Thesis Final Version

Sexuality as a National Idea: The Narratives of Homophobia and Homonationalism in the Netherlands

MSc Cultural and Social Pavel Getmantsev (12012890) [email protected] Anthropology Department of Anthropology,

GSSS

March 2019 Supervisor: Dr. Rachel Spronk 2nd Reader: Dr. Oskar Verkaaik Word count: 20123 3rd Reader: Dr. Paul Mepschen Declaration on Plagiarism and Fraud: I have read and understood the University of Amsterdam plagiarism policy [http://student.uva.nl/ binaries/content/assets/studentensites/uva-studentensite/nl/a- z/regelingen-enreglementen/fraude-en- plagiaatregeling-2010.pdf?1283201371000]. I declare that this assignment is entirely my own work, all sources have been properly acknowledged, and that I have not previously submitted this work, or any version of it, for assessment in any other paper.

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!2 Abstract The thesis explores how the narratives of homophobia embody homonationalism in the Nether- lands. Based on the interviews with the white Dutch gay men, the paper presents homonationalism as a process which can be traced on three different levels: a public discourse, a political organization, and a personal narrative. On the discursive level homonationalism is investigated through the respondents’ images of Amsterdam’s gay scene. Further, a gay organization is studied to find out how the practices, ideology and the language of the political movement practice homonationalism. Finally, the research explores the personal narratives of coming out to illustrate that nowadays in the Netherlands such narratives are incorporated in the discourse of homonationalism. All the three levels illustrate that homonationalism is a complex process and has various modalities. It cannot be reduced to a single political discourse only.

!3 Introduction...... 5

Political and cultural context ...... 7

Theoretical framework ...... 9

Research question and operationalization ...... 14

Setting and methodology ...... 15

Fieldwork process and the profiles of respondents ...... 17

The diversity of data ...... 19

Thesis structure and overview of the chapters ...... 20

Chapter 1. The nostalgic narrative. The Netherlands as a gay-friendly country and Amsterdam as the worlds’ gay capital ...... 21

Nostalgia as a concept ...... 21

Opinions ...... 23

A bit of history of gay Amsterdam and the dynamics of Amsterdam’s gay scene ...... 25

Amsterdam Gay Pride ...... 27

Chapter 2. Dutch GayServatives/De Roze Leeuw: The narrative of homophobia embodied in a conservative gay organization...... 31

First meeting with the member of DGS/De Roze Leeuw ...... 32

Opposition to COC and anti-establishment agenda ...... 33

The employment of left-wing/right-wing categories ...... 34

Homonormativity and masculinity of the organization ...... 35

Pim Fortuyn ...... 37

Chapter 3. Coming out narratives and personal experiences ...... 40

Sexual stories ...... 40

Bart ...... 42

Felix ...... 44

Conslusion ...... 48

Bibliography ...... 51

!4 Introduction Before I moved to the Netherlands from Russia to start the master’s program, I was thinking about the topic of my future thesis. Back then I came across an article in the Russian independent media Meduza. The article was called “Record appearance as the means against nationalism” and was written by Carnegie Moscow Center; it reflected upon the results of the Dutch election which was held in March 2017. The text starts with the mention of “Dutch Trump” Geert Wilders and the description of his political program which, among other articles, included “the protection of the ‘traditional minorities’ - Jews and homosexuals, the threat to which he sees first of all the immigrants of from the East”1. This piece surprised me. How come, I thought, a politician who is described in the article by such words as “right-wing” or “populist” can talk about the protection of sexual minorities? My idea was that it used to be mainly “left-wing”, more progressive parties which support LGBT community, while conservative politicians of Western European countries would claim that “traditional family values” are under threat nowadays. After reading this article and exploring the issues a bit further I assumed that it might be the case for my thesis. I was curious about how the acceptance and protection of sexual minorities in the Netherlands became a part of the nationalistic, anti-globalist and anti-immigration discourse. Moreover, why is this the case of the Netherlands in particular? What is so specific about this country, what is the context in which the acceptance of homosexuality turns out to be not just the object of the populist manipulations but connected to the national values and sometimes even nationalism? During the further exploration of the topic I was curious if the links between the acceptance of sexual minorities in the Netherlands and the Dutch values of tolerance and sexual freedom go be- yond the “populist” or “right-wing” discourse. During fieldwork I talked with the gay men with various political views and experiences, including those who are the followers of a conservative anti- immigrant organization as well as the members of the progressive political parties. Listening to the stories and opinions of both sides, I found out that being open about one’s homosexuality in the Netherlands is possible, according to the respondents I interviewed, because of what they call the Dutch culture and the Dutch values. In the end, after listening to the stories of the informants, the tolerant and friendly attitude to homosexuality is more rooted in the national context than I originally imagined. When I came across the term “homonationalism” introduced by Jasbir Puar, it helped me to understand this case better. For me the paradox of the whole situation consisted in the fact the modern narratives about homosexuality and homophobia in the Netherlands, indeed, become a part

1 https://meduza.io/feature/2017/03/17/rekordnaya-yavka-kak-sredstvo-ot-natsionalizma [accessed 14.01.19]

!5 of the “right-wing” discourse. At the same time, the articulation of these narratives specific for the “right-wing”, anti-immigration policies, becomes common among the progressive, or “left-wing” gay men. To understand the case that interested me, I discussed with my informants homophobia in the Netherlands. Even though the country has the image of one of the most gay-friendly nations, there should be some cracks and tensions which worried Dutch gay men. The conversations I had normally started with a discussion of homophobia in the Netherlands in general and finished with personal experiences of dealing with homophobia. Almost every time we talked about the Netherlands itself, its culture and traditions. I decided to use the term “homonationalism” because it helps to trace the different ways in which the narratives of homophobia become nationalized, whether it is a narrative of a discourse, a narrative elaborated by the particular organization, or a personal narrative which involves coming out experiences. The main research question of the study is the following: How is homonationalism embodied in the Netherlands through the different narratives of homophobia? So, in my research I will focus on three different levels of homonationalism. In the first chapter I will investigate how homonationalism is practiced on the discursive level through the articulations of the images of Am- sterdam and its gay scene. In the second chapter I will move to the embodiment of homonationalism on the level of a particular organization. I will show how the practices, ideology and the statements of the conservative organization invest to homonationalism. Finally, the third level of homonationalism is the personal narratives, which I study in the last chapter. These narratives not only tell about coming out experiences, they are also placed within a particular cultural and political context. I choose exactly these three levels to illustrate that homonationalism is not an abstract notion that describes the current political situation in the Netherlands. Homonationalism is a process that can be found not in the public discourse only, it can also be found in the private spheres of our lives (e.g. the stories about personal experiences). Homonationalism in the Netherlands, I argue, is a part of new nationalism which can be traced in everyday life (Verkaaik 2010). The focus on these three levels also allows to see how homonationalism is practiced not only by the “right-wing” policies but also by the people with more progressive views. While Puar studies homonationalism within the context of the United States, the Netherlands is one of the countries in which homonationalism can be well explored. What is the political and cultural context of the Netherlands, in which the today’s narratives of homophobia become nationalized, linked to what is described as typically Dutch?

!6 Political and cultural context The Netherlands is one of the few countries that was the earliest to accept its sexual minorities and to start their integration into society. But before the rise of the welfare state of the 1950s and the emergence of sexual revolution, which in the 1960s embraced many Western European nations including the Netherlands, the country was a deeply religious (both Catholic and Protestant) country. Until then the Dutch society was divided into four so-called pillars, or communities. These included Protestant, Catholic, socialist and liberal communities which were separated from each other. “Everything in society was organized according to these pillars. The Dutch pride themselves on their long tradition of tolerance, but this was part of a broader system of noninterference with other pillars” (van der Veer 2006: 118). Each pillar used to have its own church, political party, schools, shops, etc. The organization of the Dutch society by the four pillars meant that the people who come from those different pillars had to look for compromises and manage to reach consensus to be able to live together in one country. Thus, tolerance and the ability to negotiate, which later played a significant role in the acceptance of the gay movement by the Dutch government, come from the earlier period in the history of the Netherlands when the nation was divided into these pillars. In the beginning of the 20th century the Catholic community of the Netherlands reintroduced legal discrimination of gay people (after the law which criminalized sodomy was abolished in 1811 under the influence of the French Revolution) (Tielman 1987: 9-10). As a reaction to this new law, the Dutch Scientific Humanitarian Committee was founded by a liberal lawyer Jacob Schorer, who was inspired by the German scientist Magnus Hirschfeld and his Scientific-Humanitarian Commit- tee which is considered as the world’s first organization created to support homosexual and trans- gender people’s rights. The Dutch organization also sought for equality between homosexual and heterosexual men and women. During the World War II, an underground gay subculture was promoted by the periodical Leven- srecht (Right to Live). After the war, in 1946, the world’s first LGBT organization - COC (Cultuur- en OntspanningsCentrum) - was founded by the editors of Levensrecht in the Netherlands. After the late 1960s, when sexual revolutions burst out around Western Europe, including in the Netherlands, the Dutch government began to negotiate with the gay rights organization to integrate sexual minorities. For example, sexuality was promoted to discuss by the society. Also, homosexual movements of the students and intellectuals played a significant role in making gay people more visible and accepted (Tielman 1987: 13-14). Tielman states that, although COC was mainly opposed by the Roman Catholic church, the organization “was tolerated by the Dutch authorities, for the existence

!7 of that group enabled them to keep a better eye on the homosexual subculture”. In the end, “the government treated COC more and more as a ‘mini-pillar’: the COC had a certain autonomy that enabled them it to maintain order in the gay subculture” (Ibid.: 12). During the 1960s, “in a relatively short period the Netherlands was transformed from a highly religious to a highly secular society” (van der Veer 2006: 118). In 1971, article 248bis of the Dutch law made the age of consent for same-sex partners the same as for opposite-sex partners - 16 years. Moreover, homosexual people stopped being discriminated in the Dutch army in 1973 (Hekma 2006: 134-135). During the 1980s, more rights were provided for sexual minorities. In 1973, COC was granted a legal status by the government. Later on, in the 1980s, other forms of discrimination of sexual minorities were prohibited by the Dutch authorities. Tielman argues that, when AIDS was discovered in early 1980s and when it became a major threat all over the world, the ability of the Dutch gay movement to find compromises and to cooperate with other minority communities as well as the Dutch authorities, homosexual people in the Netherlands avoided being discredited and scapegoated (Tielman 1987: 16). The legalization of same-sex marriage in 2001 made the Netherlands the first country to grant marital rights to gay and lesbian couples (Hekma 2006: 134-135). All these processes and events made sexual minorities more normative and inclusive into Dutch society. Mepschen, Duyvendak and Tonkens argue that “the popular representation of gay identity has changed from a deviant other to the mirror image of the ideal heterosexual” (Mepschen et al. 2010: 971). The authors note that gay identity in the Netherlands exists in accordance with heteronormativity and does not threaten it (Ibid., 2010). The rights of gay couples to create families and adopt children goes hand in hand with heteronormative way of life. Such way of life is the opposite of the aims of the radical gay movements of 1960-1970s. Those movements, in such countries as the USA or the UK, aimed at the transformation of a heteronormative society itself. The processes which happened in the Nether- lands in 1900-2000s have a completely different, assimilationist but not radical character. For the better understanding of the population of my thesis - native Dutch gay men - it is also important to note that the homonormative discourse is mainly attributed to homosexual men rather than lesbians or transgenders (Ibid., 2010: 963). The homonormative discourse implies the assimilationist strategies of the homosexual policies, capitalist consumerism of gay people, and its relation to heteronormativity. Wekker states that all the above-mentioned achievements of the Dutch homosexual movement concerned primarily assimilation of gay men with a heteronormative Dutch society. “The gay movement - and white men have populated this movement more thickly and thus have

!8 been at the forefront here - has from its inception been more interested in equality: equal rights, gay marriage, the right to adopt children, the right to copious consumption of all manner of material goods, and has pursued a more assimilationist agenda with the social, political, and cultural powers that be” (Wekker 2016: 115). Unlike the women’s movement, the white male homosexual movement was less reflexive upon racial categories. Thus “homonormativity” and assimilationist agenda of the Dutch gay movement were, among others, the circumstances due to which sexual minorities became a part of the Dutch anti-immigrant discourse. “Public visibility of gay life has its limitations. The dominant representation of homosexuality after sixty years of intense postcolonial, labor, and refugee migration to the Netherlands still is that gay and lesbians belong to the dominant racial group; that is, in public eye gays are white” (Ibid.: 117). The public images of homosexuality in the Netherlands lacks diversity. Normal- ly it does not include more marginalized identities, such as ethnic sexual minorities. This is important for understanding why some gay movements against violent homophobia, for instance Dutch GayServatives/De Roze Leeuw, which I discuss in the second chapter of the thesis, turn against globalization, immigration from Muslim countries, and ethnic minorities who are presented as a threat to white Dutch gay men.

Theoretical framework - Homonationalism To understand homonationalism, which is the key concept and the main analytical term of the thesis, Jasbir Puar introduces the term in her book “Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times” and defines it as a “sexual exceptionalism”, national homosexuality. She claims that “this brand of homosexuality operates as a regulatory script not only of normative gayness, queerness, or homosexuality, but also of the racial and national norms that reinforce these sexual subjects” (Puar 2007: 2). She states that heterosexuality and heteronormativity are constitutive parts of every national identity. Nowadays, when homosexuality is becoming normative in Western societies, white gay men are no more excluded from the nationalistic discourse and opposed to it as the Other. On the contrary, homosexuality becomes a part of the sexual exceptionalism. “…homosexual sexual exceptionalism does not necessarily contradict or undermine heterosexual sexual exceptionalism; in actually it may support forms of heteronormativity and the class, racial, and citizenship privileges they require” (Ibid.: 9). Puar relates sexual exceptionalism of white homosexual people to the impe- rialistic exceptionalism of the United States. “Produced in tandem with the ‘state of exception’, the

!9 demand for patriotic loyalty to the United States merely accelerates forms of sexual exceptionalism that have always underpinned homonormativities” (Ibid.: 77). In her book the author uses a discourse analysis and introduces the term “homonationalism” as a critical tool to put into question the modern political situation of the USA. Thus, in this work she places her notion within the context of the leading position of the United States in the world. Nevertheless, in her later article “Rethinking Homonationalism” Puar redefines the term that makes it applicable to other countries in which homosexuality is becoming normative as well as heterosexuality. She states that “homonationalism, thus, is not simply a synonym for gay racism, or another way to mark how gay and lesbian identities became available to conservative political imaginaries; it is not another identity politics, not another way of distinguishing good queers from bad queers, not an accusation, and not a position. It is rather a facet of modernity and a historical shift marked by the entrance of (some) homosexual bodies as worthy of protection by nation-states, a constitutive and fundamental reorientation of the relationship between the state, capitalism, and sexuality” (Ibid.: 337). The term homonationalism can be attributed to the national identity of the Netherlands. The narratives of homophobia which are explored in the chapters of the thesis involve the topics of progress, modernity and backwardness; freedom and religious conservatism. The acceptance of homosexuality becomes in the Netherlands the condition of being recognized as progressive and secular, the kind of values which are today considered to be the key values of the country.

- Nationalized liberal values The cases which I am investigating are the ones in which liberal values become nationalised and presented as exclusively Dutch or European. Theoretically, such values are considered to be universal, applicable to all the nations, while national values can only be particular. Lægaard suggests that “the presentation of liberal values as national values may either be understood as a non-truth-apt statement, that is as a claim that is not supposed to be evaluated in terms of truth and falsehood...” (Lægaard 2007: 47). Populist parties tend to make “loud” and emotional statements possibly exaggerating troubling issues to persuade as many people as possible (such statements also can be defined by Frankfurt’s concept of “bullshit” (2005)). In this way, populists’ politics become rather performative than concerning facts or statistics. Within such performative statements, values of sexual freedom are utilized and presented as specific for a particular culture (for example, West-

!10 ern or European culture) and in opposition to other cultural identities. Muslim culture usually becomes the main target. In this way, the populistic statements regarding specifically Dutch or French values are given in the context of the broader Western culture. Fassin proposes his notion of sexual democracy to illustrate how sexual liberties and gender equality are instrumentalized in different national contexts. Opposing the expansionist logic of the United States to the protectionist politics of France and the Netherlands, he discusses the various approaches to supporting sexual liberties which are utilized to highlight a “clash of civilisations” and legitimize an invasion of hostile nations or oppose immigration within the countries (Fassin 2010: 512-513). In this case “Frenchness” and “Dutchness” represent two slightly different models of liberal nationalism (Fassin claims that the nationalism of France is more heterosexual). Neverthe- less, the boundary mechanisms are the same. Populists of both countries use the values of sexual freedom to oppose immigration. “If sexual democracy is about sexual freedom and equality between the sexes, its application to the exclusion of “others,” that is, its racialization, can eventually transform these lofty ideals into a practice that hinders sexual liberty by racializing sexual discrimi- nations” (Ibid.: 522-523). Indeed, when nationalistic politics employ the values of sexual freedom and gender equality, it neglects the fact that the LGBT community, which is allegedly defended by the populist parties, is very different and multi-layered within itself. Thus there is always a risk of exclusion of the members of sexual minorities who are appealed to in order to justify nationalistic views. For example, those who belong not only to a sexual minority but also to an ethnic minority may be racially discriminated.

- Culturalization The politics that sustain the dichotomy of “us/them” rely on a notion of culture which is described as static and unchanging. In this view, the world is represented as consisting of many cultures which are not just separate from each other but may also be threatening each other. Today the duscussion of immigration in the Netherlands especially sustains such concept. Investigating this problem in the context of the Netherlands, Uitermark, Mepschen and Duyvendak use the term “neoculturalism” which indicates cultural protectionism and strictly opposes cultures against each other. The pragma- tist policy preceded the neoculturalist policy and it was directed towards rather smooth and politically correct negotiation between the conflicting social actors. Today, the authors claim, neoculturalists began to manipulate with class issues and produce populism causing public exclusion of immigrant minorities. There there are two main features which are used by the neoculturalist way of

11! thinking. “First, neoculturalists employ a populist schema to challenge the political establishment and allegedly multicultural of leftist elites in particular. Dutch neoculturalists have used a trans- posed class discourse that pits the white working class against a state-entrenched progressive elite” (Uitermark, Mepschen and Duyvendak 2014: 236). Moreover, emancipated sexuality is used to define European nations in opposition to conservative and homophobic Muslims. Thus, the values of sexual freedom become the instruments of neoculturalism. The authors also emphasise that the ascent of such forms of populisms in Europe are treated my mistake as conservative. Neverthe- less, “neoculturalists combine the framing of Dutch national culture as morally progressive with a virulent anti-immigration agenda” (Ibid.: 251).

- Modernity Another key symbolic resource that is used to construct national identities is the term “modernity”. The values of sexual liberty, gender equality and open-mindedness suppose that they are all possible due to the historical period which is called “modernity”. Van der Veer states that this period started in the Netherlands (and also throughout Europe) when the sexual revolution and the student protests of the late 1960s occurred. Before this, the country was highly religious and separated into several ideological “pillars” which never intruded each other (van der Veer 2006: 118). Again, this analysis displays how a nation can be redefined in public discourse in a relatively short period of time. By examining the notion of modernity, Butler states that the culture which propagates progress and sexual liberty is not just viewed as homogeneous and the one that should be protected from outsiders but it is also hegemonic. “This uncritical domain of ‘culture’ that functions as a precondition for liberal freedom, in turn, becomes the cultural basis for sanctioning forms of cultural and religious hatred and abjection” (Butler 2008: 6). The political message of Butler calling for consideration of how “time” becomes instrumentalized geopolitically allows to see that the oppositions of sexual politics and religious conservatism are displayed as essentialist and within the temporal framework. The Dutch values are presented as dominant because they are modern and progressive while the conservatism of Muslims indicates their historical and cultural “infancy”.

- Sexual freedom Meanwhile, sexual freedom as a part of the discourse of modernity is also a concept worth investi- gation. Sexual freedom relates to non-discrimination of homosexual people and depathologization of homosexual practices. Magnus Hirschfeld (1868-1935) was one of the first scientists to study

!12 homosexuality and propagate its depathologization and decriminalization. However, the struggle for sexual freedom became a distinctive political activity in the 1960-1970s, when sexual revolutions spread around Western Europe and the USA. The generation of baby-boomers who were in conflict with their parents - witnesses of the Second World War - was the generation which created the student, feminist and the first homosexual movements. Thus, sexual freedom became the aim of the radical social struggle of that period. Nowadays, when many rights and liberties are granted to sexual minorities, especially gay men, sexual freedom became an instrument of the nationalist policies. Sexual freedom, among other liberal values, becomes nationalized.

- Sexularism and sexular practices (ethnography of sexularism) The notions of modernity and the secular mentioned by Butler are revised in an anthropological perspective by Verkaaik and Spronk (2011). Instead of looking for power relations “in a deconstruc- tivist and critical manner, denaturalizing discourses on culture, identity, and religion, and pointing out the disparities within these discourses” (Ibid.: 83), the authors suggest that the processes of secularization intertwined with sexuality can be studied by anthropologists as a cultural practice. Thus, they oppose a deconstruction of the secular discourse to an ethnography of secularism as a cultural practice. The text suggests studying the concrete cultural and historical practices of people and their everyday lives to understand how exactly a secular worldview is shaped today. The ethnographic approach, according to the article, allows to understand the existing paradoxes of secularism. For example, it helps to investigate and understand how the populists support both the sexual minorities and the working class. The authors refer to Scott’s notion of sexularism (Scott: 2009) which “denotes a particularly salient form of body-politics that is part of today’s secularism in Europe” (Verkaaik and Spronk 2011: 85) and raise the question of the forms in which today’s sexularism is embodied. The argument of Spronk and Verkaaik is similar to the one of Scott: a historical approach helps to put into question common deconstructionist and critical oppositions such as modern/traditional secular/ religious and others. By introducing the term “sexularism”, Scott states that “secularism” and “sexism” are not always completely opposite to each other. The text of Verkaaik and Spronk mentions the case of Geert Wilders’ “Party for Freedom” and its claims to represent not only the working class but also sexual minorities. The authors suggest that an ethnography of sexular practices might investigate in a productive way this at first glance para- doxical combination of both nationalist populism and the progressive values of sexual freedom. The

!13 article emphasises the usefulness of anthropologists’ ethnographical method along with Scott’s historical and genealogical approach to understand populism and secularism in Europe.

Research question and operationalization In my thesis I argue that homonationalism in the Netherlands is an ongoing process which is supported by the discourse of homophobia as well as nostalgic discourse, which include the stories about Amsterdam that used to be a gay capital of the world. This process is also embodied by the narratives which are presented by a conservative organization along with its practices. Finally, the personal narratives, such as the coming out narratives, invest to homonationalism in the Netherlands as well. Thus, the research question is: How is homonationalism embodied in the Netherlands through the different narratives of homophobia? To answer this question, I need to find out first how an imaginative, nostalgic narrative invests to homonationalism. I am using the term “nostalgia” for the analysis of the feelings of loss expressed by my respondents. Such feelings of loss, which I discovered in the interviews with various respondents, are related to the changes in Amsterdam’s gay scene and the increasing number of the cases of anti-gay violence in the Dutch capital. The use of this term allows to understand that such feelings are caused not only by the images of the imagined past. They are not just the longing for an idealized past but they also represent a vision of a desired future. The next step is to investigate how the ideology, practices and the language of a conservative gay organization invest to the process of homonationalism in the Netherlands. The activities of the organization Dutch GayServatives/De Roze Leeuw, whose members I interviewed, are a good example of one of the modalities of homonationalism. Anti-immigrant and anti-establishment statements, which express their opposition to multiculturalist policies, along with such practices as opposition to COC, the attendance of Rotterdam Pride, or visiting Pim Fortuyn’s monument are the cases of when nationalistic discourse and gay activism are intertwined. And finally, to answer the research question, I should explore how the coming out narratives embody homonationalism. The stories of coming out are not only personal stories about early-age experiences, growing up being gay, and the relationship with relatives, friends, classmates, etc. These narratives (at least in the cases of my respondents) also include today’s evaluations of the circumstances and situations happened in the past. These personal stories also include comments about how it “should” be, meaning

!14 Setting and methodology Amsterdam and Rotterdam were the main Dutch cities where I conducted interviews with the majority of my informants. As I myself live in Amsterdam, I already knew some gay men whom I asked whether they would like to be interviewed or whether they know people who would be willing to have a conversation. Moreover, Amsterdam has the largest gay scene in the Netherlands which made it easier to find informants. Apart from the Dutch capital, I travelled to Rotterdam twice to have talks with the members of Dutch GayServatives/De Roze Leeuw. I also travelled to Rijswijk, the small town near The Hague, and unexpectedly found myself in Bergen op Zoom in the province Noord-Brabant to meet with the other two followers of DGS/De Roze Leeuw. For my research I preferred to meet with the people individually and conduct semi-structured interviews which also included life histories. This method appeared to be the most feasible for my work. Before the official start of fieldwork I went to an event that I thought might be helpful in finding respondents. The event is called “Jongeheerenborrel” and is usually organised every two months. It is a gathering of Dutch gay men that I discovered on UvA’s website. Although later I met with several board members of this event and interviewed them, I did not manage to discuss the topics relevant for my research with the others during the meeting itself. The main reason why it was not feasible is because my research involved the issues (such as coming out or experiencing discrimination and violence) that could be discussed more profoundly via private interviews. This borrel was first of all an informal leisure event where people would have entertaining and relaxing talks. Thus, later I contacted some of the organizers of “Jongeheerenborrel” to meet with them separately. There was also a conservative organization from Rotterdam called “Dutch Gayservatives/De Roze Leeuw” which I discovered on Facebook and whose members I wished to meet with and po- tentially do a participant observation. Unfortunately, this organization very rarely organises collec- tive events. It operates mainly in the social media. Nevertheless, I met with its members individually and discovered the topics useful for my project. During fieldwork I also attempted to meet with new informants in gay bars and clubs of Amster- dam. However, in gay bars there was a problem for me to join a group of people hanging out with each other. In those cases when I did manage to meet someone, the situation itself did not allow me to elaborate the topics regarding politics or personal experiences and discuss them more profoundly. Thus, I decided to focus instead on tête-à-tête semi-structured interviews. Already having some acquaintances, including foreigners living in the Netherlands, I used a snowball sampling technique

!15 and asked them if they do not mind to be interviewed or whether they have any friends who are Dutch gay men and who would wish and find time to meet separately and have a conversation. As meeting with respondents combined walking around a city/park and going to a cafe/bar I decided not to use a voice recorder and instead use my smartphone to write down the notes and quotes. I think this fact made the conversations less formal. After each meeting I went home a wrote field notes. After the first two interviews I decided that I have to correct my interview questions listed in the research proposal. As I was about to meet gay men with opposing political views I wanted to make the new questions more politically neutral and appropriate for respondents with all political back- grounds. After starting my fieldwork, I found the original interview questions mentioned in the research proposal somewhat intrusive. Thus, the final questions were the following: 1. Can you tell something about yourself and your life? How old are you? Where were you born? Where did you study, work? What do you do at present? 2. Can you tell something about your life as a gay man? (coming out, relations with relatives, friends and co-workers in terms of acceptance of your homosexuality, gay scene, etc) 3. Is there homophobia in the Netherlands, in your opinion? If so, what are the forms of homophobia in your country? 4. Which political party do you support? What is its stance on sexual minorities? 5. What do you think about other political parties’ attitudes towards sexual minorities (if you are familiar with them)? 6. What do you think about the changes (positive or negative, in your opinion) in terms of acceptance of gay people in the Netherlands? Of course, as I was conducting semi-structured interviews, I did not ask all the questions in every case. Sometimes, depending on the personality and background of my informant, I could skip some question(s) and focus more on the other ones. There were also situations when a respondent himself touched upon the topic mentioned in one of the questions so I did not have to voice them separately. In other cases I asked some sub-questions to poke into the topic which was mentioned by my informant and seemed relevant for my research. Moreover, speaking of the methods and the ways I collected data, the topics I discussed with the respondents depended on how I met with them. For example, for some reason it was easier for me to walk around Rotterdam with the members of DGS/De Roze Leeuw and discuss rather political issues existing in the Netherlands along with their activities as the followers of the organization.

!16 Thus, in their case I focused more on discussing discourse and politics rather than their own personal experiences of encountering homophobia and the aspects of coming out. On the contrary, when I met with other Dutch gay men, we chose to meet either in the park or a cafe where we could sit down and I could listen to their own personal stories. Another source of data, apart from the semi-structired interviews, is the social media. I used Facebook to analyze some of the posts published by the members of DGS/De Roze Leeuw. Such posts, including the language used in them, along with the followers’ comments which I heard personally, contribute to the whole ideology of the organization and also say much about the main activities of it. For example, I learned from their Facebook page that they attended Pim Fortuyn’s monument on the anniversary of murder of the politician.

Fieldwork process and the profiles of respondents The first month of my fieldwork was rather worrisome for me. As I did not find informants at bars and clubs, I was a bit confused about what to do and where do I find the people to interview. In the beginning of June I sent a message to Lars, the person who founded “Dutch GayServatives” in Rot- terdam. For the next couple of weeks I was waiting for his respond. Luckily, in the end he replied and agreed to meet in Rotterdam. After we had a long talk walking around the city I asked him if it was possible for me to meet with other members of his organization. During the next weeks I was expecting to receive their contacts. Meanwhile I met with one of my foreign friends who had been living in Amsterdam for seven years and was already rooted in the city’s gay scene. He offered his help and asked his Dutch friends if they would be willing to meet and talk with me. As a result he provided me with four new respondents (Bart, Bram, Paul, and Gert) with whom I arranged meetings in the next weeks. Besides, I had contacts of the organizers of “Jongeheerenborrel”, the event which I attended earlier in Spring. All three of them - Alex, Felix and Jonas - agreed to meet in Amsterdam. Later Jonas gave me a contact of his friend Rick. By mid July Lars sent me a message with contacts of his friends who are the members of “Dutch GayServatives” - Gerard, Krijn and Thomas. Thomas introduced me to one of his friends, Jacob. I met with him in September, he was my last interviewee. I also decided to include in the research some topics I discussed with Jan - a Dutch friend of mine with whom I met several times during fieldwork. He was interested in my project and asked me about its details. Sometimes, apart from his personal stories of being gay that he shared with me,

!17 I listened to his opinions on homophobia in the Netherlands, the acceptance of gay people and the way he sees the current political situation. Before the fieldwork period I planned to contact “COC Nederland” to find potential informants. Later it seemed more appropriate to talk to the members of the organization because the topics relat- ing to COC were mentioned by some of the people with whom I already talked. I sent emails to several offices of COC (the ones in Amsterdam, Utrecht and Rotterdam) but, unfortunately, I did not receive any response. Only the office in Amsterdam replied and suggested that I contact Dutch political parties instead. Below I list the profiles of the people I interviewed during my fieldwork. I purposely omit the profiles of the members of Dutch GayServatives/De Roze Leeuw to maintain their anonymity. In the chapter dedicated to DGS/De Roze Leeuw I use the pseudonyms instead of the real names of the members. During fieldwork I asked my respondents about the political parties they support and/or vote for. Although in some cases I did not use this for the analysis, I believe it is nevertheless important to mention the parties (along with their hometowns, education and current occupation) to demonstrate the identities of the informants.

- Bart, 37 years old, born in Apeldoorn. Studied urban planning in Deventer. Moved to Ams- terdam at 26. During the last several years worked as a freelancer. Currently lives in Southern France and studies Buddhist practices in a monastery. A member of GroenLinks. - Jan, 29 years old, born in the province of Gelderland, comes from farmers’ family and today lives in Utrecht. Currently finishes master’s history program at University of Leiden. A member of Christian Unie party. - Bram, 39 years old, born in Harderwijk. Studied International business and Marketing. Works at GreenPeace and lives in Amsterdam. Supports GroenLinks. - Paul, 26 years old, born in Enschede, finished Catholic school in Almelo, studied hospitality management in Berlin. Currently lives in Amsterdam, works as an account manager in a tailor company. Supports GroenLinks. - Matthijs, 19 years old, born and lives in Amsterdam. Finished school in Amsterdam. A member of Forum voor Democratie. Also partially supports PVV. - Gert, 32 years old, born in Zeist, finished school there. Studied hospitality management in Leeuwarden. Works in a hotel and lives in Amsterdam. Supports VVD and D66.

!18 - Alex, 28 years old, from Maastricht, studied psychology and marketing there. Lives in Ams- terdam and works at Heineken. One of the organisers of “Jongeheerenborrel”, a drinks event for young gay men in Amsterdam. Does not support any political party, according to him. - Jonas, 29 years old, born in Woerden, finished secondary school in his hometown. Studied business administration in human resources in Rotterdam and at Vrije Universiteit in Amster- dam. At the moment lives in Amsterdam. Jonas is one of the three organisers of “Jongeheeren- borrel” I talked to. Votes for D66. - Felix, 26 years old, born in Heiloo, studied at school there. Then moved to Amsterdam and studied law at University of Amsterdam. Currently he is a PhD candidate at UvA’s department of law. Organises “Jongeheerenborrel”. Supports D66. - Jacob, 25 years old, Born in Zeist. Finished Theology bachelor’s program in Utrecht, currently studies at master’s Spiritual care program at Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam. Supports PvDA. - Rick, 30 years old, born in Nijmegen, after school moved to Amsterdam and studied Sociolo- gy at UvA. Recently worked as a journalist for VolksKrant.

The diversity of data I should also comment on the kind of date I collected while arranging interviews in summer 2018. Although my respondents were relatively of the same age category and all of them received bachelor’s and master’s degrees, they nevertheless had different experiences and varying political views and opinions on the issues I was interested in. This is why, for example, with the members of Dutch GayServatives/De Roze Leeuw I discussed rather their organization along with the political and social issues that disturbed them while in the cases of other respondents I was more interested in their personal experiences and/or coming out stories. Because of this the pieces of data I collected during fieldwork turned out to be quite different from each other which made me organize the chapters of the thesis in the way it is. The diversity of data brought out the modalities of homonationalism, different levels on which homonationalism is embodied in the Netherlands through practices, signs, language, narratives, etc. I also focus particularly on the Dutch gay men and not women because exactly the homosexual men represent the Dutch homonational discourse (Wekker 2016). Homonationalism is closely linked to homonormativity, which is in turn associated with masculinity (as the study of DGS/De Roze Leeuw will show). Besides, gay men are the main figures who participate in the assimilationist policy and practice consumerism within the homonational discourse.

!19 Thesis structure and overview of the chapters The three chapters of the thesis are organized in a way to show the different levels on which homonationalism in the Netherlands is embodied. These levels are a discourse, an organization, and personal stories. In the first chapter I am showing how nostalgic feelings and narratives regarding the image of Amsterdam as the world’s gay capital become a part of the current political discourse in which the Netherlands is seen as threatened by conservative values and anti-gay violence. The places that used to be safe for sexual minorities are nowadays dangerous for men walking hand in hand and drag queens wearing make up. My argument is that such discourse is also a part of the Dutch homonationalism. The second chapter is dedicated to a young Rotterdam-based organization which was created with the aim to stop gay bashing and punish the attackers who are claimed to be homophobic Mus- lim immigrants. This section explores the ideology, the language and the practices of Dutch Gay- Servatives/De Roze Leeuw to illustrate how activism against homophobia distinguishes and opposes itself to social groups (such as ethnic minorities) and other movements and organizations (in this case, COC along with the activism supporting multiculturalism) that become the Other of the Dutch nationalistic discourse. In the final chapter I tell the stories of gay men whose coming out experiences as well as the experiences of being gay are evaluated by them in terms of how the see the Netherlands, their native country, which is visualised as emancipated and progressive in relation to sexual minorities. This is the chapter in which personal narratives are intertwined with the images which originate from the modern Dutch sexual discourse. In the conclusion I summarize all the chapters and argue that homonationalism is an ongoing process and its forms and manifestations can be contradictory to each other even within one country - the Netherlands. Particularly ethnography makes it possible to discover such kinds of contradictions.

!20 Chapter 1. The nostalgic narrative. The Netherlands as a gay-friendly country and Amsterdam as the worlds’ gay capital

Nostalgia as a concept In this chapter I would like to introduce the examples of what the Dutch gay men whom I interviewed think about Amsterdam and the way it is changing. Most of the respondents believe that the capital of the Netherlands used to be the world’s centre of the gay scene but lost this status due to the increasing number of anti-gay violence perpetrated by the Muslim population of the country. However, the conservative reaction to the male homoerotic images, as I will show further, is common not only among the immigrants. Fundamentalist Protestant and Catholic Dutch activists also express discontent with such images. The term “nostalgia” reflects the feelings and opinions of the men I talked with while doing fieldwork. Nostalgia can be defined as a “longing for an idealized past” and is essentially related to the concept of loss (Pickering & Keightley 2006: 923). But the term does not mean only the desire to go back to the past which is imagined as better than the present, it can also mean that those who have nostalgic feelings want to use the images of the past for a brighter vision of the future. Thus, Pickering and Keightley claim that “we should perhaps reconfigure it in terms of a distinction between the desire to return to an earlier state or idealized past, and the desire not to return but to recognize aspects of the past as the basis for renewal and satisfaction in the future. Nostalgia can then be seen as not only a search for ontological security in the past, but also as a means of taking one’s bearings for the road ahead in the uncertainties of the present. (…) Nostalgia can be both melancholic and utopian” (Ibid.: 921). The argument of the authors is that the term is not always a direct opposite of progress. “In being negatively othered as its [progress’ - P.G.] binary opposite, nostalgia became fixed in a determinate backwards-looking stance” (Ibid.: 920). To avoid such binary opposition (nostalgia - progress), they call for recognizing mul- tiple nostalgias, or different modalities of nostalgia. “Nostalgia is neither an absolute nor singularly universal phenomenon” (Ibid.: 934). One of the key scholars who closely investigated the term is Svetlana Boym. In her book “The Future of Nostalgia” she defines the concept (from “nostos” - return home, and “algia” - longing) as “a longing for a home that no longer exists or has never existed. Nostalgia is a sentiment of loss and

!21 displacement, but it is also a romance with one’s own fantasy” (Boym 2001: 8). She also explores a history of the term and reminds that originally it came from medicine: Similar to the argument of Pickering and Keightley, Boym states that the term can sometimes be related to the images of the future. “Nostalgia is not always about the past; it can be retrospective but also prospective. Fantasies of the past determined by needs of the present have a direct impact on realities of the future. Consideration of the future makes us take responsibility for out nostalgic tales” (Ibid.: 11). Finally, exploring the history of the concept discussed by the intellectuals of the modern era, she argues that “modern nostalgia is a mourning for the impossibility of mythical return, for the loss of an enchanted world with clear borders and values; it could be a secular expres- sion of a spiritual longing, a nostalgia for an absolute, a home that is both physical and spiritual, the edenic unity of time and space before entry into history” (Ibid.: 20). Jan Willem Duyvendak in “The Politics of Home: Belonging and Nostalgia in Western Europe and the United States” (Duyvendak 2011) investigates the case of Dutch nostalgia and associates the latter with “homelessness”, or the debates about “the stolen home”. In the chapter dedicated to the Netherlands, he argues the common idea the politics of multiculturalism caused such feelings of homelessness among the native Dutch population. However, he states that there was no multiculturalist policy and the alienation of the white Dutch was triggered by a different process. “The 1970s policy on cultural identity can easily be misunderstood as multiculturalist, for its central tenet was that ‘guest workers’ should maintain their identities. The reason for this, however, was not to ac- commodate pluralism in the Netherlands, but to facilitate guest workers’ return after they had ful- filled their function as unskilled laborers in the Netherlands.” (Ibid.: 86). Later, in 1980s, it turned out that these workers did not wish to go back to their homeland. Thus, it is irrelevant to speak about a coherent multiculturalist policy in the Netherlands. The reason for the native Dutch people feeling not at home anymore is the process of culturalization. Since the rapid secularization of the nation in 1960s, the majority of the Dutch people believe in gender equality as well as the equality of homosexual and heterosexual people. In this way, Dutch culture is portrayed as progressive and modern. With such strong perception of what is called the Dutch culture and its progressive values, there is a demand that the immigrants share the same values. “Pillarization may once have accom- modated pluralism in the Netherlands. But pluralism today is a weak shadow; the growing consensus about progressive values has created a wider values gap between the native majority and Mus- lim immigrants than in countries with less progressive majority cultures” (Ibid.: 90). This means that the newcomers who wish to stay in the Netherlands, must adopt such values and norms to be-

!22 come citizens. Such strict opposition between “we” (the progressive native Dutch) and “them” (the newcomers, the bearers of the different (commonly backward) cultures) makes the former feel not at home in their native country because of the immigrants who live in the same place but allegedly not follow the norms and values of the former. “… people can only feel at home with those who have been part of that home for a long time and who share the same norms and values” (Ibid.: 97). “(…) ‘we’ emphathize with those who no longer feel at home in what was once their hopeful neigh- bourhood and country. The native Dutch, it is argued, have become like foreigners in their own country, feeling that foreigners should allegedly feel: not at home” (Ibid.: 98). Below I will show how on a discursive level the images of Amsterdam presented by my informants differentiate the native Dutch population and its gay scene from the migrant Others who, according to the respondents, are the main reason of the transformation of the gay capital. The feeling of nostalgia and homelessness is frequently articulated by the gay men I interviewed.

Opinions The stories about how Amsterdam used to be the most popular city of the world among gay people were told by many informants. First I heard it from Lars, the member of DGS/De Roze Leeuw from Rotterdam. When he was explaining to me why the cases of anti-gay violence increase in the Netherlands (which I will disclose in the next chapter), he suddenly commented on the gay scene which existed in Amsterdam in 1990s. Although he could not witness it himself, he told me how flourishing and safe it used to be. “Drag queens could walk wearing make-up in the streets! Now they would get beaten.” Lars stated that today gay people going to gay bars and clubs as well as drag queens performing there used to feel safer but not today. Nowadays, according to the follower of DGS/De Roze Leeuw, they are attacked by Muslim youngsters who are more violent today and the streets are less safe than they used to be earlier. Another member of the Rotterdam organization, Thomas, whom I met later after the interview with Lars, mentioned one of the gay venues of the Dutch capital, Reguliersdwarsstraat. He confirmed Lars’ view that today the Dutch cities are much less safe now. “Amsterdam used to be the gay capital of the world in 1960s.” But these years Reg- uliers is “one of the most unsafe streets in Amsterdam” because of the “guys on scooters” who yell swear words at the visitors of gay bars. It is noteworthy that such nostalgia was expressed not only by the followers of conservative political organizations - such as members of DGS/De Roze Leeuw - but also by the supporters of more liberal Dutch parties. When I talked to Gert, a gay man who votes for VVD and critisized Gert

!23 Wilders (PVV) and Thierry Baudet (FvD), said that “Amsterdam used to be more accepting but maybe that’s because the city was different. It used to be a gay capital but not anymore. Muslims also are not that tolerant.” Another informant, Paul, who supports the green party GroenLinks, shared the very same words about Amsterdam that used to be the gay capital, but, according to his view, it was in 1970s. The main gay venues, he stated, used to have more gay bars and clubs. He admitted that the number of places for homosexual people is decreasing because of the acceptance of sexual minorities today. The gay scene itself “is more mixed now”. But he also mentioned the street violence which happens nowadays and linked it with the idea that ethnic minorities are not integrated into the “Dutch culture”. “We live in a city with lots of immigrants. They live their own rules. They’re from Syria, Afghanistan. And the government is not doing enough about integration.” Another case related to the gay-friendly image of Amsterdam is worth mentioning. One of the respondents, Alex, who organizes a drinks event Jongeheerenborrel along with the other two men, briefly mentioned the Suitsupply case which dates from February 2018. When I arrived in the Netherlands from Russia in early February 2018, I saw the posters of the two men kissing with each other or touching each other. The banners were the advertising of the Amsterdam-based suit company called Suitsupply. Looking at those posters while already having the image of the Netherlands as one of the most LGBT-friendly countries of Western Europe, I thought that my expectations of the place I moved to were certainly justified. However, later, when I started following the official page of COC on Facebook, I came across the posts with the pictures of Suitsupply banners which were either damaged or crossed out with a black tape in the parts where the two men were kissing. After a while the advertising completely disappeared from the streets of Amsterdam. I was confused when I found out that such reaction can be possible in the Netherlands. Commenting on the accidents with these billboards, Alex said that he found that “disturbing”. Again, the case was linked to today’s image of the Dutch capital. “Amsterdam positions itself as a gay capital. But we are not there yet.” He claimed that recently the city “has become more multicultural” and there are people different from each other who live in it. Nevertheless, he quickly turned to the native Dutch who, in his opinion, “try to be more tolerant than they really are”. He brought another example of erotically explicit advertising, the one of Radio 538 which depicted two half- naked women kissing and touching each other and covering their faces with a boombox. Alex claimed that while so many people were disturbed by the two men kissing on Suitsupply posters, no one cared about the two women on Radio 548 advertising billboards, which appeared in the streets of Dutch cities in summer 2018.

!24 Many of my respondents, when they spoke about Amsterdam which “used to be the world’s gay capital”, including the followers of DGS/De Roze Leeuw, see the reason of the negative changes in the city in the Muslim population of the Netherlands. The increasing numbers of anti-gay violence are regularly linked to ethnic, Muslim minorities. However, as Alex mentioned, it is also the white Dutch people who remain sensitive to such homoerotic images (particularly male) as the ones on the posters of Suitsupply. In March 2018, young people from a Catholic organization Civitas Chris- tiana held a demonstration in Nijmegen against the advertising of Suitsupply. The slogans on their banners said "Stop Suitsupply" and "God's marriage = 1 man + 1 woman.” The Catholic movement, founded in 2014, claims that its aim is to protect a tradition, family, and private property.2 “Follow- ing the protest, Civitas Christiana announced the start of a new campaign called ‘Family in Danger.’ Campaign leader Hugo Bos stated its goals: ‘This protest was just the beginning. We now are going to campaign intensively and persistently for the family. We will not stop until the family is completely protected from the sexual revolution.’”3 Although there are indeed existing cases of homophobia among the native Dutch population, for example, the protest of the Catholics against the Suitsupply billboards, the problem remains less visible and discussable. It is the Muslim population which is normally triggered in the media as well as in the stories of my respondents. The dichotomy “us/them”, which relies on neoculturalism and the ideas of progress, emphasizes first of all the homophobia of the migrant minorities. Homophobia of the native Dutch population, in particular the fundamentalist Protestant and Catholic parts of it, was discussed in the media not only in the case of Suitsupply. In the last chapter of the thesis I will investigate the story of my respondent Bart, who personally experienced discrimination by his conservative religious relatives.

A bit of history of gay Amsterdam and the dynamics of Amsterdam’s gay scene The informants’ beliefs that the Dutch capital used to be the world’s centre of the gay scene are indeed justified. When the Dutch government took steps to achieve the emancipation of sexual minorities in 1970-1980s, Amsterdam was the first municipality to assume measures. “These include various issues such as education, social support for the elderly, better health care services particularly for STDs, sport facilities, equal rights in city services, and the promotion of gay and lesbian visibility. The City of Amsterdam promised to stop tearing down public toilets and ordered the police to

2 https://civitaschristiana.nl/?page_id=19 [accessed 22.01.19] 3 https://www.tfpstudentaction.org/blog/lgbt-activists-disrupt-pro-family-demonstration [accessed 22.01.19]

!25 stop harassing gay men who were cruising. Since the 1990s, special projects that enhance the emancipation and visibility ethnic minority queers have been added to the list” (Hekma 2006: 134). Moreover, in 1987 Homomonument was opened in the Dutch capital. It is situated right next to Westerkerk and consists of the three pink triangles which form a larger triangle. A public toilet was placed next to one of the triangles as they used to be a common spot for gay men to meet and cruise. Homomonument is one of the world’s first monuments that commemorates the victims of homophobia.4 In 2001, the first gay marriage was held in Amsterdam. So, all these events con- tributed to the image of Amsterdam as a gay friendly city. As some of my respondents mentioned the changing gay scene of the Dutch capital, it is worth investigating what were the exact changes that influenced the city as a “gay capital”. Amsterdam used to have (but from my own impressions it still has) many gay and lesbian venues all over the city. The main streets full of LGBT clubs and bars are Reguliersdwarsstraat, Amstel, Kerkstraat, Warmoesstraat, and Spuistraat. Reguliersdwarsstraat, the largest gay-friendly street of the city, has its own history. In 1981, a very popular gay cafe called “Cafe April” was opened in that street. “Di- rectly from the start April became famous for its big and fancy parties with spectacular decorations. Gay people from all over the world came here on their trip to Amsterdam. When this bar was ex- tended and a rotating bar was installed in 1996, it was the biggest gay bar in Europe.”5 When AIDS reached Amsterdam and became a large problem, the owners of the cafe organized a fund to help the diseased gay men. Other venues, where gay people could be open about their sexual orientation, such as April’s Exit, Havana, Reality Bar, and Soho, were opened in Reguliersdwarsstraat during the 1980-1990s. In 1996, the owners of Havana club organized Amsterdam Pride for the first time. The Gay Games were held in 1998 and gathered thousands of athletes from many countries. “Ams- terdam Pride and the Gay Games added to the self-confidence of the gay community and were new impulses for the gay night life scene, for which Reguliersdwarsstraat, with flourishing venues like

April, Exit and Havana, acted as the flagship.”6 The beginning of the 21st century marked the decline of the gay venues of Amsterdam as it was mentioned by my informants. With the appearance of the Internet and the fact that it became more and more popular, there was less need for sexual minorities to meet in the special places like gay bars. Around 2010, several bars and clubs in Reguliersdwarsstraat faced financial issues and had to

4 http://www.homomonument.nl/sinds1987/geschiedenis.php [accessed 04.01.2019]

5 http://www.reguliers.net/history.php [accessed 20.01.19] 6 Ibid.

!26 close down. Besides, the appearance of the dating apps, such as GayRomeo or Grindr, made the gay bars less attractive for homosexual people to meet with each other. Up until now online communi- cation stays the most convenient way of dating for many gay men. Moreover, some streets of Amsterdam lost their status of being gay streets due to the increasing number of tourists from around the world. Warmoesstraat is an example of this process. From the conversations I had not only with my “official” informants but also with my gay friends and acquaintances living in Amsterdam, I had an image that this street, along with the bars and shops lo- cated there, is loosing its gay visitors because of the tourists and the business and crowdedness they cause in the area. Earlier in 2018, a gay fetish store MisterB has moved from Warmoesstraat to Prinsengracht due to this reason. The owner of the shop claimed that in Warmoesstraat regular cus- tomers did not feel comfortable at the shop when tourists came in just to laugh at the fetish products and take selfies.7

Amsterdam Gay Pride Amsterdam’s famous Gay Pride is the key event that invests to the image of the city as a gay capital. The event originates from the activities of COC in 1970s. In the beginning, the largest gay rights organization of the country did not want to hold a Gay Pride parade like the activists did in the United States after the Stonewall riots of 1969. COC saw the Dutch gay community as similar to heterosexual people and strove for the inclusion of gay people into heteronormative Dutch society (as mentioned in the introduction of the thesis). But after the policy of the organization had changed and it strived for visibility of gay people, the first Gay Liberation and Solidarity Day was held in the Dutch capital in 1977. This parade was organized in June and was later called Pink Saturday. This march was a political demonstration rather than a celebration of sexuality. The latter became more popular when Amsterdam Pride was invented by a group of people from above-mentioned Havana bar in August 1996. “The new Amsterdam Pride was different from Pink Saturday and most other Gay Prides, as it was solely meant to be a celebration of freedom and diversity in Amsterdam, and not as a political demonstration for equal rights or against discrimination.”8 After several years younger Amsterdam Pride held in August became more and more popular than June’s Pink Saturday due to the fact that the city was mentioned in the name of the former.

7 https://www.ad.nl/amsterdam/fetishwinkel-mister-b-verhuist-vanwege-overlast-toeristen~a575046d/ [accessed 21.01.19] 8 http://www.reguliers.net/history-gaypride.php [accessed 22.01.19]

!27 Moreover, in 1990s there were less political issues to fight with in Amsterdam because gay men were less marginalized and more assimilated into the Dutch society. “The Amsterdam Pride was unique, because instead of a march with trailers through the streets, there's a parade of boats over some of the city's world famous canals.”9 Moreover, Pink Saturday was not attached exclusively to the Dutch capital and was organized in other provinces of the Netherlands. Since 2012 Amsterdam has its own march which has a political background - Pride Walk. This march was created as a reaction to anti-gay violence in the Netherlands and abroad. Every year, one week before the canal parade of Amsterdam Pride, the marchers walk through the city starting from Homomonument near Westerkerk to Vondelpark. When I talked with one of my respondents - Rick - in the end of the conversation he mentioned that he was going to participate in Pride Walk. He also characterized it as a mainly political march and stated that he was taking part in the demonstration because the party he was a member of - Dutch Labour Party - was one of the march’s organizers. He suggested that I should better go to Milkshake dance festival (which was held on the same day as Pride Walk) because it was more fun than the demonstration. Amsterdam Pride emerged at the time when it seemed that the main issues related to homophobia were gone. Five years after the first canal parade same-sex marriage became legal in the Nether- lands and gay men and women gained adoption rights. In this political context Amsterdam Pride was and still remains predominantly a party, a celebration of emancipated sexuality. Moreover, more and more heterosexual people join the parade. Paul, the informant whom I already mentioned in this chapter, also stated that, in his opinion, the canal parade today is a party rather than a political demonstration. He said that because of the special format of the event - the fact that the parade is organized with boats sailing in the canal - there is no enough contact and interaction between the participant of Amsterdam Pride and the viewers. Thus, political issues cannot be addressed properly there. Having a conversation with me, Paul mentioned that, for example, the issue of homophobia in Russia should be addressed better during the parade. He also said that, unlike in the Netherlands, there are more political activists in Germany during the parades. For example, in Berlin, where Paul used to live while studying there. When I attended Amsterdam Pride myself in August 2018, I also had an impression that the parade is a huge party at which the few activist boats (like the ones of COC or Amnesty International) did not look relevant sailing together with the party (Club Church, MisterB) and commercial (Netflix, Phillips, Google) boats. In the next chapter dedicated to a con-

9 Ibid.

!28 servative gay organization one of the informants expressed discontent with such format of Amster- dam Pride, so I will continue exploring this topic further. The study of the gay scene of Amsterdam and its dynamics showed that there are indeed changes happening in the city’s LGBT scene. Moreover, I explored the history of Amsterdam Pride as the main gay event of the capital. Apparently it also affected the image of Amsterdam as well as the feelings of loss expressed by the men I had conversations with. In one way or another, the image of Amsterdam’s past becomes somewhat idealized by the respondents. First, the majority of the guys I interviewed were too young to witness the gay scene personally. Second, although it is true that gay bars, clubs, and stores close down or move to other streets of the city, Amsterdam Pride is getting more and more popular and larger. Moreover, Seidman, cited by Duyvendak in one of his articles (Duyvendak 1996: 421), states that “the dominant public spaces in Amsterdam are still very much officially sanctioned as heterosexual. A lesbian and gay public presence seems confined to certain spaces, e.g. bars, cafes, or sex shops… I am not suggesting that Amsterdam is as intolerant and as homophobic a culture as the United States but that heterosexuality remains the organizing principle of social life” (Seidman 1994: 70-1).

The opinions of the respondents speaking about the changing scene of Amsterdam and the fact that the city is not the world’s capital anymore have, I argue, nostalgic character. The gay scene of Amsterdam, indeed, has been changing through the years. Boym, Pickering and Keightley argue that nostalgia is the term which involves not just our idealized images of the past but it also has to do the vision of the future. The discontent expressed by my informants is connected with the idea of the progressive and modern Dutch nation which nowadays is disturbed by the presence of the Mus- lim immigrants who are claimed to be the bearers of the traditional, backward culture. As Duyven- dak states, the idea of a culture as static, closed, and unchanging sustains such a strong opposition between “we” - the native Dutch who feel homeless, who feel that Amsterdam is not like it used to be anymore - and “them” - the newcomers who do not fit in the emancipated and progressive Dutch culture and hence are destroying the image of the Dutch capital as a gay-friendly city. Such nostalgic narratives involve neoculturalist statements and the oppositions “we” - “them” is inevitably present in them, despite the fact that the changes in Amsterdam’s gay scene are not always caused by the influence of Muslim immigrants. One of the examples is Warmoesstraat which is transform- ing with the increasing flow of tourists. Thus, the nostalgic discourse becomes a part of the homonationalism in the Netherlands. The vision of the Netherlands as a country that brings progress

!29 and which is placed within the discourse of modernity coexists with the neoculturalist discourse which strictly distinguishes (by the use temporal categories) the modern and progressive Nether- lands and the backward and religiously conservative Muslim Others. Such strict opposition sustains the tension between the two populations and causes the feelings of nostalgia, homelessness and fear among the autochthonous part of the Dutch population. Such feelings of nostalgia and fear were frequently expressed by the respondents. Further, in the next chapter I move from a discursive modality of homonationalism to the particular community. I will explore the ideology, the practices and the language of a conservative and anti-immigrant gay organization from Rotterdam and investigate how those embody homonationalism as well.

!30 Chapter 2. Dutch GayServatives/De Roze Leeuw: The narrative of homophobia embodied in a conservative gay organization. In this chapter I will explore how homonationalism is embodied on the level of a political organization. I apply several concepts to the analysis of statements and the practices of DGS/De Roze Leeuw. First of all, I use the concept “neoculturalism” (Uitermark, Mepschen and Duyvendak 2014), which describes the world as divided into static and opposed to each other cultures. This term also denotes today’s political context of the Netherlands. In this context the progressive and sexually emancipated Dutch culture is opposed to the backward Muslim culture which is depicted as a threat to allegedly autochthonous population. Another important for this chapter concept is “modernity”. Butler (2008) uses it to mark how the temporal categories are manipulatively exploited in the sexual politics by such politicians as Pim Fortuyn. The members of DGS/De Roze Leeuw also present the values of sexual freedom and gender equality as specifically Dutch. Lægaard (2007) states that the nationalisation of the liberal values is a form of nationalism. This process has a normative function: it excludes from the nation the citizens who are not considered to be following the liberal values. Finally, homonormativity plays a key role in the nationalisation of the liberal values in the Netherlands. Homonormativity establishes the link between gay identity and capitalist consumerism (Drucker 2015). In the Netherlands it also marks assimilationist policy of the gay movement instead of the struggle for radical social changes (Mepschen et al., 2010). All these concepts mark the processes which embody homonationalism. Nowadays in the Netherlands gay movements and organizations can be well fitted within the neuculturalist and nationalist discourse. I refer to DGS/De Roze Leeuw to illustrate how homonationalism is practiced on the lever of an organization. When I discovered on Facebook a page of a Rotterdam-based conservative political organization in May 2018, it was then called “Dutch GayServatives” (or shortly DGS). In July I met with a member of DGS and he told me about their plans to change the name of their organization to make it more “inclusive” and appealing not only among gay people, but also among other members of LGBT community. He would not tell me which name he came up with by then. On October the 1st a separate Facebook page was created and called “De Roze Leeuw”. The change of the name of the organization reflects the transition in how its members identify themselves in the landscape of LGBT activism in the Netherlands. The original name - Dutch GayServatives - represented a reac- tionary position and activities of the followers and their opposition to one of the largest Dutch LGBT organizations - COC. I will elaborate this in one of the sections below. The new name for the

!31 organization - De Roze Leeuw - employs one of the national symbols which is featured in the coat of arms of the Netherlands - the lion. In my opinion, this is crucial in terms of how the members of the organization visualise themselves politically and also symbolically. The new name, along with the organization’s aims (which are listed below), contributes to the modern nationalistic discourse in which the Netherlands is depicted as a progressive and tolerant country. I had separate meetings with four members of the organization, including Lars. It was him who later arranged for me the interviews with other three members of DGS/De Roze Leeuw. Although very small, DGS/De Roze Leeuw is a political organization with a public Facebook page. All of the members I talked to did not experience any violence because of their sexual orientation. I will focus not on the members particularly but on the practices and the statements which the members shared with me.

First meeting with the member of DGS/De Roze Leeuw I met with the member of DGS/De Roze Leeuw on a sunny Sunday afternoon in late June. We agreed to have a conversation in Rotterdam, the city where he lives. The weather was perfect for a walk and Lars was kind to show me around the city to which I came for the first time. After a short walk we started from Centraal Station he suggested that we go to a cafe popular among gay people living in Rotterdam. I did not want to start straight away with the discussion of the organization so I asked him about the local gay venues. According to him, there is no particular gay area with bars and clubs as it is in some parts of Amsterdam. Lars mentioned that there was a gay club but the mayor of the city decided to shut it down due to the noise. When I asked Lars if the residents living around the club didn’t like the noise, he said that, indeed, it was rather their decision. Lars wondered about the studies I did in Moscow and the reason why I decided to move exactly to the Netherlands among all other Western European countries. I said that, apart from many other features of the Netherlands that attracted me, I appreciate its acceptance of sexual minorities. He replied: “I think that the Dutch are not proud enough of their country”. He also mentioned that the people should not be too proud of their country thinking that they are better than others. Never- theless, the Dutch take the achieved values for granted, he stated. “The Netherlands used to be one of the most liberal towards gay men countries but not anymore.” After Lars showed me the market building as well as Erasmus bridge we started talking about the organization. At the time we were having a walk DGS/De Roze Leeuw consisted only of 6 regular members (apart from Lars himself), most of whom live in Rotterdam. There are other members

!32 based in The Hague and Utrecht, according to my informant. DGS/De Roze Leeuw was created when the current members realized that they have to do something about anti-gay violence caused mainly by Turkish and Moroccan youngsters. Lars saw the media reports about the attacks and thought there is a lack of action among the existing LGBT organizations. The reason these organizations do not take action, according to Lars, is because they are afraid of being labelled as racist, fascist, or even Nazi. After this he insisted that he was not against immigrants or more specifically Muslim immigrants. He stated that he was against aggressive behaviour of Muslim teenagers who attack gay men in the streets of the Dutch cities. As reported by Lars, it was the third generation of Muslims (which is mostly young Turkish and Moroccan people) who, because of not being born in the native country of their grandparents, were looking for their national roots and opposed themselves to the Dutch progressive values. Hence anti-gay violence arises among them. That is why Lars and other members want to have an organization that strongly opposes such cases of violence. To do so, they want to legalize the use of pepper-spray in the Netherlands so that gay men who are attacked are able to fight back or avoid the violence and run away. They also want to bring more attention from the government and the police to the cases of violence. I asked Lars about the name of his organization, back then called Dutch GayServatives. Ap- parently GayServatives means Gay + Conservative. They chose this combination because, according to them, many people think that gays cannot be conservative, so they wanted to demonstrate that there are also conservative gay people. Lars pointed out that ‘conservative’ derives from ‘conserve’. By using this word he stated that he wishes to conserve what is already achieved for gay men in the Netherlands, which is the acceptance of homosexuality. He pointed out that he likes freedom, gay life and gay scene and he wants to keep it in the Netherlands. Moreover, Lars believes that “conservatives tend to become more progressive”.

Opposition to COC and anti-establishment agenda On its Facebook page DGS/De Roze Leeuw regularly opposes itself to the largest Dutch LGBT- rights organization COC and critisizes it for not doing enough for the gay community and pretend- ing to represent all sexual minorities in the Netherlands.10 I decided to discuss COC with the members of DGS/De Roze Leeuw to understand better an attitude of the small organization to COC and also have a better picture of DGS/De Roze Leeuw itself.

10 https://www.facebook.com/gayservatives/ [accessed 30.12.18]

!33 First I asked Lars what he thinks about COC. He told me that it refuses to acknowledge that there is a problem with homophobic Muslims. Instead, Lars claims, COC worries about gay jokes on the TV which are allegedly homophobic. Another member of the organization in Rotterdam - Gerard - told me that “COC was corrupted by the left-wing people. They don’t represent all the gay people.” He insisted that the organization is left-wing and thus cannot deal with the issues homosexual people encounter today. “COC are left-wing” and the gays are turning right.” The phrase “symbolic politics” was associated with the activity of COC by the two members of DGS/De Roze Leeuw I talked to. By calling “symbolic politics” what COC does they state that the organization does not do anything against the cases gay bashing in the Netherlands. Instead, the members believe, COC pretends to support and protect sexual minorities by, for example, financing rainbow zebras in the street of Dutch cities. “Visibility is only symbolic politics” - Gerard commented on the activity of the organization he critisizes mentioning rainbow-coloured crosswalks. “We need more security, we need more police and the rights to secure ourselves”. He admitted that COC - along with the left-wing parties - did a lot for the homosexual movement in the 1960’s. To- day, on the contrary, the organization looses support from the community and their offices are being closed down around the country. Another follower of DGS/De Roze Leeuw - Krijn, who identifies as bisexual and decided to join the organization specifically for its stance against anti-gay violence - told me the following: “COC failed in my eyes. They get money from the government. They are afraid of the debates. The only thing they do is the rainbow crossroads. In my opinion they failed the discussion.” The first LGBT organization of the Netherlands is associated first of all with the establishment (noting the financial support COC gets from the government) and the left-wing political agenda which is also rejected by the followers of DGS/De Roze Leeuw as “multicultural” and not able to represent homosexual people nowadays.

The employment of left-wing/right-wing categories The opposition to COC also entails the employment of such political categories as “left-wing” and “right-wing”. The use of these notions is also important for the analysis of the forms of homonationalism. The members of the organization frequently used them to claim their own position in gay activism in the Netherlands and distinguish themselves from other anti-homophobia organizations. “Left-wing” politics is associated by the followers of DGS/De Roze Leeuw with multiculturalism, the politics of inclusion, and Dutch political establishment. The latter link may seem peculiar as during almost a decade the leading party of the Netherlands has been a conservative liberal VVD.

!34 When I was talking with Lars he claimed that gay people in the Netherlands “are becoming more right-wing”. According to him, this is connected with the fact that “they would like to preserve their status quo”. Besides, he stated that the Dutch right-wing political parties are becoming more progressive towards sexual minorities nowadays. Lars also mentioned that it relates to the gay people with different incomes. He believes that wealthier gay men support right-wing parties “to protect their status quo” while those with low income vote for such parties as PVV and FvD as they live in the neighbourhoods mainly populated by ethnic immigrants and are more exposed to anti-gay violence. Lars himself is a member of a municipal Rotterdam party “Leefbar Rotterdam” and state “Forum voor Democratie”. Thomas is a member of these parties as well and described them as right-wing but not far right. Krijn also described the organization he is a member of as right-wing. Besides, he claimed that he receives “more support from the right than from the left flank. The left parties total- ly don’t understand the discussion. In the right parties you can have a discussion.” During my interview with Gerard he started the conversation about DGS/De Roze Leeuw saying that “we are too left-wing”. Nevertheless, he noted: “left wing and right wing is not a good way to divide politics. It’s more globalist and anti-globalist”. However he kept using the former terms to describe the politics in the Netherlands. He again mentioned 1960s, when “it was the left-wing parties that fought for us”. The terms “left-wing” and “right-wing” are actively exploited by the followers of this organization. These categories have temporal connotations. My respondents, especially Gerard, claimed that left-wing parties and organizations (such as COC) are not able to handle the current issues anymore but used to be important in fighting for gay rights in 1960s. Moreover, the terms are also employed to express the organization’s position on immigration.

Homonormativity and masculinity of the organization The first facebook page of DGS/De Roze Leeuw creates the image of the masculinity of the organization. One of the mottos that can be found on the page says “Wel homo, geen mietje” that can be translated into english as “truly gay, not sissy”. Another motto says “Liever pepperspray dan een genderneutrale wc” - “Better pepperspray than genderneutral wc”. I asked Lars to comment on the first motto. He noted briefly that he want to let people know that gay people are not weak and feminine as common stereotypes might give an impression. But he seemed to avoid the topic in the end. The promotion of the legalization of pepper sprays in the above-mentioned description of the orga-

!35 nization on Facebook and its preference over genderneutral toilets also creates the image that its members wish to use force to fight back the perpetrators of anti-gay violence and do not want to be seen as weak and feminine. The Rotterdam organization, I argue, is homonormative. Mepschen, Duyvendak, and Tonkens refer to Lisa Duggan and characterize the Dutch gay community by the term “homonormativity”. “in the Netherlands, an ‘assimilationist’ strategy focusing on equal rights rather than ‘queerness’ or radical social change characterized the movement almost from its inception.” “Queerness does not necessarily challenge the national order (cf. Kuntsman, 2008b) but can be implicated in it and can, in particular circumstances, even be mobilized to shape and reinforce (neo-)nationalist and Oriental- ist projects and politics” (Mepschen et al., 2010: 971). The members of DGS/De Roze Leeuw act within a neonationalist and neoculturalist political context. Their organization is based on the assimilationist agenda of the Dutch gay movement and is not radical. My assumptions that DGS/De Roze Leeuw is the organization focused on its masculine image were later supported by the words of Krijn when I was interviewing him in Bergen op Zoom. De- scribing DGS/De Roze Leeuw he opposed it not only to COC but also to the LGBT community in general. He believes that “gays are accepted in their community which is feminine. But they’re not accepted in a main world”. According to Krijn, LGBT community represents only a small number of gay people but does not include all sexual minorities. “The way they are acting on boats [during Gay Pride parade - P.G.] feeding them [perpetrators of gay bashing - P.G.].” He did not comment on how exactly the behaviour of Gay Pride participants “feeds” those who perpetrate anti-gay violence. Julien thinks that modern Pride parades are about the small community of mainly feminine gay people. “This is not the nation-wide community.” That is why he joined DGS/De Roze Leeuw as he thought that this organization is different from the ones he described. In the previous chapter dedicated to the image of Amsterdam and the feelings of loss expressed by the respondents I explored the history of Amsterdam Pride and characterized it as a large party rather than a political demonstration. The canal parade was organized by the people from the club in Reguliersdwarsstraat and already in the beginning saw it as as a celebration of emancipated sexuality, since in the end of the 1990s it seemed that the rights for the homosexual people were achieved. That is why Amsterdam Pride has the image of the party crowded with queer men who are dressed flamboyantly and sometimes provocatively. One of my Dutch friends once mentioned a saying common in the Netherlands - “doe normaal” (act normal). He then said that Gay Pride is the the only time of the year when this unspoken rule can be ignored. “During Pride you can do whatever

!36 you want.” However, it seems that the members of DGS/De Roze Leeuw, following the words of Krijn, do not accept such image of Gay Pride and oppose themselves to it. The queerness and, as Krijn stated, the femininity of Gay Pride community become in the eyes of DGS/De Roze Leeuw members the images which do not represent the whole LGBT community, including the members themselves. Instead, they have created and support their own image which, following their vision, can demonstrate their willingness to actively fight gay bashing.

Pim Fortuyn The first openly gay populist politician of the Netherlands - Pim Fortuyn - is a key political figure for the members of DGS/De Roze Leeuw. Although most of the organization’s members are too young enough to have witnessed the career of Fortuyn before he was murdered in May 2002, all of them expressed their admiration for his position and political activities. The time when Pim Fortuyn appeared in the political scene of the Netherlands and became popular for his populist statements against Muslims was the time of significant social changes within the country. The problem of increasing immigration and the number of asylum seekers from Middle Eastern countries became more evident. The immigrants, who arrived at the country as guest workers in 1960s, as well as their children, could not integrate into the Dutch society. Among the reasons were their Islamic religion and the involvement of the Turkish and Moroccan youth into petty crimes. This led the immigration to being associated with criminal activities and caused xenophobic sentiments among the native Dutch people (van der Veer 2006: 116). Besides, the decades that preceded 1990s were characterised by the rise of the welfare state with many social benefits spread among the Dutch population. Youngsters became more independent from their parents and could start living on their own from early years. This also led to the emergence of the feminist and homosexual movements which started sexual revolution in 1960s. This, apart from other factors, turned the Netherlands into a secular and tolerant country which before used to be one of the most religious and conservative in Western Europe. Van der Veer claims that the benefits of the welfare state formed in 1950s along with progressive values caused by the sexual revolution of 1960s were by the end of 1990s threatened by immigration of Muslims and globalization (Ibid.: 119). Fortuyn challenged the political establishment of the Netherlands with the statements which were directed against immigrants who seemed as a threat to the Dutch liberal values. He used his provocative image and statements, his sexuality, as well as a flamboyant way of living to gain sympathy among the white Dutch population. Keuzenkamp and Bos state that the government “coalition was put to the

!37 test in the autumn of 2001 by a newcomer to the Dutch political scene. Pim Fortuyn called for a re- strictive immigration policy, a robust approach to crime and small government, though he could not really be described as a true conservative: he was not only openly gay, but also talked publicly about his sex life, which was far from monogamous or domesticated. Fortuyn described the ‘islami- sation’ of the Netherlands as a threat to, among other things, the country’s gay-friendly climate” (Keuzenkamp & Bos, 2007: 27). Lars as well as Gerard and Thomas claimed that Pim Fortuyn could have become the first gay prime minister of the Netherlands if he had not been killed by a radical animal rights activist (van der Veer 2006: 113). “Dutch people loved him but his haters always labelled him as racist” - stated Lars. When I was interviewing Thomas in Rotterdam I walked with him to Pim Fortuyn’s monument so he could show it to me. On the anniversary of Pim Fortuyn’s assassination the members of DGS/De Roze Leeuw attended the monument to bring the flowers and commemorate the politician whom they call “the country’s greatest GayServative”, and who talked about the dangers of the multicultural society including for gay people11.

This chapter explored the ideology and the activities of Dutch GayServatives/De Roze Leeuw and how they invest to the process of homonationalism in the Netherlands. The key ideas promoted by the members of this organization are essentially attached to the image of the Dutch nation which is depicted as progressive and emancipated. The claim of the organization that anti-gay violence is always caused by the young generation of Muslim immigrants who belong to and were raised in a culture different from the Dutch culture and its values is a good example of cultural protectionism which follows “modernity-versus-tradition paradigm” (Mepschen et al., 2010: 970): the progressive values of the Netherlands are portrayed as belonging to modernity while the homophobic behaviour of the perpetrators is described as backward. The practices of DGS/De Roze Leeuw also contribute to homonationalism in the Netherlands: the organization emerged with the opposition to COC which is viewed by the members as too multicultural and not caring enough about the Dutch sexual minorities. Moreover, the activists of the Rotterdam-based organization participated in Rotterdam Pride walking with the national flag of the Netherlands as well as their new logo which used one of the Dutch national symbols - a lion. An- other important practice is the visit of the monument of Pim Fortuyn - the populist politician who

11 https://www.facebook.com/gayservatives/posts/1842592542667309?__tn__=-R [accessed 30.12.18]

!38 was notorious for his loud anti-immigrant statements and his critics of the idea of multiculturalism in the Netherlands. The followers of DGS/De Roze Leeuw call Pim Fortuyn the great GayServative. And finally, the language, meaning the categories and terms, the followers use demonstrate their affiliation to the nationalistic discourse. This language includes the new name (De Roze Leeuw), which exploits the national symbol of the Netherlands; the use of the categories “left-wing” and “right-wing”, where the former is associated by the members with multiculturalism and avoidance of the problem of anti-gay violence and the latter is used by themselves denote their own position in the political discourse of the Netherlands. Lastly, DGS/De Roze Leeuw created the mottos which are provocatively masculine and intended to oppose the organization to a more mainstream LGBT community which is considered feminine and not able to solve the issues of gay bashing. The final chapter of the thesis tells the personal stories of the two respondents and explores how the coming out narrative intertwined with the Dutch discourse of homophobia becomes nationalized, i.e. embodying homonationalism.

!39 Chapter 3. Coming out narratives and personal experiences Nowadays personal narratives of the Dutch gay men, who tell about growing up being gay and their coming out experiences, may also embody homonationalism. I will tell the stories of my two informants, Bart and Felix. Although both men do not support conservative parties and movements, their narratives nevertheless include the statements which relate to the discourse of homonationalism. Thus, the personal narratives also embody homonationalism today in the Netherlands. Besides, the storytellers do not necessarily have to belong to a conservative, or what is called “right-wing”, discourse. As I will show further, to explain why the experiences of Bart and Felix are exactly the way they are, they both appeal to the Dutch values and the idea of the Dutchness.

Sexual stories The stories of Bart and Felix are their personal sexual narratives. For the analysis of these stories I use the work of Ken Plummer “Telling Sexual Stories” (Plummer 1995). For the sociologist personal stories which mention sexual experiences construct the reality of those who tell them. Thus, in his book Plummer adheres to symbolic interactionism. “Story telling can be placed at the heart of our symbolic interactions. The focus here is neither on the solitary individual life (which is in principle unknown and unknowable), nor on the text (which means nothing standing on its own), but on the interactions which emerge around story telling. Stories can be seen as joint actions. (…) People may be seen as engaged in fitting together lines of activity around stories; they are engaged in story actions.” (Ibid.: 20) Moreover, what is important in the case of the stories of my respondents, the stories are not only symbolic actions which construct the reality, they are also a “part of the political process. Sexual stories ooze through the political stream. (…) Sexual stories live in this flow of power. The power to tell a story, or indeed to not tell a story, under the conditions of one’s own choosing, is part of the political process” (Ibid.: 26). Another important feature of sexual stories is that they include a social memory. “This is a memory which is attached to social groups—the common stories talked about and heard within particular groups that often come to have a life of their own” (Ibid.: 41). In the case of Bart and Felix and considering the topic of my thesis, it is the social memory attached to the native Dutch gay men as a social group. Plummer, who wrote his book in the UK in the early 1990s, claims that suffering is the major motive of the coming out narratives of gay and lesbian people. However, as I will show fur-

!40 ther, it seems that the stories of Bart and Felix do not include experiences of severe cases of homophobia (Ibid.: 52). Although the stories about sexual experiences might have a universal character, “the notion of ‘the homosexual’ is a very modern thing” (Ibid.: 52). “Stories of ‘homosexuality’ have recently changed. Once upon a time, in the western

world, there were the Greeks and their loves. Then came the ganymedes, ingles, buggers

and catamites. A little later found the mollies; and then the inverts, urnings, homosexuals

5 and queers. The male gay, the clone, the macho man appeared from the 1970s onwards. During the 1980s, the post-Stonewall ‘Aids’ gay has appeared, and even now as I write in

6 the early 1990s, the story of the new Postmodern/New Age queer is in the making. Les- bians too have their own ‘mother tongue’: stories of Amazons, Sapphos, romantic friend- ships, boarding school loves, mythic mannish lesbians, women-identified women, radical

lesbians and lipstick lesbians. Throughout time and space the pleasures and displeasures of erotic experience between the same genders have certainly existed; but in every culture such experiences both create and respond to a wider set of cultural meanings” (Ibid.: 81). Thus, the stories which we hear nowadays, are linked to the current era and, more specifically, to today’s discourse. In the Netherlands, the stories of homosexual people often embody homonationalism. The stories about the experiences of being gay are explained and supported by the argument that there is a long Dutch tradition of tolerance and (sexual) freedom. Also, today’s kind of personal narratives concerning gayness and coming out originated in 1970s, when the private and the public intertwined with each other. At that time, mass student, feminist and homosexual protests spread around the Western European countries and the United States. The modern feminist and gay movements appeared exactly in 1960s-1970s. Back then one of the main slogans of those movements was “The personal is political”. This slogan basically meant that the issues of the private sphere of people’s lives, such as patriarchy within a nuclear family, domestic violence, homophobia, and others, are now the political issues that must be discussed openly and in public. These problems which before were normally kept private were since the end of the 1960s the core problems which were addressed by the second-wave feminist and homosexual organizations. “The personal is political”, thus, became their key argument. “The full cycle of private, personal, public and political tellings has become possible. Thus, not only have gays and lesbians started to tell the story of their lives to themselves, they have started to tell their stories face to face to each other - in bars, in rap groups, in

!41 lesbian and gay centres” (Ibid.: 82). So, the personal stories always refer to a community and the particular political context. Further I will show how the two coming out narratives not only tell us about the personal mo- ments, worries, events, and so on, but also incorporate the political. In this case, the narratives in- cest to homonationalism in the Netherlands.

Bart I will start with the story of Bart, a 37 years old gay man who was introduced by one of my friends. He sent me a text in early August and then we agreed to meet in the end of the month because he was not in the Netherlands yet. When I first saw him in the Hague he told me that he currently lives in Southern France and studies Buddhist practices in a monastery. Bart was born in Apeldoorn which he later described as “the edge of the Bible Belt of the Netherlands”. After graduating from high school he travelled to Australia for one year and then started a bachelor’s program in urban planning in Deventer. The parents of my respondent are politically left-wing, as he himself told me. Today he supports GroenLinks and he is also a member of the party. He comments it the following way: “The social aspect for me is very important. I trying to live by inclusivity and fairness”. According to Bart, when he started to realize that he was gay when he was 15-16 years old, he had bad feelings about this. “I’d rather die than be gay” - he told me about the way he felt at that age. At that time, he said, the schoolchildren called each other gay when they did not like each other”. This was hurtful for Bart. Later, when he started his bachelor’s program, he came out and “everybody was okay with that”. He admitted that his classmates were “more being annoying than being homophobic”. They regularly wondered about Bart’s homosexuality and talked about it. For some time he worked in a bookstore in his hometown and his cowork- ers “kind of celebrated my coming out”. Although Bart parents also accepted the fact that he is gay and did not see it as a problem, he told me that his grandparents could never accept it. “They kind of pushed me away.” Bart’s grandparents were Jehovah’s witnesses and later became Protestant. And although he did not see them often, he acknowledged that it was disturbing for him. He also shared with me two more cases of homophobia he experienced later after he moved to Amsterdam at the age of 26. When he was walking with his boyfriend near Reguliersdwarsstraat, one of the main gay streets of the capital with several gay bars and clubs, “Moroccan youngsters” almost attacked them. One of the youngsters looked at them and demonstratively spat on the ground in front of them. “I have been yelled at and shouted. There was a fatty Moroccan in a hat who

!42 yelled: hit the gay, hit the gay!” Bart said they also used such offensive Dutch words as “nicht” and “flikker”. In the end he and his boyfriend managed to avoid the violence. Bart was 28 when this happened. Another accident happened 3-4 years later near Amstel station. Bart was alone when three or four, as he claims, Moroccan guys shouted the words “pussy” and “faggot” to him. He wanted to report about what happened to a policeman on a motorcycle nearby but “did not bother” in the end. Recalling these experiences, the ones related to his religious grandparents and the verbal discrimination in Amsterdam, Bart began to reflect on them. He started to compare homophobia he experienced while seeing his conservative family members to encountering young people from ethnic minority in the Dutch capital. Commenting on the latter, he admitted: “I don’t think it’s homophobia. It wasn’t maybe about me, it was more about team building.” After this he recalled his grandparents: “There’s even more nasty shit. I think those cases are more severe. That’s hypocrite. From my own experience it’s far more severe.” So, he looked more worried about homophobic behaviour of his white Dutch grandparents rather than verbal discrimination of the Moroccan, as he himself described them, young people. It seems that Bart took more personally the homophobic behaviour of his grandparents. At the same time he thought that the guys who yelled at him could also find a different target, that case was not about him particularly. Besides, it looks like it is more ob- vious to be discriminated by the Muslim youngsters rather than face homophobia when he sees his white Dutch grandparents. After talking about his experiences with me, we discussed more generally the issues related to homophobia in the Netherlands. Considering his poor relationships with the conservative and religious grandparents and the two accidents that happened in Amsterdam several years ago, Bart shared some of his thoughts about homophobic Muslims as well as homophobic white Dutch people: “The other thing, it’s coming from the culture of homophobia, it’s rooted in their religion [Is- lam - P.G.]. It’s not even allowed to even ask about this. Most times when you get discriminated in Amsterdam they are Moroccans. It’s true that if there are some Moroccans approaching and I’m holding my boyfriend’s hand, I’ll loose hands. But those Christian groups, they attack you from the back.” Having told this, he mentioned anti-Muslim gay people who are concerned gay bashing and see young people of ethnic background as the main perpetrators: “Racism from the gays and homophobia from the Moroccans - it’s like a battle. Now it’s this group that’s excluded [Muslims - P.G.] and which group will be next?.. I can think they made a link: these kind of people attack us and these kind of people don’t belong here - they need to go. They call it a Jewish-Christian tradition

!43 [which, according to Bart, made Europe friendly towards sexual minorities - P.G.], that’s a lie. They mean a non-Muslim tradition.”

Felix The second story is the story of Felix, whom I met for the first time at Jongeheerenborrel in April. Jongeheerenborrel is an event for young gay men who gather to have drinks and spend time together. I discovered on the website of UvA and one day decided to visit it. I interviewed Felix in mid August. We were sitting on Roeterseiland campus, in one of its offices. Felix works at the university as a PhD candidate. From the window of the office you can see Amsterdam’s city centre. He showed me the towers of the churches and then pointed at Rijksmuseum. Then we sat down at the table and I briefly described my research so we could turn to the first interview questions concerning his personal experiences. Felix is 26. He moved to Amsterdam in 2011. He was born in a small town called Heiloo, which is close to Alkmaar. He described it as a wealthy town. He came out already at the age of 14, at the 4th grade of high school. Felix’s parents are from Amsterdam. He told me that they expected that he was gay. Besides, his grandparents already knew some gay people. “It was in my favour” - he said. Felix says that he didn’t face homophobia with his schoolmates. Nevertheless, after this he asked me if I am familiar with the Dutch system of high school education and then claimed that he “only encountered homophobia with the students from lower level. Mostly yelling.” Nevertheless, being the only openly gay pupil at high school, he made a big musical about homosexuality. It was spon- sored by COC. According to him, since then there is a special educational program about homosexuality at his school. It seemed to me that Felix didn’t take verbal discrimination he heard other schoolchildren seriously as he excitedly described the success of his own musical. Then I asked him if there is homophobia in the Netherlands. “I’m sure about that, there is.” Felix said that almost every week you can read about the attacks on gay men. “I have the feeling that the most of the homophobia is coming from the people of ethnic background”. He sounded as if he was cautiously choosing the words while turning to this topic. “The boys that are the third generation that were born here… It is increasing” [the cases of violence - P.G.]. But then he quickly turned to reflecting on the homophobia among the Dutch. “The problem is also the Dutch people who are not tolerant. It’s okay to be gay but I don’t want to see gay people kissing.” He later recalled that some years ago he decided not to apply for a membership in a frater- nity because of his homosexuality. Considering the masculine culture of fraternities, he suspected

!44 that he would not feel comfortable there. I also asked Felix about his living in Amsterdam, going out with friends, etc. I already knew that he was the organizer of Jongeheerenborrel and at least every two months he and his other friends have drinks in gay bars. He replied that he heard yelling from the “people with an ethnical background”. Once it happened when he was with his gay friends near Albert Heijn close to Reguliersdwarsstraat. They heard the word “kankerhomo” yelled to them. However, he admitted, he feels safe in the city. “I’m in a kind of a bubble.” After discussing Felix’s coming out and experiences of being gay, I naively wondered why he was lucky to have accepting family and classmates, why he could stage a large musical at high school and are there any circumstances he believes for which he feels safe in Amsterdam. He told me that it has to do with a long tradition of tolerance in the Netherlands and it dates back to several centuries ago. “It’s been an open and tolerant country for a long period. This has always been a country of the immigrants. And it’s a small country. A country of trade. That’s why we have to be open, we are a small country.”

These two narratives respond to the national and political context of the Netherlands. As Plummer states that personal stories can be “joint actions”. In this way the stories or Bart and Felix relate to the particular discursive narrative, according to which the Netherlands is traditionally a tolerant, modern, progressive country. At first the story of Bart may seem contradictory to such narrative because his native Dutch grandparents were homophobic. However, he talks about his family in such an evaluative way that his grandparents’ behaviour is not typically Dutch and should be different, proper. He also brings up the events when he was verbally discriminated by the Muslim youngsters. While he cannot accept homophobia from his family, the behaviour of the non-native Dutch youngsters, as it seems to me, was apparent for him. In the second story, Felix told me that he never experienced homophobia in his family. He also was not discriminated severely by his classmates at school. To explain why he was so lucky, he appealed to the “long tradition of tolerance in the Netherlands”. Again, speaking about anti-gay violence, he mentioned the Muslim population and stressed that the perpetrators come from the immigrant families. Such opposition of the native Dutch population to the immigrant minorities mentioned in both personal stories, I believe, also embody homonationalism. These stories use neoculturalist narratives, in which the two cultures - the white Dutch culture and the Muslim culture - are displayed as opposing each other. Furthermore, both stories involve interpretations of what the Dutchness is and what the traditional Dutch values are.

!45 The narratives of Bart and Felix also suppose that there should be a community which hears their stories. They both include the scenarios which are common when telling about one’s own growing up being a homosexual: personal worries during the realization of one’s homosexuality, relationships with family, friends, and classmates; discovering the gay scene, etc. However, the modern Dutch gay men’s personal narratives about coming out have one more characteristic which is absent in Plummer’s pre-1990’s stories. Both Bart and Felix use the image of the Netherlands as a modern and tolerant country which means it should not be a big issue to be a homosexual. When Bart told he was not accepted by his religious grandparents he saw it as something that should not exist in such country. The story of Felix who, as he said, did not encounter homophobia from his family and friends, explained it by the existence of the tradition of tolerance in the Netherlands. So, the modern stories about coming out can also include something that was not common in the earlier stories of gay men: the modern personal narratives (at least in the case of the Netherlands) are put within the national context and linked to the common national narratives and images of the country. Thus, the personal stories of the Dutch gay men, along with the discourse and communities, also practice homonationalism. Doing a research about naturalization ceremony for immigrants in the Netherlands, Verkaaik also mentions “the culturalization of citizenship” (Verkaaik 2010: 69). Seeing the ceremony, during which the newcomers receive a Dutch passport, as a disciplinary ritual, the author of the article states that this event is one of the expressions of “new Dutch nationalism” (Ibid.: 70). Verkaaik defines it as “a major discursive change that took many people by surprise: the sudden outburst of nationalism, including the definition of an “autochthonous culture” and a fear of “foreign” cultures and religions (especially Islam), in a society known - to outsiders and to itself - as tolerant and multicultural (Ibid.: 70). The main difference of new nationalism from its older versions is that “it is primarily directed against internal migrant Others, especially Muslims” (Ibid.: 71). Another crucial characteristic of new Dutch nationalism is that it is “attractive to many people. (…) On the one hand, new nationalism is discursively thin and one-dimensional, based on a simplified orientalism in which secular freedom stands in opposition to religious doctrine. On the other hand, its social elasticity makes it serve many projects and desires” (Ibid.: 71). The author investigates the diversity of natularization ceremonies which are organized by the local municipalities around the Netherlands and discovers that in some cases these ceremonies are treated by local bureaucrats with a sense of irony or embarrassment when having to think how the “Dutchness” is defined and characterized. However, he argues, “the nationalist discourse on culture

!46 can be contested, ridiculed, and undermined but that new nationalism, as institutionalized in ritual form, is much more difficult to resist. The form is subtler and more seductive precisely because it allows for discursive ambiguity” (Ibid.: 80). It is exactly such subtlety and discursive ambiguity that can also be traced in the two stories I investigated. In Bart’s narrative homophobia of the Muslim youngsters is something that seems evident and has to do with their culture. Bart states that homophobia is rooted in their religion, which is why it was more shocking for him to be discriminated by his native Dutch grandparents. Felix’s narrative also employs neoculturalist scenario which opposes the non-homophobic native Dutch population to the homophobic Muslim Others. To investigate the Dutch neoculturalist nationalism, Mepschen uses Oudenampsen’s term “post- progressivism” and states that today “cultural nationalists abstract liberal achievements in gender and sexual emancipation from the processes in which they were embedded and understand them not as products of an ongoing contingent, historical, progressive social struggle but as inherently Dutch. That is to say, they naturalize them” (Mepshcen 2018: 26). The values of progress, as in the case of almost all the respondents, be it the members of anti-immigrant DGS/De Roze Leeuw, or Bart and Felix who support green and liberal parties, become pulled out of and employed without their original, emancipatory political context. In such neocultiralist discourse the migrant population is depicted as “pre-progressive” (Ibid.: 27), meaning it has not yet achieved sexual emancipation and gender equality. What is important is that such “culturalization of citizen ship (…) is not confined to the neonationalist or populist Right. Discourses of sexual nationalism fit well with progressive articulations of culturalism” (Ibid.: 31). Post-progressivism along with the neoculturalism are parts of the Dutch homonationalism. In this way, as I have studied above, the subjects of this homonational discourse are not only the right-wing and anti-immigrant organizations (such as DGS/De Roze Leeuw). Its subjects are also such people as Bart and Felix, who oppose themselves to the public nationalist discourse but whose personal stories nevertheless practice homonationalism.

!47 Conslusion In my research, I investigated the different modalities and manifestations of homonationalism in the Netherlands. In researching how the opinions and ideas about homosexuality and homophobia become linked to new nationalism and the images of “Dutchness”, I moved along the three levels of homonationalism: first, in the discourse, then I turned to an organization, and finalized the research studying the personal narratives. The research question of the thesis is “How is homonationalism embodied in the Netherlands through the different narratives of homophobia?” Thus, in the three chapters I studied three kinds of narratives: a discursive narrative, an organization’s narrative, and a personal (coming out) narratives. In chapter 1 dedicated to the images of Amsterdam as a gay capital I showed how on a discursive level the opinions on homophobia in the Netherlands involve the opposition of the so-called autochthonous population to Muslim immigrants. The newcomers as well those who were born in the country but identify themselves with Islam are clearly depicted as the bearers of a different and foreign culture. This foreign culture is in turn opposed to the Dutch culture which is seen as progressive and modern. The informants’ stories about the changing gay scene of the Dutch capital and the increasing numbers of anti-gay violence involve nostalgic feelings. This kind of nostalgia is a defin- ing part of the progressive and at the same time nationalist discourse. The native Dutch people’s feelings of not belonging anymore to their country as well as the feeling of losing the country’s liberal and tolerant values due to the religiously conservative Others are what essentially invests to homonationalism in the Netherlands. It is the fear that was articulated throughout the interviews, whether it is the members of a conservative, anti-immigrant organization, or the gay men with the opposite political views. In all their cases nostalgia is fed by the feelings of loss and fear that one day the Netherlands will not be as sexually emancipated and tolerant as it used to be. The second chapter was dedicated to a Dutch conservative organization which was created to oppose and discuss the cases of gay bashing in the Dutch cities. The organization regularly critisizes the younger generation of the Muslim population and also employs the native Dutch population - progressive and secular - to immigrant perpetrators of homophobic violence. In this opposition cultural differences the exploitation of the nationalistic symbols and language are in the centre of the political arguments of DGS/De Roze Leeuw. In this chapter I described the main practices, the language its anti-establishment agenda. The anti-establishment statements express the opposition of organization to COC, which, in their opinion, cannot solve the problem of gay bashing. Moreover, Although the members of this organization describe themselves as right-wing, I argue that nowa-

!48 days the political categories such as right-wing and left-wing become problematic. One of the reasons which interests me is that those politicians who are called right-wing today claim to defend progressive values and fight against homophobia. These issues before 1990s (in the Netherlands it was before the appearance of Pim Fortuyn in the political scene) traditionally were addressed by the left-wing parties and movements. Homonationalism in the Netherlands is particularly embodied by such process in which conservatism becomes associated with the support of progressive values and sexual freedom against the religious (often specifically Muslim) Others and the employment of the nationalistic discourse. Finally, in the last chapter I give the two personal stories about growing up being gay, coming out and experiencing homophobia in the country which is internationally known as tolerant and gay-friendly. The first story, the story of Bart, tells about homophobia within the native Dutch population. The storytellers not just share his memories about his teenager years and adulthood but also evaluates his experiences of homophobia from the perspective which involves the ideas of what the Dutch nation is and what are its key values. Thus, Bart believes that homophobic behaviour of his family does not fit what is claimed to be a proper, non-homophobic, behaviour of the white Dutch population. At the same time he mentions homophobia and verbal discrimination when he was encountered two times by the Muslim youngsters. Discussing their behaviour, he did not question them being homophobic like he questioned his religious grandparents. In the second story the respondent says that he did not experience homophobia when he was young and explains it that there is an old tradition of tolerance in the Netherlands and it defines the Dutch culture. I think that these two personal narratives are what defines homonationalism but from the other perspective. This modality of homonationalism is not related to the “right-wing” discourse but still remains homonationalism because of the close linkages of being gay to the images of “Dutchness” and its values. Neoculturalist categories as parts of the homonational discourse are also employed by both Bart and Felix in their stories. Jasbir Puar defines the modern form of homonationalism as a “fundamentally a deep critique of lesbian and gay liberal rights discourses and how those rights discourses produce narratives of progress and modernity that continue to accord some populations access to citizenship—cultural and legal—at the expense of the delimitation and expulsion of other populations” (Puar 2013). De- scribing the three modalities of homonationalism in the Netherlands one can see that all of them employ neoculturalist scenarios: today’s Dutch culture is necessarily defined as modern, progressive and gay friendly. At the same time its definition is based on the opposition to the conservative

!49 and backward culture of Others who in some cases are seen as a threat to the native Dutch population and its cultural identity. The exclusion of others who do not fit this identity is one of the features of the modern Dutch nationalism. In my research, I showed how this kind of new nationalism, more particularly, homonationalism is supported by the Dutch gay men with different political standpoints. Indeed, in most cases the “culturalization of citizenship” appears to be in the centre of the discussion on homophobia in the Netherlands. All three kinds of the narratives of homophobia included two subjects culturally opposed to each other: the modern autochthonous population on the one side and religious and conservative population on the other side. With the ethnographic research which I conducted I managed to describe not only how this neoculturalist opposition is manifested on the three different narrative levels but also showed that sometimes the native population also does not fit in the common image of the Netherlands (take, for example, the case of homophobia of Bart’s religious grandparents). However, the immigrant minorities appear to be the most targeted and visible population when homophobia is publicly discussed. Such contradictions could mean that not only new Dutch nationalism (Verkaaik 2010) but also homonationalism as one of the sides of new nationalism cannot be described in one way only. It has various definitions and manifestations which sometimes might even seem contradictory to each other. It cannot be reduced to the right-wing discourse only. Although the main and the official source of the data I collected were the interviews which I arranged during the fieldwork period, I should say that during the whole year of my living in the Netherlands I had experiences, meetings, talks and discoveries which helped me to understand the topic I have explored in this thesis. Apart from tête-à-tête conversations with the Dutch gay men in summer, I had unexpected acquaintances and experiences while I was yet working on the research proposal and still while I was writing the thesis. That is why I could say that, in a way, the research is not based purely on the semi-structured interviews organized in advance. It is also based on my personal impressions, feelings and discoveries. I believe this is what defines (at least in part) the ethnographic research.

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