“Seek Nothing Elsewhere Than in Him”: John Calvin on Happiness and the Highest Good

by

Ryan Maynor Reed

A Doctoral Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Knox College and the Graduate Centre for Theological Studies of the Toronto School of . In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of in Theological Studies awarded by Knox College and the University of Toronto.

© Copyright by Ryan Maynor Reed 2019

“Seek Nothing Elsewhere Than in Him”: John Calvin on Happiness and the Highest Good

Ryan Maynor Reed

Doctor of Philosophy in Theological Studies

Knox College and the University of Toronto

2019

Abstract

This thesis considers John Calvin’s thinking on the subjects of happiness and human flourishing.

In it, I specifically consider Calvin’s relationship to eudaimonism and I argue that Calvin should be considered a eudaimonist. I make this argument in stages. I begin by considering Calvin’s thinking on the subjects of pietas, happiness, and the highest good. In so doing, I note how this constellation of interrelated topics points to Calvin’s eudaimonism. In particular, I note the acquisitive dimensions of Calvin’s thought, in which humans are to seek happiness in God, the highest good. After considering these themes, I consider Calvin’s anthropology. I note how

Calvin thinks of humans along the lines of eudaimonism’s threefold anthropological scheme, which conceives of humanity as having a distinct telos. Having observed this aspect of Calvin’s thought, I turn to consider Calvin’s thinking on obligation to God and law. Here, it is argued that

Calvin understands God to have structured the world in such a way that obedience to God brings about human flourishing. I subsequently consider Calvin’s thinking on humanity’s desire for happiness and well-. I argue that Calvin thinks that all humans are engaged in seeking after their own well-being, which, in turn, is another aspect of his thought which is in complete alignment with eudaimonistic thought more generally. I then consider challenges to my thesis, specifically focusing on the three subjects of self-denial, God’s glory, and self-love. While each of these themes might be seen to overwhelm the eudaimonistic elements of Calvin’s thought, in

ii

this chapter I make the case that none of these elements decisively overturns my argument. As early as chapter one of this thesis, it was seen that Calvin considers union with God to be the highest good. In the final chapter of the work, I consider the relationship between union with

God and union with Christ—an extremely important aspect of Calvin’s theology. I ultimately argue that these two concepts should be understood as different ways of referring to the highest good.

iii

Acknowledgements

There are many people I would like to thank who have helped me complete this thesis— far more than I can name here. I am extremely grateful for all those whom God has graciously placed in my life.

First, I would like to thank the many professors I have had who encouraged me in my development as both a thinker and as a Christian. Many professors—again, more than I can name—at all of the schools I have attended have contributed to my academic and spiritual formation. Several professors I would like to individually thank are: Michael McDuffee and

Ronald Sauer at Moody Bible Institute, and Douglas Sweeney and Scott Manetsch at Trinity

Evangelical Divinity School. These men have given me a love for academic study and the study of the history of in particular. What is more, in their lives they also displayed a deep devotion to Christ. In the process of completing this PhD, I am also thankful for many professors at the Toronto School of Theology. I am especially grateful for those who have served on my advisory committee. I am also thankful to Gene Haas for taking time to read portions of this thesis. I am also thankful for Paige Britton, who helped me edit this project with both great attention to detail and great efficiency. Naturally, I take complete responsibility for whatever mistakes remain.

In addition to academic mentors, I am thankful to all of the pastors who have encouraged me in my spiritual and academic journey. Yet again, I am unable to thank all of the people who have personally encouraged me during the course of my studies in this space. I am especially thankful to the pastors who have encouraged me in faith throughout the course of my studies, especially Jeff Scott, Daniel Winter, Mike Bullmore, Jon Dennis, Pareja, Mike Seaman,

Daniel Yang, and Alec Millen.

iv

Also on a personal level, I would like to thank my friends and family for your ongoing support and encouragement. I am profoundly grateful for the family God has given me. I am especially thankful to my dad, Rick, and my mother, Linda, for their encouragement in every way—from meals to prayers. Michael and Lindsey—I am equally grateful for your care for me as your brother. Above all, I am thankful to my wife, Jenny. You are undeniably God’s greatest earthly gift to me. Thank you for patience with me and your constant support—that I have completed this thesis is just one testament to the countless ways in which you help me. Lastly, I am thankful for my son, Jonathan. Jonathan is still teaching me daily about the subject of this project—happiness.

Finally, I want to acknowledge God’s goodness to me. It is my conviction that the completion of this project is visible testament to God’s care for me. Thanks be to God!

v

Contents List of Abbreviations ...... viii Introduction ...... 1 The Promise of This Project ...... 2 “Eudaimonisms,” Classical and Christian ...... 11 Methodology...... 21 Status Questionis ...... 23 Work in Outline ...... 25 Personal Background and Interest...... 27 Chapter 1: Pietas, Happiness, and the Highest Good ...... 29 Pietas ...... 31 Happiness ...... 45 The Future Life...... 66 The Highest Good ...... 70 Conclusion ...... 72 Chapter 2: Human Purpose ...... 74 Calvin’s Doctrine of Creation and Doctrine of Humanity ...... 75 Anthropology in the Eudaimonistic Tradition ...... 78 Calvin and Eudaimonistic Anthropology...... 80 Humans as Created “Towards” God ...... 82 Human To and Away From God ...... 84 Humanity’s Telos...... 89 Ascending the Ladder of Creation ...... 92 Conclusion ...... 98 Chapter 3: Obligation to God ...... 100 Human Obligation to God ...... 103 Law ...... 109 The Law, Christ, and Happiness...... 126 Conclusion ...... 129

vi

Chapter 4: Inclination to God ...... 131 Calvinian Dynamic Nostalgia ...... 134 and Immanent Longings ...... 143 ...... 145 ...... 150 Transcendent Summons and Immanent Longings ...... 157 Conclusion...... 161 Chapter 5: Self-Denial, God’s Glory, and Self-Love ...... 163 Historical Criticisms of Eudaimonism ...... 164 Self-Denial ...... 166 God’s Glory...... 173 Self-Love ...... 188 Conclusion ...... 195 Chapter 6: Union with Christ and Union with God ...... 197 Calvin’s Christology Generally ...... 198 Union with Christ ...... 200 Union with Christ, Union with God, and the Highest Good...... 207 Union with Christ and Happiness ...... 214 Excursus: Predestination and Election ...... 216 Conclusion...... 218 Conclusion ...... 220 Areas for Further Study ...... 225 Concluding Remarks...... 227 Bibliography ...... 229

vii

Abbreviations

CD Augustine, De Civitate Dei

Comm. Commentary

Inst. Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion

CO Ioannis Calvini opera quae supersunt omnia

NE Aristotle, Nicomachean

ST Aquinas, Summa Theologiae

viii

Introduction

Grant, O Almighty God, since thou wishest us to be subject to so many changes, that we cannot settle on earth with quiet minds—grant, I pray thee, that, being subject to so varying a condition, we may seek our rest in heaven, and always aspire to behold thy glory, so that what our eyes cannot discern may shine upon us from thence; and may we so acknowledge thy hand and power in the government of the whole world, that we may repose upon thy paternal care till we arrive at the enjoyment of that happy rest which has been acquired for us by the blood of thine only begotten Son.—Amen.1

This thesis considers John Calvin’s thinking on the subject of happiness and human flourishing.

In it, I am particularly interested in Calvin’s relationship to eudaimonism and whether he should be considered a eudaimonist. To consider Calvin’s relationship to eudaimonism, I will address the question: Does Calvin develop his thinking on the Christian life in ways that reflect the eudaimonistic tradition, particularly its Christian variants? In this question, the eudaimonistic tradition is shorthand for the that there is a highest good whose attainment is synonymous with happiness—particularly with a happiness defined as an objectively desirable state of well- being that describes the fulfilment or realization of human nature or humanity’s telos.2

Eudaimonists hold that humans naturally long for this particular kind of happiness and, what is more, that pursuit of this happiness is appropriate—that is, it is in no way morally suspect. In fact, it is important to see that the eudaimonist understands the pursuit of this happiness to be entirely sensible, since, as we have just seen, it is tied up with the realization of one’s nature.

1 Comm. Ezekiel 1, prayer.

2 Here I am indebted to John Bussanich’s definition of eudaimonism. See John Bussanich, “Happiness, Eudaimonism,” in Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia, ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald et al. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 413.

1

2

As I explore extensively in what follows, my argument will be that Calvin should be understood to be part of the eudaimonistic tradition. Calvin is clear that union with God is the highest good, that God is the one for whom persons were made. As the highest good, union with God ought to be the goal of the Christian. What is more, as the highest good, union with God offers perfect happiness to humanity. As a eudaimonist would, Calvin thinks of God as the telos of humanity.

Though I acknowledge some potential challenges to this understanding of Calvin, my argument is that considering Calvin as a eudaimonist best explains key aspects of his thought.

The Promise of This Project

This project promises to contribute to Calvin studies and to contemporary discussions of ethics in at least three different ways. In the first place, this thesis promises to contribute to contemporary discussions of Calvin’s thought by challenging and perhaps overturning a common suggestion which has been made about Calvin’s ethics, namely, that Calvin rejected eudaimonism. This thesis, then, works to overturn this particular claim. Additionally, this thesis challenges the assumption that Calvin was uninterested in the subject of happiness. Giving credence to such a claim, in her recent semi-popular theological work, God and the Art of Happiness, theologian

Ellen Charry has made the assertion that “[h]appiness was of little interest to [the Reformers.]”3

While this may be true of at least some of the Reformers, this thesis intends to show it is not true of Calvin. My thesis intends to demonstrate that Calvin’s theology has in view not only God’s glory but also human happiness. As we will see, happiness is an integral part of Calvin’s theology.

3 Ellen T. Charry, God and the Art of Happiness (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010), 111.

3

More specifically, this thesis intends to overturn mistaken claims regarding how Calvin’s theology relates to eudaimonism. In addition to happiness, scholars have not always been attentive to the fact that Calvin is drawn to ideas from this particular philosophical tradition. One finds this claim in Alasdair MacIntyre’s well-known work, After Virtue. Here, he argues that

Calvin, due to his unique conception of , undermines the teleological view of man articulated by Aristotle and reinterpreted by various theistic thinkers such as .

Viewed in this particular manner, Calvin’s thought is seen as a departure from previous versions of with their attendant eudaimonism.4 Other scholars have made similar claims.

Among ethicists, Jennifer Herdt made the claim directly, speaking of “[Calvin’s] rejection of eudaimonism.”5 In this article, Herdt specifically sets Calvin in opposition to Aquinas on the subject of eudaimonism. Previously, Herdt similarly contrasted Calvin and Aquinas on the subject of eudaimonism in her 2013 Warfield Lectures.6 Here again, Herdt claimed that Calvin represents a departure from the eudaimonistic tradition as represented in the thought of Aquinas.

In addition to ethicists, Calvin scholar J. Dewey Hoitenga has argued that, in clear contrast to

Plato, Calvin considers happiness to be a gift rather than a goal.7 In understanding Calvin in this way, Hoitenga claims Calvin avoids the motive problem that is present in Plato’s thought—

4 MacIntyre writes, “Reason can supply, so these new assert, no genuine comprehension of man’s true end; that power of reason was destroyed by the fall of man. ‘Si Adam integer stetisset’, on Calvin’s view, reason might have played the part that Aristotle assigned to it.” Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 53; emphasis original.

5 Jennifer A. Herdt, “Sleepers Wake! Eudaimonism, Obligation, and the Call to Responsibility,” in The Freedom of a Christian Ethicist: The Future of a Reformation Legacy, ed. Brian Brock and Michael Mawson (New York: T&T Clark, 2016), 163.

6 Jennifer A. Herdt, “Reditus Reformed” (Warfield Lectures, Princeton, NJ, 2013).

7 Dewey J. Hoitenga, Jr., “Happiness: Goal or Gift? Two Lectures on the Relationship between , Goodness, and Happiness in Plato and Calvin,” in Seeking Understanding: The Stob Lectures, 1986-1998 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), 337–38.

4 namely, that happiness is regarded as a goal to be pursued through right acting. As will be seen in this work, Hoitenga is undoubtedly right to suggest that happiness is a gift from God, according to Calvin. Whether intentionally or not, this particular way of framing things tends to undermine the fact that Calvin also thinks about happiness as something persons rightly orient their lives to. On this point, there is significant overlap between Calvin and Plato, as this thesis will suggest.

In a similar way, Calvin scholar Irena Backus has also questioned the connection between

Calvin’s thought and Greek philosophy. She writes, “Calvin does not redefine all Greek philosophical concepts to make them fit the Christian framework as can be seen from his discussion of virtue and happiness (eudaimonia) in his commentary on Seneca in his Sermons sur l'Harmonie évangélique.”8 Later on, she writes, “The between the Christian concept of eternal happiness and all pagan views of eudaimonia seems so great to Calvin that he does not even consider reworking it to fit the Christian framework.”9 Backus’ suggestion that

Calvin does not redefine pagan views of virtue and happiness is disputable in light of Calvin’s approval of Plato’s conception of the highest good, which will be discussed later on in this thesis.

Related to Hoitenga’s and Backus’ claims, quite recently historian Brad Gregory appears to follow MacIntyre’s assertion, claiming the Reformers generally represent a shift away from virtue ethics.10 For his part, however, Gregory partially tempers this claim, noting that the shift away from ethics of virtue in Calvin (and Luther) is not as complete as MacIntyre suggests.

8 Irena Backus, Historical Method and Confessional Identity in the Era of the Reformation (1378-1615), vol. 94, Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought (Boston: Brill, 2003), 82.

9 Ibid., 85.

5

Indeed, for Gregory, though they still affirmed a “teleological ethics of the good,” they did so by being so at variance with each other that they undermined this tradition.

Perhaps a final illustration of this widespread conception comes from dictionary articles on

Calvin’s ethics, in which the importance of happiness or eudaimonia receives little to no attention.11 Virtue, moreover, is only rarely mentioned in these articles. Instead, these articles invariably focus on ideas like the importance of law, obedience, and calling in Calvin’s thought.

With such a near focus on these ethical themes, Calvin’s ethics appear to be essentially a form of divine command ethics or, at the very least, an ethic of duty. Ultimately, then, dictionaries on Calvin’s ethics are illustrative of a general tendency to view Calvin’s ethics as focusing on the concepts of law and obedience to the exclusion of virtue and happiness.

Once again, this thesis is in part a response to such a reading of the Reformer. My aim is to point to texts in Calvin’s thought which challenge this understanding of Calvin’s thought, noting that

Calvin does think in ways that are familiar to the eudaimonistic tradition.

In the second place, given the relative scarcity of works on Calvin’s ethics, this dissertation certainly contributes to this general area of scholarship. In English, there is only a handful of book length works on Calvin’s ethics.12 Fewer still have drawn attention to Calvin’s connection with the tradition of virtue ethics.13 Indeed, while scholarly work has been done to demonstrate

12 Some of the most important include: Guenther Haas, The Concept of Equity in Calvin’s Ethics (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1997); I. John Hesselink, Calvin’s Concept of the Law (Allison Park, PA: Wipf & Stock, 1992); John H. Leith, John Calvin’s Doctrine of the Christian Life (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1989); James B Sauer, Faithful Ethics According to John Calvin: The Teachability of the Heart (Lewiston: E. Mellen Press, 1997).

13 These works include: Pieter Vos, “Breakdown of the Teleological View of Life?,” Journal of Reformed Theology 9, no. 2 (2015): 131–47; Pieter Vos, “Calvinists among the : Reformed Theological Contributions to Contemporary Virtue Ethics,” Studies in Christian Ethics 28, no. 2 (2015): 201–12; Guenther Haas, “Ethics and

6

Calvin’s connections with both the classical philosophers14 as well as his debts to patristic theology,15 the relation of Calvin’s ethics to the ethics of previous thinkers, both philosophical and theological, has received considerably less attention. This study should help bridge this gap.

Above all, of course, this study is aimed at treating Calvin’s thinking on the topic of eudaimonism specifically, as at present there are no monograph-length treatments in English on the specific subject of Calvin and eudaimonism. What is more, there are no monographs on

Calvin’s thinking on the subject of happiness. In a number of ways, then, this project fills a lacuna in existing Calvin scholarship. It helps clarify the “shape” of Calvin’s ethics, specifically his relationship to virtue ethics, and especially his relationship to eudaimonism. Given that, historically speaking, scholarship is perhaps guilty of the sin of omission on this subject, this study of Calvin’s thought about happiness promises to yield important results.

Finally, this thesis promises to contribute to contemporary discussions of virtue ethics. Indeed, my argument that Calvin is a eudaimonist also stands to contribute to the contemporary discussion of virtue ethics. As is generally well known, since Elisabeth Anscombe’s seminal work, “Modern Moral Theory,”16 virtue ethics has enjoyed a major revival as an ethical theory.

While more strictly secular forms of virtue ethics have also been advanced, Anscombe was herself a Christian; and other Christian thinkers have played a part in virtue ethics revival,

Church Discipline,” in The Calvin Handbook, ed. Herman J. Selderhuis (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), 332–43; Kirk J. Nolan, Reformed Virtue after Barth: Developing Moral Virtue Ethics in the Reformed Tradition (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2014).

14 See esp. Charles Partee, Calvin and Classical Philosophy (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005).

15 See esp. Anthony N. S. Lane, John Calvin Student of the Church Fathers (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2000).

16 G. E. M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Philosophy 33, no. 124 (January 1, 1958): 1–16.

7 including going so far as to propose versions of Christian virtue ethics from different confessional standpoints.17

In addition to these constructive works, the revival of interest in virtue ethics has prompted numerous studies which have also sought to bring the works of major Christian thinkers into conversation with contemporary virtue ethics. The immense interest in the moral theology of

Thomas Aquinas is a vivid illustration of this trend. Though Thomas is almost certainly the most widely studied figure, he is certainly not the only thinker who has been read through this lens.

Similarly, with specific reference to Protestant thinkers, at least one major study has been written examining Jonathan Edwards’s thought in relation to virtue ethics.18 ’s moral theology has also occasioned several studies.19 For my purposes, of course, it is especially of note that only a handful of similar of studies has been authored with regard to Calvin’s thought. In

English, there is no monograph-length work of this sort, but instead only a series of journal articles.20 This dissertation, then, should add to this existing scholarship. Significantly, this thesis does not directly seek to show that Calvin is a virtue ethicist. Nonetheless, if my thesis is correct that Calvin is a eudaimonist, it seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that his ethics are compatible with virtue ethics. I say “compatible” here, because Calvin’s ethics are eclectic and

17 See, for instance, Joel D. Biermann, A Case for Character: Towards a Lutheran Virtue Ethics (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2014); Joseph Woodill, The Fellowship of Life: Virtue Ethics and Orthodox (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002).

18 Elizabeth Agnew Cochran, Receptive Human Virtues: A New Reading of Jonathan Edwards’s Ethics (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2010).

19 Matthew Rose, Ethics with Barth: God, , and Morals, Barth Studies (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010); Nigel Biggar, “Karl Barth’s Ethic Revisited,” in Commanding Grace: Studies in Karl Barth’s Ethics, ed. Daniel L. Migliore (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010), 26–46.

20 Vos, “Breakdown of the Teleological View of Life?”; Vos, “Calvinists among the Virtues”; Nolan, Reformed Virtue after Barth.

8 therefore not easily classified in terms of any one ethical school. Therefore, though my focus is restricted to eudaimonism, this work has important connections to this wider discussion.

Due to the renewed interest in virtue ethics just noted, eudaimonism is a subject which, in turn, has experienced a concurrent revival of interest. The reason for this is that, as it was traditionally conceived, eudaimonism is a core part of virtue ethics.21 Perhaps secondarily, however, interest in eudaimonism has been a result of its emphasis on human flourishing—a perennially relevant topic. As a part of the contemporary discussions of eudaimonism, Christian apologies for this ethical system have been given, and, in response, serious critiques of eudaimonism have been offered. One especially prominent “apologist” for eudaimonism is Christian ethicist Jennifer

Herdt.22 Detractors, on the other hand, include notable thinkers such as Nicolas Wolterstorff and

John Hare.23 Both sides of this debate appear eager to enlist historical figures as support for their position. Porter and Herdt have both written, above all, on Augustine’s and Aquinas’ eudaimonism, for instance. John Hare, in contrast, has found resources in the thought of Duns

Scotus and Kant—and also, as noted above, in the thought of Calvin.24 Wolterstorff, for his part,

21 For more on eudaimonistic virtue ethics, see Liezl Van Lyl, “Eudaimonistic Virtue Ethics,” in The Routledge Companion to Virtue Ethics, ed. Lorraine L. Besser and Michael Slote (New York: Routledge, 2015), 183–95. 22 Jennifer A. Herdt, “Sleepers Wake! Eudaimonism, Obligation, and the Call to Responsibility,”; “Desire for the Common Good: A Defense of Eudaimonism” (Consultation on Desire and the Common Good, Yale Divinity School, 2010); “Reditus Reformed”; Putting on Virtue: The Legacy of The Splendid Vices (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008). Herdt has elsewhere commented that this indirectly lends support to the plausibility of Christian eudaimonism. She writes, “Putting on Virtue does assume that some kind of Christian eudaimonism is defensible. I did not, though, understand my enterprise in the book to be a defence [sic] of Christian eudaimonism.” Jennifer A. Herdt, “Back to Virtue,” Scottish Journal of Theology 65, no. 2 (2012): 222–26.

23 , : Rights and Wrongs (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 149–226.

24 John E. Hare, God’s Call: , God’s Commands, and Human Autonomy (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 49–85; John E. Hare, God’s Command, Oxford Studies in Theological Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).

9 as a part of his critique of eudaimonism, has enlisted Augustine in this cause, thus challenging the traditional reading of Augustine as a eudaimonist.25

As another example of using a historical figure in debates about the legitimacy of Christian eudaimonism, several studies have been written trying to argue for a eudaimonistic rather than a deontological Barth.26 These works are quite explicit in their stated preference for a more eudaimonistic Barth. This project is an obvious analogue to these works, perhaps especially to the work of Matthew Rose. My work thus fits within a larger, ongoing discussion about eudaimonism and Christian theology. My hope is simply to consider Calvin in relation to eudaimonism.

I believe it is worth clarifying here at the outset that in this thesis I am arguing that Calvin is part of the eudaimonistic tradition broadly conceived or understood. It is not my argument that Calvin represents a particular strand of the eudaimonistic tradition such as an Aristotelian, Platonic,

Augustinian or Thomistic version of eudaimonism. Later on in this chapter, I seek to place all of these figures within the broad tradition of eudaimonistic ethics. As has already been seen, in developing a definition of eudaimonism for this thesis, I have relied on John Bussanich’s definition of eudaimonism in the encyclopedia Augustine Through the Ages. Here, Bussanich writes: “Augustine’s eudaimonism, like its classical antecedents, holds that beatitude (beatitudo) is an objectively desirable state of well-being which represents the fulfillment or self-realization of human nature. His theory of happiness satisfies Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic criteria, but

25 Wolterstorff, Justice, 108–226; “Augustine’s Rejection of Eudaimonism,” in Augustine’s City of God: A Critical Guide, ed. James Wetzel, Cambridge Critical Guides (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 167– 85.

26 Rose, Ethics with Barth; Nigel, “Karl Barth’s Ethic Revisited.”

10 the content of happiness and the means of attaining it are determined by his Christian faith.”27 In this thesis, likewise, my argument is that Calvin’s eudaimonism satisfies the criteria of a number of versions of eudaimonism.

While this clarification is, I think, essential, it should also be noted that, in terms of a formal description of the highest good, Calvin is clearly most drawn to Plato, of all the ancient . As will be seen below, he explicitly parallels his thought with Plato’s at several points in his writings. An important complicating factor here is that Calvin simultaneously affirms parts of Plato’s description of the highest good while ultimately rejecting it as an imperfect formulation of the highest good. Given this, there is a sense in which Calvin’s eudaimonism is Platonic, and there is, at the same time, another sense in which it departs from

Plato’s thought. This points to some of the complications of placing Calvin’s eudaimonism in one particular philosophical tradition.

In view of these conversations surrounding virtue ethics, this thesis will compare Calvin’s thinking on happiness and flourishing to Aristotle and Aquinas at different points, given that these conversations are far more frequently carried out with reference to the ethics of these two thinkers than to Plato’s ethics. Yet, once again, it should be remembered that my hope is not to argue that Calvin is an Aristotelian or Thomistic eudaimonist but rather that he is a eudaimonist more simply, and that his ethics are not hostile to these thinkers at every point. As noted above,

Jennifer Herdt is one thinker who has explicitly placed Calvin and Aquinas in opposition on the subject of eudaimonism.

27 Bussanich, “Happiness, Eudaimonism,” 413.

11

A final clarification that I think is worth making is that Calvin’s vocation as a pastor shapes his thinking on the subject of happiness and the highest good. Stated negatively, an implication of this is that Calvin should not be understood as a who addresses the subject of happiness and the highest good without recourse to revelation. Accordingly, while this thesis works to show that Calvin’s thought may be understood to belong to the eudaimonistic tradition, it should also be noted at the very outset that Calvin did not write on the subject of happiness in precisely the same way as the ancient philosophers. Ultimately, Calvin uses philosophical categories in the service of the church specifically, as we will also see, to foster piety or godliness in his hearers and readers.

In line with this acknowledgement of the way Calvin’s pastoral ministry affects his thinking on happiness, it should likewise be noted that Calvin wrote much of his material in the service of the

Protestant church. Given his work as a pastor as well as his commitment to the reformation of the church, Calvin ultimately repurposed the classical philosophical discussions of happiness to serve of the gospel and the Protestant movement.

“Eudaimonisms,” Classical and Christian

For the purposes of this work, it is worth describing the eudaimonist tradition to which I am comparing Calvin. Once again: for the purposes of this project, eudaimonism will be defined as the view which claims that there is a highest good, the attainment of which may be described as

“happiness”—happiness defined as an objectively desirable state of well-being, which is conceived of as humanity’s final end or telos. As should likely be evident from this definition and the foregoing, eudaimonism claims that a moral agent’s happiness or well-being is the basis for all his or her ethical actions. The agent, in other words, acts morally, in order to be happy or

12 to flourish. On eudaimonism’s account of things, well-being, happiness, and flourishing are related to human nature. Indeed, happiness is the realization of human nature—or indeed, its fulfillment. For the eudaimonist, then, morality aims properly at happiness.

If not already apparent, happiness or flourishing in the eudaimonistic tradition differs in important ways from standard, modern conceptions of happiness.28 Happiness is related to morality and human fulfillment—and therefore to what kind of things persons are. To further see this, one might consider that when the eudaimonist says that all are aiming at happiness. The happiness referred to here is captured by the Greek word eudaimonia. This word has been a notoriously troublesome term for translators. There seems to be no clear English equivalent. It therefore has been translated variously, with its most common glosses including: happiness, well-being, and flourishing. The absence of a clear-cut English equivalent is likely also partly the result of the fact that, as Julia Annas has noted, Aristotle uses this word as a kind of placeholder or “thin specification of my final end.”29 What these different translations are trying to capture is that the human good is good for humanity. It is specifically the good for humans qua humans.

Given that it functions as a kind of placeholder, the ancient eudaimonists were not all agreed in what eudaimonia refers. These diverse thinkers do share two overarching commitments, however: First, for all of them, eudaimonia turns out to refer to something much broader than pleasure or contentment with one’s present state. Though the term may encompass pleasure or contentment, it concerns something much broader than this. Indeed, it concerns one’s well-being across one’s whole life. The human good, eudaimonia, is something to which one orients one’s

28 For my description of ancient eudaimonism that follows, I am indebted to Julia Anna’s The Morality of Happiness. See Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

29 Ibid., 45–46.

13 entire life. The ancient eudaimonists were therefore in widespread agreement on this broader point. Aristotle thus observes how eudaimonia implicitly and explicitly functions as the fundamental organizing principle for all of one’s actions. All our actions, in other words, aim at eudaimonia.30 This is true, he claims, despite the fact that our actions may have more immediate ends. To illustrate this idea, one might go to work, say, to make money; but surely, says

Aristotle, money is not the fundamental reason for my acting. While I do aim at money, in other words, I also aim at something more primary; and this, finally, is eudaimonia or happiness.

Money is an especially good example of this fact, according to Aristotle, given that money is itself instrumental—that is to say, no one wants money as an end in itself, but rather as a means of obtaining other things.31

As the end of human activity, Aristotle claims that whatever eudaimonia is it must meet two criteria: it must be complete and self-sufficient.32 For him, eudaimonia, whatever it turns out to be, must met these criteria by definition. Eudaimonia must be complete in that it must satisfy or

“put a stop to” human desire.33 By self-sufficient, alternatively, Aristotle means that eudaimonia must encapsulate the all of one’s subordinate aims.34 As a final note regarding this first point, while eudaimonism is more than a moral theory. Indeed, given that there may be elements of

30 Aristotle, NE, 1095a 14-22.

31 Ibid., 1096a 1-11.

32 Ibid., 1097a 15 1097b 1-22.

33 Annas, The Morality of Happiness, 40. She writes, “Completeness is here explained as an end's putting a stop to desire…. If I desire A because of B, but B just for itself, then B is complete and A is not; B has put a stop to my desire.”

34 Ibid., 40–41. She writes, “A final end, however, can only be self‐sufficient in this sense if it includes all the agent's subordinate aims. If it did not, there would be a source of lack in the agent's life which was not part of her final aim; but then the agent would not be self‐sufficient, as far as her aims go. So self‐sufficiency also implies comprehensiveness: a final end which is self‐sufficient must include all the agent's other ends.”

14 one’s life that are amoral—that is, neither praiseworthy nor worthy of censure—and eudaimonism concerns one’s whole life, eudaimonism is perhaps more than moral theory. Again, as this section has indicated, it is certainly not less than this, however.

In addition to eudaimonia’s relationship to one’s whole life, a second shared commitment among eudaimonists is that a eudaimōn life is in some sense desirable. It is, in other words, worth aiming for. However, at this point there are two different schools of thought among eudaimonists on what it means that a eudaimōn life is desirable. A first school of eudaimonistic thought taught that, given that one can only control one’s actions and not external circumstances, morality is necessary and sufficient for happiness. Others, including Aristotle, seek to do justice both to the

“theoretical pull” of this system, which points towards a complete identification of happiness and morality, and more conventional ideas about what happiness is, building a kind of composite idea of happiness as morality along with external goods. At least according to Julia Annas,

Aristotle equivocates here as a moral theorist.35 She finds his position to be an “unstable view.”36

This disagreement is especially important to note because it illustrates the notion that the term happiness does not necessarily always reflect commonplace ideas about human happiness. This is famously typified in the Stoics’ conviction that a person can be “happy on the rack”—that is, while being tortured. Members of both these opposing schools should nonetheless be considered eudaimonists, given that the content of eudaimonia is identified with living well; indeed, living a eudaimōn life means that one’s life is worth living. As we have just seen, a life worth living may theoretically not be “happy” in the sense of pleasurable to the one living it, but it is nonetheless meaningful and desirable.

35 Ibid., 383–84.

36 Ibid., 364.

15

A life worth living is specifically identified by all eudaimonists as a life of virtue (arête). Arête, like eudaimonia, differs markedly from the English term(s) with which it is usually translated.

Arête has to do with excellence broadly defined.37 It can be applied to contexts that are not explicitly moral. One might speak of a hammer having arête, if that hammer functions excellently, or in the way that a hammer should. Analogously, arête can freely be applied to humans. There is, in other words, a distinctly human excellence, specific to the kind of “entity” we are as humans. Alasdair MacIntyre has illustrated this, noting that contained already in the idea of a watch is the idea of “a good watch.”38 The point, in other words, is that objects have function inherent within them. This line of thinking, evaluating humans in terms of their function, is seen in Aristotle’s well-known “function argument.”39 Aristotle thought something similar was true of human —that “built into” humanity was a distinctly human function, a means by which humans might straightforwardly be evaluated. In Aristotle’s case, since he understands humans as “rational animals,” “the human good” is defined as “the activity of the in accordance with virtue.”40 For Aristotle, then, a person simply responds in accordance with their human nature, following its dictates—a view that is generally referred to as .

I have introduced eudaimonism by specifically highlighting Aristotle’s thought on happiness. I have chosen to begin with Aristotle because his thought is especially clear. It should be noted that other classical philosophers were eudaimonists. In fact, virtually all of the classical philosophers were eudaimonists. For the purposes of this project, it is important to note some

37 Ibid., 129.

38 MacIntyre, After Virtue, 57–59.

39 Aristotle, NE, 1097b 22- 1098a 20.

40 Ibid., 1098a 16-19.

16 distinctive features of Plato’s eudaimonism. For his part, Plato defines the highest good as nearness or likeness to God.41 Of course, this articulation of the highest good is remarkably different than Aristotle’s, with the principle difference being that it conceives of humanity’s end or highest good as connected to something external to them. It is important to observe here, however, that, though Plato’s conception of the highest good is different than Aristotle’s, his description of humanity’s final end nonetheless fulfills Aristotle’s twofold criteria for the highest good.

The first systematic expounders of this ethical theory were the classical philosophers. To reiterate: virtually all the ancient philosophical schools were eudaimonists. As part of being educated in the context of classical ideas, early Christian thinkers were also drawn to this theory.

Augustine’s first major work, for instance, was “On the Happy Life.”42 Here, Augustine considers happiness to be the goal of human , and he counsels his readers how to attain it. The general scholarly consensus appears to be that Augustine never changed his mind that happiness was the goal of life. Ellen Charry suggests, however, that as he grew older he grew increasingly pessimistic that happiness might be “had” in this life.43

Despite his enduring adherence to the overall structure of eudaimonism, Augustine repurposed this theory to fit with his understanding of Scripture’s teachings. As in the case of fellow eudaimonists, Augustine defined happiness in terms of humanity’s nature. In particular, he held

41 Plato, Theaetetus and , trans. Christopher Rowe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 47 (176a5- b2).

42 Augustine, The Happy Life, trans. Ludwig Schopp (St. Louis, MO: Herder, 1939). I am indebted to John Bussanich’s description of Augustine’s eudaimonism in this section. See Bussanich, “Happiness, Eudaimonism,” 413-14.

43 Ellen T. Charry, “Happiness,” in Dictionary of Scripture and Ethics, ed. Joel B. Green et al. (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2011), 347.

17 that the human good is something external rather than internal to humanity—namely, Godself. In so doing, Augustine effectively broadened the “scope” of eudaimonia, considering one’s whole life in this life and the life to come.44 What Augustine envisioned “true happiness,” moreover, though in some ways a rough-and-ready analogue to pagan eudaimonia, differs in terms of its scope content, because it concerns this life and the life to come. This is a first major change he makes to the moral system.

Augustine made two further, major changes to eudaimonism as moral system, in addition to this first change. A second change has to do with drastically altering the material content of eudaimonia. The goal of life is no longer simply eudaimonia in his life, something immanent and presently available to humans. Instead, Augustine thinks it is blessedness in the life to come.

This future blessedness, for Augustine, centers on God himself. In some places, Augustine will speak of human happiness as the visio dei, the vision of God.45 In his City of God, Augustine thinks true happiness can only be had by the saints, the citizens of heavenly city, in the life to come.46

As a final change, in addition to altering its scope and content, Augustine maintains that the goal of the moral life is happiness; but due to his study of Scripture, and his struggles with Pelagius,

Augustine came to emphasize the impossibility of living a truly virtuous life. Thus, while virtue is still seen as essential to happiness, Augustine comes to see grace as having primacy in the

44 See, for instance, Augustine, CD, 19.4.

45 Ibid., 22.29-30.

46 Ibid., 19.20.

18 human attainment of happiness.47 Happiness, in short, is something that cannot be had apart from grace.

While in this section I have treated Augustine’s eudaimonism and Aristotle’s as, together, competing forms of eudaimonism, it should now be clear that Augustine makes substantial, even drastic, changes to Aristotle’s eudaimonism. In one sense, it is possible to see that Aristotle’s eudaimonism and Augustine’s are so different as to be distinct systems. For the purposes of this thesis, however, I will be treating them as two varieties of a unified ethical system with pagan and Christian variants. My reason for this is that Aristotle’s and Augustine’s eudaimonism share the same conceptual structure. Though these two thinkers differ on whether humans can achieve this good without divine aid, and with respect to the material content of the human good, they are nonetheless united in saying that humans aim at happiness, that happiness is humanity’s last end, and that morality is central to humanity’s last end, even if this does not fully capture its full dimensions. Throughout, then, I will be treating eudaimonism as something that has both pagan and Christian versions.

At this point, it is worth mentioning that Augustine’s eudaimonism also shares the same conceptual structure as Plato’s eudaimonism. In fact, his eudaimonism is near to Plato’s in that both thinkers conceive of the highest good as external to human beings. Beyond this, both thinkers even consider God as being integral to the highest good.

In the subsequent history of the church, Augustine’s eudaimonism has found its intellectual disciples—as well as its detractors. Doubtless the most prominent of Augustine’s disciples is St.

Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas worked extensively with Augustine’s eudaimonism, and specifically

47 Ibid., 19.4.

19 sought to affirm Augustine’s position and significant portions of Aristotle’s eudaimonism (as well as with an array of other philosophical sources).48 To do this, Aquinas effectively “houses”

Aristotle’s eudaimonism within the wider structure of Augustine’s eudaimonism, creating a kind of two-tier structure with a lower and upper level. On Aquinas’ two-tier system, there are finally two kinds of happiness—natural and supernatural happiness.49 Of course, with two forms of happiness, Aquinas does justice to both Aristotle and Augustine: his natural happiness closely resembles Aristotle’s eudaimonism, for it is an earthly happiness available to all. Supernatural happiness, on the other hand, markedly parallels Augustine’s teaching regarding the beatitude given by the . In his Summa, this is described by Aquinas in terms of Aristotelian theoria, or contemplation and knowledge of God.50

However, as important as Aquinas and Augustine are to Christian theology, their eudaimonism has never found universal Christian acceptance. An alternative tradition of Christian thinkers emphasized the need for pure love of God, or love uncontaminated by human concerns about happiness, which were deemed entirely unspiritual and selfish. On this line of thinking, a

Christian, it is reasoned, ought to love and serve God without reference to their own happiness, since only this kind of love of God is biblically sanctified and therefore pure. A heuristic distillation of this view may be found in Anders Nygren’s two volume work, Eros and Agape.51

Though this work once exerted considerable sway in its own right and on moral theory

48 See esp. Aquinas, ST, Ia-IIæ, 1-5.

49 Ibid., Ia-IIæ, 62,1. Ralph McInerny reads Aquinas similarly. See Ralph McInerny, “Ethics,” in The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, ed. Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 214.

50 Ibid., Ia-IIæ, 3, 8.

51 Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros (London: SPCK, 1932).

20 specifically in the twentieth century, it now has largely fallen from academic grace. Still, its central thesis nearly perfectly describes the pious desire to keep Christian love pure from the intrusion of self-interest. In this work, Nygren argues there are two forms of love, eros and agape. Eros is pagan and foreign to Scripture. Agape, on the other hand, is Christ-like and thus an example for all humans to follow. A Lutheran, Nygren thinks Luther understood this in a way that had previously eluded the church fathers and medieval theologians. This position that

Nygren presents in an easily understood form has been affirmed by other Christian thinkers.

Quite recently, Nicholas Wolterstorff rejected elements of Nygren’s work, while nonetheless affirming his central thesis. In contrast to Nygren, he no longer uses terms eros and agape.

Instead, he uses the term “agapism.” For his part, Wolterstorff finds eudaimonism overly self- centered and therefore morally abhorrent.52

I have already noted that happiness and eudaimonia are not necessarily the same. Accordingly, it seems to me that it is worth clarifying happiness’s dimensions—at least partially and imperfectly—since the two concepts overlap, especially in Christian versions of eudaimonism.

Happiness has been defined in a number of ways. Indeed, though popular usage of the term might belie this fact, the term’s precise meaning is hardly self-evident. Of course, as we have just seen, one way to define happiness is as synonymous with eudaimonia, that is, where “happiness” denotes precisely what the ancient moral philosophers meant by this Greek term. Alternatively, on a common hedonistic vision of happiness, the term signifies the of pleasure and the absence of . Accordingly, hedonistically defined, one is happy when one is experiencing more, likely significantly more, pleasure than pain. A happy life, on this definition, is a life of significantly more pleasure than pain.

52 Wolterstorff, Justice, 108–226.

21

Other definitions of happiness include getting what you want no matter what you want—a view that is sometimes called preferentialism. As with the hedonic definition, this happiness might be worked out in terms of one’s satisfaction with one’s life, considered as a whole. A common feature of these three approaches is that they take a subjective view of happiness. The one who is living determines in some sense what happiness is. Indeed, on the first approach, pleasure or pain is a fundamentally subjective determination. Alternatively, on the second and third approaches, personal preferences decidedly shape an evaluation of whether one is happy. In case it is not evident, subjectively defined happiness stands in contrast to eudaimonism, because eudaimonia is envisioned to be an objective happiness—desirable because it satisfies the human person in terms of their make-up as a human person and therefore is not “up to” each person to determine on an individual basis.

Methodology

This thesis is in the area of the history of interpretation and theological ethics. As noted above, my aims are to clarify the shape of Calvin’s ethics by challenging a particular reading of them and to add to contemporary discussions of Calvin’s ethics and theological ethics more generally.

For the purposes of this project, I have focused primarily on Calvin’s Institutes and his commentaries. As will be seen below, I have primarily attended to the English versions of these texts. I have also made use of the Calvini Opera Database 1.0, relying on it to help me find relevant passages on my theme in Calvin’s thought.

In clarifying my method, it is worth mentioning what is beyond the scope of this project: I do not claim, in the first instance, to have canvassed all of Calvin’s thought. I have sought to be thorough, but I nevertheless may have missed important texts. More than this, I also never

22 systemically compare Calvin with any other theologians, though comparisons are made at different points. The same can be said of Calvin and the classical philosophical tradition. My focus is consistently on Calvin throughout, briefly comparing him with the tradition of moral philosophy at different points. While I seek to describe this tradition accurately, it is nonetheless considered here in very broad strokes. Unless Calvin himself specifies, I also never seek to show direct dependence of Calvin’s thought on any other thinker. I think this question is interesting, but I also think it often leads to unwarranted speculation. Closely related to this, I do not seek to establish that Calvin is using his philosophical or classical sources correctly. This, too, is an interesting question, but also one that falls outside the scope of my project.

As a final point in terms of my methodology, it is perhaps worth adding that there is danger in domesticating Calvin or using eudaimonism as a kind of philosophical straightjacket, claiming that his thought on the topic is of a unified whole. In this project, I seek to avoid this problem.

Though I think that Calvin aims to be systematic and is clearly interested in relating one part of this thought to another, at the same time, it is my view that Calvin, as with any thinker, may well be less consistent than he wishes to be. This project seeks to explore tensions and perhaps contradictions in Calvin’s thought. It advances the thesis that Calvin held to a form of eudaimonism, but I also think Calvin is far less systematic and careful than one might wish on this subject.53

53 It should be noted here that some scholars such as Richard Muller and David Fergusson have argued that Calvin is first and foremost a biblical or exegetical theologian (that is, rather than a systematic theologian). In my view, this assessment is probably correct—though it lies beyond the scope of this project to judge this claim. This claim is relevant, because I claim above that Calvin is not as careful or as systematic as one might wish. In my view, even if Calvin is judged to be primarily a biblical theologian, he nonetheless is a biblical theologian who sees Scripture as unified, and therefore he is a theologian who shows a clear interest in bringing together the claims of the writers of Scripture in a systematic way. Given this, for the purpose of this project I think it is important to assess the consistency and care with which Calvin addresses a subject like happiness.

23

Status Questionis

At the outset, it is worth reviewing literature relevant to my thesis. A number of important works have already been mentioned. I have already called attention to the fact that a number of thinkers have called into question Calvin’s relationship to eudaimonism.

Relatively recently, this narrative of Calvin’s opposition to eudaimonism has been subtly, if perhaps unintentionally, undermined by a number of scholars, though never in a systematic way such as I am proposing to do. In my view, the scholar’s work which perhaps serves as the best point of entry here is that of Heiko Oberman. Oberman saw happiness as an important and underexplored element of Calvin’s thought.54 Though Oberman alerts us to the centrality of happiness in Calvin’s thought, he never detailed Calvin’s relationship to the eudaimonistic tradition.

Albeit rather indirectly, other senior scholars have observed parallels between Calvin and eudaimonism, including Charles Partee, Brian Gerrish, Guenther Haas, and Paul Helm. Charles

Partee devotes a chapter to the subject of Calvin and ancient ethics in his book, Calvin and

Classical Philosophy.55 Some parallels between Calvin and eudaimonism are observed here, though this is not his main theme. Brian Gerrish, likewise, has documented one important connection between Calvin and eudaimonistic tradition in his well-known work on Calvin’s

54 Heiko A. Oberman, “The Pursuit of Happiness: Calvin Between and Reformation,” in Humanity and Divinity in Renaissance and Reformation: Essays in Honor of Charles Trinkaus, ed. Charles Edward Trinkaus et al., Studies in the History of Christian Thought, v. 51 (New York: E. J. Brill, 1993), 251–86.

55 Partee, Calvin and Classical Philosophy, 66–90.

24 eucharistic thought, Grace and Gratitude.56 In this work, Gerrish specifically draws his reader’s attention to the Aristotelian and Platonic overtones of Calvin’s description of God as the fountain of all good.57 For my purposes, it is especially significant that Gerrish calls for further research into this connection. To the best of my knowledge, Gerrish’s call has never been heeded, though

Gerrish’s student, Randall Zachman, has done impressive work, showing how the image of God as the fountain of all good runs through all of Calvin’s thought.58 Guenther Haas, meanwhile, like Gerrish before him, has also highlighted an element of Calvin’s debt to the classical philosophical tradition by emphasizing Calvin’s thinking on equity.59 Haas’ work relates to my topic only obliquely, but, in his conclusion, he calls for similar projects to explore connections between the ethics of Calvin and the ancients.60 Like Partee and company, Paul Helm has also explored connections between Calvin and philosophical ideas, including classical philosophy.61

Calvin’s relationship to eudaimonism, however, has never been a focus of Helm’s work.

As noted already, the literature on Calvin’s ethics is generally fairly limited. There are a number of journal articles on elements of his ethics. Some—perhaps even the majority—of these are related to Calvin’s thinking on natural law.62 In this connection, it is worth noting that, since the

56 Brian A. Gerrish, Grace and Gratitude: The Eucharistic Theology of John Calvin (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1993).

57 Ibid., 31-41.

58 See Randall C. Zachman, John Calvin as Teacher, Pastor, and Theologian: The Shape of His Writings and Thought (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006); Randall C. Zachman, The Assurance of Faith: in the Theology of Martin Luther and John Calvin (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005).

59 Haas, The Concept of Equity in Calvin’s Ethics.

60 Ibid., 125.

61 Paul Helm, John Calvin’s Ideas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

62 Some recent articles on this subject, include Neil Arner, “Precedents and Prospects for Incorporating Natural Law in Protestant Ethics,” Scottish Journal of Theology 69, no. 4 (2016): 375–88; Jennifer A. Herdt, “Calvin’s Legacy for Contemporary Reformed Natural Law,” Scottish Journal of Theology 67, no. 4 (2014): 414–

25

Barth-Brunner debate, this has been a point of continual controversy among Calvin scholars. As noted above, a number of book-length treatments of Calvin’s ethics have also been published.

Calvin’s thinking on law more generally has also been a source of perennial interest. Beyond this, as I have suggested, scholars have also increasingly shown interest in the topic of Calvin and virtue ethics. In this connection, projects especially relevant to mine are the recent work of

Pieter Vos and the unpublished dissertation by Kyle Fedler entitled “Living Sacrifice: Emotions and Responsibility in Calvin's Doctrine of the Christian Life.”63 As also noted above, Pieter Vos has written several articles which detail Calvin’s relationship to the tradition of virtue ethics.64

Vos considers Calvin’s thought as having many significant parallels with virtue ethics. Felder’s work also considers Calvin’s thought in relation to virtue ethics. For his part, however, Felder claims that Calvin cannot be said to belong to this ethical school. Both projects certainly overlap with the one I am outlining here, and yet neither of these projects explores whether a connection exists between Calvin’s thought and eudaimonism, as I am proposing to do in this thesis.

Work in Outline

This work may be briefly outlined. In the first chapter, I consider the interrelated subjects of pietas, happiness, and the highest good in Calvin’s writings. It will be argued here that these are interconnecting themes which overlap in significant ways. Taken together, these themes point to the eudaimonistic reading of Calvin developed in this thesis.

35; C. Scott Pryor, “God’s Bridle: John Calvin’s Application of Natural Law,” Journal of Law and Religion 22 (2007 2006): 225–54.

63 Kyle David Fedler, “Living Sacrifice: Emotions and Responsibility in Calvin’s Doctrine of the Christian Life” (PhD diss., University of Virginia, 1999), https://search-proquest- com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/pqdtglobal/docview/304547667/abstract/D455560CF56444C2PQ/1 (accessed March 30, 2018).

64 Vos, “Breakdown of the Teleological View of Life?”; Vos, “Calvinists among the Virtues.”

26

In chapter two, I specifically consider the topic of Calvin’s anthropology, noting the considerable overlap with eudaimonistic anthropology, specifically with regard to its expression of human telos.

In chapter three, I focus on Calvin’s thinking on the overlapping ideas of obligation to God and the concept of law. My purpose here is to refute the idea that Calvin’s teaching on law is at odds with eudaimonism’s emphasis on human fulfillment. This view has been vividly articulated by

Alasdair MacIntyre. In this chapter, then, I specifically seek to refute MacIntyre’s claims.

In chapter four, I consider the inverse of the idea of obligation—namely, inclination. My overall point in this chapter in that Calvin’s theology reflects this particular, critical aspect of eudaimonism—what Oliver O’Donovan calls its emphasis on an “immanent summons” from within creation to draw it towards God, who is himself the goal of its existence.65 Though I note that Calvin does not affirm any and all human desires, he does affirm the existence of this underlying desire towards well-being, or the perfection of one’s . In so doing, Calvin affirms that an “immanent summons” exists within humanity.

In the penultimate chapter of this thesis, I consider three central elements of Calvin’s theological program that may potentially challenge my thesis that Calvin may be read as eudaimonistic.

These three concepts are specifically Calvin’s teaching on themes of self-denial, God’s glory, and self-love. Overall, my argument is that none of these themes decisively overturn the particular reading of Calvin I am proposing.

65 Oliver O’Donovan, The Problem of Self-Love in St. Augustine (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 157.

27

Lastly, in the final chapter, I consider Calvin’s relation of union with God and union with Christ, specifically as related to this eudaimonistic idea of the highest good. In so doing, my argument here is that Calvin is best read as teaching that both union with God and union with Christ are the highest good.

A Statement of Personal Background and Interest

It seems appropriate at this point to say something of my personal relationship to Calvin and my interest in my chosen topic. First, regarding my own “relationship” with Calvin himself, I share a number of things in common with him, at least theologically speaking. Perhaps above all, I am a

Protestant. I also come from a Reformed background (although the tradition in which I was raised rarely highlighted these connections). Personally speaking, then, I am something of a theological heir of Calvin. In my studies of Calvin, I have found him to be at once engaging, aggravating, and brilliant. With regard to Calvin’s theology, I am especially attracted to, and even in agreement with, his understanding of theology’s greater purpose. I share, in other words, his concern about the need for a theology that is written to foster greater piety. At the same time, while I share much in common with Calvin, theologically speaking, I do not consider myself a devotee.

My interest in the question of Calvin and eudaimonism relates to my own “intellectual biography” in a number of ways. In college, I was first attracted to the subject of eudaimonism, after having been introduced to it by Robert Lewis Wilken’s beautiful introductory texts, The

Spirit of Early Christian Thought.66 Wilken’s study first attracted me to this idea of a distinctly

66 Robert Louis Wilken, The Spirit of Early Christian Thought: Seeking the Face of God (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003).

28 human telos, which was at once happiness and God. In his work, Wilken focuses especially on

St. Augustine’s articulation of this idea. Through Wilken, I was led to study Augustine himself, and then, in reflecting on Augustine’s relationship to the Protestant tradition of which I was part, to the study of Jonathan Edwards and his eudaimonism. My interest in this topic was further developed through my exposure to the moral theology of Thomas Aquinas in a doctoral seminar.

As is fairly well known, Aquinas treats the topics of happiness and human flourishing at some length.

Standing between Augustine, Aquinas, and Jonathan Edwards is, of course, the monumental figure of John Calvin. This specific project occurred to me as I studied Calvin’s thought. I began to wonder where he stood with reference to this intellectual tradition, especially given his substantial intellectual debts to Augustine. My question came into clearer focus through Jennifer

Herdt’s unpublished Warfield Lectures on Calvin and Aquinas on eudaimonism.67 Here as elsewhere, Herdt contrasts Thomas’s moral theology with Calvin’s, viewing Calvin as a kind of foil to Thomas’ eudaimonism. Herdt’s choice of figures fascinated me, and I wondered if the two were as far apart as she suggests. In this work, although I show deference to Herdt at several points, I question her conclusion. I hope to show that Thomas and Calvin are not as far apart as is often supposed. Though I do not develop comparison of Thomas and Calvin in this work, I nonetheless hope to show that Calvin’s thought, like Aquinas, is eudaimonistic. In showing its eudaimonistic dimensions, this thesis also points to similarities between the ethics of both

Augustine and Edwards, and, however tantalizing, these are also left largely undiscussed.

67 Herdt, “Reditus Reformed.”

Chapter 1 Pietas, Happiness, and the Highest Good

Grant, Almighty God, that we may not be inebriated with the sweetness of earthly blessings which thou bestowest continually on us, but learn to ascend to the hope of celestial life and eternal felicity, and in the meantime have such a taste of thy blessings, that we may know that thou art an inexhaustible fountain of all felicity, so that we may cleave to thee with a sincere heart and in perfect integrity, until we shall at length be brought to the full fruition of that kingdom, which thine only-begotten Son has procured for us by his own blood.—Amen.1

If God contains the fullness of all good things in himself like an inexhaustible fountain, nothing beyond him is to be sought by those who strive after the highest good and all the elements of happiness.2

This chapter explores Calvin’s thinking on the interrelated subjects of pietas, happiness, and the highest good. As should become clear, each of these seemingly distinct themes are fundamentally intertwined in Calvin’s theology. This chapter, then, explores these interconnections and takes up these themes together precisely because of the interconnections between the themes. As stated in the introduction, this work takes its general structural cues from the order of the Institutes. Accordingly, this chapter concerns themes which are tightly intertwined in Book I of the Institutes. In particular, Calvin’s explanation of pietas connects to his thinking on both happiness and the highest good. In Book I, the themes are taken up in precisely the order I have stated here. I thus treat each of these themes in the order presented just above. The central thrust of this chapter is that happiness is an integral element of Calvin’s

1 Comm. Jer. 50, prayer.

2 Inst. III.25.10. Note that in this thesis I have chosen to retain Calvin’s general use of masculine personal pronouns for God. I think this is appropriate, given that it reflects Calvin’s personal word choice. At the same time, I use the term Godself instead of God himself throughout this thesis.

29

30 theology and that Calvin claims perfect happiness is found in humanity’s highest good—namely, union with God.

This chapter has several major section breaks: I begin by specifically treating Calvin’s thinking on pietas, because this concept situates happiness in relation to Calvin’s entire theological project. In this first section, after showing that Calvin’s goal in writing the Institutes was pietas, I proceed to show that pietas is rooted in happiness—a fact that reveals something of the significance of happiness in Calvin’s thought. These sections, in other words, show that happiness lies at the heart of Calvin’s theological program. I then discuss the concepts of happiness and the highest good, seeking to demonstrate that Calvin develops his thinking on the subject of happiness along eudaimonistic lines. Indeed, though it must be noted that Calvin’s thinking on happiness is wide-ranging, he nonetheless occasionally uses the term as the exact equivalent of the classical idea of eudaimonia. To make this point, I consider Calvin’s thinking on the highest good itself. In this section, I show both Calvin’s familiarity with this classical idea as well as his reworking of this idea to make it more amiable to Christian theology. In relation to the central purpose of this thesis, this chapter shows that each of these three concepts clarifies

Calvin’s relationship to eudaimonism. Overall, this chapter demonstrates both that happiness is central to Calvin’s theology, and that Calvin thinks about happiness in ways that are familiar to, and even customary in, eudaimonism.

31

Pietas

Pietas is a concept of vital importance to Calvin’s theology.3 Indeed, Calvin makes it clear that pietas is a central goal in of the Institutes as well as of his theologizing more generally, as we will see. To establish something of the importance of the concept, one might initially note how frequently Calvin uses the term pietas.4 Though its frequency alone suggests something of its importance to Calvin’s theology, its true significance is more firmly established by Calvin’s use of the concept. From his usage of the term, it becomes clear that Calvin views his theology as a means of promoting piety. John McNeill has thus written, “[Calvin’s theology] is his piety described at length.”5

Calvin’s intense focus on piety is first seen in the lengthy title of his 1536 Institutes. In full, this edition of the Institutes was entitled: Institutes of the Christian Religion, embracing almost the whole sum of piety, & whatever is necessary to know of the doctrine of salvation: a work most worthy to be read by all persons zealous for piety, and recently published. Though Calvin later shortened the title of the Institutes and omitted the statement that it was a summary of piety, this early emphasis on piety was never eclipsed. Thus, Calvin notes this same purpose in the preface to his 1559 edition, addressed to King Francis I. Here he explains that his purpose in writing the

Institutes is “solely to transmit certain rudiments by which those who are touched with any zeal

3 For more on Calvin’s understanding of pietas, see Ford Lewis Battles, “True Piety According to Calvin,” in Readings in Calvin’s Theology, ed. Donald K. McKim (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 1998), 192–211.

4 Calvin uses the term (in all its cases) 3,496 times in his writings included in the Calvini Opera Database. As a point of reference, consider that Calvin only uses the Latin term caritas 1,880 times in the same works. “John Calvin, Calvini Opera | The Jonathan Edwards Center at Yale University,” accessed December 28, 2017, http://edwards.yale.edu/node/130.

5 John T. McNeill, “Introduction,” in Calvin: Institutes of the Christian Religion, by John Calvin, trans. Ford Lewis Battles (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1960), li.

32 for religion might be shaped to true godliness.”6 Summarizing this aspect of Calvin’s theology,

Brian Gerrish has repurposed a Kantian phrase to great effect—Calvin’s theology, he says, is “a theology within the limits of piety alone.”7

As a theologian intent on remaining within the limits of piety alone, Calvin is uninterested in and even openly hostile towards speculative theological questioning which, in his view, does not promote godliness.8 Or put somewhat differently, Calvin theology that is biblically sound ought to have profound, positive spiritual effects on its knowers.9 In several places, Calvin makes this point by distinguishing between the head and heart in the believer. Consider the following passage:

Now we are to conceive the Christian faith as no bare knowledge of God or understanding of Scripture which rattles around the brain and affects the heart not at all…. But it is a firm and staunch confidence of the heart by which we securely repose in God’s mercy promised us through the Gospel.10

In making this head-heart distinction, Calvin suggests something of theology’s affective dimensions.

6 John Calvin, “Prefatory Address to King Francis I of France,” in Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1960), 9.

7 Brian A. Gerrish, Grace and Gratitude: The Eucharistic Theology of John Calvin (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 18. See also Gerrish’s essay, “Theology within the Limits of Piety Alone: Schleiermacher and Calvin’s Notion of God,” in The Old Protestantism and the New: Essays on the Reformation Heritage (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 196–207.

8 Calvin writes, “What is God? Men who pose this question are merely toying with idle speculations. It is more important for us to know of what sort he is and what is consistent with his nature. What good is it to profess with Epicurus some sort of God who has cast aside the care of the world only to amuse himself in idleness? What help is it, in short, to know a God with whom we have nothing to do? Rather, our knowledge should serve first to teach us fear and reverence; secondly, with it as our guide and teacher, we should learn to seek every good from him, and, having received it, to credit it to his account.” Inst. I.2.2.

9 Noting this dimension of his thought, Brian Gerrish has suggested that “[Calvin’s] sole intention in talking of God is to evoke a right attitude toward God.” See Gerrish, Grace and Gratitude, 25. In my view, this is only partially correct—Calvin wants to evoke more than simply a right attitude, but also right actions as well.

10 John Calvin, “Catechism 1538,” in Calvin’s First Catechism: A Commentary, ed. I. John Hesselink, trans. Ford Lewis Battles (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1997), 18 (article 14). See also Inst. III.2.36.

33

Having first established its importance, it now must be asked what Calvin means by the term pietas. Though it is often translated either simply as “piety” or “godliness,” Calvin packs several ideas into the term. One gets a first impression of its meaning from Calvin’s first catechism, where he defines piety in this way: “True godliness consists rather in a sincere feeling which loves God as father as much as it fears and reverences him as Lord, embraces his righteousness, and dreads offending him worse than death.”11 At the outset of the Institutes, Calvin similarly, though more succinctly, defines the term this way: “I call ‘piety’ (pietas) that reverence joined with love of God which the knowledge of his benefits induces.”12 From these passages, it is evident that Calvin includes two elements within piety. The first is reverence for God; the second is love of God. Calvin understands these two responses to correspond to the two about who God is—namely, that God is both sovereign Lord and loving Father.13 Apparently describing the full dimensions of reverence and love, Calvin notes that piety also includes faith or trust in God, worship of him, and submission to his will, among other things. At root, then, pietas is seen to be a proper response towards God.

From the preceding paragraph, it should be evident that pietas is a concept which exists as part of a wider network with other ideas in Calvin’s thought. Indeed, this is evident in Calvin’s definition of pietas as reverence joined with love that flows from the knowledge of God’s benefits. From this definition alone, it is clear that pietas is connected to the concepts of reverence, love, knowledge and God’s benefits—and therefore, implicitly, grace. The concept of

11 Calvin, “Catechism 1538,” 8 (article 2).

12 Inst. I.2.1.

13 In my view, though it is tempting, it is almost certainly unwise to conclude the reverence is solely related to God’s Lordship and love to God’s Fatherhood. It is better to say that reverence and love are equally linked to both characteristics of God.

34 faith, too, is almost certainly implicit in the background of definition, given Calvin’s thinking on faith specifically as a form of knowledge which grasps God’s benefits.14 Calvin’s stated goal of pietas, then, brings us directly to many other core concepts of Calvin’s theology. More than this, these concepts are central to the whole of the Christian tradition. These connections between pietas and other core concepts might profitably be explored at some length; but what is vital to see, for my present purpose, is its connection to happiness.

As already noted, Calvin says that pietas is connected to happiness. At the outset of the

Institutes, Calvin explicitly states that pietas depends on happiness. Note, in fact, how Calvin continues on after defining pietas.

I call “piety” (pietas) that reverence joined with love of God which the knowledge of his benefits induces. For until men [and women] recognize that they owe everything to God, that they are nourished by his fatherly care, that he is the Author of their every good, that they should seek nothing beyond him—they will never yield him willing service. Nay, unless they establish their complete happiness in him, they will never give themselves truly and sincerely to him.15

This is a striking passage. Structurally, Calvin follows his definition of pietas with a series of statements about what is included in the “knowledge of [God’s] benefits,” as he follows this sentence with a connective conjunction “for” and a list of related benefits offered by and located in God. The benefits listed, though closely related, appear to build in terms of their “proximity” to God. Calvin begins by suggesting that humans owe everything to God due to his “fatherly care,” and he ultimately asserts that they should seek nothing beyond him, implying that

14 Pietas’ connection to faith might briefly be noted. Again, pietas is part of a broader nexus of ideas, each of which depends on the next. From the broader context of Calvin’s theological program, it may be assumed that faith is the specific form of knowledge that begets pietas. This can be seen from the detailed definition of faith which Calvin gives elsewhere in the Institutes. He characterizes faith as “a firm and certain knowledge of God’s benevolence toward us, founded upon the truth of the freely given promise in Christ, both revealed to our minds and sealed upon our hearts through the Holy Spirit.” Inst. III.2.7. Ultimately, since pietas is caused by a knowledge of God’s benefits, and faith is a firm and certain knowledge of God’s benevolence, faith appears to be the specific kind of knowledge that begets pietas.

15 Inst. I.2.1.

35 complete provision for human needs is somehow contained in Godself. Calvin concludes with the idea that unless humans “establish their complete happiness in [God],” they will not give themselves to God. This acknowledgement—perhaps especially given that it is placed as a kind of summation of Calvin’s argument here—is necessary if a person is to yield his life to God, as is appropriate. For my purposes, it is essential to see that pietas depends on establishing one’s happiness in God, according to Calvin. Calvin, then, is writing to foster pietas in his readers; and to do so, it is imperative that he demonstrate that happiness is established in God.16

It is important to note the cause of pietas in Calvin’s thinking. For Calvin, pietas is rooted in

God’s powers and his goodness. Early on in the Institutes this becomes apparent. Calvin holds that God manifests his powers in the benefits we enjoy as humans.17 Calvin says we feel the force of these powers within ourselves.18 God’s powers, for Calvin, are portrayed in the works of

God “as in a painting.”19 It is Calvin’s conviction that God intended to use this awareness of his powers to invite and draw us to himself. Ultimately, it is by our awareness of God’s powers that he invites us to eternal happiness.20

By suggesting that the knowledge of God’s powers and benefits leads us to Godself, Calvin evidently affirms pietas’ acquisitive dimensions. Indeed, this passage shows that Calvin believes that pietas is rooted in part in humanity’s dependence on and even indebtedness to God—in the

16 Contextually, “establishing one’s happiness” must mean something like acknowledging one’s happiness is in God, given that the entire section is elaborating what it means to know the benefits God offers.

17 Calvin writes, “For the Lord manifests himself by his powers, the force of which we feel within ourselves and the benefits of which we enjoy.” Inst. I.5.9.

18 Ibid.

19 Inst. I.5.10.

20 Calvin writes, “We must therefore admit in God’s individual works—but especially in them as a whole— that God’s powers are actually represented as in a painting. Thereby the whole of mankind is invited and attracted to recognition of him, and from this to true and complete happiness.” Inst. I.5.10.

36 fact that one owes everything to God. Once again, unless humans are convinced of these truths, they will never serve God. Pietas is thus born out of realizing one’s poverty apart from God, along with a corresponding acknowledgement that one’s needs are met by and provided in God.

To accurately understand Calvin’s thinking on happiness, the dialectical nature of Calvin’s thinking on the subject of God and humanity must be grasped.

Calvin’s thinking on God and humanity is a true study in contrasts. Calvin consistently emphasizes the aseity of God and, alternatively, humanity’s dependence upon God: God is God in and of Godself, while human beings exist and find their happiness in proper relationship to

God. For Calvin, as we will see in this section, the first step of pietas is recognizing our dependence on God. God’s sufficiency and humanity’s dependence are twofold: God is sufficient for humanity’s very existence, and also for its salvation. Humanity, in turn, depends on

God for both its existence and its salvation. In his writings, Calvin is intent on highlighting

God’s greatness and his ability to meet human needs. In so doing, of course, his goal is to drive humans to realize their dependence on God as well as to seek the fulfillment of their needs in

Godself. In a word, his goal is to foster pietas.

This also forms the opening motif of the Institutes. Calvin famously opens the Institutes with the claim that almost all of our wisdom is found in true knowledge of God and ourselves.

Calvin writes, “Nearly all the wisdom we possess, that is to say, true and sound wisdom, consists of two parts: the knowledge of God and of ourselves.”21 Here and elsewhere, Calvin stands in a long tradition which begins with knowledge of the self. Calvin then immediately states that, given that the concepts mutually inform one another, it is difficult to know which of these

21 Inst. I.1.1.

37 doctrines—the doctrine of God or the doctrine of humanity—should be considered first, given that one leads directly to the other.22 Elaborating on this claim, Calvin explains that this difficulty is due to the fact that the knowledge of either of these concepts turns out to be correlative—that is, one concept comes into clear focus only in relation to the other.

According to Calvin, to truly know humanity is to know humanity’s dependence on God for both their existence and for the gifts humans have been given. Calvin writes, “In the first place, no one can look upon himself without immediately turning his thoughts to the contemplation of

God, in whom he ‘lives and moves.’”23 He continues: “The miserable ruin, into which the rebellion of the first man cast us, especially compels us to look upward.”24 Calvin thus advances this particular argument, relying on the dialectic I have been highlighting—true knowledge of humanity’s humble state brings God’s majesty and all-sufficiency into sharper focus. In this same section of the Institutes, Calvin offers the analogy that, just as the human eye that has seen nothing but black objects judges even a dirty or off-colour white to be “whiteness itself,” so too a person would view himself to be pure and morally upstanding without having seen God’s judgment.25 Or, using a financial analogy, knowing humanity’s abject spiritual poverty only serves to magnify the spiritual riches God contains.26

In these early pages of Institutes, as Calvin continues to work to explain the dialectic between

God and humans, he turns to two prominent images which point to this contrast. The two

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Inst. I.1.2.

26 Inst. I.1.1.

38 metaphors Calvin specifically turns to are God as Father and God as the source of all blessings

(or fons omnium bonorum). Explaining the nature of pietas, Calvin says, “For until men [and women] recognize that they owe everything to God, that they are nourished by his fatherly care, that he is the Author of their every good…. they will never yield him willing service.”27 In this context, Calvin uses the specific phrase “the author of every good” rather than “the fountain of every good.” It is difficult, however, to see a substantial difference between terms “author” and

“fountain.” Indeed, both words point to God as the source of blessing. It is therefore clear from the contexts that each of these metaphors is used by Calvin to point to the dialectic between

God’s complete sufficiency and humanity’s emptiness apart from God.

With some justification, then, Brian Gerrish has argued that the two images serve the same point in Calvin’s theology.28 Certainly, any distinctions that exist between the concepts might be profitably explored. Strictly speaking, however, Gerrish’s claim is entirely justified where pietas is concerned. For indeed, both images together point towards the same dynamic—namely, that a recognition of God and the benefits contained in him is the first step of piety. Then, later on in the Institutes, focusing exclusively on the image of God as Father, Calvin explicitly makes this point:

Only let the readers agree on this point: let the first step toward godliness be to recognize that God is our Father to watch over us, govern and nourish us, until he gather us unto the eternal inheritance of his Kingdom.29

27 Inst. I.2.1.

28 Gerrish writes, “There is of course no conflict between these two images, the ‘fountain’ and ‘father.’ They say the same thing, one by a metaphor taken from nature, the other by a metaphor from personal relationships. Here, having connected piety with the persuasion that God is the fountain of good, Calvin can equally well assert later on that the first step to piety is to recognize God as father, and that none will devote themselves freely to God’s service unless they taste his fatherly care and are coaxed to love and worship him in return. As the Institutes unfolds, it is in fact the familial rather than the natural imagery that dominates—in part, no doubt, because it is more readily adapted to Calvin’s other themes.” Gerrish, Grace and Gratitude, 27.

29 Inst. II.6.4.

39

Thus, recognizing God as able to meet one’s need is essential to pietas. Though stated differently, this point was already evident in Calvin’s definition and explanation of pietas. For my specific purposes, a point that should not be missed is that Calvin’s explanation highlighted

God’s ability to provide humans with happiness.

With images of God as both Father and Fountain informing the nature of pietas, it is worth considering the specific image of God as the fountain of all good in more detail, because it leads directly to Calvin’s thinking on the highest good—a subject which we will consider in what follows. This image of God as the fountain of all good is an important image of God for Calvin.

Indeed, Brian Gerrish has gone so far as to argue that this image is, in fact, “Calvin’s fundamental definition of God"; or, as he says parenthetically, “[I]f you prefer, his fundamental image.”30 Randall Zachman, a student of Gerrish, has likewise pointed to the importance of this image in Calvin’s theology.31 My aim here, then, is to build on the work of these writers.

Unlike the image of God as Father, this image of God as the fountain of all good is less obviously biblical.32 Instead, this image appears to be either selected or used by Calvin as a way of explaining the Scripture’s teaching.33

30 Gerrish, Grace and Gratitude, 26.

31 See Randall C. Zachman, The Assurance of Faith: Conscience in the Theology of Martin Luther and John Calvin (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005); John Calvin as Teacher, Pastor, and Theologian: The Shape of His Writings and Thought (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006).

32 Admittedly, the idea of God as a kind of fountain of all is partially biblical metaphor, since God is portrayed as fountain in Scripture. In Jeremiah 2:13, for instance, God describes himself as the fountain of living waters. However, the specific phrase “the fountain of all good” is nowhere found in Scripture. It is noteworthy that, as Calvin’s commentary on Jeremiah 2:13 shows, Calvin draws together the biblical metaphor of God as the fountain of living waters with his own thinking—if not the image—of God as fountain of all good. Here, Calvin writes, “We now perceive what the Prophet meant,—that we cannot possibly be free from guilt when we leave the only true God, as in him is found for us a fulness of all blessings, and from him we may draw what may fully satisfy us. When therefore we despise the bounty of God, which is sufficient to make us in every way happy, how great must be our ingratitude and wickedness?” Comm. Jer. 2:13.

40

This metaphor of God as the fountain of all good highlights the dialectic between human poverty and God’s sufficiency and the “resources,” so to speak, contained in God, which I have been exploring. Consider the use of the metaphor in the opening paragraphs of the Institutes. First,

Calvin says,

For, quite clearly, the mighty gifts with which we are endowed are hardly from ourselves; indeed, our very being is nothing but subsistence in the one God. Then, by these benefits shed like dew from heaven upon us, we are led as by rivulets to the spring itself.34

At this point, Calvin’s use of the image is somewhat veiled. Still, even here God is pictured as the spring of life itself. From this passage, it is also clear that this image of God as the fountain is tied to the dialectic previously noted—in Godself are the fullness of all blessings, blessings without which humanity is destitute.

In the next section, Calvin returns more directly to the picture of God as the fountain of all good.

In fact, Calvin says that knowledge of God as the source of good is part of knowing God clearly:

“Again, you cannot behold [God] clearly unless you acknowledge him to be the fountainhead and source of every good.”35 With the initial word “again,” Calvin refers to what he has written just prior:

Rather, our knowledge [of God] should serve first to teach us fear and reverence; secondly, with it as our guide and teacher, we should learn to seek every good from him, and, having received it, to credit it to his account. For how can the thought of God penetrate your mind without your realizing immediately that, since you are his

33 I say “selected or used” because it is not altogether clear whether this image is unique to Calvin or borrowed from another writer. Here, I am not taking a position on whether Calvin adopted this image from somewhere else or whether this image is original. I think this is an interesting question, but it is nonetheless one that lies beyond the scope of my project.

34 Inst. I.1.1.

35 Inst. I.2.2.

41

handiwork, you have been made over and bound to his command by right of creation, that you owe your life to him?36

From this entire passage—including the previous quotation as well—a kind of dialectic between

God and humanity is understood to lead humans to God. Indeed, Calvin goes on to explicitly say that out of coming to see God as the fountain of every good, the “desire to cleave to [God] and to trust [God] would arise.”37 On the image of God as the fountain of all good, then, God is pictured as the source of good of which humans, empty in themselves, stand in need, and therefore the One with whom they should seek a direct connection. Ultimately, the image of the fountain of all good points to the acquisitive nature of Calvin’s piety, where pietas is understood to include seeking what one lacks in God.

This acquisitive nature of piety should not be missed in light of my work’s thesis. As I will explore more fully in chapter five, the acquisitive nature of eudaimonism is often seen as a central—perhaps, even the fatal flaw of eudaimonism among Christian thinkers who reject this theory. Already here, however, it is evident that Calvin does not appear to share this concern. In fact, the goal of his discussion on the differences between God and humanity appears to have precisely the opposite concern. Indeed, as just seen, he speaks of the desire to cleave to God arising from God being the fountain of all good. Or, put slightly differently, a pious person, by definition, sees that God is the fountain of all good and seeks good in him. Piety thus springs from this acknowledgement about God. For Calvin, pietas recognizes God as the One in whom

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

42 one’s needs can be met. Indeed, as we have also seen already, pietas recognizes that all human wants, including humanity’s desire for happiness, may be met in God.38

This acquisitive dimension of Calvin’s theology and ethics is thoroughly Augustinian. It is, indeed, essentially a reworking of Augustine’s claim that our hearts are restless until we find rest in God.39 This aspect of his thought also has clear connections to Platonic eros. Accordingly, when Calvin says that reverence and love together describe pietas, it is impossible not to see pietas as sharing the acquisitiveness which is a central feature of Nygren’s eros.40 That is to say,

Calvin does not ask humans to love God by displaying disinterested obedience to God—or put in

Nygren’s terms again, in the sense of agape. Instead, Calvin is after love of God which includes a desire to cleave to God and to possess the benefits found in God. In chapter five, I also return to Nygren’s charges against Calvin.

In Calvin’s theological program, an essential part of this goal of producing pietas is pointing persons to Christ, the Mediator.41 Following Paul, Calvin sees Christ as the divinely-appointed

Mediator between God and man, and it is Calvin’s conviction that Christ, as that Mediator, is the one who provides for humanity’s hopeless condition.42 According to Calvin, Christ is the

38 Later on in this chapter, it will be seen that Calvin thinks that humans without exception desire happiness.

39 Augustine, The Confessions, trans. Maria Boulding (New City Press, 2001), 39 (I.1.1).

40 In the early twentieth century, Anders Nygren developed a twofold typology of love based on the Greek words agape and eros. Nygren uses these two terms as shorthand for two ways of loving. He used the Greek eros to signify distinction acquisitive, self-interested love. Agape, on the other hand, is used by Nygren to signify a love in the sense of disinterested, selfless love. See Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros (London: SPCK, 1932). I return to the nature of love in Calvin’s thought in chapter five.

41 See, for instance, Inst. II.6.4.

42 Calvin writes, “For this reason I subscribe to the common saying that God is the object of faith, yet it requires qualification. For Christ is not without reason called ‘the image of the invisible God’ [Col. 1:15]. This title warns us that, unless God confronts us in Christ, we cannot come to know that we are saved…. [T]here is no other remedy for a hopeless condition, no other way of freeing the church, than the appearance of the Mediator.” Ibid.

43 specific “point”—or, better, Person—where God’s riches are offered to sinful humanity.43 God’s riches are offered exclusively through union with Christ.44 Epistemically, too, Calvin that a person comes to see that God is Father through Christ. Calvin writes:

God is comprehended in Christ alone. John’s saying has always been true: “He that does not have the Son does not have the Father” [1 John 2:23]. For even if many men once boasted that they worshiped the Supreme Majesty, the Maker of heaven and earth, yet because they had no Mediator it was not possible for them truly to taste God’s mercy, and thus be persuaded that he was their Father. Accordingly, because they did not hold Christ as their Head, they possessed only a fleeting knowledge of God.45

Since, like faith, pietas is in part born out of a response to God’s goodness, we can see from this passage that one responds specifically to God’s goodness in Christ. It cannot be any other way, since God is comprehended only in Christ. We have already noted how foundational knowledge is to pietas. This passage connects knowledge of God to knowledge of Christ—God, says Calvin, is comprehended in Christ alone. The proper response to God’s mercy presented in Christ for humanity is faith. Calvin is therefore as intent on pointing to the need for faith as pointing to the person of Christ.46 Faith instrumentally brings one into union with Christ, the Mediator. In an important sense, then, both Christ and faith are at least in some sense instrumental to individuals’ accessing the riches contained in God.47 More will be said on Calvin’s doctrine of union with

Christ. It might be noted already, however, that union with Christ is not simply a means to an

43 Calvin writes, “From the beginning of the world he had consequently been set before all the elect that they should look unto him and put their trust in him.” Ibid.

44 See, for instance, Inst. III.1.1.

45 Inst. II.6.4.

46 See, for instance, Inst. II.6.4.

47 Ibid. In this context, Calvin yet again makes a fascinating comment. Here he writes, “For this reason Christ himself bade his disciples believe in him, that they might clearly and perfectly believe in God: ‘You believe in God; believe also in me’ [John 14:1]. For even if, properly speaking, faith mounts up from Christ to the Father, yet he means this: although faith rests in God, it will gradually disappear unless he who retains it in perfect firmness intercedes as Mediator.”

44 end in Calvin’s thought, but rather a kind of comprehensive goal. As we will see, union with

Christ is humanity’s end, according to Calvin.

With reference to the Institutes more broadly, this dialectic between God’s sufficiency and humanity’s poverty accounts for important developments in the structure of the Institutes.

Indeed, structurally speaking, the Institutes is, in part, centered around the profound differences between humans and God.48 As we have just seen, Calvin begins his Institutes noting the chasm that exists between God and humanity. Calvin also establishes that each doctrine is brought into clarity by the other. More specifically, humanity’s dependence on God, along with humanity’s spiritual poverty, and God’s sufficiency and holiness are mutually clarified by each other.

Having acknowledged this, Calvin thus faces a dilemma of whether to start with the doctrine of

God or the doctrine of humanity. Calvin turns first, apparently heuristically,49 to discuss God in the rest of Book I. Calvin’s focus here is on God as Creator rather than God as Redeemer. For

Calvin, it is essential to assert that both are true; but he considers it proper to consider the knowledge of God the Creator prior to considering God the Redeemer. In Book II, Calvin turns to humanity and then to Christ, the Mediator. Calvin begins Book III by formally stating the many benefits contained in Christ are located in his person, so that to get Christ’s benefits one must receive Christ himself. Out of this conviction, Calvin articulates his views on the Christian life and the church in Book IV. An awareness of this structure of Institutes will be relevant to later discussions of each of these elements of the Christian faith.

48 In making this claim, I am not stating that this constitutes the major organizing principle of the Institutes. In this paragraph, I think I make it clear that this dialectic partly accounts for the development of Calvin’s thought.

49 Calvin writes, “Yet, however the knowledge of God and of ourselves may be mutually connected, the order of right teaching requires that we discuss the former first, then proceed afterward to treat the latter.” Inst. I.1.3.

45

Having noted the importance and nature of pietas, especially its acquisitive nature, let us now consider the subject of happiness.50 We have already seen that Calvin explains that pietas is rooted in happiness. Now I will consider the nature of happiness in Calvin’s thought.

Happiness

In this section, I seek to demonstrate that happiness occupies a major place in Calvin’s thought.

This argument runs counter to many caricatures that exist of Calvin. Indeed, a leading image— perhaps the leading image—of Calvin, the man, of is that of a dour and inhospitable figure.51

Many also see Calvin’s theology as a severe system obsessed with predestination. When taken together, the overall picture is of a Calvin who was both personally unhappy and who developed a pessimistic theology to match his gloomy disposition. Over against this line of thinking, I seek to show that happiness occupies an important place in Calvin’s theology. To do this, I begin by briefly considering some of the specific Latin and French terms Calvin uses to describe happiness.

As might be expected, Calvin uses several different terms to discuss happiness. In Latin, he chooses words which are variously translated “happiness,” “felicity,” and “blessedness.” In what follows, I have chosen to focus on Calvin’s usage of the Latin words felicitas and beatitudo, as these are almost certainly the most prominent words he uses to describe human well-being and

50 A concept I do not explore here, but which is related to pietas, is religion. For Calvin, religion is connected to proper worship of God. See Inst. I.2.2. More specifically still, proper worship is defined in terms of obedience to the law. See Ibid. Calvin also teaches that there is a seed of religion in all persons, given that all persons have a sense of divinity. See Inst. I.3.1

51 Whether this vision of Calvin’s personality is correct is beyond this scope of this study. My point is simply that this is a widely held of Calvin.

46 happiness.52 In French, two words which Calvin uses prominently to describe the constellation of ideas related to happiness are félicité and béatitude. I again will focus on these two words. It would take considerable space to fully probe the nuances of these different terms. In this section,

I want to make some initial observations about the different ways in which Calvin uses the term happiness, acknowledging this is doubtless an area for further study.

I will begin by considering Calvin’s use of the different Latin terms for happiness. In general, it will be seen, that Calvin uses felicitas for happiness that does not necessarily have reference to

God. Calvin, alternatively, regularly uses beatitudo for a kind of well-being that is connected to spiritual and, more specifically, generally to God in some way. In this connection, we will see that Calvin uses this term when referring to the life to come in which he holds believers will be united to God.

As noted above, Calvin uses a number of terms of describe happiness. A first that may be considered is felicitas. A number of passages can be cited to show something of Calvin’s use of this particular word. Early on in the Institutes, in a passage previously considered, Calvin states that piety depends on establishing our “complete happiness (felicitatem) in [God].”53 Also in

Book I, Calvin speaks of the “access to happiness” (felicitatem) which finally lies in the

52 My study of the different ways in which Calvin uses terms that denote happiness is not exhaustive. I have tried to highlight some of the nuances that exist in the way Calvin uses these different terms. Undoubtedly, further study is warranted. Related to this point, I make no claim that this list of words of Latin and French nouns exhaustively encompasses Calvin’s ways of describing happiness. Instead, these terms are only partially representative of his use of the terms. Add to this, of course, that I am only considering nouns and not related verbs, adjectives, or adverbs. It is, in short, difficult to know precisely how to quantify Calvin’s vocabulary on the subject of happiness.

53 Inst. I.2.1. John Calvin, Institutio Christianae Religionis, Ioannis Calvini opera quae supersunt omnia, ed. Johann Wilhelm Baum, Eduard Cunitz, and Eduard Reuss (Brunswick: A. Schwetschke and Son (M. Bruhn), 1863-1900), vol. 2, 34; in this section, I include citations to Ioannis Calvini opera quae supersunt omnia; hereafter references will be in the format CO 2:34.

47 knowledge of God.54 In this second context, Calvin is speaking about blessedness as the ordering principle of a person’s life. Indeed, the full context of his statement is as follows:

The final goal of the blessed life (quia ultimus beatae vitae finis), moreover, rests in the knowledge of God [cf. John 17:3]. Lest anyone, then, be excluded from access to happiness, he not only sowed in men’s minds that seed of religion of which we have spoken but revealed himself and daily discloses himself in the whole workmanship of the universe.55

In speaking of “the final goal of the blessed life,” Calvin is almost certainly referring to humanity’s final end. The fact that he immediately refers to humanity’s access to happiness in the following sentence points to the fact Calvin can use felicitas as a way of speaking about this final end.

In some passages in the Reformer’s writings, terms for happiness denote a feeling of pleasure or contentment. Calvin, in fact, thinks that this is the general wisdom on happiness—a position he says is erroneous:

We know that not only the great body of the people, but even the learned themselves, hold this error, that he is the happy man who is free from annoyance, attains all his wishes, and leads a joyful and easy life. At least it is the general opinion, that happiness (felicitas) ought to be estimated from the present state.56

This passage points to what Calvin takes to be a common understanding of felicitas—namely, the kind of well-being which is associated with ease and the absence of problems. Felicitas is also evidently considered in light of the present state. From this passage, it is clear felicitas may be understood to refer to a well-being that has no evident connection to God. Even if this view is

54 Inst. I.5.1 (CO 2:41).

55 Ibid.

56 Comm. Matt. 5:2 (CO 45:161).

48 not his own, it is likely that this common usage of the word felicitas informs his usage of the word.

Calvin evidently thinks this very conventional definition of happiness is inadequate, and he proceeds to explain why. Calvin’s views on happiness are greatly shaped by his convictions regarding the life to come. By widening the discussion of the nature of happiness in this way,

Calvin, whether intentionally or not, seems to approach the philosopher’s eudaimonia. He writes:

Christ, therefore, in order to accustom his own people to bear the cross, exposes this mistaken opinion, that those are happy (felices) who lead an easy and prosperous life according to the flesh. For it is impossible that men should mildly bend the neck to bear calamities and reproaches, so long as they think that patience is at variance with a happy life (beatae vitae). The only consolation which mitigates and even sweetens the bitterness of the cross and of all afflictions, is the conviction, that we are happy in the midst of miseries: for our patience is blessed by the Lord, and will soon be followed by a happy (laetior) result.57

Calvin thus takes a complex view of happiness here—patience in the face of affliction is not at variance with a happy life. In addition, a happy life in the present age arrives at “a happy result.”

Moreover, since it is only through bearing his or her cross that a believer arrives at this happy result, Calvin reasons this experience of suffering is itself, in some sense, divinely blessed, despite how painful it might be. Moreover, as with the eudaimonist’s eudaimonia, Calvin’s views on happiness are based on considerations of one’s life as a whole. It is also a life that is, in some sense, lived well, since bearing one’s cross is central to it. At least initially, being happy does not inevitably mean having one’s life go well; and this runs contrary to popular opinion, as

Calvin emphasizes. In Calvin’s theology, whole-life considerations are extended beyond the

57 Ibid.

49 present life to include the life to come. Calvin thus arrives at a version of happiness which is quite close to eudaimonia.

Related to his use of felicitas, Calvin can use this word to denote the concept of eudaimonia or the highest good (specifically, as it is used in the sense of the final ordering principle of human actions).58 He does so in contexts where he is discussing the ideas of the classical philosophers or relating their ideas to his own.

In Book III of the Institutes, Calvin conceptually joins happiness (felicitas) and the highest good.

He specifically speaks of those “who strive after the highest good and all the elements of happiness” (summum bonum et omnes felicitatis).59 This passage shows Calvin specifically connecting felicitas to the pursuit of the highest good. Later on in this same section, Calvin refers similarly to “every sort of happiness” (omne felicitatis genus)60 which is included under the benefit of being made one with God.61

Calvin also connects the two concepts in his remarks on the ancient philosophers in his

Commentary on a Harmony of the Evangelists. He writes:

By this statement [“For where your treasure is, there your heart will be also”] Christ proves that they are unhappy men who have their treasures laid up on the earth: because their happiness (felicitas) is uncertain and of short duration. Covetous men cannot be prevented from breathing in their hearts a wish for heaven: but Christ lays down an

58 In this connection, it should be noted that “the highest good” is a term that can be used in different ways. As noted above, what I have in mind here is the sense in which the highest good is conceived as the ordering principle of human actions.

59 Inst. III.25.10 (CO 2:741).

60 Ibid (CO 2:742).

61 Calvin writes, “If the Lord will share his glory, power, and righteousness with the elect—nay, will give himself to be enjoyed by them and, what is more excellent, will somehow make them to become one with himself, let us remember that every sort of happiness (omne felicitatis genus) is included under this benefit.” Ibid.

50

opposite principle, that, wherever men imagine the greatest happiness (summum bonum) to be, there they are surrounded and confined. Hence it follows, that they who desire to be happy (felices) in the world renounce heaven. We know how carefully the philosophers conducted their inquiries respecting the supreme good (summo bono). It was the chief point on which they bestowed their labour, and justly: for it is the principle on which the regulation of our life entirely depends, and the object to which all our senses are directed. If honour is reckoned the supreme good (summum bonum), the minds of men must be wholly occupied with ambition: if money, covetousness will immediately predominate: if pleasure, it will be impossible to prevent men from sinking into brutal . We have all a natural desire to pursue happiness; and the consequence is, that false imaginations carry us away in every direction. But if we were honestly and firmly convinced that our happiness (felicitatem) is in heaven, it would be easy for us to trample upon the world, to despise earthly blessings, (by the deceitful attractions of which the greater part of men are fascinated,) and to rise towards heaven. For this reason Paul, with the view of exciting believers to look upwards, and of exhorting them to meditate on the heavenly life, [Col. 3:1] presents to them Christ, in whom alone they ought to seek perfect happiness (solida felicitas); thus declaring, that to allow their to grovel on the earth would be inconsistent and unworthy of those whose treasure is in heaven. 62

From this passage it is apparent that Calvin considers the pursuit of the highest good to be a way of thinking about the pursuit of happiness. In view of the wider purposes of this thesis, it is also apparent that Calvin freely adopts the ancient philosophers’ thinking about the highest good for his own purposes.

Calvin also uses the word beatitudo as a way of speaking of human well-being. Accordingly, in

Institutes III.25.10, Calvin writes,

For though we very truly hear that the Kingdom of God will be filled with splendor, joy, happiness, and glory, yet when these things are spoken of, they remain utterly remote from our perception, and, as it were, wrapped in obscurities, until that day comes when he will reveal to us his glory, that we may behold it face to face [cf. 1 Cor. 13:12]. We know that “we are God’s children,” says John, but “it does not yet appear.… But when “we shall be like him … we shall see him as he is” [1 John 3:2]. Accordingly, the prophets, because they could not find words to express that spiritual blessedness (spiritualem… beatitudinem) in its own nature, merely sketched it in physical terms.63

62 Comm. Matt. 6:21; Luke 12:34 (CO 45:205).

63 Inst. III.25.10 (CO 2:742).

51

It is doubtless significant here that beatitudo is used in contrast to physical blessings. This appears to be a pattern in Calvin’s thought.

Other passages in Calvin’s writings also indicate that that Calvin uses beatitudo to refer to a happiness that is specifically connected to a well-being dependent on, or least connected to, God.

Notably, with reference to the specific the passages considered here, Battles translates beatitudo as “blessedness”—a translation choice which evidently suggests that well-being that in some way flows from God. Likely due to this connection, Calvin also uses beatitudo to refer to a kind of well-being that will be enjoyed by believers in the future life. Though we will come to this idea in the next section of this chapter, it might be proleptically pointed out here that Calvin considers union with God to be the highest human good. This is a good that will be enjoyed fully in the life to come. Given Calvin’s broader theological program, it is clear that the future life is connected with spiritual blessing—in particular, in the future life believers will enjoy the highest good of being united to God, as will be explored in the final section of this chapter. In one such context, Calvin writes,

For this reason, Paul says that the faith and love of the godly have regard to the hope that rests in heaven [Col. 1:4–5]. When, therefore, with our eyes fast fixed on Christ we wait upon heaven, and nothing on earth hinders them from bearing us to the promised blessedness (promissam beatitudinem), the statement is truly fulfilled “that where our treasure is, our heart is” [Matt. 6:21].64

And Calvin continues on:

To the huge mass of miseries that almost overwhelms us are added the jests of profane men, which assail our innocence when we, willingly renouncing the allurements of present benefits, seem to strive after a blessedness (beatitudinem) hidden from us as if it were a fleeting shadow.65

64 Inst. III.25.1 (CO 2:729).

65 Ibid.

52

Together, these two passages demonstrate that Calvin uses the term beatitudo to refer to the future life. In a passage I will return to in chapter four, Calvin again uses beatitudo in a way that calls attention to the future life. He writes, “There is no man to whom eternal blessedness

(aeterna beatitudo) is not pleasing.”66

From these passages, then, it emerges that felicitas and beatitudo are both used by Calvin to speak of human well-being. In general, we have seen that felicitas is used with reference to happiness that does not necessarily have reference to God. Calvin specifically uses this word in referring to popular and philosophical concepts of happiness. Ultimately, however, as we have seen and will continue to explore, Calvin sees true happiness as coming from God and therefore rejects a popular view of felicitas which views it as ease in the present life. When using felicitas specifically in contexts where he is discussing the pursuit of the highest good, Calvin sees philosophical concepts of the human pursuit of felicitas as inadequate. Specifically, Calvin, seeking to follow Paul, directs persons to Christ, in whom he holds felicitas is found. This specific aspect of Calvin’s thought is a theme I will return to in chapter six. Concerning Calvin’s use of beatitudo, I have observed that Calvin generally uses this term in contexts where it is clear

God stands behind the well-being which is being discussed. This is a key distinction between

Calvin’s use of felicitas and beatitudo, for, as we have seen, Calvin does not always use felicitas to denote this kind of well-being.

I now turn to the two French words that are used by Calvin to describe the constellation of terms connected to happiness. Once again, these are félicité and béatitude. These two words will each be considered in turn.

66 Inst. II.2.26 (CO 2:207).

53

To consider Calvin’s use of félicité, one might begin with the 1560 French edition of the

Institutes. Given the conceptual overlap, we might even consider several of the passages I have already referred to in the 1559 edition of the Institutes. In Book I, in a passage we have already considered where Calvin speaks of establishing one’s “complete happiness in him [God],”67

Calvin refers to it “en luy toute leur félicité.”68 Here, then, we see that Calvin uses félicité to translate felicitas. As we also explored, Calvin affirms Plato’s insight into the highest good as

“union with God.”69 In this section, Calvin proceeds to speak of “the unique and perfect happiness (la félicité unique et parfaite)” which believers know on their earthly pilgrimage.70

This particular French phrase renders the Latin phrase unica et perfecta felicitas.71 In comparing these passages, one notes that félicité is used here translate to felicitas. While this should not be taken to indicate that Calvin72 viewed the terms as synonymous, it does suggest that he sees the words as having significant sematic overlap.

If félicité is often used to translate to felicitas, something similar appears to be the case the Latin beatitudo and the French béatitude. Thus, we have noted that this this term speaks of “spiritual

67 Inst. I.2.1.

68 John Calvin, Institution de La Religion Chrestienne, ed. Jean-Daniel Benoit, vol. 1 (Paris: J. Vrin, 1957), 56 (I.2.1).

69 Inst. III.25.2. In the 1560 French edition, this phrase is rendered, “le souverain bien de l’homme est d’estre conioint à Dieu.” John Calvin, Institution de La Religion Chrestienne, ed. Jean-Daniel Benoit, vol. 3 (Paris: J. Vrin, 1957), 474 (III.25.2).

70 John Calvin, Institution de La Religion Chrestienne, ed. Jean-Daniel Benoit, vol. 3 (Paris: J. Vrin, 1960), 474 (III.25.2).

71 See CO 2:729.

72 Elise Anne Mckee notes that differences in the French between the 1541 and 1560 editions have led some scholars to question whether Calvin is responsible for the translation of the 1590 edition. She suggests, however, that “the translation is commonly recognized as his." Elsie Anne McKee, “Introduction,” in Institutes of the Christian Religion: 1541 French Edition, by John Calvin, trans. Elsie Anne McKee (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), xi.

54 blessedness” (spiritualem… beatitudinem) in Institutes III.25.10. In the 1560 French edition this same phrase is rendered “béatitude spirituelle.”73 This parallel is suggestive of the sematic overlap between the two terms. Other passages also suggest this same connection. We noted above that Calvin speaks of the “promised blessedness (promissam beatitudinem)” which awaits believers. In the 1560 French version of the Institutes this phrase is rendered “la béatitude promise.”74 In these passages, we see that béatitude is used to render beatitudo. In addition, as we noted with Calvin’s use of beatitudo, béatitude is likewise used to denote a well-being dependent on to spiritual realities.

In Institutes III.25.10, we see that Calvin quickly shifts between beatitudo and fecilitas.

Likewise, in the same passage in the 1560 French edition he shifts between béatitude and félicité in the course of several . In fact, he uses these words only several sentences apart without sharply distinguishing between them. This suggests Calvin does not understand these words to denote radically different concepts. Still, on the basis of the passages considered here, it may be said that Calvin uses the terms in subtly different ways.

Having considered Calvin’s usage of terms related to happiness, we can now explore his overall thinking on the concept of happiness. In light of the purposes of this thesis, it should be noted that, in addition to sometimes using happiness as the equivalent of eudaimonia, Calvin clearly takes up ideas from the eudaimonistic tradition. In the first place, Calvin, with the ancient eudaimonists, held that: “[A]ll [people] naturally desire and seek after happiness (felicitatem).”75

Calvin makes this comment in passing, without seeking to demonstrate that this is the explicit

73 Calvin, Institution de La Religion Chrestienne, vol. 3, 492 (III.25.10).

74 Ibid., 474 (III.25.1).

75 Comm. Ps. 1:1 (CO 31:37-38).

55 teaching of the passage. Certainly, Calvin thinks Scripture teaches this. It is, however, quite probable that Calvin assumes this to be a kind of general knowledge, one available to humans without reference to Scripture’s teaching:

The prophet does not inquire if there be any [person] so disposed, as if all men voluntarily brought upon themselves the miseries which befall them; for we know that all men without exception desire to live in the enjoyment of happiness (feliciter).76

Calvin’s claim here appears to imply that this is not a uniquely biblical insight. This is another element of Calvin’s thinking on happiness which he shares with earlier eudaimonists.

Even if all desire happiness, Calvin thinks that only believers can finally obtain happiness.

Calvin holds that believers obtain happiness in both this life and in the life to come. Concerning the believer’s life in the present, Ronald Wallace has written, “Calvin affirms that the life of the

Christian even in this present world is a happy and satisfying life.”77 Calvin reasons this is true for at least two reasons. A first reason that believers are happy is that they have clean . In his commentary on 1 Timothy, Calvin writes, “The sum is, that believers are not miserable in afflictions, because a good conscience supports them, and a blessed and joyful end awaits them.”78 Since Calvin thinks anyone with an unclean conscience is miserable, one can only be happy if one has a clean conscience.79 Calvin even goes so far as to say that “the happiness (felicitatem) of [humans] consists only in the free forgiveness of sins.”80 Calvin’s rationale for this claim is that “nothing can be more terrible than to have God as our enemy.”81

76 Comm. Ps. 34:12 (CO 31:341).

77 Ronald S. Wallace, Calvin’s Doctrine of the Christian Life (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1959), 313.

78 Comm. 1 Tim. 4:10.

79 Comm. Ps. 1:5.

80 Comm. Ps. 32, arg. (CO 31:314).

81 Ibid.

56

Given that such a statement seemingly contradicts statements regarding a believer’s perfect happiness in union with God, Calvin must either be unaware of this tension or perhaps he simply resorting to hyperbole to emphasize the importance of the forgiveness of sin in the attainment of happiness. The stress Calvin places on the free forgiveness of sins points directly to the doctrine of justification in his thought. More will be said on justification by faith in chapter six of this work.

A second reason that believers are happy is that a blessed and joyful end awaits them. Armed with this knowledge, believers are enabled to be happy in the present life, despite the many problems they face. In this connection, consider Calvin’s comments on Paul’s statement that his reward is sure:

This arises from turning his eyes to the day of the resurrection, and this is what we also ought to do; for all around we see nothing but death, and therefore we ought not to keep our eye fixed on the outward appearance of the world, but, on the contrary, to hold out to our minds the coming of Christ. The consequence will be, that nothing can detract from our happiness.82

Thus, through possessing a clean conscience and knowledge of their eternal reward, Calvin says that believers are made happy.

Although Calvin’s believer is said to be happy, Calvin qualifies this claim in important ways.

Above all, this claim is clarified by Calvin’s insistence that believers are to expect frequent problems in this life. Overall, he has a pessimistic outlook on the number of problems believers must endure. Thus, in one place, after suggesting that “[Christ’s] whole life was nothing but a sort of perpetual cross,”83 Calvin goes on to say that believers should expect nothing different,

82 Comm. 2 Tim. 4:8.

83 Inst. III.8.1.

57 since he thinks that Scripture teaches that Christ, God’s firstborn Son, set a pattern for the rest of

God’s children to follow.84 Indeed, he even succinctly states, “[Believers] must pass our lives under a continual cross.”85 From this passage, it becomes clear the believer’s life takes a cruciform shape prior to the resurrection.86When focused on the problems that attend this perspective of the present life, Calvin is seemingly at his most Platonic.87 He speaks of the present life as a place of exile.88 Our sinful bodies, moreover, are “prisons.”89 Nonetheless, for

84 Ibid.

85 Inst. III.8.2.

86 Ibid.

87 Calvin’s relationship to Plato has long fascinated scholars. In the instances cited above, Calvin certainly sounds indebted to Plato and likely was. For his part, Henri Blocher claims that was an attractive option for humanists generally and perhaps especially to Augustinian thinkers. See Henri Blocher, “Calvin’s Theological Anthropology,” in John Calvin and Evangelical Theology: Legacy and Prospect, ed. Sung Wook Chung (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2009), 75. As will be seen later on in this chapter, Calvin is clearly appreciative of aspects of Plato’s thought. Overall, with Augustine, Calvin shares greater affinity with the Platonic tradition then with the Peripatetic tradition. Calvin’s anthropology is one aspect of his thought that points to this . Broadly speaking, Calvin rejects Aristotle’s view of the body in favor Plato’s. Indeed, almost certainly under Plato’s influence, Calvin affirms that the soul is immortal. Inst. I.15.6. I return to this aspect of Calvin’s anthropology in my next chapter. In considering Calvin’s “Platonism,” it must be observed that Calvin breaks with Plato at points. Calvin, for instance, explicitly rejects Plato’s view that we only sin out of ignorance. See Inst. II.2.22. Calvin, then, should not be seen as an uncritical devotee to Plato’s thought. In the last analysis, then, Calvin draws on Plato’s thought at a number of points, while at the same time distances himself from some aspects of Plato’s thought. For more on Calvin’s relation to Plato, see Charles Partee, Calvin and Classical Philosophy (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005), 105–25. For my purposes, it is especially noteworthy that Calvin’s vision of happiness is articulated with reference to Plato. In the next section of this chapter, I will note that Calvin specifically singles out Plato as the ancient philosopher who possessed the greatest understanding of the highest good. However, in keeping with his critical appreciation of Plato, Calvin clearly thinks Plato failed to fully grasp the nature of the highest good. 88 Calvin writes, “Let the aim of believers in judging mortal life, then, be that while they understand it to be of itself nothing but misery, they may with greater eagerness and dispatch betake themselves wholly to meditate upon that eternal life to come. When it comes to a comparison with the life to come, the present life can not only be safely neglected but, compared to the former, must be utterly despised and loathed. For, if heaven is our homeland, what else is the earth but our place of exile? If departure from the world is entry into life, what else is the world but a sepulcher? And what else is it for us to remain in life but to be immersed in death? If to be freed from the body is to be released into perfect freedom, what else is the body but a prison? If to enjoy the presence of God is the summit of happiness, is not to be without this, misery? But until we leave the world “we are away from the Lord” [2 Cor. 5:6]. Therefore, if the earthly life be compared with the heavenly, it is doubtless to be at once despised and trampled under foot. Of course it is never to be hated except in so far as it holds us subject to sin; although not even hatred of that condition may ever properly be turned against life itself. In any case, it is still fitting for us to be so affected either by weariness or hatred of it that, desiring its end, we may also be prepared to abide in it at the Lord’s pleasure, so that our weariness may be far from all murmuring and impatience. For it is like a sentry post at which the Lord has posted us, which we must hold until he recalls us.” Inst. III.9.4.

58

Calvin, such challenges take on a considerably brighter hue when they are considered in relation to the positive role they play in the Christian life. The positive dimensions are central in Calvin’s discussion of the three main features of the Christian life, perhaps especially the second element—the discipline of bearing one’s cross.90 In discussing the necessity of bearing one’s cross, Calvin identifies the teleological purpose of suffering—that is, that the believer’s trials serve a broader purpose.91 In this section, relying extensively on metaphor, Calvin speaks of trials as, alternatively, training, medicine, and remedial, paternal discipline for believers.92

Through trials, God works to deepen believers’ trust in God, to grow them in humility and patience, and to train them in obedience.93

In his treatment of cross-bearing in the Christian life, Calvin can sound rather Stoic. In particular, his teaching on divine providence has certain superficial similarities with Stoic teaching on accepting external events beyond one’s control. Calvin also thinks that since God providentially causes things to happen in one’s life, one must accept suffering as one’s cross to bear. However, aware of these similarities, Calvin is at pains to distance himself from key elements of Stoic teaching. Specifically, Calvin distances himself from the Stoic principle of apatheia—the idea that one must not allow external events to affect one emotionally. Calvin rejects this position as an “iron philosophy,”94 one which is unhuman and essentially reduces humans to “blocks.”95

89 See, for instance, Inst. III.6.5; See also Inst. III.9.4; IV.1.1.

90 See Inst. III.8.

91 Ibid.

92 Ibid.

93 Ibid.

94 Inst. III.8.9

59

Stoicism, for Calvin, stands in contrast to , which emphasizes that humans are properly—indeed, created as—emotional and affective beings. As properly affective beings,

Christians—and perhaps persons generally—should allow emotions to affect them. This, indeed, is God’s intention for the emotions. Nevertheless, a key idea for Calvin regarding the emotions is not eliminating our emotions, but moderating them.

Moderation is a very important concept for Calvin. Ronald Wallace has written that for Calvin

“[a]n essential element in the ordered Christian life is the moderation of all passion, appetite, and zeal, no matter how good and well-directed such zeal, and the passion which accompanies it, might be.”96 Calvin thus counsels moderation in our enjoyment of all created things.97

Moderating one’s emotions is especially important, given that Calvin thinks emotions can override reason.98 As we will explore more in the next chapter, he thinks emotions are supposed to be regulated by reason. Specifically, he allows that Christians may feel painful emotions, including grief, sorrow, and anxiety, but at the same time he insists that they should not wallow in or simply indulge these emotions.99 Calvin’s reasons for emphasizing the importance of the positive dimensions of the emotions are finally biblical. Thus, individuals like the Psalmist, the

95 Inst. III.10.3

96 Wallace, Calvin’s Doctrine of the Christian Life, 171.

97 Inst. III.10.1-6.

98 Calvin writes, “To make this matter still more clear, it will be of importance for us to distinguish between man’s first nature, as it was created by God, and this degenerate nature, which is corrupted by sin. When God created man, he implanted affections in him, but affections which were obedient and submissive to reason. That those affections are now disorderly and rebellious is an accidental fault; that is, it proceeds from some other cause than from the Creator.” Comm. John 11:33.

99 Comm. Acts 8:2.

60 apostle Paul, and, above all, Christ himself are seen as experiencing intense emotions in appropriate ways.100

Insisting that believers can have a happiness that exists alongside their experience of life’s unrelenting miseries, Calvin seeks at once to affirm that reality of suffering and God’s goodness to humanity. There is, then, a kind of paradox at work here, in which believers may simultaneously be sorrowing and rejoicing. Calvin freely acknowledges the paradoxical nature of this position: “[I]t is a paradox strongly at variances [sic] with the feeling of the flesh, that God supplies his people, in this world, with everything that is necessary for a happy and joyful life.”101 Precisely how this is possible, Calvin states, is a mystery beyond human understanding.102 Chiefly, as we have seen, sustained happiness is available to believers as they rest in their knowledge of God’s salvation in the midst of the troubles which they experience:

“[W]e ought to… hold out to our minds the coming of Christ. The consequence will be, that nothing can detract from our happiness.”103 Trusting in the reality of one’s coming salvation, then, brings a kind of deep stability and happiness to the believer’s life. Calvin ties knowledge of one’s salvation to knowledge of God’s providence, which will direct history towards the salvation of the elect and the individual believer’s good, for directing history towards this end also gives happiness to individual believers.104

100 Wallace, 191-2. Speaking of Christ, Calvin writes, “[H]e groaned and wept both over his own and others’ misfortunes. And he taught his disciples in the same way…” Inst. III.8.9.

101 Comm. 1 Tim. 4:9.

102 Comm. Isa. 33:20.

103 Comm. 2 Tim. 4:8.

104 Calvin comments, “Now, because that only is pleasing to us which we recognize to be for our salvation and good, our most merciful Father console us also in this respect when he asserts that in the very act of afflicting us with the cross he is providing for our salvation. But if it be clear that our afflictions are for our benefit, why should

61

Implicit in this idea of trust is, of course, the theological concept of faith. It is therefore important to see how Calvin’s expansive concept of faith deeply informs this discussion of happiness, especially happiness in the midst of suffering. Calvin explicitly ties a believer’s happiness in the midst of suffering to faith. Faith, in general, makes the believer steadfast in the face of trials.105

Indeed, by faith, believers may mount up on wings and rise above their trials.106 Elsewhere, again making recourse to metaphor, Calvin likens faith to a shield. He notes that David, though cast down by troubles, fashioned his hope of salvation into “a shield to repel those temptations with the terror of which he might be greatly distressed.”107 Following David’s example, Calvin comments that, being armed with the knowledge of God’s promised protection, “no affliction shall ever shake out of his heart the joy (gaudium) of faith.”108 In his faith, with its attendant joy,

David gives believers an example to follow: “With the very same confidence ought all the godly to be furnished and sustained.”109 The believer is thus continually furnished and sustained by faith. This is Calvin’s partial answer to the paradox of suffering and joy—believers in this life are sustained by the “joy of faith.”

we not undergo them with a thankful and quiet mind. Therefore, in patiently suffering these tribulations, we do not yield to necessity but we consent for our own good. These thoughts, I say, bring it to pass that, however much in bearing the cross our minds are constrained by the natural feeling of bitterness, they are as much diffused with spiritual joy. From this, thanksgiving also follows, which cannot exist without spiritual joy; but if the praise of the Lord and thanksgiving can come forth only from a cheerful and happy heart—and there is nothing that ought to interrupt this in us—it thus is clear how necessary it is that the bitter of the cross be tempered with spiritual joy.” Inst. III.8.11.

105 Comm. Luke 2:16.

106 Comm. Ps. 17:15.

107 Comm. Ps. 13:5 (CO 31:134).

108 Ibid.

109 Ibid.

62

Calvin’s claim surrounding the “joy of faith” brings us directly to his interpretation of an important biblical term—joy. When discussing the writings of a Christian theologian, it is no doubt common to try to determine the difference between the terms joy and happiness. In

Calvin’s case, distinguishing between the two can be quite difficult, if not impossible. This is because Calvin often uses the terms almost interchangeably or in ways that suggest extensive semantic overlap between them. For instance, Calvin writes: “[T]he Kingdom of God will be filled with splendor, joy (gaudio), happiness (felicitate), and glory.”110 Calvin suggests the terms can be equivalent, stating that joy may be an equating of Paul’s use of the term with happiness:

“joy (gaudii)—by which term I understand happiness (felicitatem).”111 There are multiple passages in which Calvin fails to carefully distinguish between the two terms but rather alternates between them.112 From this, for my part, I see no reason to see these as terms with substantially different referents. Generally, any difference between them is slight and perhaps even imperceptible.

These general claims must be tempered by contextual uses of the term joy. In several places,

Calvin makes it clear he is using the term technically. Calvin appears to use joy in at least three technical ways: a first kind of joy is “cheerful behaviour towards our fellow-men which is the opposite of moroseness.”113 This kind of joy stands in partial contrast to “joy in the Holy Ghost” or “spiritual joy (gaudium spirituale).”114 This spiritual joy comes from the peace of having a

110 Inst. III.25.10 (CO 2:741).

111 Comm. 2 Cor. 1:24 (CO 50:25).

112 See, for instance, Comm. Rom. 12:12.

113 Comm. Gal. 5:22.

114 Comm. Rom. 14:18 (CO 49:266).

63 clean conscience before God.115 This spiritual joy, Calvin says, “does not depend on fading things, such as honor, property, riches, and other things of that nature which quickly perish.”116

Indeed, “this joy is secret and has its seat in the hearts [sic], from which it cannot be shaken or torn away in any manner, though Satan endeavours by every method to disturb and afflict us.”117

Ultimately, it seems that joy as cheerfulness and spiritual joy must be wholly compatible ideas, given that Calvin’s description of the former kind of joy occurs in his exposition of the fruits of the Spirit. The Spirit works both these kinds of joy in a person, granting them a clean conscience and a cheerful disposition towards others. Believers are thus expected to demonstrate both kinds of joy. Calvin finally refers to a kind of joy—an “ordinary joy”—which is available to unbelievers.118 Although unbelievers may rejoice, Calvin emphasizes that they cannot have lasting joy. It is difficult to tell how these technical uses of the term joy relate to happiness.

Though “technical,” these are existential descriptions of joy and thus come nowhere close to approaching the concept of eudaimonia. “Spiritual joy” shares much in common with Calvin’s thinking on happiness.

In this life, indeed, both happiness and spiritual joy arise from faith and hope. Faith and hope are closely parallel ideas.119 Hope, according to Calvin, is essentially faith in God’s promises which

115 Calvin writes, “[Paul] seems to me to express the character of this joy; for however torpid the reprobate may be, or however they may elevate themselves, yet the conscience is not rendered calm and joyful, except when it feels God to be pacified and propitious to it; and there is no solid joy but what proceeds from this peace. And though it was necessary, when mention was made of these things, that the Spirit should have been declared as the author.” Ibid.

116 Comm. Isa. 35:10.

117 Ibid.

118 Ibid.

119 Calvin writes, “Yet, wherever this faith is alive, it must have along with it the hope of eternal salvation as its inseparable companion. Or rather, it engenders and brings forth hope from itself. When this hope is taken

64 are yet to come.120 Just like happiness, “joy is derived from the hope of future life,” 121 he writes.

Calvin continues on to remark that, because joy is derived from the future life, “patience will grow up in the midst of adversities.”122 Ultimately, no one “will indeed calmly and quietly submit to bear the cross, but he who has learnt to seek his happiness beyond this world, so as to mitigate and allay the bitterness of the cross with the consolation of hope.”123 Given that in this passage (and others) Calvin can move seamlessly between the two concepts suggests what I have observed above—that at least with respect to spiritual joy and happiness in this life, it is difficult to make a sharp distinction between the two terms.

This final kind of joy returns us to a point I made earlier—namely, that Calvin thinks true happiness is for believers only. The obvious implication of this is that unbelievers cannot be said to be happy. Notably, Calvin insists this to be true, despite frequent appearances to the contrary.

Indeed, Calvin says unbelievers may appear to be better off than believers: “When we see the ungodly enjoying prosperity, crowned with honours, and loaded with riches, they seem to be in great favour with God.”124 Calvin, however, thinks that external appearances can be quite

away, however eloquently or elegantly we discourse concerning faith, we are convicted of having none.” Inst. III.2.42.

120 Calvin continues, “For if faith, as has been said above, is a sure persuasion of the truth of God—that it can neither lie to us, nor deceive us, nor become void—then those who have grasped this certainty assuredly expect the time to come when God will fulfill his promises, which they are persuaded cannot but be true. Accordingly, in brief, hope is nothing else than the expectation of those things which faith has believed to have been truly promised by God. Thus, faith believes God to be true, hope awaits the time when his truth shall be manifested; faith believes that he is our Father, hope anticipates that he will ever show himself to be a Father toward us; faith believes that eternal life has been given to us, hope anticipates that it will some time be revealed; faith is the foundation upon which hope rests, hope nourishes and sustains faith.” Ibid.

121 Comm. Rom. 12:12.

122 Ibid.

123 Ibid.

124 Comm. Ps. 17:15.

65 deceiving. Indeed, he insists that, however happy an unbeliever might appear, this is only a kind of chimera. Faith, according to Calvin, is able to discern the true nature of reality, finding order amidst the present disorder, in which the righteous often perish while the wicked flourish.125

There are several reasons why an unbeliever cannot be happy. These are largely the inverse of the above discussion on a believer’s happiness. Above all, since unbelievers are presently under

God’s just condemnation, they cannot be said to be happy.126 A second reason that unbelievers are unable to achieve happiness is also related to the above. We have already begun to see how strong an emphasis Calvin places on having a clean conscience. He thus claims what Scripture teaches: “[A] happy life depends on a good conscience.”127 Since Calvin considers unbelievers to have unclean consciences, he therefore thinks that they be cannot be happy. However, “[The

Psalmist] does not deny, that before they are driven to judgment, all things succeed well with them; but he denies that they are happy.”128

In part, Calvin reasons that whenever an unbeliever is confronted about her sin, she must be unhappy. Indeed, due to having their conscience as a tormentor, Calvin’s explanation of the unbelievers is at least partly psychological. Consider the following passage:

The ungodly may be at their ease, and have abundance of good things, even to bursting, but as their desire is insatiable, or as they feed upon wind, in other words, upon earthly things, without tasting spiritual things, in which there is substance, or being so stupefied through the pungent remorse of conscience with which they are tormented, as not to enjoy the good things which they possess.129

125 Ibid.

126 Comm. Ps. 1:5.

127 Ibid.

128 Ibid.

129 Comm. Ps. 17:15.

66

So, unbelievers are seemingly at ease and yet are unable to enjoy this ease.

Finally, in addition to these two causes of an unbeliever’s unhappiness, Calvin adds a third explanation: unbelievers are unhappy, he claims, as result of their “irregular desires.” This claim is partly a psychological one. Calvin writes,

“They [unbelievers] never have composed and tranquil minds, but are kept unhappy by the inward passions with which they are perplexed and agitated. It is therefore the grace of God alone which can give us contentment, and prevent us from being distracted by irregular desires”130

The Future Life

“The joy of faith” no longer obtains once faith grasps its object. For Calvin, as for the author of

Hebrews, faith will one day give way to sight. In the future life, then, no longer sustained by faith, the elect will be fully and eternally happy. Calvin is, doubtless, well within the broad

Christian tradition at this point—he gives his unambiguous and unqualified affirmation that believers will finally be made completely happy. He states: “[L]et us always have in mind the eternal happiness, the goal of resurrection—a happiness of whose excellence the minutest part would scarce be told if all were said that the tongues of all men can say.”131 Indeed, “all the elements of happiness” will be granted to believers in the future life.132 However, beyond specifying that the believer’s happiness is eternal and perfect, Calvin is not especially descriptive on the subject of a believer’s future happiness. Because Calvin thinks that the Scripture does not

130 Ibid.

131 Calvin continues, “For though we very truly hear that the Kingdom of God will be filled with splendor, joy, happiness, and glory, yet when these things are spoken of, they remain utterly remote from our perception, and, as it were, wrapped in obscurities, until that day comes when he will reveal to us his glory, that we may behold it face to face… Accordingly, the prophets, because they could not find words to express that spiritual blessedness in its own nature, merely sketched it in physical terms.” Inst. III.25.10.

132 Inst. III.25.10.

67 go into great detail on this subject of the future life, this is not surprising.133 Indeed, judging that

Scripture avoids answering many questions we might have about the future life, Calvin meets such speculative questions with a dismissive attitude: “I… personally refrain from superfluous investigation of useless matters.”134 Such questions are, in fact, said to be born out of an

“immoderate desire to know more than is lawful” and are “harmful.”135 Indeed, Calvin sees such questions as a kind of labyrinth, by which most people end up in inverting the order, devoting themselves to the question of what the future life will be like instead of how one enters into this future life.136

Though overall Calvin is tight-lipped on the subject of what, exactly, a believer’s future happiness might look like, he is nonetheless clear on its source—happiness comes from God, the fountain of all good; and this thought is specifically connected to union with God. Consider the following passages from the Institutes:

The ancient philosophers anxiously discussed the sovereign good, and even contended among themselves over it. Yet none but Plato recognized man’s highest good as union with God, and he could not even dimly sense its nature. And no wonder, for he had learned nothing of the sacred bond of that union. Even on this earthly pilgrimage we know the sole and perfect happiness.137

Then, in a passage we have already considered, Calvin returns to this claim that God is the fountain of all good:

Accordingly, the prophets, because they could not find words to express that spiritual blessedness in its own nature, merely sketched it in physical terms. Yet because any taste

133 Ibid.

134 Inst. III.25.11.

135 Inst. III.25.10.

136 Inst. III.25.11.

137 Inst. III.25.2.

68

of that sweetness ought to kindle fervent desire in us, let us pause to reflect especially on this: If God contains the fullness of all good things in himself like an inexhaustible fountain, nothing beyond him is to be sought by those who strive after the highest good and all the elements of happiness, as we are taught in many passages….138

Calvin then goes on to list Scriptural passages that he takes to support his claims.

From these two passages just quoted, we see that perfect happiness comes from being united to

God. According to Calvin, this is how he thinks the Scriptures depict the life to come—a future in which humans are united to God and given all happiness. Its vision, according to Calvin, is deeply theocentric. Indeed, Calvin believes human beings can only be fully satisfied when they are eternally united to God.

Calvin can use provocative language to describe a believer’s union with God—in the life to come, believers, he says, will be made “one with himself.”139 It is worth clarifying the striking language on a believer’s union with God, perhaps especially since Calvin himself feels the need to do just this. Elsewhere, Calvin qualifies his claim that believers will be made “one with God.”

In his commentary on 2 Peter 1:4, a verse which figures prominently in discussions of union with

God or theosis, Calvin says our union with God occurs “as far as our capacities will allow.”140

Calvin thus seeks to preserve some distance between God and the believer in the life to come.

Later in this same commentary, to help explain his thinking, Calvin also distinguishes between two different ways of one with God—in terms of sharing God’s “essence” and sharing in a “quality” God possesses.141 For Calvin, the believer’s union with God is of the latter kind,

138 Inst. III.25.10; emphasis added.

139 Ibid.

140 Comm. 2 Pet. 1:4.

141 Ibid.

69 rather than the former, according to Calvin. Accordingly, rather than believers being swallowed up by God—a union of essence—believers instead will share with God certain communicable attributes, a union of quality. In a word, Calvin thinks believers will not in any sense become

God, but they will become like God. The specific attributes believers will share with God include

God’s power, glory, and his righteousness:

Indeed, Peter declares that believers are called in this to become partakers of the divine nature [2 Peter 1:4]. How is this? Because “he will be … glorified in all his saints, and will be marveled at in all who have believed” [2 Thess. 1:10]. If the Lord will share his glory, power, and righteousness with the elect—nay, will give himself to be enjoyed by them and, what is more excellent, will somehow make them to become one with himself, let us remember that every sort of happiness is included under this benefit.142

At least in this passage, Calvin claims that everything is included under the benefit of union with

God. Note that Calvin considers “every sort of happiness” to be included under the heading of union with Christ. It is interesting to consider, if also unclear from this quotation, what Calvin might think are different kinds of happiness. What is clear, however, is that this is a complete and perfect happiness, as we have already seen. Of course, speaking of happiness, complete in all its varied forms, is another way of doing just that.

Calvin thinks that union with God makes us one with himself by means of joining us to Christ.

He writes,

And assuredly, that we may cleave to God through [Christ], it is necessary that he have God as his head. (1 Cor. 11:3.) We must observe, however, with what intention Paul has added this. For he admonishes us, that the sum of our felicity consists in this, that we are united to God who is the chief good, and this is accomplished when we are gathered together under the head that our heavenly Father has set over us…143

142 Inst. III.25.10; emphasis added.

143 Comm. 1 Cor. 3:23.

70

Christ is therefore the instrument or the means by which we are joined to God. Quite closely following the specific language of 1 Cor. 11:3, Calvin evidently thinks there is a kind of ordering at work here such that Christ is the believers’ head, while he himself has God as his “head.”

Doubtless such passages, as well as Calvin’s claim about union with God, instead of union with

Christ, being humanity’s highest good, raises the question of whether union with Christ is the means to the greater end of union with God. Perhaps, in other words, union with Christ is only a means and not an end in itself.144

The Highest Good

This language of the highest good has been intermingled through passages in the previous section. As we have seen, Calvin interweaves the classical philosophical idea with his own preferred image of God as the fountain of all good. The two are indeed analogous according to

Calvin. Once again: God contains the fullness of all good things in himself like an inexhaustible fountain and therefore nothing beyond him is to be sought by those who strive after happiness and the highest good.145 God, then, is to be sought as the fountain of all good and the highest good.

Calvin clearly understands the philosophical provenance of the idea of the highest good. “This teaching was not unknown to the philosophers,” he writes.146 In various places, Calvin discusses the views of the ancient philosophers on this subject. He also, at times, directly relates his own

144 Note that I consider the relation between union with God and union with Christ in the final chapter of this thesis (chapter six).

145 Inst. III.25.2.

146 Inst. I.3.3.

71 thinking on the highest good to these writers. Of the philosophers, Calvin thinks that Plato alone correctly understood the nature of the highest good—namely, that it consisted in union with God.

Twice in the Institutes Calvin makes claims that Plato correctly taught that God is the highest good or that nearness to God is the highest good. First, in Book I, he writes, “Plato meant nothing but this when he often taught that the highest good of the soul is likeness to God, where, when the soul has grasped the knowledge of God, it is wholly transformed into his likeness.”147

We have seen the second passage, which is found in Book III. Again, here Calvin writes, “The ancient philosophers anxiously discussed the sovereign good, and even contended among themselves over it. Yet none but Plato recognized man’s highest good as union with God...” 148

In this second passage, Calvin is far less approving of Plato’s claims. Here, he emphasizes that

Plato “could not even dimly sense” the nature of this union.149 Above all, Calvin thinks Plato understood union with God dimly because he did know the source of this union. Thus, he writes,

“And no wonder, for he had learned nothing of the sacred bond of that union.”150 Almost certainly Calvin is referring to Christ when he speaks of “the sacred bond” here. Christ is thus the one who unites us to God, according to Calvin. Overall, this tendency to diminish the accomplishment of pagan learning is not unique to this passage. Indeed, it relates to a general pattern with Calvin, who, after freely relating his thought to an element of classical philosophy, is often keen to highlight what he judges to be differences.151 In this instance, while Plato’s

147 Ibid.

148 Inst. III.25.2.

149 Ibid.

150 Ibid.

151 In his Commentary on the book of Romans, Calvin writes, “And this is the main difference between the gospel and philosophy: for though the philosophers speak excellently and with great judgment on the subject of

72 general claims may be correct, Calvin thinks Plato failed to truly understand the nature of the highest good.

Ultimately, then, though Calvin relies on the philosophical concept of the highest good, and even agrees formally with Plato that union with God is humanity’s highest good, he nonetheless makes these ideas his own. Union with God is humanity’s highest good, he says, but we must understand this in Christologically. There may be other ways that Calvin’s vision of union with

God differs from Plato’s, but this is the one that Calvin chooses to highlight in this particular context.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have considered Calvin’s thinking on pietas, happiness, and the highest good. I believe I have shown that these are deeply interlocking concepts in Calvin’s thought. Pietas is an overarching goal of Calvin’s theological project. Central to pietas, in turn, is the concept of happiness. In particular, the pursuit of happiness in God is a central dimension of pietas. Overall, happiness is a concept that Calvin is quite comfortable with, despite caricatures to the contrary. It was also seen that Calvin uses the term happiness in the more informal sense of temporal satisfaction as well as in the technical sense of eudaimonia. Calvin’s decision to use happiness in this technical sense brought us to the final sections of the chapter, in which it was seen that

Calvin believes perfect happiness is reserved for the future life, at which time humans will be united to God. Accordingly, this union with God is humanity’s highest good. Calvin employs this language of the highest good well aware of its pagan philosophy origin. As he uses the term,

morals, yet whatever excellency shines forth in their precepts, it is, as it were, a beautiful superstructure without a foundation; for by omitting principles, they offer a mutilated doctrine, like a body without a head.” Comm. Rom. 12:1.

73

Calvin will even go so far as to directly compare his position with the philosophers. In the end,

Calvin acknowledges that his position is superficially similar to Plato’s, though he hastens to add that, whatever formal overlap exists, materially speaking, his understanding of the highest good is remarkably different than Plato’s. Ultimately, for Calvin, the highest good for humanity is union with God through Christ which offers to humanity a happiness which is complete in all its forms.

In the next chapter, I turn to Calvin’s anthropology, specifically his thinking about humanity’s telos, and note its similarities to the eudaimonistic tradition. This chapter should further strengthen my argument that Calvin belongs to this tradition.

Chapter 2 Human Purpose

Grant, Almighty God, that as we are placed in this world, that while daily receiving so many blessings, we may so pass our time as to regard our end and hasten towards the goal,—O grant, that the benefits and blessings by which thou invitest us to thyself, may not be impediments to us, and keep us attached to this world, but on the contrary stimulate us to fear thy name as well as to appreciate thy mercy, so that we may thus know thee to be our God, and strive on our part to present ourselves to thee as thy people, and so consecrate ourselves and all our services to thee, that thy name may be glorified in us, through Christ our Lord.—Amen.1

Minister: What is the chief end of human life? Child: That men should know God by whom they were created.2

This chapter seeks to explain the underlying anthropological foundations for Calvin’s vision of the Christian life. For my purposes, this framework is highly significant, because Calvin’s teaching on the Christian life, divine commands, and morality all flow from his prior commitments to human nature and purpose—in a word, from his beliefs surrounding humanity’s telos. As such, it is only by gaining a clear understanding of human nature and human purpose that we are able to fully understand Calvin’s ethics. The primary question I will be exploring in this chapter is therefore: what is the purpose of humanity, according to Calvin?

Given this study’s focus on eudaimonism, I hope to make it clear in what sense Calvin understands human purpose to be related to happiness and joy, and point to some significant parallels that Calvin’s anthropology has to the anthropological claims of eudaimonistic thought.

Comparing Calvin’s anthropology and anthropology in the eudaimonistic tradition on this particular point is extremely important, because, as Alistair MacIntyre has noted, all

1 Comm. Jer. 24, prayer.

2 John Calvin, “The Catechism of the Church of Geneva,” in Theological Treatises, ed. and trans. J. K. S. Reid (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2000), 91.

74

75 eudaimonistic ethics rest on assumptions about human nature and human telos.3 Given my study’s focus on eudaimonistic ethics, the argument of this chapter will be structured along the lines of a comparison of teleology in the eudaimonistic tradition and in Calvin’s thought.

My argument here, situated as it is within the larger argument of this work, is that Calvin develops an anthropology which has significant resonances with the anthropology of the eudaimonistic tradition, in which humans possess a clear telos. As a Christian theologian, Calvin believes that humans were given this telos at creation. Precisely what is humanity’s telos is more difficult to describe, since Calvin uses multiple concepts to describe it. Such ideas include a greater closeness to God, true knowledge of God, union with God, as well as—especially significant for my purposes—eternal life and happiness. In making these conceptual moves, my overall argument is that Calvin structures his anthropology as a Christian eudaimonist would.

Calvin’s Doctrine of Creation and Doctrine of Humanity

Before addressing Calvin’s thinking on human purpose directly, it seems appropriate to address briefly Calvin’s theology of creation in general.4 In many ways, Calvin’s thinking on creation reflects the central parts of the Christian tradition more broadly. Indeed, in line with Christian teaching generally, Calvin holds to the traditional beliefs, including creation of all things

3 Alasdair C. MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 53–54.

4 For additional overview of Calvin’s doctrine of creation, see Susan E. Schreiner, Theater of His Glory: Nature and the Natural Order in the Thought of John Calvin (Durham, NC: Labyrinth Press, 1991); Susan E. Schreiner, “Creation and Providence,” in The Calvin Handbook, ed. Herman J. Selderhuis, trans. Henry J. Baron, Judith J. Guder, and Randi H. Lundell (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), 267–75; Oliver D. Crisp, “Calvin on Creation and Providence,” in John Calvin and Evangelical Theology: Legacy and Prospect, ed. Sung Wook Chung (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2009), 43-65.

76

(material and immaterial) ex nihilo,5 that humans were created with a “body and soul,”6 that God created the world good, and that he is not the author of sin.7 Following tradition at this point as well, Calvin’s theology of creation is specifically worked with reference to the Triune God. Of the members of the Trinity, Calvin’s doctrine of creation places special emphasis on Christ; and it is perhaps here that his doctrine of creation has a unique character. Indeed, what is perhaps most surprising in Calvin’s doctrine of creation is his insistence that Christ had a mediatorial role in creation even prior to the entry of sin into the world.

The relationship between Christ and the world can be described in several ways. One passage which is illustrative of Calvin’s views expresses his comments on Paul’s statement that “All things were created by him, and for him” (Col. 1:15). Calvin begins by interpreting this passage specifically with reference to the angels, moving then to discuss all of creation:

He places angels in subjection to Christ, that they may not obscure his glory, for four reasons: In the first place, because they were created by him; secondly, because their creation ought to be viewed as having a relation to him, as their legitimate end; thirdly, because he himself existed always, prior to their creation; fourthly, because he sustains them by his power, and upholds them in their condition. At the same time, he does not affirm this merely as to angels, but also as to the whole world.8

What is true of angels is true of the world, and of humans in particular, according to Calvin. As this passage shows, Christ’s relationship with the human creature can be worked out in a series of prepositional phrases. Calvin understands humans to be created by God and thus coming after him (that is to say, chronologically speaking), and established on him (as he is the one who

5 See, for instance, Comm. Gen. 1:1.

6 See, for instance, Inst. I.15.2.

7 See, for instance, Inst. I.14.16.

8 Comm. Col. 1:17; emphasis original.

77 ensures their continued existence through his providential care).9 Finally, according to Calvin, humans are ordered to God as their teleological end. Establishing that humans are ordered to God is the central claim of this chapter.

A final point which should be made here is that Calvin’s thinking on creation is, in some sense, the starting point for his ethics. Calvin believes that in creation God established an “order of nature” to which our lives must conform. I will say more regarding the significance of the concept of the “order of nature” in the next chapter.

It is worth pointing out one significant feature of Calvin’s anthropology that will color what follows. In relation to this thesis, it is essential to see that Calvin is clearly drawn to Plato’s conception of humans possessing an immortal nature. Calvin’s position on human nature is that humans are created, yet immortal. In one place, for instance, he writes, “It would be foolish to seek a definition of ‘soul’ from the philosophers. Of them hardly one, except Plato, has rightly affirmed its immortal substance…. Hence Plato’s opinion is more correct, because he considers the image of God in the soul.”10 As a number of quotations throughout this thesis will make clear, Calvin repeatedly makes recourse to this Platonic conception of human nature. In chapter four, for instance, it will be seen that Calvin speaks of “what is truly good for [a person] according to the excellence of his immortal nature.” 11 Such passages point towards Calvin’s view that human persons were created immortal. This position, as Calvin himself acknowledges,

9 All these convictions, save the second, appear in Calvin’s commentary John 1. Here, of Christ, Calvin states: “[B]y his power all things were created.” Comm. John 1:1. Here Calvin also writes, The Evangelist, therefore, declares that we must not confine our views to the world and to created things; for [Christ] was always united to God, before the world existed.” Comm. John 1:1. Finally, Calvin writes, “[John] now attributes to him, in the same manner, the preservation of those things which had been created.” Comm. John 1:4.

10 Inst. I.15.6.

11 Inst. II.2.26.

78 has clear affinities with Plato’s anthropology. Though Calvin acknowledges this, he makes it clear that he does not think Plato’s anthropology is completely correct. Indeed, as he states above, among the philosophers, Plato’s position is “more correct.” This insistence is in keeping with Calvin’s preference for Plato among all of the philosophers. As will be seen later in this chapter, Calvin prefers Plato’s definition of the highest good, in addition to his definition of the soul.

Anthropology in the Eudaimonistic Tradition

Alasdair MacIntyre’s summary of the anthropology in the eudaimonistic tradition is exceptionally clear, and it is therefore a helpful place to start as a reference point for a comparison of Calvin with the anthropology in this tradition. According to MacIntyre, eudaimonistic virtue ethics holds that humans possess innate potentialities which need to be realized. This conception of humans and their flourishing can be summarized along the lines of a threefold scheme, which runs as follows: (1) an untutored human nature (or human-nature-as-it- is) which needs to be transformed by (2) (rational precepts) which enable humans to reach (3) their telos (or human-nature-as-it-should-be-if-it-were-realized).12

Accordingly, in what is almost certainly the most classic presentation of eudaimonism, Aristotle sees humans innately ordered and striving towards a definite end, which is eudaimonia.13 Despite these structural similarities, humans differ from plant and animal life, in that they possess

12 See MacIntyre, After Virtue, 53–54. I have closely followed Vos’s summary of MacIntyre’s argument here. See Pieter Vos, “Breakdown of the Teleological View of Life? Investigating Law, Telos and Virtue in Calvinistic Ethics,” Journal of Reformed Theology 9, no 2 (2015): 131-147.

13 Aristotle, NE, 1097b 15-1098a 5. Note that I have left eudaimonia untranslated here. As noted in the introduction, eudaimonia has been translated variously. Common translations include happiness, human flourishing, and well-being.

79 practical reason and volitional capacities. Human flourishing, unlike the case of, say, a plant, involves the exercise of these uniquely human capacities.14

In the Christian tradition, a number of theologians have reworked this threefold scheme, specifically by making God and grace central to this framework.15 Of these, perhaps the most well-known figure is Thomas Aquinas. Following MacIntyre,16 I take Aquinas’ thought as illustrative of these alterations in the Christian tradition generally: St. Thomas, for his part, worked with Aristotle’s framework to explain the dynamics of human nature and moral development. To his way of thinking, it is finally only through God’s grace that humans are able realize the end for which they were created.17 Aquinas’ insistence on the necessity of grace obviously in some sense materially alters the second element of Aristotle’s threefold scheme. For

Aquinas, in short, reason, while essential, is nonetheless insufficient to reach our final end. This insistence flows from Aquinas’ prior belief that humans are not simply untutored but sinful.18

With this insistence, Aquinas has also altered the first point of Aristotle’s system. As a final

14 Ibid.

15 As I noted in the introduction, it is debatable, of course, whether these changes are so significant that Aquinas should be considered to be breaking with Aristotle’s eudaimonism, with its fundamentally human-centered view of eudaimonia and the achievement of this eudaimonia. For my purposes, what is significant is that both schemes retain a similar structure, with an untutored human nature and a telos, plus a second step where the human person journeys between the two. As my discussion shows, Aquinas radically differs from Aristotle regarding the content of each element of the structure.

16 MacIntyre writes, “This is complicated and added to, but not essential altered, when it is placed within a framework of theistic beliefs, whether Christian, as with Aquinas, or Jewish with Maimonides, or Islamic with Ibn Roschd. The precepts of ethics now have to be understood not only as teleological injunctions, but also as expression of a divinely ordained law. The table of virtue and vice has to be mended and added to and a concept of sin is added to the Aritotelian [sic] concept of error. The law of God requires a new kind of respect and awe. The true end of man can no longer be completely achieved in this world, but only in another. Yet the threefold structure of untutored nature-nature-as-it-happens-to-be, human-nature-as-it-could-be-if-it realized-its-telos and the precepts of rational ethics as the means for the transition from one to the other remains central to the theistic understanding of evaluative thought and judgment.” MacIntyre, After Virtue, 53.

17 Aquinas, ST, Ia-IIæ. 5, 5.

18 Ibid.,, Ia-IIæ. 71-89.

80 point, Aquinas also proceeds to alter the material content—if not the basic structure—of

Aristotle’s thinking regarding human telos. Both, indeed, hold that telos of humanity is happiness. Aquinas, however, by insisting that perfect happiness consists in a vision of Godself, holds that the realization of humanity’s telos depends on something outside of humanity.19

Calvin and Eudaimonistic Anthropology

Having briefly detailed the teleological framework of anthropology in the eudaimonistic tradition, I now hope to indicate what parallels exist with Calvin’s anthropology.20 As will be seen in this section, to accurately understand Calvin’s anthropology, an important distinction needs to be immediately observed. Following Scripture’s teaching, Calvin holds that humanity should be understood in two ways: as created, and as fallen.21 Precisely because of this distinction, Calvin’s thinking on anthropology and, ultimately, ethics is fundamentally different than that of a thinker like Aristotle (if not Aquinas). Indeed, given that it should be understood in these two separate ways, Calvin’s anthropology relates to all three elements of Aristotle’s anthropology in two distinct ways.

Summarizing my argument, we will see that Calvin describes humans as first created just as

Aristotle does—that is to say, as having an untutored human nature which needs to be transformed by practical reason (rational precepts), ultimately enabling them to reach their telos.

19 Ibid., Ia-IIæ. 5, 5.

20 In keeping with the focus of this chapter, I will not explore Calvin’s anthropology generally.

21 Calvin writes, “But knowledge of ourselves lies first in considering what we were given at creation and how generously God continues his favor toward us, in order to know how great our natural excellence would be if only it had remained unblemished; yet at the same time to bear in mind that there is in us nothing of our own, but that we hold on sufferance whatever God has bestowed upon us. Hence we are ever dependent on him. Secondly, to call to mind our miserable condition after Adam’s fall; the awareness of which, when all our boasting and self- assurance are laid low, should truly humble us and overwhelm us with shame.” Inst. II.1.1.

81

Alternatively, Calvin describes fallen humanity in Augustinian terms, conceiving of human nature, and human reason in particular, as completely deformed by the Fall. For Calvin, as for

Augustine, deformed human nature needs more than practical reason to effect its transformation.

What is needed, of course, is grace.

Accordingly, then, due to his Augustinian anthropology, as was the case with Aquinas’ thought detailed above, Calvin understands human nature to be so radically distorted by the fall that this threefold teleological scheme must be altered. First, humanity no longer simply needs to be tutored but instead needs to be restored from a state of spiritual dullness—even deadness.

Second, as a result of this deadness, humans are completely unable to receive any instruction from practical reason, enabling them to reach their telos. In this state, God’s grace is needed, and it must transform human reasoning. What remains unchanged is the final element of the schema—humanity’s telos. For Calvin, as we will see, God remains the final end of both fallen and unfallen humanity. This never alters for him. With such a claim, and as a result of his emphasis on the necessity of God’s grace, obvious parallels between Calvin’s thinking and the thought of other Christian theologians start to emerge.

In the next two major sections, I will proceed to demonstrate this as I have just described. I begin by detailing how Calvin understands humanity before the fall along the lines of the threefold scheme of eudaimonistic anthropology. I will take each of the elements in turn, but as each of these three elements is mutually interdependent—a kind three-legged stool—it should nonetheless become clear that even when discussing each of these other elements the others are never that far out of sight.

82

Humans as Created “Towards” God

Still working with MacIntyre’s framework, I now hope to show that this threefold scheme in

Calvin’s thought applies to humans in their unfallen state. In the first place, then, it must be shown that humans were created with what MacIntyre called an untutored nature. In Calvin’s case, I understand this term “untutored nature” to mean something like this: humans, in themselves, are “unrealized,” and so they must strive for something they do not innately possess.

That Calvin understands humanity as created untutored, standing in need of further realization, is something he very explicitly says in his commentary on the book of Genesis. Here Calvin writes,

“[T]he the state of [humanity] was not perfected in the person of Adam.”22 In order for the state of humanity to be “accomplished,” Calvin says humans needed to somehow achieve a life with a settled constancy, a life that is somehow “celestial.”23

This idea that humans are not accomplished is also evident in several other strands of Calvin’s thought. The first of these strands is Calvin’s emphasis on the meditation of the future life

(meditatio vitae futurae). Perhaps surprisingly, Calvin thinks humans were created for a future life—a life better and higher than one they were given in creation—and, having been created for this life, humans were always called to meditate on and aspire to this future, better life. Three such passages serve to illustrate these points. In the first place, in the Institutes Calvin writes,

God fashioned us after his image [Genesis 1:27] that he might arouse our minds both to virtue and to meditation upon eternal life. Thus, in order that the great nobility of our race (which distinguishes us from brute beasts) may not be buried beneath our own dullness

22 Comm. Gen. 2:7.

23 Ibid.

83

that we have been endowed with reason and understanding so that, by leading an upright and holy life, we may press on to the appointed goal of blessed immortality.24

Likewise, in his Commentary on the Book of Genesis, Calvin comments:

After the world had been created, man was placed in it as in a theater, that he, beholding above him and beneath the wonderful works of God, might reverently adore their Author. Secondly, that all things were ordained for the use of man, that he, being under deeper obligation, might devote and dedicate himself entirely to obedience towards God. Thirdly, that he was endued with understanding and reason, that being distinguished from brute animals he might meditate on a better life, and might even tend directly towards God, whose image he bore engraved on his own person.25

The overall picture given to us here is of a humanity created to worship God, to live lives of virtue and obedience, and to achieve the end of blessed immortality as well as, somehow, of God himself—“to tend directly towards God,” as Calvin says so enigmatically in the second passage above. Within the context of this broader vision is nested this idea of the meditatio vitae futurae, which, as I have already begun to suggest, indicates that Adam was to aspire to something better than what he already possessed in creation. Calvin himself even explicitly calls this future life a

“better life” in the second passage. Contained within this idea of the meditatio vitae futurae, then, we see that even in this state of primal blessedness, Adam was to aim for something higher.

As the second passage makes clear, this “something” is essentially bound up with God. Indeed, though the precise meaning of the phrase “to tend directly towards God” is difficult to discern, what is clear is that there is some relation with God that Adam was made for but did not possess solely by virtue of creation. Accordingly, even if Calvin thinks humans were born rich,26 he still thinks a greater riches awaited humanity, a kind of future inheritance.

24 Inst. II.1.1.

25 Comm. Gen, Argument; emphasis added.

26 Calvin writes, “In the very order of the creation the paternal solicitude of God for man is conspicuous, because he furnished the world with all things needful, and even with an immense profusion of wealth, before he formed man. Thus man was rich before he was born. But if God had such care for us before we existed, he will by

84

Given the prominence of the meditatio vitae futurae in Calvin’s treatment of the believer’s life in

Christ, it is essential to note the emphasis on Adam’s need to meditate on the future life even prior to the Fall. That humans were called to meditate on the future life from the outset of creation indicates we were always called to a future life. For Calvin, then, meditatio vitae futurae is emphatically not a dimension of piety added after the Fall as a part of the process, but is instead an integral part of created human existence, bound up with the fact that we were created to aim for something we lacked when first created. The object of this meditation is nothing less than humanity’s telos. It is the end toward which they are supposed to tend. From all of this, a parallel with eudaimonistic anthropology should be clear—namely, the concept of human nature as originally untutored or lacking something which they must to aspire to. We also have begun to glimpse that this “thing” is not a thing, but is Godself.

Human Rationality To and Away From God

From both of the passages quoted in the previous section, it is also clear that Calvin thinks we, as untutored humans, were created with certain faculties, that we might meditate on a better life and reach this end. In both passages, the specific human faculties mentioned are cognitive ones: understanding and reason. Note the purpose clauses in both passages: “[Adam] was endued with understanding and reason, that….” And again: “God fashioned us after his image [Genesis 1:27] that he might arouse our minds….”27 Calvin thus makes it clear that rationality was to be central to humans achieving their end of the future life. Human reason, in other words, was provided so

no means leave us destitute of food and of other necessaries of life, now that we are placed in the world.” Comm. Gen.1:26.

27 Inst. II.1.1.

85 that by it we might tend directly towards God.28 In saying this, it should be emphasized emphatically that Calvin never conceives of humans apart from God.

It might also be noted here that it is not insignificant that meditation is something one does with one’s mind. In a stunning passage—one I will return to below—Calvin says, “[T]he more anyone endeavors to approach to God, the more he proves himself endowed with reason.”29 Human telos is, as we have begun to see, bound up with God. For Calvin, then, the more we pursue this goal, the more we show ourselves to be rational, since we are employing our reason for the end for which it was created.

Calvin offers another illustration of this idea in his metaphor of creation as a school. This comparison clearly points to the fact that human reason should lead untutored human nature (to return to MacIntyre’s term) to its end. The metaphor employs this exact language of tutoring:

“The natural order was that the frame of the universe should be the school in which we were to learn piety, and from it pass over to eternal life and perfect felicity..”30 From this first image of the world as a school, then, we see the first two elements of the threefold scheme: Firstly, that humans were created to aspire to something higher and greater—in this case, eternal life and happiness; and secondly, that human reason would have enabled human beings to reach their end—that this was to be the natural course of things. From this picture of human rationality as the instrument by which we draw near to God, we again begin to see a parallel with the scheme

28 Within Calvin studies, there has been significant debate about whether the image of God (imago Dei) in men is relational or substantial for Calvin or some combination of two. Passages such as this one suggest that gifts which God gave humanity were intended to be used to further their relationship with him. It thus seems that if there are, indeed, substantial elements of the imago Dei, these were always to be used to direct humans to God. This element of Calvin’s thought has too often been overlooked.

29 Inst. I.15.6.

30 Inst. II.6.1.

86

MacIntyre describes. In fact, all three elements of the scheme are present. Indeed, in Calvin’s view, humans were made with the intention that they, being untutored, would be “tutored” by reason to aspire to their final end or telos.

At this point, it should be clear that human rationality was to be an instrument by which we reach our telos, just as in the scheme MacIntyre describes. There is, in other words, general agreement between Calvin and ancient philosophers such as Aristotle about the role of reason in reaching our end.31 Sin, however, constitutes the fundamental fault line between Calvin and a thinker like

Aristotle. Once again, Calvin thinks reason would have been sufficient to lead us successfully to our final end of God and happiness, just as Aristotle suggests—provided that humans had not fallen. Indeed, as in this metaphor of the world as a school, humans would have discerned this through the very fabric or structure of the world, the original and proper site to learn how to reach perfect happiness. According to Calvin, we are now so dull that we can no longer be tutored by the world. I turn to this closing of the human mind and, as we will see, the will with it.

Calvin seems to be aware of the significant overlaps between his anthropology and that of the classical eudaimonism I have been pointing to. For his part, Calvin appears to be interested in these similarities—though, as is characteristic of his interaction with pagan philosophical thinkers, he seems eager here to point out that his views are more dissimilar than similar to pagan thought. Due to his emphasis on the Christian message and previous Christian thinkers’

31 In general, it also should be noted at this point that Calvin has a very high view of the human mind. He explicitly understands himself to be in agreement with the philosophers about the role of reason in human life, agreeing with them that human will is always directed by human reason—or at least, this is how human rationality was intended to function. Calvin also consistently ranks the human faculties, and, for him, reason is always the most noble element of humans. Ultimately, it is as a result of their failure to make the all-important distinction between humanity as created and as fallen that Calvin thinks the anthropology and the attendant ethical theory are doomed to fail. In some sense, this failure could hardly be starker: according to Calvin, the philosophers claim to have found order and structure in the midst of ruins. See Inst. I.15.8.

87 overreliance on classical philosophy,32 this is understandable. Calvin is thus at pains to differentiate his position from that of the classical philosophers regarding reason. The fundamental difference between the two, according to Calvin, is the philosophers’ failure to grasp the ways in which sin has altered the human soul, especially the faculties of human reason and will.

Calvin summarizes the philosophers’ position on reason succinctly: “Reason which abides in human understanding is a sufficient guide for right conduct”33—a conclusion to which he demurs. Indeed, for Calvin, there is a clear difference between “Christian philosophy” and the philosophy of ancients at this point, for Christian philosophy, unlike the ethical theories of the ancients, knows reason and will to be incapable of reaching humanity’s true end.34 Calvin therefore finds the widespread philosophical sentiment that “[humans are] abundantly sufficient of [themselves] to lead a good and blessed life” to be hopelessly misguided.35 To him, nothing could be further from the truth. Consistent with this argument, and in response to the question of,

“What was the end of creation?,” Calvin answers: “[Our end] is that from which we have been completely estranged.”36 Sinful humans are, in other words, completely cut off from the good and blessedness for which we were intended.

32 Inst. II.2.4.

33 Inst. II.2.3.

34 For his part, Calvin is quick to point out that many of the church fathers did not do much better than the ancient philosophers, precisely because they were overly indebted to their theories of human understanding and will. See Inst. II.2.4.

35 Inst. II.1.2.

36 Inst. II.1.3.

88

That humans have been entirely cut off from knowing their final end is also suggested in how

Calvin distinguishes between what may be naturally known and what cannot be naturally known after the Fall. Calvin claims that this distinction is drawn from another distinction, one which he attributes to Augustine—namely, the distinction between “natural” and “supernatural gifts.”37

Calvin holds that humanity’s supernatural gifts were lost at the Fall, but that the natural gifts remained in humans—these latter gifts being distorted, but not entirely destroyed.38 Applying this distinction to human knowing, Calvin reasons that humans lost all knowledge of what he refers to as “heavenly things,”39 including true knowledge of God and eternal blessedness—in other words, our telos, or our end. Humans still possess some knowledge of the world in which they live—of “earthly things.”40 Such knowledge, however, is unreliable and therefore cannot be trusted in an absolute sense; but through this earthly knowledge (godless) humans have achieved impressive feats. Such feats include the liberal arts learning generally, as well as technical disciplines like architecture.41 In other words, to say that humans do not know their true end is

37 Calvin writes, “And, indeed, that common opinion which they have taken from Augustine pleases me: that the natural gifts were corrupted in man through sin, but that his supernatural gifts were stripped from him.” Inst. II.212. Evidently, then, this is a “common opinion,” with its roots—according to Calvin, at least—in the teachings of Augustine.

38 Inst. II.2.12.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.

41 A debate I have not addressed as a part of this section is Calvin’s thinking on the possibility of natural theology. Historically, this discussion is closely associated with the (in)famous Barth-Brunner debate. Calvin’s thought surrounding natural theology has been enlisted and interpreted by those in both camps as amiable to their position. For my part, I think Calvin does believe in the possibility of natural theology, but he thinks this natural theology does not take one very far. Calvin writes, “God has given us, throughout the whole frame-work of this world, clear evidences of his eternal wisdom, goodness, and power; and though he is in himself invisible, he in a manner becomes visible to us in his works.” Comm. Heb. 11:3. The general knowledge which all humans have of God is sufficient only to condemn, according to Calvin, for unbelievers fail to grasp the full truth about God and therefore fail to respond appropriately to him: “Men’s minds therefore are wholly blind, so that they see not the light of nature which shines forth in created things, until being irradiated by God’s Spirit, they begin to understand by faith what otherwise they cannot comprehend.” Ibid. Calvin also writes: “[T]hough there has been an opinion…. among heathens, that the world was made by God, it was yet very evanescent, for as soon as they formed a notion of

89 not, according to Calvin, the same thing as saying that they know nothing at all. This is also true, as we explore in chapter four, of the ethical precepts. As a result of the inadequacy of our human rationality to attain our end due to sin, it is only by “the revelation of the Spirit” that humans can attain knowledge of heavenly things, according to Calvin.42

Humanity’s Telos

We are now in a position to consider Calvin in relation to the third element of eudaimonistic anthropology. It has already been clear that, for Calvin, as in anthropology of eudaimonistic ethics, humans have a telos. What, however, does Calvin teach specifically regarding this end?

As we have seen, Calvin says that the legitimate end of the angels is Christ. To return to my earlier question: can something similar be said of humans?

At this point, it is valuable to note where else Calvin uses this exact “legitimate end” phrase.

Indeed, in all of Calvin’s writings, this exact phrase only occurs in one other place—the passage in the Institutes in which Calvin exposits what he takes to be “Christian philosophy” in one of the most lyrical passages in his work:

But if we are not our own, but the Lord’s, it is plain both what error is to be shunned, and to what end the actions of our lives ought to be directed. We are not our own; therefore, neither is our own reason or will to rule our acts and counsels. We are not our own; therefore, let us not make it our end to seek what may be agreeable to our carnal nature. some God, they became instantly vain in their imaginations, so that they groped in the dark, having in their thoughts a mere shadow of some uncertain deity, and not the knowledge of the true God. Besides, as it was only a transient opinion that flit in their minds, it was far from being anything like knowledge. We may further add, that they assigned to fortune or chance the supremacy in the government of the world, and they made no mention of God’s providence which alone rules everything.” Ibid. What Calvin says here fits with a pattern I have already pointed to above, where Calvin, after praising secular learning for establishing some point, immediately points out how this insight misses some other, more important way. It is, I suggest above, ultimately as a result the working of the Spirit that one comes to truly understand who God is. At this point, we begin to move in the direction of Calvin’s thought on election.

42 Inst. II.2.20.

90

We are not our own; therefore, as far as possible, let us forget ourselves and the things that are ours. On the other hand, we are God’s; let us, therefore, live and die to him (Rom. 14:8). We are God’s; therefore, let his wisdom and will preside over all our actions. We are God’s; to him, then, as the only legitimate end, let every part of our life be directed.43

Calvin is therefore quite clear that humans have a telos. In a word, it is God. Every part of our actions ought to be directed to him. The opposite of this, for Calvin, is seeking what is agreeable to our carnal nature. This subject will also be explored in the next chapter.

Calvin uses other conceptual ideas to describe the end for which humans were created. In a number of places, Calvin describes human telos simply in terms of knowing God. Calvin’s 1545

Catechism, for instance, begins with a discussion of human purpose, and here Calvin uses the language of knowing God to describe our purpose.44 Accordingly, when asked what the purpose of human existence is, the Catechism indicates that the proper Christian response is: “To know

God by whom men were created.”45 Calvin seems to feel this language stands in need of further clarification. By knowledge here he means much more than a simple awareness or bare acknowledgement of facts. Instead, knowledge in this context involves knowing in such a way that the knower is properly responsive to his or her knowledge—as in a personal relationship, wherein knowledge of facts about the other is essential but is not everything.46

According to this Catechism, honouring God has four different elements. It involves:

43 Inst. III.7.1

44 Calvin, “The Catechism of the Church of Geneva,” 91.

45 John Calvin, Theological Treatises, trans. J. K. S. Reid (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2000), 91.

46 Likewise, in his Commentary on the Gospel book of John, Calvin writes, “[Humans] were not created like the beasts, but having been endued with reason, they had obtained a higher rank. As it is not in vain that God imparts his light to their minds, it follows that the purpose for which they were created was, that they might acknowledge Him who is the Author of so excellent a blessing.” Comm. John 1:4.

91

“[Placing] put all our trust in him; [studying] to serve him all our life, by obeying his will; [calling] upon him, whenever any need impels us, seeking in him salvation and whatever good things can be desired; and lastly, [acknowledging] him with both heart and mouth to be the only author of all good things.47

Calvin uses this same language in his Commentary on the Book of Acts: “[M]en must be very careful to know God, because they be created for the same end, and both for that purpose, for he doth briefly assign unto them this cause of life, to seek God.”48 In this passage, Calvin shows that seeking God is the same as knowing him. From this, it would again seem to be the case that

Calvin’s understanding of proper knowledge of God has affective dimensions as well as cognitive ones.

In addition to seeking God and knowing him, a final way that Calvin thinks about humanity’s end is in terms of being united with God. In the Institutes, for instance, Calvin writes:

Just as man was made for meditation upon the heavenly life, so it is certain that the knowledge of it was engraved upon his soul. And if human happiness, whose perfection it is to be united with God, were hidden from man, he would in fact be bereft of the principal use of his understanding. Thus, also, the chief activity of the soul is to aspire thither. Hence the more anyone endeavors to approach to God, the more he proves himself endowed with reason.49

Humans, then, were made for the future life, and the chief activity of the human soul, according to Calvin, is to aspire to union with God and to the happiness which is found perfectly in him.

The proper use of reason, as explored in the previous section, consists in aspiring to this end.

Indeed, as Calvin says here, the more we do this, the more we display that we are acting rationally.

47 Calvin, “The Catechism of the Church of Geneva,” 91–92.

48 Comm. Acts 17:26.

49 Inst. I.15.6.

92

The composite of these varied ideas is one of humanity made to know and relate to God. Of course, that Calvin speaks about humanity’s end in a variety of ways makes him open to the charge that he is inconsistent or that he offers conflicting visions of what our telos is. I would suggest, however, that there is a fundamental harmony between these varied ideas, for, despite their differences, each of these ideas suggests that humans were created to be properly related to

God. Humans were created to seek God, to know God, and to be united to God.

For my purposes, what is especially significant is that union with God happily, so to speak, coexists with human happiness. Indeed, as Calvin says in the passage just above, union with God is the sum of human happiness. Indeed, “The perfection of human happiness,” he says, “is to be united to God.” Such a statement points to the thesis of this chapter and the thesis of this work as a whole. Calvin sees humans as created unto an end. That happiness is encompassed by union with God points to a eudaimonistic undercurrent in his thought. For Calvin, humans were created to be united to God and happy in this union.

Ascending the Ladder of Creation

In commenting on Calvin’s anthropology, I think it is important draw out a final strand of his thought in this area—namely, how Calvin envisions the relationship between the human creature and creation generally. This element is implicit in what I have said previously about the medatio future vitae. Here I hope to make this dimension of his thought explicit.

Calvin consistently emphasizes that the world is for humanity’s use. He affirms this belief in the strongest possible terms, plainly stating at one point that the world was created “for the sake of

93 humans.”50 This belief that the things in the world were created for humans can sound jarringly out of place in Calvin’s writings.51 Indeed, taken at face value, such anthropocentric sentiments are in clear conflict with Calvin’s consistent emphasis on God’s glory—a subject I discuss in the penultimate chapter of this thesis. While I will more fully explore these tensions in chapter five, it should be noted in passing here that Calvin must somehow explain the relation between God’s glory and human flourishing. He seems to want to affirm the possibility that both of these things are true—that the world was created for God’s glory, and also for humanity’s good.

To begin to make sense of such anthropocentric sentiments, it is clearly important to consider in what sense the world is created “for the sake of humanity.” With this claim, Calvin seems to have two interwoven and concomitant ideas of what it means that the world is for humanity. The first way that the world is for the sake of humanity is that humans might enjoy and delight in the world. Calvin devotes what was to become the final section of The Golden Booklet of the True

Christian Life52 to the proper use of the created good we possess in the present life. In this passage, Calvin demonstrates that God desires not merely to provide what is necessary for us, but also to create things “for [our] delight.”53 Calvin illustrates this truth by pointing out how superfluous the beauty of God’s creation is. Referring to things like food, natural wonders such as trees, and all human creations which depend on God’s prior creation, such as clothing and wine, Calvin asks: “Did [God] not render many things attractive to us, apart from their necessary

50 Elsewhere, Calvin writes similarly, “[W]e infer what was the end for which all things were created; namely, that none of the conveniences and necessaries of life might be wanting to men.” Comm. Gen. 1:26.

51 Ibid.

52 Calvin’s treatment of the main features of the Christian life was later republished as a popular work by this title.

53 Inst. III.10.2.

94 use?”54 God, in other words, created things that are attractive to our physical senses, even though they did not have to be this way. Thus, we can look out to the world and see that it was fashioned with us in mind—indeed, according to Calvin, it is not too strong to say it is for our delight.

According to Calvin, to deny this is to come under the sway of an “inhuman philosophy,” one which reduces a human being to “a [lifeless] block.” 55

Calvin is clear that the joy we find in the world is itself significant; but it also points to a broader, more consequential reason why God created the world—namely, that the world would exist, not as end in itself, but ultimately as a guidepost to Godself. God created the world, then, not only to be enjoyed by us, but that our enjoyment of it might draw us to himself. Consider the following passage:

For we are now conversant with that history which teaches us that Adam was, by Divine appointment, an inhabitant of the earth, in order that he might, in passing through his earthly life, meditate on heavenly glory; and that he had been bountifully enriched by the Lord with innumerable benefits, from the enjoyment of which he might infer the paternal benevolence of God.56

In a word, the creation for Calvin is never to be experienced only with reference to itself but also and mainly with reference to God. It is in this sense, also, and more importantly, that the world is

“for the sake of man.” While this particular strand of thinking runs through all of Calvin’s teaching on creation, it offers an important perspective specifically on the present use of creational goods. Here, as in the passage above, Calvin counsels that God’s creational gifts are intended to be received with thanks to God. He writes, “All things were created for us that we

54 Ibid.

55 Inst. III.10.3.

56 Comm. Gen. 2:8.

95 might recognize the Author [of them] and give thanks for this kindness towards us.”57 This emphasis on gratitude is a repeated refrain for Calvin. Calvin then goes on to say that God’s gifts are intended to cause us to aspire to the heavenly life and, as a part of this, to the cultivation of virtue.58

The failure to recognize the world’s latent purpose of directing us to God has the most serious of consequences, according to Calvin. Indeed, he says that when the created things of this world are used only with reference to oneself and not to God, the world no longer works for our good, but instead brings us to ruin.59 In line with his persistent emphasis on the value of moderation in all things, Calvin finds that using the world as an end in itself is generally evidenced in immoderation.60

In this section on the proper use of worldly goods, Calvin is explicit that this use of earthly goods is simply an application to created things of his prior emphasis on meditatio futurae vitae.

Indeed, Calvin notes that, with reference to these goods, “there is no surer or more direct course

57 Inst. III.10.3. Calvin here obviously counsels that God’s creational gifts are intended to be received with gratitude. This emphasis on gratitude is a repeated refrain for Calvin. He thus treats ingratitude as a serious sin. According to Calvin, ingratitude manifests itself in immoderate use of earthy gifts. See Inst. III.10.2.

58 Inst. III.10.4. Also in this context, speaking of meditation of the future life and virtue, Calvin writes, “[God’s bidding destroys] all care and inclination that either diverts or hinders you from thought of the heavenly life and zeal to cultivate the soul. Long ago Cato truly said: ‘There is great care about dress, but great carelessness about virtue.’ To use the old proverb: those who are much occupied with the care of the body are for the most part careless about their own souls.”

59 Calvin writes, “Let this be our principle: that the use of God’s gifts is not wrongly directed when it is referred to that end to which the Author himself created and destined them for us, since he created them for our good, not for our ruin. Accordingly, no one will hold to a straighter path than he who diligently looks to this end. Now if we ponder to what end God created food, we shall find that he meant not only to provide for necessity but also for delight and good cheer. Thus the purpose of clothing, apart from necessity, was comeliness and decency. In grasses, trees, and fruits, apart from their various uses, there is beauty of appearance and pleasantness of odor.” Inst. III.10.2.

60 As noted previously, moderation is an important concept for Calvin. Its importance is on full display in Institutes III.10.

96 than that which we receive from contempt of the present life and meditation upon heavenly immortality.”61 Calvin makes the same point regarding proper use of the world, though less directly, with his well-known metaphor of the world as a theater of God’s glory. We have already seen this emphasis in the first quote of this chapter. Calvin says humans were set in the world as in a theater. Latent within this metaphor is the idea I am pursuing; indeed, as Calvin sees it, the similarities between the world and a theater are roughly as follows: as theaters display material which is intended to affect those who see them, so in the world material is a showcase which is intended to affect its viewers. Building further on this analogy, if the purpose of a comedy is, most basically, to amuse and enliven an audience, the purpose of the world is to bring its audience—in this case, all humanity—to worship and desire him. Randall Zachman has made this same point:

The creation of all good things in the world for the benefit and enjoyment of humans is not, therefore, an end in itself, but is rather the way God initially reveals to humankind that God is the author of and fountain of every good thing. Our use and enjoyment of the good things of creation is not intended by God to be an end in itself, but is rather the way God allures and invites us to seek God as the source of every good thing. It would be a perversion of the theater of God’s glory and a of manifest ingratitude for us to feel and enjoy the good things of creation, and yet to ignore the one who invites and allures us to Godself by means of these benefits.62

There is, then, a basic harmony between the metaphors of the world as a theater and as a school—both point out that the world was intended to lead us to God. Calvin uses other metaphors as well to make precisely this point.63

61 Inst. III.10.4.

62 Randall C. Zachman, John Calvin as Teacher, Pastor and Theologian: The Shape of His Writings and Thought (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006), 235.

63 Though this metaphor of the theater, as Randall Zachman has shown, is far from the only image Calvin uses to describe the world, it is nonetheless almost certainly the most well-known. See Randall C Zachman, “The Universe as the Living Image of God: Calvin’s Doctrine of Creation Reconsidered,” Concordia Theological Quarterly 61, no. 4 (October 1997): 299–312. In this article, Zachman comments on three metaphors Calvin uses to

97

Ultimately, whether intentionally or not, Calvin essentially recreated Augustine’s uti/frui distinction.64 For both, the world should be loved with reference to God (uti), while God should be loved for his own sake (frui). Consider the following passage:

[S]ince the eternal inheritance of man is in heaven, it is truly right that we should tend thither; yet must we fix our foot on earth long enough to enable us to consider the abode which God requires man to use for a time. For we are now conversant with that history which teaches us that Adam was, by Divine appointment, an inhabitant of the earth, in order that he might, in passing through his earthly life, meditate on heavenly glory.65

Observe in this passage how Calvin emphasizes the use of creational gifts. By divine appointment, these gifts are to be used for a time, as humans were always called by God to meditate on a heavenly glory higher than earth’s benefits. Implicit in what we have said above is, for Calvin, that the present world itself also has a purpose, and that this purpose is to draw us to

Godself. With Augustine, Calvin envisions the human person as in via, journeying from the present world to the next. Calvin, again like Augustine, is drawn to the metaphor of the Christian life as a pilgrimage.66 Through this metaphor, Calvin expresses that the Christian, as pilgrim, must always be focused on God—her final destination, or, indeed, her final end.

describe the world. These are: the theater of God’s glory, the living image of God, and the beautiful garment of God. In addition to these, Calvin uses other metaphors to describe the world, including that of a mirror. An interesting and, ultimately, important dimension of Calvin’s theology is that he affirms all of these elements of creation are true of those of individuals who have been renewed by Christ. Such persons are true microcosms of the world and thus display God’s glory; they are importantly and obviously living images of God, renewed and restored into God’s image in and through Christ; and they are, finally, clothed in the garments Christ’s righteousness and thus beautifully clothed. Whether this is an intentional feature of Calvin’s thought or not, this fits nicely the framework that Calvin posits, where humans, are understood as “world[s] in miniature.” Comm. Gen. 1:26.

64 Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana, ed. and trans. R. P. H. Green, Oxford Early Christian Texts (Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press, 1995), 15 (I.3). It might be noted here that, pace Oberman, I do not think Calvin “transcends” Augustine’s distinction. Instead, as suggested above, he simply reaffirms this traditional distinction. See Oberman, who specifically writes, “Augustine’s dualistic dialectic between frui and uti, between enjoyment of God and use of the world, is transcended to make space for, and to lend legitimacy to, the pursuit of pleasure in the ‘sweet delicacies’ of the world” (274).

65 Comm. Gen. 2:8.

66 Calvin writes, for instance, “[Christ] teaches us to travel as pilgrims in this world.” Inst. III.7.3.

98

I conclude this section noting how Calvin’s convictions concerning the proper attitude toward creational goods are central to his understanding of piety. I therefore return to the prayer in the introduction:

O grant, that the benefits and blessings by which [You invite us to Yourself], may not be impediment to us, and keep us attached to this world, but on the contrary stimulate us to fear thy name as well as to appreciate thy mercy, so that we may thus know [You] to be our God, and strive on our part to present ourselves to [You] as [Your] people, and so consecrate ourselves and all our services to [You], that [Your] name may be glorified in us, through Christ our Lord. Amen.

It is ultimately Calvin’s view that the things of the world were supposed to be ladders by which we might ascend to God.67

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that Calvin develops his anthropology along the lines of the anthropology in the eudaimonistic tradition, in which humans are understood to possess a specific telos. In the end, I believe I have shown that Calvin structures his anthropology as a

Christian eudaimonist would. To do this, I have noted that Calvin thinks of humans as having innate potentialities which need to be realized. Calvin specifically thinks human potentialities were intended to be realized in intimate connection to God. He says that humans were intended

“to tend directly towards God.” Calvin thus conceives of God as humanity’s telos, as we have seen. Originally, Calvin appears to think that humans could have realized these potentialities through reason. After the Fall, Calvin emphasizes that grace is needed in a distinct way for humans to reach their end. As noted already, more will be said on this subject in chapter six.

67 Calvin also comments: “For this reason, we ought the more carefully to mark the example which is here set before us by David, who, elevated to the dignity of sovereign power, surrounded with the splendour of riches and honours, possessed of the greatest abundance of temporal good things, and in the midst of princely pleasures, not only testifies that he is mindful of God, but calling to remembrance the benefits which God had conferred upon him, makes them ladders by which he may ascend nearer to Him.” Comm. Ps. 23:1.

99

In the next chapter, I turn to a consideration of Calvin’s thinking on humanity’s obligation to

God in general, as well as to divine commands in particular.

Chapter 3 Obligation to God

Grant, Almighty God, that as thou hast not only in former times sent thy prophets, but makest the testimony of thy will to be declared to us daily,—O grant, that we may learn to render ourselves teachable and submissive to thee, and so willingly bear thy yoke, that thy holy word may gain among us that reverence which it deserves: and may we so submit ourselves to thee, while thou speakest to us by men, that we may at length enjoy a view of thy glory, in which will consist our perfect felicity; and that we may not only contemplate thy glory face to face, but also hear thee thyself speaking, and so speaking, that we shall delight in that sweetness, which is laid up for us in hope, through Christ, our Lord—Amen1

Calvin too presents a God of whose goodness we cannot judge and whose commandments we cannot interpret as designed to bring us to the telos to which our own desires point; as with Luther, so with Calvin, we have to hope for grace that we may be justified and forgiven our inability to obey the arbitrary fiats of a cosmic despot.2

This chapter considers Calvin’s thinking on human obligation to God and God’s command. My reason for taking up this theme is that eudaimonism is typically seen to stress the importance of one’s immanent desires, whereas those who reject eudaimonism are seen to emphasize concepts like duty and obligation, regardless of human desire. Christian ethicists and theologians who reject eudaimonism particularly stress one’s obligation to God. Over the course of the next two chapters, I hope to answer this question of how Calvin thinks about duty, obligation, and immanent desires. In this chapter, I examine Calvin’s convictions regarding the concepts of duty and obligation. In so doing, I consider Alasdair MacIntyre’s charge that Calvin’s ethics are essentially opposed to eudaimonism, and I seek to refute these claims. In the next chapter, I take up MacIntyre’s additional charge that in Calvin’s ethics there is no emphasis on immanent inclinations towards our telos. I seek to refute this argument as well.

1 Comm. Jer. 17, prayer.

2 Alasdair MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics (New York: Macmillan, 1966), 123.

100

101

The claims of MacIntyre to which I refer above might now be noted. Specifically with reference to Calvin, Alasdair MacIntyre claims that his thought is opposed to eudaimonism, particularly due to the way he articulates the nature of human obligation to God:

Calvin too presents a God of whose goodness we cannot judge and whose commandments we cannot interpret as designed to bring us to the telos to which our own desires point; as with Luther, so with Calvin, we have to hope for grace that we may be justified and forgiven our inability to obey the arbitrary fiats of a cosmic despot.3

There is much in this passage that is striking—perhaps even “blood-chilling,” as Paul Helm suggests.4 Obviously, MacIntyre intends to startle. There are also obviously several different charges brought against the Reformer. For my purposes, what is most important here is the overall, vivid contrast between Calvin and the Aristotelian tradition. What MacIntyre understands to be the central point of dispute between the two ethical theories ultimately lays the groundwork for his charge that Calvin’s God is finally a “cosmic despot” who issues “arbitrary fiats.” For him, the central point of dispute and the basis for these claims is that Calvin ignores the eudaimonistic tradition’s emphasis on rationally intelligible desires, which may direct us to our telos. MacIntyre thus sees Calvin’s thought as a departure from the eudaimonist tradition: where the eudaimonistic tradition emphasizes desire, Calvin emphasizes only duty to divine commands—and ultimately, justification by faith in light of our inability to obey God’s commands.

In response to MacIntyre and the line of thinking his claims represent, the argument of the next two chapters runs as follows: Consistent with the broader argument of this work, I argue that

Calvin does not solely emphasize duty to God, demonstrating instead that reason and desire together play an important role in Calvin’s ethical thought alongside notions of command,

3 Ibid., emphasis original.

4 Paul Helm, John Calvin’s Ideas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 348.

102 obligation, and duty. My argument, in other words, is that Calvin works with both concepts of duty and desire. I will develop this argument heuristically along the lines of this dialectic of obligation and inclination. In this first chapter, I argue that humans have a clear obligation to

God, focusing especially on Calvin’s thinking on divine commands. In so doing, while I observe that Calvin places a strong accent on divine commands, I also note that divine commands align with the order of nature. They are, therefore, by no means “arbitrary fiats,” issued by a cosmic despot, as MacIntyre suggests. I also note that the law directs individuals to happiness. This, too, shows that God’s commands may not be used to bolster the claim that he is a tyrant.

In the next chapter, I consider Calvin’s thinking on inclination, specifically asking whether

Calvin believes that a person’s desires indicates their telos. Human desires do play a role, if an unexpected one, in Calvin’s thought. I therefore suggest the answer to this question is an emphatic “yes”—that there is what Oliver O’Donovan calls “a summons immanent” within each person, according to Calvin’s teaching.5 Specifically, human desires do point towards their telos, albeit ineffectively. Though I note that there is an important strain of Calvin’s thought that emphasizes natural law, for Calvin it is only through God’s grace, as it is received through union with Christ by the Spirit, that a person can realize their God-given telos. Given this emphasis on grace, MacIntyre is undoubtedly correct to conclude that there is a difference between Calvin’s and Aristotle’s thought in this area. According to Calvin, humans cannot arrive at their end simply by consulting their desires. Calvin’s eudaimonism cannot be a “reason-source” eudaimonism,6 as it is for Aristotle. This does not mean that desires cannot be consulted,

5 Oliver O’Donovan, The Problem of Self-Love in St. Augustine (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 157.

6 I am indebted to Jennifer Herdt for this term. See Jennifer A. Herdt, “Sleepers Wake! Eudaimonism, Obligation, and the Call to Responsibility,” in The Freedom of a Christian Ethicist: The Future of a Reformation Legacy, ed. Brian Brock and Michael Mawson (New York: T&T Clark, 2016), 162.

103 however. Ultimately, I conclude in the second chapter that Calvin’s eudaimonism is, indeed, an

“agent-perfective” eudaimonism, such that there is deep harmony between inclination and obligation in Calvin’s thought. He believes that to complete our duty to God is to partially fulfill our deepest desires—our desire for our own well-being and happiness. In this, Calvin’s thought stands firmly within the Augustinian tradition generally, with its emphasis on divine commands and on Godself giving rest to our restless hearts.

I develop this chapter by first considering Calvin’s thinking on human obligation to God generally. I then consider a central way that humans learn of their obligation to God in Calvin’s thought—law and divine commands. Finally, I consider the relationship between the law and happiness.

Human Obligation to God

Calvin is clear that humans have an obligation to honor and obey God. In part, Calvin believes that humans are subject to God simply because we are his creation. In this connection, he writes:

“God, as he is our Creator, has towards us by right the place of Father and Lord.”7 Another place where this same conviction can be found is Calvin’s discussion of Adam and Eve in the Garden.

Calvin’s claim that humans were subject as God’s creation is forcefully present here, especially in Calvin’s discussion of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil (or what I will simply refer to as the “Tree of Knowledge”). The Tree was a physical object intended to teach humanity

7 Inst. II.8.2.

104 of God’s grace: “For we know it to be by no means unusual that God should give to us attestation of his grace by external symbols.”8

However, beyond pointing to the sacramental theory that he will elaborate elsewhere, Calvin indicates a great deal about human submission to God in general and on law and divine commands in particular in this passage. Taking human submission to God first, Calvin reiterates what we have just seen in the Institutes, expressing that humans, as God’s creation, are his subjects. He writes: “[Humans] were to be the governors of the world, with the exception that he should he should, nevertheless, be subject to God.”9 In sum, as our Creator, God has the authority to establish rules for our lives. Here, as in the Institutes, Calvin suggests that God’s authority as Creator enables him to regulate human existence. It is essential to see this initially here. As we will explore below, because humans are bound to obey God as his creation, the law simply indicates this prior reality and gives humans a sense of the concrete shape human submission to God should take.

Calvin does not explain in either of the passages why humans are obligated as God’s creation.

Instead, in both places, he simply affirms this reality. Thus, at least initially it would seem that

Calvin thinks that simply because God created us, he can command us as he wills. This is part of the picture, but not all of it. Overall, to get a fuller sense of Calvin’s thought, we might consider his thinking on order. Calvin’s thinking on law must be understood in relation to his thinking on order, for a purpose of the law is to point towards God’s ordering of things.

8 Comm. Gen. 2:9.

9 Ibid.

105

Order and the Order of Nature

Calvin’s teaching on humanity’s subjection to God is only coherent within his broad vision of a divinely ordered world. It has frequently been observed that Calvin possessed a deep and abiding passion for order. For instance, he often speaks teleologically of the need for humans to rightly order their emotions. Overall, he insists a person’s life must be rightly ordered. As will be discussed in due course, Calvin’s thinking on law fits within his broader thinking on order.

Calvin’s abiding passion for order is also expressed, perhaps most obviously, in his frequent recourse to the concept of the “order of nature” (naturae ordo).10 It must immediately be noted that the term the “order of nature” is used quite flexibly by Calvin. Though the concept deeply permeates Calvin’s ethical thought, the order of nature is not employed only or even primarily as an ethical category. Rather, in the first place, the order of nature refers to something much broader—to the created structure of the world as established by God, particularly how the different elements are supposed to function.11 Calvin thus speaks of the movements of “the sun, moon, and stars” as integral element of the order of nature.12

10 According to the Calvini Opera Database, Calvin uses this exact Latin phrase twenty-four times. See “John Calvin, Calvini Opera | The Jonathan Edwards Center at Yale University,” accessed December 28, 2017, http://edwards.yale.edu/node/130.

11 This is partly illustrated in Calvin’s thinking on the flood. Calvin writes, “Moreover, the deluge had been an interruption of the order of nature. For the revolutions of the sun and moon had ceased: there was no distinction of winter and summer. Wherefore, the Lord here declares it to be his pleasure, that all things should recover their vigor, and be restored to their functions.” Comm. Gen. 8:22.

12 Calvin writes, “He confirms the same thing, but by introducing a similitude; for he shews that God’s covenant with the people of Israel would not be less firm than the settled order of nature. Unceasing are the progresses of the sun, moon, and stars; continual is the succession of day and night. This settled state of things is so fixed, that in so great and so multiplied a variety there is no change. We have now rain, then fair weather, and we have various changes in the seasons; but the sun still continues its daily course, the moon is new every month, and the revolving of day and night, which God has appointed, never ceases; and this unbroken order declares, as it is said in Psalm 19, the wonderful wisdom of God. The Prophet then sets before us here the order of nature, and says, that God’s covenant with his Church shall be no less fixed and unchangeable than what it is with mankind, with regard to the government of the world.” Comm. Jer. 33:19.

106

The order of nature is established by God, specifically by his command.13 This claim dovetails, unsurprisingly, with Scripture’s description of creation being the result of God’s command. The order God established in creation is reasonably fixed, according to Calvin. In one passage,

Calvin makes this point by analogy—God’s covenant with the people of Israel is as firm and settled as the order of nature.14 Elsewhere, though speaking of one aspect of the order of nature,

Calvin suggests the order of nature is “eternal and inviolable.”15 The order of nature is fixed, not simply because of what has been established once for all, but rather because of God’s continual, providential government of the world, which ensures its continuation.16

From the foregoing, we have little evidence of how Calvin believes the order of nature impacts— or at least ought to impact—a person’s moral life. However, more than simply being just another part of Calvin’s thinking on creation, the order of nature is taken by Calvin to be normative and therefore is understood to be continually prescriptive for human behavior. 17 In other words,

Calvin thinks that “order of nature” indicates the way or ways in which God made the world to work or to function—ways which were to obtain everywhere and always. In this connection,

13 Comm. 1 Tim. 2:13.

14 Comm. Jer. 33:19.

15 Comm. 1 Tim. 2:13.

16 Comm. Jer. 33:19. Elsewhere, discussing astrology, Calvin writes, “God has so formed and ordered the sun, and the moon, and all the stars, that he himself still governs and changes the seasons as it pleases him... Then this diversity in nature itself shews that God has not resigned his power to the stars, but that he so works by them, that he still holds the reins of government.” Comm. Jer. 10:1-2.

17 Ronald Wallace also notes the importance of the “order of nature” in Calvin’s ethics. See Wallace, Calvin’s Doctrine of the Christian Life, 141–47.

107 noting that humans are called to conform to the order of nature, Peter Wyatt has remarked that the order of creation is “tacitly legislating.”18

The order of nature dictates the function of created things. Metaphorically speaking, one might say that the order of nature acts as a kind of “grain of the world,” and humans are to work with it, not against it.

Calvin’s comments on work serves to illustrate his views on the order of nature generally.

Regarding human work, Calvin writes:

Moses now adds, that the earth was given to man, with this condition, that he should occupy himself in its cultivation. Whence it follows that men were created to employ themselves in some work, and not to lie down in inactivity and idleness. This labor, truly, was pleasant, and full of delight, entirely exempt from all trouble and weariness; since however God ordained that man should be exercised in the culture of the ground, he condemned in his person, all indolent repose. Wherefore, nothing is more contrary to the order of nature, than to consume life in eating, drinking, and sleeping, while in the meantime we propose nothing to ourselves to do.19

On the of this passage, God has created humans to work—it was part of the order of nature, which God established. Calvin is therefore emphatic that a life of complete leisure and idleness stands in violation of God’s intentions concerning how the world was intended to function. For

Calvin, a shorthand way of speaking about this violation is that it is a violation of the order of nature. As it is with work, so it is with many dimensions of human existence, according to

Calvin. God prescribes an order in nature generally that should be upheld between God and humans, between humans themselves, and between humans and the rest of the created world. In other words, Calvin’s application of the concept is quite wide-ranging.

18 Peter Wyatt, Jesus Christ and Creation in the Theology of John Calvin (Allison Park, PA: Wipf & Stock, 1996), 126.

19 Comm. Gen. 2:8.

108

As a part of his thinking, Calvin insists that the order of nature regulates which behaviors are appropriate within relationships. For instance, Calvin says the state of polygamy20 is said to corrupt “nature’s laws.21 It ought to be observed that elements of the order of nature are often hierarchically arranged. Children, for instance, are called to obey and respect their parents.22 The submission of wives to husbands is equally prescribed by the order of nature.23

Naturally, Calvin thinks that underlying this ordering of the world is Godself. For Calvin, God has ordered the order of nature. Indeed, Calvin understands God to be the one who created this order and, secondly, because God continually and providentially sustains it.24 Calvin states,

“God, the maker of the word, will by no means neglect the order which he has established.”25 We

20 Commenting on the statement “[a]nd Lamech took unto him two wives,” Calvin writes, “We have here the origin of polygamy in a perverse and degenerate race; and the first author of it, a cruel man, destitute of all humanity. Whether he had been impelled by an immoderate desire of augmenting his own family, as proud and ambitious men are wont to be, or by mere lust, it is of little consequence to determine; because, in either way he violated the sacred law of marriage, which had been delivered by God. For God had determined, that ‘they two should be one flesh,’ and that is the perpetual order of nature. Lamech, with brutal contempt of God, corrupts nature’s laws. The Lord, therefore, willed that the corruption of lawful marriage should proceed from the house of Cain, and from the person of Lamech, in order that polygamists might be ashamed of the example.” Comm. Gen. 4:19.

21 See Susan E. Schreiner, Theater of His Glory: Nature and the Natural Order in the Thought of John Calvin (Durham, N.C: Labyrinth Pr, 1991), 88. Harro Hopfl claims, “Calvin thought that ‘nature’ or ‘natural sense’ or ‘reason’ teaches the authority of fathers over wives and children, the sanctity of monogamous marriage, the duty to care for families, breast-feeding, primogeniture (albeit with qualification) the sacrosanctity of envoys and ambassadors, the obligation of promises, degrees of marriage, the need for witnesses in murder trials, the need for a distinct of ranks in society, and natural law prohibits incest, murder, adultery, slavery, and even the rule of one man. And again, nature itself teaches the duty to ward honors only to those qualified, respect for the old. Equity in commercial dealing and that religion must be the first concern of governors.” The Christian Polity of John Calvin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 180.

22 Comm. Gen. 9:24.

23 Comm. Gen. 2:18. Likewise, in his commentary on 1 Timothy, Calvin writes, “Now Moses shews that the woman was created afterwards, in order that she might be a kind of appendage to the man; and that she was joined to the man on the express condition, that she should be at hand to render obedience to him. (Gen. 2:21.) Since, therefore, God did not create two chiefs of equal power, but added to the man an inferior aid, the Apostle justly reminds us of that order of creation in which the eternal and inviolable appointment of God is strikingly displayed.” Comm. 1 Tim. 2:13.

24 Comm. John 5:17.

25 Comm. Ps. 11:4.

109 have already seen, however, that upholding the order of nature does not mean preserving it exactly as created.

For Calvin, ultimately, since God is the one who has ordered creation in a particular way, living in harmony with the order of nature always returns us to the idea of living in harmony with the

Creator. Indeed, ultimately, given that God is understood to have established the order of nature, conforming to the order of nature, the grain of the universe, is finally an act of obedience and submission to God, according to Calvin. Accordingly, to violate the order of nature is, according to Calvin, to pervert “the majesty and authority of God.”26 To Calvin, Scripture envisions humans as created to live in submission and obedience to God and, as part to this obedience to

God, to live in harmony with the order he established in creation.

Law

Having explored how God regulates human existence through the order of nature, I now turn to the concept of the law through which God also regulates humanity. At the outset, it is essential to see that for Calvin there is a deep and abiding harmony between God’s law and the order of nature. He can write simply: “There is a certain agreement between the law of God and the order of nature, which is engraved in all [persons].”27 It appears that God himself is the reason for this harmony. Indeed, just as with the order of nature, the law of God flows directly from his will and his command. Thus, in another place, Calvin directly joins the two ideas together, speaking of

26 Comm. Gen. 9:24. In this passage, Calvin specifically applies this to created authorities, whom God has “commanded to preside in his place.”

27 John Calvin, John Calvin’s Sermons on 1 Timothy, ed. Ray Van Neste and Brian Denker, vol. 2 (Jackson, TN: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2017), 160 (Sermon 38).

110 what is “at variance with the will of God and the legitimate order of nature.”28 The two ideas, then, work harmoniously together, according to Calvin. Precisely why God used the law in addition to concepts of order of nature will become clearer momentarily. Given that the concepts significantly overlap, it is indeed difficult to determine which is more primary, as both concepts are equally expressions of God’s will. Both concepts convey the moral norms for humanity. In the last analysis, however, despite the prominence of law in treatments of Calvin’s ethics, order is almost certainly the more primary concept. To see this, one might note how Calvin speaks of his treatment of the Christian life as a statement of how the “Christian person ought to be ordered.”29 In this same section, the law is seen as an aid to helping a person properly order his or her life.30

While law is not the primary feature of Calvin’s ethics, it is, as Gunther Haas has written, “an integral feature of [Calvin’s] ethics.”31 Due no doubt in large part to Calvin’s influence, law became a central feature of the Reformed tradition generally.32 The importance of this concept in

Calvin’s program may be easily observed in the Institutes. Calvin spends a considerable part of

Book II explaining the concept of law and then specifically exegeting and applying the

Decalogue.33 Calvin also discusses the law in his Catechism. In his “Catechism of the Church of

28 Comm. Gen. 16:1.

29 Inst. III.6.1.

30 Ibid.

31 Guenther Haas, “Ethics and Church Discipline,” in The Calvin Handbook, ed. Herman J. Selderhuis (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), 335. Probably the best and most comprehensive treatment of Calvin’s thinking on law is I. John Hesselink’s Calvin’s Concept of the Law (Allison Park, PA: Wipf & Stock, 1992).

32 Law is often understood to be a defining feature of Calvin’s ethics and the Reformed ethics generally. Indeed, almost invariably dictionary articles on the subject of Calvin’s ethics stress his emphasis on law. This is also true of articles on Reformed ethics.

33 Inst. II.7-9.

111

Geneva,” Calvin includes a series of questions intended to exposit the Decalogue at length.34 As

Calvin’s catechism is selective and seeks to distill central elements of the Christian faith, the inclusion of the law in these contexts is again suggestive of the law’s importance in his ethics.

Having observed its prominence, it seems that it is important to say exactly what Calvin means by “law.” While in some instances the referent is clearly the “Mosaic Law,”35 already, from

Calvin’s use of the term in his Genesis Commentary, one sees he can use the term quite flexibly.

Indeed, from this passage, we see that Calvin believes a law may be simply synonymous with a divine command. Comprehensively considered, a law is an expression of God’s will that regulates human actions and affections. For Calvin, as with the order of nature, God’s law and

God’s commands give the concrete shape of the obligation which is due to God.

In addition to suggesting the breadth of the term, Calvin’s description of the initial prohibition against eating from the Tree of Knowledge also illustrates several of the most basic features of his thinking on the law and divine commands. First, and most obviously, this passage shows that

God is able to legislate human behavior. In this passage, Calvin affirms again what we have already seen—that God has the right to regulate human behavior due to his position as their good

Creator. Here, this dimension of Calvin’s thinking is seen in his comment that law was imposed on Adam “in token of his subjection,” a claim that implies, of course, that this prohibition was instituted by God to indicate or signify a previously existing reality. In part, this is a striking

34 John Calvin, “The Catechism of the Church of Geneva,” in Theological Treatises, ed. and trans. J. K. S. Reid (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2000), 107–19.

35 Calvin writes, for instance: “The law was added about four hundred years after the death of Abraham.” He continues: “I understand by the word ‘law’ not only the Ten Commandments, which set forth a godly and righteous rule of living, but the form of religion handed down by God through Moses.” Inst. II.7.1.

112 statement for several reasons, because it seems to suggest a kind of theological at work in Calvin’s thought. I will return to this idea in due course.

Beyond this, however, discussing the Tree of Knowledge, Calvin specifically asserts that the law not to eat from Tree of Knowledge was given by God for two tightly interwoven purposes, one positive and the other negative. Positively, through this early law, Adam was called to honor

God. Indeed, through this law, Calvin says, “[t]he whole human race [was to] be accustomed from the beginning to reverence his deity.”36 Similarly, “God, from the beginning, imposed a law upon [humanity], for the purpose of maintaining the right due himself.”37 Negatively, as the inverse of an opportunity to revere and honor God, Calvin thinks that the Tree of Knowledge was intended to be a test for humanity. Regarding this second purpose, Calvin writes,

“[A]bstinence from the fruit of the one tree was a kind of first lesson in obedience, that man knew he had a Director and Lord of his life, on whose will he ought to depend in whose commands he ought to acquiesce.” 38 These two purposes are evidently interrelated, the second flowing from the first. The Tree of Knowledge, Calvin says, presented humans with a tangible way of reverencing God and testing their obedience to him—a test they could pass or fail. From what he says elsewhere, Calvin appears to consistently maintain that God’s law presents humanity with an opportunity to reverence God and, conversely, to disobey him. Calvin’s thinking on law elsewhere similarly presents this kind of test for humanity. Once again, returning to a key theme of the previous chapter, Calvin thinks that humans would have ultimately been perfected—that is, their telos would have been realized—if they consistently passed this test.

36 Comm. Gen. 2:17.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

113

As in this Genesis text, though Calvin uses the term law generally, he often uses it with specific reference to the Mosaic Law. Concerning the Mosaic Law, many features of Calvin’s thinking are commonplace, and therefore may be reviewed briefly. A first point that should be made about the law is that it is “everlasting and unchangeable”39 and a “perfect pattern of righteousness.”40 Calvin also adds: “[The Mosaic Law] is just as applicable to every age, even to the end of the world.”41 Such claims are striking, given that, following Scripture, Calvin also thinks that some parts of the Mosaic Law were in some sense done away with. In one place,

Calvin even calls elements of the Law “childish rudiments.”42 In another place, building further on this idea, Calvin observes, “[W]e must distinguish between what belongs to the perpetual government of human life and what properly belongs to ancient figures.”43 To do just this,

Calvin turns to the tripartite division of the law, developed at least several centuries before his time,44 which distinguishes between the moral, civil, and ceremonial codes. For Calvin, only the so-called moral code of the Old Testament law applies to New Testament believers in a linear and straightforward way. This aspect of law is what Calvin is apparently referring to when he speaks of “what belongs to the perpetual government of human life.”45 As an example of this

39 Inst. II.7.13.

40 Ibid. See also Calvin, “The Catechism of the Church of Geneva,” 118-9.

41 Ibid.

42 Inst. 4.10.14. I. John Hesselink points to the fact that this is part of Calvin’s well-known doctrine of accommodation by which God accommodates himself to the limited understanding of humans. See Hesselink, Calvin’s Concept of the Law, 178.

43 Comm. Gen. 2:3.

44 Calvin recognizes this to be a “common division.” See Inst. II.7.6. The exact origin of this division is somewhat murky. The division clearly predates Calvin by several centuries.

45 Comm. Gen. 2:3.

114 dimension of the law, believers are commanded equally in the Old Testament and the New not to commit adultery. This specific command is therefore part of the moral law.

In contrast to this unchanging part of the law, the ceremonial law refers to those commands which provided specific instruction for sacrificial worship prior to Christ’s first coming.46 The civil law, on the other hand, refers to specific legislation particular to the social life of the nation of Israel as a distinct nation. In the case of both civil and ceremonial codes, Christ’s life and death has transformed them without fully abrogating them. Calvin explains the transformation of these parts of the law as their no longer being “in use,” even if they are still “in effect.” He writes:

The ceremonies are a different matter: they have been abrogated not in effect but only in use. Christ by his coming has terminated them, but has not deprived them of anything of their sanctity; rather, he has approved and honored it. Just as the ceremonies would have provided the people of the Old Covenant with an empty show if the power of Christ’s death and resurrection had not been displayed therein; so, if they had not ceased, we would be unable today to discern for what purpose they were established.47

From this passage, it is evident that Christ’s coming has transformed parts of the law. The distinction between use and effect is therefore Calvin’s technical way of accounting for important redemptive-historical developments. Thus, owing to Christ’s coming, Calvin believes, humans are no longer responsible to obey parts of the Mosaic Law exactly as originally commanded. However, Calvin emphasizes this does not mean that these dimensions of law are completely done away with. Instead, they are still “in effect,” if not “in use.” To illustrate this distinction, while believers are, say, no longer required to make sacrifices to God, they

46 See esp. Inst. II.7.16.

47 Ibid. Emphasis added. Paul Helm’s discussion of this passage made me aware that it is only the civil and ceremonial parts of the law which are no longer “in use” but still “in effect.” The moral law, by contrast, is “in use,” but one important dimension of it is no longer “in effect” for believers—namely, its effect of condemning us before God. See Helm, Calvin’s Ideas, 351.

115 nevertheless remain dependent on the sacrificial system, since Christ came not to invalidate this system but to honor its requirements. Once again, the civil as well as the ceremonial laws are thus no longer in use, but remain in effect.

In addition to this threefold division, Calvin relies on a second tripartite division to explain the purposes of the law. Calvin seemingly borrowed this division from Melanchthon.48 This threefold division adds an additional element to Luther’s twofold division of the law. According to Calvin, the law has three purposes: it has a restraining function (primus usus legis or usus civilis), a convicting function (usus secundus or usus elenchticus), and a guiding function (tertius usus legis or usus didacticus).

In its convicting role, the law renders humanity without an excuse before God.49 The law, then, acts as a kind of mirror,50 displaying each person’s manifold, moral deficiencies.51 Calvin’s fellow reformer Martin Luther, with his dialectic of law and gospel,52 is perhaps better known for this use of the law. With Luther, Calvin is emphatic that no human, save Christ, has lived or may live in perfect obedience to the moral law. Of course, any violation of the law is sin, and Calvin is equally emphatic, repurposing Medieval category, that all sin is mortal (or deadly) sin.53 In

48 Richard Muller notes this parallel with Melanchthon. See Muller, Unaccommodated Calvin, 129.

49 Inst. II.7.6.

50 Calvin writes plainly, “The law is like a mirror. In it we contemplate our weakness, then the iniquity arising from this, and finally the curse coming from both—just as a mirror shows us the spots on our face.” Inst. II.7.7.

51 Calvin writes, “The first part is this: while it shows God’s righteousness, that is, the righteousness alone acceptable to God, it warns, informs, convicts, and lastly condemns, every man of his own unrighteousness.” Inst. II.7.6.

52 One might note that Calvin also employs this same dialectic. For Calvin, however, the law becomes sweet when one apprehends the mediator. See Inst. II.7.12.

53 Inst. II.8.59.

116 pointing out human sinfulness, law causes humans to despair and thus prepares the way for the good news of the gospel.54

In its restraining role, the law acts, on a favourite metaphor of Calvin’s, as a bridle or halter.55

Flowing from what we have already begun to see about Calvin’s low view of sinful human nature, certain persons may be compelled to do what is right simply “by hearing the dire threats of the law.”56

Lastly, in its guiding capacity, the law shows believers how to live holy lives unto God as a kind of guide on their spiritual pilgrimage. According to Calvin, this positive function is the primary function of the law.57 Thus, even while cast in this role, the law may be still be a “whip” used by

God to fight against “the flesh”—that is, of course, that part of believers which draws them towards sin and causes them to be spiritually lethargic.58 For sinful humans, the law can only become “sweet” through Christ. Making this point, Calvin distinguishes between what he calls

“bare law” and the law as properly understood in relation to the gospel. Where the bare law, the law divorced without the gospel, condemns, the law understood in light of the gospel becomes a friend rather than a foe. According to Calvin, this is the sense in which the Psalmist speaks about

54 The law makes God’s grace sweet. In this connection, Calvin writes, “Thereby the grace of God, which nourishes us without the support of the law, becomes sweeter, and his mercy, which bestows grace upon us, becomes more lovely. From this we learn that he never tires in repeatedly benefiting us and in heaping new gifts upon us.” Inst. II.7.7.

55 See, for instance, Inst. II.7.10. Here, Calvin writes, “[T]he law is like a halter to check the raging and otherwise limitlessly ranging lusts of the flesh.”

56 Ibid.

57 Calvin speaks of the “third and principle use, which pertains more closely to the proper purpose of the law.” Inst. II.7.12.

58 Inst. II.7.12. Here Calvin writes, “The law is to the flesh like a whip to an idle and balky ass, to arouse it to work. Even for a spiritual man not yet free of the weight of the flesh the law remains a constant sting that will not let him stand still.”

117 the law being delightful.59 As we will explore in the final section, in all three of its uses, but perhaps especially this use, the law promotes happiness and human flourishing.

Prior to Christ’s coming, the Mosaic Law might be applied to a person’s life straightforwardly in all three uses. After Christ’s coming, all three uses of the law apparently only apply to moral law, which alone remains in use and in effect. The natural law, as we will explore in the next chapter, is the moral law as it is known by all persons apart from God’s verbal revelation. Accordingly, all three uses of the law also apply fully to the natural law.

In this section, I have considered key features of Calvin’s thinking on law. I have not yet considered MacIntyre’s charge that Calvin’s ethics are arbitrary fiats. I now consider this by considering whether Calvin was a voluntarist of this sort. Related to Calvin’s alleged voluntarism, I also briefly consider to what extent Calvin is a divine command theorist.

Voluntarism and Occamism

Though he does not use this term, the charge of voluntarism is leveled by Alasdair McIntyre against the French Reformer’s ethics. To repeat: MacIntyre claims God’s commands are

“arbitrary fiats” for the Reformers. Voluntarism, of course, can simply mean that morality depends on God’s will. It is certainly possible that Calvin is voluntarist in this sense, since both the order of nature and of God’s commands depend on God’s will. MacIntyre’s charge is more

59 See, for instance, Comm. Ps. 119:142. Here Calvin writes, “[The Psalmist] affirms that he finds in the law of God the most soothing delight, which mitigates all griefs, and not only tempers their bitterness, but also seasons them with a certain sweetness. And assuredly when this taste does not exist to afford us delight, nothing is more natural than for us to be swallowed up of sorrow. Nor ought we to omit noticing the form of expression which the Prophet employs, by which he teaches, that although he was besieged and shut up on all sides, he found a remedy sufficiently powerful in improving the consolation offered him by the word of God. As this could not be true of the bare commandments, which so far from remedying our distresses, rather fill us with anxiety, there is no doubt that under the word commandments there is comprehended by the figure synecdoche, the whole doctrine of the law, in which God not only requires what is right, but in which also calling his elect ones to the hope of eternal salvation, he opens the gate of perfect happiness. Yea, under the term law are comprehended both free adoption, and also the promises which flow from it."

118 specific, however. His accusation is that Calvin’s ethics are voluntaristic in the sense that something is right simply because God commanded it—indeed, that this is only rationale for

God’s commands. Indeed, along with MacIntyre’s claim that God is a cosmic despot, Calvin’s theology, like Luther’s, is thus seen as voluntaristic in the worst sense—in a word, in the

“Occamistic sense.” Of Ockham’s thought, MacIntyre writes, “[I]n an Occamist perspective…

[commands] have no further rationale or justification than that they are the injunctions of God.”60

It may be asked whether this claim is true of the Reformer’s ethic.

To begin to answer this question, one might straightaway acknowledge that there are parts of the law that do seem to be historically situated ordinances rather than eternal precepts. We have, of course, seen this in Calvin’s discussion of the three parts of the law. He seems to have no qualms in calling parts of the law “childish rudiments.”61 For Calvin, these civil and ceremonial laws were intended to help the children of Israel in their particular historical situation. On a favorite metaphor of Calvin’s, God used the law as a teacher to train his people. Accordingly, of the ceremonial law, Calvin writes, “The ceremonial law was the tutelage of the Jews, with which it seemed good to the Lord to train this people, as it were, in their childhood, until the fullness of time should come.”62 Of course, related to the charges of voluntarism, one may ask whether God had to tutor his people with these rites and civil regulations. Though I know of no specific passage where Calvin directly confronts this question, it seems more than likely that the answers in the negative—it seems fair to say that these commands were not strictly necessary. This is not the same as saying these commands were arbitrary, however. Indeed, Calvin should be taken at

60 MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics, 121.

61 Inst. IV.10.14.

62 Inst. IV.20.15

119 his word—for him, the Mosaic Law is rudimentary or childish, not arbitrary. Again, as we have just said, the Mosaic Law served an important function—the function of pointing persons to

Christ.

The abiding goodness of the law is also shown, in part, in the portions of the Mosaic Law which remain “in effect.” In this connection, it might be noted that the logic which appears to be at work here is that, in Calvin’s theological program, the moral law remains “in effect,” in part because the moral law perfectly aligns with God’s eternal ordering of things or the order of nature. We have already noted that Calvin occasionally directly relates the two concepts. This parallel is also seen in strands of Calvin’s thought which may be placed alongside one another.

For instance, Calvin claims that murder is both against the “order of nature” as well as a clear violation of the sixth commandment. In short, Calvin thinks these laws reflected an established order.

MacIntyre’s claim is refuted most fully by the fact that Calvin himself directly confronts the charge that God’s commands are arbitrary fiats. In response to this claim, Calvin insists God’s will and God’s commands are always related to his character. In the Institutes, he explicitly writes, “Whatever [God] requires of us (because he can require only what is right), we must obey because of natural obligation.”63 With the short parenthetical remark here—that “[God] can only require what is right”—Calvin briefly suggests an alternative picture, one in which humans were commanded to do something immoral. Dismissing this possibility, Calvin makes it clear that it does not follow that, if God were somehow evil or malevolent, we would be obligated to follow his commands, as we presently are. Indeed, it is clear that Calvin thinks that had God issued

63 Inst. II.8.2.

120 some immoral command—say, to torture others simply for the sake our own pleasure—we as humans would not be obligated to do it. In short, we as humans never find ourselves in the position of being commanded to do what would be wrong. And one can be sure this will never happen, because of God’s character.

Confirming this position later in the Institutes, Calvin makes a similar point:

And we do not advocate the fiction of “absolute might”; because this is profane, it ought rightly to be hateful to us. We fancy no lawless god who is a law unto himself. For, as Plato says, men who are troubled with lust are in need of law; but the will of God is not only free of all fault but is the highest rule of perfection, and even the law of all laws.64

Calvin makes this point in a discussion of election. According to Calvin, those who peddle the fiction of “absolute might” hold that there is no higher principle than God’s will. Calvin clearly abhors this idea. The reason Calvin abhors it, as he goes on to say, is that it paints a picture of a

“lawless god.” Calvin thus does not think that simply because God wills something, it must be right. Instead, Calvin assumes that God’s will is what he calls “the highest rule of perfection,” or

“the law of all laws.” Calvin’s comments apply quite directly to voluntarism—God is not a lawless God, but is instead a God who necessarily wills what is good. Given his rejection of the idea that God could command or do whatever he wishes, Calvin cannot be a voluntarist in the

Occamist sense. Thus, while morality—as expressed in the natural order and God’s law—is undoubtedly determined by God’s will, God’s will always depends on his character, according to

Calvin.

In the end, Calvin consistently maintains that we must do what God requires of us, not simply because he is powerful, but because he is good. It is extremely important to see this fact when considering Calvin’s thinking on law. God’s commands and God’s character are expressions of

64 Inst. III.23.2.

121

God’s character. Or indeed, to be still more specific, they are good for human persons. His commands cannot be otherwise. Tacitly, at this point, we begin to see that God’s commands promote human flourishing. Though humans are obligated to obey God’s commands, these commands are nonetheless always in a person’s best interest. More will be said on this point at the end of this chapter as well as in chapter five.

At this point, it may be helpful to resituate Calvin’s reputation of the doctrine of absolute might within his wider theological vision. Stepping back, we recall that Calvin envisions unfallen humanity as born rich in circumstances and abilities. Indeed, the world in which humans were placed was radiant with God’s goodness. More than this, human nature was itself good in its all parts. Ultimately, humanity’s highest feature, facility in understanding and reason, was supposed to lead to the contemplation of God’s goodness in creation, and to move from this fact to meditation on the future life, and, by way of meditation, arrive at Godself. As a part of this, humans were, specifically, called to live lives of worship and obedience, culminating in the arrival at a richer, more blessed kind of existence. In this vision, it is impossible to think about obedience to God without reference to God’s goodness. This truth is always in the background in

Calvin’s thinking about obedience. In short, Calvin thinks that Scripture’s vision is one where

God’s goodness and our obligation are inseparable realities—those obligated to obey God have experienced his goodness. Calvin, indeed, never seriously contemplates obedience to God divorced from an awareness of his goodness towards us. Thus, even if, by virtue of creation, humans are called to submit to God as their Creator, it is important to see that this is only one part of a larger picture. This aspect of Calvin’s thought is filled out by another—humans are obligated to obey God, knowing his goodness.

122

In Calvin’s thought, this same point applies not only with reference to Adam, but also with equal force to all Old Testament and New Testament believers. In his exposition of the Mosaic Law,

Calvin is therefore at pains to show that the obligations to obey this law follow from his redeeming work.65 What is more, following Scripture’s lead, Calvin thinks that believers in the

New Testament share this experience—their duty to obey is set within a wider narrative of gracious redemption. The New Testament believer’s experience, of course, is one of redemption from slavery to sin, not slavery to Pharaoh. Obedience out of gratitude to God, empowered by grace from God, is an important theme in Calvin’s thought.

From the foregoing, it should already begin to be clear that Calvin should not be classified as a theological voluntarist who insists something is right simply because God wills it. Again, I likewise believe it is sufficiently clear that Calvin thinks humans would not have been obligated to submit to him if he were a divine tyrant. Thus, MacIntyre’s description of Calvin’s God as a

“cosmic despot” is, to put it mildly, seriously misguided. Calvin emphasizes God’s goodness, and the goodness of his commands.

As a final point, however, MacIntyre speaks of “a God whose goodness we cannot judge.”66

There is much that could be said about this particular claim. To begin, we note that MacIntyre’s claims relate to a debate over whether Calvin is a divine command theorist. Some thinkers like

65 See, for instance, Comm. Lev. 19:36. “I am the Lord your God. In these first four passages he treats of the same points which we have observed in the preface to the Law; for he reasons partly from God’s authority, that the law should be reverently obeyed, because the Creator of heaven and earth justly claims supreme dominion; and, partly, he sets before them the blessing of redemption, that they may willingly submit themselves to His law, from whom they have obtained their safety. For, whenever God calls Himself Jehovah, it should suggest His majesty, before which all ought to be humbled; whilst redemption should of itself produce voluntary submission.”

66 MacIntyre, Short History of Ethics, 123; emphasis original.

123

John Hare have claimed that, like , Calvin stands in this tradition.67 I note briefly that this classification of Calvin’s ethics seems unlikely. In this connection, Paul Helm has previously questioned those who have classified Calvin as a divine command theorist.68 If anything, says Helm, Calvin holds to an epistemic version of .69 On such a version of divine command theory, morality is not established by divine commands but is instead known by divine commands.

For my part, I agree with Helm’s assessment—Calvin hardly seems to be a divine command theorist, given his thinking on the order of nature previously considered, as well as his thinking on natural law. These dimensions of Calvin’s thought are related and, due to both dimensions, it seems that morality does not depend solely on God’s commands. Certainly, a case could be made that Calvin is something like a “divine will theorist.” In one sense, all morality is linked to God’s will. God’s will, however, is linked to God’s character, so even this classification seems to miss something important. In the last analysis, divine commands are one source of moral knowledge for Calvin—though almost certainly the most important one for fallen humans. The difference between whether morality depends on divine commands and is known through divine commands is important. If this line of analysis is correct, Calvin’s emphasis on divine commands largely functions with thinking on the subject of human rationality. In short, Calvin consistently thinks reason cannot be trusted—because it is inherently error-prone—and therefore is not sufficient for living a virtuous life. This is especially the case given that fallen humans are unable to discern

67 John E. Hare, God’s Call: Moral Realism, God’s Commands, and Human Autonomy (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2000), 49–86.

68 Helm, John Calvin’s Ideas, 343–44.

69 Ibid.

124 their end apart from revelation. For Calvin, virtue is only apparent (and therefore illusory) when it is not directed towards the end to which humanity was created.70

Given that human reason is so flawed, it seems that the law of God may be an affront to sinful

(and finite) human reason. Directly, then, to MacIntyre’s point that humans cannot judge God’s commands, my subsequent treatment of Calvin’s thinking on natural law should be helpful.

Already here, however, given this disjunction between human reason and God’s command, it appears that Calvin can envision God commanding us humans to do something we might not wholly understand, perhaps even things which we humans find troubling. That is to say, if and when humanity’s grasp of morality appears to be at odds with God’s will as revealed in

Scripture, Calvin thinks that in this situation, fully acknowledging God’s superior wisdom, humans must submit to Scripture—and therefore God.

Given that human rationality may not be able to judge the goodness of God’s commands,

MacIntyre’s point is correct in one respect—namely, that, according to Calvin, humans finally cannot judge God’s commands. However, as I explore in the next chapter, humans have may have good intuitions about the rightness and wrongness of particular acts. Therefore, that Calvin does think God’s commands may sometimes offend human moral sensibilities does not mean he assumes that God’s commands always offend. Obedience, as just seen, is situated in the context of God’s goodness. More specifically, it is always situated within the covenant of grace, which is the overarching framework for divine-human interaction, according to Calvin. This is an

70 Calvin writes, “Therefore, since by the very impurity of men’s hearts these good works have been corrupted as from their source, they ought no more to be reckoned among virtues than the vices that commonly deceive on account of their affinity and likeness to virtue. In short, when we remember the constant end of that which is right—namely, to serve God—whatever strives to another end already deservedly loses the name “right.” Therefore, because they do not look to the goal that God’s wisdom prescribes, what they do, though it seems good in the doing, yet by its perverse intention is sin.” Inst. III.14.3.

125 important move that Calvin takes to avoid MacIntyre’s charge. Above all, however, it may be said that Calvin avoids MacIntyre’s charge in his views on faith. As we have seen, a life of obedience to God is, for Calvin, necessarily rooted in faith.71 In short, then, Calvin thinks that

God can command what he will (on an Augustinian phrase) and humans are not in a position to judge his individual commands. Calvin does think, however, that believers are in a position to judge God’s goodness. In the life of the believer, obedience is expected to flow from faith, and faith, once again, is a sure knowledge of God’s goodness.72 In the case of a believer, then, Calvin thinks Christians have sufficient knowledge to judge God’s goodness.

In the end, MacIntyre is no doubt entirely right to flag their respective views on rationality as a key difference between Calvin and Aristotle. Aristotle, on the one hand, thinks that reason is sufficient for ethics, whereas Calvin, on the other, does not. Ultimately, Calvin’s perspective is shared by any ethics that suggests God’s law and divine commands may override human rationality. Both thinkers, in other words, allow for revealed law to supersede what seems apparent to human reason. Beyond insisting on the priority of God’s will, Calvin’s consistent solution to these matters is to situate human obedience in the context of God’s goodness.73

71 Inst. III.3.3. Here Calvin writes, “Now, both repentance and forgiveness of sins—that is, newness of life and free reconciliation—are conferred on us by Christ, and both are attained by us through faith. As a consequence, reason and the order of teaching demand that I begin to discuss both at this point. However, our immediate transition will be from faith to repentance. For when this topic is rightly understood it will better appear how man is justified by faith alone, and simple pardon; nevertheless actual holiness of life, so to speak, is not separated from free imputation of righteousness. Now it ought to be a fact beyond controversy that repentance not only constantly follows faith, but is also born of faith. For since pardon and forgiveness are offered through the preaching of the gospel in order that the sinner, freed from the tyranny of Satan, the yoke of sin, and the miserable bondage of vices, may cross over into the Kingdom of God, surely no one can embrace the grace of the gospel without betaking himself from the errors of his past life into the right way, and applying his whole effort to the practice of repentance.”

72 Inst. III.2.7.

73 There is a second important and related difference between Calvin and Aristotle. We have already seen where one point of divergence lies and that Calvin himself is aware of the difference. For his part, Calvin does not think that sinful humans truly know their telos of union with God apart from revelation.

126

The Law, Christ, and Happiness

MacIntyre finally claims that, in Calvin’s thought, “[W]e cannot interpret [God’s commands] as designed to bring us to the telos to which our desires point.”74 In this section, I show this contention is incorrect. In fact, this is precisely how Calvin understands the law.

As a first point, one might note again that the whole law is understood as purposeful by Calvin— even despite the fact that some parts of it are, in some sense, “childish.” If what the law demands of humans is not onerous or arbitrary but purposeful, up to this point it has largely remained unclear what this purpose is. The overall purpose of the law might be explored from several different standpoints. We have already noted the law’s purpose(s). These purposes, however, are subservient to the end of directing persons towards Christ. On this point, Calvin is emphatic—

Christ is the end of the law. According to Calvin, Christ is the end in at least two distinct senses.

First, Christ is the end of the law in the sense that the law leads—or, at least, it should lead— humanity to Christ by revealing human sinfulness and thus, in turn, directing despairing persons to find hope in Christ. Apart from Christ, as we have seen, the law necessarily condemns sinful humans. This, as already suggested, is not the primary purpose of the law. In this connection,

Calvin teaches that the condemning use of the law is an accidental rather than a necessary property of the law.75 Indeed, seeking to follow Scripture’s teaching, Calvin insists with the

74 MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics, 123.

75 Comm. Gen. 2:16. Calvin writes, “Should any one bring, as an objection, another statement of Paul, where he asserts that the ‘law is the minister of death,’ (2 Cor. 3:7) I answer, it is so accidentally, and from the corruption of our nature. But at the time of which we speak, a precept was given to man, whence he might know that God ruled over him.”

127

Apostle Paul that the law is inherently good.76 It is therefore human sinfulness that makes the law seem otherwise. For sinful humans, Calvin thinks that through Christ the law should become sweet. For him, the law becomes sweet in the sense that it is fulfilled by Christ, and therefore the penalties of disobedience to the law no longer threaten those in Christ.

Second, in addition to leading persons to Christ, the law also leads Christians to moral conformity to Christ’s image. This is part of Calvin’s thinking on the twofold gift offered in

Christ. Christ not only fulfilled the law in the place of humanity, but enables humans to follow the law—albeit imperfectly—in this life. The purpose of moral conformity to Christ is the restoration of the image of God. The restoration of humans into the image of God is also the restoration of persons to order. For Calvin, these are finally identical concepts—the restoration of the image of God involves all parts of the human person in God’s intended order. The law therefore points to Christ in its first and third use. In its second use, it is not as clear how it points to Christ. Yet even here, insofar as the law preserves societies that Christ may redeem, the law points to, or at least prepares the way, for Christ.

The law has other purposes, according to Calvin. In one sense, the central purpose of the law is the expression of the image of God in the lives of humans. On this subject, Calvin writes:

Now it will not be difficult to decide the purpose of the whole law: the fulfillment of righteousness to form human life to the archetype of divine purity. For God has so depicted his character in the law that if any man carries out in deeds whatever is enjoined there, he will express the image of God, as it were, in his own life.77

In expressing the image of God in our lives, ultimately it appears that the final end of the law must be obedience which brings God glory. It appears that this is the other side of the coin, as it

76 Comm. Rom. 7:12. 77 Inst. II.8.51.

128 were, where Calvin is concerned. He writes, “God has prescribed to us the way, by which he would have himself to be glorified by us, even by true piety, which consists in obedience to his word. He who leaps over this boundary, strives not to honour God, but to dishonour him.”78

What is more, it appears that this law’s purpose is to bring glory to God, because Calvin insists all created things exist for this goal. The world is, after all, a theater of God’s glory, according to

Calvin.79 In this connection, it might also be noted that God’s glory is the final cause of salvation—that is, in the specific sense of Aristotle’s four causes.80 Accordingly, the law’s other purposes, including directing humans to salvation in Christ and the restoration to the image of

God and order, must ultimately serve this overarching goal. In a word, these things are instrumental to this particular end.

Though the law promotes God’s glory, regarding the thesis of this work it should be noted how happiness relates to the law’s purposes. Calvin, in short, appears to indicate that happiness is the purpose of the law by specifically indicating that obedience leads to happiness. This can be seen from multiple passages. For instance, Calvin writes,

The Prophet intended to show that true happiness, with its accompaniments, consists in obedience to God; and that the wicked, by their obstinacy, bring upon themselves every kind of calamities, and therefore that all our distresses ought to be ascribed to the sins and crimes which we have committed.81

Or likewise:

Our whole happiness undoubtedly consists in our having that true wisdom which is to be derived from the word of God; and our only hope of obtaining this wisdom lies in God’s being pleased to display his mercy and goodness towards us. The Prophet, therefore,

78 Comm. Rom. 3:8.

79 See, for instance, Inst. I.6.2.

80 See Comm. Luke 1:74.

81 Comm., Isa. 1:19.

129

magnifies the greatness and excellence of the benefit of being instructed in the , when he requests that it may be bestowed upon him as a free gift.82

From this foregoing material, we have seen that the law has several purposes. Most basically, as

Calvin lays it out, the law convicts persons, sustains communities, and guides believers. In these roles, it points to Christ such that, in Christ, the law finds fulfillment. Those in Christ are expected to find the law to be “sweet.” Finally, while pointing towards Christ, the law promotes

God’s glory and human happiness.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have broadly considered Calvin’s thinking on duty and obligation to God. To do so, I have taken Alasdair MacIntyre’s accusation of Calvin’s ethic creating a despotic picture of

God as my starting point. Taking issue with this claim, I have argued that Calvin sees humans as obligated to obey God, but he does not see this obligation as arbitrary. I responded to

MacIntyre’s claims in multiple ways, beginning first with Calvin’s emphasis that humanity’s obligation to God aligns with the overall structure of the universe—what he calls the “order of nature.” It was seen that the order of nature is an important and dynamic concept for Calvin. I then turned specifically to law and divine commands. Here, I noted the complexity of Calvin’s thinking on the law.

For Calvin, as we have seen, the law is at once enduring and rudimentary. This paradox is largely explained by Calvin’s division of the law into three parts. Calvin, in turn, also speaks of three initial purposes of the law. The complexity of Calvin’s thought shows that the law in no way is a collection of arbitrary fiats. In this connection, I considered whether Calvin is a voluntarist,

82 Comm. Ps. 119:124.

130 particularly in the narrow, “Occamistic sense” suggested by MacIntyre. Perhaps unsurprisingly, I rejected this claim. To do so, I noted how the law serves a number of purposes in Calvin’s thought. From this, I believe I demonstrated that Calvin is not a voluntarist in this specific sense.

I concluded this chapter, noting the purposes of the law beyond Calvin’s threefold uses. The law directs persons to Christ and promotes God’s glory. A final purpose of the law appears to be that it promotes human happiness and well-being, a point that is not insignificant to the overarching purpose of this work.

In the next chapter, as already noted, I discuss the concept which functions as a kind of counterweight to Calvin’s thinking on duty—namely, his thinking on desire. As we will see,

Calvin thinks that desire plays an important role in the Christian life. In fact, Calvin uses a combination of philosophical and biblical language to affirms that all humans desire the realization of a particular state. In his thinking, the world is dynamically animated with a desire to be perfected. This aspect of Calvin’s thought is significant, because it yet again points to the overall harmonious nature his thought has with eudaimonism, which strongly emphasizes the importance desires play in our moral lives.

Chapter 4 Inclination to God

Grant, Almighty God, that since thou hast at this time deigned in thy mercy to gather us to thy Church, and to enclose us within the boundaries of thy word, by which thou preservest us in the true and right worship of thy majesty,—O grant, that we may continue contented in this obedience to thee: and though Satan may, in many ways, attempt to draw us here and there, and we be also ourselves, by nature, inclined to evil, O grant, that being confirmed in faith, and united to thee by that sacred bond, we may yet constantly abide under the guidance of thy word, and thus cleave to Christ thy only-begotten Son, who has joined us for ever to himself, that we may never by any means turn aside from thee, but be, on the contrary, confirmed in the faith of his gospel, until at length he will receive us all into his kingdom. Amen.1

In the previous chapter, I considered elements of MacIntyre’s claims surrounding Calvin’s ethics. I believe I have shown there that, in Calvin’s thinking, God’s commands are hardly

“arbitrary fiats.” Over against this accusation, I argued that Calvin understands the law to be purposeful. Indeed, according to Calvin, the law has several purposes, not the least of which is directing humans to obedience to God and the happiness which flows from this obedience.

In this chapter, I consider Calvin’s thinking on desire and inclination. Desire, as I have already begun to suggest, plays a central role in eudaimonism. Alasdair MacIntyre placed Calvin outside of the Aristotelian tradition, due to his perception that the emphasis on Calvin’s thought is entirely on duty to divine commands—commands which have no apparent relationship to the telos which all humans desire. I think this statement of desire’s role in eudaimonism might be filled out in more detail here at the outset, as this will be my point of comparison.

Desire has a key function in eudaimonistic ethics. In the first instance, the eudaimonist will say that all desire eudaimonia, in the sense that all of us are working towards some united end, which can explain and unite our various tasks. On this claim, eudaimonia is a—even the—de facto object of human pursuit. Taking Aristotle once again as representative of the ethical philosophy,

1 Hos. 4, prayer. 131

132 this is in fact where he begins. Making a related but not identical claim, the eudaimonistic tradition insists that eudaimonia, adequately defined, is an objectively desirable state. Simply put, if it is something that is worth pursuing, one should want it. The eudaimonist therefore assumes that persons are directed towards something they should desire. Lastly, we have already seen in MacIntyre’s presentation that for the eudaemonist, reaching our telos involves consulting and judging our desires. Morality is, of course, consistently taken by eudaimonists.to be central to the end we are working towards

On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that a eudaimonist does not think about our desires’

“work” in a completely straightforward way. Indeed, eudaimonists emphasize that serious reflection should lead us to see that our desires conflict with one another. For the eudaimonist, a way forward is found in determining which desires are most central to reaching our end. We all desire to live well, according to the eudaimonist; and through rationality, it is claimed, we are not only able to see that our desires are in conflict, but also to successfully bring them into a harmony with one other. To do this successfully, of course, we must subordinate certain desires to others, seeing them as instrumental to a greater good and, ultimately, the highest good of one’s eudaimonia. More than this, the eudaimonist can envision a situation in which humans are expected to deny certain desires which are not conducive to reaching our final end. It is finally through this process of rationally subordinating one’s desires to other desires that one comes to realize how to order one’s life for the purpose of reaching one’s final end, and therefore one’s eudaimonia. Jennifer Herdt gives a helpful general summary of this dimension of eudaimonism as a moral philosophy: “[It] insists[s] we can only be transformed through our desires, not against or in defiance of them, that virtue involve[s] arriving a harmony between one’s desires

133 and reason’s grasp of the good, that the virtuous life is the happy life.”2 The eudaimonistic tradition as a whole places a strong accent on realizing our desires. This is as true of Christian eudaimonism as it is of pagan eudaimonism. In Christian reflection, however, God is the ultimate object of human desire. In a word, God is the highest good. Augustine is again representative of the Christian tradition here. Indeed, this sentiment is perfectly captured in Augustine’s claim that our hearts are restless until we find rest in God.3

Finally, as a fundamental part of the Christian eudaimonistic reflection, the world—or better,

God’s creation—is seen as invested with an innate longing for Godself. This belief has been described by Oliver O’Donovan as an affirmation of a kind of “dynamic nostalgia.” O’Donovan uses this particular phrase to describe Augustine’s eudaimonism:

Augustine's picture of the universe shows us one who is the source and the goal of being, value, and activity, himself in the center of the universe and at rest; and it shows us the remainder of the universe in constant movement, which, while it may tend toward or away from the center, is yet held in relation to it, so that all other beings lean, in a multiplicity of ways, toward the source and goal of being. But the force which draws these moving galaxies of souls is immanent to them, a kind of dynamic nostalgia rather than a transcendent summons from the center. Such a summons, of course, is presupposed; but it is reflected by this responsive movement which is other than itself, so that there is a real reciprocity between Creator and creature. In the last resort what is at issue is whether all movement in the universe is from the center to the circumference or whether there is also this responsive movement.4

A key idea in this passage is that Augustine conceives of the universe having an inclination within itself to move towards God, the center of the universe, the source and goal of being, value, and activity. While O’Donovan is describing Augustine’s eudaimonism here, this picture

2 Jennifer A. Herdt, “Sleepers Wake! Eudaimonism, Obligation, and the Call to Responsibility,” in The Freedom of a Christian Ethicist: The Future of a Reformation Legacy, ed. Brian Brock and Michael Mawson (New York: T&T Clark, 2016), 159.

3 Augustine, The Confessions, 39 (I.1.1).

4 Oliver O’Donovan, The Problem of Self-Love in Augustine (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 157.

134 is, yet again, broadly representative of the Christian eudaimonistic tradition.5 Accordingly,

O’Donovan himself goes on to note that it is this emphasis on an immanent summons coming from within the world that a thinker such as Anders Nygren finds so objectionable about this eudaimonistic tradition as a whole.

I now turn to consider Calvin’s thinking on desire in general and this idea of “dynamic nostalgia” in particular.

Calvinian Dynamic Nostalgia

By now, it should be clear that Calvin places a strong emphasis on human obligation to God and, more broadly, on what O’Donovan has called God’s transcendent summons. For Calvin, we saw that this transcendent summons takes on a threefold—indeed, a Trinitarian—shape: Humans, or at least the elect, are summoned back to God himself, by God’s own providential directing of things. God accomplishes this through a Mediator—namely, Christ, by whom he “connects earth and heaven.”6 Union with Christ materially ensures that the elect will return to God. Union with

Christ also enables and ensures that the final element of the transcendent summons is human fulfillment of God’s law. Persons fulfill the law as the Spirit enables those who have been united to Christ to obey it. The Spirit and God’s word, including God’s commands, are always connected for Calvin. The law is the perfect rule of righteousness which directly summons us to the holiness which is a necessary part of our union with Christ and God, and therefore of humanity’s end. Accordingly, an emphasis on God’s transcendent summons is clear. The

5 Jennifer Herdt highlighted the significance of this passage for understanding eudaimonism in her Warfield Lectures. See “Reditus Reformed” (Warfield Lectures, Princeton, NJ, 2013).

6 Calvin states, “It is Christ alone, therefore, who connects heaven and earth: he is the only Mediator who reaches from heaven down to earth: he is the medium through which the fulness of all celestial blessings flows down to us, and through which we, in turn, ascend to God.” Comm. Gen. 28:12.

135 question, then, becomes: Is there anything akin to Augustine’s “dynamic nostalgia” in Calvin’s thought—an internal desire for God—rather than simply divine intervention and directives? I now work to show that there is.

Undoubtedly, there are elements in Calvin’s thought which might seem to overwhelm any sort of dynamic nostalgia. Preeminent among these, as we have already explored in both chapter two as well as in the previous chapter, is Calvin’s emphasis on the Fall’s impact on the human faculties of reason and will. We have thus seen that Calvin does not think, as the pagan eudaimonist would, that reason is sufficient to lead us the highest good. Calvin, as we saw, quite explicitly rejects this position. He reasons that humans no longer contain within themselves the ability to meditate on and successfully reach the bliss of the future life, which centers of Godself. For

Calvin, as just seen, God’s threefold transcendent summons—God’s electing grace; Christ, to whom persons may be united; revelation generally and God’s commands specifically, which are used by the Spirit—are needed to ensure that humans can reach their end. All persons work together, enabling human responsiveness to God. In important ways, this strand of Calvin’s thought works against a kind of built-in nostalgia and it is intended to do just this—for Calvin works to show that salvation is not a process that works harmoniously with human desires.

Instead, salvation is a dramatic : it replaces old desires with new ones.

This is only one vital strand of Calvin’s thought, however. It emphatically does not represent the whole of his thought. Calvin, with Augustine conceives of a dynamic nostalgia within humanity, and all creation with them. While it is not my purpose here to compare it to Augustine at every point, this strand of thought may be understood as being broadly in harmony with these writers on the subject of desire. This element of Calvin’s thought finds expression in several overlapping parts of his writing. It is therefore difficult to know where to begin. Perhaps the best place to start

136 might be Calvin’s affirmation that the creation as a whole is endued with an innate longing for its

God. Consider Calvin’s words on Romans 8:19:

[T]here is no element and no part of the world which, being touched, as it were, with a sense of its present misery, does not intensely hope for a resurrection. He indeed lays down two things, — that all are creatures in distress, — and yet that they are sustained by hope. And it hence also appears how immense is the value of eternal glory, that it can excite and draw all things to desire it.7

From this passage, it is evident that all the elements of the world somehow long for what the resurrection will bring. Here, then, is clear allusion to dynamic nostalgia within the world.

Initially, as in the passage just above, Calvin follows Paul’s lead and describes creation’s longing for its redemption using the language of hope. Calvin himself, of course, quickly acknowledges that this hope is finally an anthropomorphism. Even so, seeking to be true to Scripture, Calvin thinks this anthropomorphism describes an important reality.

Apparently seeking other ways to describe this reality, Calvin explicitly explains creation’s hope for the resurrection by making recourse to the philosophical affirmation that all things naturally seek the good. Thus, in this same section of his Romans Commentary, Calvin writes: “Since there is no reason in such creatures, their will is to be taken no doubt for their natural inclination, according to which the whole nature of things tends to its own preservation and perfection.”8 In the Institutes, Calvin echoes this sentiment, unreservedly affirming that “metals and stones [tend] towards their own perfection of the essence.”9 Prior to making this comment, Calvin mentions the philosophical provenance of this claim, observing that the idea that all things seek good naturally was affirmed by both philosophers and the scholastic theologians alike. He then goes

7 Comm. Rom. 8:19.

8 Comm. Rom. 8:20.

9 Inst. II.2.26.

137 on to say that this idea “has been received with general consent,” and from the subsequent discussion it becomes apparent that Calvin feels no need to reject the prevailing wisdom. He does, however, emphasize that this tendency of nature does differ from humanity’s tendency towards the good—an idea to which I will return.

For clarity’s sake, it is worth noting that the specific philosophical tradition within which Calvin is placing himself is one which emphasizes that the good is the good qua that object. As Calvin puts it, all things tend towards “the perfection of their essence.” As at least partially explored in the previous chapter, it is this exact line of reasoning which leads Aristotle to claim that all humans naturally seek their telos, which is eudaimonia. As is evidenced in his comments above,

Calvin evidently thinks those things that he calls in one place “the irrational parts of creation”— are striving towards their perfection.

For Calvin, only at the final resurrection will inanimate objects such as plants and animals reach their end. Perhaps characteristically, he refuses to speculate what exactly the perfecting, say, of metal might involve. He specifically mentions discussion surrounding whether beasts will achieve immortality in the life to come as an example of misguided speculation into the world’s future perfection.

Seeking to follow Paul’s comments in Romans, Calvin thinks that humans determine the timeline for the world’s other elements reaching their perfection. He thus emphasizes that “the irrational parts of creation” will only reach their perfection when the Sons of God, as part of the rational part of creation, reach their goal. Calvin’s commentary on the book of Romans finally makes it clear that God gave this desire to the world and is also the one who continues to sustain it. Again taking Paul’s lead, Calvin emphasizes that whatever perfection the world might long

138 for, it is presently frustrated and therefore not reflected in the present state of affairs. For Calvin, then, as for Paul, creation groans in expectation.

Overall, Calvin’s vision of the world has significant parallels with O’Donovan’s description of

Augustine’s world. For Calvin, as for Augustine, God is in some sense the source and goal of all things. No doubt, as we have just seen, Calvin does not here specifically say that creation has

God as its goal, but instead speaks of all things longing for the perfection of the essence. God is nonetheless central to the picture Calvin paints of the world at every point. Indeed, Calvin thinks the irrational parts of the creation long for their perfection, which is bound up with humans being brought to their final end, Godself. God is the one, moreover, who has given all things a longing for their perfection; what is more, he continually sustains hope for this end. God, finally, must in his providential care bring history to its ultimate end. It is therefore impossible to think of the perfection of the non-human elements world apart from God, since the perfection of these elements is so inescapably bound up with Godself. Calvin, in other words, cannot think of the world’s longing for the perfection of its essence apart from God.

It may therefore be said that Calvin thinks that the whole of creation tends towards the perfection which God will finally bring. The question that remains unanswered is how humans factor into this picture. In other words, are humans also subject to an immanent summons in addition to a transcendent one? Or, put another way, if metals long for perfection or telos, can something similar be said about humans? Calvin’s response is—or so I will argue—a qualified

“Yes.” Indeed, if Calvin’s vision of creation emphasizes that things are sourced in God and move toward an appointed end bound up with God, something similar can also be said of humans, even though, because humans are rational and volitional beings, their movement towards God is more complex and far less “linear.” Humans, according to Calvin, play a role in reaching the

139 perfection of their essence, a perfection which is tied up in something extrinsic to them—namely,

Godself.

To begin to see this, we might begin by looking at a comparison Calvin explicitly draws between humans and the non-rational parts of creation, in the Institutes II.2.26.10 In fact, his discussion of the non-rational parts of creation longing for the good is mentioned in passing as a part of a larger discussion about human nature and, specifically, the freedom of the human will. As a part of this discussion, Calvin compares humans with animals. Humans, just like animals, Calvin teaches, innately long for the good. Indeed, animals and humans together “long for their well- being.”11 Of course, as we saw already, Calvin attributes a longing for well-being to plants and inanimate objects as well as animals. In Institutes II.2.26, Calvin thus effectively places humans on a single continuum of created beings, where all beings possess an analogous longing for well- being. Calvin thus envisions humans, together with all creation, longing for good. This is perhaps not surprising, given that at the outset of this discussion Calvin says, “[A]ll things seek good through a natural instinct.”12

As we have seen, Calvin uses several different terms to describe the good that all things seek. He begins by talking about longing for the good. He then moves to describe this as a longing for

“well-being.” Calvin also works this out in terms of things seeking “the perfection of their essence.”13 Since throughout this discussion Calvin does not distinguish between these terms, it appears as though there is considerable semantic overlap between the terms. Calvin continues,

10 Inst. II.2.26.

11 Inst. II.2.26.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

140 explaining that humans long for the perfection of their essence, just as stones and other created objects do. It is important to see this because, although Calvin does not use this term, the underlying concept is that of telos. Indeed, as mentioned already, the idea that all things seek a good that is good for them is central to Aristotle’s claims regarding human telos. To reiterate,

Aristotle taught that humans naturally seek the human good for the good qua human, which is eudaimonia. It is especially important to see that for Calvin, as for Aristotle, humans not only have a telos, but they are innately striving for this human good. However, while Calvin is implicitly working with reference to Aristotle’s eudaimonistic position, he nonetheless appears to think he cannot give his unqualified assent to this position.

Calvin qualifies his assent to the eudaimonist’s position by making two distinctions. First, he clarifies his position on the human appetite for the good. Second, he clarifies what exactly he means by “the good.” Each of these qualifications may be taken in turn. First, regarding human appetite, Calvin states that appetite may be understood in two senses: the first of these is “an inclination of nature” and second is “an impulse of the will.”14 In this discussion, Calvin says he is using the term appetite to describe an inclination of nature.15 In this section, it is important to observe that Calvin first explicitly states that this longing for the good is something humans have in common with the animals. Consider the following:

And actually, if you consider the character of this natural desire of the good in man, you will find that he has it in common with the animals. For they also long for their own well- being and when some sort of good that can move their sense appears, they follow it.16

14 Ibid. Here, Calvin specifically writes, “That no reader may remain in doubt, we must be warned of a double misinterpretation. For ‘appetite’ here signifies not an impulse of the will itself but rather an inclination of nature; and ‘good’ refers not to virtue or justice but to condition, as when things go well with man.”

15 Ibid.

16 Inst. II.2.26.

141

After distinguishing between the inclination of the will and a pre-rational natural desire, Calvin makes a second, related distinction to clarify his remarking on the human inclination to the good by differentiating between two kinds of “good.” The first of these is “good of condition,” and the second of these is “the good of virtue” or “the good of justice.” Calvin writes:

That no reader may remain in doubt, we must be warned of a double misinterpretation. For ‘appetite’ here signifies not an impulse of the will itself but rather an inclination of nature; and ‘good’ refers not to virtue or justice but to condition, as when things go well with man.17

Only partially defining his terms, then, Calvin refers to the “good of condition” as “when things go well with man,” while leaving the “good of virtue” undefined. Despite this, one can piece together what he means by this from surrounding comments in this section. In Calvin’s discussion, “the good of virtue” appears to be what is truly good for humanity rather than simply a vague and unspecified longing that all goes well. Calvin thus contrasts a general desire for well-being with “what is truly good for [a person] in according to the excellence of [her] immortal nature.”18 In a word, Calvin is referring to the idea of a true telos. Or in terms of other philosophical categories, the idea seems to be one’s eudaimonia, properly defined, and not simply a generic placeholder for one’s final end. Calvin appears to be saying that all long for their telos, but all do not properly direct their actions towards this end. From what follows, this picture starts to become clear. Calvin writes:

To sum up: much as man desires to follow what is good, still he does not follow it. There is no man to whom eternal blessedness is not pleasing, yet no man aspires to it except by impulsion of the Holy Spirit.19

17 Inst. II.2.26.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

142

Here Calvin says that the fact that all humans would be naturally pleased by eternal blessedness shows that humans possess an immanent longing for happiness. He thus indicates that happiness is another equivalent term to the human good or telos. As we have already seen, the list of

(roughly) equivalent concepts includes “the good of virtue or justice,” “well-being,” and the perfection of one’s essence. Ultimately, then, “the good of virtue” in some sense overlaps with

“eternal blessedness.” Or indeed, still more fully, eternal blessedness is: “what is truly good for

[a person] in according to the excellence of [her] immortal nature.”20 Calvin will give us some idea of what he might mean by eternal blessedness elsewhere, but what is of primary importance to see here is that, for Calvin, as for a eudaimonist such as Aristotle, happiness is something humans innately want.

Calvin makes analogous comments regarding human blessedness and happiness elsewhere. We have already seen how, like Augustine, Calvin will at times state flatly that all desire happiness.21

This is seen in the passage above—all desire to what is good and all, equally, desire eternal blessedness. For both, nonetheless, there is an immanent longing within humanity for happiness.

From this particular section of the Institutes, the overall picture we are given is one of humanity striving for its good, worked out variously in terms of its well-being, perfection, and blessedness.

From this, it should now be evident that Calvin thinks humans—and all creation with them—are somehow endued with a dynamic nostalgia in an Augustinian sense. Creation’s desire for its good can only be fulfilled by humanity’s true good, which is synonymous with seeking eternal blessedness. If we remember our previous discussion of Adam’s state being unfinished in the

20 Ibid.

21 For representative passages, see chapter one.

143

Garden, it is likely better to say that, where Calvin is concerned, this is more a kind of “dynamic desire” than a “dynamic nostalgia”—since it is more fundamentally oriented towards an unrealized future state than reflective of a past reality. Of course, it is in some sense true that we long for our previous state. Even more than this, however, Calvin ultimately thinks humans long for what we never had—for a perfection and an eternal blessedness higher than were ever possessed in the Garden. The point is that we long both for what we lost and for what we have never had.

As noted in our discussion of union with Christ, these longings are met in Christ, the Mediator.

Through Christ, God will restore the elect to order and, by extension, restore the world to order with them. This is a restoration to order, but it is, again, more than this. Through Christ, a new order is realized, one in which the essence of all parts of creation are perfected and the elect will realize their telos in which God is central. This picture, much like the one described by

Augustine, places God at the center of creation not only as its source, but also as its goal.

Morality and Immanent Longings

It is important to see that Calvin explicitly links humanity’s realization of its end to virtue.

Indeed, we do not overlook the fact that Calvin uses plainly moral terms to describe the true human good—alternatively, as either “the good of virtue” or “the good of justice.” Calvin’s choice of terminology rather straightforwardly suggests the moral dimensions of the human good. More than this, given that Calvin is continually working with reference to the thought of philosophers in this section of the Institutes, it seems that his decision is shaped directly by the fact that, with few exceptions, the philosophers so closely tied morality to the human good. In fact, a central question for the ancients was whether morality is either solely or partially

144 constitutive of the human good. Both contextually and verbally, then, it seems reasonable to conclude that Calvin follows suit, thinking of the human good as tied up with morality. Of course, given that Calvin so fully equates the good of justice or virtue with eternal blessedness, it appears to follow that Calvin, following the Stoics rather than the Peripatetics and Augustine, holds that morality is wholly constitutive of the human good.

If one focused solely on the moral terms by which the good is described by God, virtue was the means of attaining this good. Throughout this same section, however, Calvin forecloses on such a possibility. Calvin states that humans can attain “the good of virtue” only if three criteria are satisfied: “that [one] discern[s] good by right reason; that knowing it they choose it; that having chosen it they follow it.”22 From what we have already said about Calvin’s description of fallen humanity’s ability to effectively reason and choose, it comes as no surprise that sinful humans are cut off from the “good of virtue,” if not the “good of condition.” As suggested above, Calvin thinks, due to the severe consequences of the Fall just discussed on human cognitive and volitional capacities, sinful humans are unable to meet his threefold criteria—fallen humans cannot know the good, pursue the good, and continually pursue it. Accordingly, as Calvin says in one passage above, no one can meaningfully aspire to future blessedness apart from “the impulsion of the Holy Spirit.”23 Calvin thus states matter-of-factly: “[M]uch as [humans] desire to follow what is good, still [they] do not follow it.”24 Therefore, even though all desire the blessedness of the future life, Calvin insists that only those who are enabled by the Holy Spirit

22 Inst. II.2.26. Calvin specifically makes this comment in a discussion of the nature of . It appears nonetheless that these three criteria are required for a person to attain “the good of virtue.”

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

145 will aspire to it. This fits neatly with Calvin’s emphasis on the need for God’s transcendent summons, described above.

While humans are unable to discern and consistently pursue their true good, of which virtue is a central part, this does not mean humanity has no awareness of morality. Indeed, given the fact that Calvin sees the natural law as something known by all persons and therefore internal to them, Calvin’s thinking on the natural awareness of virtue and justice may be placed under the heading of his thinking on an immanent summons within humanity. Yet, given that humanity cannot consistently pursue the good, my decision to locate this aspect of Calvin’s thought here should not be taken to suggest that humans harmoniously follow what the natural law teaches.25

We have seen that Calvin strongly emphasizes God’s transcendent summons, not only in providential care and in the person of his Son, but also in his teaching on divine commands. I therefore now seek a synthesis between these two elements—Calvin’s emphasis on transcendent summons and his teaching regarding humanity’s immanent longing for wholeness and happiness in God.

Natural Law

As we have seen, Calvin often thinks of God’s law regulating human behavior as given to humanity verbally by God—in other words, God’s commands. Calvin does not think of law only

25 More fully stated, I have decided to locate Calvin’s thinking on natural law here rather than in the previous chapter on law, because of this chapter’s focus on what is immanent to humanity. In making this decision, I believe it is worth stating emphatically that, for Calvin, there is a clear difference between knowing what one ought to do and actually doing it. To reiterate: Calvin does not think that humans are not consistently able to discern what is right and choose to do it. Accordingly, as also noted above, though all humans are understood to desire eternal blessedness, Calvin thinks that no one can meaningfully aspire—and still less attain—future blessedness apart from “the impulsion of the Holy Spirit.” Inst. II.2.27. In short, Calvin is not suggesting a harmonious process by which one simply follows the dictates of natural law and achieves happiness or flourishing. In this connection, so far as I am aware, Calvin never suggests that there is a “natural happiness” available to all humanity. As we will see, however, Calvin does affirm that blessings consistently flow from doing what is right. This truth applies to believers and unbelievers alike.

146 in these terms, however. As suggested in the previous chapter, Calvin also clearly thinks that there is a natural law (lex nataralis), in addition to God’s verbally revealed commands. As with

Calvin’s thinking on natural theology, this element of his thought has sometimes been downplayed or even completely ignored.26 According to Pieter Vos, scholars who have downplayed this element of Calvin’s thought, as well as emphasized its discontinuity with the

Middle Ages and earlier thinkers, include August Lang, Karl Barth, Michael Walzer, Jochem

Douma, James Torrance, John I. Hesselink.27 On the other hand, scholars such as ,

John T. McNeill, Richard A. Muller, Gerard Th. Tothuizen, Paul Helm, Stephen J. Grabill, and

David VanDrunen have emphasized the continuity between Calvin and the preceding tradition on the subject of natural law.28 It is, in my view, quite perplexing that this strand of his thought has been ignored, given that Calvin so explicitly uses the language of natural law, employing multiple terms to express his belief in this concept. Despite using a collection of terms, Calvin nonetheless possesses a unified theory of natural law.

Calvin speaks of “[an] inward law… written, even engraved, upon the hearts of all.”29 In this statement, many of its most basic features are already evident. First, in claiming the law is an

“inward law” (lex interior) Calvin affirms a basic teaching of the natural law theory—namely, that humans know the natural law apart from God’s explicit verbal revelation of it. The context of this statement is extremely important—it comes in Calvin’s discussion of the Ten

26 In this section, I cannot hope to begin to survey the voluminous literature on this subject. My overall goal here, then, is quite basic—to establish the existence of natural law in Calvin’s thought and note some of its key features.

27 I have taken this list directly from Vos, “Breakdown,” 136.

28 Ibid.

29 Inst. I.6.2.

147

Commandments. In this context, Calvin claims, perhaps surprisingly, that the natural law’s contents include the basic ideas of the Ten Commandments,30 perhaps especially the “Second

Book” (that is, what Calvin designates as commands six through ten).31 In his own words: “In a sense [the inward law] asserts the very same things that are to be learned from the two Tables.”32

Equating parts of the revealed law and natural law in this way shows that Calvin considers natural law to contain moral precepts regarding a person’s actions and thoughts.

Calvin’s claim that the inward law is written on the hearts of all is itself significant. It shows that the law is “universally distributed”—that is to say, all humans are aware of this law, at least in some general way, even without access to God’s verbal laws. Elsewhere, noting that a sense of right and wrong is universal, Calvin writes,

“[T]here is no nation so lost to every thing human, that it does not keep within the limits of some laws. Since then all nations, of themselves and without a monitor, are disposed to make laws for themselves, it is beyond all question evident that they have some notions of justice and rectitude.”33

Ultimately, it is through natural law that God providentially ensures that “even ‘barbarians’ are not as barbaric as they could be.”34

30 I think it is important to say the “basic content” of Ten Commandments, because Calvin makes the comparison between the two in passing. Of course, by sidestepping a full discussion of the differences and convergences between the natural and revealed laws, we are left to wonder to what extend the natural and revealed law overlap. In this connection, questions like whether humans innately know whether the Sabbath should be observed immediately spring to mind.

31 Calvin divides the Ten Commandments into two parts or what he calls “tables.” The first part is commands one through four. As he sees it, the fourth command is the command regarding the Sabbath. Accordingly, then, the second table is commands five through ten. See Inst. II.8.40.

32 Inst. II.9.3.

33 Comm. Rom. 2:14.

34 Paul Helm, John Calvin’s Ideas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 371.

148

This element of Calvin’s thought relates in important ways to his thinking on virtue, as I will explore below. Presently, I simply note that, while his thinking on depravity is undeniably stark, he nevertheless has a place for a kind of virtue available to those outside of Christ. The fact that this element of the law is epistemically available to all humanity serves a negative purpose as well as positive one—it serves to condemn humanity, rendering us without excuse before God

(so long as we are outside of Christ). Calvin’s discussion of the book of Romans makes this especially clear. As in his thinking on law more generally, this condemning function of the natural law is—and this is important—accidental to it. Calvin, in other words, stresses that God’s original purpose in giving us the law was not to condemn us. Indeed, God’s law, however it is known, is fundamentally good, since it is of God. The law only condemns us when we transgress it. This emphasis on condemnation is, of course, not Calvin’s last word on the subject, for even as the law condemns us by virtue of its goodness, making us aware of “our miserable condition,” it simultaneously causes us to seek help from outside of ourselves.35

It lies well beyond the scope of this chapter to determine what is the actual content of natural law, according to Calvin. We might note in passing that Calvin says different things in different places on this subject. As we have already seen, the natural law is at least partly expressed in the

Decalogue. In addition, Calvin also partly identifies the natural law with the principle of equity.36

35 Inst. II.8.2.

36 Calvin writes, “It is a fact that the law of God which we call the moral law is nothing else than a testimony of natural law and of that conscience which God has engraved upon the minds of men. Consequently, the entire scheme of this equity of which we are now speaking has been prescribed in it. Hence, this equity alone must be the goal and rule and limit of all laws.” Inst. IV.10.16.

149

Indeed, it may well be, as Guenther Haas has argued, that “the basic principle” of the natural law for Calvin is the principle of equity.37

So far, our discussion has centered on the law’s ontological dimensions (what it is) rather than on its precise epistemic dimensions (how it is known). Epistemically speaking, Calvin claims that humans know the law imperfectly in their natural (read: fallen) state. Calvin thinks that, though humans are in some sense a law unto themselves, this knowledge of the law is far from perfect.

Thus, immediately after acknowledging the existence of the natural law, Calvin writes:

But man is so shrouded in the darkness of errors that he hardly begins to grasp through this natural law what worship is acceptable to God…. Accordingly (because it is necessary both for our dullness and for our arrogance), the Lord has provided us with a written law to give us a clearer witness of what was too obscure in the natural law, shake off our listlessness, and strike more vigorously our mind and memory.38

Therefore, the fact that humanity’s natural knowledge of God’s law is so imperfect accounts for the necessity of God’s revelation of his law to humanity, according to Calvin.

Overall, an interplay between natural inclination and God’s transcendent summons is assumed by Calvin. In the moral life specifically, Calvin assumes that God’s commands may often comport with human moral inclinations about what is right.39 As noted in the previous chapter, however, God’s transcendent summons may override such human moral inclinations. In Calvin’s thought, this has everything to do with the fact that human faculties are unreliable. Particularly

37 Guenther Haas, The Concept of Equity in Calvin’s Ethics (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1997), 68.

38 Inst. II.8.1.

39 I use the term “moral inclinations” here advisedly. I have chosen “moral inclinations” because Calvin thinks that humans make decisions about right and wrong on this basis and not always on deeply considered moral convictions. In this connection, Matthew Tuininga writes, “The basic principles of morality, for Calvin, are not primarily conclusions drawn from rational inquiry, but inclinations and commitments deeply embedded in conscience.” Matthew J. Tuininga, Calvin’s Political Theology and the Public Engagement of the Church: Christ’s Two Kingdoms, Cambridge Studies in Law and Christianity (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 105.

150 where ethics is concerned, God’s transcendent summons in the form of commands is apparently needed to clarify humanity’s confusion.

As a final part of this discussion on inclination, specifically moral inclinations, we might consider Calvin’s thinking on virtue as a habitual inclination towards the good. I now turn to

Calvin’s thinking on virtue.

Virtue

As with the classical concept of the highest good, Calvin appears to be quite familiar with the descriptions of the classical tradition on virtue. In general, as David Steinmetz has written, one may assume that Calvin uses these terms with an awareness of their heritage.40 Calvin’s use of the term virtue is doubtless no exception. One may do more, however, than assume Calvin uses virtue as the philosophers did, for in some places he explicitly uses the term with reference to the philosophers.41 Of course, simply because Calvin references a term that is part of a long intellectual tradition does not mean he has understood it in precisely the way the tradition has.

Given my specific purposes, I will not directly compare Calvin with the classical thinkers. I note that Charles Partee has begun this task, though surely work remains to be done on this subject.

Overall, at a minimum, one must say that Calvin frames his discussion of the Christian life in terms of ancient moral philosophy, with its emphasis on virtue. His purpose in so doing is to

40 He specifically writes, “When Calvin used words like virtue or soul or immortal, he was using language with a long history in Western culture. No educated person could say ‘immortality of the soul’ without thinking of Paul’s positive (but problematic) employment of the phrase or of Aristotle’s negative assessment of Plato’s arguments.” See David C. Steinmetz, “Calvin among the Ancient Philosophers,” in Calvin in Context, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 244–45; emphasis original.

41 See, for example, Inst. III.6.3. Here, of the Stoics, Calvin writes, “Now, let these persons who think that moral philosophy is duly and systematically set forth solely among philosophers find me among the philosophers a more excellent dispensation. They, while they wish particularly to exhort us to virtue, announce merely that we should live in accordance with nature.”

151 show that “Christian philosophy” transcends the wisdom of the ancients, particularly Stoic philosophy.

Calvin is manifestly familiar with the concept of virtue. He thus speaks of “persons, who, guided by nature, have striven towards virtue throughout life.”42 Calvin also speaks of individuals who

“not only excelled in remarkable deeds, but conduct themselves most honorably throughout life.”43 Still further, as noted in the previous chapter, he often frames his discussions of the

Christian life in terms of obedience to laws. Calvin, however, apparently does not understand this to be in conflict or in competition with framing the Christian life in terms of virtue. Indeed, he simply frames his discussion in terms of law in light of considerations of space, commenting that if he were to discuss each virtue he would become quite “prolix” and would begin to give lengthy exhortations, which would be at cross purposes with his interest in brevity.44 He therefore freely uses the term virtue when referring to the Christian life; and indeed, he may seamlessly move back and forth between the two concepts of law and virtue. To get a sense of this, one might specifically consider Calvin’s teaching on the Christian Life in Book III of the

Institutes. In this discussion of “The Life of the Christian [Person],”45 he begins by talking about law.46 However, he then unceremoniously shifts to a discussion of the Christian life in terms of virtue.47 From this and other passages, it is apparent that Calvin is not concerned to sharply distinguish between the two. Calvin’s ethics, then, are neither strictly an “ethic of virtue” nor an

42 Inst. II.3.3.

43 Ibid.

44 Inst. III.6.1.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid.

152

“ethic of duty”48—just as, likewise, his ethics are adequately described as simply an ethic of natural law or of divine command. Instead, he sees law as promoting virtue, and virtue, in turn, as a concept which depends on law to be meaningful.

In regard to his thinking on the subject of virtue, it may be asked whether Calvin thinks those apart from Christ may be considered virtuous. His position on this matter is somewhat complex.

On the one hand, Calvin clearly allows for instances of pagans acting virtuously, though he partly qualifies this claim, stating that this virtue comes from God: “The virtues of unbelievers are God-given.”49 Similarly, consider the following passage:

I do not so dissent from the common judgment as to contend that there is no difference between the justice, moderation, and equity of Titus and Trajan and the madness, intemperance, and savagery of Caligula or Nero or Domitian, or between the obscene lusts of Tiberius and the continence of Vespasian, in this respect, and—not to tarry over individual virtues and vices—between observance and contempt of right and of laws. For there is such a great difference between the righteous and the unrighteous that it appears even in the dead image thereof. For if we confuse these things, what order will remain in the world? Therefore, the Lord has not only engraved such a distinction between honorable and wicked deeds in the minds of individual men but often confirms it also, by the dispensation of his providence. For we see that he bestows many blessings of the present life upon those who cultivate virtue among men. Not because that outward image of virtue deserves the least benefit of him; but it pleases him so to prove how much he esteems true righteousness, when he does not allow even external and feigned righteousness to go without a temporal reward. Hence, there follows what we just now acknowledged: that all these virtues—or rather, images of virtues—are gifts of God, since nothing is in any way praiseworthy that does not come from him.50

So, Calvin thinks that there is a major difference between vice and virtue, even among pagans.

Note how Calvin affirms that this is important to establishing order. With his second use of the

48 Ibid. At this point in the Institutes, the accent, as Pieter Vos points out, does fall decidedly on the importance of duty to law. Even so, this section of the Institutes shows Calvin’s tendency to frame duty teleologically.

49 Inst. III.14.2.

50 Ibid.

153 law, he makes room for something like civic virtue, by which individuals act in ways that promote the well-being of society as a whole.51

On the other hand, even if there is significant difference between the virtues of a Titus or a

Trajan and the vices of a Nero or a Domitian, Calvin refuses to call someone like Titus truly virtuous.52 Titus’ virtue is, as seen in the passage above, only a “dead image” of virtue. In the same context, Calvin goes on to make this point more directly: he says that when pagans display what appears to be virtue—they are only displaying “images of virtues.”53 Such images are themselves gifts of God, according to Calvin, given that “nothing is in any way praiseworthy that does not come from him.”54 For Calvin, then, though he does not use this term, virtue in the lives of those who have not been united to Christ is something like a “glittering vice.” For Calvin, faith is what makes the crucial difference whether a person is considered virtuous.55 Hence, it is only when a person possesses faith in Christ that his or her righteous actions may be considered

51 Inst. III.14.3. Calvin specifically mention this, along with the several “pagan” virtues in this same section: “For even though they [those who appear virtuous yet are estranged from God] are God’s instruments for the preservation of human society in righteousness, continence, friendship, temperance, fortitude, and prudence, yet they carry out these good works of God very badly.”

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid.

54 Inst. III.14.2.

55 Inst. III.14.3. Calvin seeks to indicate his agreement with Augustine on this point. He writes, “Yet what Augustine writes is nonetheless true: that all who are estranged from the religion of the one God, however admirable they may be regarded on account of their reputation for virtue, not only deserve no reward but rather punishment, because by the pollution of their hearts they defile God’s good works. For even though they are God’s instruments for the preservation of human society in righteousness, continence, friendship, temperance, fortitude, and prudence, yet they carry out these good works of God very badly. For they are restrained from evil-doing not by genuine zeal for good but either by mere ambition or by self-love, or some other perverse motive. Therefore, since by the very impurity of men’s hearts these good works have been corrupted as from their source, they ought no more to be reckoned among virtues than the vices that commonly deceive on account of their affinity and likeness to virtue.”

154 virtuous. Calvin thinks that this is what invalidates apparently virtuous actions. Indeed, because of the pollution of their hearts, even these “good” works are defiled.56

According to Calvin, due to the pollution of individuals’ hearts, virtue is not properly aimed at the true end of serving God:

In short, when we remember the constant end of that which is right—namely, to serve God—whatever strives to another end already deservedly loses the name “right.” Therefore, because they do not look to the goal that God’s wisdom prescribes, what they do, though it seems good in the doing, yet by its perverse intention is sin. He therefore concludes that all Fabriciuses, Scipios, and Catos in their excellent deeds have sinned in that, since they lacked the light of faith, they did not apply their deeds to the end to which they ought to have applied them. Therefore, true righteousness was not in them, because duties are weighed not by deeds but by ends.57

Throughout this passage— and especially in his final, simple phrase, “duties are weighed not by deeds but ends”—Calvin faults pagan virtue on teleological grounds. An act, he says, is only truly virtuous when it is aimed at serving God. We have seen this already in Calvin’s discussion of the proper use of created things. He is thus wont to emphasize the direction of a person’s whole life.58 It is, of course, possible only for believers to aim at this end, according to Calvin.

This conviction is a function of his affirmation of the corruptio totalis of humanity, which now may be seen as an affirmation that humans do not aim at the right end more than anything else.

Given his emphasis on deeds being judged by their ends, we see here that Calvin does not think there is such a thing as a virtuous unbeliever. Calvin, of course, shares this position with

56 Ibid.

57 Inst. III.14.3.

58 Pieter Vos again makes an instructive comment: “In line with Augustine’s distinction between the amor Dei and the amor sui, Calvin emphasizes the importance of the entire direction of one’s life coram Deo. Calvin agrees with Augustine that obedience to God and responsibility to God (in the sense of responding to God) is what counts.” Vos, “Breakdown,” 142.

155

Augustine—a fact of which he himself is fully aware.59 Alternatively, Thomas Aquinas develops a theory of cardinal and , whereas Calvin has no such theory. Indeed, by now it should be clear that Calvin’s position is far simpler—for him, virtue depends on constellation of related ideas, all beginning with the Spirit’s reorienting of a person to believe in Christ and thereby be united to him.

Despite all the various ways he discusses virtue, Calvin thinks virtue is a part of happiness. It is important to see this, as virtue is a necessary feature of happiness in all eudaimonistic ethics.

This is true, in other words, of both pagan and Christian forms. For Calvin virtue was one important, constituent part of one’s final end. Consider the following passage from Calvin:

Let it be observed here, that, while a pattern of perfect happiness was exhibited in Christ, he had nothing that belonged to himself, but rather was rich, in order to rich those who believed in him. Our happiness lies in having the image of God restored in us, which was defaced by sin. Christ is not only the lively image of God, in so far as he is the eternal Word of God, but even on his human nature, which he has in common with us, the likeness of the glory of the Father has been engraved, so as to form his members to the resemblance of it.60

Central to happiness, then, is being a person with Christ-like character.

Although true happiness is something reserved for believers, one should nonetheless note that

Calvin seems to admit that pagan virtue, which is only a semblance of true virtue, does nonetheless produce genuine benefits in the life of virtuous pagans:

For we see that he bestows many blessings of the present life upon those who cultivate virtue among men. Not because that outward image of virtue deserves the least benefit of

59 Inst. III.14.3. Calvin writes, “What Augustine writes is nonetheless true: that all who are estranged from the religion of the one God, however admirable they may be regarded on account of their reputation for virtue, not only deserve no reward but rather punishment, because by the pollution of their hearts they defile God’s good works.”

60 Comm. John 17:22.

156

him; but it pleases him so to prove how much he esteems true righteousness, when he does not allow even eternal and feigned righteousness to go without a temporal reward.61

Accordingly, “many blessings” come from virtue, even virtue which is only apparent and not real—a claim which needs to be counterbalanced by Calvin’s thinking that only believers may be considered happy. Calvin’s overall point seems to be that a kind of temporal, chimerical happiness is available to those who cultivate only pagan, apparent virtue. Indeed, both apparent, pagan virtue and true, Christian virtue redounds to a person’s well-being—in a word, it “blesses” them as a person. The key difference between the two seems to be that, in the case of believers, true, Christian virtue arrives at a secure, eternal blessing. Add to this that Calvin claims the believer’s existence is not complicated by a troubled conscience, a persistent feature in the life of an unbeliever.62

Nonetheless, Calvin’s overall response to the question of natural virtue and therefore natural happiness seems to find a parallel in Barth’s response to natural theology—nein (!). We have already seen this in part, especially in chapter one. Calvin repeatedly claims that no one is happy apart from Christ. If they appear so, this is only a chimera. At the same time, the classical concept of virtue is one which Calvin has no objections to. Indeed, virtue is therefore a part of happiness for Calvin. Since happiness centers on God and union with God, according to Calvin,

61 Inst. III.14.2.

62 See, for instance, Calvin’s comments on Isaiah 57:20. Here he writes, “As the troubled sea. That metaphor of ‘the sea’ is elegant, and very well fitted to describe the uneasiness of the wicked; for of itself ‘the sea is troubled.’ Though it be not beaten by the wind or agitated by frightful tempests, its billows carry on mutual war, and dash against each other with terrible violence. In the same manner wicked men are ‘troubled’ by inward distress, which is deeply seated in their hearts. They are terrified and alarmed by conscience, which is the most agonizing of all torments and the most cruel of all executioners. The furies agitate and pursue the wicked, not with burning torches, (as the fables run,) but with anguish of conscience and the torment of wickedness; for every one [sic] is distressed by his own wickedness and his own alarm; every one [sic] is agonized and driven to madness by his own guilt; they are terrified by their own evil thoughts and by the pangs of conscience. Most appropriately, therefore, has the Prophet compared them to a stormy and troubled sea. Whoever then wishes to avoid these alarms and this frightful agony of heart, let him not reject that peace which the Lord offers to him. There can be no middle course between them; for, if you do not lay aside sinful desires and accept of this peace, you must unavoidably be miserably distressed and tormented.”

157 he thinks that virtue is necessary but not sufficient for happiness. For him, a person needs virtue to be united to God. It is therefore not an end in of itself. Virtue, then, is an important part of

Calvin’s broader vision of human happiness.

Transcendent Summons and Immanent Longings

At this point, it may be helpful to bring together the strands of transcendent summons and immanent longings, explored in the previous two chapters. From the foregoing, it should be evident that Calvin’s individual between the Fall and final restoration of things is a conflicted person, wanting what is truly good for herself but unable to seek it. This conviction leads Calvin to articulate a different theory of desire than would a classical eudaimonist such as Aristotle.

While Aristotle, as we have seen, thinks we can be led to our end through rational reflection on our desires, Calvin does not. He thinks we reach our end through God’s transcendent summons.

God’s transcendent summons, however, affirms our deepest desires—our desires for well-being, perfection, and happiness. God’s initial transcendent summons in election and the person of

Christ affirms these. God’s commands also affirm our desires. At times, his commands reflect our innate moral initiation apprehended through natural law. In other instances, his commands may not. But even here, God’s commands affirm at least some of our desires and we obey because we know God to be good. Altogether, though Calvin’s believer does not reach her end through desire and rationality alone, rationality and desire are still never wholly ignored.

Therefore, Calvin, like Aristotle, thinks that a person reaches his end at once through his desires as well as against them. Unlike Aristotle, however, God’s transcendent summons is first needed.

To reiterate: Calvin himself is aware of this distinction. Humans cannot in themselves sort their way through the conflicting desires. God’s summons thus initially takes the place of rationality

158 in the classical system. God’s achieves what rationality cannot. God’s summons, however, does not invalidate rationality, but instead reshapes it and allows it to understand and pursue humanity’s true end. In summary, and to directly answer the question that opened this chapter,

Calvin thinks that God’s summons both frustrates human desires and fulfills them. It frustrates those desires which fail to bring us to our end. It fulfills our desire for our well-being and brings us to this goal.

Returning to Alasdair MacIntyre’s comments on Calvin with which we began the previous chapter, we note that the previous two sections of this chapter together begin to show the problematic nature of his depiction of Calvin. Parts of MacIntyre’s claims are doubtless accurate.

For one thing, as we have seen, Calvin does affirm the importance of divine commands, just as

MacIntyre suggests. The same could be said of justification by faith, though that has not been examined in any detail in this thesis up to this point.63 MacIntyre goes astray, however, in claiming that Calvin’s God is one who issues “arbitrary fiats” to which one must be blindly submit, and that God’s commands have no reference to human desires. MacIntyre is misunderstanding Calvin’s thought in at least two important ways. His first error lies in his failing to perceive that Calvin sees God’s law as a unified entity. As we have just seen, Calvin holds that God has explicitly revealed to us the Decalogue, the Golden Rule, and the principle of equity, both verbally and naturally. Calvin therefore quite obviously feels there is a genuine harmony between the natural and revealed laws. We can conclude from this that for Calvin, as for St. Thomas, all of God’s law is of a piece. In other words, Calvin thinks that the natural law

63 I seek to highlight the importance of justification by faith in chapter six of this thesis. Moreover, it might be remembered that in chapter one I already noted that Calvin sees a connection between happiness and having a clean conscience. There, I noted that the emphasis that Calvin places on having a clean conscience points directly to the doctrine of justification by faith in his thought. Again, more will be said on Calvin’s doctrine of justification by faith in the final chapter of this thesis.

159 and verbally revealed law work together harmoniously.. In affirming the law’s unity, it becomes clear that God’s transcendent summons in the form of written laws, and humanity’s immanent summons in the form of internal inclinations, often work together harmoniously. God, in other words, commands what humans already know to be true by natural law. Calvin acknowledges that humans also aspire to conform to natural law, though not without overlooking its dictates whenever it is convenient.

The stress Calvin places on the concept of the order of nature leads us to the second problematic element of MacIntyre’s work. As we have seen, Calvin thinks morality fits within the order of nature. In this connection, it is again important to remember that by the natural law God preserves human societies. What is more, the existence of the natural law prevents the humans from consuming themselves as they otherwise would. From this, too, it is clear that the natural law ultimately promotes human well-being and flourishing. Virtue, moreover, as we have also already seen, is an essential part of the human good (or human telos) for Calvin. If humans innately long for their well-being, perfection, and happiness, God’s transcendent summons never invalidates this desire. This notably includes God’s transcendent summons in the form of moral commands. Accordingly, given that God’s commands reflect the order of nature, or what I have been calling the grain of the universe, and therefore promote human flourishing, God’s commands are in no way arbitrary. Instead, they always point humans to the order of things and promote what is in humanity’s best interest. In promoting what is in humanity’s best interest,

God is far from a cosmic despot.

Though MacIntyre misunderstands these two elements of Calvin’s thought, it should be acknowledged that Calvin does think that humans are called to submit to God without full understanding of what he commands. Calvin, in other words, retains a place for God’s judgments

160 and human rational judgments to diverge. In such cases, Calvin thinks that humans must submit to God’s judgment. Calvin thinks this is entirely reasonable, because the believer already knows

God to be good. Faith, for Calvin, is the entry point in the Christian life, and faith a trust in

God’s goodness. Obedience is therefore an act of faith—one which assumes God’s goodness.

Even in these cases, then, Calvin never calls humans to blind obedience.

Something similar could be said of a believer’s desires. Calvin interprets Romans 7, for instance, as a description of the believer’s struggle to obey God’s commands.64 For him, the believer senses something of the goodness of God’s law but is also frustrated by its constraints, desiring both to obey the law and to disobey it. Calvin expects that believers are often tied up in a struggle between two parts of themselves—what Paul calls Spirit and flesh. This struggle, according to Calvin, is a struggle of faith, where believers know God’s will to be more trustworthy than their own.

Calvin’s point here is essentially epistemic. Sinful humans, including believers in the process of being remade into Christ’s image, cannot trust their rationality. Nor can they trust their wills.

Indeed, they may have an appetite for what is apparently good for them but not truly good and properly in their best interest. The believer, however, knows and can trust in God’s goodness.

Therefore, he or she can trust that God’s commands will lead them to their good, even when

64 Calvin writes, “For [Paul] is discussing the Christian struggle (more briefly touched in Galatians [ch. 5:17]), which believers constantly feel in themselves in the conflict between flesh and spirit. But the Spirit comes, not from nature, but from regeneration. Moreover, it is clear that the apostle is speaking of these regenerated, because when he had said that no good dwelt in him, he adds the explanation that he is referring to his flesh [Rom. 7:18]. Accordingly, he declares that it is not he who does evil, but sin dwelling in him. [Rom. 7:20.] What does he mean by this correction: ‘In me, that is, in my flesh’ [Rom. 7:18]? It is as if he were speaking in this way: ‘Good does not dwell in me of myself, for nothing good is to be found in my flesh.’ Hence follows that form of an excuse: ‘I myself do not do evil, but sin that dwells in me’ [Rom. 7:20]. This excuse applies only to the regenerate who tend toward good with the chief part of their soul. Now the conclusion appended clearly explains this whole matter: “For I delight in the law … according to the inner man, but I see in my members another law at war with the law of my mind” [Rom. 7:22–23].” Inst. II.26.27.

161 failing to understand his command or not wanting to obey it. In short, because Calvin’s self is driven by internal conflicts, God’s transcendent summons is needed. It is needed, because sinful, conflicted humans cannot aspire to the true good. They cannot mount to God and happiness apart from the dramatic intervention of Godself. To reach the human good, God’s transcendent summons comes first in the form of God’s providential election. This election is to union with

Christ, a union accomplished by God’s transcendent summons through the Spirit’s work in creating faith in Christ. God’s transcendent summons also comes to humans in the form of commands. These commands point to the moral dimensions of the human good. God’s commands are needed because sinful humans can neither rationally know nor aspire to the human good.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have considered Calvin’s thinking on human inclination—specifically human inclination towards God. The previous material may be summarized by returning to

O’Donovan’s description of Augustine’s world, using this as the basis for a description of

Calvin’s thought. Borrowing liberally in places to summarize our findings, it can be said that

Calvin’s universe is one in which God is the source and goal of being, value, and activity, himself at the center of the universe. All creation stands in relation to God as its center, being continually sustained by him. All creation is animated with a dynamic nostalgia—or, more precisely, a dynamic nostalgia and a kind of dynamic desire by which all creation seeks its perfection from God. The non-rational parts of creation seek and even hope for God to bring them to perfection. All humans share with creation this hope for their own perfection and eternal blessedness. Having been estranged from God, only God himself can give creation what it wants.

162

Everything, moreover, turns on humans, the centerpiece of God’s creation, who can only return to God and reach their goal through God’s transcendent summons. For reasons not revealed to humanity, God providentially determines that he will only summon some individuals to achieve their end. Those who receive this summons are, in a word, the elect. Only the elect return to God through union with Christ, and they are united to Christ by faith, a faith which is created by the

Holy Spirit and firmly trusts in God’s goodness. Indeed, sensing their emptiness, believers trust that Christ is the fountain in which they might find new life and receive the blessings they once had and were even made for. Christ restores them to life and goodness by justifying them and giving them new life.

Finally, the human good has moral dimensions. Holiness is, in some sense, also the bond of the believer’s union with God.65 Therefore, God’s transcendent summons also comes in the form of his command. His command leads humanity to its goal by clarifying and altering human desires.

All responsive movement which is meaningful, that is, able and willing to reach its end, also presupposes a transcendent summons. This transcendent summons affirms the human desire for the good—and indeed, the only desires it ever conflicts with are those that do not lead to this end.

In the next chapter, I turn specifically to elements of Calvin’s thought that may appear to undermine the eudaimonistic reading of Calvin I have been putting forward.

65 Calvin writes, “When we hear mention of our union with God, let us remember that holiness must be its bond; not because we come into communion with him by virtue of our holiness! Rather, we ought first to cleave unto him so that, infused with his holiness, we may follow whither he calls.” Inst. III.6.2.

Chapter 5 Self-Denial, God’s Glory, and Self-Love

Grant, Almighty God, that since it is the principal part of our happiness, that in our pilgrimage through this world there is open to us a familiar access to thee by faith,—O grant, that we may be able to come with a pure heart to thy presence: and when our lips are polluted, O purify us by thy Spirit, so that we may not only pray to thee with the mouth, but also prove that we do this sincerely, without any dissimulation, and that we earnestly seek to spend our whole life in glorifying thy name, until being at length gathered into thy celestial kingdom, we may be truly and really united to thee, and be made partakers of that glory, which has been procured for us by the blood of thy only- begotten Son. Amen.1

[Humans are] made happy by self-denial.2

This chapter considers objections to the reading of Calvin proposed in this thesis. I specifically consider the objections that Calvin’s teaching on self-denial, God’s glory, and self-love are at odds with the ostensibly eudaimonistic elements of his thought, which I have highlighted in the foregoing chapters. Each of these aspects of Calvin’s thought potentially presents challenges to the reading of Calvin put forward in this work. My purpose here, then, is to note the challenges that exist to the reading I am proposing, asking whether all or any of these elements constitute a

“fly in the ointment,” so to speak, to a eudaimonistic reading of the Reformer. Overall, I seek to show in this chapter that none of these elements of his thinking decisively overturns such a reading. Of these three elements, I do acknowledge that Calvin’s teaching on self-love appears to be especially at odds with his eudaimonistic thinking.

Prior to considering contradictions in Calvin’s thought, I have chosen to begin this chapter by first briefly noting historical objections to eudaimonism. As I think will become evident, these

1 Comm. Zeph. 3, prayer.

2 Comm. Heb. 4:10.

163

164 historical objections should help give a context to issues surveyed in this chapter, especially the question of eudaimonism’s (inappropriate) self-referentiality.

Historical Criticisms of Eudaimonism

Historically, eudaimonism has been rejected for several reasons. Perhaps above all, it has been charged with being overly concerned with the human self—too self-centered, too egoistic. In explicitly Christian reflection, Anders Nygren infamously has opposed that eudaimonism on these grounds. Nygren’s central argument is that Christian love—agape—is given without reference to self-interest.3 God thus commands Christians—and, indeed, Christ models—to love without reference to self-interest. Christian love is “agapeic” in that it is given without considering how it is in one’s interest to do so. Nygren’s theory of love has, perhaps unsurprisingly, attracted admirers and critics.

Quite recently, philosopher Nicholas Wolterstorff echoed Nygren’s criticism of eudaimonism.4

Wolterstorff’s criticisms of eudaimonism are twofold, though we will only be considering the first of them in this chapter. First, Wolterstorff states that eudaimonism, even if not formally egoistic, is essentially ‘me-ism.’”5 Secondly, he argues that eudaimonism leaves no room for compassion.6 This chapter is concerned with only the first of these criticisms. What Wolterstorff means by “me-istic” is that morality is based on the well-being of the moral agent. Accordingly, one acts a certain way, because it directly concerns his or her life.

3 Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros (London: SPCK, 1932).

4 Nicholas Wolterstorff, Justice: Rights and Wrongs (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 149–226.

5 Ibid., 190.

6 Ibid., 212-26.

165

I am obviously less concerned with objections to eudaimonism generally than with the objection that Calvin’s theology runs counter to the eudaimonistic reading of him I am proposing. These introductory comments are intended to show that the question of self-referentiality is raised with reference to eudaimonism. This question of self-referentially has been directly raised by Dewey

J. Hoitenga in his Stob Lectures.7 In these lectures, Hoitenga compares Plato and Calvin on the subject of self-referentiality. The preceding discussion is especially relevant in relation to

Hoitenga’s remarks, because he interprets Calvin as having remarkable affinities Nygren’s agape. Specifically, he claims that Calvin reasons that once one’s happiness is established in

God as a gift, one is able to pursue virtue without reference to one’s happiness, since that happiness has already been established in God by God.8 To be clear, this position is essentially

“Nygrenian,” because it is considered improper in their thinking to base one’s motivation for living virtuously on one’s obtaining happiness. According to Hoitenga, this is precisely Plato’s

(motive) problem.9 Hoitenga interprets Calvin’s thought as avoiding improper self-referentially; in other words, that Calvin’s Christian acts—or should act—for something outside of the self rather than out of naked or even “baptized” self-interest. Reading Calvin in this way, Hoitenga rejects the interpretation presented in this work. A central question of this chapter is whether this reading of Calvin is correct—is Calvin as opposed to self-interest as Hoitenga suggests?

7 Dewey J. Hoitenga, Jr., “Happiness: Goal or Gift? Two Lectures on the Relationship between Knowledge, Goodness, and Happiness in Plato and Calvin,” in Seeking Understanding: The Stob Lectures, 1986-1998 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), 295–342.

8 Hoitenga writes, “Happiness—more exactly, knowing that our happiness is ‘established’ in God as his gift—becomes the motive for virtue. The proper knowledge of God, in short, becomes, by way of the happiness it brings, the motive for virtue. This has the all-important effect of placing happiness before the moral life instead of after it, as a goal. It is Calvin’s simple solution to the motive problem.” Ibid, 336.

9 Hoitenga’s first lecture (of two) is entitled, “Goodness for the Sake of Happiness: Plato’s Problem.” Ibid.

166

To consider this question, I turn to three subjects outlined at the beginning of this chapter. Again, these are Calvin’s teaching on self-denial, his all-encompassing stress on God’s glory, and, finally, Calvin’s discussion of the dangers of “self-love.”

Self-Denial

Self-denial has long been heralded in the Christian tradition, for the straightforward reason that

Scripture emphasizes the importance of this practice. Most famously, of course, the practice finds commendation in Jesus’ sweeping claim, “Whoever wants to be my disciple must deny themselves and take up their cross and follow me” (Mark 8:34). The Christian tradition as a whole has built on this textual foundation.

Following the teaching of Scripture and subsequent Christian reflections on this theme, Calvin stresses the importance of self-denial. Indeed, self-denial occupies an extremely important theme in Calvin’s theology of the Christian life. As noted already, in the Institutes he determines that there are three primary dimensions of the Christian life—self-denial, cross-bearing, and meditating on the future life. It is almost certainly not incidental that self-denial is the first of these three elements. Indeed, Calvin calls the denial of ourselves “the sum of the Christian life.”10 Self-denial, as described in the Institutes, may serve, in some sense, as an adequate descriptor of the first two of his three descriptors of dimensions of the Christian life.11 This is because, according to Calvin, considered from the proper angle self-denial has an “outward” as well as an “inward” dimension. Self-denial’s inward dimensions involves saying “no” to the

10 Inst. III.6.1.

11 This is evidently Calvin’s view on this subject—his discussion of cross bearing opens with this discussion with this heading: “Bearing the Cross, a Part of Self-Denial.” See Inst. III.8.1.

167 sinful part of one’s self and simultaneously, “yes” to God and others. Self-denial’s outward dimensions, on the other hand, involve bearing the hardships of life as a cross. That these two elements are intertwined should be unsurprising. Ultimately, as Raymond A. Kemp has argued, all three elements are mutually dependent on one another.12 Accordingly, as with his theology as a whole, Calvin’s doctrine of the Christian life is carefully built on a number of interrelated concepts. In an important sense, self-denial so deeply informs Calvin’s vision of the Christian life that it is the essence or sum of this Christian life.

Situated theologically, the believer’s ability to deny herself is rooted in her union with Christ.

Calvin, as has been suggested, develops an ethic in which the believer’s participation in Christ’s life, death, and resurrection fundamentally redirects and reorganizes his or her moral life. Union with Christ first reshapes the believer’s moral life, because self-denial is only possible in the context of mystical union with Christ. Stated fully, only those who have died with Christ and have been given new life by the Spirit’s power can deny themselves, as God requires.13

Not only is self-denial possible only through Christ, but it is patterned on (and thus follows) his example. Christ is, indeed, the perfect example of self-denial, even if his experience of temptation was different from the experience of believers.14 In this area, as in not a few others,

“Christ… has been set before us as an example, whose pattern of life we ought to express in our life.”15 Claiming this, of course, Calvin’s thought fits within the broad tradition of the Christian

12 Raymond Kemp Anderson, “Corporate Selfhood and Meditatio Vitae Futurae: How Necessary Is Eschatology for Christian Ethics?,” Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics 23, no. 1 (2003): 24.

13 See Inst. III.7.2. Here, without self-denial, Calvin thinks those outside of Christ only display semblance of virtue.

14 See Comm. Luke 4.

15 Inst. III.6.3.

168 reflection on the imitation of Christ, the imitatio Christi. However, as I am working to show here, Calvin carefully places participation before performance, emphasizing that only after one is engrafted into Christ, then can one pattern one’s life after his.16

Certainly, Christ is far more than an example to Calvin. Nonetheless, following the pattern of

Christ’s own life, the believer’s life is a continual and ongoing process of dying with Christ. In other words, although believers have died and been raised to new life in Christ through regeneration, their lives continually follow the pattern of dying and rising. As Calvin works this out, these two movements are mortification (dying with Christ) and vivification (being raised with Christ).17 Self-denial is a central dimension of mortification—perhaps, even, its only dimension.18 At the same time, however, there are life-giving dimensions to self-denial. Perhaps broadly understood, it may be that there is a vivifying element of self-denial, as we will explore below.

Empowered by the Spirit, and patterned after Christ’s example, self-denial finds its impetus in gratitude springing from one’s experience of God’s goodness, particularly God’s goodness as experienced in Christ. We have already started to see this. Calvin holds this is Scripture’s pattern. In his Institutes, for instance, Calvin cites Romans 12:1 in this capacity.19 From this passage and others, we learn of Calvin’s conviction that humans will devote themselves to God once they experience God’s goodness to them. As Calvin works this out, self-denial flows from

16 Inst. III.2.24.

17 Inst. III.3.3.

18 As noted above, Calvin considers self-denial to have what I am calling two aspects—its “inward” and “outward” aspects. Together, these seem to encompass the whole of mortification of one’s sinful self.

19 This passage reads, “Therefore, I urge you, brothers and sisters, in view of God’s mercy, to offer your bodies as a living sacrifice, holy and pleasing to God—this is your true and proper worship.”

169 the realization that we, as humans, belong wholly to God. “We are not our own but the Lord’s,” he says.20 This claim, first noted in chapter two of this work, is worth returning to in this context, since it marks Calvin’s opening foray into the topic of self-denial in the Institutes. Accordingly, it might be quoted fully here:

If, then, we are not our own, but the Lord’s, it is clear what error we must flee, and whither we must direct all the acts of our life. We are not our own: let not our reason nor our will, therefore, sway our plans or deeds. We are not our own: let us therefore not set it as our goal to seek what is expedient for us according to the flesh. We are not our own: in so far as we can, let us therefore forget ourselves and all that is ours. Conversely, we are God’s: let us therefore live for him and die for him. We are God’s: let his wisdom and will therefore rule all our actions. We are God’s: let all the parts of our life accordingly strive toward him as our only lawful goal.21

Previously, I focused on Calvin’s remark that God himself is the Christian’s “only lawful goal,” which in the larger context of this work is extremely important. What is especially relevant in this context is how this passage shows that self-denial is a proper response to one’s belonging to

God. For Calvin, then, the Christian life is built on the foundation of the claims that God has placed upon the believer. To him, again, the believer is doubly “claimed” by God: for indeed, as observed in chapter two, as with humans generally, they first owe obedience to God as their good

Creator; and yet, also, having received salvation in Christ, believers belong to God in another way. Having been claimed by God, a believer is called to direct her life towards God. Practically, for Calvin, this means submitting to God’s will instead of our rationality or desires.

In emphasizing the importance of self-denial, Calvin is stressing a virtue quite commonplace in the Christian theological tradition. Still, it is worth describing, if only briefly. In the first place, it is worth saying that this dimension of his thought evidently returns us to many themes elsewhere

20 Inst. III.6.3.

21 Inst. III.7.1.

170 explored in this thesis. Indeed, to begin to understand his thinking on self-denial, we should return to an important tension in Calvin’s thought surrounding union with Christ. Once again, as a result of the believer’s union with Christ, he or she receives the “double grace” of Christ’s imputed righteousness and new life in him by the power of the Spirit.22 Concerning the first of these two gifts, Calvin’s affirms Luther’s dictum that believers are simultaneously righteous (or just) and sinners. Calvin, perhaps more obviously than Luther, insists that union with Christ radically transforms human nature, enabling a believer to live freely—indeed, to have a life which is described elsewhere in the Institutes as freedom to obey God’s will.23 This element of the Christian life turns to the second aspect of the twofold gifts. Now free to obey God’s will, a life of perfect obedience to God’s will is demanded of believers. They are expected to become what they have been declared to be—in a word, holy. To say that this is demanded of believers, as we explored in chapter three, gets things only partially right. For indeed, as we saw there, whatever God demands is good for human persons. Accordingly, a life of complete obedience, however much it might be demanded of believers, is also (or should be) desirable to them.

Self-denial is especially important to Calvin, because he thinks sin continues to negatively affect the believer’s life well after conversion.24 Due to sin, there must be an ongoing tension in the believer’s life. Also due to sin, a life of complete obedience to God is out of the question for

22 Inst. III.11.1.

23 Inst. III.19.4.

24 Inst. III.7.2. Calvin writes, “When [self-denial] has once taken possession of their hearts, it leaves no place at all first either to pride, or arrogance, or ostentation; then either to avarice, or desire, or lasciviousness, or effeminacy, or to other evils that our self-love spawns. On the other hand, wherever denial of ourselves does not reign, there either the foulest vices rage without shame or if there is any semblance of virtue, it is vitiated by depraved lusting after glory.”

171 believers, at least so long as they are in the present world.25 The believer’s indwelling sinfulness ensures that he or she cannot obey God’s law perfectly. Believers are nonetheless called to struggle for this perfection.26 For Calvin, struggle is emphatically the right word; one’s sinful inclinations—or in biblical language “the flesh”27 or the “old nature”28—continually desire what is contrary to God’s will.29 The believer, then, is quite often caught between sinful desires and his or her holy duties. In such instances, it will doubtless come as no surprise, the believer must resist sinful temptation in order to follow and obey God. Calvin sometimes frames this as a tension between self-love and self-denial.30 Self-denial, says Calvin, is the only remedy to excessive self-love, an element of Calvin’s thought we further explore below.

As a believer is expected to be in tension with herself, self-denial is thought to flow from her acknowledgement that God’s will, revealed in the law’s judgments, is superior to her own judgments.31 This is an act of faith and humility. Faith, we have seen, is an acknowledgement of

God’s goodness. Accordingly, by trusting in the goodness of God’s will for them, and simultaneously acknowledging that their desires may be in error, believers are expected to be able to say no to certain desires. As one’s faith increases, this struggle to deny the sinful self is

25 Inst. III.6.5.

26 Ibid.

27 See, for instance, Inst. III.7.1.

28 See, for instance, Inst. III.3.6.

29 Comm. Rom. 7:14.

30 I say “sometimes” because I do not think it can be shown he always does this. See, for instance, Inst. III.8.

31 Inst. III.7.1-2.

172 expected to be increasingly or progressively overcome.32 Indeed, having been transformed by the

Spirit, the believer trusts in God and wants to obey God. This is not to deny, however, that believers are deeply inconsistent in this righteous “want.” Conversely, in contrast to believers, unbelievers lack this same desire to live a life of obedience to God and therefore, apart from the

Spirit’s regenerating work, they cannot become truly virtuous, as we explored previously.33

However, to return to a point made in the previous chapter, some of God’s commands are revealed naturally, and therefore natural humanity perhaps partially this same tension between God’s will and their sinful desires. In the end, however, it seems that the primary difference between the two is not simply a matter of degree—the believer feeling this tension more—but rather that an unbeliever’s apparently virtuous acts are not oriented toward the proper end of serving God.34”

From the above, it should now be clear that self-denial is required of persons in situations where their own thoughts and desires conflict with God’s will. Self-denial is therefore not considered an inherent good by Calvin. It is, in other words, not an end in itself. Rather, for Calvin, self- denial serves a wider, life-affirming purpose. As we have seen, Calvin thinks that it serves the purpose of making a believer holy and therefore Christlike. Along with this, Calvin affirms that self-denial serves the purpose of making believers happy. As we saw in this chapter’s epigraph,

32 Inst. III.6.5. Here he writes, "Let each one of us... proceed according to the measure of his puny capacity and set out upon the journey we have begun. No one shall set out so inauspiciously as not daily to make some headway, though it be slight. Therefore, let us not cease so to act that we may make some unceasing progress in the way of the Lord."

33 See chapter 5.

34 Inst. III.14.3.

173

Calvin claims that “[Humans] become happy by self-denial.”35 Commenting on this dimension of Calvin’s thought, Joel Beeke has written:

[S]elf-denial helps us find true happiness because it helps us do what we were created for. We were created to love God above all and our neighbor as ourselves. Happiness is the result of having that principle restored. As Calvin says, without self-denial we may possess everything without possessing one particle of real happiness.36

This passage expresses Calvin’s thought well. Self-denial is not antithetical to happiness, according to Calvin. Instead, it promotes happiness by restoring humans to the life they were created to live.

According to Calvin, a life that is in harmony with God’s will, that is properly ordered, is a life of service to others that considers others as much as one’s self. Given that self-denial is an end in itself, it is emphatically not the same thing as or being “selfless,” characteristics which

Nygren and others in the Christian tradition have valorized. Indeed, according to Calvin, denying one’s self involves denying one’s sinful wants, and is not to deny oneself wholly. One can deny one’s self and, at the same time, be promoting one’s own well-being. What explains this dynamic is the fact that sin is destructive, according to Calvin. As he sees it, happiness and sin cannot coexist. Therefore, the self-denial of believers involves turning away from the parts of them which are destructive and embracing God’s will, which is always life-giving to a person.

God’s Glory

Another possible challenge to a eudaimonistic reading of Calvin is his emphasis on God’s glory.

In his treatment of Calvin on the Christian life, John Leith has made this claim: “[Calvin’s]

35 Comm. Heb. 4:10.

36 Joel Beeke, “Calvin on Piety,” in The Cambridge Companion to John Calvin, ed. Donald K. McKim (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 142.

174 emphasis on the sola gloria Dei undercuts every act which is tainted by self-seeking. True morality is directed towards God alone.”37 For the purposes of this work, this is an important claim. Of course, if Leith’s claim is true, Calvin’s thought cannot be possibly read as eudaimonistic, as I am suggesting. Perhaps Calvin thinks humans are only to think about God’s glory and nothing else, including self-interest.

At least on the surface, there is a tension between God’s glory and human fulfillment in Calvin’s thought. On the one hand, Calvin frequently tells believers to act for God’s glory. Believers, he says, are to prefer God’s glory to all things, including their own lives.38 On the other hand, as explored in chapter one, Calvin claims that we will not serve God truly unless our happiness is rooted in him.39 Seemingly, then, piety, which is said by Calvin to be the central element of the

Christian life, finds its impetus in one’s self-interest. Accordingly, growth in piety is also claimed to be the central goal of the Christian life. A question raised by these claims is: are humans supposed to seek God’s glory, or their own happiness? What, in other words, is the relationship between these concepts, and how can these motives for human activity be reconciled?

Also observing this tension, Brian Gerrish has written:

Calvin’s understanding of the end of knowing and glorifying God is paradoxical insofar as it calls for a corresponding human abnegation. If the exaltation of God requires the humbling of ourselves, how can God’s glory be our highest good? As Calvin explains in his Catechism and many times elsewhere: although we ought to look to God’s glory alone

37 Leith, John Calvin’s Doctrine of the Christian Life, 38.

38 Comm. John 12:28.

39 Inst. III.2.2.

175

and to have no regard for our own advantage, God’s infinite goodness has so arranged things that what makes for God’s glory is also good for us.40

According to Gerrish, then, Calvin thinks that humans should aim at God’s glory; and, however paradoxically, this goal, though it has nothing directly to do with humanity, is also humanity’s highest good. I think that Gerrish is correct in the main. However, pace Gerrish, I suggest

Calvin’s solution is less paradoxical than he suggests. Though Gerrish is right to suggest there is an evident paradox here, he misspeaks when he says that humans should have no regard for their own advantage, for this is not Calvin’s position. Gerrish seems to think that, assuming a person is aware that God in Godself contains true happiness for humans, they must pursue God’s glory for its own sake, seemingly all the while ignoring the fact that God offers them happiness. To seek to bring these two motives into agreement—a motivation to advance God’s glory and to advance one’s own well-being. Therefore, Gerrish understands Calvin to teach—now borrowing a phrase from Kierkegaard—that purity of heart is to will one thing. This “one thing” for Calvin, according to Gerrish, is God’s glory. Over against the claims of scholars like Gerrish and Leith, I maintain that Calvin holds that a believer may act with reference to her own well-being while at the same time promoting God’s glory..

To get a sense of Calvin’s thinking on the subject of God’s glory, we might begin by noting its importance in Calvin’s thought. For Calvin, God’s glory is the end for which God created the universe. This is a point Calvin makes quite strenuously in his debate with Pighius. In his response to Pighius’ attack on Reformational theology, Calvin claims that God created the world out of pure goodness towards humanity. Calvin says Pighius gets things backwards, as he

40 Brian A. Gerrish, Grace and Gratitude: The Eucharistic Theology of John Calvin (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1993), 36.

176 focuses on humanity, not on God. In complete rejection of Pighius’ (alleged) stance, Calvin exclaims:

What! does God desire to be worshipped by us more for our sakes than for His own? Is His regard for His own glory so buried out of His sight that He regards us alone? What, then, is to become of all those testimonies of the Scripture which make the glory of God to be the highest object and ultimate end of man’s salvation?

As he continues, Calvin suggests his reading of Scripture’s teaching on salvation and God’s glory.

Wherefore, let us hold fast this glorious truth–that the mind of God, in our salvation was such as not to forget Himself, but to set His own glory in the first and highest place; and that He made the whole world for the very end that it might be a stupendous theatre whereon to manifest His own glory. Not that He was not content in Himself, nor that He had any need to borrow addition from any other sources; but it was His good pleasure so highly to honour His creatures, as to impress on them the bright marks of His great glory.41

Thus, according to Calvin, God created the world for Godself—in particular, God created the world as a theater to display his glory.42 Since God created the world for his glory, Calvin emphasizes human salvation, though obviously important, must not take “center stage” in theology.

In his later works, Calvin continues to develop his thought along the lines of these early writings, consistently viewing God’s glory as the end of creation and redemption as subservient to this end. It is therefore not without reason that God’s glory became a hallmark of the Reformed tradition. Calvin thus makes essentially the same point in the context of another theological debate—his dispute with Cardinal Sadolet. In his response to the Cardinal, Calvin chides Sadolet

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

177 for this focus on human salvation to the exclusion of God’s glory. At root, he defines the problem of Sadolet’s theology in this way:

[I]t is not very sound theology to confine a man’s thoughts so much to himself, and not to set before him, as the prime motive of his existence, zeal to illustrate the glory of God. For we are born first of all for God, and not for ourselves. As all things flowed from him, and subsist in him, so, says Paul, [Rom. 6:36] they ought to be referred to him.43

This passage, especially its claim that “we are born first of all for God, and not for ourselves,” recalls Calvin’s statement that “[Christians] are the Lord’s” in the Institutes. The particular offense of Sadolet’s writing is frequent exhortation to pursue the life to come, without an emphasis on sanctifying God’s name in the present. Calvin writes:

I am persuaded, therefore, that there is no man imbued with true piety, who will not consider as insipid that long and labored exhortation to zeal for heavenly life, a zeal which keeps a man entirely devoted to himself, and does not, even by one expression, arouse him to sanctify the name of God.44

Thus, Calvin judges Sadolet’s sentiments to be overly anthropocentric.

Unsurprisingly, then, the goal of creation—God’s glory—is expected to be an overarching motive for a believer’s behavior. Calvin thus counsels believers that “now the great thing is this: we are consecrated and dedicated to God in order that we may therefore think, speak, meditate, and do, nothing except to [God’s] glory.”45 Likewise, Calvin claims, “We seek not the things that are ours but those which are of the Lord’s will and will serve to advance his glory.”46 As noted,

Calvin says God’s glory is to be preferred to our own lives. Christ set an example for believers in

43 John Calvin, “Calvin’s Reply to Sadoleto,” in A Reformation Debate (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1966), 58.

44 Ibid.

45 Inst. III.7.1.

46 Inst. III.7.2.

178 this. From his example, believers see that “[T]he true regulation of all our desire is, to seek the glory of God in such a manner that all other things shall give way to it.”47

Though Calvin consistently emphasizes that the human person and human salvation are secondary to God’s glory, Calvin believes the two should not be set in opposition to one another.

It should therefore be noted that, also in his response to Cardinal Sadolet, Calvin writes:

I acknowledge, indeed, that the Lord, the better to recommend the glory of his name to men, has tempered zeal for the promotion and extension of it, by uniting it indissolubly with our salvation. But since he has taught that this zeal ought to exceed all thought and care for our own good and advantage, and since natural equity also teaches that God does not receive what is his own, unless he is preferred to all things, it certainly is the part of a Christian [person] to ascend higher than merely to seek and secure the salvation of his own soul.48

Accordingly, while Calvin considers a zeal for God’s glory to be “the prime motive of [our] existence,” he also claims to be “tempered” by the way in which God has joined this task with human salvation. Calvin therefore concludes this discussion finding his partial agreement with

Sadolet. He thus also writes in this context:

But I readily agree with you [Sadolet] that, after this sanctification, we ought not to propose to ourselves any other object in life than to hasten towards that high calling; for God has set it before us as the constant aim of all our thoughts and words and actions. And, indeed, there is nothing in which man excels the lower animals unless it be his spiritual communion with God in the hope of a blessed eternity. And generally, all we aim at in our discourses is to arouse men to mediate upon it and aspire to it.49

Calvin therefore agrees with Sadolet that it is right to encourage people to aspire after the calling

God has given them, which includes within it “the hope of a blessed eternity.”50

47 Comm. John. 12:28.

48 Calvin, “Calvin’s Reply to Sadoleto,” 58.

49 Ibid., 58–59.

50 Ibid., 59.

179

Ultimately, drawing together the various parts of his response, Calvin’s overall solution in this particular letter is complex and perhaps somewhat tangled. In sum, Calvin thinks God did not create the world simply to save humans. Yet, at the same time, since Scripture also enjoins us to seek the eternal blessedness of the life to come, there is nothing wrong in concerning ourselves with this end, provided we understand that this task promotes the highest end of God’s glory.

These motives are not seen to be in competition.

Precisely how Calvin harmonizes the two motives for acting is significant. We have seen that we are to constantly aspire to God’s glory. This is supposed to be the aim of all our actions. At the same time, we are to aim all our thoughts, words, and actions at the heavenly life, which Calvin understands to be good for humanity. To reconcile these claims, Calvin insists the final end of creation to be humanity’s highest good. That is, in the process of advancing the final end of

God’s glory, humans receive the highest good. Calvin thinks that a believer may give God glory in multiple ways. Both gratitude and obedience, for instance, give glory to God.51 For my purposes, one might consider especially the following passage:

Mark the end that God has in view in bestowing all things upon us in Christ — that we may not claim any merit to ourselves, but may give him all the praise. For God does not despoil with the view of leaving us bare, but forthwith clothes us with his glory — yet on this condition, that whenever we would glory we must go out of ourselves. In short, man, brought to nothing in his own estimation, and acknowledging that there is nothing good anywhere but in God alone, must renounce all desire for his own glory, and with all his might aspire and aim at the glory of God exclusively.52

Thus, a believer abandons the hope of finding glory in her own self and her personal resources and aims, finding it instead in the glory of God. Specifically, according to Calvin, humans “aim at” the glory of God as they acknowledge that God possesses what they need. Though Calvin

51 John H. Leith, John Calvin’s Doctrine of the Christian Life (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1989), 42–43.

52 Comm. 1 Cor. 1:31.

180 does not use this exact language here, essentially it is the same idea as that of acknowledging

God as the fountain of all good. Thus, by placing one’s happiness in God and seeking satisfaction in God, God is glorified. Indeed, according to Calvin, this is what it means to “glory in the Lord”:

If therefore a man has his mind regulated in such a manner that, claiming no merit to himself, he desires that God alone be exalted; if he rests with satisfaction on his grace, and places his entire happiness in his fatherly love, and, in fine, is satisfied with God alone, that man truly “glories in the Lord.”53

It therefore becomes clear that one’s seeking to advance God’s glory cannot easily be placed in opposition to one’s self-interest. Indeed, as this passage shows, it is precisely in meeting humanity’s needs that God is glorified. Therefore, when a person is at rest in God’s fatherly love, and satisfied with him, God is glorified. With this specific language, what is being expressed overall is a comprehensive view of salvation. Doubtless another way of expressing what is claimed above is that the salvation of humans brings God glory. It is not surprising, then, that

Calvin says nothing brings more glory to God than Christ’s saving work for humanity.54 The two concepts work together in tandem—“[God] so joins his glory with our salvation that we cannot procure the one without the other.”55

This same idea of God’s glory being harmonized in meeting human needs is found in Calvin’s comments on the Lord’s Prayer. Following the example of Luther, Calvin made expositing the

53 Ibid.

54 Comm. John 13:31. Calvin writes, “[F]or in the cross of Christ, as in a magnificent theatre, the inestimable goodness of God is displayed before the whole world. In all the creatures, indeed, both high and low, the glory of God shines, but nowhere has it shone more brightly than in the cross, in which there has been an astonishing change of things, the condemnation of all men has been manifested, sin has been blotted out, salvation has been restored to men; and, in short, the whole world has been renewed, and every thing [sic] restored to good order."

55 This appears to be Leith’s translation. See Leith, John Calvin’s Doctrine of the Christian Life, 41. For the original French, see . See CO 51:13. Here, Calvin writes, “[I]l conjoint tellement sa glorie avec nostre salut, que nous ne pouvons procurer l’un sans l’autre.”

181

Lord’s Prayer central to his overall theological program. The first edition of the Institutes thus included a section expositing the Lord’s Prayer. Calvin continued to place a section on the

Lord’s Prayer in subsequent revisions of the Institutes. Focusing specifically on his commentary in the 1559 edition, he observes that the prayer focuses on God’s glory: “[T]he whole prayer is such that throughout it God’s glory is to be given chief place.”56 While the first three petitions focus on God’s glory especially, the other three petitions promote God’s glory indirectly. Having this consistent focus throughout, Calvin’s solution to the relationship between God’s glory and our own well-being is complex. Given its complexity, Calvin might be profitably quoted at length. He writes,

[T]he first three petitions have been particularly assigned to God’s glory, and this alone we ought to look to in them, without consideration of what is called our own advantage. The three others are concerned with the care of ourselves, and are especially assigned to those things which we should ask for our own benefit. So, when we ask that God’s name be hallowed, because God wills to test us whether we love and worship him freely or for hope of reward, awe must then have no consideration for our own benefit but must set before ourselves his glory, to gaze with eyes intent upon this one thing.57

Thus, Calvin sees God’s glory as something that believers should set before themselves, almost obscuring their focus on the present life. Calvin continues:

And in the remaining petition of this sort, it is meet to be affected in precisely the same way. And, indeed, this yields a great benefit to us, because when his name is hallowed as we ask, our own hallowing in turn also comes about. But our eyes ought, as it were, to be closed and in a sense blinded to this sort of advantage, so that they have no regard for it at all, and so that, if all hope of our own private good were cut off, still we should not cease to desire and entreat this hallowing and the other things that pertain to God’s glory. In the examples of Moses and Paul, we see that it was not grievous for them to turn their minds and eyes from themselves and to long for their own destruction with fierce and burning zeal in order that, despite their own love, they might advance God’s glory and his Kingdom. On the other hand, when we ask to be given our daily bread, even though we

56 Inst. III.10.35.

57 Inst. III.20.35.

182

desire what is to our benefit, here also we ought especially seek God’s glory so as not to ask unless it redoubt to his glory.58

This passage acknowledges a paradox. Calvin finds biblical examples of individuals who were ostensibly willing to forego their private good in order to advance the common good. And yet,

Christ apparently instructs his followers to pray for their individual needs. Calvin’s solution to this is to say that we should seek these goods in order that God’s glory might advance. In fact, he thinks this is finally the only permissible way to pray for our needs. Calvin makes this same point later in this section of the Institutes:

God specifically claims the first three petitions and draws us wholly to himself to provide our piety in this way. Then he allows us to look after our own interests, yet under this limit: that we seek nothing for ourselves without the intention that whatever benefit he confers upon us may show forth his glory, for nothing is more fitting than that we live and die to him.59

In other contexts, also, it can appear that there is a potential for conflict between the two goals of

God’s glory and the human good. In the Institutes, for instance, Calvin claims: “This is also evidence of great progress in the Christian life: “that, almost forgetful of ourselves, surely subordinating our self-concern, we try faithfully to devote our zeal to God and his commandments.”60 In this particular context, it is worth noting that Calvin proceeds immediately to discuss self-concern as it is fixated on gaining power and status: “[W]hen the Scripture bids us leave off self-concern, it not only erases from our minds the yearning to possess, the desire for all power, and the favor of men, but it also uproots ambition and all craving for human glory and other more secret plagues.”61 Self-concern thus appears here to reference one’s standing in

58 Ibid.

59 Inst. III.20.44.

60 Inst. III.7.2.

61 Ibid.

183 relation to others, particular one’s desire to be “placed” above others. From this, it is clear that

Calvin does not counsel persons to ignore self-interest to advance God’s glory, as Gerrish suggests. Instead, one almost forgets about oneself, perhaps especially in relation to others. Self- interest is thus seemingly subordinated to the project of promoting God’s glory.

The particular examples of Moses and Paul are cited as examples of individuals who considered

God’s glory more important than their own good. Calvin’s commentary on these particular men again shows his attempt to reconcile these two dimensions of his thought. As he explains regarding Moses, Moses was so devoted to the good of the church that he seemingly preferred the salvation of the rest of God’s people to his own. Seemingly, if there was a contradiction between God’s glory and human good, Calvin thinks Moses would have to choose the former over the latter. However, this possibility, which is considered by both Moses and Paul, is purely hypothetical, according to Calvin. He writes: “Even, however, though this should be accepted, still their words would have been hyperbolical.” Calvin then explains his reasoning:

[F]or, although God’s glory may well be preferred to a hundred worlds, yet He so far as accommodates Himself to our ignorance, that He will not have the eternal salvation of believers brought into opposition with His glory; but has rather bound them inseparably together, as cause and effect. Moreover, it is abundantly clear that Moses and Paul did devote themselves to destruction out of regard to the general salvation. Let, therefore, that solution which I have advanced hold good, that their petition was so confused, that in the vehemence of their ardor they did not see the contradiction, like men beside themselves. Nor is it a matter of surprise that they should have been in such perplexity, since they supposed that by the destruction of the elect people God’s faithfulness was abandoned, and He Himself in a manner brought to nought, if the eternal adoption wherewith He had honored the children of Abraham should fail.62

Calvin, then, considers individuals who play God’s glory over against their own good to be speaking offhandedly and incautiously, since this is not a serious possibility. In short, Calvin

62 Comm. Ex. 32:31.

184 thinks that a believer will never be forced to choose to promote God’s glory at their own expense. God’s glory, indeed, is advanced by advancing the believer’s good.

In sum, Calvin thus joins happiness together with God’s glory—indeed, in his thought the two ideas are never in conflict. Overall, Calvin thinks one ought to order one’s existence both to

God’s glory and one’s own interest. The mature Christian, he reasons, seeks his or her own good while simultaneously seeking God’s glory. It is somewhat difficult to understand this, since the believer seeks his or her own good by seeking God’s glory. A person, in other words, works to promote God’s glory, knowing that this project, this particular ordering of one’s life, promotes his or her own well-being. According to Calvin, the believer seeks God’s glory by admitting her emptiness and turning to God to meet her needs. This act is acquisitive—an act in which the self seeks something outside of itself. The Christian’s focus, then, is not improperly on the human good, according to Calvin, given that seeking one’s own good in God brings glory to God. For

Calvin, a person’s flourishing is included within Scripture’s vision of creation as made unto

God’s glory. Thus, because the concepts of God’s glory and human flourishing are inseparable, it is impossible to seek one properly without the other. This is not surprising, given that God and humans are so inseparably joined together in Calvin’s thought.

Given that a person’s self-concern is not entirely eclipsed, but rather finds its fulfilment when

God’s glory is advanced, Calvin does not think the Christian’s duty to advance God’s glory is met with a call to a corresponding self-abnegation. Of course, given what we have seen so far,

Calvin seems to entertain that believers should be willing to be advance God’s glory at their own expense. Still, Calvin does not think that believers will actually need to sacrifice their own well- being to advance God’s glory. This strand of Calvin’s thought works with elements that we have previously explored, especially in chapter two concerning Calvin’s thinking on humanity (and,

185 indeed, all creation’s natural love of its well-being). To say that all creation naturally seeks its own well-being, and yet insist that creation must deny this part of its self, would put humanity in conflict with something God placed within human persons and continually sustains. Calvin’s proposal thus affirms the natural longing that all things have for their well-being, while likewise placing an emphasis on the will being directed not simply to what is advantageous but also to what is good.

Although Calvin’s proposal on the relationship between God’s glory and human flourishing brings together disparate elements of his thought, paradoxes nonetheless remain. Indeed, while I think Gerrish wrongly views Calvin’s solution as contradictory—because he claims that the believer is not enjoined to forget himself somehow, even while seeking to advance God’s glory, which he knows will advance his own good—he is right to see paradox here. Perhaps above all, a paradox exists surrounding Calvin’s language of subordinating our self-concern to the primary concern of advancing God’s glory. Such a framing of things appears to create anxiety about constantly policing one’s motives—indeed, how does one know when one has become too focused on personal well-being? Perhaps it could be reasoned that, provided one is steadfastly working to advance God’s glory, this is not a particularly helpful question to ask. Calvin, however, is not especially clear on this point. As a result, it seems his thinking may produce an anxiety about the purity and ordering of one’s intentions.

I think it is worth mentioning that Calvin finally harmonizes God’s glory with humanity’s self- interest in an additional way—by uniting God’s glory and humanity’s glory. This final dimension of Calvin’s thought shows that one’s concern for one’s own self-interest cannot be easily played off against or pitted against a concern for God’s glory. Yet, in Calvin’s eschatology, God’s glory is shared with humanity. Therefore, although a believer is not called to

186 pursue her own glory relative to others’, Calvin teaches that a believer is nonetheless given glory by virtue of his or her union with God. Consider the following remark:

The image of God in holiness and righteousness is restored to us for this end, that we may at length be partakers of eternal life and glory as far as it will be necessary for our complete felicity.63

These particular comments come in the context of Calvin’s treatment of 1 Peter 1:4. In this context, Calvin emphasizes that believers are made partakers of the divine nature, and thus they are made completely happy. Calvin relates this passage to what we have considered about the highest good, for he observes a point he makes elsewhere that Plato was aware of this doctrine— again, inchoately.64 Calvin thus teaches again that believers are made happy as God makes us one with him and, as a part of this process, God shares his glory with us. This passage, then, provides a very striking example that God’s glory is not at all at odds with human flourishing. In the end, the two concepts are quite neatly harmonized—God is given glory as humans are made happy in himself and made to share in his glory.

Elsewhere, Calvin explains—at least partially—what it means for humans to share in God’s glory. According to Calvin, God’s glory is always properly God’s, though God may share his glory with humans. Again: “[God’s] good pleasure is so highly to honour His creatures, as to impress on them the bright marks of His great glory.”65 As first created in God’s image, Calvin

63 Comm. 2 Peter 1:4; In this context, following the language of the Apostle Peter, Calvin claims, “[W]e shall be partakers of divine and blessed immortality and glory.” Thus, in sharing in God’s glory, the believer is made happy. This, related to claims of eudaimonism, relates to humanity’s created dimensions—indeed, humans, again, will share God’s glory “as far as [their human capacities] will allow.”

64 Ibid. Indeed, consider this full passage: “This doctrine was not altogether unknown to Plato, who everywhere defines the chief good of man to be an entire conformity to God; but as he was involved in the mists of errors, he afterwards glided off to his own inventions. But we, disregarding empty speculations, ought to be satisfied with this one thing,—that the image of God in holiness and righteousness is restored to us for this end, that we may at length be partakers of eternal life and glory as far as it will be necessary for our complete felicity.” Comm. 2 Peter 1:4.

65 John Calvin, Calvin’s Calvinism, trans. Henry Cole (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1950), 70.

187 thinks humans reflected the glory of God; now, due to sin, God’s glory no longer shines in humans. Calvin thinks that Christians are gradually restored to God’s image in Christ, and thus reflect God’s ordering of things and therefore God’s glory. Calvin’s imagined person, as Julie

Canlis has pointed out, is a fundamentally dependent self.66 As she explains, all that is good in humanity comes from God. Humans act as mirrors, reflecting God’s glory by displaying particular attributes which may be shared between Creator and humanity. By displaying the attributes of wisdom, righteousness, and power humans reflect God’s glory. This was God’s original intention as well as the initial ordering of things. Hence, as originally created, humans possessed these traits and therefore God’s glory was displayed in them.67 The gospel restores humans to their original glory. In this connection, Calvin writes,

Observe, that the design of the gospel is this—that the image of God, which had been effaced by sin, may be stamped anew upon us, and that the advancement of this restoration may be continually going forward in us during our whole life, because God makes his glory shine forth in us by little and little.”68

In the life to come, as just noted, humans will share attributes with God as far as their capacities allow and, in so doing, share his glory.

66 See .Julie Canlis, “What Does It Mean to Be Human? John Calvin’s Surprising Answer,” Theology in Scotland 16, no. 2 (2009): 93–106.

67 Comm. Gen. 1:26. Here, Calvin writes, “[The] glory of God … peculiarly shines forth in human nature, where the mind, the will, and all the senses, represent the Divine order.”

68 Comm. 2 Cor. 3:18.

188

Self-Love

A final dimension of Calvin’s thought I now turn to discuss is his thinking on self-love.69 The question of the place of self-love is yet another way debates surrounding eudaimonism may be framed. Indeed, by considering Calvin’s use of this term, it is therefore possible to consider whether it is appropriate for humans to act out of self-interest. For indeed, Calvin sometimes uses the term self-love with precisely this meaning.

In some contexts, however, as we will see, Calvin uses the term “self-love” to refer to self- interest or selfishness. In such contexts, Calvin unsurprisingly sees self-love as deeply problematic. Famously, for instance, Calvin calls self-love a deadly pest.70 If self-love is wholly forbidden, this would again make a eudaimonistic reading of Calvin impossible, since eudaimonism supposes one acts in one’s best interest, broadly defined.71 Indeed, a eudaimonist, as I am using the term, would not consider it possible to act morally in a way that is against one’s self interest. A dilemma between doing what is in one’s best interest and doing what is best is foreign to the eudaimonist. Indeed, to him or her, the two ideas cannot be played off against each other. Instead, as one acts morally, one is working towards, perhaps even achieving, one’s well- being, given that both view happiness as more of an activity than a state. In this section, I hope to

69 Calvin’s references to self-love focus specifically on lack of concern for others or love of neighbor. So far as I am aware, he does not specifically address the relationship between love of self and love of God. I think it is important to highlight Calvin’s thinking on self-love because it shows that Calvin thinks there is a clear place for an appropriate self-concern in his thought. As will be seen in what follows, Calvin expresses that the love we have for ourselves ought to be extended to others.

70 Inst. III.7.4.

71 It is important to say one’s best interest broadly defined, given that, as noted above, self-sacrifice is possible within a eudaimonistic framework, acting in one’s self-interest need not mean that one does not do actions which are harmful for one’s self. However, these acts must always advance one’s well-being.

189 show that Calvin thinks that self-love is not wholly dangerous but instead plays a permissible, even positive, role in a person’s life.

As with his thought on self-denial and God’s glory, Calvin’s thinking on this subject is complex.

From Calvin’s condemnation of “self-love” as a “deadly pest” alone, it would seem that self-love is something wholly negative—indeed, in Christian language, a sin—and therefore something that must be avoided. From this observation alone, one might conclude his prescription is to avoid it completely. This conclusion, however, is hardly representative of Calvin’s thinking on the subject of self-love. Thus, one must consider Calvin’s other uses of the term. In using the term in various ways, Calvin, whether intentionally or not, echoes St. Augustine.72

Certainly, as we have just seen, one way Calvin uses the term self-love is wholly negative.

Though Calvin does not label the term this way, this might be considered “perverse self-love.”73

As this name implies, this kind of self-love is not permissible under any circumstances. Calvin himself can use qualifiers to suggest a self-love that is perverse. He speaks, for instance, of

“blind self-love.”74 He also speaks of “excessive self-love.”75 Each of these uses suggests a love of self that is untoward. Many references to self-love in this sense of perverse self-love can be found in Calvin’s writing. Calvin says, for instance, that the minds of those apart from Christ are

“corrupted with contempt of God, with pride, self-love, ambitious hypocrisy, and fraud.”76

Evidently, then, self-love can be placed on a list of vices—as, indeed, Calvin goes on label these

72 Oliver O’Donovan argues that Augustine uses the term self-love in four different ways in writings. See Oliver O’Donovan, The Problem of Self-Love in St. Augustine (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980).

73 Ibid., 127.

74 Comm. Gen. 18:2. In this context, Calvin says, “[B]lind self-love rather impels us to mercenary services.”

75 Comm. 2 Cor 10:17.

76 Comm. Gen. 8:21.

190 traits in summary.77 In another context, Calvin says, “And doubtless when we regard our own advantage, or return good offices to friends, it is self-love, and not love to others.”78 Further,

Calvin’s claim that self-love is the opposite of self-denial is also illustrative of this dimension of his thought.79 Of course, given what we have already seen about how important self-denial is to

Calvin—it is, after all, the “sum of the Christian life”—as the opposite of self-love, self-love must be especially morally problematic for Christians.

Given his views on human sinfulness, Calvin thinks blind self-love is innate in all persons.

Calvin writes, “Since [humans] were born in such a state that they are all too much inclined to self-love—and, however much they deviated from the truth, they will keep self-love.”80 Self-love is innate and inordinate, then, according to Calvin. A central danger of loving ourselves inordinately, according to Calvin, is that this will blind us to reality. Thus, Calvin writes, “Self- love so blinds us, that we seek to absolve ourselves from that fault which we freely condemn in others.”81 Then, further explaining this phenomenon, Calvin writes, “In general …. [people] are always more correct in their judgment, that is, in matters in which they themselves are not concerned; but as soon as they come to themselves, they become blind, and all rectitude vanishes, and all judgment is gone.”82 Thus, self-love generally prevents individuals from truly understanding situations in which they are involved. In short, it distorts one’s perspective. This situation obtains, despite the fact that all individuals have “access,” as it were, to the natural law.

77 Ibid.

78 Comm. 1 John 4:11.

79 Comm. John 13:35.

80 Inst. II.8.56.

81 Comm. Hab. 2:6.

82 Ibid.

191

Calvin writes, “we maliciously and purposely shut our eyes upon the rule of justice, which shines in our hearts.”83

An important question is whether Calvin thinks love of self is permissible. In at least one place,

Calvin ostensibly frames self-love as at odds with love of neighbor. He thus writes, “There is no greater agreement between love of ourselves, and love of our neighbor, than there is between fire and water. Self-love keeps all our senses bound in such a manner that brotherly love is altogether banished.”84 Continuing on, Calvin advocates for individuals to “direct [their] whole lives to love of the brethren.”85 Seemingly from this passage, then, these two kinds of love are completely at odds—one must overcome love of self in order to love one’s neighbor wholeheartedly. The obvious contemporary analogy to this line of thinking is Nygren’s terms agape and eros, where one of these types of love excludes the other and Christian love must be agape rather than eros.86

Ultimately, however, Calvin’s views on this matter cannot be defined in terms of Nygren’s selfless agape. Indeed, this passage is hardly representative of Calvin’s views on the subject, for in other contexts Calvin claims that self-interest is permissible. One especially important passage in this connection is Calvin’s commentary on the words of 1 Corinthians 13:5, which reads,

“[Love] is not self-seeking.” As Calvin explains this verse, his views on self-love become evident: First, at the outset of his explanation, Calvin notes that love of self is implanted in us by

83 Comm. Matt. 7:12.

84 Comm. John 13:35.

85 Ibid.

86 In a footnote, McNeill discusses Calvin’s use of the word love. Calvin, as McNeill notes, uses a number of different words for love, including amor, dilectio, and charitas. For his part, McNeill thinks there is no use in seeking to puzzle out the differences between the three different words. Instead, they are overlap to the point of being finally undisguisable. See John Calvin, Calvin: Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John T. McNeill, vol. 2 (Philadelphia: Westminster John Knox Press, 1960), 418, fn. 61.

192 nature. He thus writes, “[W]e are naturally prone to have love and care for ourselves, and aim at our own advantage.”87 It is unclear what Calvin means by “naturally” here—that is to say, by the term “natural” does he mean that it is a result of God’s creation, or a result of the Fall? We have already seen that Calvin uses the term in both ways. In this context, “natural” appears to be a result of the Fall, for Calvin immediately goes on to say that this self-love is not only natural, but

“we rush headlong into it.”88 He then specifically calls it a “perverse” inclination. Paul’s words, then, as Calvin sees it, condemn this perverse type of self-love. Further on, Calvin defines self- love as a love which, “[s]eeks one’s own things, is to be devoted to self, and to be wholly taken up with concern for one’s own advantage.”89

Having noted that there is an improper way to love oneself, the question remains whether self- love is at all permissible. Calvin clarifies just this point in what follows. He writes,

This definition solves the question, whether it is lawful for a Christian to be concerned for his own advantage? for Paul does not here reprove every kind of care or concern for ourselves, but the excess of it, which proceeds from an immoderate and blind attachment to ourselves. Now the excess lies in this — if we think of ourselves so as to neglect others, or if the desire of our own advantage calls us off from that concern, which God commands us to have as to our neighbors.90

This self-love is permissible so long as it is not “excessive” love of ourselves, so long as we not neglect others in an “immoderate and blind attachment to ourselves.”91 This perverse self-love, as I am calling it, might therefore be described as the equivalent of selfishness.

87 Comm. 1 Cor. 13:5.

88 Ibid.

89 Comm. 1 Cor. 13:5.

90 Ibid.

91 Ibid.

193

Elsewhere, Calvin claims that the remedy for perverse self-love is, paradoxically, love. Indeed, commenting on the “Greatest Commandment,” specifically Christ’s elaboration of the second command, Calvin states,

“And the second is like it. [Christ] assigns the second place to mutual kindness among men, for the worship of God is first in order. The commandment to love our neighbours, he tells us, is like the first, because it depends upon it. For, since every man is devoted to himself, there will never be true charity towards neighbours, unless where the love of God reigns; for it is a mercenary love which the children of the world entertain for each other, because every one of them has regard to his own advantage. On the other hand, it is impossible for the love of God to reign without producing brotherly kindness among men.92

As Calvin expresses this conviction: “For so perverse an inclination [to love ourselves above others] the remedy is love, which leads us to leave off caring for ourselves, and feel concerned for our neighbors, so as to love them and be concerned for their welfare.”93 In another place,

Calvin notes that our love for ourselves needs to be extended beyond ourselves to others. Indeed. this is how Calvin interprets the “Great Commandment.” Famously, Jesus in his Great

Commandment tells his follows to love their neighbor “as they love themselves.” On its face, this seems to permit a kind of appropriate self-love. Calvin claims that this means that the love we feel for ourselves should extended to others:

Indeed, to express how profoundly we must be inclined to love our neighbor [Lev. 19:18], the Lord measured it by the love of ourselves because he had at hand no more violent or strong emotion than this…. [the Lord] transformed to others the emotion of love that we naturally feel towards ourselves.... [indeed, the Lord] shows that the emotion of love, which out of our natural depravity commonly resides in ourselves, now must be extended to another, that we may be ready to benefit our neighbor with no less eagerness, ardor, and care than ourselves.94

92 Comm. Matt. 22:39.

93 Comm. 1 Cor. 13:5.

94 Inst. II.8.54.

194

In this same discussion, Calvin contrasts the apparent position of other theologians whom he labels as “.” Calvin claims that these theologians interpreted this Great Commandment to mean that one should place his or her love of self before his or her love of others on the assumption that “the thing ruled is always inferior to its rule.”95 For Calvin, however, self-love is not primary and “other-love” subordinate, but instead the two ought to be equal to each other. In a word, the principle of equity must apply to our love of others. This is a conviction that Calvin expresses in multiple places.96

The position that Calvin arrives at—namely, that we must be as concerned for our neighbors as for ourselves—is seemingly not his only position. Rhetorically at least, in the very same discussion, Calvin can contrast love of self with love of others. Thus, he claims in context that

“he lives the best and holiest life who lives and strives for himself as little as he can.”97 No doubt this statement is not easily reconciled with the claims that self-love is appropriate but must be extended to others. Calvin’s exact position is therefore difficult—perhaps impossible—to determine. Again, the question is: Is self-love such a legitimate part of human nature that, though it may be extensive due to sin, it might now be moderated by extension to others? Or alternatively, is self-love a feature of a person’s life that that is inherently problematic?

Seemingly, this is the position Calvin takes when he says that godliness consists partly in striving after our own interests as little as possible. It is possible that he commits himself both of these positions in different places. Alternatively, perhaps the passages which seem to diminish the

95 Ibid.

96 Comm. Matt. 22:39.

97 Inst. II.8.54.

195 importance of self-love are simply rhetorical flourishes, as suggested above. This is the position I am inclined to take.

Admittedly, however, simply in light of this project’s stated goals, this conclusion is perhaps too

“clean,” given that it so nicely aligns with my overall thesis that Calvin develops a position akin to the theological eudaimonism of Augustine or Aquinas. However, as noted throughout this project so far, this appears to be the position that Calvin arrives at in numerous places in the

Institutes and elsewhere. Admittedly, as a result of his oscillating between extending self-interest and ignoring self-interest, if one is looking for discrepancies instead of unity, one might conclude

Calvin is either an inconsistent eudaimonist or perhaps even a thinker who lacks a coherent ethic altogether. For my part, I think that Calvin is likely inconsistent here. In general, I think that he is given to incautious language at times. In the context mentioned above, he seems to want to emphasize that godly persons are not focused on themselves at the expense of others. In so doing, to my mind, he commits himself to a position that contradicts his wider program. This, I think, is the position that one must arrive at, in order to understand Calvin fairly.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have specifically considered potential objections to the eudaimonistic reading of

Calvin set forth in this thesis. These three elements were: self-denial, God’s glory, and self-love.

In the first place, I noted the strong accent that Calvin places on self-denial. For Calvin, self- denial is, in some sense, “the sum of the Christian life.” As we saw in this section, self-denial is not in any way opposed to human fulfillment and happiness. In fact, Calvin views self-denial as

196 fundamentally life-affirming. Calvin even says that “[Humans are] made happy by self-denial.”98

In the second section of this chapter, I considered Calvin’s thinking on God’s glory. Like self- denial, we saw that God’s glory is not opposed to humanity’s well-being. According to Calvin,

God has ordered things in such a manner that humans promote their own well-being in seeking

God’s glory. Calvin views placing human well-being and God’s glory as standing in opposition to each as a hypothetical—and indeed, an opposition which is finally unbiblical. In the final section of this chapter, I treated Calvin’s thinking on self-love. In this section, I observed that

Calvin appears to have two different views on self-love. In some places, he thinks of self-love as something that needs to be extended to others—that we need to love others as we love our selves.

In other places, Calvin views self-love as a “deadly pest.” Of the three concepts surveyed in this chapter, I argued that this aspect of Calvin’s thought appears to present the most challenges to my thesis. In the last analysis, I believe Calvin is probably best read as being inconsistent on themes of self-love. And yet, for my purposes, it is nonetheless not insignificant that in a number of places Calvin seems to think that self-love needs to be extended to others.

98 Comm. Heb. 4:10.

Chapter 6 Union with Christ and Union with God

Grant, Almighty God, that as we cannot look for temporal or eternal happiness, except through Christ alone, and as thou settest him forth to us as the only true fountain of all blessings,—O grant, that we, being content with the favour offered to us through him, may learn to renounce the whole world, and so strive against all unbelief, that we may not doubt but that thou wilt ever be our kind and gracious Father, and fully supply whatever is necessary for our support: and may we at the same time live soberly and temperately, so that we may not be under the power of earthly things; but with our hearts raised above, aspire after that heavenly bliss to which thou invitest us, and to which thou also guidest us by such helps as are earthly, so that being really united to our head, we may at length reach that glory which has been procured for us by his blood.—Amen.1

“As long as Christ remains outside of us, and we are separated from him, all that he has suffered and done for the salvation of the human race remains useless and of no value for us.”2

In this chapter, I connect the material covered in the previous chapters with Calvin’s Christology and, more specifically still, with his doctrine of union with Christ. My overall argument is that union with Christ is not only central to Calvin’s soteriology but also to his vision of happiness.

To argue this, I consider features of Calvin’s Christology generally and then his doctrine of union with Christ in particular. In considering Calvin’s thinking on union with Christ, I note that he understands it to include the twofold grace of justification and regeneration. Here, I suggest both elements of the twofold grace offered to humanity in Christ is essential to Calvin’s broader vision of happiness. I then consider the relationship between Calvin’s thinking on union with

Christ and union with God, because, in different places, he speaks of both concepts as the highest good. Calvin is thus either guilty of contradicting himself or, alternatively, these two unions are understood by him as complementary ideas. I ultimately argue that the latter possibility appears far more likely. Accordingly, it appears that union with God and union with Christ are together

1 Comm. Zech. 9, prayer.

2 Inst. III.1.1. 197

198 understood by Calvin as being humanity’s highest good. Lastly, in the final section of this chapter, I comment on Calvin’s views on predestination in a short excursus.3

Calvin’s Christology Generally

Prior to discussing the ways in which Calvin relates his Christology to the specific topics considered in this project, it may be helpful to say something about Calvin’s Christology generally. In the main, his Christology is not especially “creative” nor constructive. One suspects, however, that Calvin himself would view this as a compliment rather than a criticism, as creativity was never a central aim of his. Indeed, over against creativity, Calvin articulates his firm commitment to the traditional, creedal formulations of Christology. Ultimately, this coincides with his commitment to Nicene and Chalcedonian orthodoxy more generally. Calvin thus affirms that Christ is fully God and fully human, and he likewise affirms that these two natures are united in one person without confusion or separation.4

Though creativity was certainly not the guiding principle in the formation of Calvin’s

Christology, Calvin does develop his Christology in ways that are at least partially distinctive.

One especially important distinctive feature of Calvin’s Christology is his deployment of the

3 My reason for this excursus is straightforward—it seems to me that this doctrine must be addressed at some point, given that the doctrine of predestination has become so identified with Calvin’s thought. However, given that this is hardly the subject of this project, an excursus—rather than a separate chapter—seemed to be the appropriate way to address it.

4 For instance, in his Institutes, Calvin writes, “For we affirm [Christ’s] divinity so joined and united with his humanity that each retains its distinctive nature unimpaired, and yet these two natures constitute one Christ.” See Inst. II.14.1. Likewise, in his commentary on 1 Timothy, Calvin states, “He could not have spoken more appropriately about the person of Christ than in these words, “God manifested in the flesh.” First, we have here an express testimony of both natures; for he declares at the same time that Christ is true God and true man. Secondly, he points out the distinction between the two natures, when, on the one hand, he calls him God, and, on the other, expresses his “manifestation in the flesh.” Thirdly, he asserts the unity of the person, when he declares, that it is one and the same who was God, and who has been manifested in the flesh.” Comm. 1 Tim. 3:16.

199 category of Christ as the Mediator.5 Steven Edmondson has gone so far as to articulate Calvin’s

Christology through this particular frame.6 Calvin is clear that a mediator between God and humanity is needed. He writes, “For, since ‘God dwells in inaccessible light’ [1 Tim. 6:16],

Christ must become our intermediary.”7 Calvin thus stresses that Christ was always the Mediator between God the Father and humanity, and he specifically points to Christ as the one through whom life and riches, which God alone possesses by nature, are imparted to humanity. As explored previously, Calvin thinks that a mediator was necessary to remedy humanity’s hopeless condition. Again, he says: “[T]here is no other remedy for a hopeless condition, no other way of freeing the church, than the appearance of the Mediator.”8 Calvin is thus emphatic on humanity’s need for a Mediator.

An additional salient feature of Calvin’s Christology is his well-known division of Christ’s ministry into three distinct offices, those of prophet, priest, and king.9 It is noteworthy that, by discussing the work of Christ within this threefold frame, Calvin places the ministry of Christ in its redemptive historical-context, given that these offices were occupied by other biblical figures prior to Christ’s coming. In this way as in others, Calvin is characteristically sensitive to the

5 Of course, I say Calvin’s “deployment” advisedly, since this category of Mediator is ultimately a biblical one.

6 Stephen Edmondson, Calvin’s Christology (Cambridge University Press, 2004).

7 Inst. III.2.1. Calvin continues on, providing further Biblical support: “Hence, he calls himself ‘the light of the world’ [John 8:12], and elsewhere, “the way, the truth, and the life”; for no one comes to the Father, who is ‘the fountain of life’ [Ps. 36:9], except through him [John 14:6] because he alone knows the Father, and afterward the believers to whom he wishes to reveal him [Luke 10:22]. On this ground, Paul declares that he considers nothing worth knowing save Christ [1 Cor. 2:2]. In the twentieth chapter of Acts he relates that he has preached ‘faith in … Christ’ [v. 21]. And in another passage he has Christ speak as follows: ‘I shall send you among the Gentiles …, that they may receive forgiveness of sins and a place among the saints through faith that is in me’ [Acts 26:17–18]. And Paul testifies that the glory of God is visible to us in His person, or—what amounts to the same thing—that the enlightening knowledge of the glory of God shines in His face [2 Cor. 4:6].”

8 Inst. II.6.4.

9 Inst. II.15.

200 redemptive-historical development of the Scripture.10 Calvin’s emphasis on the offices of Christ may represent a shift in accent from a natures- to an offices-Christology,11 as Heiko Oberman has claimed.

Shifting from these general features of Calvin’s Christology, I now turn to consider Calvin’s doctrine of union with Christ as well as its relation to the highest good specifically. Firstly, as will be demonstrated below, the doctrine of union with Christ plays an important role in Calvin’s thought, connecting different aspects of his theology. Beyond the doctrine’s significance, it will also be shown that it connects with his thinking on God, and union with God in particular, as the highest good.

Union with Christ

In recent years, many scholars have drawn attention to the importance of the doctrine of union with Christ in Calvin’s thought.12 Whether union with Christ is Calvin’s central dogma, as Partee suggests,13 what is undisputed is that it plays a central role in his thought. A number of

10 For more on Calvin’s sensitivity to historical context see David Lee Puckett, John Calvin’s Exegesis of the Old Testament, Columbia Series in Reformed Theology (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1995), esp. pp. 52-81.

11 Heiko A. Oberman, “The ‘Extra’ Dimension in the Theology of Calvin,” The Journal of Ecclesiastical History 21, no. 1 (January 1970): 60.

12 Some important works on this subject include the following: J. Todd Billings, Calvin, Participation, and The Gift: The Activity of Believers in Union with Christ (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Mark A. Garcia, Life in Christ: Union with Christ and Twofold Grace in Calvin’s Theology (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2008); Dennis E. Tamburello, Christ and Mystical Union: A Comparative Study of the Theologies of and John Calvin (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990); Marcus P. Johnson, “Luther and Calvin on Union with Christ,” Fides et Historia 39, no. 2 (2007): 59–77; John McClean, “Perichoresis, Theosis and Union with Christ in the Thought of John Calvin,” The Reformed Theological Review 68, no. 2 (2009): 130–41.

13 Charles Partee, “Calvin’s Central Dogma Again,” The Sixteenth Century Journal 18, no. 2 (1987): 191– 200. One should note that Partee’s argument that union with Christ is Calvin’s central dogma is complex and nuanced: Indeed, on the one hand, he asserts that the quest for a central dogma is misguided. On the other hand, however, he suggests that, since “no one can start everywhere at once… various ‘centrally important themes’ may

201 impressive studies have shown this to be the case. Notably, already suggesting something of the importance of this doctrine for Calvin, Merwyn S. Johnson have shown that Calvin uses a constellation of phrases, in addition to the phrase communio cum Christo, to describe this concept.14 Johnson highlights the following phrases: “join us to himself” (ut sibi aggregarent),15

“communion with him” (communione),16 “fellowship with Christ” (suorum consortio),17 and that which is central to the overall thesis of this work, namely, union with God (cum Deo coniunctionis).18 Taken together, these phrases make it clear that this doctrine is fundamentally relational. Indeed, Calvin stresses that humans must be somehow closely related with Christ and with God.

Union with Christ plays a number of different roles in Calvin’s thought. This doctrine extends well beyond his soteriology to influence both his ecclesiology and his eschatology in important ways. Perhaps most fundamentally, union with Christ is for Calvin the specific means by which

God channels his blessings to humanity. Union with Christ, in other words, is the specific means by which humans receive the manifold blessings connected with Christ’s saving work.

That union with Christ is the means through which believers experience all of the goodness of salvation is especially clear from Book Three of the Institutes. Calvin begins this particular book be considered and the one judged to be the most comprehensive can be justifiably called Calvin's central dogma-not in a final and absolute sense, but in a heuristic and relative way.” Partee, 192.

14 Merwyn S. Johnson, “Calvin’s Ethical Legacy,” in The Legacy of John Calvin: Papers Presented at the 12th Colloquium of the Calvin Studies Society, April 22-24, 1999, ed. David Foxgrover, Calvin Studies Society Papers 1999 (Grand Rapids: CRC, 2000), 63–83.

15 Inst. III.6.2.

16 Ibid., III.8.1.

17 Inst. III.8.1.

18 Ibid.

202 by asking: “We must now examine this question. How do we receive those benefits which the

Father bestowed on his only-begotten Son—not for Christ’s own private use, but that he might enrich poor and needy men?”19 This is an important question for Calvin, given that he immediately indicates his belief that: “[A]s long as Christ remains outside of us, and we are separated from him, all that he has suffered and done for the salvation of the human race remains useless and of no value for us.”20 This particular claim forms a central pivot point in Calvin’s theology and should therefore not be missed.

The benefits we as humans stand in need of have been suggested by the preceding chapters, but they can be laid out in the broadest possible terms here—we stand in need of life, good, purpose, and happiness. This follows from the fact that, due to sin, humanity has lost its connection to

God, the fountain of life and all good. In particular, according to Calvin’s doctrine of original sin, humans are completely alienated from life and the good.

Following the Scripture’s terminology, Calvin thinks of the consequences of sin in terms of death. On this point, early on in his theological career, Calvin commented: “Would you know what the death of the soul is? It is to be without God—to be abandoned by God, and left to itself: for if God is its life, it loses its life when it loses the presence of God.”21 Similarly, in the 1559

Institutes, Calvin writes: “As with the spiritual life of Adam was to remain united and bound to his Maker, so estrangement from him was the death of his soul.”22 In this passage, there is clear

19 Inst. III.1.1.

20 Ibid.

21 John Calvin, “Psychopannychia,” in Tracts and Treatises, ed. Henry Beveridge, Electronic Edition, vol. 3 (Charlottesville, VA: InteLex Corp., 2002).

22 Inst. II.1.5.

203 connection between God and life. Sin leads to death for Calvin because it is an estrangement from God. Calvin elsewhere makes this clear with his language of the fountain of life. He writes:

[F]or as soon as [Adam] revolted from God, the fountain of life, [Adam] was cast down from his former state, in order that he might perceive the life of man without God to be wretched and lost, and therefore differing nothing from death. Hence the condition of [humanity] after his sin is not improperly called both the privation of life, and death. The miseries and evils both of soul and body, with which man is beset so long as he is on earth, are a kind of entrance into death, till death itself entirely absorbs him.23

Calvin thus thinks of human life as simply a long, drawn-out process of dying. Humans can only be restored to life by God himself. God graciously meets our needs in the person of Christ, restoring humans to life, by uniting us to Christ, so that the life that is in God can become ours.

Calvin uses the metaphor of God as the fountain of life to describe this. He writes:

For as the Father hath life in himself. He shows whence his voice derives such efficacy; namely, that he is the fountain of life, and by his voice pours it out on men; for life would not flow to us from his mouth, if he had not in himself the cause and source of it. God is said to have life in himself, not only because he alone lives by his own inherent power, but because, containing in himself the fullness of life, he communicates life to all things. And this, indeed, belongs peculiarly to God, as it is said, with thee is the fountain of life, (Psalm 36:9.) But because the majesty of God, being far removed from us, would resemble an unknown and hidden source, for this reason it has been openly manifested in Christ. We have thus an open fountain placed before us, from which we may draw. The meaning of the words is this: “God did not choose to have life hidden, and, as it were, buried within himself, and therefore he poured it into his Son, that it might flow to us.”24

For Calvin, life is found in Christ and we must be united to Christ to get this life. Ultimately, it is through Christ that life and all good is restored to us. Calvin divides the benefits we receive in

Christ into parts. In Christ, the double grace we receive comprises the gifts of sanctification and justification. Calvin writes,

By partaking of him, we principally receive a double grace: namely, that being reconciled to God through Christ’s blamelessness, we may have in heaven instead of a Judge a

23 Comm. Gen. 2:17.

24 Comm. John 5:26.

204

gracious Father; and secondly, that sanctified by Christ’s spirit we may cultivate blamelessness and purity of life.25

Elsewhere, Calvin makes a similar point:

Therefore, to share with us what he has received from the Father, he had to become ours and to dwell within us. For this reason, he is called “our Head” [Eph. 4:15], and “the first-born among many brethren” [Rom. 8:29]. We also, in turn, are said to be “engrafted into him” [Rom. 11:17], and to “put on Christ” [Gal. 3:27]; for, as I have said, all that he possesses is nothing to us until we grow into one body with him. It is true that we obtain this by faith.26

The language of this passage is striking. Calvin goes so far as to suggest that believers possess none of God’s benefits until they “grow into one body with [Christ].” According to Calvin, a person is specifically united to Christ by faith. Transparently, not all come to have faith in Christ.

Thus, turning to the specific cause of faith, Calvin concludes this section of the Institutes:

Yet since we see that not all indiscriminately embrace that communion with Christ which is offered through the gospel, reason itself teaches us to climb higher and to examine into the secret energy of the Spirit, by which we come to enjoy Christ and all his benefits.27

This final sentence of the opening paragraph of Book III serves as an apparent transition statement, and it thus signals Calvin’s readiness to address the person of the Spirit. Yet already here we see that the Spirit unites a person to Christ by giving them faith. The Trinitarian pattern at work in this single passage should be noted—the Spirit causes faith, which, in turn, unites a person to Christ, which, finally, has an instrumental role in causing one to partake of God’s benefits—specifically the benefits which God the Father has bestowed on his Son. In general, much of Calvin’s thinking on soteriology, including the Trinitarian shape that humanity’s reception of grace ought to take, is evident in this passage.

25 Inst. III.11.1.

26 Inst. III.1.1.

27 Ibid.

205

At this point, we are now in a position to begin to see the ways in which Christ’s doctrine of union with Christ connects elements of his theological program more broadly. For my purposes,

I would especially like to draw attention to two interrelated themes in Calvin’s thinking—God as the fountain of all good as well as Calvin’s thinking on Christ’s mediatorial work. Ultimately, it should be noted that these two themes intersect, because of an ever more primary overarching conviction that Calvin possesses—namely, that God’s goodness comes to humanity through the person of Christ. Indeed, on Calvin’s use of this biblical idea, Christ mediates God’s riches to humanity. On this subject, Calvin writes:

For God would have remained hidden afar off if Christ’s splendor had not beamed upon us. For this purpose the Father laid up with his only-begotten Son all that he had to reveal himself in Christ so that Christ, by communicating his Father’s benefits, might express the true image of his glory.28

For Calvin, then, Christ is the one who communicates or mediates God’s benefits to humanity.

Concomitantly, we already explored in chapter one that an important way that Calvin thinks of

God is as the fountain of all good. Drawing these separate strands of his thought together, then, the goodness that emanates from this fountain comes to us, according to Calvin, specifically in the person of Christ. More specifically still, the fullness of God’s goodness is offered to humans through union with Christ’s person.29 Or, stated somewhat differently, if God is the fountain of all good, according to Calvin, Christ is the means of access to the fountain—that is, humans experience the goodness of God in the person of Christ. Though both justification by faith and

28 Inst. III.2.1.

29 At this point, it might be remembered that Christ’s mediatorial role extends both to creation and redemption. Due to this, all people, not just believers, may be said to experience God’s goodness specifically through Christ. In contrast to this general display of God’s goodness, the elect are seen by Calvin to experience God’s goodness distinctly expressed in Christ’s redemptive, mediational work. Indeed, in redemption, as we will see, Calvin thinks God displayed his goodness to humanity without reserve, offering not simply forgiveness to access to himself, the fountain of all goodness. As noted above, we come to share in these benefits only through union with Christ.

206 regeneration are important categories in Calvin’s thought, Calvin’s treatment of union with

Christ as the way in which humans receive God’s benefits shows that this category is more primary, including, as it were, both justification and regeneration within it. At the same time, it is also essential to see that justification and regeneration are integral to his vision of happiness.

According to Calvin, justification is so significant, because, knowing oneself truly involves knowing God’s wrath and hostility towards oneself:

No one can descend into himself and seriously consider what he is without feeling God’s wrath and hostility toward him. Accordingly, he must anxiously seek ways and means to appease God—and this demands a satisfaction. No common assurance is required, for God’s wrath and curse always lie upon sinners until they are absolved of guilt. Since he is a righteous Judge, he does not allow his law to be broken without punishment, but is equipped to avenge it.30

Ultimately, Calvin thinks that justification deals with the problem of human guilt. Calvin writes,

Accordingly, wherever there is sin, there also the wrath and vengeance of God show themselves. Now he is justified who is reckoned in the condition not of a sinner, but of a righteous man; and for that reason, he stands firm before God’s judgment seat while all sinners fall. If an innocent accused person be summoned before the judgment seat of a fair judge, where he will be judged according to his innocence, he is said to be “justified” before the judge. Thus, justified before God is the man who, freed from the company of sinners, has God to witness and affirm his righteousness.31

We have already seen that Calvin thinks that it is impossible to be happy when one has God as one’s enemy. While Calvin’s central soteriological category is not justification by faith, justification must nonetheless be seen as an essential part of Calvin’s soteriology. And ultimately, given that humans cannot achieve happiness apart from God’s saving intervention on their behalf, justification by faith should be seen as an essential part of Calvin’s thinking on happiness more broadly.

30 Inst. II.6.1.

31 Inst. III.11.2.

207

Regeneration is likewise essential because the renewal of the image of God is essential to a human’s experience of the highest good of union with God. In this connection, Calvin’s comments on 2 Peter 1:4 may be cited again:

This doctrine was not altogether unknown to Plato, who everywhere defines the chief good of man to be an entire conformity to God; but as he was involved in the mists of errors, he afterwards glided off to his own inventions. But we, disregarding empty speculations, ought to be satisfied with this one thing,—that the image of God in holiness and righteousness is restored to us for this end, that we may at length be partakers of eternal life and glory as far as it will be necessary for our complete felicity.”32

The restoration of the image of God in humans is thus seen as necessary to happiness. From this text, we see that regeneration—the image of God being restored in humans—serves the broader purpose of enabling humans to complete felicity.

In sum, both elements of the twofold gift—justification and regeneration—are integral to

Calvin’s vision of happiness. As we have seen, these two gifts come to humanity through union with Christ.

More could be said about Calvin’s thinking on union with Christ, as well as its connection to other doctrines in Calvin’s thought. Having noted the role union with Christ, as well as its connection to other themes previously explored, we are now in a position to consider the relationship between union with Christ and the highest good, union with God. To this subject, then, I now turn.

Union with Christ, Union with God, and the Highest Good

I have just noted the importance of union with Christ in Calvin’s thought and highlighted aspects of the way the doctrine functions in Calvin’s thought. It will be remembered that in chapter one I

32 Comm. 2 Peter 1:4.

208 introduced the subject of union with God and the question of its relation to union with Christ.

There, we saw that Calvin thinks that union with God makes us one with himself by means of joining us to Christ. For instance, he states the following:

And assuredly, that we may cleave to God through [Christ], it is necessary that he have God as his head [1 Cor. 11:3]. We must observe, however, with what intention Paul has added this. For he admonishes us, that the sum of our felicity consists in this, that we are united to God who is the chief good, and this is accomplished when we are gathered together under the head that our heavenly Father has set over us…33

Christ, then, is the specific means by which we are joined to God. Here, following the language of 1 Cor. 11:3, Calvin evidently thinks there is a kind of ordering at work here such that Christ is the believers’ head, while he himself has God as his head. This claim, along with Calvin’s claim that union with God—seemingly instead of union with Christ—is humanity’s highest good, raises the question of whether union with Christ is the means to the greater end of union with

God. Perhaps, in other words, union with Christ is only a means and not an end in itself.

Alternatively, these unions may be equivalent terms—that is, different ways of describing a single unified reality such that union with God is union with Christ, and union with Christ is union with God. As we will explore below, there are passages in Calvin’s writing that point to the latter as a superior reading of his thought.

This question of the relation between the two is both an interesting and important question— perhaps especially given the substantial amount of scholarship devoted to Calvin’s doctrine of union with Christ to which I have alluded. However, though this is an important question, Calvin does not appear to have addressed this issue at any length.34 Instead, his general practice is to

33 Comm. 1 Cor. 3:23.

34 I say “appears to” because there may be some passage in Calvin that I have not read which addresses this specific issue. From my reading of the Reformer, it appears that he does not extensively address this issue. Instead, Calvin tends to mention the phrase “union with God” without pausing to define it, still less define its relation to union with Christ.

209 simply refer to the idea of union with God without carefully defining it. Ultimately, his reasons for doing so are unclear.35 Given that Calvin does not detail his thinking on the relationship between union with God and union with Christ, it is difficult to work out the relationship between the concepts. In what follows, I nonetheless seek to consider the relation of the concepts. I do not claim, however, to have definitively solved their relation. Indeed, in the conclusion of this work I point to this as an area for future study. In my judgment, then, this important issue warrants further study beyond what I say here.

In response to the questions just above about the relations between the two kinds of unions— union with Christ and union with God—it must be noted at the outset that there are two different possible interpretations of the phrase “union with God.” The attentive reader of Calvin—and indeed, of Christian theology more generally—may already have suspected as much, for Calvin, in the company of many other theologians, uses the term God equivocally to refer to both God the Father as well as to all three members of the Godhead.36 Ultimately, due to the semantic flexibility of the term “God,” it is possible that by “union with God,” Calvin could mean a union with all of three members of the Godhead. If this is so, then when Calvin says that the highest good is the believer’s union with God, he intends to say that the highest good is union with all three members of the Trinity. The second possibility, naturally, is that by “union with God”

Calvin is speaking distinctly of a union with God the Father. On this reading, to say that union with God is the highest good would mean that communion with God the Father—and not the Son and Spirit—is the highest good.

35 Though I am tempted to speculate about his reasons for this decision, this seems unwise at best.

36 In saying “equivocally” I mean that Calvin uses the term in two different senses. I am certainly not implying that Calvin intended to deceive.

210

In outlining these two different possibilities, one may begin to sense that the specific way Calvin is using the phrase “union with God” dramatically impacts the phrase’s relationship to the idea of union with Christ. More exactly, if Calvin is using “union with God” to denote union with God the Father, it seems that union with Christ must serve what might be called an instrumental purpose in his theology. That is to say, since union with God the Father is the highest good, union with Christ must be a means to this end, rather than the end itself.

On the other hand, if Calvin is using the phrase “union with God” to refer to a union between persons and all the members of the Trinity, it would appear that union with Christ is not simply a means to another end—union with God the Father—but is itself part of humanity’s final end.

This would seem to be true even if union with Christ also served an instrumental purpose in

Calvin’s thought. The question then becomes, which of the readings of union with God appears to be more likely?

As already suggested, it seems significantly more likely that by the phrase “union with God,”

Calvin means union with the Triune God rather than union with God the Father, exclusively. It seems to be the only way to logically understand Calvin’s thought on this subject. Otherwise he must be guilty of committing a straightforward logical fallacy, violating the law of noncontradiction by asserting in different contexts that humanity’s end and, alternatively, the highest good are found either in union with Christ or union with God the Father—for indeed, by definition there can only be one final end and highest good.37 Of course, it is possible that even a thinker as astute as Calvin might occasionally commit a basic logical error. This possibility seems unlikely in this context, however. Again, in my judgment, it is far more likely that these

37 Of course, these two ideas are tightly related and more than likely identical—I am just flagging a difference in Calvin’s specific choice of terminology here.

211 passages point to the idea that union with Christ and union with God are overlapping rather than competing ideas.

It can easily be shown that several passages open up the possibility of simple contradiction in

Calvin’s thought. Consider the following passage:

Augustine has finely spoken of this matter: in discussing the goal of faith, he teaches that we must know our destination and the way to it. Then, immediately after, he infers that the way that is most fortified against all errors is he who was both God and man: namely, as God he is the destination to which we move; as man, the path by which we go. Both are found in Christ alone.38

We see in this passage that Christ plays both an instrumental as well as “telic” role in Calvin’s thought. In line with what has already be suggested, the two roles need not be seen as at odds.

Indeed, following (or claiming to follow) Augustine, Calvin ties Christ’s instrumental and telic roles to his two natures: as a human, Christ is “path by which we go [to God].” As God, however, Christ is “the destination to which we [ought] to move.”39 Christ, then, is at once both the means and goal. To return to the point I have been making already, to say that Christ is the goal of all humanity may be seen to run counter to Calvin’s claim that God is humanity’s end, if we interpret these passages to mean God the Father is our end. We have already seen that Calvin claims that God is humanity’s final end in not a few passages.

It should be noted that this is hardly the only passage in which Calvin expresses that Christ is the means to our union with God. He writes,

When he declares that he is “a man,” the Apostle does not deny that the Mediator is God, but, intending to point out the bond of our union with God, he mentions the human nature rather than the divine. This ought to be carefully observed. From the beginning, men, by contriving for themselves this or that mediator, departed farther from God; and the reason

38 Inst. III.2.1.

39 I believe I am justified in the insertion of the word “ought” here, since Calvin is clear in his affirmation that not all will make it to the final end of union with God. See Inst. III.23.3.

212

was, that, being prejudiced in favor of this error, that God was at a great distance from them, they knew not to what hand to turn. Paul remedies this evil, when he represents God as present with us; for he has descended even to us, so that we do not need to seek him above the clouds.40

Elsewhere, Calvin expresses the same sentiment, asserting “we can be fully and firmly joined with God only when Christ joins us with him.”41 Thus, union with Christ is essential to being united to God, as the means by which this union is formed.

Moving away from Calvin’s thinking on Christ as the Christian’s path and goal, it must also be noted that, in other contexts, Calvin refers to Christ as the one “in whom the chief good is found.” He writes:

[The Apostle John] also sets forth the fruit received from the Gospel, even that we are united thereby to God, and to his Son Christ in whom is found the chief good.... It is, indeed, as it has been stated, our only true happiness, to be received into God’s favour, so that we may be really united to him in Christ.42

As is the case with claim that Christ is humanity’s destination, Calvin’s insistence here that chief or highest good is found in Christ may also be seen as being in conflict with other passages on this subject, passages in which Calvin speaks of God as the highest good. Once more, these passages conflict if by “God” Calvin specifically means God the Father. Unfortunately, here as elsewhere, it is finally not clear whether the referent of “God” is God the Father or the Triune

God. Though this passage does seek to explicate the connection between these two fruits of the gospel, these two kinds of unions, it is evident that these are related ideas.

Ultimately, it is my view that it is not necessary to see a contradiction between union with God and union with Christ. Indeed, these two unions may be understood as coterminous—that is, they

40 Comm. 1 Tim. 2:5.

41 Inst. II.16.3.

42 Comm. 1 John 1:3.

213 may be seen as overlapping and complementary ideas rather than as standing in any way in a competitive relationship. Or, more simply still, union with God and union with Christ may be seen as different ways of speaking of a single, unified reality. In making this suggestion, I am hardly alone. Among others, Yaroslav Viazovski also reaches this conclusion: “It is doubtful that

Calvin means a different union when he says ‘God’ instead of ‘Christ.’”43 Likewise, Charles

Partee has written, “Certainly union with Christ and union with God are not different concepts in

Calvin.”44 Once again, this is the only way in which Calvin’s claims can be made sense of without positing a straightforward contradiction. In sum: we must finally conclude that Calvin is either guilty of contradicting himself regarding highest good and humanity’s last end or he thinks that union with God and union with Christ are roughly equivalent ideas. What is clear in any case is that union with Christ is seen not simply as a means to a higher goal of union with

God but is, instead, described as the highest good and the end goal of human existence.

In concluding this section, I believe it is also necessary to add that, however Calvin understands these two unions to be related to one another, this work’s overall thesis does not finally turn on the answer to this question. Indeed, my overall point that Calvin is a Christian eudaimonist who thinks of union with God as providing humans with ultimate happiness should stand regardless of whatever ambiguity still remains on the relationship between the concepts of union with

Christ and union with God.

43 It should be noted that Viazovski is commenting only on a single passage here. It seems to me, however, that his conclusion that these are overlapping ideas has a universal application to Calvin’s writings as a whole. See Yaroslav Viazovski, Image and Hope: John Calvin and Karl Barth on Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2015), 84.

44 Charles Partee, The Theology of John Calvin (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2008), 177.

214

Having now surveyed Calvin’s doctrine of union with Christ and exploring how it fundamentally overlaps with the idea of union with God in his thought, I hope to fill out this idea by noting the connection between union with Christ and happiness in Calvin’s theology.

Union with Christ and Happiness

Numerous passages in Calvin’s writings point to the centrality of union with Christ in attaining happiness. Of course, this might be expected from what we have already seen. Indeed, as has already been noted, union with Christ is specifically the means by which persons, having been cut off from life and the good, receive access to God, the foundation of all good. Calvin likewise expresses that believers find happiness in Christ, in addition to life and the good. We have already seen that Calvin refers to Christ as humanity’s end and goal. Consider, however, how in his commentary on Christ’s statement that he is “the way, the truth, and the life” (John 14:6),

Calvin fills out this idea:

[Here Jesus] lays down three degrees, as if he had said, that he is the beginning, and the middle, and the end; and hence it follows that we ought to begin with him, to continue in him, and to end in him…. [Jesus] makes them partakers of the truth. At length he makes them enjoy the fruit of it, which is the most excellent and delightful thing that can be imagined.45

In this same context, Calvin continues:

In short, Christ now affirms, concerning happiness, what I have lately said concerning the object of faith. All believe and acknowledge that the happiness of man lies in God alone: but they afterwards go wrong in this respect, that, seeking God elsewhere than in Christ, they tear him—so to speak—from his true and solid Divinity.46

A striking feature of this passage is Calvin’s comment that all are agreed that happiness is found in God. Calvin builds on this philosophical claim, affirming that happiness is found in Christ.

45 Comm. John 14:6.

46 Ibid.

215

Thus, as noted in chapter one, with a philosopher like Plato, Calvin acknowledges that happiness is found in God. At the same time, he acknowledges that Plato’s position is only partially accurate—and therefore ultimately inaccurate—because the philosophers, including Plato, were without knowledge of Christ. For Calvin, the philosophers—for this seems to be who he has in mind with the expression “they”47—should have said that happiness is not only found in God but also found in Christ, because Christ is fully God. In this passage, then, we see how Calvin’s

Christology is deeply connected to his eudaimonism, for he insists that happiness is specifically to be sought in Christ. This particular insistence, of course, aligns with what has already been discussed—namely, that Christ serves as the means by which humans are united to the Triune

God.

Frequently in other contexts Calvin makes this same point. He writes in one place, for instance:

“[W]hoever has obtained Christ wants nothing that is necessary to perfect happiness, since we have no right to desire any thing better than the eternal glory of God, of which Christ puts us in possession.”48 Elsewhere, Calvin straightforwardly states, “[T]here will be no reason to dread scarcity or want, when we have been reconciled to God through Christ, because perfect happiness flows to us from him.”49 In the same context, Calvin emphasizes that the inverse is also true—apart from Christ, there is no good thing. According to Calvin, the situation is just this

47 I say this because Calvin continues on to comment: “For Christ proves that he is the life, because God, with whom is the fountain of life, (Ps. 36:9,) cannot be enjoyed in any other way than in Christ. Wherefore all theology, when separated from Christ, is not only vain and confused, but is also mad, deceitful, and spurious; for, though the philosophers sometimes utter excellent sayings, yet they have nothing but what is short-lived, and even mixed up with wicked and erroneous sentiments.” Comm. John 14:6.

48 Comm. Matt. 16:13.

49 Comm. Isa. 35:6.

216 stark. Indeed, he asserts that apart from Christ, even abundant food and wine are a chimera blessing—in eating and drinking them one is really swallowing the curse of God.50

Thus, Calvin sees Christ as the key to happiness. In and through him, humans may be made happy. Apart from him, no one may truly be happy. For Calvin, then, those who seek happiness should look for it in the person of Christ and nowhere else.

Excursus: Predestination and Election

Prior to concluding this chapter, I would like to comment on the topics of providence and predestination in Calvin’s thought, in relation to the themes taken up in this chapter as well as throughout this thesis. As previously alluded to, providence and predestination are sometimes considered to be Calvin’s central theological ideas, over against other doctrines, including union with Christ. In case it is not clear, I am treating the ideas of providence and predestination together because in Calvin’s theology the ideas of providence and predestination are inextricably intertwined. Regarding the doctrine of providence, Calvin holds that God is providentially guiding the world. In fact, providence is defined by Calvin as God’s governance of all that occurs in the world.51 He emphasizes that only those things God ordains happen. As a part of

God’s ordination of all things, therefore, God chooses who will receive eternal life and who will receive eternal death. Calvin writes, “Eternal life is foreordained for some and eternal damnation for others.”52 Calvin is, of course, closely associated with the doctrine of election.53 In the

50 Ibid.

51 Inst. I.16.2.

52 Inst. III.21.5.

53 Donald McKim writes, “When the name John Calvin is mentioned, the term ‘predestination’ or ‘election’ often follows.” John Calvin: A Companion to His Life and Theology (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2015), 126.

217 popular mind, Calvin is often seen as the foremost defender of this doctrine. Indeed, “Calvinism” has become popular shorthand for the Augustinian view on the doctrines of election and predestination.

Predestination, then, for Calvin is “double”—to eternal life or to eternal death. In addition,

Calvin held that God’s decision to predestine particular individuals was not based on divine foreknowledge of their future faith.54 Instead, it is God’s election that ultimately leads individuals to have faith in the first place. This order of events is of central importance in

Calvin’s thinking on the issue, for he wants to emphasize that salvation begins with God.

Calvin’s emphasis on the priority of God is an attempt to do justice to Scripture’s teaching, including—and perhaps especially—the Pauline idea that salvation is a gift. Donald McKim notes how in the Institutes Calvin’s treatment of the doctrine of election “stands as the culmination of what Calvin emphasized as the priority of God and God’s initiative in providing justification by faith through the Holy Spirit. This is God’s gift.”55 Ultimately, for better or worse, Calvin follows Augustine in interpreting predestination to eternal life as a necessary corollary of this idea that salvation is a gift from God.

Having briefly outlined Calvin’s convictions on providence and predestination, it might now be noted how these doctrines connect to the other themes explored in this work. In brief, if Calvin thinks that it is imperative for fallen humans to be close to God and to receive from him all good, he holds that only those whom God elects to be united to Christ by faith will receive the chief good. For my purposes it is important to note the connection of these doctrines to the doctrine of

54 Inst. III.22.1.

55 Ibid.

218 union with Christ, in particular. The logic of Calvin’s thought runs as follows: salvation comes through union with Christ and one is united to Christ by faith through the work of the Spirit. The working of the Spirit is, finally, a result of God’s election. Because union with Christ depends on

God’s election of his saints, God is not only the highest good, but the one who leads individuals to himself, the highest good. Seeing just this is essential to understanding Calvin’s thought as a whole.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have considered Calvin’s doctrine of union with Christ in relation to union with

God. I have argued that union with Christ and union with God are best understood as overlapping concepts rather than two opposing concepts. At the same time, I also acknowledge that I believe this is the best reading of Calvin’s thinking on this subject. I therefore suggest that more work on this subject is needed. As a part of this discussion of the relationship between these two unions, I have noted that union with Christ plays an important instrumental role in

Calvin’s thought in the sense one comes to receive the benefits found in God through union with

Christ. Christ has thus been seen to be the key to happiness. In a final section, I have briefly explored how providence and predestination relate to Calvin’s thinking on union with Christ as well as Calvin’s broader theological project. Here, it was noted that the doctrine of providence in general and predestination in particular undergirds Calvin’s thinking on happiness generally.

Indeed, since only the elect will be united to Christ, and happiness is found in Christ, election shapes Calvin’s thinking in fundamental ways. Though I am focusing on happiness, the inverse is nonetheless also true—Calvin’s thinking on reprobation profoundly and unavoidably shapes his thinking on unhappiness.

219

In the final analysis, happiness turns on this doctrine of union with Christ, for Christ is for believers the path on which they walk, as well as their ultimate destination.

Conclusion

Grant, Almighty God, that we may remember ourselves to be pilgrims in the world, and that no splendour of wealth, or power, or worldly wisdom may blind our eyes, but may we always direct our eyes and all our senses towards the kingdom of thy Son. May we always fix them there, and may nothing hinder us from hastening on in the course of our calling, until at length we pass over the course and reach the goal which thou hast set before us, and to which thou dost this day invite us by the heralding of thy gospel. Do thou at length gather us unto that happy eternity which has been obtained for us through the blood of the same, thy Son. May we never be separated from him, but, being sustained by his power, may we at last be raised by him to the highest heavens.—Amen.1

This thesis has considered Calvin’s thinking on the subject of happiness and human flourishing.

More specifically, it has sought to address the question of whether Calvin is a eudaimonist. In response to this question, it has been argued that Calvin’s thought aligns with a eudaimonistic ethic and that he therefore should be considered a eudaimonist. Though Calvin articulates a theory of happiness that aligns with philosophical eudaimonism, it must be remembered that he ultimately articulated this particular teaching, as all his other teachings, in the service of the gospel and the Protestant movement. This comment dovetails with another truth noted in the introduction, namely, that Calvin’s primary vocation was that of pastor (and not philosopher).

Ultimately, Calvin’s thinking on happiness must be understood as decisively shaped by these two truths.

I have sought to show this over the course of six chapters. The argument of these chapters will be reviewed briefly below.

In chapter one, I argued that happiness is an important concept to Calvin, despite popular and scholarly conceptions of the Reformer. Indeed, I noted that Calvin thinks that the pursuit of happiness is a central part of piety. Piety is itself an extremely important concept for Calvin and

1 Comm. Dan. 2, prayer. 220

221 this, in part, establishes the importance of happiness to Calvin. Calvin also refers to happiness with some regularity, using it as a synonym for the classical idea of eudaimonia as well as in far less technical ways. Related to this, it was also noted that Calvin relies on the traditional idea of the chief or highest good, holding that union with God is humanity’s highest good. In this chapter, already, it was seen that Calvin is drawn to ideas from the eudaimonist tradition. In fact, more than this, it was seen that he appropriates ideas from this tradition into his theological program. In so doing, Calvin makes happiness a central part of theology.

In chapter two, I considered Calvin’s anthropology. In this chapter, I noted that Calvin again displays overlap with the eudaimonistic tradition. Here, I noted that Calvin specifically develops his anthropology along similar lines of eudaimonistic anthropology, thinking of human nature as created incomplete, having an end or telos, which remained realized. For Calvin, as for thinkers like Aristotle, rationality is intended to be central in the realization of humanity’s telos. Calvin, however, following the Augustinian tradition generally, holds that the Fall foreclosed on this possibility by distorting human nature in profound ways. Grace thus becomes all the more central to humans reaching their God-given end, in Calvin’s thinking. With regard to the question of what humanity’s end is, Calvin has a number of answers, all of which revolve around

God. Calvin, in a word, thinks of the human end as God—He is the one to whom humans should aspire. Calvin also speaks in places of aspiring not only to God but to the happiness found in

God. Calvin thus appears to think of humanity’s telos as God; and this telos, as a eudaimonist would have it, may also be thought of in terms of happiness itself—indeed, as Calvin puts it, “the

222 perfection of [happiness].”2 The fact that happiness is so perfectly encapsulated by a particular end further supports the eudaimonistic reading of Calvin set forth in the previous pages.

In chapter three, I turned specifically to Calvin’s thinking on human obligation to God. Here, I engaged with Alasdair MacIntyre’s caricatured—in my view—description of Calvin’s ethics.

MacIntyre accused Calvin of developing an ethic in which humans are obligated to obey God, who arbitrarily and despotically issues fiats. This, I argued, seriously misunderstands the nature of Calvin’s thinking on human obligation to God in general, and divine commands in particular.

To expose this as a misreading of Calvin, I surveyed the Reformer’s thinking on human obligation to God. I began by noting, in the first place, that Calvin displays a passion for order which is expressed vividly in his thinking on the order of nature. The order of nature is an expansive concept, one which points to the fact that Calvin conceives of the universe as inherently ordered. For Calvin, humanity’s obligation to certain moral duties is inherent within the way that God has ordered the world. From the concept of the order of nature, I turned to

Calvin’s thinking on the law and divine commands more specifically. In this section, I noted the complexity of Calvin’s thinking on law and the Mosaic Law in particular. The Mosaic Law, according to Calvin, has a number of purposes in the believer’s life, including its famous three uses. That the law is purposeful ultimately undermines MacIntyre’s assertions about the arbitrary nature of divine commands. Beyond these three uses, I observed that the law points to Christ and to moral conformity to his image. The law also brings God glory, according to Calvin. Finally, I concluded this chapter noting that Calvin explicitly indicates that the law promotes happiness—a claim which was likely already implicit in Calvin’s thinking that God’s commands reflect his

2 Inst. I.15.6.

223 goodness. I noted here, however, that Calvin explicitly says that law promotes happiness and human flourishing.

In chapter four, I considered Calvin’s thinking on humanity’s inclination to God. Here, I observed how Jennifer Herdt has called inclination to the good a central feature of the eudaimonist tradition. Indeed, the eudaimonist envisions that individuals are transformed through harmonizing their desires rather than acting in defiance towards their desires. In this chapter, I turn specifically to O’Donovan’s evocative depiction of Augustine’s vision of creation, in which all creation is drawn “in multiplicity of ways, toward the source and goal of being.”3 Calvin does not affirm all desires, given that humans are sinful. In this connection, the material from the preceding chapter on law and divine commands is especially relevant. At the same time, however, Calvin nonetheless affirms human desires. He specifically affirms that all persons long for well-being, if not for the good of virtue. Ultimately, Calvin’s affirmation of universal human pursuit of what is good places him within the eudaimonistic tradition. As I note in this chapter, this pursuit of the good is a kind of dynamic, forward-looking desire.

In chapter five, I addressed potential objections to my argument that Calvin should be understood as standing within the eudaimonistic tradition. I specifically considered three recurring themes in his thought which might be understood to undermine this: self-denial, God’s glory, and self-love. With regard to self-denial, I noted that Calvin ultimately sees self-denial as an act which is life-affirming rather than an act of pure self-abnegation. Calvin even goes so far as to say that humans are made happy in self-denial. Such a claim demonstrates that this aspect of Calvin’s thought does not run counter to the eudaimonistic ideas previously noted. Turning to

3 Oliver O’Donovan, The Problem of Self-Love in St. Augustine (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 157.

224 the theme of God’s glory, I demonstrated that Calvin never places human self-interest or well- being in opposition to God’s glory. Calvin briefly considers this possibility, but says that it is purely hypothetical. In God’s world—which is to say the one we currently inhabit—God’s glory and human salvation, and therefore well-being, are mutually interdependent concepts. The final concept explored in this chapter was self-love, which of these three concepts appears to present the greatest challenge to the thesis of this project. I argued that, ultimately, Calvin is probably best understood as inconsistent on this theme, for while he often speaks of the need to extend our legitimate self-love to others, one can, at the same time, find passages where he speaks of considering ourselves as little as possible. Since it is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile these two different sentiments, my argument in response to this is that Calvin is either inconsistent in his eudaimonism or he is, alternatively, simply rhetorically emphasizing the importance of extending our self-love to others. In any case, my argument is that this aspect of

Calvin’s thought should not be given decisive weight with regard to the question of whether

Calvin is a eudaimonist, especially given that Calvin himself is inconsistent on this subject.

In the final chapter of this work, I consider the relationship between union with Christ and union with God. Noting the importance of union with Christ in Calvin’s thought, in this chapter I specifically consider how this particular union relates to union with God, which, as noted previously in my thesis, Calvin considers to be the highest good. In this chapter, however, I observed that Calvin also speaks of the highest good being found in Christ. This, of course, raises the question of how Calvin thinks about relationship between union with Christ and union with God. An additional complication that needs to be considered is whether in saying that union with God is the highest good Calvin is referring to union with the Father specifically or, alternatively, whether he is speaking of a union with all three members of the Trinity. If union

225 with God is a reference to God the Father in particular, then union with Christ would appear to specifically serve the instrumental role of bringing humans to this highest union with the Father.

I argued that, in the final analysis, this possibility appears unlikely, for it would mean that Calvin is guilty of contracting himself. Of course, this is a legitimate possibility. Nonetheless, it is possibility that seems unlikely, given both that Calvin had a sharp mind and the concept of the highest good seems straightforward enough for him to be fully consistent on.

Having reviewed the major ideas of this thesis, I now turn briefly to mention several areas for future study which this project has raised.

Areas for Further Study

In concluding this work, I think it may be helpful to point to some areas for further study which were raised by this project. The following are only some of the aspects of Calvin’s thought which might be explored in more detail, in light of the preceding material. A first focus for further study would be Calvin’s thinking on union with Christ and union with God, considered in the final chapter of this work. As just noted, in chapter six I argued that it appears that Calvin views union with God and union with Christ as, together, encompassing humanity’s end. In this chapter, however, I acknowledged that more research on the relationship between union with

God and union with Christ is warranted, as the relationship between the two concepts remains unclear. In this connection, it would be helpful to determine, if possible, whether Calvin intends the phrase “union with God” to be understood as a reference to union with God the Father or union with all three members of the Trinity.

226

Another area for further study would be the relationship between Calvin’s eudaimonism and his theological forbearers, especially Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. Frequent mention was made to these two theologians throughout, but I refrained from engaging in an extensive comparison on what similarities and differences exist between the theologians on the subject of happiness and human flourishing. Similar studies with reference to other theologians would yield interesting results.

This study has briefly noted Calvin’s thinking on virtue. Though his thought on this subject has been alluded to here, it might be explored much more extensively. A central idea of eudaimonism is that virtue is necessary—if not sufficient—for human happiness. Given that it has been argued that Calvin’s thought follows the contours of eudemonistic thought, it might be considered more specifically how his thinking on virtue relates to classical philosophical ideas as well as in what ways his thinking may be understood as part of the ongoing tradition of Christian reflection on this idea. In this connection, an exploration of Calvin’s deployment of the ancient concept of habit might be an especially interesting line of inquiry. In addition, Calvin’s thinking on classical virtues such as clemency (clementia) could also be explored in detail.

Though it was explored, it is my view that more work could be done regarding Calvin’s thinking on the natural inclination to the good. In particular, in Institutes II.2.26, Calvin uses a number of different terms to speak about this inclination. As we saw there, he speaks of “the good of virtue or justice,” “well-being,” and the perfection of one’s essence. It would be fascinating and instructive, I think, to do a more extensive study of Calvin’s deployment of these phrases than I have undertaken in these preceding pages.

227

This list is not exhaustive—there are doubtless other areas ripe for further study. Still, I believe these ideas suggest that this study has touched on a number of underexplored concepts in

Calvin’s thought.

Concluding Remarks

This thesis has explored Calvin’s thinking on happiness and human flourishing, specifically regarding his relationship to the eudaimonistic tradition which was formally articulated by Plato and Aristotle and theologically reworked by Augustine and Aquinas. It has been argued that

Calvin is fully a part of this tradition, given that his thought fits with the broad conventions of this particular ethical tradition. As I noted at the outset, my focus has been on seeking to place

Calvin within the eudaimonistic tradition broadly conceived. This conclusion is significant in part, because, as noted in the introduction, a number of scholars have suggested that Calvin belongs outside of this tradition. Further, this should contribute to our understanding of the

Reformer’s ethics. In addition to contributing to our understanding of John Calvin, I believe this thesis contributes to the contemporary discussions of virtue ethics and eudaimonism, specifically regarding the study of the history of ethics, religious and otherwise.

Ultimately, it is my hope that this study contributes to the ongoing discussion of human happiness and flourishing, especially as these concepts relate to ethics, not least because, in the last analysis, it is difficult to imagine many conversations that could be as relevant and significant as this one.

I conclude this thesis, as the work began, with a prayer of Calvin’s:

Grant, Almighty God, that as thou seest us labouring under so much weakness, yea, with our minds so blinded that our faith falters at the smallest perplexities, and almost fails

228 altogether,—O grant that by the power of thy Spirit we may be raised up above this world, and learn more and more to renounce our own counsels, and so to come to thee, that we may stand fixed in our watch-tower, ever hoping, through thy power, for whatever thou hast promised to us, though thou shouldst not immediately make it manifest to us that thou hast faithfully spoken; and may we thus give full proof of our faith and patience, and proceed in the course of our warfare, until at length we ascend, above all watch-towers, into that blessed rest, where we shall no more watch with an attentive mind, but see, face to face, in thine image, whatever can be wished, and whatever is needful for our perfect happiness, through Christ our Lord. Amen.4

4 Comm. Hab. 2, prayer.

Bibliography

Works by John Calvin

Calvin, John. The Bondage and Liberation of the Will: A Defense of the Orthodox Doctrine of Human Choice against Pighius. Edited by A. N. S. Lane. Translated by Graham I. Davies. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1996.

———. Calvin’s Calvinism. Translated by Henry Cole. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1950.

———. Calvin’s Commentaries. Translated and Edited by the Calvin Translation Society. 19 vols. Online digital library application. Bellingham, WA: Logos Bible Software, 2010.

———. “Calvin’s Reply to Sadoleto.” In A Reformation Debate, 49–94. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1966.

———. “Catechism 1538.” In Calvin’s First Catechism: A Commentary, edited by I. John Hesselink, translated by Ford Lewis Battles, 1–38. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1997.

———. “The Catechism of the Church of Geneva.” In Theological Treatises, edited and translated by J. K. S. Reid, 88–139. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2006.

———. Institutes of the Christian Religion. Edited by John T. McNeill. 2 vols. Philadelphia: Westminster John Knox Press, 1960.

———. Instruction in Faith (1537). Edited and translated by Paul T. Fuhrmann. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1992.

———. Institution de la religion chrestienne. Edited by Jean-Daniel Benoit. 5 vols. Paris: J. Vrin, 1957–63.

———. Ioannis Calvini opera quae supersunt omnia. Edited by Wilhelm Baum, Edward Cunitz, and Eduard Reuss. 59 vols. Corpus Reformatorum 29–87. Brunswick: A. Schwetschke and Son (M. Bruhn), 1863–1900.

———. John Calvin’s Sermons on 1 Timothy. Edited by Ray Van Neste and Brian Denker. Vol. 2. Jackson, TN: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2017.

———. “Psychopannychia.” In Tracts and Treatises, edited by Henry Beveridge, Electronic Edition, 3:414–90. Charlottesville, VA: InteLex Corp., 2002.

———. Selected Works of John Calvin: Tracts and Letters. Edited by Jules Bonnet and Henry Berveridge. 7 vols. Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1983.

———. Theological Treatises. Translated by J. K. S. Reid. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2006.

229

230

———. Truth for All Time: A Brief Outline of the Christian Faith. Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 1998.

Calvin, John, and Jacopo Sadoleto. A Reformation Debate. Edited by John C. Olin. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1966.

Other Original Sources

Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologiae. 61 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by Terence Irwin. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub. Co, 1987.

Augustine. The City of God (Books 1-10). Edited by Boniface Ramsey. Translated by William Babcock. Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 2012.

———. The City of God (Books 11-22). Edited by Boniface Ramsey. Translated by William Babcock. Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 2013.

———. The Confessions. Translated by Maria Boulding. Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 2001.

———. De Doctrina Christiana. Edited and translated by R. P. H. Green. Oxford Early Christian Texts. New York: Clarendon Press, 1995.

———. The Happy Life. Translated by Ludwig Schopp. St. Louis, MO: Herder, 1939.

Plato. Theaetetus and Sophist. Translated by Christopher Rowe. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Secondary Sources

Anderson, Raymond Kemp. “Corporate Selfhood and Meditatio Vitae Futurae: How Necessary Is Eschatology for Christian Ethics?” Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics 23, no. 1 (2003): 21–46.

Annas, Julia. The Morality of Happiness. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.

Anscombe, G. E. M. “Modern Moral Philosophy.” Philosophy 33, no. 124 (1958): 1–16.

Armstrong, Brian. “Calvin, John.” Edited by Mircea Eliade. Encyclopedia of Religion. Detroit: Macmillan, 2005.

Arner, Neil. “Precedents and Prospects for Incorporating Natural Law in Protestant Ethics.” Scottish Journal of Theology 69, no. 4 (2016): 375–88. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0036930616000363 (access April 30, 2018).

231

Atkinson, David John. “Calvinistic Ethics.” Edited by David Field, Arthur Frank Holmes, and Oliver O’Donovan. New Dictionary of Christian Ethics and Pastoral Theology. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1995.

Battles, Ford Lewis. “True Piety According to Calvin.” In Readings in Calvin’s Theology, edited by Donald K. McKim, 192–211. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 1998.

Backus, Irena. Historical Method and Confessional Identity in the Era of the Reformation (1378- 1615). Vol. 94. Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought. Boston: Brill, 2003.

Beeke, Joel. “Calvin on Piety.” In The Cambridge Companion to John Calvin, edited by Donald K. McKim, 125–52. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Biermann, Joel D. A Case for Character: Towards a Lutheran Virtue Ethics. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2014.

Biggar, Nigel. “Karl Barth’s Ethic Revisited.” In Commanding Grace: Studies in Karl Barth’s Ethics, edited by Daniel L. Migliore, 26–46. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010.

Billings, J. Todd. Calvin, Participation, and The Gift: The Activity of Believers in Union with Christ. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Blocher, Henri. “Calvin’s Theological Anthropology.” In John Calvin and Evangelical Theology: Legacy and Prospect, edited by Sung Wook Chung, 66–84. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2009.

Budziszewski, J. Commentary on Thomas Aquinas’s Virtue Ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017.

Bussanich, John. “Happiness, Eudaimonism.” In Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia, edited by Allan D. Fitzgerald, John C. Cavadini, Marianne Djuth, James J. O’Donnell, and Frederick Van Fleteren, 413–14. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999.

Canlis, Julie. Calvin’s Ladder: A Spiritual Theology of Ascent and Ascension. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010.

———. “What Does It Mean to Be Human? John Calvin’s Surprising Answer.” Theology in Scotland 16, no. 2 (2009): 93–106.

Charry, Ellen T. God and the Art of Happiness. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010.

———. “Happiness.” In Dictionary of Scripture and Ethics, edited by Joel B. Green, Jacqueline E. Lapsley, Rebekah Miles, and Allen Verhey, 347–48. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2011.

Chung, Sung Wook, ed. John Calvin and Evangelical Theology: Legacy and Prospect. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2009.

232

Clark, Gordon H. “Calvinistic Ethics.” In Baker’s Dictionary of Christian Ethics, edited by Carl F. H. Henry, 80–81. Grand Rapids: Baker, 1973.

Cochran, Elizabeth Agnew. Protestant Virtue and Stoic Ethics. Enquiries in Theological Ethics. New York: T&T Clark, 2018.

———. Receptive Human Virtues: A New Reading of Jonathan Edwards’s Ethics. University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2010.

Crisp, Oliver D. “Calvin on Creation and Providence.” In John Calvin and Evangelical Theology: Legacy and Prospect, edited by Sung Wook Chung, 43–65. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2009.

Curran, Charles. E. “Christian Ethics.” In Encyclopedia of Religion, edited by Mircea Eliade, 2nd ed., 3:1650–57. Detroit: Macmillan, 2005.

Deferrari, Roy J. A Latin-English Dictionary of St. Thomas Aquinas. Boston: St. Paul Editions, 1960.

Dewey J. Hoitenga, Jr. “Happiness: Goal or Gift? Two Lectures on the Relationship between Knowledge, Goodness, and Happiness in Plato and Calvin.” In Seeking Understanding: The Stob Lectures, 1986-1998, 295–342. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001.

Edmondson, Stephen. Calvin’s Christology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Fedler, Kyle David. “Living Sacrifice: Emotions and Responsibility in Calvin’s Doctrine of the Christian Life.” Ph.D diss., University of Virginia, 1999. https://search-proquest- com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/pqdtglobal/docview/304547667/abstract/D455560CF56444C2 PQ/1 (accessed April 30, 2018).

Garcia, Mark A. Life in Christ: Union with Christ and Twofold Grace in Calvin’s Theology. Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2008.

Gerrish, Brian A. Grace and Gratitude: The Eucharistic Theology of John Calvin. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1993.

———. “Theology within the Limits of Piety Alone: Schleiermacher and Calvin’s Notion of God.” In The Old Protestantism and the New: Essays on the Reformation Heritage, 196–207. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982.

Gregory, Brad S. The Unintended Reformation: How a Religious Revolution Secularized Society. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012.

Gustafson, James. M. “Christian Ethics.” In Encyclopedia of Ethics, edited by Lawrence Becker and Charlotte Becker, 2nd ed., 1:222–28. New York: Routledge, 2001.

233

Haas, Guenther. The Concept of Equity in Calvin’s Ethics. Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1997.

———. “Ethics and Church Discipline.” In The Calvin Handbook, edited by Herman J. Selderhuis, 332–43. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009.

Hare, John E. God’s Call: Moral Realism, God’s Commands, and Human Autonomy. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000.

———. God’s Command. Oxford Studies in Theological Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015.

Haroutunian, Joseph. “Calvin and Calvinist Ethics.” In Dictionary of Christian Ethics, edited by John Macquarrie, 42–44. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1967.

Helm, Paul. “Calvin, John.” In Encyclopedia of Ethics, edited by Lawrence Becker and Charlotte Becker, 2nd ed., 1:178–79. New York: Routledge, 2001.

———. John Calvin’s Ideas. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Herdt, Jennifer A. “Back to Virtue.” Scottish Journal of Theology 65, no. 2 (2012): 222–26. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0036930612000075 (accessed April 30, 2018).

———. “Calvin’s Legacy for Contemporary Reformed Natural Law.” Scottish Journal of Theology 67, no. 4 (November 2014): 414–35. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0036930614000192 (accessed April 30, 2018).

———. “Desire for the Common Good: A Defense of Eudaimonism.” Yale Divinity School, 2010.

———. Putting on Virtue: The Legacy of The Splendid Vices. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008.

———. “Reditus Reformed.” Warfield Lectures, Princeton, NJ, March 18-22, 2013.

———. “Sleepers Wake! Eudaimonism, Obligation, and the Call to Responsibility.” In The Freedom of a Christian Ethicist: The Future of a Reformation Legacy, edited by Brian Brock and Michael Mawson, 159–74. New York: T&T Clark, 2016.

Hesselink, I. John. Calvin’s Concept of the Law. Allison Park, PA: Wipf & Stock, 1992.

———. Calvin’s First Catechism. Westminster John Knox Press, 1997.

“John Calvin, Calvini Opera | The Jonathan Edwards Center at Yale University.” Accessed December 28, 2017. http://edwards.yale.edu/node/130 (accessed April 30, 2018).

234

Johnson, Marcus P. “Luther and Calvin on Union with Christ.” Fides et Historia 39, no. 2 (2007): 59– 77.

Johnson, Merwyn S. “Calvin’s Ethical Legacy.” In The Legacy of John Calvin: Papers Presented at the 12th Colloquium of the Calvin Studies Society, April 22-24, 1999, edited by David Foxgrover, 63–83. Calvin Studies Society Papers 1999. Grand Rapids: CRC, 2000.

Lane, Anthony N. S. John Calvin Student of the Church Fathers. Grand Rapids: Baker, 2000.

Leith, John H. John Calvin’s Doctrine of the Christian Life. Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1989.

Little, David. “Calvin, John.” In The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, edited by Hugh LaFollette, 2:679–85. Malden, MA: Wiley, 2013.

MacIntyre, Alasdair. A Short History of Ethics. New York: Macmillan, 1966.

———. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007.

McClean, John. “Perichoresis, Theosis and Union with Christ in the Thought of John Calvin.” The Reformed Theological Review 68, no. 2 (2009): 130–41.

McInerny, Ralph. “Ethics.” In The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, edited by Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump, 196–216. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

McKim, Donald K. John Calvin: A Companion to His Life and Theology. Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2015.

———. The Cambridge Companion to John Calvin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. http://cco.cambridge.org/login2?dest=/book?id=ccol0521816475_CCOL0521816475 (accessed April 30, 2018.

Nolan, Kirk J. Reformed Virtue after Barth: Developing Moral Virtue Ethics in the Reformed Tradition. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2014.

Nygren, Anders. Agape and Eros. London: SPCK, 1932.

Oberman, Heiko A. “The Pursuit of Happiness: Calvin Between Humanism and Reformation.” In Humanity and Divinity in Renaissance and Reformation: Essays in Honor of Charles Trinkaus, edited by Charles Edward Trinkaus, John W. O’Malley, Thomas M. Izbicki, and Gerald Christianson, 251–86. Studies in the History of Christian Thought, v. 51. New York: E. J. Brill, 1993.

O’Donovan, Oliver. The Problem of Self-Love in St. Augustine. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980.

235

Partee, Charles. Calvin and Classical Philosophy. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005.

———. “Calvin’s Central Dogma Again.” The Sixteenth Century Journal 18, no. 2 (1987): 191–200. https://doi.org/10.2307/2541176 (accessed April 30, 2018).

———. The Theology of John Calvin. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2008.

Post, Stephen G. Christian Love and Self-Denial: An Historical and Normative Study of Jonathan Edwards, Samuel Hopkins, and American Theological Ethics. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987.

Pryor, C. Scott. “God’s Bridle: John Calvin’s Application of Natural Law.” Journal of Law and Religion 22 (2007 2006): 225–54.

Puckett, David Lee. John Calvin’s Exegesis of the Old Testament. Columbia Series in Reformed Theology. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1995.

Rose, Matthew. Ethics with Barth: God, Metaphysics, and Morals. Barth Studies. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010.

Sauer, James B. Faithful Ethics According to John Calvin: The Teachability of the Heart. Lewiston: E. Mellen Press, 1997.

Schreiner, Susan E. “Creation and Providence.” In The Calvin Handbook, edited by Herman J. Selderhuis, translated by Henry J. Baron, Judith J. Guder, and Randi H. Lundell, 267–75. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009.

———. Theater of His Glory: Nature and the Natural Order in the Thought of John Calvin. Durham, NC: Labyrinth Press, 1991.

Selderhuis, Herman J., ed. The Calvin Handbook. Translated by Henry J. Baron, Judith J. Guder, and Randi H. Lundell. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009.

Simmons, Frederick V., and Brian C. Sorrells. Love and Christian Ethics: Tradition, Theory, and Society. Georgetown University Press, 2016.

Steinmetz, David C. “Calvin among the Ancient Philosophers.” In Calvin in Context, 2nd ed., 235– 46. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Swezey, Charles M. “Ethics, Theological.” Edited by Donald K. McKim. Encyclopedia of the Reformed Faith. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1992.

Tamburello, Dennis E. Christ and Mystical Union: A Comparative Study of the Theologies of Bernard of Clairvaux and John Calvin. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990.

236

Tuininga, Matthew J. Calvin’s Political Theology and the Public Engagement of the Church: Christ’s Two Kingdoms. Cambridge Studies in Law and Christianity. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2017.

Van Lyl, Liezl. “Eudaimonistic Virtue Ethics.” In The Routledge Companion to Virtue Ethics, edited by Lorraine L. Besser and Michael Slote, 183–95. New York: Routledge, 2015.

Viazovski, Yaroslav. Image and Hope: John Calvin and Karl Barth on Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting. Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2015.

Vos, Pieter. “Breakdown of the Teleological View of Life?” Journal of Reformed Theology 9, no. 2 (2015): 131–47.

———. “Calvinists among the Virtues: Reformed Theological Contributions to Contemporary Virtue Ethics.” Studies in Christian Ethics 28, no. 2 (2015): 201–12.

Wallace, Ronald S. Calvin’s Doctrine of the Christian Life. Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1959.

Werpehowski, William. Karl Barth and Christian Ethics: Living in Truth. Burlington, VT: Routledge, 2014

Whyte, James A. “Calvinistic Ethics.” In The Westminster Dictionary of Christian Ethics, edited by James F. Childress and John Macquarrie, 71–73. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1986.

Wilken, Robert Louis. The Spirit of Early Christian Thought: Seeking the Face of God. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003.

Wolterstorff, Nicholas. “Augustine’s Rejection of Eudaimonism.” In Augustine’s City of God: A Critical Guide, edited by James Wetzel, 167–85. Cambridge Critical Guides. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

———. Justice: Rights and Wrongs. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008.

Woodill, Joseph. The Fellowship of Life: Virtue Ethics and Orthodox Christianity. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002.

Wyatt, Peter. Jesus Christ and Creation in the Theology of John Calvin. Allison Park, PA: Wipf & Stock, 1996.

Zachman, Randall C. The Assurance of Faith: Conscience in the Theology of Martin Luther and John Calvin. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005.

———. John Calvin as Teacher, Pastor, and Theologian: The Shape of His Writings and Thought. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006.

237

———. “The Universe as the Living Image of God: Calvin’s Doctrine of Creation Reconsidered.” Concordia Theological Quarterly 61, no. 4 (1997): 299–312.