforeseen benefit of the operation was a much improved opinion of the armed forces among the civilians in the border region.

Figure 1. Operation Common Will – mission and end state13

13 Drawn by the senior author. 310

In 2017 – partly in response to the experience gained in Operation Common Will – the Hungarian government initiated a complex national defense and armed forces development program, whose purpose is to improve the capabilities of the regular forces, and at the same time prepare society to adapt to the changed security environment. A significant element of this program is a territorial volunteer reserve force that will double the personnel strength of the HDF, acquaint the younger generation with the principles of national defense, and will boost the resilience of the entire Hungarian society in the face of new threats and challenges. Conscription was suspended in 2004 in Hungary, when the general expectation was that a long period of peace would follow the cold war, and small, professional military forces would be sufficient to maintain national sovereignty. Subsequent events have shown that this was a mistaken assumption, but in the meantime Hungary’s reserves forces were allowed to melt away, until they were reduced to nearly zero by 2010. At that time a decision was made to encouraged soldiers who had left the service in the course of earlier force reductions to sign up for reservist service. However, that manpower pool has also been drained by now: many of the prior- service reservists are reaching the age limit for military service. Another deleterious consequence of the suspension of conscription was a growing isolation of the armed forces from Hungarian society. National defense was a truly national affair that impacted on nearly every Hungarian family when all able-bodied males were called to serve for a period of time. Shifting to a professional force undoubtedly improved the capabilities of the remaining units, but it also removed from society the cohesive effect of the experience of serving the nation for a period of time, until someone else takes up the task. The new territorial volunteer reserve is expected to address both these issues.

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The HDF’s regular units are deployed in 10 counties. The volunteer reserves cover all 19 counties, and when all the planned units are raised, there will be one company in every administrative district (197 in all). The boundaries of their areas of responsibility coincide with those of the civilian administrative system. In this context the reserve forces play a liaison role between the civilian population and the regular forces. At the time of this paper’s publication the personnel strength of the reserve forces will be about 8000, in seven regiments. The goal is to achieve by 2026 an operational reserve capability, defined as a total personnel strength of 20 000 trained soldiers in 21 battalions (seven regiments), and in 8 guard battalions. In order to avoid mass outflows when a particular generation reaches the age limit for military service, recruitment targets all age groups. Also, it proceeds according to principles that differ from previous practice: it takes into account not only the changing circumstances and the needs of the armed forces, but also the requirements of the citizens. In time the reserve force will not only to provide backup manpower for the armed forces, but through the experience of voluntary service it is expected to rebuild the trust and cohesion between the HDF and society. Training and preparation for support tasks are obviously the two primary peacetime missions for the reserve units. Training is designed to be a challenging, but positive experience. It is tailored to the sociological characteristics of the various age groups: generations X, Y and Z cannot be trained using the same methods, but hey can be well integrated. Besides training, another function of the reserves is readiness to respond to local emergencies. In today’s security environment it is impossible to predict when and where a terrorist attack would take place, and industrial or natural disasters can occur with little or no warning. Immediate response makes all the difference between containing the damage and managing the

312 consequences, or letting the incident turn into a major catastrophe. The situation can be on the way to immediate resolution if the responder is a trained, organized and locally available force that has access to some heavy equipment and can be mobilized quickly to support of the local civilian authority. It can also prepare the ground for the deployment of a regular military force, if that is required. Hungary is not threatened by a hybrid challenge at present. However, should the situation change in the future, a well-trained, well organized territorial reserve would be an invaluable defensive asset and serve as a very effective “societal vaccine” against the subversion and low intensity aggression of such threats. The units are a permanent presence of the state’s coercive power. They can be mobilized and armed at short notice to reassure the citizens and deter the aggressor. Since the reservists are familiar with the area and its population, they are quick to recognize outsiders and unusual circumstances, and respond immediately. And since they are protecting their home environment, they are highly motivated to succeed. Their training and combat readiness may be less than those of the regular forces (or those of the aggressor), nevertheless, a military force that has thorough and detailed local knowledge, enjoys the support of the local civilian population, and defends its own town or city is very highly motivated. These factors can compensate to a great extent for such deficiencies in training and combat readiness as they may have. At this time a conventional war directly involving Hungary is no more likely than a hybrid challenge. But, again, this positive situation may change. Should that happen, the reserve forces would be employed not as combat, but as combat support units. They would maintain the permanent presence of the state’s military power throughout the country, thereby providing security and a deterrent to behind-the-lines operations. They would also serve as an economy of force measure, freeing the more combat capable

313 regular units from such routine rear area security tasks as the protection of critical infrastructure, movement control, and control of the population. Yet another – crucially important – function of the reserves both in peacetime and in crises, one that no other organization or institution can perform, is that of societal barometer. The reservists are in daily contact with the population – they are the population. Their cumulative experience can serve as an invaluable feedback both to the HDF’s command echelon and to the government. The number of new volunteers versus the numbers resigning serve as a better gauge of the people’s expectation of the government success or failure in a crisis than any public opinion survey. A particularly important target audience is the younger generation: the grade school, high school and university students – the officers and soldiers of the future are among them. Various scholarship programs have been made available to high school and university students to improve opportunities for students living in reduced circumstances. A military boarding-school was established, where the students learn leadership skills in addition to a regular high school education and some military training. Both the parents and the education professionals agree that in addition to a solid education program schools must also inculcate values, beliefs and behavioral standards, and the armed forces have become significant partners in discharging that task. The first military summer camps were opened three years ago, and they have become quite popular. This year (2018) they are the second most popular camping opportunity, due to the positive experience, learning and physical activity they provide (as well as their low cost). Sports competitions and instruction in basic military knowledge and skills in accordance with each age group’s characteristics serve to improve physical conditioning, and influence behavior and teach healthy habits.

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Volunteer military preparatory training is a new program. Anyone can try military training at various levels of difficulty, without incurring any obligation. The program’s secondary purpose is to provide such training to employees in public administration as will be credited in their promotion system, and thereby contribute to improving their qualifications.

Conclusions

In the near future every country shall have to confront the changed characteristics of warfare. The boundaries between peace and war are becoming indistinct; the identification of the enemy is increasingly complicated; the war economy is decentralized; developments in technology produces new ways of war. Having taken these factors into account, we must not assume that conventional war has disappeared. Soldiers must take the opponent’s capabilities and how these can be neutralized as their twin starting points. Everything else serves only to distract attention from the essentials. Hungary has recognized the characteristics of the new type of conflict in time and is providing an adequate answer. It gave an adequate response to the challenge of mass illegal migration in 2015, and achieved its designated end state. However, instead of sitting back complacently after this success, the government recognized the need to modernize the armed forces, and initiated a development program. In the course of this ZRÍNYI 2026 program Hungary not only improves the capabilities of its armed forces, but also sets enhanced societal resilience as one of its goals. The papers of this conference make it clear that societal resilience is the product of many components. However, these components really depend on the morale of society. Identity has become the goal of warfare, and the increasingly urbanized society itself has become

315 its primary military target. National resilience can be developed through technical means, and – subject to the availability of resources – can be quickly restored. Identity, which provides the moral foundation of society’s cohesion, can also be developed – but unfortunately it cannot be easily restored.

About the authors Brigadier General Takács is an infantry officer of the Hungarian Defence Forces At present he is the commander of the HDF Augmentation, Preparation and Training Command. He can be reached at [email protected].

Peter A. Kiss is a retired US Army Non-Commissioned officer. senior researcher at the Hungarian Defence Forces General Staff Scientific Research Centre. He can be reached at [email protected].

Sources Clausewitz. Carl von. On War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993. Cronin, Audrey Kurth. “ISIS Is Not a Terrorist Group.” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2015. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/isis-not- terrorist-group, Retireved on January 11 2016. Financial Times encyclopedia. http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=bric, Retireved on January 03 2016 “Global population forecast.” The Economist. http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2015/08/daily- chart-growth-areas Kaldor, Mary. “In Defence of New Wars.” Stability. http://www.stabilityjournal.org/articles/10.5334/sta.at/ 316

Kristensen, Hans. “Status of World Nuclear Forces.” Nuclear Darkness. http://www.nucleardarkness.org/globalnucleararsenal/statusofw orldnuclearforces/ Retrieved on: 01 06 2016 Lind, Michael. “The Age of Identity Wars.” The Smart Set. http://thesmartset.com/the-age-of-identity-wars/ Retrieved on: 01 06 2016 Lindley French, Julian. “NATO-Russia and the New Cold Peace.” http://lindleyfrench.blogspot.hu/2014/03/nato-russia-and-new- cold-peace.html Retrieved on 11 02 2014 Stott M. – Nakhoul, S. “Syria expects more financial aid from Russia, Iran.” Reuters, 24 April 2013, at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/24/us-syria-crisis- economy-idUSBRE93N0QA20130424 Szendy, István. Hadelmélet és katonai műveletek. Budapest: National University of Public SErvice, 2014. Takács, Attila – Kovács, Ferenc. “Ami nem béke az háború.” Seregszemle, 2009/III. pp.115. Uhalt, Alfred R. Jr. “De Gaulle: Enigma in the Western Alliance?” Air University Review, March-April 1967 (http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/19 67/mar-apr/uhalt.html)

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Zoltán Tóth Civil-Military Medical Interface — a Topic for Concept Development & Experimentation

Introduction ‘Civilian considerations’ is the letter ‘C’ in the familiar METT- TC1 mnemonic, and Civil-Military Cooperation or Interface (CMI), especially in the medical field, is crucial in current and future military operations. Based on the Collaborate Resilience (CoRe) Concept Proposal of NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT): “NATO’s support to nations and enhancing Alliance resilience has been primarily focused on civil preparedness, through the implementation and ongoing assessment of the NATO Baseline Requirements for National Resilience (the so-called ‘seven baseline requirements’ – 7BRs).”2 The fifth baseline requirement is the ‘ability to deal with mass casualties.’ This requirement is much more than merely the immediate medical response to a mass casualty incident. It includes also the protection, maintenance and repair of general healthcare system (including its preventive, curative and rehabilitation functions). Conventionally military forces establish and operate their medical support system parallel to their civilian counterpart; and according to the traditional general3 and medical4 doctrine concepts

1 METT-TC Memory aid used by the U.Sarmed forces for operational planning: Mission; Enemy; Troops available; Terrain and Weather; Time available; and Civilian consideration. 2 Collaborative Resilience (CoRe) Concept Proposal — Enclosure 1 to 7300/TSC- FCL-0150/TT-180439/Ser:NU0259 (16APR2018) 3 AJP-3.4.9 Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation (Feb 2013) 4 AJMedP-6 Allied Joint Civil-Military Medical Interface Doctrine (Nov 2015) 319 and based on the conflicts of previous decades the military will help rebuild the damaged infrastructure and institutions of civilian society’s key sectors. In fact, the Civil-Military Medical Cooperation/Interface has a very broad spectrum, from everyday homeland medical activities during peacetime to a (theoretical) Article 5 situation (i.e. medical support for the affected military and civilian population during a large scale, high intensity, peer-on-peer conflict on own, allied or foreign territory). As Figures 1 and 2 show, the main question: WHO will/can/has to support WHOM and HOW (how long and to what extent)? Each affected participant has his own expectations but limitations and regulations as well. While Chapter 7 of the current NATO Medical Doctrine5 contains the official approach of the Alliance on this topic, the Humanitarian Principles (Humanity, Neutrality, Impartiality and Independence) were published by United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.6 As Figure 2 shows, Interoperability — based on NATO’s definition7 — is the key factor in successful co-operation. Interoperability, even in medical topics, has several domains. Most important of them are:  Technical — i.e. interchangeability, functional connectivity and interface among the parts from different sources;  Procedural — a common way of thinking and universally accepted medical tactics, techniques and procedures;  Human — e.g. proper knowledge, skill, practice and competencies; communication, etc. The medico-legal status could

5 AJP-4.10 Allied Joint Doctrine for Medical Support (May 2015 — Edition B Version 1) 6 General Assembly Resolution 46/182 (1991) and 58/114 (2004) 7 “Interoperability is the ability to act together coherently, effectively and efficiently to achieve Allied tactical, operational and strategic objectives.” (AAP-03 Directive for the Production, Maintenance and Management of NATO Standardization Documents (FEB 2018 — Edition K Version 1)) 320

be especially challenging within a multinational environment both in clear military or civilian and combined missions.

Figure 1. The Comprehensive approach of the Civil-Military Medical Interface Abbreviations: CMI – Civil-Military Interface; DOTMLPFI – Doctrine, Operation, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facility, Interoperability; DR – Disaster Response; GO – Governmental Organization; IO – International (Humanitarian) Organization; J1-9 – Joint Staff Directorates; METT-TC – see Footnote 1; MJO+ – Major Joint Operation plus; NA5CRO – Non- Article 5 Crisis Response Operation; NGO – Non-Governmental Organization; PVO – Private Voluntary Organization

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Figure 2. Domains of the Interoperability within the Civil- Military Medical Interface

New Challenges Beside strategic NATO documents8 for this short review, an excellent US monograph9 as well as a masters’ thesis10 were also used to look into the future. The changing global, political and military environment poses several new, significant challenges for the medical support of military operations. Figure 3 summarizes these.

8 e.g.: MC 0326/4 NATO Principles and Policies of Medical Support 9 Jones, S J; Gillingham B L; Murphy, S L : “Anticipating the Challenges of Potential Battlefields Out of the Crucible.” In How the US Military Transformed Combat Casualty Care in Iraq and Afghanistan. Kellermann, AL; Elter, E (Eds.) Borden Institute 2017 10 Parsons, P B: Medical Support for Combat Operations in a Denied Environment (MS-CODE): Considerations for Immediate and Future Operations and Research Across the Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Domains. Air War College Air University, 2017. 322

Figure 3. Potential challenges of a Future Conflict

The possibility of a large scale, high intensity, peer-on-peer war with a technologically capable adversary cannot be ruled out. Advanced weapon systems cause large numbers of serious combat casualties, while Anti Access and Area Denial (A2/AD) potential could seriously jeopardize the medical support of the troops. Furthermore, new types of belligerents – terrorist groups, separatist nationalists, cyber-criminals – are also present, who will not necessary respect the laws of armed conflict. They pose direct and indirect, kinetic and non-kinetic threat to both the military and the civilian medical support system. Urban terrain as a potential battlefield also poses several existing and new persistent medical problems and difficulties for medical support. A high casualty rate among civilians and unintentional and deliberate threat to the civilian health support system are obvious. Scarcity of medical professionals (nurses and physicians) both in the military and in the civilian society dictates the need for pooling and sharing these rare and valuable resources.

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Concept Development and Experimentation (CD&E)11 Concept Development and Experimentation as a working method has generated growing interest within the Alliance as a promotional and testing tool of transformation (see Figure 4.). The NATO Centre of Excellence for Military Medicine (MILMED COE) has been involved since the middle of this decade in this process under the guidance of Allied Command Transformation (ACT).

Figure 4. Joint Force Development Cycle12

In September 2017 during the Vigorous Warrior ’17 exercise in Lehnin, Germany we conducted our first experiments in 3 areas:  Medical Modularity / Interoperability;  CIV-MIL Medical Interface (both Live Experiments); and  Bio-Responsiveness (Tabletop Experiment).

11 MC 0583 MC Policy for Concept Development and Experimentation, 2011; BI- SC 75-4 Experimentation Directive, 2010; Concept Development and Experimentation (CD&E) Handbook — Allied Command Transformation, 2013; Guide for Understanding and Implementing Defense Experimentation (GUIDEx), Version 1.1 2006; The Technical Cooperation Programme; Experimenting in Exercises — A Short Guide HQ SACT Operational Experimentation Branch, Version 1.0, 2016. 12 Based on AAP-47 Allied Joint Doctrine Development, Edition B Version 1, 2016. 324

Based on the scenario of the CIV-MIL Medical Interface experiment, a small Romanian mobile civilian, pre-hospital Emergency Medical Team happened to be located at a German Role- 2 Enhanced Medical Treatment Facility (R-2E MTF). Due to a sudden incapacity of the DEU EM-Module personnel they had to take over the work of this module. Two simulated cardiac emergency cases had to be managed by the ROU Civilian EM-Team sequentially:  First alone in a completely new foreign clinical environment;  Thereafter in cooperation with DEU nurses, under the leadership of the single ROU physician. Both the medical performance (use of current protocols) and the non-technical skills (aka. Human Factors) were observed, but the primary purpose was proper interoperability with the other components of the MTF. After the simulated cases an Attitude Questionnaire was filled out by the ROU civilians. The results were not very surprising. Even though the professional performance itself was appropriate, interoperability within the military environment was not without its problems, due to lack of prior knowledge of, and training within that particular environment. This emphasizes the necessity of proper prior common training and shared knowledge of both systems. Although this first occasion, due to the lack of official concept and because of the very limited number of civilian participants could be considered as a pilot event, it will be continued in the future hopefully, with a much larger civilian audience.

Conclusion

Civil-Military Medical Interface is an imperative aspect of the Civil-Military Cooperation with growing importance due to the new potential problems and challenges of the Future Conflicts. The key

325 of the proper collaboration is the mutual knowledge and common training of parties focusing on DOTMLPFI aspects. Both Tabletop, Command Post and especially Experimentations during Live Exercises are potentially useful tool to test hypotheses and to validate concepts.

About the Author Dr. Zoltán Tóth is a Hungarian military officer. After 25 years medical work on field of acute care medicine since 2016 he works for NATO Centre of Excellence for Military Medicine on the Interoperability Branch as Doctrine SO1. His official topic is the Civil/Military Medical Interface and he is personally interested in Medical Consequences of New-Type (Hybrid, Asymmetric and MJO+) Conflicts.

Sources AAP-03 Directive for the Production, Maintenance And Management of NATO Standardization Documents, edition k version 1, 2018. AAP-47 Allied Joint Doctrine Development, Edition B Version 1, 2016. AJMedP-6 Allied Joint Civil-Military Medical Interface Doctrine, 2015. AJP-3.4.9 Allied Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Cooperation, 2013. AJP-4.10 Allied Joint Doctrine for Medical Support, Edition B Version 1, 2015 BI-SC 75-4 Experimentation Directive, 2010 Collaborative Resilience (CoRe) Concept Proposal — Enclosure 1 to 7300/TSC-FCL-0150/TT-180439/Ser:NU0259 (16APR2018) Concept Development and Experimentation (CD&E) Handbook — Allied Command Transformation (JAN 2013)

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Experimenting in Exercises — A Short Guide. HQ SACT Operational Experimentation Branch, Version 1.0, 2016 Guide for Understanding and Implementing Defense Experimentation (GUIDEx), Version 1.1 (FEB 2006); The Technical Cooperation Programme Jones, S J; Gillingham B L; Murphy, S L: “Anticipating the Challenges of Potential Battlefields.” In Out of the Crucible — How the US Military Transformed Combat Casualty Care in Iraq and Afghanistan. Kellermann, AL; Elter, E (Eds.) Borden Institute, 2017 MC 0326/4 NATO Principles and Policies of Medical Support MC 0583 MC Policy for Concept Development and Experimentation, 2011 Parsons, P B: Medical Support for Combat Operations in a Denied Environment (MS-CODE): Considerations for Immediate and Future Operations and Research Across the Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Domains. Air War College, Air University, 2017

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