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PY2002 Mind and World Academic Year 2017‐2018 12/19/2017 PY2002 Mind and World | Royal Holloway, University of London Home My Lists My Bookmarks Feedback Log In PY2002 Mind and World Academic year 2017‐2018 1. Modern Empiricisms (10 items) Primary Reading: Discourse on Method: And the Meditations ‐ Rene Descartes, F. E. Sutcliffe 1968 BOOK Essential Meditations I, II, & VI An Essay Concerning Human Understanding ‐ John Locke, P. H. Nidditch 1975 BOOK Essential Book I Chapter 1, Book II Chapters 8 & 9, Book III Chapters 1‐3 An Essay Concerning Human Understanding ‐ John Locke, P. H. Nidditch 1975 (electronic resource) BOOK Essential Book I Chapter 1, Book II Chapters 8 & 9, Book III Chapters 1‐3 Further Reading: Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy? ‐ Ian Hacking 1975 BOOK Further Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Locke on Human Understanding ‐ E. J Lowe 1995 BOOK Further Especially Chapter 7 Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Locke on Human Understanding ‐ E. J. Lowe 1995 (electronic book) BOOK Further Especially Chapter 7 The Inverted Spectrum ‐ Sydney Shoemaker 1982 ARTICLE Further Inverted Qualia ‐ Byrne, Alex ARTICLE Further 2. Frege and Modern Philosophy (12 items) https://rhul.rl.talis.com/lists/17ACE9C1-7BC9-DFE0-9E31-C59DA5D7349B.html 1/12 12/19/2017 PY2002 Mind and World | Royal Holloway, University of London Primary Reading: Letter to Jourdain ‐ Frege DOCUMENT Essential Available on Moodle The Thought: A Logical Inquiry ‐ Gottlob Frege 1956 ARTICLE Essential Sense and Reference ‐ Gottlob Frege 1948 ARTICLE Essential Further Reading: Gottlob Frege ARTICLE Further Frege: making sense ‐ Michael Beaney 1996 BOOK Further Frege, Philosophy of Language ‐ Michael Dummett 1973 BOOK Further The Cambridge Companion to Frege ‐ Tom Ricketts, Michael Potter 2010 (electronic book) BOOK Further Especially Chapters 7 & 8 Philosophy of Language: A Contemporary Introduction ‐ William G. Lycan 2000 (electronic book) BOOK Further pp. 10‐12 & 31‐34. Start here if you are lost! Frege’s Distinction Between Sense and Reference ‐ Gideon Makin 2010 ARTICLE Further Available on Moodle Routledge Philosophy GuideBook to Frege on Sense and Reference ‐ Mark Textor 2009 (Paperback) BOOK Further 3. Acquaintance and Description (10 items) https://rhul.rl.talis.com/lists/17ACE9C1-7BC9-DFE0-9E31-C59DA5D7349B.html 2/12 12/19/2017 PY2002 Mind and World | Royal Holloway, University of London Primary Reading: Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description ‐ Bertrand Russell 1911 ARTICLE Essential On Denoting ‐ Bertrand Russell 1905 ARTICLE Essential Further Reading: Reference and Deinite Descriptions ‐ Keith S. Donnellan 1966 ARTICLE Further Philosophy of Language: A Contemporary Introduction ‐ William G. Lycan 2000 (electronic book) BOOK Further Chapters 2 & 3 Mr. Strawson on Referring ‐ Bertrand Russell 1957 ARTICLE Further Russel's reply to Strawson. On Referring ‐ P. F. Strawson 1950 ARTICLE Further The Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell 2003 (electronic book) BOOK Further Especially Beaney's Chapter on 'Russell and Frege' and Hylton's on 'The THeory of Descriptions' Descriptions ‐ SEoP ‐ Peter Ludlow ARTICLE Further 4. Nature Against Sense (16 items) Primary Reading: Two Dogmas of Empiricism ‐ W.V.O. Quine WEBPAGE Essential Speaking of Objects ‐ W. V. Quine 1957 https://rhul.rl.talis.com/lists/17ACE9C1-7BC9-DFE0-9E31-C59DA5D7349B.html 3/12 12/19/2017 PY2002 Mind and World | Royal Holloway, University of London ARTICLE Essential Further Reading: Word and Object ‐ W. V. Quine 1960 BOOK Further Chapter 2 Quine ‐ Christopher Hookway 1988 BOOK Further Quine: A Guide for the Perplexed ‐ Gary Kemp 2006 (electronic book) BOOK Further Chapters 2 & 3 Just the Arguments ‐ Michael Bruce, Steven Barbone 2011 BOOK Further Read: 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' by Sinclair Philosophy of W.V. Quine: An Expository Essay ‐ Jr Gibson, Roger F. 1982 BOOK Further Other Resources: On the Ideas of Quine: Section 1 2008 AUDIO‐VISUAL DOCUMENT Further On the Ideas of Quine: Section 2 2008 AUDIO‐VISUAL DOCUMENT Further On the Ideas of Quine: Section 3 2008 AUDIO‐VISUAL DOCUMENT Further On the Ideas of Quine: Section 4 2008 AUDIO‐VISUAL DOCUMENT Further On the Ideas of Quine: Section 5 2008 AUDIO‐VISUAL DOCUMENT Further https://rhul.rl.talis.com/lists/17ACE9C1-7BC9-DFE0-9E31-C59DA5D7349B.html 4/12 12/19/2017 PY2002 Mind and World | Royal Holloway, University of London In Conversation with W.V. Quine ‐ The Boolos Panel 2013 AUDIO‐VISUAL DOCUMENT Further Especially the irst 20 mins 5. Following a Rule (14 items) Primary Reading: Philosophische Untersuchungen =: Philosophical investigations ‐ P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte Ludwig Wittgenstein ; translated by G. E. M. Anscombe (electronic resource) BOOK Essential Essential 143,151,165,166,169,172,173,179ff,200‐242 Philosophical Investigations ‐ Ludwig Wittgenstein, Gertrude E. M. Anscombe 2009 BOOK Essential 143,151,165,166,169,172,173,179ff,200‐242. Extract available on Moodle Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language: An Elementary Exposition ‐ Saul A. Kripke 1982 BOOK Essential Extract available on Moodle Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language Ultimate HomePage WEBPAGE Recommended Further Reading: Wittgenstein: a critical reader ‐ Hans‐Johann Glock 2001 BOOK Further Read: 'Following a Rule' by Arrington An Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations Vol 2 ‐ G.P. Baker, P.M.S. Hacker 2014 BOOK Further Rule‐Following and Meaning 2002 BOOK Further Read: 'The Rule‐Following Consideration' by Boghassian Tacit Knowledge ‐ Neil Gascoigne, Tim Thornton 2013 BOOK Further Extract available on Moodle Wittgenstein, Kripke and the Rule Following Paradox ‐ A Croom https://rhul.rl.talis.com/lists/17ACE9C1-7BC9-DFE0-9E31-C59DA5D7349B.html 5/12 12/19/2017 PY2002 Mind and World | Royal Holloway, University of London DOCUMENT Further Available on Moodle A Wittgenstein dictionary ‐ Hans‐Johann Glock 1996 BOOK Further Entry under: 'Rule Following' The Routledge Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations ‐ Marie McGinn 2013 (electronic book) BOOK Further Chapter 3 Wittgenstein and Derrida ‐ Henry Staten 1986 BOOK Further Chapter 2 (esp section 4) 6. Behaviourism, Identity Theories and Functionalism (10 items) Primary Reading: Sensations and Brain Processes ‐ J. J. C. Smart 1959 ARTICLE Essential The Philosophy of Mind: Classical Problems/contemporary Issues ‐ Brian Beakley, Peter Ludlow 2006 BOOK Essential Read: 'The Nature of Mental States' by Putnam. Also available on Moodle Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature ‐ Richard Rorty 2009 BOOK Essential Also available on Moodle Richard Rorty: Liberalism, Irony and the Ends of Philosophy ‐ Neil Gascoigne 2008 BOOK Essential Extract also available on Moodle. Richard Rorty: Liberalism, Irony and the Ends of Philosophy ‐ Neil Gascoigne 2008 (electronic resource) BOOK Essential Extract also available on Moodle. Further Reading: Troubles With Functionalism ‐ Ned Block DOCUMENT Further Link given in course outline no longer works. https://rhul.rl.talis.com/lists/17ACE9C1-7BC9-DFE0-9E31-C59DA5D7349B.html 6/12 12/19/2017 PY2002 Mind and World | Royal Holloway, University of London The Case Against B.F. Skinner ‐ Noam Chomsky WEBPAGE Further Philosophical Papers: Vol.1 ‐ David Lewis 1983 BOOK Essential Read: 'Mad Pain and Martian Pain' by Lewis 7. Being in the World (15 items) Primary Reading: Being and Time ‐ Martin Heidegger 1962 BOOK Essential See Moodle for relevant extract. Phenomenology and Anthropology ‐ E Husserl DOCUMENT Essential Phenomenology ARTICLE Essential Link provided in course outline no longer working. Further Reading: Groundless Grounds: A Study of Wittgenstein and Heidegger ‐ Lee Braver 2014 BOOK Further Especially Chapter 1 Heidegger's Analytic: Interpretation, Discourse and Authenticity in Being and Time ‐ Taylor Carman, Robert B. Pippin 2003 (electronic resource) BOOK Further Chapter 1 Heidegger's Analytic: Interpretation, Discourse, and Authenticity in Being and Time ‐ Taylor Carman 2003 (electronic book) BOOK Further Chapter 1 Being‐in‐the‐World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time ‐ Hubert L. Dreyfus 1991 BOOK Further Chapter 3 A Heidegger Dictionary ‐ Michael Inwood 1999 https://rhul.rl.talis.com/lists/17ACE9C1-7BC9-DFE0-9E31-C59DA5D7349B.html 7/12 12/19/2017 PY2002 Mind and World | Royal Holloway, University of London BOOK Further See entries on: 'Daesin'; 'World and Beings as a Whole'; 'Ontology and Fundamental Ontology'; 'Subject and Object'. Future Pasts: The Analytic Tradition in Twentieth Century Philosophy 2001 BOOK Further Read: 'Heidegger's Response to Skepticism' by Minar Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Heidegger and Being and Time ‐ Stephen Mulhall 2005 BOOK Further Chapter 1 Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Heidegger and Being and Time ‐ Stephen Mulhall 2005 (electronic book) BOOK Further Chapter 1 Wittgenstein and Heidegger ‐ David Egan et al 2015 BOOK Further Read: 'Heidegger and Wittgenstein on External World Skepticism' By Philipse Martin Heidegger ‐ SEoP ‐ Michael Wheeler ARTICLE Further 8. Externalisms and Internalisms (11 items) Primary Reading: Meaning and Reference ‐ Hilary Putnam 1973 ARTICLE Essential Further Reading: Externalism About Mental Content ‐ Joe Lau ARTICLE Further The Incompatibility of Anti‐Individualism and Privileged Access ‐ Jessica Brown 1995 ARTICLE Further Foundations of mind ‐ Tyler Burge 2007 BOOK Further Read: 'Individualism and the Mental' also available on Moodle https://rhul.rl.talis.com/lists/17ACE9C1-7BC9-DFE0-9E31-C59DA5D7349B.html 8/12 12/19/2017 PY2002 Mind and World | Royal Holloway, University of London Putnam on Mind
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