Ecosystem Health and Sustainable 2 Agriculture

Ecology and Animal Health

Editors: Leif Norrgren and Jeffrey M. Levengood

CSDCentre for sustainable development Uppsala.  Food Safety and Public Health

Agricultural Terrorism The US Perspective 36

John A. Herrmann University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL, USA

Introduction to growers and processors approached an estimated $50- 100 million. Throughout history, natural disasters ranging from Two months after these outbreaks, consumer purchas- droughts and floods to untimely frosts and unmitigated ing of leafy greens was still significantly below pre-out- heat have routinely reduced production of the safe and break levels (Cuite et. al, 2007) If consumer confidence inexpensive food that is taken for granted in the United is shaken by food-borne illnesses not associated with States. However, the terrorist attacks on the World Trade intentional contamination of food, then it is reasonable Center and other American targets in 2001 caused policy- to assume that a directed attack against agriculture, well makers to consider whether American agriculture was planned and executed, would cause significant and long- also susceptible to malicious acts of terror. lasting economic and social impacts in addition to any American agriculture could be a particularly inviting ensuing human, plant and animal diseases. target. Not only could intentional contamination of the This chapter briefly discusses the history of agroterror- food supply or a natural disaster affect the health of hu- ism in America, the potential impact of agroterrorism on mans, plants and animals, it could also have profound the US economy and how policy-makers have responded and lasting effects on the agricultural economy and com- to the likelihood of an attack on US agriculture. promise consumer confidence. In 2006, an outbreak of human illness caused by E. coli O157:H7 associated with What is Agroterrorism? spinach grown in the state of California led to 183 cases Agroterrorism has been described as: and one death in 26 states (MMWR, 2006). The spin- “The deliberate introduction of a disease agent, ach disaster was followed by an outbreak of Salmonella either against livestock or into the food chain, to traced to contaminated tomatoes, which affected almost undermine socioeconomic stability and/or generate 200 people in 21 states (Wood, 2006). Another E. coli fear.”(Chalk, 2003) outbreak associated with shredded lettuce at fast food and: restaurants affected 152 individuals a few months lat- “Agroterrorism is a subset of , and is er (USFDA, 2008).Following national recalls by the defined as the deliberate introduction of a plant or United States Food and Drug Administration (US FDA), animal disease with the goal of generating fear, consumer confidence in leafy greens plummeted, sales causing economic losses, and/or undermining so- dropped, shares of publicly traded grocery store stock cial stability.”(Monke, 2007) declined in value, produce had to be destroyed and losses

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Although these and similar definitions have been ac- The cost of recovering from natural disasters or in- cepted for some time in topical discussions, both de- tentional agricultural terrorism directed at plants, ani- scriptions accentuate plant and animal disease but do mals or production and distribution systems would be not mention water, human health or food safety. A more much higher than that associated with the loss of prod- inclusive definition of agroterrorism proposed in this uct alone. Agroterrorism, because it is a directed and chapter is the “intentional introduction or threat of in- purposeful activity designed to create maximum dam- troduction of biological, chemical or physical agents age to targets, could have much higher costs than ran- into agricultural production or processing systems that domly occurring natural outbreaks. The immediate loss diminish human, animal or plant health, compromise of tangible goods and consumer confidence in safe and public confidence in the safety of food and water, gener- wholesome food and declines in domestic food pur- ate economic losses for the agricultural sector or under- chases would be followed by declines in the value of mine social stability.” publicly traded stocks in agriculture and food-based in- dustries and loss of domestic and international markets, The Importance of US Agriculture agricultural and non-agricultural alike. The Foot and The agriculture sector of the United States economy di- Mouth Disease (FMD) outbreak in the United Kingdom rectly employs only 2% of the nation’s workforce but, in 2001 illustrated the extent of collateral economic overall, approximately one in six US workers, ranging damage associated with an agricultural disaster. Due to from producers to processors, shippers and grocery shops that episode, costs to agriculture were estimated at £3.1 to restaurant workers, are associated with food and fibre billion. Additional costs to the tourism and hospitality production. (USDA, 2005) Estimates from 2002 indicate industries were estimated at between £2.7 and £3.2 bil- that agriculture contributes $1.3 trillion dollars (USD), lion (Thompson et al., 2002). or 11%, to the gross domestic product. Gross farm sales exceed $200 billion dollars annually, with production al- most evenly split between livestock and plants. As of 2003, the United States produced more than Effects of Agroterrorism, Natural 42% of the world’s maize, 35% of the world’s soybean Disasters and Disease Outbreaks on and 12% of the world’s wheat. A significant proportion Agriculture in the United States of US agricultural production (21%) is exported, with crops (22%) outpacing livestock (10.5%). These products Agroterrorism made up 8% of all US exports ($60 billion USD) in 2003, Attacks against agricultural production systems and water which more than balanced the agricultural imports of 4% supplies are not new and have been employed through- ($47 billion USD)(US Census Bureau, 2004). out the world for many years. Over the past forty years, Because of production surpluses and government poli- the United States has experienced numerous incidents cy supports, the average family in the United States spends of intentional contamination of food, feed and water. only an estimated 5.8% of disposable household income Although the following list is comprised of events that on food, whether it is prepared at home or eaten away did not involve recognised terrorist groups or states, the from home. Estimates from the European Union suggest events indicate how easy it has been to contaminate food, that 7.2% of disposable household income is spent on food feed or water. in its member countries. The world average for household In 1970, 30 cows were found dead on a farm owned spending for food is 15% for most developed nations and by a Black Muslim group in Ashville, Alabama. Analysis over 30% for many developing nations (USDA, 2006). of a pinkish-white material found on rocks in the stream Because US citizens are used to having access to safe, in- from which the cows drank was identified by a local vet- expensive food and water, any disruption in US agricul- erinary surgeon as cyanide. It was alleged that the local tural productivity would severely shake consumer confi- racist group, the Klu Klux Klan, might have been respon- dence and could lead to significant social unrest. sible (New York Times, 1970).

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One of the earliest proven attempts to disrupt civil so- eventually became ill with symptoms of nicotine poison- ciety with bioterrorism in the United States occurred in ing. The perpetrator was indicted after an investigation by 1972, when a group of college students who belonged to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the United States a neo-nazi group apparently cultured and then planned to Department of Agriculture (MMWR, 2003a). put 30-40 kg of typhoid bacteria into Chicago’s drinking In 2007, a number of pet dogs and cats were reported water system. Fortunately, had the group been success- to have become ill with symptoms consistent with kidney ful in delivering the bacteria into the water system, the failure. Many of the pets were diagnosed with abnormal bacteria would have been killed by normal water chlo- crystals in their urine samples and impaired kidney func- rination and no illnesses would have been expected. In tion. Many deaths of dogs and cats were alleged to have less developed countries, however, the plan, if carried resulted. Epidemiological investigation strongly associ- out, could have been effective in inducing human illness. ated the ill pets with various pet foods that were proc- In addition, the incident made authorities aware of how essed by a Canadian pet food manufacturer, which used easy it was to culture pathogens in a school laboratory imported wheat gluten and rice middlings from China in (Kellman, 2001). the pet food formulations. Analysis of these raw products In 1984, upset about local zoning board decisions from China indicated that the wheat and rice products that had gone against them, followers of the Indian guru were contaminated with the synthetic polymer melamine Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh tested a plan to influence a to try to increase crude protein levels. The price of the local election by spiking salad bars with Salmonella wheat and rice was directly tied to crude protein concen- Typhimurium at 10 restaurants and one grocery store in the trations and the contamination was a deliberate attempt to town of The Dalles, Oregon. The cult members had hoped increase the value of the product. to incapacitate enough voters through food poisoning the An April 2007 hearing in the US Senate led to legisla- day before a local county election so that their own candi- tion requiring the Secretary of the Department of Health dates would win and would eventually reverse the previ- and Human Services to establish: “(1) processing and ous zoning board decisions. At least 751 persons became ingredient standards for feed, pet food, animal waste, sick with gastrointestinal illness from what local public and ingredient definitions; (2) update standards for pet health officials thought was a naturally occurring contami- food labelling that includes nutritional information and nation. It was only when the cult leader admitted one year ingredient information; and (3) an early warning and later to purposefully contaminating the salad bars that the surveillance system to identify contaminations of the pet plan was revealed. Fortunately, the exercise did not make food supply and outbreaks of illness from pet food”. (US enough people sick, so the plan to influence the November Senate, 2007) Although the melamine incident was a case election was abandoned (Carus and Tucker, 2001). of manipulating agricultural production for financial gain In 1999, a Wisconsin man was indicted for contami- and not a deliberate form of agroterrorism, it illustrates nating, on two occasions, consumer products intended how easy it was to contaminate foodstuffs for companion as ingredients in animal feed processed by National animals and humans. By-Products, Inc. The contamination with the pesticide chlordane forced the company to recall products and to Natural Disasters and Disease Outbreaks destroy raw material, leading to losses exceeding $2.5 The recent history of natural disasters and disease out- million. Chlordane, a potent pesticide, is linked to cancer breaks that resulted in widespread agricultural losses in in humans. On 13 April 2000, a federal jury returned a the United States is impressive. Hurricanes Floyd (1999) guilty verdict to the charge of tampering and sentenced and Katrina (2005) left agricultural and environmental the defendant to three years’ incarceration (USFDA, devastation in their wake. Total damage estimates as a 2000). In early 2003, a disgruntled employee at a su- result of hurricane Floyd were approximately $6 billion. permarket in Michigan intentionally contaminated over The estimated livestock damage was estimated at over $13 200 pounds of minced beef with a nicotinic acid-based million. Hurricane Floyd destroyed a total of 2,504,161 insecticide. Approximately 100 people in the community acres (1.0 million hectares) of crops, with damage es-

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timates exceeding $543 million. Portions of ten states distribution and release of African rodents, prairie dogs were declared major disaster areas, from Florida north to and certain other animals to prevent the introduction and Connecticut (NWS, 1999 and NCFMP, 2007). spread of monkeypox in the United States. The govern- The effects of Katrina reached far beyond the immedi- ment response was swift but this incident yet again point- ate geographical area that felt her winds. The Mississippi ed out how easily exotic diseases could be introduced River serves as the major shipping route for maize, soy- into the country (USFDA, 2004). bean, rice and wheat produced in the nation’s major grain- producing states from Louisiana to Minnesota, a distance of over 1200 miles. New Orleans, at the terminus of the Mississippi River, is a major port for US oil imports and for Agents and Toxins with Agroterrorism export of agricultural products and is the site of consider- Potential able oil processing. Hurricane damage brought a halt to the flow of agricultural trade through New Orleans, which re- Agents and toxins that can cause disease in plants and an- sulted in a domino effect of negative consequences. Grain imals are often easy to employ, spread rapidly through the producers were not able to move their harvested grain to environment, are generally safe for humans to handle and the port of New Orleans, requiring them to seek storage have a potential for great economic damage. Terrorists facilities at high storage fees. Commodity prices were af- would not only want to create as much damage as pos- fected due to excessive stockpiles and there was eventual sible, but would also want to take credit for the attack in loss of product that could not be stored properly (Schnepf the ensuing media coverage. Pathogenic organisms and and Chite, 2005). Hurricane damage to farm-related indus- toxins that affect animals might be more likely to be used tries was estimated at more than $2 billion. The estimate as agents in an agroterrorism attack. There are a number included $1 billion in direct losses, as well as $500 million of reasons for this: in higher fuel and energy prices (AFBF, 2005). Officials suspected that the outbreak of Exotic • Animal pathogens can be easily imported, concealed Newcastle Disease that occurred in California in 2002 and introduced into production animal herds. was introduced into the United States by birds smug- • Many animal pathogens are zoonotic, i.e. they can gled into California for illegal cock fighting. Although cause disease in both humans and animals and can that incident was relegated to 50 small backyard producer also be transmitted between humans and animals. premises and only 5,700 birds were euthanised, it demon- • Animal pathogens can multiply within the target spe- strated how easily a potentially devastating disease agent cies, create a carrier state and thereby serve as vectors could be introduced into the country (Nolen, 2002). of the disease, prolonging the outbreak. The rapidly expanding trade in exotic pets was associ- • Many animal diseases are highly contagious and have ated with the first outbreak of human monkeypox seen the potential to cause a rapidly progressing, explosive in the United States. In June 2003, 71 people in several epidemic. Midwestern states were afflicted with pox type symp- • Due to very effective eradication programmes in the toms after handling prairie dogs that they had purchased United States over the past century, production ani- as pets. Monkeypox, native to parts of central and west- mals in the United States are immunologically naïve ern Africa, is common in rodents. The prairie dogs had to many foreign animal diseases. been housed with African Gambian rats at exotic pet sup- • Many animal pathogens can spread to wildlife, creat- ply warehouses, contracted the disease from the rats and ing a reservoir that would be difficult, if not possible, transmitted monkeypox to humans (MMWR, 2003b). to control. In November 2003, The Center for Disease Control and • In addition, due to historically effective eradication Prevention (CDC) and the Food and Drug Administration programmes, veterinary professionals and producers, (FDA) issued interim final rules to establish new restric- the first line of surveillance for foreign diseases, are tions on the import, capture, transport, sale, exchange, inexperienced in their early recognition.

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• In an outbreak requiring the widespread destruction Current Susceptibility of US Agriculture of infected animals, the disposal of dead animals to Terrorism would become a challenge to public health agen- cies. Media coverage of the burning or burial of dead Consolidation and Vertical Integration animals would be distressing to consumers and might A trend in American agriculture over the past 50 years cause them to question the government response. has been toward larger farms and less plant and animal diversification on each farm. Large farms have become In contrast, plant pathogens and toxins may be less likely so prevalent that according to the National Agricultural to be employed as agents of agroterrorism because their Statistics Service of the USDA, 6.7% of farms (143K/2.1 effects might be more protracted and less dramatic, re- M) account for 75% of the value of agricultural produc- sulting in a diminished ‘shock value’ to consumers. Other tion in the United States and average 2000 acres in size. reasons why plant agents would be less likely to be em- In the beef, pork and poultry industries, consolidation ployed in an agroterrorism attack include: among meat packers to form mega corporations has fol- lowed and perhaps even directed the same trend. During • Plant pathogens are as easily imported into the the past 30 years, concentration within the meat packing country as animal pathogenic agents but difficult to industry has tripled and now just four beef packing com- disseminate over a large area due to weather, tem- panies control more than 83% of the industry. Similar perature, humidity, particulate binding, dilution and trends have occurred in pig and poultry processing (Farm air currents. Bill, 2007 and USDA, 2002). • Many plant pathogens require months to show their From a bio-surveillance standpoint, large consolidated effects. The time lag between introduction and notice- farms can be either very good or very bad. If adequate able disease would reduce the shock value of a terror- surveillance and response systems are in place, large ist act. farms can recognise, control and mitigate breaches of • Given the lack of immediate effect after introduction bio-security rapidly and effectively. However, because of of a plant pathogen, it would be difficult for terrorists their sheer size, an unrecognised outbreak of animal or to ‘take credit’ for an event. plant disease can affect many more acres of crops and • Many plant pathogens mimic naturally occurring more individual animals, resulting in significantly more diseases, further reducing the shock value. financial loss than on small diversified farms. • Plant pathogens have very little, if any, direct effect Concurrent with the change from small diversified on human health. farms to larger, more specialised farms has been the ver- • There is not as much consumer distress over media tical integration of agriculture. In a vertically integrated coverage of destroyed crops as there is over destruc- system, producers, shippers, processors and often retail- tion of animals. ers are all part of the same company. There are economic advantages to this business model as well as greater con- Through its Program, the United States trol of product quality and uniformity. Vertical integra- Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), regu- tion provides an opportunity to develop and implement lates all laboratories and other entities that possess, use effective programs such as Hazard Analysis and transfer pathogenic agents and toxins that could be of Critical Control Points (HACCP), since one man- used in a terrorist attack. These select agents were des- agement team has control of all aspects of production, ignated as such because they have the potential to create processing and retailing to consumers, essentially the a severe threat to human, animal and plant health, either ‘farm to fork’ concept. through direct effects on humans, plants or animals or on However, there are risks with vertical integration. their products, or because they are particularly virulent, From an agroterrorism perspective, the danger of verti- easily introduced into populations and difficult to pre- cal integration is that a breach in any part of the system vent, recognise and treat (Table 36.1) (CFR, 2005). could conceivably affect the entire system, resulting in

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Table 36.1. Select Agent and Toxin List. Source: USCDCP, 2005. USDA only agents and toxins USDA/HHS overlap agents and toxins Livestock • Bacillus anthracis • African horse sickness virus • Botulinum neurotoxins • African swine fever virus • Botulinum neurotoxin-producing species of Clostridium • Akabane virus • Brucella abortus • Avian influenza virus (highly pathogenic) • Brucella melitensis • Blue tongue virus (exotic) • Brucella suis • Bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent • Burkholderia mallei • Camel pox virus • Burkholderia pseudomallei • Classical swine fever virus • Clostridium perfringens epsilon toxin • Cowdria ruminantium (Heartwater) • Coccidioides immitis • Foot-and-mouth disease virus • Coxiella burnetii • Goat pox virus • Eastern equine encephalitis virus • Japanese encephalitis virus • Francisella tularensis • Lumpy skin disease virus • Hendra virus • Malignant catarrhal fever virus (exotic) • Nipah virus • Menangle virus • Rift Valley fever virus • Mycoplasma capricolum /M. • Shigatoxin F38/M. mycoides capri • Staphylococcal enterotoxins (contagious caprine o pleuropneumonia) • T-2 toxin • Mycoplasma mycoides mycoides • Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus (contagious bovine pleuropneumonia) • Newcastle disease virus (VVND) • Peste des petits ruminants virus • Rinderpest virus • Sheep pox virus • Swine vesicular disease virus • Vesicular stomatitis virus (exotic)

Plants • Candidatus Liberobacter africanus • Candidatus Liberobacter asiaticus • Peronosclerospora philippinesis • Ralstonia solanacearum, race 3, biovar 2 • Sclerophthora rayssiae var. zeae • Synchytrium endobioticum • Xanthomonas oryzae pv. Oryzicola • Xylella fastidiosa (citrus variegated chlorosis strain) widespread exposure of consumers to tainted produce especially cattle, are often born and raised at one site and and massive financial loss to the company. then transported to another site to be fattened to market weight. Ultimately they are transported once again to a Other Potential Vulnerabilities of U.S. Agriculture processing facility at yet another location. Commingling With the development of the international economy, hu- of livestock, especially if surveillance is deficient, could mans, animals and consumer products can travel across allow easy and rapid transmission of disease among ani- the globe within 14 hours. In today’s world, extremism mals and across large regions of the country. A national and the frequency of international travel make the inten- identification system for all individual animals or ship- tional introduction of foreign disease agents a possibility ments of livestock would greatly improve traceability. and unintentional introduction a probability. However, without a national capacity to arrive at an early Farms in the United States are geographically dispersed and definitive diagnosis of foreign plant or animal dis- and are typically grouped in remote locations. Livestock, eases, spread of an introduced pathogen could occur una-

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bated for too long to prevent widespread damage to the States Senate Government Affairs Committee hearing industry. 2003, a simulation of an intentional introduction of foot Although measures have been enacted to improve bor- and mouth disease (FMD) into the country was described. der security, experts warn that there is still much work to Since the incubation period for FMD is three to five days be done. In addition, there is little biosecurity at processing and the disease is not usually diagnosed until day five, and distribution centres and even less on most farms. A and due to the customary movement of cattle throughout recent study found that livestock producers fattening beef the country, FMD would have already spread to 23 states cattle did not have high implementation of , by the time it was diagnosed. By day nine, it would have biosecurity or security practices. The authors found that, in been in 29 states and would require an estimated 700,000 general, larger cattle feedyards had better biosecurity prac- people to aid in response and recovery operations and tices than smaller facilities (Brandt et al., 2008). to deal with the estimated 23 million head of cattle de- Since the United States has been relatively success- stroyed. Estimated losses ranged from $30.4 billion to ful in eliminating many internationally important animal $83.6 billion, not including loss of export markets. These diseases such as foot and mouth disease and classical estimates did not include the possibility of FMD spread- swine fever, there are few producers, extension agents ing to deer and elk and becoming endemic in the wildlife and veterinary surgeons, conceivably the first line of sur- population (US Senate, 2004). veillance, who are adept at recognising foreign animal A terrorist attack on the transportation infrastructure and plant diseases. Furthermore, since eradication pro- could also have profound effects on agriculture. Similar grammes have been so successful, there has been little to the consequences seen with hurricane Katrina, any dis- need to fund federal indemnity programmes for livestock ruption of producers’ ability to get their products to ter- losses associated with disease surveillance and eradica- minal markets would dramatically affect the agricultural tion programmes. Many livestock producers see no finan- economy, as well as food and feed supplies. Similarly, cial incentive in reporting odd disease symptoms for fear since agriculture is very labour-intensive despite advanc- that an investigation by animal disease authorities will es in mechanisation, any intentionally introduced epi- result in economic losses to them with little chance of demic affecting the labour force would necessarily affect regaining the value of animals or their products. In these the harvesting, processing and marketing of food, feed circumstances, passive surveillance for animal diseases and fibre. could be severely affected. This was apparent when the ban on processing downer cattle (cattle unable to rise) for slaughter took effect right after the first case of bovine spongioform encephalopathy (BSE) was discovered in Legislative and Presidential Responses the United States in 2003. (USDA, 2003) BSE surveil- lance was centred on testing at processing centres by Legislative Responses teams from the Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS) of During recent years in the past, the United States Congress the USDA. The highest BSE risk cattle, those that were has held four hearings on agroterrorism, three in the Senate non-ambulatory or showing neurological signs, were of- and one in the House of Representatives. Congressional ten lost to surveillance because, with the downer cow ban hearings are formal events during which invited witnesses in place, they never made it to slaughterhouses where are asked to offer their expertise on the topic of interest. they could be tested. Congressional hearings serve to focus legislators’ atten- The longer the time between recognition of symp- tion on particular issues and often result in the eventual toms and actual diagnosis, the greater the chance of an introduction of legislation to address needs discovered explosive outbreak occurring. Besides the lack of trained during the hearings. The four hearings were entitled, personnel on most farms, there are few on-site, rapid di- ‘Agroterrorism: The Threat to America’s Breadbasket’, agnostic tests for most agents liable to be used in an at- ‘Evaluating the Threat of Agroterrorism’, ‘Bio-security tack on the nation’s food production systems. At a United and Agroterrorism’, and ‘Biosecurity Coordination’.

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Three major pieces of legislation were passed into law, appropriate funds for only some provisions of executive two in 2002 and one in 2006, and focused on the nation’s directives, thereby dramatically altering their function security with specific provisions to safeguard agricul- and effectiveness in achieving the original intent of the ture, the food supply and public health. The Bioterrorism President (Relyea, 2007) Preparedness Act (PL 107-188) was passed in 2002 and Three Presidential Directives concerning homeland expanded FDA authority over the registration of food security were issued from December 2003 to December manufacturing and required prior notice from importers 2004. The first was the Homeland Security Presidential within a specified period prior to product arrival at the Directive-7 (HSPD-7), which designated critical infra- US borders. It also created the Select Agent List and the structure that was vulnerable to terrorist attack and was es- policies tightening the control over possession, transport sential to the operation of the economy and government. and uses of those agents. In addition, the Act expanded Presidential Directive-9 (HSPD-9) was issued a agricultural security at USDA facilities and defined crim- month later and was entitled ‘Defense of United States inal penalties for violation of the Select Agent rules and Agriculture and Food’. This directive established a na- for terrorism activities against animal production and tional policy to protect against attacks on agriculture processing enterprises. and food systems. The directive specifically instructed The massive Homeland Security Act (PL 107-296) federal agencies to develop prevention and surveillance created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) by systems to monitor plant and animal health, food quality combining parts of many agencies throughout the federal and public health through an integrated diagnostic sys- government into one Cabinet level agency. Two major tem. It also recommended the establishment of a National changes directly affected agriculture: 1) responsibility Veterinary Stockpile (NVS), which would be able to de- for agricultural border inspections was transferred from ploy vaccines and therapeutic products within 24 hours of the USDA to the US Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) an attack, and a National Plant Disease Recovery System while retaining scientific expertise from the USDA; and (NPDRS), which was charged with developing disease- 2) responsibility for Plum Island Animal Disease Center, and pest-resistant plant varieties within one growing sea- the lead foreign disease unit in the United States, was son of an attack. transferred from the USDA to the DHS. The reason for A previous Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5) called consolidation of these activities within the DHS was to for the development of a National Response Plan to coor- coordinate activities and intelligence to prepare the ag- dinate federal agencies as they plan prevention, response ricultural industry for disaster prevention, planning, re- and recovery capabilities. Agricultural components of sponse and recovery. the plan provided nutrition assistance for disaster areas, The third law, the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act control and eradication of animal and plant diseases and (PL 109-374) was enacted to expand criminal penalties pests, assurance of food safety and protection of natural for terrorism activities against animal production and and cultural resources and historic properties. processing enterprises. The Executive Branch has also been active in promot- ing the development of public-private partnerships to Presidential Responses protect critical infrastructure. Examples of public-private Presidential directives have been issued throughout US partnerships engaged in agricultural security activities in- history to establish national policies, goals and objec- clude the: tives, especially for administrative agencies within the Executive Branch of government. These directives can • National Infrastructure Protection Plan, which shares be challenged by Congress if they are thought to violate best practices, identifies deficiencies in biosecurity, the statutory process or conflict with the Constitution. and improves communication between government Presidential directives often carry the force of law but can agencies and private sector agriculture. be modified extensively by Congress through its legisla- • Strategic Partnership Program Agroterrorism, which tive oversight. For example, Congress can authorise and determines critical aspects of agriculture that may

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Table 36.2. Appropriations for funding of activities direct against agroterrorism. Source: Monke, 2007. YEAR 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 (millions) (requested) USDA 552 416 412 596 598 523 719 DHS NA 69 227 211 264 295 300 TOTAL 552 485 639 807 862 818 1,019

be vulnerable to attack, enhances intelligence and sur- Protection (CBP) and to support research and training in veillance, and develops mitigation strategies in case science and technology. of an attack. Federal funding of activities directed toward agricul- • Information Sharing and Analysis Center, which as- tural biosecurity has increased by $262 million from the sesses information shared with the law enforcement 2002 budget though to the 2007 budget. The requested and intelligence communities budget for 2008 would increase funding by another $201 million over the 2007 budget, which would be almost a Private, university and governmental laboratories and re- 100% increase in funding from the 2002 baseline level search centres have also been asked to coordinate activi- (Table 36.2). ties so that a seamless laboratory system would have the Federal funding for agroterrorism activities described surge capacity needed to respond in the case of an attack. by function is depicted in Figure 36.1. The bulk of fund- in addition, public and private research centres have been ing goes to the US Customs and Border Patrol. The sec- asked to coordinate research activities to provide the sci- ond largest amount of funding is spread across the USDA entific basis for response and recovery phases. and DHS and directed to address catastrophic threats. Ninety three percent (93%) of funding for agroterrorism Funding of Government Anti-agroterrorism Activities activities is directed to border security, identifying and Legislative and executive branch responses to the threat researching catastrophic threats and preserving critical of agroterrorism have little impact unless they are accom- infrastructure. panied by appropriate levels of funding. The US Congress has oversight of the national budget and has, for the most part, complied with the President’s funding level requests for agroterrorism activities. The bulk of federal funding to combat the potential of agroterrorism proceeds to the Departments of Agriculture and Homeland Security. The agricultural biosecurity func- tions of these two agencies are funded primarily through direct appropriations from Congress and, to a lesser de- gree, through user fees generally charged to food import- ers. The leading USDA recipients are the Agriculture Research Service (ARS), the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), the Cooperative State Research, Education and Extension Service (CSREES), the Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS), the Economic Research Service (ERS) and various administration and executive operations. Funds appropriated to the Department of Homeland Figure 36.1. Homeland security funding for agriculture by function. Security are used to support Customs and Border Source: Monke, 2007.

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Conclusions continue to be, many simulations and tabletop exercises that link local, state and federal agencies in a coordinated Agriculture is a significant component of the US econo- response to natural disasters and intentional exposures. my, providing safe and inexpensive food for people and All three levels of government have been energised to feed for animals at an affordable cost and helping to bal- develop coordinated and workable plans to respond ef- ance trade with international markets. It is fundamental to ficiently to threats to public health. the health of humans, animals and the ecosystem. Public health and agricultural planners recognise that Previous natural disasters and incidents of deliberate the damage associated with an outbreak is proportional contamination of food, feed and water have shown that to the time elapsed between the index case and diagno- agricultural systems in the US are susceptible to inten- sis. They also recognise that as efforts progress through tional and malicious attacks. The ineffective state prepa- primary to tertiary prevention, attendant costs rise dra- rations and federal responses to hurricane Katrina in 2005 matically. Planning must be all-inclusive and bring to the highlighted the necessity for a well-funded, directed and discussion the intelligence and science communities, the coordinated response to help communities in need. public and private sectors and risk communicators who The US government has taken numerous measures to can inform consumers about the nature of threats. counteract the threat of agroterrorism based on the prin- ciples of primary, secondary and tertiary prevention. Primary prevention focuses on eliminating or reducing individual and community exposures through enhanced surveillance and communication at borders, at produc- tion and processing facilities, and at importing entities, whether the importers are countries or international cor- porations. The bulk of the federal budget allocated to agri- cultural biosurveillance is directed at border security and keeping foreign pests and pathogens out of the country. Secondary prevention centres on recognising expo- sures and preventing disease through better training of individuals in the diagnosis of foreign diseases, better diagnostic tests and coordinated and timely laboratory response capabilities. These areas have also received considerable federal financial support over the past five years. A recent example of renewed interest in developing a cadre of professionals adept at foreign disease diagnosis is the mandatory training in exotic and emerging animal diseases taken by students in the professional veterinary medicine programmes at 23 colleges in the United States. However, such efforts are offset by the unfulfilled need for veterinary surgeons in production medicine and public health practice. Legislation to encourage more veterinary medical students to enter food animal and public health careers has also been introduced in Congress. Tertiary prevention concentrates on mitigating the ef- fects of disease outbreaks through rapid response and mo- bilisation of necessary funds and personnel. Over the past seven years throughout the country, there have been, and

305 References

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