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Analysis

Georgia’s Secessionist De Facto States: From Frozen to Boiling By Stacy Closson, Zurich

Abstract Relations between Russia and have reached a new low. At the center of their quarrel are Georgia’s secessionist regions, and South . As Russia and Georgia accuse the other of troop move- ments in and around the secessionist territories, the UN, EU, OSCE, and NATO meet to determine their response. Critical to these deliberations are several underlying developments, which would benefi t from an independent review. Th ese include economic blockades of the secessionist territories, Russia’s military sup- port for the secessionists, the issuance of Russian passports to secessionist residents, and declarations of in- dependence by secessionist regimes. In these circumstances, it has become diffi cult to contain the confl icts without resolving them. However, as confl ict resolution has proven impracticable, it is time to consider al- tering present arrangements in order to prevent an escalation of violence.

Boiling Point For , Georgia’s 2005 off er of autono- Several developments have brought the frozen confl icts my equivalent to North Ossetia’s in Russia, plus quo- to the present boiling point. First, relations between tas for representation in the national parliament, execu- Georgia and Russia have deteriorated since 2004, when tive branch, and judiciary went much further than pre- Georgia expelled alleged Russian spies, followed by a vious off ers. However, this proposal was preceded by Russian embargo on Georgian goods and transport, Georgia’s forced closure of the South Ossetians’ prin- and stricter visa regulations. Second, there have been cipal livelihood, Ergneti market, which came at the increasing calls for independence from the Abkhazian expense of dozens of casualties and a sustained low- and South Ossetian leaderships following Georgia’s intensity confl ict. Moreover, the off er was followed by May 2004 ousting of Aslan Abashidze from his 13-year Georgia’s support for the election of an alternative gov- hold on the “presidency” of the autonomous Ajara re- ernment led by a former secessionist offi cial, Dimitry gion. Th ird, confrontations have escalated between the Sanakoyev, representing the majority Georgian popu- United States/Europe and Russia over Kosovo’s uni- lated part of South Ossetia. Th e culmination of these lateral declaration of independence and promises of actions bolstered de facto president Eduard Kokoity’s NATO membership action plans (MAPs) for Georgia role as the guarantor of South Ossetians’ security. and Ukraine. Finally, in March the Russian govern- Similarly for Abkhazia, Georgia’s April 2008 off er ment revoked the 1996 Commonwealth of Independent was comprehensive: unlimited autonomy, the right to States (CIS) blockade of Georgia’s secessionist territo- veto amendments to the Georgian constitution and laws ries and announced a formalization of ties. regarding Abkhaz rights, and a free economic zone to redevelop areas destroyed by the war. However, after A Story of Miscues Georgian paramilitaries were relieved of their duties in Starting in 2004, newly elected President Mikheil regions along the de facto border, a government-in-ex- Saakashvili hoped that the confl icts would fi nally be ile accompanied by a nominal security force was estab- resolved in the wake of Georgia’s liberal economic re- lished in the only part of Abkhazia under Georgian con- forms and a vigorous anti-corruption campaign. His trol, the upper Kodori Gorge. Th is move was deemed by government believed that a reformed Georgia would the to be proof of an inevitable Georgian be a more attractive option for the Abkhazians and military off ensive. South Ossetians to rejoin. Moreover, the re-activation At the same time, the parties have employed dif- of a direct negotiation process, combined with car- ferent strategies, which are dangerously colliding. Th e rots of cultural protection, reparations for war-time have a two-pronged approach, international- losses, and economic subsidies would hasten a reso- izing the confl icts in order to expose the role of Russia lution. However, the challenge for the Georgian gov- in the secessionist territories, while positioning alter- ernment has been neither a lack of will, nor a lack of native regimes and security forces in the de facto bor- content, but rather one of forceful implementation, re- der areas. Th e Abkhazians and South Ossetians have sulting in miscues. increased their calls for independence from Georgia, 2 rrussianussian aanalyticalnalytical russian analytical digest 40/08 ddigestigest

declining European off ers to fund and implement eco- opment on both sides of the de facto border. Second, nomic rehabilitation, refugee return, and confi dence- the participation of Georgian security services and building measures. Instead, they are increasing their paramilitaries fostered the perception among residents dependence on Russia for political, economic, and se- in the secessionist territories that ceding authority to curity assistance. the Georgian government would not guarantee securi- Domestic politics also complicate the process. Th e ty. Th ird, the criminalization of the transit routes was timing and content of confl ict resolution is tied to the accompanied by a rise in violence among competing regimes’ survival. Georgia and the de facto states, to a groups, which was often mistaken for ethnic confl ict certain degree, share common legacies that ail the post- or irredentism. Finally, illicit trade was so profi table for Soviet state-building process, including a lack of cohe- those working in political and security positions that sion between the state and society, the capture of the the incentive for confl ict resolution diminished. state by political-economic elites, a manipulated judi- Disrupting these informal networks, however, ap- ciary, indiscriminate violence by security forces, limit- pears to be equally harmful. In South Ossetia, there ed freedom of expression, and a rigged electoral process. was a thriving transport corridor from Russia through Th us, given disparate levels of socio-economic develop- the Roki Tunnel down to the Ergneti market. As a re- ment, combined with an irregular application of the sult of forced closure, much of South Ossetia is now rule of law, the leaders’ support base rests on fulfi lling almost fully dependent on Russia and movement be- their campaign promises to end the confl icts. tween the two communities is limited. Recent propos- As a result, the sides maintain their positions of in- als from the Saakashvili government to develop a new dependence versus wide autonomy, and there has been market have gone unanswered. Instead, Russia’s off er little interactive dialogue. Accordingly, four key issues to offi cially rescind the blockade and to increase assis- remain unresolved. tance is preferred.

Blockade or No Blockade Mysterious Air Raids and Stray Missiles Th e fi rst unresolved issue is the blockades on the se- Th e second unresolved issue is Russia’s military support cessionist territories. Th e socio-economic conditions for the secessionists. Th ere have been fi ve major bomb- in Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been worse than ing incidents in Georgia since 2001 and Russia has de- in the internationally recognized post-Soviet states be- nied them all. In March 2001, nine unidentifi ed jets cause of the destruction wrought by the war, the block- bombed areas of Kodori Gorge under Georgian con- ades on normal economic activity, sparse employment trol. In August 2002, Georgia accused Russia of bomb- opportunities, and the limitations placed on interna- ing its northern Pankisi Gorge. In March 2007, Mi-24 tional assistance. Th e maintenance of a “state budget” helicopters bombed , the Kodori and has been more for show than substance, as the live- Gorges, and the Chuberi Pass. Th at same year, lihoods of the citizens have been sustained by smug- there was an air strike on the village of Tsitelubani in gling, remittances, international aid, and Russian gov- Shida Kartli region near South Ossetia. Th is past April, ernment payments. In order to survive, the Abkhazians a MiG-29 fi ghter was videotaped downing an unarmed and South Ossetians have engaged in over a decade Georgian reconnaissance drone over the region of of informal trading, accounting for more than half of Abkhazia. Only in the case of the missile in Shida Kartli their cash earnings. did an independent commission conclude and openly For Abkhazia, the 1996 CIS embargo permitted state that it came from Russia. the direct import only of food products, medical sup- Th us, either Russia gave the secessionists air com- plies, petroleum products, and household items. A li- bat and air defense forces, or Russian forces are con- cense from the Georgian government was required for ducting operations on their behalf. It is known that everything else. To circumvent these restrictions, the the secessionists have been trained by Russian forc- Abkhazians resorted to trade along undetected or ille- es or have served in the Russian army. Georgia claims gally sanctioned passageways, including the de facto that Russia periodically moves military equipment into borders, as well as at its seaports. Participating in the the secessionist regions. Moreover, the international smuggling chains were Georgian, Russian, and de fac- community has been unable to verify whether Russia to government authorities, armed forces, security ser- vacated the base in Abkhazia in compliance vices, peacekeepers, paramilitaries, criminals, and lo- with a 1991 Conventional Forces in Europe agreement. cal residents. Russia delegates its former civilian and military lead- Th e smuggling had several damaging eff ects on con- ers to serve in key posts, including as the defense min- fl ict resolution. First, it inhibited the development of le- isters of both Abkhazia (Sultan Sosnaliev) and South gitimate institutions and sustainable economic devel- Ossetia (Anatoli Barankevich) and Chief of the Abkhaz 3 rrussianussian aanalyticalnalytical russian analytical digest 40/08 ddigestigest

General Staff (LtGen Gennadii Zaytsev). Most recent- Moreover, the livelihoods of those residing in villages ly, the Abkhazian leadership has announced that it is that resemble an ethnic checkerboard are in question. preparing an agreement with Russia that would guar- Perhaps most troublesome is the unresolved status of antee Abkhazia’s security in exchange for a permanent the displaced Ingush, who fl ed the Prigorodny district Russian military presence. of North Ossetia in 1992 during a brief but violent ethnic confl ict with the Ossetians. Compounding the Th e Politics of Passports Ingush’s inability to return home have been waves of Th e third unresolved issue is Russia’s issuance of pass- South Ossetian and Chechen war refugees into North ports. Russia plays several increasingly confl icting se- Ossetia, occupying Ingush property. curity roles in the secessionist territories. Russia, along Th e Abkhazians realize that their bid for indepen- with the US, UK, France, and Germany, is a mem- dence is, paradoxically, solely dependent on Russian dip- ber of the UN Group of Friends, which is responsible lomatic representation. However, it is unknown wheth- for fi nding a resolution to the confl icts. Similarly in er Russia will ultimately support independence. No one South Ossetia, Russia has either direct or indirect infl u- understands this contradiction better than Abkhazian ence over three of the four parties to the Joint Control President , who was not meant to win if Commission (Russia, North Ossetia, South Ossetia, Russia had had its way. In the December 2004 presiden- and Georgia). Russia, under UN auspices, staff s a CIS tial election, , the pro-Russia candidate peacekeeping force along the ceasefi re lines. However, and surrogate of former president , in apparent contradiction to these functions, Russia lost to Bagapsh. Days of uncertainty led to judicial and issued passports to the majority of residents in the se- parliamentary deliberations, with supporters of both cessionist territories and is now their self-declared pro- candidates threatening violence. It ended in a Russian- tector. mediated re-election, with Bagapsh as president and Th ere is no immediate international legal prece- Khajimba as vice-president. However, Bagapsh subse- dence for this issuance, which raises several questions. quently appointed his own loyalist, Aleksandr Ankvab, Russia may have violated the non-intervention norm by as prime minister, and the pair consolidated power. sending agents into Abkhazia and South Ossetia to is- Perhaps most troublesome for Russia is the potential sue passports. Th erefore, Russia’s claim to a right to pro- reaction of the Chechens who, after losing two devas- tect its citizens may be invalid. Moreover, it is question- tating wars for independence, are hardly appeased by able, particularly in Abkhazia, whether the recipients their Kremlin-appointed leader. consider themselves to be citizens of Russia. Th eir deci- sion could be aff ected by what Russia expects of them. Way Forward While it is known that they have voted in Russian elec- Given the four unresolved issues complicating the res- tions, the Russian government has yet to demand that olution of the confl icts, the international community they pay Russian taxes or be conscripted into the army. should focus in the near-term on preventing an esca- Finally, Russia may not wish to be held responsible for lation of violence. the actions of the secessionist regimes, including the Most importantly, mediators, perhaps the UN, fi ghter jets destroying Georgian property, the alleged should encourage the sides to use more neutral lan- violations of human rights on Georgian returnees, and guage when referring to the other party. Th e character- the infringement of the IDP’s property rights. ization by Georgia of the separatist zones as havens for criminals and terrorists exaggerates the situation and Declarations of Independence defeats confi dence building. Likewise, the portrayal of Th e fourth unresolved issue is the declarations of in- Georgians as bloodthirsty nationalists who are willing dependence. Th e implications for Russia of indepen- to use force to regain the territories should be moder- dence for the secessionist territories could be trouble- ated. More factually-based reporting disseminated to some, leading it to recalculate current policies. Th e all sides would help. South Ossetian leadership states that it wants acces- So would more contact among people on both sides sion to the Russian Federation through unifi cation of the de facto borders. Exchanges of goods and the re- with North Ossetia, the most prosperous republic in opening of markets should be encouraged, managed by the North Caucasus. Presumably, it would be a chal- a joint customs institution. Th e EU should consider es- lenge for the North’s economy to absorb the much tablishing border monitoring missions on the Georgian- poorer South, including the possibility of signifi cant Russian border in the secessionist territories. numbers of South Ossetians moving north. It is also New compilations of negotiation teams are need- unclear if the South Ossetian leaders would willingly ed. Th e EU should be much more involved, and eff ort give up their positions to join the North’s structures. should be made to ensure that Russia’s presence is not 4 rrussianussian aanalyticalnalytical russian analytical digest 40/08 ddigestigest

contradictory. Georgia may also wish to reconsider an Finally, the UN and OSCE missions should be ex- early role for the Abkhazian and South Ossetian alter- panded, in terms of compilation of forces (more nations), native regimes. types of forces (more police), and responsibilities (more Th e international legal precedence for the issuance maneuverability). Crucially, a common regime to mon- of passports, and the potential implications of Russian itor, report, and sanction, when necessary, troop levels, citizenship for Abkhazians and South Ossetians should armaments, and movements in and around the seces- be studied by a team of experts, perhaps under the aus- sionist regions is needed. pices of the OSCE Minsk Group or the UN Group of Friends.

About the author Stacy Closson is a Transatlantic Post-Doc Fellow for International Relations and Security (TAPIR) at the Center for Security Studies, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich.

Analysis

A Russian Perspective: Forging Peace in the Caucasus By Sergei Markedonov, Moscow

Abstract Although frequently described as “frozen confl icts,” the situations in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which seek independence from Georgia, are in fact deteriorating quickly. Th e precedent of Kosovo heartened the lead- ers of the break-away regions and spurred Georgia to take action to reintegrate its lands. In reaction to the West’s recognition of Kosovo’s independence, Russia began to institutionalize its support for South Ossetia and Abkhazia and formally lifted trade sanctions against them. Th is article argues that helping to unfreeze the confl icts is a bad policy for Russia. Instead, Russia would be better off trying to stabilize the confl ict ar- eas and only discussing the status of the various territories once their economic situation is secure.

Unfreezing Frozen Confl icts were several attempts to change the status quo in the Before analyzing the interests, plans, and role of Russia confl ict zones at the end of the 1990s and the begin- in regulating the ethno-political confl icts in Georgia, it ning of the 2000s. At the end of 1997 and the be- is helpful to review the terms used to defi ne them. In ginning of 1998, the Georgian partisan groups Forest studying the situation in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Brotherhood and the White Legion increased their ac- both experts and politicians talk about “frozen con- tivities in the area where the Russian peacekeeping forc- fl icts.” Unfortunately, this description is no longer cor- es were operating. Th ey carried out violent acts against rect. Th e “frozen” status of a confl ict assumes the ab- the Russian soldiers and Abkhaz policemen. In May sence of any dynamics, whether positive or negative, 1998 the situation escalated into a military confron- and thus the preservation of the status quo. However, tation. Th e result of the military activities in the Gali over the last four years, the confl ict in the two Georgian District was a second wave of refugees among the lo- territories has evolved. And this evolution has not been cal Megrelian population into Georgia. Georgian me- positive. dia described the events of 1998 as a second ethnic Across the post-Soviet space, and especially in cleansing in Abkhazia after the one that took place in Georgia, we are witnessing an “unfreezing” of ethnic fall 1993. While it would be hard to describe the ac- confl icts. Th ere is a change in the format of resolving tions of the Abkhazian police toward the residents of the the confl icts and also a desire to violate the legal base, Gali District as “tolerant,” the Georgian partisan units, which had been created for preventing the resumption identifying themselves as defenders of the Georgian of armed confl ict in the beginning of the 1990s, namely people, often used the Georgian (Megrelian) popula- the 1992 Dagomys Agreement on South Ossetia and the tion as a living shield. On May 25, 1998, the two sides Moscow agreements of 1994 on Abkhazia. Unfreezing signed a cease fi re agreement. After the tragic events of the confl ict means changing the status of the disput- 1998, a new, spontaneous return of displaced people to ed territories, or attempts to make such changes Th ere the Gali District began. By the end of the 1990s, ac- 5