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Lehigh Preserve Institutional Repository The American military expedition against Quebec, September 19, 1775 to January 1, 1776 Reeves, Robert F. 1973 Find more at https://preserve.lib.lehigh.edu/ This document is brought to you for free and open access by Lehigh Preserve. It has been accepted for inclusion by an authorized administrator of Lehigh Preserve. For more information, please contact [email protected]. ·•· by Robert F. Reeves A Thesis Presented to the Graduate Committee of Lehigh University ..• \. In Candidacy for the Degree of \ Master of Arts 1n the Department of History Lehigh Uni vers1 ty ..; 1973 I •.• . , .. I .. ·- "'. .. ,... -·.--- .--- . ~ ., ~ ... --.. .,.._,, ___ .~--·--·------ .. ....,_ ···-·-,--------- .. ··-.-· . -·-·· -·,··-····'··- -· ., ____ . ! - Th1 s ther,1 s 1 s ncceJ)ted nnd approved 1n partial • M.aster or Arts. 73 date . , fl Professor 1n Chairman of Department •: . ;.. ,, 1: ' ! .•. .~ -· , ..., 11 f ··. -.· ,.-. ,·: ........... ' . ' -~---~~ ., - ... -· .......... ;•- .... ,.. :--,,.. __ , ... ..._ --··'."·,__..._., ..... ,-----~···-·--·~- ....... ,~.---- .... ;.-,. ....... _ .. ,' ······-,,, ...-..--.-- .... -------,--.~--. - ~ ---., ·---·-- ·-· --- . Table of Content• Page Abstract - .. 1 Introduction 3 . Chapter I 7 Invasion Decision and Preparations • Chapter II 29 The Kennebec and the Realities of Travel Chapter III 55 An Army of "0urang-Outangs" Chapter IV 78 Quebec Attacked and Conclusions Bibliography 102 Vita 110 .. ,.,'. ·.•· • ,., I ·, .. , i.: t. -- . iii !Jr" ·,. ~: i '. ·.... {'· . ' . ' . '• l... -.• ,,, ,., . -~/ .. { ~' • ·~ '. u . ' . ,. ' '/·' ·-· Abstract Prom September 19, 1775 until December Jl, 1775 a motley army of Continental sold1ers under Colonel Benedict Arnold engaged 1n an exped1t1on a1med at .. captt1rl r1iL:, t}1e Cr1r1rtd 1an city of Quebec. Thls exped ition was the first attc~pt to attnck Quehcc by an overland route through the ~!a1ne w1 lderne ss. But due to the lateness of the season and an underestimation of the distance to be covered, the struggle of Arnold's poorly trained and ill-equipped soldiers to survive the march became an epic of human suffering and endur- ance. The survivors emerged from the wilderness With Quebec in a highly vulnerable state, only to realize that their march had rendered them incapable of attack ing the city. However, had it not been for poor timing and miscalculation, it seems likely that Arnold's men could have taken Quebec despite their lack of military competence. The assault went into a second phase. The rebel army laid siege to Quebec, hoping to regain their advant-· .-4---,,-_ ..:, age. But since Continental soldiers enlisted for only ' . six months, the e:xped1 ti on •.s commanders soon faced the dilemma of having to attack the city before their army '-. -1- '/ I " '. .,r,1 '' - .. ~ ' fn, • • -,..,:+. -· ., 4 • ' • "' •• , ' ' . ' •· -·--- -_,_, -- - . ·-- ·-----·-~· . ____..._,..,~·-·. '' ; ' ' ..... '•"" . ·- -·--·- - ... .. -· __ - ·-,··-, •--- --- ------,-· -')·-------------- ·----------,--.,. - - -·- -~- --- -~·----·----.. - ~----.-·~ - - - - -· . - ~·- ---- .~ . ---·-.. -- :-.- - ------"~------··:··---- ' . .. ·.. ' . ,, ... return,ed ho,ne. The result vas a forced battle vhich t l (-1 'f l i I • ' . •.,,,,• i i l t • , • { " !~ tl . (".. ('") 1. t def•~ at 1. t. j n"1 t 1 \. ~ c-~ c): ~ t t l 1, · - - - " • ... -. ,. > L ... it ,. • - C7 ll~l r1cc they had of qaininq Canadiar1 alleqiar1ce. The assault vas part of a larger strategy to vin Canada. Al tl1ot1ql1 tl1Q Que~c attack developed as the ve f ind h is s t 1· a t cl q 1, corr f~ c t . fl o,,.r c \.r c r , t l 1 (~ re is a question of whether his priorities were correct in placing the greatest importance on the capture of Montreal. The expedition also laOOred under many disadvant ages inherent to the early Continental Army. A sense of military discipline was almost totally lacking among the enlisted men. Insipient regionalism also caused numerous . command problems. Lack of training in rudimentary survi- val skills or in martial skills badly handicapped the army. Lastly, the unwillingness of the civilian soldier to commit himself longer than six months broke the exped ition• s back. In the end, the example of the Quebec expedition draws clearly into tocus the odds against which the American colonies struggled and the miracle of their success. -2- • ~- ·-' ... -~·· 1 " ta,)1 - ,.{;i•f:1·. 1 :·, ! . .., ' t - . ~-- . ' -,, . ., \ I , ' ---\ ~--·~·- ... - .... ,,_,...._ .. -~-------. ··-·----t<----.-·-·····-. ~-,,...,. ................ -.- ..-- .. ·- -- .. ., Introduction In the first year of the Arrcricar1 Rr!volt1tior·1, the Second Continental Cor1qrr~~;s rr\ l uc t,111 t 1 :l· a c1n1 i t t, \ .:J tr1 its c 1 ! that hope for reconciliation with Great Britair1 vas rapid ly fi1c1ir1q. Part of this admission r£:?St1lted in the creation liowf!\'"t~r, Conqress • recoqn1• t1on• of con1inq }10.c;tiJ i tjc~~; lackcc1 t11c~ CCJ!'L\rict ior1 to pro\ride strategic guidelines to the new army's leaders. That responsibility fell on Commander George \iashington. For several months Congress had debated the question of dealing with tl1e British presence in Canada. Several colonial militias had already attacked two British garris ons along the Canadian border, and the problem seemingly had become one of convincing the Canadian population that the rebel colonies were directing their actions solely against the British. British garrisons on the Canadian border generated the fear that Canada would serve as a staging area for military thrusts aimed at dividing the colonies from Canada to Boston or New York. By late July General Washington had taken control of the new army and had begun formulating strategies to deal with Canada as well as the critical situation in Boston. From this military evaluation by Washington came .....,_ p the Canadian campaign. It first d~veloped as a ~single ,, -3- .I .• . --f . I ----· •··•···--···--·· ------ -······-·-----------------~ tront assault led b7 General Ph111p S,ohuyler or New York on ti1,. F~Itrrlsor1s 11.t ,St. Jot1n'n nnd Montreal. But when 1 "l-- ..h i, ~ l •"~:· ..~ 1 \._,.".• t• '.. t',cl i'1\ •. :~()·re me r1 11 t Cnmbr 1 dp;e than ·1· 1.. 1 • • • \.~ t'.•· ,,.. he. c o tl, • d. I~tr e-~ C'. p· ,.1,, · \ '4 ,. , J J r· ·1 ,, • f ,-. ~,., d·· ,. ,·· .. , ,,·, • frequently suggested but never used plnn to attack over land throt1gh the M.a1ne wilderness and capture the St. Law rence gateway clty of Quebec. The rna i r1 J") t1 r1. s ,:_; o f Wr1 s }1 t n p; t on ' s p 1 an re s u 1 t e d 1 n c 1 ear successes, but the expedition to Quebec ended in a frus trating defeat. Shortly after this defeat, st. John's and Montreal both fell into British hands again. The British threat in Canada remained, and instead of becoming a potential fourteenth colony, Canada co~tinued as a British military base. Eventually, in 1777 this threat culminated 1n General Burgoyne's Hudson Valley Campaign. Until the smoke at Saratoga had settled and a resounding American victory resulted, the defeat of rebel forces at Quebec and its aftermath stood as a significant deter minant of the Revolution. This study deals with the development, execution and failure of the Quebec expedition. It is concerned mostly with how the expedition progressed rather than why it failed. As the reader will see, the reasons for the expedition's failure are fairly obvious, and because of the.spurce materials available on the expedition, how • , -4- =-··: .' . I . ',. 'f- ., , · lt occurred 1& by rar the most 1nterest1ng study. 'l.' ~1 t~ r <~ ,ire r· c ] r1 t~ 1 , .. c 1 y f ow opp or tun 1 t 1 e a to st ud7 (,r ("!J 'rl ()-'f'! 8eoiutrr*",nr1• ,.. L ,_,•. , .' ,. +l, •~~r• • . Ji• '"... f ,.,.... ~• . , ... • ..~,,l,. .. --- ,__ ~.··,l, .. _. 11•·. v 1\ . • • If.,11~ort • _ •• ~ ...J exc1u~1vely. .:, · ·_ (·• C c·_·,_ (' .., 1 ' ?··1 ,... ._--_. P P 't • )"· ~ r.- ,J -· -' .... z... __... "' ; • ·Pf · r t-'""' l l. .,._r r..__,,.. • _., n.___ .. I"', t.-· i L ,.. ,.~ J. 1__ , r~,._ - exped1 t1 on aga1 nst Quebec not only off crs tt11 s op;1cJr· ~ ur1i ty but also provides excellent 1ns1ght on the m}l1t£1ry llfe and chnracter of some of the first Continental soldiers, the strenFths nnd particularly the weaknesses of the infant Cont1ner1tal Army nnd early colonial ~llitary stra tegy. That the enigmatic and controversial Benedict Arnold commanded the expedition is but an additional attraction to the study of this subject. At least eighteen members of the expedition kept diaries or later wrote accounts of their participation in the expedition. Furthermore, for the later stages of the expedition we are able to play the American accounts off against those kept by several civilians and soldiers trapped in Quebec. Because of the large number of accounts, there is an almost daily breakdown of events directly up to the defeat. Wherever possible the author attempts, through multiple-source footnotes, to indicate all of the works corroborating or disagreeing with one another. There are definite problems associated with any attempt to accurately piece together the expedition solely from primary accounts. Many times diarists were , -.5-' , r , . > ,, ' ' a1otakon 1n thetr entrtea, etther beoauae they were <,. t: (~ :; rn o o t 1 .,.. l ', •• ' I r1 :: r \~ r rt ] c rt '& (' • 1. '!' • ,r' ' ,.. ··- t. t . ·1 ( ' ,.., ).., .... .!If '-. ' • ,... L..·, • ( ) ,..• ". ·~ !-' .--oi " ,Iii '.t .J._ 1 n C-~ ,. .. .,,. ·-·" t '.., ...' i .... • talse. .i,I. Although the s1ege or Quebec oont1nued