The Nigerian Military Counterinsurgency in the Niger Delta Nigeria, 1999-2009

THE NIGERIAN MILITARY COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THE NIGER DELTA NIGERIA, 1999-2009

AFAHAKAN, EKAETE EFIONG PG/MA/12/61700

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES FACULTY OF ARTS UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, NSUKKA

OCTOBER, 2016 TITLE PAGE

The Nigerian Military Counterinsurgency in the Niger Delta

Nigeria, 1999-2009

APPROVAL PAGE

This project report has been approved for the Department of History and International

Studies, University of Nigeria, Nsukka.

……………………………………… …………………………… Professor Uchenna Anyanwu DATE Supervisor

…………………………………………… …………………………… Professor Chima Korieh DATE Internal Examiner

…………………………………… ………………………….. Professor Okpeh O. Okpeh DATE External Examiner

………………………………… ……………………………… Prof. Chima Korieh DATE Head of Department

CERTIFICATION PAGE

We certify that Afahakan, Ekaete Efiong (PG/MA/12/61700) has satisfactorily carried out all the corrections on her work as suggested by the External Examiner.

……………………………………… …………………………… Professor Uchenna Anyanwu DATE Supervisor

…………………………………………… …………………………… Professor Chima Korieh DATE Head of Department

…………………………………………….. .……………………………. Professor Pat Uche Okpoko DATE Dean of Faculty of Arts

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DEDICATION

To God Almighty who by His grace I have life and live in good health.

In posthumous tribute to my dad

In forever indebtedness to my mum.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

All praises and thanks are ascribed to my Almighty Father for sustaining me and keeping me in good health throughout the period of this graduate program. His grace and mercy has brought this thesis to an end.Though only my name appears on the cover of this thesis, a great number of people have contributed to its production. I owe my gratitude to all those people who have made this thesis possible and because of whom my graduate experience has been one that I will forevercherish. Much guidance and intellectual sustenance came from many of my academic mentors of whom I shall mention specifically.

My deepest gratitude is to my mentor and adviser Dr. Ubong Essien Umoh whom I have been fortunate to be mentored and who has given me the freedom to explore on my own, and at the same time the guidance to recover when my steps faltered. His patience and support helped me overcome many crisis situations while on this graduate program. I am also thankful to him for encouraging the use of correct grammar and consistent notation in my writings and for carefully reading and commenting on countless revisions of this thesis. I hope that one day I will make him proud in this career.

I offer my sincerest gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Anyanwu, who has supported me throughout the writing ofthisthesis with his patience and knowledge whilst allowing me the room to work in my own way. I attribute the level of my masters’ degree to his encouragement and effort and without him this thesis, too, would not have been written or completed. One simply could not wish for a better or friendlier supervisor.

My internal examiner, Professor Chima Korieh, in a short while has added much value to me which enhanced the speed and consequently the completion of this thesis. Thank you so much Professor. To my other academic advisers which include Late Professor Tekana

Tamuno and Professor Njoku,I am deeply grateful for the long discussions that helped me

sort out the geographical and chronological scope of this thesis. To Associate Professor

Otoabasi Akpan and Associate Professor Chukwuma Osakwe my association with you has been of great profit. Thank you for always been there to listen, encourage me and believe in me that this program will come to an end and subsequently open a way for another. I am grateful for your assistance in the needed research materials and advice. I can never repay you for your kindness.

I appreciate my other lecturers in the discipline of History and International Studies who have granted me friendship with them and has given some good advices that helped the fruition of this thesis, Professor Egodi Uchendu, Dr. Nkereuwem Edemekong, Dr. Uwem

Akpan, Mrs Mfon Udofia, Mr. Obina Muoh and Mr. Bright Alozie among others. I am very grateful.

To Lt. Col. Moyo, Lt. Col. Danja, Group Captain Bobby, Squadron Leader Amemuni my interaction with you as yielded much results. Thank you for giving a listening ear and for contributing to the completion of this work through your field experience. I am very grateful.

I specially appreciate my mum Deaconess Arit Afahakan for her moral support and for being sure that I was financially and psychologically stable in the course of this graduate program. I owe you a lot though I know I can never repay you for all you have been and have done for me. May God bless you and grant you all your heart desires. To my beloved

Babatunde Ogundare, I could never have asked for a better friend and partner of life, your inputs in my academic success cannot be quantified with mere words, you are truly the best and my gratitude soars. To my pastors, siblings, family, friends and classmates, God has used you to teach me the things I may not have known, I really appreciate you all. Thank you.

ABSTRACT The study examines the constraints faced by the Nigerian military in carrying out counterinsurgency in the Niger Delta of Nigeria between 1999 and 2009. The study argues that there are significant problems in relying on conventional forces to engage in specialized COIN operations like the insurgency in the Niger Delta. The Nigerian military commitment to specialized COIN appeared negligible and it more often than not regarded its mission in the Niger Delta essentially in conventional military terms. As long as the COIN lasted, the military organization appeared to have been reluctant in changing the acceptable ways of conventional military operations, especially at the tactical level. Indeed, the Nigerian military COIN operation in the Niger Delta was distinguished more by its conventionality than by its adaptiveness. Consequently, continuity rather than change defined the COIN operations of the Nigerian military in the Niger Delta. Such continuity was made possible by the Nigerian military bandwidth problem and the Nigerian military organization. A unconventional coastal insurgency in a complex and difficult terrain was a significant departure from conventional war preparedness the Nigerian military were often exposed to in their training, composition and structure. Indeed, the entire military organization had to adapt and learn fast in response to changing realities evident in the Niger Delta insurgency. The Niger Delta insurgency required innovation and adaptation, but the Nigerian military were constrained by slow institutional modifications made possible by an overwhelming military bandwidth problem. In all, the Niger Delta insurgency was a new kind of war for the Nigerian military. In such a war, the Nigerian military was constrained by military bureaucracy and a democratic government almost to the point of ineffectiveness. The study submits that COIN operations invariably faced constraints when conventional oriented military assumes COIN responsibilities without making appropriate re-organisation to its force projection.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Pages

Title page i Approval Page ii Certification Page iii Dedication iv Acknowledgements v Abstract vii Table of Contents viii List of Abbreviations xi List of Illustrations xiv

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION Background of Study 1 Statement of the Problem 12 Theoretical Framework 12 Purposeand Significance of Study 17 Scope of Study 18 Literature Review 19 Method, Sources and Organization 31

CHAPTER TWO: THE NIGERIAN MILITARY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS BEFORE 1999

Introduction 33 The Nigerian Military and Counterinsurgency Operations outside Nigeria 33 Nigeria’s Role in Congo Peace Keeping Operations34 viii

Nigeria and Chad Operation 1979 37 Nigeria’s Role in Lebanon Operations, 1978 – 1983 38 Nigeria’s Role in Liberia (1990-1998) 40 Nigeria-Sierra Leone Peace Keeping Operations (1998-1999) 44 The Nigerian Military and Counterinsurgency Operations within Nigeria before 199947 Conclusion56

CHAPTER THREE: THE NIGER DELTA INSURGENCY AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE NIGERIAN MILITARY

Introduction 57 Insurgent Groups and Insurgency in the Niger Delta between 1999 and 2003 58 Insurgent Groups and Insurgency in the Niger Delta between 2003 and 200562 Insurgent Groups and Insurgency in the Niger Delta between 2005 and 200965 The Deployment of the Nigerian Military in the Niger Delta80 The Nigerian Military and Defensive Counterinsurgency in the Niger Delta, 2003-200581 The Nigerian Military and Offensive Counterinsurgency in the Niger Delta, 2006-200984 Conclusion 88

CHAPTER FOUR: NIGERIAN MILITARY COUNTERINSURGENCY CONSTRAINTS IN THE NIGER DELTA

Introduction 89 Interagency Constraints 90 Dealing with Multiple Insurgent Groups 92 The Physical Environment 97 Ambiguous Mandate 101 Intelligence 106 Hierarchical Issues 107 Logistics 108 Corruption 109

CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 113

Bibliography 117

Primary Sources 117 Oral interviews117 Archival materials/Government Gazzettes118

Secondary Sources 119 Books119 Journals 124 Articles 129 Book Chapters 131 Unpublished projects134 Newspapers/Magazines 134 Websites 135

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFN Armed Forces of Nigeria

ANPP All Nigeria People’s Party

AOR Area of Responsibility

AU African Union

COIN Counter Insurgency

COMA Coalition for Militant Action in the Niger Delta

DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo

EATF ECOMOG Air Task Force

ECOMOG Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group

ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States

ENC Eastern Naval Command

FCS Fellowship of Christian Students

FOIN Fomenting Insurgency

HAM Hearts-and-Minds

HRWHuman Rights Watch

HUMINT Human Intelligence

HQ Headquarters

ICG International Crisis Group

I-COIN Insurgency and Counter Insurgency

IHL International Humanitarian Law

IS Internal Security

ISOPs Internal Security Operations

IYC Ijaw Youth Council

JTF Joint Task Force

JTF ORH Joint Task Force Operation Restore Hope

MACP Military in Aid to Civil Power

MIDLIFE Military, Intelligence, Diplomatic, Law Enforcement, Information, Finance,

and Economic Elements

MNOCs Multinational Oil Companies

MOSOP Movement for the Survival of Ogoni people

MSS Muslim Students Society

NDDC Niger Delta Development Commission

NDVS Niger Delta Volunteer Service

NIBATT Nigerian Battalion

NMF Nigerian Military Force

NN Nigerian Navy

NNPC Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation

NPFL National Patriotic Front of Liberia

NPP National Patriotic Party

OAU Organisation of African Unity

ONUC Opération des Nations Unies au Congo (UN Operation in the Congo)

OP Observation Posts

OPC Oodua People Congress

PDP People’s Democratic Party

QOR Queens Own Regiment

RA Rational Actor

RNA Royal Nigerian Army

RNC Royal Niger Company

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ROE Rules of Engagement

RRBs Rapid Response Boats

RUF Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone)

SALW Small Arms and Light Weapons

SOs Standing Orders

SPDC Shell Petroleum Development Corporation

UN United Nations

UNO United Nations Organisation

UNAMSIL United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone

UNIFIL United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

USA United State of America

WAFF West African Frontier Force

WNC Western Naval Command

WHAM Winning Hearts and Minds

3MCD 3rd Marine Commando Division

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LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Pages

Figure 1.1: Historical Map of the Niger Delta 2

Figure 1.2: Map of Nigeria Showing the nine states of the Niger Delta 3

Figure 1.3: Land and Population of the Niger Delta 4

Figure1.4: Map Showing the Operational Environment of the Joint Task Force 1999-2009 10

Table 2.I:Military Operations in Civil Crisis Showing Units of the Military Deployed, Commanding Officers and Duration of Operation 54

Figure 3.1:A scene of the capture of a foreign oil worker in the creeks of the Niger Delta70

Figure 3.2:Configuration of insurgent groups in the Niger Delta as at 2007 74

Figure 3.3: Navy SBS Commando Boat 84

Figure 3.4:Mi 35 Helicopter Gunship 85

Figure 4.1: List of Some Insurgent Groups and Locations in the Niger Delta as at 2009 93

Figure 4.2:One of the Training Camps of Niger Delta Insurgents 96

Figure 4.3:Nigerian Military Gunboat used in the Niger Delta between 2006 and 2009 99

Figure 4.4: An example of a narrow creek (Ayamakiri) that posed operational constraints on the JTF ORH gunboat 99

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Background of Study

Contemporary military history of the Niger Delta of Nigeria shows that the Nigerian military has been actively involved in counterinsurgency. A background of the geopolitics1 of the Niger Delta becomes necessary to explain why the Nigerian military assumed such responsibility for a role that would have passed for a police job. The geopolitics of the Niger

Delta projects it as the single richest geographical region in Africa.2It wasas navigable waterways that the rivers of the Niger Delta became so important in the economic history of modern Nigeria.3Historically known as the Slave Coast and later as the Oil Rivers, the area was chiefly remarkable among British West African possessions for the exceptional facilities which they offered for penetrating the interior by means of large and navigable streams and by a wonderful system of natural canalization which connects all the branches of the lower

Niger by means of deep creek.4

However, in contemporary political history of Nigeria, the term Niger Delta has taken on so many definitions in Nigeria that the actual meaning is almost lost to the politics of opportunism. In one broad sense, it refers to oil bearing areas of Nigeria, while in another rather restrictive sense it is employed to describe the ethnographic area with a peculiar ethnic make-up viz: Ijaw, Itsekiri, Urhobo, Isoko, Ogoni, Eleme, Ibibio, Ikwere, Kalabari, Efik,

Okirika, Andoni, the Obolo and Opobian as well as Etche, Ekpeye, Ogba, Egbema, Engenne

1The Niger Delta geopolitics is rooted in history. Geopolitics in this sense captures the relationship between geography and politics as it affects the governance of space. The Niger Delta is a peculiar geography with abundant hydro-carbon resources whose importance to the Nigerian economy has attracted various political definition, re-definition, interpretation, re-interpretation and delimitation. Consequently, various social movements (violent and non-violent) with dynamic interests have struggled for the exclusive control of the region with the Nigerian state. 2Otoabasi Akpan, The Niger Delta Question and the Peace Plan (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, 2011), 22. 3Kenneth O. Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta 1830-1885: An Introduction to the Economic and Political History of Nigeria (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956), 19. 4F.O.84/1882, “Memorandum by Consul H. H. Johnston on the British Protectorate of the Oil Rivers, Part II,” in Kenneth O. Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta 1830-1885…, 19-20.

1 and Abua.5 These body of controversy on the actual area that constitutes the Niger Delta has given rise to terms like the “historical Niger Delta,” the “political Niger Delta” and the

“geographical Niger Delta.”

Figure: Historical Map of the Niger Delta

Source: Cosmas Ndichie, Cartographer, Department of Geography, University of Nigeria, Nsukka

The historical Niger Delta is restricted to the areas now covered by five states namely;

Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta and Rivers States. It follows the original description of the Niger Delta as given by the Willink Commission of 1958.6 This description does not include the Igbo-speaking areas of Abia and Imo states as well as the Yoruba area of Ondo state as it is today.7 This leaves the Niger Delta comprising Rivers, Bayelsa, Delta, Akwa

Ibom, Cross River and Edo states. Historically, Benin, as an area, came into the picture of the

Niger Delta on February 22, 1890 when the term “Oil Rivers Protectorate” was employed in

5Steve Azaiki, Oil, Gas and Life in Nigeria(Ibadan: Y-Books, 2007), 192. 6N.A.I., Sir Henry Willink, Chairman, and 3 others: Report of the Commission Appointed to Inquire into the Fears of Minorities and Means of Allaying Them, H.M.S.O., 1958, CE/W3. 7Otoabasi Akpan, The Niger Delta Question..., 6.

2 the instructions issued by the Secretary of State under the Order in Council of October 15

1899.8

The political Niger Delta enlarges the scope of the geographical and historical Niger

Delta to include all oil bearing states found in the South-South, South-East and South West region of the country. To this end, the present Niger Delta is made up of nine oil bearing states (Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers states) out of the thirty-six states in Nigeria. It equally has one hundred and eighty-five local government areas out of a total of seven hundred and seventy-four local government areas in

Nigeria9(see Figure 1.3).

Figure 1.2: Map of Nigeria Showing the nine states of the Niger Delta

Source: Cosmas Ndichie, Cartographer, Department of Geography, University of Nigeria, Nsukka

8G. I. Jones, The Trading States of the Oil Rivers: A Study of Political Development in Eastern Nigeria (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 78. 9Otoabasi Akpan,The Niger Delta Question..., 6.

3 Figure 1.3: Land and Population of the Niger Delta

States Land Area Population Males Females Capitals No. of (Sq/m) LGs

Abia 6,320 2,845,380 1,430,298 1,415,082 Umuahia 17 A/Ibom 7,081 3,902,051 1,983,202 1,983,202 Uyo 31 Bayelsa 10,773 1,704,515 874,083 830,432 Yenagoa 8 C/River 20,156 2,892,988 1,471,967 1,421,021 Calabar 18 Delta 17,698 4,112,445 2,069,309 2,043,136 Asaba 25 Edo 17,802 3,233,366 1,633,946 1,599,420 Benin 18 Imo 5,530 3,927,563 1,976,471 1,951,092 Owerri 16 Ondo 15,500 3,460,877 1,745,057 1,715,820 Akure 18 Rivers 11,077 5,198,716 2,673,026 2,525,690 P/Harcourt 23 Total (9) 111,937 31,277,901 15,857,359 15,420,542 9 185 Source:National Population Commission, 2009 Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette No. 2. Vol. 96, February 2, 2009 The geographical Niger Delta has been argued to be the “Delta of the Niger,” made up of Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers states and shaped by River Niger and its tributaries.10 Advocates of this position argue that not minding the fact that some oil bearing states in the southern part of Nigeria share certain environmental problems in common with the people of the geographical Niger Delta region, they are not located in the Delta of the Niger. As such, it remains a delusion to include them as a part of the Niger Delta.11 The geographical Niger

Delta is divided into two zones namely; the central and western Delta. The central Delta is made up of today’s Bayelsa and Rivers States. The indigenous people of the two states are the Ijaw, Ikwerre, Okrika, Ogoni and Opobo.12 The western Delta has historically been the

10Ibid.,8. 11T. T. Tamuno, “The Geographical Niger Delta,” (Conference Proceedings, International Conference on the Nigerian State, Oil Industry and the Niger Delta, Organizedby the Department of Political Science, Niger Delta University, Yenagoa, Wilberforce Island, in Collaboration with the Centre for Applied Environmental Research, University of Missouri-Kansas City, at Bayelsa State, 11th-13th March, 2008), 917. 12G. I. Jones, The Trading States of the Oil Rivers…., 78.

4 region of today’s Delta state and its people include the Itsekiri, Urhobo, Ijaw, Isoko, Aboh and Ukwuani.13 The people of the Western Delta can further be divided into two groups:

“lower Delta, the home of the Ijaw, the Itsekiri and the Aboh; and the upper Delta inhabited by the Isoko, Urhobo and Ukwuani.”14

The denominator reality is that the Niger Delta, from the slave trade era, has evolved over time to fit into the changing and dynamic nature of Nigeria’s geopolitical configuration.

The Niger Delta, serving as an orbit and domain for internal and external commerce, grew in importance and became a significant trading centre on the Atlantic seaboard.15The slave trade had significant effects on the internal political, social, demographic and economic history of the Niger Delta. For instance, the slave trade accelerated the transformation of fishing villages to City States.16

The House System (a peculiar socio-political system in the Niger Delta) also responded to the needs of the trade in palm oil. The opportunities and challenges created by the overseas trade induced the inhabitants of the Niger Delta cities to make structural changes which accounted for the social, political and economic institutions of the City States. With the waning of the slave trade due to the British naval blockade after 1839 and the copious slave-trade treaties between 1839 and the 1850s, the trade in palm oil had grown in profitability heralding the disappearance of the overseas slave trade by the middle of the nineteenth century.17

13C. Ogbogbo, “Identity Politics and Resource Control Conflict in the Niger Delta,” in Society, State, and Identity in African History, ed. BahruZewde (Addis Ababa: Forum for Social Studies, 2008), 264. 14Obaro Ikime, “The People and Kingdoms of the Delta Province,” in Groundwork of Nigerian History, ed. ObaroIkime (Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books, 1980), 89. 15Kenneth O. Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta 1830-1885…, 20 16Once the slave trade across the Atlantic began, the hinterland communities were attempted to the coast, coming down in voluntary migrations to take up places in the Delta suitable as ports for the trade. This immigrant population converted the fishing villages into City-States in the period 1450-1800. Additional increment to the population of these states were made through the purchases of slaves, especially during the 19th C. See, Kenneth O. Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta 1830-1885…, and Robin Horton, “From Fishing to City-State: A Social History of New Calabar,” in Man in Africa,eds. M. Douglas and P. M. Kaberry (London: Tavistock Publications, 1969), 37-58. 17Kenneth O. Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta 1830-1885…, 1.

To this end, Dike identifies two periods of European activity in the Niger Delta: first, a period beginning with the advent of the Portuguese in the fifteenth century to the British abolition of the slave trade in 1807 and second, the period 1807-1885. This perioddistinguishes between the slave trade and trade in palm oil and kernels. To this a third and contemporary period can be added: the era of crude oil trade since the twentieth century.

In its contemporary profile, the once busy and rich slave and palm oil coast stands out as a busy hydrocarbon hub of Nigeria. Since the discovery of oil in commercial quantities in

1956, the Niger Delta has been in the forefront of energy and security concerns.Crude oil which is solely mined in the region accounts for about 95 percent of the country’s foreign exchange earnings.18 The management of such overwhelming deposits of hydrocarbons, which accounts for the main source of foreign exchange earnings inNigeria, has resulted in strained social and political relations and at several times violence in the Niger Delta.

A constant observation in the evolution of the Niger Delta has been the apparent relationship between resource abundance and conflicts in the Niger Delta. This has been evident in the slave trade, palm oil era and crude oil era. During the slave trade and palm oil trade era, relative abundance of natural resources (slaves and later palm oil) has been connected with broad-based socio-economic and political problems. The crude oil era appeared to have added a significant dimension to, but not a departure from, this established relationship. The crude oil era witnessed “loot-seeking” rebellion and armed violence at an organized scale. Consequently, the Nigerian state has reacted in sufficient ways in an attempt to clamp upon the activities of various deviant social actors employing insurgency as means to attain objectives. In contemporary military parlance, the reaction of the Nigeria state has been tagged counterinsurgency and has been basically carried out by the Nigerian military.

18A. O. Babatunde, “Oil Exploration, Armed Conflict and their Implications for Women’s Socio-economic Development in Nigeria’s Niger Delta,” in Peace, Security and Development in Nigeria, ed. Isaac Olawale Albert, Willie AziegbeEselebor and Natheniel D. Danjibo (Abuja: Society for Peace Studies and Practice, 2012), 258

Historically, insurgency and counter insurgency (I-COIN) in the Niger Delta cuts across three periods of Nigeria history and historiography: pre-colonial, colonial, and post- independence. It also cut across three distinct epochs of Nigeria economic history: slave trade, staple commerce and petroleum economy. Insurgency has been a central and enduring phenomenon in the Niger Delta from the era of the slave trade, staple commerce and petroleum economy. It is a form of violent protest, or a highest stage of the manifestation of dissident. The need to dominate trade in the Niger Delta (slave and commodity trade) was an important factor in the conquest of the Niger Delta areas by Britain. At various times, such move to bring the indigenous people of the region under British suzerainty met with insurgent reaction. From 1894 to 1895, King William Koko of Nembe resisted the Royal Niger

Company’s attempts to shut out the Nembe people from the lucrative trade in palm oil. In

January 1895, over a thousand warriors led by King William Koko from Nembe raided

Akassa, killed workers, sacked the town and destroyed the company’s workshop, machines and stores.19 The Akassa raid on the Royal Niger Company (RNC) headquarters in 1895 represented manifestation of insurgency against external elements in the Niger Delta.

A significant aspect of counterinsurgency in the Niger Delta during that period was carried out by the Oil Rivers Irregulars established in 1885 and later metamorphosed into the

Oil Rivers Constabulary in 1891 and renamed the Niger Coast Constabulary in 1893. The

Niger Coast Constabulary, a military force made up of an indigenous Nigerian recruited population, carried out counterinsurgency roles during the Akassa raid in 1895 when in support of the British Royal Navy attacked Nembe in an epic battle.20 They also carried out

COIN role againstKing Nana Olomu of Itsekiri (1896), Oba Ovonramwen of Benin (1897),

19See, N.A.I., A. F. P. Newns, “An Intelligence Report on the Akassa Clan in Degema Division, Owerri Province,” CSO 26, 1935, File 31016; E. J. Alagoa, The Akassa Raid, 1895 (Ibadan: University of Ibadan Press, 1960); Tekena N. Tamuno, “Some Aspects of Nigerian Reaction to the Imposition of British Rule,” Journal of the Historical Society of NigeriaIII, no. II (1965); TekenaTamuno, The Evolution of the Nigerian State: The Southern Phase, 1898-1914(London: Longman, 1972); Obaro Ikime, The Fall of Nigeria: The British Conquest(Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books, 1982). 20E. J. Alagoa, The Akassa Raid, 1895 (Ibadan: University of Ibadan Press), 1960.

7 the Ekumeku Movement of 1902, and “Women’s War” of 1929.21 In 1901, these constabulary forces became incorporated into the West African Frontier Force (WAFF) that was later designated the Northern Nigeria Regiment and the Southern Nigeria

Regiment.22Upon amalgamation in 1914, it survived as the Nigerian Regiment which was later renamed Queens Own Regiment (QOR) in 1956 and thereafter the Nigerian Military

Force (NMF). In 1960, when Nigeria attained independence, the NMF became the Royal

Nigerian Army (RNA) and in 1963 when Nigeria attained the status of a republic, the RNA changed to the Nigerian Army.

It is safe to state that as an institution, the Nigerian military has evolved over time. It emerged at different periods of Nigerian history as part of the overall process of evolution and consolidation of the Nigerian state. Within the geographical space of the Niger Delta, the military gained peculiar experiences in counterinsurgency operations. However, given the peculiarity of the Niger Delta terrain, the counterinsurgency operations of the evolving

Nigerian military assumed an amphibious character (land and sea based operations). By 1964, the Nigeria military had attained the status of a tri-service institution made up of the Army,

Navy and Air Force.

As a legitimate establishment structured to dispense violence, the Nigerian military has been used at various times as an instrument of conflict resolution and as a credible means to defend the national interest of the country. Technically, the Nigerian military is deployed for security purposes.23 It is saddled with the responsibility of defending the country against internal subversion and external attacks. Section 217 of the Constitution spells out the roles of Armed Forces of Nigeria (AFN). Section 217 sub Section 2(c) specifically saddles the

21C. Osakwe and U. E. Umoh, “Militancy, Amnesty and Sustainable Peace in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria,” Sokoto Journal of History (SJH) 1, (2012): 115. 22Ekaete Afahakan, “History of the Nigerian Army, 1860-1960”(Undergraduate Project, University of Uyo, Nigeria, 2008), 25. 23Otoabasi Akpan, the Niger Delta Question..., 155.

AFN with the responsibility of suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon to do so by the president.24

Severally, this post-independence constitutional role of the Nigerian military has been put to test in the Niger Delta.In February 1966, Isaac Boro led a 12 day insurgency in the

Niger Delta which was quelled by the Nigerian military.25During the Nigerian Civil

War(1967-1970), the Nigerian military under the 3rd Marine Commando Division was deployed to suppress Biafran secessionist aspirations in the Niger Delta area of Bonny, Port

Harcourt, Calabar, etc.26The Nigerian military, especially its naval component has been stationed in the Niger Delta, especially in the open waters of Escravos and Forcados in the

Atlantic littoral. The army component of the Nigerian military have had close contact with

Niger Delta as they perform several auxiliary roles of guarding critical oil infrastructure and in recent times personnel of Multinational Oil Companies (MNOCs) and government officials operating in the Niger Delta.

The resurgence of insurgence in the Niger Delta between 1999 and 2009 brought the

Nigerian military counterinsurgency skill to test once more. In November 1999, the Nigerian military was deployed to the Niger Delta community of Odi to quell mutating insurgency.

Under code name Operation Hakuri, the military was deployed again to the Niger Delta communities of Ogbogbene, Smoothgbene, Tenigbene, Sandfield, Mila Waterside and

Makiva waterside to suppress mutating insurgency in the area.27 However, the counterinsurgency operation of the Nigerian military as a solution appeared to have been counterproductive. Rather than insurgency atrophying, it appeared to have attained a more

24The Nigerian Army in Military Operations Other than War Volume 1, Strategic and Operational Framework (Abuja: 2011), 22. 25I. T. Sampson “Niger Delta Militancy: Causes, Origins and Dimensions,” African Security Review Institute for Security Studies18 no. 2 (2008): 31. 26Cyril I. Obi, “Nigeria’s Niger Delta: Understanding the Complex Drivers of Violent Oil-Related Conflict,” African Development XXXIV, no. II (2009): 105. 27Ubong Essien Umoh, “The Joint Task Force and Combating Insurgency in the Niger Delta of Nigeria, c. 1999- 2009” (Ph.D Thesis, Nigerian Defence Academy Kaduna, 2015), 6.

9 organised and sustainable outlook in response to sustained conditions of oil-related community tensions, environmental degradation, relative poverty and perceived deprivation.

The post-1999 insurgency manifested itself in the damage of oil facilities and infrastructures, killing of security and oil personnel, oil theft (bunkering), kidnapping and hostage taking for ransom.

Arguably, post-1999 insurgency in the Niger Delta became prevalent and significant in three states: Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers. These three states under the period of study were the cash cow of the Nigerian economy as they produced the largest quantity of crude oil.

Although the response of the Nigerian military to the insurgency appeared to have remained unofficial (i.e without a formal name), in 2003, it was made formal with establishment of the

Joint Task Force Operation Restore Hope (JTF ORH). The Joint Task Force Operation

Restore Hope (JTF ORH) was formed and deployed to the Niger Delta with their area of responsibility covering Delta (Sector I), Bayelsa (Sector II), and Rivers states (Sector III) in response to insurgency that became prevalent in Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers.28

Figure 1.4: Map Showing the Operational Environment of the Joint Task Force 1999-2009

28V. Ojakorotu and L. D. Gilbert, Checkmating the Resurgence of Oil Violence in the Niger Delta of Nigeria (Johannesburg,2010), 6.

Source: Cosmas Ndichie, Cartographer, Department of Geography, University of Nigeria, Nsukka

The Nigerian Military (Army, Navy and Air Force) under a designated Joint Task

Force Operation Restore Hope (JTF ORH) were tasked with the responsibility of countering insurgency in the Niger Delta states of Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers. On the other hand, insurgents operating within and across Delta, Bayelsa, and Rivers states from camps camouflaged by maze of creeks were able to use their local knowledge of the terrain, riverine access to weapons, finances through oil bunkering, and connection to top political and military officials to establish a formidable resistance.

Prior to the commencement of the Joint Task Force Operation Restore Hope (JTF

ORH) in 2003, military operations in the Niger Delta were carried out by individual battalions of the Nigerian army. These included 73 battalion, Elele Barrack, Rivers State, with area of operations in Rivers and BayelsaStates; 7 battalion, Effurun Barracks, Delta

State, with responsibility in Delta State; 2 battalion, Bori Camp, Rivers State, with area of responsibility in Rivers State; 195 battalion, Aganabode, Benin, Edo State with area of responsibility in Edo and Ondo States; 65 battalion, Bonny Camp, Lagos; 146 battalion,

11 Burutu Barracks, Cross River State, with area of operation in Cross River State. In 2007, 93 battalion from Rokuba Barracks, Jos replaced 7 battalion in Effurun.29

The counterinsurgency (COIN) task and operation of the JTF ORH demanded sustained military operations in a difficult and challenging terrain made up predominantly of creeks, swamps and contiguous local communities. JTF ORH was demanded to operate within the professional requirements of Rules of Engagement (ROE), Standing Orders (SOs), and economy in the use of force.30 The nature and composition of their training and orientation was to reflect this professional demand. However, the professional operation of the military under the umbrella of the JTF was constrained by a difficult and complex operational terrain, (physical and human) communication difficulties, challenges of winning the hearts and minds of the local population, political bottlenecks, human right abuses, and most significantly corruption.31 These constraints elongated the COIN operations of the

Nigerian military in the Niger Delta, while at the same time gave the insurgents a considerable boost.

Statement of the Problem

The Nigerian military faced at least two obvious constraints in their counterinsurgency duty in the Niger Delta between 1999 and 2009 which has not been captured in the military historiography of the Niger Delta. These were the military bandwidth and organisational constraints. With an almost complete conventional battlefield orientation, the Nigerian military appeared to have lacked forces specially trained for, and an organisation adapted to, coastal COIN duties in the Niger Delta. However peculiar and important these constraints were, they have been relatively ignored, consequently begging for a systematic

29Lt. Colonel Otu Abam, oral interview c. 40 years, Commander, 82 Battalion Effurun, Warri, Delta State, June 11, 2013. 30Lt. Colonel Danjuma Y. Danja, oral interview 46 years, JTF Headquarters Opulo, Yenegoa, Bayelsa State, December 22, 2013. 31Lt. Colonel Danjuma Y. Danja, oral interview...

12 investigation, analysis and documentation in the form of a dissertation. The present study intends to go beyond the mainstream approaches to COIN constraints in the Niger Delta and examine the peculiarity of military bandwidth and military organisation as a problem faced by the Nigerian military in the Niger Delta between 1999 and 2009.

Theoretical Framework

It has become imperative to situate historical research on relevant social theories to understand the phenomenon and dynamics of the events. Being that the primary purpose of any theory is to clarify concepts and ideas that have become, as it were, confused and entangled,32 theoretical framework provides a particular perspective, or lens, through which a topic is examined. The study relies on the Military Bandwidth Theory and the Organisational

Theory to aid our explanation on the constraints faced by the Nigerian military in its COIN role in the Niger Delta under the period of study.

The bandwidth theory argues that a basic military problem arises when a military force is so focused on one particular type of opponent that it can be defeated by a different kind of opponent.33When a conventional military is suddenly given non-conventional task, there is a tendency that it might run into the problem of insufficient band-width. Metz and

Kievit used this theory to explain the contemporary challenges that the United States is facing in 21st century wars.34As reflected in Max Boot’s Invisible Armies, the military bandwidth theory is an enduring one, rooted in the history of armed conflict as it significantly explains the challenges faced by big militaries in Guerrilla warfare from ancient times to present.35

32Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 132. 33Qiao Liag and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare: Thoughts on War and Strategy in a Global Era(Beijing: PLA Arts Publishers, 1999), 153-155. 34Steven Metz and Kievit, “Strategy and the Revolution in Military Affairs: From Theory to Policy” US Army Strategic Studies Institute, June 27, 1995. 35Max Boot, Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present(New York: Liveright Publishing, 2013).

During most of the Middle Ages, for example, the only threat to a well-armoured, well-mounted and well-trained knight was another knight. By the 15thC, knights at Agin- court and other battles experienced a band-width problem as they were devastated by formerly insignificant types of opponents such as archers, halberdiers, pikemen and later, arquebusiers.36During the Napoleonic wars (1803-1815), the French army became predominantly used to a conventional mode of warfare with its European counterpart.

However, they faced a band-width problem when they encountered the Spanish forces which employed guerrilla (small wars) tactics. The inability of the French army to adjust to the new band-width of the Spanish forces saw the eventual defeat of the Napoleon’s military in 1815.

The conventional nature of World War I and II between 1914 and 1945 restricted the militaries of mostEuropean nations to a conventional bandwidth. By the time most European nations faced non-conventional armies in colonial wars in Africa and Asia after World War

II, they witnessed a bandwidth problem, which at most times,resulted in their defeat.

America’s loss in the Vietnam War has been attributed to a bandwidth problem where a conventional fighting mentality was brought into a non-conventional environment.37

Thomas X. Hammes’ The Sling and the Stone38 and Arreguin-Toft’s How the Weak Win

Wars,39have used the bandwidth theory to explain America’s inability to achieve a quick victory in the Second Gulf War (since 2003) as compared to the lightening victory achieved during the First Gulf War. In the First Gulf War, the entire spectrum of fighting was conventional; however, in the Second Gulf War, the spectrum was highly unconventional.40

Between 1979 and 1989, Soviet Union lost in the war against Afghanistan;41 and since 2001,

36Qiao Liag and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare: Thoughts on War and Strategy in a Global Era, (Beijing: PLA Arts Publishers, 1999), 153-155. 37Bernd Greiner, War without Fronts: The USA in Vietnam (London: Bodley Head, 2009). 38Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century (Osceola, WI: Zenith Press, 2004). 39Ivan Arreguin-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 40Ivan Arreguin-Toft, “Why Victory Became Defeat in Iraq” Nieman Watchdog, March 30, 2007. 41Gregory Feifer, The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan (New York: Harper & Row, 2009).

14 the United States of America has suffered huge losses in its war against Afghanistan. Military bandwidth theorists blame the loss by these super powers on their conventional patterns of warfare in previous years.42

The present study seeks to employ the bandwidth theory in a domestic setting, however with a twist. The theory supports the position that the Nigerian military having been used to a conventional military settings experienced a bandwidth problem in the coastal insurgency in the Niger Delta. Although the Nigerian military have been involved in a near- unconventional warfare setting, like the rebel wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, adapting to an insurgency in a complex coastal terrain like the Niger Delta was at most difficult.

One of the reasons that explain why most militaries face the bandwidth problem is the nature and structure of its organisation – the organisational theory. An organization is the rational coordination of the activities of a number of people for the achievement of some common explicit purpose or goal, through division of labour or function, and through a hierarchy of authority and responsibility.43 The military is an organisation modelled to achieve national objectives through the use of force. As an organisation, it is made up of service units (basically the Army, Navy and Air Force) assigned distinct and specialised tasks for overall success. The organizational theory of military operations argues that the way a unit is organised drives how it will fight and the challenges it is bound to face. The ability to confront challenges in an unpredictable non-conventional battle space is arguably a function of capabilities and training.

To this end, the theory argues in part that a military organization trained and conditioned to conduct conventional warfare will tend to be tailored towards that specific task. Consequently, deploying conventional troops in COIN operations would amount to bringing in an elephant into a room. An organisation that is structured and trained for high

42Ivan Arreguin-Toft, “How a Superpower Can End Up Losing to the Little Guys” Nieman Watchdog, March 23, 2007. 43Edgar H. Schein, OrganizationalPsychology, (2nd ed.,) (Engelwood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970) 9.

15 intensity combat operations in a conventional setting will lean toward executing combat operations in such settings, even when the situation calls for a different approach. The organization of the Nigerian military units for high intensity combat and their lack of preparation for counterinsurgency operation is a simple explanation for the constraints they faced.

The organisational theory of military operations gained verve with Thomas Rick’s

Fiasco and Nigel Aylwin-Foster’s “Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations.”

Thomas Rick describes how in the initial stages of the Iraqi insurgency US forces tried carrying out police roles such as cordon, search and arrest, encountered operational and strategic setbacks because they created widespread resentment that generated recruits for the insurgency.44 Nigel Aylwin-Foster’s critique of the US Army’s performance in post invasion

Iraq pointed out the over-reliance on aggressive kinetic operations designed to kill or capture insurgents and cultural insensitivity that although “inadvertent arguably amounted to institutional racism.”45 In all, they argue that the challenges the US Army faced in executing counterinsurgency operations were, at least in part, due to the reliance on conventional units to conduct a highly specialised form of warfare.

The organisational theory holds that the demands of counterinsurgency require full time preparation which can best be achieved in units within a part of the military organisation dedicated to counterinsurgency. Consequently, no unit in the military organisation is capable of performing every mission – conventional and unconventional alike. The mentality of conventional assault troops prepared to storm defensive positions may not be consistent with the patience required for counterinsurgency. Moreover, leadership skills required for high

44Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco (New York: Penguin Press, 2006) 192-202, 235-243. 45Nigel Aylwin-Foster, “Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations” Military Review(November- December 2005) 2-15; See also Ahmed S. Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006) 99-102; Steven Metz, “Learning From Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy” Strategic Studies Institute January 2007, 12-41; Bing West, “American Military Performance in Iraq” Military Review, September-October 2006, 2-7; http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil

16 intensity combat cannot be developed to the highest level while simultaneously struggling to achieve mastery of the diplomatic skills required for counterinsurgency. The theory places a strict difference between organisation for conventional warfare and that of COIN. An effective counterinsurgency unit requires the capability to: conduct combat operations to defeat insurgent forces; provide security to the population; win the support of the population; identify and develop local leaders; and build civil institutions. The organisational theory holds that a review of these counterinsurgency capabilities captures the challenges that conventional units are bound to face in counterinsurgency operations.

Much more difficult and tasking is the ability to carry out security and policing duties by conventional oriented troops. In most cases, the organisational structure of conventional troops is not tailored to adopt a mentality suited to carry out security operations necessary for

COIN operations. As argued by Andrew Pavord, the operational focus of security operations is contrary to the “can do” tempo of a combat battalion.46 While success in conventional combat is measured by what happens to the enemy - the defeat of enemy forces, success in security operations is measured by what does not happen. Counterinsurgent units must be prepared for the patient work of security operations.

Employing the organisational theory to the Nigerian military in the Niger Delta, it can be safely argued that the Nigerian military, through its ad hoc deployment of troops in the

Niger Delta, appeared to have been conditioned to fight an unconventional warfare in a peculiar terrain against its configuration to engage in convention warfare. This created the temptation and vulnerability of performing conventional roles in COIN situations. In such a situation, the Nigerian military faced significant transition costs as they had to change mission focus in the Niger Delta from conventional to non-conventional on short notice.

Consequently, the terrain, casualty management, logistic challenges, communication

46Andrew Pavord, “Force Structure for Small Wars” 2008, http://smallwarsjournal.com/ mag/docs-temp/60- pavord.pdf (accessed November 2, 2014).

17 difficulty, and other variables became factored in giving the sudden turn to COIN warfare a habit. Consequently, the constraint behind the constrains of the Nigerian military lay in the way the military was assembled and deployed under the Joint Task Force Operation Restore

Hope (JTF ORH) between 1999 and 2009.

Purpose and Significance of Study

The study seeks to examine the constraints of the Nigerian military while carrying out counterinsurgency in the Niger Delta between 1999 and 2009. This aspect of study in the military history of Nigeria as well as the historiography of the Niger Delta appears less attended to. Despite the enormous challenges faced by the Nigerian military in the Niger

Delta insurgency, only newspaper documentation and journalistic commentaries make up for our overall understanding. The study seeks to go beyond the journalistic bias of newspaper reporting and document the challenges faced by the Nigerian military in the Niger Delta between 1999 and 2009. An examination of the constraints of the Nigerian military would explain why the counterinsurgency efforts assumed such an extensive duration.

Consequently, the study is significant for several reasons. It would mirror the adaptation of the Nigerian military to COIN operations. Given that the nature of contemporary warfare is highly asymmetric and insurgency-based, the study would make useful contributions to the calibration of the Nigerian military for similar operations within or outside Nigeria. The study of changes and adaptation of the Nigerian military to COIN operations in the Niger Delta, which the present study examines, would serve as lessons learnt for the military institution in particular and Nigeria in general. It will also mirror the

Nigerian military in terms of readiness and adaptability to 21st century security challenges.

Since the study derives much of its evidences from personal stories of combat participants in the Nigerian military that were deployed to the Niger Delta, it provides a collective memory of experiences and thus serves as an institutional memory for the military organisation. The

18 study would thus be of benefit to policy makers, the Nigerian military and men in the profession of arms as well as students in political and military history.

Scope of Study

There are three distinct scope of study in this work: the chronological, geographical and thematic. The chronological scope will stretch from 1999 and 2009. The base chronology marks the period that the Nigerian military were deployed in a significant number to Odi community in Bayelsa state to restore order. The terminal chronology marks the military victory at Camp 5 and the subsequent acquiescence by a significant number of insurgent groups to embrace the Amnesty deal of the Federal Government of Nigeria.

The geographical scope will be restricted to Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers states which were the initial Area of Responsibility of the Nigerian military that operated in the Niger

Delta between 1999 and 2009. When the Nigerian military were constituted under the Joint

Task Force Operation Restore Hope (JTF ORH), Delta state became designated “Sector I,”

Bayelsa State was designated “Sector II,” and Rivers state was designated “Sector III.” To this end, the geographical scope of this study would be limited to Sectors I, II and III in the entire Niger Delta.

The thematic scope of this study will be restricted to the themes of Insurgency-

Counterinsurgency (I-COIN). Discussion on the socio-political and demographic constituents of the Niger Delta would be carried out to aid our understanding and explanation of the changes over time witnessed in I-COIN in the Niger Delta under the period of study. While various social actors were responsible for fomenting insurgency (FOIN) in the Niger Delta, it was the reserve responsibility of the Nigerian military to counterinsurgency (COIN) in the

Niger Delta.

Literature Review

Literature review is basically historiography organised around and related directly to a specific subject matter. It makes justification for the present study by examining what knowledge and ideas have been established around the subject matter. It portrays the strengths and weaknesses of previous studies with the aim of identifying gaps in which the present study intends to narrow. The Niger Delta is a sensitive, and to some, an emotional aspect of Nigeria’s history. Consequently, it appears magnetic, attracting an overwhelming amount of literature from pundits, amateurs, journalists, and freelance commentators. The review of literature for the present study would however concentrate on literature from pundits in the field that pass the methodological test of reliability, credibility and objectivity.Reviewed literature that meet these criteria will be selected to cover two broad perspectives - cause and effect – in the analysis of insurgency and counterinsurgency in the

Niger Delta with the motive to mirror the challenges of the Nigerian military. The causal literature review will concern studies on insurgency that aid our explanation of the onset and duration of insurgency in the Niger Delta. Literature bordering on the effect will constitute studies on counterinsurgency that aid our understanding and explanation of the counterinsurgency role of the Nigerian military in the Niger Delta.

The study will first examine classic literature on insurgency. This would assist our understanding of the nature of the Niger Delta insurgency. This is important for our analysis of the challenges faced by the Nigerian military in its COIN role in the Niger Delta, since

COIN is a response to an insurgency. Another set of literature would concern classic literature on the Niger Delta which provides the foregrounding for understanding the contemporary profile of the Niger Delta and it proclivity towards insurgency. The next set would be a review of general literature on counterinsurgency. This will be followed by available literature on the Nigerian military in counterinsurgency operations within the Niger

Delta.

Gleaned from available literature, studies on insurgency weave seamlessly with studies on counterinsurgency. There seems to be no separate set of literature for insurgency and a separate one for counterinsurgency. Their views are often tailored as classical and non- classical. The classical view derives primarily from the seminal works of David Galula and

Robert Thompson. Galula provides a classical definition of insurgency, and posits that the term refers to a protracted struggle conducted methodologically in order to attain specific objectives, in particular “to overthrow the existing order”47 Consequently, Galula lays the ideational foundations of COIN theory based upon the primacy of political power over military power. According to him, “a revolutionary war is 20 percent military action and 80 percent political.”48 Galula argues for civilian-centric operations and not kinetic warfighting as heavy, indiscriminate weaponry alienates the population and is not conducive of hearts- and-minds (HAM). Robert Thompson’s ideas appear to be focused at the strategic and operational level. Robert Thompson outlined five broad principles: A clear political aim, work within the law, the development of an overall plan, defeat political subversion and secure base areas.49It is widely acknowledged in the literature that the principles outlined by

Thompson are sine qua non to successful COIN operations.50

The classicists’ thesis has been challenged by the Neo-COIN school of thought. The principle tenants of which are Frank Hoffman,51 David Kilcullen52 and David H. Ucko.53 In many respects Neo-COIN represents the restatement of the established maxims of counterinsurgency as they still emphasise political primacy, but with some significant twists.

47David Galula, Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (London: Praeger, 1964), 2. 48David Galula, Counter-Insurgency Warfare ..., 63. 49Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1966). 50Joshua Gray, “The Challenges of British Counterinsurgency in Helmand: Why did it go so Wrong?” E- International Relations, November 17, 2014. 51Frank Hoffman, “Neo-Classical Counterinsurgency?” Parameters, 37(2), 2007, 1-17. 52David Kilcullen, “Counter-Insurgency Redux,” Survival, 48(4), 2006, 111-130; David Kilcullen, “The Anatomy of a Tribal Revolt,” Small Wars Journal, August 29, 2007. 53David H. Ucko, The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009).

Hoffman,for instance, emphasises the changing organisational structure of insurgencies, which are less hierarchal. He however indulges in a twist arguing that insurgents are more virtual comprising loosely affiliated networks, linked by a key individual/ideology.54

Hoffman draws attention to new technologies in communication, such as internet, mass media, which are becoming more central in generating support and recruiting globally.55As part of the twist, Hoffman contends that the contexts in which insurgencies take place are also changing. For example, while the classical approach contends that insurgents seek sanctuary in distant and complex terrain,56 Hoffman argues, however, that “urban centres are […] the insurgents jungle of the twenty-first-century.”57 David Ucko however contends that a whole relearning process is required as the “new counterinsurgency era” of the 21st century comes with significant challenges for policy maker and practitioners in the profession of arms.58

David Kilcullen concurs with Hoffman and avers that much of what comprises contemporary insurgencies is new, requiring fundamental reappraisals of conventional wisdom. Kilcullen argues that the capacity of the insurgent is changing due to “globalisation effects.”59 For example, he draws attention to the complicated international networks which now aid insurgencies and the increasing use of media for conveying the insurgents’ message to a global audience. The internet gives insurgents near-instantaneous means to publicise their cause, it also enables moral and financial support, and a means for recruitment providing the insurgency with a “virtual sanctuary.”60

As important as these classic works on I-COIN are, they seldom situate their discourses on the Niger Delta of Nigeria. They only provide the fatal attraction to conceptualise operations of the Nigerian military in the Niger Delta within the theory and

54Frank Hoffman, “Neo-Classical Counterinsurgency…, 4. 55Frank Hoffman, “Neo-Classical Counterinsurgency…, 8. 56David Galula,Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958(Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2006), 23. 57Frank Hoffman, “Neo-Classical Counterinsurgency…, 5. 58David H. Ucko, The New Counterinsurgency Era…, 59David Galula,Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958…, 112. 60David Kilcullen, “Counter-Insurgency Redux…,” 113.

22 practice of COIN. This informs the need to examine literature on the Niger Delta that defines the geography and demography of the Niger Delta which has made it susceptible to violent activities of social movements over the years. Some of these literature include:Kenneth O.

Dike’s Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta,61G. I. Jones’ The Trading States of the Oil

Rivers,62 Obaro Ikime’s Niger Delta Rivalry: Itseki-Urhobo Relations and the European

Presence, 1884-1936,63 and E. J. Alagoa’sA History of the Niger Delta.64While Kenneth Dike examines external influences on the political economyof the Niger Delta in the 19th century;

G. I. Jones deals with the local political development of the Niger Delta as an aspect of their total history; E. J. Alagoa examines the history and culture of the Niger Delta, albeit from an

Ijo filter; and Obaro Ikime focuses on the dynamics of intergroup relations in the Niger Delta using the Itsekiri-Urhobo relations. These classic studiesrepresent the first generation of literature that set the background for the colouration of the political economy and intergroup relations of the contemporary Niger Delta. An understanding of these first generation literature on the Niger Delta significantly explains the historical forces that have made the contemporary Niger Delta susceptible to conflicts and crises. Although the term “insurgency” is hardly used by these first generation historians of the Niger Delta, their works set the background for appreciating the contemporary profile of the Niger Delta.

Obaro Ikime’s The Fall of Nigeria,65 Tekana Tamuno’sThe Evolution of the Nigerian

State,66 and Joseph U. Asiegbu’sNigeria and its British Invaders,67represent the second generation or revisionist scholars of the Niger Delta. They reflect the phenomenon of

61Kenneth O. Dike, Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta…, 30-45. 62G. I. Jones, The Trading States of the Oil Rivers: A Study of Political Development in Eastern Nigeria (London: Oxford University Press, 1963). 63Obaro Ikime, Niger Delta Rivalry: Itsekiri-Urhobo Relations and the European Presence 1884-1936 (London: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd 1969), 65-70. 64E. J. Alagoa, A History of the Niger Delta: An Historical Interpretation of Ijo Oral Tradition (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1972), 23-44. 65Obaro Ikime, The Fall of Nigeria: The British Conquest (Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books, 1977). 66Tekana N. Tamuno, The Evolution of the Nigerian State: The Southern Phase, 1898-1914 (London: Longman Group Ltd., 1978) 23-48. 67Joseph U. Asiegbu, Nigeria and its British Invaders, 1851-1920: A Thematic Documentary History (Enugu: Nok Publishers, 1984).

23 insurgency in their works but rarely use the word wholesale. Obaro Ikime preferred to use the word “revolt” for the Akassa insurgency of 1895, Tekena Tamuno preferred to use the word

“disturbances” for the Ekumeku insurgency between 1898 and 1911. Without being apt in the use of the word “insurgency”and“counterinsurgency,”Obaro Ikime, Tekena Tamuno and

Johnson U. Asiegbu provide historical evidences to show that insurgency is rooted in the history of the Niger Delta. They all agree to the testament that the desire for Britain to dictate the lucrative palm oil trade resulted in varying degrees of insurgency from the local communities in the Niger Delta.

Consequently, British armed reaction to quell such mutating threats to their imperial gains passed for counterinsurgency. Johnson Asiegbu sites the Brohemie War of 1894, The

Akassa War of 1895, the Benin and Aro Expedition of 1897 and 1901, as well as other military expeditions in the Nsit and other Ibibio districts as variations of insurgency and counterinsurgency in the present day Niger Delta. Consequently, and building upon these first generation literature, S. Aghalino, “British Colonial Policies and the Oil Palm Industry in the

Niger Delta Region of Nigeria, 1900-1960”68 identifies colonialism as the root cause of insurgency in the Niger Delta. Although the works of these authors provide important background facts, the present study intends to go beyond their perceived chronological constraints.

Ebi B. Asain’s, In the Creeks of Fire: Inspired by the Fight for Justice and Freedom in the Niger Delta, Tekena N. Tamuno’sOil Wars in the Niger Delta 1849-2009,69 Otoabasi

Akpan’s Niger Delta Question and the Peace Planand Cyril Obi’s Oil and Insurgency in the

Niger Deltaappear to represent the third wave of serious and deliberate scholarship on the

Niger Delta from a neo-revisionist filter. They all examine the contemporary issue of insurgency in the Niger Delta and the extent to which it has attracted the counterinsurgency

68S. O. Aghalino, “British Colonial Policies and the Oil Palm Industry in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria, 1900-1960” African Study Monographs 21, no. 1, (2000): 25-29. 69Tekana N. Tamuno, Oil Wars in the Niger Delta 1849-2009, Ibadan: Stirling-Horden Publishers Ltd., 2011.

24 response by the Federal government. Ebi Asain resonates how the variables of justice and freedom in a resource control conditioned environment drove young and productive men into the creeks to challenge the Nigerian state. Ebi Asain is of the view that the deployment of sections of the Nigerian military to smoke out “militants” from the creek has met with stiff resistance given the resolve of youths in the Niger Delta who have suffered years of neglect, injustice and marginalisation.Akpan examines the military approach towards the search for peace in the Niger Delta and concludes that the military in spite of possession of sophisticated and mammoth instruments of conflict resolution is ill-equipped as arbiters of domesticconflicts. Hesees the use of the idea behind the deployment of the Nigerian military in the Niger Delta as the Mad Man’s Theory.70

Tekena Tamuno is one of the few scholars who lay emphasis on the period 1999 –

2009, the chronological width of the present study. He uses the phrase “oil wars” for the enduring insurgency in the Niger Delta since 1849. According to Tamuno, the Oil Wars began as a Palm Oil-driven set of encounters since 1849 before it reached its status of a

Crude Oil-driven war after Oloibiri’s wells were exploited in 1958. Emphasising the weapon of choice, Tamuno avers that from the era of Consular jurisdiction in the Bights of Biafra and

Benin, the choice weapon consisted of gun-boats; but by May 2009 encounter in Gbaramatu kingdom, helicopter gun-ships were preferred.71Tamuno describes the oil wars between 1999 and 2009 as the “long trek towards amnesty”72and argues that the use of the military to suppress every expression of protest succeeded in alienating the population and driving it into more stubborn opposition.

Cyril Obi stands out as one of the few scholars that have used the term “insurgency” for the Niger delta in its wholesomeness and aptness. Heargues that petro-violence has for strategic, economic and political reasons brought the Niger Delta to the forefront of

70Otoabasi Akpan’s Niger Delta Question.., 71Tekana N. Tamuno, Oil Wars in the Niger Delta 1849-2009, Ibadan: Stirling-Horden Publishers Ltd., 2011. 72Ibid.

25 international energy and security concerns. In Obi’s view, the insurgency is linked to

Nigeria’s history, internal contradictions and politics, as well as to the nature of the integration of the Niger Delta into the international political economy of oil in ways that have simultaneously enriched international oil companies and their partners – national and local elites – and contributed to the disempowerment and impoverishment of local peoples, through direct dispossession, repression and the pollution of the air, lands and waters of the region. The turn to violent resistance in Obi’s view took place in the context of prolonged military rule, marginalization and repression of community protests. It has involved government armed forces (the Nigerian military) engaging in pacifying protesting or feuding communities, or fighting local militias resisting exploitation and marginalization by the

Nigerian state and its partners, the oil multinationals (MNCs). While these neo-revisionist literature examine extensively contemporary insurgency and counterinsurgency in the Niger

Delta, they seldom pay attention to the challenges faced by the Nigerian military in their

COIN role in the Niger Delta. This is the gap in previous studies that the present study seeks to remedy.

Other studies on the Niger Delta are less historical having a rather restrictive focus.

Their focus is predominantly on the cause of insurgency in the Niger Delta in the post-1999 period. S. I. Omofonmwan and L. O. Odia, “Oil Exploitation and Conflict in the Niger-Delta

Region of Nigeria”73argue that the causes of insurgency in the Niger-Delta region is the inability of the multinational companies involved in the production of crude oil to mitigate the negative consequences of their activities. A. Odoemene“Social Consequences of

Environmental Change in the Niger Delta of Nigeria”74examines the causes of insurgency through the filter of the environmental degradation of the Niger Delta; while O. F. Idowu

73S. I. Omofonmwan and L. O. Odia, “Oil Exploitation and Conflict in the Niger-Delta Region of Nigeria,” Journal of Human Ecology, 26, no. 1 (2009): 28. 74A. Odoemene, “Social Consequences of Environmental Change in the Niger Delta of Nigeria”, Journal of Sustainable Development 4, no. 2, (2011): 129.

“Niger Delta Crises: Implication for Society and Organizational Effectiveness” blames the

Nigerian economy,Aderoju Oyefusi, “Oil-dependence and Civil Conflict in Nigeria,” sees lack of national integration, inter-group antagonism, lack of economic development, and socio-economic disparities as the underlying factors of insurgency.75

Oyefusi links the Niger Delta crisis to weak institutional arrangements, deficiency in enforcement, an ineffective security system, a mix of interest between states and oil companies resulting in oppressive measures on communities by states during dispute situations, looting, and rent seeking competition within local members, amongst others, without addressing the deeper roots of these factors.76In another study, Oyefusi emphasises individual level factors that include low income, low literacy, lack of assets and absence of marital engagement as factors that increase the tendency of people to take up arms, and that most of these factors can be addressed through a combination of economic policies and effective counterinsurgency presence in the Niger Delta.77

Onasoga complements Oyefusi and identifies lack of social amenities, operation of oil companies below the acceptable international standard of environmental safety (including gas flaring), political dominance, marginalization or economic deprivation, and the inadequacies of the country’s police force to secure life and properties of the citizens as contributing factors to insurgency.78 In an attempt to interrogate the peculiarity of insurgency in the Niger

Delta situation, Cyril Obi, “Oil Extraction, Dispossession, Resistance and Conflict in

75A. F. K. Aprezi, “Threats to Internal Security in the Niger Delta: Challenges for the Nigerian Armed Forces” (National War College Nigeria, Research Paper June 2000), 24; N. Kasfir, “The Shrinking Political Arena” quoted in Crisis and Conflict Management in Nigeria Since 1980, Volume One Causes and Dimensions of ConflictA. M. Yakubu (Kaduna: Nigerian Defence Academy, 2005); T. A. Imobighe, “Introduction: Civil Society, Ethnic Nationalism and Nation Building in Nigeria” Civil Society and Ethnic Conflict Management in Nigeria, ed. T. A. Imobighe, (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd, 2003); R. T. Suberu, Ethnic Minority Conflicts and Governance in Nigeria (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, 1996). 76R. T. Suberu, Ethnic Minority Conflicts and Governance…, 5–12. 77Aderoju Oyefusi, “Oil and the Propensity to Armed Struggle in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria” Post- Conflict Transitions Working Paper No. 8, World Bank Policy Working Paper 4194, (April 2007), 1–4. 78A. K. Onasoga “Effects of Ethnic Militia on National Security,” (Armed Forces Command and Staff College Nigeria, College Paper SC 28, 2006), 75–76.

Nigeria’s Oil Rich Niger Delta” contends that insurgency in the Niger Delta rides on the groundswell of popular anger linked to the alienation, dispossession, and neglect of the people of the Niger Delta region of Nigeria, by the government and transnational institutions.

In Obi’s view, Niger Delta insurgency portrays an organized resistance by local forces to contest, repossess, and control their natural resources particularly oil and gas. Insurgent groups blocked further alienation, expropriation, and environmental degradation by a transnational oil alliance comprising the oil multinationals, their home governments, the

Nigerian state, and ruling elite coalitions.79

In as much as the knowledge of the causal dynamics of insurgency in the Niger Delta is important for the present study, an examination of the role of the military and their peculiar challenges in the Niger Delta appears neglected. The present study seeks to remedy this neglect.

The military has always been an important institution in every socio-political system. The involvement of the Nigerian military in counterinsurgency operations in the Niger Delta has its roots in the use of the military to manage domestic crisis in Nigeria. Arguably, Military involvement in internal security operations (ISOPs) is inevitable as the need for higher level of aggression continually reveal itself.

As argued by Victor A. Elaigwu, the literature on the Nigerian military in domestic conflict spots has grown tremendously. In his book,The Military and the Management of

Civil Crises in Nigeria, 1960-1993, Victor Elaigwuexplains that the military has been a veritable factor in crisis management in Nigeria since independence. As regards an assessment of their effectiveness, he argues that the deployment of a military force in Tiv division in 1960 could not deter the eruption of violence in the area in 1961, nor could a similar exercise of military force in February 1964 dissuade the people from further acts of

79Cyril I. Obi, “Oil Extraction, Dispossession, Resistance and Conflict in Nigeria’s Oil Rich Niger Delta” Canadian Journal of Development Studies 30, no. 1-2 (2010): 219-236.

28 violence between July and August 1964, culminating in another military deployment in

November 1964. He argues further that in 1980, the full force of military might was deployed in Kano against Maitatsine, but neither this nor subsequent exercise of physical force could discourage similar occurrences in Bullumkuttu, Rigasa, Jimeta–Yola and Gombe in 1982,

1984 and 1985 respectively. He concludes that while the exercise of brute force is capable of cowing insurgents in particular situations, its inherent inability to resolve basic socio- economic contradictions of which the unrest are tangible manifestations, renders such problems an inescapable and recurrent phenomenon.80 In as much as this work gives a detail of the Nigerian military operations, their strength and weaknesses in the Middle Belt and some northern states of Nigeria, this work concentrates on the first thirty three years of

Nigeria’s independence, and as such there is need to study insurgencies and counterinsurgent operations in the recent past and the Niger Delta in particular.

R. O. Dode “Nigerian Security Forces and the Management of Internal Conflict in the

Niger Delta: Challenges of Human Security and Development” opines that Nigeria’s security forces have performed well in a number of peace keeping operations in Africa and a number of other continents. He states that their performance during internal conflicts in different parts of the country and especially the Niger Delta is below average.81E. A. San’s “Military in

Internal Security Operations: Challenges and Prospects82alsodiscusses the functions of the military, and dealt on some instances of military involvement in internal security operations.

He traces some of the challenges of the military in internal operations in Nigeria. These literatures will serve as a guide for the present study as this research intends to concentrate on

80 V. A. Elaigwu, The Military and the Management of Civil Crises in Nigeria…., 198-285. 81R. O. Dode “Nigerian Security Forces and the Management of Internal Conflict in the Niger Delta: Challenges of Human Security and Development”European Journal of Sustainable Development, 1, no.3 (2012): 412. 82E. A. San, “Military in Internal Security Operations: Challenges and Prospects” (A Paper Presented at the Nigerian Bar Association 53rd Annual General Conference, Tinapa Calabar, 28th August 2013), 15.

29 the constraints of the Nigerian Military operations in the region that the Joint Task Force code named “Operation Restore Hope” was deployed.83

International Crisis Group (ICG),study on The Swamps of Insurgency: Nigeria’s

Delta Unrest examines the colonial history of the region, the marginalization of the local ethnic groups by the failures of the Nigerian federal and state governments to provide essential basic services and the exploitation of natural resources by the Nigerian federal government and foreign oil companies.84 They provide a series of recommendations through this study that essentially “line up” with the principles and strategies of counterinsurgency, minus the military action. Human Rights Watch (HRW), piece on The Warri Crisis: Fueling

Violence is a study detailing the conditions and causal agents to the violence and instability in present-day Nigeria.85 Their report describes the lack of governance, the dominance of personal agendas, corruption and organised crime contending for profits from oil exploration, and the prevalence of armed violence for different factions to gain or maintain control of this valuable resource. As HRW characterizes the level of violence in the Delta region as a war, they were unable to directly discuss the constraints of the Nigerian Military in their counterinsurgency operations.

International Crisis Group (ICG), document on Rivers and Blood: Guns, Oil and

Power in Nigeria’s Rivers State,86 is a study of the cultural aspects of violence, access to small arms and light weapons, and the tradition of ethnic resistance to centralised and non- representative government in the eastern part of the Niger River Delta, centred on Port

Harcourt. The study amplifies the Warri Crisis published in 2003, and delves into the

83R. O. Dode, “Nigerian Security Forces and the Management of Internal Conflict…, 412. 84International Crisis Group,The Swamps of Insurgency: Niger Delta’s Unrest(Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2006). 85International Crisis Group, The Warri Crisis: Fueling Violence(Brussels: International Crisis Group), 2003. 86International Crisis Group,Rivers and Blood: Guns, Oil and Power in Nigeria’s Rivers State(Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2005).

30 emergence of armed groups in the Delta region. The study provides an insight into the social and political causes for conflict.

Chop Fine’sThe Human Rights Impact of Local Government Corruption and

Mismanagement in Rivers state, Nigeria87reports on corruption at the local and state governmental level in Rivers state of Nigeria illustrates essential elements of the insurgent operational environment that directly contributes to the likelihood of a classic insurgency emerging in the Niger Delta. The report outlines that corruption compromises all categories of public governance; economic, public health, education, infrastructure, investment and economic.They further illustrate the environment within which COIN operations will have to be conducted, and some of the requirements for that future COIN campaign. While this report is important to these study, the need to assess the constraints of the Nigerian military in

COIN operations is relevant.

The bulk of the existing literature on the Niger Delta insurgency is either about analysis and theories of marginalization, structural underdevelopment, poverty, socio- economic inequality, environmental degradation or unemployment as the bane of insurgency in the region. The constraints of the Nigerian Military COIN appears vacant. The reasonswhy the Nigerian Military lingered for so long in its counter-insurgency operations in the Niger

Delta have not been given scholarly attention. It is therefore observed that none of these literatures have systematically examined the Nigerian Military constraints in tackling militancy in the Niger Delta. This study which shall be a major departure from earlier attempts at reconstructing the constraints of the Nigerian military COIN operations and insurgency in the Niger Delta intends to fill the observed gap in literature which has not been given attention by previous studies.

Method, Sources and Organisation

87Chop Fine, The Human Rights Impact of Local Government Corruption and Mismanagement in Rivers State, Nigeria (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2007).

Historical methodology is the process by which historians gather evidence and formulate ideas about the past. It is the framework through which an account of the past is constructed. As it borders on the management of evidences, the narrative, analytical and quantitative approaches were used to manage objectively.88 Historical analysis provides sufficient help in understanding the nature and continuities of insurgencies over time vis-a-vis changes in the insurgents’ environment of the Niger Delta. As it borders on the collection of evidence, this study made use of primary and secondary sources which as a matter of fact complement and validate each other. The primary sources used include written documents obtained from Calabar, Ibadan and Kaduna archives and non-written sources (oral data and material culture) obtained from the field. The secondary sources include text books and journal articles on the Niger Delta insurgents and counterinsurgency obtained from libraries.

Combat participants from both sides as well as other non-combat participant, varying in age, occupation, religion and status were carefully selected and interviewed.

The work is organised into five chapters and is presented sequentially and chronologically.Chapter one is the introduction which considers the background of study, statement of the problem, theoretical framework, purpose and significance of study, scope of study, literature review and method, sources and organisation. Chapter two examinescounterinsurgency operations of theNigerian military before 1999. Chapter three examines the Niger Delta Insurgency and deployment of the Nigerian military. Chapter four examines the Nigerian military counterinsurgency constraints in the Niger Delta. The last chapter is summary and conclusion of the work which terminates in 2009.

88Objectivity in history defines the treatment of data. It is attained when the opinion, shades, bias, colouration, and feelings of the historian are not mirrored in his attempt to explain the event using the evidence at his disposal. See M. C. Lemon, The Discipline of History and the History of Thought(New York: Routledge, 1995), 14; See also Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The ‘Objectivity Question’ and the American Historical Profession(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 25; UbongEssienUmoh and ChukwumaOsakwe, “Objectivity in History: OkonUya’s Contribution to the Debate and Art,”Lapai Journal of Central Nigeria History, 7, no. 2, (2013): 2.

CHAPTER TWO

THE NIGERIAN MILITARY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

BEFORE 1999

Introduction

Before the post-1999 Niger Delta insurgency, the Nigerian military has been actively involved in counterinsurgency operations within and outside Nigeria. Outside Nigeria, various peacekeeping operations add up to the experience of the Nigerian military in counterinsurgency operations. Within Nigeria, the various internal security operations made up for internal peacekeeping operations bearing the same texture as counterinsurgency. This chapter seeks to examine the various post-independence counterinsurgency operations in the form of peacekeeping that the Nigerian military were involved in and how it prepared them for recent counterinsurgency experience.

The Nigerian Military and Counterinsurgency Operations outside Nigeria

The participation of the Nigerian military in external counterinsurgency operations has been in the form of peacekeeping. Peacekeeping89 evolved in the grey zone between pacific settlement and military enforcement as conceived in chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter.

Peacekeepers are tasked with increasingly broad mandates, including civilian protection, counter-terror, and counterinsurgency operations.90 Consequently, counterinsurgency (COIN) has safe connections with peacekeeping operations given the overall nature of its operations.

First peacekeeping, like COIN, seeks to interpose forces in order to develop an enabling

89“Traditional” peacekeeping refers to the deployment of an interposition force with the task to supervise, monitor and verify the implementation of a ceaseﬁre between former belligerents. See Michael Bothe, “Peacekeeping,” in Bruno Simma (ed.), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (Oxford: University Press Oxford, 2002). 90Danielle Renwick, Peace Operations in Africa, Council on Foreign Relations, May, 2015.

33 environment for peace-making efforts to be established or re-established. Second, peacekeeping operations, like COIN, operate under the principle of the non-use of force, except in self-defence. Third, peacekeeping missions, like COIN, are required to approach the use-of force in its minimalist fashion.91

Before the deployment of the Nigerian military in the Niger Delta, the Nigerian military has participated in several peacekeeping operations around the globe since independence in 1960.

Nigeria has taken part in continental peacekeeping operations by providing UN peacekeepers to Congo (ONUC) from 1960 to 1964, Tanzania (1964), Chad (1979; 1981-1982), Angola

(1991), Namibia (1991), Mozambique (1992), Somalia (1992) and Rwanda (1993), in global peacekeeping operations in Lebanon (1978-1982), Yugoslavia (1992), Cambodia (1992-

1993), and sub-regional peacekeeping in Liberia (1990-1998) and Sierra Leone (1998-1999) among others.92

Nigeria’s Role in Congo Peace Keeping Operations

The Congo Civil War, or Congo Crisis, was a complex political tumult that began just days following Belgium’s granting of Congolese independence in 1960. On June 30, 1960,

Belgium negotiated post-colonial mining rights in declaring an independent Democratic

Republic of the Congo (DRC).93 Yet within days, soldiers of the Congolese army mutinied, demanding increased pay and the removal of white officers from their ranks. When Belgium intervened militarily, more soldiers rebelled. Many of these soldiers gravitated toward the radical nationalist Prime Minister Patrice Emery Lumumba. The war lastedfor four years, and the associated violence claimed an estimated 100,000 lives including the nation's first Prime

Minister, Patrice Lumumba, and UN Secretary Dag Hammarskjöld, who died in a plane crash

91D. A. Briggs and J. G. Sanda, Issues of Peace and Security in Nigeria: Essays in Honour of Major General Charles B. Ndiomu(Bukuru: National Institute Press, 2004), 5. 92Adekeye, Adebajo, Liberia's Civil War Nigeria, ECOMOG and Regional Security in West Africa(London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 90. 93Kevin Shillington,Encyclopedia of African History (New York: Fitzroy Dearborn, 2004).

34 as he attempted to mediate the crisis.94 Escalating with the secession of the southernmost province of Katanga, the conflict concluded with a united Congo emerging under the dictatorship of Joseph-Désiré Mobutu. Then, dominated by Belgian business interests, the mineral-rich Katanga province under the leadership of Moïse Kapenda Tshombe seceded from the DRC with Belgian support.95 Congolese President Joseph Kasavubu and Prime

Minister Lumumba asked and received a peacekeeping force from the United Nations (UN).

On July 14, 1960, the UN Security Council called on Belgium to withdraw her troops from

Congo and also authorized the UN Secretary General to provide the government of Congo with necessary military assistance until the country’s security forces could meet their task fully.96 The UN called on Nigeria to help by contributing troops even before her independence.Nigeria attained its independence on October 1, 1960 and joined the United

Nations on October 7, 1960.97Nigeria contributed troops to the Congo under the UN

Operation Des Nation Unies Congo (ONUC) between 1960 and 1964.98

Nigerian soldiers who served in some of the most difficult areas strived along with other UN forces to execute their assignment which included among others: Helping the Congolese government to restore and maintain the political independence and territorial integrity of the

Congo, helping the Congolese government maintain law and order in the country and putting into effect a wide and long term programme of training and technical assistance.99 The

Nigerian troops were the last to leave the Congo on June 30, 1964 after dedicated efforts in the service of mankind in search of international peace and security. However, The Congo

94Guy Arnold, Historical Dictionary of Civil Wars in Africa(Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 1989). 95H. M. Epstein(ed)., Revolt in the Congo, 1960-1964(New York: Facts on File, 1965). 96G. Abi-Saab, The United Nations Operations in the Congo, 1960-1964 (London: Oxford University Press, 1978). 97G. Habu, “Peace Support Operations in Africa,” in G. B. Shederack (ed.),Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies in West Africa(Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, 2007). 98EricG.Bernanand and Katie E. Sams,Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2000), 107. 99Chilaka Francis Chigozie andOdoh Samuel Ituma, “Nigerian Peacekeeping Operations Revisited,” Singaporean Journal of Business Economics and management Studies 4, no. 2 (2015): 4.

35 crisis thus provided the first situation where Nigeria could partner with other professional forces within the United Nations in peacekeeping operations.

Training for the Nigerian contingent that participated in peacekeeping in Congo mainly focused on basic skills, such as patrolling, map reading, observation post duties, mine clearing, communication skills, manning of road blocks, first aidand field hygiene under the

Geneva Conventions.100During the operations, Nigerian troops suffered from ambushes - a phenomenon peculiar to insurgency. A peculiar ambush on the Nigerian contingent was in between Leopoldvilleand the Katanga Region.While in the Congo, the Nigerian troops were commended for their courage and gallantry.101 The United Nations decorated Major

AdekunleFajuyi for setting a good example of courage and gallantry, and for displaying a high degree of leadership, military skills and ability.102The troops brought Nigeria great honour and pride. As a result of their wonderful performance, Ironsi was appointed the commander of the UN force in Congo in 1964. Nigerian contingents were also sent to

Tanganyika (now Tanzania) in 1964 under the auspices of the Organization for African Unity

(OAU).103 Nigeria’s participation in peacekeeping operation at this infant stage of her independence could be attributed to its bid to make her a force to be reckoned with in the region and internationally.

Nigeria and Chad Operation 1979

Chad, a vast landlocked nation rich in oil and uranium, has faced severe and violent internal turmoil since it gained independence from France in 1960. The country’s post-colonial history has been marked by a long series of coups, and the country has not seen a peaceful

100M. S. Ahmed, Nigeria’s Participation in Peacekeeping Operations (Peace Operations Training Institute, 2013). 101L. Onoja, Peacekeeping and International Security in a Changing World (Jos:Mono Expressions Publishers) 1996),l. 102O. B. C. Nwolise, “Nigeria and International Peacekeeping Operations Since 1960” in Twenty-five Years of Nigerian Foreign Policyed. G. A. Nweke(Nsukka: NSIA.1986). 103F. A, Agwu, World Peace through World Law:The Dilemma of the United Nations Security Council(Ibadan:University Press Plc), 2007.

36 transition of power since independence. Like many of its neighbors across the Sahel belt— which stretches from the arid Maghreb region of North Africa into tropical Central and West

Africa—Chad has historically been divided between an Arab-influenced north and a black

“African” south.104 During the French colonial period, Chad’s southern region was the breadbasket of the region, producing cotton and agricultural goods. Southerners won the favor of the French, and political control of the country at independence. Immediately following independence in 1960, French-appointed President Francois Tombalbaye faced threats from political rivals and quickly established an autocratic government. A Christian from southern Chad, Tombalbaye alienated Muslim northerners, who launched a violent opposition against the government. Tombalbaye retaliated by declaring a state of emergency and then dissolving the National Assembly in response to rioting by the opposition. 105

In 1966, the northern revolt, led by the Chadian National Liberation Front, began a full- fledged war against the Tombalbaye regime.In the early 1970s, French troops intervened to quell the northern revolt, but in 1975, Tombalbaye was deposed in a coup and replaced by another southern Christian, Felix Malloum.Before President Tombalbaye was deposed, the leader of Libya, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, crossed the Libya-Chad border and occupied a swath of uranium-rich land called the Aouzou strip. This incident not only marked the beginning of Libya’s ongoing role in Chad, but also underscored Colonel Gaddafi’s desire for

Arab-domination in the Sahel region. Chad’s largely nomadic northern population suffered continued grievances under President Malloum. In 1979, Muslim northerner Goukouni

Oueddei forced President Mallou out of power with support from Libya.

104Adebajo, A., “Nigeria,” in A.J. Bellamy & P.D. Williams (eds.), Providing Peacekeepers: The Politics, Challenges, and Future of United Nations Peacekeeping Contributions (Oxford University Press, 2013). 105C. Dokubo, “Nigeria’s International Peacekeeping and Peace Building Efforts in Africa, 1960 – 2005,” in Nigeria and the United Nations Security Council, ed.,A. A. Bola(Ibadan: Vantage Publishers, 2005).

The Chadian peace-keeping operation was the first case of Nigeria being the initiator of the operation and deployed troops and personnel to carry it out.106With the Chadian situation worsening, Nigeria’s feeling of insecurity and desire to see an end to the several years of crises in Chad made her organize a peace conference for Chad in March 1979 at Kano. The conference brought Nigeria, Sudan, Libya, Niger and Cameroon together with four warring

Chadian factions. Following appeals for help from French and Chadian governments and in accordance with the Kano conference decision, Nigeria sent her troops to Chad on 7th March

1979 with Force Commander as Col. Mohammed Magoro.107 Nigerian troops in Chad were both peacekeepers and peacemakers, the dual role being in accordance with the first Kano

Accord in which it was resolved that the peace keeping force would participate in the demilitarization of N’djamena and its environs up to 100 kilometers, participate in the enforcement of ceasefire to ensure free movement of civilians throughout Chad and to provide a forum for the warring groups to negotiate and discuss in daily conference.108

Nigeria’s Role in Lebanon Operations, 1978 – 1983

The Palestine and Israeli question has created tension and caused bloodshed and wanton destruction of property for over three decades.109 The situation became more desperate and complex in early 1978 following a full scale invasion of Southern Lebanon by Israel forces in retaliation, after Palestinian commandos’ raided Israeli territory. In reaction to the Israeli invasion, the central government of Lebanon appealed to the UNO to help it re-establish its authority in southern Lebanon occupied by Israeli forces who were determined to flush out

106Chilaka Francis Chigozie andOdoh Samuel Ituma, “Nigerian Peacekeeping Operations Revisited,” Singaporean Journal of Business Economics and management Studies 4, no. 2 (2015): 5. 107Hamman, S. & Omojuwa, K., “The Role of Nigeria in Peacekeeping Operations from 1960 to 2013,” Mediterranean Journal of Social Science, 4 no. 16 (2013). 108Ibid. 109Chilaka Francis Chigozie andOdoh Samuel Ituma, “Nigerian Peacekeeping Operations…, 5.

Palestinian Liberation Organization members operating against Israel from there.110The UN

Security Council met over the request of Lebanon, called on Israel to cease its military action against Lebanon’s territorial integrity immediately, and by resolution 425 established on

March 19, 1978 the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to: confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restore international peace and security, and help the Lebanese government re-establish its effective authority in the area occupied by Israeli forces.111 The

UN Secretary General called on and got contributed troops from 10 member nations –

Nigeria, Ghana, Senegal, Fiji, France, Nepal, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, and Norway.

The first Nigerian contingent known as NIBATT (Nigerian Battalion) of about 673 officers and men left Nigeria for Lebanon in May, 1978 and began its job of peacekeeping by policing a land area of about 50 square kilometers located around the strategic zone of the

Akiya Bridge linking southern Lebanon and the rest of Lebanon. Due to the strategic importance of their area of operation, the Nigerian troops had to carry out foot and mobile patrols, check against the smuggling of arms and ammunitions, man numerous check points, prevent the warring parties from entering UN troops locations, man Observation Posts (OP), man listening posts, maintain peace in the area of operation and reassure the local inhabitants of their safety.112

The Nigerian contingent throughout the period of peace keeping were replaced every six months, and the last contingent was pulled out of UNIFIL and withdrawn from Lebanon due to the over running of UNIFIL positions by Israel to invade Lebanon. About 5,500 officers and men and about 9 battalions of the Nigerian Armed Forces served in UNIFIL operations from May 1978 to January 1983, during which period 2 officers and 8 men died in the service. In fact, Nigeria, lost Captain Oweh, Lance Corporal Mohammed Tanko and

110A. l Abiola et al, “Nigeria’s Participation in Peacekeeping Operation in Africa: An Analysis of the Costand Benefits;” Defence Studies,8, 1998. 111Chilaka Francis Chigozie andOdoh Samuel Ituma, “Nigerian Peacekeeping Operations…, 5. 112Ibid.

Signalman Enahoro,ammunition and equipment though the mission operated under rules of engagement (ROE) in which the use of arms was highly constrained. Eventually the Nigerian government elected to cut its losses in the ever-worsening security environment and pulled its troops out in 1983. The good performance of Nigerian troops in Lebanon earned them praises and brought Nigeria international respect.113

During the NIBATT VIII UNO medal presentation parade held at TayrZibna (Lebanon) in

1972, the UNIFIL commander Lt. General William Callaghan told the Nigerian troops that the UN medal being given them was symbolic “not only for their service… but as a recognition by all peace-loving nations of the world for efforts in maintaining peace in the troubled area.”114Callaghan commended the men of NIBATT VIII for playing a fitting role in helping the UNFIL achieve its mission despite the difficulties the men faced from various armed groups in Lebanon. Nigeria’s Brigadier Mrs. Sami who was the contingent commander was appointed the UNFIL Chief of Staff.

Nigeria’s Role inLiberia, 1990-1998 The crisis in Liberia had its genesis from the manner in which the country was established, organized and governed up to the election in 1985.115 Class contradictions, ethnic rivalries, despotism and intolerance of political diversity contributed to the crisis.The conflict of successive or leadership between President Tolbert and the populace that wanted political reforms snowballed into the “Rice riots” in 1979.116The intervention of Samuel Doe and the eventual execution of public officers, including the confiscation of property belonging to

Americo-Liberians brought tension. Widespread dissatisfaction ushered in popular revolt in

113Chilaka Francis Chigozie andOdoh Samuel Ituma, “Nigerian Peacekeeping Operations…, 6. 114E. L. Adulugba, “The Nigerian Army in Peace Keeping,” in SOJA, 7, no. 7, 1982. 115S. V. L. Malu, ECOMOG: A Peace Keeping Operation in Perspective,” in Nigeria in ECOMOG Evolution and Background to Interventions,ed.,Amadu Sesay,(Kaduna: Nigerian Defence Academy Press, 2014), 161. 116A. A. Abubakar“Peacekeeping in West Africa: The Nigerian Experience” in Peace Support Operations in the New Global Environment: The Nigerian Perspective,eds., Gboribiogha J. Jonah and Istifanus S. Zabadi (Kuru: National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS), 2009), 180.

1989 and brought Charles Taylor into the Liberian crisis. Supported by Cote d’Ivoire and

Burkina Faso, Taylor invaded the country and the crisis degenerated into a civil war.117

In December 1989 soldiers of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) under the command of Charles Ghanky Taylor launched an attack on Liberia from the Cote d’ Ivorian boarder with Liberiai. Within months the fighting had escalated with the NPFL making steady and continuous military progress toward Monrovia. By March 1990, law and order had virtually broken down in most parts of Liberia (Monrovia was clearly threatened) as various rebels groups, which had spring up fought for control of different parts of the country.The Economic Community of West African States in response to the total breakdown of law and order in the country, the humanitarian catastrophe and the growing threat to sub- regional peace and security met in Banjul, the Gambia and established a Standing Mediation

Committee to resolve the crisis.118

As the security situation in Liberia degenerated, both the UN and the USA exhibited complete apathy to the problem. Nigeria had to take the initiative get other members of the

ECOWAS to intervene in the interest of Liberia and those other states within the sub- region.119 This led to the establishment of ECOMOG. Nigeria’s effort in Peacekeeping operations in Liberia can be examined under political/diplomatic and military perspectives.

Operation Liberty was the codename given to ECOMOG operations to liberate Liberia from the carnage that was going on in the country at the wake of the invasion by rebel’s forces of

Charles Taylor. The political/diplomatic aspects were undertaken by prominent statesmen and envoys.

By August 1990 ECOWAS deployed 3,500 strong West African troops made up of contingents from Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone and the Gambia to Liberia. The

117S.K.Oni, The Nigeria Army in ECOMOG Operations (Ibadan: Sam Bookman Publishers, 2003), 41. 118Amadu Sesay “Background to Civil Wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone,” in Nigeria in ECOMOG Evolution and Background to Interventions, ed., Amadu Sesay,(Kaduna: Nigerian Defence Academy Press, 2014): 43-68. 119M.A.Vogt,The Liberian Crisis and the ECOMOG: A Bold Attempt at Regional Peacekeeping(Lagos: Gabumo Publishers Co. Ltd, 1992), 83.

41 peacekeepers ECOMOG deployment was vehemently opposed by Charles Taylor’s National

Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) who saw ECOMOG as a ploy by some West African counties (particularly Nigeria) to deprive him from taking over Monrovia. NPFL thus launched immediate attack on ECOMOG as the troops landed in Monrovia. In response,

ECOMOG was forced to change its operational mandate from peace keeping to peace enforcement within a month of deployment with specific order to create a buffer zone between NPFL forces and Monrovia. Nigeria Battalions Numbers 1 and 2 (NIBATTS 1&2), on December 24 1990, had to clear the rebels at Freeport, where ECOMOG Headquarters was located and took positions from PO River to Paynville.120

While in Liberia, ECOMOG were involved in various types of missions-peace keeping, peace enforcement, mediation, disarming of rebel groups, and the protection of humanitarian aids.121Following the Abuja I and II peace agreement among the major warlords and other interest groups a cease -fire was declared, and a time-table set for election which were held on July 19,1997.The elections were overwhelming won by Charles Taylor’s of the National

Patriotic Party (NPP) with about 75.3% of the votes cast in the presidential election and21 out of 26 seats in the Senates and 49 out of 60 seats in the House of RepresentativesNigeria contributed immensely to the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), an interventionist mediation force to end the protracted Liberian civil war, where the government of Nigeria puts the financial cost at 8 billion dollars (over N800 billion) apart from a large number of lost and maimed soldiers in 1987.122

The Nigerian Naval Task Force and the Nigerian Air Force Task Force, supporting the

ECOMOG Force played important roles by dislodging the factional fighters from their hideouts thereby forcing them to accept the option of a negotiated peace settlement. In

120S.K.Oni, The Nigeria Army in ECOMOG Operations…, 64. 121Charles Ukeje, “State Disintegration and the Civil War in Liberia,” in Civil Wars, Child Soldiers and Post- Conflict Peace Building in West Africa, Ahmadu Sesay, ed., (Ibadan: College Press Publishers, 2003), 92. 122Suleiman Hamman, Ibrahim Khalid Mustafa and KayodeOmojuwa, “The Role of Nigeria in Peacekeeping Operations from 1960 to 2013,” International Affairs and Global Strategy, 21, (2014): 43.

42 addition, during other secondary operations, the various NIBATTS deployed at the frontages were able to beat back the attacks from NPFL rebels. The formation of Nigerian Brigades in

1992 with the task to open up to the hinterland facilitated the withdrawal of NPL rebel forces to the North Eastern fringes of the country.123

The civil war in Liberia is significant for two reasons. First, it served as an important example of a new type of external intervention – intervention by a sub-regional organization. Second, it has led to a re-examination by African leaders, of the policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of states. Non-intervention in the internal affairs of states is one of the principles underlying the OAU (now AU). African leaders are, however, far more aware of the threat to regional security posed by internal conflicts. This was reflected in the second principle of the 1991 Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in

Africa which stated that the security, stability and development of every African country is inextricably linked with those of other African countries.124

Consequently, instability in one African country reduces the stability of all other countries.

Nigeria shared the joy of the return to democracy by Liberia. Additionally, the then Nigeria’s president, Gen. Babangida served as the Chairman of ECOWAS thrice while the community’s secretariat in Abuja - a project mainly funded by Nigeria was completed.ECOMOG peacekeeping operation ended in February 1998 but contingents of

5000 troops remain behind in capacity building roles.

The main problem that the Nigerian military operating under ECOMOG faced on the ground during the seven years of intervention in Liberia was the proliferation of fighting factions.

The responsibility of securing a fragmented country that was under the control of many warlords became acute. During the civil war in Liberia, the criminal exploitation of natural

123A. A. Abubakar“Peacekeeping in West Africa: The Nigerian Experience…,” 188. 124Suleiman Hamman, Ibrahim Khalid Mustafa and KayodeOmojuwa, “The Role of Nigeria in Peacekeeping…,” 43.

43 resources had flourished, existing in a climate of competition between the warlords. These warlords were more motivated by the occupation of more territories for their profitable criminal activities than they were for peace.125The leaders of fighting factions were encouraged to pursue their predatory policies in order to draw more wealth to support the effort of war and recruit more rebels to fortify their movements by the availability of exportable resources. This added up to the peculiarity of challenges the Nigerian military faced in peacekeeping operations.

Nigeria-Sierra Leone Peace Keeping Operations, 1998-1999

The crisis in Sierra Leone generated by the struggle for political power, educational imbalance and different colonial experience of the geo-political areas.126 This situation bred suspicion, fear and prejudices, where lives were exploited by opposing political camps.

Additionally, improper involvement of the armed forces led to successive military coups and decline in military professionalism. This situation led to institutional failures and corruption, thus, fuelling ethnicity and loss of confidence in the government

Ahmad TejanKabbah was elected president of Sierra Leone on 17th march, 1996 and on

May25, 1997 Ahmad TejanKabbah and his democratically elected Government were overthrown in a bloody coup led by Major Koromah’s dissident military officers and rebels from Sierra Leone’s long standing insurgency. ECOWAS Heads of Government at the 20th

Session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government extended the scope of activity and mandate of ECOMOG to cover Sierra Leone. This was signed in Abuja on August 29,

1997, to monitor and supervise ceasefire violations, enforce the sanctions regime and the embargo instituted by the authority of Heads of States and Government against the illegal regime and undertake any other assignment in Sierra Leone as may be given by the

125Clement Adibe: the Liberian Conflict and the ECOWAS Partnership,The Third World Quarterly 18 no. 3 (1997): 478. 126S. K. Oni, The Nigeria Army in ECOMOG Operations…., 113.

44 authority.127In February 1998, ECOMOG troops with contingents from Ghana, Guinea,

Maliand Nigeria restored constitutional legality and reinstated the government of the democratically elected government.128

The intervention of ECOMOG forces in Sierra Leoneeventually led to the re-instatement of

President Ahmed Kabbah and the restoration of democratic institutions in Sierra Leone.In

March 10, 1998, a peace keeping force under Nigerian leadership with considerable help from a British/Africa mercenary from a local paramilitary (the (Kamajor), entered Freetown, and restored Kabbah and his government.129 The motives of the Nigerian intervention were twofold: there was a natural desire for regional security, but General Sani Abacha also wanted international legitimacy for his regime which was being discredited by the international community. The initial success of the peace keepers helped obscure some of the troubling aspects of the intervention - the lack of an international mandate, the use of mercenary in peace keeping operations and the very undemocratic nature of the Nigerian regime.130 At the peak of the operations, ECOMOG had 13, 000 troops in the country which conducted the operations.131 Late in 1999 the disputants in the sierra Leonean conflict signed an agreement in Lome, Togo, to end the crisis; thus paving the way for UNAMSIL (United

Nations Mission in Sierra Leone).132

In Sierra Leone also, there were challenges of inadequate knowledge of the forest terrain, and the difficulty to counter the guerrilla tactics employed so efficiently by the RUF. Some members of troops from the Nigerian contingent complained of lack of motivation toengage in vigorous combat against the rebels, insufficient allowances, low wages,and long periods of

127S. K.Oni, The Nigeria Army in ECOMOG Operations…, 138. 128Charles. B. Azgaku, “The Role of Nigeria in Peace-Keeping Operation in West Africa:1960 – 2010,” Research on Humanities and Social Sciences 5, no. 22(2015): 90. 129Andrew McGregor, “Quagmire in West Africa: Nigerian Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone (1997-98)” International Journal 54, no. 3 (1999): 483-485. 130Suleiman Hamman, Ibrahim Khalid Mustafa and KayodeOmojuwa. “The Role of Nigeria in Peacekeeping…, 43. 131EnemuoAnifowose, Elements of Politics(Lagos: Iroansi Publication, 1999). 132Ibid.

45 deployment, all culminating inlow morale.133Consequently, disciplinary problems related to poorliving conditions were evident. A significant number of officers werereportedly involved in the illicit diamond trade for personal profit.

The Nigerian military also gained from the use of joint forces, employing the combined tactical showmanship of the Army, Navy and Air Force. In Liberia and Sierra Leone for instance, ECOMOG peace support forces for the first time made use of elements of her Navy and Air Force in their operations.134 Virtually all the ships and tugboats of the Nigerian Navy were engaged in the Liberian operation codenamed Operation Liberty. These included the following: NNS Ambe, NNS Damisa, NNS Ekpe, NNS Erinomi, NNS Enyimiri, NNS Ohue,

NNS Agu, NNS Ayam, NNS Ekun, NNS Tug Dolphin and NNS Tug Mira as well as NNS Tug

Rudolf Forbes.135 These Nigerian naval vessels spearheaded the movement of troops from

Sierra Leone to Liberia at the commencement of Operation Liberty in August 1999.136

The Nigerian Navy under ECOMOG provided constant gunfire and cover that made possible the initial amphibious landing of ECOMOG troops. The ECOMOG Air Task Force (EATF) made up predominantly of the Nigerian Air Force was also deployed as part of ECOMOG peace support force in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Four Alpha jets with 30mm canons and

68mm rockets, and their support equipment and personnel, were deployed and gave tactical air support in the operations.137 The complement of equipment and armament comprised fighter aircraft, helicopters, aircraft engineering and aircraft armaments. Air power was employed to provide strategic air support and cover for the ground force. Moreover, C-130

133Mohamed Belmakki, “African Sub-Regional Organizations in Peacekeeping and Peace Making: The Economic Community of West African State (ECOWAS),” MA Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, March, 2005. 134S. K. Oni, The Nigerian Army in ECOMOG Operations…, 219. 135S. K. Oni, The Nigerian Army in ECOMOG Operations …, 221-222; See also, AdedoyinOmede, “The Nigerian Army and Peace Support Operations under the ECOWAS: The ECOMOG Years,” in The Nigerian Army in Global Security ed., John W. T. Gbor, (Lagos: Megavons (West Africa) Ltd., 2004), 207-208. 136S. K. Oni, The Nigerian Army in ECOMOG Operations …, 222. 137S. K. Oni, The Nigerian Army in ECOMOG Operations …, 228

46 aircrafts carried out airlift operations in Freetown, Sierra Leone. According to S. K. Oni,

EATF made a total of 2,732 combat sorties, expending about 93.79 tons of ammunition.138

The Nigerian Military and Counterinsurgency Operations within Nigeria before 1999

Post-independence Nigeria showed some remarkable degree of vulnerability to violent civil unrest. During the First Republic, the conflicts were essentially political in character with ethnic or regionalist undertone, and climaxing in the civil war of 1967-1970. In the Second

Republic (1979-1983) the crises showed clear manifestation of economic stress but seeking refuge under religious leadership. However, the task of maintaining internal security, preserving public safety and order, is primarily the responsibility of the police. Indeed, the police is the first layer of defence in the event of breakdown of law and order. The military is often deployed as the last resort to act in aid of civil authority when the incompetence of the police has been proved beyond doubt in the face of escalating and uncontrollable violence.

Consequently, the Nigerian military have carried out counterinsurgency in the form of internal security operations. It is safe to christen such internal security operations as domestic peacekeeping operations quite different from external peacekeeping operations carried out by the Nigerian military outside Nigeria.

In post-independence Nigeria, the 1960 and 1964 Tiv Crisis, the 1980 Maitatsine riots in

Kano, the 1984 Maitatsine Riots in Kano, the 1995 Maitatsine Riots in Gombe, the 1987

Kafanchan Crises, the 1990 Ife-Modakeke Conflict, the 1992 ZangonKataf Crisis, the 1991-

1992Tiv-Jukun Crises, the 1992 Jukun-Ketub Conflict, and the 1993 Ogoni Crisis in the

Niger Delta are few examples of crisis spots where the Nigerian military have been deployed to carry out internal peacekeeping roles.139

138 S. K. Oni, The Nigerian Army in ECOMOG Operations …, 232 139Victor A. Elaigwu, The Military and the Management of Civil Crises in Nigeria, 1960-1993(Kaduna: Nigerian Defence Academy Press, 2003), 243.

In previous Tiv crisis in April 1960 and August 1961, the Nigerian military were deployed to reinforce the police for short periods. However, in the February 1964 Tiv crisis, civilian participants were drawn from the rank of ex-military personnel that just returned from the

Congo civil war as well as other ex-military personnel that participated in World War II. In

November 1964, in accordance with the powers vested on the Prime Minister for the use of military forces in maintenance of public order, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa ordered the military to take immediate steps to ensure a return to normal life in crisis torn Tiv division. In the Tiv case, the Nigerian military were not deployed to reinforce the police, but replace them. The operation was christened Operation Adam III. A whole Battalion (3 NA) including the Recce Squadron were mobilized for the task. The police admitted their failure and the propriety of the military invitation thus:

It became apparent from the nature of the disturbances that the troubles had changed from civil disturbance to armed guerrilla warfare with a distinct military air to the activities of the rioters. Under the circumstances it was decided to hand over the maintenance of order to the Army as it was clear that the disorders had degenerated into a military action.140

In February, 1966, Isaac AdakaBoroformed the Niger Delta Volunteer Service (NDVS) and used the platform to lead what he called a revolution attempting to create the Niger Delta

Republic. The NDVS received paramilitary training in camps domiciled in the creeks of the

Niger Delta. He formed the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF), an armed militia with members consisting of his fellow Ijaw ethnic groups.141 Isaac Boro and his men “12-Day

Revolution” was provoked by what they saw as social neglect, ethnic chauvinism, political

140M. Gambo, The Nigeria Police Force and the Nigeria Security Organisation Relationship(Lagos: Force Headquarters, June 1985). 141E. E. Okafor, “Dynamics of Niger Delta Struggles and the State Responses: The State of Terrorism and Terrorism of the State,” Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa 13, no. 2 (2011): 90.

48 marginalization and economic deprivation, orchestrated by Nigeria’s post-independent ruling elites.142In one of his extracts, he pontificated:

Economic development of the area is certainly the most appalling aspect. There is not even a single industry. The only fishery industry which ought to be situated in a properly riverine area is sited about 80 miles inland at Aba. The boatyard at Opobo had its headquarters at Enugu … Personnel in these industries and also in the oil stations are predominantly non-Ijaw.143

He led an armed protest against the exploitation of oil and gas resources in the Niger Delta areas. They eventually set up a military camp at Taylor Creek. Their recruits were given training in the use of firearms and explosives in the creeks and bushes. Eventually, they managed to muster a force of about 150 men, and split into three divisions.144 Boro designated himself “General Officer Commanding the NDVS and Leader of the Liberation

Government.”145 He declared as invalid all former agreements on crude oil exploration and production in the Niger Delta carried out by the Government of Nigeria and its multinational oil partners. All existing and new oil companies in the Niger Delta were to renew agreements with the new Niger Delta Republic headed by Boro. The new leader of the Niger Delta

Republic set up a provisional senate and constitution. They landed inTontonbau in the Niger

Delta and launched a guerrilla battle against the Federal Military Government of Major-

General J.T.U. AguiyiIronsi.After overpowering the police, the Nigerian military were deployed to intercept the insurgency.Despite the difficult terrain and complex topography of the Niger Delta, Boro and his men were defeated by the Nigerian military within twelve days.

During the Tiv-Jukun crisis which began in October 1991, the Nigerian military were called upon when the conflict profoundly escalated in 1992. The deployment was christened

142T. Tebekaemi. (ed.), The Twelve-Day Revolution, (Benin-city: Umeh Publishers, 1982), 120. 143Ibid. 144E. E. Okafor, “Dynamics of Niger Delta Struggles and the State Responses: the State of Terrorism and Terrorism of the State”…, 90. 145Isaac J. A. Boro, The Twelve Day Revolution (Benin City: IdodoUmeh Publishers, 1982).

Operation Tofa/Mesa. A battalion of troops composed of infantry from 4 Motorised Battalion in Takum and armoured unit from 15 Armoured Brigade in Yola was assembled under

Colonel Abdul MumuniAminu, the Brigade Commander and Lieutenant Colonel O. M.

AppahCommanding Officer of 4 Motorised Battalion as second in command. In 1993, following an eruption of the perennial Jukun-Kuteb conflict in Takum Local Government

Area, the Nigerian military were again deployed when the police seemed ineffective in the face of escalating violence. A company was drafted from the 4 Motorised Battalion under the command of Captain Lampai to carry out the role of peacekeeping.146

On arrival, the first thing the military did was to cut off the resupply route of the contending forces – in the case of the Tiv from Benue and the Jukunfrom Taraba. Once these supply routes were effectively blocked, the patrols (mobile and foot) became fully operational.147

Cordon and search operations carried out to retrieve weapons began about the third week of the arrival of the military when hostilities between the contending groups had been halted.

The next state of the operation involved measures to win the hearts and minds of the local population by instilling confidence. Women and children who had gone into hiding were encouraged to return. Peacekeeping troops deployed to the area were also chosen among those that were fluent in Tiv and Jukun and/or Hausa languages but not necessarily indigenes.

This assisted in confidence building.

Maitatsine is a generic term for religious disturbances which plagued Northern Nigeria between December 1980 and April 1985.148During the Maitatsine insurgency in Kano the

Nigerian military encountered fierce resistance. The topography and terrain also constituted a

146T. N. Tamuno, Peace and Violence in Nigeria(Ibadan: Panel on Nigeria since Independence History Project, 1991). 147S. G. Best, A. E. Idyorough and Z. B. Shehu, “Communal Conflicts and the Possibilities of Conflicts Resolution in Nigeria: A Case Study of the Tiv-Jukun Conflicts in Wukari Local Government Area, Taraba State, in O. Otiteand I Olawale (eds), Community Conflicts in Nigeria: Management, Resolution and Transformation(Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd., 2001), 83-86. 148Victor A. Elaigwu, “The Military and Management of Religious Violence in Nigeria: The Maitatsine Crisis in Jimeta-Yola, 1984,” in Crisis and Conflict Management in Nigeria since 1980 Volume Two: Governance and Conflict Management, A. M. Yakubu, R. T. Adegboye, C. N. Ubah and B. Dogo, eds., (Kaduna: Nigerian Defence Academy, 2005): 741.

50 challenge for the Nigerian military. In the Kano encounter, against the glaring police inability to suppress the uprising, the Nigerian military drew up an operational order which took effect from December 28, 1980. The order required all soldiers to be in their location at 0200 hours while the actual attack on the insurgent’s enclave was to commence at 0630 hours. The

Nigerian Air Force carried out aerial reconnaissance backed by photographs of Yan Awaki.

By 0700 bours, the Nigerian military carried out heavy bombardment on Maitatsine’s enclave. The military operation was swift and decisive. At about 1030 hours of December 29,

1980, the operation was brought to an end.149

The GOC 1 Mechanised Division, Major General David Jemibewon came to Kano from

Kaduna and after conducting an on-the-spot assessment of the situation decided to hand over the operation to the police.150The armoured tanks used for the operation came from 202

Armoured Battalion in Kaduna. The operation was commanded by Major HaliluAkilu,

Commanding Officer of 146 Infantry Battalion which was assigned the task of quelling the insurgency. As argued by Elaigwu,151although the sheer awesomeness of the full force of the

Nigerian military mobilised against the insurgents may appear like cracking a nut with a sledge hammer, however, considered against the scale of violence unleashed by the insurgents, there appeared very little else the authorities could have done to bring about a quick decisive resolution of the crisis.

The military operation in Jimeta-Yola followed more or less the same pattern. The Jimeta insurgency was the fourth in the series of the Maitatsine insurgencies after those of Kano

(December 1980), Bullumkuttu (October 1982) and Rigasa (October 1982). However, it was only the second such incident after the uprising in Kano requiring the commitment of military force. Unlike the military operation in Kano which was conducted under a civilian

149Victor A. Elaigwu, The Military and the Management of Civil Crises in Nigeria..., 149. 150NIPSS Research Department, “Project on Religious Disturbances in Nigeria Final Report on Kano/Kaduna Sector,” (nd). 151Victor A. Elaigwu, The Military and the Management of Civil Crises in Nigeria..., 150.

51 government, the Jimeta-Yola action took place under military rule. Following the quelling of the disturbances in Bullukuttu and Rigasa by the Police in October 1982 the population of the fanatics in Jimeta were reinforced by new arrivals necessitating the acquisition of new houses by Musa Makaniki in Vilikilang and Doubeli.

Lieutenant Colonel G. P. Okiki of 5 Battalion was assigned the task. A company of 5

Battalion with support units was the first to move around 0400 hours on March 3, 1984. At about 0600 hours, the insurgent’s enclave of Doubeli came under heavy mortar fire. The heavily built-up area of Doubeli was reduced to rubble with the help of the long range weapons used by the Nigerian military. The Commanding Officer of 15 Mechanised Brigade,

Lieutenant Colonel C. C. Iweze handed over the operation to the Gongola state

Commissioner of Police, Mr. NuhuAliyu, bringing the crisis to a close.152

In the 1987 crisis in Kaduna state, an orgy of violence swept across many towns and cities of

Kaduna state. The 1987 Kafanchan riot was ignited by theological disagreement between

Christian and Muslim students of the Kafanchan Teachers College, Kafanchan.153First, on

March 5th 1987, there was a squabble between the Fellowship of Christian Students (FCS) and the Muslim Students Society (MSS) over an evangelical campaign organised by the

Fellowship of Christian Students tagged “Mission 87.” The MSS group protested over the banner hoisted on the college gate with an inscription “Mission 87 in Jesus Campus,” the school authority intervened to quell the protest.154

In Kaduna metropolis, churches and personal property were destroyed in many areas including Abakpa, UnwanShanu, UnguwanKanawa and Tudun Wada. In Zaria, save for the

Ahmadu Bello University’s Kongo Conference Hotel, Emanto Guest Inn and Nira Hotel, all hotels were burnt down. Only few churches survived the carnage. Armoured vehicles

152GongolaState of Nigeria, Report of the Administrative Committee of Enquiry into the Maitatsine Disturbances of February27th to March 3rd1984 in Jimeta (n.d.) 153Hussaini Abdu, Clash of Identities: State, Society and Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Northern Nigeria(Kaduna: DevReach Publishers Nigeria, Ltd, 2010): 131. 154Ibid.

52 regularly patrolled major roads especially highly volatile areas such as Tudun Wada, Kawo and UnguwarSarki. As the situation continued to deteriorate, and police inadequacies became very glaring, the General Officer Commanding 1 Mechanised Division, Major General Peter

Ademokhai sought the permission of the Chief of Army Staff to use military force to quell the disturbances. However, the police were not withdrawn, but combined to carry out a joint military/police operation. Over 2000 personnel of the Nigerian military were deployed.

Churches and Mosques were heavily guarded by personnel of the Nigerian military.155

The ZangonKataf crisis of February and May, 1992 was another crisis sufficient in intensity to attract the deployment of the Nigerian military. ZangonKataf, located about one hundred and fifty kilometres south-east of Kaduna had been the scene of uneasy communal relationship between native Kataf community and its Hausa-Fulani settlers.Violent conflict erupted in ZangonKataf between the Atyab and Hausa community of Zango over the control and relocation of ZangonKataf Market from its original location.156When violence seemed uncontrollable in the face of the incompetence of the police, personnel of the Nigerian military drawn predominantly from the Army and Air Force were drafted to assist the police contain the crisis.

Sections of the Nigerian military were also deployed to Gokhana kingdom when the indigenes protested the devastation of their farms by Wilbros, a contractor of Shell BP.

However, the troops were withdrawn after their mission of cowing the people was accomplished. However, with the subsequent withdrawal of Shell from Ogoniland and the continued sabotage of oil installations, the government of General Sanni Abacha decided to abandon any conciliatory policy. The responsibility of managing the mutating insurgency in

Ogoniland fell on the Rivers state Governor, Lieutenant Colonel DaudaKomo. In April 1994, the Rivers state government came up with Operation Order 4/94. Christened “Restoration of

155White Paper on the Report of the Committee to Investigate Causes of Riots and Disturbances in Kaduna State 6th to 12th March, (Kaduna: Government Printer, 1987). 156Rotimi T. Suberu, Ethnic Minority Conflicts and Governance in Nigeria(Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 1996),54.

Law and Order in Ogoniland,” the counterinsurgency operation was justified on the claim that “law and order gradually died down (sic) in the areawhich constitutes (sic) Gokhana and

Khana Local Government Areas towards the close of 1993.”157

The operation envisaged a joint service takeover of Ogoniland, with the Nigeria police contributing 406 officers and men and the Nigerian military contributing similar number of troops drawn from the Army, Navy and Air Force. It was christened Rivers State Internal

Security Task Force under the command of Major Paul Okuntimoh. This was another time the joint police/military operational command was set up to manage civil violence. The use of road blocks, cordon and search, mounting of patrols, enforcement of curfew were employed in the Ogoni crisis.158

Table 2.I: Military Operations in Civil Crisis Showing Units of the Military Deployed, Commanding Officers and Duration of Operation

INCIDENT UNIT OF THE COMMANDING DURATION OF MILITARYDEPLOYED OFFICER OPERATION

February 1964 5 Battalion, Kaduna (one Lt. Col. A. C. 2 weeks company only deployed) UnegbeCapt. T. Onwatuegwu

November 1964 3 Battalion, Kaduna Lt. Col. J. Y. Pam Over 14 months RecceSquadron Maj. Anuforo

Western Region 2 QONR, Abeokuta

(1962)

Niger Delta 1 Battalion, Enugu Maj. D. S. Ogunewe 2 weeks insurrection (1966)

May 1966 Riots 5 Battalion, Kano Col. M. Shuwa 2 days

(Kano)(Katsina) 5 BattalionKatsina Col. M. Shuwa 1 day

1978 Students crisis Army depot, Zaria 1 day

157Nigeria: The Ogoni Crisis: The Judgement (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information and Culture, December 1995), 20. 158Tell, 13 November, Lagos, 1995.

(ABU, Samaru Campus)

Maitatsine (Kano) 146 Infantry Battalion, Maj. HaliruAkilu 28 hours Kano

Maitatsine (Yola) 15 Mechanised Brigade Lt. Col. C. C. Iweze 3 days Yola (5Battalion, Yola) (Lt. Col. G. P. Okiki)

Maitatsine (Gombe) 231 Tank Battalion,Gombe 1 day

Kaduna State (1987) 1 Mechanised Division Maj. Gen. P. 2 days Ademokhar

Bauchi State (1991) ACCS (Demo Col. A. D. Umar 2 days Battalion)Bauchi

Bauchi State (1991) 23 Armoured Col. A. O. Fayomi 1 day BrigadeBauchi

ZangonKataf 1 Mechanised Division Brig-Gen. A. Daku 3 days

Jukun-Tiv 4 Motorised Col. A. Aminu 3 months in the BattalionTakum,15 Infantry firstInstance. Brigade, Yola.3Division (Lt. Col. OM Appa) Continued 5yrs Headquarters, Jos subsequently.

Jukun-Kuteb 4 Motorised Battalion Lt. Col. J. O. Oladosu Over 2 years

Takum Company (1 Capt. Lampai) deployed)

Ogoni Crisis RSIS Task Force Maj. P. Okuntimoh Over 5 years

Source: Victor A. Elaigwu, The Military and the Management of Civil Crises in Nigeria, 1960-1993, Kaduna: Nigerian Defence Academy Press, 2003, p. 243. Table 2. I shows that in three decades of post-independence Nigeria, a myriad of low and high intensity conflicts have been witnessed. Some of the conflicts have been recurrent, pervasive and endemic.

Conclusion

The Nigerian military has participated in peacekeeping operations in various parts of the world. Consequently, the counterinsurgency capacity of the Nigerian military has been put to test. In its well over 25 peacekeeping missions within and outside Africa, the Nigerian military has acquired novel experience, skills, and technology that proves beneficial to

55 attaining higher standards of professionalism. As it concerns internal security operations, the degree of violence, the number of casualties, the degree of destruction inflicted on property and quality of weapons employed, determined the deployment of the Nigerian military. The riots of Tiv division in the 1960s, the Maitatsine insurgency in 1980 and 1984 in Kano and

Jimeta respectively, and the ZangonKataf crisis in 1992 required the deployment of the

Nigerian military given the apparent loss of control by the Nigeria police.

From the political crisis among the Tiv in central Nigeria to the various communal unrests in different parts of Nigeria in the 1990s; from the religious conflicts in various parts of Norther

Nigeria in the 1980s and 1990s to the socio-economic unrests among the Ogoni in the 1990s, the Nigerian military has shown robust capacity for managing mutating forms of insurgencies. Consequently, it appears safe to conclude that these experiences influenced the

Nigerian military in their peacekeeping role in the Niger Delta subsequently.

CHAPTER THREE

THE NIGER DELTA INSURGENCY AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE NIGERIAN

MILITARY, 1999-2009

Introduction

The previous chapter showed the degree of proliferation of domestic crisis in Nigeria since 1960. Given the intensity of violence and the need to protect lives and properties, sections of the Nigerian military were often deployed to domestic trouble spots across

Nigeria. In post-independence Nigeria, the Isaac Jasper Adaka Boro led insurgency in the

Niger Delta saw the deployment of sections of the Nigerian military. The Nigerian military under the umbrella of the 3rd Marine Commando Division (3MCD) was deployed again to suppress Biafran secessionist aspirations in the Niger Delta area of Bonny, Port Harcourt and

Calabar. The Federal Government of Nigeria in 1999 deployed the military under Operation

Hakuri on the Niger Delta communities of Ogbogbene, Smoothgbene, Tenigbene, Sandfield,

Mila Waterside and Makiva Waterside to suppress domestic insurgency.

The renewed insurgency in the Niger Delta after 1999 manifested itself in the destruction of oil facilities and infrastructures, killing of security and oil personnel, oil theft

(bunkering), kidnapping and hostage taking for ransom. The activities of insurgents in Delta,

Bayelsa and Rivers states went on relatively unchallenged to an extent that it was termed

“hopeless.” The Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) was established in 2000 as a civil measure to manage the crisis. In 2003 the Joint Task Force (JTF) was established as a military measure to ensure security of oil installations and maintain stability in the region, and in 2009 the signing of the Amnesty Deal which is arguably to be the most successful non-military method in the attainment of peace in the region. This chapter examines the nature of the Niger Delta insurgency after Nigeria’s return to democratic rule in 1999 through

57 a narrative and analytical filter. The chapter interrogates the particulars of the Niger Delta insurgency within a post-democratic chronological space of ten years (1999 - 2009), bringing to the fore the utility of military deployment in managing the runaway insurgency.

Insurgent Groups and Insurgency in the Niger Delta between 1999 and 2003

After decades of military rule, Nigeria returned to democratic rule in May 1999. The end of military rule and emergence of civil rule in Nigeria appeared to have held fortunes of a new start for good and responsive governance. For a significant population of the Niger

Delta, a democratic government implied emancipation from the relative deprivation faced during years of military rule. Social movements were argued to spring up in the Niger Delta along the “deprived actor” theoretical line of thinking. Such postulations highlight grievances as an important cause of insurgency and explain the link between relative deprivation and violent behaviour. Arguably, a significant cause of grievance among insurgent groups in the

Niger Delta bordered on the authoritative allocation of oil benefits and the attendant environmental consequences of oil production. As military rule relied upon repression against any form of civil protest, relative deprivation-perceived discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities159in the Niger Delta produced discontent and this discontent produced dissent. By 1999, relative deprivation in the Niger Delta appeared to have followed Ted Gurr’s chain: first the development of discontent, second the politicization of that discontent and finally its actualization in violent action against political objects and actors.160

It appears safe to argue that during the extensive period of military rule, perceived relative deprivation in the Niger Delta generated grievances and grievances together with oil

159J. C. Davies, “Towards a Theory of Revolution,” American Sociological Review 27, no. 1(1962): 6; T. R. Gurr, “Psychological Factors in Civil Violence,” World Politics 20, no. 2(1968): 245; T. R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970), 13; H. D. Graham and T. R. Gurr, Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives (New York: Bantam Books, 1969), 598. 160T. R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel…, 12-13.

58 bearing identification resulted in general behavioural dissent. Graham and Gurr call this the

“frustration-aggression” mechanism.161 In the Niger Delta, such discontent which implied inequality, was not a function of the dissimilarity between what people in the Niger Delta wanted and what they had; rather, it was a function of discrepancy between what they wanted and what they expect to get given the fact that crude oil - the main stay of Nigeria’s economy was solely mined in the Niger Delta.162 The end of military rule and the return of democratic rule appeared to have provided the much needed opportunity to vent discontent through collective violence.

The return to democratic rule in 1999 also meant a reverse in state repression carried out by previous federal military governments on budding and existing social movements concerned with the plight of the Niger Delta. Consequently, the return to democracy paralleled renewed hopes of justice and equity, especially for the Niger Delta. At the same time, the return to democratic rule provided a rather convenient space for the budding of various radical social movements that had been underground during military rule. Most of the social movements and their leaders acquired armed capability and political clout as dominant political parties sought their services to secure popular votes for the 1999 and 2003 gubernatorial elections. Such social movements primarily composed of young men dissatisfied at their inability to find jobs, gradually became classified as militant groups with their fun acquisition of weapons and ammunition. They also updated their methods from the non-violence employed earlier on by the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni people

(MOSOP) to a regular use of violence.

From 1999, the Niger Delta crisis appeared to have shifted from the frequent Ijaw-

Itshekiri wars in Warri over access to benefits accruing from oil rents on contested lands to an

161Arguably, it is not the absolute level of deprivation that leads to grievances, but instead the contrast between what a person has and what he or she expects to have. See, H. D. Graham and T. R. Gurr, Violence in America…, 598. 162T. R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel…, 358.

59 organized attack on oil companies operating in the Niger Delta.163 The attack on oil companies and its personnel also involved the frequent vandalisation of oil pipelines that crisscrossed delicate areas in the Niger Delta. Most attacks were designed to extort short-term funds or municipal development projects from multinational oil companies. Consequently, the Federal Government perceived such acts as economic sabotage capable of crippling the economy of Nigeria. By 2003, most attacks moved away from communities and cities and receded into the creeks and swamps which provided concealment for the perpetrators of violent attack on Nigeria’s oil infrastructure. With pressure mounted by the presence of the

Nigerian military in the Niger Delta, insurgent groups became more sophisticated, increasingly sharing a common goal of “resource control.”

Between 1999 and 2003, insurgent groups in the Niger Delta were basically involved in intergroup violence.164 Much of the intergroup violence was basically ethnic as the Ijaw made serious attempts to assert themselves as the harbinger of the Niger Delta struggles with the formation of the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) in 1998.165 The IYC’s demands included self- determination, resource control and environmental sustainability, was considered a challenge to authority in the state and the source of a potential Ijaw uprising in the Niger Delta. The transition to democracy in 1999 exacerbated youth militancy as unscrupulous politicians used hired “thugs” to carry out violence to ensure their victory at the polls. Given their connections to powerful political barons during the 1999 and 2003 general elections, insurgent groups clashed with one another as they attempted to secure popular votes for dominant political parties. This was significantly evident in Rivers state. During this period, insurgent groups

163Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Politics as War, The Human Rights Impact and Causes of Post-Election Violence in Rivers State, Nigeria,” 20, no. 3(March 2008). 164Judith Burdin Asuni, “Blood Oil in the Niger Delta,” Special Report of the United States Institute of Peace, 2009. 165Cyril Obi, “Nigeria’s Niger Delta: Understanding the Complex Drivers of Violent Oil-Related Conflict,” Africa Development XXXIV, no. 2(2009): 109.

60 were mostly known as gangs. They consisted mostly of cult groups such as Supreme Vikings

Confraternity, Icelanders, Deewell, Deebam, Outlaws, among others.166

Gang violence spread to other Rivers State communities. In the worst-affected communities like Ogbogoro, cult gangs carried out a reign of terror that included murder, rape, and other violent crimes.167 The clashes between the groups primarily represented a violent competition for access to illegal patronage doled out by public officials in the state government. In 2001, with the financial support of the state government, Asari Dokubo became president of the IYC and subsequently used this position to exploit divisions between the Ijaw in different states and recruit youths to help ensure Odili’s re-election in 2003.168

Prior to the 2003 elections, then-Governor Peter Odili and his political associates lavishly funded criminal gangs that helped rig the election into a landslide victory for the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP).169 Those gangs used the money at their disposal to procure sophisticated weapons and became better armed than the police. Consequently,

Rivers’ post-election gang warfare spiraled out of control. Arguably, the epidemic of violence that plagued much of the Niger Delta during this period had its roots in the corrupt, violent, and unaccountable nature of politics in the region. For instance, in Rivers state, there was an established link between politics, corruption, and violence.

Between 1999 and 2003, crime and political violence grew in stride in the face of the colossal failures of governance in Niger Delta. Given that politics meant the control of government machinery for the authoritative distribution of resources, national, state, and local elections were consistently rigged by means of violence and fraud since 1999. The oil wealth in the Niger Delta appeared to have considerably increased the financial spoils of political

166Human Rights Watch(HRW), “Nigeria’s 2003 Elections: The Unacknowledged Violence,” June 2004. http://hrw.org/reports/2004/nigeria0604 167Human Rights Watch, “Rivers and Blood: Guns, Oil and Power in Nigeria’s Rivers State,” February, 2005. 168Ibid. 169Human Rights Watch(HRW), “Nigeria: Polls Marred by Violence Fraud,” April 17, 2007. http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/04/16/nigeri15708.htm.

61 office. Indeed, a political culture that views politics as a kind of war was the order of the day in the Niger Delta during the 1999 and 2003 general elections. As one interviewee in Rivers state expressed:

We want to point our fingers at our ambitious Nigerian politicians who amassed weapons for jobless youth. Life in our community used to be very vibrant. This community used to be the pride of the Akpor Kingdom. Suddenly things started getting out of hand, just before the2003 election. We saw signs of arms trafficking, arms flowed into the community. When reports of this were made to the police force they treated it with levity. They [the politicians] were above the law.170

Since 1999, insurgents in the Niger Delta of Nigeria have changed the tactics of engagement with the Nigerian government and the multi-national oil companies from peaceful protests and demonstrations to violent protests. One of the strengths of insurgents in the Niger Delta which also define their basic peculiarity is the fact that they have broad membership drawn from the local grass root. Insurgents have a membership, support and cooperation across the states and communities that make up the Niger Delta. This provides them the opportunity and ease to network.

Insurgent Groups and Insurgency in the Niger Delta between 2003 and 2005

From 2003, there was a direct link between gang violence and the corruption and criminality of many politicians in the Niger Delta. Many ineffective political leaders kept themselves in place by violently rigging elections, relying on gangs of armed thugs. The money they use to fund, arm, and support these gangs was arguably generated by the corrupt practices carried out by desperate politicians. However, once the politicians assumed office, they either abandoned the well-armed gangs or continued to use them to intimidate their

170Human Rights Watch (HRW), Interview with local leader (name withheld), Ogbogoro, Rivers State, October 10, 2007.

62 opponents. Between 2003 and 2005, cult groups used for election rigging metamorphosed into seeming “insurgent” groups with significant leadership structure.171

In Rivers state for instance, during the 2003 election cycle, state government officials working with then-Rivers State Governor Peter Odili and then-Federal Minister of

Transportation Abiye Sekibo armed and hired criminal gangs to ensure the successful rigging of Rivers’ polls in favour of the People’s Democratic Party.172 As far back as 2001, Abiye

Sekibo, provided logistical support and political protection to local youth leader Tom Polo to help counter the influence of the opposition, the All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP), particularly in Okrika local government area, during the 2003state and federal elections.173During this period, Tom Polo was given free rein to carry out profitable bunkering activities in exchange for his group’s violent services during the 2003 elections.

Arguably, the two most prominent gangs armed by PDP politicians during the 2003 campaigns were the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), led by Asari Dukobo, and the Icelanders turned Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV), led by Ateke Tom.174 Ateke Tom rose from obscurity during Rivers state 2003 elections when he was paid and armed by state government officials to help drive opposition supporters out of his hometown of Okrika.175

Not long after the polls, Asari of the NDPVF fell out with his sponsors in the Rivers state government. State government officials responded by encouraging Ateke Tom’s Icelanders to break Asari’s group by force. By late 2003, Asari’s and Ateke’s gangs were openly at war with one another. Some of the most intense fighting between Asari’s NDPVF and Tom’s

NDV occurred between October 2003 and October 2004 and centered around villages located on tributaries about twenty to forty kilometers south west of Port Harcourt, including

171Human Rights Watch (HRW), Rivers and Blood: Guns, Oil and Power in Nigeria’s Rivers State…, 17-20. 172Ibid., 18. 173Human Rights Watch(HRW), “Testing Democracy: Political Violence in Nigeria,” 15, no. 8(April 2003). 174Human Rights Watch, “Politics as War, The Human Rights Impact and Causes of Post-Election…, 10. 175Okafor Ofiebor, “Portrait of Ateke Tom,” The News September 13, 2004.

Buguma, Bukuma, Tombia, and Ogbakiri.176 These communities constitute Asari’s home area and the site of several oil wells, flow stations and gas gathering projects operated by Shell

Petroleum Development Company in the Caw Thorne Channel.

The conflict between Asari and Ateke had a devastating effect on the residents’ of

Port Harcourt and surrounding communities. In the fighting between their gangs, dozens of local people were killed and tens of thousands fled their homes. Hundreds of gang members were also killed. From late 2003, thousands of local people in and around Tombia, Buguma,

Ogbakiri and Bukuma were forced to flee as Asari’s NDPVF and Tom’s NDV launched attacks and counter attacks. The fighting intensified between January and May 2004 and the majority of the population left during this period.

On August 22, 2004 at night, about fifty members of Asari’s NDPVF attacked a densely populated slum settlement called Njemanze on the Port Harcourt waterfront. At that time the area was controlled by an armed group called the Njemanze Vigilante Service.

Asari’s fighters first fired gunshots around the settlement and then set fire to about 30 homes.177 By mid-August2004 Asari’s NDPVF stepped up its attacks, launching raids on several areas of Port Harcourt, including Marine Base, Sangana Street and Warri Street, bringing the fighting to Port Harcourt metropolis. By late August 2004 armed violence in

Rivers state had risen to a high point of intolerance that the federal government ordered the

Nigerian military to intervene and stop it.178 In September 2004 the then-President Olusegun

Obasanjo invited both Asari and Ateke to the national capital Abuja for peace negotiations, which resulted in a truce between the two gangs. But the underlying causes of the violence that their clashes represented were never meaningfully addressed.179 Neither gang made any

176Okafor Ofiebor, “Who is Alhaji Dokubo-Asari?” The News September 13, 2004. 177Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Testing Democracy: Political Violence in Nigeria,” 15 no. 8(April 2003). 178Sola Odunfa, “Nigeria’s Oil Capital under Siege” BBC News September 8, 2004. 179A Harvest of Guns, Niger Delta Project for Environment Human Rights and Development, August 2004.

64 good-faith effort to disarm, and none of the politicians implicated in arming the gangs and sponsoring the violence was held to account in any way.

When it appeared that such gangs-turned-insurgent groups could not attract significant funding from the state government, they resorted to oil bunkering. Indeed, most gangs that suddenly assumed the status of insurgent groups amassed revenue through involvement in illegal activities ranging from the bunkering trade in stolen crude oil and bank robberies.180 A widespread sense of grievance appeared to have developed among many gang members in the Niger Delta who feel that their former political sponsors had reneged on promises of money, jobs, or education. Indeed most of the promises leveraged to gang members for help with rigging the 2003 elections were rapidly forgotten by the politicians who made them.181

But unlike those promises the gangs did not simply fade away once the polls were over.

Insurgent Groups and Insurgency in the Niger Delta between 2005 and 2009

By 2004, Alhaji Mujahid Dokubo-Asari’s NDPVF and other mushrooming insurgent groups found fortification and cover in the arteries of creeks where most of them set up camps. NDPVF social mobilisation revolved around access to “black market” crude oil through oil bunkering. Asari’s NDPVF was so notorious for oil bunkering, that its product became known in the Niger Delta as “Asari fuel.”182 This provided the bulk of finances needed to sponsor the insurgency. To feed, clothe and arm its members, insurgent groups need money. Unless insurgent leaders are liable to raise sufficient funds, a conflict is unlikely to start no matter how severe the grievances. Consequently, if an insurgent group is unable to meet the financial requirements, the insurgency is likely to continue for an extended period.

Indeed, Collier and Hoeffler find the viability of insurgent movements as a more likely explanation for the perceived link between primary commodity exports and conflict than

180Human Rights Watch(HRW), “Politics as War, The Human Rights Impact and Causes of Post-Election…, 21. 181Ibid. 182Human Rights Watch(HRW), “Politics as War, The Human Rights Impact and Causes of Post-Election…, 17.

65 greed.183 It should be stressed that it was paucity of funds that plagued the first post-colonial insurgency in the Niger Delta. Adaka Boro’s 12-day insurgency began with a capital of

£150.184 Consequently, Boro’s troops had to resort to extortionist strategies on ordinary citizens in order to support the group.

In September 2005, Ebitimi Banigo an Ijaw businessman was arrested and his bank,

All States Trust Bank, was shut down by the Nigerian government. At the same time, D.S.P.

Alamieyeseigha, the governor of Bayelsa state, was arrested in London on money laundering charges. In the same year, Dokubo-Asari, the NDPVF leader, was arrested in the government house in Port Harcourt, and taken to Abuja, where he was later charged with treason in relation to his insurgent activities in the Niger Delta. These events increased tensions and restiveness in the Niger Delta as the Ijaw of the Niger Delta felt that it was a deliberate target by the Federal Government on prominent personalities of Ijaw stock in the Niger Delta. It was in the process of agonising and organising that the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)-an amalgam of all insurgent groups in the Niger Delta-was formed winning broad sympathy among the local population of the Niger Delta.

The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) is an amalgam of all arm bearing groups in the Niger Delta fighting for the control of oil revenue by indigenes of the Niger Delta who have had relatively no benefits from the exploitation of our mineral resources by the Nigerian government and oil companies over the last fifty years.185

Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) is one of the largest militant groups in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. The guerrilla group dates its formation to

January 11, 2006; its stated mission is to wage armed rebellion in order to regain the “birth rights of our stolen heritage.” The Movement's stated goals are to “localize control of

183Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Resource, Rents, Governance and Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 47, no. 5(2005): 626-628. 184T. Tebekaemi. ed., The Twelve-Day Revolution(Benin-city: Umeh Publishers, 1982), 120. 185C. I. Obi, “Oil Extraction, Dispossession, Resistance, and Conflict in Nigeria’s…, 231.

Nigeria's oil, and to secure reparations from the Nigerian state for pollution caused by the oil industry.” MEND’s objective, “is to totally destroy the capacity of the Nigerian government to export oil.”186As regards the aspiration for victory, MEND through its spokesperson

Gbomo Jomo, made it clear in 2005 that:

We believe that we will centrally defeat the government on the battlefield, or spark up a popular uprising which would forces the government to accede to our demands, or provoke international intervention on our behalf, or prolong the conflict long enough for the government to judge that it is better to negotiate a settlement...187

MEND has three main hubs: the eastern Delta of Rivers state, central Bayelsa state, and the western Delta hub in Delta state. Each hub had over 30 affiliated camps and several groups. In each location, it claims to have some 2,000 fighters. It operates as a guerrilla band, using local knowledge to navigate easily the intricate creeks area. It has proven itself capable of fighting both in the creeks and in the urban areas of the Delta, such as Port Harcourt. Its members have shown some technical capacity with explosives, with the detonation of several car bombs in Port Harcourt since the group’s emergence. MEND’s violent campaign against the government and the oil multinationals has been based on the tactical use of surprise attacks on strategic oil installations linked to production and exports, secrecy surrounding the identity of its core operators, and a sophisticated media campaign.188 MEND has often changed its tactics making military responses particularly difficult.189With an unprecedented

186Elias Courson, Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta(MEND): Political Marginalization, Repression and Petro-Insurgency in the Niger Delta,Discussion Paper 47(Uppsala: Nordiska Afrika Institutet, 2009), 19. 187Stephanie Hanson, “MEND: The Niger Delta’s Umbrella Militant Group,” Report of Council on Foreign Relations, 2007, 16. 188Ebiri, Kevin, and Willie Etim “Militants Hit Oil Facility, Abduct Six Foreigners,” Guardian Newspapers, July 7, 2009. http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/ 189P. Naagbanton, “The Fall of Godfather Tom Ateke,” The Midweek Telegraph Port Harcourt, June 2006, 13.

67 amount offirepower including heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, MEND has successfully attacked both oil facilities and Nigeriansecurity forces.190

Sensing that the disruption of the oil flow from the Niger Delta to the global market would have a most potent and devastating effect on the federal government, oil companies and the international community, MEND insurgents withdrew from the cities of the Niger

Delta and went into the maze of creeks. MEND, repeatedly and systematically bombed oil pipelines, triggering an international increase in the cost of oil globally.191It has proven effective in reducing oil production by 20–40 per cent, mostly due to kidnappings of expatriate staff from oil operations.192 The group has demonstrated an awareness of the impact of its activities on the oil industry, and their consequences for the Nigerian government and the international community.

MEND has succeeded in gaining international notoriety and attention for their activities by broadcasting their intensions through the use of a spokesman and then following through with their threats.193The attacks on the infrastructure of the oil industry, particularly oil production and oil export had the effect of cutting oil production and pushing up the price of oil in the tight and nervous global market.Armed clashes were often recorded with military personnel who attempted to defend the poorly laid and vulnerable pipelines. Consequently, the Niger Delta became an example of petro-aggression, justifying what Jeff D. Colgan describes as “when oil causes war.”194Arguably, oil created incentives that increased the petro aggression by morphing insurgents groups in the Niger Delta. Indeed, given that the Niger

190M. Boas, “‘Mend Me’: The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta and the Empowerment of Violence,” in Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta: Managing the Complex Politics of Petro-Violence, Cyril Obi and Siri Aas Rustad (eds.), (London: Zed Books, 2011), 116. 191D. A. Amaraegbu, “Violence, Terrorism and Security Threat in Nigeria’s Niger Delta: An Old Problem Taking a New Dimension,” Africa Journal of Political Science and International Relations 15,no. 4(2011): 210. 192E. Marquardt, “Nigerian Militants Influencing Election Campaign Terrorism Focus,” The Jamestown Foundation 4, no. 5 (2007): 4. http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/uploads/tf_004_005.pdf. 193I. Okonta, “Behind the Mask: Explaining the Emergence of the MEND Militia in Nigeria’s Oil-Bearing Niger Delta: Niger Delta Economies of Violence,” Working Papers No. 11 (Berkeley: University of California 2006), 13. 194Jeff D. Colgan, Petro-Aggression: When Oil Causes War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

Delta insurgency was organised around the concentration of crude oil, it appears difficult to disagree with Collier and Hoeffler’s position that insurgencies will occur where it is “viable” for groups to organize.195 Consequently, it is safe to argue that the opportunistic behaviour for organizing the Niger Delta insurgency was determined by many factors, including the socio- political and economic environment of the Niger Delta that shaped the size and nature of the payoff for investing in violence over other potentially “profitable” enterprises.

MEND insurgency was surrounded with three themes: rebellion, revolution and secession, all tied to a resource control cause. Since its inception, MEND has articulated three major demands: the release of Asari from prison, the receipt of 50 percent of revenues from oil drilled in the Niger Delta, and the withdrawal of government troops from the Delta. Its broader aim is “resource control,” with unspecific long-term goals. While MEND’s influence spanned all the states in the Niger Delta, it operations were relatively restricted to Delta,

Rivers and Bayelsa states.MEND differed from previous forms of domestic conflict in the

Niger Delta as the degree of coordination required was larger and the level of destruction carried out on Nigeria’s vast oil infrastructure was greater. With the formation of MEND, the power asymmetry between the government and insurgents appeared narrowed. MEND’s attacks significantly affected Nigeria’s oil exports, costing at least eight hundred thousand barrels per day, or over 25 percent of Nigeria’s oil output. Also, offshore oil facilities that were once regarded as safe havens from insurgent attacks came under the attack of MEND.

MEND’s first operation was on January 11, 2006 where a Shell Petroleum

Development Corporation (SPDC) oil-field located about 20km offshore was attacked and four expatriates, a Briton, a Bulgarian, a Honduran, and a US citizen from a Shell flow station in Bayelsa were kidnapped by MEND insurgents after a fierce gun duel with sections of the

195Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler and D. Rohner, “Beyond Greed and Grievances: Feasibility and Civil War,” Oxford Economic Paper 61,no. 1 (2009): 1-2.

Nigerian military guarding the oil-field.196This marked its official inception.On Sunday

January 15, 2006, MEND insurgents “attacked and destroyed one flow station and two military house-boats belonging to SPDC in Benisede, Bayelsa State.” MEND also claimed responsibility for the capture of four foreign oil workers, launching itself to the international stage.

Figure 3.1: A scene of the capture of a foreign oil worker in the creeks of the Niger Delta

Source:http://www.mendnigerdelta_online_picture_archives.com, Accessed on April 26, 2014

Besides kidnapping, MEND had engaged in most successful coordinated terrorist attacks against the state and multinational companies in the Niger Delta and beyond since

2006. For instance, in early 2006, nine officials for the Italian petrol company Eni SpA were killed when armed members of MEND attacked Eni SpA's security forces in Port Harcourt

Port. MEND militants briefly occupied and robbed a bank near the Eni SpA base, leaving at about 3:30 p.m, about an hour after they showed up.197 On October 2 2006, 10 Nigerian soldiers were killed off the shore of the Niger Delta in their patrol boat by a MEND mortar shell. Earlier that day, a Nigerian/Royal Dutch Shell convoy was attacked in the Port

Harcourt region resulting in some people being wounded. On June 20, 2008, the SPDC

196Ike Okonta, “Behind the Mask: Explaining the Emergence of the MEND Militia in Nigeria’s Oil-Bearing,…; Paul Odili, “MEND: Between Criminality and Kid Gloves,” Vanguard January 29, 2007, 6. 197Ibid., 94.

70 operated Bonga oil platform (the largest offshore oil platform in the Niger Delta) located

120km offshore was attacked by MEND insurgents with about 9 boats armed with RPGs and

GPMGs leaving over 100 people dead, and kidnapped an American, Captain Jack Stone who worked for Tidex, an oil servicing company in the Niger Delta,198 and many more.

The attack underscored thesophistication of MEND insurgents and showed that oil platforms/facilities (onshore or offshore) were within MEND’s reach.MEND’s attack on

Nigeria’s vast oil infrastructure in the Niger Delta was complemented with the regular kidnapof foreign oil workers which replenished its financial base. Hostages were often released after a period of negotiations - via intermediaries - with oil company representatives and the government. Arguably, this provided a significant source of income used in oiling the wheels of the insurgency in the Niger Delta. Another major source of income for the insurgent groups was oil bunkering. Crude oil was frequently looted from pipelines in the

Niger Delta and sold to barges concealed in the mangrove.199This involved a complicated process of tapping an oil pipeline and filling plastic cans with crude oil. The oil was then sold to locals or transported to barges offshore for transport to neighbouring West African and

Gulf of Guinea countries. Illegal bunkering was estimated to amount to up to 10 percent of total daily production, or 200,000 barrels per day, in 2003.200

It bears emphasising that continuous financing is crucial to the survival of an insurgent movement and if an insurgent group is unable to meet the financial requirements, the insurgency is unlikely to continue for an extended period.201In many prolonged insurgencies, insurgents are known to have had access to easily extractable natural resources.

198Akanimo Samson and Shola O’Neil, “Bonga Oil Field Attack: Yar’Adua sends Soldiers after Militants,” The Nation 2, no. 0701 (June 21, 2008): 5. 199Human Rights Watch (HRW), “The Warri Crisis: Fuelling Violence,” 15, no. 18 2003. www.hrw.org/en/reports/2003/12/17/warri-crisis. 200A. Ikelegbe, “Beyond the Threshold of Civil Struggle: Youth Militancy and the Militarization of the Resource Conflicts in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria,” African Study Monographs 27, no. 3 (2006): 100. 201Hanne Fjelde and Desiree Nilsson, “Rebels against Rebels: Explaining Violence between Rebel Groups,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 56, no. 4 (2012): 608.

The extortion of primary commodity resources is especially suited to the operations of insurgent groups, as they are often made up of unskilled labour and given whatever weapons are available. The looting of primary commodity resources appears to be the best way for insurgents to maintain financial viability. Examples of such primary commodity include diamonds in Sierra Leone and Angola, timber in Cambodia, coca in Columbia, poppy in

Afghanistan, etc.202

Crude oil was the primary resource that assisted the Niger Delta insurgents to sustain the insurgency. Indeed, in the Niger Delta, oil was the insurgent’s best friend. Oil in the Niger

Delta served as the “honey pot” for insurgents and other stakeholders in the Niger Delta insurgency.203The advantage that such a resource had was its ability to be easily extracted without much technological investment. Support for this argument is provided by Ross, who using case studies, finds that in many prolonged insurgencies, insurgents have had access to easily extractable natural resources.204Furthermore, such illicit oil businesses provided the opportunity to carry out an insurgency that has been widely blamed upon grievance.

The theoretical and empirical analyses of insurgencies conducted by Collier and

Hoeffler205 as well as Fearon and Laitin206 found that such opportunity factors adequately explained the onset of civil war than grievances. The insurgency at this point appeared to have satisfied Collier and Hoeffler’s argument civil violence may be a function of opportunistic (fortune-seeking) behaviour as opposed to selfless (justice-seeking) behaviour.207The established relationship between the Niger Delta insurgency and continuous

202UbongEssienUmoh, “The JTF and Insurgency in the Niger Delta,” Ph.D Thesis, Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna, 2015, 201. 203Tekena N. Tamuno, Oil Wars in the Niger Delta, 1849-2009(Lagos: Stirling-Horden Publishers, 2011), 7-8. 204M. Ross, “How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen Cases,” International Organisation 58, no. 1(2004): 35-38. 205Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “On Economic Causes of Civil War,” Oxford University Papers 50, no. 4(1998): 564-565; P. Collier and A. Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievances in Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers 56, no. 4(2004): 566-567. 206J. D. Fearon and D. D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 1(2003): 78. 207Paul Collier, “Rebellion as a Quasi-Criminal Activity,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44, no. 6 (2000): 840.

72 extortion on the economy reaffirms the prolific literature on the Rational Actor Theory of collective violence. The Rational Actor (RA) Theory rests upon varied economic theories. It debunks the idea that deprivation and anger were a necessary and sufficient condition for collective violence,208but rather emphasizes both resource mobilization209 and opportunity structures.210

Works by Collier and Hoeffler have been crucial in highlighting economic motivation behind civil conflicts. As argued by Collier and Hoeffler, an insurgent movement can be seen as any other economic entity, people fight when it pays better than their alternative sources of income. The Niger Delta insurgency arguably provided a teeming population of restive youths with a paid job – insurgency. This appeared modelled after a rather violent variant of the resource curse phenomenon - rent-seeking.211Through the insurgency, youths drew security rent from oil companies, state governors and by extension the Nigerian state.

The “loot-seeking” theory of insurgency makes insurgency attractive and viable, further extending the shelf life of any insurgency. Evidence from statistical studies on conflict duration show that conflicts taking place in regions with valuable natural resources such as oil, gems, drug cultivation, tend to last substantially longer.212In many prolonged insurgencies, insurgents have had access to early extractable natural resources. For example, insurgents in the Kachin and Shan States in Myanmar have had access to opium cultivation and gems stone mines and they have been able to engage in insurgencies lasting for

208J. C. Jenkins, “Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements,” Annual Review of Sociology, 9, (1983): 530; M. I. Lichbach, “An Evaluation of“Does Economic Inequality Breed Political Conflict?” Studies,” World Politics 41, no. 4(1989): 459; E. Zimmermann, Political Violence, Crises and Revolutions: Theories and Research (Boston, MA: G. K. Hall, 1983), 36. 209J. D. McCarthy and M. N. Zald, “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory,” American Journal of Sociology 82, no. 6, (1977): 1218. 210P. K. Eisinger, “The Conditions of Protest Behaviour in American Cities,” American Political Science Review 67, no. 1(1973): 23. 211Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “On Economic Causes of Civil War…, 570; Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievances in Civil War…, 570. 212J. Fearon, “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last so Much Longer than Others?” Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 3(2004): 279; P. Lujala, “The Spoils of Nature: Armed Civil Conflict and Rebel Access to Natural Resources,”Journal of Peach Research 47, no. 1(2010): 26.

73 decades.213Consequently, resource looting in the Niger Delta was a significant variable that made the insurgency last longer. It went a long way to enrich existing descriptive literature on the “oil complex,”214the “economics of war thesis,”215 the “resource curse thesis,”216 “new war thesis”among others.

Figure 3.2: Configuration of insurgent groups in the Niger Delta as at 2007

213J. Fearon, “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last so Much Longer than Others…, 286. 214Micheal Watts, “Petro-Insurgency or Criminal Syndicate? Conflict and Violence in the Niger Delta,”Review of African Political Economy34 (2007): 643 215A. Ikelegbe, “Encounters of Insurgent Youth Associations with the State in the Oil Rich Niger Delta Region of Nigeria,” Journal of Third World Studies 22, no.1 (2005): 158. 216Elias Courson, Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta(MEND): Political Marginalization…, 7.

Source: International Crisis Group (ICG) on the Niger Delta, 2008, p. 11. Insurgents have a membership, support and cooperation across the states and communities that make up the Niger Delta. This provides them the opportunity and ease to network. MEND do not have a single command structure, but a diverse and amorphous leadership which makes the movement elusive, but effective in guerrilla warfare. This strategy is aimed at avoiding the fate in earlier movements in the region with a visible leadership such as MOSOP, and NDPVF whose leadership/top hierarchy was easily targeted for elimination, or compromised by the oil companies and the government.217 MEND operates as a guerrilla band, using local knowledge to navigate easily the intricate creeks area. Its violent campaign against the government and the oil multinationals has been based on the tactical use of surprise attacks on strategic oil installations linked to production and exports, secrecy surrounding the identity of its core operators, and a sophisticated media campaign.

The hydra headedness of insurgency in the region is exacerbated by the plethora of deviant insurgent groups. Such groups represent breakaway factions of mainstream insurgent groups organised around a ‘powerful’ individual linked to local power brokers, top people in the political and military establishment, or oil companies.218 They are often organised as warlord based insurgents, community and clan insurgents, private insurgents, cult groups and violent street gangs. Often, they represent a slippage from popular to criminal violence or a complex mix of both, depending on expedient calculation of gain, or the disposition of the

‘warlord,’ ‘commander,’ or ‘general’ at a given point in time.219

217E. Marquardt, The Niger Delta Insurgency and its Threat to Energy Security…, 9. 218N. Duquet, “Swamped with Weapons: The Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Niger Delta,” in Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta: Managing the Complex Politics of Petro-Violence, eds., Cyril Obi and Siri Aas Rustad (London: Zed Books, 2011), 137. 219Ubong Essien Umoh, “The JTF and Insurgency in the Niger Delta…, 173.

MEND increasingly became the symbol of Ikelegbe’s “economics of war thesis.”220

Compared to other insurgent groups that preceded it, MEND appeared to be led by more enlightened and sophisticated men.Lacking a united structure andobvious leadership, MEND appeared more of an idea than an organization, providing the franchise of violence to other insurgent groups affiliated to the struggle in the Niger Delta. Arguably, MEND’s structure was highly proficient at leveraging on the international media and attracting international attention.Media organisations like Sahara Reporters, South African Broadcasting

Corporation, Bloombery News, Al-Jazeera, the Financial Times of London and the New

York Times among others are part of an elite group in MEND’s listserv.

Having such an elite listserv serves several purposes. First, the exclusivity of the listserv made it highly coveted by media organisations, journalists, scholars and researchers.

Its non-inclusivity ensured that those on the list had access to privileged information which became available to the global public after MEND carried out its attack. Second, informing subscribers to the listserv of impending acts increases the awe with which MEND was viewed, particularly when those acts were carried out at a stated time and date.MEND’s structure was also highly flexible and fluid. As argued by TemitopeOniola:

Fluidity is not necessarily quality of MEND, but it is in fact, a fundamental characteristic of the entire insurgency in the Niger Delta. A few insurgent groups have become apprenticeship schemes for manufacturing more insurgent groups. The “parent” insurgent groups include the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF) led by AsariDokubo and Camp 5 established by Tom Polo. Also, members of one group of ten migrate to another with relative ease... Individuals typically move around various groups based on reasons ranging from the fame of the group, leadership and ambition.221

220Augustine Ikelegbe, “The Economy of Conflict in the Oil Rich Niger Delta Region of Nigeria,” Nordic Journal of African Studies14, No. 2, (2005): 220. 221Temitope B. Oniola, Criminal Resistance? The Politics of Kidnapping Oil Workers (United Kingdom: Ashgate Publishing, 2013), 65.

One of the major strengths of MEND is the flow of arms to the insurgents. This has close bearing with the “commercialization of military force” in new wars.222 Arms and ammunition trickled into the Niger Delta through local and international sources. Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) proliferation has dramatically escalated in the Niger Delta since

2003. The availability of these weapons on an unregulated international market has enabled insurgents, criminal groups and political aspirants to further destabilize the fragile region.

These SALWs are brought into the delta from various locations.223

The weapons vary from AK-47s, Czech SAs, Light Machine guns, Czech model 26s, stem MK 2s, Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG), MAT-49s, MG 36s, Berettas, HK G3s, FN-

FALs, home-made guns, pump-action, shot guns and other sophisticated European-made assault rifles and explosives are in the hands of insurgents in the Niger Delta.224 Most of the assault rifles-such as the Russian AK-47, the German G3, the Belgian FN-FAL, the Czech machine guns and the Serbian RPGs are supplied by illegal dealers and sellers. The sources of arms and ammunition in the Niger Delta insurgency were diverse. Some of the illegal gun dealers are Nigerians. The insurgency also benefited from the thriving illegal arms manufacturing industry in Nigeria domiciled in Awka, Onitsha and Aba.225

Insurgents bought arms from well-placed military sources in Nigeria. On February 11,

2008, five army officers, a sergeant, two corporals, six lance corporals and one private were

222In strategic literature, new wars describe international or civil wars of low-intensity conflict that involve myriad transnational connections so that the distinctions between internal and external, aggression and repression, local and global are difficult to sustain. See, Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era (New Delhi: Natraj Publishers, 2001); See also Edward Newman, “The ‘New Wars’ Debate: A Historical Perspective is Needed,” Security Dialogue 35, no. 2,(2004): 179; Heinz Welsch, “Resource Abundance and Internal Armed Conflict: Types of Natural Resources and the Incidence of ‘New Wars,’” Ecological Economics 67, Iss. 3 (2008):510; Jacob Mundy, “Deconstructing Civil Wars: Beyond the New Wars Debate,” Security Dialogue 42, no. 3 (2011): 287; Gilberto Carvalho Oliveira, “‘New Wars’ at Sea: A Critical Transformative Approach to the Political Economy of Somali Piracy,” Security Dialogue 44, no. 1, (2013): 9; Andrew A. Latham and James Christenson, “Historicizing the ‘New Wars:’ The Case of Jihad in the Early Years of Islam,” European Journal of International Relations 20, no. 3(2014): 779. 223B. Wellington, “Weapons of War in the Niger Delta,” (New York: Jamestown Foundation, 2007), 36. 224S. G. Best and Von Kemedi, “Armed Groups and Conflict in Rivers and Plateau States, Nigeria,” in Armed and Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns, and Human Security in the ECOWAS Region, eds.,N. Florquin and E. G. Berman (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2008), 39. 225Ibid.

77 court-martialled for stealing arms and ammunition from army depots in Nigeria and selling them to insurgent groups in the Niger Delta.226In October, 2006, the Rivers State police command arrested Chris Ndudi Njoku, a 45-year-old businessman who specializes in importing prohibited fire arms into Nigeria, and supplied to arms groups in the delta.227 As at

2004, Asari Dokubo, the leader of NDPVF, boasted of having ‘168, 000 fighters with more joining the struggle.’228 He also stated that he owned 67 boats, each armed with two light machine guns and more than 3,000 rifles. While this number cannot be adequately evaluated beyond astute propaganda, it is evident that a large number of people are recruited into the cause.

Most of the illegal smuggling of weapons into the Niger Delta region is done through the sea. This is because Nigeria has very porous borders on both its land and sea edges which make arms trafficking from the neighbouring countries into the country easier. The smugglers use speed boats to connect with ships on the high seas, and then ferry the arms back to shore.

Dokubo-Asari, leader of the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDPVF) confirmed this method to reporters in 2005, “we are very close to international waters, and it’s easy to get weapons from ships”229Over 7,000 military assault rifles, sub-machine guns and rocket propelled grenades were stolen between 2003 and 2007. Local arm merchants with established sophisticated networks of arms procurement in neighbouring countries were also another source of arms for insurgents in the Niger Delta.230

Another key driver behind the proliferation of SALW in the Niger Delta is the trade in stolen oil. In 2003/2004, the practice of illegal oil bunkering boosted the acquisition of arms.

It provided the armed groups with increased financial means and better networks, in turn

226Nigeria Daily News, 2008. 227Human Rights News, “Soldiers, Police Seize High Calibre Riffles in Rivers,” Centre for Environment, Human Rights and Development (CEHRD) 1. no. 1 Eleme, Rivers State: 2006. 228S. G. Best and Von Kemedi, “Armed Groups and Conflict in Rivers and Plateau States, Nigeria…, 42. 229Interview with Asari Dokubo, Leader of NDPVF on 20 September, 2004, The News, September 2004, 25. 230Simon Lewis, Ewa Cholewa and Stephen Davis, “Illegal Arms in the Niger Delta,” Niger Delta Peace and Security Strategy Working Papers, November 2005.

78 enabling them to acquire not only more weapons but also more sophisticated and better- quality weapons.231 Oil bunkering has become the most profitable illegal private business in

Nigeria. Under the Nigerian constitution, all minerals, oil and gas in Nigeria belong to the federal government. Oil extraction outside the frame work of an agreement with the federal government is illegal. Bunkering is the illegal tapping of oil pipelines and wellheads to siphon off crude oil. The oil is then sold to foreign buyers or bartered for small arms.232

There has been a link between arms supply and crude oil theft. This is known in technical parlance as oil-for-weapons swap. The availability of crude oil, which runs in largely unsecured pipelines, provide insurgents in the Niger Delta high value resources to support their activities. This black market trade in crude oil has been identified to be highly lucrative and has enabled the various insurgent groups in the Niger Delta to be remarkably self-sufficient. Increasingly, in the Delta region, illegal oil bunkering by armed groups has provided an important source of funding and small arms to groups. Asari openly admits to funding his group through the sale of stolen oil, claiming that he is just taking back what has been stolen from the Ijaw people.233 Large quantities of stolen oil are loaded into barges, and transported through the Delta waterways to ships and oil tankers waiting on the high seas.234

Oil bunkering finances arms acquisition either directly as part of payment for the stolen oil or indirectly by providing security services for oil bunkering operations.

Other key players in the proliferation of SALW in the Niger Delta are the oil companies operating in the region. Allegedly a number of small arms were transferred to the

Niger Delta after the government decided that oil companies should be allowed to import

231N. Duquet, “Arms Acquisition Patterns and the Dynamics of Armed Conflict: Lessons from the Niger Delta,” International Studies Perspectives 10, no. 2 (2009): 173. 232Human Rights Watch, The Warri Crisis: Fuelling Violence…, 17. 233Florquin, Nicolas and Eric Berman, eds. Armed and Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns, and Human Security…, 338. 234A. Ikelegbe “The Economy of Conflict in the oil rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria,” Nordic Journal of African Studies 14, no. 2 (2005): 222.

79 weapons for the supernumerary police force (SPY) protecting oil infrastructure.235 Financial resources from oil companies have been used by the armed groups to acquire weapons. The practice of oil companies awarding surveillance and security contracts has fuelled violence in the region, not only by providing insurgents with sufficient financial means to purchase weapons, but also by encouraging competition between rival groups for contracts. These contracts have also encouraged other youths from other communities to actually start sabotaging infrastructure in order to receive similar “stay-at-home payments.”236 Paying ransom for kidnapped employees is another way oil companies have facilitated weapons procurements by armed groups. Over the years, members of staff of oil companies and their contractors have increasingly become the target of kidnapping attempts.

The Deployment of the Nigerian Military in the Niger Delta

In Nigeria, one of the core interests of the national defence objectives is to ensure territorial integrity and national security.237 National security provides conditions in which citizens enjoy free, peaceful and safe environment, devoid of crisis Section 14 (2) (b) of the

1999 constitution of Nigeria states that “the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government.”238

Consequently, the constitution empowered the Nigeria Police to maintain law and order in Nigeria. However, since internal crises affect national security, Section 217 (2) (c) of the 1999 Constitution, mandates the Armed Forces “to suppress insurrection and act in aid of Civil Authority to restore order when called upon to do so by the President, but subject to

235Jennifer M. Hazen and Jonas Horner, “Small Arms, Armed Violence, and Insecurity in Nigeria: The Niger Delta in Perspective,”An Occasional Paper of the Small Arms Survey (Switzerland: The Small Arms Survey Geneva, 2007), 39. 236K. Omeje, “Petrobusiness and Security Threats in the Niger Delta of Nigeria,” Current Sociology 54 no. 3 (2006): 454. 237An interview with Lt. Col. D. Y. Danja Joint Task Force Headquarters Opolu, Yenegoa on 22/12/2013. 238Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 CAP. C23 L.F.N.

80 the Act of the National Assembly.”239 In line with this provision, the Federal Government of

Nigeria had on several occasions, called out the military during crises situations. The use of the military to manage the crises in the Niger Delta region was first in 1966 when it quelled

Isaac Boro’s attempted secession.240 Again, during the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970), the

Nigerian military under the Third Marine Commando carried out military operations in the area.241 Since then, the Nigerian military has been called upon intermittently to restore order in the Niger Delta and has increasingly carried out internal security roles in the area.242

Since 1999, sections of the Nigerian military have remained through active deployment in the Niger Delta. However, between 1999 and 2009, the operations of the

Nigerian military underwent significant changes over time. Between 1999 and 2003, the

Nigerian military deployed to the Niger Delta were mostly engaged in stemming the tide of inter-ethnic and inter-gang conflicts. Towards the close of 2003, the Nigerian military were grouped under the Joint Task Force with the mandate to secure oil infrastructures and personnel of oil companies from the ethnic and gang violence that had engulfed a significant part of Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers states. From 2006 onwards, the Nigerian military assumed a more kinetic posture as the activities of MEND went uncontrollable and global. More offensive operations were recorded by the Nigerian military with its attendant unintended consequences.

The Nigerian Military and Defensive Counterinsurgency in the Niger Delta, 2003-2005

Between 2003 and 2005, the Nigerian military in the Niger Delta carried out a rather defensive kind of counterinsurgency. While force was applied, it was not completely kinetic

239Ibid. 240I. T. Sampson “Niger Delta Militancy: Causes, Origins and Dimensions,” African Security ReviewInstitute for Security Studies18 no. 2 (2008): 31. 241C. I. Obi, “Nigeria’s Niger Delta: Understanding the Complex Drivers of Violent Oil-Related Conflict…, 105. 242D. Adeyemo, and L. Olu–Adeyemi, “Amnesty in a Vacuum: The Unending Insurgency in the Niger Delta of Nigeria. In Checkmating the Resurgence of Oil Violence in the Niger Delta of Nigeria, eds., Victor Ojakorotu and Lysias Dodd Gilbert (Germany:Lap Lambert Academic Publishers, 2010),6.

81 in approach. The NDPVF led by Mujahid Asari-Dokubo and NDV led by Ateke Tom were both formed in July 2003 respectively, signaling the geographic expansion of the insurgency.

On September 27, 2004, Asari threatened to launch an “all-out war” in the Niger Delta, sending shock waves through the oil industry–unless the federalgovernment ceded greater control of the region’s vast oil resourcestothe Ijaw people, the majority ethnic nationality in theNiger Delta. The threat, made by Alhaji Dokubo Asari, leader of the Niger Delta People’s

Volunteer Force (NDPVF), followed the deployment offederal government troops to quell months of intense fighting between the NDPVFand a rival armed group, the Niger Delta

Vigilante (NDV), led by Ateke Tom.

Following the attacks by Asari’s NDPVF on Port Harcourt at the end ofAugust 2004,

Rivers Governor Peter Odili requested the intervention of the federal government. On

September 4, 2004, President Obasanjo approved Operation Flush Out 3, a joint operation comprising the Nigerian army, navy, air force and police.243During Operation Flush Out 3 in

September 2004, troops and police were again deployed to Amadi-Ama, Tombia, Okrika,

Buguma, Bukuma, Ogbakiri, and several other areas. With the use of military helicopter gunships, widespread destruction of homes and the death of local people and fighters were recorded.244

Previously in August 2003, the federal government officially drafted a Joint Task

Force (JTF) made up of the three arms of the military under a military campaign code named

“Operation Restore Hope” to curb the restiveness in the Niger Delta. Its mandate among others was to secure oil installations, curb oil community agitation and neutralize any threat to the oil industry. This mandate was restricted to three states in the Niger Delta that were the hot bed of insurgency: Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers states. These three states made up Sectors I,

243Human Rights Watch(HRW), Rivers and Blood: Guns, Oil and Power in Nigeria’s Rivers State, February, 2005. 244Ibid.

II and III in the Federal counterinsurgency effort.245The three services – Army, Navy and Air

Force – of the Nigerian military deployed operated across their traditional environment.

The Nigerian Army were not restricted to land operations but were fully integrated into marine warfare in an amphibious dimension. The Navy and Air Force components of the

Nigerian military deployed to the Niger Delta were also involved in joint patrol cordon and search on land with the Army component. Indeed, the Army and the Navy seemed to have operated in a tapestry at both the tactical and technical levels although their roles were distinguished at the operational and strategic levels. Men of the Nigerian Army were known to operate boats and carry out exclusive naval tasks. It was the Air Force that appeared to operate somewhat independently at the tactical and technical level but not at the operational, strategic and policy levels.246

The Army commitment was one infantry battalion assigned. The Nigerian Army had three ground combat units – armour, artillery and infantry. The Nigerian Army contributed the largest number of forces for the JTF ORH. For land operations, the three sectors were manned by the Brigade HQ of the Nigerian Army stationed in Effurun, Delta state.Upon inception, each sector of JTF ORH had three units made up of about 700 men.247Within Delta state Area of Responsibility (AOR) were the maritime assets of NNS Delta, FOB

ESCRAVOS, FOB IGBOKODA and air asset of 81 AMG of the NAF. Within Bayelsa state

AOR were themaritime asset of FOB FORMOSO and 97 SOG; while Rivers state AOR made use of the maritime and air assets of NNS PATHFINDER and FOB BONNY.248

For the Nigerian Navy (NN), the Eastern Naval Command (ENC) in

Calabarcontrolled 196 nautical miles of coastline, out of which 70 miles was within Rivers

State, and the remaining 126 miles was shared by Bayelsa, Akwa Ibom and Cross River

245UbongEssienUmoh, “The JTF and Insurgency in the Niger Delta…, 213. 246Ibid 268. 247“Joint Task Force set up to Restore Order in the Niger Delta,” The Nation(September 2003): 4. 248Nigerian Navy, Nigerian Navy Order, NNO/04, 2004; Emma Amaize, “Oil Bunkering: Their Dare Devil Plot, Governments Counter Moves,” Vanguard, September 20, 2003.

83 states respectively.249The ENC had two ships, NNS PATHFINDER in Port Harcourt and

NNS VICTORY in Calabar. The ENC maintained naval bases in all the Delta coastal states, except Bayelsa. In Bayelsa, the NN had only one forward operation base (FOB), located in

Egweama.250The Western Naval Command (WNC) area of responsibility (AOR) lay between the border with the Benin Republic and longitude 6o E while the ENC’s AOR lay between longitude 6o E and the borders with Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and

Principe.251 At the tactical level of operations, the Nigerian Navy deployed numerous small patrol craft, such as, Navy SBS commandos and Defender Rapid Response Boats (RRBs), capable of operating in the shallows of the Delta waterways and creeks. The Air Force commitment had developed to five operational Mi-35 attack helicopters stationed at Port

Harcourt and the four lift helicopters stationed at Benin City in Edo State.252

Figure 3.3: Navy SBS Commando Boat

Source: http://www.JTF ORHnigerdeltaphoto_gallery_picture_archives.com. Accessed on April 26, 2014

The Nigerian Military and Offensive Counterinsurgency in the Niger Delta, 2006-2009

249“Navy Reiterate Readiness to Ensure Waterways Safety,” The Tide OnlineJuly 22, 2007; “RSG to Assist Navy Fight Criminality in N’Delta,”The Tide Online July 22, 2007. 250“Sylva Urges Navy to Increase Presence in Bayelsa,” The Tide OnlineAugust 27, 2007. 251Nigerian Navy, Nigerian Navy Order, NNO/04, 2004. 252John Ogbedu and Bolaji Ogundele, “Nigerian Military No Match for Militants,” The Nigerian Village Square, March 19, 2007; British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), “Fight for Nigeria Oil to Continue,” June 15, 2007.

By 2006, the posture of the Nigerian military in the Niger Delta took a kinetic dimension. This was in response to the lethal dimension MEND insurgency assumed in the

Niger Delta. As argued by Inuawa, the Nigerian military under the umbrella of the JTF was initially tasked to secure oil installations and facilities, but combating armed militants was added to its mandate in 2006 as the situation worsened and more aggressive insurgent groups like MEND emerged.253On February 15, 2006, military helicopter gunships were deployed to

Okerenkoko in Delta State (stronghold of MEND insurgents) carried out aerial bombardment extending into Perezuoweikorigbene, Ukpogbene and Seitorububor, in Gbaramatu clan, Delta state.254 MEND responded swiftly by attacking the Forcados oil export terminal and wreakinghavoc on the facility, taking nine expatriate hostages in what appeared to be a retaliation for the attack on Gbaramantu.

Figure 3.4: Mi 35 Helicopter Gunship

Source: http://www.jtf_orhnigerdeltaphoto_gallery_picture_archives.com. Accessed on April 26, 2014 In April 20, 2006, MEND extended its attack into the cities in the Niger Delta by detonatingtwo bombs: one in Port Harcourt (Bori camp military barrack), and the other at a

253MuhammatNuraInuwa, “Oil Politics and National Security in Nigeria, MA Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2010, 165. 254International Crisis Group (ICG), “Fuelling the Niger Delta Crisis,” Africa Report, no. 123 (March 28, 2006): 11.

85 petrol tanker garage in the city of Warri. The JTF ORH commander, Brigadier General Elias

Zamani asked for an authorisation from the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), General Alexander

Ogomudia, to enable the JTF ORH deploy an helicopter gunship to intercept and destroy the barges. The request was granted and the JTF ORH struck with relative lethal precision dislodging the insurgents, destroying some barges and seizing the rest. About 20 people were killed and several others injured in the attack. On February 17, the attack was extended to

Ukpoghene, Seigbene and Seitorunbubor, all in Sector I. These communities were suspected to be hideouts for insurgents and camouflaged locations where local refineries belonging to insurgents were located. The attack which was carried out with three gunboats succeeded in dislodging the insurgents but resulted in heavy collateral damage.255

In 2007, the involvement of the military in the Niger Delta insurgency received an exponential boost. President Umaru Musa Yar’Adua presented the 2008 budget to the

National Assembly in December 2007 where the government allocated the sum ofsixty-nine billion naira to the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) for the development of the Niger Delta region, while the sum of four hundred and forty-fourbillion naira was allocated to security in the Niger Delta. Consequently, the securitization of the Niger Delta in the form of increaseddeployment of military force became more apparent. The initial wave of military operations in August 2007 largely forced cult gangsunderground or out of Port

Harcourt, while later JTF operations occurred within several neighboring riverine communities. These operations included a high-profilebut ultimately fruitless January 2008 raid on Ateke Tom.’s hometown of Okrika, ariverine community immediately south of Port

Harcourt. Such operations sometimes resulted in numerous human rightsabuses, including looting, arbitrary arrest, and extrajudicial killings.

255International Crisis Group(ICG), “Fuelling the Niger Delta Crisis…, 11.

On 13 September, 2008, the JTF ORH launched a raid on the villages of Soku, Kula and Tombia in Sector III, Rivers state, in search of Farah Dogo, a MEND insurgent commander. The JTF ORH battle order included 2 gunboats, each mounted with 2 Brownie

Machine Guns (BMG) and an Automatic Grenade Launcher (AGL).256 Four Navy

Commando boat, each mounted with a General Purpose Machine Gun (GPMG) cruised alongside the gunboats. A platoon of 30 JTF ORH personnel added up to the battle order force structure.257The battle order of the insurgent was not well established given the fact that they were foliaged under the civilian local population. However, it appears that they possessed some Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) as well as Heavy and Light Machine

Guns. At the end of the four hours operation, about 10 Killed-in-action (KIA) and 8

Wounded-in-action (WIA) were recorded.258

In the military assault on Gbaramatu in Delta State, which domiciled Camp 5, the

Nigerian military deployed four jet fighters, twenty-four gun boatsand three battalions of the

Nigerian army into the area. Themilitary attack was extended to several communities in the area such as Kurutie, Benikurukuru, Kunukunuma, Okerenkoko, Goba, and Abiteye

(Kiangbene) in Delta state. The military air,land and sea attack on communities left several persons dead and several others missing.259Consequently, the insurgents declared “Hurricane

Piper Alpha” which was laterupgraded to “Hurricane Moses” which targeted oil facilities in the territory and beyondby blowing up pipelines, flow-stations and oil facilities with the intent of crumbling theoil economy. These attacks reduced the oil output from 2.6 million bpd to 1.8 millionbpd within a month of renewed insurgent attacks on oil facilities.260

256International Crisis Group (ICG), “The Swamps of Insurgency: Nigeria’s Delta Unrest,” Africa Report, no. 115 (August 3, 2006): 7. 257Ibid., 9. 258See, Chris Ajero, “The Men Behind the Trigger in Niger Delta,” Newswatch 48, no. 10 (September 2008) 14. 259The casualty rate/figure in the Niger Delta insurgency appears to be inaccurately reported partly because they happen too often. 260Adekunbi Ero, “Niger Delta: A Return to the Trenches,” Tell,no. 22, (June 1, 2009): 4. See also Tunke-Aye Bisina, Emma Gbemudu and Harris-Okon Emmanuel, “War in Niger Delta – Military Extends Offensive to Rivers State,” Daily Independent Newspapers, May 25, 2009, 13.

Around the same time that the Federal government increased military pressure on communities in the Niger Delta, targeting insurgent camps, the Amnesty Option was also put in place. The amnesty policy in June 2009 was a non-violent measure to complement the military measure in the aim of addressing the crisis in the Niger Delta. The policy aimed solely at disarming, rehabilitating and reintegrating the insurgents into the Nigerian state.

With the seemingcompliance of the insurgents to the offer, the amnesty appeared to have brought about a lull in insurgency in the Niger Delta.

Conclusion

By 1999, there was a frightening proliferation of armed gangs and insurgent groups in the Niger Delta. Illegal oil bunkering, pipeline vandalism, disruption of oil production activities, riots, and demonstrations intensified and in 2003, insurgents began kidnapping oil workers at a frenetic pace. In late 2005, a broad spectruminsurgent movement was formed - the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). It operated as an amorphous, multifaceted amalgam of insurgent groups with an unprecedented clinical precision in execution of intents. After the formation of MEND insurgency in the Niger Delta developed in lethality and technical and tactical sophistication with insurgents possessing remote detonation and night vision equipment, as well as anti-aircraft missiles. In the course of the insurgency in the Niger Delta, most insurgent groups accumulated private wealth under the disguise of objectives that were more noble and acceptable – such as “resource control.”

It appeared that upon the deployment of the military in the Niger Delta, the armed capability and capacity of insurgents were trivialized and exaggerated.The Nigerian military appeared to be faced with an expansive role in the Niger Delta. As the shelf life of the insurgency extended, the mandate of the Nigerian military changed over time. From an intervention kind of deployment to stem the tide of ethnic and gang warfare in the Niger

Delta, the Nigerian military were thereafter faced with the responsibility of securing vulnerable oil infrastructure that crisscrossed the difficult terrain of the Niger Delta.

However, with the formation of MEND in late 2005, the Nigerian military assumed a more kinetic position (an overwhelming use of force); carrying out more of offensive warfare to flush insurgents out from their hideouts in the creeks and swamps.

CHAPTER FOUR

NIGERIAN MILITARY COUNTERINSURGENCY IN CONSTRAINTS IN THE

NIGER DELTA

Introduction

The Nigerian Military (Army, Navy and AirForce) under a designated Joint Task

Force (JTF) were tasked with the responsibility of countering insurgency in the Niger Delta states of Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers. The Joint Task Force (JTF) “Operation Restore Hope” –

JTF-RHwas set up in August 18, 2003 in response to the near state of anarchy and hopelessness that characterised the activities of insurgents in Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers states.

Consequently, the counterinsurgency campaign of the JTF was carried out in three sectors –

Sector I (Delta State), Sector II (Bayelsa State), and Sector III (Rivers State).These three states appeared to have witnessed the highest frequency of violent ethno-political clashes and bunkering activities on the eve of the formation of the JTF.On the other hand, insurgents operating within and across Delta, Bayelsa, and Rivers states from camps camouflaged by maze of creeks were able to use their local knowledge of the terrain, riverine access to weapons, finances through oil bunkering, and connection to top political and military officials to establish a formidable resistance.

The counter-insurgency (COIN) task and operation of the JTF demanded sustained military operations in a difficult and challenging terrain made up predominantly of creeks, swamps and contiguous local communities. The JTF were demanded to operate within the professional requirements of Rules of Engagement (ROE), Standing Orders (SOs), and economy in the use of force. The nature and composition of their training and orientation was to reflect this professional demand. The Nigerian military carried out COIN operations in the

Niger Delta between 1999 and 2009 albeit with significant constraints. These constraints

90 defined the duration of the COIN campaign. Given the ten year duration that the COIN operation lasted, the success recorded by the Nigerian military in the Niger Delta was gradual.

Interagency Constraints The Nigerian military (predominantly the Nigerian Army) were first deployed into the

Niger Delta in 1999 to manage ethnic violence between the Ijaw and Itshekiri in Delta state.

In 2003, when the radius of the conflict widened into Bayelsa and Rivers state and the participants in the conflict involved criminals, the services of other arms of the Nigerian military as well as other security agencies were incorporated. This was necessary given that the Nigerian military COIN in the Niger Delta involved a broad spectrum of roles comprising military, intelligence, diplomatic, law enforcement, information, finance, and economic elements (MIDLIFE).261Consequently, the Army, Navy and Air Force had to work together with the assistance of the Nigeria Police. The interface between the security agencies and the

Nigerian militarywas aimed at mutual understanding to ensure effective conduct of COIN operations in the Niger Delta. However, almost throughout the duration of the COIN operation in the Niger Delta, the three service arms of the Nigerian military and other security agencies did not completely work as one. There was an obvious manifestation of poor interagency cooperation.262

It should be stressed that prior to the Nigerian Civil War in 1967, the Army, Navy and

Air Force did not engage in joint military exercises, for policy reasons. The 1979 Nigerian

Constitution created the office of the Chief of Defence Staff to co-ordinate and direct the activities of the three services – Army, Navy and Air Force.263 However, this did not

261George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.: White House, March 2006). 262Cross section interview with Lance Corporal A. Jimiye, Lance Corporal T. Asiyekini and Lance Corporal U. Benton at Clough Creek, Egbemagalabri, Sector II, Bayelsa State, 15/06/2013. 263R. M. Kupolati, “Strategic Doctrines: Joint Operations,” in Nigerian Defence Policy: Issues and Problems,A. E. Ekoko and M. A. Vogt (eds.), Lagos: Malthouse Press Ltd., 1990, 325.

91 strengthen the bond between the three service arms in terms of joint operations.Indeed, given the necessity of a joint operation, there appears to be no constitutional or strategic guidance for inter-agency cooperation in such COIN operations. The absence of such a strategy constrained effective coordination and integration amongst security agencies involved in

COIN operations.

The joint operation needed to carry out COIN operations in the Niger Delta was marred by suspicion and absence of clear division of duties.264First, among the three service arm of the Nigerian military – Army, Navy and Air Force – the Army appeared to have dominated the operation given that they were the first to be deployed to the Niger Delta to manage the violence in 1999. When the conflict made its way into the rivers and creeks, the

Navy considered it their constitutional responsibility to manage the problem. The need to carry out operational or tactical attack would demand the consent of the Chief of Army Staff,

Chief of Naval Staff and Chief of Air Staff, sanctioned by the Chief of Defence Staff.265 This delayed the swift operational action required for effective COIN operations.

In the almost lack of National Security Policy, non-availability of National

Counterinsurgency Strategy and absence of Joint Doctrine, there appeared to be no strategic guidance for the Nigerian military to carry out effective COIN operations. The Nigerian military lacked a functional joint COIN doctrine to specifically guide operational and tactical level commanders in the conduct of COIN operations in Niger Delta. The lack of strategic direction to ensure cooperation between the agencies created constraint in command and control.266For instance, in 2006, the Nigerian Army Marine was formed and the Gun Boat

Company was established.267 This was an attempt for the Nigerian Army to have its own

264Interview with Navy Captain N. Maduka, FOB, NNS FORMOSO, Brass Island, 17/11/2013. 265Interview with Navy Captain N. F. Damtong, Nigerian Defence Academy, Kaduna, 10/06/2014. 266Interview with an anonymous senior officer at JTF Pulo Shield Headquarters, Yenogoa, Bayelsa State on 20/07/2013. 267Interview with an anonymous JTF ORH Gunboat Captain at Clough Creek, Bayelsa State, on 15/06/2013; Interview with an anonymous Senior Officer at JTF ORH Headquarters, Yenogoa, Bayelsa State on 20/07/2013.

92 naval component independent of the assistance provided by the Nigerian Navy. The Army also blamed the Air Force for not providing immediate air support as at when needed. The

Camp 5 operations is a good example where the Air Force came in about 40 minutes late to provide tactical air support to the Nigerian Army.268The inter-agency rivalry and mutual suspicion hindered the effectiveness of the Nigerian military and consequently appeared to have undermined its COIN operations.

Dealing with Multiple Insurgent Groups While the Nigerian military operated as a single force, especially under the Joint Task

Force, the insurgents were hydra headed. Insurgency in the Niger Delta was not conducted by a single group with a centralized, military-style command structure, but involved a complex matrix of different actors with various aims, loosely connected in dynamic and non- hierarchical networks. Each insurgent group had charismatic leadership, supporters, recruits, supplies, safe havens and funding (often from illicit activities).269Even with the formation of

MEND in December 2005, the insurgent groups hardly came together under a single command. MEND served more or less as a tributary of a more general stream of agitation, a clearing house for the Niger Delta insurgency and a culminating threshold in the mushrooming and maturation of social movements in the Niger Delta.

MEND consolidated a dense relationship among very widely dispersed local population across the Niger Delta emphasizing less on structures and actors, but more on dynamic relationship. MEND acted as a coordinated group of several insurgent leaders and a loose coalition of armed insurgent groups that operated in the Niger Delta.Each insurgent group that existed within MEND had its own leaders. Individual insurgent groups regularly carried out their own operations under the MEND banner, while still operating independently

268Interview with JTF ORH Lance Corporal at Jones Creek, Delta State, who requested for anonymity, 11/08/2012. 269Tekana N. Tamuno, Oil Wars in the Niger Delta 1849-2009 (Ibadan: Stirling-Horden Publishers Ltd., 2011), 78.

93 of one another.270Based upon field evidence, insurgent groups in the Niger Delta possessed loose structure and secrecy, amorphous leadership, ICT savvy, national and global elite connections, diaspora oil and arms network, and a sympathetic local population sold out to the “resource control” and “emancipation” toga. This combination produced an insurgency machine that was unprecedented in the history of insurgent groups in the Niger Delta of

Nigeria. Consequently, the Nigerian military were faced with a complex and difficult situation. Furthermore, the insurgent groups were not only multiple but “invisible.” The almost “invisible” nature of MEND was an importantfactor making it difficult for the

Nigerian militaryto target the organization and effectively neutralize its activities. As acknowledged by a Nigerian military spokesperson: “the Nigerian military is fighting with groups that are almost anonymous...”271

Figure 4.1:List of Some Insurgent Groups and Locations in the Niger Delta as at 2009

S/N Name of Camp Location Status of Camp Leader(s)

1 Olugbobiri Southern Ijaw (SILGA), Major Joshua McKiver Bayelsa State 2 Korokorosei SILGA, Bayelsa State Major Africa Owei 3 Okiegbene/Ebrigbene SILGA, Bayelsa State Major Gibson Kala (“Prince Igodo”) 4 Robert Creek Nembe, Bayelsa State Major Government Ekpemupolo (“Tompolo”) and Henry Okah 5 Cowthorne Channel Nembe, Bayelsa State Major Government Ekpemupolo (“Tompolo”) andHenry Okah 6 Camp 5 Warri South, Delta State Major Government Ekpemupolo (“Tompolo”) and Henry Okah 7 Okerenkoko Warri, Delta State Major Government

270Ike Okonta, “Behind the Mask: Explaining the Emergence of the MEND Militia in Nigeria’s Oil-Bearing Niger Delta,” Niger Delta Economies of Violence Working Papers No. 11 Berkeley: University of California, 2006. 271Interview with an anonymous JTF ORH Gunboat Captain at Bomadi, Delta State, on 11/06/2013; Interview with an anonymous JTF ORH Gunboat Captain at Clough Creek, Bayelsa State, on 15/06/2013.

Ekpemupolo (“Tompolo”) andHenry Okah 8 Opuraza Warri, Delta State Major Government Ekpemupolo (“Tompolo”) and Henry Okah 9 Azuzuama SILGA, Bayelsa State Major Jackson 10 Gbekenegbene SILGA, Bayelsa State Minor Not Available 11 Ezetu SILGA, Bayelsa State Minor Victor Ben Ebikabowei (“Boyloaf”) 12 Agge SILGA, Bayelsa State Minor Victor Ben Ebikabowei (“Boyloaf”) 13 Kurutiye, Forupa & SILGA, Bayelsa State Minor Not Available Okubie 14 Ken Camp Odi, Bayelsa State Minor Ken 15 Egbema Camp Warri, Delta State Minor Kem Agbakara 16 Ubefan Warri, Delta State Minor John Togo 17 Beger Camp Warri, Delta State Minor Inilo Sinite 18 Niger Delta People Akuku-Tori, Rivers State Major Alhaji Asari Volunteer Force Dokubo (NDPVF) 19 Niger Delta Volunteer Okrika, Rivers State Minor Tom Ateke Movement (NDVM) 20 Borokiri Borokiri, Port Harcourt, Minor Soboma George (Icelanders/Outlaw Okrika, Rivers State Cult) 21 Yeghe Bori, Ogoni, Rivers State Minor Solomon Ndigbara (“Osama Bin Laden”) Source: Funsho Arogundade, “War Against the People”, The Week Magazine, June 1, 2009.272

The concentration of insurgent groups judged by the location and spread of their sanctuaries appear to have revolved around Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers states. The geography and terrain of Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers states made it possible to accommodate shadowy and clandestine operations thereby enhancing their survival.273Consequently, defeating one insurgent group did not translate into winning the insurgency, and bringing down one camp

272F. Arogundale “War against the People,” The Week Magazine, June 1 2009 in C. Osakwe and U. E. Umoh Militancy, Amnesty and Sustainable Peace in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria,” Sokoto Journal of History (SJH) 1, (2012), 118-120. 273Ubong Essien Umoh, “The Joint Task Force and Combating Insurgency in the Niger Delta of Nigeria, c. 1999-2009” Ph.D Thesis, Nigerian Defence Academy Kaduna, 2015,176.

95 did not affect the operations of another camp. The various camps served as sanctuaries for the insurgents that contributed to their operational success.

A study of the table shows that Bayelsa state has the greatest number of sanctuaries- eleven in number. This is followed by Delta and Rivers state. It could be deducted from this table that there is no wholesomeness of insurgents across the Niger Delta states. It represents one of the most difficult terrains in the Niger Delta in terms of military geography.274 One distinguishing factor between major and minor camps was that the former were cited far away from communities while the later were cited close to residential communities.

Moreover, typologies of insurgents in the Niger Delta are multidimensional. The table reveals the incoherence evident in insurgents’ formation and operations. MEND has never been a coherent group, but rather an umbrella group that contained a constantly shifting line-up of insurgents.275

Insurgent camps were predominantly in the creeks away from the security reach of the

Nigerian state and the JTF ORH.276Camps differed in their organisations as well as operation.

Each camp ran its activities as an autonomous group under its own command-and-control structure.The top ranks in the camp comprised unemployed graduates while the lower ranks were populated with drop-outs from all ranges of the educational and social ladder.277Camps also ranged from minor ones to major ones. Minor camps lacked aesthetics and lavish economy but possessed the remnants of basic comfort. As admitted by one of the insurgents:

The camp in the creeks was made with wood, segmented into small room apartments with about 13 militants per room. We sleep on 6x6 mattresses, and there were television sets well connected to cable – DSTV- and fans in the rooms. We had enough of assorted foods and we ate and drank as we liked.

274C. Osakwe and U. E. Umoh “Militancy, Amnesty and Sustainable Peace in the Niger Delta…, 121. 275Morten,BØås, “‘Mend Me’: The Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta and the Empowerment of Violence,” in Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta: Managing the Complex Politics of Petro-Violence, Obi, Cyril and Rustad, Siri Aas (eds.),London: Zed Books, 2011, 118. 276Temitope Oriola, “Delta Creeks, Women’s Engagement and Nigeria’s Oil Insurgency,” British Journal of Criminology 52, February (2012): 538. 277Tekena N. Tamuno, Oil Wars in the Niger Delta…, 195.

Normally, we operated two weeks in and two weeks out and paid ₦20,000 monthly, and in some cases small tip or allowance would be added depending on operations.278

Some camps were poorly furnished with thatch houses which their commanders insisted on calling a camp. Others were lavishly furnished ones with advanced built-up structures and relatively modern architecture.279A peculiar example of a built-up camp was

Tom Polo’s “Aso Rock Barracks” camp in Okerenkoko. The camp took over the existing structures of Bilfinger and Berger Oil and Gas Company (B+B), a subsidiary of Julius Berger

Nigeria Limited which had a construction job in the area for Shell. B+B was forced to abandon the area and flee the structure at the height of the Warri crisis in 1997. Other camps such as Camp 5, John Togo Camp, Israel Camp, Mammy Water Camp and Iroko Camp were also well fortified and lavishly furnished.280 Most camps were well concealed with well- defined escape routes. For instance, Camp 5 had a link with Iroko Camp which served as its exist.

Operationally, while Camp 5 was distinguished as an administrative centre and logistic dump, Iroko Camp had the bulk of training facilities.281Indeed Camp 5 seemed to have been the most sophisticated and fortified camp. Located in the heart of the Gbaramatu

Kingdom in Sector I, it was a sizeable location which could be likened to a city in the swamp.

It had a well-planned outline, with its own crude oil depot, an ammunitions depot, sea component of weaponry including some gunboats which had been demobilized by the JTF

ORH and several defensive mini-bunkers from where armed insurgents could take on enemy forces who might attack the camp. There was also several escape routes and structures where hostages were kept.282

278Paul, an insurgent with pseudo name, interviewed by Sam Oyadongha of Vanguard, see, Sunday Vanguard, October 11, 2009, 24. 279Ubong Essien Umoh, “The Joint Task Force and Combating Insurgency…, 209-210. 280Anayochukwu Agbo, “Niger Delta: Why the War May Never End,” Tell, No. 25, June 22, 2009, 25. 281Ubong Essien Umoh, “The Joint Task Force and Combating Insurgency…, 210. 282Ibid.

Figure 4.2: One of the Training Camps of Niger Delta Insurgents

Source: http://www.mendnigerdelta_online_picture_archives.com. Accessed on April 26, 2014

The Physical Environment

In military history, the physical environment variable is often the most noticeable aspect of an operational environment. The Niger Delta is the world’s third largest wetland and is composed of dense mangrove swamps and waterways, making it an ideal location for insurgent operations. The Niger Delta terrain affected the Nigerian military’s deployment of personnel, equipment, speed and swiftness. The Nigerian military had to operate in an urban and rural terrain simultaneously.The Niger Delta terrain was not only complex, but compartmentalized. Most insurgents appeared to have advantage in terms of terrain compared to the Nigerian military given that they are usually native to the climate of the Niger Delta.

For the Nigerian military, road networks in the Niger Delta challenged smooth logistic operations.

The seas, rivers and creeks served as the dominant road networks for the Nigerian military in terms of logistic movements and military operations. However, the Nigerian military had dwarfed knowledge of the complex nature of the creeks and rivers in the Niger

Delta. The insurgents on the other hand, knew the creeks and rivers very well and made good use of that knowledge. The various oil facilities and pipelines saturate the area and are easy targets for insurgents who are able to navigate the dense web of waterways in speedboats, lay siege to a facility, capture international oil workers and then disappear back into the swamps and mangroves.

The Niger Delta is a half swamp and half land with a maze of creeks and mangroves.

It is made up of about 40,000 square metres of swamps, creeks and mangrove forest. These geographical particulars made insurgency in the Niger Delta a protracted one. The creeks were both a safe haven and a fortress for the insurgents.283 The Niger Delta represented an inhospitable terrain for a conventional force like the Nigerian military. The complex coastal terrain of the Niger Delta significantly favoured the insurgency as it provided cover from detection and impeded conventional military warfare. A significant part of the Niger Delta terrain (especially in Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers states) appeared extremely inaccessible and this allowed various insurgent groups set up an independent ad hoc government without facing instant dislocation from the Nigerian military.

The Nigerian military carried out COIN in three basic operational environments – land, creeks, and mangrove forests – across three Sectors. In all these three operational environments, the creek was the main fortress, citadel of refuge and home territory of the insurgents. At the same time, it constituted an uncharted dangerous operational environment for the Nigeria military.284Creek warfare possessed the peculiar challenges of terrain adaptability for the Nigerian military. Sectors I (Delta state), II (Bayelsa state) and III (Rivers state) had well over 300 creeks split into major and minor. The creek imposed some manoeuvre challenges for Nigerian military gunboats.

The weight and size of the Nigerian military gunboat made it less an operational boat in a battlefield that was buried within the creeks and mangrove.(see Figure 4.3). The gunboat could not manoeuvre in small creeks such as Ramous, Gbekobo, Ayamakiri, Sangana creeks(see Figure 4.4).It could only be effective in open seas like Forcados and Escravos and large rivers like Bonny River and River Nun, as well as larger creeks like Jones and Clough creeks. The Nigerian military gunboats could not also function effectively during low tides.

283Ubong Essien Umoh, “The Joint Task Force and Combating Insurgency…, 313. 284Temitope Oriola, “The Delta Creeks, Women’s Engagement and Nigeria’s Oil Insurgency…, 538.

With their enhanced knowledge of the tide and creeks, the insurgents frequently had tactical advantage over personnel of the Nigerian military where the gunboats could not achieve operational effectiveness.285

Figure 4.3: Nigerian Military Gunboat used in the Niger Delta between 2006 and 2009

Source:http://www.Jtf_orh_nigerdeltaphotos_gallery_online_archives.com. Accessed on April 26, 2014 Figure 4.4: An example of a narrow creek (Ayamakiri) that posed operational constraints on the JTF ORH gunboat

285Ubong Essien Umoh, “The Joint Task Force and Combating Insurgency…, 314.

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Source: Fieldwork photos, June 18, 2013

The creeks and the mangrove forest appeared to have been intertwined as a tapestry.

Most of the creeks passed through the mangrove forest and swamp with its adverse weather condition and the prevalence of mosquito. Consequently most personnel of the Nigerian military fell ill because of adverse weather conditions. Common sicknesses included but were not limited to malaria, pneumonia, cold etc.286The mangrove forest also enhanced visibility challenges. In most cases, visibility was either zero or less than one metre.287Also, the mangrove terrain arguably affected communication and consequently command.

The labyrinth of creeks and rivers in the Niger Delta provided a perfect network of easy movement for the insurgents who could navigate them easily as a major highway of violence. The same could not be said for the Nigerian military deployed there. Indeed, the

Niger Delta peculiar terrain increased tactical sluggishness on the part of the Nigerian military.The terrain made armored campaigns difficult if not completely impossible. The speed and size of the insurgent attacks often caught the Nigerian military protecting the

286Ubong Essien Umoh, “The Joint Task Force and Combating Insurgency…, 316 287Ibid.

101 energy installations by surprise. Consequently, in most cases, the Nigerian Military employed indiscriminate violence as a counterinsurgency strategy.288

The Niger Delta terrain also created a logistic nightmare for the Nigerian military.

The wide extensions of creeks needed constant surveillance which the Nigerian military lacked men and logistic to effect. It is likely that upon inception of their COIN role in the

Niger Delta, the Nigerian military did not envisage the magnitude of what they were to confront - the extensive distances on water within an inhibiting terrain. The terrain problem compounded the logistic problem and remained a basic constraint almost throughout the

COIN operations. Almost every oil infrastructure in the Niger Delta seems to have been in need of a standing force. However, the Niger Delta terrain did not support the deployment of large marching armies but small units. As such, the Nigerian military lacked men to spread evenly across all oil installation cutting across various communities and creeks in Delta,

Rivers and Bayelsa states.

The combination of creeks, oil infrastructures, mangrove swamps, camps, and the contiguity between communities and cities, significantly made the Niger Delta a built up area. This appeared to have added to the complex, challenging and fluid environment that had greatly influenced the conduct of the Nigerian militarypersonnel in Sectors I, II and III in unique ways. The built up nature of a significant part of Sectors I, II, and III greatly affected military operations at the tactical level. The built-up nature of the Niger Delta did not permit the use of heavy machinery and military hardware by the Nigerian military. It also restricted tactical flexibility of armoured vehicles and hampered the use of air power. For the

288Chukwuma Osakwe and Lawrence Okechukwu Udeagbala, “Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law as it Affects Armed Conflicts since 1945: An Appraisal,” International Journal of Development and Conflict4, (2014): 69-70.

102 insurgents, the built-up nature of the conflict environment allowed for quick strike and exit.289

Ambiguous Mandate It is trite to state that the Nigerian military had an ambiguous mandate in the Niger

Delta. This accentuated the bandwidth problem of the Nigerian military. The statutory responsibility for the maintenance of law and order and guarantee of national security rests on the Nigerian Police Force according to the 1999 Nigerian Constitution (FGN, 1999).

However, Section 217((a)-(d) of the same Constitution allows the Federal Government to equip and maintain the armed forces as may be considered adequate and effective for suppressing insurrection and acting in Aid of Civil authority to restore law and order when called upon to do so by the President subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by an act of the National Assembly.290 The roles assigned to the Military in Aid to Civil Power

(MACP) include, raids, proactive and systemic intelligence gathering, mounting of road blocks and check points, conducting of cordon and search operations in liaison with other security agencies.291

The relative experience of the Nigerian military in COIN warfare notwithstanding, the

Nigerian military lacked substantial doctrine in such complex operations carried out in a complex terrain like the Niger Delta. The scope of COIN activities in the Niger Delta appeared to have been ambiguous. It ranged from the protection of critical but vulnerable oil infrastructures running across a vast, difficult and complex geography to the protection of oil workers who worked in oil companies located in the region. Consequently, the Nigerian military were saddled with the task of protecting government facilities, infrastructure, and commercial enterprise vital to Nigeria.It is also important to note that the ambiguous mandate

289Ubong Essien Umoh, “The Joint Task Force and Combating Insurgency…, 328. 290R. M. Kupolati, “Strategic Doctrines: Joint Operations,” in Nigerian Defence Policy: Issues and Problems… 325. 291Claude E. Welch and Aurthur K. Smith, Military Role and Rule: Perspectives on Civil Military Relations (North Scituate, MA: Duxbury Press, 1974), 10.

103 of the Nigerian military in the Niger Delta and vast and complex physical terrain of the Niger

Delta demanded that the Nigerian military govern a vast ungoverned space. The Nigerian military COIN involved governance, and most parts of the Niger Delta, especially the rural areas, remained widely ungoverned. The physically remote, low density hinterlands of the

Niger Delta served as havens for insurgent and criminal organizations challenging the state’s monopoly of the use of force.

In addition to the ambiguous mandate given to the Nigerian military in the Niger

Delta, a high sense of professionalism was required of them. However, it appeared that while the JTF ORH troops were confined to professional requirements as enshrined in their Rules of Engagement (ROE), the insurgents were hardly concerned with such sacred rules. It also appeared that the professional conventional jurisdiction of the Nigerian military was considerably expanded given their novel and complex task of COIN in the Niger Delta.

Consequently, the Nigerian military had to combine the basic aspects of warfighting,policing, peacekeeping and peacebuilding simultaneously.292

To this end, their expert and conventional knowledge had to expand to include skills and knowledge applicable to these policing activities. Arguably, the policing, peacekeeping and peacebuilding role integrated into Nigerian military COIN mandate made a conventional military operation unattainable. In urban areas and cities like Port Harcourt and Warri, mob and crowd control were integral parts of the Nigerian militaryever evolving COIN mandate.

In most cases, mob actions and inter-communal crisis were carried out under the full coverage of the local, national and international media. In such cases, much more sense of professionalism was demanded of the Nigerian military personnel.

292Thomas L. McNaugher, “The Army and Operations Other Than War: Expanding Professional Jurisdiction,” in The Future of the Army Profession,Llyod J. Mathews (ed.), (New York: Mc Graw Hill, 2002), 161. Chukwuma Osakwe and Lawrence Okechukwu Udeagbala, “Human Rights and International Humanitarian…, 70.

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Furthermore, the Nigerian military operating as a COIN force in the Niger Delta were both bound by International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and their domestic ROE.293 Given that the geography of military operations circumscribed civilian population and communities, the need for constraints on the use of force appeared necessary on the part of the Nigerian military in order to reduce and limit civilian casualties. The Nigerian military were expected to abide by the principle of “minimum force” as much as practicable. However, while the

Nigerian military was restricted to the professional economy of ammunition, the insurgents on the other hand employed a lavish use of ammunition.

Arguably, the Nigerian military in the Niger Deltatried within its limits to carry out a combination of community policing and social services. This was a bandwidth from the mission and goal of a conventional military, which is to win wars. The Nigerian military seemed to have operated under the logic of community policing and peacekeeping mentality.

As argued by Major Sagir Musa, spokesperson of the 2 Amphibious Brigade of the Nigerian military, Port Harcourt:

It is very difficult to deal with the militants in this state because we cannot professionally wage a full- scale war against the people we are constitutionally empowered to protect. This is, and has been the dilemma over the Niger Delta crisis.294 Lieutenant Colonel Rabe Abubakar had argued that during most of the insurgent attacks, the Nigerian military failed to respond appropriately because of the belief that the

“attackers are our brothers and sisters.” According to Abubakar:

...the military is not at war with anybody or group in the region coupled with the fact that operations in the region is that of Internal Security (IS), which should be carried out with minimum force in self defence. As such, we

293Ibid. 294Anayochukwu Agbo, “The Descent to Anarchy in the Niger Delta: The Inside Story,” Tell, August 27, 2007, 20.

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have been showing maturity and restraints as professionals and not as a sign of weakness.56 The Director of Army Public Relations, Colonel Ayo Olaniyan, in 2007, had argued that the deployment of the Nigerian Army in the Niger Delta was purely for internal security to stabilize the area. He enthused that “the Nigerian Army did not go to war in the Niger

Delta area but to stabilize the area and restore order.” According to him:

The capacity of the Nigerian Army is known all over the world as Nigerian soldiers have demonstrated their capacity and ability to deal with such crises in parts of the world where they have participated in peace keeping operations. The Nigerian Army is capable of dealing with the Niger Delta militants but the situation in the oil producing area is not a war situation.295 To keep to this ambiguous mandate, ROEs were issued as setoff parameters to inform

Nigerian military personnel of the limits of constraint imposed or of freedom permitted when carrying out assigned COIN task in the Niger Delta. As part of the Nigerian military, they were not permitted to be aggressors. Nigerian military personnel deployed in the Niger Delta were only allowed the use of force in self-defence or where the arrest of an insurgent was resisted.296 However, in the case of self-defence, where perceived resistance was obvious, extra care was taken to reduce collateral damage to the barest. It was expected that warning shots be fired into the air to warn any attempt to stop convoy/escorts. However, where such warning shots did not deter the insurgents, the commander had the responsibility to order the engagement of insurgents.297This appeared to be at variance with conventional military operations, creating a bandwidth problem.

295Anayochukwu Agbo, “The Descent to Anarchy in the Niger Delta…, 21. 296Gray D. Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War (London and New York: United Nations University Press, 2009; Chukwuma Osakwe and Ubong Essien Umoh, “Private Military Contractors, War Crimes and International Humanitarian Law,” Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies 42, no. 1, (2014) 66; Chukwuma Osakwe and Lawrence Okechukwu Udeagbala, “Human Rights and International Humanitarian…, 70. 297Interview with JTF ORH Lance Corporal at Jones Creek, Delta State, who requested for anonymity, 11/08/2012.

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The Nigerian military also had a set of standing orders (SOs) that sought to guide gunboat troops on water ways and creeks. The SOs covered the use of force, handling/care of arms and equipment, code of conduct for escort troops, “dos” and “don’ts.” As part of the

Nigerian military SOs, force was not required to be used at all unless it was absolutely necessary.Also, force was not expected to be used for punitive purpose or as deterrence for future re-occurrence.298 The use of firearms was to be confined to situations where there was an immediate threat to life or if an attack could lead to death or serious injury to any member of the escort and there was no other way of averting the situation.

The use of firearms was also to be guided at all times by the principle of minimum force. Furthermore, in the absence of any other course, a soldier was expected to shoot to protect himself or others whom it was his duty to protect from real and imminent threat to life.299 In all, the use of force was expected to be justified in all circumstances or when the need arose and all commanders were to avoid acts that might compromise security in their

AOR e.g fraternizing with locals. As part of the code of conduct, Nigerian military personnel were not expected to aid or abet illegal bunkering and all other illegalities on water ways and creeks. Such SOs further placed the Nigerian military personnel deployed in the Niger Delta within the limits of civil policing.300

Intelligence Intelligence plays a critical role in COIN operations. COIN operations are highly intelligence-driven.While the Nigerian military had significant strategic and operational intelligence, it appeared that tactical intelligence was critically weak. There was a notable lack of adequate intelligence on the number, composition and dynamics of insurgent groups operating in the Niger Delta. Dealing with a multiple and mutating number of insurgents

298Interview with an anonymous JTF ORH Gunboat Captain at Bomadi, Delta State, on 11/06/2013. 299Interview with JTF ORH Lance Corporal at Jones Creek, Delta State, who requested for anonymity, 11/08/2012. 300Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann, “Re-Conceptualizing Command and Control,” Canadian Military Journal 3, no. 1, (2002): 53.

107 further complicated the intelligence calculus. The number of insurgent camps, locations and force structures as well as the waterways (predominantly creeks) denied competent and reliable intelligence. The kinds of intelligence most needed in the Niger Delta COIN appeared to have been alien to the standard institutional repertoires forconventional military operations which defines the bandwidth of the Nigerian military.

At the strategic and operational level, intelligence had to be shared among the various agencies operating alongside with the Nigerian military in its COIN operations. Even at that level, intelligence was not sufficient to identify and neutralize insurgent infrastructure, which was built upon a political and administrative apparatus. The Nigerian military appeared to have had poor knowledge of the Niger Delta conflict environment or what David Killcullen refers to as the “conflict ecosystem.”301The Niger Delta conflict environment was a complex one made up of many independent but interlinked actors, each seeking to maximize their own survivability and advantage in a chaotic, combative environment.

Hierarchical Issues Military organizations are known for hierarchy and discipline. The Nigerian military maintained this archetype almost throughout the insurgency. This was a built in institutional obstacle that made change in response to the battle realities on ground slow and incremental.

Joint operations involving the Nigerian Army, Nigerian Navy and Nigerian Air Force and other security agencies such as the Nigerian Police Force, Department of State Security,

Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps among others were activated by the Presidential directives to Defence Headquarters and national headquarters of the agencies.302This over- centralization of command constrained the swiftness needed for effective COIN operations.

301David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One(New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 302Moyosore C. Akin-Ojo, “The Military Dimension of the Niger Delta Crisis: Increasing the Effectiveness of Security Forces through Information Operations,” M.A Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, 2010, 15.

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The military commanders at the Headquarterswere exposed to the challenge of flexibility and conduct of operations due to a restrictive rules of engagement and the requirement for presidential approval to conduct many operations.303The chain of command coupled with communication difficulties posed a great challenge for the Nigerian military.

The insurgents on the other hand were not restricted to such hierarchical chain of command.

As such the insurgents had obvious operational advantages over the Nigerian military.

Insurgents did not completely rely on their respective command structure for instruction.

Given that they sometimes had different ends, they gathered their own means sometimes independently. In the course of their operations, MEND insurgents for instance, were known to flatten their structures, outsource support tasks, and as well contract other groups to meet operational goals.The line of command, control and communication of insurgents appeared to have been more direct, simple and fast.304

On the part of the Nigerian military, the Federal government adopted initiatives to better coordinate and control the application of force in the Niger Delta. This required all

COIN operations to be cleared by the federal government and in some situations the Senate and House of Representatives as well.305Such policy encumbrances appeared to have delayed the needed quick response action in COIN operations carried out by the Nigerian military.

For instance, in December 2004, a platoon of Nigerian military personnel came under sniper fire from a small settlement along the creeks in the outskirts of Port Harcourt city. However, the military had to obtain a higher level clearance before responding. It took two days to get the clearance and the delay gave the insurgents time to move from that location.306

303Interview with an anonymous senior officer at JTF Pulo Shield Headquarters, Yenogoa, Bayelsa State on 20/07/2013. 304Interview with Ateke Tom, 49 years, Port Harcourt, Rivers State, 10/03/2014. 305Interview with an anonymous senior officer at JTF Pulo Shield Headquarters, Yenogoa, Bayelsa State on 20/07/2013. 306Interview with an anonymous senior officer at JTF Pulo Shield Headquarters, Yenogoa, Bayelsa State on 20/07/2013.

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Logistics

The Nigerian military appeared to lack necessary and basic logistics to operate in a complex, inhospitable and inhibiting terrain like the Niger Delta. Indeed, the Niger Delta terrain created a logistic nightmare for the Nigerian military. The wide extensions of creeks needed constant surveillance which the Nigerian military lacked men and logistic to effect.

Indeed, logistics was an enormous problem almost throughout the operations. Almost every oil infrastructure in the Niger Delta seems to have been in need of a standing force. However, the terrain did not support the deployment of large marching armies but small units. As such, the Nigerian military lacked men to spread evenly across all oil installation cutting across various communities and creeks in Sectors I, II, and III. Between 2006 and 2009, the gunboats appeared not to have been enough to provide security for the plethora of oil infrastructure across Sectors I, II and III.307A battalion of about 400 or 500 men had about 20 locations to protect, spending several hours on water to get designated location. Moreover, military personnel at various houseboat locations demanded constant supplies. This explains why President Musa Ya’Ardua budgeted over N440 billion for Niger Delta security in

2009.308

Corruption

There appeared to be an uncertain romance between insurgency and criminality in the

Niger Delta during the period of study.309The insurgent activity could not flourish without corruption which was endemic in the conflict environment of the Niger Delta. There is a great

307Interview with Senior JTF ORH personnel who requested for anonymity at Opukrushi oil field along Brass creek, Delta State, 14/08/2013; Interview with JTF ORH personnel who requested for anonymity at Odidi flow station, Delta State, 16/08/2013. 308Rita Abrahamsen and Michael C. Williams, Security Beyond the State: Private Security in International Politics(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 309Ojong Echum Tangban and Ubong Essien Umoh, “A Political Economy of the Niger Delta Insurgency, 1999- 2009,” in Perspectives on Contemporary Nigeria: Essays in Honour of Professor A. Bolaji Akinyemi, CFR, Godwin S. Ichimi (ed.),Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 2014, 42.

110 discord between official documents and oral evidence as it borders on collaboration between the JTF ORH officers and men and the insurgents. Controversy surrounds the aspect of corruption among JTF ORH commanders and troops as it has to do with oil bunkering aiding oil bunkers for their respective percentage cut. Fieldwork oral evidences point to the fact that

JTF ORH personnel (officers and other ranks alike) were implicit in corrupt practices that made oil bunkering thrive.310Although JTF ORH senior personnel seem to suppress the aspect of JTF ORH officials colluding with insurgents and politicians in the lucrative oil black market, a significant representation of the JTF ORH other ranks agreed to various aspects of collusion among the top military brass, politicians and oil magnets in the bunkering economy.311 Indeed, the Nigerian military deployed in the Niger Delta had all the trappings of political and economic fraudulences. As documented by Tamuno:

In hot pursuit against militants,…members of the JTF units occasionally compromised the goals of their official mission, through involvement in clandestine illegal crude oil bunkering. Quite often, they compelled payment of tolls on land and at sea. They also fed fat on communities.312 The Nigerian military personnel, businessmen, and high-level government officials were allegedly involved in the bunkering business. The erstwhile Chief of Defence Staff, Air

Marshall Paul Dike, admitted publicly in 2007 that some of the soldiers attached to the JTF

ORH encouraged illegal bunkering.313 The erstwhile Acting Group Managing Director of the

NNPC in 2007 also accused naval officers working with the Nigerian military in the Niger

Delta of aiding the bunkering of crude oil.314 Furthermore, the Director of Navy Information in 2007, Captain Henry Babalola admitted to the press that “crude oil theft is perpetrated by

310Cross section interview with three JTF ORH soldiers that pleaded for anonymity at Ogbotobo flow station, Delta State, 16/09/12. 311Ibid. 312Tekena N. Tamuno, Oil Wars in the Niger Delta.., 75-76. 313Interview with “Small Boy,” insurgent that claimed to have operated under Young Shall Grow, Sagarah Community, 28 years, Delta State, 18/09/12. 314The Punch, “Naval Officers Involved in Oil Bunkering,” December 15, 2007, 3.

111 powerful and ruthless cartels assisted by notorious ship owners and corrupt government officials that benefit immensely from the illicit trade.”315

Insurgents admitted paying off military personnel at various checkpoints in the waterways so that they could turn a blind eye to their activities.316The number of military officers that were forcefully withdrawn and retired point to the fact that many senior military officers appeared to have benefited from the theft of oil. One of the military commanders,

Brigadier General Elias Zamani, was believed to have been removed from his post in March

2006 on suspicion of involvement in oil bunkering.317 Between 2004 and 2007, Nigerian military personnel were implicated in cases of oil bunkering involving huge vessels such as

Capbreton, MV African Pride, MT Mahdi, MT Tina and MT Glory. In 2006 alone, two senior naval officers faced court martial over the Cargo Vessel, MV African Pride, that was loaded with 11,300 metric tons of crude oil and was allegedly aided to disappear somewhere in

Cyprus.318

Arguably, the Niger Delta seemed to be a lucrative military station for most military officers and corruption appeared to be an established state of affairs among the military officers and troops in the Niger Delta. It appears difficult to disagree with Watts’319 argument that there existed a high level of complex and contradictory “meshing” of state actors, political elites and militia in the Niger Delta, such that alliances and lines of opposition became fluid and contingent on expedient calculations. Political elites and the military brass found it difficult to control and contain their palpable vulnerability towards enhanced “oil corruption” which brought them in deep convergence with insurgent leaders.

315Leadership, “Crude Oil Theft Carried out by Elites”, September 21, 2007, 4-5. 316Interview with Ateke Tom, 49 years, Port Harcourt, Rivers State, 10/03/2014. 317Tom Ashby, “Nigeria Commander Removed in Oil Theft Probe,” Reuters (Lagos), March 8, 2006. 318Emma Amaize and Emma Arubi, “JTF to Track Down Retired Generals Involved in Oil Bunkering – Major Gen. Bello,” The Vanguard, March 30, 2009. 319Michael Watts, “Petro-Insurgency or Criminal Syndicate? Conflict and Violence in the Niger Delta,” Review of African Political Economy 24, (2007): 114.

112

Apart from oil bunkering, most military commanders were implicated in corrupt practices as it bordered on financial extortion and misappropriation. Some military commanders were implicated in charging oil companies a “stipend” for protecting oil company facilities. This included fuel, stores and estimated N40 million per month in cash from MNOCs.320Most military other rank soldiers complained of not receiving their expected allowance due to them. Their allowances were never complete and when paid, were never paid on time. Apart from monetary emoluments, soldiers also complained of being short changed in their monthly rations by their top commanders.

Money meant to buy fuel and change the engine oil in the gunboats were similarly diverted by Nigerian military personnel. Between 2006, when the gunboats were introduced, and 2009 a significant number of the gunboats were in bad conditions due to poor maintenance occasioned by diversion of funds. Money allocated for their servicing were diverted into corrupt pockets. In Sector I for instance, by 2009, only five out of the 57 gunboats were fit for combat operations.321 Despite the amount of money sunk in for the regular and routine training of gunboat operators, most military personnel claimed that they hardly received any form of training.322Given such fraudulent practices, which were fairly constant, most of the gunboats became damaged and fell into a state of disrepair. This consequently affected the number of operational boats for COIN operations. In all, corruption among military personnel appeared to have been a function of bureaucratic behaviour evident in the Nigerian military hierarchy. In all, corruption significantly helped prolong COIN operations in the Niger Delta and as such acted as a constraint.

320Tell, “Niger Delta: Why the War May Never End,” No. 25, June 22, 2009,23. 321Official JTF ORH Document, JTF Pulo Shield Headquarters, Yenogoa, Bayelsa State, 20/07/13. 322Interview with an anonymous JTF ORH Gunboat Captain at Bomadi, Delta State, on 11/06/2013; Interview with an anonymous JTF ORH Gunboat Captain at Clough Creek, Bayelsa State, on 15/06/2013.

113

Chapter Five

Summary and Conclusion

The post-1999 Niger Delta insurgency was different from previous insurgencies in the

Niger Delta, justifying the aphorism that “each war is different from the last.” Resistance movements which were widespread in the Niger Delta before 1999 were transformed into a violent and armed insurgency in the post-1999 period by a tapestry of factors. The insurgency took shape as grievance became a political issue and government authorities failed to resolve those issues. The issues bordered on environmental pollution, neglect, poverty, unemployment, among others. Consequently, the insurgency in the Niger Delta began as “fire in the minds of locals” – a fire that was given the needed coordination by emerging insurgent leaders. Such leaders such as Ateke Tom, Tom Polo, AsariDokubo, among others, interpreted and shaped popular and existing grievances into an insurgent cause. Such leaders appeared to have been specialists in fomenting insurgency (FOIN) - a challenge that the Federal government had to respond to through the use of the Nigerian Military as a counterinsurgency

(COIN) force. Enduring violence directed as an engagement with the Nigerian state became a common feature of expression of those grievances. Consequently, the insurgent leaders depended on mass mobilization and armed action.

Thatpost-1999 insurgency in the Niger Delta presented an atypical conflict environment to the Nigerian military. Lacking forces specially trained and equipped for counterinsurgency, the Nigerian military were deployed into the Niger Delta’s conventional units adapted for counterinsurgency operations. For most personnel and units of the Nigerian military, the transition from conventional organization and tactics to the very different and challenging tasks of counterinsurgency was traumatic. Consequently, the costs of poor organization for counterinsurgency, in terms of battlefield mistakes and the misallocation of resources, were substantial. The Nigerian military featured in the Niger Delta conflict as a

114 conventional force reorganized, reequipped, and retrained on short notice for the peculiar conflict environment evident in the Niger Delta after 1999.

In such an environment which was remarkably different from a conventional battlefield, the Nigerian military faced enormous constraints. They first experience a challenge of instantaneously adjusting to an unconventional battlefield in a complex coastal setting – a bandwidth problem. Second, the faced a large conventional bureaucratic organization that could not carry out the overlapping division of labour functions and small unit combat deployment necessary for COIN operations. The bandwidth and organizational problems were manifested in the restrain imposed on the Nigerian Military in the form of

ROEs and SOs which amounted to the Nigerian Military fighting with one hand tied to the back. The organizational problems was observed in logistic management problems, corruption, hierarchical challenges, among others. These constraints point to the likelihood that the Nigerian military appeared to have been ill-prepared for the kind of complex insurgency it witnessed in the Niger Delta.

Lacking forces specially trained and equipped for coastal counterinsurgency, the

Nigerian military under the period of study carried out COIN operations in the Niger Delta with conventional units adapted to counterinsurgency operations. Indeed, the Nigerian military response to insurgency in the Niger Delta was that of deploying conventional troops on a rather ad hoc basis; drawing its force formation from the tri-service – Army, Navy and

Air Force. Such forces, with a conventional battle orientation, have been required to conform to the complex and ambiguous requirements of counterinsurgent forces that are modified to operate as “special forces.” For most units of the Nigerian military under the period of study, the transition from conventional organisation and tactics to the very different and challenging tasks of counterinsurgency appeared traumatic. This was visible in the costs of poor organization for counterinsurgency, in terms of battlefield mistakes and the misallocation of

115 resources, which were substantial. Such organisational fault-line arguably placed a huge constraint on the operational efficiency of the Nigerian military in the Niger Delta.

Consequently, it was upon such fault-line that every other constraint appeared to have stumbled upon, having grave consequences on the duration and outcome of the Nigerian military counterinsurgency operations in the Niger Delta under the period of study.

In all, the Nigerian military COIN in the Niger Delta exposed the limits of conventional military power in unconventional settings. A military bandwidth and organization problem were the outcome of such limits which acted as brakes to fruitful, successful and quick COIN operations in the Niger Delta. COIN in the Niger Delta was a slow process compared to the traditional and conventional quick, sharp and short military institutional style – an approach known to the Nigerian military. However, the Nigerian military against all odds had to adapt to the tedium of counterinsurgency operations which was characterized by small and incremental progress defined in terms of victory. In all, it appeared that the Nigerian military organisation had not lent itself to that kind of war. The

Nigerian military went blind into the war and later improved upon its sight in the course of the operations.

The Nigerian military doctrine, tactics, equipment and organization that saw its involvement in the Niger Delta under the period of study, were designed primarily for conventional war-type contingencies. This reality made it almost difficult to do anything else.

The Nigerian military force structure, its choice of equipment, its logistics, and indeed its whole style of warfare was overwhelmingly conventional. In the course of the operations, the

Nigerian military had to become a “general purpose” security outfit, blending conventional battle might with civilian policing role.

116

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Latham, Andrew A. and Christenson, James “Historicizing the ‘New Wars’: The Case of Jihad in the Early Years of Islam.” European Journal of International Relations 20, no. 3 (September 2014): 766-786.

Mansson, Katarina. “Use of Force and Civilian Protection: Peace Operations in the Congo.” International Peacekeeping 12, no .4, Winter 2005.

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Obi, Cyril I. “Nigeria’s Niger Delta: Understanding the Complex Drivers of Violent Oil- Related Conflict.” African Development XXXIV, no. II (2009): 103-108.

Obi, Cyril I. “Oil Extraction, Dispossession, Resistance and Conflict in Nigeria’s Oil Rich Niger Delta.” Canadian Journal of Development Studies 30, no. 1-2 (2010): 219-236.

Odoemene, A. “Social Consequences of Environmental Change in the Niger Delta of Nigeria.” Journal of Sustainable Development 4, no. 2, (2011): 123-135.

Okafor, E. E. “Dynamics of Niger Delta Struggles and the State Responses: The State of Terrorism and Terrorism of the State.”Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa 13, no.2 (2011): 88-92.

Oliveira, Gilberto Carvalho. “‘New Wars’ at Sea: A Critical Transformative Approach to the Political Economy of Somali Piracy.” Security Dialogue 44, no. 1 (February 2013): 3-18.

Ollivant, Douglas A. and Chewning, Eric D. “Producing Victory, Rethinking Conventional Forces in COIN Operations.”Military Review (July-August 2006): 50-59.

Omeje, K. Omeje. “Petro-business and Security Threats in the Niger Delta of Nigeria.” Current Sociology54, no. 3 (2006).

Omofonmwan, S. I. and Odia, L. O. “Oil Exploitation and Conflict in the Niger-Delta Region of Nigeria.” Journal of Human Ecology 26, no. 1 (2009): 25-30.

Oriola, Temitope. “Delta Creeks, Women’s Engagement and Nigeria’s Oil Insurgency.” British Journal of Criminology 52, February 2012.

Osakwe, Chukwuma and Umoh,Ubong Essien. “Private Military Contractors, War Crimes and International Humanitarian Law.” Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies 42, no. 1 (2014): 64-79.

Osakwe Chukwuma and Udeagbala, Lawrence Okechukwu. “Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law as it Affects Armed Conflicts since 1945: An Appraisal.” International Journal of Development and Conflict 4, (2014): 67-77.

Osakwe Chukwuma CC and Umoh, U. E. “Militancy, Amnesty and Sustainable Peace in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria.” Sokoto Journal of History (SJH) 1, (2012): 115-134.

Osakwe Chukwuma CC and Umoh Ubong Essien. “War in Peace Support Operations in Post- Colonial Africa, 1960-2009.” Ibom Journal of History and International Studies (IJHIS) 14, no. 1 (2012): 21-38.

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Petraeus, David. “Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq.” Military Review.(January-February 2006).

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Sampson I. T. “Niger Delta Militancy: Causes, Origins and Dimensions.” African Security Review, Institute for Security Studies 18, no. 2 (2008): 29-34.

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Schreer, Benjamin. “Political Constraints:Germany and Counterinsurgency.” Security Challenges 6, no. 1 (Autumn 2010): 97-108.

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Tamuno, Tekena N. “Some Aspects of Nigerian Reaction to the Imposition of British Rule.” Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria III, no. II (1965):271–294.

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Umoh, Ubong Essien and Osakwe, Chukwuma. “Objectivity in History: Okon Uya’s Contribution to the Debate and Art.” Lapai Journal of Central Nigeria History 7, no. 2 (2013): 1-19.

Welsch, Heinz “Resource Abundance and Internal Armed Conflict: Types of Natural Resources and the Incidence of ‘New Wars.’” Ecological Economics 67, Issue 3, (October 2008): 503-513.

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Watts, Micheal. “Petro-Insurgency or Criminal Syndicate? Conflict and Violence in the Niger Delta.” Review of African Political Economy 34 (2007): 643.

West, Bing “American Military Performance in Iraq” Military Review (September-October 2006): 2-7.

Articles A Harvest of Guns, Niger Delta Project for Environment Human Rights and Development, August 2004.

Aprezi, A. F. K. “Threats to Internal Security in the Niger Delta: Challenges for the Nigerian Armed Forces.” National War College Nigeria, Research Paper June 2000. Asuni, Judith Burdin. “Blood Oil in the Niger Delta.” Special Report of the United States Institute of Peace, 2009.

Bradley,Gordon H. “Framework for Countering Improvised Explosive Devices.” Naval Postgraduate School, Lecture Notes Part 4 OS3640, 20–21.

Courson, Elias. “The Burden of Oil: Social Deprivation and Political Militancy in Gbaramatu Clan, Warri South West LGA, Delta State, Nigeria.” Working Paper no.15. Economies of Violence Project, Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley and United States Institute of Peace. 2007.

Dhada, Mustafah. Warriors at Work: How Guinea Was Really Set Free, 1993.

Gray, Colin S. “Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt?” Strategic Studies Institute (March 2006). Hanson, Stephanie. “MEND: The Niger Delta’s Umbrella Militant Group.” Report of Council on Foreign Relations, 2007.

Human Rights Watch. “Nigeria: Polls Marred by Violence, Fraud,” April 17, 2007.

Human Rights Watch. “Rivers and Blood: Guns, Oil and Power in Nigeria’s Rivers State,” February, 2005.

Human Rights Watch. “Nigeria’s 2003 Elections: The Unacknowledged Violence.” June 2004.

Human Rights Watch. “Politics as War: The Human Rights Impact and Causes of Post- Election Violence in Rivers State, Nigeria.” 20, no. 3, 2008.

Human Rights Watch, “Testing Democracy: Political Violence in Nigeria.” 15, no. 8, April 2003.

Human Rights Watch, “The Warri Crisis: Fuelling Violence.” HRW Report 15, no. 18, 2003.

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Hazen, Jennifer M. and Horner, Jona. “Small Arms, Armed Violence, and Insecurity in Nigeria: The Niger Delta in Perspective.”

Human Rights News. “Soldiers, Police Seize High Calibre Riffles in Rivers.” Centre for Environment, Human Rights and Development (CEHRD) 1. no. 1 Eleme, Rivers State: 2006.

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Lewis,Simon, Cholewa, Ewa and Stephen Davis. “Illegal Arms in the Niger Delta.” Niger Delta Peace and Security Strategy Working Papers, November 2005.

Ogbedu, John and Ogundele, Bolaji. “Nigerian Military No Match for Militants.” The Nigerian Village Square, March 19, 2007.

Onasoga, A. K. “Effects of Ethnic Militia on National Security.” Armed Forces Command and Staff College Nigeria, College Paper SC 28, 2006.

Oyefusi, Aderoju “Oil and the Propensity to Armed Struggle in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria.” Post-Conflict Transitions Working Paper No. 8, World Bank Policy Working Paper 4194 (2007): 1–4.

Oyefusi, Aderoju. “Oil-dependence and Civil Conflict in Nigeria.” The Centre for the Study of African Economies Working Paper Series, Centre for the Study of African Economies, 268: (2007), 1–12.

Pavord, Andrew. “Force Structure for Small Wars.” 2008.

San, E. A. “Military in Internal Security Operations: Challenges and Prospects.” A Paper Presented at the Nigerian Bar Association 53rd Annual General Conference, Tinapa Calabar, August 28, 2013: 2-28.

Tamuno, T. T. “The Geographical Niger Delta.” (Conference Proceedings, International Conference on the Nigerian State, Oil Industry and the Niger Delta, Organized by the Department of Political Science, Niger Delta University, Yenagoa, Wilberforce Island, in Collaboration with the Centre for Applied Environmental Research, University of Missouri- Kansas City, at Bayelsa State, 11th-13th March, 2008): 905-918.

Book Chapters

Abubakar, A. A. “Peacekeeping in West Africa: The Nigerian Experience.” in Peace Support Operations in the New Global Environment: The Nigerian Perspective, edited byJonah, Gboribiogha J. and Zabadi, Istifanus S. 177-198.Kuru: National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS), 2009.

Adebajo, Adekeye. “Nigeria.” in Providing Peacekeepers: The Politics, Challenges, and Future of United Nations Peacekeeping Contributions, edited by A. J. Bellamy and P. D. Williams, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

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Aghalino, S. O. “From NDDC to Amnesty: Change and Continuity in the Denouement of the Niger Delta Crisis.” in History Unlimited Essays in Honour of Professor Abednego Ekoko, edited by Leo E. Otoide, Benin: Mindex Publishing Company Limited, 2012.

Amadu Sesay. “Background to Civil Wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone.” in Nigeria in ECOMOG Evolution and Background to Interventions, edited by Amadu Sesay, 43- 68.Kaduna: Nigerian Defence Academy Press, 2014.

Alagoa, E. J. “The Eastern Niger Delta and the Hinterland in the 19th Century.” in Groundwork of Nigerian History, edited by Obaro Ikime, 236-246. Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books, 1999.

Babatunde, A. O. “Oil Exploration, Armed Conflict and their Implications for Women’s Socio-Economic Development in Nigeria’s Niger Delta.” in Peace, Security and Development in Nigeria, edited by Isaac Olawale Albert, Willie Aziegbe Eselebor and Natheniel D. Danjibo. 256-260. Abuja: Society for Peace Studies and Practice, 2012.

Best, S. G. Idyorough A. E. and Shehu, Z. B. “Communal Conflicts and the Possibilities of Conflicts Resolution in Nigeria: A Case Study of the Tiv-Jukun Conflicts in Wukari Local Government Area, Taraba State, in Community Conflicts in Nigeria: Management, Resolution and Transformation,edited by O. Otite and I Olawale,82-115. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd., 2001.

Best, S. G. and Kemedi, Von “Armed Groups and Conflict in Rivers and Plateau States, Nigeria.” in Armed and Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns, and Human Security in the EOWAS Region, edited byN. Florquin and E. G. Berman, Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2008.

Bothe, Michael. “Peacekeeping.” in The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, edited by Bruno Simma, 648-663.Oxford: University Press Oxford, 2002.

BØås, M. “Mend Me: The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta and the Empowerment of Violence.” inOil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta: Managing the ComplexPolitics of Petro-Violence, edited by Cyril Obi and Siri A. Rustad, 115-124. London and New York: Zed Books, 2011.

Dokubo, C. “Nigeria’s International Peacekeeping and Peace Building Efforts in Africa, 1960 – 2005.” in Nigeria and the United Nations Security Council, edited by A. A. Bola, Ibadan: Vantage Publishers, 2005.

Duquet, N. “Swamped with Weapons: The Proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Niger Delta.” in Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta: Managing the Complex Politics of Petro-Violence, edited by Cyril Obi and Siri Aas Rustad, London: Zed Books, 2011.

Elaigwu, Victor A. “The Military and Management of Religious Violence in Nigeria: The Maitatsine Crisis in Jimeta-Yola, 1984.” in Crisis and Conflict Management in Nigeria since 1980 Volume Two: Governance and Conflict Management,edited by A. M. Yakubu, R. T. Adegboye, C. N. Ubah and B. Dogo,741-752. Kaduna: Nigerian Defence Academy, 2005.

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Gilbert, L. D. “Youth Militancy, Amnesty and Security in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria.” in Checkmating the Resurgence of Oil Violence in the Niger Delta of Nigeria, edited by Victor Ojakorotu and Lysias Dodd Gilbert, South Africa: JAPSS Publishers, 2010.

Habu, G. “Peace Support Operations in Africa.” in Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies in West Africa, edited by Shederack,G. B. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, 2007.

Horton, Robin “From Fishing to City-State: A Social History of New Calabar.” in Man in Africa, edited by M. Douglas and P. M. Kaberry, 37-58.London: Tavistock Publications, 1969.

Ikime, Obaro. “The People and Kingdoms of the Delta Province.” in Groundwork of Nigerian History, edited by Obaro Ikime, 86-94. Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books, 1999.

Ikime, Obaro. “The Western Niger Delta and the Hinterland in the Nineteenth Century.” in Groundwork of Nigerian History, edited by Obaro Ikime, 249-279. Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books, 1999.

Imobighe, T. A. “Introduction: Civil Society, Ethnic Nationalism and Nation Building in Nigeria.” Civil Society and Ethnic Conflict Management in Nigeria, edited by T. A. Imobighe. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd, 2003.

Kasfir, N. “The Shrinking Political Arena.” quoted in Crisis and Conflict Management in Nigeria Since 1980, Volume One Causes and Dimensions of Conflict edited by A. M. Yakubu. Kaduna: Nigerian Defence Academy, 2005.

Kupolati, R. M. “Strategic Doctrines: Joint Operations.” in Nigerian Defence Policy: Issues and Problems, edited by A. E. Ekoko and M. A. Vogt, Lagos: Malthouse Press Ltd., 1990.

Malu, S. V. L. “ECOMOG: A Peace Keeping Operation in Perspective.” in Nigeria in ECOMOG Evolution and Background to Interventions, edited byAmadu Sesay, 159- 176.Kaduna: Nigerian Defence Academy Press, 2014.

McNaugher, Thomas L. “The Army and Operations Other Than War: Expanding Professional Jurisdiction.” in The Future of the Army Profession, edited by Llyod J. Mathews, New York: Mc Graw Hill, 2002.

Nwosu, I. J. D. “Marginality and the Niger Delta Crises: Ogoni, Ijaw and Warri Crises in Perspective.” in Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution in Nigeria: A Reader, edited by Miriam Ikejiani-Clark, Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, 2009.

Ogbogbo, C. “Identity Politics and Resource Control Conflict in the Niger Delta.” in Society, State, and Identity in African History, edited by Bahru Zewde, 262-268. Addis Ababa: Forum for Social Studies, 2008.

Okonkwo, F. O. “The Military in Peace Support Operations.” in Defence Policy of Nigeria: Capability and Context, A Reader edited by Celestine O. Bassey and Charles Q. Dokubo, Bloomington: Authorhouse, 2011.

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Omede, Adedoyin. “The Nigerian Army and Peace Support Operations under the ECOWAS: The ECOMOG Years.” in The Nigerian Army in Global Security, edited by John W. T. Gbor, 204-212, Lagos: Megavons (West Africa) Ltd., 2004.

Tangban, Ojong Echum and Umoh, Ubong Essien “A Political Economy of the Niger Delta Insurgency, 1999-2009.” in Perspectives on Contemporary Nigeria: Essays in Honour of Professor A. Bolaji Akinyemi, CFR, edited by Godwin S. Ichimi, 39-58.Lagos: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, 2014.

Ukeje, Charles “State Disintegration and the Civil War in Liberia.” in Civil Wars, Child Soldiers and Post-Conflict Peace Building in West Africa, edited byAhmadu Sesay, 85-112. Ibadan: College Press Publishers, 2003.

Ukiwo, U. “The Nigerian State, Oil and the Niger Delta Crisis.” in Oil and Insurgency in the Niger Delta: Managing the Complex Politics of Petro-Violence. edited by Cyril Obi and Siri A. Rustad. 17-27. London & New York: Zed Books, 2011.

Projects/ Dissertation

Afahakan, Ekaete “History of the Nigerian Army, 1860-1960.” Undergraduate Project, University of Uyo, Nigeria, 2008.

Akin-Ojo, Moyosore C. “The Military Dimension of the Niger Delta Crisis: Increasing the Effectiveness of Security Forces through Information Operations.” M.A Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, 2010.

Belmakki, Mohamed. “African Sub-Regional Organizations in Peacekeeping and Peace Making: the Economic Community of West African State (ECOWAS).” MA Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, March, 2005.

Inuwa, Muhammat Nura, “Oil Politics and National Security in Nigeria.” MA Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2010.

Umoh, Ubong Essien. “The Joint Task Force and Combating Insurgency in the Niger Delta of Nigeria, c. 1999-2009.” Ph.D Thesis, Nigerian Defence Academy Kaduna, 2015.

Newspapers/Magazines

Agbo, Anayochukwu. “The Descent to Anarchy in the Niger Delta: The Inside Story.” Tell. August 27, 2007.

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Agbo, Anayochukwu. “Niger Delta: Why the War May Never End.” Tell, no. 25, June 22, 2009.

Ajero, Chris. “The Men behind the Trigger in Niger Delta.” Newswatch, 48, no. 10, September 2008.

Amaize, Emma “Oil Bunkering: Their Dare Devil Plot, Governments Counter Moves.” Vanguard. September 20, 2003.

Amaize, Emma and Arubi Emma. “JTF to Track Down Retired Generals Involved in Oil Bunkering – Major Gen. Bello.” The Vanguard, March 30, 2009.

Asari Dokubo, c.50 years, Leader of NDPVF,The News, 25/8/2004.

Ashby, Tom. “Nigeria Commander Removed in Oil Theft Probe.” Reuters (Lagos), March 8, 2006.

Bisina, Tunke-Aye, Gbemudu Emma and Emmanuel, Harris-Okon. “War in Niger Delta – Military Extends Offensive to Rivers State.” Daily Independent Newspapers. May 25, 2009.

Ebiri, Kevin, and Willie Etim. “Militants Hit Oil Facility, Abduct Six Foreigners,” Guardian Newspapers, July 7, 2009.

Ero, Adekunbi. “Niger Delta: A Return to the Trenches.” Tell. no. 22, June 1, 2009.

Naagbanton, P. “The Fall of Godfather Tom Ateke.” The Midweek Telegraph. Port Harcourt, June 2006, 13.

Nigeria Daily News, 2008.

Odili,Paul. “MEND: Between Criminality and Kid Gloves.” Vanguard. January 29, 2007.

Odunfa, Sola “Nigeria’s Oil Capital Under Siege.” BBC News, September 8, 2004.

Ofiebor, Okafor. “Portrait of Ateke Tom,” The News. September 13, 2004.

Ofiebor, Okafor “Who is Alhaji Dokubo-Asari?” The News. September 13, 2004

Ilenre, A. “The Accurate Predictions of Ken Saro-Wiwa.” The Guardian, November 25, 2010.

Samson, Akanimo Samson and Shola O’Neil, “Bonga Oil Field Attack: Yar’Adua sends Soldiers after Militants.” The Nation, 2, no. 0701, Saturday, June 21, 2008.

Tell, 13 November, Lagos, 1995.

“Crude Oil Theft Carried out by Elites.”Leadership. September 21, 2007.

“Fight for Nigeria Oil to Continue.” British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). June 15, 2007.

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“Naval Officers Involved in Oil Bunkering.” The Punch. December 15, 2007.

“Niger Delta: Why the War May Never End.” Tell. No. 25, June 22, 2009.

“Joint Task Force set up to Restore Order in the Niger Delta,” The Nation. September 2003.

“Militants see Month of Mayhem in Nigeria Oil Delta.” Reuters. May 9, 2007.

“Navy Reiterate Readiness to Ensure Waterways Safety.” The Tide Online. July 22, 2007.

“RSG to Assist Navy Fight Criminality in N’Delta.”The Tide Online. July 22, 2007.

“Sylva Urges Navy to Increase Presence in Bayelsa,” The Tide Online. August 27, 2007.

Websites http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil www.hrw.org/en/reports/2003/12/17/warri-crisis. http://smallwarsjournal.com/ mag/docs-temp/60-pavord.pdf www.usip.org http://hrw.org/reports/2004/nigeria0604 http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/04/16/nigeri15708.htm http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2003/12/17/warri-crisis http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/ http://www.guardiannewsngr.com/

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