PRES. ZUMA’S FIRST 100 DAYS

Prof Dirk Kotzé, Department of Political Sciences

17 August 2009 is the milestone of Pres. Zuma’s first 100 days in office. Traditionally, it is treated as the point at which a new government or administration can be seriously assessed for the first time. The Zuma administration has been determined by two factors: first, a traumatic and protracted transition of party leadership and government, and secondly, a global economic crisis that also affects . All aspects of the Zuma performance should be assessed keeping in mind the possible impact of these two factors. A number of individual aspects will now be considered.

1) RETURN OF MANDELA

A key characteristic of the Zuma style is to emphasise his respect for Nelson Mandela. Many accused former Pres. Mbeki of isolating Mandela, of not showing him the necessary respect and deviating from his agenda. Pres. Zuma, on the other hand, is consciously in the process of returning to Mandelaism. In his most important speeches so far he referred to him directly. For instance, in his acceptance speech on 6 May 2009 after his election as President, he said: “As President of the Republic, I will do my best to lead the country towards the realisation of Madiba’s vision of a truly non-sexist, non-racial South Africa, united in its diversity”. Three days later at his inauguration he repeated it: “He [Mandela] made reconciliation the central theme of his term of office. We will not deviate from that nation-building task. Thank you Madiba, for showing us the way”.

Zuma’s conscious embracing of the Mandela symbolism serves a number of purposes. In the first instance, it legitimises his status as ANC President in the wake of Polokwane’s controversy. Mandela’s public endorsement of his leadership at election rallies in the Eastern Cape and Johannesburg are examples of such legitimisation. It is not only important in the context of the Zuma-Mbeki contestation, but also in the ANC’s contestation with COPE about the authenticity of the ANC, and in the context of Pres. Zuma’s personal credibility in the public’s opinion.

Pres. Mandela’s support automatically attaches Pres. Zuma to the ANC’s history. (In some instances Zuma excluded Mbeki from it, such as in his acceptance speech.) Pres. Zuma is clearly sensitive about the ANC’s history and therefore wants to portray himself as its custodian and paying respect to it. In addition to Mandela, the Sisulu family is also more prominent in the Zuma agenda. Max Sisulu was appointed as parliamentary Speaker and as Minister of Defence and Military Veterans. COPE launched a major assault on the ANC’s status as the custodian of the liberation struggle and its values, especially as articulated in the Freedom Charter. Late 2008 was the period of this struggle about who represents the authentic ANC: COPE or the Zuma leadership? The Congress of the People (1955) and the Freedom Charter were the symbolic focus points of this inter-party rivalry. It is now quite pronounced how the ANC has returned to the Freedom Charter discourse in its election manifesto and other important events, such as Pres. Zuma’s response in the debate on the Presidency budget vote on 25 June, 54 years after the Congress of the People. Pres. Zuma’s public use of Umkhonto we Sizwe iconography (in songs and symbols) is another demonstration of his sensitivity for ANC history and its sentimental and mobilising value still today.

Mandela’s personal association with Pres. Zuma and their friendship is the model on which Zuma is structuring his administration. As discussed later, the Mandela Presidency is the example that guides the Zuma Presidency. The Mandela agenda of nation-building and reconciliation, and later his stance on Zimbabwe and HIV/AIDS, is shared by Zuma. A one-term President following a decentralised style of governing, appears also to be the Zuma approach.

2) STYLE OF GOVERNMENT

So far Pres. Zuma is a public president with a statesman style. He has decentralised or delegated many of the tasks done by his predecessor. The work allocation between Mandela and his Deputy, Thabo Mbeki, appears to be also the Zuma formula. Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe appears to have taken responsibility for the day-to-day operational tasks of government. In that sense he plays a similar role as the French Prime Minister. He is also the Leader of Government Business in Parliament. In respect of all these tasks he is assisted by the two new ministers in the Presidency: Collins Chabane and Trevor Manuel. They constitute a triumvirate which makes it possible for Pres. Zuma to play his preferred public role. Chabane is the manager of government while Manuel is the economic architect.

This style of government produced a three-layer administration: first the line-function Ministers and Departments, then the triumvirate of government managers, and culminating in Pres. Zuma and the cabinet.

It implies more decentralisation both in terms of responsibilities and structure. For example, during the Mbeki period there was a Protocol section in the Presidency and one in the Department of Foreign Affairs. They will now be merged into one in the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DICO). The Mbeki era was often criticised as overly concerned with a managerial culture. At this stage it appears as if the Zuma administration is not much different. Collins Chabane announced a number of new managerial measures, including performance agreements with the Ministers. Managerialism is output-driven in terms of quantitative measurements but not necessarily quality-sensitive. It does improve good governance (which is procedure-sensitive) but it does not necessarily improve the quality of government.

In conclusion, the Zuma administration has managed to present themselves as a new government starting with a new slate and not as a continuation of ANC governments. For instance, during the July local demonstrations in many parts of the country, the Minister of Human Settlements, Tokyo Sexwale, referred to the Mbeki ‘regime’ as one of the causes of the conflict. Though the ANC assumed power in 1994, the Zuma/Polokwane leadership distance themselves from the 1999-2009 period, as if it was another party in government. That is why the period 2007-2009 amounts to a “second transition” similar to 1990-94. The Zuma government is highly successful in convincing the public that they are a new government and therefore deserve a probation period to consolidate themselves and that it is not a continuation of the Mbeki government.

3) ZUMA’S SELECTION OF GOVERNMENT

One of Pres. Zuma’s first tests as president was how he will constitute his government. He enlarged it to 34 ministers and 28 deputy ministers, that enabled him make a few more choices. Fifteen of his choices occupied the same portfolios in the Mbeki government, and twelve were in the Mbeki government but in other portfolios. It means that he introduced 35 new appointees, though six of them are former provincial premiers and nine are former provincial MECs, most of them in office during the Mbeki period. It means that the Zuma government is a combination of continuity and newcomers.

In his choices it is clear that he used the new National Working Committee as his point of departure. Thirteen of the eighteen members are included in government. From those available, only Pallo Jordan has been excluded. After the NWC, the selections were influenced by regional associations, gender and NEC membership. It is noteworthy that this is the first cabinet in which Limpopo is represented at ministerial level – three ministers in total. After Mpumalanga, Limpopo is the strongest ANC province. Collins Chabane and Julius Malema played an important part in Limpopo’s achievement.

The dynamics of the ANC’s National Conference at Polokwane created the expectation that the Left (COSATU, SACP and ANC Youth League) will play a prominent role in the selection of government, and will be richly rewarded for their support to Zuma. At a meeting of the ANC’s National Executive Committee (NEC) before the general election, Zuma, however, countered the expectation when he stated emphatically that he does not owe anything to anyone, as a clear reference to the view that he is manipulated by the Left. In the new government of 62 positions only two went to current COSATU leaders (Ebrahim Patel and Nolutando Mayende-Sibiya) while the top SACP leadership (the Secretariat consisting of Blade Nzimande and Jeremy Cronin and three Central Committee members, Yunus Carrim, Noluthando Mayende-Sibiya and Rob Davies) was effectively coopted to government. The Party’s national treasurer serves in the Eastern Cape government. Only the Party’s National Chairperson, Gwede Mantashe, is not a member of government, but he is the ANC’s Secretary General. Nzimande’s inclusion in government created an organisational crisis for the SACP and has to be resolved at a special congress later in the year.

Regarding the ANC Youth League, no current office bearer or leader is included in government. Two former Presidents, Malusi Gigaba and Fikile Mbalula, are included, but Gigaba was already an Mbeki appointment. The Left, therefore, does not have a critical mass of members in government. They have to exert their influence through other fora in order to realise the expectations that they will play a decisive role – some predict that NEDLAC is the preferred forum but it has yet to materialise.

Another critical area of government is the senior officials, especially the Directors General. A major evacuation of officials or even a purge was expected after Polokwane. However, the head of policy monitoring in the Mbeki Presidency, Joel Netshitenzhe, remained in his post in the Zuma administration. At the same time the Director General of DICO, Ayanda Ntsaluba, was recently re-appointed despite sustained public demonstrations against him by the COSATU-affiliated NEHAWU. (In the process Pres Zuma also closed any opportunity for one of his close associates and former ambassador to Algeria, Moe Shaik, to be appointed in this position.) Ntsaluba’s re-appointment became a test in itself for COSATU’s influence in government appointments. NEHAWU’s campaign also against UNISA’s Principal, Barney Pityana, was another case of failure, keeping in mind that the ANC’s Treasurer General, Matthews Phosa, is the University Council’s chairperson.

The Zuma style in his selection of government is to build broad alliances, struck compromises, follow a consultative approach but emphasises his independence in decision-making. It often produces ostensibly contradictory results. For instance, he urged Mbeki’s Director General, Frank Chikane, to continue in his post. When he retired he was succeeded by Vusi Mavimbela, Deputy President Mbeki’s political advisor and later his Director General of National Intelligence. At the same time Pres. Zuma appointed Vusi Mona as his director of communications. A disgraced former City Press editor, he published the report in which the former National Director of Public Prosecutions, Bulelani Ngcuka, was accused of spying for the government. In the same presidential team, he appointed former Mbeki Minister of Safety and Security, Charles Nqakula, as one of his personal advisors. The pattern is therefore somewhat distorted.

Other senior appointments within the 100 days include SARS Commissioner, former COSATU trade unionist Oupa Magashule, SAPS Commissioner Bheki Cele, Reserve Bank governor Gill Marcus and nominated Chief Justice Sandile Ngcobo. More than an ideological bias, many of these appointees have a regional association. For example, Police Minister Mthethwa, Commissioner Cele and Mr Justice Ngcobo all originate from KwaZulu-Natal.

The appointments of new ambassadors also provide insight into the Zuma style of government. Former Mbeki ministers excluded from the new Zuma cabinet, like Zola Skweyiya, Ngconde Balfour and Pallo Jordan, were given very senior postings as ambassadors. (Jordan’s posting to the UN is not yet finalised.) Moreover, the former DA leader and Mbeki’s nemesis, Tony Leon, also received a posting. (His followed on earlier appointments of DA leaders Douglas Gibson (Thailand), Sandra Botha (Czech Republic) and Sheila Camerer (Bulgaria). Even more unexpected, was appointment of the leader of the Freedom Front Plus, Pieter Mulder, as Deputy Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries.

Pres. Zuma’s approach in all these appointments is ostensibly based on three considerations: 1) it should not be seen as a purge of Mbeki appointees, and that it should demonstrate continuity in government; 2) a broad alliance should emerge that includes also opposition leaders, and that follows the Mandela approach of nation-building and reconciliation, and 3) not to leave any ANC person in the cold and for them to be recruited by COPE. A good example of the latter is how he incorporated Mbeki premiers (Thabang Makwetla, Dipuo Peters and Edna Molewa) in his cabinet though they were not anymore accepted by the Zuma supporters in their provinces.

4) WHO CONTROLS GOVERNMENT?

Commentators and opposition politicians often claim that the Zuma government is controlled from outside, either by the Left or by the ANC’s Luthuli House. It applies to both decision- making and monitoring of government activities.

In the period between Polokwane (December 2007) and Mbeki’s resignation (September 2008) and thereafter Motlanthe’s interregnum until April 2009, Luthuli House and the ANC leadership tried to establish their control over the government or at least acted more assertively as a watchdog. During the first months after the election the same trend was still visible but it is slowly dissipating. Extensive overlap between the ANC-as-government and ANC-as-organisation after the general election will inevitably cause a readjustment in their relationship. Luthuli House is institutionally in a much weaker position than government. For at least the past five years it has tried to develop an autonomous policy capacity in the form of a policy institution. Polokwane reaffirmed it in a resolution. However, the ANC-as-organisation finds it difficult to compete with the capacity of government departments. Hence, the NEC Policy Committee chaired by Minister Jeff Radebe, and the sectoral committees are only prominent at the times of a National Conference or elections.

A relatively lonely voice in pursuit of ANC supremacy is Youth League President, Julius Malema. As an ex officio member of the NEC and NWC he occupies an influential position. He has been immensely influential in the elections at Polokwane but since the Motlanthe Presidency, and especially since the Zuma Presidency, it is increasingly clear that his influence in policy- making and other forms of decision-making is relatively limited. His latest remark about the dominance of the economic cluster by “minorities” and not by black Africans, has become a test of his influence. It is a direct challenge to Pres. Zuma’s choice of appointments. Gwede Mantashe responded critically to Malema as a deviation from the ANC’s non-racial character. Recent revelations of financial mismanagement in the ANC Youth League also undermined Malema’s moral authority in the ANC.

A prominent feature of the Zuma administration has been its adherence to the Polokwane resolutions: their focus on five priority policy areas in the election, restructuring and name changes in the government structure, and establishment of the National Planning Commission. Those were decisions taken in 2007 and not in 2009. Pres. Zuma emphasised it in his response to the debate on the Presidency budget vote when he said that “the resolutions of the ANC conference in Polokwane in 2007, later refined in our election Manifesto, form the basis of the policies and programmes of this government”. The influence of the Left in them was minimal. Most of the Polokwane resolutions were prepared at the National Policy Conference in July 2007, when the Mbeki administration was still intact.

We can now focus specifically on the policies of the new government. An overall feature is Pres. Zuma’s insistence on policy continuity. It created on internal tension between his government’s and his own objective to distinguish himself from the Mbeki era in terms of style of government and policy substance, but at the same time maintaining policy stability and predictability. Zuma’s insistence on continuity has therefore caused several differences with COSATU, even before the election. The Polokwane resolutions, followed by the ANC election manifesto, reduced the priority policy areas from Mbeki’s twenty-four apex priorities, to five: health, job creation and economic development, crime and corruption, education, and rural development, food security and land reform.

Macro-economic policy is arguably the most contested policy area. Already in the early 2000s the concept of a “developmental state” emerged as an alternative paradigm for GEAR. Polokwane continued to develop it further. Possibly the most contested aspect of the economic domain appears to be monetary policy, and especially inflation targeting within a sphere of 3-6% CPIX. COSATU targeted the Reserve Bank governor, Tito Mboweni, as the main obstacle to a more humane monetary policy with a developmental orientation. His resignation and replacement by Gill Marcus (at the end of the year) is presented as a public victory for COSATU. However, if inflation targeting as a policy is considered, it is clear that Mboweni’s increases in the repo (interest) rate have had a major negative impact on the South African economy, because it did not reduce inflation but reduced economic growth. In 2009 he abandoned the approach and started reducing the interest rate while the CPIX remained above the 6% threshold. Strict adherence to the policy is therefore not present. More important for Mboweni’s disqualification was his style of decision-making that included little consultation. Marcus’s popularity with COSATU is not so much based on expected policy changes but on her more consultative style.

Still an unclear aspect of the Zuma dispensation is the relationship between the Department of Trade and Industry, the new Department of Economic Development (Ebrahim Patel) and the new National Planning Commission. Minister Trevor Manuel announced earlier that two Green Papers will be published at the end of August 2009 to clarify it. The most serious challenge for the Commission and the new Department is to avoid duplication with the line-function departments and therefore “turf wars” with them. The demise of the RDP Office under Jay Naidoo is a stark reminder of these challenges.

A policy area in which Pres. Zuma had to assert his authority already at an early stage, is judicial policy. On the one hand, the Polokwane leadership insists on transformation in the judiciary and it created fertile ground for Judge President Hlophe to attach his personal aspirations to this objective as a vehicle for his promotion. It poses the biggest challenge for the Zuma leadership in the judicial domain. The Hlophe case is a complex mixture of personal alignment to the Polokwane leadership, with claims that judicial independence and judicial transformation should be promoted, while a strategy of internal challenges to key judicial institutions is also included. Both the Constitutional Court and the Judicial Service Commission have been negatively affected by the Hlophe case. Pres. Zuma’s intervention at a major judicial conference to reaffirm his trust in the judiciary and the importance of judicial independence was necessary as a clarification of his personal stance. Appointment of new Constitutional Court judges and the Chief Justice, dominated by narrow interpretations of transformation, continue to keep the judiciary in suspense.

The judiciary is a highly contested terrain for two reasons. Firstly, a widely held perception exists that the courts were used (and they complied with it) by former Pres. Mbeki against . Their complicity therefore motivates a response from the Zuma leadership. In abstract terms (and not really explaining the practical implications), the sentiment is that the judiciary must be changed, implying that any potential opposition against Pres. Zuma and residual Mbeki support in the judiciary have to be removed. Secondly, a debate not related to the first point and already started in the Mbeki period, is how the judiciary can be a vehicle for social transformation. The one side in the debate wants an activist judiciary; the other side wants a positivist, interpreting judiciary.

Foreign policy and relations are an important policy area, because of its prominence in the Mbeki years. It is arguably the policy area in which the Zuma government has lost most capacity in comparison with the Mbeki government. The Mbeki – Aziz Pahad policy axis has no yet found a successor. The institutional memory so vitally important for diplomacy is almost lost, because of Minister Dlamini-Zuma’s lateral movement. The main remnant of such capacity is the Director General, Ayanda Ntsaluba. Clear indications are that the Zuma policy approach will be characterised by continuity (meaning, continuity with the Mbeki agenda, especially in Africa). However, the ‘big ideas’ of Mbeki (African renaissance, African century, NEPAD, South-South dialogue, etc) are absent and instead a more pragmatic and reactive, instead of proactive, policy approach appears to be implemented. Incidentally, a similar situation exists in the other African power, Nigeria, after Pres. Obasanjo’s departure, which means that Africa as a continent does not have the same leadership to shape debates in the G8, G77, UN and other fora. The crisis in the Southern African Custom Union and the fact that Mozambique took the lead as mediator in the Madagascar dispute, are all indications of South Africa’s decrease prominence. Pres. Zuma does not have a natural inclination towards international diplomacy. His experience of mediation in Burundi was to resolve an internal conflict and was not about inter-state relations or diplomacy. Deputy President Motlanthe used SADC rather frequently during his Presidency, and he might emerge as the most senior official providing direction in international relations. The re-appointed Director General, who is considered as a competent decision-maker and with a wealth of experience, might also become more prominent now that uncertainty about his future has been resolved.

Areas of possible change are firstly South Africa’s bilateral relations with Angola. During the Mandela and Mbeki years it has never been warm. Pres. Dos Santos has not yet come to South Africa on a state visit. Pres. Zuma, on the other hand, introduced a much closer relationship with Angola. In 2008 he led the ANC delegation to Cuito Canavale for the 20th anniversary of the battle there. South Africa’s relationship with China will be in the spotlight in the coming years. It has been exceptionally close during the Mbeki years, possibly because he looked at China as one of the main financiers of NEPAD. However, emerging political liabilities such as the Chinese involvement in the Darfur crisis, international sympathy with Tibet, and Chinese military links with the Mugabe regime, complicate relations with China. The Chinese communist party plays an important role to maintain very close links with the ANC and SACP on party-party level. South Africa’s relations with the USA since 2009 will become also a feature of the Zuma government. Concurrent changes in leadership in both states, and Pres. Obama’s symbolic outreach to Africa, in which South Africa is perceived as a key role player, means that SA-US relations will most probably increase substantially.

In the area of policy and governing the national Parliament has assumed more prominence since Polokwane. Parliamentary committees, like the portfolio committee on communication (regarding the SABC) and the Select Committee on Public Accounts (regarding officials with business interests which caused conflicts of interest, and other matters) are more assertive and independent, and demand more executive accountability. Pres. Zuma is also more involved in Parliament than his predecessor, attending sessions and answering parliamentary questions. Parliament is one area in which an “Mbeki purge” was staged: the Speaker and Deputy, Chairperson of Committees, Chief Whip and deputies, and the ANC caucus chairperson were all replaced. Only the chairperson of the NCOP, the former Speaker Gwen Mahlangu-Nkabinde (as new Deputy Minister of Economic Development, which is a demotion in status) and the former Deputy Whip, Andries Nel (as new Deputy Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development) survived it.

Little has been said so far about the impact of the global economic crisis on Zuma policies. Apart from its quantifiable impact, such as job losses, its impact on South African society is still elusive, and many opinions are that it will be mitigated by the state projects for the World Cup. The government has not yet changed any significant policies in response to the crisis but instead, has responded with technical teams to attend to priority areas. Accordingly, in policy terms, very little has been done so far. Whether it is the most appropriate approach, will only become clearer towards the end of 2010. We shall continue with this topic in the next section.

Finally, a brief summary of some of the successes and failures in the first 100 days can be done.

5) SUCCESSES AND FAILURES

The most significant failure of the Zuma government in its first period has been the local demonstrations (not the industrial strikes) which indicated local disenchantment with the quality of government and the failed expectations after the general election. The government’s response to the demonstrations looked uncertain and initially vilified the grievances by reducing them to security matters (unacceptable conflict promoted by sinister forces). Pres. Zuma maintained an exceptionally low profile in the situation and did not provide visible leadership from the start. Tokyo Sexwale’s approach to blame the Mbeki government for the problems undermined the Zuma government’s moral claim that is a hands-on government that will confront the problems without any hesitation. A more assertive response came from the government later on 13 August at a meeting of premiers and mayors. Zuma observed that “while the reasons for protests differ from place to place, they all point to shortcomings in the way that government relates to people whether at local, provincial or national level”.

Pres. Zuma’s first ‘State of the Nation’ address received a good response from most parties. However, some of his short-term targets have become unrealistic, such as the 500 000 new jobs in the first six months. Government announced the Medium Term Strategic Framework (2009- 2014) in the meantime, but it has not received much public exposure and does not yet counter the public perception about the artificial expectations created by the State of the Nation address. Similarly, government is not seen as sufficiently pro-active in the current economic crisis. It allowed unemployment to increase by more than 500 000. The commodities sector and the motor industry are directly affected by the crisis. Over-reliance on the 2010 package might also be misplaced.

At the diplomatic level the manner in which the Sudanese President’s indictment by the International Criminal Court was handled by the South African government, raised serious concerns. South Africa is a signatory to the Court’s Rome Statute and it has been incorporated in South African municipal law in 2002. Pres. Al-Bashir’s absence from Pres. Zuma’s inauguration was an appropriate approach. However, when the matter reached the AU summit in Sirte, South Africa supported the decision that African states would not assist the Court in the matter. If defies the Court’s authority and South African law, which undermines South Africa’s international stature on human rights and international humanitarian law. It is understood that the South African delegation at the preparatory meetings for the Sirte summit adopted a different stance and was supported by about six other African states. The matter becomes more confused if it is taken into account that after Sirte DICO’s Director General, Ayanda Ntsaluba, contradicted the decision by stating on South African television that South Africa has the legal obligation to honour the indictment. In a public statement on 15 July a wide range of organisations and prominent persons have criticised the government’s support for the AU resolution, including the SA Human Rights Commission, Judge Richard Goldstone, Lawyers for Human Rights and the Centre for Applied Legal Studies.

Finally, the Zuma leadership is still unable to resolve the internal, ANC struggles in the Western Cape and North West.

Pres. Zuma managed to be highly successful in removing his personal matters from the public agenda. Questions about his stature as leader and his moral authority to address ethical issues have more or less disappeared from the public domain. The cartoonist Zapiro has “suspended” his criticism of Zuma. Retired archbishop Desmond Tutu also insists on time for Pres. Zuma to demonstrate his presidential abilities. It can be argued that Pres. Zuma even recovered some moral ground. Continuously he denounces corruption, abuse of official positions and bad service. Exorbitant use of allowances, such as car allowances, has become an Achille’s heel for the Zuma administration, while Pres. Zuma maintains some ambivalence on it. Senior officials suspected of maladministration or corruption, were placed on special leave. The signals are not always unambiguous, but are better than expected by most.

The person of Pres. Zuma was an important factor in the April general elections. For COPE the common denominator was its anti-Zuma stance similar to the MDC’s against Mugabe in earlier years. At the end of the election campaign the DA followed suit. Even a moderately successful Zuma administration poses a real threat to COPE’s coherence, hence its latest efforts to define its own ideology and identity. Part of COPE’s current internal tensions is a result of Pres. Zuma’s relative successes.

CONCLUSION

The first 100 days of the Zuma government revealed a number of important indicators. Pres. Zuma is a populist at the rhetorical level but not in government and policy-making. The rhetoric concentrates on change and transformation but his policies concentrate on continuity. His style and organisation of government is modelled on the Mandela example. Pres. Zuma is strong on style and form, but less on content and substance. This approach has two implications: firstly, he is not a “Man of Ideas” like Mbeki. He, therefore does not come with new blueprints or policy plans but rely on new procedures and institutions (like the National Planning Commission) to assist him. In the absence of new policy initiatives there is little space for the Left to be involved in policy changes. Secondly, because the Zuma government is not characterised by policy innovation they might miss new opportunities and entrench Mbeki-era problems, especially in the informal economy. Deputy President Motlanthe appears to take responsibility for the informal economy; the same as Zuma did in 2005 before his dismissal as Deputy President.