Factors Driving Collaboration in Natural Resource Conflict Management: Evidence from Romania

This document is the accepted manuscript version of the following article: Hossu, C. A., Ioja, I. C., Susskind, L. E., Badiu, D. L., & Hersperger, A. M. (2018). Factors driving collaboration in natural resource conflict management: evidence from Romania. Ambio, 47(7), 816-830. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13280-018-1016-0

Factors driving collaboration in natural resource conflict management: evidence from

Romania

Authors: Constantina Alina Hossu1, Ioan Cristian Ioja*1, Lawrence E. Susskind2, Denisa L.

Badiu1, Anna M. Hersperger3

1Centre for Environmental Research and Impact Studies, University of Bucharest, Nicolae Balcescu 1, 010041, Bucharest, Romania

2Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Urban Studies and Planning, Massachusetts Avenue 77, Cambridge, MA 02139, Unites States of America

3Swiss Federal Research Institute of Forest, Snow and Landscape, Landscape Dynamics, Zürcherstrasse 111, 8903 Birmensdorf, Switzerland

Submitted to: Ambio

Abstract

A critical challenge in natural resource management is to bring all stakeholders together to negotiate solutions to critical problems. However, various collaborative approaches to heading

off conflicts and resolving natural resource management disputes have been used. What drives

these efforts, however, still needs further research. Our study provides a systematic look at the

drivers likely to initiate collaborative problem-solving efforts in four cases in Romania. We use

Emerson's et al. (2012) framework for collaborative governance and multi-value qualitative comparative analysis (mvQCA) to analyze cases involving endangered species, restrictions on forest harvest, conflicts associated with infrastructure development projects and disputes over the management of environmentally sensitive areas. Our findings contribute to the already existing collaborative governance literature indicating which of the four factors: uncertainty, interdependence, consequential incentives and leadership, in which combination, are necessary

1 and sufficient to spur collaborative resource management efforts. Our results showed that in

Romania the initiation of collaboration is best explained by positive consequential incentives

(i.e., financial opportunities) which has determined leaders to take initiative. This study provides

additional information for the complicated process of natural resource management which is

often overriding collaboration by investigating what enables and constrains collaborative efforts

in a country where natural resources were managed and used according to the principles of

central planning.

Keywords: collaboration; uncertainty; interdependence; consequential incentives; leadership;

mvQCA.

1. Introduction

Climate change, desertification, deforestation, and concerns about biodiversity are key drivers of environmental conflict all over the world (Gerber 2011; Ide 2015). Questions about how best to manage natural resources in such cases often lead to surprisingly intense conflicts.

For solutions to emerge, key actors from multiple levels must see sufficient reasons to engage in collaborative problem solving (Brown et al. 2015).

The collaborative approach to natural resource management has flourished in large measure because, in a world of uncertainty and complexity, conventional administrative and court processes have failed to produce satisfactory results (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987; Innes and

Booher 2010). Traditional approaches to public participation in resource management disputes lack direct interaction among the affected parties and tend to present win-lose outcomes that tend to support an unjust status-quo (Innes and Booher 2004).

The management of socio-ecological systems, which are complex adaptive systems characterized by self-organization, adaptation, non-linearity and uncertainty (Berkes 2010;

Messier et al. 2016), has led to the search for more effective forms of collaborative problem- solving as a way of supplementing what government can do to resolve resource management disputes (Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000; Wondolleck and Yaffee 2003). Collaborative management refers, in general, to all efforts that bring multiple stakeholders with diverse influence and experiences to the bargaining table to seek ways of reconciling their conflicting interests and concerns about how natural resources should be used (Heikkila and Gerl 2005;

Johnston et al. 2011). It is a process of learning by interaction to both solve problems and create opportunities, where stakeholders adapt and change their behaviour and perceptions in response to the information gathered during the process (Innes and Booher 1999).

Previous research has shown the effects collaboration has in natural resource management.

For example, Hill et al. (2015) found that collaboration can improve resources’ conditions such

as slowing down biodiversity loss through mobilizing institutions and Koontz and Newig (2014)

and Scott (2015) observed improvements in water quality parameters. Berkes (2010) found that

in a wide range of resources (i.e., wildlife, forests, protected areas, wetlands, watershed)

collaboration related processes (i.e., deliberation, trust and capacity building, learning) led to adaptive co-management. Furthermore, many social benefits may directly or indirectly result,

such as additional social, intellectual and political capital (Innes and Booher 2004; Sabatier et al.

2005), new and strong relationships between stakeholders (Ulibarri 2015), as well as an

increased sense of community even amongst parties who may not traditionally cooperate

(Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000).

A handful of collaboration studies investigate what it takes for the emergence of

commitments to participate (Ostrom 1990; Sabatier et al. 2005; Emerson et al. 2012). According

to the Emerson's et al. (2012) framework for collaborative governance, a collaborative process is

more likely to be initiated when one or more of the four drivers: uncertainty, interdependence,

consequential incentives, and adequate leadership are in play. Emerson's et al. (2012) framework

for collaborative governance (Figure 1) represents the theoretical basis for this study. It is

general, flexible, and encompassing. It is appropriate for our study because it can guide empirical

evaluations of cases. In an earlier study we explored what contributes to the success or failure of

the resolution process in cases of land-use conflicts. We found that, in Romania, the absence of collaborative efforts contributes to failure (Tudor et al. 2014). The current study complements

our previous research by focusing on the initiation of collaboration and specifically to focus on

the assertion that, i.e.,: “one or more of these four drivers must be present to start a CGR

(collaborative governance regime) and that the presence of more drivers increases the likelihood

that such a regime will be initiated” (Emerson et al. 2012). This offers us a way to better understand how the four drivers might relate to each other.

Figure 1 The framework for collaborative governance, based on Emerson et al. (2012)

Uncertainty

Uncertainty is ubiquitous in natural resource management and results from the very nature of the complexity and unpredictability of socio-ecological systems. Uncertainty arises from

different combinations of resistance (barriers) and connectivity (interactions). For example, in

cases of high connectivity and low resistance, the likelihood for change to be initiated is highest,

as barriers are broken and connections are established. In cases of low connectivity and high

resistance the likelihood for change to occur is lowest, as many barriers exist and poor

connections are established (Holling 2001). Uncertainty also results from the fact that

stakeholders are competing with each other for the same limited resources in ways that they

cannot predict with confidence (Innes and Booher 2003). Furthermore, the higher the degree of

uncertainty, the greater the willingness of stakeholders to commit to collaboration. However, in

climate change as well as immigration politics, uncertainty can drive parties to compete and not

to collaborate (Emerson and Nabatchi 2015) but it can be shifted from competition to

collaboration when interdependence is present.

Interdependence

In system theory interdependence is considered a subset of a network of interactions or systems. Multiple interaction creates networked systems of interactions and thus the likelihood

for emergence increases. Interactions between actors involve a mix of constructive or destructive

tendencies (Green 2006). Constructive interactions tend to support collaboration between actors

while destructive interactions may result in power inequities and obstruction of other party's

interests. In Emerson et al. (2012) framework, interdependence refers to stakeholders’

willingness to interact. Previous research has found that the parties’ recognition of dependence

on each other increases cooperation in water resource management (Mostert et al. 2008) and

human-wildlife conflicts (Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000) and it is crucial in collaborative forest

and nature management (Zachrisson and Lindahl 2013).

Consequential incentives

It also turns out that stakeholders engage in collaborative activities when they perceive

sufficient consequential incentives to do so. These incentives may be both positive, such as

financial opportunities that may require participants to work together or negative, such as

threated reforms that are unappealing to many or most of the stakeholders involved, or proposed

policies that seem unlikely to work (Emerson et al. 2012). For example, Nita et al. (2016) found

that EU-funding puts different actors together to devise common conservation strategies.

Furthermore, Zurba and Trimble (2014) found that consequential incentives strongly related to crises in the fishery and forestry sectors have sparked collaborative initiatives.

Leadership

Finally, in the Emerson's et al. (2012) framework, leaders play a critical role in encouraging

people to act together as already Imperial (2005) pointed out. These have to be esteemed

individuals, who are perceived as honest and neutral, and who can secure the resources needed to

initiate collaborative efforts. For example, having assistance from a neutral leader during a

collaboration process may make it easier to meet the interests of less powerful parties and ensure

fairness in the process and justice in the outcomes (Colvin et al. 2015).

Emerson et al. (2012) and Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) point out that the system context,

specifically the political, social, economic and environmental influences, may enable or constrain

the effect of these four drivers in initiating collaboration. Collaboration may be enabled

depending on the socio-economic and cultural characteristics of a community. For example,

communities with limited financial resources may seek to connect with well-endowed ones to

access certain public services. Also, the environmental problems (i.e., pollution, natural

resources scarcity) may enable collaborative environmental problem-solving in order to improve

or limit them. Furthermore, people collaborate when opportunities for collaborative practices are

available (i.e., the Federal Advisory Committee Act which facilitates collaboration between the

public and the government). However, collaboration fails to be initiated when a country’s

political history and its social and economic diversity undermine people’s readiness to

collaborate (Susskind et al. 2015). Also, staff with insufficient skills in collaborative planning,

inadequate resources (i.e., funding, neutral expertise, technical and logistical support) and an

unresponsive bureaucratic culture can create serious roadblocks to collaboration (Carr et al.

1998). Finally, individualistic lifestyles typical of most modern societies where collective

interests are neglected (Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000) and the philosophical differences and

contending values among stakeholders which make trust quite challenging (Davenport et al.

2007) are important barriers to the emergence of collaborative efforts. In order to get a better

understanding of the drivers likely to initiate collaboration, we address contextual influences in

the discussion of the results.

Romania’s general political and economic context has experienced interesting shifts in the

past years. The Romanian state is a unitary state, with a young democracy, since 1989 when the

communist regime collapsed. Romania’s entrance into the European Union (EU) in 2007 and the

subsequent influence of the EU organizations and conventions in shaping the national

environmental policies have secured participation as an influential force in environmental policy- making. However, the environmental issues still receive little attention from the public which prefers to not get involved, fearing that expressing opinions might impair their own well-being as a result of the communist past when public involvement was not allowed (Stringer et al. 2009).

The industrial breakdown in the post-communism period have given rise to multinational corporations and non-governmental organizations which have called for greater transparency in

Romania’s environmental policies. However, the environmental policy is still characterized by centralized policy making and implementation (Stringer and Paavola 2013).

2. Method

2.1. Cases Selection

We chose a multiple, small-n case study approach because it permits us to explore in some depth the way in which causal mechanisms work. This approach is preferred because it describes in some detail the real-life context in which the cases unfolded (Yin 2003) and allows a

comparison of process and outcomes that would not be possible if we used a quantitative or

statistical comparison (Conley and Moore 2003) or large-n analyses (Ryan and Smith 2011). The

case studies were selected to study natural resource conflicts in different resource systems (such

as: wildlife, forestry, and water) in order to find variation in the initiation of collaboration. Most

importantly, we selected only cases where at least some components of collaborative dynamics

(Figure 1) had been initiated. An alternative approach would be to contrast cases with failed and

successful initiation as well as with lack of any attempt to initiate collaboration. The potential of this approach for future research is elaborated on in the discussion section.

We selected four Romanian cases studies on the following issues: (i) a human-bear conflict;

(ii) a conflict caused by restrictions on forest harvest; (iii) a conflict which emerge when infrastructure projects were proposed in sensitive areas and (iv) a conflict which arose over faulty management of environmentally sensitive areas (Table 1).

The published analyses of natural resources conflict resolution cases are scarce. Therefore, to document and ensure a reasonably comprehensive understanding of each story, information was collected from a variety of sources. We studied the projects reports, official meeting notes and recordings. Furthermore, the personal experiences of some authors of this paper who have been involved in the case studies (as expert advisors) were used to complement the information from the sources we used for documentation (Table 1). The triangulation of these sources allowed us to develop a solid understanding of each case.

Table 1: Properties of the selected cases

Properties Life Ursus Project Putna Vrancea Natural Highway – Surlari Green Siret Management Park protected forest Plan Sources Life Ursus Project 2010; Life Putna Vrancea Natural EPA 2007, online LSM Administration Ursus Project 2011, authors’ Park 2010, authors’ media content 2015, meetings own experiences, own experiences analysis recordings and notes, http://lifeursus.carnivoremari.ro/ authors’ own experiences Natural Wildlife Forest Infrastructure - Water resource Forest system Conflict type Conservation conflicts (human- Forest related conflicts Forest – Conflicts induced by the bear conflicts) Infrastructure environmental conflict degradation of water related ecosystems Time, duration 2010, 3 years period 2010, 6 years period 2007, 4 years period 2012, 3 years period Location Vrancea, Harghita and Covasna Vrancea County, Ilfov County, Braila, Galati, Vrancea, counties, Romania Romania Romania Bacau counties, Romania Extent Regional level County level National level Regional level Main topic An EU funded project, aimed at Collaboration efforts Negotiated efforts to Negotiated effort to improving the brown bear triggered by restrictions find a solution resolve the conservation and management on timber harvest levels concerning a disagreements over the (by changing the hunters’ and in some private forests transportation actions proposed in the farmers’ perception about the because of their zoning project planned to management plan of a brown bear) and to reduce the as protected areas cross an important river valley and its human-bear conflicts. where no intervention protected forest for protected areas in order is allowed. bird conservation. to achieve a consensual agreement. Main Environmental Protection The park Romanian Company Governmental stakeholders Agencies administration, Forest of Highways and organizations NGOs Owners Associations, National Roads NGOs hunters, farmers, Environmental Environmental conservationists, local citizens Protection agencies Protection agencies NGOs

Furthermore, we searched for other similar four cases (in terms of similar realm of conflicts)

in the United States literature to devise the calibration rules for the four drivers (section 2.3.) and

to investigate whether the Romanian cases have similar traits to previous cases. We chose the

U.S. literature because of the considerable number of reported case studies that illustrate

collaborative efforts to resolving conflicts over biodiversity conservation, natural resource

management, urban development, as well as social justice (Susskind and Cruikshank 1987;

Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000; Sabatier et al. 2005). Four of these were selected for close

analysis (Table 2).

Table 2: The U.S. case studies selected for devising the calibration rules (section 2.3.)

Cases Sources Brief description An innovative partnership, designed to improve the ecological habitat of the grizzly bears without affecting logging in the region, Beartree Challenge Forest Service 1993; Wondolleck and to solve the conflicts between the angry farmers and the pro- Project and Yaffee 2000; Kemmis 2001 wildlife groups, made diverse actors collaborate on behalf of grizzly bear management. Terhune and Terhune 1998; Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000; A partnership started to bring together all the actors concerned Quincy Library Bryan and Wondolleck 2002; about the effects on the local economy of a sharp decline in the Group Davies and White 2012, timber harvest. http://www.qlg.org/ A consensus-building approach to advance a proposal about a Alewife Task Susskind 1981; Susskind and regional transportation facility planned to be built in the heart of Force Cruikshank 1987 an environmentally sensitive wetland. Casco Bay Estuary A consensus-based planning process to develop comprehensive CBEP 1996; Grijze 2010 Project actions for the management of a watershed.

2.2. Qualitative Comparative Analysis

We used multi-value qualitative comparative analysis (mvQCA) to explore which drivers

from Emerson et al. (2012) framework for collaborative governance (Figure 1) preceded the

initiation of collaboration. According to QCA terminology we refer to the four drivers as

‘conditions’.

Since 1980 when the QCA was developed (Ragin 1987), it has been applied in various

research fields, including conflict research (Ide 2015) and social collaboration (Baynes et al.

2015). The purpose of QCA is to identify necessary and sufficient conditions that justify an

outcome. Necessary conditions are those without which the outcome could not have been

produced, while sufficient conditions are those that could produce the outcome by themselves

without other conditions being present (Rihoux and Ragin 2009). These emerged from our

analysis of set-theoretic relations across cases. Furthermore, QCA identifies not just necessary

and sufficient conditions, but also INUS conditions. The term INUS is defined as an insufficient

but necessary part of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the result.

Therefore, an INUS condition is neither necessary nor sufficient by itself, but part of the

combinations of conditions which are sufficient for the outcome under investigation.

QCA focuses on complex causality, being able to explore multiple paths leading to the same

outcome and requires an in-depth knowledge of the cases.

In our study, we used multi-value qualitative comparative analysis (mvQCA), because it

advances beyond crisp-set QCA (which allows only full (1) or no (0) membership of a condition

in a set) and fuzzy-set QCA (which uses fine-grained membership scores, specifically every

possible values between 0 and 1) by capturing the causal effect of every category of a multi-

value condition (Haesebrouck 2016). In mvQCA each condition may have more than two

categories, but generally a low number. Thus, mvQCA is most suitable for our data which was

calibrated into 2-3 categories (see section 2.3 Calibration).

An important step in mvQCA is the construction of the ‘truth table’ which lists all the

logically possible configurations (Thiem and Dusa 2013a). For example, assuming four drivers

(or conditions) ( ) for the initiation of collaborative activities, and each driver ( ) having 3, 2, 2

and 3 categories 𝑘𝑘( ), there are 36 ( ) logically possible configurations. The𝑗𝑗 truth table 𝑘𝑘 𝑗𝑗=1 was constructed from𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 the multi-valueΠ data𝑝𝑝,𝑝𝑝 using a cut-off score of 0.8 to show which configurations (from all the 36 possible ones) are expected to contribute to the initiation of collaboration.

When applying the Boolean minimization to the truth table to detect sufficient conditions,

three solutions can be produced. The conservative solution is based on the combinations of conditions from the truth table that correspond only to empirically observed cases. The

parsimonious solution incorporates logical reminders, specifically those combinations of

conditions that are logically possible and would have a positive output, but are not found in the

empirical cases. The intermediate solution is based on directional expectations (Thiem and Dusa

2013b) regarding the relationship between a condition and the outcome, and thus retains those

logical reminders where theoretical knowledge suggests they contribute to the outcome. We

calculated all three, but chose to discuss the intermediate solution as it is best suited to our study

because (i) we could set the directional expectations based on Emerson's et al. (2012) proposition

that one or more of the four drivers: uncertainty, interdependence, consequential incentives and

leadership are likely to explain why collaborative activities are initiated and (ii) it uses those

logical reminders from the parsimonious solution in line with the theoretical knowledge, thus

‘artificially’ increasing the number of case studies.

The truth table shows set-theoretic sufficiency relations. Twenty-one truth table rows remain

as logical reminders in line with the theoretical knowledge (Appendix 1). Eight truth table rows

correspond to empirically observed case studies.

Graphical representations (Venn diagrams) that display the relationships of necessity were used. The most important parameters of fit in QCA are consistency (which refers to the degree to which a condition is needed for the outcome to occur), and coverage (which refers to the percentage of cases explained by a causal condition) (Thiem and Dusa 2013b). Coverage is meaningful only for consistent results (having a consistency score higher than 0.90). The necessity in the consistency scores was analyzed to identify which (combination of) conditions might precede the initiation of collaboration. We used 0.90 as a threshold for accepting a condition to be necessary, as Rihoux and Ragin (2009) recommend.

QCA is suitable for small- to intermediate-n research designs (Ragin 1987). No generally agreed fixed limits to decide on the suitable number of case studies in QCA analysis are available. Studies using small-n analyses showed that such an approach allows gaining intimate case knowledge (Ryan and Smith 2011) which is indispensable in QCA data analysis (Schneider and Wagemann 2010). Furthermore, a within-case analysis is more suitable to get the story behind the macro configurations that emerge from the QCA (Ebbinghaus 2006). By contrast, in large-n comparative studies the possibility to gain familiarity with cases is difficult and such an approach is time-extensive.

Our research design did not allow for more case studies to be selected. As such cases of natural resource management conflicts are social phenomena, they are most of the time limited in their diversity (Ragin 1987). Given the small-N case studies we used, the problem of limited diversity occurs. This problem comes from the presence of logical reminders (those combinations of drivers that are logically possible but for which no empirically observed cases exist) in the truth table. Not all the 36 possible combinations from the truth table are empirically observable and there is no guarantee that a set of 36 case studies will cover all the 36 possible combinations as same cases may experience the same combinations of drivers. To alleviate the problem of limited diversity, we produced the intermediate solution which uses only those logical reminders that the parsimonious solution comprises and are based on theoretical knowledge (Appendix 1) (Ragin and Sonnett 2005).

The QCA analysis was performed with the QCA package (Thiem and Dusa 2013a) in R (R

Development Core Team 2008).

2.3. Calibration

Data consists of membership scores which were assigned to the four drivers (uncertainty,

interdependence, consequential incentives and leadership) and the outcome (the initiation of collaboration) based on the evaluation of four U.S. case studies (Appendix 2). Therefore, we used natural numbers such as 0, 1 and 2 to dichotomize and trichotomize the four drivers and the outcome (Table 3).

Table 3: Rules for deriving calibration scores for the initiation of collaboration

Drivers Scores 2 1 0 Uncertainty When no information about the A membership score of 1 is A case where parties had conflict and how to solve it has assigned when information information about the conflict been available, we considered the existed about the conflict but and how to solve it was case to have a high uncertainty and no information about on how calibrated as 0. calibrated it as 2. to solve it has been available. 1 0 Interdependence A membership score of 1 is A case where assigned when interdependences interdependences were were present. This means that the present, but parties looked for parties could not solve the problem collaborators either at state or on their own and looked for at local level is calibrated as 0. collaborators at both state and local level. 1 0 Consequential When both positive and negative A case is calibrated as 0 when incentives incentives existed, the case receives the negative consequential a membership of 1. incentives were dominant. 2 1 0 Leadership When a case has leaders that help A membership score of 1 is The absence of leaders results secure support for collaboration, are assigned when the leaders are in a membership score of 0. committed to collaborative solving present, they secure resources problem and impartial to the for collaboration, but they are preferences of the other parties, it not committed to collaborative receives a membership of 2. solving problem, or impartial

to the preferences of the other parties.

The calibration of the outcome (the initiation of the calibration), was achieved by assessing

each component of the collaborative dynamics (principled engagement, shared motivation and

joint action), for each case study (Appendix 2). According to Emerson et al. (2012), an initiated

collaboration reflects the degree to which parties are likely to further interact and collaborate to

reach an agreement. Therefore, a membership score of 2 is assigned when principled

engagement, shared motivation and joint action were generated and were of high quality and

effectiveness (Table 4). When the quality and effectiveness of these components decrease they

received a membership score of 1. A membership score of 0 is attributed when some of these

components failed to be initiated.

Table 4: Rules for deriving calibration scores for the components of collaborative dynamics

Collaborative dynamics Components Elements High quality and effectiveness When activities aimed at revealing the individual and shared Discovery interests, concerns and values of participants and engaging in Principled Engagement creates joint-fact-finding and analytic investigation are organized. the space for shared interactions. When parties define concepts and common goals, clarify tasks These, in turn, can help identify Definition and expectations, and develop evaluation criteria. needed information, build shared When parties have a fair and civil dialogue, are open during understanding of the issue, and Deliberation communication, thoughtfully listen and examine perspectives; create space for deliberations and manage disagreements. leading to decisions. When agreements are reached and parties consider them as Determinations fair, equitable, durable and efficient. Mutual trust and mutual When there is strong evidence of trust-building between Shared Motivation contains trust- understanding participants. building activities as well as When the participants deem the collaboration process and its legitimacy and commitment to the Legitimacy parties to be useful, worthy and credible. process which can increase the When the participants are committed to collaboration and its potential for future positive collective purpose, are motivated to achieve outcomes interactions and lower conflict Commitment together and feel responsible and accountable for the around natural resources. outcomes. Joint Action reflects parties’ Procedural and institutional When procedural and institutional arrangements exist, and are common efforts over time. arrangements of good quality.

Together, they establish rules, When leadership roles are filled (i.e., expert, sponsor, institutional arrangements, engage facilitator/mediator), well-defined during moments of Leadership in knowledge building activities deliberation or conflict and the leaders champion the and make efforts to provide collaborative implementation. resources. However, when parties When the information was presented in different interactive have contending views, somebody Knowledge ways, was of good quality and was understood by the has to help, which in some cases is participants. a professional neutral who is When resources were well accommodated and from diverse central to collaborative decision- Resources sources. making.

When we set the directional expectations to produce the intermediate solution, we considered

that in case studies where (i) uncertainty has a membership score of 1 and 2, (ii) interdependence

and consequential incentives of 0 and 1 and (iii) leadership of 2, collaboration is more likely to

be initiated.

3. Results

The assessment of each driver of the initiation of collaboration in each case study (Appendix

2) revealed particular situations in which collaboration is likely to be initiated (Table 5).

Table 5: Main results for each driver likely to initiate collaboration

Drivers Uncertainty Interdependence Consequential Leadership incentives Definition Uncertainty refers to Interdependence occurs Consequential Leadership is expressed (based on Emerson the lack of information when the parties incentives refer to by persons who design et al. (2012)) about how to manage a express the need to internal and external and create the problem that drives work together to make pressures as well as collaborative parties to collaborate in progress. opportunities that lead environment. an effort to reduce, to the development of diffuse and share risk. collaboration. Main results based High uncertainty about Parties’ recognition that More negative than Self-organizing on previous U.S. how to solve the they are dependent on positive consequential leadership is more case studies conflicting situation each other for any incentives have created likely to bring the encouraged the parties action to occur to solve opportunities for stakeholders to the table to consider the conflict collaboration to creating a chance to collaboration as their increases collaboration emerge. transform conflict into last best way to solve in natural resource collaboration the dispute. management.

Main results based High uncertainty The interest in Positive consequential Leadership was on the Romanian regarding how to solve interdependence incentives (i.e., long- provided by the team case studies the conflicts was not applied to collaboration term funding) have proposing the projects sufficient to cause the between parties was determined key funded through EU parties to initiate supported by the need individuals to take a grants. The leaders collaborative efforts. to have the project leadership role and secured resources so completed. accommodate the that discussions could resources to stimulate take place in a collaboration. collaborative way.

Life Ursus Project and Green Siret Management Plan case studies are good examples of how

collaboration was initiated: parties were aware that they would have to collaborate in a self-

organized team to begin the project implementation. Furthermore, parties realized they had to

work together or lose the benefits of the resources that were important to them. In both cases,

field trips and presentations were organized so that the participants could get a better

understanding of the environmental as well as socio-economic conditions necessary to conserve

the brown bear (Life Ursus Project) or to create the management plan (Green Siret Management

Plan).

In the Putna Vrancea Natural Park and highway – Surlari protected forest case studies,

collaboration was initiated only because the administrative process required them to do so. No

joint activities were organized, no trust was built and no platform for civil deliberation was set

up. Moreover, the lack of governmental agencies committed to implement a collaborative

approach raises questions about the legitimacy of collaboration.

3.1. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the initiation of the CGR

Our analysis of necessity shows six combinations of drivers (without which collaboration would probably not be produced) which meet the threshold of 0.90 (Table 6).

Table 6: Necessary drivers for the initiation of collaboration

Combinations of drivers Explanation Romanian Cons.^ Cov.^ case studies (no.) U{1}+L{1} <= the Regarding uncertainty, information exists about the conflict 3 1 0.857 initiation of collaboration but no information about on how to solve it has been available OR leaders are present, they help secure support for collaboration, but they are not committed to collaborative solving problem, or impartial to the preferences of the other parties. I{1}+CI{1} <= the Parties could not solve the problem on their own and looked- 3 1 0.857 initiation of collaboration for collaborators at both state and local level OR both positive and negative consequential incentives exist. U{1}+I{0}+CI{0} <= the Regarding uncertainty, information exists about the conflict 4 1 0.750 initiation of collaboration but no information about on how to solve it has been available OR parties looked for collaborators either at state or at local level OR the negative consequential incentives were dominant. U{2}+I{0}+L{2} <= the Regarding uncertainty, no information about the conflict and 4 1 0.750 initiation of collaboration how to solve it has been available OR parties looked for collaborators either at state or at local level OR leaders help secure support for collaboration, are committed to collaborative solving problem and impartial to the preferences of the other parties. U{2}+CI{1}+L{2} <= Regarding uncertainty, no information about the conflict and 4 1 0.750 the initiation of how to solve has been available OR both positive and collaboration negative incentives exist OR leaders help secure support for collaboration, are committed to collaborative solving problem and impartial to the preferences of the other parties. I{0}+CI{0}+L{2} <= the Parties looked for collaborators either at state or at local level 4 1 0.750 initiation of collaboration OR the negative consequential incentives were dominant OR leaders help secure support for collaboration, are committed to collaborative solving problem and impartial to the preferences of the other parties. X{Y} where X is a driver from the data set and Y is a set of scores of X; + OR, <= the combination of drivers is necessary; ^cons. - consistency, cov. – coverage.

In the case studies characterized by these six configurations, collaboration was likely to be initiated.

The evaluation based on Venn diagrams (Figure 2) revealed that while the six combinations of drivers are necessary to initiate collaboration, their presence is not sufficient. Each ellipse contains the number of the case studies that are members of the configuration each ellipse represents. As there are cases outside the outcome (i.e., the initiation of collaboration) but within each configuration of drivers, it shows that each configuration is only necessary but not sufficient for collaboration to be initiated.

Figure 2 Combinations of drivers necessary for the initiation of collaboration

Our analysis of sufficient drivers for the initiation of collaboration revealed three solutions:

conservative, parsimonious and intermediate. We chose to interpret the intermediate solution

(Table 7).

Table 7. Intermediate solution for the initiation of collaboration

Intermediate solution

Solution CI{1}*L{1} + U{1}*L{2} + U{2}*I{1}*L{1}<=> the initiation of collaboration

Consistency 1

Raw coverage 1

Cases covered 6

qlgUS, luRO, btcUS, tfUS, cbepUS, gsmpRO

X{Y} where X is a driver from the data set and Y is a set of scores of X; * AND, + OR, < => solution is both necessary and sufficient; qlgUS –

Quincy Library Group, US; luRO – Life Ursus, RO; btcUS, - Beartree Challenge, US; tfUS – Alewife Task Force, US; cbepUS – Casco Bay

Estuary Project, US; gsmpRO – Green Siret Management Plan, RO

The intermediate solution formula can be read as follows: The presence of both positive and

negative consequential incentives AND of leaders who help secure support for collaboration, but

not committed to collaborative solving problem, or impartial to the preferences of the other

parties (CI{1}*L{1}) OR the existence of information about the conflict but not about on how to

solve it (uncertainty) AND of leaders who help secure support for collaboration, are committed

to collaborative solving problem and impartial to the preferences of the other parties

(U{1}*L{2}) OR the absence of any information about the conflict and how to solve it

(uncertainty) AND parties’ interdependences at both state and local level AND the presence of leaders who help secure support for collaboration, are committed to collaborative solving problem and impartial to the preferences of the other parties (U{2}*I{1}*L{1}) are necessary and sufficient drivers to initiate collaboration.

This solution is both necessary and sufficient for collaboration to be initiated. It covers 2

Romanian cases studies (Table 8), while other two: the Forestry – Putna Vrancea Natural Park

and Highway – Surlari protected forest cases remain unexplained.

Table 8. Partially necessary and sufficient drivers for the initiation of collaboration

Partial solution Consistency Raw coverage Cases covered (as part of the intermediate solution) CI{1}*L{1} 1 0.333 luRO, gsmpRO

U{1}*L{2} 1 0.5 cbepUS, qlgUS, btcUS

U{2}*I{1}*L{1} 1 0.167 tfUS

X{Y} where X is a driver from the data set and Y is a set of scores of X; * and; qlgUS – Quincy Library Group, US; luRO – Life Ursus, RO;

btcUS, - Beartree Challenge, US; tfUS – Alewife Task Force, US; cbepUS – Casco Bay Estuary Project, US; gsmpRO – Green Siret Management

Plan, RO

3.2. Factors driving collaboration in Romania

The first part of the intermediate solution (CI{1}*L{1}, Table 8) explains why collaboration

is initiated in two case studies from Romania: the conflict salience and ripeness, the EU funds as

well as the leadership role assumed by the project team have created opportunities for

collaboration to be initiated.

In the Life Ursus Project case study the negative consequential incentives were related to the

urgent need to resolve the disagreements between stakeholders over the conservation of the

brown bear. The conservationists consider the brown bear to be a protected species, which is part

of the natural ecosystem. On the other hand, the hunters consider the bear to be a resource that

needs to be exploited. Lastly, the livestock farmers and ranchers consider the bear to be a

destructive nuisance. Thus, the hunters want to kill the brown bear for sport; the farmers want to

use the land without suffering losses or by investing in protection against the bears; and the

conservationists want that farmers to use non-invasive techniques to protect against the bears.

Furthermore, the financial opportunity to continue what other past EU projects (specifically

LIFE) began in terms of threats and conflicts involving brown bears was important to initiate the

collaborative efforts. Therefore, a team of experts from regional Environmental Protection

Agencies and NGOs took advantages of the EU funds and started an innovative project (Life

Ursus) focused on enhancing the brown bear conservation status. The team members (the

conservationists) pioneered the project. They helped mobilize resources by securing EU funds

and donating their energy and time. However, they were advocating for specific methods to

conserve the brown bears which made them not impartial to the preferences of the other parties

(i.e., the hunters, who had specific methods to evaluate the brown bear population, in a way that

the team members, the conservationists, do not accept).

In the Green Siret Management Plan case study, the Lower Siret Floodplain faces several

threats related to inadequate grazing, forestry and hunting practices, aggregate extracting or

chemical use in agriculture (LSM Administration 2015). As a result of including the Floodplain within the Natura 2000 network (the ecological network of European protected areas) a

management plan of the area was required. Furthermore, a funding opportunity has become

available (it is about the ‘Sectoral Operational Programme Environment, Axis 4: Implementation

of Adequate Management Systems for Nature Protection’, funded by EU funds in partnership

with the Romanian government). This has resulted in the emergence of a project, proposed by the Association for Biodiversity Conservation, a NGO, which aims to develop a management plan for the Lower Siret Floodplain and shift from resource exploitation to biodiversity conservation. The association took the leadership role and secured resources, including staff and funding, so that all of the affected organizations could discuss, in a collaborative setting, their views on the proposed measures to better manage the protected areas. The association prepared

meetings and public debates and organized awareness campaigns. However, the Association for

Biodiversity Conservation is a young organization and it is not recognized as a leader by the

older organizations that have lead for a long period the management of the natural resources in

accordance with their interests.

Two case studies from Romania (Surlari protected forest and Putna Vrancea Natural Park)

remained unexplained by the intermediate solution. These are examples of how the initiation of

collaboration failed to push parties to further interact and collaborate. For example, in the case of

the conflicts triggered by the transportation project planned to cross the Surlari protected forest,

although the parties were aware they needed to work together, and negotiated and signed an

environmental agreement, they failed to subsequently engage in cooperative activities as a result

of the state-road-building-company which ignored the negotiated agreement. Furthermore, the

impacts of the transportation project on the migratory and endangered birds in Surlari Forest

were not known. This forced the regional Environmental Protection Agency to ask for an

Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). Although an EIA requires collaboration, one of the

23 most important parties, the state-road-building-company, had no interest in collaborating because it was confident it would achieve its desired outcomes under any circumstance.

In the case of the conflicts triggered by the restrictions on harvest levels from Putna Vrancea

Natural Park the high uncertainty regarding how to achieve a compromise on restricting forest exploitation in a strict protection area encouraged the parties to meet and work together to solve the dispute. However, the parties' intransigence and their low commitment hindered the initiation of collaboration.

Although QCA is a quite a robust method as a result of researcher’s in-depth knowledge of the cases (de Meur et al. 2009), we tested the validity of the intermediate solution for the initiation of collaboration by changing the consistency threshold. In the original analysis, we used 0.8 as a consistency threshold for the inclusion of the truth table in the Boolean minimization. We ran the analysis with a higher threshold (0.9) as the next lowest consistency score is beyond the acceptable minimum value (0.75) (Ragin 2009; Thiem and Dusa 2013b). No difference emerged to the original intermediate solution.

4. Discussion

Romania’s political, socio-economic, and environmental context helps to understand what enabled and constrained the effect of the combination of drivers (consequential incentives and leadership) that emerged as necessary and sufficient to explain the initiation of collaboration.

The most important positive consequential incentive refers to long-term funding, specifically

EU funding. The impact of the EU-grants on natural resources management has become significant in Romania since its entrance into the EU. Both government and non-government organizations translate such financial opportunities into meaningful projects often on biodiversity

24 conservation (Rozylowicz et al. 2017) and sustainable issues (Batusaru et al. 2015). In Romania, collaboration tends to be initiated when financial incentives exist (Szabo et al. 2008), as seen in the cases of Life Ursus project and Green Siret Management Plan where EU long-term financial incentives have encouraged dedicated leaders to bring together all the stakeholders to start the projects. Other studies have also found that positive events can be catalysts of collaboration in natural resource management as long as someone is coordinating the process and the participants. For example, Cinque (2015) discovered that human-wolf conflicts have triggered government directives aimed at fostering collaborative management with the support of public managers. Therefore, we posit that long-term funding is an important driver of the initiation of collaboration when leaders use it to impel collaboration. This finding complements Emerson's et al. (2012) framework, where long-term funding is not a direct driver although it is connected to consequential incentives and leadership. Long-term funding is also underscored in several studies as important driver for initiating collaboration (Sabatier et al. 2005; Ansell and Gash

2007) although it has been found that financial incentives from EU and national resources spent on collaborative actions are likely to stimulate bottom-up collaboration (Eckerberg et al. 2015).

Furthermore, without external funding, the capacity of Romania's environmental institutions to carry out collaboration is limited due to understaffing and inexperienced staff in this matter

(Szabo et al. 2008) as well as distrust on the idea of working together for a common purpose

(Tudor et al. 2015). When external funding is available, it forces collaboration at least as a formal step than a win-win partnership, which undermines the stability of the negotiated agreements. However, opportunities to access EU funding are limited in Romania because these are poorly communicated to the potential beneficiaries (Mikulcak et al. 2013) and because of the difficulty in finding suitable partners (Rozylowicz et al. 2017).

The presence of leaders that help secure support for collaboration seems to be a INUS

condition that precedes the initiation of the collaborative efforts that were made both in the

previous cases and Romania. This confirms Emerson's et al. (2012) statement that out of the four

drivers leadership is the most essential in drawing parties into collaborative activities. The

evaluation of the Romanian case studies showed that leaders were not always committed or

impartial to the collaborative process. As we found in the previous cases, the role of a committed

and impartial leader is crucial to drawing parties into collaborative activities, discovering shared

goals, building trust and generating commitments to collaborative problem-solving (Susskind

1981; Grijze 2010). Romania, has not yet developed a tradition of impartiality. For the most part,

in Romania the idea of relying on an impartial leader to manage negotiations would not be well

received. Many parties would view acceptance of such an individual as a sign of “weakness”

(Floca 2011).

Two out of four Romanian case studies experienced a poor initiation of collaboration. In

Romania, few models of collaboration exist. The challenges might stem from a lack of bridging

social capital between different types of actors (both state and non-state actors) in conservation

matters (Nita et al. 2016), a lack of communication typical for the national planning culture

(Puscasu 2009) as well as the fact that collaborative sessions are often organized only to meet

formal requirements (Hossu et al. 2017). However, some good practices have been tried,

especially in the field of biodiversity conservation and protected areas management (Szabo et al.

2008; Hersperger et al. 2015; Nita et al. 2016). Furthermore, in Romania, collaboration is unfamiliar for many reasons, including the country’s transition from a central economy to a

capitalist one where decisions are still taken centrally and collaborative approaches are

minimized; bureaucratic hurdles (Tudor et al. 2013) and the lack of public institutions that

advocate for it (Stringer and Paavola 2013). In Romania opportunities for collaborations are not always made available. Tudor et al. (2014) found that the negotiation processes were dominated by the political power imbalances which have resulted in impeding local involvement in the process. Furthermore, in some cases locals decided not to participate because they are not interested in any change and they do not have any previous experience with participation. This may be the result of Romania’s communist past which still plays a role in present day through a dominant central role of state, low degree of decentralization and lack of awareness for multi- stakeholder engagement (Stringer and Paavola 2013).

In previous cases collaboration seems to be initiated by the lack of information to fully understand how to solve the conflicts (uncertainty) which encouraged dedicated parties to look for collaborators and secure resources to initiate collaboration. In the Romanian cases the high uncertainty does not encourage leaders to help parties deal with their contending views. For

example, in Green Siret Management Plan case study no previous environmental investigations

were done in the area. This led to high uncertainty about the best ways of managing common

resources for either conservation or development. However, not the high uncertainty but

interdependence determined parties to look for collaborators because they realized that the

project implementation could not begin without the support of all the team members and the

interested/affected institutions. Although previous research has found that the parties’

interdependence may overcome even the most intractable conflicts (Colvin et al. 2015), it seems

it works better under uncertainty and leadership in order to facilitate the initiation of

collaboration.

Using multi-value qualitative comparative analysis (mvQCA) in conjunction with the

framework for collaborative governance adapted from Emerson et al. (2012) has proven useful

27 because it reveals important causal effect of the categories assigned to each of the four drivers that may explain how collaboration is likely to be initiated. Emerson et al. (2012) found that one or more of four drivers: uncertainty, interdependence, consequential incentives and leadership are most likely to explain why collaborative activities are initiated. Additionally, our study revealed under which combination the four drivers are necessary and sufficient to initiate collaborative problem-solving efforts in natural resource management in a country. This information is useful to other post-communist countries when they want to explore the drivers that might lead to the initiation of collaboration.

In future research, it would be of interest to examine which elements in each of the three components of collaboration dynamics (principled engagement, shared motivation and joint action, Figure 1) are essential for the success of collaborative activities. This will reveal important information on what accounts for the success or failure of collaborative efforts.

Furthermore, relevant insights into the initiation of collaboration could be gained by systematically comparing and contrasting cases with successful initiation, cases with failed initiation and cases with lack of any attempt to initiate collaboration. This will reveal opportunities and constraints under which collaboration efforts unfold which is useful information for managers to improve collaborative processes in natural resources management in the future.

References: Ansell, C., and A. Gash. 2007. Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 18. Oxford University Press: 543–571. doi:10.1093/jopart/mum032. Batusaru, C., A. Otetea, and M. A. Ungureanu. 2015. 7 years of European funding in Romania - between success and failure. In . EURINT Proceedings. Baynes, J., J. Herbohn, C. Smith, R. Fisher, and S. Bray. 2015. Key factors which influence the success of community forestry in developing countries. Global Environmental Change 35: 226–238. Berkes, F. 2010. Devolution of environment and resources governance: trends and future. Environmental Conservation 37. The MIT Press: 489–500. doi:10.1017/S037689291000072X. Brown, R. R., A. Deletic, and T. H. F. Wong. 2015. How to catalyse collaboration. Nature 525. Bryan, T. A., and J. M. Wondolleck. 2002. When Irresolvable Becomes Resolvable: The Quincy Library Group Conflict. In Making Sense of Intractable Environmental Conflicts: Concepts and Cases, ed. R. J. Lewicki, B. Gray, and M. Elliott. Island Press. Carr, D. S., S. W. Selin, and M. A. Schuett. 1998. Managing Public Forests: Understanding the Role of Collaborative Planning. Environ Manage 22: 767–776. CBEP. 1996. Casco Bay Plan. Cinque, S. 2015. Collaborative management in wolf licensed hunting: the dilemmas of public managers in moving collaboration forward. Wildlife Biology 21: 157–164. doi:10.2981/wlb.00098. Colvin, R. M., G. B. Witt, and J. Lacey. 2015. The social identity approach to understanding socio- political conflict in environmental and natural resources management. Global Environmental Change 34: 237–246. doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2015.07.011. Conley, A., and M. A. Moore. 2003. Evaluating Collaborative Natural Resource Management. Society and Natural Resources 16: 371–386. Davenport, M. A., J. E. Leahy, D. H. Anderson, and P. J. Jakes. 2007. Building Trust in Natural Resource Management Within Local Communities: A Case Study of the Midewin National Tallgrass Prairie. Environmental Management 39: 353–368. doi:10.1007/s00267-006-0016-1. Davies, A. L., and R. M. White. 2012. Collaboration in natural resource governance: Reconciling stakeholder expectations in deer management in Scotland. Journal of Environmental Management 112: 160–169. doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2012.07.032. Ebbinghaus, B. 2006. When less is more: selection problems in large-N and small-N cross-national comparisons. In Soziale Ungleichheit, kulturelle Unterschiede: Verhandlungen des 32. Kongresses der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Soziologie in München. Teilbd. 1 und 2, ed. K.-S. Rehberg, 4013– 4021. Campus Verl. Eckerberg, K., T. Bjärstig, and A. Zachrisson. 2015. Incentives for Collaborative Governance: Top-Down and Bottom-Up Initiatives in the Swedish Mountain Region. Mountain Research and Development 35: 289–298. Emerson, K., and T. Nabatchi. 2015. Collaborative Governance Regimes. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Emerson, K., T. Nabatchi, and S. Balogh. 2012. An Integrative Framework for Collaborative Governance. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 22. Duxbury Press, Belmont, CA: 1–29. doi:10.1093/jopart/mur011. EPA. 2007. Environmental Impact Assessment Report. Ilfov. Floca, I. 2011. Practical aspects of mediation. In Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Forest Service. 1993. Sharing Ideas of the Path Taken. Accomplishments of the 1990 RPA Program. U.S. Gerber, J. F. 2011. Conflicts over industrial tree plantations in the South: Who, how and why? Global Environmental Change 21: 165–176. Green, D. G. 2006. Complexity in Landscape Ecology. Springer. Grijze, J. 2010. Outsourcing planning. What do consultants do in regional spatial planning in the Netherland. Amsterdam University Press.

Haesebrouck, T. 2016. The Added Value of Multi-Value Qualitative Comparative Analysis. Forum: Qualitative Social Research 17. Heikkila, T., and A. K. Gerl. 2005. The Formation of Large-scale Collaborative Resource Management Institutions: Clarifying the Roles of Stakeholders, Science, and Institutions. The Policy Studies Journal 33: 583–612. Hersperger, A. M., I. C. Ioja, F. Steiner, and C. A. Tudor. 2015. Comprehensive consideration of conflicts in the land-use planning process: a conceptual contribution. Carpathian Journal of Earth and Environmental Sciences 10: 5–13. Hill, R., J. Davies, I. C. Bohnet, C. J. Robinson, K. Maclean, and P. L. Pert. 2015. Collaboration mobilises institutions withscale-dependent comparative advantage inlandscape-scale biodiversity conservation. Environmental Science & Policy 51: 267–277. Holling, C. S. 2001. Understanding the Complexity of Economic, Ecological, and Social Systems. Ecosystems 4. Springer-Verlag: 390–405. doi:10.1007/s10021-001-0101-5. Hossu, C. A., I. C. Ioja, M. R. Nita, T. Hartel, D. L. Badiu, and A. M. Hersperger. 2017. Need for a cross- sector approach in protected area management. Land Use Policy 69: 586–597. doi:10.1016/j.landusepol.2017.10.012. Ide, T. 2015. Why do conflicts over scarce renewable resources turn violent? A qualitative comparative analysis. Global Environmental Change 33: 61–70. Imperial, M. T. 2005. Using Collaboration as a governance strategy: Lessons From Six Watershed Management Programs. Administration & Society 37: 281–320. Innes, J. E., and D. E. Booher. 1999. Consensus building and complex adaptive systems: A framework for evaluating collaborative planning. Journal of the American Planning Association 65: 412–423. Innes, J. E., and D. E. Booher. 2004. Reframing public participation: strategies for the 21st century. Planning Theory & Practice 5. Routledge: 419–436. Innes, J. E., and D. E. Booher. 2010. Planning with Complexity: An Introduction to Collaborative Rationality for Public Policy. New York, NY: Routledge. Johnston, E. W., D. Hicks, N. Nan, and J. C. Auer. 2011. Managing the inclusion process in collaborative governance. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 21: 699–721. Kemmis, D. 2001. This Sovereign Land. A New Vision for Governing the West. Washington, Covelo, London: Island Press. Koontz, T. M., and J. Newig. 2014. From Planning to Implementation: Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches for Collaborative Watershed Management. Policy Studies Journal 42: 416–442. doi:10.1111/psj.12067. Life Ursus Project. 2010. Project reports. Life Ursus Project. 2011. Strategy for organizing the meetings. LSM Administration. 2015. The Management plan of Lower Siret Floodplain and the overlapping natural protected areas. Messier, C., K. Puettmann, E. Filotas, and D. Coates. 2016. Dealing with Non-linearity and Uncertainty in Forest Management. Current Forestry Reports 2. Springer International Publishing: 150–161. doi:10.1007/s40725-016-0036-x. de Meur, G., B. Rihoux, and & S. Yamasaki. 2009. Addressing the Critiques of QCA. In Configurational Comparative Methods: Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related Techniques , ed. B. Rihoux and C. Ragin. Thousand Oaks: Sage. Mikulcak, F., J. Newig, A. I. Milcu, T. Hartel, and J. Fischer. 2013. Integrating rural development and biodiversity conservation in Central Romania. Environmental Conservation 40. Cambridge University Press: 129–137. doi:10.1017/S0376892912000392. Mostert, E., M. Craps, and C. Pahl-Wost. 2008. Social learning: the key to integrated water resources management? Water International 33: 293–304. Nita, A., L. Rozylowicz, S. Manolache, C. M. Ciocănea, I. V. Miu, and V. D. Popescu. 2016. Collaboration Networks in Applied Conservation Projects across Europe. PLOS ONE 11: e0164503. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0164503.

Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action. New York: Cambridge University Press. Puscasu, V. 2009. The house of many different ages. In Planning Cultures in Europe. Decoding Cultural Phenomena in Urbanand Regional Planning, ed. J. Knieling and F. Othengrafen. England: Ashgate Publishing Limited. Putna Vrancea Natural Park. 2010. Meeting notes. R Development Core Team. 2008. R: A language and environment for statistical computing. Vienna, Austria: R Foundation for Statistical Computing. Ragin, C. C. 1987. The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies. Berkeley: University of California Press. Ragin, C. C. 2009. Qualitative comparative analysis using fuzzy sets (fsQCA). In Configurational Comparative Methods: Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related Techniques, ed. B. Rihoux and C. C. Ragin, 87–122. Thousand Oaks: Sage. Ragin, C. C., and J. Sonnett. 2005. Between Complexity and Parsimony: Limited Diversity, Counterfactual Cases, and Comparative Analysis. In Vergleichen in der Politikwissenschaft, 180– 197. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. doi:10.1007/978-3-322-80441-9_9. Rihoux, B., and C. C. Ragin. 2009. Configurational Comparative Methods: Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related Techniques. Thousand Oaks: Sage. Rozylowicz, L., A. Nita, S. Manolache, C. M. Ciocanea, and V. D. Popescu. 2017. Recipe for success: A network perspective of partnership in nature conservation. Journal for Nature Conservation 38: 21– 29. doi:10.1016/j.jnc.2017.05.005. Ryan, M., and G. Smith. 2011. Towards a Comparative Analysis of Democratic Innovations: Lessons from a pilot fs-QCA of Participatory Budgeting. ECPR General Conference. Sabatier, P. A., Focht, M. Lubell, Z. Trachtenberg, A. Vedlitz, and M. Matlock. 2005. Swimming Upstream. Collaborative Approaches to Watershed Management. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Schneider, C., and C. Wagemann. 2010. Standards of Good Practice in Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Fuzzy-Sets. Comparative Sociology 9: 1–22. Scott, T. 2015. Does Collaboration Make Any Difference? Linking Collaborative Governance to Environmental Outcomes. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 34: 537–566. doi:10.1002/pam.21836. Stringer, L., and J. Paavola. 2013. Participation in environmental conservation and protected area management in Romania: A review of three case studies. Environmental Conservation 40: 138–146. doi:10.1017/S0376892913000039. Stringer, L. C., S. S. Scrieciu, and M. S. Reed. 2009. Biodiversity, land degradation, and climate change: Participatory planning in Romania. Applied Geography 29: 77–90. doi:10.1016/J.APGEOG.2008.07.008. Susskind, L. 1981. Citizen Participation and Consensus Building in Land Use Planning. A Case Study. In The Land Use Policy Debate in the United States, ed. J. I. de Neufville. New York: Plenum Press. Susskind, L., and J. L. Cruikshank. 1987. Breaking the impasse : consensual approaches to resolving public disputes. Basic Books. Susskind, L., D. Rumore, C. Hulet, and P. Field. 2015. Managing Climate Risks in Coastal Communities: Strategies for Engagement, Readiness and Adaptation. Anthem Press. Szabo, E. A., A. Lawrence, C. Iusan, and S. Canney. 2008. Participatory protected area management - A case study from Rodna Mountains National Park, Romania. International Journal of Biodiversity Science, Ecosystems Services & Management 4: 187–199. doi:10.3843/Biodiv.4.4:2. Terhune, P., and G. Terhune. 1998. Quincy Library Group Case Study. Thiem, A., and A. Dusa. 2013a. QCA: A Package for Qualitative Comparative Analysis. The R Journal 5/1. Thiem, A., and A. Dusa. 2013b. Qualitative Comparative Analysis with R: A User’s Guide. Springer. Tudor, C. A., I. C. Iojă, I. Pǎtru-Stupariu, M. R. Nită, and A. M. Hersperger. 2014. How successful is the resolution of land-use conflicts? A comparison of cases from Switzerland and Romania. Applied

Geography 47: 125–136. doi:10.1016/j.apgeog.2013.12.008. Tudor, C. A., I. C. Iojă, L. Rozylowicz, I. Pǎtru-Stupariu, and A. M. Hersperger. 2015. Similarities and differences in the assessment of land-use associations by local people and experts. Land Use Policy 49: 341–351. doi:10.1016/j.landusepol.2015.07.001. Ulibarri, N. 2015. Tracing Process to Performance of Collaborative Governance: A Comparative Case Study of Federal Hydropower Licensing. Policy Studies Journal 43: 283–308. doi:10.1111/psj.12096. Wondolleck, J. M., and S. L. Yaffee. 2000. Making collaboration work : lessons from innovation in natural resource management. Island Press. Wondolleck, J. M., and S. L. Yaffee. 2003. Collaborative ecosystem planning processes in the United States: evolution and challenges. Environments 31: 59–72. Yin, R. K. 2003. Applications of case study research. Second. Vol. 34. Sage Publications. Zachrisson, A., and K. B. Lindahl. 2013. Conflict resolution through collaboration: Preconditions and limitations in forest and nature conservation controversies. Forest Policy and Economics 33: 39–46. Zurba, M., and M. Trimble. 2014. Youth as the inheritors of collaboration: Crises and factors that influence participation of the next generation in natural resource management. Environmental Science & Policy 42: 78–87.

APPENDIX 1

Table A1 Logical reminders, in the truth table for the analysis of drivers sufficient to initiate collaboration, used to produce the intermediate solution Uncertainty Interdependence Consequential Leadership Outcome Number Sufficiency Cases (U) (I) incentives (CI) (L) of cases inclusion score 3 0 0 0 2 ? 0 -

5 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 luRO

6 0 0 1 2 ? 0 -

7 0 1 0 0 ? 0 -

8 0 1 0 1 ? 0 -

9 0 1 0 2 ? 0 -

10 0 1 1 0 ? 0 -

11 0 1 1 1 ? 0 -

12 0 1 1 2 ? 0 -

15 1 0 0 2 ? 0 -

17 1 0 1 1 ? 0 -

18 1 0 1 2 1 1 1 cbep US 19 1 1 0 0 ? 0 -

20 1 1 0 1 ? 0 -

21 1 1 0 2 1 1 1 qlgU S 22 1 1 1 0 ? 0 -

23 1 1 1 1 ? 0 -

24 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 btcUS

26 2 0 0 1 0 1 0 pnpv RO 27 2 0 0 2 ? 0 -

28 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 hsRO

29 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 gsmp RO 30 2 0 1 2 ? 0 -

31 2 1 0 0 ? 0 -

32 2 1 0 1 1 1 1 tfUS

33 2 1 0 2 ? 0 -

34 2 1 1 0 ? 0 -

35 2 1 1 1 ? 0 -

36 2 1 1 2 ? 0 -

qlgUS – Quincy Library Group, US; btcUS, - Beartree Challenge, US; tfUS – Alewife Task Force, US; cbepUS – Casco Bay Estuary Project, US; luRO – Life Ursus, RO; gsmpRO – Green Siret Management Plan, RO; pnpvRO – Forestry – Putna Vrancea Natural Park, RO; hsRO – Highway – Surlari Protected Forest, RO

Table A1.1 Rules for deriving calibration scores for the elements of collaborative dynamics

Collaborative dynamics Elements High quality and effectiveness Discovery When activities aimed at revealing the individual and shared interests, concerns and values of participants and engaging in Principled Engagement creates joint-fact-finding and analytic investigation are organized. the space for shared interactions. Definition When parties define concepts and common goals, clarify tasks These, in turn, can help identify and expectations, and develop evaluation criteria. needed information, build shared Deliberation When parties have a fair and civil dialogue, are open during understanding of the issue, and communication, thoughtfully listen and examine perspectives; create space for deliberations and manage disagreements. leading to decisions. Determinations When agreements are reached and parties consider them as fair, equitable, durable and efficient. Mutual trust and mutual When there is strong evidence of trust-building between Shared Motivation contains trust- understanding participants. building activities as well as Legitimacy When the participants deem the collaboration process and its legitimacy and commitment to the parties to be useful, worthy and credible. process which can increase the Commitment When the participants are committed to collaboration and its potential for future positive collective purpose, are motivated to achieve outcomes interactions and lower conflict together and feel responsible and accountable for the around natural resources. outcomes. Joint Action reflects parties’ Procedural and institutional When procedural and institutional arrangements exist and are common efforts over time. arrangements of good quality. Together, they establish rules, Leadership When leadership roles are filled (i.e., expert, sponsor, institutional arrangements, engage facilitator/mediator), well-defined during moments of in knowledge building activities deliberation or conflict and the leaders champion the and make efforts to provide collaborative implementation. resources. However, when parties Knowledge When the information was presented in different interactive have contending views, somebody ways, was of good quality and was understood by the has to help, which in some cases is participants. a professional neutral who is Resources When resources were well accommodated and from diverse central to collaborative decision- sources. making.

APPENDIX 2

Case 1: The Beartree Challenge Project, Montana, U.S.

SHORT DESCRIPTION OF THE CASE

The conflicts were triggered by opposition to the idea of increasing the number of grizzly bears (a federally protected species) in the Rocky Mountains. The arguments of the opposition are both motivated by economics (the presence and protection of the bears will reduce logging in the region, which is the main economic activity in the region) and safety (the bears may harm people) (Kemmis 2001). To (1) improve the ecological habitat of the grizzly bears (because their natural food does not exist anymore) without affecting logging in the region and to (2) resolve the conflicts between farmers (who have become frustrated with the fact that the bears have started to search for food on their land) and pro-wildlife groups, a project (The Beartree Challenge) was developed by Seth Diamond, a member of the Forest Service, a U.S. agency that aims to improve forest ecosystems. This project (between the Forest Service and Montana’s timber industry) is innovative as it utilizes new technology to harvest timber in a way that helps the grizzly bears.

Calibration scores

Conditions for the initiation of collaboration: uncertainty, interdependence, consequential incentives, leadership

Uncertainty 1 Uncertainty was calibrated as 1 because the Forest Service was familiar and already dealing with the conflicts around the grizzlies in the region but a solution on how to collaboratively solve the situation was lacking. Uncertainty about how to enhance the grizzlies’ habitat while keeping the logging industry alive and how to reduce the human-grizzly conflicts in a collaborative way has created the Beartree Challenge project.

Interdependence 1 Interdependence was calibrated as 1 because Seth Diamond was aware that he cannot improve the ecological and social dimension of grizzly bear management alone, so he looked for organizations that had the technical capability as well as the direct incentive to help out. Planting and other forestry practices were required to improve the grizzlies’ ecological habitat, thus Seth Diamond solicited volunteer assistance from loggers, timber companies and timber equipment dealers. The Forest Service staff collaborated with state and federal agencies, drawing on their scientific expertise in designing and implementing the project.

Consequential incentives 1 Consequential incentives were calibrated as 1 because they were related first to the presence of the grizzly bears within the ranching communities which was a big problem for both economic and personal safety reasons and second to a financial opportunity used by Seth Diamond to start the Beartree Challenge. Seth Diamond used the Forest Service’s New Perspectives Program, a federal program designed to help the agency substantively by testing out new ideas and politically by demonstrating responsiveness to pressures for change.

Leadership 2 Leadership was calibrated as 2 because Seth Diamond, an anthropologist and a wildlife biologist, who worked for the Forest Service had an entrepreneurial spirit and decided to try to solve, collaboratively, the conflict around grizzly bears: “The grizzly bear has the ability to stimulate great interest. Let’s transform it into something positive – to grizzly bears, ranchers, environmentalists, and the general public. Let’s do something positive and use it to bring people together”. Seth Diamond wanted to bring the timber companies, the environmentalists, and the public together in order to enhance the grizzly habitat while keeping the logging industry alive as well as to reduce the human-grizzly conflicts. He had pioneered the Beartree Challenge project that made the grizzly the focus of collaboration, not conflict.

The initiation of collaboration 2

Principled engagement (discovery, definition, deliberation and determination)

Discovery

The Beartree Challenge organized opportunities for participants to understand the ecosystem conditions, specifically to examine the landscape effects of the “light” timber management equipment. A representative from the equipment company said that environmentalists were ecstatic after visiting the project site and observing that management could be carried out in a manner that was relatively “light on the land” and therefore not incompatible with grizzly bear management. Moreover, 40-50 presentations were made in Montana and in Washington, D.C., to educate a wide array of people, from congressional members to schoolchildren about the high- tech timber harvesting equipment. The Forest Service held on-the-ground tours of the project’s habitat improvement projects. This served to build shared experiences.

Definition In order to accomplish the objective of improving the ecological habitat of the grizzly bear, the foresters and biologists together defined harvest strategies. The problem to be solved was also defined at the beginning of the collaborative process (e.g. “How we can get rid of grizzly bears

that prey on livestock?” or “How can we protect livestock and enhance grizzly habitat while reducing conflicts among ranchers and wildlife interests”). The on-the-ground tours organized by the Forest Service aimed at clarifying that the grizzly habitat could be improved while keeping the logging industry alive, because many skeptics were convinced that this is not possible.

Deliberation Within the Forest Service hard discussions were raised that the project is crazy, and it would not work. Moreover, the wilderness groups were skeptical about any logging on the district. When faced with this opposition, Seth Diamond put together an all-out effort that used all types of media – television, magazines, newspapers and video to achieve a common ground. Determinations The most important decision that was made, specifically the government proposal: the Beartree Challenge was successful in improving the bear’s social habitat and getting people to work together (“We didn’t just put a boring government proposal together. We made something that would catch people’s eyes”, said Seth Diamond). However, the improvement of grizzlies’ ecological habitat is delayed by the long time necessary for the whitebark pines (bears’ natural food) to produce pinenuts for the bear to eat.

Shared motivation: mutual trust, mutual understanding, legitimacy, commitment

Mutual trust and mutual understanding At the beginning of the process there was distrust from the Forest Service, distrust of the Forest Service-timber company alliance, as well as distrust of the use of media. However, Seth Diamond “helped people with polarized viewpoints find common ground.” Trust was built when Seth Diamond, worked together with the public and hired a graphic artist to create the project logo, which was very important to the project’s identity. An image was created with which partners identify: “Now all the cooperators have logos on their caps and their equipment and such. It institutionalizes us”. Trust was also built when Seth Diamond organized tours for the public “…to show them what the equipment does, to work with environmental groups which are so down on management and logging and such”. Legitimacy The skepticism of environmental groups about any logging in the district and the lack of support from the organization may raise questions about the legitimacy of the entire effort to improve the ecological and social habitat of grizzly bears. However, there were some organizations who offered equipment and volunteer for the collaborative efforts which brought the project’s success.

Commitment Commitment is visible, especially among people. According to Diamond, one of the primary reasons for Beartree’s success was simply that people were willing to try something new.

Moreover, Seth Diamond has gone well beyond the call of duty and persisted in spite of considerable personal risk.

Joint-action (procedural and institutional arrangements, leadership, knowledge and resources)

Procedural and institutional arrangements The Beartree Challenge group worked around a rule that prohibits cooperators in a project from making any economic gain from it. The agency established an administrative sale so that it could sell the logs harvested as a part of local shortage of posts for fencing. Providing the logs at a reasonable cost was an invaluable relationship builder. The Forest Service had institutional arrangements with the timber company.

Leadership Seth Diamond, a dedicated, energetic individual, who worked at being proactive and entrepreneurial has established relationships, secured resources and institutional support, marketed the efforts and pushed the for effective implementation of the Beartree Challenge. A Forest Service staff member said about Seth Diamond: “Seth was the one that made it happen. He didn’t let anything get in his way”.

Knowledge To share the vision of the Beartree Challenge project, an education component was built into program. This targeted all public sectors. Each year the public was invited to tour and observe the implemented projects. The tours were focused on the project’s habitat improvement projects. The high-tech timber harvesting equipment, which featured robotics and had never before been used in the U.S., was especially popular, drawing visitors from all over the country. The project also featured “community links” with Boy and Girl Scout troops, elementary and high schools, and universities, as well as ties with environmental education programs. 40-50 presentations were made in Montana and in Washington, D.C., to educate a wide array of people. Such outreach activities have created two-way flows of information, in which citizens learn about the plans of an agency or group, while the agency or group simultaneously learns about the interests and aspiration of the community. Moreover, Seth Diamond insisted to show people what they are doing. Project’s marketing also provided critical feedback. “The more ideas you get, the better you can refine your project”. One example of this, according to Diamond, was that the Forest Service had not even considered using high-tech robotics equipment when they first started the project, but it quickly become one of the most popular aspects of the project.

Resources Many cooperators donated their time, energy and equipment. Diamond explained: “We worked hard to build strong relationships with cooperators. Without cooperators, we could not have done the project”. Moreover, the financial resources necessary to accomplish the Beartree Challenge project were provided by the Forest Service’s New Perspectives Program.

Case 2: Northern California's Quincy Library Group (QLG)

SHORT DESCRIPTION OF THE CASE

The conflicts were triggered by the sharp decline in timber harvest in a few counties in Northern California. This decline was primarily due to a shift in the priorities of the Forest Service, which proposed a forest plan that favored non-timber values, such as recreation and conservation. This plan also set an annual target of timber to be harvested, primarily through clear-cutting, which was incompatible with the interests of loggers and environmentalists. Both timber companies and environmentalists have proposed alternatives to the Forest Service plan: the timber industry requested for an increase in harvest levels, whereas environmentalists requested for lower harvest levels, selective logging practices and protection of natural sensitive areas. The Forest Service selected its own plan, but also recognized the environmentalists’ plan as the “environmentally preferred alternative,” saying that it provided for better “community stability” than other options, including its own. However, the Forest Service did not select the environmentalists’ plan because the selective logging practices were less efficient than clear- cutting, which is the Forest Service’s preferred method of harvesting timber. A group of three actors concerned with the effects on the local economy of a sharp decline in timber harvest established a partnership named Quincy Library Group. This partnership aims to resurrect the environmentalists’ forest plan but in a way that could support old-growth (selective tree cutting) and the protection of spotted owl habitat, while nearly restoring traditional harvest levels. Therefore, the Quincy Library Group developed a five-year conceptual plan and has aimed for it to be implemented.

Calibration scores

Conditions for the initiation of collaboration: uncertainty, interdependence, consequential incentives, leadership

Uncertainty 1 Uncertainty was calibrated as 1 because the conflict was already known since 1986 when the environmentalists proposed a plan to reverse the sharp decline in timber harvest. Coates, Nelson and Jackson (the three actors who started the partnership) wanted to resurrect this plan in a way that is advantageous for both loggers and environmentalists, namely restoring traditional harvest levels, supporting old-growth (selective tree cutting) and protecting spotted owl habitat protection. Uncertainty on how to get the Forest Service to implement a new plan was present.

Interdependence 1 Interdependence was calibrated as 1, because Coates, Nelson and Jackson were aware that they need support from diverse stakeholders to work on the environmentalists’ plan from 1986. Therefore, they assembled a group of representatives from local timber and business interests,

environmental activists, county supervisors and local citizens and start to meet frequently at the Quincy Library.

Consequential incentives 0 Negative consequential incentives were present and were related to shared problems and fears. The Forest Service’s plan which favored clear-cutting as a harvest method triggered both environmentalists (because of the environmental and visual impacts) and loggers (fewer jobs) angry. Therefore, they decided to draw on their common interests, fears and perceptions to craft a joint vision statement in a process that encouraged communication and the development of trust, namely the Quincy Library Group. The threat faced by the community has been a declining economy coupled with a degraded environment, which resulted in threats to the community’s way of life: sawmills had closed; private timberlands were cut over, timber supplies were reduced and jobs losses led to increased anxieties and hostilities in communities. As a consequence of the acts of vandalism and threats to community members, environmentalists, Michael Jackson, the attorney, said in an editorial “We know what is wrong with present Forest Service’s activities and we know how to fix it. We know how to do that while preserving all of the local timber industry jobs and potentially increasing them…”. Both Jackson’s editorial and the county’s resolution condemning acts of violence (which calls upon members of the community to cooperate and continue positive discussions on the future of the forest and the stability of the rural quality of life) pointed the way toward a collaborative solution. Therefore, the Quincy Library Group (QLG) was viewed as one potential way out of a bad situation. An internal incentive, refers to Michael Jackson’s reason to initiate the collaboration: “I need my neighbors. My heart doesn’t bleed for Sierra Pacific Industries, but bleeds for folks getting 12$ an hour who don’t have alternatives for work.”

Leadership 2 Leadership was calibrated as 2. Three different actors (Bill Coates, a Republican who had historically supported the timber industry; Tom Nelson, a timber industry forester; and Michael Jackson, an environmental attorney) concerned about the effects on the local economy of sharp declined in timber sales in the three national forests (Plumas, Lassen and Tahoe) assembled a group of actors (environmentalists, the timber industry, loggers, ranchers, and residents of the town of Quincy) who agreed to meet on a neutral ground the Quincy Public Library to develop “a plan that would promote the objectives of forest health, ecological integrity, adequate timber supply and local economic stability”. The timber industry forester, Tom Nelson, initiated the idea of a collaborative group.

The initiation of collaboration 1

Principled engagement (discovery, definition, deliberation and determination)

Discovery

Discovery The information from the environmentalists’ plan from 1986 was used by Coates, Nelson and Jackson during the meetings to build a shared meaning among the participants. The QLG sponsored field trips for those who had reservations about the group to tour neighboring forests, which served as a model for the group’s plan.

Definition The environmentalists’ plan contained concepts which went into Coates, Nelson and Jackson’s attention. Therefore, they organized group discussions with other members in community to help develop the concepts and a plan which seeks a middle ground between the wise use and conservation of natural resources. Under the plan, local timber mills would process all harvested logs. Michael Jackson empathized with loggers’ frustration with Forest Service policies and suggested that they had more in common than they realized: “We know that for a complete solution to our common goals we need the wisdom of the people who have worked in the woods for the four generations that we have been logging Plumas County”.

Deliberation As might be expected of truce negotiations in a wartime atmosphere, early meetings had some very tense moments, and some participants were extremely uncomfortable. A variety of circumstances and decisions no doubt contributed to QLG's success in progressing from a gathering of uncomfortable individuals and contentious factions to the easy-going and cohesive group it has become. The stakeholding groups used negative characterization frames to discredit or discount adversaries by portraying them in a negative light. Loggers characterized environmentalists as a “vocal minority” and “wandering minstrels”, thus challenging their claims to legitimacy. Local environmentalists were also portrayed as extreme “preservationists” and “radicals” who were “against progress” even though they had proposed a forest plan that targeted significantly more timber than had been harvested in recent years. The message being conveyed was that environmentalists were unconcerned with community economic stability or the well-being of their neighbors and cared infinitely more about owls than about people. Local environmentalists saved their attacks for the Forest Service and timber industry, which environmentalists believed were in cahoots to maximize efficiency at the expense of local communities and the environment. In contrast, local environmentalists often characterized the local logging community in positive terms (as their neighbors), even though they were vilified in return. Positive characterization at the local level may have kept the timber wars from erupting into violence.

There were disagreements about land base and target volumes, roadless areas and riparian zones. Finally, the group agreed to disagree on certain points and move forward with the items upon which they could agree.

Determinations The participants of the Quincy Library Group were able to agree to a “Community Stability Proposal”, a plan “that would promote the objectives of forest health, ecological integrity, adequate timber supply, and local economic stability.” This plan was signed into law in 1998 as “The Herger-Feinstein Quincy Library Group Forest Recovery Act”. The equity of such proposal is questioned because the national interest groups were excluded when it was prepared. Moreover, the Forest Service avoided the adoption of the plan. The Quincy Library Group managed to get through the Congress the implementation of the plan as a funded pilot project, but its full implementation is still pending.

Shared motivation: mutual trust, mutual understanding, legitimacy, commitment

Mutual trust and mutual understanding The group started meeting at the local library, where a larger group could be accommodated. This has demonstrated openness, and, some say, has kept the members of the group from raising their voices. The conversations, both formal and informal, that have occurred as a result of the efforts of the Quincy Library Group have been very positive and trust among participants grew as they were able to draft together a five-year conceptual plan. Mistrust also existed, for example from a forest supervisor that dismissed QLG’s efforts in an internal memo, commenting “This group does not have all the answers, and they don’t have the expertise they claim”. The Forest Service officials applauded the community for moving beyond gridlock, even though they were skeptical of their ability to work together and doubted about the group’s plan implementation. Mutual understanding was built within the meetings at the Quincy Library: “They have made us realize how dysfunctional a community we were before, always fighting each other, instead of trying to move forward on common goals. The social experiment of working together as neighbors is perhaps as important or may be more important than the forestry experiment we are now proposing”.

Legitimacy The Quincy Library Group waited years for the Forest Service to act. With growing frustration, QLG began to see Congress and federal legislation as its only hope for action. Lobbying the Congress has raised serious questions about the legitimacy of the broader effort. In spite of their efforts, The Quincy Library Group members and supporters in Congress could not, with minor exceptions, get the Forest Service to implement its plan. A year passed, then two, with little action other than verbal support from the agency: “They say that they’re all for this

plan, but we’re still waiting for them to do something-anything” said M. Jackson. This also has decreases the legitimacy of the effort. The atmosphere within the group was hostile to anyone who challenges the proposal. “We started out as a consensus process” says Jackson, “but…[we’re not anymore] - now we’re a consensus-acquiescence process…we intimidate the hell out of each other”. It is precisely that climate that leads to questioning the viability of the QLG proposal.

Commitment Commitment to the collaborative efforts is visible. The Quincy Library Group members began meeting on a regular basis. The QLG meetings were open to anybody and have included up to 350 attendees at once. The QLG members held dozen of meetings and hearings at the public library, spending “a year and a half and hundreds of hour debating on ways to protect fragile ecosystems, improve forest health and provide economic stability for their community.” The local Forest Service officials were not committed to the process that is why the QLG members went to Washington, D.C. to lobby the Congress.

Joint-action (procedural and institutional arrangements, leadership, knowledge and resources)

Procedural and institutional arrangements The meetings of the Quincy Library Group had an agenda, which invariably run behind schedule. Parliamentary rules were not strictly adhered to, and votes were informal. The members seemed comfortable with the format. However, the failure to comply with existing environmental laws and procedures was the most problematic aspect of the QLG proposal.

Leadership Tired of years of litigation and watching the area's once healthy forests become overgrown and diseased, then Supervisor Bill Coates, approached environmental attorney Michael Jackson and said, "Let's talk." The three persons Coates, Nelson, and Jackson who assembled the Quincy Library Group, supported the collaborative efforts to get the implementation of a plan which aims at improving the management of three national forests.

Knowledge Quincy Library Group members spent "a year and a half and hundreds of hours debating on ways to protect fragile ecosystems, improve forest health and provide economic stability for their community."

Resources The Quincy Library Group has very little capital to work when they began negotiations. The participants contributed with resources, especially time and energy. Quincy Library Group also gained early attention and support from California political leaders, which means support for the plan and to secure funding for the plan’s implementation. The biggest resource challenge has

44 been the lack of funding from the Forest Service to implement the proposed plan which determined the Quincy Library Group to lobby the Congress.

Case 3: Alewife Task Force, US, Massachusetts

SHORT DESCRIPTION OF THE CASE

The conflicts were triggered by the state’s proposal of a massive transportation project, the extension of a subway, to reduce the number of cars coming into Massachusetts’s Capital City, Boston, U.S. The transportation facility, including a subway station and a huge parking garage, were planned to be built in the heart of an environmentally sensitive wetland (Alewife wetland), which is an important habitat for migratory birds and other types of wildlife. This proposed project was highly opposed by environmentalists, who advocated for a “no-build” approach and for the protection of the wetlands. To resolve the conflicts, a Citizen Advisory Committee was appointed by the state to learn what would be most affected by the proposed transportation project. Furthermore, the group expanded its advisory role and became the Alewife Task Force. A local university professor and mediator chaired all of the negotiation meetings between the members of the Task Force to help plan the transportation project in the Boston area. The facilitator created a climate in which joint problem solving was possible due to his efforts in managing the meetings to ensure effective communication and in assisting the participants in managing their time. Therefore, a proposal was advanced after the collaboration efforts that permitted every party involve to partially benefit. This case illustrates a consensus-building approach.

Calibration scores

Conditions for the initiation of collaboration: uncertainty, interdependence, consequential incentives, leadership

Uncertainty 2 Uncertainty was calibrated as 2 because the state did not know the impacts of the transportation project nor the beliefs of the most affected actors by the proposed transportation project. Such uncertainty led to an environmental impact assessment where the assembling of an advisory group (Alewife Task Force) became imperative. Some officials thought that assembling an advisory committee will offer the opportunity to learn the deeply held beliefs of those most affected and predict unintentional side effects of proposed changes.

Interdependence 1 Interdependence was calibrated as 1 because, the state could not move forward on the transportation project without an environmental impact assessment which prepared the ground for the formal meeting between the pro- and against- development actors. The state needed a negotiated agreement with the environmentalists who wanted as little change in the use of land as possible, and the residents of the neighboring town who protested the impacts of the subway

extension. Therefore, the Alewife Task Force was assembled so that everyone has an opportunity to be heard and to achieve a negotiated agreement.

Consequential incentives 0 Consequential incentives were calibrated as 0 because of the issue salience and ripeness given the fact that the area suffered several planning mistakes along the time and because of the project’s harmful effects: “Don’t they know”, “that Alewife is a floodplain, and a key piece of the larger watershed?” “Any more construction in the area will simply push flood waters into residential areas of Alford”. Moreover, people were brought together because the letter of the law must be met. An environmental impact statement, required under both federal and state law before the transportation project could begin, prepared the ground for the formal meeting between the pro- and against- development actors.

Leadership 1 The state, the proponent of the development, together with the local agencies, established a citizen advisory group to help planning the transportation project. After a while, the advisory group wanted their role be changed from advisory to a more empowering role in which a binding negotiated settlement should be worked out. Consequently, the Alewife Task Force has been established. Leadership was calibrated as 1 because the state was not really committed to collaborative planning solving, it established the advisory group because the letter of the law must be met and did not anticipated that the group will expand and require an empowering role.

The initiation of collaboration 2

Principled engagement (discovery, definition, deliberation and determination)

Discovery

Discovery The discovery of shared interests and concerns were achieved during the informal procedures in which the Task Force members were involved so that a consensual planning of the transportation project to be achieved. These procedures were coordinated by the facilitator and aimed at sensitizing participants to each other's objectives, helping to build agreement. Such procedures are: “Charettes”, or intensive problem-solving workshops, were used to explore specifics such as possible alignments of the transit tracks through residential areas. Participants sketched the most desirable alignments and station locations on a large map. Each participant or coalition presented its map and argued for its proposal. The rest of the participants then indicated their concerns and raised questions about possible engineering constraints; Between meetings, within these procedures participants were asked by the facilitator to mail back questionnaires designed to clarify underlying conflicts. For instance, a poll with multiple-choice answers detailing the probable advantages and disadvantages of different parking garage sizes narrowed the scope of

47 the debate, and suggested that a broader basis of agreement existed than was indicated by the participants’ public positions. Presentation of these survey results eliminated the need for external debate, and sharpened the agenda to everyone’s satisfaction. Finally in an effort to focus the participants’ thinking about possible open-space improvements, the group examined color slides of parks and parklike elements – such as landscaping along highways, lighting, and pedestrian walkways – from other places in the country. These explorations helped the group crystallize its concerns about esthetics. One of the most interesting outcomes of the collective imaging process was that after viewing slides of other garages, almost everyone agreed that the size of the garage proposed initially by the state, was utterly inappropriate.

Definition Among the members of the task force were neighborhood representatives who had extensive experiential information about flooding patterns, water flow, noise levels, and wildlife habitats. The citizen members of the task force could not be intimidated or put off by claims that certain evidence or techniques of analysis were too complex to explain. They plowed through the reports, references, and documents produced by the consultants, and spent hours debating the merits of baseline estimates, forecasts, and impact assessments. A consensus could not have emerged before the individual stakeholders understood the details of the proposed project, and were familiar with each interest group’s priorities of all the other interest groups. Preparation, therefore, was essential. Another informal procedure, used by the facilitator: brainstorming sessions, had generated additional design options and also helped to identify issues about which the participants were confused. For instance, early attempts to generate new roadway and ramp designs indicated that many of the participants were unclear about the constraints posed by grade, slope and soil characteristics, even though they had already heard general presentations on these subjects. As a result, the facilitator scheduled additional presentations by outside experts acceptable to the entire group.

Deliberation The task force was a public forum for discussion. At the first meeting of the Advisory Committee, proponents of the project made their case. The environmentalists responded with equal conviction. After a few sessions, it was clear to the Committee Chairman that the two camps were becoming dangerously polarized. The fact that the proposed project was supported unequivocally by almost all the relevant elected officials at the state and federal level had little impact on the environmentalists. The coalition of environmentalists threatened to withdraw from the advisory process and pursue their cause in court. The project proponents responded that they were perfectly willing to do battle in another arena – suggesting that they would find ways to exercise their considerable political and financial clout. At a climactic meeting several months after the formation of the Advisory Committee, both sides announced their willingness to break off the talks. “Get off this “no-build” craziness and talk about something realistic”, a representative of the development community shouted across the crowded room at his environmental counterparts, “or we’ll settle this politically. We have the

elected officials on our side.” The environmentalist countered with their own threats. “Either you acknowledge the need to improve and restore this environment”, “or we’ll go to court. And we’ll not only block this project – we’ll kill every other development project you ever propose for Alewife area.” The environmentalists felt comfortable only with the "no-build" option. They were accused of impeding progress, sabotaging the planning effort, and frustrating the legitimate economic interests of the neighborhoods. They soon realized that their most effective strategy was to search for a constructive alternative that would give them some bargaining leverage. Within the meetings led by the facilitator the parties were able to listen and examine perspectives, manage conflicts, and offer individual opinions.

Determinations A subcommittee was formed to think about the opportunities created by the transportation improvements, rather than just the problems or adverse impacts it was likely to cause. This group, headed by the most ardent environmentalist on the task force, Dr. Herbert Meyer, dubbed itself the Linear Park group. It envisioned parklike landscaping along the transportation corridor that would connect open space areas, soften the impact of the automobile, and create a pleasant atmosphere for pedestrians. Other environmentalists supported this idea because they thought it would add to the "human scale" of the new transit facilities and enhance the visual appearance of the area. After many months of discussion, the linear park concept was adopted.

Through the activities designed and managed by the facilitator, the stakeholders began to see items that could be traded. The emergence of the linear park proposal, through which almost every group could gain at least partially, helped to persuade skeptics that a consensual approach was both possible and promising.

Shared motivation: mutual trust, mutual understanding, legitimacy, commitment

Mutual trust and Mutual understanding The informal procedures used by the facilitator helped build trust as parties worked together and got to know each other. For example, role-playing exercises, which encouraged disputants to switch positions, helped to build respect and understanding for opposing points of view. The most ardent developers, for example, were teamed up with the environmentalists to examine the probable environmental impacts of suggested roadway designs. Similarly, environmentalists were asked to look at the same roadway proposals with an eye toward maximizing the return on private investment and increasing tax revenues for Massachusetts’s Capital City.

Moreover, the previous activities of the most ardent environmentalist, Mr. Meyer, gave him credibility with other environmental representatives, and his prominent role in the earlier Boston Transportation Planning Review forced the agency representatives to listen to his objections to highway and transit proposals.

Legitimacy The facilitator, Lawrence Susskind, basically “managed” the group discussions – and, by the time those discussions concluded, all parties felt they had achieved a fairer, more stable, more efficient, and wiser agreement than would otherwise have emerged. This has increased the legitimacy of the broader effort. When the facilitator made it clear that his loyalties were to the Task Force and not to the convening agencies, and that his role was to help the task force build itself into an independent organization, the Alewife effort shifted from a traditional citizen involvement project to an attempt at consensus building. Thus, the process has become more credible and worthy.

Commitment Commitment to the process by the participants is visible. Most members have regularly participated in meetings and have maintained an active level of involvement over time. The Alewife Task Force met biweekly for fourteen consecutive months. Meetings were held in the evening at a state field office in the Alewife area. Attendance rarely dropped below twenty-five. Representatives from sponsoring state and local agencies attended every meeting. All meetings were advertised in the local newspapers. As the task force gained visibility, more and more people attended meetings.

Joint-action (procedural and institutional arrangements, leadership, knowledge and resources)

Procedural and institutional arrangements Task force members has established its protocol which was of good quality and agreed at the outset that no formal votes would be taken and that informal procedures would be used. The informal procedures used by the facilitator so that the proposed project and the priorities of all the other interest groups to be understood, were: (1) charettes, (2) opinion surveys and straw polls, (3) brainstorming sessions, (4) role playing, and (5) collective image building.

Leadership Leadership is formally established in the task force through the chair position (the facilitator Lawrence Susskind). Its leadership was essential to sensitize participants to each other's objectives and helped to build agreement. The emergence of the compromise linear park proposal was in part the result of the inventiveness and initiative of the ardent environmentalist Dr. Meyer. The idea might have been dropped without support because Meyer's staunch advocacy of the environmentalist perspective alienated him from many of the other participants, and certainly from the state transportation agencies.

Knowledge The relevant knowledge was generated and developed. High quality and trusted information was presented, made accessible and understood by the participants. Technology was used to aid in

knowledge generation and management. The parties cooperated and built knowledge for a better planning of the transportation project, namely the linear park proposal. Knowledge-building have mostly increased at task-force meetings during the informal procedures.

Resources The members of the Task Force contributed especially with time and energy. The agencies involved had spent millions of dollars on consultant studies, evaluating not only alternative designs for a regional transit stop, but also the feasibility of mitigating any and all adverse environmental impacts. MAPC – Metropolitan Area Planning Council - provided technical assistance on land use and administered a federal grant for joint development planning in conjunction with the proposed Red Line extension. Hundreds of thousands of dollars were set aside from federal transportation planning grants to support public participation in the planning effort, but the Alewife Task Force and its counterparts at other proposed station locations had no say in the allocation of this money. Consultants were hired by the government agencies to prepare drawings in perspective to help clarify the visual impact of a forty-five-foot elevated roadway and a five-story parking structure.

Case 4: Casco Bay Estuary Project, Main U.S.

SHORT DESCRIPTION OF THE CASE

The estuary and watershed of Casco Bay in the Main deal with many environmental issues arose directly from human activities, such as sewage disposal, and indirectly from population growth, suburban sprawl or other pressures (CBEP 1996). The multiple uses of the Bay have triggered several conflicts which have galvanized the attention of federal agencies, who called for coordinated efforts to protect the Bay. The Environmental Protection Agency, the State Department of Environmental Protection, the State Office of Comprehensive Planning, municipal officials, scientists, citizens, and interest groups joined into a cooperative project (Casco Bay Estuary Project) to protect, preserve, and remediate the estuary and watershed of Casco Bay. After many unsuccessful discussions to outline priority issues for the conservation and management of Casco Bay, a public policy mediator was hired to help implement a consensus-based planning process so that a final consensus on the priority concerns, the actions to be achieved and a management plan can be developed.

Calibration scores

Conditions for the initiation of collaboration: uncertainty, interdependence, consequential incentives, leadership

Uncertainty 1 Uncertainty was calibrated as 1 because the issues for the conservation and management of the Casco Bay were known from previous studies, but how to select the priority issues was uncertain.

Interdependence 0 Interdependence was calibrated as 0, because the institutions interested in the protection of the Casco Bay couldn’t select the priority issues on their own and decided to hire a mediator to help in consensus building.

Consequential incentives 1 Consequential incentives were related to the challenges posed by the threats from water pollution, habitat loss, and human development which have triggered the need for cooperative efforts to reduce or prevent impacts in the Casco Bay. Through selection of Casco Bay as an estuary of national significance by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Maine received federal support to study the state of the bay, assess the impact of human activities, and determine the actions needed to improve its health. This has driven the emergence of the Casco Bay Estuary Project which aims at encouraging communication and cooperation among diverse interest groups and individuals throughout the watershed. The pressure for selecting priority

issues for the conservation and management of the Casco Bay was ripe because the something had to be done to save the Bay.

Leadership 2 Leadership was calibrated as 2. The federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) took the leadership role and provided financial support for Maine to study the state of the bay, assess the impact of human activities, and determine the actions needed to improve its health. At impasse after 18 months of discussions to select priority issues for the Casco Bay management, the EPA hired a public policy mediator to overcome the impasse of its cooperative project.

The initiation of collaboration 2

Principled engagement (discovery, definition, deliberation and determination)

Discovery

Discovery The public policy mediator designed innovative strategies to reveal the individual and shared goals as well as the necessary information to reach an informed outcome. Strategies refer to: (i) technical expert roundtable - to develop the “universe of options” to meet the Casco Bay Estuary project goals and objectives; and (ii) focus groups of outside stakeholders such as farmers, foresters and clammers - to provide feedback and suggest revisions on proposed action plans. An example of bringing in new information by bringing in new people in the Casco Bay project was the involvement of clammers. The federal government was mapping the wetlands in Casco Bay from area photographs. The clammers then said to the mediator: “we are on the ground with our hands in the mud, we can tell them [the federal government] better [about the position of the wetlands], than what they can see from the air, because the wetlands shift all the time as a result of the tides”. This is a good example of “people on the ground having information that a government official doesn’t have access to.” Another example is when the team of experts was brought in, because they had information the stakeholders didn’t have access to. By exploring the “horizon of possibilities,” the outcome was based on more complete information about the situation at hand. By bringing new people in, the mediator helped the parties to reach “a better informed outcome.”

Definition The process to develop the Casco Bay Plan began with a public forum held in Brunswick. This forum briefed participants about Casco Bay issues and sought their views on priority concerns. The information generated at that forum provided the basis for the work of the project. When the staff of the Casco Bay Estuary Project began working on the CBP, the first step was the development of discussion papers on each priority issue that contained a detailed description of the problem and a range of possible actions to address it. These were reviewed by both experts in the field and focus groups of stakeholders. Each step resulted in significant revisions of the

drafts. The draft action papers were rewritten to address the issues raised by the focus groups. The problems and threats were more clearly identified, the actions made more specific, and estimated costs outlined. As preparation for the priority-setting meeting, the mediator started to translate and summarize the issues and available knowledge into accessible and readable documents: “each person had thick technical reports on the issues and they were lay people.” The mediator, with the help of an environmental expert, made a bullet list of the issues and explained each issue to the group.

Deliberation The procedures use by the mediator, such as designing process map and consensus decision- making ensured that all represented interests were integrated into the plan and by working together they show they are able to cooperate and reach agreement on issues, even before they actually start the deliberations. The Casco Bay Estuary Project embarked on a five-year process to develop the Casco Bay Plan. During that period, information was gathered, ideas were presented, and disagreements were discussed. With the help of the mediator, the parties came to a common understanding of most issues: “we did focus groups and went to, for example, farmers and said: “these are the actions we would like you to take, can you take them?” And so the farmers said: “we can do it this way, but we can’t do it that way.” The farmers made all kind of changes. If the project had said this is what we want farmers to do, the farmers would have looked at the list and said: “we can’t do that” - and they wouldn’t do it. But if the farmers can get their feedback integrated into the action plans and if they can create solutions that fit their actual day-to-day experience, then when you put the action plans out, the farmers say: “ok, I can do that.”

Determinations To develop a plan that reflects the interests and active participation of the community, the project established four committees: (i) a Management Committee which is responsible for overseeing the project, directing work, and developing the Casco Bay Plan and 3 other committees: (ii) the Citizens Advisory Committee, (iii) the Technical Advisory Committee, and (iv) the Local Government Advisory Committee — provide the public, technical experts, and local governments with a strong voice in the project. The mediator designed and implemented a six-month consensus-based planning process, during which the Management Committee reached final consensus on all elements of its Comprehensive Conservation and Management Plan (CCMP), which included action plans for each priority issue. The Casco Bay Plan has been developed. It represents an important cooperative environmental initiative to improve the management of the Bay, but only by working together to achieve a balance between human users and the health of Casco Bay. The Plan sets forth actions to improve the health of Casco Bay through collaborative effort, and emphasizes creation of partnerships and approaches to managing the region that are governed not by political boundaries, but by the needs of the natural environment.

Shared motivation: mutual trust, mutual understanding, legitimacy, commitment

Mutual trust and mutual understanding The use of drawing a process map enabled parties to work together and get to know each other. Although the process map of the Casco Bay Project was drawn afterwards, the mediator started to design these kinds of maps with the parties at the table at the beginning of a consensus- building process. The first thing the map does is to give participants confidence and trust in the cooperative process, because they know there is a plan and that if they keep following it, they will reach an outcome.

Three members of each advisory committee serve on the Management Committee, along with representatives of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and four state agencies: Maine Departments of Environmental Protection, Marine Resources, and Economic and Community Development (formerly), and the Maine State Planning Office. This balance built trust and has encouraged discussion as the groups worked toward a shared vision for the bay.

Legitimacy The designing of the process map shows the “road they have to take to get there.” In this way, the mediator helped the parties in Casco Bay with knowledge about how to proceed. It also enhances the transparency and accountability of the process, as parties can see whether each step has indeed been taken and can hold the mediator responsible for following the agreed-upon process design.

Commitment Commitment to the process by participants is visible. The participants cross the political boundaries and created partnerships and approaches to managing the region.

Joint-action (procedural and institutional arrangements, leadership, knowledge and resources)

Procedural and institutional arrangements The mediator established protocols for the informal procedures (such as technical expert roundtables, focus groups, and consensus-based processes) so that the proposed project and the priorities of all the other interest groups to be understood. The protocols were of good quality.

Leadership Leadership is formally established through the professional mediator. At impasse after 18 months of discussions to select priority issues for the Casco Bay management, the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) hired in 1992 a public policy mediator (Susan Podziba) to overcome the impasse of its cooperative project: Casco Bay Estuary Project in Maine.

Although, the mediator was hired by one of the parties (EPA), she was “neutral” and worked for the “whole” group of involved parties. The mediator helped the actors to grasp complexity: she helped the actors to come from a seemingly endless number of issues and viewpoints to a policy outcome using a step by step process. The mediator proposed bringing in a group of technical experts to help the group with the problem they had defined.

Knowledge During the consensus planning process, the mediator created a structure that enabled the participants to make a decision. In the priority-setting workshop, the mediator developed a set of criteria together with the parties. The mediator then made a matrix with the issues on one axis and the criteria on the other axis, and she divided the parties in two groups. Each group scored each issue on the criteria. The issues scoring the highest in both groups were made priority issues. As a next step, the parties decided to broaden the consultation to other stakeholders in the region. They organized a public forum to ask citizens living in the area whether they felt these were the right priorities. The parties decided to extend the mediator’s involvement to help them to move from identifying the priorities to implementing measures. The mediator helped the group develop goals and objectives for each priority issue. At this point the parties “looked around the table and said “now we don’t know how to achieve these.” The mediator proposed bringing in a group of technical experts to help the group with the problem they had defined. The parties asked the group of experts to “generate the universe of options” to realize the goals for each priority issue. The parties could then choose from “this universe of options” as they developed draft action plans.

Resources The federal Environmental Planning Agency (EPA) provided financial support for the Casco Bay Estuary Project. The participants contributed with resources, especially time and energy. A mediator was hired to coordinate the meetings. To provide the public with more information on the Plan’s proposed action the Casco Bay Estuary Project sponsored a series of public lectures (to educate the public about the impacts of the household practices; to educate the recreational and commercial boaters – about the low-impact boating practices; as well as to educate the people that use Casco Bay for recreation about the importance of specific habitats.) Competitive mini-grants were offered to support local water quality monitoring, outreach, and educational programs. This initiative should be used to encourage greater involvement by schools located in the Casco Bay watershed.

Case 5: The LIFE URSUS Project, Vrancea, Harghita and Covasna counties, RO

SHORT DESCRIPTION OF THE CASE

The conflicts were related to the death threat facing the brown bear. The natural habitat of brown bears has become degraded because of forestry practices as well as agricultural and industrial activities. The fragmentation of bear habitat has forced the bears to search for food within other inhabited areas. To enhance bears conservation and management and to resolve human-bear conflicts, an innovative project was proposed (Life Ursus, a LIFE co-financed project). To achieve its goals, the project proposed innovative techniques to both restore the habitat of the bears and to manage human-bear conflicts using friendly techniques such as relocating wandering bears.

Calibration scores

Conditions for the initiation of collaboration: uncertainty, interdependence, consequential incentives, leadership

Uncertainty 0 Uncertainty was calibrated to be 0 because the problems (e.g., the methods used by the hunters to evaluate the brown bear population and the social problems caused by the presence of the brown bears within the ranching communities) for which the project was created as well as the institutional mechanisms that do not work for brown bear conservation (e.g., hunting restrictions, the difficulty to access compensation for the damages produced by the bears) were already well known from previous similar LIFE Projects. The uncertainty has not led to collaborative efforts, but the financial opportunity (EU funds) has.

Interdependence 0 Interdependence was calibrated to be 0 because the interest of the project team to collaborate with other partners was high due to their goal to implement the project’s results at the national level. The project manager was aware that he needed the expertise of other institutions to develop comprehensive actions to improve the conservation of the brown bear and solve human- bear conflicts: “Without the collaboration with the other interested institutions we couldn’t succeed. It was vital to work together with them.” Moreover, he was aware that working together with others would secure the long-term implementation of the proposed actions within the project. The collaboration began when the project manager invited all of the potential interested institutions, including the Ministry of Environment, to meet and begin building a partnership on behalf of the brown bear.

Consequential incentives 1 Consequential incentives were related to the urgent need to resolve the disagreements over the conservation of the brown bear. The hunters evaluate the number of bears in a way that the conservationists do not accept, while the farmers see the brown bear as a threat and support bear eradication. The opportunity to continue what other past LIFE projects began in terms of threats and conflicts involving brown bears was the most important incentive for collaboration. Moreover, brown bears had a high priority in conservation in Romania at that time. Therefore, a team of experts took advantages of the LIFE funds and started a new project that was focused only on brown bear conservation.

Leadership 1 There was an initiation of leadership to improve the status of brown bear conservation. Silviu Chiriac, a wildlife biologist who works for the Vrancea Environmental Protection Agency, decided, together with a team of experts from other regional EPAs and NGOs, to propose and implement a project that enhances brown bear conservation status. A value of 1 was assigned because the leaders were advocating for specific methods (those proposed by the project team) to conserve brown bears.

The initiation of collaboration 1

Principled engagement (discovery, definition, deliberation and determination)

Discovery

Discovery Life Ursus Project created opportunities for interested actors to understand the proposed conservation methods used for conserving the brown bear. To better understand these methods, presentations were held at the meetings. Approximately 80-90% of the meeting time was devoted to presentations and discussion. The presentations were such a high proportion (80-90%) of the meeting time because the moderator wanted to ensure that all of the presented topics were fully understood by the participants. In addition, the moderator wanted to ensure that the many concerns that have been raised would be debated so that all of the actors could articulate their concerns. Moreover, questionnaires were passed out to determine regions where people with the lowest level of knowledge about the brown bear and its conservation currently live. The aim of this action was to identify the locations where people with a lack of such knowledge live, so that meetings could be organized there. The aim of such meetings was to share knowledge with the local people. Field trips were organized by the project team with representatives from Ministry, research institutes, mass-media or other interested institutions so that they could see, in practice, how the bears are monitored using non-invasive techniques. Moreover, the areas where some project

activities have been implemented were visited to share knowledge on the conservation of the brown bear. Workshops were organized and the representatives of the interested institutions were informed of the proposed methods for brown bear conservation and were asked to analyze, discuss, and improve them.

Definition The participants defined objectives and concepts during the meetings. Clear strategies and objectives as well as concepts were defined to create a common language among the participants. Many partners were engaged in defining terms, although the representatives of some key institutions were missing.

The discussions were focused on topics which varied depending on the core interests of each participant. The topics included the following: the importance of the protected areas, methods for counting the bears, and methods for assessing their conservation status. Moreover, the discussions were focused on how to update the project results.

Deliberation Generally, the discussions were civilized. The discussions were civilized because of the subtle intervention of the moderator who placed the discussions back on track when they started to drift away from the topic at hand. There were also difficult discussions because of the divergent opinions; these often ended in less pleasant ways (e.g., throwing the case). Such divergent opinions came from the different perspectives of each party. The conservationists consider the brown bear to be a protected species, which is part of the natural ecosystem. On the other hand, the hunters consider the bear to be a resource that needs to be exploited. Lastly, the livestock farmers and ranchers consider the bear to be a destructive nuisance. Thus, the hunters want to kill the brown bear for sport; the farmers want to use the land without suffering losses or by investing in protection against the bears; and the conservationists want that farmers to use non- invasive techniques to protect against the bears. Difficult discussions also took place between the conservationists and the hunters: the conservationists suggested that the hunters should more accurately assess the bear population and should not consider all bears to be destructive.

Determinations Among the determinations made by the project team include the establishment of working groups and the approval of the project products, such as the “The guide for brown bear population estimate” and “The practical guide for preventing the brown bear’s habitat degradation and fragmentation and for ensuring the connectivity of the Natura 2000 sites.” There were no real negotiations, and no consensus was built.

Shared motivation: mutual trust, mutual understanding, legitimacy, commitment

Mutual trust and mutual understanding There was distrust even from the Ministry of Environment. All of the project’s final documents were only recommended documents that had to be approved by a ministerial order. Moreover, the national associations of hunters and fishermen considered the project to merely be a way to squander money and were skeptical that results of the project will contribute to the resolution of the conflicts. The hunters do not trust the methods proposed by the conservationists to assess the health of the bear population. The hunters consider their methods to be very different from those of the conservationists. Specifically, the hunters claim that the methods of the conservationists are not cognizant of the interests of hunters because they argue that they will not be able to hunt as many bears as they would want. Some trust was built during the field trips when the methods for bear monitoring and conservation were shown to the participants. Usually the participants worked together because they were aware that, without collaboration, the project would not be successful and the proposed methodology for brown bear conservation would not be implemented. Legitimacy Invitations were sent to some potential interested institutions, but some of them have declined to attend because they were not interested in the project. The project was not a priority for them, and they also did not want to assume the results of the discussions. This failure to attend may raise questions about the legitimacy of the entire effort to protect the brown bear. For example, the National Association of Sport Hunters and Fishermen, the largest interested institution on behalf of the hunters, did not want to participate in the meetings; instead this institution prefers to comment remotely. Two persons from the Ministry of Environment were also invited to the meetings; however, they did not participate because they did not want to take responsibility for any outcomes.

Commitment Commitment is visible, especially among the project team. The participants were committed to find solutions of common interests because such solutions will create a favorable image of their institution and will therefore facilitate the acquisition of funds. The project team members were committed to the process because they were confident that they could solve the conflicts with the hunters and the farmers. The participants attended meetings regularly, although the key actors were often missing.

Joint-action (procedural and institutional arrangements, leadership, knowledge and resources)

Procedural and institutional arrangements A document named “Lobby Strategy. Protocol for organizing a workshop” established the arrangements based on how the target participants should be identified, how the time and location for the meeting should be established, to whom invitations should be sent, how the meetings should be organized, including the tasks of the moderator, the technical expert, the

event secretary, the protocol officer, etc. Institutional arrangements existed, but they were not stable arrangements.

Leadership The meetings were moderated by conservation experts. They dedicated their time and energy and tried to make the actors collaborate on behalf of brown bear management. No neutral party was involved.

Knowledge Knowledge-building activities were conducted through an educational campaign that involved 14 local schools. Information on the brown bear (e.g., feeding habits and sleep) was disseminated among pupils in an interactive and simple way, highlighting that we, the people, are responsible for the future of the bear. A DVD of a documentary on the brown bear was also disseminated to attendees. Posters were placed in locations frequented by the target groups. TV (38 shows), radio (13 shows) and articles in the local and national media (190 articles) contained information on the causes of the damage produced by the bears, what factors favor such damages, as well as information on the bear as a key element in the ecosystem and its national value. Nearly 6000 flyers were distributed with information on the effects of excessive disturbance of bear habitat, how tourists or mushroom pickers should behave within bear habitat as well as information on the importance of the Natura 2000 network. Within the meetings (from which 15 were organized with the local authorities and farmer representatives), information on the damages caused by the bears, as well as the best techniques to diminish the damages were disseminated. Workshops and seminars were also organized with the interested institutions.

Resources All of the participants contributed resources, especially time and energy. The main circle of partners (such as Vrancea, Covasna and Harghita EPAs, the Association for Biodiversity Conservation – Vrancea and the Association for Nature Conservation – Harghita) donated their time, energy, equipment and funds. The EU funds for the LIFEURSUS project were the main source of funding.

Case 6: Forestry - Putna-Vrancea Natural Park, RO

SHORT DESCRIPTION OF THE CASE

The conflicts were triggered by restrictions of harvest levels in some private forests from Vrancea County. These restrictions are in place because much of the forest is designated as Natural Park property (e.g., Putna Vrancea Natural Park) and is consequently a strictly protection area. The conflicts were ignited by the fact that the Natural Park had no management plan. The lack of a plan meant that the restrictions could be easily questioned, and no compensations could be achieved for the forest owners. The conflicts were aggravated because of the lack of communication and collaboration between forest owners and the park administration. Moreover, the forest owners lack information on protected areas, which were mostly designed without their participation. Several collaboration efforts have attempted to bring together forest owners, the interested public authorities and the park administration to come to a compromise on how the forestry resources should be best exploited.

Calibration scores

Conditions for the initiation of collaboration: uncertainty, interdependence, consequential incentives, leadership

Uncertainty 2 Uncertainty was calibrated to be 2 because the parties had no idea on how to achieve a compromise on the conservation-exploitation problem (e.g., the forest exploitation through clear- cutting in an area designated as Natural Park, specifically in a strict protection area). The high uncertainty forced the stakeholders to meet and work together.

Interdependence 0 Interdependence was calibrated to be 0. The administration of Putna Vrancea Natural Park (APVNP) was interested in collaborating with forest owners to find a solution to the emerging conflicts. APVNP expressed the need to communicate with only FOA representatives, while others were permanently against the designation of the area as Natural Park and demanded that its status as such be rescinded.

Consequential incentives 0 Consequential incentives were related to the conflicts between the administration of Putna- Vrancea Natural Park and the representatives of the Forest Owners Association (FOA). The ANPVP considered collaboration as the last solution to solve the tensions, especially because most of the time has been blamed to be the cause of these tensions.

Leadership 1 APVNP took the leadership role because the park was the cause of the conflicts. If the Natural Park had not been established, then no conflict would have emerged. The APVNP was not known to be an institution with legal authority in the area, so it aimed to demonstrate its real power. The value of 1 was assigned because APVNP was not really committed to collaborative problem solving and was advocating that forests be strictly protected.

The initiation of collaboration 1

Principled engagement (discovery, definition, deliberation and determination)

Discovery

Discovery The actors decided to work together only at critical times or because the administrative process required them to do so. During the sporadic meetings, the participants were informed by the PVNP Director of the laws by which the APVNP operate. These include the internal zoning of the PVNP, and the problems related to it. In addition, these include the negative economic effects of the harvest (primarily through clear cutting) in the strict protection areas. A frequent topic of discussion was the approval, by the APVNP, of extracting fallen trees as a result of landslides. Field trips were organized to verify what harvesting methods are used. Exploitation was conducted with articulated forestry tractors and large ditches were created that needed to be managed. Landslides or other natural hazards made the forest owners request approval to extract the fallen trees. The APVPN asked them to complete documentation that explains the scale of the natural phenomenon (such as the quantities of affected trees and the specific parcels where the affected trees are located). The documentation of the forest owners was found to be incomplete. The APVPN argued that their decision to prohibit the extraction of the fallen trees by organizing field trips and observing what happened on the field is not what the forest owners had reported.

Definition During the discussion, the affected actors (the APVPN and the FOA representatives) did not spend much time defining their duties or strategies for reducing the conflicts. The APVPN usually defined measures/strategies based on forestry legislation that has to be undertaken (mandatory) by the forest owners.

Deliberation The FOA representatives expressed their concerns in an aggressive and unhelpful manner. They were aware that nobody had listened to them. All of the FOA representatives had the opportunity to speak, but generally there were few people that took the opportunity to discuss. The FOA representatives argued that they have a lot of wood that degrades and that they face several obstacles. For example, if they do not sell the wood, there are no funds for reforestation.

As long as the legislation does not permit action on this issue, the other actors did not listen to such requests. All of the FOAs in the region asked for exemptions from the protection measures established for the strict protection zones. The APVNP finds that the requests do not come along with the necessary technical reports, plans, or images based on which a decision should be made. Explanations were requested from the FOA representatives so that APVNP could explain what species and habitats are protected in the strict protection zones. The Park Administration explained that strictly protected areas are established to protect certain species of flora and fauna that are protected under the European Directives. These species were defined based on scientific studies. The FOA representatives are not convinced by such arguments, claiming "... Please enlighten us that the wolf lives there...”. The FOA representatives also consider the Ministry’s approach to impose restrictions strange due to the designation of the area as a Natural Park without granting compensation for the new restrictions. The APVPN stated that a petition requesting compensations of the owners who have forest located within the strict protection area was sent to the Senate, Chamber of Deputies, the Government, Presidency and Ministry of Environment but that their response was vague.

Determinations Determinations were made during the meetings. These included the following: the preferred harvest method, specifically, the logging technologies that have a low impact on soil; the harvest levels for the next two years and the approval procedure for the forestry activities outside of the strict protection zones that have to be done by the APVNP.

Because the zoning of the park is the reason for conflict, the Scientific Council of the Park decided to appoint a committee (representatives of the APVNP, the Scientific Council and local communities) to analyze how the zoning of the park can meet the economic requirements of the local community and how the anthropogenic barriers to biodiversity can be reduced. Therefore, a new zoning regime was proposed.

Shared motivation: mutual trust, mutual understanding, legitimacy, commitment

Mutual trust and mutual understanding The voting process did not build trust. When the members were missing from the meetings (most of the time), voting was done via e-mail. Concerns existed whether or not the views expressed by e-mail take into account the actual views of the participants. The participants decided that the decisions were to be made by the majority of those who were present.

Legitimacy The Ministry of Environment was invited to the meetings, but it did not attend them. Nobody believed that a solution would emerge. The participants said constantly that a solution is unlikely. The decision was always postponed. All of these facts raise questions on the legitimacy of the entire process.

Commitment Most of the meetings took place with the minimum number of participants (50% +1) necessary to make a valid decision. When the minimum number of participants is not met, the participants only engaged in informal discussions. The frustration of the forest owners, due to the designation of the area as Natural Park, was sometimes difficult to overcome, and their availability for discussion was limited. The FOA representatives actively participated at all meetings. They felt committed to the process because it was about their land, and they were interested in achieving a compromise with the APVNP.

Joint-action (procedural and institutional arrangements, leadership, knowledge and resources)

Procedural and institutional arrangements According to the organization and functioning rules of the Scientific Council of the PVNP, at least two thirds of its members are required to be present at the meetings. Interinstitutional protocols were established so that the conservation objectives of the protected area could be implemented (e.g., the approval of the logging activities should be done by the APVNP). The Director of the PV Natural Park proposed to sign a protocol of cooperation with the institutions with responsibilities for the regulation and control of activities with impacts on the protected area, so that the information exchange could be improved.

Leadership 0 No leadership role was filled during the collaboration process.

Knowledge The management plan of the protected area and the results of some scientific studies regarding the protected species were presented to the forest owners, but these results were contested. Technical and scientific details about the natural park were presented to the forest owners, but they were unable to understand them.

Resources The participants contributed their time and energy. There were some financial resources (EU funds) that supported these efforts, from the Sectoral Operational Program for Environment (POS Environment), the park administration, and the Vrancea Environmental Protection Agency, which brought financial resources through a LIFE project (EU funds), but all of these funds were not constant.

Case 7: Highway – Surlari Protected Forest, RO

SHORT DESCRIPTION OF THE CASE

A massive transportation project, a highway, was proposed by the state government to link Romania’s capital city, Bucharest, to another important city situated 60 km away. Part of the highway was planned to cross a forest located within a Natura 2000 site, which is important habitat for migratory and endangered birds. This proposal was brought to the attention of environmentalists, who opposed clearing of the forest to make room for the highway. Instead, the environmentalists advocated for compensatory measures, such as tunnels, green bridges for bats, sound-absorbing panels for the protection of migratory and endangered birds as well as compensating six times the proposed area for the deforestation. To resolve the conflicts, the stakeholders met and negotiated an environmental agreement so that the highway could be constructed, and the birds could be protected. However, the environmental agreement did not include the protection of the birds because the state-road-building-company did not meet their obligations as they were negotiated.

Calibration scores

Conditions for the initiation of collaboration: uncertainty, interdependence, consequential incentives, leadership

Uncertainty 2 Uncertainty was calibrated to be 2 because the magnitude of the impact of the highway on the migratory and endangered birds, and what solution should be taken, was unknown. This uncertainty has caused the regional Environmental Protection Agency to ask for an environmental impact assessment and an environmental agreement.

Interdependence 0 Interdependence was calibrated to be 0 and was visible when the environmentalists came out strongly against the highway project because of its potential impact on the Natura 2000 site. Therefore, the state-road-building-company was aware that it needs to work together with the environmentalists to get the project done. Thus, the environmentalists were invited to be part of a technical committee at the Environmental Protection Agency and to work together toward an environmental agreement.

Consequential incentives 1 Consequential incentives were related to the EIA Procedure. The interested actors met and worked together because this was a requirement of the Environmental Impact Assessment Procedure. According to the EIA, the project is of high environmental impact and, in this case,

the collaboration between the interested actors is considered to be vital for improving the project’s impact and sustainability.

Leadership 0 There was no initiating leadership for this case study. The actors met and began to work together because the administrative process (specifically the EIA) required them to do so. The environmental protection agency has coordinated the EIA and was interested in protecting the birds with or without the completion of the highway project (The EPA was advocating for a particular solution; thus, it was not a real leader). Later, the NGO and EPA expressed their concerns regarding the project and its impacts, but they did without show an interest in leadership.

The initiation of collaboration 0

Principled engagement (discovery, definition, deliberation and determination)

Discovery

Discovery During the meetings of the Technical Committee, the results of the environmental impact assessment were presented to the members. These meetings engaged the members of the Committee in a process of discovery through which they began to comprehend the environmental impact of the highway project. The EIA results were shown to the Committee members because the rules of the EIA process required them to do so. The interested actors went together on a field trip during the construction of the highway to verify if the negotiated compensatory measures would be implemented.

Definition The members of the Committee engaged in the process of definition by defining the compensatory measures for the potential damage that might be caused by the construction of the highway. These include the construction of tunnels, green bridges for bats, sound-absorbing panels for the protection of migratory and endangered birds as well as compensating six times the deforested area (~5 ha which means that ~30 ha needed to be compensated by reforestation). The actors also defined strategies related to the management of the subsequent problems caused by building the highway in a Natura 2000 site. The process of definition was focused more on administrative than scientific or technical details.

Deliberation The meetings were focused on getting the environmental agreement signed. Within the Technical Committee, all of the members had the opportunity to speak. The state-road-building-company listened to the concerns of the environmentalists. The company agreed to the compensatory

measures, but, in the end, they did what they wanted and ignored the negotiated agreement. There was no honesty during the discussions: the state-road-building-company negotiated an agreement that they knew they would break.

The reaction of the NGO to the violation of the conditions stipulated in the environmental agreement, which the state-road-building-company has committed to abide by, became the main cause for tensions and deliberations. Skepticism existed among the environmentalists that the negotiated compensatory measures would not be performed. The state-road-building-company has begun to build the highway, without taking into account the compensatory measures that they agreed to. Thus, the NGOs and the regional Environmental Protection Agency have sued the state-road-building-company (Romanian National Company of Motorways and National Roads) to comply with the negotiated agreement. The state-road-building-company did not react. Therefore, the EPA and the NGOs asked the European Commission to begin an investigation.

Determinations Both the environmentalists and the representatives of the state-road-building-company were able to agree to an environmental agreement. A working group, which was required by law, was assembled.

Shared motivation: mutual trust, mutual understanding, legitimacy, commitment

Mutual trust and mutual understanding Trust was not built because it did not exist between the interested actors. Although the actors worked together to define the compensatory measures and they achieved a compromise, they did not succeed in building trust.

Legitimacy The only actors who were really interested were the representatives of the NGOs and the EPA. They remained committed to the process because they wanted to build their public image as ardent environmentalists. The state-road-building-company had no reaction to the fact that it was sued for its failure to comply with the negotiated agreement. This indicates that the company had no interest in collaborating. Moreover, the lack of progress in implementing compensatory measures raised questions about the legitimacy of the broader effort.

Commitment All interested actors participated in all of the meetings because their presence was mandatory by law—not because they trusted the collaboration.

Joint-action (procedural and institutional arrangements, leadership, knowledge and resources)

Procedural and institutional arrangements The Environmental Impact Assessment Procedure contained rules and guidelines related to the frequency of the meetings.

Leadership There was no initiating leadership for this case study.

Knowledge The environmental impact statement was made available to the participants. It was useful in ensuring that there is a general understanding among the participants of the environmental impacts of the highway.

Resources The members of the technical Committee contributed their time and energy. The state-road- building-company has provided the funding to conduct the environmental impact assessment, although it did not implement the negotiated compensatory measures. The EPA provided space for the meetings.

Case 8: The project: “Green Siret - creating integrated management system for SPA Natura 2000 Lower Siret Meadow and overlapping areas”, RO

SHORT DESCRIPTION OF THE CASE

Lower Siret Meadow and the overlapping natural protected areas face several threats, which have generated conflicts around the species and habitats for which it was designed as a SPA Natura 2000 site. Most of them are related to inadequate grazing, forestry and hunting practices, aggregated extracting, chemical use in agriculture as well as other pressures (LSM Administration 2015). One of the requests as a Natura 2000 site is to develop a management plan that guides the management of the protected areas in the future. In this context, an innovative project was implemented by the Association for Biodiversity Conservation. Within the project, several meetings and discussions were held to reach a consensus over the proposed measures in the management plan. The Association for Biodiversity Conservation played the main role in drafting the plan and leading the meetings and discussions by employing several strategies that enhance the collaboration of all of the interested institutions and achieve a consensual agreement.

Calibration scores

Conditions for the initiation of collaboration: uncertainty, interdependence, consequential incentives, leadership

Uncertainty 2 Uncertainty was calibrated to be 2 because the need for local and regional institutions to collaborate in order to manage common resources that would be available for both conservation and development purposes was voiced in the concerns that were raised. No previous studies have been conducted in the area; thus, the issues and their solutions are not known.

Interdependence 0 Interdependence was calibrated to be 0. The procedure for plan approval required consultation with interested institutions. Therefore, the Association for Biodiversity Conservation was aware of the need to work together with the affected institutions and organized meetings to know what the institutions really think about the proposed measures. The interest in collaboration was supported by the need to have the project completed.

Consequential incentives 1 Although the SPA Lower Siret Meadow was included within the Natura 2000 – the Ecological network of European protected area, a management plan of the area is required. This has resulted in the emergence of the Green Siret Project, which aims to develop a management plan for all of the protected areas overlapping the Lower Siret Meadow and shift from resource exploitation to biodiversity conservation. A funding opportunity has become available (it is about The Sectoral Operational Programme Environment, Axis 4: Implementation of Adequate

Management Systems for Nature Protection”, funded by EU funds in partnership with the Romania’s government), therefore, the Association for Biodiversity Conservation, a NGO, interested in taking advantage of this funding opportunity, proposed a project that will result in the development of a management plan for the Lower Siret Meadow and the overlapping natural protected areas.

Leadership 1 There was leadership available for the management of the Lower Siret Meadow and the overlapping natural protected areas. The Association for Biodiversity Conservation proposed a project to construct a management plan and took care of the collaboration with the affected institutions. The Association prepared meetings and public debates and organized awareness campaigns. The Association secured resources, including staff and funding, so that all of the affected institutions could discuss, in a collaborative setting, their views on the proposed measures to better manage protected areas. However, the Association for Biodiversity Conservation is a young organization and is not considered to be a leader by other institutions that have told it what to do.

The initiation of collaboration 1

Principled engagement (discovery, definition, deliberation and determination)

Discovery

Discovery The discovery of shared interests and concerns took place during the meetings when presentations about the general characteristics of the Natura 2000 site, the threats the protected areas are facing and the proposed measures in the management plan were followed by debate sessions. The meetings lasted for 2-3 hours. A video was presented to ensure that the participants understood the problems confronting the Natura 2000 site. Field visits were organized by the Association for Biodiversity Conservation to build a shared experience. Their purpose was to assess the environmental (such as species inventory monitoring) as well as socio-economic conditions that are needed to develop a management plan as well as to inform the public (the pupils) about the protected species. The affected institutions knew the environmental conditions; thus, their participation in the field visits was considered to be unnecessary.

Definition The Association for Biodiversity Conservation organized focus groups with the representatives of the institutions in natural resource management, local authorities, and representatives of public and private institutions in the infrastructure sector to provide feedback and suggest revisions on the proposed measures.

The discussions were focused on how the activities of different institutions could be harmonized with the proposed measures that limit the actions of each institution. Specifically, the discussions were related to the contradictions found in the proposed measures for the management of the protected area. For example, the terms underlying water resources contained contradictions in the future plans for the area: the terms included the construction of hydraulic infrastructure and flood control devices as well as the application of conservation measures. There was also a controversy between bird protection and fish farming: discussions were about the compensations of fish farmers for the damages caused by protected birds. There was another conflict relating to forestry activities: discussions were focused on erosion problems vs. conservation activities. Another controversy consisted of technical aspects, such as how the value of 30 m was established to be appropriate for the length of an ecological corridor so that the loss of forest by erosion could be mitigated?

Deliberation The deliberations were open and civilized but were not constructive because each affected institution held predefined ideas/interests that they wanted to defend despite the need to officially register and justify their presence at the meetings. Moreover, the representatives of the institutions lacked a clear understanding on what they could or could not do. This has limited the deliberations. All participants had the opportunity to speak, and the most relevant and balanced views were taken into account. The major disagreements were not resolved (especially those related to the conflict over the exploitation of mineral aggregates and erosion control, etc.), but they were noted. Moreover, some problems, which were not the responsibility of the participants, were raised. When the participants realized that the meetings are recorded, they became reluctant to express their honest opinions. The public was not invited to the meetings, but a few municipalities and NGO representatives participated and formally represented the public’s interests. Public access was not limited, but the discussions were not publicly announced. Thus, a certain intimacy was established. Moreover, the public had the opportunity to present their views during the environmental impact assessment process, which was conducted so that the management plan could be approved by the Ministry. However, the public did not have any concerns; the institutions had most of the concerns. The Association wanted to be viewed as an important institution. At each meeting, the desire for collaboration was present. However, the participants had divergent views regarding the protected areas to be managed. Although the interested institutions agreed with the measures proposed by the Association for Biodiversity Conservation, most of them were still maintaining their own interests (the institutions for water resources management wanted to exploit the mineral aggregates; the fish farmers and hunters wanted to pursue their activities no matter the regulations, etc.). Therefore, the actors collaborated but the level of trust between them was very

low. The project success did not hinge on the cooperation between actors because the participants were there only to approve the proposed measures for the management plan.

Determinations The product of the project was The Lower Siret Meadow Management Plan. This plan represents an important initiative to protect natural protected areas, by balancing the need for natural resources and with traditional human uses. The plan aims to increase the management capacity of the protected areas and the involvement of local communities in managing the area. Groups of experts were appointed for the scientific activities; for example, a group of researchers conducted the socio-economic assessment, while others conducted an inventory of species and habitats. Most of the activities were the responsibility of the Association for Biodiversity Conservation. After each meeting, the Association for Biodiversity Conservation asked for written reports that should be made by the participants where they could express their views regarding the proposed measures for managing the protected areas.

Shared motivation: mutual trust, mutual understanding, legitimacy, commitment

Mutual trust and mutual understanding The meetings helped the participants to understand each other’s interests. They were a good exercise, especially because the institutions were generally isolated from each other and do not communicate. The meetings helped each party learn of the views of each institution regarding the proposed measures that administered by each institution (e.g., water, forestry). Trust between participants did not increase because the institutions usually did not work together. The Association created the management plan, and this plan was presented to the affected institutions, which argued for integrating their views into the plan. Meetings and discussions were again organized so that the views over which there was no agreement could be debated and included in the plan before its submission for approval by the Ministry.

Legitimacy The institutions participated in the meetings because they were confident that their views would be taken into account and integrated within the final draft of the management plan. The discussion was considered to be useful by all participants, although there were moments when the institutions did not believe in the success of the project. The representatives of each municipality gave up participating in the meetings because the area under discussion was far away from the boundary of each municipality. They, therefore, did not have an interest in these regions. Several institutions attended the meetings on the way. Such institutions were recommended by other institutions that were already participating. Usually, the local institutions invited the regional institutions that supervise the same natural resources. The management plan was quickly developed relative to the situation in other protected areas, especially due to the team’s previous experience. The main obstacles were related to the interests

73 of some affected institutions, especially regarding the exploitation of mineral aggregates, fishery and forestry. Some of these institutions were politically favored. Moreover, conservation is a new direction in Romania: although conservation exists in sectoral policies, it is not often applied in practice.

Commitment Participants were motivated to argue for their opinion. Most of them understood how important the plan is and often overstated its importance. Several general and detailed changes to the plan. There was also skepticism relating to the implementation of the plan with respect to the outdated policies of the institutions. The Association for Biodiversity Conservation was a new institution, which was a significant disadvantage. Thus, the affected institutions wanted not to be invited to express their opinion; they wanted to be the host for such discussions. All of the interested institutions were committed to the process because they saw the project as a threat to their activities. Thus, they were interested in participating and hoped that their activities would not be inhibited. Moreover, the representative of each institution had to report to their superiors what had been discussed during the meetings, thus, they were interested in participating. The institutions with national coverage felt responsible for the results of the project. Each meeting was a challenge for the representatives of each institution.

Joint-action (procedural and institutional arrangements, leadership, knowledge and resources)

Procedural and institutional arrangements All of the rules regarding the responsibilities of experts were referred to in the project. During the meetings, no clear protocols were established relating to who should be invited for discussions. The institutions that were considered to be interested were invited. These institutions also invited other institutions that joined the meetings.

Leadership The Association for Biodiversity Conservation invited a neutral moderator to the meetings (Cristian Tetelea, from WWF). He highlighted the fact that the interests of all interested actors should be considered and that the actors should be honest and open in arguing their position regarding the management plan. He stated that, no matter the problems, the only solution can be obtained through dialogue.

Knowledge The management plan was given to the participants for consultation before each meeting. The scientific reports, which included details about the advanced technology for species monitoring, were presented to the participants.

The information was disseminated in local mass-media, excursions with the pupils were organized and awareness campaigns were held. Several presentations were given relating to the results of species monitoring activities.

Resources The funds came from the Sectoral Operational Programme Environment and were managed by the Association for Biodiversity Conservation. The association offered transportation funding for the experts and participants. The other actors contributed only their time and energy. The meetings were organized at a neutral location: a hotel most of the time or at the local environmental protection agencies. At these meetings, there were actors who offered space for meetings. Other actors contributed scientific data and their expertise.