Diari De Les Idees

Diari de les idees

Núm. 71

(30 d’octubre-3 de novembre 2017)

RESUM D’IDEES

Both sides talking about democracy doesn‟t seem to me to be helping things at all. It seems if anything more precarious, more fragmented, more confused than it was when it started

Yasmeen Serhan, ―Catalonia‘s Self-Defeating Independence Declaration‖, The Atlantic, 27 d‘octubre de 2017

Flawed, oversimplified narratives are driving both sides.

Lisa Abend, ―The Myths That Fuel the Catalan Crisis‖, The Atlantic, 29 d‘octubre de 2017

At the core of Catalonia‟s separatist movement is an argument that a country‟s better-off regions shouldn‟t have to pay to cover their less productive counterparts.

Steven Johnson, ―When Rich Places Want to Secede‖, The Atlantic, 28 d‘octubre de 2017

As in Greece, the higher the economic costs for Catalonia, the more likely that the separatist bloc might fracture.

Stathis Kalynas, ―Why Greece‘s Fate Helps Make Sense of Catalonia‘s Gamble‖, The Atlantic, 27 d‘octubre de 2017

Barcelona‟s vote for independence, and Madrid‟s decision to take control of the region, will not solve this dispute but make matters worse

―Damage to Catalonia‖, The Guardian, 27 d‘octubre de 2017

Madrid‟s tactics put Catalonia‟s separatists in a fix, but they could backfire by handing the independence movement a clear win

Giles Tremlett, ―Calling an election will by no means resolve the Catalan conundrum‖, The Guardian, 30 d‘octubre de 2017

It is surely not beyond the wit of Catalans and Spaniards to work out a form of amicable association that both can live with

―The Observer view on independence for Catalonia‖, The Observer, 29 d‘octubre de 2017

The nationalist leaders seemed aware of the fragility of their project. To secede is not, necessarily, to succeed. To have sovereignty, you need two things at least: international recognition and control over your territory.

Miguel-Anxo Murado, ―Catalonia‘s nationalist leaders are well aware their project is fragile‖, The Guardian, 29 d‘octubre de 2017

Warning that deposed Catalan president could be jailed within two months comes as huge protest held against independence

Sam Jones, Stephen Burgen and Emma Graham-Harrison, The Guardian, 29 d‘octubre de 2017

Secession from Spain would be unwise for many reasons. But in this age of hectic change, the search for identity cannot simply be dismissed

Matthew d‘Ancona, ―The Catalan dream will not be extinguished by force‖, The Guardian, 29 d‘octubre de 2017

Madrid has promised regional elections but the vote cannot be held fairly in a toxic media environament

Peter Preston, ―What Catalonia‘s media dearly needs is neutral voices‖, The Guardian, 29 d‘octubre de 2017

Although the longest history of oppression and centralisation from Madrid has cast a shadow over the modern age – and is often used as a rallying call by pro-independence politicians – it is modern-day politics and economics which are driving this latest constitutional crisis.

Caroline Mortimer, ―Catalan crisis: Why does Catalonia want independence? Do the majority really support it?, The Independent, 29 d‘octubre de 2017

The call for calm by Catalonia‟s sacked leader Carles Puigdemont is sensible and strikes a helpful tone. Let‟s see what happens. But if the end does turn out to be a new European country, then in another decade it is likely to be a prosperous one.

Hamish McRae, ―Catalonia could be an extremely successful econony and EU member State‖, The Independent, 29 d‘octubre de 2017

Unless both sides step back from deepening confrontation and accept compromise, the outlook for Spain and Catalonia looks bleak

―Catalonia‘s declaration of independence has come too soon‖, The Independent, 28 d‘octubre de 2017

Each nationalism - Catalan and Spanish - has dug itself deeper into exclusively self-referential bunkers

―Catalonia: the case for creative thinking‖, The Irish Times, 29 d‘octubre de 2017

Catalans in turmoil as they find themselves split on geographical, class and ethnic lines

Guy Hedgecoe, ―Divided Catalonia: Calm, negotiated solution ‗not going to be the case‘‖, The Irish Times, 28 d‘octubre de 2017

With that task looking anything but straightforward for the Rajoy government, there is reason to think both sides might soon be ruing their failure to seek an alternative way out of this crisis.

Guy Hedgecoe, ―Biggest political upheaval in Spain since 1970s return to Democracy‖, The Irish Times, 28 d‘octubre de 2017

Dans la réalité, la tâche s'annonce plus compliquée que sur le papier. Un parfum de désobéissance civile flotte sur la région

Charlotte Cieslinski, ―Catalogne, et maintenant? Comment Madrid va prendre le contrôle‖, L’Obs, 29 d‘octubre de 2017

L'histoire prouve que ces déclarations de rejet de l‟indépendantisme résistent rarement aux réalités politiques

Jean-Baptiste Nauder, ―Catalogne: Paris et ses voisins européens font fausse route‖, L’Obs, 28 d‘octubre de 2017

Cette nuit, les indépendantistes ont tiré des feux d'artifice sur la place Sant Jaume. Mais que peuvent-il espérer à présent ?

Charlotte Cieslinski, ―‘Nous ne nous soumettrons pas‘: La Catalogne se réveille sous tutelle dans une Espagne déchirée‖, L’Obs, 28 d‘octubre de 2017

Maintenant c‟est la lutte démocratique, pacifiste qui est la plus puissante. Ce qui attire les gens, ce n‟est pas la force, c‟est le pacifisme.

Jean-Baptiste Nauder, ―Catalogne; ‗l‘indépendance, le pacifisme ou la mort‘‖, L’Obs, 26 d‘octubre de 2017

Les Catalans ont choisi une référence : le modèle lituanien. C'est-à-dire la résistance pacifique populaire de masse.

Jean-Baptiste Nauder, ―Pourquoi les Catalans pensent déclarer l‘indépendance maintenant‖, L’Obs, 27 d‘octubre de 2017

En quatrième division il y a une décennie, le club de football de Gérone a fait tomber le Real Madrid au surlendemain de la proclamation d'indépendance du Parlement. Et partage avec son rival et voisin du FC Barcelone des sympathies indépendantistes affirmées...

Antonin Vabre, ―Gérone, le petit club catalan indépendantiste qui monte, qui monte...‖, Slate.fr, 30 d‘octubre de 2017

Si Madrid et la Catalogne campent sur leurs positions, sans véritable référendum, il y a un risque d'affrontements importants. Et personne ne sait sur quoi cela peut déboucher

Yohan Blavignat, ―Catalogne: Un risque d'affrontements dans les prochaines semaines‖, Le Figaro, 27 d‘octubre de 2017

Quels sont les scénarios possibles en Catalogne après la déclaration d'indépendance et la suspension des autorités autonomes par Madrid?

Catherine Gouëset, ―Catalogne: ‗Rajoy sort renforcé de cette crise‘‖, L’Express, 28 d‘octubre de 2017

A Catalunha é o campo de batalha onde prossegue a guerra destes tempos – a do ataque ao liberalismo. São os valores republicanos que precisam de defesa.

Alexandre Homem Cristo, ―Estar do lado da República‖, Observador, 30 d‘octubre de 2017

A maior diferença das últimas semanas está na mudança da postura de Madrid, firme, mas mais conciliadora, e na tão falada “reposição da legalidade”. Mas é preciso não esquecer que a legalidade é muito pouco, quando o problema é, sobretudo, político.

Diana Soller, ―Un longo mês de outubro‖, Observador, 27 d‘octubre de 2017

O mais trágico é que Puigdemont tinha argumentos: a Catalunha tem uma história que impressiona; possui língua e cultura próprias; uma economia próspera; uma elite ilustrada. Poderia ter ponderado de outra maneira o momento e a forma de reivindicar mais, sabendo de antemão que Espanha nunca aceitaria a secessão e que a Europa anda por estes tempos avessa a nacionalismos.

Leonìdio Paulo Ferreira, ―Puigdemont acreditou‖, Diário de Notícias, 26 d‘octubre de 2017

Não houve "diálogo" nem "bom senso" em relação à pretensão de independência da Catalunha, uma das "regiões mais ricas de Espanha, que tem de facto um sentimento nacional profundo, uma língua própria e uma cultura própria, embora nunca tenha tido estado

―Manuel Alegre diz que Espanha devia criar estado federal‖, Diário de Notícias, 28 d‘octubre de 2017

L‟annonce par le gouvernement espagnol de convoquer des élections régionales le 21 décembre en Catalogne et de donner la parole à tous les Catalans remet enfin le curseur là où il devait être.

“Catalogne: place à la démocratie‖, Le Monde, 28 d‘octubre de 2017

La Catalogne s‟est déclarée indépendante quelques heures avant de perdre sa large autonomie. Si la sécession menace, c‟est surtout dans les têtes

―Catalogne: le gâchis historique‖, Le Temps, 27 d‘octubre de 2017

Entretenant l‟illusion d‟une possible victoire, Puigdemont marche vers un sombre destin au mépris du peuple espagnol, mais surtout des Catalans, en première ligne du désastre annoncé.

Pierre Ruetschi, ―Le coup de folie catalan‖, La Tribune de Genève, 27 d‘octubre de 2017

The two politicians have been acting like stubborn schoolboys, blind and deaf to any other arguments but their own.

Jessica Jones, ―Stubborn schoolboy tactics have plunged Spain and Catalonia into political crisis‖, The Independent, 28 d‘octubre de 2017

Spanish officials say that even as he tweeted to suggest he was outside the regional presidency building, Carles Puigdemont was already making plans to escape to Belgium

Kim Sengupta, ―How Catalonia‘s first day as an ‗independent state‘ descended in chaos‖ The Independent, 30 d‘octubre de 2017

'There are no incidents – it's magnificent news.' On a crucial day for judging the resilience of the Catalan independence movement, most just stayed away

Alasdair Fotheringham, ―Catalonia: Why Spain's government will be delighted with day one of the 'independent Catalan Republic'‖, The Independent, 30 d‘octubre de 2017

L'affrontement entre le pouvoir central espagnol et les indépendantistes catalans illustre bien la complexité de la question du droit des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes.

Ferghane Azihari, ―Faut-il réserver le droit d'auto-détermination aux seuls peuples colonisés?‖, Slate.fr, 30 d‘octubre de 2017

Catherine Gouëset, ―Catalogne: pourquoi les indépendantistes iront au scrutin convoqué par Rajoy‖, L’Express, 30 d‘octubre de 2017

L'ex-dirigeant catalan devra justifier de la persécution dont il est victime dans son pays d'origine, et de l'impossibilité qu'il a de s'y défendre. Pas si simple.

Loreline Merelle, ―Qui est Theo Franken, l‘amfitryon de Carles Puigdemont‖, Le Point, 31 d‘octubre de 2017

O exílio de Carles Puigdemont é coisa para rir, é um insulto aos verdadeiros exilados espanhóis da trágica história recente

Ferreira Fernandes, ―É trágica tanta comédia‖, Diário de Notícias, 31 d‘octubre de 2017

Alguns catalães sentem-se algo desamparados pelo governo de Carles Puigdemont, presidente da Generalitat que ontem partiu para a Bélgica

João Francisco Guerreiro, "Catalunha: Agora partiram. As pessoas sentem-se um pouco perdidas", Diário de Notícias, 31 d‘octubre de 2017

Nuno Ramos de Almeida, ―Posição do governo português sobre a Catalunha foi ditada por Madrid‖, Sol, 29 d‘octubre de 2017

Carles Puigdemont received the ultimate Belgian welcome: good- humored total chaos.

―Puigdemont‘s Catalan political circus comes to Brussels‖, Politico, 31 d‘octubre de 2017

Pour remobiliser l'électorat nationaliste, les indépendantistes jouent le sentiment d'humiliation et les accusations contre Madrid. Ça marche. Le discours de Carles Puigdemont, aujourd'hui, amorce cet angle d'attaque de campagne. Il dit 'regardez, les libertés catalanes ont été atteintes, je suis obligé d'être en exil'.

Sarah Dyffalah, ―Catalogne : ‗La virée belge de Puigdemont est une mise en scène pour masquer son agonie politique‘, L’Obs, 31 d‘octubre de 2017

Based on the icy silence Carles Puigdemont encountered in Brussels, it appears the EU will continue to rely on Spain to resolve crisis itself

Jennifer Rankin, ―EU silenci over Catalan leader‘s call for action speaks volumes‖, The Guardian, 1 de novembre de 2017

The turmoil of the past weeks, with Catalonia proclaiming independence, and Madrid stamping it down, amid bitterness and violence, has been a reminder of dark days gone by

Kim Sengupta, ―Here in Catalonia, people no longer feel like they live in a Democracy‖ The Independent, 1 de novembre de 2017

If we accept such self-serving and irresponsible arguments in one case, the whole of Europe is gone.

Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, ―Why Catalonia does not deserve to be independent‖, OpenDemocracy, 31 d‘octubre de 2017

The deposed Catalan president, Carles Puigdemont, has said he will accept the result of this election. Catalan firms have already voted with their feet. Will Catalan citizens follow by voting with their pockets in the forthcoming regional elections?

José Guimón, ―Will exodus of firms from Catalonia economically influence voters?‖, The Irish Times, 2 de novembre de 2017

Catalonia is in limbo as direct rule begins, but independence activists remain optimistic

Guy Hedgecoe, ―Separatist Catalans continue to fly the flag of independence‖, The Irish Times, 2 de novembre de 2017

Le parasitage de la diplomatie belge par les jeux politiciens de certains nationalistes flamands parties prenantes de la majorité gouvernementale a peut-être discrédité le pays dans la perspective d'une initiative internationale en faveur de la reprise du dialogue

Carlos Crespo, ―Catalogne, vers une résistible confrontation‖, Le Vif, 2 de novembre de 2017

Por outras palavras, o que sucederá em Madrid no caso – não impossível! – de a actual maioria separatista voltar a ter a maioria por um deputado que seja? Presumivelmente voltaria tudo à estaca zero.

Manuel Villaverde Cabral, ―Catalunha: soma e segue‖, Observador, 1 de novembre de 2017

Apesar de sensível à questão identitária, tudo aquilo me parece artificial e conduzido por aprendizes de feiticeiro que poderão (quererão?) incendiar toda a Europa

José Ferreira Machado, ―Catalunha nao tem direito à independència‖, Sol, 1 de novembre de 2017

Both sides talking about democracy doesn‟t seem to me to be helping things at all. It seems if anything more precarious, more fragmented, more confused than it was when it started

Yasmeen Serhan, ―Catalonia‘s Self-Defeating Independence Declaration‖, The Atlantic, 27 d‘octubre de 2017 https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/10/catalonias-self-defeating- independence-declaration/544205/

The Catalan parliament voted Friday overwhelmingly in favor of independence from Spain, reaffirming the result of the contested independence referendum the region held nearly four weeks ago. The vote marked a major escalation in Catalonia‘s territorial dispute with Spain‘s central government in Madrid. ―We shall constitute the Catalan Republic as an independent, and sovereign, democratic, and social state of law,‖ the motion read.

But of course it won‘t be that simple.

If anything, the passage of the motion puts hopes for Catalan independence even further away. At the same time it was being held, Madrid was threatening to impose direct rule on its northeastern region, which would mean taking away the broad autonomy long enjoyed there and dismissing the very regional government that led the independence push—including Catalan President Carles Puigdemont. It seemed likely even before the Catalan parliament acted that Spanish lawmakers would grant Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy the authority he had requested, under Article 155 of the Spanish Constitution, to suspend Catalan autonomy. And passage of the independence motion all but assured it. Shortly after Catalonia‘s regional parliament voted in Barcelona, the Spanish senate voted in Madrid to hand Rajoy extraordinary powers over the region. ―Catalans must be protected from an intolerant minority that is awarding itself ownership of Catalonia and is trying to subject all Catalans to the yoke of its own doctrine,‖ Rajoy told lawmakers Friday.

Rajoy has long maintained that Catalonia had no legal right to declare independence— and indeed, the Spanish Constitutional Court found that the independence referendum held earlier this month violated national constitution, which holds that Spain is indivisible. Just minutes after the Catalan vote was announced, Rajoy tweeted: ―The Rule of Law will restore legality in Catalonia.‖

And despite Catalonia now having passed both a popular referendum and a parliamentary motion in favor of independence—and despite the celebrations on Friday by independence supporters inside and outside the parliament in Barcelona—not all Catalans were jubilant. The popular referendum, while it saw a 90 percent vote in favor of independence, did so with a low turnout of only around 40 percent. A similar dynamic played out in Barcelona‘s parliament on Friday, with opposition lawmakers walking out of the chamber to protest the vote. Of the 135 deputies, 82 cast ballots (70 voted in favor, 10 voted against, and two were left blank).

If the real popularity of Catalan independence within the region itself remains in question, the level of international support for it is clearer: There is very little. Despite Puigdemont‘s appeals to international leaders to support Catalonia‘s self-determination aspirations, the bid has so far failed to get the backing of any country or major international body. European Council President Donald Tusk reaffirmed the European Union‘s position of declining to support Catalan independence shortly after Friday‘s vote in Barcelona took place, noting that ―For EU nothing changes. Spain remains our only interlocutor. I hope the Spanish government favours force of argument, not argument of force.‖ The State Department issued a similar statement soon after.

Mary Vincent, a professor of Modern European history at the University of Sheffield, told me the speed with which the Catalonia crisis has escalated only adds to the confusion about what happens next. Article 155 has never been invoked in the four-odd decades in which the current Spanish constitution has been in force; there is no historical guide to what implementation looks like. And whereas Rajoy has framed the independence issue as being about ―the rule of law and the Spanish constitution, Puigdemont has dubbed Catalonia‘s quest for independence one of democratic aspirations. ―Both sides talking about democracy doesn‘t seem to me to be helping things at all,‖ she said. ―It seems if anything more precarious, more fragmented, more confused than it was when it started.‖

Article 155 is expected to go into force Friday night local time, and it‘s not clear how Catalonia will respond. ―It‘s difficult to understand what an independent Catalonia will be, or is,‖ Vincent said. ―Are they suddenly going to find their own army, put up customs borders? There‘s a sense in which it all seems a bit rhetorical and, at the moment, Article 155 also seems like that.‖

Flawed, oversimplified narratives are driving both sides.

Lisa Abend, ―The Myths That Fuel the Catalan Crisis‖, The Atlantic, 29 d‘octubre de 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/10/catalan-spain- referendum-independence-puigdemont/544307/

In the hours after their parliament declared independence, thousands of Catalans streamed into the Plaça Sant Jaume, a medieval square in Barcelona that serves as the seat of Catalonia‘s regional government. They waved the Catalan flag, sang the Catalan anthem, and shouted ―Long live the Republic!‖ But at the decidedly un-Mediterranean hour of 11:00 pm, the party ended, and its participants went back to their normal Friday night activities. One observer commented on the ambivalence with a reference to the local football team. “It‘s like Barça tied in a home match,‖ he said of the celebration that, while jubilant, was noticeably subdued for this part of the world.

On October 27, the clash between Spain and Catalonia—one that, depending on who you ask, has been building for months, years, or centuries—reached a head, with the Catalan parliament casting a secret vote in favor of independence and the Spanish government subsequently activating Article 155, the constitutional provision that allows it to impose direct rule. There is no shortage of reasons for why a little over 40 percent—but nearly 52 percent of their members of parliament—supported independence. The Catalans‘ distinct language and culture, the oppression they suffered under the dictatorship of Francisco Franco, a tax structure perceived as unfair (especially during the economic crisis), and Madrid‘s unwillingness to renegotiate their autonomy agreement, all contributed to the crisis. Spain‘s opposition to Catalan secession has numerous roots as well, beginning most fundamentally with its constitution, which expressly prohibits a region from breaking away unilaterally.

But behind these arguments are two fundamental myths, two epic narratives that have shaped each side‘s understanding of what it is fighting for. Those myths brought them to the perilous moment they now face.

The independentist myth, largely amorphous until October 1, locked into focus during the referendum. When police sent by the Spanish government to stop an unconstitutional vote responded by smashing in school doors and beating old ladies in their attempt to confiscate ballot boxes, it gave the secessionists the ballast they needed. Here was proof that they really were being violently oppressed, and ammunition for their narrative that this was not just about regional rights. It was about something much bigger, something captured in a recent video produced by Omnium Cultural, one of the pro-independence groups. It features a young woman, seemingly on the verge of tears, warning that the ―European values‖ of freedom, democracy, and human rights ―are under attack‖ in Catalonia; the video quickly went viral.

That myth was again evident at an October 21 rally in Barcelona to protest the imprisonment of Jordi Sanchez and Jordi Cuixart, the heads, respectively, of the pro- independence Catalan National Assembly (ANC) and Omnium Cultural. With police helicopters circling overhead, the 450,000 protestors in attendance listened as the emcee, a middle-aged woman in turquoise-colored glasses, read De Que Se Ríe, a work

by Uruguay‘s left-wing poet Mario Benedetti. It includes the lines: Here in the street, / Your guards kill / And those who die /Are humble people.

Invoking Benedetti‘s poem was a stretch. While police beat hundreds of Catalan protesters weeks earlier when they tried to vote, no one was killed. The betrayal of the nation to the ―gringo‖ that Benedetti describes in an earlier line in the poem also didn‘t really apply. But it hardly mattered. In a single voice, the protestors joined the announcer in shouting out the poem‘s final line—What are you laughing at? In their minds, they were no longer fighting just for the right to declare themselves a nation, speak only Catalan, and collect their own taxes. As they saw it, they were fighting the Good Fight, the one that began in 1789 and had passed through the Paris Commune to the Battle of Guadarrama, from Che, to King, to Mandela. They were the latest in a long line of freedom fighters throwing off the yoke of oppression. ―This is a fight for liberty,‖ the ANC‘s national secretary Francesc Bellavista said. ―It‘s clear now that we‘re fighting a colonial power that wants to subjugate us.‖

With astonishing speed, the myth has helped convert Sánchez and Cuixart, imprisoned without bail for alleged sedition (they helped orchestrate a protest during which police were trapped inside a building, and their vehicles vandalized), into political prisoners arrested not for their actions but for their ideas. ―In my 20 years as a lawyer,‖ Barcelona deputy mayor Jaume Asens wrotein a post that has been re-tweeted 5,100 times, ―I have never seen a legal aberration so extreme. There is no tyranny worse than that exercised in the shadow of the law.‖ Tomas Belanche, who attended the October 21 rally with his three-year-old daughter perched on his flag-wrapped shoulders, shook with emotion when asked why he had come. ―We are here so that she never has to face the insult of having someone ask her ‗Why do you speak Catalan?‘ So that she can grow up free.‖ Tyranny, colonialism, freedom: a sense of proportionality dims, and history elides. In the last few days, French Catalans have offered safe houses to Carles Puigdemont, the now-deposed Catalan president, as if they were the Resistance. A poster published by the Sindicat d‘Estudiants called for a student strike on October 25 and 26. It declared that the protest was ―against Francoist repression,‖ and featured the stern figures of the Spanish king, the prime minister, and Franco. That one of them had been dead for 40 years was not immediately obvious.

In this telling, the fact that Catalonia has more autonomy than any other region in the European Union, including Scotland, does not figure. Fueled by the myth, pro- independence forces have clung stubbornly to the belief that the international community will rush to their aid, despite little to no evidence of their willingness to do so. (In the aftermath of Friday‘s declaration, both the EU and the United States emphasized their unequivocal support for the Spanish government.) The myth helps explain why, on the day before the declaration, the pro-independence forces briefly turned on Puigdemont. He had entered negotiations with Madrid on a deal wherein he would abandon the independence proclamation and call for new regional elections; in exchange, the state would not apply Article 155. This made him persona non grata for many of his erstwhile supporters, who accused him of weakness and betrayal. Gabriel Rufián, a representative in the Spanish parliament for the Catalan Republican Left party, compared Puigdemont to Judas, tweeting―155 pieces of silver‖ in response to the news. Although Puigdemont later told the Catalan parliament that he favored the electoral route, the pressure from diehard independentists proved too great, and he abandoned negotiations.

Yet if the independence movement has been in the thrall of its own myth, the same can also be said of Spain‘s Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy. In fact, the Catalan bid for independence has awakened the oldest myth in Spanish history: the myth of homogeneity, of one Spain, despite its numerous cultures, languages, and traditions. In its most severe iterations, that myth propelled the Reconquest, the Inquisition, and the Franco dictatorship. In its current form, it is far milder, tolerating regional differences so long as they remain submerged beneath a topsoil of Spanishness. But you can sense its presence in the Spanish flags newly draped across balconies in Madrid and Sevilla that, until recently, were adorned, at most, by fronds left out to dry from Palm Sunday celebrations.

There was a certain inconsistency to Rajoy‘s decision to prevent the October 1 referendum: If it didn‘t count, why take such pains to stop it? Especially when, 30 minutes before the polls opened, the Catalan government announced it was adopting procedures that would essentially allow anyone to cast their vote anywhere, regardless of their assigned polling station. At that point, whatever legitimacy the vote possessed dissipated. So when Rajoy nonetheless chose to invite international opprobrium by allowing Spanish authorities to confiscate ballot boxes and beat Catalan citizens trying to vote, it was hard to avoid the conclusion that it was the myth talking more than the law. The same is true of the charges brought against ―the Jordis,‖ who will stand trial not for disturbing the peace or resisting the police, but for the far graver crime of sedition. On Thursday, when Rajoy could have negotiated an agreement with Puigdemont that would have diminished the conflict, allowed each side to save face, and most likely triggered the implosion of the independence movement, he again chose instead the myth over politics.

Of course, there‘s another meaning to the word myth—falsehood. On Friday night, after the Spanish senate and council of ministers approved Article 155, Rajoy went on television to explain what intervention would actually mean: the removal from office of the Catalan president and heads of government, the dissolution of the Catalan parliament, and new regional elections to be held on December 21. It would not, as many secessionists had expected, mean tanks rolling through the streets of Barcelona. Nor, as some of the more fervent ―españolistas‖ hoped, would it mean a permanent revocation of regional autonomy.

No one knows for sure what comes next. On Saturday, Puigdemont appeared on television in a taped segment to say he was not stepping down, and to encourage peaceful resistance to Madrid‘s intervention. But his party, and the other pro- independence groups, are now also preoccupied with the decision of whether and how to participate in the December elections. Will Puigdemont be dragged off in handcuffs to stand trial for rebellion? Will the ANC and other independence groups mount massive civil-disobedience campaigns, form human shields to protect Catalan institutions, and essentially shut down the region? If it comes to force, will local authorities turn against their fellow Catalans or against their national colleagues? Will more businesses join the over 1,000 that have left Catalonia? Will anyone pay taxes? Or will everyone simply come together for one more election?

Myths brought Catalonia to its declaration of independence, and Spain to its application of Article 155. And so long as each side views the other through this lens, there is no reconciliation. But if, instead, both the Good Fight and One Spain myths are accepted as nothing more than stories people tell themselves, there just might be a way out of this mess.

Recognition of that possibility might explain the sense of sobriety that ran through Friday‘s celebrations. From a stall at a food festival just outside the same park where large crowds had gathered to await the declaration of independence, Carmen Uviedo was presenting her prize-winning Catalan cheeses. ―I wish I were with them,‖ she said, motioning to the crowds of flag-draped citizens who were busy popping the corks on bottles of cava. ―We‘ve waited a long time for this day. But I still have a job to do. And we still have hard days ahead.‖

At the core of Catalonia‟s separatist movement is an argument that a country‟s better-off regions shouldn‟t have to pay to cover their less productive counterparts.

Steven Johnson, ―When Rich Places Want to Secede‖, The Atlantic, 28 d‘octubre de 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/10/catalonia-secede-rich- region/544244/

The crisis kicked off by Catalonia‘s contested October 1 secession vote has come to a head. Following police violence, imprisonments, and mass protests, Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy announced last weekend that he would pursue Article 155 of the Spanish Constitution to replace Catalonia‘s leaders and impose direct rule over what is the country‘s most productive region. On Friday, the Spanish parliament approved the measure, just after its Catalan counterpart formally declared independence.

A major reason cited for the crisis? As Catalan protesters cried, ―Madrid nos roba‖— ―Madrid is robbing us‖—by which they mean the federal government is taking more than it gives in transfer payments. Catalonia, the northeastern region that includes Barcelona and holds 16 percent of the Spanish population, accounts for about a fifth of Spain‘s $1.2 trillion economy and about a quarter of all Spanish exports and industry. Most crucially, it pays Madrid $12 billion more in taxes per year than it gets back. As a relatively rich region with its own independence movement, Catalonia's not alone: A small set of secession movements in historically productive areas, most visibly in Europe, say they‘d be better off on their own, and more are pointing to Catalonia's example to regain momentum. Belgium‘s Flanders region, one of the birthplaces of modern commerce and the host to a separatist party that made gains after the global financial crisis, boasts a GDP per capita 120 percent higher than the EU average. If the German state of Bavaria were its own country, as the Bavarian Party wishes, its economic output would crack the top 10 of EU member states, according to its government. And last weekend, two deep-pocketed northern Italian regions that are home to each Milan and Venice, passed nonbinding referenda for greater autonomy. In Europe, resentments of paying to cover less productive countrymen are longstanding, but recently they seem to have intensified as a swirl of nationalist sentiments has swept the continent.

The common wisdom used to be that separatist movements mostly came from weak minorities that rallied around racial or ethnic injustices. ―With globalization, that changed significantly,‖ said Andrés Rodrìguez-Pose, a professor of economic geography at the London School of Economics (LSE). ―Virtually everywhere in the world,‖ movements have swapped out the ―identity card‖ for the ―economic card.‖

Erin Jenne, a professor of international relations at Central European University, agrees. Economic inequality is one of a few factors that can keep independence movements simmering, but they won‘t boil over without a catalyst—usually some external circumstance like a major political crisis, or an offer from another country to provide military support to a region with separatist aspirations, she said. After all, inequality between regions is baked into the entire concept of modern nationhood—if subsidizing

poorer parts of a country were motivation enough to split off, every region would have done it by now.

Last weekend‘s referenda in Italy‘s regions of Lombardy and Veneto show how these economic tensions seldom come free of matters of ethnic identity. The initiatives, which more seek financial autonomy than outright secession, are sponsored by the Northern League, a populist anti-immigrant party. Paolo Grimoldi, a League official, said the regions were tired of ―giving 80 billion euros [each year] to the state coffers.‖ Politico has argued that the votes were a symbolic tribute to a northern Italian dream of the ‗90s: a fully seceded, Celtic-inflected ethno-state called Padania that would cut the dead weight of ―Roma ladrona‖—―Thieving Rome.‖

But movements to secede can be a gamble. Independence talk in places like Quebec and Catalonia has historically made businesses and consumers feel queasy—after pro- secession parties took action, the regions have seen relocations of corporate headquarters, and even drops in home prices in Quebec and bank deposits in Catalonia. Plus, there are economic perks to staying together: Trade is easier across internal borders, and diversified regions diffuse risk.

Catalonia, for example, has built up some of its own institutions, but it has a long way to go before it has all the systems of a national government, and the limited evidence that exists suggests secession doesn‘t necessarily fling open the gates of economic growth. A huge portion of Catalonia‘s trade is either domestic or with the European Union, says Rodríguez-Pose, of LSE. If the region were to break off, not only would Spain lose 20 percent of its GDP overnight—Catalonia could see, Rodríguez- Pose says, ―rapid impoverishment‖ depending on the scale of conflict.

Jenne, of Central European University, has published research indicating that economic issues are often not as strong of motivators as other factors, such as how densely a group is concentrated in its territory, or whether a region eager to split off is offered military support by another nation. But that doesn‘t stop groups all over the world from using regional inequality as a negotiating tool. The U.S. has seen it, too: In February, California argued that its role as a ―donor state‖—that it sends more money to the federal government than it receives—gave it leverage over the Trump administration‘s threats to withdraw federal funding following its actions to declare itself a ―sanctuary state‖ for immigrants. California is indeed a ―donor,‖ but not by much: The state gets 99 cents back in federal spending for every dollar it contributes through taxes, below the nationwide average of $1.22. There‘s an initiative in the state to put secession on the ballot in 2018, and Silicon Valley floats talk of breaking off to form an independent nation (sometimes literally floating).

Similarly, after Brexit, the Texan Nationalist Party pushed to mimic the U.K. Independence Party‘s tactics, billing Texas‘s $1.6 trillion economy as the ―World‘s 10th Largest.‖ Texan lawmakers, though demurring on secession, started to adopt the economic language of the fringe group.

Of course, there have been hundreds of these movements in American history, and few expect these recent ones to amount to much. Calls for secession happen for all sorts of reasons, and rarely gain majority support—although Catalonia‘s vote overwhelmingly passed, it drew just 43 percent of eligible voters, with many opponents staying home.

Still, ―you never really know what you‘re going to get when you enter into these negotiating processes,‖ said Jenne. She pointed to the relatively peaceful ―Velvet Divorce‖ between the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993. Slovakia, the weaker region, was ―absolutely shocked‖ when the Czechs bought into their calls for secession, she said. After the decade or so it took the weaker Slovakia to recover, ―it has done relatively well,‖ said Rodrìguez-Pose. ―So it can happen.‖ But that‘s about as good as can be hoped, he said: ―If secession takes place with conflict, then recovery times are much, much worse—and it can take a generation, if not longer.‖

Crackdowns like Spain‘s can risk inflaming that sort of conflict, and Catalonia‘s push for independence likewise threatens its economic well-being. Movements around the world are watching Spain in the coming days to see just how just how the crisis unfolds—and whether their turn could be next.

As in Greece, the higher the economic costs for Catalonia, the more likely that the separatist bloc might fracture.

Stathis Kalynas, ―Why Greece‘s Fate Helps Make Sense of Catalonia‘s Gamble‖, The Atlantic, 27 d‘octubre de 2017 https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/10/catalonias-gamble/544259/

Anticipating the Spanish government‘s decision to suspend Catalan autonomy, the Catalan government proceeded today to unilaterally proclaim independence. At about the same time, the Spanish Senate voted to suspend Catalan autonomy, following which Spanish prime minister Mariano Rajoy deposed Catalan premier Carles Puigdemont and other Catalan high officials, and called for elections in Catalonia to be held in December. Jointly, these actions are escalating the Catalan crisis. How are things likely to develop from now on?

Every political crisis is unique, yet sometimes analogies are useful—especially when crises are unfolding and the flow of information can be extremely confusing. Seen from this perspective, the Greek crisis of 2015 offers some useful analogies.

In 2010 Greece found itself unable to refinance its debt. Faced with the prospect of default, it accepted a massive bailout from its eurozone partners along with the IMF, in exchange for which it agreed to implement a large set of fiscally restrictive policies (―austerity‖) and structural reforms. In turn, these policies led to an acute economic recession and a parallel political crisis which went through various phases and resulted in a massive political realignment. This process culminated in the January 2015 elections, which produced a victory of an anti-austerity party, Syriza.

Headed by Syriza leader, and now prime minister, Alexis Tsipras, and its flamboyant, unorthodox finance minister Yanis Varoufakis, the new Greek government set out to renegotiate its bailout deal and extract more favorable conditions from its creditors, including a steep debt reduction. Its strategy consisted in threatening to default on its debt which, in theory, could endanger the euro and shake the European Union.

Although there were good arguments in favor of a renegotiation of the bailout agreement, Greece‘s goals were not really achievable. For one thing, a debt haircut was extremely unpopular among creditor eurozone countries, some of which were poorer than Greece; for another, such an outcome would have set a precedent and make the eurozone subject to blackmail by member states. In addition, most investors did not see a Greek default as posing a critical eurozone risk. Soon it became clear that the negotiations were going nowhere and the Greek government was hitting a wall. aced with this impasse, Tsipras called a referendum in July 2015, advocating the rejection of the bailout agreement‘s austerity policies. At the same time, he assured the Greek electorate that the costs of rejection were minimal. As a result, over 60 percent of the electorate followed his recommendation. The world held its breath. Would the eurozone cave in to Greek demands? Or would Tsipras concede and lose face? We know the outcome. The eurozone did not blink, and Germany went as far as propose that Greece exit the eurozone. Faced with the risk of economic implosion, Tsipras caved

in. He fired Varoufakis, purged his party from its most radical faction, and signed on the austerity measures.

The key lesson of the Greek case is that the crisis de-escalated when the Greek anti- austerity bloc split as a response to the economic cost of following through.

The Catalan crisis shares a key parallel with the Greek crisis. Setting aside arguments in its favor, the Catalan demand for independence is a very long shot, as perhaps was Greece‘s demand for a debt haircut in 2015. Catalan society is divided in the middle and secession creates a precedent that most states wish to prevent. It entails enormous complications, including Catalonia‘s EU and eurozone membership. The unilateral declaration of independence that the Catalan government has just voted in is an even longer shot. It goes against the wishes of a substantial part of the Catalan population and its elected representatives, the rest of Spain, the European Union, and the international community more broadly, including the United States. In many ways, the Catalan independence proclamation is reminiscent of the July 2015 Greek referendum. It is an expression of a wish rather than a real policy, a part of the bargaining process between the Catalan separatists and the Spanish government rather than its conclusion.

All of this is well known by both sides in this conflict. So, how are things going to play out? Much will depend on how the two sides deploy their weapons. On the one hand, the Spanish government has suspended Catalan autonomy and assumed direct control of the restive region. This move entails many practical concerns, not least of which is the use of force. Will Spain put the Catalan separatist leaders on trial? How will it sanction Catalan civil servants who refuse to obey Madrid‘s orders? Most importantly, will it offer options to moderate Catalan separatists, and if so, what kind? On the other hand, the Catalan separatists can count on the intense commitment and mobilization of a large segment of the local population and their ability to elicit international sympathy on their behalf. They will certainly count on widespread civil disobedience and will take advantage of any repressive state actions to paint themselves as victims whose cause is worthy of international support.

Two factors will be critical as the crisis inches forward: the use of state force and the depth of economic pain.

First, how will Spain use force in Catalonia? The more repressive the Spanish response, the more likely it is to be counterproductive, reinforcing the cohesion of the separatist bloc and weakening Madrid‘s position. If, on the other hand, the Spanish government offers a face-saving and credible way out to Catalan moderates, it could fracture the separatist bloc—an extremely heterogeneous coalition of pro-business center-rightists, moderate socialists, and anti-capitalist radical leftists.

Second is the extent of economic costs. Since the beginning of the crisis more than 1,300 firms, including major banks, have moved their headquarters out of Catalonia in response to political instability. Bank depositors have been equally volatile. As in Greece, the higher the economic costs for Catalonia, the more likely that the separatist bloc might fracture.

Barcelona‟s vote for independence, and Madrid‟s decision to take control of the region, will not solve this dispute but make matters worse

―Damage to Catalonia‖, The Guardian, 27 d‘octubre de 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/oct/27/the-guardian-view-on-spains- crisis-damage-to-catalonia

Thousands of Catalans cheered, danced and downed glasses of cava to celebrate the regional parliament‘s vote to declare independence from Spain on Friday. Less than an hour later, the national senate voted overwhelmingly to approve article 155 powers allowing Barcelona‘s authority to be removed in an attempt to stop independence in its tracks. The Spanish government has taken control of Catalonia, sacked its president, Carles Puigdemont, and called a snap regional election for December. Remain calm, Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy urged his compatriots; legality will be restored. He hopes for a speedy resolution. But despite the applause on one side and pledge of quiet resolution on the other, they all know that no end is in sight.

Independence is opposed by many Catalans – historically the majority of them, though current events may change that – as well as Spain and the rest of Europe. But using Article 155 is the ―nuclear option‖, never invoked since Spain returned to democracy after the death of Franco in 1975. A crisis already damaging both to a region that is deeply divided on the issue of secession (almost half of Catalan legislators walked out of Friday‘s vote), and to the country, has just got much worse.

It has been long in the making. But in recent months it has accelerated thanks to the recklessness and intransigence of both sides as they have ploughed on, intent on forcing the other to step aside or back down. That may owe less to the real conviction that they could strongarm their opponents than to the pressures they faced from their own side to stand firm. When reports spread on Thursday that Mr Puigdemont was about to call for fresh regional elections, offering a way out of the deadlock, allies in the independence movement tweeted ―fraud‖ and ―155 pieces of silver‖; protesters took to the streets. The increasingly ugly nature of the dispute can only make it harder to resolve matters.

And yet – as the anxiety in Madrid and Barcelona showed – declaring independence and invoking article 155 are in a sense the easy parts. Making these declarations real is quite another matter. For Catalan nationalists that is a very long-term challenge. But as officials and politicians in Madrid acknowledge, their path is not straightforward either. What happens if Catalans defy the decree en masse?

Concern is spreading. Mr Puigdemont has begun to pitch his case explicitly to a European audience, as a call for the upholding of universal principles, including self- determination: he will not win over governments, but may find their peoples more receptive. Jean-Claude Juncker, president of the European commission, warned that the EU did not need ―more cracks‖. A tweet from Donald Tusk, the European council president, reiterated that Spain remained the EU‘s ―only interlocutor‖, but added: ―I hope it favours force of argument, not argument of force.‖

There is no doubt that the Catalan leadership acted illegally in holding the referendum. There can equally be no doubt that Madrid turned a blind eye to legal and civil rights when it dismissed criticism of police brutality in the anti-referendum operations. It is beyond question that a legal response is inadequate to fix this problem: the Belgian prime minister, Charles Michel, was right to remind Spain that a political crisis can only be solved through dialogue. Madrid‘s inept and tone-deaf response to the independence movement has inflamed the cause, not dampened the fire. Matters should never have got to this stage. They should go no further. Economic damage is already evident; the damage to the social fabric of Spain, and Catalonia in particular, is equally obvious and, in the long run, may prove harder to repair. But when tempers are so heated it is clear that this crisis is likely to get worse before it gets better. How much more will be destroyed before the flames are beaten down?

Madrid‟s tactics put Catalonia‟s separatists in a fix, but they could backfire by handing the independence movement a clear win

Giles Tremlett, ―Calling an election will by no means resolve the Catalan conundrum‖, The Guardian, 30 d‘octubre de 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/30/calling-an-election-will-by-no-means- resolve-the-catalan-conundrum

When Catalans vote for a new regional government on 21 December, truncheon- wielding riot police should be absent and the results will clearly be valid, but the Spanish prime minister‘s decision to call a snap election, combined with the imposition of direct rule, does not magically resolve the problem.

Much could, and probably will, go wrong before then, as the cat-and-mouse game between Madrid and Catalonia‘s independence movement enters a new phase.

It is still not clear that all separatist parties will stand. If they do, they look unlikely to maintain the unity that has turned them into such a formidable force. Conservatives and anti-capitalists were always a strange and strained alliance.

Oriol Junqueras, who was sacked as deputy prime minister with the rest of the Catalan government on Friday, is expected to become the independence movement‘s leader as his Republican Left of Catalonia(ERC) party storms past more moderate rivals.

His warning on Sunday that the movement must now take ―decisions that will be difficult to understand‖ reveals a terrible dilemma. If his party stands, it will be accused of backtracking on claims that Catalonia is now an independent republic – even if no other country recognises it. If it does not stand, it will be accused of cowardice.

Mariano Rajoy‘s government in Madrid has challenged the deposed Catalan president, Carles Puigdemont, to stand so that voters can judge his behaviour. Puigdemont, however, was a compromise candidate in January 2016 and will reportedly step back. His conservative Catalan European Democratic party (PDeCAT), a recent convert to separatism, has clearly lost its position as the region‘s dominant party.

With emboldened unionists demonstrating in Barcelona on Sunday and many politicians already in campaign mode, the separatist side is mulling its options.

In many ways, this is the best possible moment for the independence movement to go to elections. With some of its leaders now remanded in jail – but able to run as candidates – while Puigdemont and others face long-running court cases, sympathy is running high. The memory of police violence during the chaotic 1 October referendum remains fresh.

Rajoy wants voters to punish the separatists for the chaos of recent weeks and for any future disruption, including upcoming strikes. With Catalonia‘s biggest banks and companies moving their registered headquarters elsewhere and the lack of EU support now obvious to all, he hopes waverers will back down.

Rajoy also expects a so-called silent majority of non-separatist Catalans to shake off their apathy and vote. This is risky, because the police violence on 1 October may have shrunk their numbers or they may prove to be a figment of unionist imagination.

In the meantime, legal action against Puigdemont for deliberately flouting the Spanish constitution is likely to provoke another round of peaceful mass demonstrations. Separatists know violence would dramatically damage their cause, and Puigdemont called on Saturday for civic and peaceful conduct, though he does not control the entire movement.

On Sunday the only violence came from a small group of ultra-rightists who joined the unionist demonstration.

Separatists will seek other ways to keep people mobilised. The remains of the deposed government could issue their own instructions to 200,000 public sector workers in the hope that some will defy direct rule. At a more local level, separatist mayors may also start a campaign of disobedience that leads them to court.

The results of open elections are impossible to predict, especially because Catalonia seems to be almost equally divided into two. At the last regional elections in September 2015, separatists won 48% of the vote but took a majority of seats.

After the events of recent weeks, a unionist victory would be deeply humiliating for the separatists, but Rajoy is taking a risk because a clear victory by the independence movement would help win the support that it lacks among EU governments.

It may also finally oblige his conservative People‘s party to accept that the constitution which Spaniards, and Catalans, approved so massively in 1978 is overdue for a rewrite.

It is surely not beyond the wit of Catalans and Spaniards to work out a form of amicable association that both can live with

―The Observer view on independence for Catalonia‖, The Observer, 29 d‘octubre de 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/oct/29/observer-view- independence-catalonia

The imposition of direct rule in Catalonia is, at best, a stopgap measure that will do little to resolve, and may seriously aggravate, the long-standing problem of the region‘s troubled and rivalrous relationship with Madrid. Mariano Rajoy, Spain‘s prime minister, says that, in the end, he had no choice but to take the ―nuclear option‖ of sacking Catalonia‘s government and placing himself and his ministers in charge. But while his actions may calm the situation in the short term – and the tense days to come will be determine whether that is the case – Rajoy has set a time bomb ticking that could ultimately explode in his face.

The fresh regional elections Rajoy has scheduled for 21 December promise to be a titanic battle of wills between those who passionately believe in Catalonia‘s future as a sovereign republic and those who are equally passionate about upholding the union with Spain. The polls will, in effect, become the referendum on Catalan independence that the Madrid government has fought so hard to prevent. The regional election in 2015 was cast in a similar light by Artur Mas, the then leader of the independence forces, but he failed to secure an absolute majority. In December, his successors will hope for a more decisive outcome.

One of many problems with this scenario is the as yet unanswered question of whether Carles Puigdemont, the current Catalan president, and other senior figures in his pro- independence coalition will contest, or be allowed to contest, the election. Prosecutors in Madrid are planning to file charges of rebellion against Puigdemont that carry a penalty of up to 30 years in jail. Prompted by Rajoy, Spain‘s constitutional court is expected to rule that last Friday‘s declaration of independence by the Catalan assembly was illegal. All 70 MPs who voted for it potentially face arrest, as do civil servants or police officers who reject direct rule.

How can Rajoy hope to mount a free, fair and credible election if his principal opponents are in jail or on the run? How can there be an open, democratic debate if television and radio stations and newspapers deemed to be biased in favour of independence are brought under state control? Who in Catalonia, or internationally, would credit the results of such a poll? If the Madrid authorities persist in their apparent determination to punish the secessionist leadership, an election that may represent their best chance of ending the crisis will be condemned as a travesty. It would certainly be boycotted by many Catalans. It will be doomed from the start.

Such considerations are but one reason, among many, why Rajoy must now tread very carefully – or risk blowing himself up. Dialogue, not retribution, should be his aim. It is far from clear whether Puigdemont and his leftwing allies, specialists in rash, provocative and inflammatory behaviour, will quietly give themselves up to a Spanish justice system they understandably distrust. It is unclear whether Catalan public sector workers, security forces, labour unions and university students will tamely submit to

Madrid‘s diktats. Although the immediate reaction to Rajoy‘s démarche has been muted, there are calls for a general strike tomorrow. Tensions could quickly escalate. The great nightmare, for both sides, is the possibility that the attempt to enforce central government authority, gathering pace in the coming days amid widening civil disobedience and resistance on the streets, will trigger a descent into violence. Rajoy and Puigdemont both have a duty to prevent such a deterioration. Both need to exhibit a responsible judiciousness and sense of proportion that has too frequently been lacking. This means, for Rajoy, no more incendiary arrests of key opponents or police crackdowns, no acts of political revenge and no playing to the hardline unionist gallery in Madrid. Now that the high point of the crisis has arrived, he must make a courageous, practical commitment to openly discuss the best way forward.

For his part, Puigdemont must eschew the gesture politics and vainglorious posturing that have characterised his approach. Independence for Catalonia is a respectable ambition. But it cannot be conjured into existence by otiose declarations, specious parliamentary manoeuvres, media manipulation and spin, misuse of public funds and the intimidation of ordinary citizens. To become a reality, independence requires the clear majority in favour within Catalonia that it presently lacks, the maximum possible degree of agreement with the Spanish state and people and the support of the international community. These conditions have not yet been met. The case has not yet been made. It could be. If Puigdemont cannot make the leap from agitator to statesman, he should not wait for the knock on the door. He must step aside and let somebody else try.

The stakes for Catalonia, Spain and Europe are incredibly high. If meaningful elections do take place in December, they could produce another pro-independence administration in Barcelona with an enhanced majority and an undeniable mandate for secession. Such an outcome could spell the end of Rajoy‘s premiership – and of Spain as a unified state. Alternatively, a majority of Catalans could vote to remain, influenced by the ever more obvious economic consequences of secession, as banks, businesses and investors relocate and Spaniards boycott Catalan products. Yet would the struggle for independence then be over? Not at all. It would merely be deferred.

The Catalan dilemma is one, dramatic, illustration of a bigger problem for the many European nation states that face secessionist pressures, namely, the unresolved question of the right to self-determination. Respect for the equal rights of national minorities is one of the European Union‘s core values, incorporated in the EU‘s founding treaty and charter of fundamental rights. The UN charter plainly states that a people has the right to freely choose their sovereignty and international status without interference. But nowhere in international law is it laid down how such a decision is properly made, what it entails (for example, autonomy, federation or outright independence) or, indeed, what in this context constitutes ―a people‖.

Given the existential reluctance of established states to yield territory and power, this conundrum has no easy solution, whether it is played out in Scotland, Corsica or Upper Silesia (or in the American colonies in 1776). But where the law fails, common sense should prevail. Catalonia is, by most measures, a prosperous and successful place. Its people do not suffer hunger, preventable diseases or military oppression. They are not murdered, raped or displaced (unlike millions in recently independent South Sudan). Catalans, on the whole, like Spaniards, on the whole, lead a fortunate, peaceful,

privileged existence. Barcelona, like London, is a model international city, where divisions of nationality, race, colour and creed increasingly belong to the past. In such propitious circumstances, it is surely not beyond the wit of Catalans and Spaniards to work out a form of amicable association that both can live with. To fight would be self- indulgent foolishness.

Miguel-Anxo Murado, ―Catalonia‘s nationalist leaders are well aware their project is fragile‖, The Guardian, 29 d‘octubre de 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/29/catalonia-independence-madrid- elections-rajoy

During the rapturous celebrations in Barcelona‘s Sant Jaume Square following the pronouncement of Catalonia‘s independence on Friday, there was a nagging little detail in the background. Many demonstrators noticed it and there were shouts of ―Fora, fora, la bandera espanyola! [Out with the Spanish flag!]‖ Indeed, even hours after the birth of the new Catalan Republic, the flag of what was now deemed a foreign country kept flying on top of the presidential palace.

Whether this was due to a technical difficulty or an oversight, it looked like a Freudian slip. For those in the square, independence was a long-held dream: but was it now a dream come true, or just a mirage?

Judging from their concerned looks, the nationalist leaders seemed aware of the fragility of their project. To secede is not, necessarily, to succeed. To have sovereignty, you need two things at least: international recognition and control over your territory.

Recognition has not been forthcoming, especially from where it matters most. The European Union, in its Brexit mindset, couldn‘t be less inclined to pander to a region breaking away from a key member state such as Spain. As for control of the territory, the general strike set to begin tomorrow is aimed at giving the new republic at least some semblance of that, but it will be incomplete and temporary.

Madrid has invoked article 155 of the Spanish constitution, which allows it direct rule over a regional government. But the Spanish state has little presence in the region – Catalonia enjoys the highest possible level of autonomy, and to reassert itself, the central government may have to act forcefully.

This is what the nationalists both hope and fear: that in doing so, it may repeat the blunder of 1 October, when an attempt by the police to pre-empt an illegal referendum backfired spectacularly – by failing in its aim and also providing ugly scenes of violence. Now, arresting the Catalan president and his government for rebellion – as the state prosecutor has vowed to do – and taking control of a huge, and partly hostile, Catalan regional administration, could turn into a nightmare for Madrid.

Madrid knows this and that‘s why prime minister Mariano Rajoy has decided to make an unexpected move: he has called a snap regional election. This crucial vote will be held on 21 December, the eve of Christmas Lottery Day in Spain. It‘s an aptly chosen date, for this will be a gamble.

By calling an election so soon, Rajoy hopes to spare himself most of the nasty stuff of taking Catalonia to task by setting up a new regional government that would do the job for him. At the same time, he is forcing on the nationalists a tricky conundrum: if they take part in the vote, it will be a depressing climbdown for them, an admission that their independence is a mere bluff.

At least one nationalist party, the far-left CUP (Popular Unity Candidacy) will boycott in the vote, which makes a unionist victory more likely, especially with the Catalan administration hemmed in by Madrid. If all three of the nationalist parties finally shun the election, they will be shut out from the new parliament, and it could get cold outside.

Rajoy‘s is a well-played hand, but perhaps also a bluff that could end in a flop. The nationalists may finally decide not to stand in the election and, if turnout is low, the new parliament‘s legitimacy will look precarious. And if the nationalists pick up the gauntlet and present a united list, they could turn the election into an undeclared plebiscite on independence. This they may win, even if their platform for a sovereign republic will look somewhat redundant and contradictory.

Making the election happen at all may prove as difficult as winning it. With just over 50 days to go and neither side in full control, accidents can happen. Violence – hitherto almost completely absent – is unlikely, but not impossible. One good sign is that the Catalan government seems to have decided to leave the Catalan regional police out of the fray, but tensions are inevitable, and they can spiral out of control even if both sides intend to exercise restraint.

A lot will depend on luck. Christmas Lottery Day is going to be really dramatic this year.

Warning that deposed Catalan president could be jailed within two months comes as huge protest held against independence

Sam Jones, Stephen Burgen and Emma Graham-Harrison, The Guardian, 29 d‘octubre de 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/29/spain-barcelona-set-for-huge- rally-against-catalan-independence-catalonia

The Spanish government has said the deposed Catalan president, Carles Puigdemont, could be jailed within the next two months over his part in the regional parliament‘s unilateral declaration of independence.

The warning came on Sunday afternoon as hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets of Barcelona to call for Spanish unity two days after some Catalan MPs voted for independence and the Spanish government assumed control of the region.

Spain‘s prime minister, Mariano Rajoy, has sacked Puigdemont and his government and called regional elections for 21 December. In an interview with the Associated Press, the country‘s foreign minister, Alfonso Dastis, said Puigdemont could ―theoretically‖ run for re-election in the vote if the courts decide he should remain free until then.

Spanish prosecutors said on Friday that they would file charges of rebellion against Puigdemont, a crime punishable with up to 30 years in prison. ―I don‘t know what kind of judicial activity will happen between now and 21 December,‖ said Dastis. ―If he is not put in jail at that time I think he is not ineligible.‖

According to a poll for El Mundo, the December election could be very close, with anti- independence parties winning 43.4% of the vote to pro-independence parties‘ 42.5 %.

Dastis told Catalan separatists to ―think twice‖ before rejecting the election as it ―will be held according to the law. So the results will have to be respected afterwards.‖

He did, however, hint that there could yet be negotiations over a new deal for Catalonia. ―I rule out full independence but not necessarily more autonomy, even if they are now already one of the regions with the highest powers and competences not only in Spain but in the world at large,‖ he said.

Sunday‘s demonstration, which was convened by the anti-independence group Societat Civil Catalana, saw a huge crowd mass in central Barcelona. Organisers put attendance at 1.3 million, while the city‘s police said 300,000 turned out. Another pro-unity protest this month drew similar numbers.

People with Spanish flags tied around their necks congregated on the Passeig de Gràcia, one of Barcelona‘s main thoroughfares. Others carried white banners with the flags of Catalonia, Spain and the EU surrounded by a heart.

The event‘s slogan was ―We are all Catalonia. Common sense for coexistence‖ and drew people from the region and beyond as well as members of the Spanish government and pro-unity Catalan MPs.

Speaking shortly before the rally, Inés Arrimadas of the Ciutadans (Citizens) party, said: ―The silent majority of Catalans are once again taking to the street to show that the majority of Catalans feel Catalan, Spanish and European.‖

Arrimadas said the time had come to ―restore Catalonia‘s institutions‖ and prepare for the December elections.

Juan Montalvo, 65, a retiree from Mataró, a town 2o miles from Barcelona, had travelled to the protest with his 29-year-old son Roger.

―We‘ve come to give our opinion and show that part of Catalonia feels Spanish as well,‖ he said. ―Catalan society is divided. We need to achieve more unity, but also to show [pro-independence Catalans] that we are 50% and they need to respect us like we need to respect them.‖

Montalvo, who was born in Extremadura, said he felt increasingly like a Spanish immigrant even though he speaks Catalan and is married to a woman from the region. His son added: ―I feel Catalan, but for me that means being Catalan inside a Spanish state.‖

Some protesters shouted: ―Viva España‖ while others vented their anger at the region‘s sacked president, chanting: ―Puigdemont to prison!‖

Despite the Spanish government‘s unprecedented use of article 155 of the country‘s constitution to take control of Catalonia‘s civil service, police, finances and public media, some pro-independence politicians have refused to recognise the measures.

Writing in the Catalan newspaper El Punt Avui on Sunday, Oriol Junqueras, the vice- president of the deposed Catalan government, accused Rajoy‘s ruling Partido Popular (People‘s party) of overthrowing regional democracy.

―We cannot recognise the coup d‘état against Catalonia, nor any of the anti-democratic decisions that the PP is adopting by remote control from Madrid,‖ he said. ―The president of the country is and will continue to be Carles Puigdemont… at least until the day the citizens do not decide otherwise in a free election.‖

However, Junqueras also said that decisions would have to be made over the coming days that ―won‘t be easy to understand‖, adding that the independence movement would push onwards ―without ever giving up ballot boxes to validate the republic‖.

On Saturday, Puigdemont said efforts would continue ―to build a free nation‖, adding: ―We must do so resisting repression and threats, without ever abandoning, at any time, civic and peaceful conduct.‖

Dastis dismissed such calls, saying any attempt by Puigdemont or his allies to continue in office this week would prove futile as regional civil servants would not heed their instructions.

―If he wants to live in a parallel universe he may go on, but nobody, I think, is going to obey him,‖ said Dastis. ―No matter what he says, the central government is now in charge of Catalonia, although we have clearly decided we don‘t want to be there for the long run.‖

While the Spanish government has sacked the Catalan government and as many as 150 officials, it remains to be seen to what extent it will take over the running of the civil service, which includes about 200,000 employees in the administration, health and social services and education.

Employees of the Generalitat, the Catalan government, told the Guardian they had not received any instructions or warnings of the changes might lie ahead, although there had been some informal meetings by staff worried about the implications of article 155. Nor had anyone in the Barcelona provincial government department received official notification.

School headteachers and inland revenue employees also said they had not received any notifications.

In an open letter to all the police stationed in Catalonia – including the regional police force, the Mossos d‘Esquadra – Spain‘s interior minister, Juan Ignacio Zoido, reminded all officers they had a duty to ―obey orders, guarantee the rights of all, and fulfil the mandates‖ of both the Spanish constitution and the region‘s statue.

It is unclear whether Madrid plans to micromanage Catalonia or if it will let it run itself for the 53 days that remain before the election and, presumably, the resumption of regional autonomy.

As the Spanish government prepared to implement its strategy, Belgium‘s immigration minister incurred Madrid‘s wrath by suggesting that Puigdemont could be offered asylum in the country.

―It‘s not unrealistic, looking at the current situation,‖ Theo Francken, a member of the Flemish separatist N-VA party, told the Flemish-language broadcaster VTM on Saturday. ―Looking at the repression by Madrid and the jail sentences that are being proposed, the question can be asked whether he still has the chance for an honest court hearing.‖

Belgium‘s prime minister, Charles Michel, later clarified that an asylum request from Puigdemont was ―absolutely not on the agenda‖, while a spokesman for Rajoy‘s Partido Popular described Francken‘s remarks as ―unacceptable‖ and said the Belgian minister had levelled ―serious accusations against Spain‘s legal system‖ that required an immediate correction.

Secession from Spain would be unwise for many reasons. But in this age of hectic change, the search for identity cannot simply be dismissed

Matthew d‘Ancona, ―The Catalan dream will not be extinguished by force‖, The Guardian, 29 d‘octubre de 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/oct/29/catalan-force-secession- spain-identity-catalonia

It‘s remarkable what you can learn in Slovenia. At a conference on politics, security and development in Bled earlier this year, I was lucky enough to chat to the Catalan delegates, proudly representing the interests and wisdom of their ancient principality. With considerable poise and dignity, they seemed to me to be channelling Pericles on the Athenians: we do not imitate, but are a model to others.

So I am not surprised that Madrid is as frightened as it evidently is by Catalonia‘s unilateral declaration of independence. This is not a tinpot province threatening to secede as a means of squeezing a bridge or two out of central government. Recognised as a distinct political entity since the 12th century, it has always treasured its autonomy – lost under Franco and recovered after his death in 1975. Since Friday, its separation from Spain to become a fully functioning sovereign state, though still improbable, is quite conceivable.

This alone represents a terrible defeat for Mariano Rajoy, the Spanish prime minister, whose response was to order the sacking of the entire Catalan government, the closure of Barcelona‘s ministries, the dismissal of Catalonia‘s police chief and the dissolution of its regional parliament. Though Madrid has generously declared that Carles Puigdemont, the deposed Catalan president, is welcome to run in the snap election on 21 December, he remains, confusingly, at risk of arrest for rebellion.

There are all sorts of cogent arguments against secession – the best of which is that Catalonia itself is profoundly divided on the question. The region has a low credit rating, and debts that have more than tripled since 2009. It is not remotely ready to manage its own defence, currency, utilities, border controls and infrastructure. An absolute rupture from Spain would make Brexit seem a mere bagatelle.

Yet Madrid – aided by Brussels – appears determined to inflame separatist emotions rather than seek a diplomatic solution to the crisis. The independence referendum held on 1 October may have been technically illegal, as Spain‘s constitutional court asserted, but the often brutal manner in which the poll was obstructed by the national police and Guardia Civil made such appeals to the rule of law seem like a preposterous fig leaf for street-level authoritarianism.

While the Spanish government pontificated, social media fizzed with shocking video of officers in riot gear using violence to prevent Catalan citizens from peacefully casting their votes. At that point, the question changed from ―Is this referendum meaningful?‖ to ―How are such scenes possible on the streets of a modern liberal democracy?‖

Rajoy‘s strategy has been spectacularly unnuanced. At every turn, he has scorned the independence movement as no more than a plot ―to liquidate our constitution‖, a ―criminal‖ conspiracy, and ―a clear violation of the laws, of democracy, of the rights of all‖. King Felipe VI has loftily chastised Catalans for trying ―to break the unity of Spain and its national sovereignty, which is the right of all Spaniards to democratically decide their lives together‖. With dependable insensitivity, Jean-Claude Juncker declaredon Saturday: ―There isn‘t room in Europe for other fractures or other cracks – we‘ve had enough of those.‖ The Brussels naughty step is getting rather crowded.

Because of Spain‘s singular history, the integrity of the nation has special significance. In a country governed by a military dictator between 1939 and 1975, the threat of disaggregation and lawlessness is especially vivid.

But in an age of hectic change such as ours, history must be granted a vote rather than a veto. Bad memories may explain present errors, but they do not excuse them. And Rajoy is proving himself unequal to the moment. Simply asserting that the rules have been broken and will be enforced is a pitiful approach to a hugely complex cultural dilemma.

Take a step back: if the early 21st century has a unifying theme, it is that the rules-based order that seemed triumphant in 1989 faces a series of fundamental challenges. Prime among them is a burgeoning of the secessionist impulse, of tribalism and populist resistance to distant elites. In this era of disruption, nomadism and technological revolution, the appeal of place and space has returned. A longing for what Heidegger called wohnen – ―dwelling‖ – is suddenly resurgent. In some instances, as in Charlottesville, this takes the form of a despicable blood-and-soil nativism. But the instinct is not always reprehensible. For Catalans to crave their own nation is not intrinsically wrong, whatever its impracticalities and inconveniences.

Those of us who still value rules-based internationalism have to acknowledge that not everyone is at ease on the rollercoaster of modernity. That much was made clear by last year‘s EU referendum and the election of Donald Trump. The notion that politics is simply a branch of economics is no longer sustainable (if, indeed, it ever was). The issue of identity has assumed a fresh importance that we ignore at our peril.

It takes pathological form in the ugly ―identitarian‖ movements of the European far right. But it also infuses the politics of the mainstream – from Catalan separatism to parliament‘s scrutiny of the EU withdrawal bill. The primal need to belong, to be more than a tiny cog in a global machine, is asserting itself with astonishing force. As Sebastian Junger writes in his book Tribe: ―Humans don‘t mind hardship, in fact they thrive on it; what they mind is not feeling necessary.‖

I am deeply suspicious of the populism that offers easy solutions to complex problems: secession, like hostility to immigration, cannot possibly be the panacea that its champions typically claim. I still believe in the liberal order, viable nation-states and the supranational agreements that make possible global collaboration between them. But it is idle to pretend in 2017 that this order is in especially good shape.

We are in the foothills of a formidable debate about its future, and how it should be adapted to address the inequities of globalisation, the transformative power of technology, and the fears of communities great and small that they will be swept away by the hurricane of change. If the Catalan crisis has a lesson to date, it is that Madrid‘s answer – repressive constitutionalism, so to speak – is no answer at all. Saying the same, only louder, will not preserve the integrity of Spain or of anything else. In the unfolding of history, the greatest mistake is to believe there is a script.

Madrid has promised regional elections but the vote cannot be held fairly in a toxic media environament

Peter Preston, ―What Catalonia‘s media dearly needs is neutral voices‖, The Guardian, 29 d‘octubre de 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/29/free-speech- catalonia-madrid-toxic-media

Here‘s a stinker of a question, the whole concept of press freedom tangled in its own contradictions. If you run a government-financed broadcasting system (say Catalan radio and TV) can some higher authority (say the Spanish state) take control of you when it steps in to run everything?

Maybe an easy problem if we‘re talking about independent, truth-seeking newsrooms. But what if that is not exactly possible? See the shades of grey gather. Here‘s the EU head of Reporters Sans Frontières, quoted in a new report on the Catalan imbroglio: ―The climate for the free exercise of journalism has been tremendously corrupted by extreme polarisation in Catalan politics and society. The regional government‘s eagerness to impose its own narrative on to the local, Spanish and international press has crossed red lines, and the intimidating manoeuvres of the central Spanish government have certainly not helped.‖

Here‘s the boss of TV3, the main Catalan channel: ―The legality for the director of television in Catalonia is the legality that emanates from the parliament of Catalonia.‖ His staff ―will oppose‖ the national government‘s intervention. He believes that ―the parliamentary majority‖ for Catalan independence ―represents a majority social feeling‖ that overrides Spanish legalities.

Catalan TV and radio – perhaps especially radio – are not negligible forces. They account for 31% of all regional broadcasting money spent in Spain. And television meshes with print and online activity. TV3 stalwarts are on the board of Ara, the biggest Catalan-only paper in the region (with an online audience close to 2.5 million). President Carles Puigdemont is a journalist who worked for El Punt in Girona, one of the staunchest pro-independence areas. Last year, according to the Madrid paper El Mundo, the Catalan Generalitat gave €7m in grants to chosen media, with well over a million going to Ara and El Punt. There‘s been a forest of magic money trees before that.

So much for background. What about the future – including regional elections promised on 21 December? How can they be held fairly in a toxic media climate – which, of course, won‘t be helped by the countervailing bias of Madrid‘s public service media? Does Madrid impose discipline, censorship by another name? Or does it let the vituperation roll – and abide by the non-intervention initiatives of Rajoy‘s socialist partners? Go one way and all those Franco memories will get another airing. Go the other and the vote may be fatally compromised.

The difficulty is that the two paths are equally fraught. But when in doubt, always choose less rather than more repression, no matter how difficult it is. See the stick given to the followers of the Spanish prime minister, Mariano Rajoy, only a few weeks ago, when they took down Catalan websites.

There will be neutral monitors when the election comes, and there ought to be neutral media voices in play before that. Let them report regularly and openly. Ask Catalan newspapers, websites and broadcasters to carry their verdicts on events as a voluntary running commentary. Begin transparent work towards a better appointments system for editors and directors. Keep parliament and press freedoms at arm‘s length.

But leave your heavy boots in the hall. Tread softly. ―Both sides should understand that the best sign of a democracy is a free press, with journalists who seek truthful information and feel no need to self-censor,‖ says the RSF director. It will be infernally difficult after the shambles of the last few days. But it‘s a flag on the battlefield that must still be saluted.

Caroline Mortimer, ―Catalan crisis: Why does Catalonia want independence? Do the majority really support it?, The Independent, 29 d‘octubre de 2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/catalan-crisis-why-does-catalonia- want-independence-do-people-really-support-it-spain-latest-a8025836.html

The crisis in Catalonia began on 1 October after the Catalan parliament held a referendum on independence which the Madrid government had already declared illegal.

The Civil Guard, Spain‘s semi-militarised central police force, were sent in to stop people voting and were condemned for their heavy-handed tactics which saw them firing rubber bullets into the crowd and beating people as they arrived at polling stations.

Dismissed President Carles Puigdemont declared Catalonia to be an independent republic, only for Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy to impose Article 155 of the Spanish constitution – which allows the central government to take direct control of a province – and order fresh regional elections for 21 December.

Mr Puigdemont then accused Mr Rajoy of the ―worst attack on Catalan institutions since the dictator General Franco ordered the end of our autonomy‖.

He was referring to a long history of grievances between Spain and one of its most troublesome provinces.

Was Catalonia independent before?

Not really, but it has always been fiercely proud of its distinct language and cultural heritage and has always zealously guarded its autonomy.

Although many Spanish schoolchildren are brought up on the myth of the ―Reconquista‖ – where Christian knights gradually pushed Muslim rulers out of the peninsula during the Middle Ages as part of a grand plan to unite Spain under Catholic rule – the country as we know it today largely came into being during the 16th century. After Ferdinand and Isabella conquered the last Muslim kingdom, Granada, and began to build an international empire, their grandson Philip II, husband of Mary Tudor, became the first ruler to declare himself the ―King of Spain‖ instead of each individual Spanish kingdom.

To this day Spain remains something of a mishmash of different territories which each have their own distinct heritage and traditions – the Spanish national anthem famously has no lyrics because they cannot agree on what to say.

So is Catalonia like the other Spanish regions?

Many of the other regions have their own languages and separate cultural traditions but in Catalonia, along with the equally restive Basque Country, the desire to emphasis the difference seems particularly pronounced.

The Catalan language comes from the same Latin root and has many similarities with Spanish (unlike Basque) but it is recognised as distinct.

Catalonia has always seen itself as separate from the rest of Spain as it has historically had its own regional government.

It maintained a degree of autonomy under the Spanish crown until the early 18th century when King Felipe V signed a series of decrees which clamped down on the region's independent institutions, language and culture.

He was a newly installed king from the French royal family who had come to power after the War of Spanish Succession between France on one side and Britain and Austria on the other, after the last king died without an heir.

The Catalans had sided with the British and the Austrians during the war and declared independence, but had been forced to become part of a centralised Spain based on a similar model of government in France.

When Spain was declared a republic in 1931, Catalonia was granted an autonomous regional government but this proved short-lived as the country soon erupted in civil war which led to the fascist General Francisco Franco coming to power.

Franco seized control of Barcelona in 1939 and executed Catalonia's political leaders, including former Catalan president Lluís Companys, at the fortress on the Montjuic hill which overlooks the city in 1940.

For decades the Catalans suffered under his harsh rule as political opposition was violently suppressed as well as their autonomy, language and culture. Their regional government was only restored in 1979, four years after his death.

The Catalan language was also given equal status with Spanish as an official language of government for the first time.

So it is a historical grievance then?

Not entirely. Although the longest history of oppression and centralisation from Madrid has cast a shadow over the modern age – and is often used as a rallying call by pro- independence politicians – it is modern-day politics and economics which are driving this latest constitutional crisis.

In 2010, a decision by the Spanish Constitutional Court – the country‘s equivalent of a Supreme Court – struck down a law passed by the Catalan parliament in 2006 which updated the autonomous government‘s statute from 1979 which mapped out its relations with the rest of Spain.

T he court struck down 14 articles and curtailed another 27 of the 223 articles in the statute – rejecting a pledge to place the importance of the Catalan language above Spanish and anything that suggested Catalonia was a ―nation‖ as opposed to a ―region‖. This led to massive street protests and the rise of the pro-independence political parties who now control the Catalan parliament.

In 2014 there was an unofficial referendum on independence in which 80 per cent of voters said they wanted Catalonia to be an independent state.

But unlike in 2017, the Catalan government branded it as a ―popular consultation process‖ to gauge public opinion and did not threaten to declare independence unilaterally.

It’s the economy stupid

The renewed bid for political independence came at a time when Spain as a whole was facing an acute financial crisis.

It was one of four massively indebted Eurozone countries, alongside Portugal, Ireland and Greece, who were forced to go to the European Union for a loan to shore up their finances.

This and the years of harsh austerity policies that followed lead to the rise of populist parties across Spain and an increasing frustration in the wealthy Catalonia.

Catalonia is the richest region in Spain and if it successfully seceded Madrid could lose 20 per cent of its GDP.

Many Catalans feel they are paying high taxes and suffering under austerity to shore up the profligacy of a country they have little in common with.

A large proportion believe they will be wealthier and more successful if they go it alone in future.

So what’s next?

It is currently unclear. Barcelona and Madrid are currently locked in stalemate and there appears to be no immediate risk that the army will be deployed to the streets of Barcelona.

The Madrid government‘s next step would be to arrest Mr Puigdemont for sedition, which carries up to 25 years in prison, but appear to have adopted a ―wait and see‖ approach. Neither side wants to resort to violence and Madrid is conscious of not encouraging similar independence movements in the Basque Country and Galicia.

Mr Puigdemont continues to defy the Madrid government but it is also unclear just how much of the Catalan population do genuinely want to leave Spain or indeed the EU as it will involve a major economic shock. They are likely to no longer be able to use the euro as currency and will initially have no access to financial markets.

Hamish McRae, ―Catalonia could be an extremely successful econony and EU member State‖, The Independent, 29 d‘octubre de 2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/catalonia-spain-independence-vote-economy- population-location-trade-currency-a8025051.html

It is not for foreign economists to take positions on the independence of Catalonia, for that is for the people of Catalonia and Spain to decide. What can be said, though, is that if Catalonia were to become a fully independent country there is no reason why it should not – after a period of disruption – be an extremely successful economy.

There are a number of reasons why this is likely to be so. For a start, it has a population of 7.5 million. There is no right or wrong size as such, for there are successful countries that are very small: Luxembourg, with a population of just under 600,000, is the richest country in the world in terms of GDP per person. (Monaco probably comes in higher, but it is a special case.) And of course the three largest countries in terms of population – China, India and the US – are also success stories in their own ways.

But there does seem to be a sweet spot in the 5 million to 15 million bracket, where countries are big enough to offer their citizens a full range of services but are also small enough to be socially cohesive. This includes Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Switzerland. Catalonia would naturally join that group.

That argument leads to a second condition for success: location. Countries cannot choose their location, and have to make the best of what they have. But if your neighbours are doing well, unless you deliberately cut yourself off from them, you will tend to be pulled along too. Catalonia, in that sense, is lucky in several ways. It has prosperous neighbours, France and the rest of Spain (though relations with the latter would be difficult for a while). It has a coastline, and a Mediterranean one at that. Barcelona and Tarragona, a little to the south, are Spain‘s two largest ports.

Third, it has an established economic base. It is a manufacturing centre, has two top- ranking business schools, and the usual array of service industries. Separatists have noted that though Catalonia has about 18 per cent of Spain‘s population, it generates more than 20 per cent of its GDP. Were it to be fully independent, with Barcelona and its 1.6 million people, it would have one of the glitziest capital cities on earth.

A final point: Catalonia has brand recognition. Brand is an intangible advantage, but can be deployed to leverage other economic advantages. Ireland is a fine example of that, using its brand (and its educated workforce) to make it a base for high-tech American companies seeking to enter the European market. On its own, Catalonia could be nimble in attracting business, and consequently creating jobs, than it has been as part of Spain. But these advantages are general ones, formidable in the medium and long run, but less helpful in the short. To get from here to there is difficult, and political disruption leads

to economic disruption. Unlike the separation of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, if this is to be a divorce, it will not be a velvet one.

There are a string of practical questions. What currency would Catalonia use? It would probably have to establish its own, as it would be difficult to continue to use the euro, even informally. In the long run, a separate currency might well to be the country‘s benefit, for the inflexibility that the euro has imposed on Spain is one of the reasons why it has such high unemployment. But in the immediate days and months after independence, this would be very disruptive. It would be difficult for the banks based there, some of which have said they would relocate their legal headquarters. It would also be difficult for business and tourism.

My guess is that an independent Catalonia would be welcomed into the EU if it still wanted to rejoin, but that could take a decade. In the meantime we are seeing hostility from the EU. As for the other major countries, while their present stance of not recognising Catalonia is quite understandable and correct, if and when the country became truly independent, they have no option but to accept reality. But – and this is important – there is a considerable economic cost to political disruption on this scale. The call for calm by Catalonia‘s sacked leader Carles Puigdemont is sensible and strikes a helpful tone. Let‘s see what happens. But if the end does turn out to be a new European country, then in another decade it is likely to be a prosperous one.

Unless both sides step back from deepening confrontation and accept compromise, the outlook for Spain and Catalonia looks bleak

―Catalonia‘s declaration of independence has come too soon‖, The Independent, 28 d‘octubre de 2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/editorials/catalonia-s- declaration-of-independence-has-come-too-soon-a8024856.html

The decision by the Catalan parliament to declare independence from Spain is the latest in a long chain of misjudgements on both sides.

The leaders of the Catalan independence movement are playing games, hoping that by escalating the conflict with an unwisely confrontational central government in Madrid they will increase support for their notional republic. If it works, it would only be by causing conflict and tension that is not in the interest of the peoples on either side of the border between Catalonia and the rest of Spain.

There are only two peaceful routes to sustainable independence for Catalonia. One would be what might be called the Scottish route: to work towards a referendum by agreement with the central government in Madrid, in which both sides would respect the outcome. Sadly, that option has not been possible, partly because the Madrid government is too influenced by the history of the Civil War (in which demands for Catalan independence played a part on the Republican side) and by the more recent experience of fighting Eta terrorists seeking Basque independence (whose violence alienated most of the Basque population).

The only other peaceful route to independence would be to demonstrate overwhelming, sustained and resolute support for it among the Catalan population. The unauthorised referendum organised on 1 October by the Catalan government suggested that this condition has not been met. The referendum was boycotted by most supporters of Spanish unity, and secured a 92 per cent vote for independence on a 43 per cent turnout. This means that just under 40 per cent of the electorate supported independence. This is higher than the 37 per cent of the British electorate who voted to leave the European Union, but the test in a disputed referendum is more stringent. Who knows what the outcome would have been in a referendum agreed with the central government, in which both sides campaigned and the result of which both sides undertook to respect?

In any case, support for independence is one thing; support for a unilateral declaration of independence is quite another. If support for independence is unclear, opinion polls suggest that there is a majority against a unilateral declaration among Catalans.

Carles Puigdemont, the would-be president of an independent Catalonia, has got ahead of himself. Some of the questions about independence can be hard to resolve in advance, as Alex Salmond and the Scottish National Party discovered in 2014. But the SNP had better answers about currency and relations with the rest of the EU than Mr Puigdemont has now. One pressing question that may seem trivial but which is of great cultural importance is what would happen to FC Barcelona, one of the greatest football clubs in Europe?

It was striking, too, that the Scottish government, led by Mr Salmond‘s successor Nicola Sturgeon, said it ―understands and respects‖ the position of its Catalan counterpart, but stopped short of recognising Catalonia as an independent country.

Both sides need to pull back from confrontation. The Madrid government must recognise that it will defeat the separatists only by respecting the free democratic will of the Catalan people. If the central government is to maintain Spanish unity and stability, it needs to offer dialogue and legitimate options short of independence.

Equally, the Catalan independentistas must recognise that the only sure route to sustainable nationhood is by winning such support for it in Catalonia and beyond that it becomes impossible to resist. A short-term reaction against Madrid‘s heavy-handedness will not secure that. Both sides have history working against them, but they need to shake off those chains. Unless both sides step back from deepening confrontation and accept compromise, the outlook for Spain and Catalonia looks bleak.

Each nationalism - Catalan and Spanish - has dug itself deeper into exclusively self-referential bunkers

“Catalonia: the case for creative thinking‖, The Irish Times, 29 d‘octubre de 2017, https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/editorial/catalonia-the-case-for-creative-thinking- 1.3273286

An article Guy Hedgecoe in the Weekend edition of this newspaper described how three members of the same Catalan family hold very different views on the way forward. A leftist father had reluctantly espoused the independence cause, more from disgust with the conservative Spanish establishment than out of passion for the Catalan flag. His wife remained committed to staying in Spain, for pragmatic reasons. His daughter, in her 30s, had embraced the full independence agenda.

A crisis that divides families along such nuanced lines cannot be resolved by constitutions and laws alone. It requires empathy and respect for the convictions and sense of identity of others, especially when they differ most from one‘s own.

This kind of emotional intelligence informed the most imaginative parts of the Belfast Agreement. Recognising the idea that citizens can have differing, and indeed plural, national identities has greatly helped to relax rigid positions that have caused bloodshed for generations.

There has been little sign of this sort of creative thinking, on either side, in the Catalan- Spanish conflict in recent years. Instead, each nationalism has dug itself deeper into exclusively self-referential bunkers. This led almost inevitably to last Friday‘s unilateral declaration of independence from the Catalan nationalists, and the imposition of direct rule by the Spanish government.

Article 155 of the Spanish constitution, which has been triggered to impose direct rule on Catalonia, has often been called the ‗nuclear option‘. We will begin to know this week, as Spanish representatives attempt to take over ministries that have been Catalan for almost four decades, whether this option will indeed prove explosive and destructive. Or whether it will, as Madrid claims, return calm and normality to the region.

Everything will depend on the sensitivity with which the new rulers operate. They must avoid any appearance of repression. Meanwhile, the relatively muted response so far from the Catalan nationalist leadership to direct rule is puzzling. Pro-union Catalans, probably a majority, with their huge demonstration in Barcelona yesterday, actually appear better organised.

But maybe the apparent paralysed confusion of the independence leaders is due to a massive mutual misunderstanding with Spain. Perhaps, for many Catalan nationalists, ‗independence‘ was never a real political goal. Rather, it was an expression of political theatre, aimed at gaining greater respect and a better deal for the region. But Madrid read it deadly seriously, all along.

If that is really the case, there is still an outside chance that a period of calm, and the elections called for December, can lead to a new accommodation. If it is not, and direct rule causes violent conflict, then the region, Spain, and the European Union face a very threatening future.

Catalans in turmoil as they find themselves split on geographical, class and ethnic lines

Guy Hedgecoe, ―Divided Catalonia: Calm, negotiated solution ‗not going to be the case‘‖, The Irish Times, 28 d‘octubre de 2017, https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/divided-catalonia-calm-negotiated- solution-not-going-to-be-the-case-1.3270187

Throughout most of his life, José Luis Godes never considered himself a Catalan nationalist. A Barcelona bank worker until he took early retirement, he leaned to the left politically, worrying more about social justice than national boundaries. But after years of neutrality on the issue, he has recently been converted to the Catalan independence cause.

―There could be a peaceful, calm, negotiated solution to this, one without winners and losers – a cultured, intelligent solution – but unfortunately that‘s not going to be the case,‖ he says of the ongoing Catalan crisis.

―When it‘s radicalised like this, there‘s no way out, one side or the other wins.‖ Believing that one day, those on the side of Catalan independence will emerge as the victors, he has joined them.

―I‘ve never been a nationalist,‖ Godes (59) says. ―But if I have to decide, I‘ve gone for [Catalan] nationalism. Because I‘ve had enough of the other kind.‖

The ―other kind‖, he says, is Spanish nationalism, which he believes has been particularly aggressive in recent weeks.

He cites the attempts by the Spanish government and judiciary to prevent the October 1st independence referendum, with raids on Catalan administration buildings and arrests of officials in the build-up to it. On the day of the vote itself, there were the now- infamous scenes of Spanish police using violence to stop Catalans from voting.

Direct rule

Then, on October 21st, the Spanish government took an unprecedented step by triggering a plan to implement direct rule in the region.

As Godes‘s journey from agnostic to believer in an independent republic suggests, the Catalan sovereignty issue is a complex one. With the Catalan and Spanish governments deeply entrenched in their positions in recent weeks, the divisions this crisis has dug are often deep.

However, the dispute is not only between the northeastern region and the rest of Spain. Within Catalonia itself, schisms are equally evident.

Ever since the independence movement entered the political mainstream, in 2012, polls have suggested that Catalans are fairly evenly split on the issue, with those in favour of remaining part of Spain in a majority. The most recent figures published by the regional

government, in July, showed 41 per cent wanting secession and 49 per cent opposed to it.

Those who want to break away are not one homogeneous section of society, nor do they all have the same motives. Before the current independence drive, mainstream nationalists were mostly content to remain as part of Spain, occasionally even lending their parliamentary support to the central government in Madrid.

During that time, backing for independence tended to hover around 20-25 per cent. The members of that hardcore of separatism were often found living in the region‘s rural interior, a long way from Madrid, both geographically and psychologically, and their desire for an independent state leaned heavily on an emotional detachment from Spain. Those areas are still dominated by the pro-independence Junts pel Sí coalition and the Popular Unity Candidacy (CUP), an anti-capitalist party which advocates a Catalan republic.

―There‘s a clear concentration of pro-independence voters in the [Catalan] interior, in the Pyrenean area,‖ says Josep Borrell, formerly a Socialist minister in the Spanish government and a president of the European parliament. Borrell, an outspoken critic of independence, is himself from the Pyrenean town of La Pobla de Segur.

In the past decade or so, support for secession has expanded beyond those highland areas. It became seen as an appealing alternative when the Spanish economy ran into trouble between 2008 and 2013, but also as a response to the perception that the central government of Mariano Rajoy was unsympathetic to Catalan culture and society. Yet its growth has been nuanced, says Borrell.

―Catalan society is divided geographically, it‘s divided along ethno-linguistic lines […]it‘s divided socio-economically.‖ The pro-independence slogan ―Un sol poble‖ (―One people together‖), he says, is erroneous.

Sometimes those divisions are linked. While the rural highlands are a hotbed of secessionism, Barcelona and the highly populated metropolitan area surrounding it are much more unionist.

Economic opportunities

That is mainly attributed to the fact that the city and its environs are home to many non- Catalan migrants who moved to the region seeking economic opportunities and who rarely learn the Catalan language fluently.

Their children are technically Catalan and may speak the language, but have roots elsewhere in the country, giving them a distinct perspective on the region‘s relationship with the rest of Spain. It‘s a phenomenon that combines Borrell‘s geographical and ―ethno-linguistic‖ factors.

―Catalonia is a region which over the last 40 to 60 years or so has received a lot of immigrants,‖ says electoral analyst Kiko Llaneras, of think-tank Quantio. ―And those who are first-generation arrivals in Catalonia or who are children of first-generation arrivals are, for the most part, not in favour of independence.‖

Data provided by the Catalan government shows that only 12 per cent of the region‘s residents who were born elsewhere in Spain are in favour of breaking away. That figure rises to 29 per cent for Catalans whose parents were both born in another region, and reaches 75 per cent in favour among those with two parents and four grandparents all born in Catalonia.

Firm opponent

While José Luis Godes is Catalan-born and bred, his wife, Amelia Esquinas, is from Córdoba, in the southern region of Andalucía. She is a firm opponent of independence, and although in her case that is due to an intellectual mistrust of the secessionist project, she says family background does influence many of her fellow first-generation Catalans. ―In the rest of the country they don‘t want to hear anything about an independence referendum,‖ she says. ―And across the Barcelona industrial belt there are a lot of immigrants who aren‘t the slightest bit interested in independence either.‖

She links this trend to the legacy of the dictator Francisco Franco, whose 36-year rule ended with his death in 1975. Although he repressed the languages and cultures of Catalonia and the Basque Country, Esquinas points to the fact that he reinforced the industrialised status of both regions. Their resulting economic development outstripped that of more rural regions such as Andalucía and Extremadura, whose workers started migrating to the northern industrial hubs.

―Other regions felt neglected,‖ Esquinas says. ―Franco divided us and he continues to do so.‖

Many of those migrants to Catalonia – and their children – are low earners, helping to explain another aspect of the independence drive: it is a middle-class phenomenon, rather than a working-class uprising. The Catalan government‘s figures show that only 29 per cent of Catalans who have ―a lot of difficulty‖ in making ends meet support independence, while 51 per cent of those who are ―comfortably off‖ favour it.

Looking beyond the migrant factor, Llaneras says those with lower incomes or who are out of work are likely to worry more about their own financial situation than Catalan sovereignty.

Relatively afluent

But this middle-class support for independence also has economic motives. In 2012, when the Catalan government first announced its intention to pursue independence, many in the region who had until then been relatively affluent were feeling the effects of Spain‘s deep economic crisis.

―Separatists now are no longer a bunch of radical kids on the margin,‖ wrote financial commentator Jordi Sacristán, at the time. ―Separatists now are the middle classes who are watching as their standard of living drops and they start to lose basic state services.‖ Since then, the Spanish economy has recovered, but much of the Catalan bourgeoisie remains convinced of the need for independence.

A glance at those who queued to vote at polling stations on October 1st, or at those who have been turning out on the streets to demonstrate recently, shows the independence cause has a firm hold among younger Catalans. Although the movement tends to cut across generations, many young people have been encouraged to join it by shedding the baggage of history which still weighs on their forebears.

While José Luis Godes has embraced independence relatively late and his wife Amelia rejects the idea altogether, their 31-year-old daughter, Alicia, is fervently in favour. ―The younger generations are freer of the legacy of Franco than the older ones,‖ Godes says. ―Those of us who are older were fed that concept of ‗Spain – united, great and free‘,‖ he adds, citing a Franco-era slogan. ―Younger people don‘t have that.‖

While his wife and daughter have opposing views on the Catalan situation, Godes insists the three of them are able to discuss it calmly. But he forecasts at least one of them will be dismayed in the end.

―In a confrontation, unfortunately it‘s rare for there to be a solution that everyone is happy with,‖ he says.

With that task looking anything but straightforward for the Rajoy government, there is reason to think both sides might soon be ruing their failure to seek an alternative way out of this crisis.

Guy Hedgecoe, ―Biggest political upheaval in Spain since 1970s return to Democracy‖, The Irish Times, 28 d‘octubre de 2017, https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/biggest-political-upheaval-in-spain- since-1970s-return-to-democracy-1.3272053

Friday‘s developments in Spain represent the biggest political upheaval the country has seen since its return to democracy in the late 1970s. The Catalan parliament‘s approval of a unilateral declaration of independence is a threat to Spain‘s territorial unity; and the senate‘s backing of article 155 of the constitution immediately afterwards allows Madrid to take control of a devolved administration for the first time ever, but carries with it significant risk.

Despite the drama that those two steps imply, both have been slowly unfolding before Spaniards‘ eyes in recent months, even if few expected them ever to become reality. At the beginning of this year, the use of article 155 was talked about as a mechanism to prevent the Catalan government from staging an independence referendum. But instead, Rajoy trusted in the judiciary and the police to stop that vote, which he and the constitutional court deemed illegal. They failed, a referendum of sorts took place on October 1st, and the police violence of that day became a potent new PR weapon for the independence cause.

After that, the pressure on the prime minister to use the controversial article mounted. Factions within his own Popular Party (PP) and the stridently unionist Ciudadanos kept it alive as an option, as did increasingly shrill headlines in the Madrid press. The morning after the referendum, graffiti appeared on the headquarters of Rajoy‘s governing Popular Party (PP), saying ―155 now, you traitors‖, reflecting the desire for a tough line among many voters.

Direct rule

Never a bold politician or one to defy mainstream opinion among his colleagues and voters, Rajoy saw direct rule as unavoidable. But characteristically, he waited until the last moment to use it.

Yet, on Thursday, there had been a brief moment when the two sides appeared to have engineered a temporary reprieve, as Catalonia leader Carles Puigdemont mulled calling elections instead of declaring independence. With the Spanish government planning to do the same itself, it would have been the first genuinely conciliatory step by either side in months of brinkmanship.

But an angry response from many of Puigdemont‘s supporters and allies to the election option appeared to help change his mind, and instead he allowed the Catalan parliament to issue the declaration of independence. That decision appeases the two million or so Catalans who voted for independence on October 1st and most of Puigdemont‘s

political partners. For him, and many others, breaking away from Spain is a lifelong dream.

External factors

Puigdemont has struggled over the last month to weigh up those pressures coming from his own camp with other considerations, such as the exodus of companies from Catalonia, or appeals for him to pull back from independence from outside parties, such as European Council president Donald Tusk.

European institutions and member states have pointedly refused to back the independence cause and the Spanish state is now moving in to take control of Catalonia‘s devolved powers.

With that task looking anything but straightforward for the Rajoy government, there is reason to think both sides might soon be ruing their failure to seek an alternative way out of this crisis.

Dans la réalité, la tâche s'annonce plus compliquée que sur le papier. Un parfum de désobéissance civile flotte sur la région

Charlotte Cieslinski, ―Catalogne, et maintenant? Comment Madrid va prendre le contrôle‖, L’Obs, 29 d‘octubre de 2017, http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/monde/20171029.OBS6668/catalogne-et-maintenant- comment-madrid-peut-concretement-prendre-le-controle.html

Mettre sous tutelle la Catalogne ? Cela implique de reprendre en main son gouvernement, son parlement, ses 304.000 fonctionnaires ainsi que ses finances et ses médias publics. Bref, un véritable casse-tête d'autant qu'une partie de sa population se dit prête à désobéir et que Puigdemont appelle à s'y opposer "démocratiquement". Et, on le voit ces jours ci, la réalité s'affiche bien plus complexe que sur le papier (comprendre l'article 155 de la Constitution).

Concrètement, Madrid peut-elle vraiment prendre les rênes de cette région très autonome ? Lui suffit-il de couper les têtes des dirigeants du gouvernement, du parlement et de la police pour "restaurer l'ordre constitutionnel" ? Non, à en croire les élus destitués, qui ce dimanche matin affirment dans une tribune publiée dans le quotidien "El Punt-Avui"que "Carles Puidgemont est et restera le président" de la Catalogne".

Destituer le gouvernement ? Oui, mais…

Depuis vendredi, la région est officiellement dirigée directement par la numéro 2 du gouvernement, Soraya Saenz de Santamaria. En effet, tout le gouvernement catalan a été destitués vendredi. Et "El Pais" ajoute que jusqu'à 150 hauts responsables de l'administration l'ont été également.

Mais ça n‘est pas si simple. Tous (et c'était prévisible) n'acceptent pas de partir sans broncher. Hier, l‘ex-président catalan s‘est brièvement exprimé à la télévision catalane. Il a appelé à poursuivre pacifiquement la résistance mais a astucieusement éludé la question de sa destitution.

Or ce dimanche matin, son ancien bras droit Oriol Junqueras a affirmé dans une tribune publiée dans le quotidien "El Punt-Avui" que Carles "Puidgemont est et restera le président" de la Catalogne. De même, poursuit-il, Carme Forcadell est et resta la présidente du parlement, et ce au moins jusqu'au jour où les citoyens décideront du contraire lors d'élections libres". Du coté de Madrid, une source gouvernementale rétorque :

"Si Puigdemont se retranche, les délits s'accumuleront pour lui", et "rien de ce qu'il fera n'aura de validité".

Dans tous les cas, la décision de le "déloger" ou de l'arrêter s'il entre en rébellion appartiendra à un juge et devra être exécutée par la police catalane, ajoute cette source.

Faire le ménage dans la police

Autre casse-tête pour Madrid : la prise de contrôle de la police catalane, les Mossos d'Esquadra. Hier, le chef opérationnel de la police catalane Josep Lluis Trapero a été destitué. Vendredi, une des premières décisions de Madrid a ainsi été de remplacer l'emblématique chef de la police catalane, Josep Lluis Trapero, jugé trop proche des indépendantistes.. Mais cela suffira-t-il ?

Dans les rangs des Mossos, la colère gronde. Leurs relations avec les corps de police nationaux ont été mises à rude épreuve depuis le référendum d'autodétermination interdit du 1er octobre, émaillé de violences policières qui n'ont pas empêché la tenue du vote dans la plupart des bureaux.

Il y a quelques jours, Alfonso Merino Redondo, secrétaire général de l'Association unifiée des gardes civils (AUGC) - le syndicat représentant la Guardia Civil en Catalogne, expliquait à l'Obs :

"Avant le référendum, les relations entre la Guardia Civil et les Mossos d'Esquadra étaient cordiales, sinon amicales. Mais depuis le 1er octobre, elles sont devenues inexistantes. Il n'y a plus aucune communication entre nous."

Et mathématiquement, le calcul est simple : "El Pais" rappelle que l'Etat ne dispose en direct (en Catalogne), que 5.900 forces de l'ordre. Ce qui explique qu'il ait dû envoyer en renfort quelque 10.000 gardes civils et policiers, hébergés en partie... dans des bateaux de croisière. C'est un obstacle majeur pour la prise de contrôle réelle de la Catalogne. Seuls 9% des fonctionnaires de Catalogne -26.000 personnes- sont issus de l'administration centrale. C'est bien moins qu'en Andalousie (19%) et dans la région de Madrid (39%).

Surmonter grèves et désobéissance civile

Si la police et les pompiers ne répondent pas favorablement aux consignes de Madrid, comment surmonter les grèves et les actes de désobéissance civile ? Dans cette région de 7,5 millions d'habitants grande comme la Belgique et très jalouse de son autonomie, les indépendantistes sont habitués à prendre la rue pour soutenir leurs dirigeants. Et il y a quelques jours, un pompier expliquait à l'AFP, sous couvert d'anonymat :

"Si une route est bloquée (par des manifestants) et qu'on nous demande de la débloquer, il est probable que nous ne répondions pas."

Sur les 304.000 fonctionnaires en Catalogne, dont 167.000 travaillent pour l'administration régionale et 84.000 pour les mairies, certains pourraient en effet traîner des pieds. Envoyée par Madrid, la nouvelle dirigeante du gouvernement catalan Soraya Saenz de Santamaria a pourtant prévenu:

"Il pourra y avoir des limogeages, pour les employés qui continueraient ouvertement à ne pas respecter la Constitution".

Surmonter l'opposition des médias

La prise de contrôle des médias catalans, que le gouvernement de Mariano Rajoy justifie par la nécessité d'une "information fiable, objective et équilibrée", serait également une gageure, à cause de l'image de violation de la liberté de la presse que cela donnerait.

Et avant même la proclamation d'indépendance, les trois médias -TV3, Catalunya Radio et l'Agence catalane d'information- comptant quelque 2.300 employés avaient qualifié mercredi cette tentative d'"ingérence inacceptable". De leur coté, les syndicats de journalistes de TV3 ont dénoncé les directives qui selon eux biaisent la couverture en faveur de l'indépendance. Leurs collègues de la télévision nationale dénoncent eux aussi régulièrement la mainmise du gouvernement sur l'information en particulier dans la crise catalane.

Et enfin, maîtriser les finances

Un des seuls points positifs pour l'Etat espagnol : il tient les cordons de la bourse. Les finances du gouvernement catalan sont déjà sous tutelle depuis septembre, et dès fin octobre, il sera incapable de payer ses fonctionnaires et d'honorer ses dettes. L'administration fiscale reste entre les mains de l'Etat central et de ses fonctionnaires. Inquiétées par l'insécurité juridique, plus de 1.600 sociétés ont déjà décidé de transférer leur siège social hors de Catalogne, agitée depuis des semaines par des manifestations pour et contre l'indépendance. Les banques catalanes accentuaient leur chute vendredi à la Bourse de Madrid. Reste à savoir si elles reviendront après le 21 décembre, date de l'organisation de nouvelles élections régionales.

L'histoire prouve que ces déclarations de rejet de l‟indépendantisme résistent rarement aux réalités politiques

Jean-Baptiste Nauder, ―Catalogne: Paris et ses voisins européens font fausse route‖, L’Obs, 28 d‘octubre de 2017, http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/monde/20171028.OBS6648/catalogne-paris-et-ses- voisins-europeens-font-fausse-route.html

Ainsi, Paris et les principales capitales européennes ont annoncé qu‘elles ne reconnaîtraient pas l‘indépendance de la Catalogne. On connait les principaux arguments : le respect de la loi, de la Constitution espagnole et, en arrière-plan, la peur d‘une "balkanisation" de l‘Europe.

L‘histoire, dit-on, est une suite d‘erreurs de calculs. Et il semble qu‘en matière d‘indépendantisme, nos dirigeants n‘ont peut-être pas encore bien appris à compter. Plutôt que de balayer d‘un revers de la main la proclamation de Barcelone du 27 octobre, ils auraient sans doute mieux fait de se taire, simplement de se taire. Pour plusieurs raisons. D‘abord, parce que, sans remonter trop en arrière, en restant sur le continent européen, l‘histoire prouve que ce genre de déclarations, parfois contre- productives, de rejet de l‘indépendantisme, résiste rarement aux réalités politiques. Car comment appelle-t-on un leader séparatiste qui a réussi ? Un chef d‘Etat.

Et voilà d‘ailleurs que nos dirigeants français se relaient à Alger pour aller serrer la main d‘un un hors-la-loi ! Un bandit ! Un fellouze ! Le terroriste du FLN (mais néanmoins chef de l‘Etat algérien) Abdelaziz Bouteflika. A Alger, on va même s‘excuser, mais seulement du bout de lèvres, pour avoir massacré ("légalement") hommes, femmes et enfants.

Plus récemment : où se trouve notre ancien ami Slobodan Milosevic, le chef d‘Etat serbe-yougoslave, que Paris a très longtemps soutenu contre vent et marées, au milieu des massacres, contre les "irréalistes" séparatistes slovènes, croates, bosniaques, kosovars etc. ? Il est mort en prison au Tribunal international de la Haye, alors qu'il était jugé pour crimes de guerre et crimes contre l‘humanité.

Où sont ces infréquentables leaders séparatistes de l‘ex-Yougoslavie auxquels nos dirigeants ne voulaient pas parler ? Au pouvoir, à Zagreb, à Pristina, dans leurs républiques indépendantes. A la décharge du Quai d‘Orsay, de l‘Elysée, il faut dire que l‘ambassadeur de France à Belgrade avait parfaitement analysé la situation avant le conflit. Aux journalistes, à ces "catastrophistes sensationnalistes" qui s‘affolaient de la dangereuse et sanglante fuite en avant chauviniste de Milosevic, petit apparatchik communiste reconverti dans le nationalisme grand-serbe, ce diplomate français, écouté au plus haut niveau de l‘Etat français, répondait : "Quand la Yougoslavie éclatera, elle éclatera de rire." Tous ceux qui ont ensuite vécu, survécu, à ces années de guerre des Balkans, n‘ont pas rigolé tous les jours.

S‘agissant de séparatisme, d‘indépendantisme, la clairvoyance de nos dirigeants a été plus frappante encore dans l‘ex-Union soviétique et en Russie. Au nom d‘un soutien sans faille à Mikhail Gorbatchev (par ailleurs l‘organisateur des conflits séparatistes sanglants en Union soviétique), le président français François Mitterrand a traité comme

quantité négligeable, a humilié Boris Eltsine, premier président élu de Russie. Bilan : quand l'URSS disparaît et Gorbatchev avec, quand Boris Eltsine devient le chef d‘Etat d‘une des plus grandes puissances du monde, nos dirigeants s‘emploient à se rattraper, en lui disant que tout ce qu‘il fait est juste et bien. Comme par exemple d‘écraser dans le sang et la torture la minuscule Tchétchénie (des séparatistes, musulmans en plus). Bref, pour réparer une erreur : une infamie.

Fais ce que je dis, pas ce que je fais

On sait que nos dirigeants, de tradition centralisatrice, "intégrationniste" et jacobine, sont contre la séparation de la Catalogne du reste de l‘Espagne car ils ne reconnaissent pas le référendum sur l‘indépendance organisé par Barcelone le 1er octobre dernier. Mais, bizarrement, ils n‘ont rien dit quand les Britanniques (qui ne doivent pas être aussi démocrates que nous ou que les Espagnols ?) ont organisé un vote séparé sur l‘indépendance de l‘Ecosse. Très étrangement aussi, c‘est au nom du référendum d‘indépendance séparé que la France occupe - illégalement - Mayotte (la quatrième île de l‘archipel de l‘Etat des Comores, dans l‘Océan Indien) depuis 1975 et que Paris se fait régulièrement condamner pour cela à l‘ONU. Donc il faut surtout qu‘à Madrid, le Premier ministre espagnol fasse ce que la France lui dit mais surtout pas ce qu‘elle fait. Et encore...

Car le plus grave n‘est pas là. Le plus problématique, ce n‘est pas la question juridique, qui, dans le conflit catalan, n‘est que le ridicule cache-sexe démocratique de l‘affrontement de deux nationalismes. En soutenant, même indirectement Madrid contre Barcelone, "au nom de la loi", Paris et les autres capitales européennes encouragent les conservateurs au pouvoir du Parti Populaire espagnol, lointain héritier du franquisme, aux tendances autoritaires, machistes et dominatrices, à utiliser la répression contre l‘indépendantisme catalan. Que l‘on soit pour ou contre, que cet indépendantisme soit ou non une bonne chose, là n‘est pas la question. La question est que la répression, fut- elle "légale", n‘a que très peu de chance d‘aboutir. Au contraire, elle risque d‘être contre-productive, d‘alimenter le feu de l‘indignation et de la révolte et, finalement de rendre l‘indépendance, que l‘on voulait combattre, inéluctable. Elle l‘est peut-être déjà. Alors que les indépendantistes catalans n‘avaient qu‘une majorité relative en voix (entre 40% et 45%) avant la répression espagnole du référendum "illégal", selon Madrid, les séparatistes catalans, rejoints par des "indécis" indignés par les coups de matraques, seraient devenus majoritaires, d‘après un sondage confidentiel. Le seul moyen de réprimer efficacement un mouvement indépendantiste aussi puissant que celui de Catalogne, qui réunit près de la moitié de la population (et donc aujourd‘hui sans doute plus depuis le 1er octobre), c‘est l‘écrasement à la Poutine en Tchétchénie, à la Milosevic au Kosovo.

Alors, si l‘on veut éviter à tout prix le risque d‘un bain de sang, il faut encourager Madrid à emprunter la seule voie possible, la seule solution démocratique : celle du dialogue, celle d‘organiser, s‘il n‘est pas déjà trop tard, en changeant la Constitution espagnole, un référendum légal sur l‘indépendance en Catalogne. Si Madrid, Paris ou Berlin veulent garder la Catalogne dans l‘Espagne, ils doivent prendre le risque de la perde lors de ce vote. La Catalogne doit se sentir libre. Car c‘est pour cela qu‘elle se bat. Comme dans un mariage, moins elle se sentira libre, plus elle voudra partir.

On sait que le parti populaire espagnol au pouvoir à Madrid(la droite conservatrice qui, par nature, ne comprend jamais que les temps changent) a toujours été contre le divorce. Mais il est légal aujourd‘hui en Espagne. Et il n‘est pas légal de mettre des claques à sa femme si elle veut partir. Et si demain les matraques d‘une Guardia Civil encore infiltrée de fascistes et de nostalgiques du franquisme s‘abattent sur des manifestants pacifistes catalans, si le sang coule à Barcelone, on verra bien pour qui le peuple français prendra parti. La France, ce ne sont pas les déclarations de l‘Elysée, ce ne sont pas les communiqués d‘un Quai d‘Orsay, qui, depuis le chute du mur de Berlin, a reconnu en Europe l‘indépendance de tous les pays qu‘il avait systématiquement juré de ne jamais reconnaître. La France, c‘est la Révolution française (illégale). C‘est ce qu‘il y a écrit sur nos bâtiments publics. "Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité". Et pour la Catalogne aussi.

Cette nuit, les indépendantistes ont tiré des feux d'artifice sur la place Sant Jaume. Mais que peuvent-il espérer à présent ?

Charlotte Cieslinski, ―‘Nous ne nous soumettrons pas‘: La Catalogne se réveille sous tutelle dans une Espagne déchirée‖, L’Obs, 28 d‘octubre de 2017, http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/monde/20171028.OBS6643/nous-ne-nous-soumettrons- pas-la-catalogne-se-reveille-sous-tutelle-dans-une-espagne-dechiree.html

La Catalogne se réveille sous tutelle de l'Etat espagnol samedi, au lendemain d'une déclaration d'indépendance historique fêtée par une partie des Catalans mais aussitôt contestée par Madrid et largement rejetée à travers l'Union européenne. En attendant les nouvelles élections régionales, convoquées par Madrid pour le 21 décembre, la nuit barcelonaise était dominée par les indépendantistes et leurs feux d'artifice, sur la place Sant Jaume.

Ce samedi matin, le gouvernement espagnol a annoncé via le journal officiel la destitution du chef opérationnel de la police catalane Josep Lluis Trapero, dans le cadre des mesures de mise sous tutelle de la Catalogne adoptées la veille. La veille, Mariano Rajoy avait déjà démis de ses fonctions le directeur administratif de la police régionale, les Mossos d'Esquadra, ainsi que des membres de l'exécutif catalan.

"Nous ne nous soumettrons pas"

Mais samedi, à Madrid, ce sera au tour des partisans du maintien de la Catalogne en Espagne de manifester: deux camps diamétralement opposés, symbole de cette crise sans précédent pour l'Espagne depuis son retour dans le camp de la démocratie, en 1977. La folle journée d'hier s'affiche en Une dans tous les kiosques du pays. En Andalousie dans le sud, le "Diario de Sevilla" crie au coup d'état.

Vendredi soir, quelques heures seulement après la proclamation de "la République catalane comme Etat indépendant et souverain", le gouvernement espagnol a de fait commencé à mettre en application tout un arsenal de mesures exceptionnelles, préparées depuis des semaines. A l'issue d'un conseil des ministres extraordinaire, le dirigeant conservateur Mariano Rajoy a annoncé la destitution du président séparatiste catalan Carles Puigdemont et de son gouvernement. Et le parlement catalan, dominé par les indépendantistes, a été dissous, en attendant son renouvellement, lors d'un scrutin annoncé pour le 21 décembre. Dès samedi, la vice-présidente du gouvernement espagnol, Soraya Saenz de Santamaria, devait réunir les secrétaires d'Etat qui seront chargés d'assumer les fonctions des gouvernants catalans.

Les autres mesures annoncées comprennent la destitution du directeur de la police régionale catalane ou encore la fermeture des "représentations" catalanes dans le monde. Mais les conséquences de cette déclaration d'indépendance unilatérale de la Catalogne, comme de la mise sous tutelle par Madrid, sont incalculables. Signe de l'inquiétude en Europe, le président de la Commission européenne Jean-Claude Juncker (conservateur du Parti Populaire européen) a souligné vendredi que l'UE n'a "pas besoin d'autres fissures". Washington, Londres, Berlin, Ottawa ou encore Paris ont de même immédiatement fait savoir qu'ils soutenaient l'unité de l'Espagne. Et une des rares voix à soutenir les indépendantistes est venue de l'île française de Corse, dominée par les autonomistes.

Cependant, le président du Conseil européen Donald Tusk a appelé Madrid à choisir "la force de l'argument plutôt que l'argument de la force", alors que beaucoup craignent que la Catalogne ne soit entraînée dans une spirale de troubles face à la tentative de reprise en main par l'Etat. "Le gouvernement a adopté ces mesures pour éviter la prise en otage inadmissible d'une majorité des Catalans et le vol d'une partie du territoire au reste des Espagnols", a plaidé Mariano Rajoy.

Le silence de Puigdemont, la colère de Colau

L'annonce de la mise sous tutelle de la région a été aussitôt accueillie vendredi soir par les huées des dizaines de milliers d'indépendantistes réunis à travers les villes catalanes pour fêter leur nouvelle et fragile "République", sur un territoire grand comme la Belgique où vivent 16% des Espagnols.

Le petit parti d'extrême gauche indépendantiste CUP, qui avait résolument poussé à une proclamation immédiate de l'indépendance, a annoncé dans un tweet: "Nous continuerons à construire la République! Nous ne nous soumettrons ni à l'autoritarisme de Rajoy, ni à l'article 155".

Relevé de ses fonctions par Madrid, le président catalan Carles Puigdemont ne s'est pas exprimé depuis l'annonce officielle de sa destitution. Le parquet général d'Espagneavait déjà annoncé qu'il engagerait la semaine prochaine une procédure judiciaire pour "rébellion" contre Carles Puigdemont, qui risque la prison. Exprimant le désarroi d'une partie de ses administrés, la maire de gauche de Barcelone, Ada Colau, a diffusé un message amer, rejetant une déclaration d'indépendance "qui n'a pas le soutien majoritaire des Catalans".

Elle a accusé les conservateurs à Madrid d'avoir été "incapables d'écouter et de gouverner pour tous", et les partis indépendantistes à Barcelone d'avoir poursuivi "à une vitesse de kamikaze" leur "fuite en avant".

Maintenant c‟est la lutte démocratique, pacifiste qui est la plus puissante. Ce qui attire les gens, ce n‟est pas la force, c‟est le pacifisme.

Jean-Baptiste Nauder, ―Catalogne; ‗l‘indépendance, le pacifisme ou la mort‘‖, L’Obs, 26 d‘octubre de 2017 http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/monde/20171026.OBS6533/catalogne-l-independance- le-pacifisme-ou-la-mort.html

Il a connu la clandestinité, il a connu la prison, il a connu la torture. Il a connu la peur, la douleur et l‘exil. Souriant, cheveux longs, petit anneau à l‘oreille, yeux doux, l‘ancien "terroriste" catalan en T-shirt noir a aujourd‘hui des allures de vieux hippie pacifiste et tranquille. D'une voix calme, douce et amicale, il dit qu‘il ne veut plus que l‘histoire de la Catalogne s‘écrive avec les larmes et le sang. Il ne veut plus de la poudre, des bombes et des armes. Il veut des enfants et des grands-parents qui envahissent les rues de Barcelone pour crier "Llibertat !". Il veut une révolution indépendantiste catalane "peace and love", avec des sourires et des fleurs.

C‘est Frederic Bentanachs i Chalaux, 60 ans, le principal fondateur de Terra Lliure ("terre libre" en catalan), une organisation armée luttant pour l'indépendance de l'ensemble des Pays catalans qui a commis, entre 1978 et 1995, plus de 200 attentats. En buvant du thé froid dans l‘arrière salle d‘un café de Barcelone, il raconte comment il a créé Terra Lliure grâce à l‘aide de l‘ETA, l‘organisation séparatiste armée basque. Il raconte la lutte armée, ses plus de quatre ans de détention, ses six jours d‘affilée de torture ininterrompue, les matraques de la police espagnole sur sa tête, les matraques qui brisaient la plante de ses pieds. Mais, malgré l‘actuelle répression du mouvement indépendantiste catalan par le gouvernement central espagnol, cet ancien combattant, engagé dès l‘âge de 15 ans dans les Jeunesses révolutionnaires catalanes, ne veut plus entendre parler de violence, de lutte armée. Au contraire, il tente de dissuader les jeunes trop excités.

"Je leur explique - car c’est à nous les historiques, c’est à nous qui avons connu la prison, la torture, d’expliquer - qu’avec la violence l’on n’arrive à rien."

D'ailleurs, l‘ex-clandestin dément catégoriquement l‘existence de tout nouveau mouvement armé séparatiste catalan, comme l‘ont laissé entendre certains journaux de Madrid, comme le craint la police espagnole. "Il n‘y a aucune 'Nova Terra Lliure'. Ce sont des rumeurs pour détruire l‘unité du mouvement indépendantiste pacifiste catalan', s‘emporte soudain le militant.

"Il n’y a pas de projet de séparatisme armé. Je vous l’assure à 100%. Et si demain, des bombes explosent, ce ne peut être qu’une provocation des Espagnols."

"Que vont-ils faire ? Nous tirer dessus ?"

Proche de la CUP (Candidature d‘unité populaire), le parti indépendantiste catalan de gauche radicale, Frederic Bentanachs souligne que ce mouvement a toujours prôné le pacifisme. "S‘il y a quelques années, si depuis Franco, la lutte armée avait une efficacité, si, par notre combat, nous avons éveillé la conscience indépendantiste catalane, dans l‘Europe d‘aujourd‘hui la violence est inadéquate", estime-t-il.

"Maintenant c’est la lutte démocratique, pacifiste qui est la plus puissante. Ce qui attire les gens, ce n’est pas la force, c’est le pacifisme."

L‘ancien apôtre de la violence rêve maintenant "d‘une révolution dans la révolution, à la Gandhi". "Aujourd‘hui, dit-il, tirer un coup de pistolet contre l‘armée espagnole, ce serait non seulement injustifiable mais juste absurde." "Même si l‘on ne peut exclure que quelques fous prennent les armes, la violence parait très peu probable car ce serait la victoire de l‘Etat espagnol", estime Miquel Sellarés, fondateur de la police autonome catalane (les Mossos d‘Esquadra), qui a passé quelques années en prison sous Franco pour séparatisme. Dans la lutte qui oppose Madrid à Barcelone, "le premier qui tue quelqu'un a perdu", poursuit Sellarés qui dirige aujourd‘hui un institut spécialisé dans les questions de sécurité et de stratégie.

Pour obtenir l‘indépendance, Frederic Bentanachs, comme les autres indépendantistes catalans, mise sur la mobilisation permanente, sur des manifestations de deux millions de personnes, sur la solidarité catalane, sur la désobéissance civile pacifique. "On occupera, on dormira dans la rue. Que vont-ils faire ? dit-il. Nous tirer dessus ?" Lui ne veut plus tirer. La violence ? "Non, jamais. Plus jamais."

Les Catalans ont choisi une référence : le modèle lituanien. C'est-à-dire la résistance pacifique populaire de masse.

Jean-Baptiste Nauder, ―Pourquoi les Catalans pensent déclarer l‘indépendance maintenant‖, L’Obs, 27 d‘octubre de 2017, http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/monde/20171027.OBS6610/pourquoi-les-catalans- pensent-declarer-l-independance-maintenant.html

Fines lunettes, barbe de deux jours, ton pédagogique. Ferran Requejo, 65 ans, passe parfois, surtout chez les unionistes espagnols, pour "un dur", pour un "radical", pour l'un des principaux théoriciens de l'indépendance catalane. Mais, avant toute chose, cet indépendantiste tranquille est l'un des plus grands professeurs de sciences politiques de l'université de Barcelone. Et au lieu de crier en catalan "Llibertat ! Llibertat !" dans la rue, Ferran Requejo fait de subtils et compliqués calculs politiques.

"Pourquoi déclarer l'indépendance plutôt que de convoquer des élections régionales ?", dit-il. Dans l'arrière-salle d'un café-librairie pour intellos barcelonais, il déchire une feuille de notre carnet de note puis dessine un tableau. En haut, les deux options : "rupture" avec l'indépendance ou "conservateur" avec les élections. Puis, en deux parties, les conséquences, "court terme" - "moyen terme". C'est-à-dire le rapport inconvénients/avantages de chaque solution.

Pour lui, accepter des élections locales (c'est-à-dire ne pas déclarer l'indépendance) aurait eu comme avantage que le gouvernement central de Madrid aurait appliqué de façon "light" l'article 155 de la Constitution, qui suspend l'autonomie de la Catalogne. C'est-à-dire que les autorités autonomes catalanes auraient plus ou moins continué à fonctionner, dans certains domaines, et, en tout cas, évité la prison. L'inconvénient, c'est que la dynamique séparatiste aurait été cassé, le "momentum" perdu, le processus indépendantiste interrompu, ce qui risquait de provoquer une forte déception populaire et la division du camp indépendantiste entre "modérés" et "radicaux". Et, à moyen-long terme, c'est une opportunité historique d'indépendance qui risque de disparaître, peut- être pour une génération.

Dans le scénario de rupture, celui de la déclaration de l'indépendance, le principal inconvénient est que Madrid risque d'appliquer de façon "dure" l'article 155 suspendant l'autonomie. Le gouvernement autonome catalan pourrait bientôt dormir en prison pour "sédition" (jusqu'à 30 ans de prison). En revanche, l'unité des indépendantistes catalans, leur dynamique, est maintenue. A moyen terme, en réaction à la répression, une forte majorité de la population, (jusqu'à 60% contre environ 40-45% aujourd'hui) pourrait soutenir l'indépendance.

La Lituanie en exemple

Que vont faire les Catalans face à l'article 155 ? Pour faire face à la répression de l'Etat central espagnol qui risque de s'abattre après une déclaration d'indépendance, les théoriciens séparatistes catalans semblent avoir étudié les différents modèles indépendantistes de ces 30 dernières années. Et ils ont choisi une référence : le modèle lituanien. C'est-à-dire la résistance pacifique populaire de masse.

C'est ce que nous confie un très important et ancien activiste catalan qui a connu la prison sous Franco. Après la proclamation en mars 1990 de l'indépendance par le Parlement de cette république soviétique annexé par Moscou, au Kremlin, Mikhaïl Gorbatchev décide d'envoyer en Lituanie les forces militaires soviétiques pour s'emparer de bâtiments stratégiques à Vilnius, notamment la tour de la télévision. Mais ces bâtiments sont encerclés des foules d'indépendantistes pacifiques qui barrent les accès. A la télévision, l'assaut soviétique pour prendre le bâtiment tue, le 13 janvier 1991, 14 manifestants pacifiques, écrasés par des chars, tués par balles. C'est l'émotion en Lituanie et dans le monde entier. Gorbatchev n'est pas un démocrate mais passe pour un assassin.

Le 13 janvier 1991, le maître du Kremlin doit retirer les troupes soviétiques de Vilnius. Gorbatchev a perdu. La Lituanie devient indépendante. Dans sa course vers la liberté, et avec moins de 3 millions d'habitants, la minuscule Lituanie dynamite la seconde plus grande puissance du monde.

Antonin Vabre, ―Gérone, le petit club catalan indépendantiste qui monte, qui monte...‖, Slate.fr, 30 d‘octubre de 2017, http://www.slate.fr/story/153071/girona-football- catalogne

Deux jours après la proclamation de l'indépendance catalane par le Parlement régional, la lutte entre le pouvoir central espagnol et la Catalogne s'est déplacée pendant quatre- vingt-dix minutes sur un terrain de football. Dimanche après-midi, le «petit» club catalan de Gérone, quinzième de Liga avant le match, a battu dans son stade le Real Madrid par deux buts à un. Si le match a été disputé dans une ambiance apaisée en tribunes comme sur le terrain, les drapeaux catalans ont rivalisé avec ceux de l'Espagne déployés par les fans madrilènes et, comme souvent en ce moment au stade municipal de Montilivi, des chants indépendantistes ont jailli après précisément dix-sept minutes et quatorze secondes de jeu–une référence à 1714, année de la conquête de Barcelone par le roi Philippe V d'Espagne.

L'ancien maire de la ville a salué d'un tweet à double sens ce succès historique: Carles Puigdemont, devenu depuis président du gouvernement catalan et chef de file des sécessionnistes, a estimé que cette victoire sur le double champion d'Europe en titre constituait «un exemple et une référence pour beaucoup de situations». Pendant que Marca, le principal quotidien sportif espagnol, surfait sur l'ambiance référendaire en titrant ironiquement «Le Real Madrid vote non au championnat»...

Gérone avait déjà, mi-août, tenu en échec 2-2 l'autre grand club de la capitale, l'Atletico, pour son premier match dans l'élite du football espagnol. En mai dernier, un nul à domicile contre Saragosse avait assuré une montée historique au club, après 77 ans d'existence. Pelouse envahie, des dizaines de milliers de personnes dans les rues... À cent kilomètres au nord de Barcelone, toute une ville avait fêté cette incroyable accession.

«Nous avons conscience d'avoir fait l'histoire et nous sommes fiers de l'objectif atteint. Avec le travail quotidien, on en oublie un peu tout ce qu'on a accompli», nous expliquait fin septembre Quique Carcel, directeur sportif d'un club qui a grandi à son rythme –il était encore en quatrième division il y a une décennie. Le latéral droit Pablo Maffeo, 20 ans, s'en souvient lui très bien: «Un moment inoubliable, le meilleur que j'ai vécu dans ma jeune carrière. La saison d'avant, ma première ici, je jouais peu. Cette montée m'a enlevé une épine du pied, c'était extraordinaire.» Et d'autant plus inoubliable que le club avait raté l'accession les deux saisons précédentes, notamment en s'inclinant 4-1 à domicile face à Saragosse en demi-finale des barrages d'accession en juin 2015 après une victoire 3-0 au match aller... et alors qu'un but encaissé dans les arrêts de jeu de la dernière journée de championnat l'avait déjà privé de son billet direct pour l'élite.

«In-inde-indepedència!»

Avec l'entrée de Gérone dans l'élite, la Catalogne s'est trouvée un nouveau derby, entre indépendantistes celui-ci. Car si le célèbre derby Barça-Espanyol est souvent perçu comme une opposition entre pro-Catalans (le Barça) et pro-pouvoir central –le RCD Espanyol de Barcelona a été ainsi nommé car le Barça, créé par le Suisse Joan Gamper, n'acceptait pas les joueurs non-catalans–, l'identité indépendentiste du club géronais ne fait aucun doute. Poussez la porte d'un bar à Barcelone, on vous accueillera généralement en espagnol, voire parfois en anglais. Ici, dans la capitale de la province de Gérone, une des quatre qui forment la communauté autonome de Catalogne, on parle le catalan.

Le 23 septembre, à quelques heures d'une large victoire du Barça (0-3), les supporters des deux équipes s'étaient réunis pour boire quelques verres ensemble, à l'image de Marc côté Gérone et Adria chez les Blaugranas: «On est amis dans la vie, on se sépare juste le temps du match», résumait le premier. Tous unis par la Senyera, le drapeau catalan rayé rouge et jaune. Au pied d'un de ces oriflammes sur lequel était écrit «La Catalogne n'est pas l'Espagne», ils se sont chauffés la voix aux cris de «In-inde- indepedència!». Francesc, fan du Barça, y a vu un jour historique «pour deux raisons. D'abord, c'était la première fois que ce derby avait lieu en première division. Ensuite, avec les problèmes que nous avons en Catalogne, on s'est réunis pour lutter ensemble pour l'indépendance».

Le soir du match, Jordi avouait: «Je suis socio du Barça mais supporte aussi Gérone. C'est où je vis et c'est la plus petite des deux équipes.» Pareil pour Albert: «Il y a beaucoup plus d'amitié que de rivalité, le coeur est partagé entre ces deux clubs. Mais tous à 100% derrière la Catalogne.» Symbole de cette unité, l'hymne catalan et les slogans pro-indépendance alors repris en choeur, à une semaine du référendum, dans les tribunes locales comme visiteuses, devant un Carles Puigdemont content de cette aubaine du calendrier.

Antichambre de Manchester City

Le FC Barcelone est souvent montré du doigt en Espagne pour ses positions pro- indépendantistes, affichées notamment par l'ancien président Joan Laporta ou le défenseur central Gerard Piqué. Début octobre, le président de la Ligue nationale de football, Javier Tebas, annonçait ainsi qu'«en cas d'indépendance, les clubs qui soutiennent cette indépendance seraient expulsés du championnat national». Dans cette partie de poker menteur qui relève plus de la politique que du sport, l'arrivée de Gérone en première division tombe à point nommé pour les Blaugranas. Si les menaces de Tebas se réalisaient, la Liga perdrait peut-être un autre futur grand, car le club est actuellement en profonde mutation du fait d'un phénomène bien éloigné du nationalisme catalan: la mondialisation financière du football.

Quatrième ville de Catalogne avec 100.000 habitants, Gérone semble être devenue l'antichambre idéale pour faire grandir des joueurs. C'est du moins ce qu'ont pensé les dirigeants du club anglais de Manchester City qui, depuis quelques années, prêtent au petit club catalan des joueurs afin qu'ils s'y aguerrissent. À l'origine de cette initiative, le duo Ferran Soriano-Txiki Begiristain, anciens de la maison Barça, désormais directeur exécutif et directeur sportif du club anglais.

Parmi les joueurs envoyés en Catalogne, on compte Pablo Maffeo, prêté pour la troisième saison consécutive à Gérone: «C'est une sécurité de savoir qu'ils vont continuer à suivre mon évolution ici, ils ne t'oublient pas, tu te sens valorisé. City nous soutient, on sait qu'ils sont derrière, c'est un projet ambitieux. Et si tu es dans une mauvaise passe, il y a d'autres joueurs de City prêtés, on en parle, ça aide.» Ils sont en effet quatre autres dans son cas: Aleix Garcia (20 ans), en manque de temps de jeu en Angleterre, le Brésilien Douglas Luiz (19 ans), le Nigérian Olarenwaju Kayode (24 ans), acheté à l'Austria de Vienne en août et prêté le lendemain aux Espagnols et le Colombien Marlos Moreno (20 ans), acheté au Deportivo La Corogne pour filer lui aussi rapidement sur la Costa Brava. Des recrutements étrangers qui n'empêchent par ailleurs pas le club d'aligner régulièrement cinq ou six titulaires catalans. «Tout le monde est gagnant, résume l'entraîneur Pablo Machín. Gérone en profite s'il y en a un qui fait une bonne année ici, les joueurs ont du temps de jeu, poursuivent leur évolution. Et ils alimentent leur rêve: jouer un jour pour Manchester City.»

Après l'élite, un jour l'Europe?

Une collaboration qui ne doit rien au hasard. Manchester City appartient au cheikh Mansour bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, membre de la famille royale d'Abou Dhabi (EAU). Cet été, le cheikh est passé à la vitesse supérieure: en achetant 44,3% des parts du Girona FC, il a ajouté un nouveau club à sa Holding, le City Football Group, qui comprenait déjà, en plus des «Citizens», le New York City FC, le Melbourne City FC et les Yokohamas Mariners, au Japon. Et les autres parts? 11,6% appartiennent aux socios et les autres 44,3% ont été achetés par le Girona Football Group, une société appartenant à Pere Guardiola, le frère de Pep Guardiola.

Le directeur sportif Quique Carcel ne retient que le positif de ces montages économiques, comme l'agrandissement de la capacité du stade de 9.000 à 13.500 places. «Nous sommes au début de cette relation, chaque jour nous avons la certitude de grandir avec eux. Cela va nous permettre d'aller plus vite en terme de structures. Leurs intérêts et nos intérêts se sont croisés. Même si nous savons que leurs objectifs et les nôtres sont différents, tout comme nos championnats. Mais c'est bien d'avoir ces jeunes dans notre effectif.» Des jeunes qui, comme le disait Pablo Machín, ne s'imaginent pas rester à long terme. Pablo Maffeo a déjà goûté au maillot des Skyblues trois fois: soucieux de sa communication, il préfère expliquer prosaïquement que sa tête «est au Girona pour toute la saison».

Le maintien en Liga est le maître-mot dans la bouche de Quique Carcel, qui a pu constater que le City Football Group a tenu sa parole en affirmant que l'équipe dirigeante en place ne serait pas remaniée. Mais si jamais, en grandissant, le club accédait un jour aux compétitions européennes? L'article 5 du règlement actuel de l'UEFA sur les compétitions remettrait en cause sa participation en raison de l'identité de son actionnaire principal: «Pour assurer l'intégrité des compétitions, [...] aucun club participant à une compétition interclubs de l’UEFA ne peut directement ou indirectement détenir ou négocier des titres ou des actions de tout autre club participant à une compétition interclubs de l'UEFA.»

Une hypothèse qui ne posait guère de souci au directeur sportif quand nous l'avons rencontré: «Soyons sérieux, lutter pour l'Europe, c'est surréaliste pour l'instant. Il faut être honnête, savoir où nous nous trouvons et qui nous sommes.» Mais si le club poursuit sa progression linéaire, la question reviendra assurément sur la table. Et la Catalogne prendrait un peu plus de poids dans l‘Europe du football.

Si Madrid et la Catalogne campent sur leurs positions, sans véritable référendum, il y a un risque d'affrontements importants. Et personne ne sait sur quoi cela peut déboucher

Yohan Blavignat, ―Catalogne: Un risque d'affrontements dans les prochaines semaines‖, Le Figaro, 27 d‘octubre de 2017, http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2017/10/27/01003-20171027ARTFIG00278- catalogne-un-risque-d-affrontements-important-dans-les-prochaines-semaines.php

Le parlement catalan a déclaré, ce vendredi, l'indépendance avant que le premier ministre espagnol, Mariano Rajoy, ne destitue le gouvernement catalan. Des élections anticipées seront par ailleurs organisées en Catalogne le 21 décembre prochain. En quelques heures, le destin d'une région historiquement tiraillée entre ses volontés d'indépendance et ses racines espagnoles a basculé. Pourtant, la déclaration du parlement catalan revêt des enjeux politiques et géopolitiques complexes, et augure d'un bras de fer avec Madrid duquel il n'y aura qu'un seul vainqueur.

La résolution adoptée par le parlement catalan constitue «la République catalane, comme État indépendant et souverain, de droit, démocratique et social». En principe, la situation est claire: la Catalogne se proclame comme un État à part entière au même titre que l'Espagne ou la France. Seulement, aucun État européen ne semble prêt à reconnaître la Catalogne comme entité indépendante. Le président du Conseil européen, Donald Tusk, a indiqué que cette déclaration ne «change rien» pour l'Union européenne, et Washington a affiché son soutien à Madrid.

Toutefois, comme le souligne Barbara Loyer, directrice de l'Institut français de géopolitique à Paris 8, cette résolution «n'a rien de symbolique». «La feuille de route des autorités catalanes est assez claire. Ils se sont inspirés du modèle slovène - la Slovénie est devenue indépendante en 1991. Madrid n'a pas pris la mesure de l'ampleur de la grogne en Catalogne et ils ont été pris au piège», analyse la chercheuse. Selon elle, les dirigeants favorables à l'indépendance n'ont pas agi à l'aveugle et ont étudié depuis «plusieurs années les modalités que devrait prendre la République autonome de Catalogne. En cela, ce n'est absolument pas symbolique mais réel».

Quelques heures après la déclaration d'indépendance du parlement catalan, le gouvernement espagnol a démis de ses fonctions le président de la Catalogne, Carles Puigdemont, et dissous la Generalitat. Pour Barbara Loyer, «Madrid et Barcelone ont opté, depuis le début de la crise, pour l'option la plus radicale». «Jusqu'en 2010, une négociation avec la Catalogne était possible pour lui accorder plus d'autonomie, mais le gouvernement espagnol n'a pas répondu aux attentes des Catalans et leurs velléités d'indépendance se sont accrues. Aujourd'hui, le risque est de ne pas pouvoir revenir en arrière», analyse-t-elle.

Dans les rues de Barcelone, des centaines de personnes se sont rassemblées pour célébrer cette déclaration d'indépendance. «Une partie des Catalans pensent que c'est acté. Le risque est là car Madrid ne va pas laisser faire», poursuit la chercheuse. Selon elle, «le risque d'affrontements est important dans les prochaines semaines car la société civile est fragmentée». «Je ne vois pas comment il est possible de sortir de cette impasse», indique-t-elle.

Comment Madrid peut-elle reprendre la main? Après avoir destitué le président de la région, Carles Puigdemont, et ses conseillers, le gouvernement espagnol va tenter par tous les moyens de reprendre la main dans ce dossier. Seulement, la tâche sera difficile tant une frange de la population catalane se satisfait de cette déclaration d'indépendance. «Une marge de négociation entre Madrid et Barcelone est possible, mais la marge de manœuvre est mince», tempère Barbara Loyer, spécialiste des relations Espagne-Europe.

«L'enjeu est que le parlement espagnol permette aux autorités catalanes d'organiser un véritable référendum d'autodétermination

Selon elle, «l'enjeu est que le parlement espagnol entérine une réforme de la Constitution afin de permettre aux autorités catalanes d'organiser un véritable référendum d'autodétermination. Cela permettra de connaître le nombre de personnes favorables à l'indépendance». Le 1er octobre dernier, un vote organisé par le gouvernement régional de Catalogne avait recueilli 90% de scrutins favorables à l'indépendance sur plus de deux millions de votants - soit seulement 42% des inscrits sur les listes électorales. «Je n'ai pas de boule de cristal, mais si Madrid et la Catalogne campent sur leurs positions, sans véritable référendum, il y a un risque d'affrontements importants. Et personne ne sait sur quoi cela peut déboucher», conclu Barbara Loyer.

Quels sont les scénarios possibles en Catalogne après la déclaration d'indépendance et la suspension des autorités autonomes par Madrid?

Catherine Gouëset, “Catalogne: ‗Rajoy sort renforcé de cette crise‘‖, L’Express, 28 d‘octubre de 2017, http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/europe/catalogne-rajoy-sort-renforce-de-cette- crise_1955926.html

La crise s'est accélérée vendredi en Catalogne après que le Parlement régional a approuvé "l'indépendance". Le gouvernement de Mariano Rajoy a aussitôt riposté en plaçant la région sous tutelle et en convoquant des élections régionales anticipées, le 21 décembre, afin de "restaurer la légalité". L'Analyse d'Edgar Rovira, politologue catalan.

Que va-t-il se passer après la déclaration d'indépendance et la mise sous tutelle de la Catalogne par le gouvernement espagnol?

Edgar Rovira: Il faut d'abord préciser qu'il y a débat ici en Catalogne sur la réalité de cette déclaration unilatérale d'indépendance. Hier, le Parlement catalan a adopté une résolution "exhortant l'exécutif régional indépendantiste à déclencher la sécession", et à mettre en oeuvre la loi de transition vers l'indépendance. Pour autant, en terme de perception, en Espagne comme à l'international, il s'agit bien d'une proclamation d'indépendance. D'où la réaction de Madrid.

Une courte majorité d'élus catalans s'est prononcée pour cette indépendance: 70 'oui', 10 'non', deux votes blanc et 53 députés hostiles qui ont refusé de participer et ont quitté la salle. Bien que le scrutin ait été secret, on peut supposer que les 10 'non' sont ceux des 10 députés de Catalogne oui c'est possible (CSQP, coalition de gauche formée autour de la branche catalane de Podemos).

Qu'est-ce que cela change?

L'ambiguïté des termes choisis par le Parlement catalan traduit les divisions dans le camp indépendantiste vis-à-vis de la déclaration unilatérale d'indépendance. 30 à 40% d'entre eux n'étaient pas d'accord avec les modalités et le timing de cette décision.

Que vont-il décider sur les élections du 21 décembre? Une large partie d'entre eux n'entend pas y participer, partant du principe qu'avec la déclaration d'indépendance, ce scrutin déclenché depuis Madrid ne les concerne pas. Mais cette position n'est pas unanime. En face, les partisans du non sont, au contraire, tous favorables à de nouvelles élections dans l'espoir qu'elles rebattent les cartes.

S'ils refusent ces élections, que peuvent faire les indépendantistes?

Continuer sur la voie de l'indépendance avec le déploiement de la loi de transition qui prévoit une élection constituante. Mais ils seront entravés dans leur capacité d'agir avec la suspension des institutions catalanes par Madrid.

Les séparatistes peuvent s'appuyer sur la mobilisation de la rue. Ce qui n'est pas rien. Une grève générale de 10 jours est envisagée, à l'instigation de deux grandes associations catalanistes, l'Assemblée nationale catalane (ANC), et Omnium cultural - dont les deux dirigeants sont en prison. Très populaires parmi la jeunesse, elles ne reconnaissent pas l'État espagnol comme interlocuteur. Après les mesures de rétorsion décidées par Mariano Rajoy, jeudi, l'ANC s'est même fendue d'un tweet ironique disant qu'elle "n'avait pas pour habitude de commenter la politique des gouvernements étrangers".

Nous vivons une situation surréaliste. La moitié des habitants de Catalogne sont persuadés de vivre dans une nouvelle ère, une république catalane indépendante, l'autre non.

Comment expliquer les tergiversations de Puigdemont ces dernières semaines?

Il joue serré avec les différentes composantes du camp indépendantiste. Jeudi, il était très près de convoquer lui-même des élections anticipées de la communauté autonome.

Une date avait même circulé. Le président catalan avait posé comme condition la libération des présidents des associations catalanistes ANC et Omnium. Ce qui montre que des discussions avaient probablement lieu avec Madrid. Mais il a visiblement cédé face à la frange la plus résolue de ses partenaires indépendantistes.

Qui sort renforcé de cette crise?

Aussi bizarre que cela puisse paraître, Mariano Rajoy. La principale surprise d'hier a été le fait qu'il annonce des élections dans un délai aussi rapide, le 21 décembre, alors qu'il avait auparavant laissé planer un délai de six mois.

Autant il a mal géré les débuts de la crise catalane, autant il s'est rattrapé ces derniers jours. En déclarant vendredi que son objectif n'était pas de suspendre le gouvernement autonome, mais de "rétablir la légalité" et "redonner la parole aux Catalans", il coupe court aux critiques, en Espagne comme à l'extérieur, sur le refus de Madrid de tenir compte de la volonté démocratique des Catalans.

Il s'efforce par la même occasion de réparer les effets délétères en terme d'image, de la répression contre des électeurs pacifiques, lors du référendum du 1er octobre, qui avaient nui à son gouvernement à l'étranger.

En Catalogne, les sondages réalisés avant la déclaration d'indépendance n'indiquent pas de grand changement dans le camp indépendantiste. Le parti socialiste catalan (PSC, opposé à l'indépendance, mais partisan du fédéralisme en Espagne) sort légèrement renforcé. Il semble récupérer les voix perdues ces dernières années au profit de Ciutatans (droite libérale anti-indépendantiste) et de Catalogne oui c'est possible (CSQP, gauche). Mais la situation est si volatile qu'il est impossible de prévoir ce qu'il en sera dans les prochaines semaines. La prochaine échéance à observer sera la manifestation des opposants à l'indépendance prévue dimanche à Barcelone.

A Catalunha é o campo de batalha onde prossegue a guerra destes tempos – a do ataque ao liberalismo. São os valores republicanos que precisam de defesa.

Alexandre Homem Cristo, ―Estar do lado da República‖, Observador, 30 d‘octubre de 2017, http://observador.pt/opiniao/estar-do-lado-da-republica/

Imagine que, entre 2011 e 2015, a maioria parlamentar PSD-CDS havia alterado a Constituição. Que o texto constitucional havia sido expurgado da sua visão estatizante da sociedade. Que se havia reduzido a rigidez da Constituição e flexibilizado as normas sobre a revisão constitucional. Ou que se havia reduzido o elenco de direitos sociais e retirado da Constituição a fixação do seu respectivo financiamento. Dir-me-á o leitor que imaginar tal coisa é um exercício inútil – e é precisamente esse o meu ponto. Não por causa do teor das alterações – estas são plausíveis e foram alvo de proposta formal em 2010 ou objecto de reflexão na iniciativa ―Nova Constituição‖ em 2015. O exercício é inútil porque as revisões à Constituição exigem formalmente um acordo alargado de 2/3 dos deputados na Assembleia da República – dos 230 deputados com assento parlamentar, 154 teriam de votar favoravelmente as alterações. E, em 2011-2015, PSD e CDS somavam juntos 132 deputados. Ou seja, para que uma revisão constitucional acontecesse, teria sido necessário obter a aprovação de partidos à esquerda.

O exemplo serve, por via da proximidade com a nossa realidade nacional, para sublinhar algo que gera consenso nas democracias liberais e que deve servir de base de qualquer discussão política: os regimes têm regras e alterações significativas à organização política de uma sociedade requerem validação reforçada pelos representantes eleitos. Uma república democrática funciona assim. É democrática, porque a fonte do poder político está no povo. E é uma república, porque é essa a forma específica de organização política que fixa as regras, que separa os poderes, que estabelece equilíbrios e contrapesos, que define os procedimentos e a legitimidade política – e que todos os actores políticos aceitam.

É importante ter esta ideia assente quando se olha para a Catalunha, porque o que lá está a acontecer é precisamente o inverso. Um parlamento regional que, através de uma maioria parlamentar inferior a 2/3, quer fabricar unilateralmente um país e impô-lo sobre a população. Um líder político que viola a Constituição do Estado espanhol, que jurou cumprir. Um desrespeito sucessivo das regras republicanas, que teve o seu auge num referendo fraudulento, sem qualquer validade constitucional e que instrumentalizou a urna como arma de legitimação. Um movimento político que força uma posição dramática de ruptura contra a vontade popular – as sondagens indicam que apenas 19% dos catalães não se sentem espanhóis e que só 29% realmente votariam a favor da independência da Catalunha. A intimidação social aos que recusam a agenda independentista. Um clima sufocante de ―fake news‖, gerado pela propaganda da Generalitat catalã: nas manifestações de 1 de Outubro, afirmou-se a existência de 893 feridos graves, ―o pior registo de feridos na Europa desde a II Guerra Mundial‖, quando afinal os dados oficiais do Departamento de Saúde da região apenas registam a entrada de quatro feridos em hospitais.

A Catalunha é hoje o campo de batalha onde prossegue a guerra dos nossos tempos – a do ataque ao liberalismo. Por mais ruído que se ouça, é isto que interessa e são esses valores republicanos que estão realmente a ser desafiados. E, claro, são esses valores, reais garantes da liberdade, que devem ser defendidos. Contra a democracia directa, que coloca o ódio identitário como matriz, fragmenta a sociedade e põe todos contra os outros. Contra Trump, Le Pen, os hipócritas do Brexit e Puigdemont. Contra os nacionalismos de direita e os nacionalismos de esquerda. E contra aqueles que, oportunisticamente, apoiam a erosão dos valores liberais em troca de uma vitória para a sua agenda política. Sim, costuma-se dizer que, no combate político, tudo se pinta em tons de cinzento, porque ninguém tem toda a razão do seu lado. E sim, há e tem havido erros políticos de todas as partes nos momentos decisivos – na Catalunha, no Reino Unido, nos EUA, na política europeia. Mas a existência de erros não anula que haja um lado certo – que não é à esquerda ou à direita. Seja onde for, estar do lado certo é estar do lado da república.

Diana Soller, ―Un longo mês de outubro‖, Observador, 27 d‘octubre de 2017, http://observador.pt/opiniao/um-longo-mes-de-outubro/

A vitória de Madrid foi dar tempo aos governantes catalães para exporem as suas divergências em público. Rajoy montou a armadilha a Puigdemont com um compasso de espera que este não foi capaz de gerir

Cada vez que vemos Carles Puigdemont na televisão – que tem sido muitas vezes – parece que está à beira de um ataque de nervos. Também não admira. Só ontem assistimos a quatro avanços e recuos do líder independentista catalão. Logo ao início da manhã dizia-se que era quase certo que ia haver declaração de independência. Era inaceitável ceder às pressões de Madrid. Contudo, a manhã não tinha terminado e Puigdemont desdisse-se: o melhor seria mesmo convocar eleições antecipadas (o que travaria a ativação do artigo do descontentamento) e até já havia data: 20 de dezembro.

Suspirou-se cautelosamente de alívio. E a verdade é que a cautela do suspiro se justificava. Puigdemont vinha anunciar a decisão, em conferência de imprensa já estava marcada, mas os partidários que suportam a coligação ―Juntos pelo Sim‖ desencadearam uma ―pequena‖ revolta interna. A ERC, o partido republicano independentista e da CUP, o movimento de esquerda radical separatista opuseram-se tão veementemente à cedência a Madrid, que o presidente da Generalitat já nem veio encarar os jornalistas, que esperavam as suas declarações. Houve demissões no CDC. E Puigdemont deixou a decisão para o parlamento regional. Entretanto, o prazo dado por Madrid para que a Catalunha tomasse uma decisão, em plena consciência das consequências, tinha-se esgotado.

Agora, quer se declare independência quer não até ao Senado reunir esta tarde, e se não houver nenhum recuo de última hora parece que é mesmo o que vai acontecer, a aplicação do artigo 155 é praticamente inevitável. A Catalunha será governada diretamente por Madrid a partir de amanhã.

Dado este cenário, realço quatro elementos que me parecem essenciais. Em primeiro lugar, fui muito crítica da forma como Madrid geriu a crise catalã durante, e logo após o referendo de 1 de outubro. Mas Mariano Rajoy terá percebido o seu erro a tempo e pareceu ganhar a sensibilidade política que uma situação desta natureza requer. Conquistou os apoios parlamentares necessários, ofereceu à Generalitat tempo para decidir o seu próprio futuro ―dentro da legalidade‖ e a possibilidade de convocar eleições antecipadas. É um passo político arriscado e este braço de ferro custará a vida política a algumas das personagens principais conflito. Mas tem três grandes vantagens: por um lado, apresentado desta forma, o artigo 155 já não se parece com uma ―bomba atómica‖ como tantas vezes se disse. Com esta posição tão mais moderada, o governo central espanhol sai reforçado, por ter recuperado a postura de estado que lhe faltou nos primeiros dias. Por outro lado, as eleições antecipadas (a que o artigo 155 obriga) permitem um esclarecimento muito mais efetivo da vontade popular catalã. Assim,

sejam quais forem os resultados, pode recomeçar-se o diálogo do zero, e evitar muitos dos erros do passado. Finalmente, a verdadeira vitória de Madrid foi ter dado tempo suficientemente aos governantes (e opinião pública) catalães para exporem as suas divergências na praça pública. A Generalitat caiu em descrédito; se Puigdemont montou uma armadilha a Rajoy com o referendo ilegal, Rajoy montou uma armadilha a Puigdemont com a criação de um compasso de espera, que o lìder do ―Juntos pelo Sim‖ não foi capaz de gerir.

Em segundo lugar desde que Carles Puigdemont, no dia 10 de outubro, declarou a independência para a suspender imediatamente, o governo Catalão não mais se voltou a entender. Adia, muda de opinião, dá o dito pelo não dito. Ora isto prova que o presidente da Generalitat não só é um líder fraco que deu um passo maior do que as pernas, como é refém das forças independentistas mais radicais da sua própria coligação. Puigdemont legitimou-se como um líder corajoso à frente de um movimento de contestação contra a toda poderosa Madrid, alegando estar a agir em nome da vontade dos catalães. Mas hoje é um líder fraco, incapaz de manter a ordem dentro da sua própria casa.

Em terceiro lugar, e apesar de todas estas trapalhadas, as sondagens mostram que os catalães se mantêm divididos e as eleições antecipadas não têm vencedor anunciado. Ainda é cedo para fazer prognósticos sobre o desfecho da crise. Muita água pode correr debaixo da ponte. Apesar dos volte-faces permanentes, o drama catalão pode estar para durar.

Finalmente, nenhuma destas questões isenta Espanha de, paralelamente, pensar seriamente numa revisão constitucional. Como escreveuMadalena Meyer Resende, especialista em matérias de nacionalismo, ―em 1978, Espanha estava imersa num intenso debate sobre o estado das autonomias. Assim, a Constituição que emergiu desse debate falhou em atender às reivindicações da Catalunha e do País Basco. Madrid criou um sistema disfuncional e dispendioso que não agrada completamente a nenhuma das partes.‖ Face a esta já longa crise catalã, fugir para a frente do problema de fundo deixou de ser uma opção.

Os meses que mediarem a suspensão dos poderes da Catalunha e as eleições para o parlamento regional vão ser uma prova de fogo para ambos os lados, especialmente para os catalães. Vão viver em condição duríssimas: a deslocalização das sedes dos bancos e das empresas para outras zonas de Espanha pode continuar; o cidadão comum vai viver entre o domínio das forças políticas e de segurança de Madrid (incluindo a polícia nacional) e os independentistas mais radicais que usarão de todos os meios para lutarem pela secessão. Esta situação vai gerar grande tensão e Madrid está obrigada a tornar o processo de espera o mais breve possível.

Esta vai ser, pois, a prova dos nove: encurralados entre Madrid e Barcelona, os catalões vão ser testados na sua verdadeira vontade de sessação de Espanha. Se conseguirem passar por estes tempos e voltarem a eleger um governo independentista, Madrid fica de mãos e pés atados. Caso o cenário contrário se verifique, o golpe palaciano (e arruaceiro, passo o pleonasmo) separatista terá falhado redondamente. Mas não é demais reforçar os dois problemas fundamentais: (1) independentemente do que acontecer nos próximos meses, questão de fundo mantém-se, e permanecerá enquanto a Constituição não for revista. É a única forma de evitar outros longos meses de outubro;

e (2) o que suceder na Catalunha nos próximos tempos, terá um impacto profundo não só em Espanha, mas na Europa, cheia de enclaves nacionalistas mais ou menos adormecidos. A maior diferença das últimas semanas está na mudança da postura de Madrid, firme, mas mais conciliadora, e na tão falada ―reposição da legalidade‖. Mas é preciso não esquecer que a legalidade é muito pouco, quando o problema é, sobretudo, político.

Leonídio Paulo Ferreira, ―Puigdemont acreditou‖, Diário de Notícias, 26 d‘octubre de 2017, https://www.dn.pt/opiniao/opiniao-da-direcao/interior/puigdemont-acreditou- 8875537.html

Carles Puigdemont acreditou que uma grande maioria dos catalães iriam juntar-se ao grito independentista; acreditou que a sua coligação estava sólida atrás de si nas reivindicações; acreditou que os catalães que se sentem igualmente espanhóis não sairiam à rua; acreditou que as empresas catalãs não iriam fugir do caos; acreditou que Madrid hesitaria na firmeza da resposta a dar ao referendo de 1 de outubro; acreditou que Felipe VI se limitaria a um papel de mediador; acreditou que o PSOE não estaria convicto ao lado do PP de Mariano Rajoy na defesa da unidade espanhola; acreditou que a União Europeia premiaria com promessas de reconhecimento o tradicional europeísmo dos catalães; acreditou que a imprensa internacional confundiria nos seus editoriais a memória da Espanha franquista com a realidade democrática de hoje; acreditou que a América Latina se identificaria com a rebelião catalã.

Puigdemont acreditou demasiado, alheio à realidade. E depois recuou. Prometeu e logo suspendeu a declaração de independência. E começou a fazer ofertas de diálogo a Madrid.

E a ter de lidar com divisões nas fileiras independentistas, alguns a falar de traição. E a hesitar, hesitar, hesitar. As sondagens dão agora o seu partido a fraquejar e o bloco nacionalista como um todo a não crescer. É incerto o que vem aí, até porque a aplicação do artigo 155.º da Constituição é inédita e ninguém, nem Rajoy, sabe bem como se substitui os governantes de uma região que o poder central considera agir fora da legalidade. Ninguém sabe, aliás, se o Parlamento catalão declarará hoje a independência. Mas dificilmente Puigdemont será o líder que um dia levará a sua nação ao objetivo final, se este for atingido.

Puigdemont acreditou e enganou-se.

―Manuel Alegre diz que Espanha devia criar estado federal‖, Diário de Notícias, 28 d‘octubre de 2017, https://www.dn.pt/portugal/interior/catalunha-manuel-alegre-diz-que- espanha-devia-criar-estado-federal-8879772.html

O histórico Socialista Manuel Alegre afirmou hoje que a questão da Catalunha está a ser mal gerida por todas as partes e que Espanha deveria criar um estado federal.

"Vejo com muita apreensão o que se está a passar [em Espanha]", afirmou Manuel Alegre, que considera que o conflito entre Barcelona e Madrid "está a ser mal gerido por todos", quer pelo líder do governo regional destituído, Carles Puigdemont, quer pelo chefe do Governo espanhol, Mariano Rajoy, "até porque ele tem uma certa herança franquista apesar da linguagem legalista".

O socialista, que falava no festival literário de Óbidos, apontou que não houve "diálogo" nem "bom senso" em relação à pretensão de independência da Catalunha, uma das "regiões mais ricas de Espanha, que tem de facto um sentimento nacional profundo, uma língua própria e uma cultura própria, embora nunca tenha tido estado".

Sem defender a independência da Catalunha, Alegre afirmou que "o que será bom para Espanha será a existência de um estado federal" e admitiu ver "com muita apreensão" a dissolução do parlamento regional catalão.

"Dissolveram o parlamento, demitiram os dirigentes catalães, mas como é que aquilo se vai fazer, eles estão lá, a praça está cheia, vai a Guardia Civil metralhar o povo todo?", questionou.

Apesar de não defender a independência da região, Manuel Alegre considera que "se a Catalunha fosse independente tinha tanto direito a estar na Europa como têm outros", referindo-se à União Europeia.

O escritor acrescentou que "a Europa, a NATO e outros países apoiaram a entrada do Kosovo, que tinha muito menos razão de ser do que a Catalunha".

O parlamento regional da Catalunha aprovou na sexta-feira a independência da região, numa votação sem a presença da oposição, que abandonou a assembleia e deixou bandeiras espanholas nos lugares que ocupavam.

Quase ao mesmo tempo, em Madrid, o Senado aprovava a intervenção na autonomia catalã, tendo o Governo espanhol reunido em seguida para aprovar as medidas para restituir a legalidade institucional na região.

O Governo central anunciou ao fim do dia de sexta-feira a dissolução do parlamento regional, a realização de eleições em 21 de dezembro próximo e a destituição de todo o Governo catalão, entre outras medidas.

“Catalogne: place à la démocratie‖, Le Monde, 28 d‘octubre de 2017, http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2017/10/28/catalogne-place-a-la- democratie_5207255_3232.html?xtmc=catalogne&xtcr=12

Et maintenant, place à la démocratie. La décision du gouvernement espagnol, annoncée vendredi soir 27 octobre par son président, Mariano Rajoy, de convoquer des élections régionales le 21 décembre en Catalogne remet enfin le curseur là où il devait être dans cette douloureuse affaire catalane. Il fallait donner la parole aux Catalans eux-mêmes. A tous les Catalans. A eux, à présent, de se prononcer.

La « république indépendante » proclamée dans l‘après-midi par un Parlement catalan déserté par près de la moitié de ses élus est une fiction, qui n‘aura vécu que quelques heures. Aucun Etat étranger ne l‘a reconnue. L‘Union européenne et ses principaux Etats membres ont aussitôt réaffirmé leur soutien à l‘Etat espagnol. L‘avis des services juridiques de l‘assemblée catalane, qui avaient averti que la résolution d‘indépendance soumise au vote des députés était illégale, a été superbement ignoré par les dirigeants indépendantistes.

L‘état d‘impréparation de ces mêmes responsables sur ce que serait, institutionnellement, économiquement, diplomatiquement, la république à laquelle ils prétendent donner naissance, a trahi une immaturité politique sidérante. Aucun projet d‘avenir sérieux, au-delà de la simple affirmation de l‘indépendance, n‘a été soumis au peuple catalan. Les milieux économiques, pourtant traditionnellement proches des nationalistes, ont si peu confiance dans la viabilité de cette procédure que près de 1 700 entreprises ont déjà quitté la Catalogne depuis un mois.

Dérapages et affrontements ont été évités

Malgré les applaudissements d‘usage et contrairement à ce que peuvent laisser croire des images télévisées forcément partielles, il n‘y a eu ni fierté ni liesse populaire à Barcelone pour saluer cette proclamation bancale. L‘heure est trop grave pour les Espagnols, toutes régions autonomes confondues, et pour les Européens, qui savent ce que peut coûter à l‘UE cette crise en son sein, pour se laisser aller à des débordements d‘allégresse – ou de colère – face à une folle fuite en avant. Il faut à cet égard saluer la remarquable retenue du peuple catalan, qui, à l‘exception de quelques incidents mineurs, a su éviter jusqu‘ici dérapages et affrontements.

Il faut aussi saluer la volonté des responsables de Madrid (après la bavure de l‘intervention brutale de la Guardia Civil lors du vote sur l‘indépendance, le 1er octobre), de Bruxelles et des gouvernements européens de s‘en tenir au droit, rien qu‘au droit, et au respect des règles démocratiques et constitutionnelles. C‘est le fondement de la construction européenne, et c‘est la grande erreur de Carles Puigdemont de l‘avoir ignoré.

Car le président de la Généralité de Catalogne, désormais destitué par Madrid, aurait pu, lui-même, décider de donner la parole à ses électeurs en convoquant, de Barcelone, un tel scrutin régional. Mais l‘indécis M. Puigdemont s‘est laissé enfermer dans les replis d‘un nationalisme jusqu‘au-boutiste, qui a transformé une aspiration légitime à une autonomie mieux conçue en une haine d‘une Espagne fantasmée comme une dictature qu‘elle n‘est plus.

Le moment est venu de reprendre son souffle et de regarder l‘avenir. Les élections convoquées par M. Rajoy offrent aux nationalistes catalans la perspective d‘un processus légal et négocié pour décider de leur relation avec le reste de l‘Espagne. Rien ne dit, à ce stade, que la raison l‘emportera. Mais il y a, enfin, une porte de sortie de crise dans laquelle les forces politiques catalanes responsables peuvent tenter de s‘engouffrer.

La Catalogne s‟est déclarée indépendante quelques heures avant de perdre sa large autonomie. Si la sécession menace, c‟est surtout dans les têtes

―Catalogne: le gâchis historique‖, Le Temps, 27 d‘octubre de 2017, https://www.letemps.ch/opinions/2017/10/27/catalogne-gachis-historique

L‘histoire retiendra-t-elle ce vendredi 27 octobre 2017 comme la naissance d‘une nouvelle république? Ou, dans quelques années, le vote du parlement catalan se sera-t-il dissipé, comme on se réveille d‘un mauvais rêve? Après tout, le 15 septembre 1996, le leader de la Ligue du nord Umberto Bossi avait déclaré l‘indépendance de la Padanie sans que la face de l‘Italie en soit changée. Mais douze ans plus tard, un 17 février, le parlement du Kosovo jetait les bases d‘un nouvel Etat, aujourd‘hui reconnu par la moitié de la planète.

Nul ne sait quel sera le destin de la Catalogne indépendante. Mais on est pris de vertige. L‘Espagne est désormais menacée de dislocation, moins dans les faits que dans les esprits. C‘est bien là le plus préoccupant. En effet, la déclaration d‘indépendance n‘a aucune autre valeur que la force du symbole. Alors que les élus catalans n‘avaient pas fini de s‘autocongratuler, le parlement espagnol approuvait la mise sous tutelle de la région rebelle.

Ce n‘est pas la moindre des absurdités: la Catalogne s‘est déclarée indépendante quelques heures avant de perdre sa large autonomie. Si la sécession menace, c‘est surtout dans les têtes. Depuis le référendum du 1er octobre et le choc des intransigeances, le fossé s‘est encore creusé entre Madrid et Barcelone mais aussi parmi les Catalans eux-mêmes. Le vote de vendredi l‘a démontré jusqu‘à la caricature. Une écrasante majorité en faveur de l‘indépendance dans un hémicycle à moitié vide, l‘opposition ayant quitté la salle. Comme un miroir de la faible participation au referèndum.

Sans parler de légalité, inexistante, le «processus», comme disent les indépendantistes, manque de légitimité, tant la société catalane est divisée. Après des semaines d‘atermoiements, le président Carles Puigdemont et ses alliés ont choisi la fuite en avant. Sans doute espèrent-ils accroître et resserrer les rangs indépendantistes. Malheureusement, le gouvernement de Mariano Rajoy ne leur a jamais laissé une porte de sortie honorable.

Il a lui aussi une écrasante responsabilité dans cette situation d‘impasse. Dès ce samedi, policiers et fonctionnaires espagnols vont concrètement reprendre en main les institutions catalanes, une mesure jamais appliquée depuis la fin du franquisme. Le gouvernement va devoir agir avec la plus grande prudence. Il en avait singulièrement manqué en tentant vainement d‘empêcher le référendum au prix de centaines de blessés. Sinon, la cause catalane aura ses martyrs. Et d‘autres démons se réveilleront, ceux de la guerre civile.

Entretenant l‟illusion d‟une possible victoire, Puigdemont marche vers un sombre destin au mépris du peuple espagnol, mais surtout des Catalans, en première ligne du désastre annoncé.

Pierre Ruetschi, ―Le coup de folie catalan‖, La Tribune de Genève, 27 d‘octubre de 2017, https://www.tdg.ch/signatures/editorial/Coup-de-folie-catalan/story/29731039

Ce vendredi, le point de non-retour a été franchi. Carles Puigdemont et ses ayatollahs de l‘indépendantisme ont engagé leur ex-pays sur le chemin hautement périlleux d‘un affrontement. Le mouvement catalan se veut pacifique, ses leaders disent vouloir agir avec dignité, dans le respect de la démocratie. Mais on peut désormais craindre le pire. Car derrière la majorité tronquée et le vote illégal du parlement catalan, il y a une population profondément divisée, à peu près par la moitié. Et dès ce week-end, ces forces chauffées à blanc, raidies par des semaines de confrontations verbales, vont se retrouver face à face avec le risque évident que le bras de fer ne dégénère.

Les ennemis sont irréductibles. Et 5000 policiers anti-émeute de la garde civile stationnés sur des ferries n‘attendent que l‘ordre de Madrid pour remettre au pas la province. Se heurteront-ils aux 17 000 policiers catalans, les Mossos d‘Esquadra, qui devront choisir leur camp? Quel que soit le scénario envisagé, le danger est réel et la confusion totale.

Un coup de folie en vérité. Les authentiques et légitimes aspirations d‘autonomie d‘une partie de la population catalane se sont transformées en un combat aux accents totalitaires foulant au pied les droits démocratiques des peuples dont Carles Puigdemont pourtant se rengorge.

Folie économique aussi de Catalans aveuglés par les feux de leur combat. Plus de 1500 entreprises ont déjà fui la province pour se mettre à l‘abri. Laisser croire que cette dernière pourrait rejoindre l‘Union européenne tient de l‘imposture. L‘UE et ses membres n‘en veulent pas. Ils l‘ont dit, répété. Affaiblie par le Brexit, Bruxelles craint plus que tout les divisions contagieuses.

La Catalogne est au bord du gouffre. Elle menace d‘y entraîner un pays historiquement meurtri qui redoute le retour des vieux démons.

Les sécessionnistes peuvent-ils revenir sur leur pas? Les chances sont minces. Le retour de bâton de Madrid, qui a annoncé la mise sous tutelle de la Catalogne, n‘aura d‘autres effets qu‘excitants. Aucun doute que Carles Puigdemont compte là-dessus pour radicaliser encore son mouvement. Entretenant l‘illusion d‘une possible victoire, il marche vers un sombre destin au mépris du peuple espagnol, mais surtout des Catalans, en première ligne du désastre annoncé.

The two politicians have been acting like stubborn schoolboys, blind and deaf to any other arguments but their own.

Jessica Jones, ―Stubborn schoolboy tactics have plunged Spain and Catalonia into political crisis‖, The Independent, 28 d‘octubre de 2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/spain-catalonia-independence-protests-dissolve- article-155-referendum-a8024681.html

After a night of jubilation and Cava drinking for pro-independence Catalans who were celebrating the region declaring itself a republic on Friday, chaos quickly descended. The Spanish government – after voting to invoke Article 155 of its Constitution – dissolved the Catalan parliament, sacking Catalan President Carles Puigdemont and his ministers, and called regional elections for 21 December.

The head of the Catalan police, the Mossos d‘Esquadra, was also fired, although it it unclear whether the region‘s 17,000-strong force will take orders from Madrid.

The move from the Spanish Senate to assume control of the autonomous region, including its police, public media and finances, came minutes after Catalan MPs voted in secret to declare independence, by 70 votes to 10 in the 135-seat chamber. Many MPs who do not support independence boycotted the vote.

Friday‘s events have plunged Spain deeper into its worst political crisis in decades and many observers are now wondering what will happen next.

Catalonia has, within a day, declared independence and lost its autonomy, while Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy has called new elections but seemingly not thought about what will happen if independence parties win again in December.

The two politicians have been acting like stubborn schoolboys, blind and deaf to any other arguments but their own.

Puigdemont has pushed ahead with his independence plan, ignoring at least half of Catalans, who are against independence. In the October 1 referendum, 90 per cent voted for independence, but only 43 per cent turned out, with the vast majority of Catalans against independence staying at home.

He has ignored opposition parties and his vision for an independent republic apparently ignores the views of half the population.

Despite trying to gain EU support, many countries, including the UK, France, the USA and even Catalonia-friendly Scotland, refused to recognise the new Catalan republic on Friday.

Puigdemont also seems unconcerned by the now more than 1,500 companies – from Catalonia‘s biggest banks to some of its iconic Cava producers – that have moved their headquarters from the region citing the volatile political situation.

Rajoy, on the other hand, has completely ignored the growing crisis in Catalonia and the legitimate grievances of many of its people. The opinion of over two million Catalans cannot be ignored, but Rajoy has appeared to have done so.

What does Rajoy hope to achieve by calling regional elections for 21 December? He no doubt hopes that anti-independence parties, such as the centre-right Ciudadans, the Socialist Party and his own conservative Popular Party, will triumph, but that is by no means guaranteed.

His ham-fisted reaction on polling day, sending in Guardia Civil and national police whose violence shocked the world, was disproportionate, and may have served to push more on-the-fence Catalans towards the independence cause.

The Catalan crisis seems severely polarised but there have been voices calling for an alternative solution from the beginning.

Ada Colau, the left-wing Mayor of Barcelona, reacted to Friday‘s events in a lengthy Facebook post, in which she not only described the invoking of Article 155 as a ―blow to democracy‖ but also accused the Catalan government of advancing only ―partisan interests‖ that ―culminated today with the Declaration of Independence in the name of Catalonia that doesn‘t have the support of the majority of Catalans‖.

She called for ―dialogue, common sense and an agreed solution‖ and added, ―Not in my name, no to 155 no to DUI [unilateral declaration of independence].‖

Colau and her Madrid counterpart, Mayor Manuela Carmena, were widely praised when, just days before the referendum, they appeared together on Spanish news satire programme El Intermedio.

They debated the issue of Catalonia calmly and many took to social media to commend their ―cordiality‖ and ―good sense‖.

It is unlikely Rajoy‘s calling of another election will calm the situation. Over two million Catalans are unlikely to change their pro-independence views, whatever the result.

Perhaps if Puigdemont and Rajoy had been more willing to listen to opposing viewpoints, as well as each other, Spain would not be facing this crisis.

Spanish officials say that even as he tweeted to suggest he was outside the regional presidency building, Carles Puigdemont was already making plans to escape to Belgium

Kim Sengupta, ―How Catalonia‘s first day as an ‗independent state‘ descended in chaos‖ The Independent, 30 d‘octubre de 2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/catalonia-independence-catalan- carles-puigdemont-brussels-escape-spain-madrid-a8028346.html

The first working day for the administration of Catalonia, Europe‘s newest ―independent‖ country, unfolded in an extraordinary and dramatic fashion with its leader reportedly fleeing to Brussels as he faced charges brought by the Spanish government for rebellion, sedition and embezzlement.

Carles Puigdemont travelled to the Belgian capital, according to officials, as Spain‘s chief public prosecutor announced that he was seeking indictments carrying prison sentences of up to 30 years against the Catalan President and other members of the government in Barcelona, which has been recently dissolved by Madrid.

Reports of the flight came 24 hours after Belgium‘s Minister for Asylum and Migration stated that Mr Puigdemont can seek refuge in the country. ―Catalan people who feel politically threatened can ask for asylum in Belgium and that includes President Puigdemont, this is 100 per cent legal,‖ Theo Francken had declared.

In a day of accusation, recrimination and confusion, Mr Puigdemont posted a photograph of the regional presidency building with the Catalan flag flying beside that of Spain, accompanied by a smiley emoticon and the words ―good morning‖. This led to the assumption that he had, as he had vowed, turned up in office as usual.

But, Spanish government officials say, he was already making plans to escape to Brussels. The move spreads the Catalan crisis, which shows no sign of ending, across the Continent. The European Union has refused to recognise the region‘s declaration of independence, but Mr Francken‘s Flemish nationalist party has strong ties with Catalan separatists and its officials stated that all attempts would be made to prevent Mr Puigdemont‘s extradition to Spain if he sought sanctuary in Belgium. VRT, the Belgian state broadcasting station said: ―Carles Puigdemont is almost certainly coming to Brussels and is said to be on his way. Mr Puigdemont will meet lawyers and political representatives here.‖

The Spanish government had reacted angrily to Mr Francken‘s asylum offer, with Esteban Gonzalez Pons, of the governing Popular Party, accusing him of ―violating principles of solidarity and loyal collaboration between the countries of the European Union‖ and ―making serious accusations against the work of Spanish judges and the rule of law in Spain‖.

The Spanish Attorney General, Jose Manuel Maza, announced that Mr Puigdemont and his colleagues ―have produced an institutional crisis that ended with a unilateral declaration of independence with total disregard of our Constitution‖ and that the accused must answer summons ―taking into account the seriousness of the facts and/or crimes imputed‖.

According to some reports, Mr Puigdemont drove from Catalonia across the French border to Marseilles with five members of the Catalan cabinet to catch the Brussels flight.

As news of Mr Puigdemont‘s supposed Brussels journey spread there was further internationalisation, albeit in a limited form, of the Catalan issue with Jan Skonberne, the deputy leader of Slovenia‘s democratic party, part of the ruling coalition, insisting that his country will recognise the region‘s independence in the near future.

The Spanish government has announced that elections will be held in Catalonia on 21 December. The result of that is expected to be very close with a recent poll by El Mundo showing anti-independence parties getting 43.4 per cent of the vote to the pro- independence group‘s 42.5 per cent.

Catalonian separatists had initially refused to take part in the December ballot, insisting that the vote for independence in a controversial referendum earlier in the month must stand. But Mr Puigdemont‘s PDeCat (Catalan Republican Party) and Vice President Oriol Junqueras‘s Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) stated that it would field candidates. Sergi Sabria, an ERC MP, held that Madrid has called an election ―which is illegitimate, meant to be a trap. But taking part on 21 December is an opportunity to better consolidate the Republic‖.

A vast demonstration was staged on Sunday by anti-independence Spanish nationalists, with estimates of attendance numbers varying between 300,000 to a million, and there were some chants in memory of Franco and a few Nazi salutes.

There was a heavy deployment of police in the streets in anticipation of possible trouble, with Catalan ministers insisting that they would carry on the duties of their ―independent‖ administration. The Spanish government had ordered that they had ―a few hours‖ to collect their belongings, but faced arrest if they stayed beyond that in their offices.

One Catalan minister, Josep Rull i Andreu, did turn up at his office tweeting ―at my desk, carrying out the duties that I was tasked with by the people of Catalonia‖. But he left 50 minutes later. Cesar Puig, the Catalan secretary-general, went to the interior ministry and was said to have wandered around before leaving. ―He said goodbye,‖ said the janitor. ―He did not say when he was coming back, he did not take any of his things.‖

The twists and turns of the day left some Catalonian nationalists bemused. Goncal Ignasi, a 23 year old student, said: ―My friends and I don‘t know what‘s going on. If Mr Puigdemont has had to leave the country then it is because Spanish judges cannot be trusted. This used to happen in time of Franco, are we going back to those days?

―Whether Mr Puidgement has left or not,‖ Mr Ignasi said, ‖there is no chance of us accepting things the way they were in the past and Spain taking control. The future is very worrying.―

'There are no incidents – it's magnificent news.' On a crucial day for judging the resilience of the Catalan independence movement, most just stayed away

Alasdair Fotheringham, ―Catalonia: Why Spain's government will be delighted with day one of the 'independent Catalan Republic'‖, The Independent, 30 d‘octubre de 2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/catalonia-independence-spain- madrid-reaction-republic-carles-puigdemont-analysis-a8028386.html

As the international media spotlight on Catalonia swung to Carles Puigdemont‘s unheralded journey to Belgium, for much of today the most popular image of the widely predicted civil resistance to direct rule in the region boiled down to this: one Twitter photo of one besuited former regional minister, Josep Rull, sitting at his desk at 9.30am sharp, working away on his computer.

―In my office, carrying out the duties the Catalan people have entrusted us to do,‖ ran the somewhat smug caption below the picture of Mr Rull, the former minister for territory and sustainability, who had insisted on Friday he would go to work today as a minister for the new Catalan Republic.

As the morning drew on, however – and this on a day considered crucial by Madrid in estimating the degree of popular opposition to direct rule – the embarrassing lack of other sacked regional ministers following Mr Rull‘s example grew painfully obvious. So, too, was the near absence of grassroots support outside Mr Rull‘s government building, an anonymous concrete-and-glass high rise affair sited – in an ominous coincidence – just a mere stone‘s throw away from the high, grimy walls and watchtowers of the now closed Modelo jail, where General Franco‘s regime kept many Catalan political prisoners.

Outside Mr Rull‘s building two Catalan policemen stood on one side of a broad boulevard, visibly bored as they watched the six or so, equally bored, local journalists on watch for any developments. A dozen or so pro-independence supporters briefly made an appearance before disappearing again, and the only Catalan flag visible outside the building was the one engraved in its smart glass front door.

At mid-morning at Mr Puigdemont‘s party offices in the city centre, a similarly low-key story played out: dozens of TV camera crews waiting outside, but two young men clutching a Spanish flag represented the only protesters either for or against independence.

―We‘re just here by chance, we were out shopping,‖ one of them, Pau, explained to The Independent, ―but we feel it‘s right the Catalan government should go on trial, they have to respect the law.‖

For the Spanish government, this apparent near-absence of protests or resistance meant their low-key approach to taking over the running of Catalonia, at least initially, seems to be proving singularly effective. ―There are no incidents,‖ one government minister, Iñigo de la Serna, claimed this afternoon. ―It‘s magnificent news.‖

Meanwhile, official portraits of Mr Puigdemont were removed from government buildings in Tarragona, one regional capital and in police stations, and former councillors were left bereft of official cars and police escorts. Although one nationalist grassroots association has issued detailed instructions to Catalonia‘s 200,000 civil servants on passive resistance tactics, and one human chain of several hundred people did form around a government building in Girona, a nationalist stronghold, on Monday morning, any outbreaks of resistance were quickly overshadowed by Mr Puigdemont‘s abrupt departure from Catalonia.

Early in the day, government sources told local media they were untroubled by his absence, given that meant that ―for today at least‖ he was not attempting to go to work as usual.

And while preaching civil disobedience, it was notable that the two biggest nationalist parties pitched much of today‘s narrative towards explaining why they will be participating in the upcoming regional elections on 21 December. This despite it being held under the auspices of the much-reviled Article 155 of the constitution.

And as for Mr Rull? He left after 40 minutes ―work‖ – for a party meeting. Whether he will return tomorrow, and whether civil resistance will begin to flourish in earnest, remains to be seen. The Spanish government, meanwhile, is surely breathing a huge sigh of relief.

L'affrontement entre le pouvoir central espagnol et les indépendantistes catalans illustre bien la complexité de la question du droit des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes.

Ferghane Azihari, ―Faut-il réserver le droit d'auto-détermination aux seuls peuples colonisés?‖, Slate.fr, 30 d‘octubre de 2017, http://www.slate.fr/story/153164/reserver- autodetermination-peuples-colonises

«Qu’il soit permis à une région d’exercer unilatéralement, dans un contexte d’État de droit, le droit à l’autodétermination dévolu aux peuples placés sous le joug colonial ou impérialiste, et c’en sera fini de l’intangibilité des frontières établies au prix du sang.» Ces propos tenus par Maxime Forest, chercheur affilié à Sciences Po, dans les colonnes de Libération sur la situation en Catalogne illustrent les imperfections de l‘auto- détermination et des controverses qui l‘entourent. Théorisé au XIXe siècle durant la formation des États-nations européens, consacré dans le droit international durant le XXe siècle et appliqué en grande partie durant le démantèlement des empires coloniaux, le droit des peuples à disposer d‘eux-mêmes est réservée aux collectifs qui forment un peuple bien identifié. Problème: personne ne s‘accorde sur ce qu‘est un peuple.

«C’est alors qu’apparaît l’ambiguïté fondamentale du droit des peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes; elle tient à l’absence de critères objectifs permettant de déterminer avec certitude ses titulaires», ainsi que le soulèvent les juristes Yann Kerbrat et Pierre-Marie Dupuy.

En Espagne et en Catalogne, unionistes et indépendantistes se disputent chacun une légitimité populaire aux contours flous. Vendredi 27 octobre, le parlement catalan a voté l'indépendance provoquant la mise sous tutelle de la région par le gouvernement central du pays. La chambre rebelle a donc été dissoute avec convocation de nouvelles élections pour le 21 décembre prochain. Les membres de l'exécutif local ont été destitués. Les Catalans revendiquent le droit de révoquer leur affiliation à l‘État espagnol sous prétexte qu‘ils formeraient un peuple à part, ce que nient leurs opposants. Ces derniers ne reconnaissent qu‘un peuple espagnol, considéré indivisible.

Quelle légitimité?

La notion de peuple est communément associée à un collectif humain qui partage des racines communes, ce qui tend à renvoyer à des critères culturels, ethniques et linguistiques. Mais la perméabilité et les interdépendances culturelles, économiques et sociales qui ont toujours caractérisé les sociétés humaines rendent toute volonté de délimitation périlleuse pour ne pas dire arbitraire. L‘anthropologue et philologue italien Maurizio Bettini, dans son ouvrage Contre les racines, soutient par exemple que l‘identité culturelle d‘un collectif humain est toujours le fruit d‘un processus évolutif permanent qu‘il est impossible de borner dans l‘espace et le temps. Parler de racines communes exclusives pour définir un peuple serait donc impertinent.

Toujours est-il qu‘il n‘existe à l‘heure actuelle aucune autre source de légitimité politique que celle de la fiction populaire sur la scène internationale. L‘impossibilité de délimiter les contours d‘un peuple interroge d‘ailleurs la définition du fait colonial. Contrairement à une idée reçue, l‘impérialisme colonial ne se définit ni par la brutalité

politique, ni par l‘absence de consentement populaire à la domination d‘un État. Il fait davantage appel à un critère ethno-racial. Il y aurait colonisation quand un État étendrait sa domination à des populations différentes, sur le plan ethnique, de celles qui le composent historiquement. Un critère peu commode (ou très commode selon les intérêts) qui rend possible toutes sortes d‘interprétations historiques à n‘en plus finir. Il faut dire que le critère de la brutalité politique et du consentement mettrait en difficulté la quasi-totalité des États de la planète.

Idéologie vs sociologie

Contrairement à ce que laisse entendre la théorie du contrat social, les processus de formation et de consolidation des États ont toujours été des entreprises violentes avec leurs lots de crimes. Les historiens, politologues, anthropologues et sociologues qui ont travaillé sur les phénomènes de «state building» le savent très bien. Cette observation concorde d‘ailleurs avec la nature même de l‘État qui se définit comme une organisation ayant su revendiquer durablement le monopole de la violence légale sur un territoire et une population donnés. Or, ce monopole se construit difficilement par la simple persuasion. Il est toujours obtenu au prix du sang.

Reste alors à savoir pourquoi le droit de s‘auto-déterminer serait subordonné à un critère ethno-racial comme le voudrait la pensée dominante aussi bien chez les séparatistes que chez les unionistes de tous bords. À titre d‘exemple, Bernard-Henri Lévy est récemment intervenu sur France Inter pour défendre le référendum kurde en Irak, en réfutant tout parallèle avec la situation catalane. La première raison invoquée étant que l‘Irak serait un «faux État». Il faut comprendre par-là que ce n‘est pas un État-nation à l‘européenne.

On en revient donc au même critère bancal de légitimation du pouvoir politique: l‘existence d‘une communauté nationale avec ses propres spécificités culturelles, ethniques, linguistiques aux contours parfaitement délimités, ce qui relève davantage de l‘idéologie que de la sociologie. La tradition politique occidentale voudrait pourtant que l‘on s‘appuie un critère plus rationnel pour légitimer la formation et le maintien d‘un gouvernement.

Danger ou opportunité?

Il n‘y a justement pas plus rationnel que la faculté de consentir librement à l‘autorité d‘un État, et ceci indépendamment des considérations identitaires. Cela serait d‘ailleurs plus conforme à la finalité officielle des États modernes qui prétendent puiser leur légitimité dans la sauvegarde des libertés individuelles. Or, la première des libertés politiques, avant la démocratie et le suffrage universel, est celle de ratifier (ou non) son appartenance à une communauté.

En Europe, la Principauté du Liechtenstein est la seule démocratie à reconnaître dans sa Constitution l‘existence d‘un droit de sécession unilatérale. Le deuxième alinéa de son article 4 dispose notamment que «chaque commune a le droit de faire sécession de l'État. La décision d'engager une procédure de sécession doit être prise à la majorité des citoyens résidant dans la commune et habilités à voter». Comme l‘énonce le Prince Michael von Liechtenstein:

«La possibilité pour les régions de se séparer d’un État ne devrait pas être considérée comme une menace, mais au contraire comme une opportunité. Cela contraint les gouvernements centraux à mettre en place des politiques efficaces. Permettre la sécession est une vraie force d’ajustement, tandis qu’une union voulue dont les citoyens sont fiers en fait des acteurs bien plus actifs de la vie de leur pays qu’ils ne le seraient sous la contrainte.»

Le penseur Ernest Renan, dont se réclament les partisans de la nation civique, considérait le fait national comme une volonté de vivre ensemble et «un plébiscite de tous les jours». Quoi de plus plébiscitaire qu‘un droit inconditionnel et universel à l‘auto-détermination?

Catherine Gouëset, ―Catalogne: pourquoi les indépendantistes iront au scrutin convoqué par Rajoy‖, L’Express, 30 d‘octubre de 2017 http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/europe/catalogne-pourquoi-les- independantistes-iront-au-scrutin-convoque-par-rajoy_1956369.html

Les deux principaux partis indépendantistes de Catalogne, dont celui de l'ex-président Carles Puigdemont, ont annoncé leur participation aux régionales du 21 décembre, explications.

Les indépendantistes catalans sont confrontés à leurs contradictions. Le parti du président destitué Carles Puigdemont, le PdeCat (centre droit), et celui de son partenaire ERC, viennent d'annoncer leur participation aux élections convoquées vendredi par le chef du gouvernement espagnol Mariano Rajoy. Une démarche qui paraît contradictoire après que ces formations ont proclamé l'indépendance, quelques heures avant que Madrid ne place la région sous tutelle.

"On nous a imposé des élections illégitimes. Un piège, a déclaré ce lundi le porte-parole d'ERC, Sergi Sabrià. Les urnes ne nous font pourtant pas peur".

Garder deux fers au feu...

Pourquoi ont-ils accepté de participer à ces élections s'ils les considèrent illégitimes? "Les formations indépendantistes restent dans la logique qui est la leur depuis qu'ils ont enclenché le processus de rupture avec l'Espagne, celle de garder deux fers au feu", explique à L'Express l'universitaire Gemma Ubasart, celle de la négociation et celle de la confrontation. "Aujourd'hui, ils sont obligés de faire preuve de réalisme", poursuit la professeure de l'université de Gérone.

"S'ils ne prennent pas part aux élections, ils perdent les privilèges et les moyens financiers auxquels ils peuvent prétendre aujourd'hui, complète la politologue Berta Barbet, professeure de sciences politiques à l'Université autonome de Barcelone. Et compte tenu de l'absence de reconnaissance de l'indépendance à l'international, ils ne peuvent se permettre la coexistence de deux entités parallèles."

Cette stratégie donne un sentiment d'impréparation. "Les indépendantistes tablaient sans doute sur une stratégie de la tension pour la poursuite du chemin vers l'indépendance", complète Gemma Ubasart. Ces derniers mois, l'évocation de l'article 155 de la constitution espagnole prévoyant la mise sous tutelle des institutions autonomes semblait augurer de longs mois d'intervention de Madrid. Mais le "155 light" finalement activé par Rajoy les prend au dépourvu: il l'a appliqué à minima, pour convoquer rapidement de nouvelles élections, le 21 décembre, et "revenir au plus vite à la normalité", selon ses propres termes de Mariano Rajoy.

Certains observateurs émettent aussi l'hypothèse d'un accord tacite entre Madrid et Barcelone. Carles Puigdemont était très près de convoquer lui-même les élections régionales, vendredi. Mais il pouvait difficilement le faire sans heurter sa base indépendantiste. Puigdemont aurait-il convenu avec Rajoy que ce dernier soit celui qui déclenche le scrutin et accepté par la suite d'y participer?

Comment vont réagir la base et les associations?

"Ces élections dans un délai rapide marquent en tout cas un retour au politique après que Madrid a privilégié la voie policière et judiciaire", se félicite Gemma Ubasart. Il faut désormais attendre la réaction de la base des électeurs et celle des très populaires associations indépendantistes, l'Assemblée nationale catalane et Omnium cultural quant à ce scrutin. Ils ont de quoi se sentir trahis.

Les derniers sondages réalisés juste avant la proclamation de l'indépendance et la mise sous tutelle de la Catalogne, donnent les partis indépendantistes en baisse. Mais pour la politologue, "la situation actuelle est trop volatile pour qu'on puisse s'y fier. La capacité de rebondir des formations indépendantistes dépendra de plusieurs facteurs. De leur capacité à produire un discours permettant de justifier leur changement de ligne. Ils ont très habiles ces dernières années". Cela dépendra aussi de leur volonté ou non de se présenter unis ou séparément.

Enfin la décision du petit parti d'extrême gauche indépendantiste CUP de participer ou pas au scrutin pèsera aussi. En cas contraire, une partie de ses électeurs pourrait s'abstenir, une autre voter pour Podemos. En face, dans le camp hostile à l'indépendance, un forte polarisation devrait favoriser le mouvement Ciudadanos -le principal parti d'opposition depuis 2015. Mais une baisse de la tension limiterait son attrait.

L'ex-dirigeant catalan devra justifier de la persécution dont il est victime dans son pays d'origine, et de l'impossibilité qu'il a de s'y défendre. Pas si simple.

Loreline Merelle, ―Qui est Theo Franken, l‘amfitryon de Carles Puigdemont‖, Le Point, 31 d‘octubre de 2017, http://www.lepoint.fr/europe/qui-est-theo-francken-l-amphitryon- de-carles-puigdemont-31-10-2017-2168783_2626.php

S'il y a bien un homme qui pourrait être tenu pour responsable de cette cavale étonnante de Carles Puidgemont en Belgique, c'est bien le secrétaire d'État à l'Asile et à la Migration Theo Francken. La veille de la venue pour le moins surprenante de l'ex- président catalan dans la capitale bruxelloise, ce nationaliste flamand, membre du parti indépendantiste ultra-conservateur N-VA, avait déclaré de manière péremptoire que Carles Puidgdemont pouvait faire sa demande d'asile politique dans le royaume. Cela lui a valu les reproches du Premier ministre belge, d'ordinaire conciliant. « Je demande à Theo Francken de ne pas jeter de l'huile sur le feu », a ainsi lancé Charles Michel. Theo Francken savait-il que Carles Puigdemont allait partir pour Marseille le lendemain avant de rejoindre la capitale belge ? Voulait-il en tant qu'indépendantiste flamand rappeler son attachement aux revendications catalanes ? Ces questions restent pour l'heure en suspens, tout comme une éventuelle rencontre avec Carles Puigdemont. Mais les propos de Francken ont contribué à saper l'autorité du Premier ministre. Les médias flamands s'interrogent déjà : où est passé Charles Michel ?

Qui est ce Flamand prêt à accueillir un dirigeant catalan qui risque près de 30 ans de prison ? Si l'on en croit ses états de service, ce pilier du parti indépendantiste flamand n'a rien d'un bon samaritain. « Flamingant » (partisan du mouvement flamand en Belgique francophone, NDLR), né dans une famille aisée de la petite ville de Lubbeek, en pleine principauté flamande, il a bâti sa réputation par ses propos polémiques et une politique migratoire très restrictive. À son entrée en politique, Theo Francken préside le groupe informel VNV, littéralement « cercle des amis nationalistes flamands ». Des initiales qui font froid dans le dos tant elles évoquent le « Vlaams nationaal verbond », une formation collaborationniste lors de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. En 2014, à peine arrivé à son poste de secrétaire d'État à l'Asile et à la Migration et juste après sa prestation de serment au roi, il assiste à l'anniversaire de Bob Maes, qui a collaboré avec les nazis. Cela vaut au nouveau gouvernement fédéral une première polémique.

Sorties controversées

Theo Francken aime autant la scène, les caméras, les coups de projecteur… que les polémiques. Et son actuel portefeuille lui donne l'occasion de sorties controversées. Au début de l'année, le nationaliste se félicite de la hausse de 8 % du nombre de personnes renvoyées dans leur pays d'origine en 2016. En septembre 2017, il évoque le « nettoyage » en cours dans le parc Maximilien, où se sont réfugiés quelques centaines de déboutés du droit d'asile durant l'été. C'est également lui qui invite une délégation soudanaise pour identifier les ressortissants du pays à expulser.

Il y a un an, il partage un montage vidéo sur les réseaux sociaux montrant un homme sénégalais se faire hélitreuiller via une ventouse sur la tête. À l'époque, il déclenche aussi une polémique suite à la demande de visa humanitaire d'une famille syrienne.

Obligé par la justice belge à accueillir cette famille venue d'Alep, il en réfère à la Cour européenne de justice, obtient gain de cause et refuse de les accueillir. Theo Francken se félicite également du renvoi d'un Irakien dans son pays – alors même que l'Irak n'est pas considéré comme sûr, sans recevoir de véritables remontrances de la part de l'exécutif. Le quotidien belge La Libre Belgique a estimé que « le faire tomber », ce serait « déstabiliser l'ensemble du gouvernement ». Malgré ces polémiques, l'homme, charismatique, est populaire en Belgique, selon les derniers sondages. Il est même pressenti pour succéder à Bart de Wever lors des prochaines élections en 2019 et permettre au parti N-VA d'assumer sa gestion très conservatrice.

Le casse-tête de l'asile politique

Pourtant, si Carles Puigdemont demande l'asile politique ce mardi à la Belgique, Theo Francken devra y réfléchir à deux fois. Si les deux hommes ont en commun le désir d'indépendance et l'amour des projecteurs, Theo Francken ne peut ignorer les conditions pour obtenir l'asile dans un pays européen : l'ex-dirigeant catalan devra justifier de la persécution dont il est victime dans son pays d'origine, et de l'impossibilité qu'il a de s'y défendre. Pas si simple.

O exílio de Carles Puigdemont é coisa para rir, é um insulto aos verdadeiros exilados espanhóis da trágica história recente

Ferreira Fernandes, ―É trágica tanta comédia‖, Diário de Notícias, 31 d‘octubre de 2017, https://www.dn.pt/opiniao/opiniao-dn/ferreira-fernandes/interior/e-tragico-tanta- comedia-8884342.html

Uma declaração de independência que não foi, porque seguiu-se a respetiva suspensão, tem agora uma independência que não o é, porque os independentistas vão a eleições que, afinal, lhe são permitidas pelos colonizadores, que não o são. Nem burlesco de Cervantes nem surrealismo de Dalí, mas, como prova de que o nacionalismo, hoje, está ultrapassado, uma chanchada brasileira. Catalunha merecia melhor.

O líder que a atrapalha, Carles Puigdemont, fugiu para o exílio, numa fuga desnecessária para um exílio inexistente. Foi para o exílio em fins de outubro, para um provável regresso a meados de dezembro para votar e ser votado. Exílio é outra coisa, não tem prazo de validade nem a certeza de votos. Exílio viveu-o o socialista madrileno Largo Caballero, presidente do governo da República espanhola, que com a vitória de Franco foi levado para o campo de concentração nazi de Sachsenhausen. E viveu-o o republicano catalão Lluís Companys, presidente da Generalitat da Catalunha, entregue pelos nazis a Franco e fuzilado.

O exílio de Carles Puigdemont é coisa para rir, é um insulto aos verdadeiros exilados espanhóis da trágica história recente. É como comparar a livre, democrática, autónoma e progressista Catalunha a países colonizados e ocupados. Nenhuma das hipóteses com que Puigdemont contava aconteceu: nem a independência surtiu nem os tanques vieram... Restava-lhe a fuga para a frente. Partiu, com uma decisão categórica tão rara nele, para um exílio de comédia.

Alguns catalães sentem-se algo desamparados pelo governo de Carles Puigdemont, presidente da Generalitat que ontem partiu para a Bélgica

João Francisco Guerreiro, "Catalunha: Agora partiram. As pessoas sentem-se um pouco perdidas", Diário de Notícias, 31 d‘octubre de 2017, https://www.dn.pt/mundo/interior/agora-partiram-as-pessoas-sentem-se-um-pouco- perdidas-8884197.html

A presidente do parlamento da Catalunha, Carmen Forcadell seguiu ontem a ordem do governo de Madrid, dissolvendo a assembleia. Mas, do lado de fora do palácio, as duas hastes sem as bandeiras de Espanha e da região eram, ao cair da noite, um sinal da insurreição independentista.

"Era o mínimo que se poderia fazer", comenta Tanit, ao reparar com "surpresa" que os símbolos oficiais do Estado não se encontravam, como habitualmente, no topo do edifício. "Alguém deveria ter feito o mesmo na Generalitat".

Entrevistada para o DN e TSF, esta representante da administração do processo eleitoral do dia do referendo, presidente do colégio que funcionou no Institut Quatro Cantons del Poplenou, em Barcelona, lamenta a saída de Carles Puigdemont e de outros membros do governo, para a Bélgica. "Tínhamos de ter um governo que se debatesse por nós e agora partiram para a Bélgica. As pessoas sentem-se um pouco perdidas", diz, referindo-se às "pessoas que defenderam o presidente e estavam ao seu lado, saindo para batalhar".

"Defenderam os colégios [eleitorais] no 1 de outubro, foram às manifestações. E, agora sentem-se um pouco desamparadas, porque não têm presidente nem ninguém que represente o que pensam", lamenta.

"Talvez haja uma estratégia por trás, muito bem trabalhada, para seguir em frente, mas a população não sabe. Mesmo assim, não podemos julgá-los sem conhecer tudo", afirma, acreditando, porém, que este pode ser um movimento inconsequente de Puigdemont, pois "o governo espanhol vai rebentar com os telefones [do governo] da Bélgica e, se a Bélgica cede, vamos ficar com tudo na mesma, até que alguém nos ajude".

A praça Sant Jaume, sede da Generalitat, foi ontem o palco mediático para alguns protestos de independentistas e unionistas. Num movimento teatral, defensores isolados de um e de outro lado passeavam bandeiras de ambas as causas, num ambiente de incerteza sobre os tempos vindouros.

"Isso só os artistas sabem", ironiza Clemente Francesco, um professor de inglês, reformado, referindo-se "aos que estão a fazer o teatro público, a nível internacional", que tem como "principal protagonista o presidente deposto da Generalitat da Catalunha, o senhor Puigdemont".

Esta praça era, por isso, o espelho de uma "divisão" na sociedade catalã. "As armas da repressão pertencem ao reino de Espanha", comenta Francesc, um operário fabril, reformado, acrescentando que "os independentistas só querem a paz e o direito à república".

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Mas, a ouvir esta conversa, um homem grita "todos para a prisão" e "sem mais nada para dizer" retira-se porque está "farto de tudo" o que a "escória da política catalã trouxe à sociedade".

No centro da praça, José abafa as cordas da guitarra e anuncia que daí a "15 minutos" cantará La Estaca, a canção com que Luis Llach, deputado até esta segunda-feira do Junts pel Sí, se opôs na década de 70, à ditadura de franquista, tornada no hino do movimento independentista da Catalunha.

"Estes 15 minutos de silêncio são uma homenagem simbólica aos dois presos políticos, que o governo de Madrid encerrou atrás das grades", disse o músico de rua, referindo-se a Jordi Sànchez, da Associação Nacional Catalã e a Jordi Cuixart, da Omnium Cultural, que estão sob detenção "há 15 dias" acusados de sedição.

"Eu não colocaria ninguém na cadeia", comenta o professor de inglês, numa espécie de debate espontâneo. "A minha mulher é catalã, a minha filha e o meu filho também. Quando a conversa é sobre a Catalunha, calamo-nos todos, se não ficamos desgostosos", confessou, referindo-se à clivagem que atinge "o coração" de algumas famílias.

"Não vejo a sociedade catalã partida ao meio. Obviamente que há pessoas que opinam uma coisa e gente que opina outra. Mas, se se for minimamente cívico e conciliador, não haverá discussões", afirma Tanit, admitindo alguma frustração com os desenvolvimentos mais recentes, embora esteja disposta "obviamente" a repetir tudo, para levar os catalães às urnas.

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Nuno Ramos de Almeida, ―Posição do governo português sobre a Catalunha foi ditada por Madrid‖, Sol, 29 d‘octubre de 2017, https://sol.sapo.pt/artigo/586685/posicao-do-governo-portugu-s-sobre-a-catalunha-foi- ditada-por-madrid

O governo espanhol enviou um formulário aos seus congéneres da União Europeia para que respondessem em determinados termos, usando a mesma argumentação que legitima a intervenção de Madrid na Catalunha. A revelação foi feita pelo correspondente em Bruxelas da televisão alemã ARD, Markus Preiss.

A nota do governo espanhol aos seus aliados, e ao governo português, diria o seguinte: ―Enviaremos uma curta nota sobre a Declaração Unilateral de Independência, que acaba de ser aprovada por ‗70 representantes do povo‘ no parlamento regional catalão, numa votação secreta, sem a presença da oposição. Uma clara tomada de posição, tão rápido quanto possível, seria muito bem-vinda e ajudaria muito. Aqui têm os pontos que pedimos que incluam num posicionamento curto e claro.

1. (Nome do país) não reconhece e não reconhecerá de nenhuma maneira a declaração unilateral e ilegal que se aprovou hoje no parlamento regional catalão.

2. Condenamos como violação flagrante do Estado de direito, da democracia e da Constituição espanhola, que é uma parte do marco legal europeu.

3. Temos confiança no governo espanhol e nas suas instituições democráticas para restaurar o Estado de direito e a ordem constitucional, para garantir as liberdade e os direitos de todos os cidadãos.‖

Lendo a posição oficial do governo português, expressa em comunicado, parece que foi ditada diretamente por Madrid, com poucas alterações de vírgulas e tendo o cuidado de especificar no início, como lhe pediam, o país do governo que escreve.

―Comunicado do governo português sobre a ‗Declaração Unilateral de Independência‘ no parlamento da Catalunha:

O governo português não reconhece a declaração unilateral de independência hoje anunciada no parlamento regional da Catalunha.

Portugal condena a quebra da ordem constitucional e o ataque ao Estado de direito em Espanha – parte integrante do quadro jurídico da União Europeia – que este ato configura.

O governo português confia que as instituições democráticas espanholas saberão restaurar o Estado de direito e a ordem constitucional, quadro natural do diálogo

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democrático, a fim de preservar os direitos e liberdades de todos os seus cidadãos e garantir que seja encontrada a melhor solução para preservar a unidade de Espanha.‖ Bélgica oferece asilo Por sua vez, a Bélgica, que chegou a considerar, segundo declarações do seu primeiro-ministro, Charles Michel, mediar o conflito entre o governo catalão e Madrid, ofereceu asilo político ao presidente da Generalitat, Carles Puigdemont. O ministro belga da Imigração, Theo Francken, declarou no domingo que o seu país poderia conceder asilo político ao presidente catalão, se ele assim o solicitasse, perante a perspetiva de ―que não tivesse um julgamento justo‖ e no caso de ser detido, depois da proclamação unilateral da independência da Catalunha. ―Claro que isso nos colocaria perante uma situação diplomática difìcil com o governo espanhol‖, referiu, mas ―essa opção teria de ser seriamente examinada, caso ―estivesse em causa uma pena de prisão. Nesse caso teria de ser analisado até que ponto este julgamento [a Puigdemont] tinha garantias de que seria justo‖, concluiu o ministro belga.

A Bélgica não é o único país da Europa em que a frente de apoio às posições do governo de Madrid pode não reunir consenso total. Na Finlândia, o parlamento vai votar nos próximos dias uma moção, apresentada pelo deputado do Partido do Centro da Finlândia, Karna Mikko, para que o país nórdico reconheça formalmente o governo da Catalunha.

O governo regional escocês, por seu lado, também afirmou uma posição diferente da do Reino Unido, que apoiou as decisões de Madrid. A secretária dos Assuntos Exteriores da Escócia, Fiona Hyslop, disse na sexta-feira passada que compreendia a oposição do governo espanhol à declaração de independência da Catalunha, mas que o povo catalão tinha o direito a escolher o seu próprio futuro. E criticou o governo de Mariano Rajoy por ter-se negado a inúmeros pedidos de diálogo por parte das autoridades catalãs. A nível internacional, para além da posição de apoio da quase generalidade dos governos dos países da União Europeia, Rajoy também pode contar com o firme apoio de Donald Trump, que disse mais uma vez que ―a Catalunha faz parte de Espanha‖. A Rússia, por seu turno, sublinhou apenas a sua preocupação com o agudizar do conflito na região.

A conspiração de Moscovo

O ―El Paìs‖, garantiu, há uns meses, que a Rússia conspirava para dividir a Espanha e que tinha usado meios informáticos, hackers e recursos nas redes sociais para ajudar os independentistas a organizar o referendo inconstitucional. No fim desta semana, uma estação de televisão espanhola acrescentou mais argumentos sobre essa conspiração e juntou imagens de um comentário na televisão russa Russia Today em que um alegado comentador oficial russo defendia a independência da Catalunha. Acontece que o comentador usado como prova da conspiração é um jornalista português. ―Ontem, imediatamente a seguir à declaração da independência da Catalunha, comentei em direto no canal russo RT sobre a proclamação daquela república. Fiquei a saber que o canal espanhol Telecinco transmitiu parte da minha análise como prova de que a Rússia está a interferir nos assuntos internos de Espanha e a alimentar o separatismo. Agora, duas novidades bombásticas. A primeira é que não sou russo e, infelizmente, nunca estive na Rússia. E a segunda é que um canal estrangeiro que dê diferentes versões da única que a imprensa espanhola insiste em dar não significa que o seu governo esteja a imiscuir-se em coisa alguma‖, comentou o jornalista Bruno Carvalho no seu mural de Facebook.

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Carles Puigdemont received the ultimate Belgian welcome: good- humored total chaos.

―Puigdemont‘s Catalan political circus comes to Brussels‖, Politico, 31 d‘octubre de 2017, https://www.politico.eu/article/carles-puigdemont-catalan-circus-comes-to- brussels-eu-spain/

Demonstrators both for and against Catalan independence lined the entrance to the Brussels Press Club in the city‘s EU district on Tuesday, anticipating Puigdemont‘s first public appearance since his surprise switch from Barcelona to Belgium. The protesters waved Catalan and Spanish flags, the EU‘s 12-star banner and signs that included ―Not in my Name. Long live Spain.‖

More than 300 journalists waited more than an hour, crammed into a space designed for 80, giving the place the feel of a music festival or sweaty nightclub floor. A dozen Belgian police stood by outside to keep the peace, but no one checked who came and went from the press club, leading to pandemonium inside.

At one point Griselda Pastor, a diminutive Spanish radio journalist, tried in vain to keep a path clear for Puigdemont to arrive. Journalists joked that the Catalan ex-president would need to be passed above their heads — rock-concert style — in order to reach the podium. Glastonbury was set to come to Brussels.

While some Catalans may be wondering if Puigdemont had abandoned them, by 12:40 p.m. the assembled journalists had begun to wonder the same thing.

Order prevailed in the final moments before Puigdemont arrived, 45 minutes late. It took the ample form of the press club‘s president who shouted ―My middle name is Moses, so move!‖

Then security arrived, dressed improbably in a camel-colored cashmere coat and blue pinstripe flannel suit. A private bodyguard? A spy? It was impossible to know; the man declined to identify himself. But he declared himself satisfied and then Puigdemont — the rock star of Brussels‘ quiet school holiday week — arrived.

With Puigdemont mobbed by aggressive photo and TV journalists, his six fellow fugitive ex-ministers were all but forgotten in the chaos: wedged between the photographers and the print journalists. They took several minutes to join him on stage, left to adjust their hair as the cameras rolled. No matter. The press club president had forgotten to turn on the sound. He used the time to flee the stage so that finally the one- ring Catalan circus could begin.

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As Puigdemont began in French, a Francophone journalist unhappy with the quality of his French shouted: ―Do it in Spanish!‖

He said he would not attempt to claim asylum in Belgium. Perhaps the chaos scared him off.

As his entourage left in three taxis, a group of Spaniards demonstrating for Catalonia to remain part of Spain turned nasty: ―Coward!‖ they shouted.

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Sarah Dyffalah, ―Catalogne : ‗La virée belge de Puigdemont est une mise en scène pour masquer son agonie politique‘, L’Obs, 31 d‘octubre de 2017, http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/monde/20171031.OBS6769/catalogne-la-viree-belge- de-puigdemont-est-une-mise-en-scene-pour-masquer-son-agonie-politique.html

Accusé de sédition, de rébellion et de malversation par le parquet, Carles Puigdemont, destitué samedi dernier par Madrid, est apparu ce lundi... à Bruxelles. Tout un symbole. Après un rocambolesque voyage vers la capitale belge, accompagné de cinq des membres de son gouvernement régional, lui aussi révoqué, le chef catalan s'est livré devant la presse, à un exercice d'équilibriste difficile à suivre : il n'a pas demandé l'asile politique en Belgique mais y restera "par sécurité" ; il ne veut pas se soustraire à la justice catalane mais accuse l'Espagne de "grave déficit démocratique" ; il acceptera les résultats des élections des régionales anticipées du 21 décembre mais à condition de Madrid "respecte les résultats" si les indépendantistes gagnent (des élections décidées par Madrid..) ; enfin, tout en assurant que le "déploiement de la République" adviendra, il appelle l'Union européenne à s'impliquer davantage.

Décryptage de Benoît Pellistrandi, historien et spécialiste de l'Espagne.

Pourquoi Carles Puigdemont a-t-il trouvé refuge à Bruxelles ?

Il y a plusieurs raisons. Bruxelles est la caisse de résonance des institutions européennes. Or, les indépendantistes ont toujours voulu internationaliser le conflit mais ils n'ont pas compris, bien que cette volonté soit cohérente, que cette tactique était vouée à l'échec. Ensuite parce que le gouvernement belge a été ambigu sur la question et que le bloc national flamand est favorable aux thèses indépendantistes catalanes. Carles Puigdemont savait qu'en Belgique, l'accueil lui serait plutôt bienveillant, contrairement à d'autres pays.

Il a mis en avant des raisons de sécurité pour justifier sa présence à Bruxelles. Est- ce crédible ?

Non. Le gouvernement espagnol lui a laissé une porte de sortie dès dimanche en indiquant qu'il souhaitait que Carles Puigdemont puisse être candidat aux élections. S'il se présente comme candidat, Madrid suspendrait ses poursuites pour que cette séquence se déroule dans le calme et ne donne pas des arguments aux indépendantistes. Madrid ne va pas en faire un exemple, ce serait contre-productif au moment où le vent tourne et que les choses s'améliorent. L'argument est donc hypocrite. Mais Carles Puigdemont a besoin de se victimiser. Il est parti dans une semi-clandestinité alors que personne ne le lui imposait. Personne ne l'aurait empêché de prendre l'avion depuis Barcelone.

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On voit bien qu'il essaie d'"européaniser" la crise catalane. Jusqu'ici l'Union européenne n'a pas souhaité intervenir et s'est positionnée du côté de Madrid. Va- t-elle être contrainte de le faire ? Qu'attend Carles Puigdemont des institutions européennes ?

Les déclarations de l'UE étaient très claires. Elle a explicitement apporté son soutien au gouvernement de Mariano Rajoy. Et ne va pas revenir sur sa position. Aucune faute n'a été commise par Madrid, il n'y a pas eu de suspensions des libertés individuelles, politiques et collectives, ni de suspension de la Constitution. L'article 155 de la Constitution aurait été accompagné de l'article 116 qui prévoit l'état de siège, peut-être qu'il y aurait eu une émotion légitime. Mais Madrid n'a pas remis en cause l'Etat de droit.

Carles Puigdemont veut réveiller l'UE en dénonçant les violences policières lors du référendum. Mais cela n'a pas eu tellement d'écho au Parlement européen. Tous les pays ont estimé qu'il s'agissait d'une affaire intérieure espagnole. Vous imaginez si on ouvrait la boîte de Pandore des violences policières ? Tous les Etats se trouveraient sous le discrédit des institutions européennes.

Carles Puidgemont fait une erreur d'analyse en pensant trouver un relais au sein de l'Union européenne. Les indépendantistes n'ont jamais eu affaire à des responsables politiques officiels et ont jugé, sur la base de quelques conférences et réunions, que l'UE les attendait. En réalité, les indépendantistes n'ont jamais disposé du soutien de personnalités européennes influentes, auxquelles ils n'ont jamais eu accès. L'écoute polie ou enthousiaste qu'ils ont pu avoir de certains, les a conduit à biaiser le jugement sur l'état des forces.

Et puis c'est trop tard. Entre le le 27 septembre et le 1eroctobre, les indépendantistes ont dilapidé leur capital politique. On a tous cru que les indépendantistes avaient une stratégie alors qu'ils n'avaient que des tactiques. Ils ont maintenu une fiction, mais ils sont en train de reconnaître que c'est une fiction.

Un ancien ministre du président catalan destitué Carles Puigdemont a reconnu mardi que la région n'était pas pleinement prête pour l'indépendance...

La virée belge de Carles Puigdemont est une mise en scène pour masquer son agonie politique et le fait que cette République catalane qu'il a proclamé n'a aucune force, alors qu'il n'a cessé de dire que tout était prêt. Son discours est contradictoire. Il explique à la fois qu'il est à Bruxellespour porter au cœur de l'Europe la question catalane et se rallie en même temps aux élections du 21 décembre. Son premier argument est annulé par le suivant. Les indépendantistes acceptent des élections que lui-même, en tant que président du gouvernement catalan, aurait pu convoquer jusqu'à vendredi, avant que Mariano Rajoyn'invoque l'article 155...

Carles Puidgmont essaie de renverser l'ordre des choses. Mais Madrid a fait un bon jeu : il ne s'est pas installé dans une occupation longue de la Catalogne en convoquant des élections le plus rapidement possible et en redonnant la parole aux Catalans. Sa ligne de conduite a été le respect de la Constitution et du statut d'autonomie. Carles Puigdemont essaie de se raccrocher aux branches. La démonstration de démocratie n'a pas à être faîte du côté de Madrid mais plutôt du côté des indépendantistes.

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Carles Puigdemont peut-il faire campagne depuis la Belgique ?

Le calendrier est court. D'ici au 7 novembre, les partis doivent dire s'ils concourent en coalition ou non. Les listes doivent être faites pour le 18 novembre. Actuellement, il y a un déficit pour les indépendantistes, car on ne sait pas si Carles Puigdemont va rentrer, s'il va faire une campagne électorale, s'il va se représenter... Il peut faire campagne depuis la Belgique, mais je ne suis pas sûr que les journalistes couvrent les moindres faits et gestes de Carles Puigdemont en Belgique et qu'il y ait la même affluence qu'aujourd'hui. Ça ne fonctionnerait pas.

Transforme-t-il ces élections en nouveau référendum ?

Oui c'est évident. Ces élections seront décisives et vont revêtir un caractère référendaire. Elles ne vont pas régler la crise, mais elles vont être une première étape. Elles seront une sanction positive ou négative de l'action du gouvernement catalan depuis 2015. La difficulté devant laquelle vont se retrouver les nationalistes c'est le risque de démobilisation de leurs électeurs déçus par la tournure des événements alors que dans le même temps les anti-indépendantistes, eux, vont se ruer dans les bureaux de vote. Pour remobiliser l'électorat nationaliste, les indépendantistes jouent le sentiment d'humiliation et les accusations contre Madrid. Ça marche. Le discours de Carles Puigdemont, aujourd'hui, amorce cet angle d'attaque de campagne. Il dit 'regardez, les libertés catalanes ont été atteintes, je suis obligé d'être en exil'.

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Based on the icy silence Carles Puigdemont encountered in Brussels, it appears the EU will continue to rely on Spain to resolve crisis itself

Jennifer Rankin, ―EU silence over Catalan leader‘s call for action speaks volumes‖, The Guardian, 1 de novembre de 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/nov/01/eu-silence-over-catalan-leaders-call- for-action-speaks-volumes?CMP=share_btn_fb

It was no accident that the sacked Catalan leader Carles Puigdemont turned up in Brussels, after vanishing from Spain. ―I am here in Brussels as the capital of Europe,‖ he told reporters, dismissing suggestions he wanted political asylum. ―I am asking for Europe to react.‖

This vague call for European action was greeted with resounding silence in the corridors of Brussels and other EU capitals. Only the Belgian government offered any response, forced by the media furore his arrival created. ―Mr Puigdemont is in Belgium, neither at the invitation or the initiative of the Belgian government,‖ said a statement from the prime minister‘s office, calling for political dialogue in Spain.

The silence was revealing. Soon after the Spanish prime minister, Mariano Rajoy, announced on Friday he was calling fresh elections in Catalonia, Donald Tusk spelled out the EU view. ―Spain remains our only interlocutor,‖ the European council president tweeted, adding a barely concealed warning against a repeat of the scenes of police violence. ―I hope the Spanish government favours force of argument, not argument of force.‖

The EU lacks any legal mechanism to get involved, say senior officials. While the European commission is tussling with rightwing populist governments in Poland and Hungary over the rule of law, Spain is a very different case.

Poland‘s proposed changes to the constitutional court and Hungary‘s restrictions on NGOs and a university strike at the heart of the rule of law and democratic values, but Spain is seen as capable of fixing its own political conflicts. ―Spain is a democratic country; they respect the judiciary,‖ said one EU source, adding that the situation was ―awful‖ because Rajoy had made so many mistakes.

Colouring the Brussels view is the fact the EU is a club of nation states that fears splintering into tiny statelets. ―I do not want a situation where, tomorrow, the European Union is made up of 95 different states,‖ said Jean-Claude Juncker, the head of the European commission. ―We already have enough splits and fractures.‖ Under the Lisbon treaty, the EU will respect ―essential state functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the state‖. Allowing Catalonia to enter the EU on the back of a hasty, illegal referendum would set a precedent for other regions, such as Flanders, Corsica or South Tyrol.

Richard Youngs, senior fellow at Carnegie Europe, thinks the EU has made the correct call in supporting Spain‘s legal argument. ―The way the Catalan government is going is clearly not the way to succeed and there is no realistic chance of creating an independent state in this way,‖ he said.

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Youngs also thinks, however, the EU should have been doing more behind the scenes to cajole both sides to an agreement, in the years building up to the current crisis.

―Now [Madrid] should accept that as this crisis becomes more serious it has an effect on the EU politically, economically, socially. And therefore the EU does have a stake in this crisis.‖ But he sees this role as informal and only with the agreement of the Spanish government.

In the days leading up to the suspension of direct rule in Catalonia, one senior diplomat repeated there was no role for the EU, but speculated how it might happen. “My advice would be to do it in silence.‖

The EU‘s muted response to the Catalan crisis, especially the police brutality on referendum day, has opened the bloc to criticism from across the political spectrum. However, Francisco de Borja Lasheras, the head of the Madrid office of the European council on foreign relations in Madrid, describes the EU‘s role as positive. He said the EU has helped to uphold the rule of law in Catalonia, after ―a wafer-thin majority‖ in the Catalan parliament ―rode roughshod‖ over parliamentary rules to introduce the referendum.

―You have two competing visions of democracy that we see replicated across the west. One is a so-called plebiscite, people‘s will democracy against a pluralistic, institutional and rule of law democracy. The current leaders of the secessionist camp have been arguing that they represent the people of Catalonia but they only represent a part of it.‖ De Borja Lasheras supported calls for investigation into excessive police force to be carried out by the Council of Europe (a non-EU body). While he thinks statements by EU leaders have been helpful, he hopes Brussels will maintain some distance. Deeper EU involvement would be very bad for Spanish democracy, he said. ―I think we need to find our own way.‖

Based on the icy silence Puigdemont has encountered in Brussels, it appears the EU will continue to rely on the Spanish to resolve this crisis.

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The turmoil of the past weeks, with Catalonia proclaiming independence, and Madrid stamping it down, amid bitterness and violence, has been a reminder of dark days gone by

Kim Sengupta, ―Here in Catalonia, people no longer feel like they live in a Democracy‖ The Independent, 1 de novembre de 2017 http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/catalonia-day-of-the-dead-independence- referendum-carles-puigdemont-franco-a8032026.html

Friends and relations had gathered together to lay flowers and light candles on the graves of their departed, as is the custom during Day of the Dead celebrations in Catalonia. The thought of many at the commemorations this year, however, was not of just the past, but what lies ahead in an uncertain future.

The Garrigo family had come to the cemetery on the slope of the Montjuic hills to pay their respect to their grandfather who was killed in a battle at Terrasa in Spain‘s civil war; one among the thousands who died trying to save Barcelona from advancing fascist forces. The fall of the Catalan capital, when it took place, was a hammer blow to the country‘s Republican government. Hitler and Mussolini increased air strikes, poured in more supplies for Franco to help crush remaining opposition and just a few months later Britain and France recognised the rebel general‘s military regime as Spain‘s legitimate government.

The turmoil of the past weeks, with Catalonia proclaiming independence, and Madrid stamping it down, amid bitterness and violence, has been a reminder of those dark days with anger at chants in the name of Franco and Nazi salutes by Spanish nationalist demonstrators – albeit a relatively small number – opposed to what they see as the dismemberment of their country.

Members of the Catalan administration, disbanded by the Spanish government, are due to present themselves before a court in Madrid on Thursday to answer charges of sedition, rebellion and embezzlement. Failure to do so would lead to them being pursued and detained. Instead of starting to rule Europe‘s newest ―independent‖ country, the Catalan president, Carles Puigdemont, is in exile in Belgium. His refusal to appear before judges is likely to lead to the issuing of an arrest warrant which could prevent him from running in an election called, by Madrid, in December.

Two members of the Catalan cabinet who fled to Brussels with Puigdemont, interior minister Joaquim Forn and Dolors Bassa, the labour minister, returned to Barcelona late on Tuesday evening. Puigdemont‘s lawyer in Belgium, Paul Bekaert, said his client will stay where he is ―because of the high risk of detention. He prefers to wait and observe what happens for the time being. I have suggested that the Spanish question him here. That is possible, but I don‘t know if that will happen‖.

But in Madrid, Judge Carmen Lamela of the National Audience Court stressed that the state prosecutor is expected to follow procedure and issue the warrant.

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Some of the other ministers and deputies facing charges say they will be going to Madrid to avoid Spanish security forces raiding their homes and offices and prevent the possibility of clashes of the sort seen when police detachments sent by Madrid tried to stop the referendum for independence taking place by seizing ballot boxes.

A sizeable force of the Spanish civil guard has been sent to Catalonia from other parts of Spain since the confrontation began. On Tuesday they raided eight offices of the Catalan regional police, Mossos d'Esquadra, to gather evidence for possible charges in relation to what took place during the referendum.

The head of Mossos, Josep Lluis Trapero, was sacked over the refusal of his men and women to refuse orders by Madrid to stop the vote taking places. They pointed out that this would lead to clashes with activists who were guarding the polling stations, which is, in fact, what happened when the national police tried to enforce the orders.

One of the raided buildings was the headquarters of Mossos in Sabadell where communications on the day of the referendum were collated. The city is eight miles from Terrasa where 24-year-old engineer, trade unionist and volunteer soldier Vincenc Garrigo died in a mortar barrage almost eight decades ago. Standing at the graveside, his grandson Jaume said: ―I have read his letters to my grandmother, what they all went through at the time, and I feel very proud. That was a time of war when people had to stand up to the dictators; to Franco, Hitler and Mussolini. People at home also suffered very much as well, often they had no heating, little food, little water.

―Of course things have changed and we live in a modern, democratic Europe. That is why what is happening here now is so strange with a vote for independence being rejected by the Spanish, just like that. Then they raid the offices of the Mossos with police from other places. Are we living in a lawful society?‖

Jaume‘s cousin, Tomas, complained about what he and others like him see as the indifference of the European Union to what is going on in Catalonia. ―We have had no understanding no sympathy from them. We were talking about the [civil] war: you know that when Germany and Italy was supplying Franco, the French closed the border so that the [Republican] government could not get supplies to counter that? The EU countries just look after each other‘s governments. But we shall get our independence, we are a determined people, we have got a strong economy and we will survive, in fact we will be OK.‖

The economy, however, is suffering from the current upheaval with a marked impact on tourism which accounts for 12 per cent of the region‘s GDP. The twin Islamist terrorist attacks in August in Barcelona and Cambrils which resulted in 16 deaths scarcely dented the number of visitors, but numbers fell by 15 per cent in the two weeks following the referendum violence.

Esteve Climent, who is a travel guide taking visitors to events surrounding the Day of the Dead, said ―People are getting around to almost accepting that there are always possibility of terrorist attacks, there have been so many in many cities in Europe. But the pictures of police violence, frightening big rallies, that‘s what seems to make people think a place is politically unstable and the result is that they stay away.‖

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Les nationalistes flamands ne lâchent pas Carles Puigdemont mais ne franchissent pas la ligne rouge qui politiserait le dossier et dynamiterait le gouvernement fédéral. Tension maximale.

David Coppi, ―Crise catalane: la N-VA sur la corde raide, la suédoise contrainte au funambulisme, Le Soir, 2 de novembre de 2017, http://plus.lesoir.be/122279/article/2017-11-02/crise-catalane-la-n-va-sur-la-corde- raide-la-suedoise-contrainte-au- funambulisme#_ga=2.32870139.410848763.1509610665-161210456.1504615756

On l‘explique à bonne source au sein du gouvernement fédéral : « Charles Michel a adressé un message à ses principaux ministres, il les a implorés de ne plus faire de commentaires sur la Catalogne, et de passer la consigne ».

En d‘autres termes : attention à ne pas « jeter de l’huile sur le feu », selon l‘expression du Premier ministre il y a quelques jours lorsqu‘il avait ainsi recadré Theo Francken, secrétaire d‘Etat N-VA, qui avait quasiment encouragé Carles Puidgdemont à demander l‘asile en Belgique et pratiquement douté de l‘impartialité des autorités judiciaires espagnoles à l‘égard du président indépendantiste catalan, destitué par Madrid, maintenant convoqué devant les juges.

Le Premier ministre craint-il pour sa suédoise ? Affirmatif. Et normal.

Une autre source gouvernementale précise : « Dans les réunions en interne il y a trois ou quatre mois déjà, Charles Michel se réjouissait des avancées dans le domaine socio- économique, se félicitait du bon déroulement de la législature, mais il pointait dès le début le dossier catalan, confiant qu’il pouvait se révéler dangereux pour sa majorité ». Nous y sommes.

Indépendantiste (c‘est l‘article 1 de ses statuts), la N-VA est tendue comme un arc entre ses engagements nationaliste et gouvernemental, entre Barcelone et la suédoise. Elle est « mal prise », comme on dit partout à son sujet.

La Belgique, base de repli

Chef de file de la formation de Bart De Wever au parlement européen, et pas le dernier quand il s‘agit de promouvoir la cause flamande à cet étage, Sander Loones ménage l‘exécutif fédéral tout en affirmant ses valeurs : « Sachez d’abord, nous dit-il, que je partage complètement les commentaires de Charles Michel à propos de Carles Puigdemont, un citoyen libre de circuler jusqu’à nouvel ordre, et qui a choisi Bruxelles parce que c’est la capitale de l’Union, celle où il peut mobiliser ses réseaux s’il le souhaite, et s’exprimer de façon à mettre le dossier catalan à l’agenda européen. Carles Puigdemont est un homme respectueux, pacifique, et je m’étonne de voir certains politiciens parler de lui comme s’il était un terroriste, alors qu’il a juste organisé un référendum pour donner la parole à son peuple, rien de plus, ce qui est tout à fait démocratique ».

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Cela étant, visiblement terre d‘accueil ou base de repli pour le leader catalan en rupture avec le gouvernement espagnol, la Belgique ne risque-elle pas de s‘attirer les foudres et de Madrid et de ses partenaires européens, soucieux de contenir les poussées nationalistes et séparatistes sur le Vieux Continent ? « Isolé notre pays ? Pas du tout. De temps en temps, il faut choisir entre les tactiques et les principes, entre les manœuvres et le respect des valeurs qui fondent l’Europe, c’est-à-dire le dialogue, les libertés démocratiques, l’Etat de droit. C’est exactement la position de notre gouvernement. Et j’ose dire que Charles Michel est un exemple désormais pour toute l’Union européenne, car plus que tout autre chef d’Etat et de gouvernement, il a voulu ramener de la sérénité dans le débat, il a appelé au dialogue entre Catalans et Espagnols, il a rappelé quels sont les droits de tout citoyen européen. C’est exactement ce qu’il fallait faire ».

Une « ligne » dont il ne faut pas se départir, ponctue le député européen N-VA. C‘est une question de survie pour la suédoise. A savoir : « S’il devait y avoir une demande d’asile, c’est le CGRA, le Commissariat général aux réfugiés et aux apatrides, qui devrait trancher, et s’il devait y avoir une demande d’extradition, ce sont les juges qui devraient décider ; donc, dans tous les cas, c’est la procédure juridique qui primerait, et le gouvernement, lui, n’a pas à se prononcer à ce sujet ».

Indépendantiste s‘il en est, président de l‘OVV (Overlegcentrum van de Vlaamse verenigingen), l‘organisation chapeautant le mouvement nationaliste flamand, Willy De Waele ne souhaite pas, lui non plus, nous explique-t-il, dynamiter le gouvernement fédéral et provoquer une crise à une quinzaine de mois des élections générales. Il trace la ligne rouge à son tour : « Tout cela doit rester dans le domaine juridique, il faut suivre les procédures, alors le gouvernement fédéral n’a rien à craindre. Mais il est vrai que si, à un moment donné, Madrid devait interpeller la Belgique, s’adresser politiquement à notre gouvernement d’une façon ou d’une autre, cela pourrait être fatal, la majorité fédérale ne résisterait pas. La N-VA, vu son engagement flamand, vu sa base électorale et la concurrence du Vlaams Belang, ne pourrait supporter que le gouvernement plie politiquement face aux exigences de Madrid. Mais nous ne sommes pas dans ce scénario aujourd’hui ».

En attendant, les responsables de la N-VA, après avoir fixé émotionnellement l‘opinion nationaliste flamande (Bart De Wever et son « On ne laisse pas tomber un ami »), évitent de poser le geste de soutien de trop à Carles Puigdemont, qui contraindrait Charles Michel et les partenaires MR, CD&V et VLD à rompre le pacte de 2014. Chaque jour est un jour de gagné sur l‘inconnu…

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If we accept such self-serving and irresponsible arguments in one case, the whole of Europe is gone.

Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, ―Why Catalonia does not deserve to be independent‖, OpenDemocracy, 31 d‘octubre de 2017, https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe- make-it/alina-mungiu-pippidi/why-catalonia-does-not-deserve-to-be-independent

A few years ago, when a major political science conference was held in Spain, I rented a country house with some American colleagues for a week in deep Catalonia – near Ripoll. It turned out to be a medieval castle, replete with a chapel that our hosts had lovingly restored. Over those days, a world soccer championship that Spain eventually won was unfolding and we duly congratulated our hosts, only to find them deeply offended. A success of Spain, they told us, meant the opposite to them, as Catalans. The Catalan soccer players in the national team were opportunists, if not traitors.

Such deep nationalist resentment in a core EU member state presents the European Union with its next major challenge after Brexit. Catalonia is one of the regions that has profited most from EU cohesion programs during its development (in 2007-2013 it still qualified for 1.4 billion, although it has meanwhile been raised to the status of ‗very developed‘). Spain, one of the few successes of fiscal equilibration after the euro crisis finds herself entirely destabilized by the unilateral proclamation of Catalonia‘s independence following a non-constitutional referendum where less than the absolute majority voted in favor. The whole set of arguments of the Catalan nationalists for their independence could apply nearly everywhere else in Europe and if deemed acceptable for Catalonia the European ‗integration‘ concept would become meaningless. A brief review of such claims from a scholar of nationalism might therefore be helpful.

To start with, the Catalan claim rests on the separate history and identity of the Catalans which entitles them to a separate path from the rest of Spain. But Spain as a whole, as, indeed, Germany, Italy, France, Belgium, United Kingdom (this is why it‘s called ‗united‘), let alone Poland and Romania, are the products of different regions, states or a part of states opting in at some historical moment when borders have been put into question – 1918, 1945, 1989-1990 – in order to combine their destinies into modern multinational states. Some of them opted for unitary states, others for federal ones, but none of the European nation states are based on collective identities where the region is based on a specific ethnicity.

Some EU states have been more respectful of the traditional, organically developed institutions of such regions (as in Germany), others less (as in Italy), but nobody was unwise enough to enshrine an ethnic character into EU regions, grounded in a feudal order predating the modern idea of the nation. Indeed, only the 1918 born Yugoslav kingdom was officially called the ‗Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes‘ and despite the historical transformations it underwent, it was the persistence of this ethnic character which led to its tragic end.

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A threat to their survival?

Therefore, the insistence of the Catalan Parliament on being allowed a unilateral right to secede is anything but democratic. There is no iron law of democracy allowing the right to unilaterally vote to leave a nation state that one has subscribed to before without coercion. Catalonia was no colony. Therefore, the citizens of the rest of a Spanish state based on the 1978 democratic Constitution have as much right to vote on the future of their joint project as do those who reside temporarily in the autonomous Catalonia (of which many are Spanish).

Of course, each region has its history and differences apply. For instance, the Communist Yugoslav constitution allowed the right of secession, as does Quebec‘s. In the case of Scotland, the right was granted as a temporary power by Westminster to the Scottish Parliament to make it constitutional by a decision of David Cameron‘s government. It was not unilateral.

Of course, if there is a real threat to the identity or survival of the minority group in the seceding region, its right to self-determination becomes stronger. The international community respects existing borders, but has acknowledged secessions by endangered regions or groups whose rights were systematically infringed by the state they lived in. This was the situation of Kosovo, where the entire education in their native language had first been suppressed under the Communist strongman Slobodan Milosevic, followed by a mass expulsion of Kosovar Albanians by the Yugoslav army once an armed conflict broke down. The Kurds can also point to the Anfal genocide that killed over 50,000 Kurds and the enforced change of the ethnic character of Kurd areas like Kirkuk through Arabization during Saddam Hussein. The forces surrounding them today are not so very different from the ones during the Iran-Iraq war that ended in their victimization, and so their argument that they alone can ensure their own safety (especially after their heroic fight against ISIS) is worth listening to. They have a legitimate claim which should be discussed peacefully.

But not so the Catalans. They have an advanced autonomous rule in a country ranked by OECD in the top ten in the world where fiscal decentralization (direct collection of taxes by the sub-national units) is concerned. Not only are their general human rights not infringed upon in democratic Spain, which also ranks among the most democratic countries in the world by Freedom House or Human Watch standards, but their linguistic policy had been, on the contrary, one of exclusion, not inclusion [1].

In Catalonia students are only taught in Catalan in their first years of schooling, English is more promoted than Spanish as a foreign language (although the majority of Catalans have long indicated that Spanish was the number one mother tongue, before this statistical item was dropped). The obligatory use of Catalan as the sole medium of instruction for all school subjects has been championed by Catalan nationalists over the past decades with little contestation, although in no other region of Europe has a group which does not have the linguistic majority managed to promote a monolingual model [2].

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True, the Spanish dictator Franco had once banned Catalan in schools, but arguing in democratic Spain that one has to go completely in the opposite direction to do justice or make reparation, goes too far. In fact, in a bilingual society a bilingual model should be promoted to ensure social communication. Had a similar policy existed in Scotland, they would have gained independence by now. This long term linguistic policy is a proof of an exclusionary, not inclusionary identity politics. Indeed, the many people who rally for independence are the products of such schools. Unfortunately, academics have long gathered evidence that organizing states on identity lines – giving each group each own police and army, for instance, does not result in anything else but secession

Furthermore, although they live in a region which has benefited the most from European redistribution from the rest of Europe in earlier years (two different lavish highways connect Lerida to Barcelona, a sign of abundance rarely seen anywhere else in Europe), they seem themselves less inclined to return this generosity. Catalonia is not plundered by Madrid, whose redistribution to poorer Spanish regions is twice Barcelona‘s (5 versus 10% of GDP).

Economic solidarity within nations and the Union is a guarantee for bad times

What if people in Baden-Wurttemberg, a region which always comes out on top of Europe‘s net donor regions, claimed that from tomorrow onwards they wanted to keep all their income in Baden-Wurttemberg rather than redistributing it to poorer EU regions, and that otherwise they would threaten secession? And yet this region does not owe the debt that Catalonia does – all the great separation plans rest on the assumption that secession is good for business if there are no more taxes and the 72 billion euros in debt (16.34 percent of Spain's) are no longer paid to Spain. Catalonia has 16% of Spain‘s population and its grievance is that it pays almost 20% to the budget in taxes. But that is how Europe works – more urban areas, and capitals in particular redistribute to more rural ones and those whose economies do well help those who experience downturns, as economic fortunes are not everlasting. Economic solidarity within nations and the Union is a guarantee for bad times – Europe is full of cities which once had mighty economic power on the European scene and are today just charming places to visit for the amateurs of UNESCO heritage sites. Surely it would be good business for all of us to leave our debts unpaid and leave with all the income when we are riding high? Of course, this might appeal to more naïve voters.

And what if every region where the political majority happens to be different at one moment in time than in the centre – it happens every day, anywhere, when you hold free elections – just left, calling the others Fascists or Communists? Last, but not least, there is the argument regarding the monarchy. Yes, this is a deep division between Republicans and Monarchists. Funnily enough, in the constitutional textbooks we have all been citing, two economists once calculated that Greece would have been as prosperous as Spain had it only kept its monarchy and the stability advantage it entailed [3]. So more neutral outsiders can even find some good features in constitutional monarchies.

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Nationalism and populism combined

The combination of nationalism with populism is not new in Europe and has been resurfacing in recent years. But the Catalan story is exemplary. If we accept such self- serving and irresponsible arguments in one case, the whole of Europe is gone. This is why both Vladimir Putin and Nigel Farage champion the Catalan cause, because it enfeebles Europe. Could something that propaganda channel Russia Today champions daily, the cause of Catalan independence, be good for the rest of us, Europeans? Perhaps it is time to think more critically of charismatic Catalan national heroes, before they rally all the separatists of Europe. In the early 1990s, Italy also had similar problems, when the Northern League (Lega Nord) party enjoyed an electoral breakthrough in Veneto and Lombardy precisely by campaigning against Rome and the ―centralist state‖ allegedly ripping off the hard-working North to redistribute resources in the parasitic South.

When independentists moved to real action – civil disobedience, tax strikes, occupation of public places like San Marco bell tower in Venice, the government struck back by legal methods and eventually accused them of crimes ranging from tax evasion to terrorism. And no, Italy was not ruled by Fascists at the time, but by left-winger Eurocrats like Giuliano Amato and Romano Prodi.

Notes

[1] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/may/04/spain [2] http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/2014/04/22/language-rights-in-catalonia/ [3] Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. E. (2005). The economic effects of constitutions. MIT Press.

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José Guimón, ―Will exodus of firms from Catalonia economically influence voters?‖, The Irish Times, 2 de novembre de 2017, https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/will- exodus-of-firms-from-catalonia-economically-influence-voters-1.3276643

The secessionist process initiated by Catalonia‘s regional government has prompted companies to relocate in other Spanish regions to ensure continued free-market access to the rest of Spain and the European Union.

Over 1,300 companies have now moved their headquarters outside Cataloniain the three weeks following Catalonia‘s illegal referendum for independence of October 1st. The traditional concern that multinational affiliates are ―footloose‖ applies equally to local companies. The moves resulted from the political uncertainty triggered by secessionist movements, as also happened in the case of Quebec in the 1980s and 1990s.

The Catalan government claims this is nothing to worry about, just mere corporate makeup with no significant effect on the region‘s economy. But this argument is very questionable.

The first to leave were the banks. Caixabank and Sabadell, the third- and fifth-largest banks in Spain by assets, respectively, were fast to move their headquarters outside Catalonia, amid fears of a flight of capital associated with the risk of becoming ghost institutions outside the supervision of the European Central Bank in the event of secession.

A cascade of other small and large firms from different industries followed suit. Out of the seven Catalan companies listed in the Ibex 35, the Spanish stock market index, only one now still has its headquarters in the region.

Circulation of goods

These departures underscore fears that Catalonia would be left outside the EU and the euro zone if it became independent, leading to the restoration of tariffs and other barriers to the free circulation of goods, capital and people. Catalan companies are also citing concerns over borrowing costs, credit ratings, and legal and regulatory issues in the aftermath of a move to independence.

The Catalan government has lost its credibility in managing business affairs. Before the referendum, it said that the region‘s firms would not leave. But they have done so massively. The government also claimed (and continue to do so) that Catalonia would never exit the EU following secession. But EU leaders insist that the region would have to reapply for membership in a process that would take years.

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Catalonia is among Europe‘s most advanced regions and its economy holds great promise, if properly managed. Its capital, Barcelona, has become not only a magnet for tourists but also for international investors, technology companies and talent. With current developments in the secessionist movement, however, Catalonia risks missing the opportunity of becoming a central hub in global production and innovation networks.

To be sure, decisions to move out headquarters do not imply significant job losses for Catalonia in the short term. They do not result in lower tax revenue either, since the Spanish central government currently administers corporate taxes anyway. Yet they may have substantial negative impacts in the medium to long run. The international business literature has shown that the ―headquarter effect‖ has a strong influence over corporate decisions to locate future investments, especially when it comes to high- value-added activities such as strategic planning or innovation centres.

Negative signals

Perhaps more importantly, the exodus of Catalan firms produces a very negative ―signalling effect‖ for prospective international investors. Catalonia is the second- largest recipient of foreign direct investment in Spain, after Madrid, but many such projects have now been frozen. How can foreign firms be persuaded to locate in Catalonia against the stampede of local firms? Naturally, the odds that new investments by multinationals will gravitate instead towards other Spanish regions have increased substantially.

In any case, these kinds of reputational and signalling effect are difficult to quantify and will therefore remain debatable. What‘s clear is that their magnitude will depend on the final outcome of the secessionist movement. The longer that the current uncertainty lasts, the more acute the effects on business decisions will be. In the most negative scenario, if the process concludes with an independent Catalonia outside the EU, the effects on the Catalan economy would be devastating. But even if things return to normal fast, this episode will remain in the memory of investors, whose decisions will be influenced by the risk of a future return to political unrest and of an eventual secession. Unfortunately, it will take years for the Catalan economy to fully recover its reputation.

On October 27th, following a declaration of independence by the Catalan parliament, the Spanish central government exercised its powers to cease the Catalan government and call for regional elections, now set to take place on December 21st. The deposed Catalan president, Carles Puigdemont, has said he will accept the result of this election. Catalan firms have already voted with their feet. Will Catalan citizens follow by voting with their pockets in the forthcoming regional elections?

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Catalonia is in limbo as direct rule begins, but independence activists remain optimistic

Guy Hedgecoe, ―Separatist Catalans continue to fly the flag of independence‖, The Irish Times, 2 de novembre de 2017 https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/separatist-catalans-continue-to-fly-the- flag-for-a-new-state-1.3276716

At the top of the impressive façade of Sabadell town hall, above a pair of stone gargoyles, two flags are flying: the green-and-yellow of the city‘s banner and the red- and-yellow stripes of Catalonia. Next to them, two flag masts are conspicuously bare. Until last Friday, the Spanish and European colours were hanging from them, but after the Catalan parliament issued a declaration of independence that day, members of the local council took both down.

The man who gave permission for that step was Maties Serracant, the pro-independence mayor of Sabadell.

―We know we‘re not yet in a Catalan republic, but those symbols don‘t make sense given the times we are living through in Catalonia,‖ Serracant says, speaking in his office inside Sabadell town hall.

Many were surprised by the removal of the EU flag, given the independence movement‘s pro-European convictions. But the move reflects widespread disappointment among secessionists at the bloc‘s refusal to intervene in the Catalan crisis. Serracant describes the removal of the flags as ―a complaint, not just against Spain but also against the EU, because we believe that Europe isn‘t helping or supporting Catalonia in its legitimate claim to self-determination‖.

Serracant represents a leftist coalition, Crida per Sabadell, which controls the town hall with the support of other leftist and pro-independence forces. But the flag withdrawal has drawn an angry response.

Serracant and his allies ―have declared themselves in rebellion and they want to corral those who don‘t support them‖, says José Luis Fernández, of the unionist Ciudadanos party, which has since hung a Spanish flag from the window of its offices on the ground floor of the town hall building.

„Disparagement and abuse‟

Despite the drama of the flag episode, Serracant hardly comes across as a separatist firebrand. A softly spoken environmentalist activist, he only converted to the independence cause over the last decade, in response to what he says was the Spanish government‘s attitude of ―disparagement and abuse‖ towards Catalonia.

He and many others believe that attitude has been amply represented by Madrid‘s response to last week‘s proclamation of independence: the very same day, it introduced direct rule in Catalonia, via the use of article 155 of the constitution.

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On Monday, when many people expected to see some form of civil unrest to resist the implementation of article 155, there was almost total calm. Meanwhile, the deposed Catalan president, Carles Puigdemont, secretly fled to Brussels with several former members of his cabinet. He has since claimed to be continuing his work as Catalan leader there.

Given such a dramatic series of events, there is a sense that Spanish prime minister Mariano Rajoy, who has called a Catalan election for December 21st, has taken the upper hand in this crisis. A frequent accusation by unionists is that those who continue to campaign for independence are detached from reality. Albert Rivera, leader of Ciudadanos, quipped that Puigdemont was behaving like a character in the fantasy film The Matrix. Spanish foreign minister Alfonso Dastis said he was ―living in a parallel world‖.

Serracant, while he insists his own course of action is rooted in reality, admits to feeling a degree of uncertainty.

―There are some developments which are hard to understand,‖ he says, when asked about Puigdemont‘s flight. ―They are hard for me to understand, even though I‘m mayor of the fifth-biggest city in Catalonia.‖

The region‘s current situation, he says, is extraordinary, although recent events have not totally quenched his optimism. ―We feel we‘re in a transition between the Spanish state and the Catalan republic,‖ he says. ―We‘re living in uncertainty.‖

Business as usual

Out on the streets of Sabadell, there is little to suggest either that a revolution has been under way or that the region has been robbed of its devolved powers. People go about their business and public services operate as normal in the town that was once known as ―the Manchester of Catalonia‖, due to its industrial heritage. Many pro-independence flags – similar to the Catalan symbol, but with a white star – hang from the balconies of apartment blocks. Very occasionally a Spanish flag is visible.

Guillermo Fernández is still excited by last week‘s declaration of independence. Smoking a cigarette on the steps leading to Sabadell‘s underground railway, the 23 year old recalls how his mother rang him to tell him the news when he was at work. ―It‘s a moment I will never forget, it was a very special day,‖ he says.

Clearly unsettled by the idea of direct rule, he nonetheless has a similarly upbeat mindset to that of his mayor.

―I‘m happy because we‘re a republic but I think it‘s just getting started and we have to do a lot of things,‖ he says. Yet the timeframe he suggests for achieving a full, legal breakaway shows how much expectations in the separatist camp have dropped recently. ―The beginning is never easy,‖ he says. ―But maybe in seven, eight or 10 years we‘ll be in a better situation.‖

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Marìa Fernández, a student who describes herself as a ―Spanish republican‖, says she was converted to the independence cause after witnessing Spanish police violence during the October 1st independence referendum organised by Puigdemont‘s administration.

―I don‘t identify with Puigdemont,‖ she says, describing him as a representative of the Catalan bourgeoisie. ―I‘d like independence but not with Puigdemont.‖

But despite her newly found separatist convictions, Fernández is less upbeat than many others in Sabadell about achieving that goal. ―We‘re not independent yet,‖ she says. ―We‘ve got a long way to go.‖

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Carlos Crespo, ―Catalogne, vers une résistible confrontation‖, Le Vif, 2 de novembre de 2017, http://www.levif.be/actualite/international/catalogne-vers-une-resistible- confrontation/article-opinion-748559.html

En réponse à ce processus séparatiste, l'Etat central espagnol vient d'utiliser ses pouvoirs constitutionnels pour mettre sous tutelle la Région autonome catalane (Generalitat de Catalunya) et démettre son exécutif. Le dialogue entre Madrid et Barcelone, ou du moins entre le Premier Ministre espagnol Mariano Rajoy et le président démis de la "Generalitat", Carles Puigdemont, est aujourd'hui rompu. Certes, différents aspects de ce litige ont prêté récemment à l'aborder de manière légère. Ainsi la fuite de Puigdemont à Bruxelles, dans la foulée d'une énième sortie malheureuse de Théo Francken, a pu faire passer les fortes tensions hispano-catalanes pour une bien inoffensive blague belge. Mais ne nous y trompons pas ! Nous assistons en ce moment à un conflit qui pourrait s'avérer être le plus intense que l'Europe occidentale ait connu depuis 1945.

Comment en est-on arrivé là ?

Sauf à considérer que le Comté de Barcelone issu de la "Marche d'Espagne" conquise par Charlemagne sur Al-Andalous constituait un état au sens moderne, la Catalogne n'a jamais existé jusqu'à aujourd'hui en tant que pays indépendant. Il y a toutefois déjà eu une proclamation d'un état ou d'une république catalane en 1873, 1931 et 1934 mais toujours dans un contexte particulier et dans le cadre d'une démarche fédéraliste et non sécessionniste, contrairement à la récente déclaration unilatérale d'indépendance. Les trois fois précédentes, la portée de cet acte fut davantage symbolique. Lors de la tentative de 1934, le gouvernement conservateur espagnol réprima les nationalistes catalans et suspendit la "Generalitat". L'alternance politique rendue possible par la victoire du Front Populaire en 1936 rétablira les institutions autonomes catalanes jusqu'à la conquête de la Catalogne à la fin de la guerre civile par le Général Franco en 1939. Ce dernier, au nom de la grandeur de l'Espagne, réprima fortement le nationalisme catalan jusqu'à interdire la langue catalane durant sa dictature. Après sa mort, les libertés publiques furent rétablies ainsi que l'autonomie des régions et des institutions comme la "Generalitat". La constitution espagnole de 1978 prévoit le droit à l'autonomie des différentes composantes de l'Etat espagnol ainsi qu'un article permettant de suspendre ce droit si l'entité autonome ne respecte pas "ses obligations" ou porte gravement atteinte "à l'intérêt de l'Espagne". C'est le fameux article 155 dont on a beaucoup parlé récemment. A noter que cet article s'inspire non du Franquisme, qui ne reconnaissait pas l'autonomie régionale, mais de la constitution de la République fédérale allemande! Un statut spécifique (Estatut) de l'autonomie catalane est adopté l'année suivante par le Parlement et soumis aux Catalans par référendum. Ceux-ci l'approuvent à 88,1%. Le catalan est alors non seulement reconnu comme langue officielle mais aussi comme langue "propre" de la Catalogne. Un nouvel "Estatut" est approuvé en 2010, suite à un accord entre le gouvernement du socialiste Jose Luis Zapatero et le gouvernement de la Generalitat de l'époque. Ce dernier qui allait plus loin

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en termes d'autonomie est adopté par 73,23% des Catalans. Le Parti Populaire de Mariano Rajoy, alors dans l'opposition, refuse ce nouveau texte et introduit un recours devant le Tribunal constitutionnel. Celui-ci annule plusieurs dispositions de l'"Estatut" en 2010. Ainsi, la référence à la nation catalane est supprimée, le catalan ne peut être la langue "préférentielle" même s'il est obligatoire dans l'enseignement, et la "Generalitat" n'obtient pas la tutelle sur le pouvoir judiciaire catalan. En 2012, le nouveau gouvernement de Mariano Rajoy oppose une fin de non-recevoir à la "Generalitat" qui propose un nouveau pacte fiscal[1]. Ce dernier était inspiré du modèle basque, qui donne à l'autorité autonome des prérogatives étendues en matière de fiscalité. Ces deux échecs dans la recherche d'une autonomie étendue de la Catalogne renforcent progressivement les séparatistes les plus durs qui finissent par organiser un référendum, en toute illégalité, le 1er octobre dernier avec les conséquences que l'on connait.

Et maintenant ?

La succession de ces refus tend à montrer une faible capacité de dialogue dans le chef de celui qui est aujourd'hui encore le Premier Ministre espagnol. Il entend régler les revendications indépendantistes par la force de la loi ou par les forces de l'ordre. Bien sûr, le référendum illégal du gouvernement de Puigdemont était une provocation qui n'allait pas manquer de faire réagir Rajoy de manière forte. Il n'empêche, il y a fort à parier que la répression des autorités espagnoles menée à bien lors de cette journée de scrutin ne va pas apaiser le ressentiment de nombre de Catalans vis-à-vis de Madrid. Pas plus d'ailleurs qu'elle ne va donner une image sympathique d'un gouvernement espagnol dont la notoriété internationale était jusqu'à ce moment principalement due aux affaires de corruptions qui concernent certains de ses membres. Au niveau de la propagande, les indépendantistes catalans semblent indubitablement plus forts que les autorités espagnoles. Rajoy pourrait vouloir assumer jusqu'au bout sa stature de dirigeant ferme et autoritaire face aux sécessionnistes qui veulent briser l'Espagne. La concurrence électorale de "Ciudadanos", la formation politique de centre-droit du Catalan très unioniste Albert Rivera, n'incitera pas Rajoy à faire beaucoup de concessions. Dans ce contexte d'escalade, le nationalisme espagnol est en train de vivre une nouvelle jeunesse dans sa confrontation avec le nationalisme catalan. Dans quelques manifestations unionistes, on a pu revoir des drapeaux franquistes et des saluts fascistes en tête de certains cortèges. Les unionistes cultivent décidément moins bien leur image que les catalanistes. Puigdemont, lors de son arrivée à Bruxelles fin octobre, a bien réitéré son opposition à la violence. Mais quelle sera son autorité depuis la Belgique sur des indépendantistes encore plus radicaux qui sont restés en Catalogne? D'ailleurs dans certains milieux sécessionnistes, on envisage un scénario "à la kosovare" avec un pourrissement de la situation, une accentuation de la répression de l'état central et des réactions internationales favorables suite aux excès répressifs[2]. En sachant que c'est bien l'état espagnol qui dispose aujourd'hui de l'appareil répressif et du monopole de la violence légitime dont rien n'indique qu'il userait avec parcimonie en cas d'escalade dans le conflit.

Quel rôle pour la Belgique?

Notre pays avait peut-être une belle carte à jouer au niveau diplomatique par rapport au conflit catalan. La position du Premier Ministre après le référendum était assez nuancée et encourageait les deux parties à dialoguer. Hélas, le parasitage de la diplomatie belge par les jeux politiciens de certains nationalistes flamands parties prenantes de la

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majorité gouvernementale a peut-être discrédité le pays dans la perspective d'une initiative internationale en faveur de la reprise du dialogue. Il y a pourtant une urgence démocratique à favoriser la désescalade et à faire en sorte que les élections catalanes prévues le 21 décembre se passent le mieux possible. Le pire peut encore être évité. Si l'indépendance ne semble pas négociable, un cadre favorable à la renégociation d'une nouvelle réforme de l'Etat espagnol et de sa Constitution en allant vers une décentralisation accrue devrait être encouragé. Le Gouvernement belge devrait, à tout le moins, oeuvrer à apaiser les esprits dans le contexte de la mise en place prochaine d'une Commission du Parlement espagnol qui va réfléchir à une réforme Constitutionnelle[3]. Reste à voir si la N-VA qui ne vote pas des réformes de l'Etat en Belgique peut réussir à en faire capoter à l'étranger...

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Manuel Villaverde Cabral, ―Catalunha: soma e segue‖, Observador, 1 de novembre de 2017, http://observador.pt/opiniao/catalunha-soma-e-segue/

Neste momento, a confrontação violenta entre os separatistas e os defensores da permanência da Catalunha no Estado espanhol parece contida. Por uma vez, o primeiro- ministro Rajoy e o PP actuaram inteligentemente, dissolvendo o parlamento catalão e demitindo o governo dele resultante, ao mesmo tempo que convocavam novas eleições no mínimo espaço de tempo legal para dia 21 de Dezembro, isto é, daqui a menos de 8 semanas. Entretanto, o governo central impôs pela primeira vez na história da democracia espanhola e do Estatuto das Comunidades Autonómicas o Artigo 155 da Constituição, aprovada na época por perto de 90% dos residentes na Catalunha.

Artigo 155 parece, pois, estar a ser imposto com o máximo cuidado e, até agora, sem reacção aparente da «rua» mobilizada até há pouco pela extrema-esquerda anti- europeísta da Candidatura de Unidade Popular (CUP), a qual possui os 10 deputados que faltam à coligação nacionalista dos «Juntos pelo Sim» para fazer mais de metade dos deputados, embora menos de 50% dos votos! Por isso é que os independentistas tradicionais cederam perante a CUP e, em vez de dissolverem a Generalitat e de marcarem eles próprios novas eleições para tentar dirimir o conflito democraticamente, proclamaram uma República que poucas horas durou e que ninguém defendeu na «rua» nem tão pouco na administração e na polícia catalãs, agora controladas pelo governo central.

Perante esta aparente vitória do governo central com o apoio dos partidos socialistas central e catalão, Carles Puigdemont e outros líderes do seu partido (o actual PEdeCat, continuador da antiga CiU) lembraram-se de fugir ao processo que lhes foi inevitavelmente instaurado pelo Tribunal Constitucional. Refugiaram-se na Bélgica como se fossem «exilados políticos», recorrendo assim a um gesto vão que desarmou muitos dos seus apoiantes. O próprio Puigdemont foi incapaz de explicar a fuga de forma inteligível na sua conferência de imprensa da manhã de terça-feira, como de resto lhe tem sucedido desde o início do chamado procès independentista. É altamente improvável, contudo, que a União Europeia dê «asilo político» aos fugitivos.

Pouco antes de o governo central decidir – com o apoio da larga maioria do parlamento nacional! – pôr ordem no dito procès, restituindo assim a palavra aos Catalães sobre os desígnios confiados aos seus próprios políticos, as sondagens davam uma maioria de eleitores contra a independência da Catalunha, mantendo-se contudo a opinião pública muito dividida. No mesmo momento, porém, outra sondagem feita pela agência catalã dava nova vitória por estreita margem de eleitos aos três partidos separatistas mas sem a maioria dos votantes.

Depois de alguma vacilação, os três partidos soberanistas acabaram por aceitar o desafio das eleições marcadas pelo governo central. É o melhor início possível para ultrapassar um diferendo com raízes históricas muito antigas e que deixará marcas profundas para o futuro, seja qualquer a solução encontrada após a votação de Dezembro. E aqui há que

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dar razão, por uma vez, ao inepto líder da rebelião. Garantiu Puigdemont em Bruxelas que aceitaria os resultados da próxima eleição. Ao mesmo tempo, perguntou se o governo central e os partidos que se opõem à independência da Catalunha os aceitam também?

Por outras palavras, o que sucederá em Madrid no caso – não impossível! – de a actual maioria separatista voltar a ter a maioria por um deputado que seja? Presumivelmente, os separatistas pretenderiam recomeçar o procès onde este ficou no dia da imposição do artigo 155 da Constituição, ou seja, voltaria tudo à estaca zero. E é isso que não pode acontecer. A campanha eleitoral terá de servir, para além da defesa dos programas de cada um dos partidos, por um triplo acordo sobre as condições em que cada uma das coligações – pró e contra a separação – se colocará perante a eventual independência da Catalunha, seja qual for o resultado da votação.

Primeiro, é preciso saber se um deputado seria suficiente para conferir à maioria separatista o direito de impor a independência ou se tal decisão, que continua a ser anti- constitucional, só teria vencimento no caso de se verificar uma maioria qualificada a fixar. Em segundo lugar, os partidos opostos à independência têm obrigação de clarificar quais as alterações ao actual Estatuto da Catalunha que estariam disponíveis para fazer de maneira a que os pró-independentistas abandonassem o procès no caso de não terem maioria qualificada.

Finalmente, no caso de essa maioria qualificada se verificar, o que é muito improvável que suceda se tudo fôr clarificado à partida, todos ou, pelo menos, a maioria dos partidos do parlamento espanhol deveriam comprometer-se a conceder à Catalunha uma separação negociada que lhe garantisse, nomeadamente, que continuaria a ser membro da União Europeia e da Zona Euro. Infelizmente, não é crível que esta obrigação ética seja aceite por todos eles, pelo que o machado de guerra está longe de estar enterrado de vez!

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Apesar de sensível à questão identitária, tudo aquilo me parece artificial e conduzido por aprendizes de feiticeiro que poderão (quererão?) incendiar toda a Europa

José Ferreira Machado, ―Catalunha nao tem direito à independència‖, Sol, 1 de novembre de 2017, https://sol.sapo.pt/artigo/582697/catalunha-nao-tem-direito-a- independ-ncia-

1. Catalunha. O chamado referendo pela independência terá lugar este domingo. Confesso-me ambivalente. Apesar de sensível à questão identitária, tudo aquilo me parece artificial e conduzido por aprendizes de feiticeiro que poderão (quererão?) incendiar toda a Europa. No fundo cheira-me a uma sublevação liderada por uma vanguarda revolucionária (qual bolcheviques pós-modernos). Como José Manuel Fernandes mostra numa fria, lúcida e profunda análise publicada no Observador, a independência não tem razão nem à luz do direito internacional nem à luz do direito espanhol. Aqui o contraste com a Escócia, como Fernandes nota, é claríssimo. O argumento histórico também é fraco pois a Catalunha goza hoje de uma autonomia ímpar na sua história e mesmo em comparação com estados em algumas federações democráticas. Por outro lado, num mundo de interdependências e soberanias partilhadas como o que se vive na UE, parece-me haver pouco up-side numa separação seguida de uma integração e diluição numa ‗UE a n‘ (e onde a dimensão é um trunfo). Dito tudo isto, se acreditar num mundo de relações internacionais em que a dimensão traz poder e em que esse poder se define por comparação com o poder dos outros, um português calculista não pode deixar de sorrir face à perspetiva do desmembramento do domínio castelhano em Espanha. Numa Ibéria de Estados-nação Portugal apenas será fortalecido.

2. Au ...quê? Estou completamente por fora das autárquicas. Nem sei que têm lugar. E estou convencido que para Lisboa onde vivo não fará a mais pequena diferença quem ganha. Qualquer voto será sempre por considerações nacionais.

3. Armadilhas. Resquício de um antigo emprego, fui testemunha num Tribunal de Trabalho de Londres num processo que opunha a Universidade (meu empregador) a um professor demitido por «má-conduta grosseira». For uma grande lição de civilidade, clareza procedimental e de classe da juíza. Mas aprendi também o cuidado que as equipas de gestão devem ter com os emails que trocam entre si. No RU (como, julgo, que na função pública em Portugal) o trabalhador tem direito a solicitar acesso a toda a comunicação interna onde apareça referido. Uma troca de emails mais «distendida» entre o CEO e um dos administradores ia deitando a perder uma caso que parecia claro.

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